Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

15 August 2001
1. **Scope**

   This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for the planning and execution of foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

2. **Purpose**

   This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and specifies doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. **Application**

   a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

   b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

S. A. FRY  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director, Joint Staff
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Defines Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations
• Covers Laws, Policy, Roles, Responsibilities, and Interagency Coordination
• Provides Guidelines for Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination
• Describes Planning, Execution, and Training Considerations

General

The purpose of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of property. It is sometimes in the best interests of the United States and its allies to deploy US forces to provide humanitarian assistance (HA) to those in need. In addition, humanitarian and political considerations are likely to make HA operations commonplace in the years ahead. US forces are uniquely equipped and structured to provide a rapid and capable response when such missions arise. However, US military forces are not the primary US Government (USG) means of providing FHA. Ultimately, military participation in FHA normally only supplements the activities of US and foreign civil authorities as well as private organizations.

Types of Operations

Military forces may assist with relief, dislocated civilian support (refugees, displaced or stateless persons, evacuees, and other victims of conflict or manmade or natural disaster), and security or technical assistance. The latter might include such short-term tasks as communications restoration, relief supply management, provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining assistance, and high priority relief supply delivery. The US military may provide humanitarian demining training and technical education programs to develop long-term indigenous assistance capabilities.

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is a type of military operation other than war conducted outside the United States and its territories and possessions.

US military forces participate in FHA operations that may be unilateral, multinational, or United Nations coordinated responses.
demining capabilities, as well as mine awareness programs to educate the local populace on the danger of landmines. HA programs carried out on a regular basis by the Department of Defense (DOD) include the **Excess Property Program** (title 10, United States Code (USC), section 2547), which makes available nonlethal DOD property; the Humanitarian Assistance Program (title 10, USC, section 2561), which authorizes transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies as well as disaster relief training and assessments, small scale construction, and other humanitarian purposes worldwide; the **Denton Space Available Transportation Program** (title 10, USC, section 402), which allows for military transport of privately donated humanitarian cargo; and the **Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program** (title 10, USC, section 401), which provides medical, dental, and veterinary care, construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, well drilling and construction, and repair of public facilities. HA provided under HCA must be in conjunction with exercises or other military operations, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefits.

Often, FHA operations are conducted simultaneously with other types of operations, such as peace operations, nation assistance, or noncombatant evacuation operations. Funding and legal authority for FHA will in nearly every case be a major concern for commanders, along with the conditions and standards of the end state and transition and termination of the operations. Caution in avoiding overcommitment to programs of a long duration, such as nation assistance, with these shorter term FHA efforts is necessary. **The environment of operations may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile**, thus requiring attention to the principles of war as well as those of military operations other than war. Regardless of the environment, commanders at all levels will institute force protection measures that ensure the safety and security of DOD personnel. In summary, DOD HA operations may consist of ongoing, deliberate small-scale programs or contingency operations in response to natural disasters or complex humanitarian crises; these may range from small-scale to joint task force (JTF)-scale responses.

**Organization and Coordination**

In an FHA operation, interagency coordination is often highly complex. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead federal agency for US FHA. FHA, the focus of this publication, is coordinated by USAID’s Bureau
for Humanitarian Response and its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Its responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the total USG FHA response, performing needs assessment, and initiating necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation. OFDA funds relief activities of some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and United Nations (UN) agencies, and has authority to coordinate directly with the Department of Defense for provision of defense equipment or transportation. OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART), which provides the initial assessment of the situation and specialists to assist with the management of the USG response. OFDA may provide a liaison officer to the military in order to facilitate coordination between OFDA and the Department of Defense and act as an advisor. The US Ambassador oversees all US humanitarian activities within the host nation.

A combatant commander may establish an HA coordination center to assist with early interagency coordination and planning and to provide a link between the command and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies that may be participating in the operation at the theater strategic level. The combatant commander may also organize and deploy a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to acquire information required for operation plan development such as an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for HA force structure. The humanitarian operations center (HOC), normally established by the UN or a relief agency, coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, the UN, and IOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to a JTF through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) in cases where these organizations have been established. The HOC is primarily an interagency policymaking and coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve unity of effort.

The joint task force commander may establish a civil-military operations center to conduct coordination with civilian organizations.

The CMOC, working closely with the OFDA DART, provides the primary interface between US military forces and relief agencies and other organizations involved in the operations, whether or not a HOC is established. The CMOC monitors military support, and responds to security and technical support requirements by identifying support resources and forwarding validated requests to them. The CMOC is one tool for commanders to use in promoting unity of effort with other agencies. Others include symposia,
meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions. A clear understanding of the legality, nature, and amount of support and a cautious approach to requests for support will be important. **Successful HA commanders will respect different agency cultures, while still striving for unity of effort.**

Ensuring agreements and memoranda of understanding that fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels will promote effective relationships. **Exchange of operating procedures and capabilities** and **sharing logistic databases** such as Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System and Commodity Tracking System will also contribute to unity of effort.

**Planning and Training**

The planning process involves a detailed situation assessment of the political, cultural, economic, military, geographic and health factors in the crisis area. Information will derive from the US Country Team, OFDA, HAST, relief organizations, intelligence sources, and special operations forces and will include an assessment of any threat in the area, other organizations operating there, and the underlying causes of the crisis. The combatant commander will then address the force structure for the operation and develop a military mission statement and the concept of the operation. **A JTF may be established for an FHA mission.** Because of the nature of this mission, combat support and combat service support forces (i.e., engineers, logistics, transportation, medical) will often serve more prominent roles than combat elements in the JTF. It should be noted that the National Guard and Reserve Components may provide assets and personnel across the spectrum of requirements such as logistics. Also the JTF may require a more than usual complement of legal, security, engineering, public affairs, psychological operations, health services, civil affairs, and logistic personnel, and may employ special organizations such as a **multinational force support team** when multinational forces are involved. Special considerations will include structures such as a CMOC or HOC or the division of the FHA area in sectors, because of ethnic, tribal, religious, organizational, or political boundaries.
Command and control in FHA is complicated by the need for cooperation between other governmental and nongovernmental agencies and the US military.

The presence of numerous agencies in the area will require more than usual reliance on commercial communications to facilitate coordination as well as close attention to communications security, frequency management, and interoperability. Force protection and security in FHA will remain a high priority. Rules of engagement (ROE) for the unique circumstances of FHA will also be required, based on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing rules of engagement. Legal considerations will include ROE, fiscal law, memoranda of understanding between military forces and others, status-of-forces agreements, and laws concerning displaced persons and refugees. As with most operations, public affairs activities will be important as well as commanders’ responsibilities for internal information programs and other troop support considerations. Continuous situation assessment in regard to commanders’ intent and mission accomplishment, employment of measures of effectiveness, and criteria for mission transition or termination will also be important. Transition and termination will require close coordination with all concerned and may be organized by military functions, while remaining understandable to nonmilitary agencies. DOD support to foreign consequence management operations is concerned primarily with specialized assistance provided in support of Department of State, the lead Federal agency, in response to the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high yield explosive weapons of mass destruction against an ally, regional friend, or a vital interest of the United States. Training for FHA will include both mission-specific predeployment, sustainment, and post-mission training as well as routine training, concentration on ROE, force protection, populace control, coordination with nonmilitary entities, legal and media aspects, and regional or country orientation. Situation training exercises have proven most useful in past operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the planning and execution of FHA operations. This publication describes various types of FHA operations, discusses organization and interagency coordination, and reviews JTF-level organization and coordination. This publication also provides guidelines for planning, execution, and training.
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1. General

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is a type of military operation other than war (MOOTW), as outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

a. **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.** This publication describes FHA as programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are conducted outside the United States, its territories and possessions. Although US military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend the United States, generally military resources can be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness enables commanders to rapidly and effectively respond when time is at a premium. However, US military forces are not the primary US Government (USG) means of providing FHA. Ultimately, military participation in FHA normally only supplements the activities of US and foreign civil authorities and private organizations.
b. Historical Perspective. The US military has played a major role in providing FHA. Some of the many examples of military support to FHA include: the meningitis vaccination campaign in Cameroon (1991); assistance to Bangladesh following a typhoon that killed 139,000 people (Operation SEA ANGEL, 1991); construction and operation of refugee camps and feeding of Kurds in Iraq (Operations PROVIDE COMFORT I and II, 1991-); delivery of relief supplies to states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, including Russia; medical support in Bosnia; delivery and security of relief supplies to Somalia, Ethiopia, and the former Yugoslavia; support to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda (Operation SUPPORT HOPE, 1994); support during the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and Albania (Operation SHINING HOPE, 1999); and flood relief and medical assistance in Maputo, Mozambique (Operation ATLAS RESPONSE, 2000).

c. United States Public Law. Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is contained in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, in title 10 of the US Code (USC). These statutes authorize assistance in order to:

• Preserve life and minimize suffering by providing warning of natural events that often result in disaster;

• Preserve life and minimize suffering by responding to man-made disasters;

• Foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness;

• Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, adequate response to aid requests; and

• Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR) in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has primary responsibility for the US response in FHA operations.

d. Related Terminology. US military forces will rarely undertake an FHA operation without coordination with many other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental. This coordination is discussed in detail in JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. The following terms and descriptions are important to form a basis for understanding FHA operations.

• Interagency Coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense (DOD) involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and other government agencies (OGA), elements of the United Nations (UN), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) is for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

• Nongovernmental Organizations. Transnational or national organizations of private citizens that often maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance (HA) activities (development and relief).

• International Organizations. Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Red Cross (IRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and UN agencies.
Unified Action. Unified action encompasses the wide scope of activities taking place in unified commands, subunified commands, and joint task forces (JTFs) under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Unified action integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations into the overall operation in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, multinational, or UN operations, into a unity of effort within the theater. Unified military action further supports the national unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of policy as they apply within the theater.

2. Policy

a. DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, dated 4 December 1975, establishes policy guidance for FHA operations. It is applicable to all Executive Branch components that are directly or indirectly responsible to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, defines FHA as prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. NOTE: Although DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, calls these activities “foreign disaster relief,” the equivalent term of “foreign humanitarian assistance” is used throughout this publication. As shown in Figure I-1, normally FHA includes humanitarian services and transportation, to include provision of food and water, clothing, beds and bedding, temporary shelter and housing, medical material, medical and technical services, and essential service restoration. Foreign disasters may result from acts of nature (such as flood, drought, hurricane, fire, earthquake, and volcanic eruptions) or acts of man (such as civil violence and nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) accidents). DOD policy permits military components to participate in FHA operations in response to these disasters only at the direction of the President, upon request from the Department of State (DOS), and in emergency situations in order to save lives. Sections 401, 402, 2547, and 2561 of title 10, USC, selected provisions of the FAA, and the Annual DOD Appropriation Act extend to DOD the authority and funding to donate and transport humanitarian relief supplies, and conduct FHA operations worldwide.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, dated 30 June 1998, establishes guidance for foreign consequence management (CM) operations. It is applicable to all DOD activities tasked with planning for, supporting, or executing foreign CM operations. DOD support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance in response to use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against US forces, allies, or vital interests. Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign WMD incident resides with the HN government. The DOS is designated as the lead Federal agency (LFA) for foreign CM operations in support of a foreign government. All DOD support will be coordinated through the responsible Chief of Mission (COM) and Country Team. Once beyond any immediate lifesaving response, the combatant commander must seek National Command Authorities (NCA) approval to conduct a foreign CM mission.

3. Types of Missions

FHA missions conducted by US military forces fall under the umbrella of MOOTW. A single FHA operation may well contain
more than one of these missions. The following missions are common in FHA operations.

a. Relief Missions. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims (DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief). Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the domain of the UN, NGOs, and IOs, because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, when the relief community is overwhelmed, US military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for US forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care.

b. Dislocated Civilian Support Missions. Dislocated civilian support missions include camp organization, basic construction, and administration; provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). The first priority for the management of dislocated civilians should be to utilize the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination can be effected. This allows the force to concentrate its resources on other FHA efforts. Dislocated civilian operations are often long-term and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD sources. “Dislocated civilian” is a generic term that includes refugees, stateless persons, evacuees, expellees, and displaced persons. These
persons may be victims of conflict or natural disaster. Other related terms are “migrant” and “internally displaced persons.” Dislocated civilian support missions are specific humanitarian missions designed to support the resettlement of these persons. The following distinctions exist among these various terms.

- **Refugees** are any persons who, by reason of real or imagined danger, have left their home country or country of their nationality and are unwilling or unable to return. **Displaced persons** are civilians who are involuntarily outside the national boundaries of their country. This may be due to natural or man-made disasters or other reasons not associated with persecution. It is important to understand the difference between these two designations because of associated legal ramifications. Refugees are entitled to special protection because they can no longer avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality. (The DOS provides guidance as to what groups of people are classified as refugees. This description is provided as general guidance.) DOD personnel should request specific DOS guidance when involved in operations that require the classification of groups of displaced persons.

- A distinction also exists between migrants and refugees. **Migrants** are persons who leave their homes temporarily or permanently for economic reasons. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.

- **Stateless persons** are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.

- **Evacuees** are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by civil or military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.

- An **internally displaced person** is any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country.
c. Security Missions. These missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. The delivery of humanitarian relief supplies often depends on the affected country having secure and serviceable ports and air terminals. In some cases, however, the affected country will not be able to meet this condition, and US military forces may be called upon to do so. Once the lift commences, secure areas will be needed for storage of relief material until it can be distributed to the affected population. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for dislocated civilians, and guaranteeing conditions of temporary refuge for threatened persons.

d. Technical Assistance and Support Functions. An FHA force may support short-term tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply management, provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high priority relief supply delivery. This technical assistance may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment. Other than for force protection and immediate mission accomplishment, humanitarian demining is limited to technical education and training. US forces should not physically take part in the removal of mines unless further directed by competent authority. Based upon NCA and combatant commander guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, UN, NGOs, and IOs as soon as possible. The technical assistance policy should clarify what assistance may be provided as well as the source of authority for assistance. For example, the Air Force flies relief missions in support of FHA. The US Navy provides technical service when it uses its vessels to move displaced civilians to temporary safety and to rescue fleeing civilians or victims of shipwrecks and storms.

Further information regarding the DOD Humanitarian Demining Program is found in Appendix D, “Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs.”

e. Consequence Management Operations. CM operations mitigate the results of intentional or inadvertent release of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materials or high yield explosives (CBRNEs). These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works, fire fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential and/or routine health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. In the context of this publication these terms apply to incidents involving CBRNE incidents and/or their contaminants outside the territorial limits of the United States, its territories, and possessions.

4. Related Operations

FHA operations may be concurrently conducted with other military operations. FHA assistance in areas of political instability and conflict may be unilateral or multinational in nature. Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type has unique characteristics. For example, an FHA operation may be concurrently conducted with a peace operation, but each has its own end state and transition or termination objectives. Nation assistance operations are also often connected with military FHA operations, but there are very distinct differences. Some nation assistance is inherent in FHA operations when the infrastructure has been
damaged to the extent that operations cannot proceed until basic repairs have been completed. However, nation assistance generally refers to a long-term commitment to increase the effectiveness of the HN’s infrastructure, government, military capacity, and economy. The noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is an example of an operation that may be conducted while FHA operations are ongoing. NEOs are of relatively short duration and involve the evacuation to safe havens or to the United States of official or private American citizens, as well as certain host-country and third-country nationals, from foreign countries when their lives and safety are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. The FHA operation may also involve crisis management, which is a response under the primary jurisdiction of the federal government or HN involving measures to resolve, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal, national, or international law. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA concurrently with other operations must both develop end state, transition, and termination objectives as well as develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that are complementary to other concurrent military operations.

5. Operational Contexts

US military forces participate in FHA operations that may be either unilateral or multinational coordinated responses. Multinational responses may or may not involve the UN.

a. Unilateral. In this type of operation, the USG provides FHA without direct involvement by other nations other than the HN. A unilateral response would normally occur when expediency is essential, such as when a humanitarian crisis or disaster demands an immediate response. A unilateral effort may transition to a multinational operation.

b. Multinational. This type of operation involves military forces and civilian agencies from more than one nation. Three command and control (C2) options exist for multinational forces: lead nation, parallel, and regional alliances. Lead nation option describes the option of placing multinational partners’ forces under the control of a single nation’s military commander. The parallel option allows multinational partners to retain greater control of respective forces. Under the regional alliance option, existing alliances may serve as a basis for FHA force C2.

6. Complex Contingency Operations

a. In 1997, the USG initiated a process to integrate the political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other dimensions of USG planning for complex contingencies.

b. The USG defines complex contingency operations as peace operations such as: the peace accord implementation operation conducted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Bosnia (1995-present); the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq...

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, and JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provide detailed discussions of multinational operations and possible C2 structures.

c. Coordinated by the United Nations. Responses coordinated by the UN are those specifically organized and executed by UN forces. UN activities include not only coordination of certain FHA operations but, in some cases, the commitment of dedicated UN (blue helmet) forces.
called Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991); and FHA operations such as Operation SUPPORT HOPE in central Africa (1994) and Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise directed, the term, “complex contingency operations,” does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to a relatively routine or small-scale operation, nor to military operations conducted in defense of US citizens, territory, or property, including counterterrorism, hostage-rescue operations, and foreign internal armed conflict. In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency operations in coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in ad hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states.

Chapter I

c. Integrated planning for USG involvement in “complex contingency operations,” should enhance military and civilian agencies operating in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management at the strategic level and using special mechanisms, most notably a political-military (POL-MIL) plan to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early in an operation can provide an interagency framework at the national strategic level for follow-on theater and operational level planning; avoid delays; reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways; and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission. The broad outlines of that USG planning process follows.

• The Deputies Committee establishes appropriate policy coordinating committees (PCCs) to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations. The oversight of ongoing operations will be performed by the appropriate regional PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.

• In future complex contingency operations to which the United States plans to contribute substantial resources, the PCC for Contingency Planning will develop a POL-MIL plan as its integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions. The POL-MIL plan will include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired end state. It will outline an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts. The plan will identify the primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation (e.g., congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination). It also will address major functional tasks (e.g., political mediation and/or reconciliation, military support, demobilization, HA, police reform, basic public service, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information).

• When the Deputies Committee tasks the executive committee (ExCom) to develop a POL-MIL plan, it will also assign specific responsibilities to the appropriate ExCom officials. Each ExCom official will be required to develop their respective part of the plan, which will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This development process will be transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being posed to senior policymakers for resolution. Based on the resulting
Introduction to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations

decisions, the plan will be finalized and widely distributed among relevant agencies. The POL-MIL plan should include demonstrable milestones and measures of success, to include detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities that might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government. The POL-MIL plan should be updated as the mission progresses to reflect milestones that are or are not met and to incorporate changes in the situation on the ground. When a POL-MIL plan is developed and adopted by the Deputies Committee, it provides a valuable instrument for achieving unity of effort among the USG agencies involved in a complex contingency operation. However, this plan does not obviate or preclude follow-on and the publication of appropriate operations orders that provide a degree of detail and specificity that a POL-MIL plan cannot provide. In particular, a joint force commander (JFC) may use the POL-MIL plan to develop the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations portions of his or her plan or order.

8. Mission Transition or Termination

a. Three of the most critical functions that a JFC must accomplish early in the planning process (based upon the combatant commander’s intent) are to ascertain and articulate:

   • a clearly identifiable end state;
   
   • transition or termination criteria for the operation; and
   
   • relationship with or impact on other concurrent operations.

b. Conditions and standards for end state, transition, or termination objectives should be based on guidance from the appropriate USG entity. The end state should complement the political agenda. Early in the planning process, the JFC should coordinate directly with all agencies and organizations involved in the FHA operation to develop a detailed transition plan and assign specific responsibilities. Failure to do so may significantly impact the success of the FHA effort. Commanders are cautioned that the desired end state conditions could change during the operations and that the end state envisioned by other participating organizations may differ.

Chapter IV, “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning and Execution,” provides more detail regarding mission transition and termination.

7. Operational Environments

The operational environment has an impact on the conduct of FHA operations, to include selection of forces and possible changes to the rules of engagement (ROE) for the mission. As shown in Figure I-2, military forces and OGA can expect to encounter three types of operational environments when providing FHA: permissive, uncertain, and hostile. Regardless of the environment, commanders at all levels will institute force protection measures that ensure the safety and security of DOD personnel.

ROE changes are further discussed in Chapter IV, “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Planning and Execution.”
Chapter I

9. Funding

The financial impacts of an FHA operation are a major concern of the JFC. Planning for FHA operations must take into account the legal authority, authority limits, and mechanisms that allow US forces to dispense supplies and services. It is important that the JFC coordinate expenditures with the appropriate agency prior to funds being expended, or reimbursement may be denied. Detailed records of expenditures are critical to the reimbursement process.

Appendix C, “Department of Defense Foreign Disaster Assistance Tasking and Funding Procedures,” provides more information regarding DOD foreign disaster tasking and funding procedures, and record keeping requirements.

10. Conclusion

The US military is often called on to participate in FHA operations. These operations, conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters outside the continental United States and its territories and possessions, require effective coordination not only within the military chain of command, but also with many other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Regardless of what type of environment and command structure exist, the FHA force commander must fully support interagency coordination. The commander must also ensure that FHA forces are not committed to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

“The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table.”
ADM P.D. Miller, USN
Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
1 Oct 1993 - 31 Oct 1994

1. Introduction

US military forces may plan and execute FHA operations at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels. The NCA provide guidance and objectives, then task a combatant commander to respond to the crisis. This combatant commander is identified as the supported commander within the context of unified action functions at the strategic level; provides strategic direction and operational focus to subordinates at the operational level; and synchronizes the military instrument of national power in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, other USG agencies, NGOs, and IOs toward theater strategic objectives. In an FHA operation, interagency coordination is essential for effective policy development and implementation. This coordination is often highly complex. This chapter provides information regarding interagency coordination, roles and responsibilities, and principal organizations. This information will assist JFCs and their staffs to understand these organizations and their responsibilities and relationships in FHA operations.

Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination,” addresses the joint task force level.

2. Overview

US authority for FHA operations begins with the NCA and continues through senior DOS and DOD representatives with cooperation from OGA. In UN-sponsored operations, command relationships may not be as clearly defined, and success depends heavily on effective, timely coordination. The challenge for US military planners is to determine the right place and time to access interagency and other coordination networks. Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, the UN, NGOs, and IOs share FHA responsibilities. US military FHA planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies usually fall outside the military “command and control” system. Cooperation and coordination are essential in dealing with these organizations. The strategic goals of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible. However, thorough coordination and planning with all concerned entities can contribute to successful operations in this complex and challenging environment. Military and civilian agencies should incorporate NCA policy and guidance into mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action (operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs) and, if required, campaign plans). The combatant commander has the critical task of developing the FHA military mission statement. This mission statement should be clear and identify results that are achievable in a short duration operation. Key considerations in developing the mission statement include the military role in assisting the UN, NGOs, and IOs, as well as security practices and policies. Interagency cooperation, coordination, and connectivity at all levels will better enable key organizations to orchestrate the
total FHA effort. Key organizations or elements may include the government of the affected country, DOS, Country Team, combatant commander, foreign military forces, the UN, NGOs, IOs, and USG agencies, particularly OFDA.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

The following entities are involved when conducting FHA operations.

a. National Command Authorities. The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly authorized alternates or successors, constitute the NCA. The NCA have the constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct FHA operations.

b. National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the principal forum that considers and discusses courses of action (COAs) regarding national security matters and makes subsequent recommendations to the President.

- The NSC is made up of four statutory members: the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisors to the NSC.
  - Secretary of Treasury; and
  - Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Advisor).

 c. Department of State. The US Ambassador to the affected nation is responsible for declaring the occurrence of a disaster or emergency in a foreign country that requires US FHA support. The Ambassador may declare a disaster based upon a request by the government of the affected country and consultation with and recommendations by the US Country Team. This declaration is sent to OFDA and the DOS via cable to begin possible USG assistance.

- Each Embassy or USAID Mission should have a mission disaster response officer (MDRO) responsible for disaster planning and management as well as maintenance of the Mission Disaster Response Plan. The MDRO, a member of the Country Team, serves as the focal point for USG agencies responding to a disaster. In some cases, the Ambassador may serve in this capacity.

- The DOS is organized into functional and regional bureaus. When a disaster is declared, the regional bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau. The bureaus of Population, Refugees, and Migration; International Organizations; Political Military Affairs; and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will also be involved in operational support (see Figure II-1 for DOS organization). The DOS may augment the PCC with expertise from the other cabinet level offices. Such augmentation is situation dependent and may play a major role in national strategic plan development.

- United States Agency for International Development. USAID, is a distinct agency that shares certain administrative functions with DOS, and reports to and is under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. USAID plays a major role in US foreign assistance.
policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. This agency administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and acts as the lead federal agency for US FHA. USAID manages a worldwide network of country programs for economic and policy reforms. These reforms are undertaken to generate sound economic growth, encourage political freedom and good governance, and invest in human resource development. USAID coordinates and executes foreign assistance on two levels: long-term developments and FHA. FHA is comprised of relief (actions having immediate impact on disaster victims), rehabilitation (actions restoring victims to self-sufficiency), and reconstruction (actions bringing the stricken population beyond immediate self-sufficiency) activities. FHA, the focus of this publication, is coordinated under the auspices of USAID’s BHR through OFDA, which is further discussed in paragraph 3d of this chapter. Additionally, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of BHR may also be present as part of the USAID structure deployed in a region emerging from such a disaster. The OTI acts as a bridge in the post-crisis development phase, and is addressed in paragraph 3e of this chapter. Figure II-2 depicts the organization of the BHR of USAID.

The USAID Administrator serves as the USG’s interagency coordinator for the disaster relief under the authority of Section 493 of the FAA of 1961, as amended, and through the 15 September 1993 NSC directive. The Administrator, as Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, conducts interagency coordination through a PCC. The Special Coordinator chairs the PCC, or co-chairs with a representative of the NSC.

A large segment of disaster relief is food aid, and the USG is the largest food aid donor in the world. USAID’s Office of Food for Peace is responsible for managing the USG’s food donations for disaster relief, channeling them through the World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs.

d. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. USAID administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and rehabilitation through OFDA. OFDA’s involvement in relief operations is triggered by the disaster declaration issued by the US Ambassador; it will normally respond only if the situation is beyond the affected country’s ability to respond and if the country desires US assistance.

• OFDA’s responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the total USG FHA response to a disaster, performing needs assessment, and initiating necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation. OFDA also funds selected relief activities performed by NGOs, UN agencies, and IOs outside the United States and its possessions and territories.

• OFDA has authority to coordinate directly with the Department of Defense for provision of defense equipment for the affected country or procurement of DOD transportation. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes relationships between the Department of Defense and OFDA and appoints the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance) as the primary DOD point of contact.

• OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the crisis area to assist coordination of the FHA effort. A DART provides specialists,
Figure II-1. United States Department of State
trained in a variety of relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US military when it is participating in FHA operations. The structure of a DART depends on the size, complexity, and location of the disaster, and the needs of the embassy or mission and the affected country.

The DART is discussed in greater detail in Appendix F, “Disaster Assistance Response Team.”

- OFDA’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assistance and Response (version 3) is a useful reference tool for personnel involved in FHA operations. It explains the DART structure and functions as well as information on transportation and communications specifications; food, water, and sanitation requirements; emergency health treatments; and shelter parameters.

  e. Office of Transition Initiatives. OTI, like OFDA, is part of USAID’s BHR. OTI is charged with managing USAID’s assistance to nations in the wake of political, social, and economic trauma resulting from manmade or natural disasters. Assistance to such nations supports indigenous efforts to make the transition from crisis to fundamental socio-political stability that may serve as the foundation for longer-term, sustainable
development efforts. **OTI acts as a bridge in the post-crisis development phase** by providing resources to encourage stability through decentralized initiatives in the field of local governance, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, conflict resolution, and administration of justice.

- **OTI operations are based on the premise that fast, direct, and overt political development assistance is needed as a catalyst to move countries beyond crisis toward stability.** Founded in 1994, OTI is operational around the world, working with local governments, NGOs, and IOs to deliver assistance in a rapid-response, decentralized manner. OTI may act directly or through a grant or cooperative agreement with an IO or NGO. OTI actively coordinates its activities with the government of the affected country, OFDA, USAID missions, US embassies, other donor countries, and deployed US military resources.

- **OTI’s role is to respond rapidly to potential crises and transition situations, with a particular focus on political development. ****OTI may deploy transition teams to a crisis area** to assist in the implementation and funding of start-up programs with USG entities, IOs, or NGOs in order to address (among other elements) critical governance needs, political institution building, establishment of rule of law, development of legal institutions, and support for processes of political and social reconciliation as well as civil society. The structure and size of a transition team is dependent on the size, complexity, and location of the transition situation. Once deployed, a transition team will coordinate closely with the US Embassy, the USAID Mission, the government of the affected country, and any NGOs, IOs, and civil affairs (CA) components of US military forces which may be present. Depending on the conditions in the operating area, OTI’s scope of work may include the following.

  - **Promotion of security initiatives** through programs such as: (1) Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (2) Reintegration planning for displaced and vulnerable populations; (3) Promotion of civil-military relations in conjunction with the Department of Defense and DOS; and (4) Planning of unexploded ordnance removal operations.

  - **Promotion of political development initiatives** through decentralized programs such as: (1) Training and capacity building of local officials; (2) Quick impact, community-based projects; (3) Promotion of conflict management through dialogue; and (4) Support for indigenous NGOs.

  - **Deployment of transition teams** to the field, which may work alongside special operations forces (SOF) (as was the case in Haiti in 1994-95) promoting political and security initiatives by: (1) Helping to initiate community development; (2) Funding appropriate projects; (3) Promoting participation of local populations; and (4) Facilitating transition from humanitarian to development activities.

  - **The Department of Defense.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing military policy for FHA operations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC) administers policy and statutory programs; policy oversight is executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance) (DASD(PK/HA)); program management and funding of
these programs is the responsibility of the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency. See Figure II-3 for Office of the Secretary of Defense organization.

g. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for recommending supported and supporting commands for FHA operations. The **Secretary of Defense** is responsible for designating these units. Once these relationships have been established, detailed staff planning and coordination will proceed. The **Joint Staff’s Director for Strategic Plans and Policy** has the primary responsibility for the concept review of OPLANs in support of FHA. The **Logistics Directorate (J-4)**, through the Logistics Readiness Center, oversees Service logistic support for FHA operations. The **Operations Directorate (J-3)** will also be involved when a military force is inserted into a foreign country as part of US humanitarian response.

h. **Combatant Commander.** The combatant commander establishes theater strategic objectives required to transform national strategic policy and guidance into operational level activities. Combatant commanders and their staff are critical in the formulation and execution of operations within that geographic area. The supported commander structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF. Advisors on the combatant commander’s staff will be in close communications with various advisors and counterparts on the JTF staff. One notable

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<th>OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION</th>
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<td>USD for Personnel &amp; Readiness <strong>USD Comptroller</strong> Deputy Comptroller</td>
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<td>ASD for International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD for Command, Control, Communications, &amp; Intelligence <strong>USD for Acquisition &amp;Technology</strong> PDUSD for Acquisition &amp;Technology</td>
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<td><em>ASD for Special Operations &amp; Low Intensity Conflict</em></td>
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<td><em>DAS for Peacekeeping &amp; Humanitarian Affairs</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD - Assistant Secretary of Defense DAS - Deputy Assistant Secretary PDUSD - Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense USD - Under Secretary of Defense</td>
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*Offices responsible for Humanitarian Assistance*

Figure II-3. Office of the Secretary of Defense Organization
example is the combatant commander’s political advisor who can provide nonmilitary insights as well as possibly serve as a direct link to the DOS, while enhancing communications and coordination with the affected Embassy and Country Team. Additionally, the **supporting combatant commander provides necessary support**, including transportation, communications relay, and SOF assets.

i. **Crisis Action Team.** Each combatant commander has an **organization designed to respond to immediate requirements**, often called a crisis action team. When an FHA operation has been or will likely be directed, the crisis action team can recommend to the combatant commander how to organize for the most effective response. From within the crisis action team, the following organizations may be designated to accomplish specific responsibilities.

• **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** The supported combatant commander may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported combatant commander, a civil-military operations (CMO) planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (such as a preventive medicine physician) when required. The HACC provides the critical link between the combatant commander and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies that may participate in the FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. However, the HACC may continue to function throughout the operation if required. When this occurs, the HACC is normally integrated into the humanitarian operations center (HOC), if a HOC is established. The HOC is discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination.”

• **Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).** The supported combatant commander may also organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information required for OPLAN development. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current FHA operations intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy and DOS points of contact. The senior deploying commander should ensure that a pre-deployment vulnerability assessment has been conducted. These assessments should include a medical member qualified to evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources, perform an epidemiological risk assessment, evaluate local medical capabilities, perform a vector/pest risk assessment, determine adequacy of hygiene of local billeting and public facilities, and perform an environmental risk assessment. Assessments provide the necessary background data for sizing the force protection package required, reducing the threat to DOD force personnel and assets. The DART (discussed in paragraph 3d and in Appendix F, “Disaster Assistance Response Team”) and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country; identify primary points of contact for coordination; determine the threat environment and survey facilities that
may be used for force protection purposes; and make specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST can assist with the following tasks.

- Assess the nature and extent of: (1) Available food, water, and sanitation; (2) Casualties and loss of life; (3) Injury, illness, and the outbreak of disease; (4) Displaced civilian population and location (to include security requirements of the population); (5) Status of the government of the affected country; (6) Degree of destruction to property and infrastructure; (7) Available logistic facilities for air- and sealift, roads, and bridges; and (8) Significant actors, the span and depth of their control over territory, resources, and individuals, and their objectives.

- Formulate recommendations for provision of US funding, equipment, supplies, and personnel.

- Establish liaison and coordinate assessment with: (1) Agencies of the affected country; (2) Supported commanders or their representatives; (3) US diplomatic personnel; and (4) Other relief agencies operating within the crisis area.

- In conjunction with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment.

- Be prepared to actually begin providing FHA to relieve suffering and avoid further loss of life, if so directed by the combatant commander.

- Determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be required for self-defense of forces.

- **Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).** Formed at the discretion of the combatant commander and operated by the combatant commander’s logistics

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**OPERATION IDA**

On 1 September 1962, a series of earthquakes struck northwestern Iran, and on the 3rd of the month the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed United States Army, Europe, to send aid to the victims. Early the next morning the airlift of the 8th Evacuation Hospital with a professional staff drawn from several hospitals in Europe began at Ramstein Air Force Base. With the 8th Evacuation Hospital went helicopter elements of the 421st Medical Company (Air Ambulance), a field maintenance detachment from the 29th Transportation Company, a preventive medicine detachment from the 485th Laboratory (Preventive Medicine), and a water purification unit from the 299th Engineer Battalion. Lt Col. Alexander M. Boysen, 8th Evacuation Hospital commander, assumed command of the entire relief force.

When the Americans arrived in Tehran, Iranian officials instructed them to locate their hospital on the plain of Kazvin, a site near the worst area of destruction but adjacent to a rail line and a hard surface road. Iranian drivers transported the unit, and the Americans worked through the night to become operational by early the next morning. During the day, the Americans established a base camp near Buin, further into the disaster area, to serve
both as a first aid station and as a helicopter base. From it, crews flew medical teams into the distressed area and evacuated seriously injured victims to the hospital. On the flight back into the area to pick up the teams, the helicopters brought in food, tents, and other essentials. In all, the choppers flew 404 sorties, delivered 45,000 pounds of supplies, and evacuated 66 patients.

Operations at the 8th Evacuation Hospital where the helicopters brought the casualties did not proceed without difficulties. High winds wreaked havoc on the unit’s tents because pegs did not hold in the sandy soil. After two days’ service, the laundry exploded, badly burning three enlisted men. Supply shortages developed, particularly of items not ordinarily required by a fighting unit — catheters for small children, for example. Finally, the professional staff, drawn from various facilities in Europe, had never trained with the hospital and the resulting confusion hindered operations.

Another difficulty, the suspicion and hostility of the local population, was only overcome through Iranian cooperation and American flexibility. Local government officials and the Shah himself during a visit, urged the people to cooperate. Even with a royal endorsement, however, the 8th Evacuation Hospital’s staff had to make minor adjustments [to accommodate] local customs. Its commander reported: “Many decisions that...were strange to Americans were made because they were not strange to Iranians...When one helps a foreign nation you accept their philosophy in many things, if by doing this it means you eventually gain your objective.”

As it solved its organizational problems and slowly secured the cooperation of the Iranians, the 8th Evacuation Hospital gained its objective in becoming an efficient emergency hospital. Then, by October, the medical and sanitary situation in the area had stabilized and the United States Ambassador approved their withdrawal. When they departed, the Americans left the equipped hospital for the Iranians.


staff, the LRC supports the command center and operational planning teams. The LRC receives reports from supporting commands, components and external sources, distills information for presentation to the combatant commander, and responds to questions. During FHA operations, the LRC, if activated, may assist in coordinating for materiel acquisition and/or disposition and movement with other US and foreign agencies. The LRC can enhance the combatant commander’s situational awareness.

More information may be obtained in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

j. Joint Task Force. In response to a foreign CBRNE incident, a CM-specific JTF may be activated and employed. In these cases the JTF would be responsible for providing the initial DOD response to the incident and would further serve as the C2 element for all subsequent DOD assets committed to a particular foreign CM operation.
k. **Multinational Units.** Other nations may deploy military forces to support the FHA effort. These units may provide **liaison officers (LNOs)** at both the combatant command and JTF level.

4. **Interagency Process**

   a. When the NCA determine that a US humanitarian response to a foreign disaster or crisis is required, **the NSC normally directs the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance** (who is also the USAID Administrator) **to convene an International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordinating Committee** to review all pertinent information and recommend policy and specific actions. The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee participation will generally include:

   - representatives of senior DOS and DOD officials;
   - US Ambassador or COM;
   - USAID representative; and
   - heads of other concerned agencies.

   b. **The International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee concurrently develops a comprehensive strategy for emergency response and develops tasks for each key participant.** Consideration of other elements or organizations that may be involved in the crisis is crucial to the development of sound recommendations. For example, the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee should consider the involvement of UN organizations, NGOs, and IOs that may already be operating in the crisis area. Interagency coordination (Figure II-4) continues throughout the mission. Successful interagency coordination requires effective interaction among all organizational and functional elements.

5. **Coordination and Relationships with NGOs and IOs**

   Relationships with NGOs and IOs need to be based on mutual understanding of lines of communications (LOCs), support requirements, procedures, information sharing, capabilities and, most importantly, missions. Necessary coordination can be facilitated by the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), a US-based consortium of over 150 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is another valuable resource for coordination of efforts. Although NGOs and IOs may enter the interagency coordination hierarchy throughout its many levels, the primary impact is at the JTF level. The following may assist in building unity of effort among these various organizations and the joint force commands.

   **JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, provides more information and points of contact for many of these organizations. Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination,” (Figure III-2) depicts coordination at the JTF level.**

   a. *Increase awareness* and *encourage contact* between the military and NGOs and IOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions.

   b. *Incorporate selected NGO and IO training* into Service and joint training programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and personnel into NGO and IO training.
c. **Review lessons learned** as recorded in both the joint and Services’ lessons learned databases.

d. Remember that NGOs and IOs may have the **propensity to view the military as an inexhaustible resource reservoir**, and may inundate the FHA force with requests for various types of support. Members of the FHA force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be allowed to provide. Normally, requests from IOs and NGOs should come to the Department of Defense through the Department of State at the Executive Secretary level. If circumstances on the ground dictate that the JFC has authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority, and guidance on its use, should be included in the execute order (or a modification thereto).
e. Keep in mind that many humanitarian relief agencies interpret equivocal responses, such as “we’ll try,” as affirmative, and subsequently expect the military to fulfill the request. When, for any reason, the FHA force is unable to provide the support desired, relationships may be adversely affected.

f. Be aware that not all NGOs and IOs appreciate military assistance or intervention into HA operations. Some NGO and IO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. FHA commanders need to honor this fact, while still striving for unity of effort. Commanders may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with NGOs and IOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations.

g. Clearly articulate the role of the military and how it intends to interact with NGOs and IOs. It is imperative that these organizations understand that the military mission may only allow limited types of support for their operations. Assets such as the crisis action team, HOC, HACC, civil-military operations center (CMOC), and LNOs are effective methods of ensuring mission clarity.

Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination,” provides details about the HOC and CMOC. Military LNO responsibilities are outlined in Appendix E, “Liaison Officer Procedures.”

h. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships between the military and NGOs and IOs.

i. Ensure that agreements and memorandums of understanding fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

j. Exchange NGO, IO, and military unit operating procedures and capabilities.

k. Ensure that CMOC officers are not perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations.

l. Consider acquiring an LNO from the NGO and/or IO community to be part of the US force staff. Such an LNO can perform duties such as initial coordination with the humanitarian relief community prior to deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective during planning, and advisement to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other coordinating mechanisms during operations.

m. Post information on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site. ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs, IOs, and other participants in HA operations to share and coordinate information.

n. Share logistic database information. Commodity tracking systems used in FHA include the following.

- **Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS).** DALIS was designed by the US Army to enhance the operations of one or more logistic coordination centers supporting multiple worldwide FHA operations.

- **Commodity Tracking System (CTS).** CTS is a computer program developed by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a warehouse and logistic management tool. CTS uses DALIS for its basic design.
• **Global Transportation Network (GTN).** GTN is a standardized DOD system that provides access to transportation data inputs from a wide variety of in-transit visibility systems. Users can query the GTN database to track cargo and passengers from origin to destination, anywhere in the Defense Transportation System.

6. **Conclusion**

A solid understanding of FHA organizations and their responsibilities, capabilities, and relationships to the mission and to other organizations is an essential ingredient in effective operations. Knowledge of the strategic and operational environment, including agency “cultures,” will enhance military effectiveness. However, members of other agencies should be reminded that the Armed Forces’ core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression and achieve US national security objectives. The Armed Forces are organized, trained, equipped, maintained, and deployed primarily to ensure that the Nation is able to defeat aggression against the country and to protect US national interests. *JTF-level organizations are addressed in Chapter III, “Joint Task Force Level Organization and Coordination.”*
1. Introduction

This chapter addresses key JTF-level organizations and coordination for FHA operations that differ from other military operations. It provides a basis to assist the commander, joint task force (CJTF) in developing the staff organization and addresses special purpose organizations and sections to align the force with FHA mission demands.

2. Joint Task Force

The Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander establishes a JTF when a mission has a specific limited objective, does not require overall centralized control of logistics, and involves significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments on a significant scale. In addition, close integration of effort is required. The authority establishing the JTF dissolves it when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required. The authority establishing the JTF determines the command relationships for the JTF and assigns the missions and forces. The adaptive nature of the C2 structure, the unique component capabilities, and their ability to deploy quickly to execute a variety of FHA missions makes a JTF ideally suited to perform FHA. A CJTF is normally assigned a joint operations area (JOA) in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR). The CJTF operates primarily at the operational level. However, there may be instances requiring the CJTF to focus at the tactical level. While the JTF is the most common type of organizational structure used for FHA, a combatant commander may also opt to create a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).


a. JTF Organization. JTF organization for FHA is similar to traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and mission tailored forces. However, the nature of FHA results in combat support and combat service support forces (i.e., engineers, military police, logistics, transportation, legal, chaplain, civil-military affairs, and medical) often serving more significant roles than combat elements.

b. JTF Staff Organization. The CJTF organizes the JTF staff to provide the appropriate expertise required to carry out the specific FHA mission. Some staff functions that may require increased support and manning include legal services, security, engineers, public affairs, health services, psychological operations (PSYOP), CA, resource management and logistics.
 Additional staff sections may also be established to complement and emphasize critical functions.

c. Special Functional Organizations. Besides the normal JTF organization, special functional organizations and staff elements can assist the CJTF in carrying out the FHA mission. These organizations support important functions including coordination, logistics, security, and liaison. Creation and utilization of these organizations is dependent on several factors, to include the mission, the size of the operation, whether multinational forces are involved, logistic constraints, the degree of participation by other relief organizations, and the viability of HN infrastructure.

• Civil-Military Operations Center. The CJTF may establish a CMOC to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational forces’ humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies, HN agencies, and HN authorities. The CMOC, working closely with the OFDA DART, provides the primary interface between US military forces and relief agencies and other organizations involved in the operations, whether or not a HOC (see paragraph 3a) or similar organization is established. The CMOC monitors military support throughout the operational area and screens UN, NGO, and IO logistic, security, medical and technical support requests. The CMOC identifies JTF component support capabilities and resources and forwards validated requests to the J-3 or appropriate component or multinational force for action. Requests for support will be prioritized by the HN representatives or the lead US agency for the operation. Only in rare instances will the US military prioritize distribution of requested resources.

• CMOC Tasks. The following tasks may, in accordance with NCA direction, fall under CMOC auspices: (1) Screen, validate and prioritize (based on DART advice) NGO, UN, and IO military support requests; (2) Coordinate NGO, UN, and IO military support requests with military components; (3) Act as an intermediary, facilitator, and coordinator between JTF elements and NGOs, UN, and IOs; (4) Explain JTF (military) policies to NGOs, UN, and IOs and,

The nature of FHA results in combat support and combat service support forces often serving more significant roles than combat elements.
conversely, explain NGO, UN, and IO policies to the JTF; (5) Respond to NGO, UN, and IO emergency requests; (6) Screen and validate NGO, UN, and IO requests for space available passenger airlift (see Joint Travel Regulations for restrictions); (7) Administer and issue NGO, UN, and IO identification cards (for access into military controlled areas); (8) Convene ad hoc mission planning groups when complex military support or numerous military units and NGOs, UN, and IOs are involved; (9) Exchange JTF operations and general security information with NGOs, UN, and IOs as required; (10) Chair port and airfield committee meetings involving space and access-related issues; (11) Assist in the creation and organization of food logistic systems, when requested; (12) Provide liaison between the JTF and HOC; and (13) Explain overall interagency policies and guidelines to the JTF and NGOs.

**CMOC Structure.** While sharing many general characteristics, each FHA operation is unique, and the CMOC structure must be tailored for each emergency. CA personnel are routinely trained in skills that make them an optimal choice to form the core of a CMOC team, into which other functional specialists integrate. Variables in establishing a CMOC include: (1) Number and expertise of CMOC personnel; (2) Degree of decision making authority vested in the CMOC director; and (3) Relationship between the CMOC and the rest of the JTF staff. The US Ambassador or designated representative will also be expected to play a lead role in the CMOC structure and operations.

Even if the FHA mission is the primary or only mission for the JTF, the CMOC should normally not serve concurrently as the Joint Operations Center (JOC) for the JTF. The JTF J-3 should normally staff a JOC with personnel and assets separate from the CMOC. Particularly in the case of an FHA operation, CMOC personnel will usually be fully engaged with the HN, IOs, NGOs, and other concerns. Operating a JOC would not be a prudent use of CMOC assets by the CJTF. The CMOC director may work for the Civil-Military Officer on the J-3 staff, the J-3, the JTF Chief of Staff, or possibly for the Commander, Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), if one is formed (see paragraph 4a). Special consideration should also be given to the relationship between the CMOC and the Intelligence Directorate (J-2), as well as addressing the sensitivity of NGOs, UN, and IOs about talking to intelligence personnel. Though information gathering to assist the mission is acceptable, any perception on the part of IOs and NGOs that the military is using them for intelligence purposes could prove devastating to the commander’s mission, and will likely result in immediate cessation of communications with those organizations. The structure and responsibilities of the CMOC need to be established as quickly as possible in the planning phase of an operation. An OFDA DART representative will coordinate with the CMOC director. DART representatives provide advice to the CMOC and assist in screening and validating requests for military support from the relief community. The CMOC serves as the central clearing organization for FHA information and coordination for the JTF operation. It is designed to harmonize military efforts and resources with requirements of the international relief community to achieve overall efficiency and effectiveness. Because of the nature of
FHA, representation from and continual coordination with the JTF J-4 (or J-4 functional organizations) is critical. A CMOC is not restricted to the JTF level; a commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC based on the need to coordinate with civilian agencies. Figure III-1 depicts an example of a joint level CMOC.

- The following organizations were used successfully during Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia 1992-1993).

**Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB).** The JFUB was formed under JTF engineer supervision. Since large numbers of US and multinational forces operated within the same geographic area, facility allocation to accommodate requirements was necessary. The JFUB served as the executive agent to deconflict real estate issues arising from multiple-user demands on limited facilities and recommended COAs to resolve issues. The JFUB addressed multinational force accommodation,
ammunition storage points, joint visitors bureau, postal facilities, transit facilities, and other related areas.

**Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST).** The CFST was organized to coordinate activities between participating multinational forces. The CFST focused on controlling all support and coordination tasks. CFST duties included: (1) Welcome and orient newly arrived FHA forces; (2) Designate initial staging areas, provide water, rations, and other support; (3) Identify sensitivities (historic animosity or religious differences) among multinational forces and the affected populace; (4) Receive, process, and provide situation update to arriving multinational forces, including a briefing on the legal limits of US support; (5) Brief ROE to arriving multinational forces; (6) Conduct multinational capability assessments and recommend missions accordingly; and (7) Brief C2 and relief agency relationships.

**Other Organizations.** Efficient coordination and management of special functions conserves JTF resources by reducing duplication of effort. Examples of organizations that may be established to accomplish these special functions during FHA operations include the following.

**Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC).** JCCC can provide overall communication systems management. The JCCC manages frequency allocation, assignments, and deconflicts internal frequency requirements. The JCCC also monitors the use of communications security procedures throughout the operational area.

**Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** The JISE conducts intelligence operations for the JTF. The composition of the JISE will depend on the type of information required by the JTF. If a JISE is not formed, the JTF J-2 can request support from the theater joint intelligence center.

**Joint Information Bureau (JIB).** The JIB is the focal point for the interface between the military and the media. The JIB serves to provide the news media with timely and accurate information on command issues. The JIB also provides command information to support deployed forces and facilitates coverage by the Services of their contribution to the operation.

See JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

**Joint Movement Center (JMC).** The JMC coordinates the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational areas, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by the CJTF.

For detailed information on movement control, see JP 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.*

**Coordination at the JTF level is illustrated in Figure III-2.**
3. **Humanitarian Operations Center**

a. Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference. The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The US Ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC.

b. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, UN, and IOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to the JTF through the CMOC. The HOC is primarily an interagency policymaking and coordinating body that does not exercise C2 but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA.
operation. Close JTF coordination with the affected country, UN, and other key members of the humanitarian relief community forms the core of FHA operations. Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or UN and IOs. During large scale FHA operations, a HOC may be established to accomplish this coordination. The country affected by a disaster and in need of HA will normally have a ministry designated as the senior point of coordination for all HA activities. Ministries involved could include the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, or an emergency management office within a ministry. These ministries will establish the priority needs for their country and solicit international assistance from donor countries and relief organizations, either bilaterally or through the UN. In a failed state situation such as Somalia, the UN has the responsibility to establish overall coordination of the HA effort. The more representation of the various relief agencies and donor countries at the HOC, the more coordinated the HA efforts will be. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US Embassy or Consulate, JTF (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, NGOs, IOs, and other major players in the operation. The structure of a HOC can be formal or informal. HOCs may have political significance and authority when directed by the affected country, or may be less formal if established by the UN. The HOC is normally collocated with the appropriate lead or UN headquarters conducting the operation.

c. HOCs may establish working groups and committees based on the HA situation. These groups and committees discuss and resolve issues including relief material prioritization, medical, sanitation, health, and other related areas.

d. During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN will form a UN Disaster Management Team under the leadership of the in-country Resident Coordinator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). That group will accomplish UN coordination and liaison in-country at the national and ambassadorial level. At the site of a natural disaster, the UN will establish an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC). In complex emergencies, the UN establishes a humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). Either of these operations centers assists the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The OSOCC or HOCC reports to the UNDP Resident Coordinator, who renders a field situation report with worldwide distribution. The CMOC and the OSOCC or HOCC should be closely located to synchronize US contributions to the overall international effort.

4. Special Operations Forces

SOF assets assigned or attached to the JTF during FHA operations will most likely include CA, PSYOP, and special forces. There are several reasons why SOF are well-suited to FHA operations. They are adaptable, can deploy rapidly, have excellent long-range communications equipment, and can operate effectively in austere environments typical of FHA efforts. Perhaps the most important capabilities found within SOF for FHA are their geographic orientation, cultural knowledge, language capabilities, and the ability to work with local ethnic groups and civilian populations to provide initial and ongoing assessments.

• **Joint Special Operations Task Force.** A JSOTF is composed of special operations units from more than one Service to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The JSOTF may have nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

• **Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF).** A JPOTF is composed of PSYOP units from more than one Service, formed to carry out PSYOP in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The JFC may designate the senior PSYOP unit commander as the JPOTF commander.

• **Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.** A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Service or US agency, formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Although the JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there should be a strong representation of CA trained personnel. Because of their expertise in dealing with NGOs, IOs, and OGA, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for success. The JCMOTF may be established to carry out missions of limited or extended duration involving military forces’ interface with local civilian populations, resources, or agencies; and military forces’ coordination with OGA, multinational and affected country forces, UN agencies, NGOs, and IOs. The JFC may designate the senior CA unit commander as the JCMOTF commander.

b. **Civil Affairs.** CA assets are capable of supporting protracted FHA operations in a variety of functional areas. The combatant commander’s staff must ensure that all plans consider CA support to the mission.

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**Figure III-3. Civil-Military Operations Activities**

- Provide familiarization training to US forces on the local area and population
- Provide liaison with local civil authorities
- Coordinate requirements for local labor support
- Identify public and private facilities available for use by military forces
- Advise, supervise, and operate civil information agencies
- Supervise displaced civilian movement and control (minimize civilian interference)
- Plan for displaced civilian camp construction and administration
- Advise on cultural factors
- Assist the commander to meet legal obligations and moral considerations
- Assess requirement for and support the operation of the civil-military operations center
This support ranges from assistance in civil administration to support operations for displaced civilians. **CA assets can prove extremely valuable** as the military commander’s advisor on the impact of military activities on the civilian sector. CA assets assess infrastructure damage, assist in developing and managing temporary shelters, and are trained to support the CMOC. In the CMOC, CA personnel serve as liaison between military, diplomatic, and relief organizations. (Some basic CMO activities are shown in Figure III-3).

- **Selection of CA forces.** **CA force selection must be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for FHA.** The following considerations are extracted from JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations*, which provides specific guidance on planning and executing CA activities.

  - The only Active Component CA forces are located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (one Army airborne battalion). The remaining CA assets exist within Reserve Components. Those Reserve forces may require Presidential authority to activate and deploy. Although not considered SOF assets, the United States Marine Corps, Marine Forces Reserve, has two CA groups. The Air Force maintains an organic CA capability within the Judge Advocate General’s Department with a cadre of CA-trained Air National Guard judge advocates.

  - CA should be assigned as a JTF staff element.

  - CA units primarily support the CMOC, the J-3, or JTF subordinate units.

  - Due to the complex nature of CA activities and the impact on the affected country, CA units should be kept within a single chain of command to ensure unity of effort among these scarce assets.

  - Due to the multiple and continuous needs of CA to support worldwide missions, they cannot support FHA indefinitely. Commanders should make every effort to transition to civil control through the interagency, the HN, and IOs and/or NGOs. Indefinite support to FHA results in a reduced capability to respond to emerging contingencies.

c. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages and themes intended to have an impact on selected target audiences. The objective is to influence behavior and attitudes favorable to the United States and its allies, as well as to constrain undesired actions. **PSYOP personnel can provide the JTF commander with analysis of perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and effectiveness of ongoing information and FHA operations.** PSYOP personnel provide language capability and equipment (radio broadcasting, print, audio, and audio visual) essential to disseminate necessary information to the populace. For example, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (April-July 1991 multinational relief effort in Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq), PSYOP units disseminated information on relief camp procedures, organization, and food preparation. PSYOP loudspeaker teams were considered to be the best method to control crowds and disseminate information. Videos informed distant population groups of camp existence and assistance resource locations.

  - During FHA operations, **PSYOP personnel may form international military information teams** to assist in managing displaced civilians. Within US Southern Command, the teams are called military information support teams (MISTs). These teams can provide health and safety messages, disseminate
locations of shelter and food distribution points, warn of restricted or danger areas, and disseminate security information. MISTs were employed successfully during Operation SAFE HAVEN (September 1994-March 1995 migrant camp operation in Panama). These teams provided a critical service in disseminating information throughout the migrant camps established during that operation.

 JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, provides specific guidance on planning and executing PSYOP.

• The following considerations are provided for use of PSYOP in FHA operations.

  • PSYOP forces should deploy with the first security elements to communicate security force intentions to the local population.

  • PSYOP, CA, and public affairs (PA) efforts are coordinated through the JTF information operations cell to ensure that their complementary capabilities are integrated into synergistic plans that are fully coordinated and executed through the JPOTF, JCMOTF, CMOC, JSOTF, and JIB. As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information of a truthful nature and to counter propaganda directed against the operation and the United States.

  • PSYOP units should either deploy with organic transportation or be provided adequate dedicated vehicles for necessary mobility.

  • PSYOP should be integrated into JTF planning at an early phase, and personnel should ensure that the entire chain of command understands how PSYOP contributes to accomplishing the FHA mission.

• Other Special Operations Forces. In addition to CA and PSYOP forces, SOF include the following.

  • US Army: Special Forces, Rangers, and special operations aviation units.

  • US Navy: sea-air-land teams (SEALs), SEAL delivery vehicle teams, special boat units, Naval special warfare units, patrol coastal class ships, and special mission units.

  • US Air Force: designated fixed- and rotary-wing transport, aerial tanker, fixed-wing gunship, and PSYOP support aircraft. Austere airfield management can be provided by special tactics teams, which are composed of specially trained combat control, pararescue, and weather personnel. To support FHA operations, specially organized and trained SOF aviation advisors can train foreign aviation fixed- and rotary-wing personnel in search and rescue employment and sustainment tactics, techniques, and procedures.

  Employment of these assets will be situation dependent. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, provides detailed information on these resources.

5. Space Forces

Space forces include the space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and personnel necessary to access, use and, if directed, control space for national security. Space forces assigned or attached to the JTF during FHA operations will be prepared to provide the JTF commander with capabilities from space. These capabilities include the force
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enhancement mission areas of navigation and timing, environmental effects, satellite communications, and early warning of detected infrared events that could be indicative of fires, explosions, volcanic activity, etc. These capabilities are principally available through space support teams, either unified or component level (that can be tailored for the JOA) or reachback for support directly to the US Space Command Operations Center.

6. Conclusion

A JTF should be structured to take advantage of a wide variety of military capabilities (such as logistics, transportation, and communications support) to adapt to the unique requirements of an FHA operation. An effective JTF structure enables proper utilization of these limited military resources.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“‘The severity of human suffering in Somalia caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Upon seeing the appalling conditions, and realizing they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population, local commanders took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted the commanders’ attention from their primary mission.’”

Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter, 93-8

1. Introduction

This chapter highlights aspects of joint force planning and execution related to FHA operations. Although much of the information presented is applicable for deliberate planning, crisis action considerations are emphasized. The supported JFC starts formal planning when the CJCS Warning Order is received. Joint OPLANs for the affected area may already exist to support an FHA mission. The JFC’s intent and desired mission end state are the foundations of mission planning. Planning factors found in Appendix J, “Planning Factors for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” incorporate many of the topics discussed in this chapter.

Procedures for both deliberate and crisis action planning are described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).

2. Situation Assessment

Intelligence estimates, area assessments, and surveys are good sources of information on the current situation in the crisis area, providing political, cultural, economic, military, geographic and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, health, and other essential information. Other sources for an initial assessment include the US Country Team, Combatant Commander Country Books, recent OFDA situation reports, UN Secretariat Assessments, the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site, relief organizations already operating in the area, and SOF personnel (see Figure IV-1). A combatant commander may also choose to deploy a HAST to assess the situation. In describing the situation the joint force will encounter, the planner should address the following.

NOTE: The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the desires of the COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US Departments and agencies present. The Ambassador is the head of the Country Team. Other members may include a defense attaché, security assistance officer, political counselor, public affairs counselor, economic counselor, representatives from USAID, and the Peace Corps. During an FHA operation, a member of the joint force may be appointed to the Country Team.

For more detailed information on the US Country Team concept, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
Chapter IV

Figure IV-1. Sources of Information

**SOURCES OF INFORMATION**

- Intelligence Estimates
- Area Assessments
- Surveys
- US Country Team
- CINC Country Books
- UN Secretariat Assessments
- Relief Organizations Operating in the Area
- Special Operations Forces Personnel
- UN ReliefWeb Internet Site
- Recent Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Situation Reports

**AREAS OF INFORMATION**

- Political
- Geographic & Topographic
- Cultural
- Climatic
- Economic
- Infrastructure & Engineering
- Military
- Health

Figure IV-1. Sources of Information
a. Threats to the Operation. Hostile factions may use violence in an attempt to stop the FHA effort, or banditry may be expected. Lack of an infrastructure in the crisis area, possibly due to natural disaster, civil strife, terrorism, or combat between nations, can impede the mission. Disease, drought, or continuing flooding or earthquakes are examples of natural occurrences that can threaten successful mission accomplishment.

b. Other Organizations Involved in the Operation. An assessment of the situation should include a description of the relief organizations (nongovernmental, international, and indigenous), foreign governments and military forces, UN agencies, or any other pertinent element already involved in the FHA effort, and what relationship exists among them.

c. Environment. The physical, social, and political environment in which the operation is being planned and will be executed.

d. The Underlying Causes for the FHA Crisis. Even if the FHA force is not directed to assist in rectifying the underlying causes, understanding these causes can enhance mission accomplishment and force protection.


- What is the status of military or paramilitary forces?
- Who are the relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors in the operational area? What are their objectives? Are their objectives at odds with or compatible with the JFC’s objectives?

FHA planning takes into account not only the task required, but also the environment in which it must be carried out.
• Who are the key communicators (persons who hold the ear of the populace, i.e., mayors, village elders, teachers) within the operational area?

• What is the status of essential public services (water, electricity, communication, sanitation, and transportation, including road, bridge, and sea- and airport conditions and capabilities)? How does the current status compare to predisaster status?

• What is the status of health care providers, firefighters, police, and court systems? Include availability, level of expertise (skilled laborers), equipment, and supplies.

• What relief agencies are in place, what are their roles and capabilities, and what resources do they have?

• What is the physical condition of the civilian populace?

• Where are the locations of medical facilities; are they operational, and to what level?

• What are the unique shelter, food, and security needs of the people and to what extent is support available from within the affected country?

• What facilities and support are available to FHA forces from the affected country?

• What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?

• What are the legal limitations to US assistance in this case?

• What is the local population’s attitude toward who or what is causing their plight?

• What is the local population’s attitude toward the presence of US forces?

• What are the force requirements to protect the force?

• What is the status of the host strategic transportation infrastructure? Are available seaports and airfields in usable condition? What is the status of materials handling equipment? Are connecting roads and railroads usable?

3. Force Structure

JFCs may have plans or predesignated joint forces, or both, for the conduct of FHA missions. The JFC has a number of available options, including use of a predesignated joint force or a newly designated joint force task-organized and tailored specifically to conduct FHA missions. In FHA operations, the joint force structure must provide for the means to coordinate and communicate with the numerous organizations involved in the overall FHA effort. Effective liaison among these organizations will help reduce organizational conflicts and redundant relief efforts. Personnel trained in political-military skills are valuable in establishing necessary liaison with policymakers and the diplomatic community. Additionally, personnel skilled in multifunctional logistics and security assistance operations should be part of the joint force operations, since FHA operations tend to be logistically complex. There is a high probability that the joint force will be a multinational force, and that some of the multinational forces may require and have received USG approval to be logistically supported with US equipment and may sustain these forces throughout the duration of the operation. It should be noted that the National Guard and Reserve Components may provide assets and personnel across the spectrum of possible requirements such as CA. A Presidential Reserve Callup may be required to augment
the limited number of Active Component CA personnel. Deployment times for members of the Reserve Component may be considerably longer than those of the main body of the FHA force. Joint force organization will follow established standing operating procedures and joint doctrine.

JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, provides more information on organizing joint task forces.

4. Mission Statement Development

A difficult but critical task for the combatant commander is developing the FHA military mission statement. The mission statement must provide specific direction for achieving the desired end state via clear and attainable military objectives. The combatant commander normally coordinates the mission statement with OGA through the appropriate PCC. Combatant commanders consider several factors in developing the mission statement, to include the military force’s role in assisting relief agencies, the operational environment, and security considerations.

a. JTF SUPPORT HOPE. As an example, the mission statement for JTF SUPPORT HOPE (Rwanda) included:

- Provide immediate assistance to ongoing or planned efforts for the establishment and operation of water distribution and purification in Goma (Zaire);
- Establish an airhead and distribution capability at Entebbe, Uganda;
- Provide 24-hour airfield capabilities and support services at Goma, Kigali (Rwanda) and other airfields as required;
- Establish overall logistic management capability in support of UNHCR and other nations; and
- Protect the force.

b. Operation RESTORE HOPE. The US Central Command mission statement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) is another example: “When directed by the NCA, Commander in Chief, US Central Command will conduct joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major airports and seaports, key installations, and food distribution points; to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations; and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.”

5. Concept of the Operation

a. Deployment. Deployment planning and execution considerations for FHA missions and other military operations are fundamentally the same. Joint force deployment is predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation and the perception of US interests. It is important to remember that, at every level, political factors drive military decisions and planning. The joint force deployment should be phased to allow critical force packages to deploy first. Based on mission analysis, the JFC determines what packages are required to deploy to the humanitarian crisis area as a first priority, to perform assessments and to establish required lodgment for the remainder of the joint force.

- Movement. The joint force will obtain, through the supported combatant commander, strategic lift allocations and constraints from USTRANSCOM. The time-phased force and deployment data for the operations must be developed to remain within these guidelines. USTRANSCOM provides movement schedules for deployment requirements in the sequence, or as near as possible to that requested by the joint force. The joint force staff should continually update all subordinate
commands on deployment scheduling, situation, or mission changes. Such changes may require significant shifts in force deployment. Consideration should also be given to any deployment support requested by OFDA DART and OGA, the UN, NGOs, and IOs.

- **Priority of Deployment.** Initial deployment for an FHA operation generally requires only critical command, control, communications and computer systems; security; CMOC; and logistic capability. Follow-on forces deploy as capabilities expand and requirements are better defined. However, US forces often conduct FHA operations in austere locations where air- and seaport facilities may be limited or inadequate. If the affected country has insufficient port offloading facilities, US personnel and equipment needed to establish or augment this capability should arrive prior to the primary force packages. In some cases, it may be necessary to expand existing facilities or construct new facilities to accommodate essential transshipment or to accommodate the flow of forces into the country.

- **Phasing of the Operation.** To better control an FHA operation, the JFC may decide that the operation needs to be phased. FHA planning phases permit flexibility and ease of control. Phases may run concurrently or sequentially, with the majority of phases being concurrent with others. Plan phases should not be “locked into concrete” and phase timing may be shifted as the situation dictates. Phases should be used to increase operational tempo by focusing relief assets and emphasis toward the objective. If a number of operational objectives with the same general focus are to be achieved simultaneously, a distinct phase may be required. There are, however, no standard phases. The plan for Operation SUPPORT HOPE is provided here as an example of a phased FHA operation.

  - **Phase I.** Stabilize the Situation in Goma. “Stop The Dying.” Support life-saving efforts (primarily water production, distribution, and sanitation) in the Goma, Zaire refugee camps. Phase I was to be declared complete when the death rate and refugee deprivation reached predesignated levels and when distribution began to function at an acceptable rate.
• **Phase II.** Move Refugees Back Toward Rwanda. Assist in establishing a waystation network from the major refugee centers toward the Rwandan interior. The objective was to assist relief agencies to develop a sustainment infrastructure and distribution system to help return refugees to their homes. Phase II completion criteria required establishment of the waystation support infrastructure and distribution network.

• **Phase III.** Stabilize the Refugee Situation and Begin Reconstruction in Rwanda. This phase supported ongoing relief efforts and established preconditions for operational transition to the UNHCR. Phase III was to be declared complete upon initial operational capability of a viable transportation, distribution, and storage infrastructure capable of meeting basic Rwandan needs.

• **Phase IV.** Turnover Operations to the UNHCR. This phase begins as UNHCR, third country forces, and various relief agencies developed adequate water production as well as food and medical distribution to sustain recovery. During this phase, joint force operations begin transition to a US liaison element to work closely with the UNHCR. Phase completion involved seamless transfer of ongoing relief operations to UNHCR and other agencies capable of sustained operations.

• **Phase V.** Redeploy the Force. The redeployment phase consists of relief operations control transfer to the UNHCR or redeployment of nonessential personnel and equipment.

c. **Sectors.** The JFC may help organize the FHA area into sectors, in consultation with civilian relief agencies and consideration of sectoral organization already established by the affected country. In establishing boundaries for these sectors, planners should consider ethnic or traditional tribal boundaries, political affiliations, relief agency areas, political and cultural acceptance of other nations’ forces, and contiguous sectors with forces assigned.

6. **Logistics**

a. The FHA logistic and health service support (HSS) planners should assess FHA logistic and HSS requirements as well as affected country and theater support capabilities. Attendant risks and logistic objectives should also be identified. **Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the relief recipients.** Should relief recipients be located within a major population center, all reasonable measures should be taken when establishing logistic bases that prevent migration of relief recipients from their economic and social areas. **All potential supply sources should be considered,** including affected country, commercial, multinational, and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons-learned indicate that logistics and the associated support facilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain an FHA and HSS operation are frequently underestimated. FHA and HSS operations are logistic intensive and will most likely include significant general engineering requirements. Therefore, the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting. This includes the following.

• Identifying time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.
• Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and sea LOCs.

• Establishing procedures for coordinating and controlling material movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the commander with the flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.

b. For the FHA and HSS operation to succeed, the commander must be able to fulfill priorities through adequate resource control. Critical support contracting should be considered. Contracting support may be obtained from within or outside the affected country. Military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources. To avoid competition for similar support and to promote economy of contracting effort, contracts for logistic support must be coordinated through the designated joint force J-4 or lead agent for logistics. Logisticians should be thoroughly familiar with contracting options available through the Navy’s Emergency Construction Capabilities Contract Process, the Army’s Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, and the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program contracts. When contracting for supplies, transportation, and services is possible, it can aid the economy of the affected country and facilitate responsibility transfer back to the affected country or NGOs or IOs. Logisticians must consider which equipment and supplies may be left behind at the completion of the mission. Supplies and equipment cannot be arbitrarily left behind and donated to the HN. Supplies and equipment left behind as a result of HA support operations must be in accordance with all applicable Federal laws and statues relating to the donation or transfer of military articles and supplies. Consult legal counsel prior to any release of supplies and equipment. It should also be noted that planning for security of materials and supplies is imperative.

7. Command and Control

An FHA plan must include responsibility for air and space, land, sea, and special operations. It is especially necessary to delegate authority to establish supply or transportation priorities. Delegation speeds decision making and reaction to changes in life-threatening situations faced in many FHA operations. Although there is no command relationship between military forces and OGA, UN agencies, NGOs, IOs, affected country elements, and allied or coalition governments, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between participating organizations.
8. Communications

As shown in Figure IV-2, effective communications systems are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining successful FHA operations. Operations, logistic, and intelligence functions depend on responsive communications. Communications is the central system that not only ties together all aspects of joint operations, but also allows commanders to command and control forces. Therefore, the FHA plan must include procedures to provide for interoperable and compatible communications among participants. Commercial telephone networks, military satellite channels, and conventional military C2 systems will support communication of directions, orders, and information. Commercial communications systems can be used to coordinate with other US agencies, disseminate meeting schedules, deconflict resource movement, and track logistics flow. Direct communications between commanders and nonmilitary organizations should be established to facilitate effective coordination and decision making. Information protection for nonsecured communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to other agencies such as the UN or NGOs.
a. **Communications Security.** Communications may be secured against monitoring if necessary through encryption or codes, particularly in a hostile environment. Physical hardening, operations security (to include physical security) and redundancy reduce system failures stemming from sabotage and elements of nature. Communications security will also be complicated by the need to coordinate with other agencies (US and non-US) and multinational forces.

b. **Frequency Management.** Frequency management will help allocate finite frequency availability. Multinational forces and nonmilitary agency integration into the frequency management program should be deconflicted with security requirements. Telecommunications requirements and restrictions of the affected country should also be considered. The host government (if functioning) may control frequency management absolutely. FHA forces may not have exclusive use of frequencies.

c. **Interoperability.** Identify communications equipment interoperability among all participants. It is likely that non-DOD USG agencies, HN agencies, and multinational forces will have their own communications networks. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services as well as high frequency radio equipment. It is also critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication equipment that facilitate coordination with all participants. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in FHA operations may also necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation.

d. **Reports.** Standardize similar communication reports to increase efficiency of operations.

e. **Lessons Learned.** These are some of the critical communications lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT:

   - Obtain adequate communications equipment to provide basic mission essential service;
   - Employ additional equipment and reconfigure connectivity to provide direct routing to principal destinations;
   - Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation;
   - Have sufficient equipment to support airborne capabilities, respond to new missions, and avoid critical shortages; and
   - Build in redundancy.

9. **Reporting**

The joint force staff will encounter numerous OGA, NGOs, and IOs that produce reports on the operating environment and joint force actions. The US Ambassador’s cable, the USAID representative’s reports, and OFDA DART reports are reviewed by the DOS and OGA. Additionally, other elements of the Country Team produce reports on the same issues about which the joint force staff reports. The proliferation of reports may result in conflicting information, despite efforts to maintain accuracy. One approach to deconflicting reports is to develop a consolidated report between the joint force and the Country Team. Such consolidated reporting will also serve to reduce administrative overhead while reducing opportunities for conflicting information to surface.
10. Measures of Effectiveness

The combatant commander should develop military MOEs that support the overall USG FHA mission. **MOEs should be developed for quantitative or qualitative standards as a means to evaluate operations and guide decision making.** Accurate and effective MOEs contribute to mission effectiveness in many ways. They help identify effective strategies and tactics, and indicate when to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission. MOEs should be driven by exit strategy, and are established to aid in determining when the joint force has met the criteria for transition of control and redeployment to home stations. MOEs assist the commander in determining when the situation has been returned to pre-disaster conditions.

a. Developing MOEs. There is no single all-encompassing checklist for MOEs for FHA operations. MOEs will vary according to the mission. However, commanders and staffs should keep certain factors in mind when developing and using MOEs in FHA operations. **Planners should ensure that MOEs possess the following characteristics.**

• **Appropriate.** MOEs should correlate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOEs should be general and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scene commanders (OSCs), then the MOEs should be more specific and detailed.

• **Mission-related.** MOEs must reflect the commander’s desired end state and the specific military objectives to reach that end state. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas.

If the mission expands, so should the MOEs.

• **Measurable.** Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than non-quantitative MOEs, and hence are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using non-quantitative MOEs, clear measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent mismeasurement or misinterpretation.

• **Numerically Realistic.** MOEs should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Avoid establishing excessive MOEs; they become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.

• **Sensitive.** MOEs should be sensitive to force performance, and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect established MOEs.

• **Universally Understood and Accepted.** MOEs should be clear and consensus based among the various USG agencies, HN, and others to ensure that all concerned focus on efforts desired as well as the criteria for transition and termination of the military role.

• **Useful.** MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

• **Valid.** MOEs should accurately measure the phenomenon intended. For example, “reports of human rights violations” might increase, but that increase could reflect a greater sense of security from retaliation, not an actual increase in attacks. Such a measure might be combined with survey results, hospital
b. **Possible MOEs.** MOEs in FHA operations could include:

- Drops in mortality rates in the affected population, below a specified level per day;
- Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to various levels established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption;
- Decrease the population of displaced persons in camps to a level sustainable by the affected country or non-US military organizations (Another aspect of this MOE is the increase in the number of persons per day returning to their homes);
- Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level; or
- An increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and IOs.

c. As an example, during Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint force tracked several specific MOEs to ascertain when it had accomplished its assigned mission. These MOEs included:

- The refugee population in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on 26 Jul 1994 to 575,000 on 26 Aug 1994 (Numbers of refugees were estimates only);
- The estimated mortality rate in Goma camps, based on bodies buried per day, dropped from 6,500 per day on 27 Jul 1994 to less than 500 per day on 1 Aug 1994;
- Cargo capacity at Kigali airfield increased from virtually zero on 30 Jul 1994 to 300-600 tons per day on 26 Aug 1994; and
- The number of UN agencies and NGOs, represented in Kigali grew from 6 on 22 Jul 1994 to over 60 on 26 Aug 1994. This increase represented adequate nonmilitary capability to provide FHA.

d. **USAID has developed the following strategy for measuring results of FHA operations.** The impact of HA cannot be measured only in terms of supplies shipped; the ultimate test comes from judging whether lives have been saved and communities revived. This is a complex and long-term process, and to find answers, USAID has developed the following four areas for assessing performance that must be addressed.

- **First, the structure for responding to disasters and to the needs of countries in crisis and transition must be in place.** Before crises occur, USAID — in close coordination with other agencies of the USG, multilateral agencies, and local authorities — will ascertain the following.
  
  - Have supplies been stockpiled and service providers identified? Are supplies secure from loss and theft? When USAID moves to deliver goods and services, will they go to the right place in the right amount with the intended effect?
  - Have the prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities of USAID anticipated needs and are they effective? Have local communities and businesses been enlisted for planning, prevention, and response?
  - Do proposed shipments of supplies match and maximize local skills and capacities? In view of past disasters
locally and regionally, are preparations commensurate with likely needs?

- Are the partnerships and relations with the UN (including the WFP) understood by all? Are mechanisms in place to coordinate supplies, donations, and offers of skilled labor and ensure that they are delivered where and when they are needed?

- Second, actual delivery of supplies and services must be timely and effective. During crises, USAID and its partners will determine the following.

  - Do disaster relief supplies and services reach their intended destination in time to make a difference? Are all forms of emergency relief supplies readily available and accessible to the intended beneficiaries, including women, children, the elderly, local peoples, refugees, and members of minorities?

  - Do specific programs intended to save lives or reduce malnutrition, such as emergency feeding programs, have the intended impact?

  - Are profiteering and misuse effectively controlled? Are food and other relief supplies distributed so as not to discourage local production or distort local prices and markets?

  - Do programs of disease control and emergency medical services (including immunizations, child survival interventions, and maternal and reproductive health care) have access to necessary supplies and are they coordinated with food and nutrition interventions?

- Third, in transitional and crisis situations, assistance must target the institutions and needs critical to the resumption of sustained development, civil life, and democratic governance. USAID and its partners will determine the following.

  - Has the response to countries in crisis and transition been appropriate to their needs, political situation, and indigenous capacities?

  - Have national and local political institutions been strengthened? Have key elements of the infrastructure, such as housing, communications, basic transportation, and financial services been reinforced? Are the specific needs of internally displaced persons and refugees being addressed?

  - Has food security increased throughout the country? Do farmers have greater access to seed, fertilizer, and appropriate technology? Has local food production increased significantly and/or are more people able to acquire the income needed to purchase food?

  - Has there been measurable progress toward national reconciliation and invigoration of the mechanisms of conflict resolution, as indicated by fair and open elections, constitutional conventions, new legal codes, reintegration of combatants, etc? Is there evidence of decreased disorder in cities and in the countryside? Is there increased respect for human rights?

- Fourth, follow-on mechanisms, after relief and rehabilitation, must be in place to help prevent cycles of crisis and to permit countries to cope with their own natural disasters and political crises. After the crisis stage has passed, USAID and its partners will determine the following.
Is USAID, in conjunction with local authorities and communities, and multilateral institutions, developing and implementing long-term development programs that measurably enhance the ability of countries to anticipate and manage disasters? Are the economic, political, environmental, social, and institutional causes of manmade disasters being addressed?

Have countries in crisis and transition made measurable progress toward a political and economic transformation?

HA activities ultimately must be measured by simple, yet profound standards; Do these activities prevent human misery that is avoidable? Do they provide relief for human misery that is not? Does this assistance help countries that have suffered natural or manmade disasters and crises return to the path of sustainable development?

11. Intelligence

As shown in Figure IV-3, intelligence and information gathering in FHA operations should be broadly focused and include collection concerning political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, religious, economic, medical, environmental, and criminal indicators. The primary intelligence effort must focus on answering the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) assisting in the accomplishment of the mission. While normally this will involve assessing potential threats to the FHA mission.
(from forces external and/or internal to the affected population), the unique aspects of FHA operations may result in significant or even primary emphasis being placed upon logistic, medical, or political intelligence and/or intelligence support to CA and PSYOP.

**Protecting the force will remain a high priority for intelligence collection.** Collection should not be equated with hostile penetration of a country’s internal affairs; in fact, open sources may be an excellent source to determine agendas and patterns of operation and to identify factional territory. A comprehensive intelligence analysis can help commanders avoid hostilities during the conduct of FHA missions. Intelligence operations during FHA operations are generally conducted in the same manner as in any other military operation. An intelligence architecture for the operation will be required to enable the commander to fuse all-source intelligence in a timely manner, enhancing visualization of the operational space. Normal tasking and reporting channels should also be used. Provisions will have to be made for working with governments for which no previously established intelligence agreements exist and for exchanging security-related information with NGOs and IOs. Consideration must also be given to the use of, and growing dependency on, imagery assets in order to enhance information gathering and intelligence collection. National, theater, and tactical collection systems can be tasked to provide current imagery of the crisis area. Examples of how imagery can be used include determining the status of an area’s transportation network following an earthquake or flooding and locating large groups of dislocated persons. Because of NGO and IO sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military organizations, use of the term “information” vice “intelligence” must be used. Those organizations must not have the perception that their neutrality is compromised by providing intelligence to the military. Finally, consideration should also be given to answering the intelligence requirements of adjacent task forces as well as theater- and national-level requirements. Classification and releasibility standards for intelligence and/or sensitive information should be determined early in the planning process and reviewed as the operation proceeds.

12. **Security**

For the joint force, **force protection is a high priority.** Even in a permissive environment, the joint force can expect to encounter banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminals or unruly crowds. It is imperative that the joint force be trained and equipped to mitigate threats to US personnel. All deploying members should be provided with threat and/or force protection briefings prior to and throughout the duration of the operation.

a. As in any operation, **force protection in a FHA is enhanced by establishing effective counterintelligence support and by practicing strict operations security.** All available means of intelligence sourcing should be fused into tailored data useful to operational personnel for deployment planning, mission requirements, and other unforeseen taskings as they arise.

Counterintelligence support will be conducted in accordance with JP 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.

b. In addition to force protection, **the joint force may also be tasked to provide security for other personnel and assets.** If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of:
• Allied forces working jointly with the United States;
• USG, NGO, and IO personnel and equipment;
• HA recipients;
• Affected country personnel and assets;
• Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes;
• Relief distribution centers;
• Stocks of FHA supplies; and
• Ports and airfields.

c. When an FHA operation occurs in an area torn by war or civil strife, security operations may include removal of booby-traps, mine-clearing, and other ordnance disposal efforts. For example, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, French forces provided explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to clear mines emplaced during the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict.

NOTE: No member of the Armed Forces of the United States providing humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) under title 10, USC, section 401 can engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destruction of land mines unless for the specific concurrent purpose of supporting US military operations.

d. Regardless of the environment, security must be factored into force requirements and support capability. In FHA operations, combat service support assets will require a substantial amount of their troops to protect unit and individual property.

13. Rules of Engagement

ROE are the directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE define when and how force may be used. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, provides ROE that apply to US forces during all military operations, unless directed otherwise by the NCA. For each specific operation the JFC, in conjunction with the J-3 and the legal advisor, develops ROE (as soon as possible after notification of the deployment) within the framework of the standing rules of engagement (SROE). The proposed JTF ROE must be forwarded to the Joint Staff for NCA review and approval prior to promulgation. In many situations, the mission may require specific ROE measures in addition to the basic SROE. Supplemental measures in the SROE enable the commander to obtain or grant those additional authorities or restraints necessary to accomplish the mission. The JFC must submit the changes through the appropriate approving official. When multinational forces are under US control, US commanders need to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in the same manner as US forces. When multinational forces are involved in the operation, but not under US control, US commanders should request that those forces adopt or agree to ROE similar to or compatible with those in effect for US forces. As a minimum, US commanders must understand the differences in the various participating countries’ ROE and the impact on operations.

Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” further discusses ROE.

14. Legal Considerations

Many aspects of FHA operations require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of both the planning and operations staffs and legal advisors should review and assist in preparing status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), ROE, OPLANS, OPORDs, and
especially any agreements or memoranda of understanding established between US forces and the affected country or nonmilitary organizations involved in FHA operations.


15. Liaison

Direct, early liaison with UN and other humanitarian relief agencies is a valuable source of accurate, timely information on many aspects of the crisis area. OGA, UN, NGO, or IO involvement is likely to precede that of US or multinational forces and presents an opportunity to significantly enhance early force effectiveness. A key additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based upon trust and open communications among all organizations. For that reason, ongoing liaison with other multinational forces participating in the operation is equally important. FHA planners should ensure that an adequate number of competent linguists be available early in the operation for translation and/or interpretation services, both with other multinational forces and with the HN. Area-qualified CA personnel are well suited for liaison tasks.

Appendix E, “Liaison Officer Procedures,” details responsibilities of a military LNO.

16. Media

a. Public information presented through the media promotes national and coalition policies, aims, and objectives in humanitarian operations. Explaining what the United States intends to achieve and why it is important helps gain public understanding and support for the operation. This also helps opponents understand what the United States and its coalition partners expect. The way to effectively orchestrate these strategic communication efforts is laid out in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, International Public Information (IPI).

- The goal of this directive is to ensure that all agencies of the federal government work toward a common goal by speaking with one voice that communicates a consistent message to the international audience. It helps the United States coordinate its messages and “get out in front of a crisis,” rather than taking a reactive stance. The idea is to pro-actively provide information to the media, with one organized and orchestrated effort to get friendly messages across through all relevant USG agencies.

- The directive establishes an interagency core group (ICG) to integrate the PA activities of all government departments into an overall communication strategy to deal with a humanitarian operation. It is headed by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

  - Participants in the ICG include assistant secretary-level representatives from the State Department, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAID, National Intelligence Council, NSC, and other offices or agencies as the situation requires. The ICG establishes sub-groups to address regional issues or deal with crises as they arise.

  - Information from the ICG, the Department of Defense, and various levels of command is disseminated through PA guidance. This guidance is essential to ensure consistency across the entire spectrum of the global information environment. The guidance changes weekly, daily, or hourly as the political and military situation changes. Commanders should strive for the
release of consistent information and messages at all levels of command. One effect of the global information environment is that the public can simultaneously receive information about military humanitarian operations from a variety of military units. Sources in theater and at the Pentagon are often quoted in the same media reports. Conflicting messages or information can cause skepticism and undermine public trust and support for the operation. Commanders should ensure that the JTF puts forth a consistent message through its many voices. Information and messages should be appropriately coordinated and be in compliance with official DOD, supported command, Service, and major command guidance before it is released to the public. Commanders at all levels should serve as the primary spokespersons for the humanitarian operation, using key messages developed by the ICG and PA guidance from the Department of Defense and the various levels of command.

b. The JFC and staff should expect and prepare for extensive media coverage during FHA operations. Visual media in particular can significantly influence public opinion. A positive image is a force multiplier; therefore, media coverage of improved conditions will help sustain public support and also build morale. Some images may have negative connotations for the media if they are not used to covering FHA operations. For example, barbed wire used to maintain a secure area to keep groups of displaced persons segregated from each other and the local population could be viewed as similar to concentration camps by media not familiar with FHA operations. Therefore, the reasons and problems associated with this should be explained to the media.

c. While negative media coverage can adversely impact FHA operations, members of the joint force should avoid giving the impression that continued access hinges upon favorable reporting. The only expectations should be that reporting is objective, it subscribes to the fairness doctrine (fair and unbiased reporting), and it respects the rights and dignity of others.

d. The media should have as much access as possible throughout the operation, necessitating a refined PA strategy. This may be achieved by establishing a JIB within the operational area. The information operations cell will ensure that there is centralized information dissemination and close coordination between the JIB and other participating agencies and organizations. Effective interagency channels of communication are a byproduct of this coordination. Additionally, force commanders should plan media support.

e. PA personnel should monitor military contact with the media. Such contact can have significant impact at all levels for the United States and its friends and allies, especially since the world image and its perception of the operation may change based on media coverage, as learned during other FHA operations.

f. Some techniques or guidelines for dealing with the media include the following.

- **Understand and use PA and media resources.** PA personnel should serve as advisor to and spokesperson for the JFC on media matters.

- **Remain within a defined area of expertise and recognize limits of authority and responsibility.** Overextension of either can negatively
impact the mission. Unit members should limit discussions with media to issues within their immediate knowledge and operations experience. Media queries beyond this guidance should be referred to the unit public affairs officer (PAO).

- **Know the rules.** Rules governing information treatment should be understood throughout the chain of command. Ensure that restricted information is defined and protected.

- **Don’t build unrealistic expectations** of upcoming operations through comments made to the media.

- **Project humility.** Include the “team” when describing accomplishments, i.e., multinational forces, OGA, HN, UN, NGOs, and IOs.

- **Provide accurate information** (within operations security constraints) as soon as possible. Don’t attempt to hide bad news. Keeping commitments made regarding media announcements is critical to favorable media reporting.

- **Refer reporters to the unit PAO or spokesperson** when receiving a request for an interview or for information going beyond published guidelines established in DOD Public Affairs Guidance for the contingency.

  Refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, for additional information.

### 17. Command Information

Commanders must fill the information needs of their personnel. Providing effective command information is a critical element in maintaining morale and unit effectiveness. Military personnel need information about the environment in which they are operating. They need to know that their contribution to FHA is valid, moral, and supported by the American people. The role of command information cannot be underestimated or minimized.

### 18. Dislocated Civilians

An FHA operation will often involve dislocated civilians and refugees in

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**OPERATION SHINING HOPE**

In the spring of 1999, Serbian aggression in the Balkans forced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee their homes in Kosovovo and seek refuge in neighboring countries. US European Command established Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE to support refugee humanitarian relief. Planning, design, and construction of three camps in southern Albania capable of supporting 60,000 refugees began almost immediately. United States Air Forces in Europe civil engineers, using contractor support through the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and along with Navy Seabee forces, completed one 18,500-person camp in just 51 days with two additional camps well underway. Lessons learned from this experience stress the importance of early, active, and continuing involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United States Agency for International Development, and the nongovernmental organizations who will eventually operate the camp. This is essential to appropriately balance and incorporate the needs of the refugee population to be supported.

VARIOUS SOURCES
particular. International law prohibits the forcible return of refugees to their country of origin or to any country where life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The joint force role in providing for and protecting these groups will depend on the mission. In rare instances, joint forces may be called upon to establish refugee/displaced person camps in an HN. In these cases, the JTF must take into account: legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for camps; coordination with the HN, UN, NGOs, IOs, and OGA; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, and medical care; and possible contracting requirements for construction. If called upon to establish and operate camps, the joint force can refer to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies and the United States Joint Forces Command Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Migrant Camp Operations as excellent references. The general policy of the UN is that where refugees are present, the affected country will provide security, safety, assistance, and law and order. Additionally, military forces are not normally present in camps run by UNHCR. UNHCR will, upon government request, normally provide material assistance and protection to refugees. The ultimate goal is to return dislocated civilians to their homes. Although typically involved in the early response to a crisis involving dislocated civilians, US forces may be tasked by the NCA to provide any portion of this assistance.

Appendix A, “Legal Issues,” provides additional information regarding the legal aspects of dislocated civilians.

19. Medical Support

For the joint force, force health protection is a high priority. Over 90% of casualties in modern warfare scenarios have been as a result of disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) as opposed to battle injuries. Food, water, blood products, high levels of industrial pollution, and indigenous diseases combine to provide a high-risk environment for all assigned personnel. Medical forces are normally deployed with the joint force to provide medical care for the deploying US forces. US military medical personnel do not routinely care for refugees unless specifically authorized. If authorized, US forces may also provide health care to foreign civilian populations on an urgent or emergent basis (within resource limitations) and return them to their national health systems at the earliest opportunity or when services can be provided by other agencies and organizations (NGOs). FHA operations may place US forces in situations that may substantially increase the risk of DNBI. Exposure to foreign civilian populations potentially carrying endemic diseases as well as disease outbreaks as a result of a natural disaster are all factors increasing the DNBI risk. DODD 6490.2, Joint Medical Surveillance, and DODD 6490.3, Implementation and Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for Deployments, mandate that the Department of Defense monitor and identify both long- and short-term health effects of US forces during deployments. This requires that the JTF have robust preventive medicine assets to perform medical and environmental health risk assessments and identify effective preventive medicine measures to counter the threat to US forces. In addition, the significant roles that public health and communicable disease control play in FHA missions further support the need for robust preventive medicine assets.

For additional considerations for providing HSS in FHA operations, see Appendix G, “Health Service Support in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.”
20. Religious Ministry Support

The structure of the joint force should include adequate religious ministry support for the deployed force. Religious ministry support refers to the full spectrum of professional duties, to include providing for or facilitating essential religious needs, spiritual care, and programs to enhance morale, as well as the moral and personal wellbeing of deployed personnel. Some guidelines for planning chaplain support during FHA operations include the following.

- In multinational operations, chaplains have primary responsibility for providing ministry and pastoral care to their own nation’s Services.

- In coordination with medical personnel, chaplains may serve as a resource to the commander for the conduct of predeployment stress management, “trauma debriefing”, and counseling during execution of the operation.

- Chaplains may provide the religious rites, consistent with their faith, for mass burial if required.

- When appropriate, and in coordination with the CMOC, chaplains may serve as liaison with NGOs that have a religious affiliation. Additionally, chaplains can assist in the coordination for distribution of HA supplies arriving from churches and other religious organizations. It is recommended that chaplains document the following items to ensure accountability:
  - Who provided the donations;
  - Where they were issued; and
  - Identity of recipients.

- In coordination with CA personnel, chaplains may provide pastoral support to refugees and dislocated civilians only when directed by the JFC after consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). In such cases, it is critical to avoid any activities that can be construed as proselytizing among refugees or displaced persons for one particular faith. The chaplain pastoral mission generally is limited to US military and DOD civilian personnel and, if required by the circumstances, to fulfill any obligation the JFC may have to protected persons under international law.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

During Operation RESTORE HOPE, the Somalia Joint Task Force Support Command was responsible for morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR), yet had no authorized resources to do so. Experienced units prepared and fared well through D+45, but afterwards expendables required replacing. Coordination through the Third US Army with the Army Air Force Exchange System and Armed Forces Radio and Television Service resulted in recreation equipment being replenished, establishment of a film library, and radio and television broadcasts. Most of these programs were funded with nonappropriated funds (NAFs). In some cases, NAFs are not available to fund MWR programs, leaving only mission or contingency funds for this consideration.
For more detailed information on religious ministry support, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.


Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are essential in order to relieve stress and raise morale. Additionally, MWR programs can enhance force protection when a force is operating in a hostile environment by providing activities for the troops in a secure area. The joint force must have the capability and mechanism to assess, plan, fund, and deliver MWR to US and if required, multinational forces as well. The combatant command Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1) has the responsibility to coordinate external MWR support to a joint force, and the J-1 has responsibility within the operational area. The JFC may designate one component command as executive agent to provide external MWR operational and logistic support to a designated joint force. MWR for FHA operations and other contingency operations should be funded by Service component commands through appropriated funds. While nonappropriated funds (NAFs) such as unit funds may be expended in conjunction with contingency operations, use of other NAFs may not be desirable because there is currently no legal authority for reimbursement of NAF accounts. Additional information regarding MWR support may be found in JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

22. Change of Mission

Periodic review of the mission statement will determine whether the force’s actions still support the NCA and supported JFC’s intent. The JFC must be prepared to react to a change of mission during an FHA operation, as directed by the chain of command. The JFC must also guard against an unintentional change of mission, sometimes referred to as “mission creep.” A clearly articulated end state and appropriate MOEs help the JFC protect against this phenomenon. Other organizations involved in the operation may have differing views of the desired end state, and request support from the joint force that falls outside the stated mission. Although these requests may seem logical and within the joint force’s capabilities, the JFC must be pragmatic when dealing with these organizations’ attempts to change the joint force’s mission without NCA direction.

23. Transition or Termination

Transition or termination occur when either the mission has been accomplished or when the NCA so directs. Criteria for termination or transition may be based on events, MOEs, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity against the FHA operation are statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US forces’ involvement. When other organizations (such as OFDA, UN, NGOs, and IOs) have marshalled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

a. Transition may occur between the joint force and a variety of elements, such as the affected country, the UN, or other nations’ forces. A detailed plan addressing the various FHA functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes
capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms, not loaded with military jargon, is particularly required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific FHA functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition. The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

b. Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions as well as disposition of military forces. Operation plans and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPLAN.

c. Mission transition planning will be continuous and will be accorded equal priority with execution planning. At the outset, the joint force will work in close cooperation with the supported combatant commander, HN, and other participating agencies to define the desired end state of the involvement of US military forces in these FHA and disaster relief operations. Universally understood and accepted MOEs

**Figure IV-4. Transition Model**
will be developed that indicate achievement of each element of the end state and provide the basis for timely and orderly redeployment of the joint force, while preserving continuity in the long-term relief operations.

d. Concept of Transition. Mission transition planning will be continuous throughout the operation. Specifically, it identifies the functions and tasks being performed by the joint force and determines which functions may be terminated when either the requirement no longer exists or is transferred to the HN or others. The transition plan consists of four phases (see Figure IV-4).

- **Phase A — Assessment:** identifies the functional tasks that require transfer or termination along with the organizations that agree to accept the transfer.

- **Phase B — Observation and Orientation:** familiarizes transfer organizations with the transfer tasks.

- **Phase C — Integration:** increases the level of HN and/or relief organization involvement while proportionally decreasing the level of involvement by the joint force. Use of mutually agreed-upon MOEs to build support for functional tasks will help expedite the integration phase.

- **Phase D — Hand Over:** consists of a complete transfer of tasks to either the HN or relief organizations. Completion of Phase D is the condition for transition to redeployment. An engagement plan for relief organizations supports all four phases of transition to encourage early commitment and participation. This plan would comprise confidence building measures, selected elements of the public affairs plan, and selected elements of military information operations. Confidence-building activities might include such activities as training humanitarian relief workers in radiation monitoring techniques and decontamination procedures during CM of a nuclear incident or other activities specific to a particular FHA operation.

e. Phasing the Transition

- **Phase A — Assessment**

  - **Concept.** The assessment phase consists of a review of the functional tasks being performed by the joint force and determines whether these tasks can be terminated or transferred. This process is conducted in conjunction with, and with the concurrence of, the DOS through the US Ambassador. This phase also identifies the agencies, HN, or humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) most capable and willing to assume the functional tasks performed by the joint force. This phase is complete when all functional tasks have been identified for either transfer or termination and the HN and/or HROs have been identified and accept responsibility for performing that functional responsibility.

  - **Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to review the functional tasks performed by the joint force and determine which long-term tasks will be handled by the HN and the HROs. The method is to identify functional tasks for either transition or termination. Once determined for transition, the appropriate HN and HRO is identified to assume that functional responsibility. The end state is achieved once the long-term transfer tasks have been identified and affiliated with the agency or organization willing to accept responsibility.

- **Phase B — Observation and Orientation**
**Concept.** This phase builds on the analysis and agreements obtained in Phase A. The organizations identified for transfer duties will observe the functional tasks that the joint force is currently performing. The objective is to effect a seamless transfer of functional tasks from the joint force to transfer organizations without any loss of support or international commitment. This phase is complete when transfer organizations have their required assets in place in accordance with the timeliness previously agreed upon. Care should be taken during this phase to ensure that the nonmilitary audiences involved do not perceive joint force efforts as a way to impose military procedures on their own time-tested approaches. In some cases, joint force elements may be performing civilian tasks because of a lack of civilian resources rather than lack of civilian skill. In fact, many civilian FHA skills may be superior to those of military personnel.

**Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to orient and familiarize transfer organizations with the functional tasks being performed by the joint force. When necessary for use, the method is to educate, orient, and train or familiarize the HN and HRO’s leadership on the functional tasks and methods employed by the joint force. The end state is the alignment of the HN or appropriate HRO with the component of the joint force currently performing the assigned function.

**Phase C — Integration**

**Concept.** Integration is defined by the HN and HROs’ participation in functional tasks supporting the HN, not the HN and HROs’ integration into the joint force. The integration phase initiates the direct involvement of the HN and HROs in the functional tasks being performed by the joint force that will require long-term continuation. The objective is to increase HN and HRO levels of support (within their capabilities) until they assume full responsibility for the functional support. Progress is quantified by the percentage of functional task support provided by each agency over time. This phase incrementally increases the level of involvement by the HN and/or HROs while proportionately decreasing the level of involvement by the JTF. The use of universally understood and mutually accepted MOEs will facilitate integration of the HN and HROs by building mutual support for the functional tasks. This phase ends when all functional elements performed by the joint force are capable of being transferred to properly trained, equipped, and capable organizations.

**Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to initiate and progressively increase the level of support provided by the HN and HROs until they are capable of sustained operations in their assigned functional area. Critical to this integration is the continual monitoring of the MOEs to ensure no lag or loss of support to the HN. The method is to progressively increase levels of HN and HRO involvement in performing joint force-run functional tasks. The end state is realized when all functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations, fully trained, equipped, and capable of performing sustained operations.

**Phase D — Hand Over**

**Concept.** The hand over phase culminates with the end of joint force direct involvement in humanitarian support to the HN. The objective is a seamless transfer of responsibility for
functional tasks from the joint force to the HN or HROs. These organizations must also be fully trained, equipped, and capable of assuming their functional tasks over the long term. These organizations must also be perceived by the public as being credible and capable of performing their assigned functional tasks. Progress is marked by the hand over of specified functional tasks to non-joint force organizations. This phase ends when all functional areas performed by the joint force have been successfully assumed by either the HN or HROs.

**Intent.** The purpose of this phase is to hand over all functional tasks performed by the joint force to either the HN or HROs. The method is to train capable HN agencies or HROs, incrementally increase their involvement, then disengage when they reach a mission-capable state. The end state is realized when all functional tasks are being performed by non-joint force organizations without the presence of the joint force.

24. **Redeployment**

**Redeployment planning should be conducted simultaneous to joint force deployment.** Redeployment considerations depend upon mission accomplishment and diminished requirements for military support. FHA functions conducted by the joint force should be transferred to humanitarian relief agencies when the capability exists for transition without support degradation. Redeployment by function is efficient and ensures that each FHA requirement is met or responsibility is assumed by other entities (affected country, UN, NGOs, or IOs). Commanders should continually evaluate mission requirements and redeploy unnecessary forces as soon as possible. Personnel rotation plans should also be considered for operations conducted over extended time periods.

25. **Consequence Management**

a. **General**

- DOD support to CM has much in common with disaster relief procedures, as discussed previously. DOD support to foreign CM operations is concerned primarily with specialized assistance provided in support of DOS, the LFA, or in response to the use of a CBRNE WMD against an ally, regional friend, or a vital interest of the United States. US forces may conduct operations in a designated JOA to minimize the damage stemming from incidents involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRNE contaminants and/or detonations of conventional high explosives causing significant civilian casualties or damage to critical infrastructures. These are CM operations for the purpose of this publication.

- Crisis management operations may also be conducted in conjunction with or preceding CM operations.

*Tactics, techniques, and procedures for CM operations are found in JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, CJCSI 5113.01, CJCS Counterproliferation Charter, and CJCS Counterproliferation Strategy as well as related documents and plans.

b. **Interagency Operations.** The primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign WMD incident resides with the HN government. Once the HN requests US assistance, DOS serves as the LFA for the operation. DOD support will be part of the US response and will be coordinated through the appropriate COM and the Country Team. DOD support to
foreign CM provides needed assistance until such time as other agencies can assume CM missions and tasks; then US forces can return to their warfighting posture. DOD CM support will be provided according to one of the following scenarios.

- **HN-Requested Assistance.** A sovereign government requests assistance directly from the United States through the resident COM, and the NCA directs the Department of Defense to commit assets or forces to assist, augment, and complement the HN’s indigenous CM efforts. In this scenario, all DOD assets would be placed under the command of the combatant commander. All USG support would be coordinated by the resident COM and the Country Team.

- **International Relief Effort.** A sovereign government requests assistance through the UN or an internationally recognized regional alliance council and the NCA directs the Department of Defense to furnish assets as part of a multinational relief force. In this scenario, all DOD assets would be commanded by the combatant commander. The provision of USG support would be governed and coordinated by existing or special agreements or arrangements.

  c. **Multinational Operations.** In most cases, the United States will not conduct these operations unilaterally, but with HN, allied, or coalition forces, or as part of a multinational relief effort. Also, multinational and bilateral agreements may exist, which may contain stipulations for providing emergency or disaster relief assistance. Multinational considerations for combatant commands include the following.

  • Exact composition, disposition, and readiness state of potential allied or coalition relief personnel and equipment.

  • Precise delineation of what each member of a particular multinational force has agreed to provide (e.g., personnel, equipment, supplies) under the auspices of existing bilateral agreements.

  • Multinational procedures for activating, mobilizing, and deploying relief forces. In addition, individual nation member mobilization capabilities and adequacy of organic transportation assets must be understood to forecast alliance response times.

  • Validating and, where necessary, establishing liaison with multinational relief agencies and military commands.

  • Unique capabilities and limitations of each multinational structure. Combatant commands may find it useful to develop and maintain a readily accessible database detailing what each nation in a particular multinational structure is capable of providing in support of operations (e.g., decontamination capabilities and doctrine, level of training in decontamination operations, types of earthmoving equipment available, specialized medical expertise available, medical supply limitations).

  d. **Joint Operations Area.** For deliberate planning, a combatant commander will designate the JTF JOA. It should include its land, sea, and air space. If necessary, the NCA may designate, limit, or redefine existing AOR boundaries to accommodate the JOA. The specific JOA will be coordinated with the combatant commander and designated in the CJCS Warning Order.
Chapter IV

e. US Force Planning. A JTF may be activated and employed to support a joint force in response to a foreign CBRNE incident (see Chapter II, “Organization and Interagency Coordination,” paragraph 3)). A combatant command’s initial planning tasks include identification and designation of command and force structures and staffs. Combatant commanders will identify required forces and formulate force augmentation requirements to the Joint Staff for resolution. Incident-specific JTFs may be developed and comprised of force modules that can be added to or deleted from based upon incident severity and magnitude. Such a force might include, for example, a joint radiological control group comprised of expert personnel from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Energy (DOE), Service NBC units, and the Armed Forces Radiological Research Institute. Such an organization would have capabilities for training, decontamination, aerial and ground monitoring and survey, predictive modeling, and hazards and effects planning. Factors affecting JTF force organization and allocation include the following.

- Scope of the anticipated mission.
- Anticipated threat to be encountered during deployment, employment, and redeployment.
- Forecasted reaction time.
- Geographic location, size, and nature of the management task and objective.
- Political situation in the region and nation involved.
- Special requirements, e.g., equipment and technical expertise.
- Availability and readiness of combat support and augmentation forces.
- Availability of communications support.
- Presence or absence of permanent combatant command headquarters in theater.
- Availability, deployability, and sophistication of allied, coalition, HN, and other resources.
- Availability of pre-positioned stocks (e.g., protective clothing, decontamination supplies and equipment, chemical and biological detection equipment, vaccines, et. al.)
- Anticipated augmentation from allied or coalition nations, to include an evaluation of their readiness. Multinational training programs may enhance the readiness of potential contributors and multinational interoperability.
- Anticipated support from international contracting businesses. In some cases, resources available for hire from international or regional firms may be used to reduce the commitment of resources from the United States. Combatant commands should consider the availability of such firms active in a particular AOR, establish liaison, formulate pre-arranged contracts for activation during times of crisis, and develop in-place mechanisms for acquiring contracting support prior to a crisis.

Further examples of incident-specific JTF and functionally designed force modules are in Appendix L, “References.”

f. Activation and Deployment. Requirements used in joint operations apply to these operations, but will be especially critical because of the nature of consequences involved; that is, mass destruction.
g. Conduct of Operations

• **Pre-positioning of CM Forces.** Combatant commanders may consider the pre-positioning of CM forces when developing regional CM plans. The NCA may direct that CM forces be pre-positioned at the site of a potential NBC incident or to an intermediate staging location. Combatant commanders’ planning should include stipulation for activation, marshalling, and movement of the JTF or selected components to a particular incident site or staging base. Pre-positioning of CM assets facilitates immediate assistance to the HN forces in the event the incident cannot be prevented through other means.

• **Phases of Operations and Planning Tasks.** CM operations may be designed around the following phases.

  **• Phase I. Situation Assessment and Preparation.** When authorized by the NCA, each combatant commander will provide the Department of Defense’s initial response to any foreign WMD incident. This initial response may be limited to deployment of a headquarters element capable of conducting a situation assessment or evaluation. This headquarters element will form the nucleus for subsequent DOD support and may assume C2 of DOD assets committed to help resolve a CBRNE incident. This phase might typically involve the following actions: (1) Determine incident type; (2) Conduct mission analysis and activation of C2 structure or CM forces for immediate response; (3) Determine availability of combatant command theater and continental United States (CONUS)-based assets; (4) Determine adequacy of existing HN plans to resolve CM incidents and status of HN, allied, international, and nongovernmental assets responding to the incident; (5) Determine status and availability of required movement assets; (6) Conduct necessary medical preparation of US forces; (7) Prepare initial PA guidance and plan formulation; (8) Identify deficiencies in SOFAs that provide for protection of US personnel; (9) Identify and prepare required forces for deployment; (10) Establish liaison with USG, HN, and other agencies and organizations assisting the HN; and (11) Establish liaison and coordination mechanisms with technical organizations within the interagency or nongovernmental arena who may deploy concurrently with the initial foreign emergency support team or other immediate response (such as the consequence management response team (CMRT), or the International Atomic Energy Agency). (12) Begin planning transition of responsibilities and redeployment of US forces by establishing measurable conditions for termination of military support and identifying civilian agencies to assume those responsibilities.

  **• Phase II. Deployment.** Phase II begins with the CJCS Deployment Order designating command relationships and forces to deploy and ends with arrival of forces at incident and supporting locations. The level and type of subsequent DOD assistance will be determined by the type, severity, and location of the incident, by indigenous HN capabilities and requirements for assistance, and by the availability, readiness, and warfighting posture of military forces. Depending upon NCA guidance, the affected combatant commander must be prepared to push assigned and available assets to the incident site to provide immediate
assistance and continue support to deploying forces in theater until all required forces arrive.

**Phase III. Assistance to Civil Authorities.** During this phase, the following tasks would most likely be performed: (1) Be prepared to assume responsibility for the transportation of recovered WMD; (2) Conduct NEO; (3) Assist in isolating the incident area; (4) Validate sampling efforts; (5) Determine downwind or fallout hazard; (6) Assist in the evacuation of civilians from the incident site and surrounding area; (7) Provide security for relief personnel and facilities involved in incident response; (8) Provide advice and assistance to local medical authorities; (9) Assist in conducting triage and providing emergency medical treatment for initial casualties; (10) Assist in providing mortuary support; (11) Assist in search and rescue operations; (12) Assist in decontaminating personnel, equipment, and facilities involved in initial response operations; (13) Assist in initiating a public information campaign to provide necessary information to affected civilians as well as to global and regional media; (14) Coordinate military operations with the civilian response effort; and (15) Assist through CA activities and identify other specialized support requirements. As the operation continues, US forces may: (16) Continue to assist in isolating the incident area; (17) On NCA direction, be prepared to receive additional forces based upon incident severity; (18) Assist in establishing displaced civilian centers; (19) Assist with mortuary affairs and casualty recovery, classification, and processing; (20) Assist in removal and disposal of contaminated debris; (21) Assist in infrastructure repair to facilitate CM operations; (22) Assist in reconstruction efforts to minimize long-term disruption to civil society; (23) Assist in decontaminating personnel and equipment engaged in CM operations; (24) Continue to assist with PA and CA activities; and (25) Establish and monitor conditions for termination of US military support and transition of tasks to US, HN, or other agencies.

**Phase IV. Transition to Civilian Agencies.** Based on NCA guidance, hand off CM operations to HN, allied, UN, or other personnel to complete CM mission.

**Phase V. Redeployment.** Redeploy CM forces in accordance with NCA guidance.

**h. DOD CM Resources.** Commanders responsible for planning and executing CM operations can request support or augmentation from a variety of organizations that provide military technical expertise for specific incidents. Examples of some of these include the following.

- **Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC).** Commander in Chief, United States Joint Forces Command coordinates a cadre of deployable experts designed to advise and assist combatant commanders tasked to conduct foreign CM operations. The JTAC integrates personnel with specialized areas of CM expertise from combatant commander-assigned, Service, and defense agency organizations into a single, on-call, CM planning cell to support combatant commanders. The JTAC possesses organic WMD CM technical expertise in agent analysis and mitigation, contamination reconnaissance, decontamination, and specialized medical advice. The JTAC also possesses access to additional expertise resident in
CONUS-based facilities through a communications network with “reach-back” capability.

• **US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU)**
  - The TEU provides a worldwide, no-notice capability to conduct field sampling, identification and verification as well as monitoring, recovery, decontamination, escort, and mitigation of hazards associated with chemical-biological (CB) materials in compliance with international, Federal, state, and local laws. The capabilities of the TEU are multifaceted to include: technical escort of CB agents, material, and munitions; technical escort of suspected CB agents specimens and samples for laboratory analysis to identify and confirm the use of these agents; render safe and/or dispose of weaponized CB munitions and material; conduct technical intelligence exploitation of foreign CB munitions and material; provide CB response teams to government agencies as required to support national and/or international counterproliferation policy; and operate in hazardous environments.

  • TEU’s basic operational element is the chemical-biological response team (CBRT). The unit can deploy CBRTs from Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. In general, each CBRT is comprised of 12 CB and EOD specialists, but the team composition can be tailored to the mission. The CBRT can be deployed to suspect or actual incidents involving CB agents, munitions, and other hazardous materials. The TEU’s CBRTs maintain a rapid response capability in detection, decontamination (neutralization), containment (packaging), dismantlement (render safe), and disposal (transport and escort only) of WMD containing CB agents or related materials. The CBRT also maintains an information “reach-back” capability to TEU’s emergency operations center for communications with CB agent, explosive ordnance, and disaster response subject matter experts. The TEU’s CBRT teams maintain specialized equipment to accomplish their assigned mission.

• **US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)**
  - This organization conducts research to develop strategies, products, information, procedures and training programs for medical defense against biological warfare (BW) threats and infectious diseases. It develops products such as vaccines, drugs, diagnostic tests, and medical management procedures to protect military personnel against biological attack or against endemic infectious diseases and provides medical and scientific subject matter experts (SMEs), and their technical expertise and guidance concerning prevention and treatment of hazardous diseases and management of biological casualties. The USAMRIID serves as the DOD and NCA reference center for identification of biological agents from clinical specimens and other sources.

  • USAMRIID has many capabilities that can be employed for assessing and evaluating a biological terrorist incident, from initial communication of the threat through incident resolution. The primary capabilities provided by USAMRIID are intellectual capability (consulting), extensive fixed confirmatory and reference laboratory facilities, and the Aeromedical Isolation Team (AIT).
USAMRIID can provide two personnel — a medical doctor with expertise in management of casualties caused by BW agents, and a scientist with laboratory and scientific expertise on BW agents — to participate in the initial response to a potential or known biological incident. The intent of providing the SMEs is to aid in evaluating the threat, aid in characterizing BW agents, assessing impacts resulting from dissemination, identifying protection and treatment strategies, and formulating medical and operational plans for CM and diagnostic support. USAMRIID’s extensive laboratory facilities offer confirmatory and reference capabilities for use by Naval Medical Research Institute’s mobile laboratory and any other agency requiring such services. In addition to the laboratory and BW agent expertise, a limited capability exists to transport one or two biological casualties requiring specialized containment to a medical containment care facility located at USAMRIID with the support of the AIT. The facility has a 16-bed ward with a capability of isolating up to biocontainment level (BL) 3 infectious diseases in a contingency situation. The facility also has a special BL 4 containment care facility with a maximum capacity of two beds and offers additional specialized care capabilities, to include limited intensive care.

Aeromedical Isolation Team. The AIT’s mission is to maintain the personnel, skills, and equipment necessary to transport and provide patient care under high containment for a limited number of individuals exposed to or infected with highly contagious and dangerous diseases that are a result of naturally occurring organisms, BW agents, terrorism, and possibly exposure of field researchers. The AIT is a rapid response unit that can deploy to any area of the world to transport and provide patient care under high containment. Currently, there are no personnel assigned directly to the AIT. The AIT possesses a limited capability, equipment, and staff, which is not feasible for use in a mass casualty situation. The AIT is comprised of two teams, each capable of transporting a single patient. The AIT maintains specialized equipment and required medical supplies to accomplish its assigned mission.

US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team (MCBAT). This organization provides input in the development of operating procedures and training in the management of chemical agent casualties. The MCBAT also provides clinical advice and consultation in matters related to the initial and long-term management of chemical casualties at the incident site. The experts on this team are from the USAMRICD and the USAMRIID. They provide essential medical information during the recovery phase of the operation for the safe return to normal activities. The MCBAT also provides on-site training to medical professionals on the management of CB casualties. The MCBAT is the primary source of medical information dealing with the management of chemical warfare agent casualties for the Federal Government. Through the Federal Bureau of Investigation or agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services, the MCBAT may provide consultation to state or local agencies. The MCBAT will provide requisite consulting information to the OSC by identifying the medical implications to applicable military and civilians. As necessitated, the MCBAT
supervises the collection of biological samples (bodily fluids) for subsequent verification of chemical agent exposure that can be used to facilitate the confirmation, diagnosis, and treatment.

- **US Air Force Radiological Control Team (AFRAT).** This is a deployable team of health physicists, technicians, and equipment. AFRAT provides bioenvironmental support, radiisotope analysis, radiation protection, and consulting support. Located at Brooks Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, AFRAT is deployable within 5 hours of notification.

- **US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).**
  - CBIRF provides a highly trained, rapid response force capable of providing CM (threat identification, casualty extraction, personnel decontamination and medical triage, treatment, and/or stabilization) for terrorist initiated CB attacks in order to mitigate the effects of multiple or mass casualty incidents. As a CM response force, the CBIRF is tailored for short-notice response to CB incidents. It also maintains an information “reach-back” capability to a cadre of CB matter and disaster response experts for consulting purposes.
  - The CBIRF provides a self-contained response in six areas: command headquarters; CB detection and/or identification and decontamination; medical; security; service support; and EOD. It is structured in two parts: the rapid response force that is capable of providing initial incident assessment and limited CM, and a follow-on force. The rapid response force can be tailored to the threat or mission however it deploys with part of the total CBIRF capability of external and internal communications, protective equipment, detection and identification equipment, personal decontamination equipment, medical treatment, mobile laboratory, and casualty airway protection. The remaining CM equipment is transported with the follow-on force. The rapid response force service support element provides contracting support and is capable of procuring logistic support from government and nongovernment sources within the local community near the affected site.

- **52d Ordnance Group.** This organization provides military EOD units in order to defeat or mitigate the hazards from conventional, nuclear, or chemical and biological explosive ordnance and improvised explosive devices, to include WMD. The group routinely provides military support and assistance to civil authorities in CONUS and, on order, provides forces for FHA planning and execution.
  - The capabilities of the 52d Group are multifaceted to include: identification and render safe of foreign and US military munitions (chemical, conventional, and nuclear); disposal of munitions encountered; response and render safe of terrorist improvised explosive devices (IED) (i.e., pipe bombs, booby traps); response for WMD incidents; conduct training in military munitions and IED to law enforcement agencies; and provide continuous support to the US Secret Service and State Department for very important person protection details. Each unit has a variety of bomb disposal tools and detailed classified procedures for handling US, foreign, and terrorist munitions. Their procedures are often classified and not releasable outside of the DOD EOD channels. Included in their equipment are robots for remote
operations, special disrupters and explosive shape charges, and a variety of EOD tool sets for specific explosive ordnance and improvised explosive devices.

• Existing agreements with the Army TEU outline interoperational support between the 52d Group and TEU for missions involving nonstockpile US chemical munitions and for terrorist WMD devices with chemical or biological fillers. Agreements between the Department of Defense and DOE outline roles for the 52d Group for responding to a US or foreign nuclear military weapon incident or to a terrorist WMD with nuclear or radiological components.

• The 52d Ordnance Group has four battalions and 40 companies stationed throughout CONUS. Additionally, forces from the 111th Ordnance Group (US Army National Guard) may be available for FHA planning and execution.

• Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC). The NMRC has multiple missions in the areas of infectious diseases, combat casualty care, and military operational medicine. This section will focus on the mission of the Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP) one of the five infectious diseases research divisions.

• This organization’s mission is to defend against a biological threat in a theater of operations; rapid biological detection methods are essential for prompt medical intervention and successful mission accomplishment. To provide for such needs, the NMRC BDRP has formed a scientific research program for the development of rapid detection and identification methods for BW agents.

• The BDRP has developed a capability that consists of a transportable biological field laboratory expressly for identification of BW agents. The field laboratory can process approximately 50 samples (four to five samples a day for a period of approximately 2 weeks) before replenishment of supplies is required. However, if enough advance notice is given, additional supplies can be deployed. In addition to the capabilities of the NMRC field laboratory, the USAMRIID laboratories provide a confirmatory and reference capability. This support would be required if the results from the NMRC field laboratory assays were all negative and a suspicion of BW agent contamination still existed.

• US Navy Radiological Control Team (RADCON). The Navy RADCON team can provide expert health physics (radiation control and safety) assistance to a JTF. The team is deployable from Norfolk, Virginia within several hours.

• Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). AFTAC, located at Patrick AFB, Florida, provides post-detonation plume trajectory prediction, meteorological modeling, complete plume analysis and characterization, and leading edge technology development for monitoring of CB activities. AFTAC deploys a dedicated C-135 collection platform aircraft stationed at Omaha, Nebraska.

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

• DTRA’s mission is to reduce the threat to the United States from NBC, conventional, and special weapons
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through the execution of technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site inspection, force protection, NBC defense, and counterproliferation; to support the US nuclear deterrent; and to provide technical support on WMD matters to the DOD components. DTRA consolidates a variety of DOD functions to deal more effectively with threats posed by NBC weapons. DTRA is designed to ensure US readiness and ability to respond to WMD threats.

• DTRA maintains a deployable advisory team called the defense nuclear advisory team (DNAT). The DNAT can assist OSCs through the JTF or JSOTF commanders in the management of nuclear-related issues. The DNAT can advise on the DOD assets best suited to meet the requirements of the incident. The medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) may be included in the DNAT. The MRAT can assist medical personnel by providing the most current medical guidance regarding the treatment of radiation casualties.

• DTRA maintains a detailed database on military assets capable of responding to support a CM operation. This database information is available to commanders at all levels who may have the responsibility to plan and conduct CM operations.

i. Other CM Resources

• Department of State, Consequence Management Response Team. The CMRT is an interagency team under the leadership of the DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs. It is designed to assist a US Embassy in preparing for and assisting an HN in a response to an emergency where concern for mass casualties due to exposure to NBC agents exists. An advisory body, the CMRT may provide the following.

  • Technical assistance to the COM.
  • Liaison with the foreign emergency support team, COM, appropriate combatant commander, USG agencies, and others.
  • An assessment of HN emergency needs.
  • Advice regarding the development of USG options for a coordinated CM response.
  • Recommendations for appropriate USG response.
  • Technical assistance to USG agencies and authorities.
  • The establishment of relationships among international relief agencies and organizations.

• The CMRT will be task-organized from any USG agencies to meet specific needs. However, the following organizations are normally members.

  • USAID OFDA is the LFA for FHA.
  • Public Health Service physicians assist with on-site diagnosis, treatment, outbreak control, prevention, decontamination, and isolation.
  • DOD Liaison. This typically consists of a representative from the Joint Staff J-3, who advises the senior USG official on DOD capabilities and responsibilities for foreign CM.


**• Department of Energy, Office of Emergency Response** provides technical specialists that can advise on dispersal pattern of NBC contaminants, short- and long-term health effects, and preventive actions.

**• Department of Energy.** The DOE possesses several agencies and teams that may be called upon to provide expertise and advice during a CM operation.

**• Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT).** The CMPT provides technical advice and supports the development of a CM plan that addresses radiological hazards, medical impacts, mitigation of consequences, and the deployment and use of other DOE assets. Additionally, they coordinate and direct the in-field deployment and use of other deployed DOE teams. The team consists of a team leader, two effects prediction personnel, two health physics and data assessment personnel, two communications and logistic specialists, and one medical advisor.

**• Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT).** The CMHT is activated immediately following the deployment of a DOE asset. They are the exclusive source for coordinating effects predictions, modeling, and data assessment for field operations until the CMPT is operational.

**• Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** The RAP provides the initial DOE radiological emergency response. Under the RAP, there are several radiological assistance teams to assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at the accident or incident scene. These teams also provide advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery.

**• Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).** A NEST provides technical response to resolution of incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search, locate, and identify devices or material.

**• Joint Technical Operations Team.** This team is a combined DOD and DOE team that provides technical advice and assistance to Department of Defense.

**• Aerial Measuring System.** Provides helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial multi-spectra scanning surveys.

**• Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability.** Provides real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a nuclear accident or incident.

**• Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center.** Coordinates Federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities for a nuclear incident.

### 26. Conclusion

FHA has its own set of unique planning and execution considerations. These factors place greater emphasis on human care and survival than do most other military operations. Combining this greater emphasis with other more traditional military tasks makes FHA operations a challenge for US military forces.
CHAPTER V
TRAINING FOR FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”
George C. Marshall
22 January 1948

1. Introduction

As shown in Figure V-1, joint forces may train for FHA operations as a part of routine training and exercise participation, and they may also conduct training for a specific FHA mission. **Mission-specific training falls into three types: predeployment, sustainment, and post-mission.** Predeployment training prepares a joint force to conduct a specific FHA mission. Sustainment and post-mission training allow the unit to continue to execute the FHA mission while focusing on the Armed Forces’ primary mission of deterrence and the subsequent mission of fighting and winning US wars should deterrence fail. Much of the training discussed in this chapter can be conducted during computer-assisted exercises that link various FHA elements.

2. Routine Training

If members of a JTF staff are identified prior to declaration of a foreign humanitarian crisis, they can train as a team. JTF staff training should include standardization of operating procedures, familiarization of capabilities of all Services represented on the staff, knowledge of joint doctrine, and proper procedures for coordinating with nonmilitary organizations routinely involved in FHA operations. **Routine unit training for FHA should include the following.**

a. ROE. Although specific restraints on the use of force will depend on the situation, FHA training should include the concept that the degree of permissible force will be different from that allowed in war. Commanders must be trained on how to request **changes to the ROE** when needed. Training should also include use of non- or less lethal weapons as governed by the ROE.

b. Force Protection. Closely related to ROE, force protection is important in every military operation. Commanders always retain the right and obligation of self-defense. Since ROE in FHA may be very restrictive, units should be proficient in preventive measures that enhance force protection. An example of such a measure is basing as many resources as possible at sea during an FHA operation. Force protection, including force health protection, is important as is physical force protection. Members exhibiting poor food, water, and social contact discipline may be rapidly rendered mission-incapable, and potentially die as a result of the above dangers.

c. Populace Control. Disaster victims may be desperate for relief by the time US
forces arrive in the operational area. Consequently, they may not be willing to patiently wait their turn to receive aid. JTF personnel must be trained on how to control the crowds that will quickly surround distribution points, supplies, and FHA forces. Training should include the use of non- or less lethal technology and PSYOP to control and influence the populace.

d. Other Organizations Involved in FHA. Training exercises should include notional or actual representatives of OGAs, the UN, NGOs, and IOs routinely involved in FHA operations. Additionally members of the media should be encouraged to participate in these training exercises to help foster a viable working relationship between the military and the media. Commanders should place emphasis on developing the skills necessary to coordinate and achieve unity of effort with these agencies. In addition, personnel who may be involved in future FHA operations should take advantage of training offered by some OGAs, such as Agency for International Development/OFDA.

e. Legal Aspects. Training for legal personnel, and use of legal problems in training exercises, should address US and international law relating to FHA operations. Training should also include basic understanding of SOFAs, ROE, fiscal law, emergency contracting procedures, and general surveys of foreign legal systems.

Detailed information on legal aspects is in Appendix A, “Legal Issues.”

f. Media. FHA is often conducted under the close scrutiny of the media. All members of the JTF should be instructed to refer media inquiries to the PAO.

g. Ordnance Identification and Handling Procedures. Some FHA missions occur during or after civil strife or war. During these missions, an FHA force is likely to encounter ordnance emplaced or distributed during the conflict. The FHA force should be prepared to detect and possibly remove these hazards as required to protect the force and complete the mission. US personnel cannot engage in demining activities solely for humanitarian purposes. Removal of mines as part of a combat operation or of those that realistically pose a danger to the joint force is permitted.

Forces taking part in FHA operations should undergo mission-specific training.
h. Medical Assistance. FHA operations may involve mass casualty and medical assistance activities. In addition, medical practitioners are likely to face austere environments and unique medical conditions; proper training is essential to meet these challenges.

i. Lessons Learned. Commanders should incorporate lessons learned from previous FHA operations into their training programs. These lessons can be extracted from the SOF deployment database, joint and Service lessons learned databases, or can be presented by SMEs or mobile training teams from various sources, to include Center for Army Lessons Learned; US Army Peacekeeping Institute; Air Force Center for Lessons Learned; Navy Warfare Development Command Lessons Learned; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Coast Guard Universal Lessons Learned; and the Joint Warfighting Center.

j. Situational Training Exercises. Effective training presents members of the deploying FHA force with situations they can expect to encounter during a mission. By reviewing lessons learned and after-action reports of similar operations, leaders can identify unique situations that their units can expect to encounter. Unit leaders decide what the proper response is in each of these situations, and train the unit accordingly. This response becomes an immediate action drill, and should be well rehearsed by members of the deploying force. Some examples of situations that may be appropriate for FHA training are shown in Figure V-2.

3. Predeployment Training

Once a unit has been tasked to conduct a specific FHA mission, training is tailored to the essential and unique tasks of that mission and the operational area in which it will occur. Predeployment training for the JTF staff must be accomplished quickly. A JTF staff is often an ad hoc organization, established by a combatant commander in response to a specific mission tasking. Members of the staff must quickly determine and prepare for their roles, and learn how to coordinate among themselves and with the numerous other agencies involved in the FHA operation. A combatant commander can facilitate this training process by providing key members from the combatant command staff to serve as the initial core of the JTF staff. This action quickly brings a joint perspective and common operating procedures to the JTF staff. Mission-specific predeployment
training for the JTF may include the following.

a. **ROE.** ROE training is one of the most critical components of predeployment training. Commanders, staffs, and individual JTF members must be ready, before they enter the operational area, to properly apply the ROE. Even if the JTF deploys into a permissive environment, members of the affected population may not be willing to wait for orderly distribution of relief, and violence may ensue. **JTF members must know the limits governing the use of force for protection** of themselves, nonmilitary relief workers, relief supplies, population receiving the aid, and the possible amount of force which can be used to accomplish the mission.
Application of ROE is even more complex if the FHA mission is being conducted simultaneously with another operation, such as a peace operation or nation assistance. After JTF personnel have been briefed on the ROE, they should be required to apply the ROE in situation training exercises, such as a mob or crowd control scenario, prior to deployment.

b. **Regional Orientation.** Personnel need to know the situation they will encounter once deployed. This includes the physical characteristics of the area, the medical threat, and the nature of the disaster that has precipitated the need for FHA. (The medical threat in the area consists of endemic and epidemic diseases, occupational health hazards such as toxic industrial materials, poisonous flora and fauna, environmental hazards, and potential recurrence of events leading to the disaster, such as continued flooding or aftershocks following an earthquake. All deploying personnel must be trained in personal and unit preventive measures to counter this threat.) The regional orientation should also provide information on what steps have already been taken in the operational area to relieve the pain and suffering of the affected population. Regional orientation should include training on the culture and religions of the affected population, to include ethnic influences and distinctive mannerisms. This regional orientation is most effective if conducted by an individual with recent experience in the region.

c. **Medical.** Force surgeons must prepare comprehensive medical threat assessments and a preventive medicine plan. This must be thoroughly briefed to all participants prior to deployment.

d. **Legal Aspects.** Legal advisors need to incorporate the relevant laws of the affected country and any applicable SOFAs and other international agreements into predeployment training.

e. **Multinational Considerations.** If the FHA mission is being conducted by a multinational force, JTF members should be trained on the capabilities and cultures of the forces from other countries with whom they will interact.

f. **Negotiation and Mediation Training.** A conceptual foundation of conflict management and resolution is critical to assist personnel in analyzing and selecting approaches to deal with conflict inherent in FHA operations. Junior members of the JTF may find themselves in situations requiring them either to negotiate or facilitate negotiations.

g. **Unique Skills.** Some FHA missions may require tasks that are not typically part of routine training. Training for these tasks, such as urban search and rescue, must be quickly accomplished during the predeployment phase.

h. **Media Awareness.** All personnel within the joint force should be exposed to training on how to respond to media inquiries as well as procedures for referring these inquiries to unit spokespersons. All personnel should know the mission and the stated end state for the mission.

i. **Lessons Learned.** Once the specific mission and operational area are known, the commander can request assistance from other units and organizations that have either conducted similar operations or have conducted operations in the same area. These lessons learned should be quickly disseminated and incorporated into predeployment training.
j. Situational Training Exercises. The scenarios listed in the previous section on routine training can be conducted in more detail once the specific mission, ROE, and operational area are known. Tasks unique to the specific FHA mission should also be incorporated into these exercises.

4. Sustainment Training

Once deployed, an FHA force may need to continue training for the tasks specifically required for the FHA mission. This may particularly be the case if insufficient personnel deploy with the necessary skills (such as water purification, engineering, or CA). It may be necessary to cross-train some individuals in these skills to continue the mission until experts in each area have arrived in the operational area. Additionally, an FHA force should consider training on warfighting skills during the FHA operation. This may not be feasible due to workload or political concerns, but commanders should at least explore the possibility of conducting this type of training while in the operational area. If at all possible, the JFC should ensure that the Service components are provided an opportunity to train on warfighting skills at the individual and small unit level during an FHA operation in order to better prepare the unit to transition to combat operations in the same (or possibly a different) theater. When conducting warfighting training simultaneously with an FHA mission, unit leaders must ensure that their personnel understand that, although they are training for combat, their actions in the FHA operation continue to be restrained by the applicable ROE.

5. Post-Mission Training

Warfighting skills can deteriorate significantly during FHA operations. At the conclusion of the FHA operation, training is essential to restore full combat capability to both the individual and the unit. Service component commanders must be provided with sufficient time after an FHA mission for training and skill refinement to restore combat readiness. Therefore, unit leadership must begin detailed planning for post-mission training activities well in advance to ensure availability of training resources at home station. A separate but equally important ingredient in post-mission training is recording lessons learned during the FHA operation. It is essential to document successes and failures so that future FHA operators can capitalize on proven techniques and to avoid repeating mistakes. Post-mission training should include recommendations regarding adequacy of system performance and capability, recommended improvements, and ease of operation during crisis events.

6. Conclusion

Units may train for FHA operations during routine training and exercises. Once notified of deployment for an actual FHA mission, the JTF conducts predeployment training, if possible, to prepare for the unique tasks of the mission. Routine and predeployment training are especially important for a JTF staff. Lessons learned from previous operations are an important component of predeployment training, along with application of ROE and interagency coordination. Sustainment and post-mission training prepare the unit to conduct subsequent combat missions.
APPENDIX A
LEGAL ISSUES

Annex A Humanitarian Principles in the Law of Armed Conflict
1. General

Significant and complex legal issues that surround FHA operations make it important that the CJTF understand international and domestic legal principles associated with the mission. Issues involving international law include the law of armed conflict (LOAC), the law of the sea, the status of persons encountered during the mission, and ROE, while domestic legal issues include such subjects as fiscal law, military justice, claims, and intelligence law. These topics are discussed in this appendix.

2. Law of Armed Conflict

DOD policy is to apply law of war principles in every military operation, regardless of how that operation is characterized. See DOD Instruction (DODI) 5500.17, Department of Defense Law of War Program. Specific legal responsibilities associated with armed conflict that may directly influence FHA operations include physical care for civilians or noncombatants, property issues, and law enforcement responsibilities. In most cases, there will be specific HN or US legal provisions applicable to the situation. Many issues may confront the commander that will not be governed by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the commander should consult with the SJA for legal advice on how to address these issues.


3. FHA Forces

Members of FHA forces remain subject to applicable national laws, policies, and regulations of their own nations, including military criminal codes. All US military personnel remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice which will be administered by the appropriate military commander. JFCs are responsible for the discipline and administration of personnel assigned to the joint organization, and may be delegated courts-martial authority by the combatant commander or the Secretary of Defense. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization. Absent international agreement provisions to the contrary, members of FHA forces also are subject to HN law and to actions in HN criminal and civil courts. Therefore, commanders must ensure that SOFAs are in place before any forces are deployed to the area of operations.

More detailed information may be found in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and the Manual for Courts-Martial.

4. Status-of-Forces Agreements

A SOFA defines the legal status of a military force when deployed in the territory of a friendly state. A SOFA does not itself authorize the presence or activities of those forces. The purpose of a SOFA during FHA

Annex A
operations is to define how the sending and receiving states will share their sovereign prerogatives. SOFAs seek to define the rights, immunities, and duties of the force and its members. If no treaty or SOFA exists with the affected country, the Department of Defense must become involved in establishing the status of US forces. Authority to negotiate and conclude SOFAs must be obtained from the DOS under its Circular 175 Procedure (11 Foreign Affairs Manual ch. 720). In cases where time or circumstances do not permit the negotiation of a full SOFA, adequate protection for US forces may be obtained by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and the HN. The DOS will have the lead for this action.

DODD 5530.3, International Agreements, provides guidance regarding the negotiation and conclusion of SOFAs.

5. Legal Status of UN Volunteers

United Nations volunteers (UNVs) are not UN “staff” members and as such are not subject to UN staff rules and regulations. These are persons who are performing functions or assignments for the UN under a contract of employment and are considered “agents” of the UN. The International Court of Justice’s 11 April 1949 advisory opinion established the need for agent protection as a condition of satisfactory duty performance. UNVs are under UN protection and enjoy some of the privileges and immunities accorded to UN staff officials. The 1946 Conventions on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations specify that the privileges and immunities are granted in the interest of the UN organizations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The organizations must cooperate at all times with the authorities of members to facilitate the administration of justice and secure the observance of law to prevent occurrence of any abuse in connection with privileges and immunities. UNVs are assimilated to UN staff members insofar as they shall be immune from legal process in respect to words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity, exempt from taxation by the nation in which performing UNV duties, if different than the nation of citizenship for tax purposes, on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the UN organization, and exempt from national service obligations. The United Nations Development Program Resident Representative is responsible for all arrangements relating to the security and protection of UNVs under the international instruments applicable to the UN and to its employees. When supporting the UN, US personnel may be entitled to expert-on-mission status under the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN. This status provides some protection from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the HN. Commanders and legal advisers should be familiar with The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

6. Legal Status of NGOs

No legal regime governs the status and activities of NGOs. Except for the regionally-oriented Convention of the Council of Europe, no international convention grants NGOs legal personality or authority in the territories of States. NGOs have a national legal status corresponding to the country in which each was established and is recognized. Their national government authorities and those of the affected country are the source of protection for them and their personnel and volunteers. Commanders and legal advisers should be familiar with The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

7. Internally Displaced Persons and Human Rights Law

Human Rights Law is the principal source of protection for internally displaced persons.
Unlike refugee law which only applies when a border is crossed, human rights law proclaims broad guarantees for the fundamental rights of all persons. The International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, forms the main body of Human Rights Law. These instruments guarantee a series of rights applicable to situations experienced by internally displaced populations. These vary from negative rights (e.g., that no one shall be subjected to torture, arbitrary interference with family, home, or privacy, or arbitrary property deprivation) to affirmative rights, such as an adequate standard of living, liberty, and personal security. Although Human Rights Law provides a basis for protecting and assisting internally displaced persons, it doesn’t address some situations such as forcible displacement and lack of access to HA. There is a specific need for protection of persons internally displaced by conflict. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm that during armed conflict those not directly participating in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. Violence, hostage-taking, and outrages upon the dignity of noncombatants during armed conflict are prohibited. As noted previously, the United States applies these principles to all military operations, including FHA. Additionally, Protocol II to the Geneva Convention provides that forced civilian displacement during internal armed conflicts may be undertaken legally only when the civilian’s safety or military necessity require it. If civilians have to be moved for either of these two reasons, their evacuations must be under protected, hygienic, and humane conditions. Relevant factors that may be used in classifying displaced persons include external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.

8. Refugees and Asylum Seekers

International law defines a refugee as a person outside his or her country of origin, who is unable or unwilling to return because of valid fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, social group, or politics. States may be subject to legal consequences for failing to respect the principle of “nonrefoulment” (that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom) or for failing to return refugees back to States under certain conditions. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees remain the principal international instruments benefiting refugees. The United States Refugee Act of 1980 accepts the definition of refugees offered by the 1951 Conventions and 1967 Protocol and also makes provision for annual intakes of refugees from groups of specific humanitarian interest to the United States.

DODD 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge, provides more information regarding this issue.

9. Civilian Detainee Procedures

The detention of civilians during FHA operations will normally be an issue only when HN law enforcement capabilities do not exist. JTF commanders should, however, be prepared to address the handling of civilian detainees within the JOA. Key considerations for development of procedures include:

- Authority permitting detention;
- What conduct warrants detention;
- Who has legal jurisdiction to conduct criminal trials;
• Length of time civilians will be detained or processed;

• How criminals will be imprisoned; and

• At what point detainees can be transferred to some recognized security or police force.

10. Eligibility for Medical Care

A determination of eligibility for care in a US medical treatment facility (MTF) must be made at the highest level possible and in conjunction with the supporting SJA. Each category of personnel who might seek emergency and/or routine treatment (such as DOD contractors, USG civilian employees, allied, coalition, or HN forces, and the like) in a US MTF should be determined prior to initiation of the operation and updated as required.

11. Claims

JTF elements should investigate and adjudicate claims according to established directives and regulations consistent with the terms of a SOFA or other international agreement that includes claims provisions. A single-Service component may be assigned responsibility for processing claims against the USG. Unit level commanders are responsible for investigating incidents of foreign property damage and personal injury or death to foreign nationals alleged to have been caused by JTF personnel unless otherwise stated in JTF command guidance. JTF legal personnel should be appointed as foreign claims commission(s) with authority to adjudicate and pay foreign claims. Single-Service claims authority is established by DODD 5515.8, Single-Service Assignment of Responsibility for Processing of Claims. The supported combatant commander may assign interim responsibility for resolving claims in countries where such assignment has not been made under the directive.

12. Environment

As a general rule, US environmental laws have no application overseas; however, US personnel are to follow pollution control standards of general applicability in the host country or jurisdiction. (Executive Order 12088; DODI 4715.5, Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations). Where country specific final governing standards (FGS) apply, abide by them. In a foreign nation where the designated DOD environmental executive agent has not established FGS, applicable international agreements, HN standards and the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) govern. Particular attention should be paid to the disposal of hazardous waste. FGS and OEBGD only apply, however, to installations and facilities. They do not apply to off-installation operational deployments. Such off-installation activities are governed by applicable international agreements and environmental annexes to operation plans and orders.

13. Law of the Sea

The duty to rescue those in distress at sea is firmly established in customary and conventional international law (Article 98, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982). Asylum seekers have been escaping by sea for many years. Several options are open to the state where those rescued arrive: it may refuse disembarkation and may require ships masters to remove them from the jurisdiction, or it may make disembarkation conditional upon satisfactory settlement guarantees. The state may also require care and maintenance to be provided by the flag country, by their country or state of registry, or by international organizations. A categorical refusal of disembarkation cannot be equated with a breach of the principle of nonrefoulment or refuge through time (because of State sovereignty) even though refusal results in serious consequences for asylum seekers.
14. **Rules of Engagement**

The sensitive political and international nature of FHA operations require that ROE be established and coordinated with other forces involved in the operation. CJCSI 3121.01A, 15 January 00, *Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces*, provides fundamental policies and procedures for US commanders. It is US policy that ROE never limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the unit or other US forces. ROE for FHA operations will commonly be characterized by restraint. All coalition nations operating within a humanitarian relief area should do so under a commonly established ROE, whenever possible. This is essential to assure consistency of response for all participating forces.

a. US military forces follow certain precepts essential to ROE: the first is that a commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend that commander’s unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. The second precept is that at all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality will form the basis for the judgment as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Necessity exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorist(s) exhibits hostile intent. Proportionality requires that the use of force must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to decisively counter the perceived or demonstrated threat.

b. ROE should be coordinated in detail and may change as the operation evolves. Changes to ROE must be rapidly disseminated to all personnel. Commanders at all levels may request changes to the ROE through the chain of command. Figure A-1 is provided as a sample ROE card. These ROE were established for forces conducting FHA operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. Such a card may be carried by all personnel for periodic reference.

15. **Intelligence Oversight and Operational Law**

Intelligence oversight regulations should be reviewed for applicability, especially with regard to relationships between intelligence personnel and American citizens who work for NGOs and IOs. A legal review should be conducted prior to the initiation of intelligence operations to ensure that there is no unforeseen impact upon the mission from the conduct of planned intelligence or information gathering operations.

16. **Fiscal Law**

Fiscal law principles apply to FHA operations. Expenditures in an FHA operation must be for an authorized purpose and made within applicable time periods and authorized amounts. Congress has provided limited authority for the Department of Defense to conduct overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid operations (title 10, USC, sections 401, 402, 2547, and 2561). Generally, all costs incurred by the Department of Defense arising from the conduct of HA operations will be reimbursed by the supported federal agency. Increasingly, HA is provided through the drawdown of defense articles from existing stocks. This drawdown authority is provided for in title 10, USC, section 2318(1)(A). Because drawdown authority is limited to the use of existing defense articles, commanders must be sensitive to the fiscal limitations involved (For example, no new contracts for goods or services may be made using drawdown funds). All expenditures for HA operations should be reviewed to ensure compliance with fiscal law.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your rights to take appropriate action to defend yourself and your unit.

- You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack
- Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop hostile acts
- When US forces are attacked by hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat
- You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission
- Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense

Remember

- The United States is not at war
- Treat all persons with dignity and respect
- Respect local customs and traditions of the host nation
- Use minimum force to carry out the mission
- Always be prepared to act in self-defense

Figure A-1. Sample Rules of Engagement Card
1. General

The international LOAC regulates the conduct of states and combatants engaged in armed hostilities, and is often referred to as the law of war. The LOAC is essentially inspired by the humanitarian desire of civilized nations to diminish the effects of conflicts. It protects both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and safeguards the fundamental rights of civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded and sick. The LOAC also attempts to prevent degeneration of conflicts into savagery and brutality, thereby facilitating the restoration of peace and the friendly relations which must, at some point, inevitably follow the conclusion of hostilities.

2. Basis

Much of the LOAC has been codified by the 1907 Hague Convention and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Hague Convention prescribes rules regarding the methods and means of warfare and establishes humanitarian requirements such as notification of civilians before bombardment. The Geneva Conventions define and prescribe the treatment of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians. Some of the LOAC has never been incorporated in any treaty or convention to which the United States is a party. Yet the United States, like other nations, is bound by the customary rules of international law. Evidence of customary law arises from the general consent and practice of states under the belief that the practice is required by law. Countries may disagree on the application of customary international law. For example, there are two 1977 protocols to the Geneva Conventions that pertain to international and internal armed conflicts, respectively. While the United States has not ratified either of these protocols, it agrees with and follows those portions that are believed to reflect customary international law.

3. Minimum Standards

The LOAC represents minimum standards of civilization. Humanitarian considerations underlie the LOAC. For example, the requirements of uniforms and markings exist not only to assure combatants that enemy targets, and not their own, are being attacked, but to reinforce the protections secured to civilian populations and civilian objects. Prisoners of war, wounded and sick, and the civilian population, are sought to be protected to the maximum extent possible. The international community has sought to identify situations in armed conflict in which humanitarian principles can be invoked to minimize collateral damage while allowing appropriate attacks on military targets without sacrificing material military advantages.

4. Legal Principles

Two principles of the LOAC are necessity and proportionality. The principle of military necessity provides for the right for armed forces to use an appropriate degree or means of force that is not specifically forbidden necessary to achieve the objective sought. The principle of proportionality requires that incidental injury or damage must not be disproportionate to the legitimate military advantages secured by the use of force. The principle of proportionality requires a balancing of the anticipated military advantage of conducting the attack (military necessity) with the risk of civilian casualties or damage to civilian property, as such. The
LOAC only prohibits those attacks in which the collateral damage exceeds anticipated overall military advantage.

5. Cruelties and Atrocities

The armed forces of a state act on behalf of its government and its citizens; cruelties and excesses during armed conflicts may weigh heavily on the conscience of governmental leaders and citizens. Moreover, every nation is sensitive, to some degree, to the reaction of others to its policies; the good will and support of other governments and peoples are important in the overall conduct of foreign policy and achievement of national goals. Reciprocity is a critical factor. If a state fails in the first instance to ensure respect for basic humanitarian rights, its conduct may provoke violations by an adversary. Moreover, international standing to complain of violations by an adversary is seriously compromised. Civilian loyalties may be at stake and compromised by excesses and cruelty. History demonstrates also that the successful negotiation or termination of hostilities may be prolonged or complicated by antagonisms and alienation heightened by atrocity violations.

6. Training

Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that their subordinates understand the principles of the LOAC. Even the appearance of improper behavior by US military personnel can have a significant impact on military operations and may cause a loss of international and domestic support. The command SJA should be tasked to conduct training on the LOAC to all personnel within the command in order to ensure full compliance with the LOAC.

7. Individual Responsibility

Every Service member is responsible for compliance with the LOAC. To avoid violations of the LOAC, military commanders must ensure that its principles and requirements are known and understood by all subordinate personnel. The commander’s servicing SJA is the appropriate person to arrange for or provide training in the LOAC for all personnel.
APPENDIX B
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

1. General

Responses to humanitarian emergencies are by nature difficult to manage. Inefficiency and normal bureaucratic practice compound problems. International authorities are challenged to blend or synchronize the support activities of many agencies at all levels. Synchronization of agencies and organizations with sometimes disparate goals, divergent organizational cultures, and views toward the emergency at hand may be impossible. If synchronization is not possible, then the best that can be achieved may be cooperation, coordination, and consensus.

The UN is the major provider and coordinator of HA around the world. It is responsible to assist millions of lives disrupted by conflict, repression, and natural disasters, placing a huge demand upon its resources and capacity to respond to human emergencies. The UN has thus strengthened cooperation with other organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, and has taken actions to speed its emergency response capability. The organizations described within this appendix are some of the primary international HA authorities that US military personnel will most likely encounter.

More detail is provided in JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

2. The United Nations

The UN is involved in the entire spectrum of humanitarian operations ranging from prevention, mitigation, and provision of emergency relief, through reconstruction and rehabilitation to long-range development. Plans and policy for worldwide humanitarian operations are promulgated by the UN Secretary General and his or her staff, collectively referred to as the UN Secretariat, at the UN Headquarters in New York City. One element of the Secretariat, UNOCHA, oversees coordination of HA. UN agencies which may be involved in HA activities, such as the UNHCR, are headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. UN relief agencies normally establish independent networks to execute humanitarian relief operations. Although the UN system delegates as much as possible to its agency elements located within the field, a supervisory chain or network can be traced from the UN headquarters to field elements.

The UN organization for complex emergencies includes both headquarters and field components. The UN Under Secretary General for UNOCHA, as the UN Emergency Coordinator, serves as the headquarters component. Field-level organization relies on the Resident Coordinator System administered by the UNDP. Prior to confirming the resident coordinator as humanitarian coordinator, the emergency coordinator consults with Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) members. After confirmation, the resident coordinator mobilizes the UN Country Team and provides direction for the field relief effort. A UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination standby team will also be deployed by the emergency coordinator. This team provides a vital link between the field and UNOCHA.

b. UN Response to Emergencies. The gravest threat to human life usually occurs in the initial stages of a major emergency. Many lives have been lost because crucial international actions were not or could not be taken within the early stages of an emergency. The terms of General Assembly Resolution 46/182 provide three vehicles to speed UN response to humanitarian emergencies: the
Appendix B

IASC, Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), and consolidated appeals process (CAP).

• **Interagency Standing Committee.** The IASC is intended to be the primary interagency coordinating mechanism on humanitarian policy issues to expedite international response to emergencies. The IASC is chaired by the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and is composed of the executive heads of the following UN organizations: UNHCR, UNDP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), WFP, World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Other members of the IASC include the IOM, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, InterAction, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response. In addition to the coordination of humanitarian policy, the IASC addresses issues such as access to victims of conflict, security of relief personnel and material, resource mobilization, assistance to internally displaced persons, field coordination of international humanitarian responses, and coordinating transition from phases of emergency response to development.

• **Central Emergency Revolving Fund.** CERF essentially provides a quick source of emergency funding. The fund was created in 1992 and is financed by voluntary contributions. The fund was established as a cash flow mechanism for use by operational UN organizations during the critical stages of an emergency. Organizations repay advances from the fund as donors respond to fund raising requests.

• **Consolidated Appeals Process.** CAP incorporates the emergency relief requirements of UN agencies into one holistic appeal. CAP is a cost-effective way to fund emergency assistance when funding sources become increasingly stretched. The process assists the international relief community to identify the most critical needs and requirements of an affected population and enables donors and agencies to quickly focus efforts and resources where they are most needed.

c. UN Organizations and Programs Involved with Humanitarian Assistance. This section provides information regarding UN organizations and programs that have worldwide HA mandates, and that a commander may encounter during FHA operations. Many other UN organizations have mandates in other functional areas that may impact upon FHA operations. Figure B-1 depicts the structure of the UN. The entities with worldwide HA mandates are preceded by an asterisk.

*JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, provides more detail about the UN.*

• **United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.** The primary mission of UNOCHA is to coordinate international HA efforts. It evolved from the UN Disaster Relief Organization and later the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The Secretary General created UNOCHA to mobilize and coordinate international disaster relief, provide advisory and technical assistance, and promote awareness and information exchange worldwide. UNOCHA also establishes and maintains contact with disaster management organizations and
Commissions established pursuant to SC Res 687 UNSCOM
- UN Compensation Commission
- Iraq/Kuwait Border Demarcation Commission

Tr usteeship Council

International Court of Justice
- UNCTAD
- *UNICEF
- *UNHCR
- IAEA
- UNWFP
- UNITAR
- *UNDP
- *UNEP
- UNU
- UN Special Fund
- World Food Council
- HABITAT
- UNFPA

General Assembly
- Military Staff Committee
- Main committees
- Standing committee
- Other subsidiary organs

Security Council

Secretariat
- DPKO
- UNOCHA
- UNOG
- UNOV
- UNON
- GATT
- ILO
- *FAO
- UNESCO
- *UNWHO
- IDA
- IBRD
- IFC
- IMF
- ICAO
- UPU
- ITU
- WMO
- IMO
- WIPO
- IFAC
- UNIDO

Regional commissions
- Functional commissions
- Standing committees
- Expert Bodies

Specialized agencies and other autonomous organizations

Principal organs of the United Nations
- Other United Nations organs and operations

*Worldwide HA mandate

Figure B-1. United Nations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Organization Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABITAT</td>
<td>Habitat for Humanity International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction &amp; Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAC</td>
<td>International Federation of Automatic Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMR</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific &amp; Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCTYP</td>
<td>United Nations Forces in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Mongolia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India &amp; Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOG</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Geneva</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission, Uganda-Rwanda Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Nairobi</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOMI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia I</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOV</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCOM</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWHO</td>
<td>United Nations World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-1. United Nations (cont’d)
emergency services to mobilize specialized resources and services.

• **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.** This office has two closely related functions: to protect refugees and to promote durable solutions to their problems. UNHCR’s mission is to protect refugees against physical harm, to protect their basic human rights, and to make sure that they are not forcibly returned, according to the principle of nonrefoulement (refuge through time), to countries where they could face imprisonment, torture, or death. Initially, UNHCR’s mandate was limited to people outside their country of origin. Over time, however, as part of its duty to ensure that voluntary repatriation schemes are sustainable, it has become involved in assisting and protecting returnees in their home countries. In many cases, UNHCR also assists internally displaced persons who have not crossed an international border but are in a refugee-like situation inside their country of origin.

• **World Food Programme.** Parallel UN General Assembly and Food and Agriculture Conference resolutions in 1961 established the WFP. Its objectives are to establish international procedures for meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic malnutrition; assist in preschool and school feeding programs; and implement food-for-work pilot projects in support of social and economic development. WFP’s primary task is to furnish food in support of economic and social development projects in developing countries. In addition, substantial resources may be provided to meet emergency food needs. WFP purchases and ships food needed in emergencies on behalf of donor governments, UNOCHA, or the affected countries. WFP staff may assist, when required, in coordinating the reception and utilization of food aid received from all sources. The WFP can be regarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN in disaster situations.

• **United Nations Children’s Fund.** UN General Assembly Resolution 57(I) established UNICEF in December 1946. Its major function is to provide child health services. The overall objective is to reduce infant and child mortality and morbidity and promote child growth and development. The main UNICEF goal is to assist countries develop and expand primary health care systems, maternal and child health services, sufficient and accessible water supplies, and adequate sanitation, health, and nutrition programs. UNICEF uses materials from emergency stockpiles in the UNICEF warehouses in Copenhagen to meet emergency requirements. Its post-disaster interest is medium-term restoration and long-term development of services to mothers and children, and it is postured to provide substantial emergency assistance to these groups. UNICEF can also procure relief supplies on behalf of other UN agencies and relief organizations.

• **Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).** FAO’s primary objective is to raise the levels of nutrition in member states and to improve the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products in developing countries. FAO assists agriculture recovery after natural disasters such as floods and fires. FAO also monitors factors that affect food production and alerts governments and donors to potential food shortages. Through its association with the WFP, FAO oversees food aid provision during shortages. Disaster relief assistance provided by FAO is coordinated by its Office for Special Relief Operations.
• **United Nations Development Programme.** The UN stations resident UNDP representatives in over 112 developing countries. The essential mission of UNDP resident representatives or coordinators is to coordinate development programs in their country of assignment. These coordinators also represent the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator in those countries. UNDP representatives take active part on behalf of UNOCHA by directing relief committees in disaster afflicted countries. They provide a channel for requests from governments on all disaster-related matters. They lead the UN team in assessing emergency disaster relief requirements and coordination of the international response, with staff assistance from UNOCHA. UNDP also undertakes disaster preparedness projects and may provide financial aid to emergency programs. It may further adapt development programs to the needs of rehabilitation and reconstruction after a disaster.

• **World Health Organization.** WHO was established as a special agency in April 1948 in Geneva as a UN specialized agency. Its primary objective is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. It is mandated to direct and coordinate international health efforts. Article 2(d) of its constitution states that one of its functions is to furnish technical assistance and, in emergencies, aid requested or accepted by host governments. WHO is the authority for health and medical assistance during emergency relief operations. It is concerned with medical supply provision, communicable disease control and other public health issues, and technical advice related to equipment and supplies offered by donor governments. At the country level, WHO representatives assist the local authorities to assess requirements of personnel, equipment, and supplies necessary to minimize health hazards to disaster victims.

• **United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).** This UN program focuses primarily on natural disasters. It is concerned with the survey, analysis, and application of existing knowledge in the area of disaster prevention and mitigation. It also works toward development and dissemination of new techniques of forecasting disaster. UNEP also studies the implications of human settlements, habitat, and arid lands.

3. **International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**

Three Red Cross organizations make up the IRC and Red Crescent Movement: the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations. Each component of the movement is independent, although all act in accordance with the fundamental principles of the movement for unity of effort and cooperation. The seven fundamental principles of the movement are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. The objective of the movement is to coordinate their entire range of humanitarian activities. The components of the movement meet at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, with the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 27 July 1929 or of 12 August 1949, normally every four years.

a. **International Committee of the Red Cross.** ICRC is a Swiss Association created under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code. It is a private, independent NGO exclusively composed of Swiss nationals. The ICRC’s supreme policymaking body is called the
Assembly. It is composed of from 15 to 25 members (Swiss citizens). ICRC field operations and administration is managed by its headquarters in Geneva and through delegations set up in areas of conflict and turmoil throughout the world. The ICRC’s mission and activities are international, and not limited to nor oriented toward Switzerland. As an independent humanitarian organization and as the founding body of the Red Cross, the ICRC’s role is primarily to maintain and disseminate the fundamental principles, to recognize national societies, to undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, and to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims. The ICRC is essentially a promoter, custodian, and monitor of international law. It is also an important player in international relief and medical assistance.

b. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This league is an international organization, a federation of 149 national societies. The main functions of the league are to act as the permanent body of liaison, coordination, and study between the national societies; to bring relief by all available means to all disaster victims; to assist national societies in disaster relief preparedness and in the organization of their relief actions; to assist ICRC in the promotion and development of international law; and to be the official representative of the member societies in the international field. The league also acts as the information center for the Red Cross regarding situations caused by disasters and coordinates at the international level the assistance provided by the national societies.

c. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are created by countries to provide for humanitarian relief within their own borders, though in some cases national societies may provide assistance in other, often neighboring, countries.

4. International Organization for Migration

IOM is a specialized intergovernmental body of 35 member countries and 17 observer states. It is a non-political humanitarian organization, with a predominately operational mandate. The IOM has the following main functions: the handling of orderly and planned migration to meet specific needs of emigration and immigration countries, the processing and movement of displaced civilians, and other persons in need of international migration services to countries offering them resettlement opportunities, the transfer of qualified human resources to promote the socio-economic advancement of developing countries, and the provision of a forum to states, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to exchange views and experiences on international migration issues. In all migration activities, IOM arranges for reliable transportation at reduced costs and seeks financial support for movement of migrants and refugees.
Intentionally Blank
1. Approval Authority

Except in cases of emergencies where the OSC determines immediate response is required (see paragraph 5, “Immediate Response”), DOD components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the DOS and/or USAID determines that assistance will be provided to the requesting country. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the normal approval authority for DOD resource and services commitment to foreign disaster relief. The DOD coordinator for foreign disaster relief is the DASD(PK/HA). The DOD lead for management of budget allocations in this area is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Joint Staff main point of contact is the Chief, Logistics Readiness Center J-4.

2. General Responsibilities

The Department of Defense provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which normally is the combatant commander. The combatant commander, when directed, assumes the primary coordinating role for provision of DOD supplies and services. The Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM coordinate transportation requirements. The Military Departments and Joint Staff support the designated combatant commander by the coordinating interdepartmental approval and funding processes with DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)). When the request for support comes from a country not encompassed by a unified command (e.g., Russia), the Joint Staff will request an appropriate combatant commander to assume the primary coordinating role in conjunction with DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA. If items requested are not available in the combatant command, or if the request comes from a country not encompassed by a combatant command, DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA will locate resources through Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Services, or a supporting combatant commander.

3. Procedures

Requests for DOD assistance may come from the DOS or USAID, and are normally routed through OFDA to the ASD(SO/LIC). Upon approval, the request is routed to the Joint Staff J-4 for action. J-4 may activate an LRC 24-hour response team, which may be augmented by USTRANSCOM and DLA liaison elements. J-4 provides coordination among combatant command, Service, and defense agency response cells or teams, as appropriate.

4. Funding

DOD activities associated with foreign disaster relief may be sourced using Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds, service operations and maintenance funds during immediate response (see paragraph 5 below) or under some specific legal authority (e.g., drawdown authority), the combatant commander Initiative Fund, funds from other agencies, or a combination of these, depending on the nature of the operation.

USTRANSCOM calculates transportation system shipping costs (normally, using the DOD rate), and conveys that information to DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA and the Joint Staff J-4. DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA forwards cost information to USAID (OFDA) or other agencies, as required.
After cost acceptance by the appropriate agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID, DASD(SO/LIC), and/or OUSD(C)), formal approval to commit DOD materials and services is forwarded from DASD(SO/LIC) to the Director, Joint Staff. This approval contains funding and billing information (including, if possible, fund cites), as well as resource disposition instructions. Fund cites should be provided for each DOD support item. The Joint Staff then forwards the fund cites and other relevant information to the affected Service(s), agency supplier, or USTRANSCOM for each action at the time of request. J-4 (or J-3, as appropriate) develops tasking messages, which should contain fund cites, funding limits, billing addresses, and Joint Staff points of contact, if possible, for each DOD element tasked. Tasking messages will require tasked units to provide clear text itemized billing information and the tasked unit point of contact. The messages should also advise tasked elements that approval must be obtained before exceeding the funding limit; that agencies, such as OFDA, will only reimburse for those items or services requested; and that all bills must be submitted in the next monthly billing cycle following completion of the service or activity.

In the event military units and personnel are required to deploy, the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resource and Assessment assists OUSD(C) in obtaining rough order of magnitude cost estimates from the combatant commander or Service(s). Following receipt of funding approval from DASD(SO/LIC), the Director of Operations, Joint Staff prepares a CJCS deployment order for SecDef approval.

5. Immediate Response

A military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster may undertake prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance. Reimbursement of funds expended under these circumstances is not assured. Responding elements must track costs incurred by maintaining detailed records of expenditures, and provide detailed billing information to support their reimbursement efforts. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, contains guidelines for DOD elements to bill for cost reimbursement for supplies and/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.
APPENDIX D
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

1. General

The Office of the DASD(PK/HA) and DSCA execute a number of assistance programs. This appendix provides a brief overview of these programs and authority for their implementation in support of FHA operations.

2. Excess Property Program

This DOD program makes excess nonlethal DOD property (property that is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or materiel that is designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death) available to foreign recipients. The property must be transferred to DOS, which is responsible for its distribution within the recipient country (title 10, USC, section 2547). Items such as clothing, tents, medical equipment and supplies, heavy equipment, and vehicles are available through this program. The excess property program also provides that NGOs and IOs may acquire DOD excess property in support of their overseas programs. Requests for excess property are forwarded through the US Ambassador, who in turn forwards requests to DOS and the Department of Defense for approval and funding authorization. Since approval can be a very lengthy process because immediate funds may not be available, this program has limited applicability in FHA operations. Transportation costs must also be considered when requesting DOD excess property. Since the primary source of transportation is surface, requesting agencies must understand that delivery of DOD excess property could take several months. This is normally a long-term program geared to long-term objectives, but has been used in crisis situations. This program is of limited value to a JFC in procuring equipment and supplies for use in FHA operations.

3. Humanitarian Assistance Program

Title 10, USC, section 2561 authorizes DOD HA worldwide. This includes funded transportation of cargo donated by USG civilian agencies, IOs, and NGOs, procurement and distribution of relief equipment and commodities, and construction and training programs which provide humanitarian benefits.

4. Denton Space Available Transportation Program

DSCA coordinates the overall execution of the Denton Space Available Transportation Program (title 10, USC, section 402). Under this authority, the Department of Defense transports millions of pounds of privately donated humanitarian cargo from the United States to destinations overseas on a space available basis. Donors coordinate this support through OFDA, USTRANSCOM, and DSCA. Supplies transported under this section may not be distributed, directly or indirectly, to any individual, group, or organization engaged in a military or paramilitary activity. Transportation of this cargo may not be conducted unless the Secretary of Defense determines that:

- The transportation of such supplies is consistent with foreign policy of the United States;
- The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in stable condition;
• There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people for whom they are intended; and

• Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of such supplies in the destination country.

5. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Program

The DOD Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program (DOD Program) is funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation, and is authorized by title 10, USC, section 401. The goal of the DOD Program is the establishment of indigenous, long-term, and sustainable programs within countries approved for support by the PCC subgroup for HMA, through the training of HN demining personnel. Training and equipment for the programs is supplied directly to the HN and, where appropriate, coordination and facilitation of additional support from NGOs is integrated. The umbrella PCC for HMA in the NSC is the PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.

a. Within the Department of Defense, the DASD(PK/HA) is the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (OASD(SO/LIC)) lead agency for providing policy oversight of DOD HMA programs. Guidance and direction on the conduct of military support to HMA operations is provided through CJCSI 3207.01, Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations. The combatant commanders plan, coordinate, and execute HMA operations in their assigned AORs as approved by the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commander’s theater engagement plan is the planning document used to plan and prioritize HMA efforts within the assigned AOR. The combatant commanders assist the recipient countries in the development, training, staffing, and equipping of a viable HN national demining office, mine action programs, and mine awareness campaigns. The combatant commanders normally delegate these requirements to the theater special operations commander (SOC); however, they may be delegated to an appropriate component commander other than the SOC.

b. The following describes the PCC process of HMA program development.

• The PCC subgroup on HMA receives proposals for HMA programs in candidate host countries from the host country through DOS.

• These proposals are reviewed against national policies, legislation, and overarching region-specific and transnational US objectives as well as other established PCC criteria.

• If the country is selected for assessment, DOS leads a policy assessment visit (PAV) to determine the feasibility and applicability of conducting an HMA program on the basis of US policy objectives and national security interest. The assessment is specifically designed to discuss policy issues.

• After a PAV, the PCC approves or rejects the project. If accepted, the country is included in the USG HMA program.

• If the Department of Defense is required to conduct the USG program, the combatant commander conducts a site survey to determine resource, logistic, and infrastructure requirements. Once demining assistance has been approved for a country, the combatant commander will develop a country training plan that includes a COA, constraints and
restrictions, current policy concerns, MOEs, timeline, and detailed resource estimates.

• Once the plan is approved, the combatant commander executes the plan and coordinates with the host country in the conduct of demining training activities.

• The combatant commander submits annual status reports to the Joint Staff and ASD (SO/LIC) throughout the period of US military involvement.

Further information may be obtained from CJCSI 3207.01, Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations. This instruction defines responsibilities and provides guidance for planning and executing military support for HMA operations.

Further information may also be obtained from United States Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Program, 30 September 1994, OASD(SO/LIC).

6. Title 10 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

a. The title 10, USC, section 401 HCA Program is administered by the combatant commander directly, with coordination and approval authority vested in OASD(SO/LIC) and DSCA. The goal of this program is to promote regional security objectives by providing basic HCA. In contrast to activities under the Humanitarian Assistance Program discussed in paragraph 3 of this appendix, HCA activities must be conducted in conjunction with deployments of US forces for military operations. Assistance provided under this program is limited to:

• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country;

• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;

• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities;

• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; and

• Provide advice and training to HN in the detection and clearance of landmines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and removal of landmines. US forces will not engage in mine clearance operations for the HN.

Any assistance provided under this program should first undergo legal review.


b. HCA activities performed under this section will complement and may not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance provided to the country concerned by any other USG agency or Department. HCA may not be provided under this section to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity. Under title 10, USC, section 401, HCA expenses must be incidental to the associated military operation and are paid for out of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose (service operation and maintenance funds). HCA expenses in HMA activities only may include:

• Travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses of DOD personnel providing such assistance; and
• The cost of any equipment, services, or supplies acquired for the purpose of performing or supporting the HCA activities, including any nonlethal, individual, or small-team landmine clearing equipment or supplies that are to be transferred or otherwise furnished to a foreign country in furtherance of the provision of assistance.
APPENDIX E
LIAISON OFFICER PROCEDURES

1. General

This appendix provides checklists and procedures that may be utilized by personnel assigned liaison responsibilities within a JTF, between adjacent units, and between the JTF and higher headquarters.

More information on this subject may be found in JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

2. Responsibilities Prior to Reporting to a Supported Unit or Organization

Prior to reporting to a gaining headquarters for liaison duties, the LNO should obtain information and be briefed thoroughly on the following.

a. The current situation of the unit.

b. Commander’s intent, including a detailed concept of the operation along with supporting maps and overlays. Details such as unit locations, personnel strength, and logistic factors should also be known.

c. Specific information or liaison requirements from each staff section.

d. Communication, automated data processing, and transportation assets provided to meet mission requirements.

e. Required credentials for identification and security clearances. Special systems access to facilitate additional support to the parent, adjacent, or higher headquarters.

f. If it is a multinational operation, language or interpreter requirements.

g. Employment doctrine and operational procedures of both units or organizations.

h. Command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.

i. ROE and SOFAs.

3. Responsibilities Upon Arrival to a Supported Unit

Upon arrival to the gaining unit, the LNO should complete the following tasks.

a. Report to the supported commander or organization representative. Present credentials and offer assistance. Be prepared to brief the supported unit or organization regarding the parent unit’s mission and situation.

b. Establish contact with each staff section, provide required information, and obtain information that is required to be transmitted back to the parent unit.

c. Establish communication with the parent unit and exchange updated information as the situation dictates.

4. Responsibilities During the LNO Tour

During the entire liaison tour, the LNO has the following tasks.

a. Keep current on the situation of the parent unit and supported unit and exchange this information as required.

b. Accomplish liaison tasks without interfering with the operations of the supported unit or organization.
c. Report promptly to the parent unit if unable to accomplish the liaison mission.

d. Report to the parent command on matters pertinent to the liaison mission. Ensure that the supported unit is informed of the content of reports sent to the parent unit.

e. Inform the supported command about any problems being experienced by the parent unit that could effect operations of other commands and vice-versa.

f. Provide any suggestions that will enhance the effective employment of either parent or supported command.

g. Ensure that LNO location is known at all times. Keep the supported and parent staff informed of whereabouts and daily activities.

h. Attend supported unit or organization staff meetings and daily situation meetings as required.

i. Maintain an LNO journal or log of all actions and reports.

j. Be prepared to outbrief the supported unit or organization upon end of tour of duty as LNO.

5. Responsibilities Upon Return to the Parent Unit

Upon return to the parent unit the LNO should complete the following.

a. Brief the commander or staff representative regarding pertinent information and issues received during the LNO tour.

b. Follow up any issues or requests made by the supported commander.

c. Ensure that any information required by higher headquarters is transmitted in each staff operational area.

d. Maintain a current knowledge of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison tasking and requirements.
1. General

This appendix describes a disaster response organization known as the DART. The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid response to foreign disasters as mandated by the FAA. A DART provides a variety of trained specialists to assist US embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response to foreign disasters.

2. DART Variations

DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and complexity of each disaster and are staffed accordingly.

a. Immediate Action. During the initial onset of disasters, the DART focuses upon:
   - Coordinating needs assessments;
   - Recommending USG response;
   - Managing USG on-site relief activities, including search and rescue and air operations;
   - Managing receipt, distribution, and monitoring of USG-provided relief supplies; and
   - Liaison with NGOs, IOs, and UN agencies.

b. During long-term, complex disasters, the DART focuses upon:
   - Collecting situational and general data on the disaster;
   - Monitoring effectiveness of USG-funded relief activities;
   - Reviewing relief proposals for potential funding by OFDA; and
   - Recommending follow-on strategies and actions to OFDA Washington.

c. During either type of disaster response, DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country, NGOs, IOs, UN, other assisting countries, and deployed US military resources, including HASTs formed by the combatant commander.

3. Structure

The DART is structured according to the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster as well as the needs of the affected country. DART staffing is based upon personnel numbers and skills needed to carry out the strategy and meet mission objectives. The DART is designed as a highly flexible, mobile organization capable of adapting to changing disaster requirements. An illustrative structure is depicted in Figure F-1, though the DART structure will vary considerably from operation to operation.

4. Functional Areas

The DART operates in five functional areas.

a. Management. Manages overall DART activities including liaison with the affected country, NGOs, IOs, UN, other assisting countries, and US military. Develops and implements plans to meet strategic objectives.
Figure F-1. Disaster Assistance Response Team Organization Chart
b. **Operations.** Manages DART operational activities, including search and rescue activities, technical support, medical and health response, and aerial operations coordination. This function is most active during the initial onset of a disaster.

c. **Planning.** Collects, evaluates, tracks, and disseminates disaster information. Reviews activities, recommends actions, and develops its operational plan.

d. **Logistics.** Supports OFDA and DART personnel by managing supplies, equipment, and services. Orders, receives, distributes, and tracks personnel and USG-provided relief supplies.

e. **Administration.** Manages team fiscal activities and DART cost accounting, contracts, and procures OFDA DART-required goods and services.

5. **Organization**

Decisions related to DART activation, composition, and mission are made at an OFDA disaster response planning meeting in Washington, DC, by the OFDA Director. An OFDA-selected team leader organizes and supervises the DART. The OFDA Assistant Director for Disaster Response (or designee) delegates authority to and supervises the team leader. The delegation lists DART objectives, priorities, constraints, and reporting requirements. Based on that list, the team leader, in conjunction with the Assistant Directors for Disaster Response and Operations Division, identifies other positions needed. The decisions on a DART’s activation, composition, and mission are made at a disaster response planning meeting held in OFDA, Washington, DC.

6. **Coordination with the USAID Representative to the Embassy**

Prior to departure, the team leader will contact the USAID representative in the affected country to discuss the situation, review DART objectives and capabilities, and obtain additional instructions or authority. While in the affected country, the team leader advises and may receive directions from the USAID representative. Directions will be followed to the extent that they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains direct communications with OFDA to coordinate policies, authorities, and procedures. The team leader maintains direct LOCs with OFDA Washington throughout the operation.

7. **Coordination with the JFC**

Neither the DART nor CJTF is subordinate to the other; a successful relationship is based upon close coordination and mutual understanding of each element’s respective mission. Both have a common purpose and, accordingly, have much to gain through close coordination and unity of effort. In some cases it will be appropriate to have a DART member attached to the CJTF headquarters. The CJTF should be aware, however, that although the DART represents OFDA, which is the lead USG agency for the FHA response, the US Ambassador is in charge of all USG activities in the disaster-affected country.

8. **Duration**

The DART leader and OFDA Washington will review the disaster situation and DART progress in meeting mission objectives. The DART leader and OFDA Washington set the duration of the DART accordingly.
APPENDIX G
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

1. General

In addition to providing HSS for the deploying force, a CJTF may be tasked with providing HSS for the affected population in an FHA crisis. This appendix provides considerations for providing such HSS, if it is part of the mission. Essential tasks for this mission generally include the following.

a. Coordinating actions to prevent or control disease outbreak.

b. Evacuating or temporarily hospitalizing sick, wounded, and injured persons, and coordinating their return to civilian facilities or the parent nation.

c. Distributing supplies and equipment.

d. Assisting in reestablishing indigenous public health resources and institutions. Primary consideration must be given to supporting and supplementing whatever medical infrastructure exists. No operation should be considered that would or could have the effect of supplanting the existing medical infrastructure.

2. Medical Concept of Operations

During an FHA operation, the highest priority should be given to preserving the health of the forces deployed in support of the operation. This is accomplished by an intensive medical intelligence analysis and a vigorous preventive medicine program, especially involving medical surveillance activities. Based upon the mission requirements and medical and/or operational situation, the JTF surgeon and staff will develop a medical concept of operations that will (if possible) combine the efforts of the military HSS forces, NGOs, and the existing medical infrastructure. Consideration needs to be given to supporting and supplementing whatever medical infrastructure exists. No operation(s) should be considered that would or could have the effect of supplanting the existing medical infrastructure. Prior to deployment, the combatant command surgeon should acknowledge the country’s standard of care and ensure that, at a minimum, the same level of care is provided to the affected population, if such actions are part of the mission and/or the commander’s intent. Once approved by the JFC, the JTF staff should initiate planning and action required to support the standard of care. If, upon execution, a JTF surgeon thinks that modifications should be made to the standard of care, a request for modification can be made through the supported combatant command surgeon. The WHO has recommended that health care support include nutrition, sanitation, water standards, pre- and post-natal health care, disease treatment, prevention and control related to locally endemic diseases, immunization, and health education.

3. Factors To Be Considered

The JTF should anticipate that the health care delivery infrastructure will be austere to nonexistent. NGOs and IOs may be able to compensate for some of the shortfalls. The following factors merit consideration in providing HSS to the affected population.
a. **Coordination.** Effective coordination is a key element that is central to HSS provision.

- DOS Regional Medical Officer is a valuable source of regional medical information and coordination.
- Contact NGO and IO medical personnel before commencing the operation. Identification of needs and cooperation by all or most of the parties involved early on will increase efficiency and reduce redundancy.
- The CJTF should attempt to establish some type of central point or organization for coordination of medical requirements with nonmilitary organizations. The HOC or CMOC is a logical place for this coordination to occur. The differing policies and cultures of individual NGOs and IOs, military capabilities and procedures, and affected country requirements require a dedicated coordination element to ensure unity of effort among all participants.

b. **Communications.** Effective operations require a constant effort to avoid gaps in services and redundant services. Uninterrupted communications between military elements, NGOs, IOs, and affected country personnel will help eliminate unnecessary suffering and more effectively apply resources to the operation.

c. **Demographics.** The population mix is an important factor in the medical effort. Three specialties that are not typically included in a JTF deployment, but which may be needed during an FHA operation, are obstetrics and gynecology, geriatrics, and pediatrics.

d. **Preventive Medicine.** In any FHA operation, preventive medicine is a critical consideration. Individual personal hygiene practices and procedures are key elements of a sound preventive medicine program. The provision of adequate food service sanitation, potable water supplies, vector control, DNBI prevention, and waste disposal facilities all contribute to the maintenance of a healthy and fit force.

e. **Disease Prevention.** Natural and manmade disasters frequently give rise to substantial increases in endemic disease. While no parts of the world are immune to increases in diseases, some regions of the developing world are more susceptible to disease than others, and are impacted at devastating levels. Contributory factors in spreading disease to epidemic proportions during disasters include disruption of sanitation services, food and water contamination, and increased rodent and arthropod breeding grounds.

f. **Disease Control.** The risk of communicable (infectious) diseases is increased in an FHA environment due to overcrowding, poor environmental conditions, and poor public health. There is, for example, a close association between malnutrition and the effects of communicable disease, particularly childhood diarrhea. Expert advice should be obtained for communicable disease control and management of epidemics. Some communicable diseases have a seasonal pattern and timely measures must be taken to prevent a rapid increase in cases. The following are central to disease control.

- Water supply and soap.
- Proper disposal of sewage and refuse.
- Vector control (pestilence control).
- General public health education and awareness.
- Medical surveillance.
g. **Patient Evacuation.** The combatant command surgeon should advise and assist the JTF surgeon in matters pertaining to patient evacuation from the operational area and help develop a plan to meet patient movement requirements. Considerations should include, but are not limited to:

- Eligibility criteria;
- Sponsorship guidelines, i.e., secretarial designation;
- Available evacuation resources and routes;
- Reimbursement procedures; and
- Capabilities of medical treatment facilities within (and adjoining) the operational area to receive evacuees requiring all levels of care.

h. **Immunization.** There are strong reasons, both medical and practical, to resist pressure for an immediate mass immunization program. The most common causes of disease and death are generally infections, often aggravated by malnutrition, which cannot be effectively prevented by immunization. Immunization programs must be staffed with adequate numbers of workers to supervise and manage refrigerated vaccines. Though not difficult, these programs may not represent the best use of resources. There is one exception: early immunization of young children against measles. Such immunization is highly recommended even when resources are scarce. All other immunizations (diptheria, pertussis, tetanus, and polio) should be given later when facilities allow and, to the extent possible, within the framework of the affected country government’s program of immunization.

4. **Medical Intelligence**

Medical intelligence is the end product of the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available general health and bioscientific information for a given nation or operational area. Medical intelligence addresses the medical aspects that are significant to military planning in general and to HSS planning in particular. In addition to preparing commanders to protect their own forces from medical risks during an operation, medical intelligence also assesses the general health of the population, which is a significant factor in planning for FHA operations. Additionally, information related to affected country health care capabilities is important in assessing whether there are medical care shortfalls for which US, NGOs, IOs, or third nation assistance must compensate. Sources of this information include the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and established civilian organizations with long standing resources in the operational area.
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1. General

Combatant commanders are responsible for providing detailed technical guidance and oversight of mortuary affairs support during FHA operations. This responsibility includes delineating Service component responsibilities within the operational area; providing mortuary affairs guidance to all assigned or attached forces; assigning responsibilities, tasks and assets; and organizing assets to execute the mortuary affairs mission. Combatant commanders establish Joint Mortuary Affairs Offices (JMAOs) and designate a Service component to provide an Executive Agent for the Theater Mortuary Affairs Support Program. US deceased personnel remains will be handled and transported in the US Forces controlled system. It is the organization or unit responsibility to transport the remains to the nearest mortuary affairs clearing and holding area for immediate evacuation to CONUS. The US unit in charge of evacuation of remains will conduct limited identification and personnel effects review of remain procedures. The final procedures for identification and internment will be conducted in CONUS. The Army, in most cases, will provide material and supplies required to ship and transport the remains to the CONUS mortuary facility.

More detailed information may be found in JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

2. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office

FHA operations will vary, each in its own way. The mission analysis will determine what duties and oversight responsibilities the JMAO may be required to execute. Examples of these responsibilities include the following.

- Directing established procedures concerned with the search, recovery, evacuation, identification, and disposition of remains (This may include providing guidance to Service components and to JTFs or single-Service commands on the disposition of remains of those persons assigned or attached to multinational partners).

- Establishing procedures for handling and movement of local nationals that die on military property or in a medical treatment facility.

- Directing established procedures concerned with the recovery, collection, identification, evacuation, inventory, and disposition of personal effects.

- Monitoring established agreements with affected countries, multinational partners, USG, and NGOs. If agreements are not established, the JMAO will coordinate affected country support negotiations.

- Coordinating the establishment of sub-offices, as required, to supervise mortuary affairs activities on a Service component, JTF, or geographic basis.

- Coordinating interment, disinterment, and reinterment of remains within its operational area.

- Providing procedural guidance regarding the transfer of remains and their personal effects to the custody of another government, including maintenance of records required by the
Geneva Convention, affected country agreements, or cross-Service agreements.

- Designating port of embarkation holding facilities and surface and aerial evacuation of remains and personal effects.

3. **Theater Mortuary Affairs Officer**

Upon deployment of the JTF, a theater mortuary affairs officer (TMAO) should be designated within the JTF J-4 section to serve as a principal advisor to the command for mortuary affairs. The TMAO will coordinate directly with the JMAO on all issues relating to mortuary affairs support. Plans for the support of indigenous populations in particular should be thoroughly coordinated with the JMAO. If specifically authorized, the JTF may provide mortuary support to the local population. The TMAO is responsible to develop the mortuary affairs appendix to the OPLAN, providing the overall concept of mortuary support to the operation (in close coordination with the JMAO). This appendix should be developed using the format in Appendix 2, Annex D, CJCS Manual 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*. In addition to procedures for handling indigenous deceased, this appendix should include procedures for search, recovery, and evacuation of all JTF personnel.

4. **Considerations**

a. In general terms, legal obligations depend on whether the JTF is dealing with a deceased that was simply found within the operational area or if the death was associated with JTF actions. The JTF’s obligations concerning dead or buried bodies found in the operational area derive from the commander’s responsibility for health and public hygiene of US Forces. An example of this is contamination of water supplies from mass graves, or bodies washed from shallow graves constituting a health hazard. In this consideration, reinterment should be facilitated. Reinterment of remains should be conducted following local religion and culture to the extent possible. Sufficient information must be maintained to identify burial sites and, where possible, the names of persons reinterred. Upon termination of reinterment operations, records should be turned over to the affected country government representatives. The death of a person associated with JTF actions requires an indepth investigation. Processing of these remains will be in accordance with guidance provided by the SJA. Deaths of persons under the care of the JTF, such as displaced civilians seeking help at a site under JTF control, create other obligations, such as medical certification and recording of death. In countries where a governmental infrastructure is in place, death records should be registered with that government. Where there is no government, the JTF should maintain appropriate records for later disposition. The TMAO is responsible for maintaining these records.

b. In a CM or non-permissive situation, casualties may have died as a result of infectious or weaponized agents, or might be booby-trapped, regardless of the apparent cause of death. Mortuary facilities should be designed with these possibilities taken into account for planning and casualty-flow arrangement, in order to prevent further casualties among those caring for the deceased.

c. The JTF should attempt to coordinate with the ICRC or Red Crescent Society for the return of deceased local nationals to local governmental control. These organizations can provide invaluable assistance in locating deceased next of kin.

d. Multinational partners and other non-US dead will be processed in accordance
with international agreements or guidance from the supported combatant commander. In cases of foreign nationals or relief organizations requesting mortuary affairs support, the TMAO will coordinate through the CMOC or HOC (as applicable) with the DOS representative in the affected area.
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Lessons learned during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for commanders and staffs preparing for a similar operation. The following factors include some of the key lessons from FHA operations, and highlight areas that FHA forces have found to be extremely important.

1. Is the mission stated in terms of working towards restoration to preemergency status? Is mission success stated in terms not strictly defined by US or western standards? Is the situation at desired end state sustainable by the affected country and organizations remaining in the operational area?

2. What is the legal authority for the operation? Do plans include SJA personnel and assets? What is the legal and fiscal authority to conduct civil action projects? Is there a SOFA in effect? If not, should a SOFA, or some other type of international agreement, be negotiated or implemented?

3. What coordination is required with the supported combatant commander, supporting combatant commanders, subordinate JTF commands, US Ambassador and Country Team, multinational partners, NGOs, UN organizations, IOs, and OGA? What are the command and coordination relationships?

4. Have civilian agencies involved in the operation been encouraged to contribute their valuable expertise and assistance? Have US forces recognized these agencies for their efforts in this regard?

5. What restrictions exist regarding the sharing of information (sensitive or otherwise) with other agencies and/or organizations?

6. What are the liaison requirements? Are LNOs positioned in both higher and subordinate headquarters as well as OGA, UN agencies, medical facilities, NGOs, and IOs, as required?

7. Is sea port and aerial port infrastructure in place before forces begin to arrive? Has USTRANSCOM been consulted as to transportation feasibility?

8. Are interpreters available for the JTF, combatant commander, and other US agencies?

9. Is adequate communications equipment available for essential basic services? Is additional equipment or connectivity reconfiguration needed to provide direct communications routing to principal destinations?

10. What is the communications plan for communicating with NGOs, UN agencies, IOs, and multinational forces? Do these entities require equipment augmentation?

11. Are briefing formats appropriate for use in CMO? Do they emphasize conditions, activities, and population support requirements? Are other participants in the FHA effort (USG agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, and IOs) included in the briefings?

12. What are the information gathering and dissemination requirements? Has PSYOP been brought into the planning process?

13. During the planning process, has the JTF surgeon identified the commander’s critical information requirements, PIRs, and...
named areas of interest pertaining to the medical threat in the operational area and submitted requirements to the supporting intelligence element?

14. Have supplemental measures to the SROE been identified, approved, and published prior to deployment? Do multinational forces understand the ROE? Are they using the same or compatible ROE?

15. Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the operation?

16. Has a finance officer been identified and deployed early in the operation?

17. Has a contracting officer been identified and deployed early in the operation?

18. What logistics requirements are needed to support the operation, and what mechanism is in place to continually monitor logistic resources to ensure that urgent needs are met?

19. Has a public affairs plan been developed and passed to all members of the joint force?

20. Have media relations, training, and coordination been established?
APPENDIX K
FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT FORCE MODULES

1. Functional JTF Design

The actual organization of a JTF for foreign CM response will be mission and situation dependent. Figure K-1 offers a notional functional organization for a JTF involved in a CB incident. The size of component elements is dependent upon incident severity and mission requirements. The functional categories identified in this notional organization may be modified or deleted based upon mission requirements.

d. The RADCON team provides health physicists and/or other technical expertise (radiation control and safety) assistance to the component commander.

2. Immediate Response and Assessment Component

a. Immediate response and assessment component tasks may include:

• Assessments at the incident site
• Reconnaissance of the crisis site
• Assistance with decontamination of personnel and equipment
• Providing recommendations to COM, USG agencies, and HN for near-term management of the incident
• Assistance in the initial interface with local responders

b. Two chemical headquarters packages are indicated here, but more may be required for a chemical incident. The exact composition of each chemical element will be based on incident severity. Additional decontamination and reconnaissance elements may be required based upon the incident’s scope and severity.

c. The Immediate Response Force consists of a security element, a medical element, and support element.

3. Security Component

a. Security component tasks may include the following:

• Providing physical security for JTF as required
• Protecting US citizens and victims
• Implementing force protection measures as assigned
• Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area
• Providing convoy and patient transport security

b. The infantry elements are designed to isolate the incident area, provide security for relief personnel, and to perform other missions as directed by the component commander. Due to the nature of CB incident (larger area affected or contaminated) additional security elements may be necessary.

c. The military police organizations are designed for crowd control, movement of displaced civilians, and to assist with security operations.
Figure K-1. Joint Task Force Notional Organization
d. Additionally, there is a separate element that provides site security to the aerial and sea ports of debarkation as appropriate.

4. Clean-Up Component

a. The clean-up component tasks may include the following.

• Providing assistance for a protracted clean-up plan

• Providing support for decontamination efforts

• Providing support for site remediation

• Providing assistance in critical infrastructure restoration

• Assistance in site clean-up and debris removal

• Providing support to decontamination of fatalities

b. Engineer capabilities within this component fall into three categories.

c. Non-engineer assets within this component, such as water production and transport, communications equipment/facilities, and maintenance and repair of other infrastructure components are not typically an engineer functional responsibility, but often

• Combat engineers with extensive explosive demolition capability and limited earth moving and debris disposal capability.

• Construction engineer units possess an organic capability to accomplish necessary road, facility (including damage control centers), and air infrastructure repairs to support JTF operations.

• DOD and Contract Assets. DOD engineer assets maintain tremendous design and construction management capability and deployable “Prime Power” elements. DOD contracting capability spans the spectrum of construction services as well as other contracted support services in order to augment or fill operational voids.
will require engineer support. As the technical nature of this support increases, the ability of engineer units to adequately support diminishes and contract expertise is required.

d. Site remediation is designed to restore emergency essential human services support infrastructures destroyed by the incident, by augmenting or filling existing base operations assets and capabilities.

e. The composition of each of these modules will be based upon required levels of restoration, service capabilities, and availability of assets.

5. Medical Component

a. Medical component tasks may include the following:

- Providing preventive medicine support to prevent DNBI, to include providing medical surveillance activities for the JTF.
- Triage of casualties
- Treatment for attack casualties
- Augmentation to existing MTFs
- Treatment for responders
- Assistance in medical administration and management during a crisis
- Collect medical specimens as required for laboratory analysis and identification
- Patient transport
- Stress management

b. The Medical Component surgeon coordinates the activities of the sub-elements for the JTF commander through the component surgeons. Elements of the medical component will be sized based upon the severity of the incident and casualty projections from the commander’s assessment.

c. The radiological advisory medical team is specifically trained in radiological health matters and provides on-site assistance and guidance to the component commander and local medical authorities.

d. Biological Incident-Specific Augmentation.

- The US Army Chemical and Biological Advisory Team provides on-site advice for CB casualty care. They may collect medical specimens for the medical component commander.
- The aeromedical isolation team consists of physicians, nurses, medical assistants, and laboratory technicians specially trained to provide care to and transport patients with diseases caused by infectious agents.

6. Transportation and Logistics Component

a. The tasks conducted by this component may include the following.

- Providing transport support, to include aviation, ground, and, if necessary, waterborne assets
- Providing assistance to the HN in the procurement of required logistics
Foreign Consequence Management Force Modules

- Providing contract support to the JTF
- Assisting the HN in the coordination or transportation
- Coordinating logistic support for the other components of the JTF
- Providing medical evacuation transportation support

b. The rotary-wing assets provide the means to move JTF personnel and equipment, and casualties within the vicinity of the incident site. Fixed-wing assets may be used to move personnel, casualties, and equipment inter- and intratheater.

c. Ground transportation units will move personnel, supplies, debris, and equipment in and around the incident area. The combatant commander and JTF commander should anticipate the need for substantial ground transportation packages.

d. The use of a maritime support detachment will be dependent upon incident site and JTF transportation requirements.

7. Civil Military Operations Component

CMO component tasks may include:

a. Assistance in supporting the interface between HN government and outside assets.

b. Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians.

c. Liaison between US and HN organizations.

d. Coordination with NGOs and IOs.
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The development of JP 3-07.6 is based upon the following primary references.

1. **Joint and Combatant Command Publications**
   
   
   
   c. CJCSI 3207.01, *Military Support to Humanitarian Demining Operations*.
   
   d. CJCSI 3214.01, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.
   
   e. CJCSI 5113.01, *CJCS Counterproliferation Charter*.
   
   f. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.
   
   g. CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*.
   
   
   i. USCINCCENT, *Standing Operating Procedures Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST)*.
   
   j. USCINCJFCOM FUNCPLAN 2500-96, *Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Disaster Relief*.
   
   
   l. USSOUTHCOM PLAN 95, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.
   
   m. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
   
   n. JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
   
   o. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
   
   
   q. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*. 
Appendix L

r. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
t. JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
v. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
w. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
x. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.
bb. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.
c. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.
dd. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.
gg. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
hh. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.
ii. JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.
jj. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
ll. JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.
mm. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.


2. Service Publications


c. AFP 110-31, *International Law; The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*. (Historical reference)

d. FM 3-34.114 (FM 5-114), *Engineer Operations Short of War*.

e. FM 4-02.42 (FM 8-42), *Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations*.


g. FM 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), *Psychological Operations*.

h. FM 2-00.21 (FM 34-2-1), *Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*.

i. FM 2-33.4 (FM 34-3), *Intelligence Analysis*.

j. FM 2-91.1 (FM 34-7), *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations*.

k. FM 2-91.2 (FM 34-36), *Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*.
Appendix L

1. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.

m. FM 41-10 (FM 3-5.40), *Civil Affairs Operations*.

n. FM 4-100.6 (FM 63-6), *Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict*.

o. FM 3-16 (FM 100-8), *Multinational Army Operations (Draft)*.

p. FM 4-0 (FM 100-10), *Combat Service Support*.

q. FM 3-07.3 (FM 100-23), *Peace Operations*.


u. “Operations Other Than War, Volume II, Disaster Assistance,” Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Newsletter No. 93-6, October 1993.


3. **US Government Publications**


d. DODD 2000.11, *Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge*. 

L-4
References

e. DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.
g. DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*.
h. DODD 3150.8, *DOD Response to Radiological Accidents*.
i. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.
j. DODD 5111.10, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), 22 March 1995*.
k. DODD 5515.8, *Single-Service Assignment of Responsibility for Processing of Claims*.
l. DODD 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policies and Information*.
m. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*.

n. DODD 6050.7, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions*.
o. DODI 4715.5, *Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations*.
p. DODI 5500.17, *Department of Defense Law of War Program*.

r. DOD Handbook of DOD Assets and Capabilities for Response to Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Incident. This joint staff executive primer summarizes DOD, DOS, DOE, and FEMA plans, resources, and capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents. It contains a discussion of military and civil consequence management response to a terrorist incident involving WMD in which the Department of Defense will respond in a supporting role.
Appendix L


4. UN Publications


d. *UNHCR and NGOs Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations*. Available from the UNHCR Office of the NGO Coordinator, tel. 41 22 739 8328 Geneva, Switzerland.


5. Other Selected Publications


w. **ORDATA II, Version 1.0, Enhanced International Deminer’s Guide to UXO Identification, Recovery, and Disposal**. This database is contained in CD-ROM format and is available from: Naval EOD Technology Division, Attn: Code 602, 2008 Stump Neck Road, Indian Head, MD 20640-5070.

x. **CJCS Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study**, 14 March 1995.


z. **NATO Policy on Cooperation for Disaster Assistance in Peacetime**.
6. Internet References

a. DefenseLink Homepage: http://www.defenselink.mil. DefenseLink is an entry point for Internet sites for Services, SecDef, and related agencies.

b. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Homepage: http://www.demining.brtrc.com. This page is maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.

c. Joint Doctrine Homepage: http://ww.dtic.mil/doctrine. This site provides an on-line source of all approved US joint doctrine.

d. ReliefWeb: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf.


APPENDIX M
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Change Recommendations

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c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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## GLOSSARY

### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRAT</td>
<td>Air Force radiological control team</td>
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<td>AFTAC</td>
<td>Air Force Technical Applications Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>aeromedical isolation team</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDRP</td>
<td>Biological Defense Research Program</td>
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<td>BHR</td>
<td>Bureau of Humanitarian Response</td>
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<td>BL</td>
<td>biocontainment level</td>
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<td>biological warfare</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>consolidated appeals process</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>chemical-biological</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBIRF</td>
<td>chemical-biological incident response force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives</td>
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<td>CBRT</td>
<td>chemical-biological response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund</td>
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<td>CFST</td>
<td>coalition forces support team</td>
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<td>CJSO</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
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<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
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<td>CMHT</td>
<td>consequence management home team</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>CMPT</td>
<td>consequence management planning team</td>
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<td>CMRT</td>
<td>consequence management response team</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Commodity Tracking System</td>
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<td>DALIS</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
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<td>DASD(PK/HA)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance)</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
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<td>DNAT</td>
<td>defense nuclear advisory team</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>DNBI</td>
<td>disease and nonbattle injury</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense threat reduction agency</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>ExCom</td>
<td>executive committee</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
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<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>final governing standards</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>GTN</td>
<td>Global Transportation Network</td>
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<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Interagency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>interagency core group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive devices</td>
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<td>InterAction</td>
<td>American Council for Voluntary International Action</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Red Cross</td>
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<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>JCCC</td>
<td>joint communications control center</td>
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<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>Joint Facilities Utilization Board</td>
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<td>JIB</td>
<td>Joint Information Bureau</td>
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<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
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<td>JMAO</td>
<td>Joint Mortuary Affairs Office</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint movement center</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Center</td>
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<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>joint psychological operations task force</td>
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<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Technical Augmentation Cell</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<td>LRC</td>
<td>Logistics Readiness Center</td>
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<td>MCBAT</td>
<td>medical chemical biological advisory team</td>
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<td>MDRO</td>
<td>mission disaster response officer</td>
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<td>MIST</td>
<td>military information support team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<td>MRAT</td>
<td>medical radiobiology advisory team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>nonappropriated fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>NEST</td>
<td>nuclear emergency search team</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NMRC</td>
<td>Naval Medical Research Center</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NWP</td>
<td>Naval warfare publication</td>
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<td>OASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)</td>
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<td>OEBGD</td>
<td>Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agencies</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OSC</td>
<td>on-scene commander</td>
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<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>on-site operations coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>OUSD(C)</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<td>PAV</td>
<td>policy assessment visit</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>policy coordinating committee</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirements</td>
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<td>POL-MIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>RADCON</td>
<td>radiological control team</td>
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<td>radiological assistance program</td>
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<td>sea-air-land team</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMAO</td>
<td>theater mortuary affairs officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations volunteer</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAMRICD</td>
<td>US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAMRIID</td>
<td>US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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**consequence management.** Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also called CM. (This term and its definition are provided for information and proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

**crisis management.** Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**dislocated civilian.** A broad term that includes a displaced person, a stateless person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**displaced person.** A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

**evacuee.** A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

**foreign disaster.** An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization. (JP 1-02)

**foreign disaster relief.** Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition modify
the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**humanitarian demining.** Department of Defense and Department of State program to promote the foreign policy interests of the United States by assisting other nations in protecting their populations from landmines and clearing land of the threat posed by landmines remaining after conflict has ended. The humanitarian demining program includes training of host nation deminers, establishment of national demining organizations, provision of demining equipment, mine awareness training, and research development. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

**internally displaced person.** Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**international organization.** Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**natural disaster.** An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**nongovernmental organizations.** Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

**refugee.** A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

**stateless person.** Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**status-of-forces agreement.** An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting
military force deployed in a territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

unified action. A broad generic term that described the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: