Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN)
PENN Newsletter No. 10 / April 2000


c/o BITS ·  Rykestr. 13  · D-10405 Berlin ·   Germany  ·  Phone: +49-30-446858-0   ·    Fax: +49-30-4410221

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Dear Friends

On April 14, after a delay of nearly seven years, the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament finally accepted the START II-Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The vote was 288 to 131 in favor of the treaty. The same day the Parliament also passed a law on the ratification of additional agreements to the 1972 ABM-Treaty between the two countries stressing the importance of this particular treaty. President Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian government will cancel all nuclear arms control agreements if the United States withdrew from the ABM-Treaty. Up to now the ratification of the START II-Treaty is one step to fulfill the obligations to nuclear weapons reductions in accordance with Article six of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In New York on April 24 the Review Conference on the NPT begins.



A New Start for the START process?

On April 14, 2000, seven years after Presidents Bush and Yeltsin initialized the START II Treaty in 1993, the Russian Duma finally ratified START II with 288 deputies in favor and 131 opposed. Only five days later, the Upper House of the Russian Parliament also voted in favor for the ratification of the Treaty. However, by now only one thing is sure: The ink was really dry when the Russian decision was made. But it is not certain that START II ratification means that nuclear disarmament is coming back on track. Moreover, it remains totally unclear whether the bilateral system of nuclear arms control developed throughout the cold war will survive the first decade of the new millenium or will be replaced by a new ‘anarchy’ where pure national interests will receive priority over arms control.

When START II was ratified by the US Senate back in 1996, it was a different treaty than the one ratified by the Russian Duma now. In 1997, the US and Russia agreed on four protocols to the START II and the ABM treaty that made changes to the substance of the original treaty:

The protocols on START II most prominently changed the timeframe for the Russian implementation of the treaty. The completion date for verified elimination of the START II affected delivery systems for nuclear weapons was set back to the end of 2007. By the end of 2003, the original date, these weapons will have to be withdrawn from service.

Additionally, with the two protocols on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty the US and Russia agreed on the technical definitions of which ballistic missile defense systems they considered to be tactical or theater and which they considered strategic. Current US plans for a national missile defense (NMD) system clearly fall under strategic missile defense as outlined in the protocols.

Now Russia ratified START II as well as the 1997 protocols. Article 9 of the Russian law on START II ratification states that the exchange of ratification instruments will be done only upon completion by the US of the procedure of ratification of the 1997 protocols. Unless these protocols are ratified by the US, the START II Treaty will not enter into force. None of these protocols, however, has yet to be even considered by the US Senate and it is far from sure whether the Senate will eventually give its consent.

And to add more complications: The two protocols on the ABM Treaty will continue to prohibit a national missile defense system, such as the one envisaged by a law passed by US Congress. Should the US administration take a decision on the build-up of an NMD system in summer 2000, it will be a decision on whether or not to proceed with nuclear arms control, unless the Russian side agrees to sufficient changes to the ABM Treaty. Washington has approached Moscow in the context of negotiations about a START III agreement to obtain Russian consent on changes to the ABM Treaty which would make the planned US NMD system legal. Moscow has voiced strong opposition to such changes. Russia fears that the deterioration of her own strategic nuclear capability in combination with a future US NMD system will affect Moscow’s second-strike capability and thus erode the country’s capability to deter the US.

Article 2 of the "Federal Law On Ratification Of START II" passed by the Duma names a number of conditions under which Russia reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty in accordance to Article VI of the START II Treaty. While these conditions are not legally binding in an international context, they have substantial political importance. According to these (politically but not legally binding) provisions, Russia might withdraw from the treaty if: the US violates the START II treaty; the US withdraws from the 1972 ABM-treaty; other states not party to START II build up nuclear forces that pose a threat to national security; NATO deploys nuclear weapons in its new members states; extraordinary events of technical or economic nature occur that make it impossible for Russia to fulfill its obligations.

Politically, the condition about the ABM Treaty is the most crucial. This was made clear by President Putin when he told the Duma just before the vote: "I want to stress in this case, we will have the chance and we will withdraw not only from the START II Treaty, but from the whole system of treaties on limitation and control of strategic and conventional weapons."

However, Putin’s threatening words might have been for internal consumption. In a different, but strategically important context, he signaled the possibility that in the future Russia might deal with the ABM treaty in a more flexible manner. In revising President Yeltsin’s October 1999 "Concept of National Security for the Russian Federation", Acting President Putin declared on January 10 that Russian foreign policy will be directed at "adapting existing arms-control and disarmament agreements" to the changing reality in international relations.

Whether higher Russian flexibility will allow the US to implement a NMD system is still questionable. However, the discussion on building a US NMD may have already led to decision in the People’s Republic of China to increase the build-up of Beijing’s strategic nuclear forces. In turn, this could also be interpreted in the future as a threat to Russia’s national security and thus as a precondition for a Russian withdrawal from START II.

NMD problem also plays an important role when it comes to the negotiations about a future START III treaty. Here, too, are massive hurdles to overcome. Will the future upper limit for nuclear warheads be agreed at 1.500 as Russia suggests or will it be set at 2.000-2.500 warheads as the United States prefers? Will Russia and the US develop a concept for verifiable nuclear warhead dismantling as intended during the Helsinki Summit in 1997? Will sub-strategic nuclear weapons be subject to the new treaty or not? Will START III be perceived as more fair and less disadvantageous by Russia than START II as required by the Russian START II ratification law? And once more, and most importantly: Can both sides overcome the most severe difficulty under discussion: the 1972 ABM Treaty and US NMD ambitions?

On the one hand, during a positive course of events, it is possible that the core elements of START III can be agreed upon during Russian foreign minister Ivanov’s visit to the US on April 24-27 or at the Clinton-Putin summit on 4-5 June. On the other hand, a more negative course of action has to be envisaged as well: Opponents of further steps of treaty based arms control in the US Senate could continue to block the START process and impose conditions such as Russian consent to a full-scale US NMD system, which would be significantly more capable than the one pursued by the current plans of the Clinton administration. Among the strongest US opponents to bilateral nuclear arms control with Russia are some of the strongest supporters of a full-fledged US NMD system. Thus, the future of the proposed US NMD still poses the biggest stumbling block for START II entry into force as well as for a future START III Treaty.

However, any official statement on progress with START III prior to or in the context of the NPT Review Conference will surely reduce the strong criticism expected to be voiced by other NPT member states. They argue that the nuclear weapons states are not complying with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT Treaty.

Regardless of what the US and Russia tell delegations during the NPT Review Conference in New York beginning on April 24 about their countries attempts to fulfil their obligations for nuclear disarmament, they can not claim real progress. Nuclear disarmament remains at crossroads and it is far from sure that the US and Russia are back on track and are working to make deep cuts into their cold war nuclear arsenals.

Even more: It remains to be seen whether Pavel Felgenhauer’s fatalistic view of US and Russian approaches proves correct: "As the US and Russian nuclear arsenals were diminished after the end of the Cold War, arms control agreements have become more complex and increasingly insignificant politically. START treaties are only a cause of senseless squabbles between nationalistic morons." However, Felgenhauer might be proven to be overly optimistic. The START treaties might become a playing ground for nationalistic morons testing the waters for weakening treaty-based international arms control for the sake of "national interests."



Latest News – Russia goes on the Offensive

Only days after ratifying START II, Russia’s new President, Vladimir Putin, has acted to launch another arms control offensive. As this issue of the PENN Newsletter goes to print, the Russian Duma is to decide on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on April 21. If successful, the Russian CTBT ratification would send important messages to the rest of the world:

First, Russian foreign policy has surpassed the period of agony and slow motion; Russia returns to the scene as a most active player in nuclear arms control.

Second, Russia decides independent of the US. While the US Senate blocked ratification of this important treaty, Russia is willing to move ahead without the US, jointly with the EU’s nuclear weapon states, France and Great Britain.

Third, it is no longer Russia who blocks nuclear disarmament. Criticism against the Nuclear Weapons States for not fulfilling their commitments under Article VI of the NPT needs to be directed at Washington, no longer at Moscow.

As a consequence, the US is likely to come under severe pressure during the upcoming NPT Review Conference for being the main obstacle to fulfillment by Nuclear Weapons States of their disarmament commitments. Arms control hawks and unilateralists in the US Congress will likely be put on the spot for being the major stumbling block to nuclear arms control. However, it remains to be seen whether the Clinton administration’s hope that it could successfully reopen the debate on ratifying the CTBT will benefit from these developments. In addition, Vladimir Putin might hope that political opposition against US NMD plans will grow, both within the US as well as on an international level.



Nuclear Power Sharing and the NPT

Only weeks before the international community reviews progress made on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO is on the brink of adopting a doctrine that expands the role of nuclear weapons to deter the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If so, the Alliance's military strategy would serve to further degrade the health of the NPT, already seriously weakened because of the contradictions between of NATO's controversial nuclear power sharing arrangements and commitments made under the NPT.

Adoption of this strategy will: Negatively prejudice NATO's ongoing review of its arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation policy; Bring both the nuclear and the non-nuclear members of NATO into clear violation of their obligations under Articles I and II of the NPT, as well as the Negative Security Assurances; harm the NPT Review Conference and legitimate growing criticisms by non-NATO, non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation regime.

Under Articles I and II of the NPT, nuclear weapons states are prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons or control over such weapons to any recipient, directly or indirectly. Non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are likewise prohibited from receiving transfer or control of such weapons. However, NATO nuclear power sharing arrangements seem to violate these principles. Under those arrangements and in case of war, European non- nuclear weapon states — particularly Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey — may be given access to some of the up to 180 American-owned and controlled nuclear weapons stored in Europe.

At its April 1999 Summit in Washington, NATO emphasized the importance of shared responsibility within the Alliance. NATO declared in its Strategic Concept that: "A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements." Those arrangements include the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which allows European non-nuclear allies to participate in nuclear decision-making as well as in discussions about the Alliance’s nuclear policy, planning and doctrine. Although European NATO members are given a political role in decisions on the use of nuclear forces under NATO command, they can not order their use.

Alliance solidarity also requires "widespread participation", which means that US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe can be delivered either by US aircraft or by aircraft belonging to other NATO members. In peacetime, all US weapons remain strictly under the control of US forces. However, in times of war, the US President can authorize the release of deployed nuclear weapons to NATO allies. In practice, this could mean that once an allied aircraft has taken off with the armed nuclear weapon on board, the weapon is no longer under national US command and control. Instead, the allied pilot now has full control over the weapon and has sole responsibility for delivering the weapon to its target. Such a course of action would effectively mean that the non-nuclear NATO partners become nuclear powers in time of war.

Through creative interpretation of language in the NPT, American officials deny that NATO nuclear power sharing arrangements are in violation of the treaty. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the participation by NATO NNWS in the activities of the Nuclear Planning Group "in no way contravenes Article I of the NPT. This question of NPT Article I and its impact on NATO nuclear forces was debated at length during the negotiation of the NPT. All concerned accepted that the final language of Article I would not preclude the type of nuclear planning, basing, and consultative arrangements that have taken place in NATO since NPT entry-into-force in 1970."

US defense of its interpretations of the NPT is partly based on a document entitled Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by US Allies together with Answers given by the United States, which was transmitted to the US Senate on 9 July 1968 for consideration during ratification hearings on the NPT. The document offered to the Senate was designed to give an interpretation of the NPT that would allow NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. The interpretation centered around four key areas that in the US view, the Treaty did not deal with and therefore, does not prohibit.

First, the US argued in the Questions and Answers document that while there is a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear bombs, warheads and nuclear explosive devices, the Treaty does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems or control over them. This interpretation allows for NATO cooperation on development and procurement of systems capable of delivering US nuclear weapons. Second, the US position stated that the NPT does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results. This in effect allows NNWS participation in drafting target plans, obtaining information about how different weapons would be used against targets, and other aspects of the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. Third, and perhaps most crucial, the US view was that the NPT does not deal with the deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory because that does not actually involve the transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them. Only unless and until a decision were made to go to war would there be a transfer of control, but by that time the treaty would "no longer be controlling."

This position, that the NPT "would no longer be controlling" once a decision has been made "to go to war", is fundamental to US and NATO interpretations. According to this view, the general purpose of the Treaty is to prevent the spread of weapons and by extension, avert a nuclear war. Therefore, once general hostilities involving nuclear weapons occur, the Treaty has failed in its express purposes and thus, becomes moot. The US argues that because the Treaty is no longer binding, "control" over US nuclear weapons could then be legally transferred to NATO allies.

The US interpretation presents several problems to the non- proliferation regime. First, the US did not adequately inform other states of its interpretations. Even though it is a common practice, the US did not deposit its reservations or interpretations about the treaty upon submission of articles of ratification. The US claims that the Senate ratification hearings and the Questions and Answers document were sufficient notification of its interpretations. However, these were not publicly available until after July 8, 1968—eight days after the NPT signing ceremony had taken place, at which time the first 56 nations signed the Treaty.

Another problem is that NATO is able to create the very conditions under which it would no longer feel bound by the NPT. By retaining the option of first use of nuclear weapons, the US and NATO can unilaterally start a general war involving nuclear weapons, which according to its view, would then nullify the treaty. After that point, and no longer bound by the Treaty, the US would then be free to transfer nuclear weapons to any ally for use in conflict.

More recent developments further threaten the health of the NPT: new information is emerging that NATO might widen the role of nuclear weapons in its nuclear doctrine. In order to conform with US policy, NATO may soon adopt the position that nuclear weapons can be used against owners or users of WMD. This shift in policy means that the number of scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used is expanded and NATO moves one step closer to creating the very circumstances under which, by its own definition, the NPT would be null and void.

The effects of this policy decision on the health of the NPT are certain to be damaging. Already Russia is considering including a similar policy in a draft of its Military Doctrine. Furthermore, by reaffirming its belief in the utility of nuclear weapons, and in fact, by expanding the political and military usefulness of these weapons, NATO undermines the political credibility of NSAs. This may convince non-nuclear states that the only truly effective deterrent is a nuclear deterrent. NATO could thus be setting an example it surely does not want others to emulate.



Joschka Fischer’s Defeat?

Barely over a year ago, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer proposed that NATO consider reforming its out-dated, Cold War-era nuclear doctrine by adopting a no-first use policy. Approval of such a measure would have strengthened the commitment of NATO member states to the NPT and added credibility to Negative Security Assurances made to non-nuclear weapons states. Instead, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen flatly rejected the German proposal, declaring that NATO’s best hope for protecting itself against the threat of WMD is to keep all options open – including the option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries, possessing biological or chemical weapons.

Thus it appears that Fischer’s initiative may have resulted in quite the opposite of what the German Foreign Minister intended: The Alliance has devised new and increased justifications for maintaining a nuclear posture. Its first use policy becomes indispensable. In addition by adopting the new military strategy prior to deciding on the results of NATO’s review of the Alliance’s nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation policy the scope of this review process becomes more limited. DG/ON


US Deployment Of Nuclear Weapons World-Wide

A recently released document on the "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977" in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists provides new information on the deployment of US nuclear weapons throughout the world. Nine countries of places where nuclear weapons were deployed are given (Alaska, Cuba, Guam, Hawaii, Johnston Island, Midway, Puerto Rico, United Kingdom and Germany), eighteen others are deleted (Canada, Greenland, Japan, Kwajalein, Morocco, etc.). As the list is alphabetical, it was possible to identify them with one exception.

Ten years after the cold war there are still nuclear weapons deployed outside the territories of the nuclear weapon states. Via NATO’s nuclear sharing they are still to be found in at least six non-nuclear countries. The document shows that more than 7000 US nuclear weapons had been settled in NATO countries and approximately 2000 on land in the pacific region.

The first foreign deployments of nuclear weapons began in 1950, but those were only nuclear capable weapons without the fissile material that was stored in Britain and Morocco. The first complete nuclear weapons were stored in Morocco in May 1954 and in September of the same year in the United Kingdom. Deployment in West Germany begun in March 1955, Italy followed in April 1957 and afterwards in France, Turkey, the Netherlands, Greece and Belgium. Germany hosted nearly half of the 7000 nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, 21 types of US weapons from 1955 till today. In the late 1950's NATO's nuclear sharing began. An estimated 35 - 40% of the weapons were reserved for non-US NATO forces.

Deployments in the Pacific started with the US bases in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii and Okinawa. In 1954, on behalf of the US-China crises, the nuclear-armed U.S.S. Midway set off to Taiwan, while in December 1954 the transfer of nuclear capable weapons to Japan began. At the end of the Eisenhower administration there were about 1700 nuclear weapons deployed in Taiwan, the Philippines, Guam, Korea and Okinawa. Under the Kennedy administration these numbers grew to 2400 in 1963 and peaked in 1967 at about 3200 nuclear weapons in the Pacific. From 1967 these number began to decrease again. By 1977 they had fallen back to 1200 warheads. They had been withdrawn from Japan, the Philippines and Okinawa, after it reverted to Japan.

The document giving this information was first requested in 1983 under the Freedom of Information Act and declassified with deletions in 1985. The Pentagon released more information in 1992 and 1999. The process of declassification took quite a long time, as the information on nuclear deployment on foreign soil is still strictly controlled, in order not to embarrass foreign governments.

Only one of the countries figured out to be a site where the US deployed nuclear weapons, Iceland, seems not to be spotted correctly. The Icelandic Embassy in Washington DC denied this immediately as did US officials when questioned whether there were nuclear weapons deployed in Iceland. Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, the authors of the article in the Bulletin, have corrected this error: the nukes were deployed in Iwo Jima. MK


Nuclear Weapons in Hungary?

Following years of discussions Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary finally became full members of NATO in March 1999. Although Russian protests were in vain, the Alliance did make some concessions. NATO announced in a politically binding manner that it had no plans and no intentions to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members. Their participation in the Alliance's "nuclear sharing" should be limited.

Therefore it was a surprise when Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban declared on 29th October 1999, that his government would consider the deployment of NATO nuclear weapons in Hungary during a crisis, "because of uncertainties about the future of Russia". Orban said, the deployment may be necessary even though the Hungarian people may not support it.

In Hungary the statement drew sharp criticism because it represents a turnaround in the country’s demand that no nuclear weapons deployments be required after joining the Alliance. In Russia Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin declared that the remarks were "a direct violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, in which NATO countries confirmed that they had no intention, plan or cause to deploy weapons in the territories of new members." The remarks are "totally inappropriate and incorrect and, linked with the deployment of nuclear arms, simply dangerous," Rakhmanin added.

Later Prime Minister Orban tried to justify his declaration: "There is no crisis situation at the present that would justify such a request and the topic only arose because in Canada there is a debate about the future of NATO’s nuclear arsenal." During NATO’s Kosovo War a few months earlier Hungary was a frontline state with American fighter planes stationed there. GP


British Submarine Visits France – Tighter British/French fleet-cooperation expected

The British Submarine HMS Victorious became the first strategic British submarine to visit France. The visit of the Trindent class submarine to the naval base Ile-Longue, which is the heart of French strategic deterrence, is a step towards closer co-operation between British and French fleets and nuclear defense. A French submarine is expected to make a return trip in May, with a planned visit to Britain's "Faslane" naval base in Scotland.

There have been talks between London and Paris for some time about intensifying the fleet co-operation. A first result had been the co-operation between British and French naval forces throughout the Kosovo-conflict. During last year's mission of the French task force 470 in the Adria, a British frigate protected the French aircraft carrier "Foch". This co-operation is expected to kick off a trip around the world under the title "Naval Task Force 2000". The French frigate "Aconit" will accompany a British task force, guarding an aircraft-carrier, during a trip to Israel, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, China, the USA and Venezuela.

This co-operation is the first sign of tighter knots between France and Britain. There are also talks about the joint development of a new multiple purpose frigate, which is more focused on the support of land operations equipped with cruise missiles and electromagnetic artillery. This is a move away from traditional frigates, which are equipped for the protection of waterways. The British navy is expected to order six of these frigates, while France's theoretical need is more than ten.

Another part of the British-French joint venture is the co-operation in patrols of strategic nuclear submarines. An agreement on co-operation regarding the deployment of a French or British submarine for joint deterrence is expected to be possible in the foreseeable future. To meet this French-British deterrence-strategy an agreement between both countries on joint targeting would be needed. Talks about this might be going on. This would require an understanding that has been difficult to attain in the past due to Britain and France often being split on various crisis. MK


German Submarines for Israel

Three "Dolphin"-class submarines with conventional propulsion systems may be converted to carry nuclear tipped sea-launched cruise missiles after being handed over to the Israeli Navy after finishing construction at the yards of Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) and Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) in Germany. Each submarine has four 650 mm and six 533 mm torpedo tubes for German STN Altas DM2A3 torpedoes or American Sub Harpoon SSM. A total of 16 torpedoes or SSMs can be carried. However none of these weapons is being launched from 650 mm tubes.

Worldwide 533 mm tubes have become standard tubes for firing torpedoes or anti-ship missiles; 650 mm tubes are rarely used and this is the first time the have been fitted to a German submarine. This tube configuration is similar to that of Russian nuclear powered attack submarines, such as the Oscar, Improved Akula and Akula-II-class submarines. Here the 650 mm tubes are used to launch sea-launched missiles, some of which carry nuclear warheads.

It is not clear which type of weapon might be used onboard the Israeli submarines. Some sources close to the project have suggested in Jane’s Defense Review that modified nuclear "Sub-Harpoon" missiles might be fitted to the boats. Other sources indicate that a new "Gabriel IV"-missile might be used. In March the U.S. government rejected selling up to 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles to Israel for their deep-strike military modernization plan. Israeli officials said they want to discuss the Tomahawk issue during U.S. Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) Walter B. Slocombe's visit in April 2000. Others suggest that a completely new weapon system migth be used.

Up to now two submarines had arrived at Haifa: the INS Dolphin and the INS Leviathan. The third boat, INS Tekuma, will be delivered in mid-2000. GP


PENN - Suggested Readings

PENN-members BASIC and BITS recently released a new research report, entitled "Questions of Command and Control – NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT". The study employs historical evidence collected over four years to determine if the US and its NATO partners negotiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the late 1960's in good faith. Government documents from the time, many of them classified until recently, reveal that the United States and its NATO partners deliberately chose not to adequately inform the other signatories of the NPT about unilateral interpretations.

These interpretations are still used by NATO to claim that nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT and that in times of war the Treaty is no longer binding.

The report argues that these unilateral interpretations introduce major loopholes into the non-proliferation regime. These loopholes need to be closed. Investigating recent developments in NATO’s nuclear strategy, the report comes to the conclusion that NATO is in the process of widening the political and military role attributed to nuclear weapons.

NATO’s new classified military strategy document MC 400/2 (and possibly already its classified 1996 predecessor MC 400/1) assign nuclear weapons a role in deterring or even fighting the owners or users of all types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. If NATO adopts (or adopted) such a strategy, this will further weaken the NPT.

First, one can not deter most owners of biological and chemical weapons by threatening the use of nuclear weapons unless one has the will to violate Negative Security Assurances, which were given to non-nuclear weapon states by nuclear weapon states. Second, adopting such a strategy requires the political will to widen the circumstances under which NATO might consider launching nuclear operations under nuclear sharing arrangements. Finally, giving nuclear weapons a role against biological and chemical weapons as well as their means of delivery makes a "First Use Policy" an indispensable prerequisite for NATO’s strategy.

"Questions of Command and Control – NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT", PENN Research Report 2000.1, March 2000, can be obtained from either BASIC or BITS.

BITS has produced a German language Research Report entitled "Nur eine Frage der Verfügungsgewalt? – Die neue NATO-Strategie, der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag und die Nukleare Teilhabe". Based on the same materials as the PENN report, this document provides those who can read German with a deeper analysis on the consequences of NATO’s revised nuclear policy. This report addresses the effects on German Foreign Minister Fischer’s initiative to review NATO’s nuclear arms control and disarmament policy, namely the Minister’s proposal that NATO should adopt a No First Use Policy. It highlights the fact that four of the five established nuclear weapons states are considering to give nuclear weapons a role in deterring biological and chemical weapons. In her new draft military doctrine, Russia takes the same position as NATO.

"Nur eine Frage der Verfügungsgewalt? – Die neue NATO-Strategie, der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag und die Nukleare Teilhabe", BITS Research Report 2000.2, March 2000 can be obtained from BITS.

Another policy note in German language which might be of interest to the readers of the PENN-Newsletter is under preparation. Entitled "Die Nukleare Teilhabe aufgeben – den NPT stärken?" (Ending Nuclear Sharing – Strengthening Non-Proliferation?) the policy note is testing an argument: Could NATO’s non-nuclear members strengthen the non-proliferation regime by giving up the technical capability to employ nuclear weapons in times of war? The answer found is "yes".

"Die nukleare Teilhabe aufgeben – den NPT stärken?", BITS Policy-Note 2000.2, is available from BITS.

Finally, in our last newsletter we announced that a detailed analysis of the development of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESD-Policy) would follow our initial paper on "Sharks and Minnows off Helsinki". We have to apologize. It is still under preparation. The main author broke his shoulder and has been unable to write for about three months. We feel terribly sorry (for him and you), but it’s coming soon. DG/ON


Coming soon to a monitor near you....

The time has come... BITS is about to launch its website @, the site will include all the BITS, PENN and NETS publications available to download as either HTML or PDF files. A Berlin Calendar of events will be featured alongside the International calendar of events, and will provide all the relevant event dates in the new German capital. BITS will also use the website to host MAD - the Military Abbreviations Database. The launch date will be announced soon, watch the web for more...



Editorīs Note

News from PENN


Dan Plesch is now based in the London office with Theresa Hitchens, previously editor of Defense News, due to take up the position of Research Director in the Washington office at the end of April.

BASIC recently said goodbye to Tasos Kokkinides who took up a position with the BBC, to Julianne Smith who is now with the Association of the US Army working on their 'Role of American Military Power' project, and to Martin Butcher who was appointed Director for Security Programs with Physicians for Social Responsibility. PENN would like to wish them all the best in their future careers.

... BITS

Since March Denise Groves, a former Scoville fellow at of the Center of Defense Information in Washington, is working at BITS on NATO, nuclear sharing, European security and defense policy and associated matters. Jochen Gester left BITS and was replaced by Markus Nitschke to work on the NEWS-Press Reports. Magnus Kutz and Nadja Westphal, two students of political science, are also doing an internship at BITS. Soon, two new researchers will complete the staff at BITS: Steffen Wagener and Clara Portela-Sais. PC


Date Event
21 April

New Russian Military Doctrine will be published; Duma discusses the CTBT-ratification

24 April- 19 May

Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York

26/27 April

Visit of Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov to the US for discussions on international security and the ABM-Treaty

03 May

EU – Russia Summit, Moscow

05-07 May

Informal EU - Foreign Ministers Meeting, Sao Miquel (Azores)

22 May

Conference of Disarmament (CD), second session of 2000 begins in Geneva

22-26 May

NGO-Millennium Forum preparatory meeting for the "Millennium Assembly" of the U.N.

24/25 May NATO – Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Florence (MC 400/2)
27 May

2nd anniversary of the NATO – Russia Founding Act


President Clinton to decide on deployment of the National Missile Defence System in the U.S., likely to be delayed

04/05 June

US – Russian Summit

05 June

EU – USA Summit (Queluz, Portugal)

08/09 June

NATO Defence Ministerial Meeting, Brussels

19/20 June

EU Summit: Heads of Government Meeting in Santa Maria da Feira

28 June- 02 July

IPPNW‘s 14th World Congress in Paris

01 July

EU – Presidency passes to France

07 July

Conference of Disarmament (CD), second session of 2000 ends

06-09 August

55th anniversary of the Hiroshima / Nagasaki bombings

07 August- 22 Sept.

Conference of Disarmament (CD), third session of 2000, Geneva

BITS would like to thank the W. Alton Jones Foundation for its generous support for the PENN program for the fifth year.

ViSdP / Responsibility at BITS: Otfried Nassauer (ON), Roman Michaels (copy editor) and authors indicated: Peter Cross (PC) – BITS, Denise Groves (DG) – BITS, Magnus Kutz (MK) – BITS, Gerhard Piper (GP) – BITS, Arend Wellmann (AW) – BITS, Nadja Westphal (Diary) - BITS.

ISSN 1434-4262