

IAEA Board Meeting on Iran Statements obtained on 2nd Feb

1. Germany on behalf of the EU3/EU
2. EU
3. US
4. NAM
5. Iran
6. Dr. Larijani
7. Australia
8. Canada
9. Singapore
10. New Zealand
11. Norway

Germany on behalf of the EU3/EU

02.02.2006

Mr. Chairman,

on 18 January 2006, I, together with my French and British colleagues wrote to you to ask that the Board meet today to discuss the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yesterday we submitted for the Board's consideration a draft resolution on this subject together with a Memorandum of Explanation which speaks for itself.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran's nuclear activities have been a matter of great concern to the international community since 2003 when Iran was forced to admit that it had conducted a secret nuclear programme relating to the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle for nearly 20 years. At the same time the IAEA Director General found Iran's policy of concealment have resulted in many breaches of the obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement. According to its rules, the IAEA should have reported this to the Security Council already then.

However, France, the United Kingdom and Germany launched a diplomatic initiative geared towards offering Iran an opportunity to address international concerns and establish international confidence that its nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful in nature. Iran agreed to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities while negotiations were under way. This Iranian commitment was of key importance for the credibility and the sustainability of the process that we conducted with Iran. Iran committed not to proceed with those activities which gave rise to international concerns since they would have made it possible for Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

This diplomatic process allowed the Board to suspend the report to the UN Security Council that should have been made under the Agency's Statute.

Despite a number of setbacks prompted by provocative Iranian actions in violation of Iran's obligation under IAEA resolutions and the agreements with the EU 3/EU we pursued the diplomatic avenue in good faith for nearly two years.

In early August 2005 Iran was offered an ambitious proposal for cooperation with Europe in the political, security and economic fields. This proposal reaffirmed Iran's rights under the NPT and included European support for a civilian nuclear programme in Iran as well as proposals that would have given Iran internationally guaranteed supplies of fuel for its nuclear power programme. This offer was brusquely rejected even before it was handed over.

And even before rejecting the offer, Iran resumed Uranium conversion in Esfahan despite repeated requests by the Board. This was a clear violation of IAEA board resolutions and the commitment Iran had given us in the Paris Agreement in November 2004. However, responding to requests by Board Members we were ready to go the extra mile in search of a negotiated solution. To this end the EU3/EU met an Iranian delegation for exploratory talks on 21 December 2005 to see if we could find a basis for resuming negotiations. At that meeting we made crystal clear that a resumption of negotiations would only be possible if Iran refrained from any further erosion of its suspension commitment. We also agreed to hold a further exploratory meeting on 18 January 2006.

However, on 3 January 2006 Iran wrote to the director General of the IEAE that it would resume enrichment related activities. This latest Iranian decision, announced prior to the meeting foreseen on 18 January is a further clear rejection of the diplomatic process launched by the EU 3/EU and supported by the international community.

It also constitutes a further challenge to the authority of the IAEA and the Non Proliferation Regime. In the face of this challenge, our three Ministers and the High Representative of the European Union met in Berlin on January 12th and decided to inform the Board of Governors of the IEA that our discussions with Iran had reached an impasse.

Mr. Chairman,

we continue to be committed to resolve the issue diplomatically. Over the past few weeks, we have conducted a very broad range of consultations at the highest levels. These consultations revealed that our concerns about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme are widely shared.

The Board will not doubt be aware that the consultations I have just referred to also involved all 5 Permanent members of the Security Council and led to a meeting of Ministers in London on January 30th 2006.

Mr. Chairman, to put this all in the right perspective, let me be absolutely clear:

- this is not a dispute between Iran and Europe - this is an issue between Iran and the whole international community represented in this Board.
- this is not a dispute about the rights of Iran under the NPT, which we have always respected and reconfirmed - this is about the necessity of Iran to build the necessary confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, in line with Iran's NPT obligations.
- This is not about the IAEA transferring its responsibility to the Security Council - this is about the credibility of the NPT, the strengthening of the international non-proliferation system and the authority of the IAEA and its decisions.
- This is not about abandoning diplomatic efforts, - this is about solving a problem within the multilateral system and by peaceful means. The EU3/EU continues to be committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. The diplomatic endeavours have entered a new stage: the time now has come for the Security

council to become involved to reinforce the authority of the IAEA resolutions

- Now is not the time for Iranian threats to unilaterally end cooperation with the agency in breach of its obligations. Nor is it the time for Iran to further undermine confidence in its intentions fostered by such actions. The need now is for Iran to address the existing international concerns, to respect decisions by the Board.

We hope that the resolution which we have tabled, based on the Board's continuing resolve to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem, will commend itself to Governors. The ball is again in Iran's court. We call again on Iran to heed the Board's calls and to create the conditions for the resumption of negotiations.

IAEA Board of **Governors meeting starting** on 2 February 2006

EU Statement on Iran

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The Accessing Countries Bulgaria and Romania, the Candidate **Countries** Turkey, Croatia* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

Mr. Chairman.

The European Union would like to thank the Deputy Director General for Safeguards for the Update Brief circulated on 3 January 2006 on the developments that have taken place since November 2005 in connection with the implementation of the NPT—Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and on the Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities

We infer from this report that there has been little progress since the Director General reported last November. Far from heeding the calls of the international community to cooperate with the Agency, Iran continues to deny the Agency access to individuals; key question remain unanswered and major gaps remain in the history of Iran's nuclear programme. The EU is particularly concerned that Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document relating to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.

The EU also deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;

Mr. Chairman, On 30 January 2006, the Foreign Ministers of the European Union agreed on the following conclusions on Iran and I quote:

The European Union is gravely concerned at the removal of seals at several nuclear installations including at Natanz, and Iran's decision to resume enrichment related activities. The EU calls on Iran to re-instate the seals and to re-establish full, sustained and verifiable suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as called Iran repeatedly in IAEA Board of Governors' resolutions as an essential confidence building measure.

In line with the requests made in IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions the EU emphasizes the need for Iran to refrain from all enrichment related and reprocessing activities until international confidence is restored.

This is not a dispute between Iran and Europe, but between Iran and the international community. The EU does not question the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its

obligations under the NPT, a right which we have consistently reaffirmed. The dispute is about Iran's failure to build the necessary confidence as to the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme. This confidence has further eroded as a result of the unilateral steps Iran has taken contrary to its commitments. The Council noted with concern that the Director General has reported that the IAEA is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue.

In the light of recent Iranian actions, which run counter to IAEA-Resolutions and which are a rejection of the efforts to explore whether a basis can be agreed for resuming negotiations, the European Union Member States will closely coordinate and work for the forthcoming extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna to involve The UN Security Council to reinforce the authority of the IAEA in line with these conclusions. This is a necessary and appropriate step, fully in line with the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of September 2005, which found that Iran had been non-compliant with its Safeguards Agreement and that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities and the nature of these activities had given rise to questions within the competence of the Security Council.

The EU believes that the issue can still be solved by negotiations; but this will require a cooperative and transparent approach on the part of the Iranian government with the IAEA, and the return to full suspension. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in which the IAEA should play a central role. Involvement of the Security Council does not end the IAEA's responsibilities; on the contrary it strengthens them.

The EU will remain fully engaged in this issue. The EU Member States will closely coordinate their action both in the framework of the IAEA in Vienna and of the United Nations in New York, in coordination also with international partners.

The Council recalls in this context its support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including their means of delivery.

The Council recalls that in its Conclusions of 7 November 2005 it repeated that the evolution of its long-term relationship with Iran would depend on action by Iran to address effectively all the EU's areas of concern. The Council regards Iran's resumption of enrichment-related activities as a negative development that will impact on the overall relationship which we will review in the light of actions taken by Iran. The Council reiterates that it is up to Iran to determine, through its actions, whether its long term relationship with the EU will improve or deteriorate.'

(end of quote)

As it is well known, a Ministerial Meeting took place on 30 January 2006 in London to discuss the way forward regarding the Iranian nuclear program. At this meeting, the ministers agreed on a statement in which they

(quote)

- "underlined their commitment to the NPT and their determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- shared serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program, and agreed that an extensive period of confidence-building was required from Iran;

- called on Iran to restore in full the suspension of enrichment—related activity, including R&D, under the supervision of the IAEA;
- agreed to propose that this weeks Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting should report to the Security Council its decision on the steps required from Iran, and should also report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;
- also agreed to propose that the Security Council should await the Director General’s report to (hue March meeting of the IAEA Board, which would include a report on the implementation of the February Board’s Resolution, and any Resolution from the March meeting, before deciding to take action to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process;
- and conformed their resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iran problem

(end of quote)

Mr. Chairman

To end, the EU would like to express its full support for the Draft Resolution on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran as tabled by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

US Statement for February 2 Special IAEA Board Meeting

Mr. Chairman:

On Monday Secretary Rice said, "the international community has come together to say to the Iranians that they need to find a way to have peaceful nuclear energy, if that is what they desire, but in a way that removes the proliferation risk associated with the current Iranian course."

Three days ago in London, the Foreign Ministers from the US, France, Germany, the UK, China and Russia and the High Representative of the EU issued a remarkable statement noting their serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme and calling on Iran to restore confidence. The ministers affirmed that it was time for the IAEA to report Iran to the UN Security Council. They did not reach this decision in haste, but did so after a careful review of Iran's troubling history in pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

We should recall that in November 2003, Dr. ElBaradei first reported to the Board that "Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." He described the undeclared uranium enrichment, conversion and plutonium separation work that Iran had hidden from the IAEA. The Board strongly deplored Iran's "failures and breaches of its obligation to comply" with its safeguards agreement. From that moment, we believe this Board had a clear statutory obligation, under Article XII.C, to report that non-compliance to all IAEA members, the UN Security Council, and the UN General Assembly.

However, the members of the Board agreed then that such a report would await the outcome of the EU3's diplomatic efforts that had begun in October 2003. These efforts were intended to secure Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA in order to provide the international community full confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Over the ensuing 28 months, Dr. ElBaradei has issued seven further written reports, and three oral reports, all of which confirm that Iran is not providing the full cooperation with the IAEA needs, and is not taking the confidence building steps that the international community desires. In fact, it is quite the contrary, as we have just heard again from Mr. Heinonen. Mr. Chair, I ask that the contents of DDG Heinonen's oral report be made publicly available.

When Iran rejected the EU3 proposals and unilaterally broke the terms of the Paris Accord, the Board of Governors took action, and in September 2005, unequivocally found that Iran's many breaches and failures of its safeguards obligations constituted non-compliance pursuant to Article XII.C. The Board also found that Iran's history of concealment of sensitive nuclear activities and the still-unresolved questions about its program, raised questions that are within the competence of the UN Security Council pursuant to Article II.B.4.

Even then, we gave Iran more time to take action to restore our confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Now, however, the Iranian leadership has demonstrated that it is determined to move forward with its uranium enrichment program and its heavy water reactor program which would give Iran the capability to produce material for a nuclear weapon.

The Board of Governors has adopted eight resolutions on Iran since 2003, all of which Iran has ignored or defied. It is time to send a clear and unequivocal message to the Iranian regime about the concerns of the international community by reporting this issue to the Security Council. The United States urges adoption by the Board of the resolution that the EU 3 have tabled. The time has come to fulfil the obligation of the Board

under Article XII. C of the IAEA Statute to "report" the non-compliance finding with respect to Iran of September 24, 2005.

My government continues to support all efforts to seek a peaceful, diplomatic solution even as we enter a new phase of diplomacy. By reporting the Iran issue to the Security Council, we will increase the diplomatic tools available to the international community. Let me be clear: we are not now seeking sanctions or other punitive measures on Iran.

We do not seek to harm the Iranian people or deprive Iran of its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We also do not seek to remove this issue from the IAEA Board's active consideration.

Instead, we seek to support the ongoing efforts of the IAEA with the weight of the Security Council's authority. We seek a carefully calibrated approach in which the Council applies escalating measures on Iran's regime. We are hopeful that such an approach might persuade the Iranian leadership to change course. As a first step after the Council begins to consider action in March, we expect the Council to reinforce the decisions of the IAEA Board and strengthen the IAEA's continuing role by making its own call on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, to comply fully and promptly with all IAEA Board resolutions, and to provide the IAEA with the transparency measures that the IAEA has repeatedly requested.

We urge Iran's regime to pay heed, and to allow a peaceful diplomatic resolution to this issue that builds confidence with the international community, benefits the Iranian people, and enhances international peace and security.

Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
delivered by H.E. Rajmah Hussain
Ambassador and Resident Representative of Malaysia
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
at the IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting
Vienna, Austria; 2 February 2006

Agenda Item: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to make this statement on behalf of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

2. I would like to place on record NAM's understanding that the Board of Governors' Meeting today, 2 February 2006, is not meant to consider or assess the overall implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would be a subject for consideration at the first regular meeting of the Board this year starting on 6 March 2006. NAM is also of the view that today's Board meeting is also not meant to consider the timing and content of a report by the Director General of the IAEA in accordance with the Board's previous resolution, which was voted upon, as contained in document *GOV/2005177* of 24 September 2005. This would be premature as the Director General of the IAEA is still investigating outstanding issues in preparation for the March 2006 Board of Governors' Meeting.

3. Nevertheless, NAM wishes to take the opportunity of today's Board meeting to reaffirm its basic principles and position on matters related to the issue. NAM strongly reiterates the basic and inalienable right of all Member States, as stipulated in the Statute of the IAEA, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting this right of Member States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. NAM furthermore reaffirms that Member States' choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.

4. In this context NAM would like to reiterate its principled position that nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology must be addressed in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. NAM reaffirms its strong conviction that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. NAM also reaffirms further that Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be effectively assured by Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. NAM reiterates its conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. NAM also reiterates its deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority.

5. NAM also believes that the efforts of the international community directed at non-proliferation should be parallel to the simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.

6. NAM would like to emphasize that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations of Member States to their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary commitments.

This is required to ensure that voluntary commitments of Member States will not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. NAM is of the view that Member States should not be penalized for not adhering to their voluntary commitments.

7. Recognizing the IAEA as the sole competent authority for verification, NAM expresses its full confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the IAEA led by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. NAM wishes to stress that all Member States should avoid any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process which would jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of the Agency. In this regard, it strongly believes that all issues on safeguards and verification including those of Iran should be resolved within the framework of the IAEA and be based on technical grounds.

8. NAM notes that the Agency's investigation of outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement is being pursued with the Iranian authorities on the basis of a work programme developed with a view to, and in preparation for, the submission of a detailed report to the regular meeting of the Board of Governors scheduled on 6 March 2006. In this regard, due process must take its course before the Agency is able to submit a detailed report.

9. NAM had previously welcomed the fact that all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for by the IAEA, and that no such material has been diverted to prohibited activities. NAM recognizes that the Agency's work on verifying the peaceful nuclear programme of Iran, as per its declarations, is ongoing and in this regard, it is crucial for its verification process to be concluded. In this respect, NAM appreciates the ongoing cooperation of Iran to resolve these issues.

10. NAM welcomes the substantive progress that was key in resolving the issues pertaining to the implementation of Iran's safeguards agreements and is optimistic that the remaining questions will be promptly resolved. NAM is of the view that the special session of the Board of Governors at this juncture should contribute towards arriving at a fair and just solution consistent with the provisions of Iran's legal rights and obligations.

11. NAM notes that for Iran, verification of the correctness and completeness of their respective declarations is ongoing. In this regard, NAM encourages Iran to continue its proactive cooperation with the Agency in accordance with its legal obligations within the Agency's mandate.

12. NAM notes with appreciation that during the last two and half years Iran sustained a voluntary but non-legally binding suspension over its enrichment related activities to promote confidence on its peaceful nuclear programme. NAM notes recent developments with regard to Iranian decision to restore some of its activities suspended voluntarily in the last two years. NAM is pleased to see that as Iran requested, timely and necessary preparations has been made by the Agency to ensure that these research activities remain under full-scope safeguards of the Agency. NAM recognizes that any rightful nuclear activity under the Agency's safeguard does not constitute any concern.

13. NAM welcomes the cooperation extended by Iran to the IAEA, with the view to resolve remaining issues even beyond its legal obligations, particularly, the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) voluntarily taken by Iran including providing access to military sites and the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol. NAM is of the view that such voluntary confidence building measures are clear demonstration of openness and transparency and therefore should be appreciated. NAM is of the view that any voluntary suspension should end when appropriate requirements are met.

14. NAM is of the view that any request for additional legal authority for the Agency has to be negotiated by Member States. In this regard NAM reiterates the importance of the promotion and strengthening of the

multilateral process.

15. NAM strongly believes that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a long-term solution to the problem. All parties concerned must exercise patience and restraint and should not resort to any action which may escalate into a tense situation and create unnecessary confrontation. NAM believes that the only way to resolve the issue is through negotiations and cooperation with the involvement of all necessary parties to promote international confidence with the view to facilitating Agency's work on Iran's nuclear programme. In this context, NAM takes note of the letter from the Iranian side dated 7 January 2006 addressed to the EU3 expressing its desire to continue negotiations. NAM encourages the resumption of negotiations between the E3/EU and Iran towards finding an amicable solution. In this regard, NAM welcomes the meeting between the E3/EU and Iran in Brussels on 30 January 2006.

16. Furthermore, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM Troika, which comprised the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Cuba and South Africa met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Hermanus, South Africa on 27 January 2006. After the meeting, the Ministers of the NAM Troika reiterated that they remained supportive of the ongoing work by the IAEA in clarifying issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme. In this regard, the Ministers underscored the importance of the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the Agency to resolve the remaining issues. The Ministers also urged all parties concerned to exhaust all efforts, through dialogue and negotiations, in their endeavour to resolve these issues as soon as possible and in an amicable manner. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed Iran's intention to continue negotiations with the EU3, as well as with the Russian Federation with respect to its proposal on the issue of uranium enrichment, and expressed the hope that these negotiations would contribute toward achieving a satisfactory solution.

17. In encouraging an environment of cooperation to find a mutually acceptable solution to this issue, NAM appreciates all initiatives by other Member States aimed at facilitating the speedy conclusion of the Iranian nuclear issue in the IAEA. In this regard, NAM notes that negotiations are still ongoing between the Russian Federation and Iran towards finding a solution with regard to the enrichment programme.

18. In this context also, NAM urges the adoption of a balanced and evenhanded approach on the Iran nuclear issue to avoid perception of selectivity and bias. In this regard, NAM reiterates its support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. NAM attaches great importance to the implementation of the various resolutions and decisions of relevant international fora on the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

**Statement by Ambassador A.A. Soltanieh
Resident Representative of Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA**

2 February 2006
VIENNA

In the name of Allah,
the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

I am obliged to express sincere appreciation of Iranian people and government to valuable support of NAM based on principles internationally recognized as the only way to maintain peace and prosperity through the world, associating myself to the statement delivered by very eminent and distinguished ambassador of Malaysia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the main victim of chemical weapons has always been among the most active member states of international organizations such as the IAEA and party to the NPT. Iran attaches great importance to international cooperation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Iran and other peace loving, like-minded developing countries have expressed their serious concerns about development and employment of new advanced nuclear weapons by United States and United Kingdom. The recent initiative of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran on nuclear disarmament during the United Nations General Assembly which paved the way for the adoption of the UNGA resolution calling the implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, specially establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Middle East, confirms Iran's determination to work with other countries towards total elimination of nuclear warheads which exists in Nuclear Weapon States. The Nuclear Weapon States are totally ignoring the serious concern of the international community. The Nuclear Weapon States are highlighting the "non-proliferation" in order to overshadow and cover up the essential issue namely "nuclear disarmament" and the immediate threat of their nuclear arsenals to the global security.

The attention of international community has been diverted from existence of hundreds of nuclear warheads and un-safeguarded nuclear installations mostly constructed and developed with full technical and financial support of US and some European countries in Israel to few issues regarding the research in Iran which are under full surveillance of the IAEA. Islamic Republic of Iran is party to NPT and is implementing NPT comprehensive safeguards for three decades and is voluntarily implementing Additional Protocol, whereas Israel has rejected to adhere to any disarmament treaties on Weapon of Mass Destruction particularly NPT and to sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. Israel has not implemented over 30 resolutions of the IAEA and the United Nations calling her to observe international law and treaties and not to threaten the countries in the region. One could refer to strong condemnation Israel through resolutions following the military attacks against nuclear installations in the region. This discriminatory status quo can not and must not be tolerated by international community anymore.

Mr. Chairman,

During the last 27 years the Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in cooperating with the Agency as far as its commitments under the NPT are concerned. Iran is the only Member State which voluntarily invited, in late 80s, the IAEA safeguards inspectors, headed by the DDG, to visit all sites and facilities at their discretion, even those locations not declarable under the Safeguards Agreement.

Islamic Republic of Iran is the only Member State that is implementing the Additional Protocol prior to ratification by its legislative body.

The short critical review of the developments particularly during past three years reveals the facts confirming the exclusive nature of Iranian nuclear program and activities and full cooperation with international community. It also shows that the international community has been, to a great extent misled with bias, politicized and exaggerated information on Iranian nuclear programs and activities. Iranian nuclear issues, which should have been dealt in a purely technical manner within the framework of the IAEA, have been politicized.

The following international developments have had serious impacts on Iranian nuclear policies and activities:

- The failure of the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNPICPUNE) in Geneva, in 1987.
- The failure of the Committee on Assurances of Supply in the IAEA which was entrusted to establish internationally recognized principles and legally binding instruments to assure sustainable nuclear supply, in Vienna in 1987 after 7 years of intensive deliberations.
- US was obliged under the contract made prior to 1979 to supply new fuel for Tehran 5 MW Research Reactor, being under the Agency comprehensive Safeguards, producing radioisotope for application in medicine, agriculture and industry. It neither gave the fuel nor the millions of dollars received for.
- Iran is 10% share holder of the Enrichment Company, Eurodif in France, for the last three decades .Iran did donate one billion dollars to help the company from financial crisis but it has not received even a gram of the uranium produced in the factory in order to use in the research reactor and power plant.

Considering the aforementioned developments which proves the assertion of the lack of implementation of promotional pillars of Statute of the IAEA, article III in particular, as well as provisions of the Article 4 of NPT along with continuous sanctions by certain countries, and the last but not the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear fuel, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no choice other than to depend on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman,

During last three years there have been tremendous progress in our cooperation with the IAEA. Let have a short glance on events since then:

- Dr.ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA paid visit to Iranian nuclear installations particularly to the centrifuge enrichment facility in Natanz, in February 2003.
- Following the visit of the Director General, swipe sampling of the centrifuge components were made by inspectors. The analysis showed low and high-enriched uranium particles.
- Iran claimed that the source of contamination has foreign origin.
- In order to give the IAEA chance to conduct technical activities proving that the allegations are baseless and with the aim of decreasing the political tension, Iran voluntarily decided to suspend its enrichment activities.
- While full cooperation with the IAEA was going on, Iran entered into constructive dialogue with almost all Member States of the IAEA such as the members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), European Union, Russia and China with the aim of removing ambiguities on the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

- There has always been consensus in the IAEA, particularly in the Board of Governors, that the suspension of enrichment activities is voluntary, non-legally binding measure. This essential non-legally binding parameter has been reflected in Tehran and Paris Agreements between Iran and EU3/EU as well as all decisions, conclusions and even resolutions of the Board of Governors.

While appreciating the tremendous constructive work by the IAEA, and sincere attempts by Director General, Dr. El Baradei, and his staff in resolving the issues, Iran has however serious concerns about the misunderstandings, confusions, misperceptions and the underestimation of great progress so far made on political grounds.

Short list of constructive and cooperative measures is as follows:

Iran has had close collaboration with the IAEA in many cases beyond its legal obligations, such as granting more than 28 accesses to military sites and workshops, facilitating interviews with several individuals.

- Iran intensified multilateral diplomacy with the Agency's Member States, members of Non-aligned Movement and European Union, China, Russia and other members of the Board of Governors with the aim of removing ambiguities.
- Iran has proactively cooperated with the Agency in an extraordinary manner during the last two years with almost continuous inspections, amount to over 1500 man-day inspection, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA.
- In an historical and unprecedented gesture, Iran decided to voluntarily and temporarily suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in order to give the Agency opportunity to perform its technical activities including sampling and analysis of the contaminated samples at Natanz.
- Director General in his report to the Board of Governors confirmed that "Since December 2003, Iran has facilitated in a timely manner Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency.
- The Director General informed the Board that "Since October 2003, Iran's cooperation has improved appreciably".

The following major measures by Iran are the basis of his assessment:

- Signature of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003;
- Voluntary provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, from 18 December 2003, prior its ratification, as if Iran has ratified it;
- Complementary access (more than 20) in accordance to the Additional Protocol, in many cases with 2 hours notice or less;
- Full and unrestricted access to all nuclear material and all facilities, in particular to the Enrichment Facility at Natanz, Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan;
- Provision of detailed information in connection with the imports of nuclear material and components related to the centrifuge and laser enrichment activities;

- Providing full detail information on the chronologies, activities, researches, progress reports regarding the enrichment activities, uranium conversion, plutonium separation, mining and milling, research reactor, heavy water production;
- Providing accesses to military sites following the allegations by a certain country and the opposition terrorist group supported by it. The inspection proved the allegations to be baseless;
- In October 2003, the Agency was granted to visit two military industrial complex called Kolehrouz and Kazemi that had been announced by terrorist group (MKO,NRCI) as relevant to enrichment activities. Following its inspection, the Agency reported in para 49 of GOV/2005/67 : The results did not reveal any indications of activities involving the use of nuclear material;
- In June 2004, the Agency was granted to visit the military complex of Lavisan-Shian and two others military sites namely Malek Ashtar and Novin Center where the Agency took environmental samples. As DG reported in para 102 of GOV/2004/83: "...the vegetation and soil samples collected from the Lavisan-Shian site have been analyzed and reveal no evidence of nuclear material";
- In January and November 2005, free access was granted to Parchin Military site. Environmental samples were taken. The Director General then reported that the results showed no indication of presence of nuclear material and that the Agency's inspectors did not see any relevant dual-use equipment or material;
- Provision of information on Heavy water Production Plant, prior to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, where Iran was not yet obliged to do so under its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INCIRC/153);
- Submission of more than 1000 pages of the initial declarations of the Additional Protocol on 21 May 2004 and subsequently routinely updated the declarations, which have been verified by the Agency.
- Full implementation of the Additional Protocol, included performed more than 20 complementary accesses some with short notices of 2 hours or less during the past two years;
- IAEA has confirmed that it has not found any evidence that Iranian nuclear materials and activities are diverted to prohibited purposes;
- All nuclear materials are accounted for;
- Iran decided to take a major proactive step, suspending voluntarily its enrichment activities, in order to give a chance for the Agency to perform technical analysis of the samples;
- The IAEA has confirmed, as reported by DG (GOV2005/67), that the sources of HEU contamination are outside of Iran. It is proved that the HEU particles are not resulted from enrichment in Iran;
- Iran is implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol as if it has ratified it;

It is of a great concern and disappointment that the more Iran did cooperate and took additional steps, transparency measures, beyond its legal obligations, the more stringent Safeguards were applied, the more outstanding questions were resolved, language of the proposed resolutions by US and EU3 became tougher.

At the eve of the meetings of the Board of Governors, the US political campaign against Iran is augmented with baseless allegations. It is somehow disappointing that the active cooperation of the Iran in granting prompt access to military sites, being directly related to national security, has not been duly reflected in the reports to the Board of Governors as well as the public.

Considering the facts that:

- The bitter past history of monopoly, sanctions as well as the lack of any international legally binding instrument for assurances of nuclear supply;
- As reflected in NAM declarations and even the resolutions, even the last resolution adopted by the Special Board of Governors, the suspension of all related enrichment activities are a voluntary and non-legally binding as a confidence building measure;
- The existence of scientifically well justified and technically reliable mechanisms and sophisticated surveillance equipment at the IAEA' Safeguards Department, capable of verifying the declared enrichment activities and the levels of enrichment, and giving assurance that such activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes;
- As stipulated in article III of the Statute of the IAEA and the article IV of the NPT the state parties have full & inalienable right to conduct research on peaceful nuclear energy. As envisaged in article II," The Agency shall seek to accelerate and encourage the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". The article III authorizes the Agency to "encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world,

There is no reason for Iran to sustain its frustrated voluntary suspension of the R&D on enrichment as the result of which it would further be deprived from its inalienable right to work on nuclear fuel cycle, with the aim of producing required fuels for its research reactors and nuclear power plants.

I refer distinguished colleague to documents INFCIRC/657 and INFCIRC/665 for comprehensive information on this issue.

After more than two and half years of voluntary suspension, the triggering issue of contamination being resolved, there is no reason for Iranian Government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research. The Agency was thus informed on 3 January 2006 that it will resume R&D as 10 January 2006, and requested the Agency to conduct timely and necessary preparations. Iran reiterated that such activities would be conducted in accordance with the Safeguards agreement of Iran with the IAEA. It further informed that it R&D is in small scale and not planned for nuclear fuel production. Thus, the suspension of enrichment on commercial scale, started since 2003, will be sustained.

Conclusion:

Reiterating that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the nuclear weapons option is not in Iran's Defense Doctrine, it once again declares that

it is determined to continue its full cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of its obligations under the Agency's Safeguards provided that Iran is not deprived from its inalienable right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear fuel cycle and research and development, as envisaged in the Agency's Statute and the NPT. At the same time, Iran has always been ready to remove ambiguities on its nuclear activities. In this context Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to enter into negotiation on "Non-diversion of commercial large scale enrichment to military purposes" in a constructive and serious manner with a well defined time frame. If however a historical mistake is made by some member of the Board of Governors in sending the Iran's nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council, that is outside the framework of the IAEA, as a referral or report or for the information purposes which mean involving UN Security Council, the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran has to implement the law passed in the parliament a democratic institution, almost by consensus, to the effect that it has to suspend all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. Needless to say that Iran will continue its cooperation with the IAEA in accordance with the NPT and Comprehensive safeguards. My Government considers the decision of reporting or referral to UNSC as a political decision by EU3. Permit me to comment on the statement made by distinguished Ambassador of Germany on behalf of EU3:

- Suspension was voluntary and non legally binding measure,
- EU3 always assured that they are committed to Tehran and Paris agreement to the effect that nuclear fuel cycle and enrichment be temporary suspended not permanent cessation,
2~, --5
- The EU3 proposal in August 2005 explicitly denying Iran's right for nuclear fuel cycle was in contravention to Paris agreement. H.E Dr Rohani had in June 2005 in Geneva informed if the proposals do not include Fuel Cycle it will be rejected. Therefore, negotiations based on Paris agreement were put in halt by EU and not by Iran. Since according to Paris agreement, suspension was linked to negotiation, thus Iran was not anymore left obliged to its bilateral Paris agreement. However, H.E Dr Larigani Secretary of Supreme National Council took the initiative and invited EU3 to come back to negotiation table.
- Iran announce its readiness to negotiate with all member states Eu3 in particular in order to remove any ambiguities.
- As regards the statement by the representative of the U.S, I refrain from going to details but only focus on few points due to time constraint:

1- How could international community including Iranian people trust that the U.S regime and present administration in particular which has a long history of unilateral policy, the only country using nuclear weapons and the turning innocent Japanese into ashes, military invasion of Iraq despite of the opposition of international community and the U.N, that the declaration by the U.S Ambassador that passing the issue to United Nations Security Council is on the way to Diplomacy. Sending the issue outside of the IAEA framework and involving UNSC will definitely undermine the essential role and the authority of the Agency and tremendous impartial and professional attempts by Dr. ElBaradei, recently receiving Nobel Peace Prize which he certainly deserves. He has and could, with his competent staff continue joint work with Iran's cooperation towards prompt conclusion. Involvement of the UN Security Council would put the Agency's role in serious jeopardy.

Mr. Chairman,

My Delegation rejects the request by the US Ambassador for making the confidential DDG Report to be public.

Iranian people are victim of terrorist activities and 8 years war imposed on Iran by Saddam, fully supported by US and by certain countries. Iran has always been concerned about highly confidential information which is only available to the Agency's inspectors, trusting them to observe the principle of protection of confidentiality. In addition I have to express concern of selectivity of only reflecting part of the information and not the cooperation by Iran on these sensitive issues. The international community has the right to see both sides of the coin, i.e. the full information.

With respect to the statement of the distinguished Governor of Australia, I just refer her to all previous report of the DG, that reflect the fact that open source information where reported but after the Agency work, inspection and sampling all proved to be baseless, the said cases are the same, and I assure that they are all baseless allegations. We have been and are working in the spirit of cooperation beyond our obligations to prove the correctness of our assertion. We, however, were surprised that the Report of the DDG which was clear indication of big progress since last Board meeting, including accession to additional military sites. It was expected that few colleagues highlighting few questions to impartially appreciate the cooperation made.

As regards to the phase "noncompliance" I refer the distinguished Board Members to once review carefully the text of the Statute and the Safeguards Agreement.

Iran was not obliged to report on many activities as concealment, since under INFCIRC/153 Iran was only obliged to inform the Agency 180 day before nuclear material was fed to the facilities. When we started construction of UCF and Natanz facilities, the Additional Protocol and subsidiary arrangement was not signed and not in force.

As stipulated in Art XII.C, only inspectors having access to the sites, and confidential information, utilizing advanced surveillance systems will be in position to report noncompliance to DG where he would then report to the Board of Governors. Distinguished DG has never reported and used the term noncompliance, but the term "failures" where he also reported that corrected measures have been made.

The last but not least, I would like to emphasize that this dispute is not between Iran and international community, when NAM countries comprising of 100 members of the IAEA, for the last three years have always supported the inalienable right for peaceful use of nuclear energy and express satisfaction of the progress made following the cooperation between Iran and IAEA, This dispute is politically motivated once impose on Iran, developing countries, by certain countries who want to continue the monopoly in nuclear technology.

The majority of Member States and distinguished Director General are hereby requested to spare no effort at this historical juncture not to permit the deviation of constructive cooperative track to confrontation route to occur.

Thank you for your attention.

The text of the message of H.E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme

Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Director

General of the JAEA dated February 2, 2006

Respectfully, regarding the emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, I find it necessary to draw your attention to the following points:

1. The mere fact that some members of the Board who have no privilege over the others pre-impose certain decisions on the board, goes against the legal stance and authority of the Board, and the Director General is expected to reflect on this matter.

2. Furthermore, these developments have revealed the political pressures over the Board and will jeopardise the credibility of its decisions.

3. The Board decision to report the issue to the Security Council has no legal and technical basis. Nothing particular has lately happened with regard to the inspections and no change has taken place in relations to the factual circumstances. The Iranian cooperation with the Agency has increased and remaining ambiguities have been resolved.

4. The resumption of R&D activities after two and a half years of suspension cannot provide the ground for taking harsh decisions by the Board and reporting the issue to the Security Council. Those activities are exclusively peaceful and completely within the IAEA legal framework and their suspension was decided by Iran voluntarily and provisionally.

5. Although your Excellency and other authorities and experts in the Agency are well aware, but just for the record once again I reiterate that nuclear R&D programs and activities have the following characteristics:

- They have clear definitions and technical scope that can be recorded with the cooperation of the IAEA experts.
- They are exclusively in the boundary of peaceful activities and in the framework of the rights of the Member States to the Agency.
- They have are being planned and conducted only for the purpose of gaining the know-how for peaceful nuclear activities.
- They will be conducted under the surveillance of the Agency.
- They will be conducted within a specific timing and plan.

6. I reiterate that as you and the Agency experts confirmed, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to the NPT and acts within the framework of the Treaty. It implemented the Additional Protocol voluntarily. In the inspections voluntarily cooperated beyond its obligations and for more than 2 and a half years has suspended its legal and rightful activities. All these initiatives were based on the assumption that the Islamic Republic of Iran had confidence in the European interlocutors and tried to create and strengthen the mutual confidence.

7. In this context, I am afraid to warn that if the interlocutors of Iran want to put pressure on the Board to report the issue to the UN Security Council and this pressures be affective, and the Council would be involved in any way with the Iranian peaceful nuclear activities, it would be the final blow to the confidence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will totally destroy it. In such

a case, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is logically and legally bound by the law passed by the parliament would have no other choice but to suspend all the voluntary measures and extra cooperation with the Agency which have so far made. In that case the Agency's monitoring would extensively be limited and all the peaceful nuclear activities being under voluntary suspension would be resumed without any restriction.

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not interested in such a situation and considers it as a set back in the resolution of the nuclear issue and believes it as a loss for all the parties including the IAEA. Therefore I request you as the Director General of the IAEA to use all your good offices and capabilities to prevent initiations of such a harmful process.

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to believe that negotiation is the most appropriate way to help the Agency in resolving the nuclear issue of Iran. It is convicted that if negotiations with the EU3/ EU and other parties continued constructively and seriously, and free from any kind of threat and pressure, besides contributing to the Agency's ability to resolve the issues will help to reach an ultimate solution for the nuclear issue in a reasonable time.

10. The Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that in an amicable environment and free from any kind of threat and pressure an arrangement can be achieved with other parties for improving the confidence and remove ambiguities that its nuclear activities remain peaceful.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran is confident that impartial and technical reporting by the Agency of the cooperation and progress made, would augment the confidence of the Member States that there is still remarkable opportunities and capacities for a fair resolution of the present dispute and there is no necessity for blocking that path and steering to an uneasy and dangerous course.

AUSTRALIA

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting 2 February 2006

Agenda Item: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran *(as delivered)*

Mr. Chairman

My delegation wishes to thank the Secretariat for its professional efforts to implement safeguards in Iran.

Despite having been provided with many opportunities, Iran has not taken all the steps needed to address outstanding verification issues and to build international confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

My delegation recalls that the Resolution carried by this Board on 24 September urged Iran to:

- implement transparency measures;
- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity and reprocessing activity;
- reconsider construction of its heavy water research reactor; and
- promptly ratify and fully implement its Additional Protocol.

We deeply regret that Iran has failed to implement these measures.

We are greatly concerned that Iran has removed Agency seals from enrichment-related materials and equipment, and commenced work towards enrichment of uranium. Iran's maintenance of the suspension was a vital element in the international effort to reach a resolution to this issue including through building confidence.

Mr. Chairman

Nearly three years after Iran's long-running clandestine nuclear programme was revealed to the world, Iran has yet to adequately explain to the Agency the nature, scope and history of its activities. There continue to be significant outstanding questions arising from Iran's transactions with the clandestine procurement network.

In the 31 January Update Brief, the Board was informed for the first time of possible undeclared work by Iran known as the "Green Salt" project, involving conversion of uranium dioxide into UF₄. The Agency has asked Iran about this project, and also tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, "all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections".

My delegation is troubled by this and also by Iran's possession of a document "related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components" and that Iran has declined to provide the Agency with a copy of this document.

Iran's responses to the Agency's questions are unsatisfactory. The Update Brief confirms that the Agency is far from resolving outstanding issues, and that Iran's cooperation continues to be inadequate.

Mr. Chairman

My delegation recalls the Board's 24 September Resolution, which *inter alia* found Iran to be in non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute, when the Board decided to address at a later stage the nature of the report described in the Agency's Statute.

Australia considers that the time has come to report the matter to the United Nations Security Council.

Taking this action will not mean the end of diplomacy. The Statute recognises that the Security Council has a role to play in reinforcing the Agency and the Board.

Australia is not opposed to Iran's pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy. Australia also wants to develop our relations with Iran.

Australia has welcomed contributions by the E3 and the European Union, and the Russian Federation, to find a way forward for Iran. We consider Iran has the opportunity through these proposals to develop a civil nuclear power programme and at the same time restore trust and confidence.

We believe that Iran can resolve this situation, by: complying with Board resolutions; cooperating fully and immediately with the IAEA; taking up generous offers to support an exclusively peaceful Iranian nuclear industry; and establishing international confidence through setting aside its sensitive fuel cycle ambitions.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

2 February 2006

The situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme in light of the Agency's Statute, the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and related Board resolutions

Chairman,

I wish to thank the Deputy Director General for Safeguards for providing a written update brief to the Board and for his technical briefing on Wednesday. As Board members are aware, the situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme has reached a critical juncture. We now have a resolution before us that will report this issue to the UN Security Council. It also clearly outlines the steps that Iran must take to restore international confidence in its nuclear programme, a process that the resolution notes will require an "extensive period" of time.

The Deputy Director General's factual update also underlines that, despite Iran's claims, many significant questions about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program remain unresolved. Several of these questions remain of deep concern, including, *inter alia*, the document that describes the casting, and machining of uranium metal into hemispherical forms, the histories of the P1 and P2 centrifuge programs, tests of high explosives, and inquiries the Agency has made regarding Iran's modifications of its intermediate range ballistic missiles. These outstanding questions continue to raise serious doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Today, the Board should focus not on the issues just mentioned, but rather, on a much more fundamental issue – the credibility deficit Iran has created for itself and the lack of confidence in the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear activities that this deficit has produced. For nearly three years, the Agency has been investigating Iran's nuclear programme. In that time, it has uncovered undeclared nuclear sites and activities on numerous occasions. Iran's past failures to declare fully its nuclear facilities were termed a "policy of concealment" by the Director General. Both the Director General and this Board recognized these failures several years ago, but did not report Iran to the UN Security Council at that time, as is required by the IAEA Statute. Instead, the Board offered Iran an opportunity to rebuild its credibility through the EU3-Iran negotiation process and by full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA. These negotiations were premised on a set of confidence-building measures – one of which was a full suspension of all enrichment-related activities, including conversion and research and development.

On January 10, Iran made a choice. Iran was fully aware that discussions with the EU3, scheduled to resume only eight days thence, were premised on the continued suspension of enrichment research and development. Instead of taking the steps necessary for negotiations to resume, Iran unilaterally decided to resume enrichment-related research and development, and broke the seals on equipment and materials at three sites associated with its centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran, through its own decisions and actions, drove the discussions with the EU3 into an impasse. This was only the last in a series of steps by which Iran has progressively eroded its commitments.

In breaking its voluntary suspension on enrichment-related activities, Iran has always made recourse to the argument that it has, by Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nobody has denied Iran this right: the negotiated suspension in no way inhibited Iran's ability to have a civil nuclear program. However, like all rights, those in Article IV must be

seen in the context of obligations. Because of the confidence deficit Iran created for itself through its many past failures to meet its safeguards obligations, as embodied in Article III, we continue to urge Iran to heed the repeated calls of the Board and desist from the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle until the trust of this Board – and the world – is fully regained.

Now that the EU3-Iran talks are at an impasse – an impasse of Iran’s own making – this Board must again take up the question of how it will address Iran’s credibility deficit and the lack of confidence that we, collectively, have expressed about Iran’s nuclear programme. The EU3, together with China, Russia and the United States, have agreed on a resolution that will see a report made to the UN Security Council. Canada fully backs such a report. It is time that the engagement of the UN Security Council be brought to bear on the issue of Iran’s credibility. Over the past several years, Iran has played a game of “incremental brinksmanship” as it has continuously pushed forward with its nuclear programme, despite our lack of confidence.

A report to the Security Council should not end efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear issue diplomatically, nor should it remove the Iran nuclear issue from the IAEA. The Agency will continue to play a fundamental role in providing clarity with regard to the outstanding issues highlighted by the Director General. A report to the Security Council would, however, ensure that the forum responsible for international peace and security puts its weight behind the resolutions of this Board and the requests of the Director General in support of a comprehensive and durable diplomatic solution. While Iran’s credibility must ultimately be rebuilt through its interactions with the IAEA, the rebuilding process will need to go above and beyond Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, which has yet to be ratified. Among other things, this process will need to include the cooperation and transparency measures requested by the Director General in his report of September 2, 2005. Since Iran has been given every opportunity to take these measures on a voluntary basis, and since at every opportunity it has decided not to, this Board is left with little choice but to report the matter to the Security Council.

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNOR OF SINGAPORE,

AMBASSADOR BURHAN GAFOOR

AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 2 FEB 2006

Mr. Chairman

My delegation would like to thank the Deputy Director General for his update on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We note that the DDG's report has highlighted some positive aspects of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. The report has also raised some additional concerns and questions.

2 Mr. Chairman, we are disappointed with Iran's decision to resume nuclear research and development activities on 10 January 2006. The full and sustained voluntary suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities was the central component of Iran's reassurances to the international community that its nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, Iran's decision to resume its R&D activities does not help to build international confidence in Iran's nuclear programme.

3 Since August 2005, the Board has repeatedly urged Iran to fully implement previous Board resolutions and to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and re-processing activities. Sadly, we are not in a situation where we can say that all previous Board resolutions have been implemented. It is therefore clear that we have reached a critical juncture in our deliberations.

4 This Board has a fundamental responsibility to preserve the credibility of the IAEA and the integrity of NPT. As a Board, we have to demonstrate our seriousness and commitment to fully implementing Board resolutions. We cannot shirk this responsibility.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

New Zealand statement on Iran

Mr. Chairman

The best security for us all lies in the effective working of multilateral agreements and institutions. States must respect these.

Mr. Chairman

Iran has the right under the NPT to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with Article 2 of the Treaty. However, despite three years of investigations, the IAEA is as yet unable to provide assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The IAEA Board of Governors - part of the multilateral system - called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment-related activities, in order to allow time for further investigations to take place. This was necessary in order to address the confidence deficit that exists in the international community about Iran's nuclear programme.

New Zealand has publicly stated its strong concern at the action taken by Iran in deciding to proceed with uranium enrichment-related activities despite the international community's request that it not do so at this time. We are deeply disappointed that Iran chose to ignore the request of the IAEA board.

Mr. Chairman

Given the confidence deficit which still exists and given that Iran has chosen not to comply with the resolutions of the IAEA Board, New Zealand supports the course of action proposed by the EU3 plus 3 in reporting this issue to the UN Security Council, another part of the multilateral system.

We urge Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in its efforts to verify the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We also urge Iran to resume work towards a negotiated solution.

We hope Iran will now respond positively to the concern of the broader international community and act to restore international confidence in its nuclear activities.

Norway

UTKAST TIL NORSK INNLEGG PA IAEAS EKSTRAORDINIERE STYREMØTE OM IRAN, 2.-3. FEBRUARY 2006

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to thank deputy Director General Heinonen for his introduction (and...). We appreciate his (their) impartiality and sound judgment. It provides an excellent basis for our discussion today.

We would also like to commend the Director General and his dedicated staff for their strong commitment to finding solutions to this issue. We fully support them in their endeavours.

More time is needed in order to attain full clarity regarding Iran's nuclear programme. We therefore need to intensify our efforts to solve this issue by diplomatic and political means.

We commend the EU3 and the Russian Federation for their efforts in this regard. Norway has supported and continues to support the constructive approach taken by the EU and as outlined in the EU statement today.

The IAEA has so far not been in a position to clarify important outstanding questions related to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran has clearly not demonstrated the required transparency. Recent developments have eroded the confidence of the international community even further.

We acknowledge Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This right is of crucial importance and must be applied to all States Parties without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the NPT.

Norway immediately expressed its concern when the Iranian authorities started breaking UN seals at nuclear installations. These unilateral actions stand in stark contrast to the IAEA Board of Governors' resolutions over the last two years calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. These actions have not contributed to restoring confidence in Iran's nuclear programme.

Norway has welcomed initiatives to facilitate supplies of nuclear fuel, such as the one proposed by the Russian Federation. We urge Iran to pursue consultations to develop an arrangement that would satisfy the international community's proliferation concerns and Iran's need for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me reiterate that our aim is to reach a political and diplomatic solution where the IAEA plays a key role. To this end we must further strengthen the authority of the Agency.

Norway will therefore support a decision to report to the UN Security Council its decision regarding the steps Iran is required to take. By doing this, we are sending a clear and constructive message. At the same time this leaves the door open for a political solution.

We appeal to Iran to use the time between now and the next meeting of the Board in March actively and wisely. This is an opportunity for Iran to demonstrate willingness to offer full and constructive cooperation.

A new basis for a diplomatic solution should be formed within the framework of the IAEA.

Only through full suspension of enrichment activities, including research and development, and full and proactive transparency over its nuclear programme, will Iran be able to demonstrate its readiness to cooperate with the international community and allay our justified concerns. We encourage and expect Iran to make full use of this opportunity.

We urge Iran to consider favourably the proposals that have been tabled, such as the one presented by the EU last fall and the initiative proposed by the Russian Federation. We call on Iran to continue its cooperation with the IAEA on the basis of full transparency and the Additional Protocol. Ratification of this vital verification instrument would be a most welcome step.

Norway will also continue its own dialogue with Iran, including on broader regional security issues.

We reiterate our support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Norway will continue to support resolutions in the UN General Assembly calling for the establishment of such a zone as well as the resolution dealing with the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman,

There is still an opportunity for reaching a negotiated solution. Let us seize it.

Source for all Speeches:

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