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BITS Policy Note 00.5
June 2000
ISSN 1434-3274 |
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There is an open secret about summit meetings among Western
politicians. The most important and controversial topics do not appear on the official
agenda. They are discussed over lunch or dinner. No official notes are taken during these
occasions.
One of the most controversial and important topics likely to be
discussed during the EU Summit luncheons at Feira on June 19 and 20 is the EU member
nation’s position on U.S. plans to decide on the deployment of a U.S. National
Missile Defense system (NMD) by autumn. The topic’s importance to European security
and the future of arms control and disarmament is obvious. But is the EU to take a joint
position on this subject? Is the Union trying to jointly influence the outcome of what is
obviously an American decision? This is most likely as controversial as European concerns
are serious.
This Policy Note argues: The European leaders should meet the
challenge, building on their history of giving arms control and non-proliferation policies
priority and agree on a Common Position under the Union’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy, which
Clearly expresses their concerns resulting from a possible U.S.
decision on NMD for the future of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation;
Suggests a delay of the U.S. decision;
Proposes tripartite U.S.-EU-Russian as well as bilateral
consultations on the arms-control and nonproliferation consequences of deploying a U.S.
NMD-system;
Envisages bilateral and trilateral consultations with the U.S. and
Russia on cooperative initiatives to strengthen non-proliferation regimes and
Supports ongoing consultations with NATO about the consequences of an
NMD-deployment and proposes NATO-EU consultations on the issue.
Most interestingly, the challenge to discuss and consider such policies
has been triggered by an outside player, Vladimir Putin, the newly elected Russian
President. During his initial months in office, he has launched a major offensive on arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, which has pushed the United States on
the defensive and brought Europe onto the testing-ground. His policy is likely to become a
challenge for Russia’s Asian neighbors as well. However, his initiatives have already
had one major effect: the Russian Federation has reentered the world stage as a major
diplomatic actor.
The challenge for European leaders to decide whether to act jointly on
U.S. plans for an NMD system is one result of Putin’s major diplomatic campaign to
rally support for Russia’s opposition to changes to the 1972 ABM Treaty and the
consequences U.S. policies might have on the future of arms control and world security.
One element of Putin’s campaign has been to strongly engage Europe over these issues
and build bridges for European-Russian cooperation on security, arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation issues as envisaged in the EU’s "Common Strategy on
Russia". During his visit to Berlin in June he argued: "Europe must be an
example for an integration, free of barriers" and asked the European nations to seek
broad cooperation with Russia on important issues of economic and security policies.
Vladimir Putin has proven to be an energetic politician. Elected only
in late March, he has brought the Russian Federation back to the world stage as a major
player within a few months. Putin simply seized the initiative on arms-control and
disarmament. Prior to the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he
accomplished what the West had expected of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin for nearly seven
years. He succeeded in pushing the START-II Treaty towards ratification in the Russian
Duma. His second initiative came only one week after this first move: He convinced the
Russian parliament to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He indicated, that
Russia was prepared to take independent and unilateral steps on arms-control; in the U.S.
the Republican dominated Senate has refused to ratify this agreement.
During the NPT-Review Conference both steps gave Putin the results he
wanted. While the international community strongly criticized the lack of progress made on
nuclear disarmament since the last Review conference, the heat of the criticism turned
onto the U.S.. Washington had readily come to Putin’s assistance. Just in time for
the NPT conference, politicians in the U.S. including the presidential candidates had
become engaged in a heated domestic debate on U.S. plans for the deployment of a ballistic
missile defense system. All positions presented implied that the U.S. would violate the
1972 ABM-Treaty which many in the world perceive to be one of the most important
cornerstones of nuclear arms-control. Washington had even indicated that it was willing to
unilaterally withdraw from this treaty, if Russia did not agree to change the wording of
the Treaty to according to U.S. national missile defense plans.
Putin did not reject U.S. calls to consult on the future of the treaty.
He entered discussions with the U.S. and simply warned of the severe consequences which a
unilateral U.S. decision to cancel the treaty would trigger. That it would indeed cause
Russia to react very harshly and – thus Putin’s repeated threat – make
Russia to consider a withdrawal from all major existing arms control arrangements.
However, he also signaled political will to compromise. Russia
initiated a debate about seeking deeper cuts into U.S. and Rusisian strategic nuclear
arsenals under the future START-III treaty than envisaged earlier, informed the U.S. that
there might be options to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery. Finally – just one day before U.S. President
Bill Clinton was to visit him in Moscow – Putin addressed the U.S. public during a
television interview and introduced his suggestion to jointly build a
Russian-American-European missile defense system against the most likely missile threats.
Soon after Clinton left Moscow, Putin himself began traveling through EU member states,
Italy, Spain and Germany, to promote his ideas in time before the EU Summit meeting in
Feira.
His offensive has not yet come to an end. The Russian President has
already announced that he will visit China and North Korea, the two countries most likely
affected by the U.S. plans to deploy an NMD system before the Okinawa G-8 Summit in July.
During his Pyongyang visit, Putin is likely to play on the non-proliferation theme and
thus point out the influence Russia may have on this isolated country whose programs on
developing missiles and weapons of mass destruction are the most often named as
justifications for U.S. plans to build a national missile defense system. On the other
hand, China, a long-time nuclear power perceives NMD as a risk to the credibility of this
countries‘ deterrent, which consists of only a very limited number of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Putin is likely to signal that there are ways to deal
with the spread of these weapons in diplomatic not military ways. By the time of the G-8
Summit, Putin is likely to have elaborated on all elements of his initiative: more rapid
nuclear disarmament, improved non-proliferation regimes and the offer to cooperate on
missile defenses as long as they are legal under the ABM-treaty. He even might be ready to
integrate them into a Russian initiative on arms control and nonproliferation. The G-8
Summit is anyhow likely to discuss issues of nuclear safety and security, e.g.
U.S.-Russian initiatives to render surplus nuclear weapons fissile materials useless for
weapons purposes.
The Russian President is unlikely to face any significant domestic
opposition to his strategy. Those likely to oppose, both in the Duma and in the military,
can not easily attack him on reasons of giving up core Russian national interests or even
significant ground. Following Putin’s strategy Russia will not have to make any
unilateral concessions. The strategic balance with the U.S. remains unchanged.
The START-II treaty will only enter into force, if the U.S. Senate
ratifies the Treaty along with the 1997 protocols to the ABM-Treaty which is nearly
impossible in the Republican dominated U.S. Senate. Similarly, the CTBT treaty will not
enter into force in the foreseeable future. This treaty must be ratified by 44 countries
including India, Pakistan, Israel, the Peoples Republic of China and the United States,
who all did not yet ratify it.
Putin’s initiative for deeper cuts into U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear arsenals is much in the Russian interest. The Russian Federation has other
priorities spending its scarce resources than trying to maintain an oversized nuclear
posture. Russia will probably already face problems in maintaining a nuclear force of
1.000 – 1.500 nuclear weapons as suggested by the Kremlin during discussions on the
future START-III limits unless the country recovers economically.
Finally: Putin’s suggestions to strengthen non-proliferation
regimes might cause some limited concern within Russia’s export community, which
often targets countries such as Iran. However, these opponents are unlikely to be able to
form a critical mass. In addition, they might hope for some technological and financial
gains if the President’s initiative to build a joint missile defense system bears
some fruit. Thus Putin seems to be in an excellent position to continue on his path of
action.
He knows that throughout the whole process the U.S. will be on the
defensive. Russia will not loose the initiative and can indicate readiness for a number of
regional as well as global initiatives to strengthen nuclear arms control and safeguard
the non-proliferation regime. In addition Putin can signal Russia’s political will to
realistically deal with proliferation risks and – if necessary - to counter them in a
cooperative manner. Thus he will be able to continue to link Russian acceptance of
existing proliferation risks to his firm conviction that they can be dealt with while
respecting the limits set by the ABM Treaty. From his perspective there is also very
little incentive to urgently negotiate a deal with the current U.S. administration. For
most of his presidency, Vladimir Putin will have to deal with the successor to President
Clinton.
However, the combination of his initiatives and his capability to carry
them through will put the European Union countries to a test. European perception of
future proliferation risks is more similar to the Russian than to the U.S. position. The
EU’s preferred strategy to deal with these risks is arms control, non-proliferation
and diplomacy, not military responses. This again is closer to the Russian than to the
U.S. approach. However, the Europeans will not be comfortable with that choice. Are they
ready to challenge their longtime ally, the U.S., or are they going to disappoint Moscow,
one of their most important partners in cooperation for stability in Europe?
Although President Putin may hope that the EU will develop a common
position or will at least coordinate its opposition to exploit its leverage towards the
U.S., he is quite obviously not expecting to win this fight in Europe. He is fully aware
that European ties with the U.S. are much stronger than European-Russian relations. He
knows, that his European counterparts are likely to be somewhat uneasy about how strongly
they should oppose the U.S. and also whether they should discuss with the U.S. jointly or
individually.
However, it might be Putin’s intention to test how serious
European Union members are about assuming a greater role and responsibility in European
Security, as indicated during the Cologne and Helsinki Summits in 1999. He might also
wants to find out how seriously the EU is interested in developing practical examples for
what was proposed in the Union’s "Common Strategy on Russia", namely to
"identify common responses to the security challenges in Europe and beyond ... by
promoting arms control and disarmament and the implementation of existing
agreements."
Putin has a clear point there. He builds on common European-Russian
security interests and shared concerns over U.S. plans while testing Europe. Is the
European Union ready to cope with its self-imposed commitment to strengthen its Common
Foreign and Security Policy and gain greater autonomy, especially from the U.S.?
The testing ground is well chosen. It is not as delicate as challenging
Europe over near-term cooperation in military crisis-management in areas of interest to
Russia such as Central Asia or the Transcaucasus. It is over cooperation on arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation issues where there is much common ground. This is an
area where the European Union since Maastricht has developed a tradition of jointly
developing "Common Positions" as well as "Common Actions" on a variety
of issues, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Ottawa Convention banning
anti-personnel mines, the latter being a clear example where there are significant
differences between the EU and U.S. positions.
He also knows that he has an excellent point of departure. A carefully
worded reminder that European concerns about NMD might call for the European nations to
develop a joint stand had already been made by German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer,
during a recent visit in Washington. It was accompanied by the admittance that
"interests are not homogenous in Europe, so we will need some time for
discussion". However, Fischer’s remarks indeed indicate the need to act jointly.
Finally, the challenge is indirectly over a much larger issue.
Putin’s initiative will result in an indication to Russia whether the European
Union’s approach to its major Eastern neighbor seriously opens up a second door to
West for the Kremlin. Is Europe ready to opt for strategic partnership with Russia? Is the
European Union envisaging an inclusive European Security Architecture, one that
encompasses Russia as an equal partner? Is Europe to give Russia a greater say on European
Security matters than NATO does under U.S. leadership? Or is the European Union developing
into just a European version of NATO, which also might turn confrontational towards Russia
one day? The answer given by Europe will be of significance and importance to the Russian
Federation, especially when considering the position Russia will take towards EU
enlargement.
For years it had been the Europeans who had been talking about urgent
need for constructive engagement with Russia; now it seems Russia takes the initiative and
is engaging Europe. Putin suggests to his European counterparts: Don’t be
overcautious. Don’t feel like having no leverage. If Washington is willing to make
concessions to anybody, why not to its closest Allies? Thus, the European Union might be
an appropriate forum for Europeans to coordinate their response.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the EU will be reluctant to take a
Common Position on a controversial topic that could be dubbed a "defense" issue.
However, conventional wisdom sometimes is limited wisdom. For years the EU has been taking
Common Positions as well as even Common Actions on arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation issues under the authority granted to Brussels by the Maastricht Treaty
and significantly widened since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on May 1, 1999.
This ground has been tested and members would act in accordance with established practices
if they decided to do so.
The concerns aired by European governments over negative effects of the
U.S. NMD proposal are widely on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Worries
based on long-term effects on collective defense and transatlantic relations add to
European reservations, but are not the primary objection put forward. Indeed, if
collective defense issues were the main aspect of the European concerns, it would be
extremely difficult to join forces in developing a common position. Collective defense is
the one main area of a future Common European Security and Defense Policy, which until now
and for excellent reasons has been deliberately excluded from the EU-members’ scheme
of action and political integration.
However, taking a joint stand on arms control and non-proliferation
concerns resulting from a unilateral U.S. move on further developing national missile
defense technologies securely falls under the authority the European Union has assumed
under its Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy. If European leaders were to follow
their own priorities, i.e. giving the strengthening of arms control and the safeguarding
of nonproliferation primacy over fighting the consequences of proliferation militarily,
they would have to come up with a Common Position on U.S. NMD plans. These plans are very
likely to reverse these priorities.
Europe will have to face this challenge. Indecisiveness is not an
option. To Moscow, t would either signal disinterest in expanded relations or a European
reluctance to take the development of a Common European Security and Defense Policy
seriously. In either case Europe would not be ready for a true partnership with Russia.
At Feira, EU leaders should use discussions over lunch or dinner to
deliberate on the long-term consequences of taking a common position or the failure to do
so.. They might come to the conclusion that Russia, the EU and the U.S. would be best off
if they got more time before a U.S. decision seriously affects the current arms control
and non-proliferation aquis. They might also conclude that they best serve this interest
if they express a Common Position within the limits of their traditional turf. Elements of
such a position might be
Expressing their concerns resulting from a possible U.S. decision on
NMD for the future of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation;
Suggesting a delay of the U.S. decision;
Proposing tripartite U.S.-EU-Russian as well as bilateral
consultations on the arms-control and nonproliferation consequences of deploying a U.S.
NMD-system;
Envisaging bilateral and trilateral consultations with the U.S. and
Russia on cooperative initiatives to strengthen non-proliferation regimes and
Supporting ongoing consultations in NATO about the consequences of an
NMD-deployment and proposes NATO-EU consultations on the issue.
This policy note was written by Otfried Nassauer, the Director of BITS with
input from Clara Portela-Sais and Denise Groves, who both work as researchers at
the center. BITS is working on European aspects of NMD in a joint effort with the British
American Security Information Council.
BITS acknowledges the generous support received from the Ford Foundation
for its work on NATO-Russia relations.,
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