NATO, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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NATO, PEACEKEEPING,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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Executive Summary

This report attempts to explain the political and military debates taking place behind the headlines as peacekeepers struggle with conflicts around the world. The United Nations, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Western European Union, and their member states are all competing for influence over peacekeeping activity. Influence over peacekeeping has become necessary for these bodies to maintain their status in the world today.

Peacekeeping was originally intended to be a service to the international community as a means of maintaining peace. Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has increasingly become applied to the traditional military and political policies of nation states. Peacekeeping itself is becoming as much a source of instability as it is an attractive new label of old-style intervention. Even more paradoxically, the new peacekeeping order seems to be leading to a growing unwillingness to intervene effectively, in instances where an impartial military presence could make a difference to the fate of countless innocent civilians. The competition between 'interblocking' institutions and the devaluing of peacekeeping by leading nations have, in many cases, multiplied the problems faced by individuals attempting to help, and those simply trying to survive the tragedies we see unfolding on our TV screens.

Without political agreement or public discussion the NATO Alliance and various individual nation states are offering to take over tasks and roles which are currently the responsibility of the U.N. and the CSCE. Two World Wars forced the great powers to set up institutions with the potential for organizing collective security systems, first in the League of Nations, then in the United Nations. NATO, the U.S. and other leading nations seem to have returned to the idea that traditional coalitions and alliances are more trustworthy than collective security. The lessons of the century which led to the foundation of the U.N. may be abandoned by default.

This report explains the mechanics of how the struggle for power and influence in the realm of peacekeeping is taking place. This analysis focuses on the role of NATO. NATO is currently the premier security organization in Europe. It is also the body which the U.S. prefers to carry out major international operations in which it chooses to become involved. The analysis also suggests where essential remedial action should be taken.

The first chapter explains the political background of post Cold War international developments to provide a context for the institutional competition over peacekeeping that is presently taking place. Chapters two, three and four explain the development of political-military policies on peacekeeping by the U.N., NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and leading nations (United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia). The evaluation is based on primary sources which until now have not been available to the public. Chapters five and six analyze the command, control and intelligence policies of peace operations. These policies are the most crucial levers for transmitting political intentions into military actions, thereby ensuring that operations are carried out on behalf of a particular interest. Chapter seven looks at some of the consequences that the struggle for jurisdiction over peacekeeping missions may have for the U.N.

Findings

The analysis in this report results in the following

major findings:

- The peacekeeping debate is no longer about how the major military powers can best serve international peace. Now the debate is about competing national interests and how these are played out in inter-institutional infights over legitimation and resource allocation.

- The basis for collective defense organizations like NATO has been re-established in the post Cold War world by exploiting the fact that these organizations own the means to implement military action. This has distorted the development of less resource-rich collective security structures like the U.N. and CSCE and has led to the militarization of peacekeeping policies. A NATO takeover of CSCE tasks has already taken place. Now the U.N. is being subjected to similar competition from NATO. To ensure NATO's supremacy over the WEU, many of the WEU's policy options have effectively been brought under NATO control.

- Command and Control arrangements are being used to take over the role of the U.N. and the CSCE. U.S./NATO proposed command and control arrangements do not empower the U.N. but allow the U.S. or NATO to execute control over U.N. operations. This control is not limited to operations in which the U.S. or NATO participates.

- Intelligence is another means being used to bring the tasks of the U.N./CSCE under U.S./NATO control. Access to, and denial of, intelligence are used both to influence decision-making, to ensure success or failure, and to prevent action by parties not under U.S./NATO control.

- Current developments around peacekeeping tend not only to weaken the influence of the U.N./CSCE over peacekeeping, but also threaten the existence of the organizations. The function of the U.N./CSCE is to conduct peacekeeping in a credible yet impartial way, respected by all U.N./CSCE members. The precondition is that the U.N./CSCE is in charge. Reducing the role of the U.N./CSCE to a legitimizing one will cost these organizations their credibility as impartial actors.

- There is no consensus between the major and powerful players in the West on the issues of peacekeeping. In fact, there are major contradictions, which reflect different military practices and culture, as well as deep divisions regarding the political expediency of peacekeeping.

Recommendations

The authors offer the following recommendations to increase the quality of peace operations which are of crucial importance for the post Cold War world.

- National and international doctrines on peacekeeping and related tasks must be fully transparent if they are to be regarded as credible, impartial, and not interventionist. Transparency must involve the publication of national and multinational documents so that they are available to legislators, organizations involved in relief efforts, academics, media and the wider public. At present, even where they are not restricted, these documents are virtually unknown.

- The militarization of peacekeeping needs to be revised or at least counterbalanced. Financial and manpower resources should be devoted to strengthening conflict warning, conflict prevention, community building and mediation efforts rather than to re-equipping and organizing Cold War armies as rapid reaction forces for intervention.

- Separation of peacekeeping and peace enforcement is essential to maintain impartiality in crisis management. Such separation may require different types of forces and separate command and control arrangements. There also should be a clear distinction between all types of peace operations and intervention.

- Command and control procedures should include the development of professional expertise in the U.N. and of mechanisms and procedures to enable the U.N. and the CSCE to exercise their authority over their own and NATO-run operations. For example, NATO's CJTF Headquarters should include space and equipment for the supervising personnel from the U.N. or CSCE.

- Intelligence gathering and distribution have to be more open and equitable. The desire for contingency planning and for safeguarding secrecy of information must not jeopardize the impartiality of U.N./NATO operations. The U.N. and the CSCE should either be allowed access to full-scale national and NATO intelligence or be funded to gather their own intelligence.

- The Alliance needs to develop a collective security approach on behalf of all states in the region rather than remaining locked in a collective defense approach for one group of states. This means allowing the U.N. and the CSCE to have increased resources with which to exercise their increasingly nominal authority.

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Introduction

They were warned. They did not desist. They were shot down.[1]

Prime Minister John Major

1994 saw the first use of force by NATO in its history. On 28 February 1994 two American F-16s shot down four Serbian military aircraft violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia. This was an incident of minor military importance, but its political relevance should not be underestimated. The NATO action, enforcing U.N. resolution 816, marked the first implementation of a U.N./NATO ultimatum in the former Yugoslavia.

The action took place outside NATO's Treaty area and in support of a U.N. mandated operation. Thus, it represents a major change in NATO policy. The Alliance will now no longer limit its tasks to collective self-defense and to the area designated by the NATO Treaty. The shift is historic. It indicates a far more decisive change than the reshaping of the Alliance immediately after the Cold War.

On 10 and 11 April 1994 American planes attacked positions of the Bosnian Serb Army on the ground. The U.N./NATO ultimatum of 22 April 1994 resulted in further action against Serb positions around Gorazde and a NATO fighter was shot down. In August 1994 NATO fighter bombers were again in action around Sarajevo. American, French, Dutch and British planes were involved in airstrikes on 5 August 1994 to prevent Serbs from regaining heavy weapons from a U.N. compound.

Nobody is yet sure what these actions will mean for European and international security. General Sir Michael Rose, speaking as U.N. Commander in Bosnia, said: "It proves the West has teeth!"[2] There have also been continuing disputes between NATO HQ in Brussels and the U.N. political authority of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General and his representative Mr. Akashi. On a number of occasions NATO has wished to use force and the U.N. has demurred or been criticized for deciding too slowly. One NATO diplomat was quoted during the April crisis over Gorazde as saying that: "The procedure must be better than in the past. That does not mean we want to control the whole thing. But there must more flexibility as far as our objectives are concerned, and they must not be limited to what Mr. Boutros-Ghali is asking us to do."[3]

The difficulty of making the U.N./NATO relationship work in Bosnia is symptomatic of a range of wider conflicts of institutional and national interests discussed in this report. In order to properly understand and resolve the problems of peace operations in the future, these issues and questions should be publicly discussed. A number of questions will require an answer:

- Will peacekeeping serve the interests of the international community through collective security or the interests of Western countries through collective defense and intervention?
- What are the implications of NATO acting on behalf of the U.N., outside the territory of NATO's member states and against an aggressor that is not threatening NATO territory?
- What is to be the role of the U.N., in its relationship with NATO and other security organizations, where international peacekeeping is concerned?
- What is to be the long-term shape of peacekeeping operations?

NATO is currently debating its role as peace "supporter" to the U.N. and the CSCE. Meanwhile,

the United States and other NATO member-states are working separately on their own peacekeeping doctrines. Military "partnerships" with former East bloc enemies are being constructed around peacekeeping, as are relations between NATO and the Western European Union. A web of multinational military cooperation has NATO and the idea of peacekeeping at its center.

"Peace support" is NATO jargon for types of military activity the U.N. and the CSCE can authorize. This may well be a more substantial change in NATO's strategic concept than that adopted in autumn 1991.[4] Peace Support operations take NATO out of area without changing the NATO Treaty by using a wide interpretation of Article IV. Peace support operations also provide a rationale and a mission for the force structures created in the last few years, notably the rapid reaction forces. Yet very little is known about NATO's thinking on peace support operations. Though it is being tried and tested on the job in Former Yugoslavia, U.N./NATO peacekeeping has never been openly discussed for what it is -- the basis for a new military and political rationale for the Alliance.

In August 1993, NATO's Military Committee agreed to a concept entitled "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations." This document, MC 327, represents a consensus at the highest military level in the Alliance. However, it has not yet been given the political approval which would have normally been given to Military Committee decisions during the December 1993 meetings of NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers. France is understood to oppose agreement to this document by Foreign Ministers since it is not part of the Military Committee. The French object to the generic term "Peace Support" and oppose NATO taking on responsibilities out of area politically and geographically. Nevertheless, MC 327 has been circulated to national capitals and is understandably being used to guide planning in several defense ministries. At present MC 327 rests with the Secretary General. It remains to be seen when and if the process of political approval is reactivated. Meanwhile, military planning for peace support is going ahead. MC 327 and other documents widely used in this report are described in Box B.

The concepts of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support being developed in the bureaucracies of NATO and its member states are not so far advanced that they cannot be altered. They are not yet supported by a consensus and are not in harmony with each other. The opportunity for political change should be used to make improvements urgently. This opportunity should not be missed. Some solutions can be found in a paper from an informal NACC group also awaiting political approval. The paper was made available to the authors as this report went to press. In particular, the paper recommends a clear division between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[5]

Unless the Alliance's Military Authorities substantially rewrite MC 327 to incorporate the many reforms being suggested here (and by nations with considerable experience in the field) they cannot

Box A: U.N./NATO Peacekeeping

The Stepping Stones in Former Yugoslavia

JULY 1992	Adriatic Embargo
OCTOBER 1992	AWACS Patrol
APRIL 1993	No-Fly Zone
AUGUST 1993	Air Strikes Agreements
FEBRUARY 1994	Sarajevo Ultimatum
APRIL 1994	Gorazde Ultimatum
AUGUST 1994	Air Strike near Sarajevo

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Box B: Peacekeeping Policy Documents

An Agenda for Peace. This report, written by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, recommends ways in which the U.N. can become more effective in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.

MC 327. NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations. This is a NATO military decision taken on 5 August 1993 by the military representatives of the fifteen states which form the NATO Military Committee. French resistance has prevented it from being agreed by the North Atlantic Council of the sixteen Foreign Ministers of the Alliance but it is used within NATO's integrated military structures.

NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 28 February 1994, Draft, Change 1 was prepared by the Peacekeeping Section (SHOPP), OPS/LOG DIV, at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium.

Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Groups on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, M-NACC 1(93)40, 11 June 1993. This report was adopted and indicates that peacekeeping operations by NACC member countries should not only be based on a U.N. or CSCE mandate, but should also be implemented under U.N.- or CSCE-developed command and control arrangements.

Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations, 17 March 1994. This document by the NACC Informal Working Group for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning is a draft high-level, stand-alone document on which future NACC cooperation in peacekeeping may be based. It remains to be seen whether, and in what form, this document will gain political approval.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23 version 6. This draft field manual was issued on 19 January 1994 by the U.S. Army and was developed by its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). At the writing of this report, it is believed that (draft) FM 100-23 will be published, delayed, as FM 90-34.

PDD 25. Presidential Decision Directive 25 was agreed in May 1994. This report uses a draft summary that was issued to the public entitled: "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

PRD 13. Presidential Review Directive 13 discussing the U.S. approach to peacekeeping was written during 1993 and leaked to the press in late autumn 1993.

Wider Peacekeeping, Second Draft (Revised) 5 February 1994. This is a paper written by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie and others at the U.K. Doctrine and Training HQ. It does not formally represent the views of the British Army.

Participation de la France aux Operations de Maintien de la Paix. A report commissioned for the French Prime Minister concerning French participation in peace operations was published in April 1994. The report, written by Senateur Francois Trucy, is referred to as "le Rapport Trucy."

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hope to be regarded as acting in the interests of the international community. The authors hope that their analysis will contribute to the much needed public debate and provoke some thoughts about the changes required.

Endnotes: Introduction

[1] *The Guardian*, front page headline quoting British Prime Minister John Major, 1 March 1994.

[2] Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, *BBC Interview*, 28 February 1994.

[3] "NATO, Peacekeeping and the Former Yugoslavia," North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-Committee on Defence and Security Co-operation Between Europe and North America, Draft Interim Report, AL 78, DSC/DC (94) 2, Mr. Henk Vos (Netherlands) and Mr. James Bilbray (United States) co-rapporteurs.

[4] The NATO Rome Summit of November 1991 agreed a communique and an "Alliance Overall Strategic Concept." For an analysis of this new strategy and the implementation document agreed in December 1991 (MC 400 "Military Implementation of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept"), see BASIC/BITS Report 92.2, *NATO 2000*, London, 1992; see also, "NATO Strategy Review: Out of Step with Events," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1991.

[5] "Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations," Informal Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 17 March 1994.

Chapter One
NATO Goes Out of Area to Stay in Charge

While NATO is increasingly pushed into dicey conflicts, such as Bosnia, it is a long way from having the strategy and structure necessary to meet the new strategic challenges. Even though the phrase "out of area" is increasingly anachronistic, ***NATO will either develop the strategy and structure to go "out of area" or it will "go out of business."*** *" (emphasis in original)*[1]

United States Senator Richard G. Lugar

At the end of the Cold War the relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into question. There was no longer a risk of conventional war in central Europe against a Soviet invasion. The issue arose as to whether NATO might take a lesser role to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the developing European Union. By 1994 the Alliance had reasserted itself thanks to British and American support and enthusiasm from the new democracies to the East. This reassertion involved a number of sharp diplomatic disputes with other nations and institutions. The shape of these debates, and the prominent place that the language of peacekeeping took in them, provides the political framework for the peacekeeping policies analyzed in subsequent chapters.

Area and Strategy

Forty-five years after its founding, the basis of the NATO Alliance is being decisively changed without altering the text of the NATO Treaty. The use of the military assets of the Alliance in supporting the United Nations and the CSCE, on a case by case basis, is currently awaiting final approval. It will likely become part of the Alliance's mission and core functions, thus formally giving NATO's military the right to train, plan and conduct operations outside the NATO Treaty area.[2]

The core of the North Atlantic Treaty has always been Article 5[3], whereby member countries agree to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Since 1990 NATO has continued to reassert that collective self-defense remains the primary role of the Alliance military forces. However, collective defense is now seen as only one dimension of Alliance activities. The other part relates to crisis management and introduces new roles and missions for the Alliance, including, in the future, peacekeeping in support of U.N. or CSCE operations.[4] As stated at the May 1994 Defence Planning Committee Meeting, "Collective defence remains the core function of the Alliance; but today's challenges to our security and to the stability of Europe as a whole are more diverse and more complex than those NATO faced during the first four decades. To meet these challenges, we require forces, structures and procedures that can respond effectively to contingencies ranging from collective defence to peacekeeping, and contribute to the Alliance's broader approach to security issues."[5]

In late 1991, NATO agreed a strategy for the new era in "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" and the Military Committee Document 400, containing NATO's new military strategy.[6] These documents shifted the Alliance's emphasis to crisis management and military operations outside NATO's central region. It did not at this time provide the Alliance's new Reaction Forces (see Appendix F) with a rationale for military operations outside the NATO Treaty area. NATO's 1991 strategic doctrine makes no mention of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peace support operations.

Box C: NATO - Strategic Doctrine

- 1949 Collective Defense established in the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 5)
  - remains NATO's "number one" mission
  - strategy based for four decades on a combination of forward defense in the Central Region and nuclear deterrence
- 1950s-1962 Deterrence doctrine of "massive retaliation" (U.S.)
- 1967-1980s Deterrence doctrine of "flexible response" (NATO)
- 1991 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept
  - NATO forces are to be reduced and made more flexible and more mobile (Reaction Forces)
  - forward defense posture is abandoned in favor of a sufficient military presence and an assured reinforcement capability
  - multinational forces are to play a greater role in the future within NATO's integrated military structure
  - nuclear forces are greatly reduced (but strategic nuclear weapons remain the "supreme guarantee")
  - Alliance security policy now takes account of global issues such as access to resources.
- 1993 Peacekeeping added to NATO's military planning tasks
  - becomes NATO's "number two" mission

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NATO's mission according to these documents is "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe,"[7] i.e. the Alliance is committed to the defense of values within its own territory.

The strategic documents of 1991 reflect the fact that the classic task of defending Europe's mainland along a central European border was no longer relevant following the collapse of Soviet power. The shift in 1991 was toward "out of region," and not "out of area" concerns. That is, the emphasis was placed on NATO's flanks, and not on the central region focused on the border between the two German states. Accordingly, planning and training for the Alliance's reaction forces began with a focus on out of region, but not out of area, operations.

The British Commander of the ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps), General Jeremy Mackenzie, clearly reflected this position in April 1993: "The only marker we have -- and it's only a marker — is that NATO could operate in support of U.N. or CSCE peacekeeping operations, whatever they may be and wherever they may be. By their very nature these kind of operations tend to be out of area. However, my instructions are very clear -- to develop a force that operates within the boundaries of NATO."[8] Thus despite a growing expectation that the ARRC would be needed out of area, it had yet to gain the authority to actively prepare for such missions.

The newest adaptations to NATO's strategy extend its mission by both task and geography. The new peace support concept (MC 327[9]) will provide NATO's command and force structures (see Appendix D) with a basis for planning and conducting future military operations in support of every kind of peacekeeping, up to and including peace enforcement. This has far-reaching implications, both in terms of strategic rationale, and in terms of anticipated area of operations. Collective self-defense of territory will no longer provide the only rationale for the existence of the Alliance. NATO now intends to defend stability and the vital interests of its members. According to an account from the German Defense White Book:

> *The dynamics of the political changes have not changed since the NATO Summit in Rome. Consequently, the Alliance has adjusted to these changes by further developing its tasks and structures. The NATO Summit in Brussels 1994 set the course for this new development. Three main points were given:*
>
> - *NATO will face the tasks of coping with and preventing international conflicts*
> - *The projection of stability toward the east is a main task of all partners in the European-Atlantic area*

- *European peacekeeping and defense identity and the development of closer cooperation between NATO and the WEU, based on transparency, are vital factors for further development of the Alliance.*[10]

While NATO reaffirmed "collective defense" (as opposed to collective security) as its major task, it had to redefine what is to be defended and where. In the absence of a direct threat to its member territories

Box D: NATO's Rapid Reaction Forces (see Appendices G and H)

- Mid-1990 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) made proposals for NATO force restructuring based on Reaction Forces

  * Reaction Forces

  "With the Gulf Crisis in late 1990 the Rapid Reaction Corps began to be seen not just as a force for the Central Region but also as an Out Of Area force for NATO."[1]

- April 1991 NATO accepted SHAPE proposals:

  * MC 317 - Military Committee Document 317 is agreed by the Military Committee. This document set up NATO's new force structure for the mid-1990s and beyond. It was approved by the DPC in May 1991.

  * Main Defense Forces, Augmentation Forces and Reaction Forces (including Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces)

  * A multinational mobile force, supported by new RRF-Air and naval forces

- June 1991 NAC agreed Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

  * a single Rapid Reaction Corps

  * under a specified commander (the U.K.)

  * with a permanent headquarters

- November 1991 NATO's new Strategic Concept was adopted

  * the new force structure clearly pre-dated the Strategic Review

  * the RRF's original concept was geared primarily to the residual Soviet threat and was only transformed as this threat diminished after the Moscow coup of August 1991

- December 1991 MC 317 came into force

- October 1992 ARRC headquarters inaugurated by NATO's Secretary General:

  "NATO will take over the additional role of crisis management and will become an important instrument for the support of peace missions by the U.N. or the CSCE ...."[2]

  * In 1994, the ARRC headquarters was moved from Bielefeld to Moenchengladbach

  * In 1995 the ARRC will become fully operational:

  "The regional emphasis is unspecific; it is ACE-wide, bar any operations that might be undertaken for the U.N. or CSCE. The ARRC is a formation that will be used for operations across the full spectrum of military activity."[3]

Notes:

[1] Colin McInnes, "The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps," *London Defence Studies*, No. 15, London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, March 1993.

[2] Speech by Former NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner at the inauguration of ARRC headquarters, 2 October 1992.

[3] Lieutenant General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, Commander of the ARRC, "The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps--Making it Work," *RUSI Journal*, February 1993, pp. 16-20.

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NATO opted to defend its member interests and thus enlarge NATO's area of operations geographically. This includes defending NATO forces in the full range of missions in which they may be involved.

'Interlocking' Versus 'Interblocking' Institutions

As NATO developed its own new policies for the 1990s, it also had to decide how it was to relate to other institutions in Europe (see Appendix C). In late 1992 Manfred Woerner, the former NATO Secretary General, wrote that: "We have developed the concept of the European security architecture based on a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, encompassing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO, the European Community, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Council of Europe."[11]

It was through this debate on the future of the European Security Architecture that NATO developed the concept of "interlocking" or "mutually reinforcing" institutions. The idea was that the existing security organizations would work together and interact according to their specialties, "in certain circumstances one particular institution will play the leading role while, in others, another will do so; in still others, joint leadership on the part of two or more institutions may be necessary or desirable."[12] This idea was endorsed by NATO at its June 1991 Ministerial Meeting, "The peace and security of Europe will increasingly depend on a framework of interlocking institutions which complement each other, since the challenges we face cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone."[13]

Soon after this concept was publicized, it was given the nickname of "interblocking institutions" because of the competitive aspects that developed among the organizations. As NATO was taking the opportunity to extend its area of responsibility, it was also trying to ensure that no other institution gained too much influence in decision-making on security issues. Now NATO has developed working relationships with the CSCE, the WEU, and the U.N. in which NATO has assumed many of the primary functions of these organizations and clearly remains the lead organization (see Appendix C).

The CSCE

Security is indivisible and the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.[14]

Joint Declaration of the Paris CSCE Summit, 19-21 November 1990

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was described by the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner in early 1990 as "the embryo of a future security architecture."[15] It has since been marginalized. According to the concept of "interlocking institutions," the Alliance and the CSCE "do not compete, we complement each other;" relations are not based on duplication, "but rather synergy of effort."[16] In reality, NATO undermined the CSCE on two levels. First, it presented NATO as a more attractive security option than the CSCE to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Many in Eastern Europe were eager to join this Western institution and needed little persuasion. Then, in early 1991 NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to be the most attractive security body by designing it specifically for these countries to come closer to NATO. Despite the rhetoric, the CSCE is being left without serious political support and commitment, and its original functions are being increasingly duplicated by NACC.

In the euphoria post-1989 a number of imaginative proposals were advocated to make the CSCE the foundation for an all-European security structure. Vaclav Havel described the CSCE, as "the medium out of which a new security structure and a new system of all-European security guarantees could grow."[17] He urged NATO to change its name and to become "the seed of a new European security system."[18] As part of a trilateral project (arising from contacts among the new governments in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia),[19] the Czechoslovak for-

eign minister circulated a memorandum which made an immediate impact in several international fora. The memorandum outlined steps toward the goal of "a confederated Europe of free and independent states," and, having seen the advent of sub-state and transitional conflict in the new Europe, argued for a broader definition of security required to cope with new potential threats.

Designs for turning the CSCE process into an all-European security system received a cool response from the West. Many NATO members regarded the region to their East as a security nightmare, fraught with complex religious, political, economic, and ethnic rivalries, for which they would prefer not to assume responsibility. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asserted that: "We should not try to make the CSCE into a defense organization. NATO will remain the core of Western defense. At a time of great change it is important to preserve familiar and well tried structures."[20]

The principal objection to giving the CSCE a strong role is that the U.S. would have less influence and control over the future development of Europe. The transatlantic link which is perceived as the cornerstone of European stability would be severely weakened. The consensus rule in the CSCE restricts the influence of the bigger states. In addition, it slows response to emerging problems. The CSCE is perceived as a debating chamber rather than an executive body. On the other hand the CSCE can be credited with providing the intellectual basis for the resistance of movements such as Charter 77 to communist rule. It was used to reach agreements controlling military activity in Europe which are the most complex and far reaching ever achieved. The CSCE

Box E: The Czechoslovak Memorandum[1] (excerpts, emphasis added)

[...] "The sources of potential European conflicts are more heterogeneous than has until now been envisaged by the bipolar confrontational system. From this follows the necessity of conceiving European security more broadly and of including in it, in addition to political and military, also environmental and humanitarian aspects as well as the possibility of other threats. [...] The Warsaw Treaty and NATO....should shift the focus of their activity primarily to the field of disarmament[,]....enhance their political role and...gradually tone down their military role. [...] [T]he best suitable basis on which to build a unified all-European security system is provided by the CSCE process....[and] the gradual establishment of a common system of European security." [...]

"[I]n the **first stage** the establishment of a **European Security Commission** comprised of the participating states of the Helsinki process. Its justification is seen...in the fact that it would provide an until now missing permanent all-European platform for the consideration of questions relating to security on the continent and for seeking their solution. This European Security Commission would operate side by side with the existing two groupings and independently of them. The formation of an effective system of European Security would in the **second stage** be facilitated by the establishment on a treaty basis, of an **Organization of European States**, including the United States and Canada. The **third stage** would culminate in a **confederated Europe** of free and independent States."

"The European Security Commission would operate on the basis of consensus." [...] The Commission would meet at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their Permanent Representatives. [...] The forthcoming Summit[2]...could adopt a decision on creating organizational prerequisites for the establishment of the European Security Commission as a nucleus for a new security structure on the continent. Czechoslovakia, for historical, political-strategic and other reasons, has an eminent interest in the creation of such a structure. While drafting our proposal, we took into account the suggestions which have so far been submitted by the other CSCE participating countries and which came close to our concept of European security. This proposal is open to discussion."

"The dynamic development on the continent creates conditions for various approaches to the shaping of all-European structures and their appropriate mechanisms. However, the goal should be to create a new, sufficiently flexible and future-oriented model of European security. Such development should be in the interest of not only Europe but of the whole world."

Notes:
[1] Memorandum on the European Security Commission from the Foreign Office of the CSFR, 6 April 1990.
[2] Refers to the Paris CSCE Summit, November 1990.

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remains the only security body in Europe in which the whole of Europe and North America can meet freely as equals.

NATO hostility towards further institutionalization of the CSCE became apparent during the Fourth CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki between March and July 1992. Some proposals conceived of the CSCE as an organization capable of providing security guarantees under international law. The French proposal, for example, on establishing a Pan-European Security Treaty sought to "transform the CSCE into a fully-fledged international institution, in particular in the field of security, and give it the legal basis which it requires to act." However, despite Russian and German support, the proposal was not endorsed due to American and British objections. The Head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador John Kornblum, stated that: "we don't believe that the CSCE should become a structured, bureaucratic organization, with its own staff, especially staff that has a military role."[21]

NATO effectively used the NACC to incorporate many important and some of the most successful fields of work of the CSCE into its sphere of influence and control. Tasks and ideas in fields like confidence and security-building measures (CSBM), arms control and security cooperation, originally developed within the CSCE, were incorporated into the NACC. NATO/NACC joint peacekeeping exercises are the latest CSBM. Because NACC is backed up by NATO's financial resources, it does not need a large budget of its own and has rapidly outpaced the CSCE by becoming the primary forum for security cooperation. Even though it has been institutionalized, the CSCE's role now is mainly in what used to be the human dimension of the CSCE, and in the security tasks related to that.[22] In addition, because the CSCE has become a regional organization under Chapter

Box F: CSCE Milestones

● Helsinki Final Act, 1975 - formally began the CSCE process (launched in 1972) by setting up an ongoing series of conferences of NATO, Warsaw Pact, and Neutral and Non-Aligned countries (35 until 1989): The conference covered security issues, human rights and economics in three 'baskets'. By 1989 the most tangible results had been in the security field, the human rights basket had a strong psychological impact in Eastern Europe, but little happened in the field of economics.

 * Follow-up Meetings: Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83), Vienna (1986-89), and Helsinki (1992).

 * Parallel Meetings of Experts: on military, economic, cultural, environmental, scientific and technical, and human rights topics.

● CSBM - Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures agreed in Stockholm (1986) and improved in the Vienna Documents (1990, 1992).

● Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) were signed, November 1990 - The Charter began the institutionalization of the CSCE process, establishing a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), and three permanent institutions: the CSCE Secretariat in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna, and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw (now the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and joined in 1992 by a CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities).

● Helsinki Summit, July 1992 - approved a document entitled "The Challenges of Change," which creates a permanent Forum for Security Cooperation, sets out the conflict prevention measures of the CSCE and empowers it to call on NATO and the WEU to fulfil its peacekeeping goals. Also, as a part of this summit, a decision was taken to declare the CSCE a regional organization under the United Nations. This decision was formalized in May 1993 when the Agreement of Cooperation and Coordination between the U.N. and the CSCE was signed and the CSCE gained observer status at the U.N. General Assembly.

● The 1994 Review Conference scheduled for 10 October - 2 December 1994 precedes the 5 - 6 December Summit in Budapest. This Review Conference aims to review the entire range of CSCE activities and consider further steps to improve the CSCE. At the Summit following, the Heads of State will set the priorities and decide on a schedule for the CSCE work plan for the upcoming two years.

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VIII of the U.N. Charter (see Appendix B), it has the authority to mandate peacekeeping operations in its area, though it does not have the authority to take on peace enforcement operations.

NACC still insisted in December 1993: "We reiterate our full support for the CSCE, which has an essential role to play in building security in its area ... The CSCE's authority and structures need to be strengthened ... In our work, and particularly in addressing regional security issues, we will continue to support and complement the work of the CSCE."[23]

However, a comparison between the mandate of the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and the NACC Workplan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation for 1994 reveals significant duplication. For example, the NACC Workplan for 1994 includes topics such as "conceptual approaches to arms control, disarmament and proliferation," "policy-planning consultations," "principles of strategy and military doctrine," and "defence conversion." Most of these topics are also part of the CSCE agenda. The FSC's "Programme for Immediate Action," agreed in July 1992, initiates action on such topics as "arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building," "co-operation in respect of non-proliferation," and "co-operation in defence conversion." Both organizations have also been sponsoring seminars on identical topics, e.g. armed forces in civil societies, military doctrine, and defense conversion.

NATO used the CSCE as a route into peacekeeping by making itself the CSCE's security provider in the Oslo declaration of June 1992: "The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibilities of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."[24]

MC 327 notes that: "The CSCE has begun to develop procedures and institutions to promote and secure peaceful settlements under the U.N. Charter, and is willing to participate in peacekeeping."[25] In practice this means that the CSCE's Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), through the Chairman in Office, would seek to exercise political control over CSCE peacekeeping operations carried out by NATO. Marginalization of the CSCE continues to be assured by the very modest financial resources available to it. Large countries like the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France each contribute about $1.5 million per year. The entire CSCE budget for 1993 was only $17 million. Although this represents a significant improvement from the 1992 budget of $3 million, it does not begin to compare with NATO's (classified) annual operating budget of $900 million.[26]

The European Security and Defence Identity

This concept [CJTF] would ... provide the basis for "separable but not separate" forces to accommodate the needs of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity.[27]

Former Secretary General Manfred Woerner

The concept of the European Security and Defence Identity is an important part of the Maastricht Treaty. It is the idea that the European Union should have its own arm of defense through the WEU. The idea was viewed with some suspicion until recently by the United States which saw the WEU as a rival to NATO. The current understanding of the European Security and Defence Identity is that a compromise has been reached in which ESDI is one pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Les Aspin said at the NATO Ministerial in December 1993: "The U.S. welcomes the entry into force of the Maastricht agreement and supports the emerging ESDI that complements NATO and contributes to strengthening the European pillar within the Alliance." This will lead to "close cooperation between NATO and WEU."[28]

In 1991/1992 when the debate over NATO acting out of its Treaty area was at its height, the WEU looked for a time as if it might become the mechanism whereby NATO members would be able to act out-of-area. If NATO itself were prevented by the

Washington Treaty from going out of area, there was nothing to prevent the WEU from doing so, if necessary with Atlantic partners. This potential arrangement follows the principle of "double hatting." This means having forces ready to act either as NATO units or as WEU units, depending on the tasks and geography, as well as on the international politics of a given security crisis.

Double hatting may take place in various circumstances. The MC 327 policy of peace support opened up NATO's area of influence as did the Eurocorps with its out of area role. The Eurocorps, it will be remembered, was an ESDI-oriented initiative. The NATO Summit of January 1994 endorsed the Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Force proposals examined below. In consequence a wide range of multinational forces (of which many will of necessity also be Forces Answerable to the WEU) will now be available to take part in out-of-area operations under NATO command, in support of U.N. or CSCE missions. They may even operate, in agreed conditions, under WEU command. The successful use of NATO infrastructure, logistics and training in the Gulf War is the template on which NATO's new peace support function is being built.

The manner in which peacekeeping entered NATO's and WEU's agenda under pressure from post-Yugoslav developments is a good example of institutional competition. During the North Atlantic Council meeting in Oslo on 4 June 1992, NATO offered support on a case-by-case basis for CSCE peacekeeping operations.[29] The WEU followed closely during its Bonn-Petersberg meeting on 19 June 1992, offering support on a case-by-case basis for both CSCE and U.N. peacekeeping. The wording used was broadly the same as NATO's, but the WEU declaration added that WEU forces might also be deployed for "tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking."[30] NATO's NAC meeting in December 1992 closed the gap with the WEU's new-found role,

Box G: Maastricht Treaty on European Union

Title V

Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy

Article J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU)[1], which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

Article J.5

4. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Notes:

[1] The Western European Union was created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948. It was reactivated in 1983-84 as a focus of the emerging European Defence Identity. It was formally designated as the defence component of the European Union in 1991 under the Maastricht Treaty.

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Box H: Evolution of the Eurocorps (see Appendix I)

November 1987	Mitterrand/Kohl plan for a Franco-German Brigade
1990	Franco-German Brigade becomes operational - 4,200 troops, HQ at Muellheim
Summer 1991	NATO plans Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (under U.K. command)[1]
October 1991	Mitterrand/Kohl proposal for the Eurocorps (open to other members of the WEU)
June 1992	Petersberg Declaration "to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union"
January 1993	Agreement signed with NATO: Eurocorps to operate under SACEUR command in time of crisis; Eurocorps could be used for: * Collective Defense * Crisis Management * Humanitarian Intervention
March 1993	Spain establishes liaison with Eurocorps
May 1993	WEU Council of Ministers formally adopts the Eurocorps *as one of the Forces Answerable to the WEU
June 1993	Belgium joins Eurocorps
October 1993	Franco-German Brigade formally assigned to Eurocorps
November 1993	Inauguration of Eurocorps Headquarters in Strasbourg--340 permanent staff
July 1994	Eurocorps Headquarters operational--approximately 1,000 personnel
October 1995	Eurocorps to be fully operational * up to 4,500 "integrated" troops * 40,000 troops assigned altogether (French, German, Belgian and Spanish)
	Forces Answerable to the WEU (see Appendix J) also include: * the multinational division (central) (Belgian, British, Dutch, and German) * the U.K.-Netherlands amphibious force

Notes:
[1] For an analysis of the dialectic at work between the creation of the Eurocorps and NATO developments such as the ARRC, see: Alain Moyne-Bressand, *Le Corps europeen et la securite de l'Europe*, Commission de la defense, Rapport d'information No. 845, Assemblee nationale, 15 December 1993, pp. 26-35.

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stating that; "We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the Secretary General (of the U.N.) might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions."[31]

NATO and WEU peacekeeping experience in the former Yugoslavia has also shaped the outcome of the institutional competition. The Adriatic embargo was initiated through the WEU. An operation parallel to the embargo developed under NATO, using superior surveillance systems, until finally the two operations merged into one operation under NATO control in July 1992. This was viewed as a success in terms of military cooperation. Since the review of its first year of operation on 3 June 1993, the Adriatic embargo has also served as a model for a more permanent procedure for combining NATO and WEU operations in the future. In short, it is the first example of the Combined Joint Task Force concept

which evolved in the latter half of 1993.[32]

Originally, in search of new functions and legitimation, NATO and the WEU appeared to be competing to be the first to volunteer for supporting collective security structures. Because the WEU would lack the military means to fulfill its promises for at least another decade or two, NATO not only incorporated available WEU capabilities but also secured the (co)decision-making role for itself in future WEU operations by the offer of cooperation through Combined Joint Task Forces. This offer was proposed between NATO and WEU in the form of Combined Joint Task Force agreements at Travemuende in October 1993. In the words of Warren Christopher: "[CJTF] ... would allow new flexibility for organizing peacekeeping and other tasks. It would enable NATO to take effective action in contingencies that do not evoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty."[33]

The WEU will get some on the job training alongside NATO through the CJTF offer. It may get access to American assets which the Europeans cannot yet afford. On the other hand, the WEU will not achieve the capability for independent action through this cooperation.

By 1994 NATO had developed a new structure and rationale for its forces. At the same time it secured a strong influence on the development of EU defense policy and took for itself the most successful areas of work developed by the CSCE in the 1980s. NATO is now the predominant security organization in Europe with the development of peacekeeping policy an essential task if it is to remain so.

Endnotes: Chapter One

[1] United States Senator Richard G. Lugar, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," presented at the Overseas Writers Club, Washington, D.C., 24 June 1993.

[2] Geographical restrictions contained in the NATO Treaty text were made part of the text in 1949 since the U.S. was not prepared to get involved in French and British colonial adventures.

[3] Refer to the text of Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty in Appendix B.

[4] As stated by the Alliance in the Final Communique of its 4 June 1992 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway: "We are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE." In Brussels in December 1992, the Alliance stated its "readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council" in the Ministerial Meeting Final Communique.

[5] Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 24 May 1994, para. 3.

[6] The "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" was agreed at the Rome Summit on 8 November 1991, and the military strategy implementing it in MC 400 at the DPC in December 1991.

[7] "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.

[8] "Standing Together With Multinational Forces," *Military Technology*, No. 4/93, April 1993, p. 48.

[9] Military Committee 327 - NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations, 5 August 1993.

[10] [translated from] "Die Nordatlantische Allianz vor neuen Herausforderungen," *Weissbuch 1994*, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, S.53.

[11] Former NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, "The Transformed Atlantic Alliance: An Anchor of Stability and Security for Central and Eastern Europe," *NATO Review: A Framework For European Security*, Special Edition, Autumn 1992, p. 4.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Final Communique from the North Atlantic Council Meeting 19 December 1991 in Brussels, Belgium, paragraph 8.

[14] Joint Declaration of the Paris CSCE Summit, 19-21 November 1990.

[15] From the North Atlantic Assembly report on the November 1992 Helsinki Summit.

[16] Former NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, at the CSCE Council Meeting in Rome on 30 November 1993.

[17] Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), Eastern Europe, 8 June 1991.

[18] Address by Vaclav Havel to the Council of Europe, 10 May 1990.

[19] Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung der DDR: die "2+4-Verhandlungen," Ein Insider-Bericht*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992.

[20] Statement by Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the Paris CSCE Summit, 19 November 1990.

[21] John Kornblum 27 February 1992, quoted in the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) Report on the Helsinki Summit, April 1992.

[22] For example, at the Rome CSCE Council Meeting in November 1993, the most significant decisions were made with respect to the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

[23] Statement issued at the meeting of the NACC, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 3 December 1993, para 8.

[24] Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Oslo, Norway, 4 June 1992.

[25] MC 327.4.

[26] This figure is for the annual cost of both NATO and SHAPE headquarters. NATO Official, in an informal press briefing during the NATO Summit, 10-11 January 1994.

[27] NATO Press Service: Speech by Former Secretary General Manfred Woerner to the WEU Assembly, "NATO and the WEU are two viable building blocks in our broader effort to create a new Euro-Atlantic security order," Paris, 29 November 1993, p.4. The NATO Summit Declaration of 11 January 1994 picks up the phrase: "We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security."

[28] Final Communique from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 2 December 1993.

[29] According to the Final Communique from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo Norway, 4 June 1992, "11. The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to the effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."

[30] Western European Union, Petersberg Declaration 1992, (cf. para. I.2), para. II.4.

[31] Final Communique, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 17 December 1991, NATO's role in peacekeeping, para. 4.

[32] *NATO Review*, No. 3, June 1993, p. 21.

[33] U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Excerpts of NAC Intervention, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 2 December 1993, p. 4.

Chapter Two
U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping

The incremental involvement by the Alliance in the range of activities grouped loosely under the term 'Peace Support Operations' has been NATO's most significant development since 1989.[1]

Simon Lunn (Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly)

The term "peace" has become increasingly important in the Alliance's description of the functions its military will take on. Peacekeeping, or in NATO jargon, "Peace Support" Operations, is developing as an increasingly important role (and source of legitimacy) for the Alliance. This, and the following chapter explain how NATO's Peace Support policy has developed against the background of developments in the U.N. and among the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, other than China. It is clear that there are substantial contradictions and conflicts within and between the different policies which make a coherent approach to peacekeeping more difficult. Some reflect different national interests, others may result from genuine difficulty amongst officials in solving complex problems.

While the U.N. has well-known weaknesses, NATO and the leading Western powers are also ill-prepared, institutionally and doctrinally, to carry out international peacekeeping within a clearly defined concept. Specific issues which need to be addressed include:

- Whether the combination of the U.N.'s weakness and U.S. preference for greater control in more important operations will result in a smaller practical role for the U.N. and more autonomy for NATO and the U.S.
- The dispute amongst Western officials over impartiality and the so-called middle ground. Both French and British military thinkers recognize the dramatic difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and stress the overriding importance of maintaining impartiality in determining the outcome of peacekeeping operations. NATO and the United States, on the other hand, see a broad continuum of more or less violent operations. In this continuum there is assumed to be a middle ground where humanitarian aid and conventional war overlap and intermingle.
- The contradictory use of terms such as "peace enforcement" reflects differences between institutions. Also, each international and national body is developing its peacekeeping doctrine according to its own definitions of what these types of operations should include. This confusion of terms may lead to a confusion in operations and could lead to the use of the word "peace" to describe operations very similar to war.

U.N. Peacekeeping

Traditionally, the role of "peacekeeper" has rested with the United Nations. The U.N. Blue Berets, acting under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, are authorized to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations. With the consent of all warring parties, peacekeeping troops may be positioned between front lines in order to guarantee a ceasefire until negotiated agreements are reached.

Historically, however, the U.N. faced the problem of the Cold War veto. Because peacekeeping missions could only be undertaken after a unanimous vote in the Security Council, peacekeeping was infrequent. Even more rarely was peace enforcement action envisaged as a serious possibility, let alone carried out. With the United States and the Soviet Union opposed on most regional disputes, and in-

Box I: U.N. Charter - Chapter VI, VII Distinctions (see Appendix B)

Chapter VI - of the U.N. Charter provides for the "pacific settlement of disputes" by a variety of measures including, "mediation, negotiation, conciliation, enquiry, arbitration and judicial settlement." (Article 33) In operations of this type, the primary mission of U.N. forces is not to fight.

Chapter VII - of the U.N. Charter is designed to deal with "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" perpetrated by sovereign states. Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to investigate alleged violations and then determine the appropriate measures that should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. These measures can include political and economic pressure (Article 41) and force (Article 42).

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Box J: Current Peacekeeping Missions

U.N. Peacekeeping Operation	Mission	# of U.N. Personnel
UNTSO - United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, June 1948, UN resolution 50.	Monitor ceasefire.	220
UNMOGIP - United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, January 1949, UN resolution 47.	Monitor ceasefire.	39
UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, March 1964, UN resolution 186.	Monitor ceasefire.	1,235
UNDOF - United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Israel-Syria), June 1974, UN resolution 350.	Monitor ceasefire, force levels.	1,035
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, March 1978, UN resolution 425.	Monitor ceasefire, deliver aid.	5,313
UNIKOM - United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, April 1991, UN resolution 687.	Monitor ceasefire and DMZ.	1,187
UNAVEM II - United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, June 1991, UN resolution 696.	Monitor ceasefire, elections.	78
ONUSAL - United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, June 1991, UN resolution 693.	Monitor truce, human rights.	301
MINURSO - United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, September 1991, UN resolution 690.	Monitor vote on independence.	347
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia), March 1992, UN resolution 743.	Monitor truces, deliver aid.	34,555
ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in Mozambique, December 1992, UN resolution 797.	Monitor ceasefire.	5,760
UNOSOM II - United Nations Operation in Somalia II, May 1993, UN resolution 814.	Facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid.	18,404
UNOMUR - United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda, June 1993, UN resolution 846.	Observer force for Uganda/Rwanda border.	80
UNOMIG - United Nations Mission in Georgia, August 1993, UN resolution 858.	Monitor ceasefire.	21
UNOMIL - United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia, September 1993, UN resolution 886.	Monitor ceasefire and peace accord.	370
UNAMIR - United Nations Assistance for Rwanda, October 1993, UN Resolution 872.	Monitor ceasefire and peace accord.	

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volved in regional proxy wars, there was little chance of agreement on U.N. intervention. Korea stands out as the one major decision of the U.N. to intervene militarily.[2]

With the dismantling of the blocs, this picture changed. On the one hand it proved possible, as in the Gulf War, to forge new interventionist coalitions through the U.N. which were not vetoed. On the other hand, the dismantling of the blocs gave rise to new conflicts in need of mediation. There has been a dramatic increase since 1988 in U.N. peacekeeping activities, and a significant evolution in the nature of peacekeeping operations. As a result of escalating demand for peacekeeping around the world, the U.N. has become overextended both territorially and financially.

According to the classic preconditions for a peacekeeping mission as set out in 1990 by then U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, Sir Brian Urquhart, a mission can be termed peacekeeping only if there is consent of all parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, a clear and practicable mandate, and the non-use of force except in the last resort of self-defense.[3]

Traditional U.N. peacekeeping forces have handled this type of assignment well, the U.N. buffer zone in Cyprus has been a good example. U.N. operations in the Middle East, India, Pakistan and Kashmir have followed a similar pattern, with U.N. forces interposing themselves in "holding operations" pending a political solution.[4]

Today Brian Urquhart's criteria are being eroded. Boutros-Ghali's own report *An Agenda for Peace* blurs the distinctions. It concludes that "there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking [in which it includes peace enforcement] and peace-keeping."[5] On the other hand, it does attempt to recommend a clear distinction between peacekeeping troops and peace enforcement troops, and suggests that the U.N. Military Staff Committee's role should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peacekeeping operations.

Boutros-Ghali's report offers several recommendations relating to military force and peace enforcement. He believes that the U.N. should activate the use of military force anticipated in Article 42 of the U.N. Charter (see Appendix B) to respond to acts of "outright aggression, imminent or actual." He also advocates the creation of armed forces under Article 43 which would be available to the U.N. on a permanent basis "as a means of deterring breaches of the peace." When ceasefires become difficult to maintain, the U.N. should be able to call on specially trained peace enforcement units, which would be separate from peacekeeping forces.

Prompted by the growing belief that the reaction time of U.N. forces is not adequate for dealing with urgent situations, Boutros-Ghali began to promote the idea for a standby force structure for the United Nations. In early 1993, a U.N. mandate established a group of seven officers "to <u>develop a system</u> of standby resources, able to be deployed <u>as whole or in parts</u>, by the beginning of 1994, anywhere in the world, at the Secretary General's request, within an agreed <u>response time</u>, for <u>United Nations duties</u> as mandated by the Security Council [emphasis in original]."[6] The standby system calls for member nations to designate and commit resources to be used in U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to the current plan these resources could not be used for peace enforcement operations. Each member state is responsible for training personnel in these units as well as all financial obligations while the forces are on standby in their country (the U.N. begins to pay for the troops according to existing U.N. regulations once they are deployed). Eventually, the U.N. plans to develop a database listing all standing forces and their specific capabilities. This would aid the Secretary General in determining which forces should be deployed in specific situations.

The U.N. has received promises of personnel from many member nations. Most of these commitments, however, are for combat troops. The United States, despite its massive resources, has declined to pledge combat troops because of its existing commitments worldwide, but says that it will consider providing support units and equipment.[7] U.S. Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth said of U.S. involvement in the Standby Forces Initiative, "The United States recog-

nizes that it possesses a number of special military capabilities and that these capabilities are often important to United Nations peacekeeping operations. While the U.S. world wide commitments... preclude the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the United Nations on this subject, the United States will soon be prepared to submit to the United Nations a listing of the military capabilities it feels most appropriate for peacekeeping purposes, the general nature of which we have already discussed with the Stand By Forces Unit."[8] (emphasis added)

U.S. policy was exemplified in November 1993 by Sarah Sewall, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy who stated, "We should acknowledge that a major peace enforcement operation is beyond the grasp of the United Nations."[9] The U.S. has not shown a willingness to help the U.N. extend its reach to be able to grasp such tasks. Sewall went on to say that the Clinton Administration felt NATO was better

Box K: Definitions from An Agenda for Peace[1] (emphasis added)

1. **Preventive diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

2. **Peacemaking** is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

2a) **use of military force** [para 42-43] if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."

* The action by military force foreseen in Article 42 ...will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis.
* The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual.

2b) **peace-enforcement** [para 44] the recommendation for the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance.

* units from Member States would be available on call
* would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service
* would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces
* would be under the command of the Secretary-General
* should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43
* or with the military personnel which governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.

3. **Peace-keeping** is the development of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving U.N. military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Peace-building is post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Notes:

[1] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations, 1992, para 20, 42-44. For further information on the text of the U.N. Charter, see Appendix B.

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Box L: The United Nations Standby Forces System

The United Nations has received significant support in its quest to develop standby forces and is expected to formalize arrangements with its member states by the end of 1994 that will allow putting 70,000 troops on standby for the U.N. A report by Colonel Gerard Gambiez of France, who heads the U.N. team involved in assembling the standby forces, indicated that, of the Member Nations currently in discussion with the Standing Forces Planning Team:

* 18 countries have offered resources totalling some 28,000 personnel
* additional commitments from 31 other member states are expected, raising the potential personnel commitment to 70,000

Colonel Gambiez declined to indicate which countries have committed to the force structure.[1] The Netherlands is the first confirmed country to have offered personnel and equipment for the Standby Force. They have contributed: "two frigates, a supply ship, two minesweepers, a maritime patrol aircraft and a battalion of marines...an infantry battalion, along with unspecified quantities of AVFs, an HQ unit for leading a brigade-sized unit and a company of engineers for mine clearance and road repair...two F-27 aircraft, a squadron of F-16s and a unit of 50 personnel for police duties...special units including bomb disposal experts, military observers, a movement control unit, staff officers, medical personnel and instructors." The Dutch troops could be deployed within 15-30 days from a request by the U.N. and could be deployed for a maximum of six months.[2] A 14 April 1994 account by United Press International announced that Argentina had pledged 1,500 troops and that Ukraine had promised a 500-soldier airborne battalion.[3] There has been no confirmation that these troops were actually committed. The right for case-by-case decisions in each crisis remains with the countries concerned.[4]

Notes:

[1] Briefing with Colonel Gerard Gambiez, sponsored by Council for a Livable World, Washington D.C., 14 April 1994.
[2] "Dutch First into UN Standby Force," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 July 1994, p. 12.
[3] "United Nations Forms Standby Army," *United Press International*, 14 April 1994.
[4] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 21 May 1994, p. 9.

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Box M: Financing Peacekeeping Missions Under the United Nations[1]

Payment for U.N. peacekeeping missions is divided among Members according to a special scale which is different from the scale used for the general budget. This scale arranges the Members into four categories A,B,C and D. The states in group D, the poorest states, pay one tenth of their contribution to the regular budget, the states in group C pay one fifth, the states in group B pay an amount equal to their contribution to the general budget, and the states in group A, the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, pay about 22 percent more than what they pay for the regular scale. The basis for the special assessments is that since these members have the power of veto they have a greater influence and a greater responsibility than other members.

Country	% regular budget 1993	% peacekeeping budget 1993
United States	25	31.73
Russia	6.71	8.51
France	6.0	7.61
United Kingdom	5.02	6.01
China	0.77	0.97

Notes:

[1] This information was taken from Le Rapport Trucy. Rapport au premier ministre, "Participation de la France aux Operations de Maintien de la Paix," Francois Trucy (Senateur du Var, Maire de Toulon, Parlementaire en Mission 4 Aout 1993 - 4 Fevrier 1994). Paris: Documentation francaise, April 1994.

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able to enforce an eventual peace settlement in Bosnia.

NATO as Agent of the U.N.

Beginning in December 1992, support for peacekeeping was added to the missions of Alliance forces and headquarters, and the DPC was directed to consider the defense planning implications of peacekeeping operations.

As a part of its new mission, NATO has invented a new term: "Peace Support" to describe its policy. This has been agreed by the highest military body in NATO, the Military Committee, which consists of military representatives of member states. However, peace support is a policy which has not been discussed or endorsed by the legislatures of NATO states.[10] This undermines NATO's expressed commitment to civilian control of the military.

Peace Support is used as "a collective term covering a range of activities under the auspices of the U.N.

Box N: MC 327 - Defining NATO's Peace Support Operations[1]

a. Conflict Prevention: includes different activities, in particular, under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, ranging from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of troops, intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring. Preventive deployments normally consist of civilians and/or military forces being deployed to avert a crisis.

b. Peacemaking: diplomatic actions conducted after the commencement of conflict, with the aim of establishing a peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic isolation and sanctions.

c. Peacekeeping: narrowly defined, is the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally; using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace.

Peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter have traditionally involved the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the field, with the consent of the parties, including supervising demarcation lines, monitoring ceasefires and controlling buffer zones, disarming and demobilizing warring factions and supervising borders. Over the past few years, the U.N. has significantly expanded the type of military operations carried out under "peacekeeping" to include, for example, protection of humanitarian relief and refugee operations. Peacekeeping operations may also contain substantial civilian elements, usually under the command of a civilian head of mission, such as civilian police, electoral or human rights monitors.

d. Humanitarian Aid Missions: missions conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population. Humanitarian aid missions may be conducted in the context of a peace support operation, or as a completely independent task.

e. Peace Enforcement Action: using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed.

f. Peace Building: post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction, and may require military as well as civilian involvement.

Notes:
[1] MC 327.12.

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or the CSCE." [11] The term applies to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, peace enforcement and peace building. Thus the same planning document covers diplomatic efforts toward conflict prevention and peacemaking, as well as military operations connected with peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement. In MC 327, NATO is not limiting its own role to blue helmeting or traditional peacekeeping, but is also including peace enforcement.

NATO's public statements concentrate on the Alliance's preparedness to use military assets to support the U.N. and CSCE in collective security arrangements. NATO's internal decisions make it clear that the Alliance is not drawing a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement: "[T]he Defence Planning Committee (DPC) recognized the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between peacekeeping in the traditional sense, and peacemaking, peace enforcement or other activities to defend or restore peace." [12] The problem is that, while NATO discusses the differences between Chapter VI and Chapter VII type operations, it has adopted a mili-

Box O: NATO's Principles for Military Support[1] (emphasis added)

a. Mutual respect. There must exist mutual respect between the parties to the conflict and the peace support organization. Peace support forces should in particular respect the host country's laws and customs and should not act to change the status and position of de facto parties, except with the agreement of those parties. Parties should respect the peace support force as agreed in the terms of reference for the subject mission. **This principle may not be valid for peace enforcement.**

b. Impartiality. Impartiality is essential to retain the trust and confidence of the parties in dispute and of the host government. **This principle may not be valid for peace enforcement.**

c. Credibility. The credibility of a peace support operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of its capability to accomplish the mission. Credibility is necessary for creating confidence by the parties involved. A pre-requisite for achieving such credibility is that the peace support forces have clear and achievable military aims and objectives and the demonstrated will and capability to accomplish them, including the possibility to escalate or de-escalate as appropriate and politically directed.

d. Limits on the use of force. Peace support operations **short of peace enforcement** are based on the premise that peaceful methods can be used to achieve the goal of the mission. In such operations the use of force must be carefully controlled, since unnecessary force would undermine the acceptability of the operation and could increase the level of violence in the area. If the Alliance becomes involved in peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, it should deploy and be prepared to commit a decisive force. Doing so will help to ensure that the specified military objectives can be obtained as quickly as possible and without undue risk either to non-combatants or to the Alliance forces themselves.

e. Transparency of operations. In peace support operations **short of peace enforcement**, it is essential that the parties involved are fully aware of and agree to the mission of the peace support force, and that its operations be fully transparent to all parties.

f. Unity of command. Unity of command, comprising all military aspects of the operation, as well as negotiations with parties to resolve specific military problems, will be crucial for the accomplishment of the mission for a peace support force.

g. Military-Civilian coordination. In addition to the unity of military command, an overall theater commander should be identified, who may be either civilian or military, and the staffs should be part of a single command chain. With the number of NGOs involved, this may make civilian coordination difficult.

h. Freedom of movement. A general freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any peace support mission.

i. Flexibility. A peace support force should be able to adapt and move from one peace support activity to another as required.

Notes:
[1] MC 327.14.

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tary planning approach to encompass both.

In MC 327, numerous NATO policies are different for peace enforcement than for the other kinds of peacekeeping. One of the most telling is the exception made in education and training programs. For other peace support roles, NATO schools are planning to provide specific courses to train NATO personnel. Special skills will need to be learned to carry out successful peacekeeping missions. Training for peace enforcement, however, is covered by "the normal military combat training program." By implication, standard soldiering skills rather than special peacekeeping training are all that is required for peace enforcement operations. Thus, peace enforcement operations may become "normal military combat" operations masked by a more soothing name.

NATO's peace enforcement category goes far beyond the Chapter six-and-a-half type operation to which traditional U.N. peacekeeping has been likened. MC 327 lays down that if the Alliance becomes involved in peace enforcement "it should deploy and be prepared to commit a decisive force."[13]

NATO planners have nevertheless elaborated a set of overarching principles to guide planning and execution of peace support missions. Among these are mutual respect, impartiality, and transparency of operations, as well as limits on the use of force. At the same time, these most important principles have been declared invalid in the case of peace enforcement by MC 327. While peace enforcement is clearly a very different type of operation from peacekeeping, the problem NATO does not face up to is that planning in an integrated way for both types of operation can jeopardize success.

In NATO's definition, the different categories of peace support are not clearly separated from one another. On the contrary, planning documents show that the categories are seen as a continuum. The principle of flexibility, for instance, requires peace support forces to "be able to adapt and move from one peace support activity to another." In turn, the principle of credibility depends on the ability of peace support forces to "escalate" their use of force at will in order to achieve their military aims.

Because peace support operations are seen as a continuum, NATO planners are required to be prepared for the possibility of peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations turning into peace enforcement. Thus, there will be contingency planning for war whenever NATO embarks on peace support missions. Command and control structures, intelligence sharing, and perceptions of impartiality will be affected from the outset. The implications of such contingency planning will need to be confronted.

NATO's approach to peace support can therefore be seen to contain substantial structural problems at just the moment when the Alliance is becoming more influential in these types of operation.

Endnotes: Chapter Two

[1] Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly, "A Reassessment of European Security," *What is European Security After the Cold War?* Discussion Paper No. 2, Brussels: The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, December 1993, p. 61.

[2] Indeed, the decision on Korea could only be taken because the Russian delegation did not participate in the crucial U.N. Security Council meeting.

[3] Sir Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the Sheriff's Posse," *Survival*, No.32, May-June 1990, pp. 196-205.

[4] For further examples see: Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990.

[5] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations, 1992.

[6] Taken from a briefing by Colonel Gerard Gambiez, head of the U.N. team in charge of assembling the United Nations Standby Forces System, 14 April 1994.

[7] Op. cit., Gambiez briefing, 14 April 1994.

[8] United States Ambassador Karl F.Inderfurth, statement regarding the United Nations Stand By Forces Initiative, 14 April 1994.

[9] Speech by Sarah Sewall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, 2 November 1993.

[10] Only Germany's constitutional position has given rise to any parliamentary discussion of peacekeeping, and the most important part of this has been in closed session in the Defence Committee.

[11]MC 327.1.

[12]MC 327.6.

[13] MC 327.14d.

Chapter Three
Post-Summit European Security Debates

PfP should really stand for 'Plan for Prevarication.' Almost everything now offered by NATO has been offered before and failed to persuade anyone. As the leading German commentator Christoph Bertram remarked, the Alliance's current scheme is intended merely to 'keep the Russians happy and the East Europeans hoping.'[1]

Jonathan Eyal, The Independent

Partnership for Peace ... grows out of a basic concept that the NATO Alliance is at its core a security Alliance it is a military alliance concerned with the security of its members. That's how it started, that's how it developed and that of course is the foundation of the success that the Alliance has had. It struck us that this ought to be part of the question then of the enlargement of NATO membership and the question of what countries should be joined under what terms led us to the thought that what we ought to try to do is use the concept of NATO as security Alliance to develop a relationship with potential new members.[2]

Les Aspin

In 1993 the U.S. led NATO into two new initiatives to respond to the challenges of Eastern Europe on the one hand and the developing European Union on the other. These were the Partnership for Peace and the Combined Joint Task Forces. They were each first proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin during the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers at Travemuende in October 1993 and endorsed by the NATO summit in January 1994. In both of them the language of peacekeeping became central.

Partnership for Peace

At their pre-summit Ministerial sessions in December 1993, NATO's Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group discussed new tasks for the Alliance, including the Partnership for Peace program, and support for U.N. and CSCE peacekeeping missions.[3] Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy Joseph Kruzel said that the Partnership for Peace plan would deepen the relationship between the NATO allies and the former Warsaw Pact countries, especially in the realm of peacekeeping. It would offer the Central and East European countries the chance to begin joint military training and planning with members of the Alliance: "NATO itself has been working on the question of developing doctrine for peacekeeping exercises, peacekeeping activities. I expect within the first year we will see military field exercises, probably committed to peacekeeping monitoring. This will be an important part of the Partnership for Peace."[4]

The diplomatic role of PfP was to offer closer association to Central and East European countries while not offering them membership. The PfP proposal was developed so as to avoid alienating Russia and as a means of drawing Russia toward NATO without offering membership. More varied arrangements were envisaged before the January 1994 Summit. For example, the Visegrad[5] countries were being considered for early NATO membership or closer association. But sharp reaction from the Russian side convinced the United States to avoid this policy[6]. At the summit itself there was a stress on avoiding drawing a new dividing line through Europe. Currently, all four Visegrad countries see NATO membership as primary to their national security policy; Russian military doctrine represents this as a potential threat to peace[7].

Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained

Box P: The Terms of the PfP

- **PfP Offers:**

  - NATO peacekeeping courses and exercises
  - Participation in NATO peacekeeping activities (i.e. activities under U.N. Chapter VI)
  - NATO advice on military planning, procurement, budget and restructuring
  - On-site offices at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and participation in SHAPE's new planning and coordination cell
  - Consultations with NATO
  - No security guarantees
  - Participation not bound to specific human rights or democracy standards in partner countries

- **PfP Requires:**

  - That NATO decides the nature of the relationship
  - Standardization and Interoperability with NATO forces should be achieved in order to cooperate with NATO.
  - Participating Partner countries should share the costs of peacekeeping exercises and operations.

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in December 1993: "One of the great advantages of the PfP is it's non-discriminatory. It's inclusive rather than exclusive -- one of the countries that's included, and quite deliberately, is Russia. And Russia would be a natural participant in the PfP, and I think that could produce habits -- cooperation, joint planning, joint exercises -- which could draw Russia closer to the West rather than building a barrier and excluding them from the West. [...] I would hope and expect that Russia would be one of the countries that applied to be one of the PfP."[8]

The criteria that have been established for PfP invitations are deliberately vague. Though the agreement is tied to internationally recognized human rights, it is unlikely that NATO, considering the poor human rights situation in Turkey (which is a member) would set itself up as some kind of judge. There is also a big question about what kind of "security assurances" the program will offer. The initial response to the PfP from the East Europeans was cautious. These countries were in search of security guarantees--not the assurances and consultations offered by NATO. However, since nothing better is currently on offer, these countries have decided to join the PfP with the hope of future NATO membership and security guarantees under Article V of the NATO Treaty (see Appendix C).

U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, linked PfP to potential NATO membership: "As you know the PfP contemplates that countries will make a statement to NATO of what they would be prepared to do in connection with the Partnership, what forces they might contribute, what joint planning they might be involved in and so forth. [...] And I think it will be interesting to examine what various countries do because it will be an important measure as to whether or not they might move from being a PfP to ultimately being a member of NATO. I would hope that the Summit will endorse the concept of an expansion of NATO but in a careful evolutionary way that took the benefits of the experience of the PfP."[9]

Russia and PfP

In August 1993, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated in a visit to Warsaw that, "in the long term," a Polish membership of NATO "does not go against the interests of other states including ... Russia," he may not have predicted the intense debate to follow concerning NATO enlargement and the Russian Federation. Volker Ruehe, the German Defense Minister, immediately seized the opportunity to put NATO membership for the Visegrad countries at the top of the international agenda. The growing debate sparked harsh internal criticism in Russia and forced President Yeltsin to retract his statement and to raise the point that NATO enlarge-

ment would potentially violate the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany[10].

The Partnership for Peace agreement proposed by the United States reflected the need for a compromise on the issue of enlargement. The United States itself was skeptical about providing security guarantees to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The vague procedural way proposed by the Partnership for Peace for opening up NATO membership at some undefined time in the future seemed to be a fitting compromise.[11] PfP was open for all Eastern European States without discrimination, including Russia.

The Russian government crisis in October 1993 brought about pressure on Yeltsin. If he wanted to gain the support of the Russian military, then he would have to take a tough stand against NATO enlargement. On 2 November 1993, Yeltsin signed a decree putting into force a military doctrine which lists "the expansion of military blocs and alliances"[12] as a potential cause for war.

The agreement at the January 1994 NATO Summit to accept the gradualist approach to enlargement set out in the PfP brought about a change in the internal debate in Russia. Government officials wanting to create closer ties with the West embraced Russian participation in the PfP. Many hardliners and anti-Yeltsin politicians criticized the plan for orienting Russia too much toward the West and urged that Russia should decline the invitation to join.

This new battle lasted for several months. In fact, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced repeatedly that Russia would sign the PfP Framework Document, but he had great difficulty getting majority approval. Defense Minister Grachev, who did not oppose Russian participation but wanted Russia to take the strongest position possible, made himself the centrist-right spokesperson in the debate. Grachev and other military officials raised the option of Russian accession under certain conditions. Among the conditions requested were revised CFE-limits in the Southern Region and a special status for Russia in the PfP process.[13]

The internal debate on this issue heated again in April 1994 when Russia was not consulted before the second round of NATO airstrikes in Bosnia.[14] At that time, both Russian westernizers and centrists were looking to the West for assurances that Russia would be treated as a major player in future questions of European security. Opponents argued that Russia should not get involved in PfP which they perceived as NATO offering to treat Russia like Albania.

Finally, during Pavel Grachev's visit to the spring meetings of the NATO Defense Ministers in May 1994, Grachev committed[15] Russia to signing the PfP agreement. In response, NATO members indicated that they would informally have a special relationship with Russia, giving them consultation beyond that offered by the PfP. However, NATO sources strongly opposed giving Russia a "veto" over NATO decision-making (i.e. Russian might enjoy special cooperation with NATO, but no legal rights which might allow Russia to exert influence over NATO decisions). On 22 June 1994, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev released the PfP agreement for the Russian Federation. An unofficial "Summary of Discussions" was signed at the same time envisaging a wide range of options for non-binding consultations between NATO and Russia. Within Russia, this outcome was seen as an interim victory for the westernizers in the Yeltsin government.

NACC and PfP

The most substantial element proposed so far for the PfPs is the offer to non-NATO countries to participate in peacekeeping operations together with NATO countries and/or NATO itself. While the initiative offers common training and preparations for such operations, it also asks non-NATO countries to prepare themselves for cooperation by making their forces technically and doctrinally interoperable. This offer is limited to cooperation in peacekeeping and excludes peace enforcement. It is based on work conducted within the NACC's Ad Hoc Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and reflects the progress made there. In June 1993, the NACC ministerial meeting in Athens approved a report of the Ad Hoc Working Group stating that:

- NACC peacekeeping "can be carried out only

under the authority of the U.N. or CSCE"

- it is for the U.N. or CSCE to define the arrangements for the conduct of a peacekeeping operation, including command relationship.[16]

Thus, the basic setting for common operations by NACC and NATO members in support of the U.N. or CSCE is much more in line with the U.N. and CSCE approach to peacekeeping than NATO's. NACC operations would be subject to much tighter restrictions than NATO peace support operations and cover only the less intense end of military operations in support of peace. Operations where more vital interests of Alliance members might be at stake can thus be reserved for handling by the Alliance itself.

The NACC-approved Ad Hoc Group report also contains "a common understanding on conceptual approaches," a "common programme for practical cooperation," "common definitions of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building," various "criteria and operational principles," as well as "guidelines for NACC cooperation in peacekeeping." Its contents represent both the agreement of the members of the NACC and much closer reflection of U.N. policies than NATO's MC 327 document, agreed only a few months later. Based on the NACC's ministerial meeting approval, the Ad Hoc Group's Technical Sub-Group decided on 8 October 1993 to establish an "Informal Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping," chaired by NATO's Integrated Military Staff and tasked to develop a broad comprehensive paper on cooperation in peacekeeping. This working group's "Draft NACC Planning Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations" was finished in March 1994 and forwarded for approval by the Ad Hoc Group at a future NACC ministerial. The paper is meant to become a "high level political-military foundation and reference document" reflecting a NACC-wide accepted common understanding.[17] While it remains to be seen whether, and in what form, this document will gain political approval, it is intended to provide a relatively sound basis for NACC and PfP peacekeeping operations based on U.N. and CSCE procedures. The 1994 NACC Workplan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, agreed by NATO ministers 3 December 1993 also gives peacekeeping a prominent place.

By June 1994, Ministers at the Istanbul NAC meeting were able to confirm that: "Partnership for Peace and our intensifying cooperation in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council are complementary in pursuing this goal [stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area]."[18] Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Group itself reported that it had begun "to coordinate closely the work of the Ad Hoc Group with that of the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) in the NACC/PfP format, with the objective of merging the two groups as soon as possible."[19]

Combined Joint Task Forces

The other major NATO initiative of January 1994, apart from PfP, was the decision to set up Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), designed to perform peacekeeping and other contingency operations. This concept finally breaks the deadlock on how to use NATO assets for peacekeeping and other out-of-area activities, without having to change the NATO Treaty.

CJTF will enable the Alliance to utilize its military assets:

- for operations outside the NATO Treaty area
- for operations under WEU command
- for operations outside Article 5 of the NATO Treaty
- for operations with non-NATO partners.

At the NATO Summit in January 1994, Heads of State and Government endorsed the concept,[20] proposed in October 1993 and discussed at NATO's DPC meeting on 9 December 1993. In January 1994, NATO military commanders were tasked with developing the details of the CJTF concept, within the framework of NATO's ongoing force structure review. NATO ministers agreed the progress made in May 1994.

CJTF sets the tone for the future relationship between NATO and WEU activities. It is seen as part of a review of the balance of responsibilities between the European and the North American allies.

The CJTF concept is designed to provide a concrete basis for the maintenance of Alliance and European forces which will be "separable but not separate."[21] Avoiding the duplication of effort and resources which would result from distinct and independent military structures is cited as the rationale. The new concept has at its core the establishment of mobile CJTF headquarters, for which specific core groups of officers, in existing NATO regional headquarters, are now being developed as the nucleus.

Militarily, the concept is based on the U.S. Joint Task Force Concept introduced in the late 1970s, with multinationality added.

- The idea is to develop flexible, contingency-dependent force packages for different types of military mission (TASK FORCES).
- These task force packages could be drawn from any of the different armed services, land army, air force, navy and others (JOINT).
- They could also be drawn from a wide range of national and multinational contributors (COMBINED).

Thus CJTF provides for participation from either a narrower or a wider group of nations depending upon circumstance, rather than relying on all and only NATO members to contribute in every contingency.

Politically, the concept is double hatted: it intends to allow the WEU to draw on NATO assets once the decision has been made that the WEU rather than NATO should take action. It is presented inter alia as part of the effort to strengthen the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and could, according to the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, imply that NATO would accept the CJTF under WEU "operational command," instead of under SACEUR.[22]

At the same time, CJTF is intended as the format for cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries in the context of PfP. It would provide sufficient flexibility for future participation by non-NATO member countries, for example in the framework of the NACC, in peacekeeping and other similar military operations. Thus it reflects the increased demand on NATO to commit itself more strongly to pan-European security (supporting the CSCE), as well as to supporting the U.N.

The CJTF concept supplements NATO's traditional Integrated Military Structure.

- While day-to-day operational planning, training and military contacts will continue to be conducted through the normal NATO command structure, the CJTF headquarters would operate in a specific contingency.
- Depending on the type of contingency, a task force from the nations committed to the task would be selected and subordinated.
- As long as the operation continued, both the task force and the headquarters would remain under the command of whichever body had been chosen, according to the political decisions made.

The task force approach gives a considerable amount of flexibility for either NATO or the WEU to choose from the military forces offered by nations willing to contribute. This flexibility will be of use not only in ensuring military effectiveness, but also political acceptability, depending on the type and location of the conflict. It will also allow for the eventuality of drawing on NATO assets in the case of NACC-decided peacekeeping operations. However, despite all the flexibility built in and the opportunities embedded, it will neither be easily nor quickly implemented. Since the proposal was adopted, discussions have been delayed and clearly indicate that because of diverging interests, the traditional NATO members especially find it difficult to agree on the details of implementation.

A European Stability Pact?

The only diplomatic initiative challenging NACC/PfP to come out of Western Europe has been the French proposal for a European Stability Pact, otherwise known as the Balladur Plan. French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur first presented his Memorandum, "Proposed European Stability Pact," to the June 1993 European Council meeting in

Copenhagen.[23] Its primary objective is to prevent a Yugoslavia-type civil war breaking out in any of the other areas of Central or Eastern Europe where a border or minority dispute currently exists, such as between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania. Its underlying objective is to restore some credibility to the foreign policy-making process of the EU, shaken by the failures over former Yugoslavia, and to put some impetus behind the Maastricht Treaty's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The initial proposal suggested two key elements to stability: consolidation of frontiers, and protection of minorities. Originally it allowed limited negotiated border changes. After internal debate in the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, the proposal now considers borders inviolable from the outset.

Under the Balladur plan, minority rights would have to be granted and observed. The Memorandum calls for encouragement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe "to conclude among themselves agreements designed to provide, case by case, practical solutions to their minority problems."[24] The CSCE High Commissioner for Minorities might be intimately involved in the application of such agreements.

The strongest encouragement, and one which may persuade Central and East Europeans to join the pact, is the promise of eventual EU membership. Consultations with the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland (the Visegrad Group) beginning in autumn 1993 showed that, since the focus of security politics among the Visegrad states was membership in NATO, there was little initial enthusiasm for an EU pact. Only the lure of EU membership could render it attractive.

Acceptance of the Stability Pact is defined as "necessary but not sufficient"[25] for EU membership. All possible problems of stability would have to be resolved before membership could be considered. Economic assistance is to be offered from the EU in the meantime, for example "... for supporting projects in specific regions ... migration problems or refugee problems ...." Economic assistance could also be withdrawn and cooperation broken off with "... countries that seriously violate the rights of minorities or call existing frontiers into question...."[26]

Military assistance could also be part of the package, with associate status in the Western European Union (WEU) on offer, as well as cooperation in the fields of training and peacekeeping -- arrangements which bear a strong resemblance to the NATO Partnership for Peace proposal. The Memorandum also mentioned proposals for "practical measures to reinforce CSCE institutions."[27]

The Pact would be a series of agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern European states, and between those states themselves. All countries of the former Warsaw Pact, plus the Baltic states and Albania would be candidates. The U.S. and Russia, together with the Nordic States, the Vatican, NATO, the Council of Europe and the CSCE would be invited as observers.

Membership of the Pact is to "... have a geographically open and evolutionary character ... focusing initially on those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have the prospect of becoming members of the European Union...."[28] Accordingly, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes told the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee in December 1993 that the first negotiations would be with the Visegrad countries, and that once their terms had been agreed, hopefully by the end of 1994, further pacts could be envisaged. The Baltic States have also been at the forefront of negotiations, and their regional round-table is one of the concrete achievements of the Pact so far.

The Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe held in May 1994 to launch these negotiations aimed to begin a process similar in its scope to that which led to the creation of the Iron and Steel Community to link Germany and France at the end of World War Two, removing the economic basis for conflict. The main goal of this process would be to have "countries which have not yet concluded cooperation and good neighborliness agreements and arrangements, including minority and border issues, to do so, through a process of bilateral negotiation

and regional tables, the composition and agenda for which will have been freely chosen by the participating countries." One major outcome of the inaugural Conference was the decision to involve the CSCE in implementation and follow-up activities once the Pact is finalized in one year's time.[29] If the CSCE is given the necessary resources to carry out this role, then it will be a great organizational boost for the pan-European collective security process.

> *5.1 The final conference will be held, if the progress of the proceedings so permits, within one year of the inaugural Conference. It will be responsible for adopting the Pact on Stability.*
>
> *5.2 The Pact on Stability in Europe will be entrusted to the CSCE which will be requested to be responsible for evaluating and for monitoring, according to its procedures, the implementation of the agreements and arrangements as well as the commitments which comprise them, placing the follow-up activities and meetings within the substantive and organizational context of the CSCE.*[30]

NATO in the future could thus find its Partnership for Peace undermined. If the EU offers both economic and military cooperation, together with medium-term possibility of membership in the EU, then NATO's offer of military cooperation alone might be bypassed. Security guarantees would be the deciding factor.

Endnotes: Chapter Three

[1] Jonathan Eyal, *The Independent*, 8 December 1993.

[2] U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, press conference at Travemuende, 21 October 1993 (audio tape).

[3] Defense Planning Committee Communique, Brussels, 8-9 December 1993.

[4] Joseph Kruzel, WorldNet satellite television interview, 7 December 1993.

[5] Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are referred to as the Visegrad Group after a 1990 meeting in Visegrad, Hungary, at which they developed ideas for a new non-Warsaw Pact regional security grouping in Central Europe.

[6] Strobe Talbott, newly appointed Deputy Secretary of State and Clinton's chief advisor on Russia, was reported to have been instrumental in shifting U.S. policy towards a "prudent and evolutionary approach" to NATO expansion. *The Guardian*, 3 January 1994.

[7] The new "Principles of the Military doctrine for the Russian Federation," as approved by Presidential Decree 1833 on 2 November 1993, were widely publicized in the Russian press during November 1993. See: *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 18 November 1993; *Izvestia*, 18 November 1993; *Krasnaja Svesda*, 19 November 1993; *BBC World Broadcasts*: SU/1858, 29 November 1993.

[8] Warren Christopher, interview at NATO HQ, 2 December 1993.

[9] Ibid.

[10] In September 1993, Yeltsin issued letters to leaders in France, the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. warning that opening up membership to the former communist states of Eastern and Central Europe would violate this treaty.

[11] For a more critical view of the U.S. policy shift, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the Carter Administration, *New York Times*, 2 December 1993.

[12] "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," as approved by Presidential Decree No. 1833, dated 2 November 1993.

[13] In a pointed *Izvestia* article published in March 1994, Andrei Kozyrev insisted on Russia's need for an equal strategic partnership with the U.S., not a junior partnership: "Russia is doomed to be a great power."

[14] Zhirinovsky represented the lunatic fringe of a more widespread anger and anxiety when he said Russia should retaliate by bombing Western air bases in Italy!

[15] Speech by Russian defense minister Pavel S. Grachev, at a NATO DPC meeting in Brussels, 24-25 May 1994.

[16] NATO Press Service: Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, M-NACC 1(93)40, 11 June 1993, p. 3.

[17] NACC Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning: "Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations," Brussels, 17 March 1994, Note by the Chairman, p.1, cf. This document became available to the authors of this report shortly before going to press. Thus it has received less attention than it would otherwise have received. The document reflects several of the criticisms expressed in this report (e.g. the need for common UN/CSCE/NACC definitions, the level of violence and middle ground arguments made by Charles Dobbie and others) and often offers solutions much closer to current U.N. proposals than to NATO's MC 327.

[18] NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(94)46: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul, 9 June 1994; Final Communique, p.2.

[19] NATO Press Release M-NACC-1(94)47: Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Istanbul, Turkey, 10 June 1994; Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, p.1.

[20] NATO press Communique M-1(94)3; Declaration of Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held 11 January 1994 at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, p. 1.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Speech by Alain Juppe at Institut de Hautes Etudes de Defense

Nationale, 21 January 1994.

[23] The European Council is the Heads of State and Government meeting of the European Union which takes place at the end of each six-month EU Presidency.

[24] Memorandum from France to the June 1993 European Council on a Proposed European Stability Pact (from an unofficial translation by the North Atlantic Assembly), Section 2B.

[25] Ibid. Section 4C.

[26] Ibid. Section 4C.

[27] Ibid. Section 4C.

[28] Belgian Presidency of the European Union, July-December 1993: Presidency Conclusion, December 10/11 1993, Annex 1, Para 2.1.

[29] Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe, Paris, 26-27 May 1994.

[30] Ibid.

Chapter Four
U.S., European, and Russian Peacekeeping Policies

The first [problem] is the American approach to low-level military operations, which differs markedly from the practices of European and most Commonwealth armies.[1]

Mats R. Berdal

Because of the nature of the activity, discussions about peacekeeping tend to take place at an international level. When it comes down to it, however, what is done and how it is done will depend on individual nation states. Major actors, even within the Atlantic Alliance, conceive of peacekeeping quite differently. Behind the international organizations there are significant divergences of doctrine and practice, as this chapter shows. Interestingly, current trends indicate that there may be more convergence between the former superpowers than between U.S. and European approaches.

The U.S. Peacekeeping Debate: PRD 13 and PDD 25

The "Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" is contained in PDD 25 released in May 1994. The policy stresses that the U.S. wants to maintain the leadership role in peace operations, no matter if it is involved solely with its own forces or not. For the U.S. to have the most control over peacekeeping operations, the preferred multilateral institution to act in peace operations is NATO. The policy reflects long standing debates.

For the fifteen-year time span between the fall of Saigon and the Gulf War, the U.S. foreign policy debate over intervention was largely dominated by emotional reactions to the Vietnam War. Decision-makers were reluctant to urge the direct involvement of U.S. military forces, except when clear (and often limited) objectives could be established and accomplished swiftly, with little risk of American casualties. In contrast, U.S. leaders appear to have drawn the lesson from the Gulf War that U.S. forces could "win," both in so-called major regional contingencies and in less-intensive military operations.

Recent peacekeeping operations have led analysts and decision-makers to question this lesson. The U.N. Somalia operation revived concerns about the U.S. capability to intervene successfully abroad. The U.N. deployment in Somalia began as a means of offering humanitarian assistance, but ended in armed conflict. After the October 1993 raid on Mogadishu and public display of dead American soldiers, public support for the operation plummeted.

U.N. peacekeeping operations often fail to satisfy U.S. domestic policy demands and expectations. There are four principal reasons for this dissatisfaction: high cost, low control over operations, potential loss of life, and lack of speed. First, the U.S. currently pays up to 31.7 percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs, even more than the U.S. assessment for normal U.N. operations. Second, U.S. decision-makers often object to U.S. forces being placed under foreign command, mainly because of the risk that the lives of U.S. soldiers may be endangered. This is especially assumed for U.N. operations where the soldiers may not be able to adequately defend themselves because of the U.N. rules on using limited force in peacekeeping operations. They are concerned that foreign commanders will order U.S. forces to conduct operations that have not been authorized by U.S. leaders and that may not be in the U.S. interest. Third, the U.S. public perceives that the lives of U.S. soldiers are likely to be endangered in operations that do not necessarily reflect vital American interests.

The reluctance of the United States to commit forces in Bosnia is directly related to the risk of casualties. Last, both the general public and U.S. decision-makers seem concerned that U.N. operations are too slow. Together these factors act as a brake on U.S. commitment to the U.N.

Early on, the Clinton Administration embraced a policy it termed "assertive multilateralism." At that time, the U.N. seemed to be the structure within which multilateralism could work in favor of U.S. leadership and broader burden-sharing. In what may have been a result of events in Somalia, the image of a strong U.N. seemed to fade in the perspective of American elites and NATO then emerged as the new vehicle for the policy of assertive multilateralism.

NATO's role in peacekeeping missions addresses many of the U.S. domestic policy concerns that U.N. operations often fail to meet. For example, through NATO, the U.S. is still in command. In addition, the United States can share the costs with other (presumably wealthy European) partners, and NATO already has a large budget approved through Congress. As a result, it is easier to get funding for NATO than for the U.N. and its operations. Last, but not least, with a strong NATO role in peacekeeping, the U.S. will not appear to be the world's policeman. With such a structure, the United States could endorse whichever missions it wanted through the U.N., while deciding which missions it wants to participate in through NATO.

Box Q: The Key Elements of PDD 25 Address Six Major Points:[1] (all underlining in original)

- "Making <u>disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support</u>..."

  - "both U.S. and U.N. involvement in peacekeeping must be <u>selective</u> and more <u>effective</u>."

- "<u>Reducing U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations</u>..."

  - The U.S. Government intends to reduce its financial responsibility for U.N. peacekeeping missions from 31.7 percent to 25 percent by 1 January 1996. It has also proposed a number of steps to lower the cost of peacekeeping operations.

- "Defining clearly our [U.S.] policy regarding the <u>command and control of American military forces</u> in U.N. peace operations."

  - Forces will always remain under the command of the President. There are times when the President can relinquish operational control of his forces to a foreign commander if it "serves American security interests." "Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."

- "<u>Reforming and improving the U.N.'s capability</u> to manage peace operations..."

  - This policy recommends steps to improve U.N. planning and strengthen U.N. management of U.N. peace operations.

- "<u>Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations</u>."

  - A "shared responsibility" policy was developed to divide the management and funding of peace operations between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The Department of State will manage and fund traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operations (which do not involve U.S. combat units); the Department of Defense will manage and fund all Chapter VI peace operations requiring the use of U.S. combat units and all Chapter VII-type operations.

- "<u>Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress, and the American public</u> on peace operations."

  - The Administration commits to consultation with the Congress on such important issues as U.N. peace operations.

Notes:

[1] All quotes in this section are from the May 1994 draft, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

BASIC/BITS

Box: R: A Contradiction in Terms - Peace Enforcement in NATO and the U.S. Army

One of the more bizarre confusions in approach to peace operations can be found in the contradiction between the U.S. and NATO over the term peace enforcement. Following the formal agreement of MC 327 by the NATO Military Committee on 5 August 1993 NATO issued a Draft "Doctrine for Peace Support Operations" on 28 February 1994. It states that "Peace enforcement missions...generally employ conventional combat operations to achieve their objectives." "The classic peace enforcement operations have been the Korean and Gulf Wars. "This approach by NATO directly contradicts that of the U.S. Army which in a draft doctrine published 19 January 1994 states that: " Within the context of this manual, peace enforcement does not refer to major combat operations such as U.N. operations in Korea (1950-53) and U.N. operations in Kuwait and Southern Iraq (1990-91).[1] Thus, in the future, the statement from a western official cited in a newspaper as saying that "the entire spectrum of peace enforcement measures are being considered" could mean two utterly different things depending on which manual the officer had been reading.

The U.S. Army uses the term peace enforcement to describe the protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforcement of sanctions, establishment of, and supervision of protected zones and the forcible separation of belligerents as peace enforcement activities.[2] These types of activity, conducted today in the Balkans and Iraq are not discussed in NATO's draft Doctrine for Peace Support Operations. A few lines are devoted to the subject of protecting humanitarian assistance.[3]

Notes:
[1] FM 100-23 p.1-3
[2] FM100-23, Ch. 1.
[3] NATO draft Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, para. 65.

BASIC/BITS

In order to develop a comprehensive approach to peace operations involving the United States, President Clinton initiated an inter-agency review of U.S. peacekeeping policy in early 1993. Over the course of the year, the administration developed Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13), outlining a new policy for peace operations. Its early conception -- that U.S. troops would regularly operate under U.N. operational control -- did not survive the intra-governmental review process.[2] After circulating drafts of PRD 13 for comment in classified form, the Administration released an unclassified summary of Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," in draft form in May 1994.

PDD 25 avoids many of the substantial political issues of the peacekeeping debate, such as clearly defining U.S. interests, command and control structures, and guidelines for intervention. Instead, it focuses on solving the administrative and logistical problems of peace operations, such as budgeting, management, and developing a more effective command center for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The level of generality of PDD 25 suggests that many issues are still in contention. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration has adopted a fairly traditional approach which combines a strong desire to influence, if not control, any U.N. sponsored activity. This reflects a deep distrust of the U.N. and results in a preference to use NATO or Gulf type coalitions in any major operation. The tendency for anticipated casualties to determine policy makes the level of anticipated violence the criterion for analyzing potential operations. This coincides with the approach of the U.S. Army's view of peacekeeping as merely military operations at a very low level of intensity. As we see in the next section this runs up against a very different approach in European (and Canadian) forces.

Conflicting Peacekeeping Doctrines

While national and international bodies are developing their own approaches to peace operations, serious differences are emerging between NATO's policy and that of military thinkers in the Alliance's leading nations. This section looks at the broader spectrum of peacekeeping policies in NATO, the U.S., the U.K. and France, and traces some of the main differences and their potential consequences. The differences in these peacekeeping policies are not

mere semantics. The importance of impartiality, the issue of the so-called middle ground between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and the level of violence applicable all have a direct bearing on the success of operations. In addition they affect the perception of such operations as well as the manner in which such operations will be accepted by conflicting parties and the international community.

In NATO's doctrine, the different categories of peace support are, as explained earlier, not clearly separated from one another. MC 327 sees the different types of operation as lying on a spectrum or continuum of violence, with Conflict Prevention at one end of the spectrum and Peace Enforcement Action at the other (followed by post-conflict Peace Building). Other military thinkers have seen this as a recipe for the slide into war, and recommended more constraining rules of engagement.

Charles Dobbie of the British Army's doctrine and training headquarters has written on "Wider Peacekeeping."[3] It exemplifies a concern in European and Canadian forces. He argues that: "the idea, therefore, that post Cold War there is a new middle ground of military operations lying on a linear spectrum somewhere between peacekeeping and peace enforcement seems not only specious historically, but dangerously destabilizing doctrinally. Such a perception blurs recognition and application of the crucial impartiality divide." Impartiality must be the "controlling determinant".

Dobbie states that: "We regard as intellectually flaccid the idea that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are differentiated only by the degree of force being used." He expresses a concern that considerations such as popular support, negotiations, mediation and conciliation will matter less and that traditional peacekeeping would fade in favor of "a doctrine more orientated towards warfighting." [4] Turning to NATO's draft curriculum for peace support training, one is forced to agree. None of the items of obvious importance that Dobbie lists are included. Room is however found for peacekeeping training in "nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense procedures."[5]

The charts reproduced here indicate the clear difference of view between the U.S. Army and Dobbie.

Box S: Charts Depicting Different Views on Peacekeeping



Source: FM 100-23, "*Peace Operations,*" DOA HQ, (draft) version 6, 19 January 1994, p. facing 1-12.

Box S (cont.)





Source: Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie, "*Wider Peacekeeping,*" Second Draft (Revised), 5 February 1994.

This approach directly challenges NATO's peace support concept which relies on the idea of a continuum of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The U.S. Army's draft FM 100-23[6] recognizes that: "Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a peacekeeping situation to a peace enforcement situation." [7] Nevertheless, the impartiality issue is discussed as one of several of similar weight and is still within the general concept that: "It is likewise important for (commanders) to know that several kinds of peace operations may occur simultaneously or sequentially within the same deployment or campaign. Commanders must not only understand how each operation differs but also how they are bound together by common operational principles." [8] This again is contradicted by Dobbie who argues that: "...peace enforcement measures cannot be mixed with peace keeping ones. The doctrines of each are radically different and fundamentally incompatible." [9]

Nevertheless, as we have seen, NATO and the U.S. do not see that peace enforcement operations require special training even though they may occur "simultaneously or sequentially" with peacekeeping. Even the British Army only devotes a small amount of time to the subject in its officer training.

The U.S. and the U.K. military have had a close working relationship since the 1940s. The significant differences between the two in this instance indicates that there is a severe problem at the heart of Western approaches to peace operations. France is the third country most frequently taking a leading role in U.N. and interventionist operations. A policy review submitted to the French Prime Minister, the *Rapport Trucy*,[10] parallels the views expressed by Dobbie. According to the French study:

> *...peacekeeping operations should be clearly distinguished as follows:*
>
> *EITHER a peacekeeping operation, exclusively, defined as an impartial activity, based on the consent of the parties, a kind of armed diplomacy; in this peacekeeping activity, opening fire would only be authorized for legitimate self-defense.*
>
> *OR a specific peace enforcement mission, based on Chapter VII; this would mean military activity implying, if necessary, taking sides in order to complete the mission, opposing those who would defeat it, and having recourse as need be to appropriate armaments.*
>
> *These two tasks cannot be intermingled without creating:...impotence, insecurity and humiliation.*

It is clear that there exists a conflict within the Western military over the question of the so-called middle ground of peace operations. There are those in the U.S. military and in NATO who believe that such messy operations are inevitable and should be planned for. There are also those, perhaps with more experience, who believe that the issue of impartiality should be used as a clear dividing line between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations under the U.N. Charter. In Yugoslavia the problem of mixing humanitarian missions in with air strikes has been the clearest example to date of the reality which gives meaning to these theoretical discussions.

From this overview of NATO's approach to peace support operations, it appears that the Alliance's role is being developed not to support U.N. initiatives such as the standby force to which neither the U.S. nor the U.K. have committed forces. Rather, the Alliance sees itself as acting for the U.N. as the favored instrument of the United States.

In taking an assertive role, NATO assumes a certain responsibility. The Alliance's approach to peace support operations indicates that simply by merging different types of peacekeeping and peace enforcement into one peace support definition, the political leadership in the Alliance is committing itself to an approach which is seen as deeply flawed by military thinkers in Britain and France, and runs counter to the approach painstakingly developed by the U.N. over the years. Arrangements for the command and control of peace operations further indicate that these overall problems are transmitted into the heart of management of operations.

In public discussion and in the general public awareness, peacekeeping is typically a case of thousands of innocent civilians in peril of their lives needing to be rescued by well meaning, well equipped, but often confused peacekeepers. The analysis in this chapter indicates that the confusion experienced by peacekeepers is deeply imbedded in the conflicting approaches to peace operations in the U.N., NATO, the U.S., and the British and French militaries.

The Russian Mirror Image

Two terms in the Russian force structure indicate that military operations in support of peace are becoming a major topic for the Russian military as well: "Voiska po podderzhaniyu miru," i.e. forces to maintain peace, and "mirotvorcheskie voiska," i.e. forces to make peace.[11] While the former are for U.N. style peacekeeping operations, the latter are for operations likely to include combat operations, e.g. forceful settlement of conflict.

At least two separate levels of discussion exist in the former Soviet Union in respect to peace operations. One discussion concerns the CIS serving the role of an interstate body legitimate to mandate and set up peace operations. The second discussion concerns the role of Russia in peace operations. In both of these the political concept of peace operations and military doctrine are important considerations.

Events in the CIS have already caused several military operations to be characterized as peace operations. Thus experience influences the ongoing development of theory.

Keeping Peace in the CIS

CIS peacekeeping discussions go back to the time when Russia had not yet decided to establish a defense ministry, the Russian Armed Forces, but still hoped for a collective defense arrangement through the CIS. CIS commander Shaposhnikov started the debate in February 1992. During the Kiev summit in 1992 an agreement on "Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS" was signed by all CIS members, except for Turkmenistan. The agreement excluded combat functions of such forces and required the consent of all conflicting parties prior to making a decision about deploying a force.

The Tashkent Protocol of May 1992 set up "Temporary Procedures for the Formation and Function of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces." At the Bishkek summit in September 1992, the seven signatories of the CIS defense treaty agreed that the CIS High Command should execute operational command over future CIS peacekeeping forces made up of national units made available to them. The Joint Armed Forces Command of the CIS has been working on describing the tasks of CIS peace operations, which would include both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.

The language used in CIS discussion documents about peace operations is relatively close to U.N. language. Since the beginning of 1993, Russian leadership has constantly demanded that the U.N. consider the CIS a regional organization authorized to conduct U.N.-mandated (and financed) peace operations (see Appendix B).

Nevertheless until now no constant CIS peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces exist. Non-Russian CIS members disagreed inter alia with command and control arrangements proposed by the highly Russian dominated CIS Joint Armed Forces Command. During the December 1993 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers at Asgabat, it was finally decided to transform the Joint Armed Forces Command into a smaller, less influential and less capable Joint Staff Committee.

Russian-Led Ad-Hoc Peace Operations

While the structure of CIS peace operations developed much more slowly than anticipated, actual conflicts within CIS territories created an early need for such operations. In July 1992, two months after the Moscow decision to build up Russian Armed Forces, Russia set up ad-hoc missions in Moldova's Dnjestr-Region and Georgia's Southern Ossetia. Both

missions are made up of Russian troops accompanied by forces of the local conflicting parties and intended to survey ceasefires. In reality they first had to impose ceasefires.

The Georgian and Moldovan governments would have preferred U.N. or CSCE missions; both the Southern Ossetian and Dnjestr Regions supported the Russian-led model. Georgia, under military pressure from both the troops of the Abchas Region and units supporting former President Gamsakhurdia, decided in 1993 to form closer links with the CIS. Subsequently, another Russian military operation led to victory over Gamsakhurdia's troops and a ceasefire with the Abchas rebels. Meanwhile the U.N. has become involved in negotiating further solutions.

A Russian-led peace operation in Tajikistan was added in autumn 1992. Initially Moscow unilaterally increased the alert status of the Russian 201st Division near Dushanbe, widened its tasks and deployed additional units. In a second step the division was tasked to secure the Afghan-Tajik border together with Tajik forces. In September 1993 the mission was transformed into a multilateral effort, when the Moscow summit of the CIS formed an ad-hoc 25,000 man strong "collective peacemaking force" based on additional force and financial contributions from the Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh Republics, to be deployed under command of General Boris Pjankov (CIS) from mid- October 1993. During a meeting of CIS defense ministers in February 1994 preliminary agreement among nine CIS members was reached to commonly strengthen Tajik-Afghan border control. In some ways this is understandable since the lack of internal borders in the CIS virtually makes the Afghan-Tajik border Russia's Southern border. While no common doctrine exists for all of these operations, some characteristics can be derived:

- Operations seem to be based on the preparedness to use a relatively high level of force and dominate situations militarily. This results from the nature of these conflicts and Russian willingness to deploy forces sufficient to suppress conflicts if necessary.
- Russian command and control is indispensable; it may be executed via the Russian dominated CIS Joint Armed Forces Command.
- Up until now the forces in Moldova and Georgia appear to act neutrally in most cases, to limit themselves to upholding ceasefires and stabilizing order, but not directly to support either side of the conflict. In Tajikistan their mandate allows them to support the government.
- Russia has no objection to using peacemaking efforts to support its vital national interest of creating stability on its Southern flanks, as well as to foster some moves to reintegration.

Russian Military Doctrine and Peace Operations

As yet, there is no Russian peacekeeping doctrine. Traditionally Russian policies were developed with deductive philosophical logic. Today Russian thinking can only be derived from actual policy and some basic principles contained in the new Russian military doctrine, signed by President Yeltsin in November 1993. This has been labelled "a document covering Russia's transitional period." The published version of the new military doctrine is based on the idea of defending both territory and "the vital interests of Russia." It envisages the "particular danger (posed by) armed conflicts engendered by aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance" and gives Russian policy a wide range of reasons to engage in peace operations or unilateral intervention if necessary.

Operations in Russia and in the neighboring countries of the "Near Abroad" are among the options in Russia's new doctrine. So too are the possible military threats resulting from "the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states" and military action against Russian military installations. These installations have in many cases gained a new legal status via treaties signed by Russia and host countries.

"Illegal activity of nationalist, secessionist and other organisations, designed to destabilize the internal situation in the Russian Federation" is among the

range of possible reasons for the internal use of force in multi-ethnic Russia.

A three-tier security approach is envisaged by the doctrine. Russia will see its commitments within the CIS as a first priority; second will be the regional level comprised by CSCE commitments; while the U.N., as the global level of Russian involvement in security policy, will be the third. Thus clear priority is given to the "Near Abroad" and CIS commitments are perceived as independent and additional to CSCE and U.N. policies. Future more detailed legislation will reflect this: "The nature, conditions and forms of the Russian Federation of peacekeeping operations of the U.N. and other international organisations shall be determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation and international commitments and agreements, including those signed within the framework of the Commonwealth."

Nevertheless, for the near future it seems to be unrealistic for the Russian military to successfully implement the force structure and equipment needs planned to fully support such policies. Although the future command structure with the Mobile Forces Command has been founded and a kind of mobility command is underway with the creation of Mobile Forces --consisting of Immediate Reaction Forces and Reaction Forces (somewhat different from their Western counterparts), and implementation of the necessary mobility and sustainability for their independent operations —all this is not fully affordable under current economic conditions. Indeed it conflicts with the interests of both the industrial as well as the agricultural lobbies, and thus could only be fully implemented in a political environment which made the armed forces a sole priority of restructuring the Russian State, i.e. by full societal remilitarization. Even under these circumstances this concept would have to compete with other sectors of the armed forces and the military industries for resources.

Russian Policy/Western Policy

Russian ad-hoc peacekeeping and peace-making efforts came into being as Russian attempts to create a collective defense and security arrangement via the CIS began to look unlikely to succeed. While surely influenced by Russian interests to utilize these operations to foster as much reintegration in the foreign and security policy areas as possible, they were also driven by the need to contain or end real conflicts with no other realistic actor in sight. During the conduct of these operations, Russian policy became more and more oriented towards mirroring U.S. and NATO policies and seems to be running into problems very similar to those that Western policy is likely to run into:

- Russian thinking about peace operations increasingly reflects deduction from Russian national interest.
- Russian peace operations obviously seek international mandates, but limited international influence on the conduct of operations.
- Russian peace operations thinking includes limited contributions to U.N. or CSCE operations (e.g. Former Yugoslavia), but favors collective defense arrangements on the CIS level or in ad hoc coalitions in case of vital interests being at stake. Unilateral action, if necessary without a mandate, is seen as a Russian policy option.
- Wherever Russia considers multilateral action, command and control is seen as a crucial point, as is legitimation via international mandate and sharing the financial burden.
- Russia's geographical area of vital interest is currently more limited than the U.S./NATO area.
- Russia's peace operations are likely to be conducted by a dominating force if combat operations are probable.

While NATO considers strategies on how to limit Russia's options to act based on its national interests within the near abroad, and would like to get some control over decision making about Russian peace operations, Russia perceives itself as a great power which should have the same rights and options as the other great power, the U.S. Since Russian policies closely mirror U.S. and Western claims, arguments against Russian policies reflect the assumption that--to put it bluntly--the West's position will succeed

solely on account of its superior political, economic and military power.

Endnotes: Chapter Four

[1] Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 31.

[2] Ibid., pp. 33-35.

[3] Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie, "Wider Peacekeeping," Second Draft (Revised), 5 February 1994.

[4] Ibid., p.3.

[5] NATO draft Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, Annex E, para. 8, I.

[6] U.S. Army FM 100-23 (draft) was published as U.S. Army FM 90-34.

[7] FM 100-23. pp. 1-12.

[8] FM 100-23 pp. 2-18.

[9] Dobbie, op. cit., p. 7.

[10] Rapport au premier ministre, "Participation de la France aux Operations de Maintien de la Paix", Francois Trucy (Senateur du Var, Maire de Toulon, Parlementaire en Mission 4 Aout 1993 - 4 Fevrier 1994), Paris: Documentation francaise, April 1994.

[11] "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," to ensure commonality, all quotes are taken from the English translation published in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Special Review, January 1994, pp. 6-12.

Chapter Five
Peacekeeping Forces - Mandates, Command, and Control

The issue of command and control will always be a key factor in deciding whether to deploy U.S. forces as part of a U.N. peace operation.[1]

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NATO's support for U.N. missions raises crucial questions about the command and control relationship between the two organizations. "Command and Control" arrangements for peace operations are far more than a technical means to ensure the unity and success of military operations. Together with a proper mandate they are preconditions for the conduct and effectiveness of operations. Indeed in a multinational environment such as peace (support) operations they are also telling with respect to who executes political and military control. Thus analyzing the command and control arrangements envisaged by NATO and its major member nations for future operations in support of peace gives insight into national interests and political intentions. Command and control arrangements also illuminate the relationships among the organizations that mandate multilateral military activities, those who conduct them, and the auspices under which such activities take place.

A rule of thumb distinction between command and control is: command is who is in charge of the military; control is how the military know what their own people are doing and how they tell them what to do. A more difficult but official distinction defines "command" as: "The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces," and "control" as: "That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated." Within operations, "operational command" is: "The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics." "Operational control" is defined as: "The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control."[2]

This chapter analyzes the command and control models under discussion in NATO and the United States. It examines the relationships between mandates, command and control arrangements, and national decision-making for multilateral peace support operations.

U.S. Command and Control and the U.N.

Under the Clinton Administration, U.S. policy towards peace operations and participation in them has been developed within the overriding context of the U.S. national interest. "If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously...we would place our national interest uppermost," states the summary of

the Presidential Decision Directive on "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."[3] Within the U.S. conception of peacekeeping, command and control is a decisive element and closely connected to the question of "whether to deploy U.S. forces as part of a U.N. peace operation."[4]

It has been longstanding U.S. policy that, while "the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in U.N. operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests." Persuading others to share the burden of a U.N. operation may be one reason for U.S. participation; exercising "U.S. influence over an important U.N. mission" may be another.[5] In selected circumstances the U.S. President may choose to place U.S. forces under U.N. operational control.[6] Among the conditions set up for such participation is that "command and control arrangements are acceptable."[7] The limitations to operational control by U.N. commanders are clearly set out: "Within the limits of operational control, a foreign U.N. commander cannot: change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization."[8]

At the same time, PDD 25 makes it clear that it is U.S. policy to handle the U.N. assignment of U.S. forces restrictively, and to limit such assignment of forces to peacekeeping operations whenever possible. Forcible separation of belligerents, military intervention to reverse the results of aggression, and other peace enforcement operations are likely to be conducted under command and control arrangements more favorable to U.S. political control:

> *The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a U.N. commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any larger scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. operational command and control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.*[9]

The policy directive also strengthens this distinction by making the Department of State the responsible lead organization for Chapter VI operations, in which no U.S. combat forces are deployed, and bringing in the Department of Defense in charge of Chapter VII operations.[10]

In its new policy the Clinton Administration also "reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered"[11] and claims: "The U.S. must however reserve the right to conduct a peace operation unilaterally."[12] The guiding principle for deciding whether to act multilaterally or solely based on U.S. capabilities refers back to national interest: "There is one overriding factor for determining whether the United States should act multilaterally, and that's America's interests. The rule is very simple: we should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should shun multilateral action where it does not serve our interests."[13]

Command and Control for NATO Participation in Peace Operations

NATO has not had a longstanding history of conducting operations under U.N. mandates, since until recently the organization considered "peacekeeping" as well as "peace enforcement" activities to be outside its purview. Thus NATO's offer to conduct such operations required some new thinking.

Command and control arrangements for future peace support operations are now being discussed in NATO. The Alliance's preparations for a major operation in support of a peaceful solution for Bosnia are underway. Thus planning is being influenced by ongoing events as well as national debates in NATO's member countries over the conditions under which they might be willing to send soldiers. MC 327 describes basic requirements for command and control in all types of peace support operations. The draft version of "NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations" is deliberately limited to operations short of peace enforcement since "peace enforcement operations are generally covered by existing

Box T: Models of Command and Control Arrangements[1]

In the context of NATO forces potentially conducting a major operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina under a U.N. mandate, NATO is discussing on the basis of four models of command and control. These models are based on historical examples and reflect different levels of U.N. influence on the forces implementing the mandate.

UNPROFOR-type: An operation controlled by the U.N. and directed by the U.N. Secretary General. Operational/tactical control would rest with the U.N.'s local Command headquarters (HQ), which would report back to U.N. HQ in New York. The mission would be financed through the U.N. and conducted under the U.N. flag.

Somalia-type: A group of U.N. member states may be charged with implementing a U.N. peace plan. Such operations would differ in several ways from other U.N. operations (in Croatia or Macedonia for example) as well as from U.N. civil agencies' activities. In contrast to these other operations, the commander would be chosen by participating nations, rather than by the U.N. In addition, administration and logistics would be done via the Unified Command, rather than through New York. In addition, the member states would report to the U.N. Security Council on progress achieved, the finances would be provided by participating nations, and the operation would not be executed under the U.N. flag.

Desert Storm-type: Such operations would be based on a Security Council resolution, but with no further U.N. guidance. No reporting back or instructions from the U.N. would be required, and there would be no blue helmets or U.N. flag for the operation.

Korea-type: These actions would also be based on a Security Council resolution, but with a Commander appointed by the U.N. and given full authority to carry out the operation. There would not be a requirement to report back, but the operation would be carried out with blue helmets and the U.N. flag.

NATO's assumption that it was authorized to enforce Bosnian safe havens may have been intended to establish the precedent for a fifth command and control model between the U.N. and forces conducting U.N.-mandated missions. However, substantial Russian and U.N. opposition means this cannot yet be considered as a fifth model.[2]

Notes:

[1] Typology based on: Barret, op cit., p. 5.

[2] Interestingly enough, the four options reflect the U.S.-U.N. debate about military operations to be conducted in support of the U.N., as well as the financial arrangements to be made for funding them.

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NATO or national military doctrine."[14]

At the same time, NATO has been discussing the conditions for an acceptable Security Council mandate for a major operation to settle the conflict in Bosnia. Such a mandate would not only have to be "clear [and] precise," but also "complementary to the contingency military planning carried out by the main implementing force, [which] ... would likely be NATO."[15]

"NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations" (MC 327) reflects NATO's political reluctance to accept strict guidance from the U.N. and CSCE. It states only that "Alliance action will be in response to relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and will be conducted in accordance with appropriate U.N. policies."[16] Language about command and control is very carefully drafted.

While "overall political control of a peace support operation" is seen as the responsibility of either the U.N. or the CSCE (limited to Chapter VI operations), NATO demands "very clear command relationships" and arrangements that are "sound from a military as well as political point of view." The Alliance intends to use "its existing command structure ... to the greatest extent possible" with the details "to be determined on a case by case basis." While NATO retains the right at any point to commit, change, or withdraw contributions to peace support operations, it also states its willingness to execute political control over ongoing operations: "The Alliance's highest political and military bodies continue to play a vital role in the conduct of operations in support of U.N./CSCE even after a basic decision on NATO participation has been taken."[17]

Indeed MC 327 does not specify any responsibility to report to the U.N. on the part of NATO force commanders, the NAC, or the DPC. It only mentions

the need for liaison and consultation with the U.N. At the same time the document assumes that the U.N. or CSCE force commander will be "normally be an Alliance flag or general officer, serving in an appropriate position in the integrated military structure."[18]

NATO military thinking about the command and control relationship with the U.N. is likely to move in the direction of following the new U.S. peace operations policy. For traditional blue helmet peacekeeping operations NATO could accept U.N.-developed mandates and command and control relationships. These could be implemented by the NATO nations in cooperation with the Partnership for Peace countries. At the same time, increasingly restrictive policies could be implemented for mandates and command and control in operations likely to include combat missions or peace enforcement operations. Major military interventions of the Gulf War-type might be conducted by NATO or U.S-led ad hoc coalitions, based on weak and flexible Security Council resolutions. U.N. guidance would be limited to acceptable levels, guaranteeing NATO political and military freedom of movement.[19]

While the Alliance might be keen to reserve at least major peace enforcement operations for itself, it can open up participation in blue helmet operations to PfP members. Operations involving the NACC will be subject to much closer control. At the Athens NACC meeting in June 1993, participants agreed that peacekeeping operations by NACC member countries should not only be based on a U.N. or CSCE mandate, but should also be implemented under U.N.- or CSCE-developed command and control arrangements.[20] The same sharing of responsibilities between mandating bodies and executing forces is to be found in the Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations. Here it parallels the military need for effective and reliable command and control structures contained in the demand for "unity of command and control of military forces," thus indicating that both are not necessarily seen as being in contradiction. Command and Control relations "must be sound from a military as well as a political point of view."[21]

NATO itself will not accept being bound into such a strict regime. Discussions thus far indicate that NATO prefers that international bodies like the U.N. or CSCE should have no more than the most general hands-off influence on NATO operations.

Combined Joint Task Forces - Political Control by Technical Means

The CJTF concept may overcome some of the serious multilateral military planning nightmares (such as lack of common doctrine, planning, training and interoperability). The CJTF concept also appears to be a substantial NATO contribution to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity, since it has given the WEU an operational capability much earlier than it would otherwise have managed. However, there are also serious questions about its political reliability and the extent of U.S. influence.

The CJTF concept supplements the traditional NATO Integrated Military Structure[22] and thus the range of options available for command and control. Day to day operational planning, training and military contacts will continue to be conducted through small CJTF headquarter cells within the normal NATO headquarters and command structure The CJTF headquarters task will be expanded to larger sections of NATO's regional headquarters in a specific contingency. According to the type of contingency, a task force from the nations committed to the task will be selected and subordinated. Depending on the political decisions taken, both the task force and the headquarters will formally come under the command of the body politically chosen for the duration of the operation.[23]

The task force approach gives the concept a considerable amount of flexibility for NATO or the WEU to choose from the military forces offered by nations willing to participate in a contingency. NATO could also act in support of NACC consensus, the WEU in support of operations including associate members. This flexibility could be especially useful in cases where the type and location of the conflict demanded political caution.

The concept might be sufficient in cases in which

there is consent about the WEU taking action when the U.S./NATO does not wish to do so. Controversy is likely to occur when the WEU countries want to take action, but the U.S. does not. Even greater risk and damage would result from a situation in which the U.S. initially agreed to a WEU operation using NATO assets and CJTF-Headquarters, but later on withdrew from this position and thus hindered a successful operation.

Deployable command and control may serve as an example. While some non-U.S. capabilities exist within NATO (like the mobile NORTHAG HQ which was deployed in Bosnia), others are urgently needed. For instance, there is no mobile Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) available anywhere within NATO. One of the interesting questions is whether such capabilities will be acquired by NATO or the WEU.

WEU-parliamentarians have already mentioned that, as long as "it remains to be seen to what extent NATO and the Americans will agree to waive their right of refusal" and "in the absence of procedures automatically ensuring that the assets of the alliance will be made available to it, WEU must maintain its autonomous military planning capability and develop its own operational capability in order to act independently or at the request of the European Union."[24]

Using NATO headquarters structures involves using a U.S.-dominated command and control structure. The U.S. has agreed to leave its staff officers in

Box U: Multinationality and Alliance Cohesion (see Appendix E)

NATO military planning for peace support operations begins by: "Taking into account the principle of case by case decisions of the Alliance ... and recognizing that national participation in peace support operations will remain subject to national decision."[1] The Alliance has taken care to ensure member states' autonomy in deciding whether to sign up for specific peace support operations. At the same time NATO has developed a force structure (especially for Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces) which is largely based on the principle of multinationality, down to the divisional and brigade level.[2] Since these forces are to be deployed early during a crisis, this structure will often make autonomous national decision-making difficult, or will make it difficult for the Alliance to reach unanimous decisions on operations disputed among the members.[3] The Combined Joint Task Force system may circumvent these problems in traditional blue helmet peacekeeping operations. However, CJTF will face the same problems as the anticipated level of violence increases.

While this structure may help signal the Alliance's commitment, cohesion, and solidarity once the decision to deploy forces has been made, it may have negative effects on NATO's political cohesion during a crisis. Because NATO needs to make its decisions unanimously, member nations may feel forced to either participate or later be blamed for a decision not taken or made too late.

Decision-making about peace support operations and force-package deployments does not foster cohesion. Indeed, given the number of allies and their very different geographic, economic, and political priorities, there is a high probability of dissent. Member countries might be pressured to disregard their national interests and put their own economic opportunities or foreign relations at risk, in order to protect NATO's cohesion or military credibility. In addition, decisions about crisis management may need to be made under crisis-typical time constraints. Under such circumstances, it may not be possible to avoid hurting the national interests of some members. Member nations may even perceive that they are being blackmailed in some way by their alliance partners.

Notes:

[1] MC 327.1.

[2] NATO ground forces may serve as an example:
* NATO's Immediate Reaction Force [IRF] is the AMF-Land, a formation little stronger than a brigade, made up of company-to battalion-size contributions from NATO countries. The IRF is intended to be capable of being deployed within 3-7 days of receiving the order. * The first section of the ARRC to be called up for deployment either independently or as the airmobile spearhead division for the ARRC would be the Multinational Division (MND) Central or perhaps the MND South, made up by the national brigade-sized contributions. The MNDs would be ready to go within 7-15 days. * The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is the next larger force package consisting of 2-3 additional divisions (chosen from 8 being assigned) provided by one or two nations each. These should be ready to leave also 7-15 days after receiving the order.

[3] The pressure executed on the national constitutional debate within Germany, about whether Bundeswehr soldier participation in AWACS combat missions is covered by Germany's constitution, is a good example of the first outcome; the difficulties of the Alliance in developing a coherent policy with regard to its involvement in Former Yugoslavia may be seen as an example of the latter.

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place[25] even if the U.S. is not participating in the particular CJTF-operation. This solves the problem of restaffing headquarters at short notice, but it also may cause political problems. When the U.S. does not contribute forces to an operation, the U.S. might be seen as still seeking significant politico-military control.

There is likely to be a substantial lack of influential staff positions in these headquarters for staff officers from nations outside NATO's integrated military structure. There is no indication from NATO that countries contributing a large proportion of forces for CJTF operations would be represented proportionately within the headquarters. In addition, there might be concerns about U.S. officers in a CJTF headquarters which is running a WEU operation. They could be seen as having too decisive an influence on whether or not the WEU operation is successful.

As long as the concepts of CJTF and Forces Answerable to the WEU are not fully harmonized and as long as there is no commitment by NATO not to block WEU decisions by denying necessary assets, the CJTF concept will ensure overall U.S. leadership and control, while enabling the U.S. to carry less of the burden. In fact the concept might be seen as a step towards ensuring NATO as the main forum of security consultation as well as a ploy to maintain European reliance on NATO and U.S. military assets.

Western Peacekeeping Policies - Control in Whose Hands?

Peace support policies and especially mandate, command and control relationships under development in NATO and the United States raise serious questions about the future of both Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations.

The Clinton Administration's policy clearly envisages a much more important role and influence for the U.S. in future decision-making about peace operations. Driven by internal as well as foreign policy considerations, it decided to subordinate peace operations to the U.S. national interest debate. The U.N.'s position is coming under considerable pressure from that policy. The U.N. faces the challenge of mandating and fully responsibly conducting traditional peacekeeping operations, even as its future role in peace enforcement is potentially becoming more limited. The U.N. may be welcome to offer mandates. However, the larger the operation, the greater the U.S. involvement, and the higher the likelihood of combat operations, the more likely it is that command and control will be executed by either the U.S., U.S.-dominated alliances like NATO, or ad hoc coalitions. The policy to be anticipated can be described as follows:

- The United States will participate on a limited scale in selected U.N. peacekeeping operations that are not likely to involve combat operations.
- As soon as larger U.S. combat force contributions are required, the United States will opt for NATO or ad hoc coalitions under U.S. leadership, in which the command and control structures will correspond to U.S. interests.
- The United States will retain the option of acting unilaterally.
- The United States will preserve the option of leaving peace operations of limited national interest in the hands of forces from other U.N. or CSCE members, WEU or NATO's Partners for Peace. Even so, it will retain significant capability to execute political control and influence over such operations.

A mix of the different options available is also possible. For the wide variety of U.S. policy options to be anticipated, Somalia operations are an excellent example. While roughly 2,950 logistics and support troops after the end of the national U.S. operation were placed under U.N. command and control (UNOSOM II), roughly 5,000 combat forces (the Quick Reaction Force and Rangers) remained under national U.S. operational command and control at all times (UNITAF).[26] In the military context, the loss of unity of command has been widely seen as a serious problem in operations conducted in Somalia. Even more serious were the negative consequences of having both a U.N. and a U.S. command

working in Somalia, and partially pursuing different policies. UNOSOM lost the role and perception of being impartial and thus finally the chance to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflict.

Much of the criticism that U.N. peacekeeping operations lack efficient command and control has come from those well acquainted with U.N. operations. For example, UNPROFOR arrangements were widely criticized by military commanders. Generals Mackenzie, Morillon, Briquemont and Cot were appointed by the U.N. to command peacekeeping troops in Former Yugoslavia. Each in turn has broken ranks to say that it was impossible to work with the U.N. chain of command. General Lewis Mackenzie warned his colleagues: "Do not get into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 pm New York time, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone."[27] Yet not all of these problems are the U.N.'s fault. As an international organization, the U.N. can only accomplish the tasks and missions it has been given by drawing on the political support and resources it gets from its member nations.

U.N. peacekeeping has received neither the support nor the resources necessary in recent years. While the U.N. was tasked with deploying 18 new peacekeeping missions between 1988 and 1993, including operations that were much larger and more demanding than those in earlier years (for example, Cambodia, Somalia, and Former Yugoslavia), the resources on which the U.N. could draw to manage command, control and logistics, were not enlarged as necessary. As of May 1993, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations consisted of no more than 14 political officers, 9 military planners and 15 general service workers. In addition, its Field Operations Division had a staff of 33 professionals and 83 general service workers. These two units had to support 13 peacekeeping missions with over 50,000 troops deployed.[28] The problem is growing now that the number of U.N. Peacekeepers is nearly 70,000.

The U.S. offered to reform the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations by providing the U.N. with a more effective command and control structure and enlarged staffing from U.S. resources. However, this offer was accompanied by a U.S. plan to reduce its financial share in peacekeeping operations to 25 percent by the end of 1995.[29] The U.N. may be faced with an unhappy choice between reducing its peacekeeping activities substantially or accepting much greater U.S. influence in its own command and control structure. The enlarged U.S. influence will be independent of larger, or indeed any, significant U.S. contributions to troops in the field. Beyond the political effects of this policy on the U.N. itself, it will weaken the perception of the U.N. as impartial and thus the U.N.'s credibility.

The United States and NATO now threaten to exploit the U.N.'s structural weaknesses to gain a greater role for themselves. While risking the credibility of the U.N. as a collective security system they are strengthening their own influence and thus the importance of collective defense.

Perhaps the last word can be left with the Belgian General Briquemont who shortly after leaving his post as commander of UNPROFOR Bosnia reportedly "...stressed that he and General Cot, who are nevertheless officers of NATO countries, have never been contacted (by NATO), although it would have been easy to get them to come to Brussels in order to explain the situation and requirements."[30]

Endnotes: Chapter Five

[1] Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D.C., January 1994, p. 67.

[2] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms - Incorporating NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Publication 1-02, 1.12.1989; Quotes are NATO definitions; the U.S. definitions are similar, but somewhat differently worded.

[3] National Security Council, *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Draft, 1994, p. 2.

[4] Aspin, op cit., p. 67.

[5] Op cit., *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, p. 2.

[6] Nevertheless, "The U.S. commander will retain full command authority over all assigned U.S. forces." Taken from, *U.S. Army: Peace Operations, FM 100-23*, (Draft Version 6), 19 January 1994, p. 3-3.

[7] Op cit., *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, p. 5.

[8] Ibid., p. 9.

[9] Ibid., p.8; National Security Council, *Executive Summary: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Draft, (1994), Washington, D.C., p. 2.

[10] Maybe this is another reason why U.S. policies distinguish both types of operation according to the level of violence occurring and not, as British military doctrine does, according to whether the role of troops is characterized by impartiality. Op cit., *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, p. 11; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie, *Wider Peacekeeping*, Second Draft (Revised), 5 February 1994, pp. 2-12 and 2-13.

[11] Op cit.l, *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, pp. 9-10.

[12] Ibid., p. 1; U.S. Army, *Peace Operations, FM 100-23*, (Draft Version 6), 19 January 1994, p. 3-1.

[13] Anthony Lake on 21 September 1993, according to Aspin, op cit., p. 67.

[14] *NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, Draft, change 1, 28 February 1994, Brussels, p. 4.

[15] John Barret, *NATO and the UN "Agenda for Peace"*, draft written remarks for a NATO Defense College Seminar, Brussels, October 1993, p. 6.

[16] MC 327.3.

[17] MC 327.20 and Annex A.

[18] MC 327 Annex A.

[19] Although there is no official policy paper mentioning the option, several politicians from NATO countries have also indicated that NATO, perhaps in the future, could act as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which if accepted, would allow NATO to develop its own mandates under Chapter VI. Because this option is limited to peacekeeping it is less likely to be considered seriously than the idea of NATO operating unilaterally under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter without a mandate from the U.N. Security Council; *With the UN Whenever Possible, Without When Necessary?* Brussels, 1993, pp. 3-5.

[20] NATO Press Service: Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993, Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, M-NACC 1(93)40, p.3. The document also makes clear that "it is for the U.N. or the CSCE through consultations with contributing states and organisations, to define in each case the arrangement for the conduct of a peacekeeping operation, including command relationship." This should not be interpreted "as giving the mandating body the power to make unilateral decisions on command relationships."

[21] NACC Working Group for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning: Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations, Brussels, 17 March 1994, cf., pp. 10, 21, 33.

[22] Prime Minister John Major, Press release, *Statement by the Prime Minister at the NATO Summit*, 10 January 1994.

[23] Independently of this, NATO would retain the right to abolish all commitments immediately in the case of an Article V collective defense operation occurring.

[24] *The Evolution of NATO and its Consequences for the WEU*, WEU-Document 1410, 23 March 1994, part III.

[25] Rolf Clement, "Das Combined Joint Task Force Programm der NATO," *Loyal*, February 1994; quoted as reprinted in: *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, March 1994, p. 19f.

[26] Aspin, op cit., pp. 67/71.

[27] Simon Jones, "General Mackenzie slams UN's Nine-to-Fivers," *Independent on Sunday*, 31 January 1993. For further analysis see: Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* Adelphi Paper 281, London: IISS/Brassey's, October 1993; and Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 3-30.

[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, *U.N.-Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions*, GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Washington, D.C., 29 December 1993, pp. 4-5.

[29] Op cit., *Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, p. 5.

[30] "General Briquemont Is Bitter," *Atlantic News*, No. 2612, 7 March 1994, p. 3.

Chapter Six
Intelligence Policy and Peacekeeping

Under normal circumstances nearly all NATO intelligence is supplied to the Alliance by nations for the exclusive use of the Alliance as a whole and for its constituent nations. Intelligence provided on this basis cannot be given by NATO to a non-member nation or any international organization containing non-member nations. Whatever different requirements emerge for peace support operations this fundamental principle must be upheld.[1]

MC 327, Annex D

The parties to a conflict in wider peacekeeping environments will be suspicious of all intelligence related activities. They are likely to regard the gathering of intelligence itself as a hostile act.[2]

Lt. Col. Charles Dobbie

Military intelligence is as important as personnel and firepower in modern warfare. It is also one of the most decisive elements of timely, informed, and well developed decision-making in the exercise of peacekeeping. Intelligence can be gathered, for example, by armed forces on the ground, by aerial reconnaissance, satellite photography, electronic eavesdropping, spies, diplomats and open sources.

This chapter describes how NATO's management of intelligence influences peace operations. It discusses the attitudes of NATO and Western armies toward managing intelligence in peace operations with particular respect to the key issues of political control and impartiality. The relationship of NATO intelligence policy to possible PfP and CJTF operations is assessed as a source of future problems. The conclusion is that confusion, friction, threats to impartiality and weakened authority for the U.N. and the CSCE are endemic in NATO and Western intelligence planning.

Intelligence Policy in Peacekeeping

A central problem for the success of NATO-led peacekeeping is NATO's refusal to share the intelligence produced for its integrated military command. NATO planning for peace support operations reveals this starkly: "Under normal circumstances nearly all NATO intelligence is supplied to the Alliance by nations for the exclusive use of the Alliance as a whole and for its constituent nations. Intelligence provided on this basis cannot be given by NATO to a non-member nation or any international organization containing non-member nations. Whatever different requirements emerge for peace support operations this fundamental principle must be upheld."[3] The same language is to be found in NATO's draft doctrine of February 1994. NATO planning assumes a continuum of peace support operations. A low intensity monitoring operation may become a high intensity peace enforcement operation. The requirement to plan for peace enforcement from the beginning creates an additional tendency to gather and guard intelligence from the beginning.

Problems related to access to intelligence are not only something to look out for in the future. Difficulties have already erupted concerning intelligence sharing in the Bosnia operations. Belgian General Briquemont, former UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, complained that there was no way he could gain intelligence.[4] In addition, in 1992 when incoming fire, despite "U.N. control" of weapons, suggested both sides were cheating, Canadian General Mackenzie complained that "there was no way we could know--we had absolutely no intelligence. I hope General Rose now has satellite imagery and signals intelligence from the international commu-

nity to enable him to do his job."[5]

The tension between needing to inform coalition partners and international authorities on the one hand, and keeping information secret on the other, is recognized but not resolved in the planning document. NATO insists on its inability, as an international organization, to give away any sovereign state's military information. Nevertheless, it emphasizes that member nations are at liberty to authorize sharing of information: "Where military information is supported from national sources, the degree to which that information is shared will depend on the policy of the nations involved, but must be handled with great sensitivity." [6]

U.S. Army draft doctrine makes a greater emphasis than does MC 327 on the importance of sharing intelligence. U.S. Army draft doctrine recognizes that, "in some cases we have existing arrangements which discriminate between allies within the multinational force. For example our standardized exchange systems with NATO nations may create friction where we have NATO and non-NATO allies in a peace operation."[7]

In support of the U.N. during the UNOSOM II Somalia operation, the U.S. gathered intelligence at the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and distributed sanitized versions to the U.N. in New York, and its own U.S. synthesis to U.S. officers in the field. The U.S. Army recommends a similar two-tier process in future operations, but notes that "a key to effective multinational intelligence is a readiness, beginning with the highest level of command, to make required adjustments to national concepts for intelligence support to make the multinational action effective."[8] It is unclear whether the political will exists to

Box V: NATO Intelligence Policy

NATO nations, especially the United States, control the most important intelligence gathering systems in Europe. NATO itself has no intelligence assets other than the AWACS, and even this flies under the Luxembourg flag. This is because NATO is an international rather than a supranational organization.

NATO has however developed an intelligence synthesis capability using national input.

This capability provides the eyes and ears of the integrated NATO command structure under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It is this command and intelligence structure which NATO officials put forward as one of the key reasons why NATO should be the organization responsible for European security. "Unique NATO capabilities may be essential to meet the greater demands of peace support operations in the new security environment."[1] Yet in relation to peacekeeping operations of all kinds NATO's approach to the management of intelligence presents a major obstacle to achieving successful operations.

NATO staff are expected to evaluate intelligence passed to them and brief the appropriate civilian and military authorities. "While each Alliance member is committed to sharing information for the common defense, intelligence collection is dominated within NATO by the United States, Great Britain and, to a much lesser degree, West Germany."[2]

U.S. satellite photography and U.S. and British satellite electronic "eavesdropping" are the most closely guarded assets. It is on account of these that there are special rooms at major NATO command centers. They are rooms which non-U.S./U.K. nationals are allowed to visit only by special arrangement. U.S. intelligence gathering is itself not a unified system. Each armed service operates a collection management office which operates through a Joint Intelligence Center. U.S. intelligence officers attached to NATO commanders send and receive requests from NATO to the U.S. for intelligence — as do other nations' officers. This NATO Collection Coordination Intelligence Requirements Management System is managed by the Intelligence Division at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) at Mons, Belgium. Three types of information flow depend on procedures and case by case national decisions:

- Some information flows within a single nation's bureaucracies and military forces.
- Some passes between specific nations by bilateral agreement—the U.S.-U.K. agreement is the most prominent example.
- Some information is contributed by nations to NATO.

Notes:
[1] MC 327.2.
[2] Paul Stares, *Command Performance*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991.

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implement the second part of this recommendation, which might lead to ensuring the useful quality of the intelligence being passed on to the U.N. This is currently being so sanitized as to be useless. PDD 25 offers U.S. "information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods."[9] This amounts to providing analysis without sources, an approach which requires the U.N. to accept U.S. information on trust.

The international mediators in Former Yugoslavia were not in receipt of NATO intelligence. Nevertheless, as individuals, each had informal access to national channels of information, through low level diplomatic traffic from their own national governments. Thus their level of private knowledge was quite high. U.N. Commanders in the field fared similarly, relying on their unofficial access to national intelligence. Only the U.N. in New York was not informed at all.

Unfortunately, NATO's 'fundamental' principle regarding not sharing intelligence is at odds with other principles to which it also seeks to adhere. Three of the more important are: the need for impartiality and transparency of operations;[10] the requirement that political control be exercised by an accepted international authority such as the U.N. or CSCE;[11] and the desire for effective military and political command and control in peace support operations which will by their nature be multilateral.[12] These requirements imply an openness or sharing of intelligence in situations which are very different from classical warfare.

NATO's MC 327 suggests that intelligence arrangements may be packaged on a case by case basis in peace support operations to include non-member countries. "[Normal arrangements] do not prevent individual nations entering into bi- or multi-lateral arrangements with selected [non-NATO] nations for the supply or exchange of intelligence. Such arrangements should be encouraged."[13] The NACC's Draft Planning Principles express this need even more strongly. While intelligence is seen as crucial for both the security of forces and the success of operations, it states that: "All national and possibly multinational assets should be made available to ensure the timely availability of all information required for the mounting and execution of peacekeeping operations." Nevertheless, the NACC Ad Hoc Working Group has to admit that "it would be up to the nations or organizations to decide their specific contributions."[14] Since ad hoc coalitions with non-NATO partners may become the norm for peace support operations—and these coalitions will doubtless need the "unique capabilities" of NATO intelligence—the problems outlined here need prompt attention from governments.

Political Control

NATO recognizes that political control is essential in peace support operations, and states: "The overall political control of a peace support operation will be the responsibility of the U.N. or the CSCE." Yet at the same time it stipulates that: "If the Alliance decides to act in support of the U.N. or the CSCE, [NATO's] existing command structure will be used to the greatest extent possible, subject to consultations with the senior executive body of the responsible organization [U.N. or CSCE]."[15] The reasoning behind this formulation is that: "Whatever arrangements the Alliance works out with the U.N. or the CSCE will have to be sound from a military, as well as a political point of view." Military concerns are understandable, but political control is in danger of being reduced to a mere cipher both by the command and control arrangements described in the previous chapter and by NATO and Western approaches to intelligence management.

NATO restrictions on intelligence sharing with other bodies pose a particular problem with regard to the command and control relationship that NATO would prefer. Such behavior may undercut NATO's credibility in multinational discussions of possible missions or mandates. Furthermore, if NATO acts at the behest of the U.N. or CSCE, it will be acting on behalf of agencies whose decisions are informed by different and lower-level intelligence. At best, political control of the U.N. and CSCE may have to be exercised on the basis of very poor information. Political decision-making is about force levels, rules of engagement, and military objectives, all of which

can be misjudged if intelligence is wrong or insufficient. NATO's refusal to share intelligence contradicts its repeated desire for clearer mandates and missions from the U.N., since these require improved intelligence.

The friction caused by NATO's attitude toward intelligence may cause severe operational problems. It may make it difficult to mount a peacekeeping operation in the first place. Both the U.N. and the CSCE may be reluctant to sanction handing over full control of a situation to NATO in circumstances where they retain overall responsibility but do not have the information on which to act. These organizations may never seriously be able to execute political guidance or control if they are relegated to this subordinate position. Finally, the room for confusion and misjudgment in a policy-making process where different parties are using different information to arrive at their decisions is vast. It may lead to bad decisions, but also is more likely to result in indecision and inaction.

Impartiality

Problems may arise from the outset with the criterion of impartiality and with the principle of transparency. MC 327 Annex D sets out the principles of "Military Information," which is defined as military intelligence in scenarios other than "peace enforcement." "Where an area of crisis has been identified, a special intelligence focus will be required at an early stage to allow continuing assessment of the crisis situation, which will be essential in support of the decision-makers and contingency planners."[16] These sentiments contradict the concern for impartiality which is recognized elsewhere as being essential in peace support missions: "the parties to the conflict will be suspicious of all attempts by a peace support force to gather information on their military and paramilitary forces, no matter how essential the information is to the operational effectiveness of the mission. This concern requires that, with the exception of enforcement operations, the methods and procedures ... be significantly different from those developed for conventional military operations."[17] According to Charles Dobbie, the term "military information" is used to calm "local sensitivities" and to take into account the multi-national nature of these operations, but "the principles are similar to those that govern the operational intelligence function."[18]

The continued emphasis on planning at all times for all levels of contingency jeopardizes the impartiality of peace support operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations in places such as Cyprus have relied on adversaries accepting that the U.N. has not been partisan. Events in Somalia have demonstrated how difficult the U.N.'s position can become once this perception of impartiality is lost. In Bosnia, impartiality has been eroded.

Denial of intelligence information might lead to mistrust of NATO's (and by extension U.N./CSCE) impartiality. For example, NATO states expect to need the cooperation of non-NATO members in any Bosnian operation. Some states may be unwilling to serve under a NATO command which does not provide them with full access to intelligence resources. A foretaste of this problem was given in the Russian reaction to NATO's air strikes in Bosnia. Russia (with ground troops present, but not under NATO command) demanded to be consulted, implying access to intelligence, decision-making, and command and control, before NATO carried out such actions.[19]

NATO nations do not expect to be able to provide the 50,000-75,000 troops needed to administer a settlement in Former Yugoslavia. Ukrainian or Russian troops already on the ground under UNPROFOR have complained that they have not been kept fully informed. If NATO is to run a major operation in Bosnia using NACC, PfP or CJTF structures this problem will have to be faced. They would be unlikely to feed information into a system which, once it had processed the data, refused to hand over the full results. MC 327 provides a possible solution through optional bilateral agreements to share information in specific operations and U.S.-Russian agreements provide a precedent.

MC 327 recognizes the problem of jeopardizing humanitarian operations through intelligence gathering. At its worst, this danger affects NGO and other

personnel engaged in the kind of peacekeeping operations which require "an impartial third party intervention,"[20] or in humanitarian aid, either of which may turn at some point into "peace enforcement," that is war.

Another problem is that if planning is generic and includes peace enforcement operations — especially in planning for contingencies — prior intelligence needs to be gathered and shared. For example, at the present time British, French and U.S. forces (among others) are on the ground in the Balkans — though participating in different operations. At the same time, national authorities, the U.N., and NATO are all considering acts of war. Are we to assume that at the present time, or under NATO command at a later date, such forces would not be supplying intelligence to assist in strike planning? Trying to provide both peacekeeping and peace enforcement while remaining impartial is likely to be difficult if not impossible.

Intelligence in Future CJTF and PfP Operations

NATO has decided to develop CJTFs which could operate on behalf of either NATO or the WEU. However, the WEU is at a serious disadvantage with regard to C2I, in comparison with U.S.-supported NATO operations. The WEU Assembly recently emphasized that in such possible WEU operations, a CJTF headquarters can only be effective, "if essential collective alliance assets such as satellite intelligence and AWACS are available at the same time."[21] According to the report, the WEU Planning Cell "needs to have access to NATO and national intelligence including secret material if its work is to be taken seriously. An intelligence agreement between the WEU and NATO is urgently needed."[22]

After the Gulf War, France in particular became concerned at its lack of independent satellite photographic, signals and communications capability. As a first step, the WEU set up a satellite information analysis station in Spain. Unfortunately the analysts there are using only Landsat photos—which are technically inferior and can in any case be bought elsewhere—and, when budgets permit, the technically much better French SPOT photos.[23] Nothing which matches the U.S. system is yet available through the WEU. For the longer term the French government has increased budget authority for the DRM, its newest intelligence service, from 39 million francs in 1993 to 243 million in 1994. These sums are being used to upgrade European satellite capability. In May 1994 the Federal Security Council of the FRG agreed to pay up to 20% of the cost of the Helios 2, part of a new French designed satellite system consisting of two photo-reconnaissance satellites, two radar satellites and a leased relay satellite. On a national basis France is also buying signals intelligence satellites.[24]

Thus some pressure has recently been exerted to reassess the European satellite station and the capacity of WEU to operate its own independent intelligence-gathering and communications system. But there is little sense that a purely European organization could compete with what NATO has to offer. This may not appear problematic as long as a high degree of coincidence between American and European interests is assumed.

Nevertheless there are problems that should be foreseen. Neither individual states within the European Union, nor the WEU, can conduct their own peacekeeping operations without NATO C2I infrastructure and logistic support. Thus, at a time when the EU is assuming a political identity, and developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European defense and security identity lacks the capacity for independent action. Under the CJTF agreements, Les Aspin has made it plain: "In the case of WEU operations, the WEU commander would have the full authority even if drawing on NATO collective assets. The SACEUR would train, package and provide the assets to the WEU. NATO would make CJTF assets available to the WEU or other groups, provided that NATO remains the central forum for decision-making about common security issues."[25] NATO's C2I is one of the critical areas which the U.S. has in its power to deny, not by a formal veto but a de facto one, to European partners. Manfred Woerner expressed optimism that "common WEU stances will be increasingly introduced into Alliance consultations."[26] But it is difficult to foresee politi-

cally acceptable solutions where one partner always holds the trump card.

Thus it remains to be seen which of the major multi-billion dollar assets needed for truly independent operations will be developed and procured first. The WEU currently lacks long range transportation, aerial refueling, mobile Command and Control and satellite reconnaissance. Acquisition of a European reconnaissance satellite system is among the higher priorities.

The Partnership for Peace will entail increased intelligence constraints. Such constraints may limit the opportunities open to NACC countries to follow up on NATO's PfP invitation. If this is the case, it will decrease their chances of proving their worthiness—and therefore their hopes of early NATO membership. Bilateral agreement options are also double-edged. The accumulation of bilateral information exchange agreements between nations participating in PfP may open up interesting options for U.S.-Russian cooperation, since these are the partners who have most to gain from each other in intelligence terms. But such agreements could make multilateral agreements more difficult, and are likely to disadvantage many of the NACC countries.

The bilateral agreements may sharpen the distinction between any future U.S.-CIS cooperation on the one hand, and WEU-NACC cooperation on the other. While this makes for a useful division of labor in peacekeeping terms, it also risks reproducing features of the Cold War alignment, with both East and West European interests subordinated to the dynamics of the superpower relationship. It might lead to political tension between NATO and the European core, if interests diverge, as they did for example over the SDI idea in the past, and as they will do over the Counterproliferation Initiative in the future. One option would be for NATO to handle only peace enforcement operations, with all others being commanded and controlled through the U.N. and CSCE using NATO command structures, communications and logistics.

The expectation that the U.N. and CSCE can take meaningful political responsibility for a peace support operation without having access to the intelligence brief which is driving operational planning should be a major issue in the debate over NATO's future roles. If disputes over decision making continue between NATO and the U.N., it will be important to observe whether NATO uses its intelligence superiority over the U.N. to argue that it is more capable and responsible.

Endnotes: Chapter Six

[1] MC 327, Annex D.

[2] Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dobbie, *Wider Peacekeeping*, Second Draft (Revised), 5 February 1994.

[3] MC 327, Annex D.

[4] "General Briquemont is Bitter," *Atlantic News*, No. 2612, 7 March 1994, p. 3.

[5] General Lewis Mackenzie, former U.N. Commander in Bosnia, speaking in a BBC Radio interview on 11 February 1994.

[6] MC 327, Annex D.7.

[7] U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, version 6, Appendix C-1.

[8] Ibid., version 6, Appendix C.

[9] National Security Council, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, May 1994, p. 9.

[10] MC 327.14.

[11] MC 327.20.

[12] MC 327.20, and Annex A.

[13] MC 327, Annex D.

[14] NACC Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning: Draft NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations, Brussels, 17 March 1994, cf., p. 21.

[15] MC 327.20.

[16] MC 327, Annex D.4.

[17] MC 327.23.

[18] Dobbie, op cit., pp. 5-20.

[19] After the 10-11 April 1994 NATO air strikes, Russians complained that they were not represented in the decision-making. Manfred Woerner, speaking in a BBC radio interview on 12 April 1994, said that Mr. Akashi, as the U.N. representative, was representing Russia, and that Russian requests to be consulted were "mad."

[20] MC 327.12.b.

[21] Assembly of the WEU: The WEU Planning Cell, WEU-Doc 1421, Paris, May 1994.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Information provided to the author by a source who does not wish to be identified.

[24] Intelligence Newsletter, 5.5.1994 p. 5 and 27.8.1992 p. 4.

[25] Les Aspin, U.S. Secretary of Defense, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 2 Dec 1993.

Chapter Seven
The U.N. - NATO Relationship - Who Controls the Peace Agenda?

A debate has definitely begun about the wisdom of having tied NATO so tightly to the U.N.'s apron strings.[1]

Internal NATO Discussion Paper - "With the UN Whenever Possible, Without When Necessary?"

NATO's discussion of its future relationship with the United Nations has not yet come to a conclusion. However, President Clinton's recent approval of PDD 25 has clarified the position. NATO is the U.S.'s institution of choice where the U.S. national interest and the size of the commitment of its forces warrants it. The power of NATO in respect to the U.N. described in this report is exemplified in an influential NATO paper summarized here. The preference of key states for funding NATO rather than the U.N. for peacekeeping purposes powerfully reinforces these tendencies.

"With the U.N. whenever possible, without when necessary?" is the title of an internal discussion paper distributed by the U.S. mission to NATO in late summer 1993 and intended "to provoke reflection." Noting that "the U.N./NATO tandem is not delivering the goods" in cases like the former Yugoslavia, it argues that "the fortunes of the global organisation will increasingly depend on a NATO prepared to envisage autonomous action." The U.N. mandate needs to be "demystified" because the interests of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are "simply too diverse to expect that they will always succeed in generating the mandates necessary." The case of the Gulf War, where "U.N. solidarity was built around the will of the U.S. and its closest Allies ... and not vice versa" is seen as a prototype for a desirable relationship between NATO and the U.N. "NATO should set the decision-making parameters for the U.N., and not the other way around."

The success of the Gulf War--both militarily and as a coalition-building exercise--has embedded itself deep in the pysche of American defense intellectuals. The central proposition of the discussion paper is that: "The trick is now to engineer a similar dynamic [to the Gulf War] in the NATO/U.N. interface." The paper also reviews counter arguments for "NATO undertaking unmandated military activity outside the treaty area," under Article 51 provisions for collective self-defense. However, these arguments are found wanting because of the risks of setting such a precedent, and because, as a matter of fact, success rates are higher with a U.N. mandate. "Historical experience with peacekeeping and other forms of benign outside intervention in a sovereign country's affairs underlines that actions which are not carried out under U.N. mandate tend to be much less successful than those which enjoy U.N. backing."[2]

This approach sets out an agenda that apparently is already being implemented according to the analysis in the preceding chapters. There seems to be widespread consensus within the Alliance that NATO should handle requests to support U.N. or CSCE activities on a case by case basis. At the same time, it should ensure against the U.N. dominating NATO's agenda. In the words of United States Senator Byrd: "Neither the United States nor the United Nations is, or can be, the white knight that rides to the rescue of every damsel in distress."[3] Even though three of the five permanent Security Council members are also members of NATO (the U.S., Britain and France), the Alliance is nervous about U.N. decisions. NATO members have neither the capabilities nor the political will to intervene everywhere and in favor of everybody.

The debate on peacekeeping in the West has

tended to polarize between two views. The first is that peacekeeping is a public service with a high moral value in which the U.S. should naturally take a world leadership role. The second is the hard-bitten realist view that the U.S. should stay out of peacekeeping in order to look after its own interests and should avoid being a lackey of the U.N.

By accepting the terms of this debate, analysts may miss a more important process. It is perfectly possible for the U.S., or NATO, to take on U.N. peacekeeping *and* to do so in pursuit of their own interests. States which are important members of both the North Atlantic Council and the U.N. Security Council could stand to benefit most from bringing the two international organizations closer together. Thus a NATO strategy to transform itself into the security arm of the U.N. is quite consistent with a NATO strategy of maintaining its own autonomy. It all depends on the terms of the deal.

NATO's terms are clearly set out in MC 327. Whatever the arrangements worked out with the U.N. or CSCE, the Alliance will retain the authority to:

- Make available its contribution to U.N./CSCE.
- Change, replace or withdraw its contribution as appropriate.
- Formulate limitations on the use of its resources.[4]

The Alliance also reserves the right to decline any U.N. request for peace support. Thus the U.N. proposes, NATO disposes, on a case by case basis.

U.N. and CSCE mandates for NATO military activities are welcomed for the legitimation they give to NATO policy, but NATO will be selective in deciding which actions to carry out. It can rightly be argued that all states retain the right to pick and choose when they answer the call from the U.N. The crucial difference between the attitude of NATO and that of individual states toward the question of retaining autonomy is that by seeking to strengthen its "unique" qualities NATO is also ensuring that it retains a monopoly position. Since some of the members of the U.N. Security Council are NATO members they have the choice to turn down the proposal for a peacekeeping mission in non-vital situations where they may think that this is tactically more prudent. Letting the U.N. ask, and NATO turn down the request is a good way of making sure that no-one takes the blame for inactivity. Alternative structures, such as a U.N. Army or a U.N. standby force, are not supported because that would weaken the fresh legitimacy NATO gets from taking over peacekeeping tasks. At the same time, NATO is insisting that another multinational body (itself) be introduced into the decision making process.

Interests and Institutions

Another change in the decision-making environment concerns resources. One of the most important structures which is being created through formal arrangements between NATO and the U.N. is a new framework for burden sharing.

The Alliance is under no illusion that the U.N. will be able to pay for its services as peacekeeper. "The U.N. is broke."[5] Alliance members prefer to back NATO operations supporting the U.N., rather than the U.N. directly because of NATO's obvious resource advantage (equipment, trained personnel, financial) over the U.N. "Greater NATO involvement ... ensures greater coherence between resources and decisions about how peacekeeping and peace enforcement action should proceed." This has two clear advantages for the Alliance. First, it facilitates burden sharing. "The greater the NATO involvement, the greater the prospect for ensuring that Western countries share fairly in supporting the material and political burden of third-party action in favour of U.N. resolutions." Second, it connects unequivocally resources and decision-making. "The objective must be to ensure an efficient correlation between who provides the resources, who takes the decisions, and who is responsible for implementation."

One implication of this is that NATO could exploit the U.N.'s financial situation--a situation which is partially caused by NATO member states--in order to achieve the peacekeeping decisions and arrangements NATO countries want to have. Burden sharing, for instance, may become "a precondition for

nations freeing funds for U.N. missions." For a "relatively resource-rich organization like NATO" it would not be difficult to dictate terms.

The changing relationship between the U.N. and NATO cannot be viewed in isolation from the dynamics of the other "interlocking institutions." NATO's discussion about burden sharing through the U.N. can be set alongside the arrangements which are under way for CJTFs and then PfP. Together these indicate the trend toward a comprehensive restructuring of the financing of large-scale military operations. Here too, the ideal U.S. model is the Gulf War. According to some calculations, the U.S. as the lead nation came out of that operation slightly better off, compared with other coalition members, despite the enormous input of American troops and weaponry.[6]

Other subtle changes in the decision-making environment are heralded by the legal implications of NATO acting as agent of the U.N. Inevitably, since NATO was established as an alliance for collective self-defense, it has no legal status outside the NATO area. Within area, NATO personnel benefit from the privileges and immunities normally associated with the NATO Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and the same principles apply to NATO assets. Clearly, NATO will want the same benefits when acting out of area on the U.N.'s behalf. "NATO's legal identity and status, and those of its military bodies, respectively established pursuant to the Ottawa Agreement, the Paris Protocol and the NATO SOFA do not exist for operations in the territory of non-NATO nations. As a result, a formal agreement between NATO and the U.N. or the host country is required."[7] This is unusual in that the United Nations does not normally make such agreements with other international organizations. The normal pattern is for bilateral SOFA agreements to be made between the U.N. and individual member states who are contributing U.N. troops. Detailed legal arrangements are negotiated between the parties, both on command and control, and on intelligence sharing. The new proposal therefore represents a major change in the U.N.'s dealing with its member states. It requires the U.N. to negotiate, not with individual member states, but with an alliance, and a powerful military one at that.

In seeking a standard status of forces agreement from the U.N., NATO is setting a precedent. Naturally, any international organization would want to regularize its relationship with the U.N. Nevertheless, it is startling that NATO is seeking an automatic authority in the field when invited by the U.N. without offering any automatic contribution to the U.N. when requested. It could, for example, commit elements of its reaction forces to the proposed U.N. Standby Force.

Since NATO's key member states play a major role in the U.N. Security Council already, this is another case of NATO making its presence felt twice over in the decision-making process. If NATO's member states find that they have to accept a U.N. resolution they dislike on one level, they may be able to negotiate terms which effectively amend it on another level. National interests may have opportunities for asserting themselves even more strongly in these overlapping institutions; it will be difficult to convince less favorably placed nations that their interests can be served through the U.N.[8]

Peacekeeping and World Order

The NATO Alliance has quietly adopted the mantle of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping or "Peace Support" has become a principal task for the Alliance running through the new military relationships with states to the East, as well as the rationale for rapid reaction forces. There has been very little attention paid by politicians or non-governmental organizations to these developments.

The shape of NATO's approach to peacekeeping will have a profound effect upon the shape of the "New World Order." The dominance of the Alliance in European security affairs and the preference of the United States for NATO alone ensure that this will be the case. There appear to be significant and unresolved problems in the Alliance's approach to peace support. The tendency is to adopt an approach to peacekeeping which favors a more traditional military approach, largely determined by the level of violence, rather than an approach drawn from experience of U.N. operations on the ground. The latter

would focus on the question of impartiality as a divide between traditional peacekeeping and the wider operations undertaken since 1990. In addition to this problem of how to think about peacekeeping itself, the Alliance's whole approach to the issue is designed to give it a dominant position with respect to the U.N., the CSCE and the EU/WEU. In this it reflects a clear preference in U.S. policy. The larger risk may be that NATO and the U.S. will effectively prevent any other body from obtaining the capability to act without them, while they themselves often refuse to act when humanity, but not their interests, demands it. NATO and the U.S. are anxious not become the "White Knight," but are even more concerned that anyone else should look like saddling up and taking on the role. At least, anyone else should be under "control," as the WEU is via the CJTF.

The World Wars of the twentieth century led the great powers to set up organizations having the potential for organizing collective security systems, first in the League of Nations, then in the United Nations. The analysis in this report indicates that the major powers are on the brink of endorsing a de facto return to reliance on a collective defense arrangement able to act with and without the sponsorship of the U.N.

The vital national interests of the member states of the Alliance are likely to restrict NATO's involvement in peace support operations. Conflicts merely threatening to become international will be subject to peacekeeping through either NATO or NACC, while conflicts endangering Alliance members' vital interests will be more likely to become subject to peace enforcement by NATO, or in some areas WEU. Conflict containment will continue to be NATO's basic interest in situations similar to the current one in Former Yugoslavia; conflict resolution by military means may well be the Alliance's intention in Gulf War-type conflicts. National interests rather than humanitarian efforts, international stability rather than peace, are still likely to be the driving factors behind the decisions which will be made in the future.

Endnotes: Chapter Seven

[1] Quotations here and in the following three paragraphs are taken from "With the U.N. Whenever Possible, Without When Necessary?" a NATO internal discussion paper circulated in August 1993.

[2] See the examples given in Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts," *Survival*, Spring 1993.

[3] *Congressional Record*, United States Senate, 1 July 1993, p. S8404.

[4] MC 327.20.

[5] Quotations in this and the following paragraph are from "With the U.N. Whenever Possible, Without When Necessary?"

[6] "[T]he marginal cost of the Gulf War to the U.S. was very small and might well have been negative" is the conclusion of Murray Wolfson and Robert Smith, "How not to pay for the War," *Defence Economics*, Vol.4., 1993, p. 299.

[7] MC 327, Annex F.

[8] For a similar view, see: "Spheres of Influence," *Financial Times*, Editorial, 8 August 1994, which notes that "permanent members ... using the U.N. to ratify their division of the world into spheres of influence" ... "is bound to cause increasing resentment among other U.N. members."

Appendix A: Acronyms

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AMF	ACE Mobile Force (NATO)
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
AVF	All Volunteer Force
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
BITS	Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security
C2I	Command, Control, and Intelligence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS	Communications and Information Systems (MC 327)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials (CSCE)
DPC	Defence Planning Committee (NATO)
DRM	Direction du Renseignement Militaire
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
FM	Field Manual (U.S. Army)
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation (CSCE)
HQ	Headquarters
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IRF	Immediate Reaction Forces (NATO)
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Systems (U.S.)
LANDCENT	(Allied) Land Forces Central Europe (NATO)
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MND	Multinational Division
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive (U.S.)
PRD	Presidential Review Directive (U.S.)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces (NATO)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative (U.S.)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement (NATO)
STANAVFORCHAN	Standing Naval Forces Channel (NATO)
STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (NATO)
STANAVFORMED	Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (NATO)
U.N.	United Nations
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces (former Yugoslavia)
WEU	Western European Union

Appendix B: International Legal Framework

The United Nations Charter (excerpts)

Chapter I

Article 1

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

Chapter V - The Security Council

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Chapter VI - Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Article 33

1. The Parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon parties to settle their disputes by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the united Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which may have been already adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Chapter VII - Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operation by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII - Regional Arrangements

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy as it is used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C., 4 April 1949 (excerpts)

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6[1]

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France[2], on the Territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area of the Tropic of Cancer.

Notes:

[1]The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the Protocols signed on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.

[2]On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

Appendix C: Membership in Security Organizations



*	Iceland, Norway, and Turkey function as associate members of the WEU.
t	Denmark and Ireland function as observers of the WEU.
+	Finland acts as an observer of the NACC.
v	The Successor State of the former Yugoslavia has been suspended from CSCE participation.
n	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia acts as an observer of the CSCE.

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Appendix D: NATO's New Command Structure



BASIC/BITS

Appendix E: LANDCENT's Multinational Structure



Appendix F: NATO'S Reaction Forces



Appendix G: ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
Corps-Troops (proposed)



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Appendix H: ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

Part One

Appendix H (cont.): ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

Part Two



Appendix I: Euro-Corps Structure



Appendix J: Forces Answerable to the WEU



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