



THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE

Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The October 12, 2000, attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* was the latest in a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In December 1992, two bomb blasts occurred at hotels in Aden, Yemen where U.S. military forces were staying en route to deployment in Somalia. These bombings resulted in the withdrawal from Aden of U.S. personnel. In November 1995, a bomb exploded at a joint military training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 American military personnel. In June 1996, a truck bomb at the Khobar Towers compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19 U.S. service personnel. The Riyadh and Dhahran attacks were generally considered to be directed at the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, as part of a broader effort to force the United States to withdraw from the Middle East. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salem, Tanzania in August 1998, although not specifically directed against the U.S. military presence, were believed to be part of the same campaign against U.S. interests in the region.

The attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* occurred during a brief stop for refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The bomb blast ripped through the side of the ship, creating a 40x45 foot hole,



“While there was no ‘single-point failure’ that led to the attack, numerous factors combined in ways that left the ship and its crew vulnerable.”

and killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring dozens more. It was the most serious attack against U.S. military personnel since the 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Although significant security enhancements and force protection measures were implemented after the Khobar Towers incident, those measures proved inappropriate to deal with the kind of attack that took place against the *U.S.S. Cole*.

A combination of factors contributed to the *U.S.S. Cole* tragedy. These included the desire for engagement

with Yemen, operational requirements, force structure limitations, intelligence shortfalls with respect to the terrorist threat, a confusing threat level reporting system, a failure to react appropriately to changes in the geopolitical environment in the region, inadequate training and security measures, ambiguity in the determination of

hostile intent under the rules of engagement, insufficient attention to force protection measures by the ship’s commanding officer, and split responsibilities for supporting Navy logistical and intelligence requirements. There was no “single point failure” that was responsible for the tragedy, nor is it possible to conclude with any degree of confidence that all required force protection measures, if implemented, would have prevented the attack from occurring.

At the strategic level, the U.S. policy of engagement – highlighted in various national security guidance documents and reflected in U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) theater engagement plan – was the primary motivating factor behind the desire of the United States to increase its involvement with Yemen, including an increase in port visits to Aden and brief stops for ship refueling. At the tactical level, the decision to conduct refueling activities in Yemen was based on operational considerations.

The engagement with Yemen was initiated with a clear understanding that Yemen was a sanctuary for terrorists. Although the 1992 bombings in Aden led to the withdrawal of U.S. personnel, and subsequent threats to U.S. deminers resulted in an interruption of the U.S. humanitarian demining program, the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* was completely unexpected. Intelligence reporting regarding specific threats to U.S. interests in Yemen was scarce and sometimes contradictory. Consequently, the decision to conduct port visits in Aden was made on the basis of incomplete and inconclusive information, and resulted in higher risk than was generally perceived.

Compounding this was a general mindset that tended to discount the likelihood of a terrorist attack against a U.S. warship. In part, this was due to the fact that previous port visits had occurred without incident and that there was no concrete evidence suggesting terrorists were planning such an attack. In addition, operations in the region were conducted under peacetime rules of engagement and without an adequate appreciation of the “war” that terrorists had declared on the United States. Therefore, there was a widely held view that the *U.S.S. Cole* was not at particular risk. This ignored previous terrorist incidents and changes in the geo-political situation in the Middle East that should have led to a real-time reappraisal of the desirability of port visits and a more critical assessment of admittedly sketchy intelligence about possible terrorist actions in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

It is significant that the focus of the U.S. military’s anti-terrorism/force protection program has been on land-based, not waterborne, threats. The general assumption regarding ter-

rorist attacks against U.S. military assets is that they will be perpetrated on land, not at sea. Many of the Navy’s force protection measures have been designed to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. naval vessels while docked in port, including measures to ensure pierside security. The Navy’s force protection training program has focused on pierside threats, with little emphasis on defense against waterborne threats.

Waterborne terrorist threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Navy’s counterterrorism program. No one in the chain of command appears

“Waterborne terrorist threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Navy’s counterterrorism program...”

to have recognized that additional security measures were necessary to protect against waterborne terrorist threats. A waterborne suicide attack had not been considered likely.

With respect to the establishment of threat levels in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, a bureaucratic change in threat level reporting resulted in a degree of confusion over whether the threat in Yemen had officially decreased when it had not. The confusion was exacerbated by the fact that USCENTCOM did not concur with the changed threat reporting methodology and did not implement it. This raises issues with respect to the process by which threat levels are established.

Although the *U.S.S. Cole* remained at Threatcon BRAVO, not all 62 force protection measures required under this threat condition were implemented. Among the measures not

implemented were a requirement to coordinate security measures for the *U.S.S. Cole*’s visit with the local Yemeni husbanding agent and a requirement to keep unauthorized boats away from the ship. However, the failure to implement all measures does not, in itself, constitute a “smoking gun,” and it can never be known whether their implementation would have been sufficient to prevent the tragedy.

Reductions in force structure have left the Navy with significantly diminished assets. The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the *U.S.S. Cole*’s vulnerability.

Finally, split responsibilities between USCENTCOM, the Navy, DOD, and the Department of State led to confusion that could have been avoided had the coordination processes functioned effectively. Contracting issues in support of Navy port visits and refueling stops are handled by the Navy. However, operational decisions regarding refueling are USCENTCOM’s responsibility. Moreover, the establishment of threat levels, as noted above, requires greater coordination between DOD and USCENTCOM. The threat levels set by the U.S. Embassy in Yemen were based on different criteria and were not communicated to the *U.S.S. Cole*. And the existence of multiple force protection standards – one baseline set by the Navy, the other by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and augmented as necessary by USCENTCOM – is a recipe for confusion, and a single standard should be established.

In short, while there was no “single-point failure” that led to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, numerous factors combined in ways that left the ship and its crew vulnerable.

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INTRODUCTION

On October 12, 2000, at approximately 11:35 AM local time, a small boat laden with explosives detonated alongside the *U.S.S. Cole* (DDG 67) in Aden harbor, Yemen. Seventeen sailors died in the explosion and dozens more were wounded. The explosion ripped a 40-by-45 foot hole in the ship. Preliminary press reports indicated that the small boat carried more than 500 pounds of explosives and that the two individuals on board the boat sought to maximize damage to the *U.S.S. Cole* by using a “shaped

charge” that concentrated the blast in a relatively narrow area.

The *U.S.S. Cole* – a sophisticated Aegis-class ship – had arrived in Aden several hours earlier for refueling en route to joining a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf. The ship moored at a fueling “dolphin” located in the harbor some distance from the port area and had completed the process of taking on fuel when the small boat approached it and pulled up alongside. Press reports indicated that the two men on board

the boat stood and saluted just prior to the explosion.

The attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* again demonstrates that the threat of international terrorism directed against the United States, its military personnel, citizens, and interests, remains serious. This attack was the deadliest against the U.S. military since the June 1996 terrorist attack that killed 19 service personnel at the Khobar Towers compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was also the first against a sophisticated Navy ship.

THE GENESIS OF THE HASC INVESTIGATION

In 1996, a House National Security Committee staff investigation concluded that intelligence shortfalls, coupled with operational and organizational shortcomings, contributed to the unpreparedness of the military for the Khobar Towers attack. Since that attack, the United States has instituted additional security precautions to pro-

tect against terrorism. Unfortunately, they were insufficient to prevent the deadly attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*.

As part of the U.S. government’s investigation of the *U.S.S. Cole* incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a criminal investigation of the attack. U.S. FBI agents remain in Yemen, working with Yemeni officials to uncover the identity of those responsible for planning and executing the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. Numerous press reports suggest that those responsible have links to Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi expatriate who is thought to be the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Bin Laden is also thought to have been responsible for the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers.

In addition to the FBI investigation, Secretary of

Defense William S. Cohen appointed retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and retired General William Crouch, former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, to conduct a broad review of lessons learned from the attack, including a review of Department of Defense (DOD) policies and procedures regarding force protection, rules of engagement, logistical support, intelligence, and counterintelligence. This report was completed and the findings and recommendations released publicly on January 9, 2001. The Department of the Navy has also conducted a Judge Advocate General Manual investigation to determine whether the commander and crew of the *U.S.S. Cole* exercised the appropriate security precautions prior to its refueling stop. A redacted version of this report was released on January 19, 2001. Committee staff has seen and been briefed on both reports and has reviewed their conclusions.

This latest attack on the U.S. armed forces has again raised questions regarding the military’s preparedness to prevent terrorism directed against U.S. forces overseas. The *U.S.S. Cole*’s refueling in



Yemen, a country that the Department of State described in its most recent annual report on global terrorism as a “safehaven for terrorists,” has raised questions about the U.S. policy of “engagement” in the region, the sufficiency of U.S. intelligence on the terrorist threat, and the adequacy of security procedures designed to protect Navy vessels, especially during single-ship transits.

With these questions in mind, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) tasked committee staff to conduct a preliminary investigation into the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. As part of its oversight responsibility, the HASC received a series of briefings after the incident from the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy. On October 18, 2000, the HASC Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism received a classified briefing from the intelligence community on the attack. This was followed on October 25, 2000,

with an open hearing conducted by the full committee to receive testimony from Department of Defense and Department of State officials. The open session was followed by a closed executive session, during which the committee also heard from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Committee staff held numerous meetings with Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and intelligence community officials to gain a better understanding of the *U.S.S. Cole* tragedy. HASC staff received numerous briefings in Washington and requested numerous documents related to the intelligence aspects of the incident. HASC staff also worked closely with staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who provided important contributions to the understanding of the role of intelligence and the intelligence process as it related to events surrounding the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*.

On November 15, 2000, committee staff traveled to the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia, to assess the training program and force protection guidance established for crews aboard Aegis-class ships. From December 4-8, 2000, committee staff traveled to Manama, Bahrain, to discuss the attack with Navy officials at U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Staff received numerous briefings at USNAVCENT regarding policy, operations, intelligence, logistics, and force protection issues. On December 18, 2000, committee staff visited USCENCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

A complete listing of briefers and individuals interviewed during the course of this investigation appears as Appendix B of this report.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INVESTIGATIONS

The *U.S.S. Cole* Commission

On January 9, 2001, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen released the findings of the investigation into the *U.S.S. Cole* attack headed by Admiral Gehman and General Crouch. The report of the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission concluded that, although significant improvements had been made since the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in protecting U.S. installations from terrorist attack, the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* “demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces.” The report contained 30 unclassified findings and 44 specific recommendations for improvements to DOD policies and procedures in order to enhance the ability to protect U.S. military forces in transit.

The *U.S.S. Cole* Commission was tasked with responsibility for reviewing the attack in light of DOD policies and

procedures in order to assess the lessons learned. In an October 24, 2000 memo from Secretary Cohen to Admiral Gehman and General Crouch, the commission was directed to “address those matters that you consider pertinent associated with port visits, refueling stops, and related military activities in the USCENCOM AOR [area of responsibility], including, for example, force protection measures, rules of engagement, procedures for and other matters associated with logistic support, and intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.”

The commission report focused on five distinct areas: organizational issues within DOD; anti-terrorism and force protection measures; intelligence; logistics; and training. Significantly, the report did not address issues related to the reasons behind the *U.S.S. Cole*’s refueling stop at Aden, for example, the U.S. strategy of engagement, operational considerations, and Navy force struc-

ture realities. These issues are addressed in the HASC staff report.

The commission conducted its work taking the existing national security strategy of engagement as a given. In commenting on the release of the commission’s report at a Pentagon news conference on January 9, 2001, Admiral Gehman stated, “Our review was conducted in the context of the national security strategy.... The national security strategy includes the pillar the United States will be engaged actively around the world (sic.). We took that as an assumption. Our review was intended to determine how you do it more safely, not to question it.... [W]e did not review the policy of engagement with Aden. It wasn’t in our charter.” General Crouch noted, “Even though... the [U.S.S.] Cole was the catalyst for our review, the approach we took was not to find out what went wrong in the case of the [U.S.S.] Cole, but how can we do engagement activities more safely in the future.”

The commission's support of the engagement strategy was explicitly noted by Admiral Gehman, who stated, "The only thing I can say is that the premise of our report reflects our views that the national strategy of engaging in these regions around the world is a good one. It's in the U.S. best interests...." General Crouch noted, "What we are committed to is the continuation of that strategy of engagement and balancing it... with risk mitigation to protect our troops."

Another area left unaddressed by the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission is the issue of Navy force structure. The *U.S.S. Cole* was in Aden because of operational requirements that made its transit to the region necessary. Those operational requirements were influenced by the Navy's force structure and the assets the Navy can devote to contingency operations in the region. The commission concluded, "The current level of Combat Logistics Force oilers is sufficient to support the refueling and logistics requirements of the national strategy." However, it did not address the issue of using oilers to support single-ship transits, nor did it examine the adequacy of overall Navy force levels to execute the engagement strategy at an acceptable level of risk. These issues played a factor in the *U.S.S. Cole*'s presence in Aden harbor on October 12, 2000.

With respect to organizational issues, the commission concluded that "unity of effort" among the various entities within DOD with responsibilities for combating terrorism is essential. Accordingly, the commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) to oversee DOD's combating terrorism efforts. In fact, this recommendation was a Congressional initiative and previously codified in section 901 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398). That section requires the Secretary to designate an Assistant Secretary "to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism...." The commission also called for "greater coor-

"The *U.S.S. Cole* Commission did not review the basic premises, assumptions, or implementation of U.S. engagement strategy, nor did it address operational or force structure considerations."

dination of engagement activities across U.S. Government agencies." However, the commission did not review the basic premise, assumptions, or implementation of U.S. engagement strategy.

The commission recommended a variety of actions to improve the anti-terrorism and force protection capabilities of transiting units. These included manning and funding enhancements. The report concludes that Component Commanders must be provided with adequate resources to temporarily augment security for in-transit units. Moreover, the commission noted the existence of conflicting threat levels and recommended that the geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) have "sole authority" for establishing threat levels within his AOR. The commission also called for improvements to the threat condition (THREATCON) system, a series of increasingly robust force protection measures linked to the probability of terrorist attack. Importantly, the commission considered the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be "adequate" and recommended no changes to them. However, the commission did acknowledge that the SROE "do not provide specific guidelines or indicators for the determination of hostile intent of a terrorist threat." The HASC staff report concludes that, in the case of the *U.S.S. Cole*, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement and that this ambiguity was a contributing factor in the attack. Finally, the commission noted that "we must get out of the purely defensive

mode by proactively applying AT/FP [anti-terrorism/force protection] techniques and assets to detect and deter terrorists," and called for establishment of an "operational risk management" model to assist in AT/FP planning and execution.

Among the commission's key recommendations with respect to intelligence is that intelligence production and analysis must be reprioritized to decrease emphasis on traditional Cold War missions and increase emphasis on post-Cold War missions, such as combating terrorism. This recommendation presumes that the existing level of intelligence collection on some traditional Cold War targets is no longer necessary, a presumption that is certainly debatable. At the January 9, 2001, Pentagon news conference, Admiral Gehman stated that although DOD and the intelligence community have shifted resources "away from Cold War missions and toward the anti-terrorist mission," that shift has occurred "only at the margins." He noted that "that shift should continue." While additional intelligence efforts directed toward the combating terrorism mission are admittedly important, they should not necessarily come at the expense of other intelligence priorities or requirements. The commission also addressed, in accordance with its charter, counterintelligence requirements, and offered suggestions for improving threat and vulnerability assessments.

The commission highlighted existing vulnerabilities in the logistics requirement process with respect to in-

transit forces and recommended that the Component Commanders be included in the logistics planning and contract award process. In addition, the commission recommended that the logistics support process be modified in ways that incorporate security and force protection considerations. A number of these recommendations parallel the findings and recommendations contained in the HASC staff report.

Finally, the commission noted specific AT/FP training deficiencies and recommended that such training be accomplished “with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit’s primary mission areas.”

In sum, many of the commission’s recommendations are focused on improving the ability of Component Commanders to exercise appropriate force protection measures. The commission’s report describes the Component Commanders as “the fulcrum of a balance with the benefits of engagement on one side and the associated risks/costs on the other side.” While there is clearly a balance to be struck between the strategy of engagement and the assumption of risk, the commission did not address the issue of what a proper balance should be.

The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) Report

As part of the official inquiry into the *U.S.S. Cole* tragedy, the Navy conducted its own investigation, focusing on a review of the force protection measures implemented and not implemented by the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole*, and whether the commanding officer and crew were negligent or deficient in the execution of their duties.

The Navy’s Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation was conducted by an officer at USNAVCENT. Formal written endorsements of the findings were submitted by Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of USNAVCENT and the Navy’s Fifth Fleet; Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.

“Although the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* failed to implement all required force protection measures, the Navy did not recommend any disciplinary action.”

Atlantic Fleet; and Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations.

On January 19, 2001, the JAGMAN report was officially released, containing the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer, along with the written endorsements of Admiral Moore, Admiral Natter, and Admiral Clark. The endorsements to the report contain background information and the Navy’s perspective on the *U.S.S. Cole*’s port visit, threat levels and threat conditions, Navy training program deficiencies, and organizational issues.

Among the JAGMAN report’s findings were that the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* failed to implement roughly half of the force protection measures required during his refueling stop in Aden. The implementation of these measures, according to the report, “may have prevented the suicide boat attack or mitigated its consequences.” Despite this finding, the senior Navy officials endorsing the report recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against the commanding officer, Commander Kirk S. Lippold.

In his endorsement to the report, Admiral Moore disagreed with the conclusion of the investigating officer on this point and noted his view that “had *U.S.S. Cole* implemented the THREATCON Bravo force protection measures appropriately, the ship would not have prevented the attack.” Admiral Natter concurred in this assessment, noting that implementation of those additional measures would have been “inadequate” to prevent the attack. Admiral Clark also concluded that “these measures, even if fully implemented, would not have

thwarted a well-planned, determined attack of this nature.” Nevertheless, it is impossible to prove a negative and to know whether actions not taken would or would not have been sufficient to prevent the consequences that resulted.

On January 9, 2001, after reviewing the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission report, former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, to review the findings of the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission and the JAGMAN investigation and to provide his advice concerning implementation of the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission’s recommendations “and any additional actions the Department should now take.” He also directed General Shelton to assess “operational and administrative matters associated with this incident, including issues of accountability, as well as any other matter you deem appropriate.”

At a news conference on January 19, 2001, Secretary Cohen announced his and General Shelton’s concurrence with the JAGMAN report’s recommendation that no disciplinary action be taken against the *U.S.S. Cole*’s commanding officer. He indicated that responsibility for the *U.S.S. Cole* tragedy lies with the entire military chain of command, from the Secretary of Defense on down, because the chain of command did not sufficiently question the procedures for protecting U.S. military forces in transit. In a January 19, 2001 memorandum, Secretary Cohen stated that while force protection enhancements have focused on land-based installations, “all of us who had responsibility for force protection of *U.S.S. Cole*... did not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.”

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of four geographic commands and encompasses 25 countries in the Middle East, central and southwest Asia, and parts of Africa. This region is one of the most volatile and dangerous in the world. The commander-in-chief of USCENTCOM (CINCCENT) is the Department of Defense's primary liaison and representative to the countries in the region. USCENTCOM is the only geographic command with its headquarters located outside the command's area of responsibility (AOR). CINCCENT is not a force provider – he has no standing military forces under his command. Rather, he receives forces from the various other commands in order to execute the missions he is given. USNAVCENT is the Navy component command and is one of five peacetime component commands within USCENTCOM.

Throughout the course of the HASC staff investigation, USCENTCOM officials emphasized the importance of their mission, which includes promoting regional stability; maintaining access to regional resources and markets; supporting a lasting Middle East peace; and countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The three major strategic chokepoints in the region are the Suez Canal, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Bab el Mandeb. The Bab el Mandeb lies at the southern end of the Red Sea. Yemen is situated at the northern end of this waterway, with Djibouti to the south. Through these narrow chokepoints flows nearly 80 percent of the world's petroleum resources. The Navy's main responsibility in the region is to keep those chokepoints open.



The dangerous nature of operations in USCENTCOM is typified by the fact that the "normal" threat condition for most countries within the AOR is generally higher than in other commands. However, military operations within USCENTCOM take place on a routine basis using peacetime rules of engagement and operating procedures. Port visits, brief stops for fuel, and military exercises are conducted as part of the normal peacetime engagement strategy for the region.

This peacetime posture belies the fact that USCENTCOM is conducting combat or near-combat operations on a daily basis within the AOR. For example, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH requires armed U.S. aircraft to enforce the Iraqi "no-fly zone" south of the 33rd parallel in the face of active Iraqi air defense systems. The Navy conducts maritime interdiction operations against ships in the Persian Gulf suspected of smuggling in violation of the UN-imposed economic sanctions regime against Iraq. In addition, there have been a series of high visibility terrorist attacks in the region, including the attacks against the joint military facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995, the Khobar Towers compound in 1996,

and the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998.

Despite these ongoing high-risk operations, officials at USCENTCOM indicated that, prior to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, engagement in the various countries in the region was viewed as the top priority. Since the attack, the priority within USCENTCOM has changed to force protection. This change came about, according to USCENTCOM officials, because of the

realization that terrorists are "at war" with the United States. Up until the time of the *U.S.S. Cole* attack, officials did not view the situation in the region in this light, and continued to conduct operations with primarily a peacetime mindset.

This peacetime mindset may have contributed to an overall atmosphere within USCENTCOM that colored commanders' judgments and allowed units to maintain an overall security posture that was inappropriate to the actual threat in the region. Had the commander of the *U.S.S. Cole* felt that he was entering an actual "combat zone," he may have been more diligent in implementing the required force protection measures when entering Aden harbor. The realization that the United States is now "at war" with terrorists should signal commanders and units in the USCENTCOM AOR that they should approach all operations in the region as if they were combat operations. As such, they could be attacked any time, any place, and should take appropriate force protection actions. This "combat" mindset is critical to presenting a credible deterrent posture toward any would-be terrorist in the future.

THE U.S. POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT

For the past eight years, U.S. national security policy has emphasized a strategy of "engagement." Engagement can take many forms, but at its root lies the forging of closer ties between the United States and other countries in furtherance of U.S. national security objectives.

As articulated in the most recent White House national security strategy document, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," dated January 5, 2000, "Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad." The 1997 National Military Strategy, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes that "Our global engagement makes the world safer for our Nation, our citizens, our interests, and our values." In a preface to the report, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, noted, "The military has an important role in engagement – helping to shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world."

Often, the U.S. military is the tool for implementing the strategy of engagement. The U.S. military is respected around the world for its capabilities, professionalism, and adherence to the highest principles. The Navy bears a major share of engagement responsibilities in the region because of its continuous forward-based presence, which is often non-permanent and less intrusive than other types of military deployments.

Engagement with Yemen was seen as an important priority because of Yemen's strategic location astride the Bal el Mandeb. Until 1990, Yemen was divided into North and South Yemen. South Yemen was a Marxist state. A bloody but relatively short civil war between both Yemeni states was fought in 1994. Despite the end of the civil war, Yemen remained unstable and a harbor for terrorists. As Admiral Moore described it, former USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief, Marine Corps

General Anthony Zinni, saw an opportunity to try to prevent Yemen "from becoming another Afghanistan." Defense ties between the United States and Yemen expanded after 1997.

In accordance with U.S. engagement strategy, the regional CINC developed a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) that outlined the specifics for engagement with countries within the USCENTCOM AOR, including Yemen. The TEP is a classified document that is prepared, reviewed, and amended on a cyclical basis during the course of each year. The last TEP prepared prior to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* – TEP 1250-01 – was dated April 1, 1999, and covered a seven-year period from 2001-2007. The document was not solely a product of USCENTCOM. All national agencies had the ability to review the particulars of the TEP and to recommend changes or modifications to the engagement plans it outlined. According to USCENTCOM officials, no agency articulated any objections with respect to the TEP section dealing with Yemen.

In an unclassified entry in the TEP, General Zinni stated, "We need to broaden our relationships with nations in our AOR through expanded engagement activities...." He noted that a number of states in the USCENTCOM AOR "face both transnational dangers and internal threats to stability. Chief among these is anti-government terrorism, fostered by various Islamic extremist groups." Yemen, he noted, faced "internal problems between the national government and the tribes," exacerbated by the country's "extreme economic disadvantage." USCENTCOM's August 2000 classified country campaign plan



Aerial view of U.S.S. Cole refueling in Aden harbor.

for Yemen identified the specific rationale for engagement with Yemen, and addressed the security environment in the country. One of the unclassified assumptions in this document was that "Yemen will remain stable and be able to provide security for USG/DOD [United States Government/Department of Defense] personnel conducting engagement activities."

General Zinni requested the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) and the Navy's Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., to help formulate specific recommendations for the Navy's support for engagement with Yemen. Admiral Moore suggested three specific options: conducting military-to-military exercises with Yemen, assisting in the development of Yemen's coast guard capabilities, and conducting brief port visits in Aden. General Zinni accepted these recommendations and added a fourth: assisting Yemen in the clearance of land mines left over from the country's civil war. In this regard, the Navy conducted a "train-the-trainer" program to assist Yemen in the demining effort.

The U.S. Navy strongly supported the engagement policy with Yemen and continues to do so even after the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. Admiral Moore stated that, in general, the Gulf coun-

tries view the U.S. naval presence in the region as a matter of “prestige” and that they do not want the United States to disengage from the region. The Gulf states view Iran as the primary threat to their security and see the United States as providing a necessary deterrent to Iranian aggression.

In practice, USNAVCENT conducts 50 exercises annually in 13 Gulf states for engagement purposes. According to Admiral Moore, the Navy had “no discomfort” going to Yemen. In accordance with the specific engagement

worse. The port was extremely busy, many small boats, the conditions ashore and in the government were not satisfactory.” In addition, the quality of the fuel being provided in Djibouti was questionable, the fuel pumping rate was inadequate compared to other ports, fuel storage capacity was less and storage costs were higher than in Aden, and refueling took place pierside.

In addition to operational considerations that made Yemen look like an attractive refueling option, the desire for engagement with Yemen provided

The decision to refuel in Aden harbor was made with full knowledge of the fact that Yemen was home to a variety of terrorist groups, some with anti-American agendas. Yemen is also the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi expatriate and suspected mastermind behind the attacks on U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The Department of State, in its report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, concluded that Yemen remained “a safehaven for terrorist groups.”

With this background, the deterioration in the political and security environment with respect to Israel and the Palestinians in the summer of 2000 should have provided early warning that U.S. interests in the region might be placed at greater risk because of a perceived U.S. bias toward Israel. As a result of this change in the geo-political situation, a more careful and deliberate review of the CINC’s TEP and U.S. engagement plans with Yemen should have taken place. Unfortunately, this did not occur.

Key observations: U.S. national security strategy called for engagement with Yemen. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy through port visits and brief refueling stops, among other initiatives. Yemen was seen as “win-win” – it solved an operational need and met U.S. engagement policy guidance at the same time. However, the desire for engagement with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat in that country, increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an increase in the number of U.S. Navy ships refueling there. Changing geo-political conditions in the AOR should have led to a more critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities and engagement plans for Yemen, but they did not.

Recommendations: A policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in areas where the potential for terrorism is high. The balance between the desire for engagement and the assumption of risk must be recalibrated to place increasing emphasis on force protection requirements. Implementation of the TEP should be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with changing geo-political factors in the AOR.

“The desire for engagement with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat there, increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel.”

plans accepted by General Zinni, some joint U.S.-Yemeni training exercises had been conducted. U.S. deminers were also assisting Yemen in clearing the country of land mines left over from the civil war. In addition, planning was being done to help develop Yemen’s coast guard capabilities. And, by the time of the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, at least 27 U.S. Navy ships had already conducted brief stops for fuel in Aden harbor.

The original decision to refuel Navy ships at Aden was viewed by the Navy in the context of the operational benefits it would provide. Yemen not only was situated adjacent to the Bab el Mandeb, but also was roughly half the steaming distance between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The refueling situation at other ports in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility was becoming increasingly difficult. For example, Djibouti was becoming increasingly tenuous as a refueling stop because of escalating instability. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 19, 2000, General Zinni stated, “We had been in Djibouti and refueling. We were interested in terminating that contract, because at that time, Djibouti, the threat conditions were far

the Navy with a strategic rationale for increasing the number of planned refueling stops there as part of the overall engagement strategy developed by the USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief. In short, the decision to go to Yemen accomplished multiple objectives, both strategic and operational.

From the Navy’s perspective, the decision to refuel in Yemen was logical and appropriate. In fact, the Navy continues to support the engagement strategy with respect to Yemen and considers Aden to be the best refueling port option in the AOR. This is one reason why the Navy expects to return to Aden in the future. In the wake of the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, the Navy sees a return to Yemen as both a matter of sound operational policy and a matter of political necessity driven by the requirement not to withdraw in the face of terrorist attacks. Both Admiral Moore and the current USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief, General Tommy R. Franks, stated their belief that the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* was an “act of war” designed to force U.S. disengagement from the region. According to General Franks, “Terrorists have declared war on us. We shouldn’t back away. I will never recommend disengagement.”

INTELLIGENCE

Accurate intelligence information on terrorist plans and activities has historically been difficult to obtain. Even the small amount of intelligence that referenced Yemen specifically was occasionally contradictory. Generally, “strategic” intelligence - containing information about threats and preparations for possible attacks on U.S. interests or personnel - can be useful in providing early warning of terrorist actions. However, because terrorist groups tend to be small, close knit, very security conscious, and difficult to penetrate, “tactical” intelligence - that intelligence containing specific information regarding the target, method, timing, and location of an attack - is generally more difficult to obtain, if not nearly impossible. Further, it is generally agreed that there are insufficient resources, particularly in terms of human intelligence assets, to properly counter the difficult terrorist threat.

Collection

Since the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers compound in Saudi Arabia, intelligence collection efforts have improved significantly. A sizable amount of intelligence information, much of it non-specific, is collected, processed, and disseminated daily by the various national intelligence agencies. While there is always a risk that source information gathered through a variety of means may be deliberately or unintentionally erroneous, much of the intelligence product is sufficiently accurate and timely to be “actionable.”

As the USCENTCOM AOR is one of the most volatile and dangerous regions of the world where U.S. military forces operate, accurate and timely intelligence is essential to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel conducting their missions. Officials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT noted that a number of planned terrorist attacks in their AOR were thwarted as a result of accurate and timely intelligence. Both General Franks and Admiral Moore praised the work of the national intelligence agencies with respect to their efforts in providing crit-

ical intelligence that allowed successful preventive defensive actions to be taken.

The national intelligence community - including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency - has helped the United States to score notable, but largely unheralded, counterterrorism successes. Unfortunately, despite significant efforts, failures to provide tactical warning may occur, as intelligence efforts will rarely result in absolute knowledge of terrorist activities.

General Franks noted that intelligence must be “actionable” to be effective. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 19, 2000, General Zinni stated that “Aden never had a specific terrorist threat. All the other ports that have been mentioned here, that we should have considered as options, have had specific terrorist threats, and we’ve had to emergency sortie out of them.” However, recent press reports indicate that information on a possible terrorist threat to U.S. Navy ships in Aden was conveyed by the FBI to the Department of Defense in August 1998.

Much of the U.S. intelligence collection effort is dedicated to signals intelligence (SIGINT) - the exploitation of communications. Over the years, modern technology has made communications more difficult to intercept and exploit. Encryption software, devices, and other technologies have become readily available on the open market and have complicated the task of gathering accurate intelligence regarding the terrorist threat. Moreover, terrorists have become more sophisticated in their use of these technologies and more cautious in their communications. In addition to SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT) often provides a valuable source of information.

Published reports suggest that planning to attack a U.S. Navy warship in Aden may have begun as early as 1997 - three years before the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* was actually carried out. In addition, a previous failed attempt

to attack a U.S. Navy vessel remained undiscovered.

In retrospect, it is clear that USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT operated with respect to Yemen on the basis of engagement and operational factors without complete and accurate threat information. Moreover, recent press reports indicate that the FBI had access in 1998 to information about a possible terrorist attack against a U.S. Navy vessel in Yemen and that this information was disseminated to several DOD organizations. Nevertheless, engagement activities with Yemen increased and a bunkering contract to provide for the refueling of U.S. Navy ships was concluded in December 1998.

Analysis

It is common knowledge that the intelligence community circulates a large number of intelligence messages daily regarding terrorist threats. This intelligence traffic must be sorted, prioritized, analyzed, and disseminated in a timely manner. At the level of a ship commander, it is impossible to wade through the sheer quantity of raw intelligence reports. Therefore, intelligence analysts must accurately separate the critical from the uncritical and the reliable from the unreliable. This is a key role of intelligence analysis.

Source reliability is a key factor in the determination of how seriously to take an intelligence report of a possible terrorist threat. Analysts often disagree on how much credibility to lend to a given source, and this can result in points of dispute between analytical agencies. Nevertheless, these disputes may result in healthy competitive analysis. In addition, the credibility of threats may also be linked to seemingly unrelated external factors, such as geopolitical developments in the region.

In the summer of 2000, the Middle East peace process began to falter. Anti-Israeli and anti-American senti-

ment among many Arabs in the region increased. In this period of increased regional tension, it was reasonable to expect a higher probability of attacks on U.S. interests in the region. Prudence suggests that intelligence normally considered to be relatively benign with respect to threats against U.S. interests should have been viewed by the operational consumers with greater seriousness and urgency than was the case.

Both USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT officials indicated that more analysis of raw information is needed. Admiral Moore also noted a need for more timely analysis. He indicated that the *U.S.S. Cole* had all the relevant intelligence information, but was not knowledgeable of conflicting assessments with respect to source material.

In a January 18, 2001 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig noted, "While more than a dozen people participated over eighteen months in a plot against naval ships in Aden, focused intelligence resources in that port amounted to less than a man year, contributing to poor insight about the actual threat." As a result, he concluded that the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* "did not have full situational awareness." In his endorsement to the JAGMAN report, Admiral Moore conceded simply, "we did not believe an attack in Yemen would occur."

Committee staff also reviewed the analysis produced by DIA analyst Kie Fallis, who resigned from DIA after the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. According to press reports, Mr. Fallis' analysis suggested that the terrorist threat should have been taken more seriously than it was. Specific comments on the Fallis analysis are contained in the classified annex to this report.

Dissemination

Overall, the dissemination of threat intelligence reporting was extensive.

A low threshold for the dissemination of intelligence information was established and all intelligence reporting was disseminated appropriately and in a timely manner. Message traffic was relayed as expected. However, some highly classified message traffic could not be relayed directly to the *U.S.S. Cole* because the ship did not have the equipment to receive sensitive compartmented information, which is not an unusual configuration for a U.S. destroyer on a normal deployment. In addition, selective message traffic from Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bah-

"Intelligence shortfalls led to a failure to provide 'tactical' warning to the *U.S.S. Cole*."

rain, including analyses of intelligence data, was transmitted to the *U.S.S. Cole* before the ship transited the Suez Canal and entered the USCENTCOM AOR. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT officials indicated that the *U.S.S. Cole* had access to all relevant intelligence information.

Unfortunately, the massive quantity of non-specific intelligence information that was broadly disseminated contributed to an under-appreciation of the seriousness of the terrorist threat. USCENTCOM officials in Tampa, Florida and USNAVCENT officials in Manama, Bahrain indicated they had no concern that the significant quantity of raw intelligence reporting being disseminated would lead to "information overload." However, they acknowledged that a high volume of general intelligence information could have a "numbing effect" on personnel. The low threshold for dissemination of intelligence may lead to a blizzard of information that causes some to be dismissed inappropriately. This is not to suggest that the intelligence community should raise its threshold for reporting terrorism information. There

is likely no possible set of conditions for establishing a rigid reporting threshold for this type of information, and the intelligence community should, absent such, continue reporting as it has.

USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT officials indicated that, even with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, they would have made the same call to refuel the *U.S.S. Cole* in Aden, given the same intelligence information at the time. The determination to refuel in Aden was a policy decision, made with the known lack of specific information on terrorist cell activities in Yemen. Unfortunately, in this instance, the intelligence community produced no timely tactical warning of the attack.

Because an examination of the specific intelligence information available to USCENTCOM, the U.S. Navy, and the *U.S.S. Cole*, as well as a description of how the intelligence process worked in this instance, necessarily involves a discussion of classified information, it is not included in this unclassified report. However, a full discussion of intelligence factors relevant to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* appears in the classified annex to this report.

Key observations: There was clearly a shortage of intelligence information with respect to the specific attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. In spite of the fact that the intelligence community had known of general and ambiguous planning activities for an unspecified action or actions for some time, the lack of specific information led to a failure to provide "tactical" warning to the *U.S.S. Cole*. Likewise, there was no specific information to suggest that the intelligence community could have provided tactical warning to other U.S. Navy ships in Aden. Further, there was no intelligence information about a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel in the Aden port. There is sufficient evidence to believe that additional HUMINT collection personnel would enable broader coverage of the USCENTCOM AOR and provide an increased anti-terrorism collection effort. The intelligence dissemination

system worked well, as the threshold for reporting was low. However, the sheer volume of non-specific intelligence placed a premium on accurate analysis.

Recommendations: Policy determinations that place U.S. military personnel in harm's way must not be made without a full understanding that there may be an absence of specific intelligence to support them. Additional intelligence collection personnel and analysts with the proper training are needed to sort through the voluminous supply of raw intelligence

and make accurate judgments regarding the credibility of the data. The process for resolving competing analyses within and between intelligence agencies should be strengthened by encouraging alternative analyses. Improved qualitative analysis is also required. A better process is required for ensuring that useful, operationally oriented intelligence is available to ship commanders. The intelligence staffs of the regional commands must be more proactive in pushing the national intelligence community to provide better intelligence support and anal-

ysis in areas where existing intelligence collection and analysis is deficient. This should include the operational elements informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of deployments so that focused intelligence collection can be undertaken. Intelligence assessments should also be viewed in the context of broader geo-political developments within the AOR. Greater coordination between Department of Defense officials in Washington and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

THREAT LEVELS AND THREAT CONDITIONS

The system of threat level reporting is designed to provide a simple barometer of terrorist threats to U.S. interests in other countries. The threat levels in various countries are continuously assessed and reassessed based on existing intelligence information. In accordance with Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 on "DOD Antiterrorism/



Force Protection (AT/FP) Program," country threat levels are established by DIA and promulgated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). The Directive also stipulates that the establishment of country threat levels is supposed to be coordinated with the regional commanders-in-chief in their respective areas of responsibility.

Unfortunately, part of the general and prevalent complacency about the threat to U.S. interests in Yemen was the result of confusion brought about by the introduction of a new threat level reporting methodology on October 1, 2000. The change in the threat level reporting methodology was intended to clarify understanding of the threats facing the United States globally.

According to a September 29, 2000, DIA report on the new methodology, "Customers of the new methodology should receive a clearer picture of the terrorist threat in a particular country." In the case of the U.S.S. Cole incident, this change may have had the opposite effect.

Prior to October 1, 2000, the threat level reporting system classified countries according to five categories: Negligible, Low, Medium, High, and Critical. After October 1, 2000, the methodology was streamlined to reflect only four categories: Low, Moderate, Significant, and High. Under the old methodology, the threat level in Yemen was classified as "High." However, under the new methodology, the threat level was classified as "Significant," with

"High" representing the highest level of threat. Admiral Moore stated that the commander of the U.S.S. Cole may have misinterpreted this revision as signifying a decrease in the threat level in Yemen. This was also a conclusion of the U.S.S. Cole Commission, headed by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman.

USCENTCOM never concurred with the change in reporting methodology and did not adopt it because of concerns over possible confusion that might result. Although it appears likely that this concern was realized in the case of the U.S.S. Cole, officials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT pointed out that the commander of the U.S.S. Cole maintained threat condition (THREATCON) Bravo.

At the time of the U.S.S. Cole's visit to Aden, the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, was at a higher threat level than USNAVCENT. This elevated threat level was the result of factors that USCENTCOM officials suggested were not relevant to the Navy's operations in Yemen, for example, the prevalence of street crime and rioting. Because the U.S.S. Cole's visit was a brief stop for fuel and not a port visit

involving crew liberty, USCENTCOM officials discounted the relevance of the Embassy's higher threat level. The *U.S.S. Cole* was unaware of the different threat level in effect at the U.S. Embassy. They were also unaware of the fact that the Embassy was closed for security reasons from October 5-8, 2000. Had they been made aware, it is possible that this information might have factored into the *U.S.S. Cole*'s force protection plan.

Threat conditions, or THREATCONs, are a measure of the force protection requirements that must be implemented in response to the threat level in a given country. THREATCON Normal reflects a routine security posture. THREATCONs increase from Alpha to Delta as the threat of terrorism becomes more pronounced. (The specific unclassified THREATCON measures are included at Appendix C of this report.)

Normally, USCENTCOM operates under THREATCON Bravo, a higher threat condition than generally found in other regions of the world where the United States has military forces. Yemen

was under THREATCON Charlie until May 2000, when it reverted to THREATCON Bravo. The THREATCON Charlie status was initiated as the result of a threat to U.S. deminers in Yemen, who were removed from the country in response. It was not instituted as a result of any threat against a U.S. naval vessel.

By May 2000, USNAVCENT and USCENTCOM determined that there was insufficient intelligence to justify remaining at THREATCON Charlie in Yemen. U.S. naval vessels that had previously made brief stops for refueling in Aden had reported no security problems and at least one after-action report received by USNAVCENT recommended a loosening of security measures for subsequent refueling stops. The reduction in the threat condition from Charlie to Bravo was coordinated with the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a and supported by the in-country U.S. Defense Representative at the embassy.

THREATCON Charlie involves security measures that require increased vigilance and additional personnel standing watch, which can place difficult strains on a crew. It is also

usually limited to short periods of time. Since the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, all ports in the USCENTCOM AOR have remained at THREATCON Charlie and will likely remain there for some time to come. However, officials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT acknowledged that maintaining THREATCON Charlie for too long can lead to a mindset that it is normal and people can become "numb" to threats. After May 2000, THREATCON Bravo was considered to be the appropriate threat condition for Yemen. Unfortunately, critical waterborne threat security measures that must be implemented under THREATCON Charlie are not required under THREATCON Bravo.

Key observation: Confusion with respect to threat levels could have contributed to a false sense of security and complacency by the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole*.

Recommendations: Standardization of the system of threat level reporting is essential to avoid confusion regarding the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The sufficiency of THREATCON measures to accomplish their intended objectives should be reviewed and revalidated periodically.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

After the bombing of the Khobar Towers compound in 1996, revised antiterrorist security measures were instituted. However, the focus of these enhancements was on hardening land-based installations against terrorist attack. It is conceivable that these improvements played an indirect role in the terrorists' choice of a U.S. navy vessel as a target.

Among the security enhancements instituted after the Khobar Towers bombing was the conduct of vulnerability assessments of U.S. military installations and facilities abroad. After the decision was made to support engagement with Yemen, four vulnerability assessments were conducted in Aden. Two were conducted by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and one by the Coast Guard. The NCIS vulnerability assessments focused on ground-based threats to U.S.

deminers in Yemen. They did not consider waterborne threats to U.S. Navy ships. In May 1998, USCENTCOM conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Aden port. This was the only vulnerability assessment of Aden conducted by USCENTCOM and it occurred more than two years prior to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*.

An unclassified entry in the USCENTCOM Commander-in-Chief's Theater Engagement Plan 1250-01 stated, "USCENTCOM has an active Force Protection program responsible for vulnerability assessments and site surveys. The assessments will be used as part of the overall theater assessment process and will assist in determining the appropriate level of force protection required for forces conducting engagement activities." Regrettably, USCENTCOM did not believe it was necessary to conduct additional vulnerability assess-

ments, even though the threat level and threat conditions in Yemen changed.

The lack of NCIS personnel assigned in Aden may also have exposed a vulnerability. While there is no way to know whether NCIS personnel on the ground watching the port might have precluded the attack, an NCIS presence would have allowed for a more knowledgeable assessment regarding port security.

Key observations: Formal vulnerability assessments focused primarily on land-based threats in Yemen. Only one vulnerability assessment of the Aden port was conducted, but that was more than two years prior to the *U.S.S. Cole* attack.

Recommendation: Formal vulnerability assessments should be conducted at regular intervals, and when threat levels within the AOR change.

FORCE PROTECTION

USNAVCENT, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, prides itself on having the best force protection program in the world. In fact, in April 2000, USNAVCENT was awarded top honors by the Department of Defense for having the “best force protection program anywhere.” Admiral Moore noted that USNAVCENT headquarters enjoys “the best security money can buy.” Yet, again, these measures are primarily oriented toward defending against shore-based attacks. Unfortunately, even the best force protection measures in place at the time did not protect the *U.S.S. Cole*.

Extensive training is conducted to familiarize military personnel with force protection measures and procedures. However, there is always concern that additional force protection measures – usually adopted after an unexpected vulnerability is exploited – compromise the military’s ability to execute its missions and leave the armed services “looking backward” rather than “looking forward.”

This concern was voiced repeatedly at USCENTCOM headquarters and at USNAVCENT. Admiral Moore was particularly strong in expressing his view that the reaction to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* in terms of additional force protection measures will leave the United States better defended against a threat that is unlikely to be repeated. The terrorists have successfully attacked a U.S. Navy ship, he noted, arguing that they are planning their next type of attack while the United States military spends time bolstering its defenses against the last type of attack.

Force protection, as practiced, is an inherently defensive activity. Both Admiral Moore and General Franks commented that the war against terrorism cannot be won if the United States only plays defense. Implicit in their comments was a recognition that the United States cannot defend against every type of attack, in every place, at every time, and that some



offensive activity on the part of the United States is necessary if terrorism is to be defeated. Also implicit in their remarks was an apparent belief that by only playing defense, the U.S. military is being placed in an untenable situation and that incidents like the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* are inevitable unless the United States adopts a more aggressive approach toward counterterrorism.

Nevertheless, risk is an inherent element in U.S. force deployments. Whether U.S. military deployments are justified on the basis of a strategy of engagement or a requirement for power projection, risk must be managed effectively and reduced to a minimum wherever possible. Consequently, force protection measures must be thorough and adequate.

The Navy’s Anti-Terrorism/ Force Protection Training Program

In general, the U.S. Navy’s anti-terrorism and force protection (AT/FP) program is focused almost exclusively on shore-based, rather than waterborne, threats. Until now, terrorist threats to ships were considered to emanate from shore, such as truck bombs on the pier when a ship is docked in port. In the case of the *U.S.S. Cole*, waterborne threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Navy’s counterterrorism program.

The Navy’s AT/FP training program is run by U.S. Joint Forces Command. USCENTCOM does not inject itself into the training program. However, USCENTCOM has certain knowledge and experience regarding threats that would make its inputs valuable to U.S. Joint Forces Command in structuring the AT/FP training program. There is no indication anyone in the chain of command suggested a change in the training program to improve capabilities against waterborne terrorist threats.

There are few opportunities for formal force protection training to hone the skills of the commissioned officer (collateral duty assigned to one of the junior officers aboard ship) or the enlisted intelligence specialist responsible for advising the ship commander of the threat. In the case of the *U.S.S. Cole* and similar Aegis-class ships, these two personnel, along with the ship’s executive officer, are principally responsible for the training of shipboard personnel and, if necessary, implementation of the ship protection plan. They are also responsible for assisting the commander in conducting the required real-time assessment of the specific threats against his ship.

There is no Navy-wide standard core curriculum for force protection unique to Navy vessels. This fact

reflects the primacy of the domain of the East and West coast Navy commanders-in-chief. The Force Protection Officer course, which lasts five days, addresses the development of ship protection plans. However, the training focuses on shore installation protection and does not teach perimeter security (pier, water, or air) or the skills needed to execute the ship protection plans.

An additional training program for shipboard security personnel (the Shipboard Security Engagement Tactics Course) trains them to locate and neutralize intruders, protect vital ship areas, and recover hostages. It does not address threat analysis, external threats, or perimeter security. Law of the Sea training is also part of the pre-deployment training that each ship undergoes, with written certification that the training was conducted.

Training of ship personnel with respect to the use of deadly force is also considered an essential part of the ship protection measures. The official U.S. Navy policy in this regard is that members of the ship's self-defense force (SSDF) and all armed watch standers should receive pre-deployment and on-deployment refresher briefs, as well as tailored scenario training relative to the use of deadly force. The Navy traditionally leaves weapons release authority to the commanding officer or it may be delegated to another senior officer. However, even if the watch sentries on board the *U.S.S. Cole* had recognized a threat from the small boat that approached the ship, they may not have been able to engage it without first obtaining authorization from the commander or another officer.

Force Protection Measures and the Rules of Engagement

The Navy operates under multiple force protection standards: the Navy has developed its own baseline force protection standards and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have developed another set of more stringent measures. Navy operations are inconsistent in the

force protection standards used. For example, the Navy's Sixth Fleet operates under the Navy baseline force protection measures while the Fifth Fleet operates under the JCS measures. The *U.S.S. Cole* was transitioning from the Sixth Fleet to the Fifth Fleet and operating under the JCS guidelines.

According to DOD Directive 2000.12 on anti-terrorism and force protection, the USCENTCOM Com-

“The Navy’s AT/FP program is focused almost exclusively on shore-based, rather than waterborne, threats.”

mander-in-Chief has the responsibility to “assess and review the AT/FP programs of all CINC-assigned military forces and/or activities in the AOR.” USNAVCENT conducted a review of force protection programs in the summer of 2000. USCENTCOM indicated that the CINC review progress is an ongoing one, with programs reviewed on an annual basis. It is not a formal review process, and is conducted by “exception,” meaning that the force protection procedures remain unchanged unless an issue is raised that requires reexamination.

While in port, or during a refueling stop, U.S. Navy ships require various services, for example, trash removal. These services are generally provided by a local “husbanding agent.” The contracting procedures for selecting a husbanding agent primarily emphasize cost considerations. Security is not an element in selecting a husbanding agent. Background checks are not required in the contracting process and are generally not requested by the United States. This raises significant issues with respect to security and force protection for U.S. Navy ships during port visits. Admiral Moore expressed

frustration at the fact that he has no role in the selection of husbanding agents, as this is strictly a Navy contracting activity. Nevertheless, he suggested that allowing USNAVCENT to select the husbanding agent, based on host country considerations that would not necessarily be part of the evaluation process, would make the host country a “partner” in providing protection to U.S. Navy ships.

Under THREATCON Bravo, 62 specific force protection measures are required to be implemented by the commanders of U.S. Navy ships (see Appendix C). Each successive threat condition requires implementation of all force protection measures under lower threat conditions and imposes additional measures to be adopted.

In accordance with the Navy's standard operating procedure, the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* filed a force protection plan with USNAVCENT prior to transiting the Suez Canal, indicating that he would implement all 62 THREATCON Bravo measures during the brief stop for refueling at Aden. Despite this assurance, the *U.S.S. Cole* did not implement a number of force protection measures that might have had a bearing on the ability of the attackers to conduct the attack.

The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation found that roughly half of the 62 THREATCON Bravo measures were not implemented by the *U.S.S. Cole*. For example, THREATCON Bravo requires that the ship commander coordinate security arrangements for the ship's visit with the local husbanding agent. The commander of the *U.S.S. Cole* did not do so. In addition, THREATCON Bravo measures require that small unauthorized boats be kept away from the ship. However, no waterborne security measures were required, and none were implemented. Despite this significant security lapse, neither General Franks nor Admiral Moore suggested that the implemen-

tation of all 62 force protection measures would have prevented the attack. It is conceivable, though unprovable, that some of the measures not implemented could have either prevented the attack or mitigated its consequences.

The operations order issued by USNAVCENT establishing threat condition procedures for ships in the USCENTCOM AOR indicated that the ship commander “must maintain flexibility” in determining the appropriate force protection measures. Nevertheless, that flexibility does not allow for failing to implement specific THREATCON measures that the ship commander agrees to take in the force protection plan filed and approved by USNAVCENT. As Admiral Moore noted, ship commanders, in exercising flexibility, will generally take the minimum force protection measures stipulated by the existing threat condition and add to them. However, this does not appear to have been the case with the *U.S.S. Cole*.

According to USNAVCENT’s operations order, implementation of appropriate THREATCON measures serves two purposes: “First, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship’s resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship’s activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target.”

A July 21, 2000, message from the commander of the George Washington Battle Group disseminating force protection guidance to ships in the Fifth Fleet AOR noted: “The potential for our ships and personnel to become targets for terrorist groups significantly increases while inport/ashore in the gulf. No port should be considered completely safe. To help prevent terrorist attacks against personnel, ships, and aircraft, commanders must make force protection a top priority and an integral part of the planning process.”

USNAVCENT’s operations order explicitly acknowledged the possibility of waterborne attack, even under



THREATCON Alpha. Specifically, Measure 18 noted, “Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists.” In light of this, Measure 18 stated, “Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship.” THREATCON Bravo required the *U.S.S. Cole* to “implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship” and to “coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.” The JAGMAN investigation found that the *U.S.S. Cole* “waived” 19 specific force protection measures and “failed to accomplish” 12 others.

THREATCON Bravo did not require the establishment of a small boat exclusion zone around the ship, nor did it mandate the presence of “picket boats” around the ship to provide a cordon that could be used to keep unauthorized boats away from the ship. It did require the commander to make “random” picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship only “if the situation warrants.” Unfortunately, picket boats were not used in this instance, and could not have been used once the ship was tied up, because the position of the *U.S.S. Cole* against the fueling dolphin placed the picket

boats up above the dolphin. Therefore, they could not be lowered into the water. However, they could have been launched prior to mooring. In reality, USNAVCENT considered the location of the fueling dolphin away from the Aden pier to be a force protection benefit that would reduce the risk of terrorist attack.

USNAVCENT guidance on the use of force explicitly noted that a ship commander has “the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self defense.” However, the USNAVCENT rules of engagement (ROE) were also clear that “commanding officers... should avoid actions that may be interpreted as provocative or inimical by host country authorities.” Moreover, the ROE noted that “‘warning shots’ are inherently dangerous, and will not be used.”

The USNAVCENT rules of engagement allowed the use of deadly force to defend against hostile acts or hostile intent. Unfortunately, because the small boat did not maneuver in a threatening manner and demonstrated no clear hostile intent against the ship, the presumption was that it was involved in support activities for the refueling stop and, therefore, not a threat to the *U.S.S. Cole*.

The determination of what constitutes hostile intent is ambiguous in certain circumstances, and the USNAVCENT ROE do not provide clarifying guidance. The “Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces,” prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does define “hostile intent.” However, that definition does not cover the specific situation in which the *U.S.S. Cole* found itself.

Because the commander of the *U.S.S. Cole* stated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures, USCENTCOM presumed the ship was sufficiently equipped to implement them. None of the previous U.S. Navy ships stopping at Aden for refueling indicated that they lacked the resources to implement required threat condition force protection measures. In addition, some ships requested and received approval for deviations to the required THREATCON measures.

Under customary international law, the host nation assumes responsibility for the security of visiting naval vessels. Nevertheless, the United States has never relied solely on host nations to provide security for U.S. ships, and the force protection guidelines have been developed to allow a commanding officer to take whatever actions are necessary to defend his ship or crew. The commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* did not request assistance from Yemeni officials in providing security for the ship while it was in Aden.

Some of the force protection measures the *U.S.S. Cole* was supposed to implement required host country coordination. In his endorsement to the JAGMAN report, Admiral Clark noted that permission to implement certain measures, such as the use of force, must be obtained from the host country, and that “[t]here was no special authority for visiting U.S. ships to Aden to use such force.” According to USCENTCOM, only 45 of the 62 THREATCON Bravo

measures could be implemented without host nation coordination. Although USNAVCENT believes that the Yemeni government was aware, in a general sense, that the *U.S.S. Cole*’s commanding officer would take whatever action was necessary to protect his ship and crew, the Yemeni government was unaware of the specific force protection guidance developed for various threat conditions.

Until the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, security at the Aden harbor was considered to be sufficient. The Aden port had also been used by ships of

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other nations without incident. Not a single U.S. Navy ship complained about lax security at Aden during the previous 24 ship visits beginning in February 1999 that took place under the December 1998 bunkering contract. In fact, at least one after-action report filed by the commanding officer of a U.S. Navy ship that had stopped to refuel in Aden recommended a relaxation of the THREATCON Charlie security measures that were in effect at the time.

Key observations: The anti-terrorism/force protection program of the U.S. Navy trains sailors primarily to deal with terrorist threats emanating from land. There is little focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although the host nation is responsible for port security under customary international law during the visit of foreign vessels, the U.S. Navy has

never relied exclusively on host country security procedures. The commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* indicated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures required under THREATCON Bravo. However, he failed to do this. In addition, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems during previous U.S. Navy ship visits to Aden may have resulted in a sense of complacency regarding the threat that might face the *U.S.S. Cole*. Moreover, there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands. Other security shortfalls have been identified with respect to U.S. Navy host country contracting activities. The selection of husbanding agents is performed by a contracting agency outside the purview of the CINC’s component commanders.

Recommendations: In the wake of the *U.S.S. Cole* attack, the threat of waterborne attack must receive more attention as part of the Navy’s AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of port security in the USCENTCOM AOR should be conducted. There should be a single force protection standard for all U.S. Navy ships, and it should be the more stringent standard developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port visits and brief stops for fuel, and should include measures that provide for adequate ship stand-off distances and the inspection of small boats. The regional commanders-in-chief must enlist the support of host countries in providing security for U.S. Navy vessels while in foreign ports, where appropriate. Necessary agreements with host countries regarding rules of engagement and the implementation of required THREATCON measures must be worked out in advance of any port visit or refueling stop. The rules of engagement should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying procedures and addressing the issue of hostile intent. Additional security measures are required with respect to contracting for local port services. Component commanders should also be involved in the contracting process.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

After the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, the questions raised most often with USNAVCENT were, “Why Aden? What were we doing there?” Admiral Moore stated that he was “flabbergasted” by such questions, noting that the engagement plan regarding Yemen was fully coordinated and approved by superiors. He forcefully articulated his view that refueling in Aden made good sense from an operational perspective.

In April 1997, the U.S. resumed port visits to Aden after a suspension of several decades. Three visits occurred prior to the negotiation of a bunkering contract in December 1998. As explained in an unclassified entry in a September 8, 1999, NCIS classified threat assessment, “In 1999, Aden became the site for the primary U.S. Navy bunkering contract in the Horn of Africa, replacing Djibouti. Ships visiting Aden will now be able to refuel at one of two fueling ‘dolphins’ located near the mouth of the harbor. The dolphins will allow U.S. naval vessels to enter Aden and refuel without having to go pier-side.”

Under current U.S. Navy guidelines, the *U.S.S. Cole* was required to refuel when its fuel stocks were depleted to a certain level. Exceptions to this general rule must be authorized. The reasoning behind this requirement is to ensure that Navy vessels are able to fulfill operational requirements on short notice.

In the case of the *U.S.S. Cole*, the ship was transiting from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. At that time, events in the Gulf raised concerns that Iraq was mobilizing forces for a possible military action. The *U.S.S. Cole* was en route to the Gulf in order to participate in any possible U.S. contingency action that might be required in response to Iraqi actions.

Reductions in force structure over the years have left the Navy with significantly diminished assets. Most single

ship transits are required by operational demands that cannot be satisfied with the existing number of assets. A key reason the *U.S.S. Cole* was conducting a single ship transit from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was because it provided capabilities the Navy needed for contingency planning in the region and there were no other Navy assets available at the time that could be positioned in as timely a manner. Unfortunately, the reduction in force structure, coupled with an increase in the operational demands on the service, has left the Navy facing serious strains in its ability to execute its required missions.

In addition, single ship transits expose ships to greater vulnerability than when they travel as part of a carrier battle group. This was a key conclusion of the *U.S.S. Cole* Commission report, which noted that “in-transit units...are particularly reliant upon non-organic support (dispersed throughout the organization) to combat terrorism.”

The *U.S.S. Cole* was steaming at a transit speed of approximately 25 knots in order to arrive on station in time to meet potential operational objectives. The *U.S.S. Cole*’s fuel reserves had been significantly reduced when it reached Yemen. USNAVCENT consid-

ered Yemen a “perfect place” to refuel because of its location roughly halfway between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. In addition, Aden had existing infrastructure to support refueling operations. Unfortunately, the perceived operational desirability of refueling in Aden may have contributed to an inadequate consideration of appropriate force protection and security measures.

From an operational standpoint, refueling at sea has significant advantages over refueling in port. For example, environmental considerations are less onerous at sea. Fuel spillage creates less of an environmental problem at sea than it does in port. To avoid possible spillage, ships are refueled in port only to approximately 85 percent of fuel capacity. At sea, the refueling capacity is closer to 95 percent. Refueling is also faster at sea than in port. Finally, time and training advantages make at-sea refueling a preferable option to in-port refueling.

The U.S. Navy lacks sufficient assets to make at-sea refueling a credible option in all circumstances. The number of oilers and other combatants in the active inventory has decreased in recent years. Therefore, sending a tanker to meet a single ship was



considered “inefficient.” Nevertheless, the Navy’s operational preference is to refuel at sea.

The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available for theater use may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the *U.S.S. Cole*’s vulnerability. The *U.S.S. Cole* was transiting as a single ship to join the Fifth Fleet and provide a weapons platform capability needed to support possible contingency operations. In the past, when the Navy fleet was significantly larger, such single ship transfers were unnecessary. Moreover, the replenishment of Navy ships was mostly accomplished at sea, as they traveled in battle groups.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Persian Gulf War led to a decline in Navy force structure. This, coupled with USCENTCOM’s need to maintain certain force level requirements in the AOR, resulted in an increase in the number of single ship transits. The availability of addi-

tional oilers may have made it possible to position assets in the area to accommodate all refueling requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR. With current assets and the existing demands, it is impractical to consistently provide oiler support for replenishment of single ship operations.

The relative benefits of refueling in port are limited to support of the engagement strategy, providing shore leave for the crew, and conducting maintenance operations. However, few actual port visits in Aden involving crew liberty were authorized. Brief stops for fuel do not constitute port visits because they do not provide for crew liberty. In fact, USNAVCENT supported liberty visits in Aden. In at least one instance, the U.S. Ambassador in Yemen did not. Consequently, most stops in Aden were brief refueling stops only. Therefore, there was no particular crew benefit to refueling in Yemen, other than to “show the flag” as part of the broader U.S. engagement strategy. While refueling

in Aden solved an operational problem for the Navy, it was a problem that could have been addressed by other means.

Key observations: It is generally preferable to conduct refueling operations at sea rather than in foreign ports for a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has insufficient at-sea refueling assets to support single ship transits on a regular basis. Moreover, the need for single ship transits has increased as a result of the decline in Navy force structure and the need to maintain certain force level requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.

Recommendations: The U.S. Navy should reassess the desirability and practicality of port visits and refueling stops in regions where high threat levels exist. Alternative procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea should be developed. Crew liberty should not be an option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR. Increases to the Navy’s force structure are necessary to limit the requirement for single ship transits.

ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

USCENTCOM is the only geographic, or regional, command with its headquarters located in the continental United States and not in its own area of responsibility. In addition, all of USCENTCOM’s component commands are based in the United States, with the exception of USNAVCENT. This has implications for the conduct of operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. In the case of the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*, USCENTCOM’s distance from the theater of operations probably was not a significant factor with respect to the ability of the attackers to carry out the attack or the ability of the United States to prevent it.

USNAVCENT, with headquarters in Bahrain, is USCENTCOM’s “operational functionary” in the AOR. While acknowledging benefits and liabilities to having the USCENTCOM headquar-

tered in Tampa, General Franks indicated that the normal chain of command would still apply regardless of the physical location of USCENTCOM headquarters.

Although USCENTCOM contends that there is no split command or confusion as to who is in charge of operational and security considerations within the AOR, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Navy, and various other Department of Defense components have different responsibilities in support of Navy requirements and operations in the region. For example, refueling arrangements with host countries are made by USCENTCOM, through the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), but the Department of the Navy, through the Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), makes contracting arrangements with local hus-

banding agents, based on standard contracting procedures that emphasize cost and value considerations and ignore security issues. The NRCC coordinates with USNAVCENT, but the USNAVCENT commander has no role in the process of selecting a husbanding agent. Appropriate threat levels for each country are determined by the Defense Intelligence Agency and promulgated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). However, USCENTCOM also sets its own threat levels in the AOR that occasionally differ from those established by DIA and ASD(SOLIC). In the case of the *U.S.S. Cole*, a decision by ASD(SOLIC) to modify the threat level reporting system at the beginning of October 2000 was not agreed to by USCENTCOM, which continued to operate under the former reporting system. This appar-

ently resulted in confusion in the mind of the commanding officer on the *U.S.S. Cole* with respect to the level of threat in Yemen. These are issues that need to be addressed.

The location of USCENTCOM headquarters in the United States results in a "tyranny of distance" that affects USCENTCOM's ability to communicate effectively in a timely manner with its component commands. There is an eight hour time difference between the east coast of the United States and Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Although the daily dialogue between headquarters staff and component commanders would be easier if headquarters were located in the AOR, it is unlikely that, in the case of the *U.S.S. Cole* incident, additional information would have been passed that would have prevented the attack.

USCENTCOM headquarters has appropriate ties to the U.S. national intelligence community. Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service are on the staff at USCENTCOM headquarters. This arrangement provides for a relatively seamless flow of information.

In the aftermath of the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, DOD Directive 2000.12, "DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program," was pro-

mulgated. This Directive establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "the principal advisor and focal point to the Secretary of Defense" for all DOD anti-terrorism and force protection issues. It also defines the responsibilities of the military departments, commanders of the Combatant Commands (CINCs), and Defense Agencies for DOD activities in their respective organizations.

DOD Directive 2000.12 prescribes a policy that specifies that the geographic CINC's force protection policies take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any DOD Component deployed in that command's AOR and not under the security responsibility of the Department of State. It states that "the CINC or a designated representative (for example, a component commander or Joint Task Force commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DOD personnel not under the responsibility of the Department of State."

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for reviewing Service doctrine and CINC, Service, and Defense Agency standards, and is tasked with reviewing, coordinating, and overseeing the AT/FP training for all DOD personnel. In addition, the CJCS must "assess the implementation of threat conditions (THREATCONs) for uniform implementation and dissemination. The geographic CINCs exercise tactical control (for force protection) over "all DOD personnel

assigned to, temporarily assigned to, or transiting through, or training in the CINC's AOR." This provision authorizes the CINC "to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces." The CINCs also serve as "the DOD point of contact with host-nation officials on matters involving AT/FP policies and measures."

In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures.

Key observations: USCENTCOM operations are impacted by its headquarters' physical location outside the AOR. The "tyranny of distance" has an effect on the ability to communicate effectively between headquarters and the component commands. However, it does not appear that this was a factor in the U.S.S. Cole attack. In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures.

Recommendations: The operational impact of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in the continental United States instead of in the AOR should be reviewed. Responsibilities for support of U.S. Navy visits to foreign ports, including for refueling stops, should be centralized, with the regional Commander-in-Chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities under force protection directive 2000.12 should be evaluated, along with procedures for evaluating the adequacy of force protection measures.

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Policy of Engagement

Key observations: U.S. national security strategy called for engagement with Yemen. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy through port visits and brief refueling stops, among other initiatives. Yemen was seen as “win-win” – it solved an operational need and met U.S. engagement policy guidance at the same time. However, the desire for engagement with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat in that country, increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an increase in the number of U.S. Navy ships refueling there. Changing geo-political conditions in the AOR should have led to a more critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities and engagement plans for Yemen, but they did not.

Recommendations: A policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in areas where the potential for terrorism is high. The balance between the desire for engagement and the assumption of risk must be recalibrated to place increasing emphasis on force protection requirements. Implementation of the TEP should be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with changing geo-political factors in the AOR.

Intelligence

Key observations: There was clearly a shortage of intelligence information with respect to the specific attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*. In spite of the fact that the intelligence community had known of general and ambiguous planning activities for an unspecified action or actions for some time, the lack of specific information led to a failure to provide “tactical” warning to the *U.S.S. Cole*. Likewise, there was no specific information to suggest that the intelli-

gence community could have provided tactical warning to other U.S. Navy ships in Aden. Further, there was no intelligence information about a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel in the Aden port. There is sufficient evidence to believe that additional HUMINT collection personnel would enable broader coverage of the USCENTCOM AOR and provide an increased anti-terrorism collection effort. The intelligence dissemination system worked well, as the threshold for reporting was low. However, the sheer volume of non-specific intelligence placed a premium on accurate analysis.

Recommendations: Policy determinations that place U.S. military personnel in harm’s way must not be made without a full understanding that there may be an absence of specific intelligence to support them. Additional intelligence collection personnel and analysts with the proper training are needed to sort through the voluminous supply of raw intelligence and make accurate judgments regarding the credibility of the data. The process for resolving competing analyses within and between intelligence agencies should be strengthened by encouraging alternative analyses. Improved qualitative analysis is also required. A better process is required for ensuring that useful, operationally oriented intelligence is available to ship commanders. The intelligence staffs of the regional commands must be more proactive in pushing the national intelligence community to provide better intelligence support and analysis in areas where existing intelligence collection and analysis is deficient. This should include the operational elements informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of deployments so that focused intelligence collection can be undertaken. Intelligence assessments should also be

viewed in the context of broader geopolitical developments within the AOR. Greater coordination between Department of Defense officials in Washington and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

Threat Levels and Threat Conditions

Key observation: Confusion with respect to threat levels could have contributed to a false sense of security and complacency by the commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole*.

Recommendations: Standardization of the system of threat level reporting is essential to avoid confusion regarding the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The sufficiency of THREATCON measures to accomplish their intended objectives should be reviewed and revalidated periodically.

Vulnerability Assessments

Key observations: Formal vulnerability assessments focused primarily on land-based threats in Yemen. Only one vulnerability assessment of the Aden port was conducted, but that was more than two years prior to the *U.S.S. Cole* attack.

Recommendation: Formal vulnerability assessments should be conducted at regular intervals, and when threat levels within the AOR change.

Force Protection

Key observations: The anti-terrorism/force protection program of the U.S. Navy trains sailors primarily to deal with terrorist threats emanating from land. There is little focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although the host nation is responsible for port security under customary international

law during the visit of foreign vessels, the U.S. Navy has never relied exclusively on host country security procedures. The commanding officer of the *U.S.S. Cole* indicated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures required under THREATCON Bravo. However, he failed to do this. In addition, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems during previous U.S. Navy ship visits to Aden may have resulted in a sense of complacency regarding the threat that might face the *U.S.S. Cole*. Moreover, there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands. Other security shortfalls have been identified with respect to U.S. Navy host country contracting activities. The selection of husbanding agents is performed by a contracting agency outside the purview of the CINC's component commanders.

Recommendations: In the wake of the *U.S.S. Cole* attack, the threat of waterborne attack must receive more attention as part of the Navy's AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of port security in the USCENTCOM AOR should be conducted. There should be a single force protection standard for all U.S. Navy ships, and it should be the more stringent standard developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port visits and brief stops for fuel, and

should include measures that provide for adequate ship standoff distances and the inspection of small boats. The regional commanders-in-chief must enlist the support of host countries in providing security for U.S. Navy vessels while in foreign ports, where appropriate. Necessary agreements with host countries regarding rules of engagement and the implementation of required THREATCON measures must be worked out in advance of any port visit or refueling stop. The rules of engagement should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying procedures and addressing the issue of hostile intent. Additional security measures are required with respect to contracting for local port services. Component commanders should also be involved in the contracting process.

Operational Issues

Key observations: It is generally preferable to conduct refueling operations at sea rather than in foreign ports for a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has insufficient at-sea refueling assets to support single ship transits on a regular basis. Moreover, the need for single ship transits has increased as a result of the decline in Navy force structure and the need to maintain certain force level requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.

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stops in regions where high threat levels exist. Alternative procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea should be developed. Crew liberty should not be an option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR. Increases to the Navy's force structure are necessary to limit the requirement for single ship transits.

Organizational Issues

Key observations: USCENTCOM operations are impacted by its headquarters' physical location outside the AOR. The "tyranny of distance" has an effect on the ability to communicate effectively between headquarters and the component commands. However, it does not appear that this was a factor in the *U.S.S. Cole* attack. In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures.

Recommendations: The operational impact of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in the continental United States instead of in the AOR should be reviewed. Responsibilities for support of U.S. Navy visits to foreign ports, including for refueling stops, should be centralized, with the regional Commander-in-Chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities under force protection directive 2000.12 should be evaluated, along with procedures for evaluating the adequacy of force protection measures.

APPENDIX B:

LIST OF BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS

November 15, 2000 - Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic Norfolk, Virginia

Commander Frank Pandolfe, Commanding Officer, *U.S.S. Mitchner* (sister ship to Cole)
Captain Trif Rigas, Atlantic Fleet, Force Protection (N34)
Captain Jim Landay, Director, DDG-51 In Service Engineering
Rear Admiral Lindell Rutherford, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/Training (N3/5/7)
Captain Ralph Rickard, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/Training (N3/5/7)
Captain Gerrald Becker, Atlantic Fleet, Current Ops
Captain Ned Herbert, Executive Officer, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic
Mr. Al Johnson, Director of Curriculum, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic

December 4-8, 2000 - U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters) Manama, Bahrain

Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander, USNAVCENT/US Fifth Fleet
Captain Van Mauney, Chief of Staff
Captain Kurt Tidd, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Operations (N-3)
Commander Samuel Cox, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Intelligence (N-2)
Captain Julius Gostel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Directorate of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N-4)
Captain Richard Kikla, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Directorate of Naval Operations (Policy) (N-5)
Captain Greg Steele, Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity Bahrain
Colonel Gary Supnick, Force Marine Officer/Force Protection Officer
Commander Carlton Cramer, Special Assistant, Judge Advocate General
Special Agent James Lindner, OIC, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Deacon, Joint Intelligence Support Element
Colonel Larry Grundhauser, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2), Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia

December 18, 2000 - U.S. Central Command Headquarters Tampa, Florida

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM
Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong, USMC, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, USCENTCOM
Major Scott Berrier, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2)
Lieutenant Colonel Bud Rasmussen, Policy Division, Directorate of Plans and Policy
Captain Jack Dorsett, Commander, Joint Intelligence Center
Colonel Joseph Schott, Joint Security Directorate
Lieutenant Colonel John Sarver, Directorate of Logistics and Security Assistance
Captain Shelly Young, Staff Judge Advocate

Others Present:

Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell, USN, Director of Plans and Policy (CCJ5)
Major General Dennis K. Jackson, USA, Director of Logistics and Security Assistance (CCJ4/7)
Colonel Stanley G. Silverman, CCDJ2
Colonel Dario Compain, CCDJS

Colonel Richard R. Perez, CCDJ6
Rear Admiral George E. Mayer, USN, Deputy Director of Operations (CCDJ3)
Colonel James W. Danley, CCDJ1
Colonel Brian P. Hoey, USAF, Director of Public Affairs (CCPA)

October 2000–January 2001 – Washington, D.C. Briefings

Captain Tony Kouthron, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Targeting
Mr. Ron Brunson, Head, Anti-Terrorism Alert Center, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Mr. Richard E. Sunday, Office of Congressional Affairs, National Security Agency
Ms. Mary Jo Coyner, National Security Agency
Mr. Kie C. Fallis, Former Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency
Admiral J. Cutler Dawsen, Chief, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy

APPENDIX C:

THREAT CONDITION (THREATCON) MEASURES

TAB B TO APPENDIX I OF ANNEX M TO COMUSNAVCENT/COMFIFTHFLT OPORD 99-01 SHIPBOARD THREATCON MEASURES

1. Shipboard Terrorist THREATCON Measures. The measures outlined below are for use aboard all US Naval vessels (combatant and non-combatant) in the CENTCOM/NAVCENT AOR and serve two purposes. First, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship's resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship's activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target. The measures outlined below do not account for local conditions and regulations or current threat intelligence. The ship's command must maintain flexibility. As threat conditions change, the ship's crew must be prepared to take actions to counter the threat. When necessary, additional measures must be taken immediately. The simple solution to THREATCON CHARLIE or DELTA is to get under way, but this option may not always be available. Specific non-combatant shipboard THREATCON Measures are identified as: Measure Number (MSC).

a. THREATCON ALPHA. This condition is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(1) Measure 1. BRIEF CREW ON THE PORT SPECIFIC THREAT, THE SECURITY/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN, AND SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHILE ASHORE. ENSURE ALL HANDS ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF VARIOUS THREATCON REQUIREMENTS AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THEIR ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES. REMIND ALL PERSONNEL TO BE SUSPICIOUS AND INQUISITIVE OF STRANGERS, BE ALERT FOR ABANDONED PARCELS OR SUITCASES AND FOR UNATTENDED VEHICLES IN THE VICINITY. REPORT UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES TO THE OOD.

(2) Measure 2. MUSTER AND BRIEF SECURITY PERSONNEL ON THE THREAT AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

(3) Measure 3. REVIEW SECURITY PLANS AND KEEP THEM AVAILABLE. RETAIN KEY PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY MEASURES ON CALL.

(4) Measure 4. SECURE AND PERIODICALLY INSPECT SPACES NOT IN USE.

(5) Measure 5. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, POST QUALIFIED ARMED FANTAIL SENTRY AND FORECASTLE SENTRY. RIFLES ARE THE PREFERRED WEAPON.

(6) Measure 6. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND SOFA, POST QUALIFIED ARMED PIER SENTRY AND PIER ENTRANCE SENTRY.

(7) Measure 7. ENSURE SENTRIES, ROVING PATROLS, RESPONSE FORCE, AND THE QUARTERDECK WATCH HAVE THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. IF PRACTICAL, ALL GUARDS WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH AT LEAST TWO SYSTEMS OF COMMUNICATION (E.G., TWO-WAY RADIO, TELEPHONE, WHISTLE, OR SIGNAL LIGHT).

(8) Measure 8. IF AVAILABLE, ISSUE NIGHT VISION DEVICES TO SELECTED POSTED SECURITY PERSONNEL.

(9) Measure 9. REVIEW PIER AND SHIPBOARD ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES.

(10) Measure 10. COORDINATE PIER AND FLEET LANDING SECURITY WITH COLLOCATED FORCES AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. IDENTIFY ANTICIPATED NEEDS FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT (SECURITY PERSONNEL, BOATS, AND EQUIPMENT) AND DEFINE METHODS OF ACTIVATION AND COMMUNICATION.

(11) Measure 11. TIGHTEN SHIPBOARD AND PIER ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES. POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ALL PERSONNEL ENTERING PIER AND FLEET LANDING AREA--NO EXCEPTIONS.

(12) Measure 12. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND SOFA, ESTABLISH UNLOADING ZONE(S) ON THE PIER AWAY FROM THE SHIP.

(13) Measure 13. DEPLOY BARRIERS TO KEEP VEHICLES AWAY FROM THE SHIP. BARRIERS MAY BE SHIP'S VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT, PORT PROVIDED BARRIER SYSTEMS, MARINE CONTAINERS, OR ITEMS AVAILABLE LOCALLY. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL CONDITIONS, 400 FT STANDOFF FROM THE SHIP IS PREFERRED.

(14) Measure 14. POST SIGNS IN LOCAL LANGUAGE(S) TO EXPLAIN VISITING AND LOITERING RESTRICTIONS.

(15) Measure 15. INSPECT ALL VEHICLES ENTERING PIER AND CHECK FOR UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL, WEAPONS, AND/OR EXPLOSIVES.

(16) Measure 16. INSPECT ALL PERSONNEL, HAND CARRIED ITEMS, AND PACKAGES BEFORE ALLOWING THEM ON BOARD. WHERE AVAILABLE, USE BAGGAGE SCANNERS AND WALK THROUGH OR HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS TO SCREEN PACKAGES AND PERSONNEL PRIOR TO BOARDING THE SHIP.

(17) Measure 17. DIRECT DEPARTING AND ARRIVING LIBERTY BOATS TO MAKE A SECURITY TOUR AROUND THE SHIP AND GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE WATERLINE AND HULL. BOATS MUST BE IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY TO SHIP'S PERSONNEL.

(18) Measure 18. WATER TAXIS, FERRIES, BUM BOATS, AND OTHER HARBOR CRAFT REQUIRE SPECIAL CONCERN BECAUSE THEY CAN SERVE AS AN IDEAL PLATFORM FOR TERRORISTS. UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT SHOULD BE KEPT AWAY FROM THE SHIP; AUTHORIZED CRAFT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED, SURVEILLED, AND COVERED. INSPECT AUTHORIZED WATERCRAFT DAILY.

(19) Measure 19. IDENTIFY AND INSPECT WORKBOATS.

(20) Measure 20. SECURE SPACES NOT IN USE.

(21) Measure 21. REGULATE SHIPBOARD LIGHTING TO BEST MEET THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT. LIGHTING SHOULD INCLUDE ILLUMINATION OF THE WATERLINE.

(22) Measure 22. RIG HAWSEPIPE COVERS AND RAT GUARDS ON ALL LINES, CABLE, AND HOSES. CONSIDER USING AN ANCHOR COLLAR.

(23) Measure 23. RAISE ACCOMMODATION LADDERS, STERN GATES, JACOB LADDERS, ETC., WHEN NOT IN USE. CLEAR SHIP OF ALL UNNECESSARY STAGES, CAMELS, BARGES, OIL DONUTS, AND LINES.

(24) Measure 24. CONDUCT SECURITY DRILLS TO INCLUDE BOMB THREAT AND REPEL BOARDERS EXERCISES.

(25) Measure 25. REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN THREATCON BRAVO FOR POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION.

b. THREATCON BRAVO. This condition is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with local authorities.

(1) Measure 26. MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE THREATCON ALPHA MEASURES.

(2) Measure 27. REVIEW LIBERTY POLICY IN LIGHT OF THE THREAT AND REVISE IT AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE SHIP AND CREW.

(3) Measure 28. CONDUCT DIVISIONAL QUARTERS AT FOUL WEATHER PARADE TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF ON-BOARD PERSONNEL AND TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION.

(4) Measure 29. ENSURE THAT AN UP-TO-DATE LIST OF BILINGUAL PERSONNEL FOR THE AREA OF OPERATIONS IS READILY AVAILABLE. ENSURE THE WARNING TAPE IN THE PILOT HOUSE AND/OR QUARTERDECK THAT WARNS SMALL CRAFT TO REMAIN CLEAR IS IN BOTH THE LOCAL LANGUAGE AND ENGLISH.

(5) Measure 30. REMIND PERSONNEL TO LOCK THEIR PARKED VEHICLES AND TO CAREFULLY CHECK THEM BEFORE ENTERING.

(6) Measure 31. DESIGNATE AND BRIEF PICKET BOAT CREWS. PREPARE BOATS AND PLACE CREWS ON 15-MINUTE ALERT. IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS, MAKE RANDOM PICKET BOAT PATROLS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SHIP WITH THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT OR GIG. BOAT CREWS WILL BE ARMED WITH M16 RIFLES, ONE M60 WITH 200 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, AND 10 CONCUSSION GRENADES.

Measure 31 (MSC). IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO KEEP UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT AWAY FROM SHIP. COORDINATE WITH HUSBANDING AGENT AND PORT AUTHORITY, AS NECESSARY

(7) Measure 32. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND SOFA, ESTABLISH ARMED BROW WATCH ON PIER TO CHECK IDENTIFICATION AND INSPECT BAGGAGE BEFORE PERSONNEL BOARD SHIP.

(8) Measure 33. RESTRICT VEHICLE ACCESS TO THE PIER. DISCONTINUE PARKING ON THE PIER. CONSISTENT WITH LOCAL RULES, REGULATIONS, AND/OR THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, ESTABLISH UNLOADING ZONE(S) AND MOVE ALL CONTAINERS AS FAR AWAY FROM THE SHIP AS POSSIBLE (400 FEET STAND-OFF DISTANCE PREFERRED).

(9) Measure 34. MAN SIGNAL BRIDGE OR PILOT HOUSE AND ENSURE FLARES ARE AVAILABLE TO WARD OFF APPROACHING CRAFT.

(10) Measure 35. AFTER WORKING HOURS, PLACE ARMED SENTRIES ON A SUPERSTRUCTURE LEVEL FROM WHICH THEY CAN BEST COVER AREAS ABOUT THE SHIP.

(11) Measure 36. IF NOT ALREADY ARMED, ARM ALL MEMBERS OF THE QUARTERDECK WATCH AND SAT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A SAT, ARM TWO MEMBERS OF THE SDF.

(12) Measure 37. PROVIDE SHOTGUN AND AMMUNITION TO QUARTERDECK. IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS, PLACE SENTRY WITH SHOTGUN INSIDE THE SUPERSTRUCTURE AT A SITE FROM WHICH THE QUARTERDECK CAN BE COVERED.

(13) Measure 38. ISSUE ARMS TO SELECTED QUALIFIED OFFICERS TO INCLUDE COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (CDO) AND ASSISTANT COMMAND DUTY OFFICER (ACDO).

(14) Measure 39. IMPLEMENT MEASURES TO KEEP UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT AWAY FROM THE SHIP. AUTHORIZED CRAFT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED. COORDINATE WITH HOST NATION/LOCAL PORT AUTHORITY, HUSBANDING AGENT AS NECESSARY, AND REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN CONTROLLING UNAUTHORIZED CRAFT

(15) Measure 40. IF NOT ALREADY ARMED, ARM SOUNDING AND SECURITY PATROL.

(16) Measure 41. MUSTER AND BRIEF AMMUNITION BEARERS OR MESSENGERS.

(17) Measure 42. IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES FOR EXPEDIENT ISSUE OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM SMALL ARMS LOCKER (SAL). ENSURE A SET OF SAL KEYS ARE READILY AVAILABLE AND IN THE POSSESSION OF AN OFFICER DESIGNATED FOR THIS DUTY BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

(18) Measure 42. LOAD ADDITIONAL SMALL ARMS MAGAZINES TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SUPPLY FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL AND RESPONSE FORCES.

(19) Measure 43. INFORM LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF ACTIONS TAKEN AS THE THREATCON INCREASES.

- (20) Measure 44. TEST INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER US NAVAL SHIPS IN PORT.

(21) Measure 45. INSTRUCT WATCHES TO CONDUCT FREQUENT RANDOM SEARCHES UNDER PIERS, WITH EMPHASIS ON POTENTIAL HIDING PLACES, PIER PILINGS, AND FLOATING DEBRIS.

(22) Measure 46. CONDUCT SEARCHES OF THE SHIP'S HULL AND BOATS AT INTERMITTENT INTERVALS AND IMMEDIATELY BEFORE IT PUTS TO SEA.

(23) Measure 47. MOVE CARS AND OBJECTS SUCH AS CRATES AND TRASH CONTAINERS AS FAR FROM THE SHIP AS POSSIBLE.

(24) Measure 48. HOIST BOATS ABOARD WHEN NOT IN USE.

(25) Measure 49. CONSIDER TERMINATING ALL PUBLIC VISITS.

(26) Measure 50. SET MATERIEL CONDITION YOKE, MAIN DECK AND BELOW.

Measure 50 (MSC). SECURE ALL WATERTIGHT DOORS AND HATCHES MAIN DECK AND BELOW.

(27) Measure 51. AFTER WORKING HOURS, REDUCE ENTRY POINTS TO THE SHIP'S INTERIOR BY SECURING SELECTED ENTRANCES FROM THE INSIDE.

(28) Measure 52. DUTY DEPARTMENT HEADS ENSURE ALL SPACES NOT IN REGULAR USE ARE SECURED AND INSPECTED PERIODICALLY.

(29) Measure 53. IF TWO BROWS ARE RIGGED, REMOVE ONE OF THEM. USE ONLY ONE GANGWAY TO ACCESS THE SHIP.

(30) Measure 54. MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO GET UNDER WAY ON SHORT NOTICE OR AS SPECIFIED BY SOP. CONSIDER POSSIBLE RELOCATION SITES (DIFFERENT PIER, ANCHORAGE, ETC.). RIG BROW AND ACCOMMODATION LADDER FOR IMMEDIATE RAISING OR REMOVAL.

(31) Measure 55. ENSURE .50-CALIBER MOUNT ASSEMBLIES ARE IN PLACE WITH AMMUNITION IN READY SERVICE LOCKERS (.50-CALIBER MACHINEGUNS WILL BE MAINTAINED IN THE ARMORY, PREFIRE CHECKS COMPLETED, AND READY FOR USE).

(32) Measure 56. PREPARE FIRE HOSES. BRIEF DESIGNATED

PERSONNEL ON PROCEDURES FOR REPELLING BOARDERS, SMALL BOATS, AND ULTRALIGHT AIRCRAFT.

(33) Measure 57. OBSTRUCT POSSIBLE HELICOPTER LANDING AREAS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PREVENT HOSTILE HELICOPTERS FROM LANDING.

(34) Measure 58. REVIEW RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL PROCEDURES, ASYLUM-SEEKER PROCEDURES, AND BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES.

(35) Measure 59. MONITOR LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS (E.G., SHIP-TO-SHIP, TV, RADIO, POLICE SCANNERS).

(36) Measure 60. IMPLEMENT ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL AS APPROPRIATE.

(37) Measure 61. INFORM LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN AS THREATCON INCREASES.

(38) Measure 62. REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN THREATCON CHARLIE FOR POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION.

c. THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations, vessels, or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel.

(1) Measure 63. MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR THREATCONS ALPHA AND BRAVO.

(2) Measure 64. CANCEL LIBERTY. EXECUTE EMERGENCY RECALL.

(3) Measure 65. BE PREPARED TO GET UNDER WAY ON ONE 1 HOUR'S NOTICE OR LESS. IF CONDITIONS WARRANT, REQUEST PERMISSION TO SORTIE.

(4) Measure 66. MUSTER AND ARM SAT, BAF, AND RESERVE FORCE (RF). POSITION SAT AND BAF AT DESIGNATED LOCATION(S). DEPLOY RF TO PROTECT COMMAND STRUCTURE AND AUGMENT POSTED SECURITY WATCHES.

Measure 66 (MSC). CONSIDER REQUESTING ARMED SECURITY AUGMENTATION FORCE FROM FLTCINC.

(5) Measure 67. PLACE ARMED SENTRIES ON A SUPERSTRUCTURE LEVEL FROM WHICH THEY CAN BEST PROVIDE 360 DEGREE COVERAGE ABOUT THE SHIP.

(6) Measure 68. ESTABLISH .50- OR .30-CALIBER MACHINEGUN POSITIONS.

(7) Measure 69. IF AVAILABLE, DEPLOY STINGER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES IAW ESTABLISHED ROE.

(8) Measure 70. ENERGIZE RADAR AND ESTABLISH WATCH.

(9) Measure 71. ENERGIZE RADAR AND/OR SONAR, ROTATE SCREWS AND CYCLE RUDDER(S) AT FREQUENT AND IRREGULAR INTERVALS, AS NEEDED TO ASSIST IN DETERRING, DETECTING OR THWARTING AN ATTACK. MAN PASSIVE SONAR CAPABLE OF DETECTING BOATS, SWIMMERS, OR UNDERWATER VEHICLES. POSITION ANY NON-SONAR-EQUIPPED SHIPS WITHIN THE ACOUSTIC ENVELOPE OF SONAR-EQUIPPED SHIPS.

(10) Measure 72. MAN ONE OR MORE REPAIR LOCKERS. ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH AN EXTRA WATCH IN DC CENTRAL.

(11) Measure 73. DEPLOY PICKET BOAT. BOATS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY FROM THE SHIP (E.G., BY LIGHTS OR FLAGS).

(12) Measure 74. COORDINATE WITH HOST NATION, LOCAL PORT AUTHORITY, OR HUSBANDING AGENT TO ESTABLISH SMALL BOAT EXCLUSION ZONE.

(13) Measure 75. IF FEASIBLE, DEPLOY A HELICOPTER AS AN OBSERVATION OR GUN PLATFORM. THE HELICOPTER SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE NIGHT AND DAY FROM THE SHIP.

(14) Measure 76. IF A THREAT OF SWIMMER ATTACK EXISTS, ACTIVATE AN ANTI-SWIMMER WATCH

(15) Measure 77. CONSIDER ISSUING WEAPONS TO SELECTED OFFICERS AND CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS IN THE DUTY SECTION (I.E., THE COMMANDING OFFICER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT HEADS).

(16) Measure 78. IF AVAILABLE ISSUE CONCUSSION GRENADES TO TOPSIDE ROVERS, FORECASTLE AND FANTAIL SENTRIES, AND BRIDGE WATCH.

(17) Measure 79. ERECT BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES AS REQUIRED TO CONTROL TRAFFIC FLOW.

(18) Measure 80. STRICTLY ENFORCE ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES AND SEARCHES--NO EXCEPTIONS.

(19) Measure 81. ENFORCE BOAT EXCLUSION ZONE.

(20) Measure 82. MINIMIZE ALL OFF-SHIP ADMINISTRATIVE TRIPS.

(21) Measure 83. DISCONTINUE CONTRACT WORK.

(22) Measure 84. SET MATERIEL CONDITION ZEBRA, SECOND DECK AND BELOW.

Measure 83 (MSC). CONSIDER SECURING ALL ACCESS DOORS AND HATCHES MAIN DECK AND BELOW.

(23) Measure 85. SECURE FROM THE INSIDE ALL UNGUARDED ENTRY POINTS TO THE INTERIOR OF THE SHIP.

(24) Measure 86. ROTATE SCREWS AND CYCLE RUDDER(S) AT FREQUENT AND IRREGULAR INTERVALS.

(25) Measure 87. RIG ADDITIONAL FIREHOSES. CHARGE THE FIREHOSES WHEN MANNED JUST PRIOR TO ACTUAL USE.

(26) Measure 88. REVIEW INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN THREATCON DELTA FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

d. THREATCON DELTA. This condition is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

(1) Measure 89. MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE THREATCONS ALPHA, BRAVO, AND CHARLIE MEASURES.

(2) Measure 90. PERMIT ONLY NECESSARY PERSONNEL TOPSIDE.

(3) Measure 91. PREPARE TO GET UNDER WAY AND, IF POSSIBLE, CANCEL PORT VISIT AND DEPART.

(4) Measure 92. POST SENTRIES WITH M60 MACHINEGUN(S) TO COVER POSSIBLE HELICOPTER LANDING AREAS.

(5) Measure 93. ARM SELECTED PERSONNEL OF THE SDF.

(6) Measure 94. DEPLOY M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS TO COVER APPROACHES TO SHIP.

Measure 94 (MSC). EMPLOY ALL NECESSARY WEAPONRY TO DEFEND AGAINST ATTACK.