



INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

GENERAL CONFERENCE

FORTY-EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION

SEPTEMBER 2004

STATEMENT

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

**STATEMENT TO THE FORTY-EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION OF
THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY**

by

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and

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In the name of God
The compassionate, the merciful

Mr. President;

At the outset I would like to congratulate your election to the presidency of this session. I am confident that, through your rich experiences and cooperation of the participants, the conference would enjoy full success in promoting international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I assure you the full co-operation of my delegation. I would like to appreciate the Director General for his report to the General Conference.

Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates,

In order to save your valuable time, I draw your kind attention to some general points regarding our nuclear policy and programs and refrain from entering into some details which will be distributed for your due consideration.

Mr. President,

The Agency is expected to promote the international co-operation on peaceful use of nuclear energy. As stipulated in articles II and III of the Statute, the Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The Agency is authorized to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The Article IV of the NPT calls upon all the Parties, as an undertaking, to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange

of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

It is essential to note that according to the same article, nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

Mr. President;

A critical and fair review and assessment of the development of the past decades since the IAEA was established and the NPT entered into force, reveals the regretful fact that the spirit and the letter of the promotional provision of the Agency's Statute as well as the NPT have not been implemented. Islamic Republic of Iran had therefore no choice other than depending on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. President;

For more than a quarter of century, in spite of sanctions, discrimination, deprivation and 8-year imposed war, our great nation has been able to stand on her feet and to struggle for independence and sustainable development. Unjustified continuous sanctions on various items even with direct impact on humanitarian needs as well as the ones with peaceful application of nuclear energy left no other option than the national mobilization for self-sufficiency.

Remarkable achievements on various peaceful applications of nuclear technology and various stages of nuclear fuel production are the result of decades of huge investment and scientific efforts of our eminent experts.

Our great nation will not permit any interference and or interruption in our purely peaceful and indigenous nuclear program and it will not give up, at any price.

Mr. President

A new move seems to be taking sharp in recent years which, if not driven into a proper format, can stand to harm the Treaty and the Safeguards system. The apparent intention, beneath the claims for further security against proliferation, is to limit the already subdued rights of Member States for peaceful purposes. The call made earlier this year that states who have not yet acquired capability to produce nuclear fuel should forever give up this right sounds a devastating alarm.

Mr. President, distinguished Delegates,

Permit me to say a few words about the resolution adopted at the Board of Governors last week:

Some of the provisions of the resolution are in contrary to the letter and spirit of the Agency's statute and the NPT, and some are beyond the safeguards obligations. As declared by members of the Board of Governors including the sponsors of the resolution, there is a clear legal distinction between voluntary and obligatory measures. It was expected that this issue be explicitly incorporated in the resolution. In addition to that, calling upon a Member State to suspend or to stop nuclear activities such as enrichment, uranium conversion as well as construction of research reactor planned to produce radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes, which are in no means prohibited in the Agency's Statute and NPT will underestimate the credibility of this august technical body which is

established to promote the application of nuclear energy. These kinds of measures will also jeopardize the inalienable rights of the Member States. If the board chooses, under pressure from certain circles to move towards adversity and confrontation, it will make matters extremely complicated and unpredictable.

Mr. President

It is just too extreme an irony, that Israel's nuclear weapons program is not only tolerated, but indeed assisted and aided and impunity is prescribed and applied to the fullest, while peaceful programs with no established evidence of diversion are scrutinized. Such acute double-standard can not, must not and will not be sustained at the Agency.

Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates,

I would like to conclude by assuring, once again, the international community that all nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are peaceful and informing the determination of my country to continue its nuclear activities without interruption, under the surveillance of the Agency in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Short Summary of Nuclear Policy and Activities of Islamic Republic of Iran

a) Nuclear Policy & Program

Iran's nuclear policy and planning are based on peaceful, transparent and independent pillars. The nuclear weapons are not in the defense doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran's decision and determination for nuclear electricity generation is based on well technical and financial justified facts. The added value of the limited fossil resources, the utilization of these resources in other industries because of much greater added values, the concern on environmental pollution as well as the necessity of benefiting various options of energy resources including the nuclear, has convinced the Iranian policy makers to decide on the application of nuclear energy for electricity generation to fulfill the partial requirement of national electricity demands.

Based on the aforementioned considerations the reliance on merely fossil fuels for energy generation is unreasonable. Therefore, Iran has decided to produce electricity through nuclear power plants with total capacity of 7000 MWe by 2020.

Construction of nuclear power plants requires infrastructure and establishment of the related supporting facilities such as nuclear fuels fabrication. It is obvious that in order to produce nuclear fuels indigenously, one has to implement projects on mining, uranium ore processing, uranium conversion and enrichment.

To great extent Iran's nuclear activities in uranium ore processing, uranium conversion and enrichment as well as heavy water production, research reactor, designing and manufacturing centrifuge machines are the result of R&D conducted and experiences gradually gained during last 3 decades. All these are achieved during the period of imposed sanctions and lack of cooperation of industrial countries in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The international developments have had serious impact on Iran's nuclear policy, planning and implementation processes. Few example examples are as follows:

- The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1980 to convene the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy (UNPICPUNE). The conference was mandated to identify constraints and propose ways and means for the promotion of

international co-operation in this area. After almost a decade of preparation and negotiation, finally the conference was held in Geneva in 1987, but as the result of creation of obstacles by some industrial countries, particularly by Nuclear Weapon States, it failed to adopt any conclusion.

- Similar event occurred in the IAEA, where its Committee on Assurances of Supply expected to establish internationally recognized principles and legally binding instruments failed in 1987 after 7 years of intensive deliberations.
- Technical Co-operation (TC) activities of the Agency which is an important statutory function and has direct relation to developing countries, is funded by the voluntary contributions while the Safeguards activities are funded through regular budget of the IAEA. During the last three decades the developing countries have called for rectifying the situation and establishing an assured and predictable mechanism for the IAEA Technical Co-operation. This legitimate expectation has not yet been fulfilled due to objections of few developed Member States including some Nuclear Weapon States. Their intention is that the Agency be merely a watchdog institution where its statutory promotional function be gradually diminished. In a number of occasions the donors have threatened to halt or decrease voluntary contributions and in some cases have discriminated countries to benefit from the so called foot note-a TC projects.

Considering the aforementioned development which shows the lack of implementation of promotional pillars of Statute of the IAEA as well as provisions of the Article 4 of NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no choice other than to depend on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

b) Latest status of the Safeguards implementation in Iran

On basis of the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors (GOV/2004/60) one could briefly conclude:

- There has been no evidence of diversion of the Iranian nuclear program for military purposes.
- Iran is acting as if it has ratified the Additional Protocol and has submitted over 1030 pages of initial declaration pursuant to Additional Protocol. And also Iran has granted 13 complementary accesses under Article 4 of the Additional Protocol.
- The Agency continues to make steady progress in understanding the Iranian nuclear programme.
- As far as the laser enrichment activities and Iran's declared uranium conversion experiments are concerned, the Agency's investigations have reached a point where further follow-up will be carried out as a routine safeguards implementation matter.

- As the result of intensive joint work by the Agency and Iran, major progress has been made towards the resolution of the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran. Based on the Agency's analysis to date, it appears plausible that the HEU contamination found at those locations may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran.
- On the issue of the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of P-1 and P-2 design, the Agency has gained a better understanding of Iran's efforts relevant to both designs.
- The Agency has been able to verify Iran's suspension of enrichment related activities at related facilities and sites, and has been able to confirm that it has not observed, to date, any activities at those locations inconsistent with Iran's voluntary decision. *"Since the last report of the Director General to the Board of Governors, the Agency has been able to verify that there has been no operation or testing of any centrifuges at PFEP; that there has been no further introduction of nuclear material into any centrifuges at PFEP; that there has been no installation of new centrifuges at PFEP or installation of centrifuges at FEP; and that there has been no reprocessing at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)"* (Para 54 of the report). It has to be recalled that the suspension of enrichment was a voluntary gesture, a confidence building measure, temporary in nature and intended only to further facilitate a prompt closure of this Agenda Item.

c) Conclusion

The progressive development reported by the Director General's in his recent report to the Board of Governors would assist the Agency in drawing definitive conclusions and confirming the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations related to all aspects of its peaceful nuclear programme and the removal of the issue from the next Agenda of the Board of Governors.