Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, is the capstone publication for all joint doctrine, presenting fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This revision represents the evolution in our warfighting guidance since the last edition — including the consolidation, behind one cover, of fundamental overarching doctrine as well as guidance governing the unified direction of forces and the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components.

This publication ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and national military strategy and describes the military’s role in the development of national policy and strategy. It thus provides the linkage between joint doctrine and the contribution of other government agencies and multinational endeavors.

Most of all, as our Nation continues into the 21st century, the guidance in this publication will enable current and future leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States to organize, train, and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges.

I encourage all commanders to ensure the widest possible distribution of this capstone joint publication and actively promote the use of all joint publications at every opportunity. I further request that you study and understand the guidance contained in this publication and teach these principles to your subordinates. Only then will we be able to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams.

PETER PACE  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1. Scope

This publication is the capstone joint doctrine publication. It provides doctrine for unified action by the Armed Forces of the United States. As such, it specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides guidance for the exercise of that military authority, provides fundamental principles and guidance for command and control, prescribes guidance for organizing joint forces, and describes policy for selected joint activities. It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multiagency and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

a. The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the United States against all adversaries and serving the Nation as a bulwark and the guarantors of its security and independence. When called to action, the Armed Forces support and defend national interests worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the highest values and standards of American society and the profession of arms. The Armed Forces fulfill their roles, missions, and functions within the American system of civil-military relations. The Armed Forces also serve under the civilian control of the President who is the Commander in Chief.

b. The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the range of military operations. These operations may take place with the military forces of allies and coalition partners, US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The challenges are best met when the unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum contribution from each Service and Department of Defense (DOD) agency and their unique but complementary capabilities. The resulting synergy from their synchronized and integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities.

c. **Joint warfare is team warfare.** Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak points or seams to an adversary. They rapidly and efficiently find and exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they contribute most to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may choose the capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal.

3. Application

a. This publication is written to assist members of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate successfully together. The joint team is comprised of the members of each Service DOD agencies, as well as associated civilians supporting governmental and private sector workforces. The guidance in this publication is broad, authoritative, and serves as a foundation for the development more specific joint guidance. This doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. It serves as the foundation for further refinement of joint doctrine.
b. The Services and United States Special Operations Command (in areas unique to special operations) have responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces. These forces are employed under JFCs. Therefore, to assure that the Armed Forces achieve their fullest potential, all US military leaders must incorporate the policy and philosophy of this publication into their efforts to develop leaders and train forces for joint and multinational operations. They will include them as fundamental precepts while conducting interagency coordination.

c. Service skills form the very core of US military capability. Joint warfare relies upon Service traditions, cohesion, and expertise. When combined with the ability to integrate these qualities into joint operations with partner military services and other defense, logistical, and intelligence agencies, they become a formidable and capable force. Successful joint operations are made possible by the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service. With a mutual understanding and respect of other partner services capabilities and the ability to be interoperable and effectively integrate operations to accomplish an overall campaign and/or US Government objective(s), the Armed Forces of the United States continue to build on the tradition of joint victory in war that began with the Revolutionary War.

d. The Armed Forces of the United States face unparalleled challenges to US interests around the world. This means the joint forces must master several types of operations (e.g., offense, defense, and stability) across the range of military operations in order to conduct unified action. The chapters that follow describe the principles for forming, training, exercising, and employing joint forces in unified action at all levels across the range of military operations. These broad principles that guide operations are neither policy nor strategy — they are doctrine. The principles apply to action undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United States to execute applicable national policies, as well as the contemporary national security, national defense, and military strategies.

e. Today, joint operations are practiced and routine. The key to maintaining and enhancing joint force effectiveness is the military leader’s diligence in studying, applying, teaching, and ultimately improving joint doctrine, which provides the foundation for joint warfare.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 1
DATED 14 NOVEMBER 2000

- Consolidates and eliminates redundancies between JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* and JP 1, formerly titled *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

- Formats the publication in compliance with the policy and procedures set forth in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02A, *Joint Doctrine Development System*

- Updates and focuses key information and guidance contained in the previous JP 1 into a chapter on the foundations of doctrine

- Introduces the construct of irregular warfare, defines the term, and provides guidance on its relationship with traditional warfare

- Expands guidance with respect to the termination of operations

- Characterizes as “doctrine” written guidance with respect to unified direction of the Armed Forces, joint command and control, and joint commands, thus excluding the term “policy” in titling these areas.

- Expands guidance with respect to interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination

- Modifies the definition of the term, “unified action” and defines the term, “unity of effort”


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Foundations of Joint Doctrine
- Characterizes Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces
- Outlines the Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components
- Describes the Fundamental Principles for Joint Command and Control
- Details Doctrine for Joint Commands
- Provides Guidance for Multinational Operations
- Addresses Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Foundations of Joint Doctrine

*This publication provides overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.*

Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective.

*US military service is based on values.*

Joint publication 1 is the capstone publication of the US joint doctrine hierarchy. As such, it is a bridge between policy and doctrine.

Joint doctrine promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). Conducting joint operations generally involve 12 broad principles, collectively known as the “principles of joint operations”. These principles guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. They combine the nine historical principles of war (present in joint doctrine since its inception) with three additional principles born out of experience across the range of military operations.

US military service is based on values that US military experience has proven to be vital for operational success. These values adhere to the most idealistic societal norms, are common to all the Services, and represent the essence of military professionalism. Competent joint warfighters must be skilled in thinking strategically and at optimizing joint capabilities, applying strategic and operational art, and having a joint perspective. There are five values, while not specific to joint
## Executive Summary

The strategic security environment is extremely fluid. Irregular warfare has emerged as a major form of warfare. The instruments of national power come from the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic sectors. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Unified action includes a wide scope of actions.

### The Security Environment is Extremely Fluid

The security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats are constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission. The US military is well positioned to conduct operations but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.

### Irregular Warfare Has Emerged as a Major Form of Warfare

Irregular warfare (IW) has emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare. Typically in IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation’s established regime.

### The Instruments of National Power Come From the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic Sectors

The ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the US Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power. These instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) are normally coordinated by the appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction. They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

### The Purpose of the Armed Forces Is to Fight and Win the Nation’s Wars

As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

### Unified Action Includes a Wide Scope of Actions

Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with other government agencies [OGAs], intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], and coordination with nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] and the private sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces (JTF) to achieve unity of effort.
The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provide direction for Service Secretaries and combatant commanders (CCDRs). The National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by the President, addresses the tasks that, as a nation, are necessary to shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people. It provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, also signed by the President, provides national direction to secure the homeland through a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security.

Although there is no statutory requirement, SecDef may produce a National Defense Strategy (NDS), which outlines the Department of Defense (DOD) approach to implement the President’s NSS. The NDS will support the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide DOD’s security activities and provide direction for the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS, signed by the CJCS, supports the aims of the NSS and implements the NDS. It describes the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. The National Response Plan (NRP) was developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As a signatory, DOD agreed to modify existing interagency and agency incident management and emergency response plans to facilitate compliance with the NRP. The purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national level, all-hazards, all-discipline approach to domestic incident management.

The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.
The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups. It is absolutely essential to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between NSS, NDS, NMS, and the national strategic end state. The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of operational design. Further, some military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of combat operations. An extended US presence will be required to conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state.

Commanders at all levels ensure their forces operate in accordance with the “law of war,” often called the “law of armed conflict.”

The law of war is international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, and is binding on the United States and its individual citizens. It includes treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, as well as applicable customary international law.

Unified Direction of Armed Forces

National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy regarding internationally-recognized law and the national interest. This direction leads to unified action. The result of effective unified action is unity of effort to achieve national goals. At the strategic level, unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.

Unified action synchronizes joint, Service, and multinational operations with governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

The term “unified action” in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders (CDRs) of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (e.g., United Nations [UN]), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.

The terms “roles and functions” often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions among them are important.

“Roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were established in law. Functions are the appropriate assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term “function” includes functions, powers, and duties.
The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the SecDef, to the CCDRs for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service forces not assigned to the CCDRs. The Service Chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are directly responsible.

The President, through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), establishes combatant (unified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands. CDRs in the chain of command exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or a support command relationship as prescribed by law or a superior CDR over the military force under their command. The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in performing their command functions. The CJCS transmits to the CCDRs the orders given by the President, or the SecDef and, as directed by the SecDef, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders issued by the President or the SecDef normally are conveyed by the CJCS under the authority and direction of SecDef.

The Services role is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces.

The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of Service forces. CDRs of forces are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for the administration, training, and readiness of their unit(s). The US Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. However, it is established separately by law as a Service in the DHS, except when transferred to the Department of the Navy during time of war or when the President so directs.

Unified action demands maximum interoperability.

The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through
interoperability. This includes the development and use of joint doctrine, the development and use of joint operation plans (OPLANs); and the development and use of joint and/or interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises.

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

All functions in the Department of Defense and its component agencies are performed under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef.

The DOD is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the DOD agencies, DOD field activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established or designated by law, by the President, or by the SecDef. As prescribed by higher authority, the DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to fulfill the following aims: support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and, uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

The JCS, consists of the CJCS; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; supported by the Joint Staff. The JCS constitutes the immediate military staff of the SecDef. The Commandant of the Coast Guard may be invited by the CJCS or the Service Chiefs to participate in meetings or to discuss matters of mutual interest to the Coast Guard and the other Services.

Geographic combatant commanders (CCDRs) are assigned a geographic area of responsibility by the President with the advice of the SecDef as specified in the Unified Command Plan.

The Commanders, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, and US Northern Command are each assigned a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and/or attached forces. Forces under the direction of the President or the SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the CDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or the SecDef. Functional CCDRs support geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), conduct operations in direct support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted, and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CDDR for an operation.
### Fundamentals of Command and Control

**Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.**

**Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands.**

**Operational control (OPCON) is inherent in COCOM.**

**Tactical control is inherent in OPCON**

---

**Inherent in command is the authority that a military CDR lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion.**

Although CDRs may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single CDR with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.

**COCOM** is the authority of a CCDC to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. It cannot be delegated or transferred.

**OPCON** is the command authority that may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the SecDef. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.

**TACON** is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below
Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior CDR between subordinate CDRs when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the combatant command level. This includes the SecDef designating a support relationship between CCDRs as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to CDRs and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported CDR and supporting CDRs understand the degree of authority that the supported CDR is granted. There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives. These include general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support.

Command of National Guard and reserve forces. All National Guard and reserve forces (except those forces specifically exempted) are assigned by the SecDef to the combatant commands. However, those forces are available for operational missions only when mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty and after being validated for employment by their parent Service.

Command is the most important function undertaken by a joint force commander. Command is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated CDR over assigned and attached forces. Command and control (C2) is the means by which a joint force commander (JFC) synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks, and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military operations. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans. Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships; information management; implicit communication; timely decision making; coordination mechanisms; battle rhythm discipline; responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness; and mutual trust.
Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs and can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis. AJFC has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces with specification of OPCON to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.

The composition of the JFC’s staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander, composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, and established by the President through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and is established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. There are currently no specified commands designated.

When authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands.

A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified CDR, or an existing JTF CDR. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.

A Service component command, assigned to a CCDR, consists of the Service component CDR and the Service forces (such as individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to that CCDR. Forces assigned to CCDRs are identified in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum signed by the SecDef. When a Service command is designated as the “Service component commander” to multiple CCDRs, the Service...
Functional component commands may be established to perform particular operational missions.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides the basic law for discipline of the Armed Forces.

CDRs and CCDRs of subordinate unified commands and JFCs have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.

The JFC is responsible for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. Each Service component in a combatant command is responsible for the internal administration and discipline of that Service’s component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the CCDR. In a joint force, however, the JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies applicable to all Services’ personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations should be published to address hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market, combating trafficking in persons, sexual assault prevention and response policies, currency control regulations, and any other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

Guidance for Multinational Operations

International partnerships continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century challenges.

Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than the United States could achieve independently. These partnerships must be nurtured and developed to ensure their relevance even as new challenges emerge.

The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating 21st century threats. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through others nations, enabling allied and partner capabilities to build their capacity and develop mechanisms to share the risks and responsibility of today’s complex challenges.

Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations are termed “multinational operations.”

Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an IGO such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other commonly used terms for multinational operations include allied, bilateral, combined, coalition, or multilateral, as appropriate. An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations.
for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations. A **coalition** is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with specific objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

**Many factors impact multinational operations.** Cultural, psychological, religious, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact multinational operations. Many OPLANs to deter or counter threats are prepared within the context of a treaty or alliance framework. Sometimes they are developed in a less structured coalition framework, based on temporary agreements or arrangements. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language within alliances and coalitions must be considered. Normally, each alliance or coalition develops its own OPLANs to guide multinational action.

**No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions.** Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that best meets the objectives, political realities, and constraints of the participating nations. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of effort for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with whom the United States may operate in an alliance or coalition.

**Command and control in multinational organizations.** Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. There must be a common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the multinational force (MNF) and the plan for its attainment. A coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure); rules of engagement; fratricide prevention; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; etc., is essential for unity of effort. There are five tenets of multinational operations that cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. The tenets are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination.
Executive Summary

There are three types of multinational organizational structures. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated; lead nation; or parallel command. Integrated commands have representative members from the member nations in the command headquarters. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. Under a parallel command structure, no single force CDR is designated.

Most nations establish a national component. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component. (often called a national command element) to ensure effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations, and maintain personnel accountability.

National command of multinational forces. Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. For the United States, under national command, the President retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time. During multinational command, command authority for a MNF commander is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority will be specified in the implementing agreements and may include aspects of OPCON and/or TACON, as well as support relationships and coordinating authority.

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the USG including the DOD, to accomplish an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, IGO and NGO coordination refers to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective. CCDRs and other subordinate JFCs must consider the potential requirements for interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination as a part of their activities across the range of military operations within and outside of their
The interagency process often is described as “more art than science,” while military operations tend to depend more on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can facilitate unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency coordination and different organizational cultures. **Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation**, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

**The NSC is the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination.** The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the principal means for coordinating, developing, and implementing national security policy. The statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and SecDef. The CJCS is the council’s statutory military advisor and the Director of National Intelligence is the council’s statutory intelligence advisor. Officials of the Office of the SecDef represent the SecDef in NSC interagency groups. Similarly, the CJCS, assisted by the Joint Staff, represents the CCDDRs for interagency matters in the NSC system. Other senior officials are invited to attend NSC meetings, as appropriate.

While the NSC serves as the principal forum for considering national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination, the **Homeland Security Council (HSC)** provides a parallel forum for considering unique homeland security (HS) matters, especially those concerning terrorism within the United States. The HSC is responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security, and serves as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of HS policies.
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*Special arrangements may be required during domestic interagency coordination.*

For domestic HS-related interagency coordination that may require military participation in countering domestic terrorism and other civil support (CS) tasks, the DHS has the lead. For homeland defense interagency coordination, DOD will have the lead. **The DHS is the primary forum for coordinating Executive Branch efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.**

*The Constitution, law, and other governmental directives limit the scope and nature of domestic military actions.*

In domestic situations, the Constitution, law, and other governmental directives limit the scope and nature of military actions. The National Guard has unique roles in domestic operations. Under control of the respective states, National Guard units in Title 32, US Code (USC) and state active duty status provide a wide variety of CS. Per the *Posse Comitatus* Act and DOD policy, the United States refrains from employing Title 10, USC DOD forces to enforce the law except in cases of necessity. Unless under authorization by the President, Congress, or the Constitution, *Posse Comitatus, together with related DOD regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy from directly participating in civilian law enforcement activities within the United States.* In its maritime law enforcement role under DHS, the US Coast Guard as a Service under DHS, has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas as prescribed in law.

*A joint interagency coordination group can provide increased capability.*

When formed, a **joint interagency coordination group (JIACG)** can provide the CCDR with an increased capability to collaborate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. The JIACG, an element of a GCC’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes and enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between other governmental agencies’ representatives and military operational planners at the combatant commands. If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational representatives, the JIACG enhances the capability to collaborate and coordinate with the private sector and/or regional organizations. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that occurs at the national level through the DOD and the NSC and HSC systems. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, and security cooperation planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs.
CONCLUSION

This publication is the capstone joint doctrine publication. It provides doctrine for unified action by the Armed Forces of the United States. As such, it specifies the authorized command relationships and authority that military CDRs can use, provides guidance for the exercise of that military authority, provides fundamental principles and guidance for C2, prescribes guidance for organizing joint forces, and describes policy for selected joint activities. It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multi-agency and multinational operations.
1. Fundamentals

   a. This publication provides overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the capstone publication of the United States (US) joint doctrine hierarchy. As such, it is a bridge between policy and doctrine. It sets the conditions for further detailed treatment of all aspects of joint warfighting in subordinate publications. Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). It provides distilled insights and wisdom gained from employing the military instrument of national power in operations to achieve national objectives.

   For more information, refer to Appendix A, Role of Doctrine.

   b. War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. In its essence, war is a violent clash of wills. War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules. Clausewitz described it as “the continuation of politics by other means” [Book one, Chapter 1, Section 24 heading]. It is characterized by the shifting interplay of a trinity of forces (rational, nonrational, and irrational) connected by principal actors that comprise a social trinity of the people, military forces, and the government. He noted that the conduct of war combines obstacles such as friction, chance, and uncertainty. The cumulative effect of these obstacles is often described as “the fog of war.” These observations remain true today and place a burden on the commander (CDR) to remain responsive, versatile, and adaptive in real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is the art of war.

   c. As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. Decisive unified action ensures unity of effort focused on those objectives and leading to the conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States.

   d. In the traditional paradigm, nation-states wage war for reasons as broad and varied as the array of national interests. The context of irregular warfare (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Our enemies may be loosely organized networks or entities with no discernible hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, they have critical vulnerabilities to be
exploited within their interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. These actors often wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will of the nation-state. Military operations alone rarely resolve such conflicts. This publication will address all the instruments of national power. Nation-states have sovereign rights and a social contract with their inhabitants; therefore, they have sovereign responsibilities to combat these irregular threats.

e. The Armed Forces of the United States conduct military operations as a joint force. “Joint” connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of military forces in joint operations, including matters relating to (1) national military strategy (NMS); (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; (3) command and control (C2) of joint operations; and (4) unified action with the US interagency and intergovernmental communities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational forces (MNFs) and organizations. The capacity of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate as a cohesive joint team is a chief advantage in any operational environment.

f. **Joint warfare is team warfare.** The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces maximizes the capability of the force. The advantage of a joint team extends beyond the battlefield and across the range of military operations. A joint operation does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander (JFC) has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.

g. Conducting joint operations generally involves 12 broad principles, collectively known as the “principles of joint operations” (see Figure I-1). These principles guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. They combine the nine historical principles of war (present in joint doctrine since its inception) with three additional principles born out of experience across the range of military operations.

A more detailed treatment of the principles of joint operations is found in Appendix A of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations.

h. The Joint Force. Twenty years after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act (Title 10, US Code [USC], Sections 151-155) directed actions to remove the institutional barriers to jointness, the Armed Forces of the United States is a joint team. All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to the joint campaign; however, their interdependence is critical to overall joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances. Fundamentally, joint forces require high levels of interoperability and systems that are “born joint” (i.e., conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies). This level of interoperability ensures that technical, doctrinal, and cultural barriers do not limit the ability of JFCs to achieve objectives. The goal is to design joint force capabilities – lethal and nonlethal – to fight and win the Nation’s wars and effectively carry out all other missions assigned across the range of military operations.
i. **Values of Joint Service.** US military service is based on values that US military experience has proven to be vital for operational success. These values adhere to the most idealistic societal norms, are common to all the Services, and represent the essence of military professionalism. Competent joint warfighters must be skilled in thinking strategically and at optimizing joint capabilities, applying operational art, and having a joint perspective. The following five values, while not specific to joint operations, have special impact on the conduct of joint operations.

1. **Integrity** is our foremost value. It is the cornerstone for building trust. American Service men and women must be able to rely on each other, regardless of the challenge at hand; they must individually and collectively say what they mean and do what they say. Integrity inspires confidence in others to carry out assigned tasks and is a fundamental requirement for building effective teams.

2. **Competence** is at the core of the profession of arms and of the relationship of the profession with the American people. Competent performance includes both the technical competence to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine. The American people and multinational partners expect US military competence in every aspect of warfare. Service men and women deserve no less from those who lead them into battle. Successful joint action relies on each of the Services to deliver trained and ready, competent and confident
forces and leaders, able to fight decisively under JFCs. For the dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair. Moreover, many serve in assignments requiring additional competency in joint skills, and all members of the Armed Forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent required for effective operations. Those who will lead joint forces must develop skill in orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

(3) Physical courage, throughout the history, has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare characterized by advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for teamwork.

(4) Moral courage is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what one believes to be right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties. Competence is an essential foundation for moral courage. Competence separates the professional from the foolhardy. Military power must be wielded in an unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva Conventions. This morality should not be a matter of legality, but of conscience. Moral behavior is essential for gaining and maintaining the positive worldwide reputation of American fighting men and women as well as the confidence and support of the American people, a basic source of American military strength.

(5) Teamwork is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States — every military organization to the lowest level — are a team. Deterring adversaries, and when necessary, winning the Nation’s wars are the team’s common goals. Americans respond to and respect teamwork as an important value. This societal approval provides to the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams.

(a) Trust and confidence are central to military unity of effort. A highly effective team is based on the team members having trust and confidence in each other. This trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes. Trust is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit, by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.

(b) Successful teamwork requires delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility. This is a necessary part of building and maintaining the trust based on competence that characterizes the successful team. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is an essential building block.
(c) Successful teamwork also requires cooperation. While this aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition and both are central human characteristics, the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation within the team in order to compete successfully with the adversary. Higher echelons should never have to mandate cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members.

(6) When the members of the Armed Forces of the United States internalize and embody these values of joint warfare, their attitude about joint warfighting produces a synergy that multiplies the effects of their individual actions. A freely developed cooperative attitude is the key to the most productive integration of all force competencies and capabilities, and to the effective prosecution of the campaign.

2. The Strategic Security Environment

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology . . . occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President George W. Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

a. The security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission. The US military is well positioned to conduct operations but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. These challenges include IW, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive threats to US ability to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power.

b. Joint operations increasingly occur in urban terrain and the information environment. The operational area often contains humanitarian crisis conditions requiring foreign humanitarian assistance. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large number of other government agencies (OGAs), international government agencies (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, and elements of the private sector in the operational area. Each agency and/or organization has an agenda that may complement or compete with the activities of the other’s and the overall joint operation. Joint forces deploy with command and support structures not available to other government organizations or agencies. Joint forces should be prepared to develop, conduct and support nonmilitary functions until other agencies or organizations are able to assume responsibility. These functions may be as diverse as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or even nascent stages of nation building, while simultaneously ensuring a secure environment.
c. Political and military leaders must consider the employment of military force in operations characterized by a complex, interconnected, and global *operational environment* -- the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (CDR). The operational environment is influenced by the confronted adversary, adversaries exploiting opportunities or conditions, and the functional health of the local society and its institutions. Often, the adversaries are motivated by ideas that make up a belief system quite different from our own. As part of the national strategy, we must undermine the adversary’s confidence in the ideas that motivate them.

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“Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and [service] men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of the mission.”

President John F. Kennedy
Letter to the United States Army, April 11, 1962
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NOTE: This publication uses the term “operational environment” where the term “battlespace” was used previously, because the term “battlespace” is being replaced by the term “operational environment” in joint doctrine as JPs are revised.

d. Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment. The objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. Military operations in traditional war normally focus on an adversary’s armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary’s government. It generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are nonbelligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective is to minimize civilian interference in those operations. The near-term results of traditional war are often evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side and defeat for the other or in stalemate.

e. IW has emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare although it is not *per se*, a new or an independent type of warfare. Typically in IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful, conventionally armed military force, which often represents the nation’s established regime. The weaker opponent will seek to avoid large-scale combat and will focus on small, stealthy, hit-and-run engagements and possibly suicide attacks. The weaker opponent also could avoid engaging
the superior military forces entirely and instead attack nonmilitary targets in order to influence or control the local populace. An adversary using irregular warfare methods typically will endeavor to wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will of their opponent and its population. IW typically manifests itself as one or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, information operations (disinformation, propaganda, etc.), organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking), strikes, and raids. The specific form will vary according to the adversary’s capabilities and objectives. IW focuses on the control of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. The belligerents, whether states or other armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant population, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population. The focus of IW operations is on employing subversion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population. What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations – a relevant population – and its strategic purpose – to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. When engaged in irregular warfare, the US response will vary according to established national and coalition objectives, the specific type or combination of operations required (such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism), and other situation-specific factors.

f. Hostile states and non-state actors in possession of WMD represent significant security challenges. Some states, including supporters of terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation.

g. The US homeland and other US interests are potential targets for direct and indirect attack. Rather than directly confronting US military operations, adversary attacks may focus on political and public institutions. Lines of communications, ports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, economic centers, and regional allies and friends are likely targets.

h. Private, public, global, and regional information systems are tempting targets. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. With our growing dependence on these systems, it is imperative that we safeguard the inherent vulnerabilities of these new systems.

i. Within this environment, maintaining national security and managing the inevitable changes are continuous processes that often preclude simple solutions. It requires well-planned and executed joint campaigns and operations in conjunction with ad hoc partners. Additionally, joint operations are increasingly being conducted simultaneously (i.e., where offensive, defensive, and stability operations are ongoing in the same operational area).

j. Global Nature of Operations. US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats, influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends, and promoting peace and
stability with a variety of capabilities. As well, the challenging nature of globalization is affecting the character of the threat confronting the United States. Globalization and emerging technologies will allow small groups to use asymmetric approaches to include criminal activity, terrorism, or armed aggression on a transnational scale with relative ease and with little cost. Adversaries are placing greater emphasis on developing capabilities to threaten the United States directly and indirectly. Likewise, we must be prepared to simultaneously engage our enemies directly and indirectly. The increased interdependence of national economies and the rapid movement of information around the world create significant challenges in the defense of the nation’s interest. Identifying potential threats (state and non-state actors) created by these changing global dynamics, which operate independently or in loose coalitions, determining their intent and the best course of action (COA) to counter their actions is a continuing interagency and multinational challenge for the United States. The elusive nature of adversaries and the ever-increasing speed of global communications and the media demand greater adaptability and networking from US joint forces, particularly communications and intelligence resources. Consequently and as directed, the US military conducts some operations on a global, not theater, scale (e.g., special operations [SO] in the Global War on Terrorism [GWOT], network operations, space control). These operations are conducted in depth, focusing on the threat source across geographical regions that include forward regions, approaches, the homeland, and the Global Information Grid (GIG). The divisions among the geographical regions are not absolute and may overlap or shift depending on the situation and threat.

3. Instruments of National Power

a. The ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the US Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

b. At the President’s direction through the interagency process, military power is integrated with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the armed forces interact with the other responsible agencies to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays key roles in the integration of all instruments of national power facilitating mutual understanding, cooperation, and integration of effort. This process of different USG agencies and organizations coordinating and working together is called “interagency coordination.” Refer to JP 3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I, for a detailed discussion of interagency coordination. The use of the military to conduct combat operations should be a last resort when the other instruments of national power have failed to achieve our nation’s objectives.
c. Diplomacy. Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for the USG for foreign affairs. The credible threat of force reinforces, and in some cases, enables the diplomatic process. Leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States have a responsibility to understand US foreign policy and to assure that those responsible for US diplomacy have a clear understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are responsible for integrating military activities with diplomatic activities in their areas of responsibility (AORs). The US ambassador and the corresponding country team are normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in countries abroad. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the GCC employs military forces in concert with the other instruments of national power. In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team or another diplomatic mission team may have complementary activities (employing the diplomatic instrument) that do not entail control of military forces, which remain under command authority of the GCC. Since diplomatic efforts are often complementary with military objectives, planning should be complementary and coincidental.

d. Information. In a broad sense, the informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. The United States believes in the free market place of ideas. Therefore, information is freely exchanged with minimal government controls. Constraints on public access to USG information normally may be imposed only for national security and individual privacy reasons. Information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments. It is important for the official agencies of government, including the armed forces, to recognize the fundamental role of the media as a conduit of information.

(1) The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. SC’s primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort.

(2) The predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military actions to attack an adversary’s information and related systems while defending our own. PA are those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. DSPD comprises those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts. SC planning must be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in operation plans (OPLANs), and coordinated and synchronized with OGAs and multinational partners.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-13, Information Operations, for more information on strategic communication and information operations.

e. **The Military.** The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

For further guidance on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

f. **The Economy**

(1) The United States free market economy is only partially controlled by governmental agencies. In keeping with US values and constitutional imperatives, individuals and entities have broad freedom of action worldwide. The responsibility of the USG lies with facilitating the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide. A strong US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by US trade partners worldwide.

(2) The USG’s financial management ways and means support the economic instrument of national power. The Department of the Treasury, as the steward of US economic and financial systems, is an influential participant in the international economy. It is responsible for a wide range of activities including advising the President on economic and financial issues, promoting the President’s growth agenda, and enhancing corporate governance in financial institutions. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.

4. **The Unified Command Plan and Unified Action**

a. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes combatant commands. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the SecDef. The SecDef, combatant commander (CCDR), a subordinate unified CDR, or an existing joint task force (JTF) CDR may establish JTFs. Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with OGAs, IGOs, and coordination with NGOs and the private sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs to achieve unity of effort.

b. CCDRs have responsibility for a geographic area of responsibility (AOR) or a function (e.g., SO) assigned through the UCP. Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) support (or can be supported by) GCCs or may conduct assigned missions in accordance with the UCP independently.
c. The Armed Forces of the United States are most effective when employed as a joint force. This “comprehensive approach” involving all participating organizations within an operational area requires the JFC to understand the capabilities, limitations, and mandates of those organizations involved and to effectively communicate the mission of the joint force. The basic doctrinal foundations for joint functions at all levels across the range of military operations are outlined in this chapter.

5. Strategic Guidance and Responsibilities

a. Policy and Planning Documents. National policy and planning documents generally provide national strategic direction. The President and SecDef, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provide direction for Service Secretaries and CCDRs to ensure the following:

(1) The national strategic objectives are clearly defined, understood, and achievable.

(2) Strategic direction is current and timely.

(3) Active Component (AC) forces are ready for combat and Reserve Component (RC) forces are in a proper state of readiness for mobilization to active service.

(4) Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational environment.

(5) DOD, allies, coalition partners, and/or OGAs are fully integrated during planning and subsequent operations. The JFC is either the supported CDR, a component commander of an MNF, or provides support to another federal agency.

(6) All required support assets are maintained in a high state of readiness.

(7) Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS).

Refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for more information on specific policy and planning documents related to national strategic direction.

b. Military Planning. Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Regarding force planning, the Department of Defense is shifting toward capabilities-based planning (CBP), changing the way warfighting needs are identified and prioritized. The essence of CBP is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ and capabilities that could be available to the United States, then evaluate their interaction, rather than over-optimize the joint force for a limited set of threat scenarios. Integral to the CBP are Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), a common language to discuss and describe capabilities across many related DOD activities and processes. JCAs are collections of similar capabilities logically grouped to support strategic investment decision making, capability portfolio management, capability
delegation, capability analysis (gap, excess, and major trades), and capabilities-based and operational planning. As the JCAs mature, they are vetted and verified through best practices based on extant capabilities and placed into joint doctrine.

c. National Planning Documents

(1) The National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by the President, addresses the tasks that, as a nation, are necessary to shape the global environment and provide enduring security for the American people. It provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power.

(2) The National Strategy for Homeland Security, also signed by the President, provides national direction to secure the homeland through a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security.

(3) Although there is no statutory requirement, SecDef may produce a National Defense Strategy (NDS), which outlines the DOD approach to implement the President’s NSS. The NDS will support the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide DOD’s security activities and provide direction for the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NDS objectives will serve as links between military activities and those other government agencies in pursuit of national goals.

(4) The NMS, signed by the CJCS, supports the aims of the NSS and implements the NDS. It describes the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. It also provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the CCDRs and Service Chiefs identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk.

(5) The National Response Plan (NRP) was developed by the Department of Homeland Security. As a signatory, DOD agreed to modify existing interagency and agency incident management and emergency response plans to facilitate compliance with the NRP. The purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national level, all-hazards, all-discipline approach to domestic incident management. It covers the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements in anticipation of, or in response to, threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies.

(6) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG is written guidance from the SecDef to the CJCS for the preparation and review of contingency plans for specific missions. This guidance includes the relative priority of the plans, specific force levels, and supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective. It is a primary source document used by the CJCS to develop the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(7) Further, the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and JSCP provide CCDRs
with specific planning guidance for preparation of their security cooperation plans (SCPs) and contingency plans respectively. Figure I-2 illustrates the various strategic guidance sources described below in the context of national strategic direction.

(a) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides planning guidance to the CCDRs and the Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions using current military capabilities. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice to the President and SecDef.

(b) Security Cooperation Strategy. A security cooperation strategy is a strategic planning document intended to link a CCDR’s military engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

1. A theater security cooperation strategy is based on planning guidance provided by the SCG. A theater security cooperation strategy identifies the prioritization, integration, and synchronization of military engagement activities on a command basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from coordinated engagement activities. Theater security cooperation strategy represents a large portion of “shape” phase operations outlined in the CCDR’s operation plans. For planning purposes, GCCs use assigned forces, those rotationally deployed into theater, and those forces that historically have been deployed for engagement activities. Each CCDR’s theater security cooperation strategy is forwarded to the CJCS for review and integration into the global family of theater security cooperation

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**Figure I-2. National Strategic Direction**
strategies. Commanders’ security cooperation plans are internal documents intended to communicate operationalization of the theater SC strategy to subordinate components.

2. Supporting combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies routinely conduct security cooperation activities within a GCC’s AOR or involving foreign nationals from countries within an AOR. These organizations will coordinate and provide their security cooperation strategies to the supported GCC for the development of, and inclusion in, the GCC’s security cooperation strategy. When approved, security cooperation strategies of supported combatant commands are used by the Services, supporting CDRs, DOD agencies and OGAs to develop programs and budgets. The Services assigned as component commanders to the GCCs are required to develop and publish their own SCP, which is based on the GCCs country plans and SCP. These plans shall be annually reviewed and submitted to the GCCs.

d. **Role of the Geographic Combatant Commanders**

   (1) GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their geographical AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, it must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, MNFs, and elements of the private sector.

   (2) Using their strategic estimate(s), GCCs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or COAs to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. GCCs’ plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for the use of force (RUF); establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and CONOPS to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. GCCs also exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the GCC’s AOR. The exception is for those for whom a chief of mission retains security responsibility.

e. **Role of the Functional Combatant Commanders.** FCCs provide support to and may be supported by GCCs and other FCCs as directed by higher authority. FCCs are responsible for a large functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein. These responsibilities are normally global in nature. The President and SecDef direct what specific support and to whom such support will be provided. When an FCC is the supported CDR and operating within GCC’s AORs, close coordination and communication between them is paramount.

f. **Role of the Service Secretaries and Commander, United States Special**
Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). The Service Secretaries and CDRUSSOCOM (in areas unique to SO) under authority established in Title 10, USC, among other tasks, organize, train, and equip AC and RC forces, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and selected host nation (HN) personnel. The AC and RC are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy. Unpredictable crises call for trained and ready forces that are either forward deployed or are rapidly and globally deployable. These forces should be initially self-sufficient and must possess the capabilities needed to effectively act in the US national interest or signal US resolve prior to conflict. Such forces are usually drawn from the active force structure and normally are tailored and integrated into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). RC forces enhance an already robust, versatile joint force. RC individuals or forces often are required to facilitate the deployment of forces; provide continuous support and manpower augmentation to ongoing CCDR, Service, and SO; conduct homeland defense and civil support (CS) operations; and participate in SCP activities.

g. Role of the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The Commandant of the Coast Guard is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Service forces under Titles 10 and 14 USC. The Commandant may provide forces to GCCs to perform activities for which those forces are uniquely suited. Under Title 14 USC, the USCG is assigned to the Department of Homeland Security for homeland security (HS). In addition, the Commandant is responsible for the coordination and conduct of maritime law enforcement and security operations under civil authorities for HS in the US maritime domain. DOD forces may act in direct support of USCG commanders. The USCG has authority to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. It is the only Military Service, in addition to Army and Air National Guard under Title 32 USC, not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act or its extension by DOD directive.

6. Range of Military Operations

a. General. The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns (see Figure I-3). The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as CS and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF] is part of the GWOT). The nature of the security environment is such that the US military often will be engaged in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these operations, CDRs combine and sequence offensive,
defensive, and stability missions and activities to accomplish the objective. The CDR for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity.

b. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.

(1) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.

(2) Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a region. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations.

NOTE: Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.

(3) Deterrence helps prevent adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of counteraction.

(4) Joint operations (such as nation assistance for foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control) are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.
c. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to **protect** US interests and **prevent** surprise attack or further conflict. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis action plan is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., JTF SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many such operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. A crisis may prompt the conduct of FHA, CS, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace operations, strikes, raids, or recovery operations.

d. **Major Operations and Campaigns.** When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the **US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state.** In such cases, the general goal is to **prevail** against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN and the United States and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires conducting stability operations in support of broader stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) efforts. Stability operations are a core US military mission that help to establish order that advances US interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. Major operations and campaigns typically are comprised of multiple phases (e.g., Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM [1990-1991] and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM [OIF] [2003]).

NOTE: Some specific crisis response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could be considered major operations/campaigns depending on their scale and duration (e.g., Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE tsunami and Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 2005).

e. **Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations**

(1) **Simultaneous joint operations with different military end states can be conducted within a GCC’s AOR.** Major operations and campaigns can be initiated while security cooperation activities are ongoing in the same or another part of the theater (e.g., OEF during the enforcement of United Nations [UN] sanctions on Iraq). Further, a crisis response or limited contingency operation may be initiated separately or as part of a campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). In the extreme, separate major operations within a theater may be initiated/ongoing while a global
campaign is being waged (e.g., OEF and OIF during the GWOT). Consequently, GCCs should pay particular attention to synchronizing and integrating the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting forces through subordinate and supporting JFCs. This is for the purpose of achieving national, theater, and/or multinational strategic objectives. Additionally, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs work with DOS (e.g., US ambassadors or diplomatic missions), and other agencies to best integrate the military actions with other instruments of national power to promote unity of effort.

(2) **Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose.** Disaster relief operations, for example, are military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism). Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force (e.g., Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, 1992-93, peace enforcement operations evolved from FHA efforts, challenging the command with multiple missions). Joint forces must strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.

7. **Joint Operation Planning**

   a. Well-planned joint operation and campaign planning is supported by an intelligence preparation of the operational environment that benefits from a comprehensive perspective of all the systems in the operational environment relevant to the mission. In today’s world, this requires a broader and deeper understanding of the operational environment. CDRs and their staffs apply operational art – supported by their skill, knowledge, and expertise – to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.

   b. Operational design includes the key considerations used as a framework in the course of planning for a campaign or major operation. Operational design essentially involves understanding strategic guidance, identifying the adversary's centers of gravity and critical factors, and developing an operational concept to achieve strategic objectives. To that end, the elements of operational design are a tool to aid the CDR and planners in visualizing what the campaign should look like and shaping the CDR's intent.

   c. The complementary and coordinated application of all of the instruments of national power, when synergized consistent with operational art and design, provide the joint force capability required to achieve JFC objectives and the strategic end state.

8. **Termination of Operations**

   a. **General.** The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of operational design. The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups. It is absolutely essential to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between NSS, NDS, NMS, and the national strategic end state. Further, some military operations
normally will continue after the conclusion of combat operations. An extended US presence will be required to conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. It must be considered throughout planning and execution that stability operations may be required to attain the national strategic end state. These stability operations historically have required an extended presence by US military forces to assist by conducting stability operations. This contingency should be considered during the initial COA development and recommendation for execution.

b. Termination Approaches. There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by the threat of or actual occupation of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Supporting the threat of, or actual occupation is the destruction of critical functions and assets such as C2 or infrastructure or by making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of US will. The second seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less painful than continued resistance. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from three sources: national resolve, military success, and military potential. History has proven over that our national resolve is most important in impressing upon an adversary the need to seriously negotiate a conclusion to conflict. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential may compel the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. Before agreeing to one, the United States needs to consider the advantages of a truce and the difficulty of maintaining it. The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular challenges posed by non-state actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and legitimacy of his political authority; and undermines adversary influence and control over, and support by, the indigenous population.

(1) Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the USG requires some means of communication with the adversary. Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the adversary considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance.

(2) The issue of termination is impacted by an adversary’s will and freedom of action. Once the adversary’s strategic objective shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Efforts of all the instruments of national power need to be coordinated toward causing and exploiting that shift. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort that is refined as operations move toward advantageous termination.

c. The National Strategic End State. The first and primary political task regarding termination is to determine an achievable national strategic end state based on clear national
strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. **Achieving these objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.** The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is determined. Thinking of this “end state” as an integrated set of aims is useful because national strategic objectives usually are closely related rather than independent. The supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. Therefore, considering all of the objectives necessary to reach the national strategic end state will help the supported CCDR formulate proposed termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the President and/or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. CDRs and their staffs must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the national strategic end state to change even as military operations unfold.

d. **Objectives.** An objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed — the military objective. Objectives provide the focus for military action; they are essential for unity of effort. An objective may be a physical object of the action taken (e.g., a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the CDR’s plan, or the destruction of an adversarial force without regard to terrain features). This is more accurately termed the “physical objective.” Usually, physical objectives contribute to the attainment of military objectives. Military objectives must contribute to the achievement of national objectives (e.g., defend territorial integrity of an ally; ensure freedom of maritime commerce).

e. **Military Considerations.** In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military objectives supporting the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly from those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to civilian leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. Implementing military CDRs should request clarification of the national strategic end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continues upon the conclusion of sustained operations. Stability operations that support SSTR efforts primarily support OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Planning for these operations should begin when the JOPP is initiated. The JFC and staff should consider conducting early collaborative planning with interagency and multinational members, harmonizing the civil and military effort, and establishing the appropriate organization to conduct operations during the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases.

f. **Mission**
(1) An organization’s mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, the mission is a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.

(2) In a process called *mission* analysis, the JFC and staff analyze directives and guidance from higher headquarters and many other factors (including the higher headquarters’ mission) to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to subordinate and supporting organizations. The JFC’s mission analysis results in a mission statement relative to the specific operation at hand.

9. **Legal Considerations**

   a. CDRs at all levels ensure their forces operate in accordance with the “law of war,” often called the “law of armed conflict.” The law of war is international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, and is binding on the United States and its individual citizens. It includes treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, as well as applicable customary international law. It specifically applies to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict between the US and other nations; by policy, the principles and spirit of the law of war applies to all other military operations short of international armed conflict. ROE and RUF are independent of actual declaration of war. CCDRs must be particularly aware of the status of the conflict and the characterization of adversarial combatants and noncombatants (supporters).

   b. **ROE** are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE are drafted in consideration of the law of war, national policy, public opinion, and military operational constraints. ROE are often more restrictive than what the law of war would allow. **ROE ensure actions, especially force employment, are consistent with military objectives, domestic and international law, and national policy.**

   c. **RUF** are directives issued to guide US forces on the use of force during various operations other than combat. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. RUF are not the same as ROE but also are used to provide guidance on the use of force by military forces. RUF are typically used in CS operations, land based homeland defense missions, and select other military operations.

For further guidance on ROE and RUF, refer to CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, and JP 1-04, Legal Support to Joint Operations. For further guidance on the law of war, refer to CJCSI 5810.01C, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.
Chapter I

Understanding the foundations of joint doctrine is essential for the Armed Forces of the United States. As joint doctrine guides the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective, its principles also provide strategic direction to joint forces.
CHAPTER II
DOCTRINE GOVERNING UNIFIED DIRECTION OF ARMED FORCES

"The ideals that have inspired our history – freedom, democracy, and human dignity – are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. We choose leadership over isolationism and the pursuit of free trade and open markets over protectionism. We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country. We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy."

President George W. Bush
Letter Introducing the 2006 National Security Strategy

1. National Strategic Direction

a. National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy regarding internationally-recognized law and the national interest. This direction leads to unified action. The result of effective unified action is unity of effort to achieve national goals. At the strategic level, unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.

b. Responsibilities for national strategic direction as established by the Constitution and federal law and practice are as follows.

(1) The President of the United States, advised by the NSC, is responsible to the American people for national strategic direction.

(a) When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC.

(b) Complex operations, such as peace operations, may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unity of effort. Operations of agencies representing the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power are not under command of the Armed Forces of the United States or of any specific CCDR. In domestic US situations, another department such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may assume overall control of interagency coordination including military elements. Abroad, the US ambassador and the country team may be in control in operations other than war not involving the use of force.
(2) **The SecDef** is responsible to the President for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. The SecDef provides authoritative direction, and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. SecDef exercises control of and authority over those forces not specifically assigned to the combatant commands and administers this authority through the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and applicable chains of command. The Secretaries of the Military Departments organize, train, and equip forces to operate across the range of military operations and provide for the administration and support of all those forces within their department, including those assigned or attached to the CCDRs.

(3) **The CJCS** is the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and SecDef and functions under the authority of the President and the direction and control of the President and SecDef, and oversees the activities of the CCDRs as directed by SecDef. Communications between the President or the SecDef and the CCDRs are normally transmitted through the CJCS.

(4) **Commanders of combatant commands** exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

(5) In a foreign country, the **US ambassador** is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all USG elements in the HN, except those under the command of a CCDR. GCCs are responsible for coordinating with US ambassadors in their geographic AOR (as necessary) across the range of military operations, and for negotiating memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the chiefs of mission in designated countries to support military operations. Force protection is an example of a military operation/requirement where an MOA would enhance coordination and integration.

### 2. Unified Action

a. The term “unified action” in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate CDRs of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. **Unified action** synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (e.g., UN), and the private sector to achieve **unity of effort** (see Figure II-1). Unity of command within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

b. **Success often depends on unified actions.** The CJCS and all CCDRs are in pivotal positions to ensure that unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or coalition leadership).
c. Unity of command in the Armed Forces of the United States starts with national strategic direction. For US military operations, unity of command is accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission, or objective(s) to the designated JFC, establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

3. Roles and Functions

The terms “roles and functions” often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions among them are important.

a. “Roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and USSOCOM were established in law.

b. Functions. The appropriate assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term “function” includes functions, powers, and duties (Title 50, USC, Section 410[a]).
For further information on functions, refer to Chapter III, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.”

4. Chain of Command

The President and SecDef exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command (see Figure II-2). One branch runs from the President, through the SecDef, to the CCDRs for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service forces not assigned to the CCDRs. The Service Chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are directly responsible.

a. The CCDRs exercise COCOM of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate CDRs.

b. The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. This branch of the chain of command is responsible for all military forces within the respective Service not assigned to CCDRs. This branch is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.

5. The Combatant Commands

a. The President, through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes combatant (unified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands.

b. The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in performing their command functions. The CJCS transmits to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders given by the President, or the SecDef and, as directed by the SecDef, oversees the activities of those commands. Orders issued by the President or the SecDef normally are conveyed by the CJCS under the authority and direction of SecDef. Reports from CCDRs normally will be submitted through CJCS who forwards them to the SecDef and acts as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands.
CHAIN OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

PRESIDENT

CJCS...SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

FORCES
(Not assigned to Combatant Commands)

SERVICE CHIEFS

UNIFIED COMMANDS

COCOM

JOINT TASK FORCE

OPCON/TACON

SERVICE / FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND

OPCON

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDS

OPCON/TACON

FORCES/ CAPABILITIES MADE AVAILABLE

SERVICE COMPONENTS

OPCON/TACON

FORCES/ CAPABILITIES MADE AVAILABLE

JOINT TASK FORCE

OPCON/TACON

SERVICE / FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

FORCES/ CAPABILITIES MADE AVAILABLE

NOTE:
This diagram is only an example; it does not prescribe joint force organization.

Figure II-2. Chain of Command and Control
c. CDRs in the chain of command exercise COCOM, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), or a support command relationship as prescribed by law or a superior CDR over the military force under their command. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, COCOM is reserved for the CCDR over assigned forces. During contingency planning, generic forces are apportioned to specific plans according to global force management procedures. This requires supported CCDRs to coordinate with the supporting CCDRs on required capabilities during planning and on mission criteria for specific units once they have been allocated.

*Command relationships are discussed in detail in Chapter IV, “Doctrine for Joint Command and Control,” Section A, “Command Relationships.”*

6. The Military Departments, Services, Forces, and Combat Support Agencies

a. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component CDRs assigned to the CCDRs and to the CDRs of forces not assigned to the CCDRs. Administrative control (ADCON) provides for the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by the SecDef to another DOD component.

b. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of Service forces. They fulfill their responsibilities by exercising ADCON through the CDRs of the Service component commands assigned to combatant commands and through the Service Chiefs (as determined by the Secretaries) for forces not assigned to the combatant commands. The responsibilities and authority exercised by the Secretaries of the Military Departments are subject by law to the authority provided to the CCDRs in their exercise of COCOM.

c. Each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, coordinating as appropriate with the other Department Secretaries and with the CCDRs, has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill specific roles and for administering and supporting these forces.

d. Commanders of forces are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for the administration, training, and readiness of their unit(s). Commanders of forces assigned to the combatant commands are under the authority, direction, and control of (and are responsible to) their CCDR to carry out assigned operational missions, joint training and exercises, and logistics.

e. The USCG is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. However, it is established separately by law as a Service in the DHS, except when transferred to the Department of the Navy (DON) during time of war or when the President so directs. Authorities vested in the USCG under Title 10, USC, as an armed service and Title 14, USC, as a federal maritime safety and law enforcement
agency remain in effect at all times, including when USCG forces are operating within DOD/DON chain of command. USCG commanders and forces may be attached to JFCs in performance of any activity for which they are qualified. Coast Guard units routinely serve alongside Navy counterparts operating within a naval task organization in support of a maritime component CDR.

f. In addition to the Services above, a number of DOD agencies provide combat support or combat service support to joint forces and are designated as combat support agencies (CSAs). Included among CSAs are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and National Security Agency (NSA). These CSAs provide CCDRs’ specialized support and operate in a supporting role. Executive authority over these CSAs resides with the SecDef.

7. Relationship Between Combatant Commanders, Military Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and Forces

a. Continuous Coordination. The Military Services and USSOCOM (in areas unique to special operations) share the division of responsibility for developing military capabilities for the combatant commands. All components of the DOD are charged to coordinate on matters of common or overlapping responsibility. The Joint Staff, Service, and USSOCOM headquarters play a critical role in ensuring that CCDRs’ concerns and comments are included or advocated during the coordination.

b. Interoperability. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability. This includes the development and use of joint doctrine, the development and use of joint OPLANs; and the development and use of joint and/or interoperable communications and information systems. It also includes conducting joint training and exercises. It concludes with a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use will establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions that will be affected and interoperability must be considered in all joint program reviews. CCDRs will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the CJCS, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.
CHAPTER III
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS

“It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which they directed . . . The proposals or the convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success, as the united judgments and agreed decisions of all the members.”

Ernest J. King
The U.S. Navy at War, 1945

SECTION A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. General

Unified action in carrying out the military component of NSS is accomplished through an organized defense framework. This chapter describes the components and their functions within that framework.

2. Organizations in the Department of Defense

   a. Responsibility. The SecDef is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the DOD. All functions in the DOD and its component agencies are performed under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef.

   b. The DOD is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the DOD agencies, DOD field activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established or designated by law, by the President, or by the SecDef. The functions of the heads of these offices shall be as assigned by the SecDef according to existing law.

3. Functions of the Department of Defense

   As prescribed by higher authority, the DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to fulfill the following aims.

   a. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

   b. Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.

   c. Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
4. Functions and Responsibilities within the Department of Defense

a. The functions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Services, the JCS, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands will be carried out in such a manner as to achieve the following.

(1) Provide the best military advice to the President and the SecDef.

(2) Effective strategic direction of the Armed Forces.

(3) Employment of the Armed Forces in joint force commands whenever such arrangement is in the best interest of national security.

(4) Integration of the Armed Forces into an effective and efficient team operating within the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment.

(5) Prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping capabilities among the Services by using personnel, intelligence, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services of any or all Services such that military effectiveness and economy of resources will thereby be increased.

(6) Coordination of Armed Forces operations to promote efficiency and economy and to prevent gaps in responsibility.

(7) Effective multinational operations and interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination.

b. Development of Major Force Requirements. Major force requirements to fulfill any specific primary function of an individual Service must be justified on the basis of existing or predicted need as recommended by the CJCS, in coordination with the JCS and CCDRs, and as approved by SecDef.

c. Exceptions to Primary Responsibilities. The development of special weapons and equipment and the provision of training equipment required by each of the Services are the responsibilities of the individual Service concerned unless otherwise directed by the SecDef.

d. Responsibility of a Service Chief on Disagreements Related to That Service’s Primary Functions. Each Service Chief is responsible for presenting to the CJCS any disagreement within the field of that Service’s primary functions that has not been resolved. This action will not be construed to prevent any Service Chief from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service.

5. Executive Agents

a. The SecDef or Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a DOD executive agent (EA) and assign associated responsibilities, functions, and authorities within DOD. The head of a DOD component may be designated as a DOD EA. The DOD EA may delegate to a subordinate designee within that official’s component the authority to act on that official’s behalf for any or all of those DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by the SecDef or Deputy
b. The term EA is used to indicate a delegation of authority by the SecDef or Deputy Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary’s behalf. Designation of EA, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the establishing directive. An EA may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specific purposes. EA responsibilities and activities assigned to the Secretary of a Military Department may serve as justification of budgetary requirements and may be used to identify requirements and resources, including force structure to the extent permitted by law, necessary to execute assigned responsibilities and functions.

c. Responsibilities of an EA include the following listed below.

(1) Implement and comply with the relevant policies and directives of the SecDef.

(2) Ensure proper coordination among Military Departments, the combatant commands, the JCS, the Joint Staff, the OSD, and the DOD agencies and field activities, as appropriate, for the responsibilities and activities assigned.

(3) Issue directives to other DOD components and take action on behalf of the SecDef, to the extent authorized in the directive establishing the executive agent.

(4) Make recommendations to the SecDef for actions regarding the activity for which the EA was designated, including the manner and timing for dissolution of these responsibilities and duties.

(5) Perform such other duties and observe such limitations as may be set forth in the directive establishing the EA.

SECTION B. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

6. Composition and Functions

a. The JCS, consists of the CJCS; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS); the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Staff supports the JCS and constitutes the immediate military staff of the SecDef.

b. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef.

c. The other members of the JCS are military advisors to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef as specified below.
(1) A member of the JCS may submit to the CJCS advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the CJCS. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the CJCS shall present that advice or opinion to the President, SecDef, or NSC at the same time that he presents his own advice. The CJCS shall also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the NSC, or the SecDef of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

(2) The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice on a particular matter when the President, the NSC, or the SecDef requests such advice.

d. To the extent it does not impair independence in the performance of duties as a member of the JCS, each member (except the CJCS) will inform their respective Service Secretary regarding military advice rendered by members of the JCS on matters affecting their Military Department.

e. The duties of the Service Chiefs as members of the JCS take precedence over all their other duties.

f. After first informing the SecDef, a member of the JCS may make such recommendations to Congress relating to DOD as the member may consider appropriate.

g. When there is a vacancy, absence, or disability in the office of the CJCS, the VCJCS acts as and performs the duties of the CJCS until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

h. When there is a vacancy in the offices of both the CJCS and VCJCS, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President will designate another member of the JCS to act as and perform the duties of the CJCS until a successor to the CJCS or VCJCS is appointed or the absence or disability of the CJCS or VCJCS ceases.

i. The Commandant of the Coast Guard may be invited by the CJCS or the Service Chiefs to participate in meetings or to discuss matters of mutual interest to the Coast Guard and the other Services.

7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. The CJCS is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular component of the United States Armed Forces.

b. The CJCS arranges for military advice, as appropriate, to be provided to all offices of the SecDef.

c. While holding office, the CJCS outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces. The CJCS, however, may not exercise military command over the CCDRs, JCS, or any of the Armed Forces.
d. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, the CJCS serves as the spokesman for the CCDRs, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. CCDRs will send their reports to the CJCS, who will review and forward the reports as appropriate to the SecDef, subject to the direction of the SecDef, so that the CJCS may better incorporate the views of CCDRs in advice to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef. The CJCS also communicates, as appropriate, the CCDRs’ requirements to other elements of DOD.

e. The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The CJCS transmits orders to the CCDRs as directed by the President or SecDef and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the CCDRs.

f. In addition to other duties as a member of the JCS, the CJCS will, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the SecDef:

   (1) Preside over the JCS;

   (2) Provide an agenda for each meeting of the JCS (including, as the CJCS considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the JCS);

   (3) Assist the JCS in carrying out their business as promptly as practicable; and

   (4) Determine when issues under consideration by the JCS will be decided.

g. In performing CJCS functions, duties, and responsibilities including those enumerated above, the CJCS will:

   (1) Convene regular meetings of the JCS; and

   (2) As appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the JCS, collectively or individually, and of the CCDRs.

h. Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President and the SecDef, the CJCS has the following responsibilities.

   (1) Strategic planning

      (a) Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by SecDef to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

      (b) Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.
(c) Perform net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

(2) Contingency planning; preparedness.

(a) Provide for the preparation and review of contingency OPLANs that conform to policy guidance from the President and the SecDef.

(b) Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency OPLANs and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

(c) Advise the SecDef on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint OPLANs and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives, policy, and strategic plans.

(d) Establish and maintain after consultation with the CDRs of the unified and specified component commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out their assigned missions.

(3) Advice on requirements, programs, and budget.

(a) Advise the SecDef on the priorities of the requirements identified by the CCDRs.

(b) Advise the SecDef on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other DOD components for a fiscal year, conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the CCDRs.

(c) Submit to the SecDef alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the SecDef, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and the prioritized requirements of the CCDRs.

(d) Recommend to the SecDef (in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 166) a budget proposal for activities of each combatant command.

(e) Advise the SecDef on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

(f) Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

(4) Doctrine, training, and education
(a) Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

(b) Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.

(c) Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

(5) Other matters

(a) Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the UN in accordance with the USG law and policy.

(b) Perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or the SecDef.

(c) Not later than January 1 of each odd-numbered year, the CJCS shall submit to the SecDef a report providing the CJCS's assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current NMS.

(d) At or about the time that the budget is submitted to Congress for a fiscal year (Title 31, USC, Section 1105(a)), the CJCS shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the requirements of the combatant commands (Title 10, USC, Section 161).

(e) Not later then February 15 of each even-numbered year, the CJCS shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of a comprehensive examination of the NMS. Each such examination shall be conducted by the CJCS in conjunction with the other members of the JCS and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

(f) Participate, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations.

(g) Manage, for the SecDef, the National Military Command System (NMCS), to meet the needs of the SecDef and the JCS and establish operational policies and procedures for all components of the NMCS and ensure their implementation.

(h) Provide overall supervision of those DOD agencies and DOD field activities assigned to the CJCS by the SecDef. Advise the SecDef on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of a DOD agency or DOD field activity, for which the CJCS has been assigned overall supervision, conform with the requirements of the Military Departments and of the combatant commands.
(i) Periodically (not less than every 2 years) report to the SecDef on the responsiveness and readiness of designated CSAs. Those include the following.

1. DCMA.
2. DISA.
3. DIA.
4. DLA.
5. NGA.
6. NSA.
7. DTRA.
8. Any other DOD agency designated as a CSA by the SecDef.

(j) Provide for the participation of combat support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.

(k) Develop a uniform readiness reporting system for reporting the readiness of CSAs.

(l) Provide military advice on the allocation of a CSA’s capabilities to SecDef in cases where support requirements exceed capacity.

(m) Select officers to serve on the Joint Staff. The CJCS may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.

(n) Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.

(o) Advise and assist the SecDef on the establishment and review of joint duty positions, including those designated as critical joint duty positions.

(p) Advise the SecDef on establishing career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty and on procedures for overseeing the careers, including promotions and career assignments, of officers with the joint specialty and other officers who serve in joint duty assignments.

(q) Advise and assist the SecDef on the periodic review, accreditation, and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.
(r) Advise and assist the SecDef in preparing guidelines to be furnished to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for ensuring that specified officer promotion boards consider the performance of officers who are serving, or have served, in joint duty assignments.

(s) Designate at least one officer currently serving in a joint duty assignment to each officer promotion board that will consider officers who are serving or have served in a joint duty assignment.

(t) Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the SecDef, and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.

(u) Submit to the SecDef an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral.

(v) Prescribe the duties and functions of the VCJCS with the approval of the SecDef.

(w) Appoint consultants to the Joint Staff from outside the DOD, subject to the approval of the SecDef.

8. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. The VCJCS is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the United States Armed Forces.

b. The VCJCS holds the grade of general or admiral and outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces except the CJCS. The VCJCS may not exercise military command over the JCS, the CCOs, or any of the Armed Forces.

c. The VCJCS performs the duties prescribed as a member of the JCS and such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by the CJCS with the approval of the SecDef.

d. When there is a vacancy in the office of the CJCS, or in the absence or disability of the CJCS, the VCJCS acts as and performs the duties of the CJCS until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

e. The VCJCS is a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, is the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and may be designated by the CJCS to act as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
9. The Joint Staff

a. The Joint Staff is under the exclusive authority, direction, and control of the CJCS. The Joint Staff will perform duties using procedures that the CJCS prescribes to assist the CJCS and the other members of the JCS in carrying out their responsibilities.

b. The Joint Staff includes officers selected in proportional numbers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and Air Force. Coast Guard officers may also serve on the Joint Staff.

c. Selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff is made by the CJCS from a list of officers submitted by the Services. Each officer whose name is submitted must be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that Service. The CJCS may specify the number of officers to be included on such a list.

d. After coordination with the other members of the JCS and with the approval of the SecDef, the CJCS may select a Director, Joint Staff.

e. The CJCS manages the Joint Staff and its Director.

f. The Joint Staff will not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and will have no executive authority. The Joint Staff is organized and operates along conventional staff lines to support the CJCS and the other members of the JCS in discharging their assigned responsibilities. In addition, the Joint Staff is the focal point for the CJCS to ensure that comments and concerns of the CCDRs are well represented and advocated during all levels of coordination.

SECTION C. COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES

10. Common Functions of the Military Services and the United States Special Operations Command

a. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef and subject to the provisions of Title 10, USC, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, under their respective Secretaries, are responsible for the functions prescribed in detail in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components. Specific Service functions also are delineated in that directive (see Figure III-1).

b. USSOCOM is unique among the combatant commands in that it performs certain Service-like functions (Title 10, USC, Chapter 6), including the following.

(1) Organize, train, equip, and provide combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to the other combatant commands and, when directed by the President or SecDef, conduct selected SO, usually in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the SO will be conducted. USSOCOM’s role in equipping and supplying SOF is generally limited to SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services.
(2) Develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for SOF, to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) forces. (Note: Joint doctrine is developed under the procedures approved by the CJCS.)
(3) Prepare and submit to the SecDef program recommendations and budget proposals for SOF and other forces assigned to USSOCOM.

SECTION D. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

11. General

GCCs are assigned a geographic AOR by the President with the advice of the SecDef as specified in the UCP. Functional CCDRs support GCCs, conduct operations in direct support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted, and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CCDR for an operation. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command, with respect to the commands and the forces assigned to that command, are shown in Figure III-2.

![COMMON FUNCTIONS OF A COMBATANT COMMANDER](image)

**Figure III-2. Common Functions of a Combatant Commander**

12. Assigned Responsibilities

a. The Commanders, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, and US Northern Command are each assigned a geographic AOR within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and/or attached forces. Forces under the direction of the President or the SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the CCDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or the SecDef. Some responsibilities of these CCDRs are to:

- Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- Organizing commands and forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Employing forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders.
- Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial as delineated in Title 10, US Code, Section 164.
(1) deter attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and employ appropriate force should deterrence fail;

(2) carry out assigned missions and tasks and plan for and executing military operations, as directed, in support of strategic guidance;

(3) USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM will provide defense support to civil authorities as directed;

b. The Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is responsible for:

(1) providing defense support of civil authorities, as directed;

(2) in coordination with US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), providing technical advice and assistance to geographic CDRs conducting consequence management operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives incidents outside its AOR (i.e., continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the US approaches);

(3) CDRUSNORTHCOM is also designated the Commander, US Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and will normally be designated Commander, NORAD, a binational command of the US and Canada, responsible for aerospace warning and aerospace control for Canada, Alaska and the CONUS. Through NORAD the commander answers to both the US and Canadian governments.


c. The Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) is responsible for:

(1) leading joint concept development and experimentation;

(2) serving as the lead joint force integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service DOD agency, and interagency and multinational capabilities;

(3) serving as the lead agent for joint force training;

(4) leading the collaborative development of joint readiness standards for JTF headquarter (HQ) staffs, functional component HQ staffs, and HQ designated as potential joint HQ or portion thereof, for recommendation to CJCS;

(5) serving as the primary joint force provider.
d. CDRUSSOCOM is a functional CCDR who exercises COCOM of all Active and RC SOF minus US Army Reserve civil affairs and PSYOP forces stationed in CONUS. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides US based SOF to a geographic CCDR who exercises COCOM of assigned and OPCON of attached SOF through a CDR of a theater SO command or a joint SO task force in a specific operational area or to prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ a joint SO task force as the supported CDR. In addition to functions specified in Title 10, USC, Section 167, CDRUSSOCOM is responsible to:

1. serve as the SOF joint force provider;

2. integrate and coordinate DOD PSYOP capabilities to enhance interoperability and support USSTRATCOM’s IO responsibilities and other CCDRs’ PSYOP planning and execution;

3. serve as the lead CCDR for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCDRs;

4. exercises C2 of selected SO missions as directed.

e. The Commander, US Strategic Command is a functional CCDR who is responsible to:

1. maintain primary responsibility among CCDRs to support the national objective of strategic deterrence;

2. provide integrated global strike planning and C2 support of theater and national objectives, and exercising C2 of selected missions as directed;

3. plan, integrate, and coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense;

4. plan, integrate, and coordinate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of strategic and global operations to include tasking ISR capabilities in support of strategic employment as directed;

5. integrate and coordinate DOD IO that cross geographic AORs or across the core IO capabilities;

6. plan, integrate, and coordinate DOD global network operations;

7. serve as lead CCDR to integrate and synchronize combating WMD efforts for DOD;

8. plan and conduct space operations.
f. The Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) is a functional CCDR who is responsible to:

(1) Provide common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management and aerial refueling to support global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces;

(2) Serve as the mobility joint force provider;

(3) Provide DOD global patient movement, in coordination with geographic CCDRs, through the Defense Transportation Network;

(4) Serve as the distribution process owner.

For further detail concerning CCDRs’ assigned responsibilities, refer to the UCP.

13. Additional Authority

If a CCDR at any time considers the CCDR’s authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the CCDR’s command to be insufficient to command effectively, the CCDR will promptly inform the SecDef through the CJCS.

14. Authority over Subordinate Commanders

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, commanders of the combatant commands exercise authority over subordinate CDRs as follows.

a. Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a CCDR are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the CCDR on all matters for which the CCDR has been assigned authority as outlined in the UCP and Title 10, USC.

b. The CDR of a command or force assigned to a CCDR will communicate with other elements of DOD on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command.

c. Other elements of DOD will communicate with the commander of a command or force assigned to a CCDR on any manner for which the CCDR has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the CCDR.

d. The CDR of a subordinate command or force will advise the CCDR, if so directed, of all communications to and from other elements of the DOD on any matter for which the CCDR has not been assigned authority.
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CHAPTER IV
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECTION A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. General Principles

   a. Command. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although CDRs may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law.

   b. Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single CDR with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command. Unity of command requires that two CDRs may not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time.

   c. Command and Staff. JFCs are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the CDR; its sole function is command support, and its authority is delegated to it by the CDR. A properly trained and directed staff will free the CDR to devote more attention to directing subordinate CDRs and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

       (1) Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

       (2) Staffing is the term used to describe the coordination that occurs between staffs at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts do not entail command relationships. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally respond to requests for information.
d. Levels of Authority. The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the level of authority a CDR has over assigned or attached forces. A CDR can also have authority when coordinating authority, ADCON, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships have been specified. An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure IV-1.

![Command Relationships Diagram]

**Figure IV-1. Command Relationships**

2. Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Forces

All forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Military Departments (except those forces necessary to carry out the functions of the Military Departments as noted in Title 10, USC, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands or CDR, US Element NORAD (USELEMNORAD) by the SecDef in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command to another CCDR only when directed by the SecDef and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) will be specified by the SecDef. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate (see Figure IV-2).
a. The CCDR exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the President or SecDef. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of C2 is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the CCDR. Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces.

b. The CCDR normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the SecDef. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs normally will direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

c. In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum and the UCP, except as otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a specific CCDR shall be assigned or attached to, and under the command of, that CCDR. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area CDR solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the CCDR is exercising TACON for the purpose of force protection. Unless otherwise specified by the SecDef, and with the exception of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, a CCDR has TACON for exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that CCDR undertake exercises in that CCDR’s AOR.
3. Combatant Command (Command Authority)

COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, USC, Section 164 (or as directed by the President in the UCP) and cannot be delegated or transferred.

a. Basic Authority. COCOM is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or FCCs functional component commander. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the SecDef, the authority, direction, and control of the CCDR with respect to the command of forces assigned to that command includes the following.

(1) Exercise or delegate OPCON, TACON, and establish support relationships among subordinate CDRs over assigned or attached forces, and designate coordinating authorities, as described in subparagraphs (8), (9), and (10) below.

(2) Exercise directive authority for logistic matters (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).

(3) Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

(4) Employ forces within that command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(5) Assign command functions to subordinate CDRs.

(6) Coordinate and approve those aspects of administration and support, and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(7) Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

(8) Coordinate with other CCDRs, USG agencies, and organizations of other countries regarding matters that cross the boundaries of geographic areas specified in the UCP and inform USG agencies or organizations of other countries in the AOR, as necessary, to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.
(9) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, function as the US military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, DOD elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and organizations of other countries in the AOR. Whenever a CCDR conducts exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another CCDR’s AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be mutually agreed to between the CCDRs.

(10) Determine those matters relating to the exercise of COCOM in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the CCDR.

(11) Establish personnel policies to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.

(12) Submit recommendations through the CJCS to the SecDef concerning the content of guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.

(13) Participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process as follows.

(a) Submit to the CJCS comments and recommendations to be used in planning the proposed DOD policy, strategy, and force guidance for programming.

(b) Provide guidance to subordinate commands and components on warfighting requirements and priorities for addressing their program and budget requests to the respective Military Departments.

(c) Provide an integrated priority list of essential warfighting requirements prioritized across Service and functional lines for consideration by the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CDRUSSOCOM, the CJCS, and the SecDef in developing the DOD program and budget.

(d) Review reports from subordinate component CDRs on the degree to which their program and budget requests meet the warfighting requirements of the command. CCDRs will communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CDRUSSOCOM, the CJCS, and the SecDef through the CJCS concerning their assessments of operational capability deficiencies associated with program and budget requests.

(e) Review and provide comments and recommendations on the degree to which Service and DOD agencies’ programs satisfy warfighting requirements to the CJCS and the SecDef through the CJCS.

(f) Assess the impact of OSD program and budget decisions and provide recommendations to the CJCS and the SecDef through the CJCS.
(g) As directed by the SecDef, prepare and submit budget proposals to the CJCS for activities of the command.

(14) Participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). CCDRs’ comments are critical to ensuring that warfighting and peacetime operational concerns are emphasized in all planning documents.

(15) Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as CDRs directly subordinate to the CCDR and to positions on the combatant command staff. Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment, when appropriate, of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command.

(16) Convene general courts-martial in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

(17) In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for the C2, communications system, and ISR activities of the command.

c. When directed in the UCP or otherwise authorized by the SecDef, the CDR of US elements of a multinational command may exercise COCOM of those US forces assigned to that command (e.g., USELEMNORAD).

d. Directive Authority for Logistics. CCDRs exercise directive authority for logistics and may delegate directive authority for a common support capability. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s assigned mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, one Service may be given responsibility for management based on DOD EA designations or inter-Service support agreements. However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated directive authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate CDRs, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. CCDRs will coordinate with appropriate Services before exercising directive authority for logistics or delegate authority for subordinate CDRs to exercise common support capabilities to one of their components.

(1) A CCDR’s directive authority does not:

(a) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support;

(b) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or
(c) Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

(2) Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance.

(a) Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the SecDef or the CJCS. Where these factors preclude execution of a CCDR’s directive by component CDRs, the comments and recommendations of the CCDR, together with the comments of the component CDR concerned, normally will be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the CCDR, through the CJCS, to the SecDef.

(b) Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of CCDRs enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the CJCS establishes wartime logistic support guidance to assist the CCDR in conducting successful joint operations.

For further information on logistic support refer to JP 4-0 Joint Logistic Support.

(3) A CCDR will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force basing, and other aspects, as appropriate) within the command’s AOR that will have a significant impact on operational capability or sustainability. When the CCDR does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the CCDR and the Service Chief fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the CCDR may forward the issue through the CJCS to the SecDef for resolution.

4. Operational Control

OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the SecDef.

a. Basic Authority. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or FCCs functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCDR. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs.

b. CDRs of subordinate commands, including JTFs, normally will be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior CDR.

c. OPCON conveys the authority for the following.

(1) Exercise or delegate OPCON and TACON, establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.

(2) Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.

(3) Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

(4) Organize subordinate commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(5) Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(6) Assign command functions to subordinate CDRs.

(7) Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.

(8) Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the ISR activities of the command.

(9) Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the CJCS, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.
(10) Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.

(11) Assign responsibilities to subordinate CDRs for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more CDRs.

(12) Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such operational areas for subordinate CDRs as deemed desirable.

(13) Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic operational areas of subordinate CDRs.

d. The SecDef may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between CCDRs or when members and/or organizations are transferred from the Military Departments to a combatant command. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CCDRs.

5. Tactical Control

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

a. Basic Authority. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between CCDRs, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over those forces must be specified by the SecDef.

b. TACON provides the authority to:

(1) Give direction for military operations; and

(2) Control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management).

c. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the CDR of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

d. Functional component CDRs typically exercise TACON over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.
6. Support

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior CDR between subordinate CDRs when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

a. Basic Authority. Support may be exercised by CDRs at any echelon at or below the combatant command level. This includes the SecDef designating a support relationship between CCDRs as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to CDRs and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported CDR and supporting CDRs understand the degree of authority that the supported CDR is granted.

b. The supported CDR should ensure that the supporting CDRs understand the assistance required. The supporting CDRs will then provide the assistance needed, subject to a supporting CDR’s existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When a supporting CDR cannot fulfill the needs of the supported CDR, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported CDR or a supporting CDR. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

c. An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include:

(1) The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort;

(2) The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;

(3) The relative priority of the supporting effort;

(4) The authority, if any, of the supporting CDR to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and

(5) The degree of authority granted to the supported CDR over the supporting effort.

d. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported CDR will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

e. The supporting CDR determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting CDR will advise and coordinate with the supported CDR on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such
support into the supported CDR’s effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting CDR’s organization.

f. The supporting CDR has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

g. Several categories of support have been defined to better characterize the support that should be given. For example, land forces that provide fires normally are tasked in a direct support role.

For further information See Appendix B, Establishing Directive (Support Relationship) Considerations.

7. Categories of Support

There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives. These include general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support. Figure IV-3 summarizes each of the categories of support. The establishing directive will specify the type and extent of support the specified forces are to provide.
8. Support Relationships Between Combatant Commanders

a. The SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the planning and execution of joint operations. This ensures that the tasked CCDR(s) receives the necessary support. A supported CCDR requests capabilities, tasks supporting DOD components, coordinates with the appropriate Federal agencies (where agreements have been established), and develops a plan to achieve the common goal. As part of the team effort, supporting CCDRs provide the requested capabilities, as available, to assist the supported CCDR to accomplish missions requiring additional resources.

b. The CJCS organizes the joint planning and execution community for joint operation planning to carry out support relationships between the combatant commands. The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task. Supporting CCDRs provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported CCDR. Supporting CCDRs prepare supporting plans as required. Under some circumstances, a CCDR may be a supporting CCDR for one operation while being a supported CCDR for another.

9. Support Relationships Between Component Commanders

a. The JFC may establish support relationships between component CDRs to facilitate operations. Support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize and ensure unity of effort for various operations. Component CDRs should establish liaison with other component CDRs to facilitate the support relationship and to coordinate the planning and execution of pertinent operations. Support relationships may change across phases of an operation as directed by the establishing authority.

b. When the commander of a Service component is designated as an FCC functional component commander, the associated Service component responsibilities for assigned or attached forces are retained, but are not applicable to forces made available by other Service components. The operational requirements of the functional component CDR’s subordinate forces are prioritized and presented to the JFC by the functional component CDR, relieving the affected Service component CDRs of this responsibility, but the affected Service component CDRs are not relieved of their administrative and support responsibilities.

c. In rare situations, a supporting component CDR may be supporting two or more supported CDRs. In these situations, there must be clear understanding among all parties, and a specification in the establishing directive, as to who supports whom, when, and with what prioritization. When there is a conflict over prioritization between component CDRs, the CCDR having COCOM of the component CDRs will have final adjudication.

10. Other Authorities

Other authorities outside the command relationships delineated above are described below.
a. Administrative Control. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs of Service forces assigned to a CCDR at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of CCDRs. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by CDRs of Service commands assigned within Service authorities. Service CDRs exercising ADCON will not usurp the authorities assigned by a CCDR having COCOM over CDRs of assigned Service forces.

b. Coordinating Authority. CDRs or individuals may exercise coordinating authority at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a CDR or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component CDRs). Coordinating authority may be granted and modified through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and unity of effort for operations involving RC, and AC forces engaged in interagency activities. The CDR or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between CDRs, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

c. Direct Liaison Authorized. DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a CDR (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the CDR granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

11. Command of National Guard and Reserve Forces

a. All National Guard and reserve forces (except those forces specifically exempted) are assigned by the SecDef to the combatant commands under the authority provided in Title 10, USC, Sections 162 and 167, as indicated in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. However, those forces are available for operational missions only when mobilized for specific periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty and after being validated for employment by their parent Service.
b. The authority CCDRs may exercise over assigned RC forces when not on active
duty or when on active duty for training is training and readiness oversight (TRO). CCDRs
normally will exercise TRO over assigned forces through the Service component
commanders. TRO includes the authority to:

(1) Provide guidance to Service component commanders on operational
requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness
programs;

(2) Comment on Service component program recommendations and budget
requests;

(3) Coordinate and approve participation by assigned RC forces in joint exercises
and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for
training;

(4) Obtain and review readiness and inspection reports on assigned RC forces; and

(5) Coordinate and review mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training
activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned RC forces.

c. Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the following applies.

(1) Assigned RC forces on active duty (other than for training) may not be
deployed until validated by the parent Service for deployment.

(2) CCDRs may employ RC forces assigned to their subordinate component
CDRs in contingency operations only when the forces have been mobilized for specific
periods in accordance with the law, or when ordered to active duty and after being
validated for employment by their parent Service.

(3) RC forces on active duty for training or performing inactive-duty training may
be employed in connection with contingency operations only as provided by law, and when
the primary purpose is for training consistent with their mission or specialty.

d. CCDRs will communicate with assigned RC forces through the Military
Departments when the RC forces are not on active duty or when on active duty for training.

e. CCDRs may inspect assigned RC forces in accordance with DODD 5106.4,
Combatant Command Inspectors Genera, when such forces are mobilized or ordered to
active duty (other than for training).

f. CDRUSSOCOM will exercise additional authority for certain functions for assigned
RC forces and for all SOF assigned to other combatant commands in accordance with the
current MOAs between CDRUSSOCOM and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
SECTION B. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF JOINT FORCES

12. Background

Command is the most important function undertaken by a JFC. It is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated CDR over assigned and attached forces. C2 is the means by which a JFC synchronizes and/or integrates joint force activities in order to achieve unity of command. C2 ties together all the operational functions and tasks, and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military operations.

13. Command and Control Fundamentals

C2 enhances the CDR’s ability to make sound and timely decisions and successfully execute them. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans. Advances in information systems and communications may enhance the situational awareness (SA) and understanding of tactical CDRs, subordinate JFCs, CCLs, and even the national leadership. These technological advances increase the potential for superiors, once focused solely on strategic and operational decision making, to assert themselves at the tactical level. While this will be their prerogative, decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the CDR.

a. Tenets. Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets.

(1) Clearly Defined Authorities, Roles, and Relationships. Effective C2 of joint operations begins by establishing unity of command through the designation of a JFC with the requisite authority to accomplish assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of command. It is essential for the JFC to ensure that subordinate CDRs, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes (e.g., IO cell, joint movement center) understand their authorities, their role in decision making and controlling, and their relationships with others. The assignment of responsibilities and the delegation of authorities foster initiative and speed the C2 process. Joint force staff principals must understand that their primary role is to provide sufficient, relevant information to enhance SA and understanding for the JFC and for subordinate CDRs. Once a decision is made, CDRs depend on their staffs to communicate the decision to subordinates in a manner that quickly focuses the necessary capabilities within the command to achieve the CDR’s intent. The CDR should give the staff the authority to make routine decisions within the constraints of the CDR’s intent while conducting operations. Appropriate application of the command relationships discussed previously in Section A, will help ensure that the requisite amount of control is applied while enabling sufficient latitude for decentralized execution. Additionally, commander-staff and staff-staff relationships must be developed through training to promote the understanding of all regarding the direction and/or support required.

(2) Information Management. Control and appropriate sharing of information is a prerequisite to maintaining effective C2. Identifying, requesting, receiving, tracking, and
sharing the needed information ensures that decision makers make informed, timely decisions. This requires efficient use of people, procedures, and systems to keep the CDRs and staffs from being overwhelmed by information. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) must be made known, and development of an information management plan is necessary to address appropriate vertical and horizontal information flow, including common operational picture (COP) criteria. Action officers and decision makers need to be aware of the processes and procedures to be able to effectively use available system capabilities to share pertinent information based on the rule of sharing as the default and withholding as an exception.

(3) Communication. Because JFCs seek to minimize restrictive control measures and detailed instructions, they must find effective and efficient ways to create cooperation and compliance. Commander’s intent fosters communication and understanding with all subordinates. This common understanding builds teamwork and mutual trust. Two joint C2 constructs that ensure implicit communication are the commander’s intent and mission statement.

(a) Commander’s intent represents a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within centralized, overarching guidance. It is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting CDRs take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.

(b) JFCs use mission-type orders to decentralize execution. Mission-type orders direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without specifying how to accomplish it. Within these orders, the actual mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The senior leaves the details of execution to the subordinate, allowing the freedom — and the obligation — to take whatever steps are necessary to deal with the changing situation. This freedom of action encourages the initiative at lower levels.

(4) Timely Decision Making. With well-defined CCIRs, effective COP management, and establishing clear objectives, the JFC can make timely and effective decisions to get inside the adversary’s decision and execution cycle. Doing so generates confusion and disorder and slows an adversary’s decision making. The CDR who can gather information and make better decisions faster will generate a quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military advantage. Consequently, decision making models and procedures must be flexible and allow abbreviation should the situation warrant it. Adoption of a decision aid(s) offers the CDR and staff a method(s) for maintaining SA of the ongoing operation as well as identifying critical decision points where the CDR’s action may be required to maintain force momentum.

(5) Coordination Mechanisms. Coordination mechanisms facilitate integration, synchronization, and synergistic interaction among joint force components. Coordinating mechanisms can include: agreements, memoranda of understanding, exchange and/or liaison officers, direct and integrated staffing, interoperable communications systems, information
sharing, exercises and plan development. Integration is achieved through joint operation planning and the skillful assimilation of forces, capabilities, and systems to enable their employment in a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of separate operations. A synchronization matrix may be employed to visually portray critical actions that must be accomplished by multiple elements of the joint force. Coordination is facilitated through the exchange of liaisons and interoperable communications systems. These mechanisms provide the JFC with a linkage to the joint force staff and subordinate commands’ activities, and works to execute plans and coordinate changes required by the unfolding situation. In interagency and/or multinational environments where unity of command may not be possible, unity of effort may be achieved through effective coordination, exchange of liaisons, and interoperable communications and/or common operating systems. Constant coordination and cooperation between the combatant command and component staffs — and with other combatant commands — is a prerequisite for ensuring timely command awareness.

(6) Battle Rhythm Discipline. A command headquarters battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle for briefings, meetings, and reporting requirements. A battle rhythm is essential to support decision making, staff actions, and higher headquarters information requirements and to manage the dissemination of decisions and information in a coordinated manner. A defined battle rhythm should be based on the information needs requirements of the CCDR, subordinates, and senior commands. It must be designed to minimize the time the CDR and key staff members spend attending meetings and listening to briefings—it must allow the staff and subordinate CDRs time to plan, communicate with the CDR, and direct the activities of their subordinates. The battle rhythms of the joint and component headquarters should be synchronized and take into account multiple time zones and other factors. Other planning, decision, and operating cycles or processes (intelligence, targeting, and air tasking order) influence the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Further, meetings of the necessary boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups must be synchronized. Consequently, key members of the joint force staff, components, and supporting agencies should participate in the development of the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Those participants must consider the battle rhythm needs of higher, lower, lateral, and adjacent commands when developing the joint force headquarters battle rhythm.

(a) Simple, focused displays of information delivered in a disciplined way are necessary. Information displayed or discussed should be mission-related. The attention of the JFC and joint staff is pulled both from above, by requirements from seniors, and from below, by the needs of component CDRs and their staffs. These requirements must also be integrated into the activities of the JFC, but must not be allowed to dominate JFC actions. Technology offers a means to reduce the time required for conducting these essential C2 events. For example, video teleconferencing and other collaborative communication tools are common methods used in many headquarters to conduct scheduled and unscheduled meetings and conferences that include a wide range of key participants.

(b) The JFC and staff must be sensitive to the battle rhythm of subordinate organizations. Component CDRs also need information to function properly within their own decision cycles. The JFC should establish and require adherence to norms that increase the speed of the component CDRs’ decision cycles.
(7) Responsive, Dependable, and Interoperable Support Systems. ISR, space-based, and communications systems must be responsive and dependable in real time to provide the JFC with accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate information. Linking support systems that possess commonality, compatibility, and standardization to the greatest extent possible will contribute to a higher state of interoperability and thus C2 utility. Integrating the support systems of multinational and other agency partners also must be considered.

(8) SA. The primary objective that the staff seeks to attain for the commander and for subordinate CDRs is SA — a prerequisite for CDRs anticipating opportunities and challenges. True situational understanding should be the basis for all decision makers. Knowledge of friendly capabilities and adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs enables CDRs to focus joint efforts where they best and most directly contribute to achieving objectives. Further, the JFC’s situational awareness must be broad to include the actions and intentions of multinational partners, civilian agencies, adjacent commands, higher headquarters, HN authorities, and nongovernmental organizations.

(9) Mutual Trust. Decentralized execution, operating within the JFC’s intent, and mission-type orders capitalize on the initiative of subordinate CDRs. However, for these methods to work within a joint force and, indeed, for the joint force to function at all, there must be a high degree of mutual trust. Trust among the CDRs and staffs in a joint force expands the JFC’s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. The JFC trusts the chain of command, leaders, and staffs to use the authority delegated to them to fulfill their responsibility for mission accomplishment; and the joint force trusts the JFC to use component capabilities appropriately. Mutual trust results from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities that each member brings to the joint force, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.

b. Decision-making Model. JOPES is essentially the “model” used by the joint community to help the President and the SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. JOPES is the principal DOD system for translating policy decisions into OPLANS and orders in order to make the most effective use of US military capabilities and to meet US requirements for the employment of military forces. JOPES includes contingency and crisis action planning processes. It guides US military action during crises and transition to operations through rapid, coordinated planning and implementation of plans. The JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem solving elements, such as mission analysis and COA development. Joint operation planning normally begins with or during contingency planning and continues through crisis action planning until accomplishment of the strategic objectives(s). The combination of JOPES and JOPP, whether for a limited contingency or a campaign, promotes coherent planning and sound decision making across all levels of war, command echelons, and joint operation phases.

For further guidance on joint operation and campaign planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
14. Organization for Joint Command and Control

Component and supporting commands’ organizations and capabilities must be integrated into a joint organization that enables effective and efficient joint C2. The C2 structure is centered on the JFC’s mission and CONOPS; available forces and capabilities; and joint force staff composition, capabilities, location, and facilities. The JFC should be guided in this effort by the following principles.

a. Simplicity. Unity of command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities. The JFC staff does not have direct authority over any subordinate CDR’s staffs. The component staffs work solely for the component commander.

b. Span of Control. The desired reach of the JFC’s authority and direction over assigned or attached forces will vary depending on the mission and the JFC’s ability to C2 the actions required. Span of control is based on many factors including the number of subordinates, number of activities, range of weapon systems, force capabilities, the size and complexity of the operational area, and the method used to control operations (centralized or decentralized).

c. Unit Integrity. Component forces should remain organized as designed and in the manner accustomed through training to maximize effectiveness. The JFC may reorganize component units, if necessary. However, these situations should be rare and any reorganization affecting the unit integrity of component forces should be done only after careful consultation and coordination with the component commander.

d. Interoperability. C2 capabilities within joint force headquarters, component commands, and other supporting commands must be interoperable to facilitate control of forces. The simplest and most streamlined chain of command can be thwarted by an absence of interoperability among the components’ forces and systems. This includes an emphasis on the use of joint doctrine development of ISR, communications systems, and logistic architectures; joint training and exercises; and establishment of a liaison structure that is consistent with joint guidance and policy.

15. Joint Command and Staff Process

a. General. The nature, scope, and tempo of military operations continually changes, requiring the CDR to make new decisions and take new actions in response to these changes. This may be viewed as part of a cycle, which is repeated when the situation changes significantly. The cycle may be deliberate or rapid, depending on the time available. However, effective decision making and follow-through require that the basic process be understood by all CDRs and staff officers and adapted to the prevailing situation. Although the scope and details will vary with the level and function of the command, the purpose is constant: analyze the situation and need for action; determine the COA best suited for mission accomplishment; and carry out that COA, with adjustments as necessary, while continuing to assess the unfolding situation.
b. Estimates, Decisions, and Directives. These processes are iterative, beginning with the initial recognition that the situation has changed (e.g., change of mission, change in the friendly or adversary situation) requiring a new decision by the CDR. The staff assembles available information regarding the adversary, friendly, and environmental situations and assists the CDR in analyzing the mission and devising COAs. The staff then analyzes these COAs and the CDR makes a decision. This decision identifies what the command is to do and becomes the “mission” paragraph of a plan or order. An estimate process, as described in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, may be used by CDRs and staffs during the preparation of estimates and directives. Simulation and analysis capabilities can assist in correlation of friendly and adversary strengths and weaknesses, as well as in analysis of COAs.

c. Follow-Through. Having received and analyzed the mission, the CDR determines how it will be accomplished and directs subordinate CDRs to accomplish certain tasks that contribute to the common goal. Then the CDR is responsible for carrying out the mission to successful conclusion, using supporting staff studies, coordination, and analysis relating to:

(1) Supervision of the conduct of operations;

(2) Changes to orders, priorities, and apportionment of support;

(3) Commitment and reconstitution of the reserve; and

(4) After mission attainment, consolidation and refit in preparation for the next task.

16. Command and Control Support

A command and control support (C2S) system, which includes interoperable supporting communications systems, is the JFC’s principal tool used to collect, transport, process, share, and protect data and information. Joint C2S systems must provide relevant information in a useable form to allow relevant and timely JFC decisions and provide feedback on the intended outcome. To facilitate the execution and processes of C2, military communications systems must furnish rapid, reliable, and secure information throughout the chain of command. All joint functions - C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment - depend on responsive and dependable communications systems that tie together all aspects of joint operations and allow the JFCs and their staffs to initiate, direct, monitor, question, and react. Ultimately, effective C2 depends on the right person having the right information at the right time to support decision making.

For further guidance on C2S systems, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

17. National Military Command System

The NMCS is the priority component of the GIG designed to support the President, SecDef, and the JCS in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the SecDef can receive warning and intelligence so that accurate and timely decisions can be made, the resources of the Military Services can be applied, military missions can be assigned, and direction can be communicated to CCDRs or the
CDRs of other commands. Both the communication of warning and intelligence from all sources and the communication of decisions and commands to military forces require that the NMCS be a responsive, reliable, and survivable system. An enduring command structure with survivable GIG systems is both required and fundamental to NMCS continuity of operations.

For further information, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

18. Nuclear Command and Control System

General operational responsibility for the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) lies with CJCS and is centrally directed through the Joint Staff. The NCCS supports the Presidential nuclear C2 of the combatant commands in the areas of integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, decision making, decision dissemination, and force management and report back. To accomplish this, the NCCS comprises those critical communications system components of the GIG that provide connectivity from the President and SecDef through the NMCS to the nuclear CDRs and nuclear execution forces. It includes the emergency action message dissemination systems and those systems used for tactical warning/attack assessment, conferencing, force report back, reconnaissance, retargeting, force management, and requests for permission to use nuclear weapons. The NCCS is integral to and ensures performance of critical strategic functions of the Global Command and Control System. The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network provides assured communications connectivity between the President and the strategic deterrent forces in stressed environments.

19. Defense Continuity Program

The Defense Continuity Program (DCP) is an integrated program comprised of DOD policies, plans, procedures, assets, and resources that ensures continuity of DOD component mission essential functions under all circumstances, including crisis, attack, recovery, and reconstitution. It encompasses the DOD components performing continuity of operations, continuity of government, and enduring constitutional government functions across the spectrum of threats.

For further information, refer to DODD 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP).
CHAPTER V
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT COMMANDS

SECTION A. ESTABLISHING UNIFIED AND SUBORDINATE JOINT COMMANDS

1. General

Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs.

   a. Authority to Establish. In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

   b. Basis for Establishing Joint Forces. Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis.

      (1) Geographic Area. Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Note: Only commanders of geographic combatant commands are assigned AORs. Subordinate JFCs normally are assigned other operational areas.

      For further information on operational areas refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

      (a) The boundaries defining these AORs are not intended to delineate restrictive geographic AORs. CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions.

      (b) The UCP contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to CCDRs. It provides that, unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two CCDRs AORs, a JTF will be formed. Command of this JTF will be determined by the SecDef and forces transferred to the JTF commander through a CCDR, including delegation of appropriate command authority over those forces.

      (c) Each GCC and subordinate JFC will be kept apprised of the presence, mission, movement, and duration of stay of transient forces within the operational area. The subordinate JFC also will be apprised of the command channels under which these transient
forces will function. The authority directing movement or permanent location of transient forces is responsible for providing this information.

(d) Forces not assigned or attached to a GCC or attached to a subordinate JFC often are assigned missions that require them to cross boundaries. In such cases, it is the duty of the JFC to assist the operations of these transient forces to the extent of existing capabilities and consistent with other assigned missions. The JFC may be assigned specific responsibilities with respect to installations or activities exempted from their control, such as logistic support or area defense, particularly if adversary forces should traverse the operational area to attack the exempted installation or activity. GCC force protection policies take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any other DOD component deployed in that command’s AOR and not under the security responsibility of the DOS. The CCDR or a designated representative (e.g., a JTF or component commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DOD personnel not under the responsibility of the DOS.

(e) Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a CCDR are subject to that CCDR’s orders in some instances (e.g., for coordination of emergency defense, force protection, or allocation of local facilities).

(2) Functional. Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., some training and exercises, and the unified commands for transportation, SO, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority.

(a) When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the effect desired or service provided. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.

(b) The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be exempt, partially or wholly, from the command authority of a GCC in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority that establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected GCC.

c. Organizing Joint Forces. A JFC has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces with specification of OPCON to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS (see Figure V-1). The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of
effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with MNFs, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among MNFs.

(1) The composition of the JFC’s staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces.

(2) All joint forces include Service components, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a respective Service component command of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of
long-range planning, and the scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

*See paragraph 9 for more information on Service component commands.*

(3) The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands are appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate within the same mission area or geographic domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and SO component commanders are examples of functional components. (NOTE: Functional component commanders are component commanders of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force command” with the authorities and responsibilities of a JFC, even when employing forces from two or more Military Departments.) When a functional component command employs forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff should include Service representatives from each of the employed Service forces to aid in understanding those Service capabilities and maximizing the effective employment of Service forces. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises, contingency planning, or actual operations.

*See paragraph 10 for more information on functional component commands.*

(4) Normally, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components may have SOF (if assigned) organized as a functional component. The JFC defines the authority, command relationships, and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistics) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

(5) The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations. The following policy for C2 of United States Marine Corps tactical air (TACAIR) recognizes this and deals with Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation during sustained operations asho.

(a) The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF aviation combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground combat element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the joint force air component commander (JFACC), for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole.
(b) Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the GCC or subordinate JFC in the exercise of OPCON to assign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the JFC that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among the subordinate commanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment of the overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force.

NOTE: Sorties provided for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are not “excess” sorties and will be covered in the air tasking order. These sorties provide a distinct contribution to the overall joint force effort. The JFC must exercise integrated control of air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and interdiction aspects of the joint operation or theater campaign. Excess sorties are in addition to these sorties.

2. Unified Command

   a. Criteria for Establishing a Unified Command. A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander, composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, and established by the President through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to ensure unity of effort.

      (1) A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating a single strategic direction.

      (2) Any combination of the following exists and significant forces of two or more Military Departments are involved:

         (a) A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force;

         (b) A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein; and/or

         (c) Necessity for common use of limited logistic means.

   b. The commander of a unified command normally will adapt the command structure to exercise command authority through the commander of a subunified command, JTF, Service component, or functional component. Alternatively, the commander of a unified command may choose to exercise command authority directly through the commander of a single-Service force (e.g., task force, task group, MAGTF for a NEO) or a specific operational force (e.g., SOF for a direct action) who, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CCDR. The commander of a unified command normally assigns missions requiring a single-Service force to a Service component commander. These six options (shown in Figure V-2) do not
in any way limit the commander’s authority to organize subordinate commands and exercise command authority over assigned forces as they see fit.

c. The **commander of a unified command should not act concurrently as the commander of a subordinate command.** For example, the commander of a unified command also should not act as a functional component commander without prior approval of the SecDef.

d. **Primary Responsibilities of the Commander of a Unified Command.** CCDCRs are responsible for the development and production of joint OPLANs. During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required throughout the range of military operations. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. Unified command responsibilities include the following.

   (1) Planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States and its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion. The JSCP tasks the CCDCRs to prepare joint OPLANs that may be one of four increasing levels of detail: commander’s estimate, basic plan, concept plan, or OPLAN.

   *(For further detail concerning joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).)*

   (2) Maintaining the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

   (3) Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.
(4) Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions.

(5) Communicating directly with the following.

(a) The Service Chiefs on single-Service matters as appropriate.

(b) The CJCS on other matters, including the preparation of strategic, joint operation, and logistic plans; strategic and operational direction of assigned forces; conduct of combat operations; and any other necessary function of command required to accomplish the mission.

(c) The SecDef, in accordance with applicable directives.

(d) Subordinate elements, including the development organizations of the DOD agency or the Military Department directly supporting the development and acquisition of the CCDR’s C2 system in coordination with the director of the DOD agency or secretary of the Military Department concerned.

(6) Keeping the CJCS promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional area or area of operations responsibility, particularly those incidents that could create national or international repercussions.

e. Authority of the Commander of a Unified Command in an Emergency

(1) In the event of a major emergency in the GCC’s AOR requiring the use of all available forces, the GCC (except for CDRUSNORTHCOM) may temporarily assume OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR, including those of another command, but excluding those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of specific operational missions under joint OPLANs approved by the SecDef that would be interfered with by the contemplated use of such forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM’s authority to assume OPCON during an emergency is limited to the portion of USNORTHCOM’s AOR outside the United States. CDRUSNORTHCOM must obtain SecDef approval before assuming OPCON of forces not assigned to USNORTHCOM within the United States. The commander determines when such an emergency exists and, on assuming OPCON over forces of another command, immediately advises the following individual(s) of the nature and estimated duration of employment of such forces.

(a) The CJCS.

(b) The appropriate operational commanders.

(c) The Service Chief of the forces concerned.

(2) The authority to assume OPCON of forces in the event of a major emergency will not be delegated.
(3) Unusual circumstances in wartime, emergencies, or crises other than war (such as a terrorist incident) may require a GCC to directly exercise COCOM through a shortened chain of command to forces assigned for the purpose of resolving the crisis. Additionally, the CCDR can assume COCOM, in the event of war or an emergency that prevents control through normal channels, of security assistance organizations within the commander’s general geographic AOR, or as directed by the SecDef. All commanders bypassed in such exceptional command arrangements will be advised of all directives issued to and reports sent from elements under such exceptional command arrangements. Such arrangements will be terminated as soon as practicable, consistent with mission accomplishment.

f. GCC Authority for Force Protection Outside the United States

(1) CCDRs with geographic responsibilities shall exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the CCDR’s AOR; except for those for whom the chief of mission retains security responsibility.

(2) Transient forces do not come under the authority of the CCDR solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the CCDR is exercising TACON authority for force protection purposes or in the event of a major emergency as stated in Paragraph 2.e.(1).

(3) This force protection authority enables CCDRs to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces.

For further detail concerning the force protection authority of the geographic CCDRs, refer to DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

g. GCC Authority for Exercise Purposes. Unless otherwise specified by the SecDef, and with the exception of the USNORTHCOM AOR, a CCDR has TACON for exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that CCDR undertake exercises in that CCDR’s AOR. TACON begins when the forces enter the AOR. In this context, TACON provides directive authority over exercising forces for purposes relating to that exercise only; it does not authorize operational employment of those forces.

h. Assumption of Interim Command. In the temporary absence of a CCDR from the command, interim command will pass to the deputy commander. If a deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass to the next senior officer present for duty who is eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation.
3. Specified Command

There are currently no specified commands designated. Because the option to create a specified command still exists, the following information is provided. A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and is established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS (see Figure V-3).

a. Composition. Although a specified command normally is composed of forces from one Military Department, it may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.

b. Transfer of Forces from Other Military Departments. When units of other Military Departments are transferred (assigned or attached) to the commander of a specified command, the purpose and duration of the transfer normally will be indicated. Such transfer, in and of itself, does not constitute the specified command as a unified command or a JTF. If the transfer is major and of long duration, a unified command normally would be established in lieu of a specified command.

c. Authority and Responsibilities. The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command, except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

![Figure V-3. Specified Command Organizational Options](image)

4. Subordinate Unified Command

When authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified
commands (see Figure V-4). A subordinate unified command (e.g., United States Forces Korea) may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned joint operations area or functional area. The commanders of components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those for component commanders within a unified command. The Service component or Service force commanders of a subordinate unified command normally will communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified command on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.

5. Joint Task Force

As shown in Figure V-5, a JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

a. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. The proper authority dissolves a JTF when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.
b. The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander, assigns the mission, and designates forces.

c. The commander of a JTF exercises OPCON over assigned (and normally over attached) forces and also may exercise TACON over forces or be a supported or supporting commander. The commander is responsible for making recommendations to the senior commander on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander. JTF commanders also are responsible to the establishing commander for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.

d. Although not recommended, due to the need to concentrate on JTF-level considerations, the JTF commander also may act as the commander of a subordinate command, when authorized by the establishing authority. When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with the subordinate command for the forces belonging to the parent Service. The JTF establishing authority should consider that dual-hatting a commander also means dual-hatting the commander’s staff that can result in forcing the staff to operate at the operational and tactical levels simultaneously.

e. The JTF commander will have a joint staff with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command. The core of a JTF staff can be established or augmented through the standing joint force headquarters (core element) (SJFHQ [CE]) or a deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC). In addition to supporting a CCDR’s staff with a full-time, trained C2 element, a SJFHQ (CE) can be employed to form the core of a JTF staff or augment a JTF-designated Service component headquarters staff. The DJTFAC is
composed of planners and operators from the combatant command and components’ staffs, which report to the CCDR’s operations directorate until deployed to a JTF.

*For further detail concerning JTFs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

**SECTION B. THE COMMANDER, STAFF, AND COMPONENTS OF A JOINT FORCE**

6. Commander Responsibilities

a. Responsibilities of a Superior Commanders. Although specific responsibilities will vary, superior CDR possesses the following general responsibilities.

(1) Provide timely communication of specified tasks, together with the role of each subordinate CDR in the superior commander’s plan. Tasks must be realistic and leave the subordinate CDRs as much freedom of execution as possible.

(2) Transfer forces and other capabilities to designated subordinate CDRs for accomplishing assigned tasks.

(3) Provide all available information to subordinate CDRs that affect their assigned missions and objectives. This includes changes in plans, missions and tasks, resources, and friendly, adversary, and environmental situations.

(4) Delegate authority to subordinate CDR’s commensurate with their responsibilities.

b. Responsibilities of a Subordinate Commander. In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, all subordinate CDRs possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following.

(1) The accomplishment of missions or tasks assigned by the plans and orders of the superior. Authority normally is given to the subordinate CDR to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission; however, this may be limited by establishing directives issued by the superior CDR to ensure effective joint operations. When required by a changing situation, a subordinate CDR may depart in some measure from the plan if the action will not unnecessarily jeopardize friendly forces and is in the best interest of better accomplishing the overall objective. Any such departure from the plan by a subordinate CDR should, if possible, be coordinated with other CDRs prior to departure from the plan. In addition, the departure must be communicated as soon as practicable to the superior.

(2) Advice to the superior CDR regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to achieving the subordinate CDR mission objectives, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernmental agencies, and other matters of common concern.

(3) Timely information to the superior CDR relating to the subordinate CDR’s
situation and progress.

c. Responsibilities of other Commanders. CDRs who share a common superior CDR or a common boundary are responsible for the following.

(1) Consider the impact of one’s own actions or inactions on other CDRs.

(2) Provide timely information to other CDRs regarding one’s own intentions and actions, as well as those of nonmilitary agencies or of the adversary, which may influence other activity.

(3) Support other CDRs as required by the common aim and the situation.

(4) Coordinate the support provided and received.

d. Responsibilities of Deputy Commanders. Deputy CDRs in a joint force may be designated as the JFC’s principal assistant available to replace the JFC, if needed. The deputy CDR should not be a member of the same Service as the JFC. The deputy CDR’s responsibilities may include the following.

(1) Performing special duties (e.g., chair the joint targeting coordination board, cognizance of liaison personnel reporting to the joint force headquarters, interagency coordination).

(2) Working with the components to keep the CDR updated.

(3) Refining the relationship with the components to ensure the most efficient and effective command relationships.

(4) Tracking the JFC’s CCIRs to ensure compliance.

7. Staff of a Joint Force

a. General. A joint staff should be established for commands comprised of more than one Military Department. The staff of the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or JTF must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

(1) A JFC is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

(2) A joint staff should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the Service members concerned. The composition of a joint staff should be commensurate with the composition of forces and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure that the staff understands the capabilities, needs, and
limitations of each element of the force. The number of personnel on a joint staff should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task to be performed.

(3) Each person assigned to serve on a joint staff will be responsible to the JFC and should have thorough knowledge of the JFC’s policies.

(4) The commander of a force for which a joint staff is established should ensure that the recommendations of any member of the staff receive consideration.

(5) The degree of authority to act in the name of and for the CDR is a matter to be specifically prescribed by the CDR.

(6) Orders and directives from a higher to a subordinate command should be issued in the name of the CDR of the higher command to the CDR of the immediate subordinate command and not directly to elements of that subordinate command. Exceptions may sometimes be required under certain emergency or crisis situations. C2 of nuclear forces is an example of one such exception.

(7) To expedite the execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands, a CDR may authorize the command’s staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands concerning the details of plans and directives that have been received or are to be issued.

(8) Each staff division must coordinate its actions and planning with the other staff directorates concerned and keep them informed of actions taken and the progress achieved. Normally, each of the general joint staff directorates is assigned responsibility for a particular type of problem and subject and for coordinating the work of the special staff divisions and other agencies of the staff that relate to that problem or subject.

(9) Joint staff directorates and special staff sections should be limited to those functions for which the JFC is responsible or that require the commander’s general supervision in the interest of unity of effort.

(10) The authority that establishes a joint force should make the provisions for furnishing necessary personnel for the CDR’s staff.

b. Staff Organization. The staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in this section.

(1) Principal Staff Officer. The chief of staff (COS) functions as the principal staff officer, assistant, and advisor to the CDR. The COS coordinates and directs the work of the staff directorates. One or more deputies to the COS and a secretary of the staff may be provided to assist the COS in the performance of assigned duties. A deputy COS normally should be from a Service other than that of the COS. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the COS and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records.
(2) Personal Staff Group of the Commander. The CDR’s personal staff performs duties prescribed by the CDR and is responsible directly to the CDR. This group, normally composed of aides to the CDR and staff officers handling special matters over which the CDR wishes to exercise close personal control, will usually include a staff judge advocate, political advisor, public affairs officer, inspector general, provost marshal, chaplain, surgeon, historian, and others as directed.

(3) Special Staff Group. The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernmental agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the CDR and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of assigned and/or attached forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters. When a commander’s headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions.

(4) Joint Force Staff Directorates. The general or joint staff group is made up of staff directorates corresponding to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications systems. The head of each staff directorate may be designated as a director or as an assistant COS. The directors or assistant COSs provide staff supervision for the CDR of all activities pertaining to their respective functions.

(a) The manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) is charged with establishing and maintaining personnel accountability of the force; managing, synchronizing and optimizing personnel support to the force; performing joint personnel strength reporting; managing casualty reporting; coordinating morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs within the theater; formulating personnel policies; accomplishing manpower management; and supporting detainee operations. The J-1 provides support and assistance to the offices of primary responsibility regarding RC call-up, stop-loss, NEO, and personnel recovery operations.

(b) Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2). The primary function of the J-2 is to support the commander and the staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the operational area. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the J-2 participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper items of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The J-2 tells the JFC, staff, and components what the adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the
future. Intelligence assists the JFC and staff in visualizing the operational area and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern an adversary’s probable intent and future COA. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose adversary capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The J-2 is responsible for the operation of the joint analysis center, joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) for the CCDR, and the joint intelligence support element (or JTF JIOC, if established) for a subordinate JFC.

(c) Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3). The J-3 assists the CDR in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the J-3 plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), the J-5 performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the operation of the joint operations center for the JFC.

(d) Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4). The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, security assistance, HN support, and related logistic activities. Because many of the problems confronting this directorate are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the established policies of the Military Departments should be considered. The J-4 is responsible for advising the commander of the logistic support that can be provided for proposed COAs. In general, the J-4 formulates policies to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinates execution of the commander’s policies and guidance. The J-4 is normally responsible for the operation of the deployment distribution operations center for the JFC.

(e) Plans Directorate. The J-5 assists the CDR in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint OPLANs, and associated estimates of the situation. The J-5 may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the CDR in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section.

(f) Communications System Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-6). The J-6 assists the CDR in all responsibilities for communications infrastructure, communications-computer networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability. This includes development and integration of communications system architectures and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications systems in execution of the mission.

(5) Liaison Officers and/or Agency Representatives. Liaisons or representatives from various higher, lower, and adjacent organizations, DOD agencies and non-DOD entities are normally spread throughout the joint force staff and not grouped as a separate entity. However, considering the increasing complexity of joint and/or interagency coordination, the JFC may decide to consolidate, at least administratively, liaisons and
representatives in a single interagency office, and then provide them to specific directorates or components where they would best be employed and of value to their parent agency or command. The administration and assignment of liaison officers is normally under the cognizance of the deputy JFC or the COS.

8. Service Component Commands

a. A Service component command, assigned to a CCDR, consists of the Service component CDR and the Service forces (such as individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to that CCDR. Forces assigned to CCDRs are identified in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum signed by the SecDef. When a Service command is designated as the “Service component commander” to multiple CCDRs, the Service CDR and only that portion of the CDR’s assets assigned to a particular CCDR are under the command authority of that particular CCDR.

b. Designation of Service Component Commanders. With the exception of the commander of a combatant command and members of the command’s joint staff, the senior officer of each Service permanently assigned to a CCDR and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is designated the CDR of the Service component forces, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority. The assignment of any specific individual as a Service component CDR of a combatant command is subject to the concurrence of the CCDR.

c. Responsibilities of Service Component Commanders. Service component CDRs have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services’ support function. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component CDRs or, at lower echelons, other Service force CDRs. In the event that a Service component CDR exercises OPCON of forces and that OPCON over those forces is delegated by the JFC to another component CDR or other subordinate CDR, the Service component CDR retains the following responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions.

1. Make recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.

2. Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.

3. Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for attachment to other subordinate commands. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component CDR’s control when such subordinate commands are dissolved.

4. Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component CDR has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service component’s facilities and capabilities are suitable.

5. Inform their JFC (and their CCDR, if affected) of planning for changes in
logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the CCDR does not approve the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the CCDR and the Service component CDR, the CCDR will forward the issue through the CJCS to the SecDef for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component CDRs will implement directives issued by the CCDR.

(6) Develop program and budget requests that comply with CCDR guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. The Service component CDR will provide to the CCDR a copy of the program submission prior to forwarding it to the Service headquarters. The Service component CDR will keep the CCDR informed of the status of CCDR requirements while Service programs are under development.

(7) Inform the CCDR (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning. The Service component CDR will inform the CCDR of such decisions and of program and budget changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the CCDR to express the command’s views before a final decision. The Service component CDR will include in this information Service rationale for nonsupport of the CCDR’s requirements.

(8) Provide, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the CCDR.

d. Service component CDRs or other Service CDRs assigned to a CCDR are responsible to the Service Chief, for the following:

(1) Internal administration and discipline.

(2) Training in joint doctrine and their own Service doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(3) Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority.

(4) Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with the laws, policies, and directives.

e. Communication with a Service Chief. Unless otherwise directed by the CCDR, the Service component CDR will communicate through the combatant command on those matters over which the CCDR exercises COCOM. On Service-specific matters such as personnel, administration, and unit training, the Service component CDR will normally communicate directly with the Service Chief, informing the CCDR as the CCDR directs.
f. Logistic Authority. The operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Service component CDRs in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the CCDR. Joint force transportation policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System.

9. Functional Component Commands

a. CCDRs and CDRs of subordinate unified commands and JFCs have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.

b. Functional component CDRs have authority over forces or military capability made available to them as delegated by the establishing JFC. Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations to perform operational missions that may be of short or extended duration. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. (NOTE: Functional component CDRs are component CDRs of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force command” with the authorities and responsibilities of a JFC as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.)

c. The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its CDR. Normally, the Service component CDR with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component CDR; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a CDR.

d. The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional component CDR must not affect the command relationships between Service component and the JFC.

e. The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component CDR and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component CDR will exercise. A functional component CDR is normally also designated as a Service component CDR. The functional component CDR will normally exercise OPCON over that CDR’s parent Service forces and TACON over other Service’s forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish support relationships between functional component CDRs and other component CDRs to facilitate operations.

f. The CDR of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of the forces and/or military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.
g. As a Service component CDR, the functional component CDR also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces. When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component CDR must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the forces attached or made available and the responsibilities retained by the Service component CDRs.

h. When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component CDR’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the CDR with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.


SECTION C. DISCIPLINE AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

10. Responsibility

a. Joint Force Commander. The JFC is responsible for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a CCDR may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization.

b. Service Component Commander. Each Service component in a combatant command is responsible for the internal administration and discipline of that Service’s component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the CCDR. The JFC exercises disciplinary authority vested in the JFC by law, Service regulations, and superior authority in the chain of command.

c. Method of Coordination. The JFC normally exercises administrative and disciplinary authority through the Service component CDRs to the extent practicable. When this is impracticable, the JFC may establish joint agencies responsible directly to the JFC to advise or make recommendations on matters placed within their jurisdiction or, if necessary, to carry out the directives of a superior authority. A joint military police force is an example of such an agency.
11. Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ provides the basic law for discipline of the Armed Forces. The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (as amended), prescribes the rules and procedures governing military justice. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under article 22(a), UCMJ, and in Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 201(e)(2)(A) of the MCM (as amended), CCDRs are given courts-martial jurisdiction over members of any of the Armed Forces. Pursuant to article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, subordinate JFCs of a detached command or unit have special courts-martial convening authority. Under RCM 201(e)(2)(C), CCDRs may expressly authorize subordinate JFCs who are authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such courts-martial for the trial of members of other Armed Forces.

12. Rules and Regulations

Rules and regulations implementing the UCMJ and MCM are, for the most part, of single-Service origin. In a joint force, however, the JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies applicable to all Services’ personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations should be published to address hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market, combating trafficking in persons, sexual assault prevention and response policies, currency control regulations, and any other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

13. Jurisdiction

a. More than one Service involved. Matters that involve more than one Service and that are within the jurisdiction of the JFC may be handled either by the JFC or by the appropriate Service component CDR.

b. One Service involved. Matters that involve only one Service should be handled by the Service component CDR, subject to Service regulations. A Service member is vested with a hierarchy of rights. From greatest to least, these are: the United States Constitution, the UCMJ, departmental regulations, Service regulations, and the common law. JFCs must ensure that an accused service member’s rights are not abridged or trammeled.

14. Trial and Punishment

a. Convening Courts-Martial. General courts-martial may be convened by the CCDR. An accused may be tried by any courts-martial convened by a member of a different Military Service when the courts-martial is convened by a JFC who has been specifically empowered by statute, the President, the SecDef, or a superior CDR under the provisions of the RCM (201(e)(2) of the MCM) to refer such cases for trial by courts-martial.

b. Post-trial and Appellate Processing. When a courts-martial is convened by a JFC, the convening authority may take action on the sentence and the findings as authorized by the UCMJ and MCM. If the convening authority is unable to take action, the case will be forwarded to an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction. Following convening authority action, the review and appeals procedures applicable to the accused’s Service will be followed.
c. Nonjudicial Punishment. The JFC may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any military personnel of the command, unless such authority is limited or withheld by a superior CDR. The JFC will use the regulations of the alleged offender’s Service when conducting nonjudicial punishment proceedings, including punishment, suspension, mitigation, and filing. However, the JFC should normally allow nonjudicial punishment authority to be exercised by the appropriate Service component CDR. Except as noted below, appeals and other actions involving review of nonjudicial punishment imposed by a JFC will follow the appropriate regulations of the alleged offender’s Service. When the CCDR personally imposes nonjudicial punishment, or is otherwise disqualified from being the appellate authority, appeals will be forwarded to the CJCS for appropriate action by the SecDef or SecDef designee. Collateral decisions and processing (e.g., personnel and finance actions and unfavorable notations in selection records and personnel files) will be handled in Service channels.

d. Execution of Punishment. Execution of any punishment adjudged or imposed within any Service may be carried out by another Service under regulations provided by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

15. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

In a joint force, the morale and welfare of each Service member is the responsibility of the Service component CDR. The JFC coordinates MWR programs within the operational area. MWR facilities may be operated either by a single Service or jointly as directed by the CCDR in whose AOR the facility is located. Facilities operated by one Service should be made available to personnel of other Services to the extent practicable. Facilities that are jointly operated should be available equitably to all Services.

For further information on MWR, see JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

16 Awards and Decorations

Recommendations for decorations and medals will be made by the JFC in accordance with Service regulations or as prescribed by DOD 1348.33-M, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, as applicable. Recommendations for joint awards will be processed through joint channels. Concurrence of the CJCS is required prior to initiating a request for a joint award for a CCDR. When a member of a joint staff is recommended for a Service award, the JFC will process the recommendation through Service channels. Forward offers of personal foreign decorations through the CCDR to the secretary of the appropriate military department. Forward offers of foreign unit, service or campaign medals through CCDR to the CJCS.

17. Efficiency, Fitness, and Performance Reports

The immediate superior of an officer or enlisted Service member in a joint organization is responsible for preparing an efficiency, fitness, or performance report in accordance with the guidance (and on the prescribed form) of the rated member’s Service. Completed
reports will be forwarded to the reported Service member’s Service for filing. A copy of the signed report will be provided to the Service member and a copy will be maintained by the senior rater in accordance with Service guidance. Letter reports prepared by CCDRs for component commanders will be forwarded through the CJCS to the reported officer’s Service.

For further information on personnel administration, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

18. Personnel Accountability

The JFC will establish standardized procedure to account for all personnel comprising the force; cause initial accountability for all personnel comprising the force to be accomplished, and ensure accountability procedures are conducted for the duration of the operation. The JFC accomplishes joint personnel strength reporting and manages casualty reporting. The JFC CDR provides personnel reports to the CCDR and CJCS as directed.

19. Religious Support

Religious support is dedicated to meeting the personal free exercise of religion needs of members of the joint force and providing CDRs with professional advice regarding the dynamic influence of religion and religious beliefs. Religious support in joint operations includes the entire spectrum of professional duties a chaplain performs in the dual role of religious leader and staff officer. Military CDRs are responsible to provide for the free exercise of religion. Religious support to the personnel of each Service is the responsibility of their Service component CDR with the JFC providing guidance and oversight.

For further information on religious support see JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.
1. General

a. International partnerships continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century challenges. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than the United States could achieve independently. These partnerships must be nurtured and developed to ensure their relevance even as new challenges emerge. The ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating 21st century threats. Wherever possible, the United States works with or through others nations, enabling allied and partner capabilities to build their capacity and develop mechanisms to share the risks and responsibility of today’s complex challenges.

b. Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations are termed “multinational operations.” Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an IGO such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other commonly used terms for multinational operations include allied, bilateral, combined, coalition, or multilateral, as appropriate.

(1) An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations.

(2) A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with specific objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

c. Cultural, psychological, religious, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact multinational operations. Many OPLANs to deter or counter threats are prepared within the context of a treaty or alliance framework. Sometimes they are developed in a less structured coalition framework, based on temporary agreements or arrangements. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations are applicable to multinational operations. However, differences in laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language within alliances and coalitions must be considered. Normally, each alliance or coalition develops its own OPLANs to guide multinational action.

“We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace, that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations. We have learned that we must live as men, and not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.”

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Fourth Inaugural Address
d. No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that best meets the objectives, political realities, and constraints of the participating nations. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of effort for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with whom the United States may operate in an alliance or coalition.

2. Multinational Unity of Effort

Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. There must be a common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the MNF and the plan for its attainment. A coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure), ROE, fratricide prevention, and ISR, etc. is essential for unity of effort. After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.

a. Respect. In assigning missions, the CDR must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process as much as possible, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas are essential to effective communication across cultures, as are respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values. Junior officers in command of small national contingents are the senior representatives of their government within the MNFs and, as such, should be treated with special consideration beyond their US equivalent rank. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

b. Rapport. US CDRs and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander (MNF C). This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate CDRs and overall unity of effort.

c. Knowledge of Partners. US CDRs and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the MNF. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner. This will ensure the effective integration of MNF partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of the coalition forces.

d. Patience. Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, even handed patience. This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.
e. Coordination. Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and ISR, is required. Coordinated planning for ROE, fratricide prevention, deception, IO, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early. This includes an emphasis on the uses of multinational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures; development of ISR, C2 systems, and logistic architectures; multinational training and exercises; and establishment of liaison structures. Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

3. Multinational Organizational Structure

a. Organizational Structure. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated; lead nation; or parallel command.

(1) Integrated commands have representative members from the member nations in the command headquarters. Multinational commands organized under an integrated command help ensure the capabilities of member nations are represented and employed properly. A good example of this command structure is found in the in the NORAD where the commander is an American, the deputy commander is Canadian, and each of the regional commands has a commander and deputy commander from a different nation. In addition, the NORAD staff is binational.

(2) Lead Nation Command Structure. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.

(3) Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command structure, no single force CDR is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single CDR, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.

b. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component (often called a national command element) to ensure effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations, and maintain personnel accountability. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element.
4. Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command (see Figure VI-1).

a. National Command. The President retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time.

b. Multinational Command. Command authority for a MNFC is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority
Multinational Operations

will be specified in the implementing agreements and may include aspects of OPCON and/or TACON, as well as support relationships and coordinating authority.

(1) Operational Control. While the President cannot relinquish command authority, in some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign CDR to achieve specified military objectives. In making this decision, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. Normally, OPCON of US forces is assigned only for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. US CDRs will maintain the capability to report to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign CDRs. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the President has agreed, US CDRs will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign CDR. If issues remain unresolved, the US CDRs refer the matters to higher US authorities.

(a) Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign CDR cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign CDR separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the US force’s internal organization.

(b) Other MNF participants will normally exercise national or multinational command over their own forces on behalf of their governments.

(2) Tactical Control. TACON is another form of command authority exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The CDR of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON and ADCON over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

(3) Support. Supporting relationships may also be established among participating forces in multinational operations. US force CDRs must be apprised of the opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic support may be provided to forces of other nations.

(4) Coordinating Authority. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which C2 may be exercised. Normally, it is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the CDR exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. For this reason, its use during operations should be limited.

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CHAPTER VII
INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

1. General

   a. Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the USG, including the DOD, to accomplish an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, IGO and NGO coordination refers to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective.

   b. CCDRs and other subordinate JFCs must consider the potential requirements for interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination as a part of their activities across the range of military operations within and outside of their operational areas. Military operations must be coordinated, integrated, and/or deconflicted with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various HN agencies within and en route to and from the operational area. Sometimes the JFC draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. These same organizations may be involved during all phases of an operation including pre- and post-operation activities. Roles and relationships among USG agencies and organizations, DOD, state, tribal, and local governments, and overseas with the US chief of mission, and country team in a US embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

   For more information on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.

2. Interagency Unity of Effort

   a. The interagency process often is described as “more art than science,” while military operations tend to depend more on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can facilitate unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency coordination and different organizational cultures. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.
b. The interagency process facilitates unity of effort by military and nonmilitary participants conducting interagency coordination in pursuit of national objectives. Within the USG, the NSS guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives. Once the President signs the NSS, the NSC is the principal policy-making forum responsible for the strategic-level implementation of the NSS. The NSC system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. This coordination sets the stage for strategic guidance provided to the combatant commands, Services, and various DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical level guidance.

c. **National Security Council.** The NSC is the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the principal means for coordinating, developing, and implementing national security policy. The statutory members of the NSC are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and SecDef. The CJCS is the council’s statutory military advisor and the Director of National Intelligence is the council’s statutory intelligence advisor. Officials of the Office of the SecDef represent the SecDef in NSC interagency groups. Similarly, the CJCS, assisted by the Joint Staff, represents the CCRDs for interagency matters in the NSC system. Other senior officials are invited to attend NSC meetings, as appropriate. Subcommittees of the NSC include:

1. **NSC Principals Committee (PC).** NSC/PC is the senior (cabinet-level) interagency forum for considering policy issues affecting national security.

2. **NSC Deputies Committee (DC).** NSC/DC is the senior subcabinet interagency forum for considering policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC interagency groups, helps to ensure that issues brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision, and oversees day-to-day crisis management and prevention.

3. **NSC Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs).** The main day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of national security policy, NSC/PCCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG. NSC/PCCs provide policy analysis for the more senior committees of the NSC system to consider and ensure timely responses to Presidential decisions. PCCs are grouped as either regional or functional.

4. **Regional NSC/PCCs.** Regional NSC/PCCs, may be established and chaired by the appropriate Under or Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for regional issues (e.g., Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia).
(5) **Functional NSC/PCCs.** NSC/PCCs, each chaired at the Under or Assistant Secretary level within the agency indicated, have been established for fifteen various functional topics. Some of them include: Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations; Counterterrorism and National Preparedness; Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (DOD); Arms Control; Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense; Intelligence and Counterintelligence; International Organized Crime; Contingency Planning; Space; and International Drug Control.

d. While the NSC serves as the principal forum for considering national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) provides a parallel forum for considering unique HS matters, especially those concerning terrorism within the United States.

*For more information on the NSC, see CJCSI 5715.01A, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs and National Security Presidential Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.*

e. **Homeland Security Council.** The HSC is responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of HS, and serves as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of HS-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of HS policies. Other subcommittees of the HSC include:

1. **HSC Principals Committee.** The HSC/PC is the senior (cabinet-level) interagency forum for HS issues

2. **HSC Deputies Committee.** The HSC/DC is the senior subcabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting HS. The HSC/DC tasks and reviews the work of the HSC interagency groups and helps ensure that issues brought before the HSC/PC or HSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for action.

3. **HSC Policy Coordination Committees.** The main day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of HS policy, HSC/PCCs coordinate the development and implementation of HS policies by multiple departments and agencies throughout the federal government and coordinate those policies with state and local government. HSC/PCCs provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the HSC system and ensure timely responses to Presidential decisions. There are eleven HSC/PCCs established for functional areas such as: Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence (Intelligence and Detection); Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation (Policy and Plans); WMD Consequence Management (Response and Recovery); Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security (Protection and Prevention); and Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management (Response and Recovery).

3. Interagency Coordination and Integration

a. The guidelines for interagency coordination assure that all participating agencies under appropriate authority focus their efforts on national objectives. The Armed Forces of the United States have unique capabilities to offer the interagency community. These include influence through established military-to-military domestic and international contacts, resources (i.e., logistics) not available to nonmilitary agencies, trained civil affairs personnel and their assets; responsiveness based on military training and readiness. Additional unique military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications and ISR infrastructures, robust organizational and planning processes, training support for large numbers of individuals on a myriad skills, and air, land, and sea mobility support for intertheater or intratheater requirements.

b. Foreign Interagency, IGO, and NGO Coordination

(1) Interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination in foreign areas may involve the exercise of USG policy regarding internationally-recognized law; preexisting bilateral and multilateral military relationships, agreements, and arrangements managed by US embassies; treaties involving US defense interests, implementation of combatant command theater security cooperation activities; and initiatives concerning technology transfer or armaments cooperation and control, foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, or other contingencies.

(2) At the national level, DOS leads the effort to support interagency coordination overseas, forming task-oriented groups or employing the NSC system to organize the effort.

(3) The formal US interagency structure in foreign countries operates under the lead of the US ambassador and the country team and may include US embassy public affairs representation. The US ambassador is ordinarily the lead agent for interagency coordination abroad that is essentially nonmilitary in nature but requires military participation, with representation and control of the military operations provided by the JFC.

(4) Within a theater, the GCC is responsible for planning and implementing military strategies and operations that require interagency coordination. Coordination required outside the geographic region may be supported by groups within the NSC system or individual Departments, with lead for such coordination falling either to the combatant command or the Federal agency depending on the circumstances. In some operations, a special representative of the President or special envoy of the UN Secretary-General may be involved.

c. Domestic Interagency Coordination

(1) For domestic HS-related interagency coordination that may require military participation in countering domestic terrorism and other CS tasks, DHS has the lead. For homeland defense interagency coordination, DOD will have the lead. The DHS is the primary forum for coordinating Executive Branch efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.

(2) The SecDef retains the authority to approve use of combatant command resources for assistance to civil authorities. For CS within the United States, the Joint Staff Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) will normally allocate forces to USNORTHCOM for operations approved by the SecDef. JDOMS validates requests for assistance, determines what DOD capabilities are available to fulfill the request, and coordinates SecDef approval to use DOD forces.

(3) In domestic situations, the Constitution, law, and other governmental directives limit the scope and nature of military actions. The National Guard has unique roles in domestic operations. Under control of the respective states, National Guard units in Title 32, USC and state active duty status provide a wide variety of CS. Per the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy, the United States refrains from employing Title 10, USC DOD forces to enforce the law except in cases of necessity. Unless under authorization by the President, Congress, or the Constitution, Posse Comitatus, together with related DOD regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy from directly participating in civilian law enforcement activities within the United States. In its maritime law enforcement role under DHS, the USCG as a Service under DHS, has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas as prescribed in law.

(4) In addition to coordinating with US Government agencies, other domestic participants may be involved to include state, local, and/or tribal government organizations as well as the types of NGOs and IGOs that operate domestically and/or internationally.

For more information on HS, homeland defense, and associated interagency coordination activities in support of these missions, see the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Response Plan, the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

d. Command Relationships

(1) Command relationships preserve the primacy of civil authorities in their spheres of responsibility while facilitating the full utilization of military forces as permitted by the Constitution, law, and directives of the President. Military commands will provide assistance in consonance with these directives for activities conducted under the control of civil authorities.

(2) The relationship between NGOs, IGOs and US military elements may be viewed as an associate or partnership relationship. These civilian organizations do not operate in military or governmental hierarchies and therefore cannot have formal supporting or supported relationships with US military forces.

e. Organizing for Interagency Coordination

(1) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). When formed, a JIACG can provide the CCDR with an increased capability to collaborate with other USG civilian
agencies and departments (see Figure VII-1 for a notional JIACG structure). The JIACG, an element of a GCC’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes and enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between other governmental agencies’ representatives (DOS, DHS, and others) and military operational planners at the combatant commands. If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational....
representatives, the JIACG enhances the capability to collaborate and coordinate with the private sector and/or regional organizations. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that occurs at the national level through the DOD and the NSC and HSC systems. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, and security cooperation planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs.

(2) A contingency and planning focused subgroup of the JIACG, is the interagency planning cell (IPC). The IPC can be organized or tailored to operate 24/7 to assist in and support interagency planning and/or coordination in crisis and/or contingency situations. During such situations, an IPC will enable a coherent, efficient, and responsive planning and coordination effort through “focused or targeted” participation by interagency subject matter experts and dedicated agency representatives.

For more information on the JIACG and the IPC, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I.

f. JTF Interagency Coordination

(1) There are specific policies and procedures that guide JTF interagency coordination. The unique aspects of the interagency process require the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF’s components, but other agencies as well.

(2) In contrast to the established command structure of a combatant command or JTF, NGOs and IGOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities. Upon identifying organizational or operational mismatches between organizations, the staff of the combatant command or JTF should designate points in the NGOs and IGOs at which liaison and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate.

(3) In order to best coordinate military and civilian operations, the JTF should consider the location (proximity to or within the JTF command center) when establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to ensure maximum opportunities for collaboration (see Figure VII-2). The CMOC is composed of representatives from military, civilian, US, and multinational agencies involved in the operation. An effective CMOC contributes to meeting the objectives of all represented agencies in a cooperative and efficient manner.

For more information on the CMOC, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I and JP 3-57, Joint Civil-Military Operations.
Figure VII-2. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center
1. The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of US forces. Joint policy is reflected in CJCSIs or CJCSMs. These instructions and manuals are not JPs, but contain CJCS policy and guidance that do not involve the employment of forces. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine serves to make US policy and strategy effective in the application of US military power.

2. Only those doctrine publications approved by CJCS are referred to as “joint publications.” They are developed in coordination with the Services, combatant commands and the Joint Staff. Documents involving the operations of two or more Services that are approved by the relevant Chiefs of Service (or their designated agent) will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine; or Army, Navy and Air Force procedures). These documents are not JPs, but they must be consistent with approved JPs.

3. Joint doctrine is based on extant capabilities, i.e., current force structures and materiel. It incorporates time-tested principles such as the principles of joint operations, operational art, and elements of operational design for successful military action, as well as contemporary lessons that exploit US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Joint doctrine standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities and processes among all US forces to free JFCs and their staffs to focus efforts on solving the strategic, operational and tactical problems confronting them.

4. **Joint doctrine is authoritative guidance and will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.** That means doctrine does not replace or alter a commander’s authority and obligation to determine the proper COA under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision; such judgments are the responsibility of the commander, and doctrine cannot be a substitute for good judgment. Joint doctrine is not dogmatic—the focus is on how to think about operations, not what to think about operations. Its purpose is to aid thinking, not to replace it. It must be definitive enough to guide operations while versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations. Joint doctrine should foster initiative, creativity and conditions that allow commanders the freedom to adapt to varying circumstances. **The judgment of the commander based upon the situation is always paramount.**

5. Joint doctrine applies to the Joint Staff, CCDRs, subordinate unified CDRs, JTF CDRs, subordinate component CDRs of these commands, and the Services. In developing joint doctrine, existing Service, multi-Service, and multinational doctrine is considered. However, **joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service’s doctrine, which must be consistent with joint doctrine.** Joint doctrine should not include detail that is more appropriate in Service doctrine, standing operating procedures, plans and other publications. If conflicts arise between the contents of a JP and the contents of Service or multi-Service publications, the JP will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the JCS, has provided more current and specific guidance.
6. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the United States. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy and doctrine.

*For further guidance on joint doctrine, refer to CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System.*
APPENDIX B
ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVE (SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP)
CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

The following information is provided to assist CCDRs, subordinate JFCs and other CDRs with the authority to designate a support relationship between subordinate CDRs and with considerations in developing an establishing directive to clarify that support relationship.

2. Establishing Directive

An establishing directive is defined as an order normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

a. An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of command. Normally, the designated CDR will develop a draft establishing directive during the planning phase to provide the specifics of the support relationship. The CDR will submit the draft establishing directive to the establishing authority for consideration. The establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It may also include but is not necessarily limited to the following.

(1) Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.

(2) Relative priority of the supporting effort.

(3) Authority, if any, of the supporting CDRs to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

(4) Degree of authority granted to the supported CDR over the supporting effort.

(5) Establishment of air, sea, and ground maneuver control measures.

(6) Development of joint tactical air strike requests and air support requests.

(7) Development of target nominations, establishment of fire support coordination measures, integration of air defense, and the role of coordination centers.

(8) Development of the intelligence collection plan.

(9) Nonorganic logistic support.

(10) Force protection responsibilities.

b. Unless otherwise stated in the establishing directive, the supported and supporting CDRs will identify the events and conditions for any shifts of the support relationship throughout the operation during the planning phase and forward them to the establishing
authority for approval. The establishing authority will resolve any differences among the CDRs.

3. Supported Commander

A supported CDR may be designated for the entire operation, a particular phase or stage of the operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, stages, events, and functions. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported CDR has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The establishing authority is responsible for ensuring that the supported and supporting CDRs understand the degree of authority that the supported CDR is granted.

a. If not specified, the CDR will determine who has primary responsibility for the essential tasks during the mission analysis in the planning process.

b. In an operation of relatively short duration, normally the establishing authority will choose one supported commander for the entire operation.

4. Supporting Commander

The supporting CDR determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting CDR will advise and coordinate with the supported CDR on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported CDR’s effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated throughout the supporting CDR’s organization. The supporting CDR has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take full action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. When the supporting CDR cannot fulfill the needs of the supported CDR, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting CDRs. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.
The development of JP 1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Federal Statutory Laws
   c. Title 14, US Code, sections 1, 2, and 141.
   e. Posse Comitatus Act, (Title18, USC, Section 1385).

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy
   a. Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum.
   h. Unified Command Plan.
   i. National Response Plan.

3. DOD Publications
   b. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program.
Appendix C

d. DODD 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program.

e. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

f. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

g. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

h. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.

i. DODD 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint Commands.


k. DOD 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent.

l. DODD 5105.19, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

m. DODD 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

n. DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

o. DODI 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental Support.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System.

b. CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System.

c. CJCSI 5715.01B, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

d. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).

e. CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.

f. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

g. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


i. JP 2-0, Intelligence Support.
j. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

k. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Special Operations*.


m. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I*.


q. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.

r. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.


t. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.


v. JP 4-0, *Logistic Support*.

w. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

x. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

y. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*. 
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 1, 14 November 2000, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States; and, JP 0-2, 10 July 2001, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC // J7-JEDD //
   INFO: CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA // DOC GP //

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution


b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>commander</td>
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<td>CDRUSSOCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>continental United States</td>
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<td>security cooperation plan</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SJFHQ (CE)</td>
<td>standing joint force headquarters (command element)</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACAIR</td>
<td>tactical air</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>training and readiness oversight</td>
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<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>USELNMORAD</td>
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<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>VCJCS</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

**administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**Armed Forces of the United States.** A term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. See also United States Armed Forces. (JP 1-02)

**change of operational control.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**command.** 1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing
command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. See also combatant command (command authority); command; operational control; support; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

component. 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. Also called COMP. See also functional component command; Service component command. (JP 1-02)

contingency operation. A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10 United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). It is a military operation that: a. is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by definition of law. Under Title 10 United States Code, Section 101 (a)(13)(B), a contingency operation exists if a military operation results in the (1) call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under certain enumerated statutes (Title 10 United States Code, Sections 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to
Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

**Department of Defense components.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**directive authority for logistics.** Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. Also called DAFL. See also combatant command (command authority). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**direct liaison authorized.** That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1-02)

**executive agent.** A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**force.** 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (JP 1-02)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. See also component; Service component command. (JP 1-02)
**in support of.** Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control. (JP 1-02)

**integration.** 1. In force protection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

**joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint staff.** 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in Title 10, United States Code, Section 155. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

**national support element.** Any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSE. (JP 1-02)

**operational authority.** That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control,
tactical control, or a support relationship. See also combatant command (command authority); in support of; operational control; support; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

**Operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**Other government agency.** Within the context of interagency coordination, a non-Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**Service component command.** A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. See also component; functional component command. (JP 1-02)

**Specified combatant command.** See specified command. (JP 1-02)

**Specified command.** A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

**Subordinate command.** A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02)
subordinate unified command. A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned operational area. Also called subunified command. See also functional component command; operational control; subordinate command; unified command. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

subunified command. See subordinate unified command. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also combatant command (command authority); operational control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

theater. The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

training and readiness oversight. The authority that combatant commanders may exercise over assigned Reserve Component forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training. As a matter of Department of Defense policy, this authority includes: a. Providing guidance to Service component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department training and readiness programs; b. Commenting on Service component program recommendations and budget requests; c. Coordinating and approving participation by assigned Reserve Component forces in joint exercises and other joint training when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training; d. Obtaining and reviewing readiness and inspection reports on assigned Reserve Component forces; and e. Coordinating and reviewing mobilization plans (including post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) developed for assigned Reserve Component forces. Also called
TRO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**transient forces.** Forces that pass or stage through, or base temporarily within, the operational area of another command but are not under its operational control. See also force. (JP 1-02)

**unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**Unified Action Armed Forces.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**unified combatant command.** See unified command. (JP 1-02)

**unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

**Unified Command Plan.** The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP.

**unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful unified action. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 1** is the capstone joint doctrine publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature