

## Information Circular

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### Communication dated 7 March 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency

The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 7 March 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), attaching a document entitled “Complementary Information and Clarification on the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors on Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2006/15)”.

The Note Verbale and, as requested by the Permanent Mission, its attachment, are reproduced herein for the information of Member States.



**Permanent Mission of  
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The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency's Secretariat and has the honor to request the enclosed document entitled "*Complementary Information and Clarification on the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors on Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2006/15)*", to be published as an official INFCIRC document and make it available to the public through the IAEA website.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency's Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.



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**Complementary Information and Clarification  
Provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran on  
The report of the Director General to the Board of Governors on  
Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran  
(GOV/2006/15)**

The purely technical nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran is politicized. The bias, exaggerated and unjustified information has misled the international community. Due to technical nature of the issue, it requires details elaboration otherwise will create confusions for non professional individuals. The followings are additional information and clarifications aimed at facilitating better understanding of the scope and nature of the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

It should be recalled that the application of over 3 years Agency's robust inspections system and extraordinary cooperation made by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Agency is a matter of high importance.

It should also be recalled that Iran has fully cooperated in provision of voluminous information, granting many accesses to different locations even military sites, arranging interviews with individuals, submission of non-safeguards related information, permission for taking large number of environmental samples from nuclear and non nuclear sites and even from military sites, over thousands of hours of meetings with experts in understanding the detail of every subject, which arrived to close to over more than 1700 man-days of inspection, therefore the Agency has full understanding on every part of the program and has achieved progress on the matters. The list of numerous progress as well as the achievements are already reflected in various DG's report thus it will be refrained from repetition.

It is expected that the Agency makes outmost efforts based on technical rather than political grounds. However, refraining from entering into details of the DG report (GOV/2006/15), the followings comments are focused on some paragraphs of the report, which have created more confusion:

**Para 20:**

It has to be noted that the document has been presented to the Agency in previous occasions. Only one and half pages out of the total 15-page document includes general information on casting which technically is nothing more than machining a metal that could be conducted by normal workshops. The rest of the document covers the general information on converting the UF<sub>6</sub> to metal. This information is much less than the

comprehensive information that exists at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) which is fully under the Agency's safeguards. It should be reiterated that the document has always been and will be available for the Agency and thus the phrase "Iran again declined to provide" is not unjustified.

**Para 34:**

It is needed to clarify that the phrase "Iran declined to make him available to the Agency for an interview" should be corrected. As reported in para 36 -although these interviews were beyond the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol- the individual in question has in fact been interviewed by the DDG-SG.

**Para 35:**

Referring to DG's statement in June 2005 which says " ... I would also ask Iran to support the Agency's efforts to pursue further its investigation of the Lavizan-Shian and Parchin sites, by working to reach agreement on modalities currently under discussion, that would provide the Agency with access to dual-use equipment and other information related to the Lavizan-Shian site", a modality was agreed and performed.

In this regard, following points should be noted:

- There is no reference to the agreed modality in the DG report.
- According to the said modality, it was agreed that only an additional equipment list be provided by the Agency and *in situ* examination of the equipment and environmental sampling be provided which was promptly implemented. However, on the contrary, the Agency has presented another list for the first time.
- Such an extraordinary cooperation beyond Safeguards obligations and even beyond the Additional Protocol, have not been dully reflected in the report.

**Para 36:**

The phrase "use of electronic derive equipment, power, supply equipment, laser equipment and vacuum equipment" is incorrect, since none of the said items have been purchased. However, Iran submitted the documents on inquiries to the Agency in order to facilitate the prompt conclusion of the issue.

**Para 37:**

Concerning the information on the inquiries of special steels, titanium and special oil, it has to be noted that the information was provided to the Agency during the meeting on 26 January 2006.

**Para 38:**

The sentence "Iran declined to address the other topics" which is repeated in para 40, is not well elaborated since Iran has always declared its readiness to take into consideration and provide clarifications on any issues which are related to the statutory mandate of the Agency.

**Para 46:**

As far as the phrase "concealment and breaches" is concerned, it has to be noted that maximum which has occurred was failure in timely reporting of items which have been proven not being related to prohibited activities. Therefore, the phrase "resulted in many breaches of its obligations to comply with Agreement" in Para 46, is not justified.

It has to be further noted that:

The Director General paid his first visit to Iran in the year 2000, where he was thoroughly informed about the intention of the AEOI in undertaking certain activities in the field of nuclear fuel cycle technology and construction of their facilities such as the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). Although Iran had not yet adhered to the newly modified Subsidiary Arrangement, nevertheless it had willingly submitted the DIQ of Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan. The Agency received the DIQ of UCF in 2000 that is almost 4 years before Iran was obliged to inform the IAEA under its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214). Therefore the notion of the revelation of undeclared activities such as UCF or concealment is absolutely incorrect.

The phrase "Concealment" which was first used by US and later by the Agency Secretariat in its reports is absolutely incorrect and misleading. Lack of reporting of the activities such as establishment of nuclear facility which Iran was obliged to inform the Agency through providing DIQ under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214) only 180 days before the defined nuclear material are received by facility, is not a concealment.

Even if the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was started almost 25 years ago, but Iran was obliged to report its existence and give specification only 180 days before nuclear material (the fuel) is received in the plant. The same is applied to other facilities such enrichment plant at Natanz, uranium conversion Facility (UCF), which the Agency was informed even four years before Iran was obliged to do so. It has to be

noted that the Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIR) of the Agency includes a lot of failures by other Member States which have not been highlighted.

The last but not the least, is the fact that the Agency is legally neither in position nor it could judge the intention of Member States, thus the use of the concealment phraseology is out of context.

**Para 49:**

Concerning the issue of HEU and LEU contamination, it has to be noted that Iran has informed the followings from the beginning of 2003:

- Such contaminations are not from Iran's activities, and
- The origin of contaminations is from abroad coming through imported contaminated components.

Iran has provided to the Agency extensive sampling, interviews and voluntarily presented all related documents. After the Agency's evaluation and partial investigations outside Iran, the Agency has concluded in September 2005 that "the results of the environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination". The Agency concluded veracity of Iran's statement in this regard after long time.

However, during the process of investigation at each stage, the Agency was reporting and concluding base on its preliminary results which proved later to be immature and incorrect.

Eventually, the analyses of sampling from components from third country have proved the information received from Iran. The few spots on the spectrum which is the result of problems in mathematical modeling, as the DDG-SG of the Agency informed in the technical briefing on 3rd March 2006, should not create confusions and used as an excuse for leaving the file of P1& P2 opened.

**Para 50:**

Islamic republic of Iran has already provided extensive information on P1& P2 chronology thorough interview with the individuals involved, full access to various sites, swipe sampling, documentation regarding procurement, shipment and detailed confidential information on the interaction with the intermediaries. The Agency should not judge and conclude the issues base on biased and unreliable information, where it

has not been provided any documents to Iran to prove if any inconsistencies with the assertion that Iran has already made.

**Para 51:**

Regarding the Agency's question on the work on the P2 design between 1995 and 2002, the followings are some of the reasons that there have not been any works during period 1995-2002 which have been provided to the Agency but not asserted in the report:

- P-1 was the National Project and not the P-2;
- Iran did not have any experience on centrifuge enrichment;
- Iran had not still obtained skills on P-1, thus it was technically a big mistake to jump to move to more advanced model such as P-2, before being mastered on P-1. This was also confirmed by the IAEA eminent enrichment expert;
- The former President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was strongly of the belief that no work has to be conducted on P-2 before the achievement on the P-1;
- The commencement time of P-2 was the time that P-1 was in rather good hand and that the contract with an individual started in 2002;
- The inquiry of the P-2 items from abroad started in the contract period;
- The duration of an individual contract proves the assertion of the works conducted on P-2 in the indicated time;
- The Agency inspectors have already thoroughly reviewed and confirmed the activities done by the individual and its progress report;
- Had Iran conducted P-2 project during the said period (1995-2002, so called gap), then it should have procured items such as magnets from abroad, for the assembly and operation of even a single P-2 machine. The information that the Agency has obtained from sources including States Parties (date of any inquiry or purchase of magnets by Iran) proves that such measures have not taken place prior to the timing of individual contract in 2002;
- Had Iran worked on P-2 and obtained achievements, there was no logic to continue the national project and invest on P-1 in Natanz.

Unfortunately this logic was not recognized by the Agency in the ground that the issue not to be closed.

**Para 52:**

The legal authority of the Agency has already been well defined in the Safeguards documents such as Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional

Protocol, which are the result of intensive negotiations of the Member States considering the provisions of the IAEA Statute and the NPT.

Any additional legal authority therefore has to be negotiated by the member states and adopted as new additional safeguard measure. Therefore, this request by the Secretariat has nothing to do with the nuclear issue of Iran. Thus, the Secretariat should have been able to fulfill its mandate under the said Safeguards provisions.

Though, the request for transparency measures are far beyond the Agency's mandate, and Iran has not any legal obligations in this regard, granted access to several military sites and environmental samples taken in addition to those mentioned in this report. It has to be noted that more than 30 samples taken from military sites and the result of the environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations, including Lavizan.

DG reported in Para 102 of GOV/2004/83: " ...the vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavisan-Shian site have been analyzed and reveal no evidence of nuclear material ".

Transparency measures were fully made including interviews with several individuals, delivering several documents, visits the equipment.

The result of the inspections as reflected in this Para, is a crystal clear indication that over 3 years of continuous allegations by America and terrorist group supported by it, are baseless and the Agency has spent a lot of time and efforts for conducting inspections, sampling, interviews, review the documents which creating political tension among member states and damaging the credibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA which would by no means be easily compensated. It's time to stop such an unjustified trend.

**Para 53:**

It is essential to note that the Agency has been able to conclude the lack of undeclared nuclear material and activities in only 8 countries, most of which are not even the advanced countries in nuclear industry. Thus, it is not fair and justified to blame on Iran in this respect.

Although the preamble of this paragraph expresses "... that the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", the Agency makes an hypothetical assumption in military oriented activities even not providing evidence on those allegations which the Agency claims "recent information available to the Agency".

**Para 54:**

Expression of “*full transparency*“ does not have a clear and distinct definition in the nuclear activities. The reason for is the example of Iran that what so ever cooperation beyond its Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol and even beyond that were made available to the Agency, it did not satisfy the Agency by repeating such a request. It is not clear how far it should go and what is the boundary? It should be noted that any transparency measure has to be implemented in such a way that the sovereignty, dignity and national security of Member Sates be observed.

Furthermore, all the requests repeated in this paragraph, had already fulfilled.