Chapter 6: An Army Surplus-The NVA's Heritage
by Otfried Nassauer
The fall of the Berlin wall and the succeeding German reunification left the Federal Republic of Germany's Bundeswehr with an additional, inherited army, the former East German National Peoples Army (NVA). The personnel, infra-structure, weapons, ammunition and all other types of equipment of the former East German armed forces-supplemented by weaponry former-ly owned by the East German Intelligence and internal Security Services (Stasi), the border troops and other armed units-ended up under Bundeswehr ownership, custody and responsibility. Later, the stocks of the East German arms trade company 'IMES' . Thus inter alia more than 20,000 additional sub-machine guns came under Bundeswehr custody about one year after unification (Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1448, p.21).
The Bundeswehr halted attempts of the newly elected democratic Ger-man Democratic Republic (GDR) government to sell large quantities of these weapons, ammunition and equipment under 44 last-minute contracts with foreign governments and international arms traders for extremely low prices between August and October 1990, by argu-ing that many of these systems might be incorporated into the armed forces of the unified Germany. However, soon after reunification increasing amounts of former East German weapon systems and mili-tary equipment came to be seen as a 'surplus' no longer necessary for the Bundeswehr.
Today the net results have become visible: except for a few weapon sys-tems which will be used for a short period of time-24 modern Mig-29 fighter aircraft and larger quantities of low-tech, general purpose equip-ment-all of the former NVA stock-piles became surplus.
This paper looks into several aspects of the NVA case:
The paper presents an overview by concentrating on the major cate-gories of weapons and military equipment. It looks at weapon sys-tems rather than military dual-use equipment, and on weapons exported or scrapped rather than those destined for static displays at exhibitions.
The answer to the fundamental question of how much and what exactly the Bundeswehr inherited from the NVA is surprising: although both armed forces were 'German' armies-thus reflecting a specific understanding about the necessity for bureaucratic correct-ness-there seem to be no reliable or conclusive books of record. It is therefore impossible to compile a comprehensive set of data on how many of which systems and items were available on 3 October 1990, when the Bundeswehr officially took command over the former NVA. Developing a clear understanding of the destiny of many of the inherited weapons has also proven to be ex-tremely difficult.
While some of differences have been sufficiently explained in open or closed sessions of parliament, it is highly unlikely that this is true for all-the Bundeswehr has argued that this task would be too complicated and time consuming. In principle, difficulties in keeping a clear record for transportable items may be imagined due to the circumstances under which bookkeepers had to work after reunification (i.e., lack of experienced and specialized per-sonnel, layoffs in personnel, sub-stantial relocations, exports, sales and constant changes); nevertheless, there are good reasons for a more skeptical approach. Most of the excuses for mistakes in accounting for transportable goods are not reasonable for immobile items. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided parliament with varying figures regarding the total number of installations it took over in the former GDR-between May 1991 and May 1994 inter alia the follow-ing figures were given officially: 2,250, 3,320, 2,280, 2,235 and 2,288. Other aspects support a skeptical point of view; although the MoD produces regular reports for parlia-ment on NVA military equipment, it has not yet succeeded in producing them in a standard format that allows detailed comparison. From the author's point of view, an inten-tional lack of transparency exists. Even with extensive sources avail-able, therefore, there will be no clear and comprehensive set of data from which to start, when investigating the fate of surplus weapons from the former GDR stockpiles.
Indeed, the differences between the available data are large enough to encourage much speculation, includ-ing assumptions about stocks not justified, illegally exported or used for purposes of operational foreign policy.
This situation is due in part to a lack of political control over the armed forces during the unification process. The German Bundestag only lately decided to execute tougher control over the administration's decisions and behavior with respect to the former NVA equipment. Other topics were perceived as more im-portant by the newly elected parlia-mentarians during most of 1991. More detailed parliamentary control was executed only when in October 1991 the Hamburg harbor police seized a clandestine delivery of 14 military items to Israel, including two complete Schilka ZSU 23/4 air defense systems declared to be 'agricultural machines.' In the aftermath of parliamentary invest-igations, many other exports came to parliamentary attention (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991). As a consequence the Ministry of Defense was tasked in spring 1992 to regularly report on its activities with respect to the former NVA equipment.
In several last-minute contracts, signed as late as 1-2 October 1990,
huge amounts of weapon systems were sold by the GDR Ministry of Disarmament
and Defense at very low prices.
The two large contracts with arms traders included a paragraph allowing both sides to withdraw from their obligations if the necessary official licenses, allowances, etc. could not be gained; thus, it is likely no actual transfers have been made. Whether and to what extent the contracts with Poland and Hungary were fulfilled is not publicly known.
Table 1: Estimated Holdings of the NVA
Source: Deutscher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, pp. 5+. For details, see Annex 1.
The GDR Ministry of Defense and Disarmament maintained a list of weapon systems and major items held by the NVA. After taking possession, the Bundeswehr argued repeatedly that this listing was by no means correct or complete since the NVA did not keep reliable statistics on its holdings. Surprisingly the Bundeswehr never referred to an extensive database of the former NVA, which was run at the GDR MoD and contained data on the NVA military installations and their local weapon and equipment stockpiles.
A new computerized accounting and management system for a broader range of items was established by the Bundeswehr, but no comprehensive comparison of both accounting systems has been published. Nevertheless, in January 1992 the Bundeswehr reprinted large parts of the former NVA listing and preliminary figures on the differences between this list and the new accounting system. In trying to explain these differences, the Bundeswehr argued inter alia that the NVA normally updated its listing every two years; the latest completed update occurred in 1987, and therefore did not contain more recent changes. The 1989 update was allegedly canceled due to the political developments. Parts of the NVA list available to the author and representing a 30 June 1990 printout from the GDR MoD computer system, however, clearly show that an update including many 1989-1990 changes must have been accomplished by the NVA. A comparison with the list reprinted by the German MoD in 1992 reveals that the reprinted version lists data of 1989 and 1990 origin without attributing them to a post-1987 entry. Both listings reflect the same totals for most or all systems listed in both. The major difference between the two sources is that the printout in the author's archive lists the weapon systems by age, thus establishing when they were added to the NVA inventory. Additions to inventory up to 1990 are listed. Thus, the argument that no update was made since 1987 cannot be accepted.
The data published by the FRG government and given to German Parliament committees from both sources differ widely. Detailed comparisons between the figures also reveal differences between data published from the new Bundeswehr system at different times. Astonishingly enough, the new Bundeswehr accounting system figures have been corrected in many cases and in that way came much closer to the original NVA figures (see Annex 1 and Annex 2).
(Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 19 December 1991, p.19; Wehrdienst 1303/1992, p.2; Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026).(Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, Attachment 1; printout from the GDR's MoD computer, 30 June 1990)
Decisionmaking System Regarding the Future of NVA Weapons and Materials
During the early months after reunification, the Bundeswehr laid primary emphasis on ensuring control over the NVA's material heritage. Thousands of major weapons and thousands of tons of equipment were relocated and brought under a more centralized, easier-to-guard storage system. Thousands of military installations-often containing weapons, ammunitions or other dangerous goods-had to be guarded, despite a serious lack of personnel.
Because of the amount of weapons and items to be handled, the Bundeswehr established a specific selection system to make decisions about the future of these items. Three different categories of items were created:
A typical example of a category 1 weapon is the modern Mig-29 fighter aircraft, which the Bundeswehr will use beyond the year 2000. Other examples are two Tupolev aircraft converted into the German 'Open Skies' airplane. The Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters are good examples of category 2 material that was further used or evaluated and is or will be retired from service. The bulk of the major weapon systems-e.g., all other fighter and fighter bomber aircraft, 98 percent of the main battle tanks, 95 percent of the armored cavalry vehicles and 95 percent of the artillery systems and mortars-were decided to be in excess early in the process. About 80 percent of the non-weapon systems and major types of equipment were similarly resolved as early as 1991. Additional weapons and materials from categories 1 and 2 have since been recategorized to category 3. Among the weapons first considered for use with the Bundeswehr were the D-30 howitzers, the RM-70 missile launchers, the BTR-70 APCs and others. They were recategorized, as were 892 BMP-1, 2 SAM systems SA-5, 163,039 AK 74 submachine guns, 24 Mi-24 helicopters and many others (Schulte, 1990, p. 873; Deutscher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, p.5). Although recent official figures on which and how much of the former NVA equipment is still in use are unavailable, it is no longer very much. In addition to those arguments used in public for phasing out most NVA weapon systems (dependence on Russian spares, incompatibility with German technical standards, etc.) one argument may have also contributed to these decisions: the more weapons from the NVA the Bundeswehr continued to operate, the more NVA specialists it would have to continue to employ.
Category 3 weapons and materials were collected and stored in special depots. They have been used for one the following purposes:
Special interest was immediately given to those categories of weapons subject to the CFE regulations (Hartmann, et al., 1992; Zellner, 1994; Crawford, 1991; Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies). The CFE Treaty, signed November 1990 in Paris, continued to be applicable in the new political situation when Germany accepted all limitations for the unified Germany that were originally intended for West Germany. This decision made Germany the country with the second largest obligations for reductions under the treaty. Nevertheless, the treaty allowed each signatory a period of time for corrections to its original notification figures. It allowed the earmarking of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLEs) as intended for export according to Article III regulations. Some types of TLEs could also be recategorized under the treaty regulations by making specific changes to their construction. As the CFE Treaty entered into force no earlier than November 1992, there was sufficient time to use those provisions that allowed reductions to the costs associated with fulfilling the signatories obligations to scrap weapon systems. There was also sufficient time to export treaty-limited weapons. Indeed, German government officials informed members of parliament that exports would become more difficult after ratification (Deutscher Bundestag, September 1991, pp.12+). Comparing Germany's 1990 assumptions about how many TLEs it would have to scrap with those given since shows that Germany has taken advantage of these regulations-it will have to destroy much less weapons than it had assumed in 1990.
Exports became a major means of ridding the Bundeswehr of the NVA's heritage. A number of factors contributed to this development. When the Bundeswehr took command of the NVA, no specialized dismantling facilities were available to immediately begin to destroy NVA weapons, ammunitions and toxic materials in accordance with environmental regulations. Although many environmental laws were suspended in the five new Länder for several years, only a few small or experimental facilities were available to immediately start the destruction of military equipment. During the time necessary to build up specialized facilities, only small amounts of the most dangerous types of ammunitions and weapons could be destroyed, e.g., liquid fuel missile types. The bulk of all weapons and equipment had to be guarded and stored. For months this caused serious complications for the Bundeswehr; they tried to implement a centralized and categorized storage system, but soon argued that these tasks would divert the armed forces for years from their normal defense, training and military tasks. An informal consensus was reached-the sooner reductions of these surplus stocks took place, the lower the costs of handling the NVA's heritage would be. It was simply cheaper and faster to transport a weapon to another country that paid for the transfer and maybe even for the weapon, than to first pay for storing it and then for destroying it.
To help the Bundeswehr win time for its military tasks, a newly established subsidiary of the government-owned company VEBEG, the MSDG (Material-Service-Depot-Gesellschaft), was assigned with guarding and operating those depots in which material was awaiting delivery for future in-country use, export or destruction.
(according to origin)
Category 1992-93 FRG FRG GDR Percentage Type of GDR Exports Systems Surplus Surplus GDR Weapon Systems Included MBT 382 243 242 139 36.4 T-72, T-55 ACV/IFV 525 278 187 247 47.0 BMP-1, BTR-60/70, MT-LB, PTS* Artillery 459 --- --- 459 100.0 SPH 122 and 152mm Attack 2 1 --- 1 50.0 Mi-24 Helicopters Combat 106 93 93 13 12.3 Su-22, Aircraft Mig-21/23
* This ACV/IFV was not identified clearly; although no equipment of West German origin is known to be designated PTS, it is accounted for in the NVA share.
This table also makes clear that most of the exports from Bundeswehr stocks are surplus weapons. The tanks exported were Leopard 1s, the aircraft were Alpha Jets and F-4 Phantoms, and the 187 IFVs were M-113s.
Source: United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993.
Exports from former NVA stocks largely contribute to Germany's rank as the second (or third) most important supplier of major weapon systems according to the 1992 and 1993 UN Registers of Conventional Arms. Substantial numbers of weapon systems as well as other military items have been exported.
In general, the rules for handling excess Bundeswehr items had to be applied for all surplus items of the former NVA; no special regulations were created with respect to German arms trade and export laws (Heyden, 1990, p.62). Indeed, during a meeting of the German Federal Security Council on 27 February 1991, it was decided that all exports should be handled in accordance with normal West German procedures as well as the 1982 political guidelines for arms exports (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991, p.26). The seizure of the covert delivery to Israel led on 23 December 1991 to a policy within the MoD of tighter control of the political leadership (Wehrdienst, 1300/1992, p.II).
Nevertheless, the process of preparing for these deliveries had started much earlier. Only two days after the March 1990 elections in the former GDR-which brought a CDU-led Eastern German government into power-a meeting took place within the West German Ministry of Defense to discuss when and with whom the inherited military equipment would be shared.
Many countries made requests for former NVA equipment; some of them did so even before reunification. In November 1991, a list was published naming a total of 44 countries that had requested NVA weapons (not including requests for humanitarian aid purposes). Among them were NATO allies Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as Italy, Spain, Canada and Holland. A wide range of non-NATO countries from Europe and other parts of the world was listed as well: Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, the USSR, Egypt, Algeria, Botswana, Ecuador, Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, Peru, Tunisia, Singapore and many others (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär, 21 November 1991).
Preparations for the Gulf War partly coincided with the process of German reunification. Since Iraqi forces operated mainly Soviet types of military equipment, the United States, the United Kingdom and-outside of the Gulf alliance-Israel approached the German government early on for various types of military equipment with which they might be confronted. Requests were mainly driven by 'technical intelligence' needs, i.e., testing and evaluation purposes. Therefore only small numbers of individual systems were necessary.
Germany, because of internal policy reasons and constitutional problems, could not contribute troops to the war. It therefore decided to give financial support and to supply military equipment in order to avoid increasing political pressure from its allies. This compensation strategy proved to be costly, totaling some DM 17-18 billion, or roughly US $10 billion at the time (Wehrdienst, 1258/1991, p.1). NVA equipment, at cost estimated by the German government, made up a significant part. This policy largely contributed to early and major exports of NVA weapons. The Commander of the Bundeswehr Command East at the time, Jörg Schönbohm, later wrote: "I have witnessed former NVA soldiers to be laid off by 1st of January 1991, working over the Christmas Holidays of 1990, to ensure that material for our allies operating in the Persian Gulf could be provided timely" (Schönbohm, 1992, p.43).
While the United States received a wide range of weapons for technical evaluation and larger numbers of different trucks, logistics and medical supplies for operational purposes, France obtained mine clearance and mine laying equipment. Egypt secured 30 NBC reconnaissance vehicles and a 250-ton spares package in October 1992 (Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1999, p.15). Israel received NBC decontamination equipment, firefighting equipment and other dual-use supplies. Turkey was the only country that showed interest in obtaining substantial numbers and a wider range of actual weapon systems. Supplies to Turkey ultimately led to the necessity of similar deliveries to Greece, thus creating a new military aid program for both countries (see extra section below).
Type of Equipment Designation Number Recipient Delivered* Country Engineering T 130 25 USA Equipment Trucks Tatra 813 8x8 151 USA Trucks Tatra 815 6x8 208 USA Trucks Tatra 815 8x8 62 USA Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CAPL 16 104 USA Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 18 17 USA Trucks Tatra 815 VI 129 USA Trailers for Tatra --- 128 USA 815 VI Trucks (POL, 5,000 Ural 48 USA l) Trucks Maintenance Ural 375C 48 USA Heavy Load Trailers P 50 and P 80 189 USA Trailer (Water) 220 USA Trailer (POL) 294 USA Medical Cars LO 2002 A/C 47 USA Trucks with Showers W50 LA/A/C 604 USA Water Bottles 18,000 USA Containers (20 ft.) 724 USA Tents (8x15 m) 200 USA NBC protection masks 100,000 USA Mine Clearance KMT 5 10 FR Equip. Mine Clearance KMT 6M 2 10 FR Equip. Mine Laying Equip. MLG 60M 4 FR Trucks Tatra 815 6x6 40 CSFR Heavy Load Trailers P50/80 40 CSFR NBC equipment various Israel SPW-40 NBC rec. veh. 30 Egypt Spares Package 250 tons spares 1 Egypt
* This table is deliberately incomplete, as it does not include exports covered in other sections. Excluded are deliveries to the United States for testing and evaluation as well as for training purposes; deliveries to Turkey; and deliveries for technical intelligence purposes to Israel. Israel also requested other NVA equipment but detailed and official figures are not publicly known.
Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.
Exports for Technical Intelligence
Former NVA weapons were given as loans or as gifts to foreign countries for technical intelligence, i.e., testing and evaluation purposes. These types of exports were said to be limited to the NATO countries and Israel. Other countries-"several Arab countries"-may also have benefited from such exports (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991, p.5). While such deliveries were implemented on a regular basis according to agreed NATO guidelines with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, each delivery to Israel was decided on a case-by-case basis (for details, see Annex 4).
The deliveries of former NVA equipment to the United States are somewhat unique in this context. On the one hand, they covered a broader number of types of equipment than deliveries to any other country. In fact, the United States is the only country that received large numbers of complete major weapon systems. On the other hand, the United States is the only country that received substantial numbers of weapons from the former NVA for training purposes. The US military maintains complete 'red flag' units, equipped with Soviet/Russian weapons, in order to conduct its military training as realistically as possible. The opportunity to equip these units with more modern equipment from NVA stocks was not passed up. It can not be clearly determined in all cases whether deliveries of NVA equipment to the United States served technical intelligence or training purposes.
According to official statements, Israel is the only country outside of NATO participating in this exchange; several clandestine operations were set up by the West German Foreign Intelligence Service to secretly transport NVA weapons to Israel in cooperation with the Mossad.
Israel (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991; Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 10 December 1991; Kolbow/Stoltenberg, 1992) was one of the first countries to informally show interest in NVA equipment. Based on a 1967 general agreement and case-by-case cooperation between the armed forces of Israel, the German Bundeswehr and the two countries' foreign intelligence services, this type of cooperation already had some practice. Historically, the FRG had benefited greatly from cooperation, since Israel had provided the FRG with some complete major weapon systems captured during the wars in the Near East, including an AA-2 air-to-air missile and a BMP-2. The German side did not have much hardware to give in return. Even before the unification date, however, the Israeli military attaché in Bonn had tabled preliminary requests for weapon systems of interest to the Mossad and the Israeli armed forces. In mid-1991, the Israeli list contained 274 positions, of which the German government had fulfilled some 68 positions by December 1991 and was preparing to fulfill an unknown number of additional ones (it had also turned down an unknown number of wishes). The weapons seized in Hamburg (14 positions) were finally delivered in October 1992. Examples of deliveries to Israel can be found in Annex 4.
While in public it was argued that these deliveries occurred as part of the German Gulf War effort and as part of the normal, intra-alliance cooperation, one possible additional motive must be mentioned. With Germany no longer a front-line state and thus having significantly less-valuable COMINT, ELINT and other intelligence information to share, transferring relatively modern, Eastern-style weaponry and equipment from NVA stocks was clearly a possibility for interim compensation.
From what is known about exports, loans and deliveries for technical intelligence purposes, a few conclusions may be drawn.
Since cooperation in technical intelligence is normally subject to intense secrecy, the seizure of the Hamburg weapons for Israel caused investigations that allowed a first glimpse of German practices as well as of some of its partners' behaviors in this field. To the author's knowledge, this case is unique. The size and the wide range of the deliveries discussed during the investigations clearly raise the question of whether more transparency in this field could make a unique contribution to confidence building.
Turkey and Greece are among the largest recipients of former NVA weapon systems. As noted above, supplies to these two countries originated from the Turkish requests in the Gulf War context. Both countries contracted for new, large, military aid packages (Materialhilfe III), consisting of a wide mixture of surplus NVA and Bundeswehr weapons to be delivered until 1994/1995. Thus, these programs became rather independent from the Gulf War.
Greece received inter alia 21,675 RPG-18, more than 7,000 guided anti-tank missiles, 3 OSA air defense missile systems (12 launchers with 924 missiles), 306 ZSU23 air defense guns, 501 BMP-1 armored personnel carriers plus 158 RM-70 rocket launchers (including some 205,000 rockets). At one point the country, pressed by its debts, had to delay deliveries as it could no longer pay for the transport (Deutscher Bundestag, 21 January 1994, p.12).
Deliveries to Turkey are similarly impressive: 4,996 RPG-7 light assault weapons were exported together with 197,139 rounds of ammunition; 303,934 Kalashnikov rifles with at least 83 million rounds of ammunition, more than 2,500 machine guns, and 300 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers including large stocks of ammunition were also delivered. In addition, both countries received other military equipment. Parts I and II of Annex 3 show the major exports from NVA stocks; in addition, major deliveries from Bundeswehr surplus stocks within the same aid package are listed in parts III and IV of that annex.
Both countries are the major recipients of military aid within NATO. They are seen by their allies as important factors of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and with respect to the Muslim world-Volker Rühe, the German Minister of Defense, has argued, "since the end of the east-west confrontation Turkey and Greece are growing into the role of stabilizing regional powers bordering crisis areas" (Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 7 March 1994)-and they have received substantial amounts of surplus weapons for decades. German military aid programs for Turkey totaled DM 6.243 billion for the 1964-1994 timeframe; German programs in support of Greece totaled DM 2.572 billion (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, RüT II 1, 5 October 1991; Wehrdienst, 13/1993, p.2). While deliveries before the ratification of the CFE Treaty were normal military exports, later transfers had to be made under the treaty provisions which allow 'cascading.' Within this program, the more modern armed forces with troops deployed at the former Central Front-i.e., in Germany-are allowed to transfer substantial amounts of destined-to-be-destroyed equipment to the countries at NATO's flanks, thus modernizing the equipment standard of their allies within the agreed equipment limits for these countries. If these deliveries cause the recipient country to exceed the agreed holdings in a CFE category, the respective country is also obliged to destroy older TLEs of the same category to meet its treaty commitments. Since not all these limits were met prior to the cascading, this process could led to substantial increases in national holdings in some cases.
Deliveries to both countries are accompanied by the risk of fueling an arms race among poor NATO allies, who have a wide range of potentially conflicting interests (Aegis, Cyprus, Balkans) and whose governments have regularly used foreign policy disputes to overcome internal difficulties. Therefore the main suppliers, Germany and the United States, both apply a policy in which delivered equipment is carefully divided between Greece and Turkey on a proportional basis.
The supply of huge amounts of small weapons and ammunition to Turkey may well contribute to Turkey's war in the Kurdish provinces as well as to severe human rights violations. While the German government argues that Turkey committed itself to not using these weapons for purposes other than NATO defense, the Turkish government has repeatedly pointed out that fighting the Kurdish PKK guerrilla is well within the common tasks of all NATO countries, since they agreed to cooperate in fighting terrorism.
Although the bilateral treaties between Turkey and Germany on the military aid programs clearly state that Turkey is not authorized to re-export weapons received from Germany without Germany's written approval (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, RüZII 2, 11 November 1993; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung/Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung der Republik Türkei, 1994, Art. 7, para. 2.), it is possible that Turkey supplied Iraqi Kurds with small arms from former NVA stockpiles. Conversations of the author with humanitarian relief workers, who worked in Iraqi Kurdistan for several years, led to the conclusion, that AK-47s in use with Kurdish militias in Northern Iraq originate from NVA stocks. NVA ammunition also has turned up with with Northern Iraqi Kurdish units. It cannot completely be excluded that Turkey also used deliveries from the former NVA stocks to covertly supply Azerbaijan in its conflicts with Armenia.
Several of the exports of NVA equipment were intertwined with procurement programs of the recipient country from German arms industry. Sweden and Indonesia serve as examples.
In 1994, the German arms industry won a major competition. Sweden, searching for its future main battle tank, evaluated the newest versions of the German Leopard 2, the US M1A2 Abrams, the French Leclerc and the British Challenger tanks. After a lengthy process Sweden finally contracted with German industry for 120 new production tanks for DM 1.2 billion (Wehrdienst 4/1994, p.3), with a possible second lot of 90 vehicles to follow. The choice was allegedly made on the basis of the conditions Germany had offered. The Swedish arms industry would participate in the tank production, and Germany would buy additional equipment from Sweden. Finally-but never directly mentioned-Sweden contracted for cheap surplus weapons of German origin as well. Sweden had already gained an additional 160 ex-German Leopard 2 tanks (out of 200) under a favorable contract in 1994. Roughly 800 of the NVA's MB-LT multi-purpose armored vehicles were also sold to the country for an extraordinarily low price; Sweden will also receive spares from the cannibalization of 228 2S1 self-propelled howitzers (Björck, 1994, p.268; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994; Foss, 1995, p.13).
Indonesia is another example-39 former East German Navy vessels were sold to Indonesia by January 1993 in a deal very controversial for human rights reasons. The remarkably low price of some US $13 million for all these ships was accompanied by a commitment to partial demilitarization and refurbishment in a German yard-at a cost of US $314 million-and the German company Ferrostahl training 1660 Indonesian naval soldiers. The World Bank criticized the deal, noting that the total costs of the project for Indonesia would be even higher, since remilitarization of the ships at an Indonesian yard would cost another $339 million. The Indonesian yard itself had to modernized for that purpose at the expense of approximately US $119 million and a new harbor had to be built for US $179 million for operating the ships (Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/6512; Wehrtechnik, June 1993; Ziller, 1994; Dudde, 1994; Der Spiegel, 27 September 1993; Dauth, 1993; Dohnany, 1993; Schmalz, 1992).
Despite the process of demilitarization, on four ships the launchers for modern air-defense missiles were 'accidentally' left aboard, and a 5,000 ton spares and ammunition package accompanied the deal.
Spare parts deliveries (selection)
Source: Marinekommando Rostock, 1993, p.3.
The Indonesian government also decided to order three new submarines from the German company, Howaldt Deutsche Werk AG, that normally cooperates with Ferrostahl when selling submarines abroad.
Similarly, both Turkey and Greece are long-established and well-known customers of the FRG's arms industries, especially naval industries.
The massive exports from German surplus stocks are somewhat double-edged from a German arms industry perspective. While the German government on the one hand is a cheap competitor for its own arms industries, it also supports the export sales of German industries with cheap, additional equipment. Sometimes this surplus equipment needs to be upgraded or brought up to the recipient country's technology standards by German companies before delivery (Heckmann, 1989, pp.49-50). From an industry perspective, deliveries of very modern equipment may also be perceived as creating a need for next-generation weaponry by the German Bundeswehr earlier than otherwise anticipated.
Examples of additional exports are given in combination with exports supporting actual sales in Annex 5.
Large parts of the dual-purpose equipment of the NVA have been exported for civilian or humanitarian use. Trucks, maintenance equipment, clothes, telecommunications or medical and NBC equipment, food and tents have been delivered since 1990. A wide range of countries requested and received former NVA equipment as humanitarian aid-most of the successor states of the former Soviet Union plus 34 other countries and hundreds of organizations from the private sector were listed by the German government in answering parliamentary questions during 1991 and 1992 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär, 21 November 1991). In addition to the positive aspects, it must be mentioned that in some cases humanitarian aid was delivered together with the trucks transporting it, simply because the costs of destruction for the trucks according to German laws would be relatively high.
Reductions in Treaty Limited Equipment under the CFE categories are occurring through both export and destruction. Thus, the unified Germany continues to fulfill its treaty obligations. By the end of 1993 it was expected that all weapons to be dismantled could be scrapped before 16 November 1995, the deadline by which the CFE signatory countries are committed to completing their reductions.
CFE limits would have allowed the unified Germany to keep some additional TLEs, since the stocks in the former West Germany were below the upper limits allowed for aircraft and attack helicopters. Some last-minute exports and recategorizations contributed to reduced needs for expensive destruction as well. It is not officially known whether exports of former West German TLEs (e.g., Leopard tanks to Turkey, Greece, Sweden, Denmark and Norway; RF-4 aircraft to Greece and Turkey; Alpha Jets to Portugal) have also been used to further reduce the number of weapon systems to be destroyed. As no intention exists to operate the additional weapon systems allowed and therefore even more former West German weapon systems are destined for surplus-of some 2054 Leopard 1, 2124 Leopard 2 and 648 M48A2G tanks available to the Bundeswehr in 1991, it will need only 672 Leopard 1 and 1712 Leopard 2 tanks for the new Army Structure Five (without war reserve stocks) (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1994, Attachment 7)-the German government may store at least some valuable surplus NVA equipment for possible future export and has primarily scrapped older NVA weapons in each category to meet its commitments. Originally the destruction of substantial numbers of modern GDR equipment had been planned (Wehrdienst, 1322/1992, p.4).
Combat aircraft serve as a good example. Under CFE, Germany had to scrap about 140 aircraft and contracted with a subsidiary of DASA, Elbe-Flugzeugwerke in Dresden. The destruction has since then been completed. All aircraft destroyed were older Mig-21 models; not one Mig-23, Su-22 or even Mig-29 has been scheduled for destruction. At the end of 1993, 24 Mig-29s were kept in service with the Bundeswehr, while more than 139 aircraft were either scheduled for export or awaiting a decision. These included most of the later-production Mig-21s as well as all available Mig-23s and SU-22 fighter bombers.
The same procedure can be demonstrated in other areas. CFE obligations are met by destroying the older systems first: T-54s and T-55s instead of T-72s; BTR-152s, BTR-40s and BTR-50s instead of BMP-1s or BMP-2s; 120mm mortars HM and HD-30 howitzers instead of the more capable HD-20, 2S3, RM-70 or BM-21 rocket launchers. It is not yet known whether these more modern system will be dismantled later. The NVA's Mi-24 attack helicopters will also not be scrapped but probably exported, since there is no commitment to destroy them under CFE limits (Zellner, 1994; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994; Wehrdienst 3/1994, p.4).
One reason for the decision to scrap the older technology systems may have been the lower expense; another reason surely was that newer technology weapons are easier to sell. Thus, only relatively small numbers of TLEs with higher military value may have to be destroyed during the final stages of the destruction period. Consequently the budget proposal for 1995 contains a reduced allocation of DM 219 million for CFE destructions (Deutscher Bundestag, Document 13/50, Einzelplan 14, p.105; Wehrdienst 17/1994, p.1).
While it is not yet clear whether inheriting the NVA has led to a restructuring of Germany's plans to reduce its stockpiles according to CFE, it is possible that a decision to retain older Western equipment and instead destroy Eastern technology weapons has been made.
Other Methods of Demilitarization
Some TLEs from the former NVA have been rendered useless in other ways. During the early months of reunification, a number of major weapon systems were converted into firefighting equipment and other heavy duty civil machinery in former GDR armaments industry facilities for testing purposes. Several aircraft, tanks and other types of equipment have been demilitarized for static display in exhibitions in Germany and other countries (Wehrdienst 13/1993 p.3; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994, p.13). This includes individual sales to private collections, as well.
Some weapon systems will be used as targets on Bundeswehr training ranges. In some cases, this will affect substantial numbers; for example, 104 T-72 MBTs, 86 heavily armed PT-76s and 50 2S1 self-propelled howitzers were allocated for use as live targets by the end of 1993 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994, p.13).
Roughly 300,000 tons of ammunition were inherited from the NVA by the Bundeswehr. While government and media reports concentrate on successful new technologies for dismantling ammunition, analysis shows that at least one-third and maybe more than 40 percent of the former NVA's ammunition stocks have already been exported or are designated for export. The munitions available at the time of unification were listed by the NVA as belonging to the following categories.
In addition to category 1 weapon systems, the Bundeswehr initially intended to use about 30,000, then 16,400, metric tons of NVA ammunition. This figure was reduced to approximately 14,000 tons. No lower figure has since been given publicly, although the number of NVA weapon systems in Bundeswehr use has been consistently reduced.
The future of roughly 280,000 tons of ammunition had to be decided. The larger portion of this ammunition has been dismantled, while the smaller part has been exported-as a general rule, exports took place in combination with deliveries of the weapons for which the ammunition was intended. Examples of such deliveries can be found throughout the tables and annexes of this paper. Not listed in these tables are the exports of ammunition (e.g., torpedoes) to Sweden, where they were destroyed according to Swedish Ordnance, since environmental regulations did not allow Germany to do so domestically within acceptable costs (Wehrtechnik, 21 October 1991, pp. 1-3).
By 31 December 1993 a total of 60,500 tons had been exported, while 109,100 tons had been destroyed. An additional 57,400 tons were awaiting export, while 54,100 tons were awaiting destruction. No explanation is given for the difference of 300 tons from the estimated total (Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 6 April 1994, pp. 11-12; Annex 5).
The ammunition disposal is expected to be finished by the end of 1995. Since, for security reasons, the Bundeswehr does not intend to transport other countries' surplus ammunitions to the new facilities for ammunition disposal built in the five new Länder, it intends to help the companies who developed these techniques to aggressively market their unique capabilities in other countries.
CFE Holdings Holdings Reduction -"- CFE Limit Scrapped Remarks Category notified notified Commitment -"- for FRG by 31 1990 1992 calculated notified* December 1993** MBT 7,000 7,170 2,834 2,834 4,166 956 / 959 (2,834) 1,432 additional MBTs contracted ACV/IFV 8,920 9,099 5,474 5,304 3,446 2,074/ 2014 (5,474) 2,087 additional ACV/IFVs contracted Artillery 4,602 4,735 1,897 2,006 2,705 814 / 842 290 (1,897) additional contracted Attack 258 256 --- --- 306 --- Helicopter Aircraft 1,018 1,040 140 140 900 140 / 140 140 Mig-21, (118) none contracted
* Notified reduction commitments are given in two ways
** It is astonishing that two widely different sets of figures were given to Parliament in early 1994 about the numbers of weapons destroyed by the end of 1993: Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 6 April 1994 is in direct contradiction to Deutscher Bundestag, 8 February 1994, p.3. The figure for tanks in that letter was corrected in April 1994. These data are different from those listed by Crawford, 1991 and 1993. The official figures from the Bundeswehr with respect to CFE-related equipment to be destroyed have been reduced several times. See: Ulrich Weiser, Head of the German MoD's Planning Staff, quoted in Defense News (25 March 1991, p.61), as saying that "4,500 main battle tanks, 6,000 armored vehicles, 50 armed helicopters and 150 combat aircraft will have to be destroyed."
Additional sources: Hartmann, et al., 1992, p.397; Frank, 1992, p.31., Hartmann, et al, 1994, p.598.
Category of Ammunition Types Metric Tons Army Small Arms Ammunition 92 58,600 Artillery/Grenade Launchers 87 52,900 Rocket Launchers 6 23,600 AD-guns and SP-AD guns 17 21,800 Tanks, AFV, IFV 63 66,000 AT-Weapons 12 18,000 Guided AT-Missiles 8 1,500 Short Range AD-Missiles 4 500 Hand Grenades 9 8,000 Engineer Ammunition 66 16,000 850,000 AT-mines 500,000 Directional Mines Additional munitions & parts 25 3,000 Air and Air Defense Forces 1080 Air Defense Missiles 3 4,378 17,564 Air-to-Air Missiles 10 2,429 711 Air-to-Surface Missiles 7 406 177,346 Air-to-Surface Rockets 8 1,656 Bombs 15 1,290 Ammunition for Aircraft Guns 5 886 Naval Forces Naval Arty/Naval AD-guns 5 2,909 Naval Mines 6 2,208 Depth Bombs 2 1,785 Large explosives/Torpedoes/Parts 5 685 Pyrotechnical Ammunition Signals/Light 68 6,000 Smoke/Fog 9 898 Total 295,430
Sources: Machon, 1991, p.38; Heckmann, 1990, p.76. While the Bundeswehr first used figures significantly lower than the NVA numbers (Preißler, 1991), it returned to the NVA estimates and continues to use them. In some cases, the Bundeswehr estimated the ammunition heritage to be even larger, i.e., 350,000 tons. See: Erbe, 1991, p.413.
The income from sales of weapons from former NVA stocks are used to finance the defense budget and especially the dismantling process, which was expected to cost about DM 1.5 billion. According to 1994 figures the Bundeswehr predicted the earnings from sales would total roughly DM 1.5 billion by 1997. As the process of ridding the Bundeswehr of NVA equipment is scheduled to end in 1996, this is also the estimate for the overall total.
Exports of NVA equipment and weapons, even if the estimates for 1994-1997 are too optimistic, thus roughly totaled the price of a single US B-2 bomber.
The German MoD hopes to finish managing the NVA's heritage by the end of 1996. In 1994, several initiatives were begun to make this a realistic date. Whole storage sites containing old NVA equipment have been offered to civil industries willing to empty them and scrap the rest of the equipment still available. Companies accepting these offers will receive the infrastructure plus guards paid by the government for the time in which they commit themselves to emptying a site.
From a Bundeswehr perspective, there is another good reason for speeding up the process of managing the NVA's heritage. The Bundeswehr already must prepare itself for the next round of reductions of weapons and equipment in service. In the post-Cold War era, its manpower has been reduced to 370,000 soldiers; a reduction to 340,000 has been decided and further cuts-possibly to less than 300,000 soldiers-will have to be made during the next years if no significant increases in the defense budget are decided. Constant pressure exists on the defense budget, leading to the investments share falling from a Cold War third of the budget to a fifth under current conditions. With new reductions, substantial numbers of weapon systems will again become available as surplus weapons. The reduced Bundeswehr will no longer need them, and has neither the manpower to operate nor the money to stockpile and maintain them for long periods. They will therefore fuel the surplus weapons market.
Preliminary preparations for future stock reductions are already underway. Indications of this trend include Turkey's receipt of a FH-70 155mm howitzer and a more modern Leopard 1A5 version for field trials and possible future export (Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 10 January 1994).
(Official estimate for 1990-1997)
Year Income from Sales (in DM) 1990-1993 595,100,000 1994 535,300,000* 1995 278,300,000* 1996 92,100,000* 1997 16,000,000* Total 1,516,800,000*
Sources: Wehrdienst 13/1994, p.4; Wehrdienst 17/1994, p. 1. At the end of 1993, DM 903 million had been spent (DM 170 million for storage and safeguarding; DM 733 million for destruction). In the budget for 1995, the estimated costs for destruction of weapons have been reduced by DM 209 million to DM 178 million, because of reduced needs to scrap weapons and equipment. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FüS IV 2, 1994, p.5. The figures given by the Bundeswehr for 1990 to 1993 sales are contradictory, since in another document (Wehrdienst, 13/1994, p.4) the total given was only DM 338 million for the same period.
This article reflects data as available in late 1994, i.e., as of 31 December 1993. The author is especially indebted to a number of jounalists and research colleagues who allowed him to analyse materials they used for their stories. Among them, colleagues of Der Spiegel, Berliner Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung were especially helpful. Research colleagues Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and Hans-Joachim Gießmann, who authored a major book on the NVA in transition (Das unliebsame Erbe, Baden-Baden, 1992), also provided substantial assistance.
"Ausbildung für Indonesiens Marine in Neustadt/Holstein." . Wehrtechnik. June.
Bauer, Harald. 1993. "Kleinwaffen und Munition." Berlin. p. IV.2-1. Mimeo.
Billiger Rasierer." . Der Spiegel. 27 September.
Björck, Anders. 1994. "Rüstungskooperation: Wichtig für Schweden." Europäische Sicherheit. June, p.268.
Bundesminister der Verteidigung. 1994. Brief an den Vorsitzenden des Verteidigungsausschusses, Dr. Fritz Wittmann. Bonn. 10 January.
________. 1994. Brief an den Vorsitzenden des Verteidigungsausschusses, Dr. Fritz Wittmann. Bonn. 7 March.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 1991. Abgabe von Material im Zusammenhang mit der Golfkrise. Bonn. 22 February.
________. 1994. Antwort auf die mündliche Anfrage 1 des Abg. Norbert Gansel (SPD) vom 8.4.1994. Bonn. 15 April.
________. 1994. Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Fortgang der Verwertung von früherem NVA Material. Bonn. 6 April.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. FüS IV 2. 1994. Statistik Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundesländern. Bonn. May.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär. 1991. Brief an Gernot Erler (MdB). Bonn. 21 November.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. RüT II 1. 1991. Deutsche Verteidigungshilfen/ Unterstützungsleistungen für Griechenland, Portugal, Türkei. Bonn. 5 October.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. RüZ II 2. 1993. Schreiben betr. Weitergabe von Rüstungsgütern der Bundeswehr durch die Türkei an andere Staaten. Bonn. 11 November.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung/Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (DDR). 1990. "Schreiben an Generalleutnant Ullmann vom 6.9.1990." In: Waffensysteme/Gerät/Versorgungsartikel. Strausberg. 6 September.
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung/Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung der Republik Türkei. 1994. Abkommen über unentgeltliche Lieferung von Ausrüstungsmaterial der Bundeswehr (Materialhilfe III). Bonn.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1994. Jährlicher Informationsaustausch über Verteidigungsplanung Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn. Attachment 7.
"Bundeswehr erneut in Verruf." . Berliner Zeitung. 17 January.
Casdorf, Stefan Andreas. 1992. "Indonesien erhält 39 Schiffe der DDR-Marine." Süddeutsche Zeitung. 24 July.
Crawford, Dorn. 1991 (updated 1993). Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-An Overview of Key Treaty Elements. Bethesda: US-Army Concept Analysis Agency.
Dauth, Jürgen. 1993. "Billige Schiffe werden teurer." Süddeutsche Zeitung. 13 July.
Deutscher Bundestag. 1993. Document 12/6512. Bonn. 28 December.
________. 1994. Antwort des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung auf die schriftliche Anfrage der Abg. Katrin Fuchs vom 21.1.1994. Bonn. 8 February, p.3.
________. 1991. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Überlassung von Wehrmaterial aus Beständen der ehemaligen NVA an Israel zur technischen Auswertung. Bonn. 2 December.
________. Document 12/1448. Bonn.
________. Document 12/1820. Bonn. December 1991.
________. Document 12/1999. Bonn.
________. Document 12/2026. Bonn. 31 January 1992.
________. Document 13/50. Bonn. Attachment Einzelplan 14 (Defense Budget),
________. 1994. Kurzprotokoll der 24. Sitzung des Unterausschusses Streitkräfte in den neuen Bundesländern. Bonn. 21 January.
________. 1991. Protokoll der 5. Sitzung des Unterausschusses Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Bundesländern am 2.9.1991. Bonn. September.
________. 1994. Unterausschuß 'Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Bundesländern,
7. Bericht an den Verteidigungsausschuß. Bonn. 2 April.
________. 1992. Unterausschuß 'Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Bundesländern,' Sekretariat: Zahlenangaben Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundesländern. Bonn. 11 May.
Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungsausschuß. 1994. Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Fortgang der Verwertung von früherem NVA-Material. Bonn. 6 April.
________. 1991. Bericht zur Lage der Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundesländern. Bonn. 19 December.
________. 1991. Fragen und Antworten zum Bericht zur Überlassung von Wehrmaterial aus Beständen der ehemaligen NVA an Israel zum Zweck der technischen Auswertung vom 2.12.1991. Bonn. 10 December.
Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungsausschuß. Unterausschuß 'Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Bundeländern,' Protokoll der 18. Sitzung. Bonn. pp.8+.
Dohnany, Johannes V. 1993. "Korvetten für Djakarta." Die Woche. 18 February.
Dudde, Lars-Martin. 1994. "Verirrte Torpedos." Die Woche. 20 January.
Erbe, Jürgen. 1991. "Entsorgung von Wehrmaterial." Soldat und Technik. June, p.413.
Feldmayer, Karl. 1992. "Kampfschiffe für Indonesien." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 24 July.
Foss, Christopher. 1995. "Ex-German Leopards delivered to Sweden." Jane's Defence Weekly. Vol. 23, No. 1, p.13.
Frank, Hans. 1992. "Vernichtung von Wehrmaterial nach den Bestimmungen des KSE-Vertrages." Jahrbuch für Wehrtechnik. Koblenz. Vol. 21.
Gießmann, Hans Joachim. 1992. Das unliebsame Erbe. Baden-Baden.
Goldbach, J. 1990. "Bericht über Abrüstung und Konversion am Runden Tisch Militärreform." Forschung für den Frieden. January, p.124f.
Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. 1992. Kommentar zum Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. March, SWP-S-375.
Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. Der vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Baden-Baden.
Heckmann, Erhart. 1990. "Munitionsentsorgung bei der NVA." Wehrtechnik. October.
________. 1989. "NATO-Verteidigungshilfe-auch Hilfe für die deutsche Industrie." Wehrtechnik. May.
Heyden, Joachim. 1990. "Technisch-Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Ausrüstung und Neuordnung gesamtdeutscher Streitkräfte." Wehrtechnik. November, p.62.
Kolbow/Stoltenberg. 1992. Questions asked by Walter Kolbow on 23 January and answers provided by Secretary of Defense Stoltenberg on 10 February.
Machon, Christian. 1991. "Die ehemalige NVA und die Konversion- eine abschließende Zusammenfassung." Mediatus. Special Edition 1 (based on NVA databases).
Marinekommando Rostock. 1993. Schreiben an die MSDG-Außenstelle Peenenünde. March.
Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung (DDR)/MAV. 1990. "Auskunftsangaben über die Nationale Volksarmee, Stand 1.1.1990." Material für den Runden Tisch Militärreform beim Verteidigungsministerium der DDR. Berlin.
Mierzwa, Roland. 1993. "Rüstungshandel der Bundesrepublik nach dem zweiten Golfkrieg." Probleme des Friedens. April, pp. 59-69.
Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (DDR). 1990. Ausdruck aus der Datenbank des Ministeriums. Strausberg, 30 June. 3 pages (author's archive).
"NVA-Waffen zur UNO." . Der Spiegel. 29/1994.
Opall, Barbara. 1991. "German Aid to Israel Includes Two Dolphin
Subs." Defense News. 25 February.
Scheuer, Thomas. 1992. "Schalcks dubiosae Dreiecksbeziehungen." Die Tageszeitung. 25 April.
Schibli, Peter. 1992. "Die Bundeswehr wird zum Waffenhändler." Baseler Zeitung. 29 July.
Schmalz, Peter. 1992. "Kriegsmarine im Schlußverkauf." Die Welt. 25 February.
Schönbohm, Jörg. 1992. "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen." In Dieter Farwick. Ein Staat-Eine Armee. Frankfurt/Bonn.
Schulte, Heinz. 1990. "NVA equipment to be scrapped." Jane's Defence Weekly. 3 November.
Thielbeer, S. 1992. "Deutsch-finnisches Waffengeschäft." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 13 June.
United Nations General Assembly. 1992 and 1993. UN Register of Conventional Arms. Report of the Secretary-General. Reports from Germany.
Vielain, Heinz. 1991. "Dubiose Geschäfte von Offizieren der NVA." Welt am Sonntag. 27 July.
Wehrdienst, Vol. 1990-1994.
Zellner, Wolfgang. 1994. Die Verhandlungen über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Baden-Baden.
Ziller, Peter. 1994. "Bonn trägt bei Rüstungsexport hohes Risiko." Frankfurter Rundschau. 16 February.
Computer printouts (for official use only) from the German MoD, dated 6 December 1991: "Golfkrieg/Ausbildung" and "Technische Auswertung." Archives of a journalist colleague.
Main Equipment of the NVA-West and East German Accounting Differences
Type of Equipment GDR FRG Difference Remarks listing listing Tanks MBT T-72 549 551 + 2 FRG numbers vary* MBT T-55/T-55A 1,480 1,589 + 109 FRG numbers vary, partially explained MBT T-54 193 198 + 5 FRG numbers vary Armored and Armed Vehicles AFV BMP-1 1,112 1,133 + 21 FRG numbers vary AFV BMP-2 24 24 APC SPW 40P 299 APC SPW 40P2 1,579 1,158 - 421 FRG numbers vary, partially explained APC SPW 50 PK 199 154 - 45 partially explained APC SPW 60 PA/PB 1,468 1,455 - 11 FRG numbers vary APC SPW 70 1,266 1,254 - 12 APC SPW 152 W1/K 759 717 - 42 FRG numbers vary AFV PT 76 120 142 + 22 FRG numbers vary ARV BRM1 K 15 10 - 5 FRG numbers vary Arm. multi-purpose veh. 529 MT-LB Artillery Systems Cannon 85mm 225 180 - 45 Cannon 100mm 267 255 - 12 Cannon 130mm 175 137 - 38 Howitzer 122mm M-30 407 405 - 2 FRG numbers vary Howitzer 122mm D-30 395 394 - 1 FRG numbers vary Howitzer cannon 152 mm 137 137 D-20 SPH SFL 2S1 122mm 374 372 - 2 FRG numbers vary SPH SFL 2S3 152mm 96 95 - 1 Rocket launcher RM-70 265 261 - 4 FRG numbers vary Rocket launcher BM-21 58 59 + 1 Missile launcher LUNA 48 69 + 21 Missile launcher Totschka 8 Missile launcher SS-23 --- --- four with 24 msl Msl transport vehicle 26 Totschka Msl transport vehicle 94 LUNA M Grenade launcher 82mm 491 479 - 12 Grenade launcher 291 296 + 5 FRG numbers vary 120mm/SANI Air-Defense Systems Launcher SM-65 Dwina 48 eight complexes Launcher SM-90 Wolchow 174 30 complexes Launcher 5P71/73 Newa 40 ten complexes Launcher 5P72 S-200 24 two complexes Launcher 5P85 S-300 12 one complex Launcher 'Krug' 42 Launcher 'Kub' 107 Launcher 'OSA-AK' 41 Msl transport vehicle 240 'Krug' Msl transport vehicle 219 'Kub' Msl transport vehicle 42 'OSA-AK' Portable SAM - Strela-2 1,896 Portable SAM IGLA 75 75 ZU 23 mm twin AD-gun 924 ZSU 23/4 Schilka AD-gun 128 99 - 29 Anti-Tank Systems AT missile launch vehicle 48 9P110 AT missile launch vehicle 54 50 - 4 9P122 AT missile launch vehicle 156 169 + 13 9 P133 AT missile launch vehicle 52 48 - 4 9P148 AT missile launcher for 419 393 - 28 FAGOT AT missile launcher for 31 20 - 11 METIS Light Arms Machine guns 42,526 40,991 - 1,535 ----light machine gun ----heavy machine gun Sniper rifles 1,749 1,509 - 240 only once listed by FRG Submachine gun 7.62mm 705,032 731,050 + 25,988 FRG numbers vary AK-47 Submachine gun 5.45 mm 163,039 16,3039 AK-74 Pistol 9mm 267,125 270,681 + 3,556 difference caused by FRG Automatic rifle 3,518 3,862 + 344 Automatic grenade 184 173 - 11 launcher AGS-17 SPG-9 heavy assault 862 n.a. weapon Light assault weapons 26,526 26,346 - 180 LAW 40mm RPG-7 LAW RPG-18 n.a. n.a. Helicopters Mi-24 attack helicopter 51 51 Mi-8 TB armed helicopter 36 n.a. (see below) Mi-14 PL special 8 8 helicopter (Haze) Mi-14 BT special 6 6 helicopter (Haze) Mi-9 special helicopter 8 8 Mi-2 transport helicopter 25 25 Mi-8 transport helicopter 54 93 + 3 FRG counts all Mi-8 here Aircraft Mig-21 251 251 Mig-23 47 45 - 2 difference explained Mig-29 24 24 Mig-23 BN 18 18 SU-22 54 54 L-39 training aircraft 52 52 AN-2 transport aircraft 18 n.a. AN-26 transport aircraft 12 12 L-410 transport aircraft 12 12 TU-134 transport aircraft 3 3 TU-154 transport aircraft 2 2 IL-62 transport aircraft 3 3 Z-43 aircraft 12 n.a. Naval Weapon Systems Koni Class frigate (1159) 3 3 OSA missile corvette 12 12 (205) Tarantul missile corvette 5 5 (1241) Balcom 10 missile boats 1 3 + 2 difference explained (151) Kondor I 1 + 1 difference explained minesweeper/patrol boats Kondor II minesweeper 20 20 (89.2) Kondor I 2 2 reconnaissance/intl. (65.2) Parchim Class Coastal 16 16 Patrol (133.1) Libelle Class (light torp. boat)(133.4) FROSCH I Landing ship 12 12 (108) FROSCH II replenishment 2 2 renamed as msl boat ship (109) by BW DARSS replenishment ships 5 5 (602) Mob. msl launchers for 10 coastal def. Harbor tugs 5 Class 414 harbor tugs 3 Gustav Königs-Class 2 harbor tanker Ohre Class accommodation 6 ship
* Indicates that at different times, different figures for the holdings of this item have been given by the Bundeswehr.
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, 1992, Annex 1; Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Wehrdienst 41/1993, p.4; Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (der DDR), 1990 (author's archive). Where no figure for the Bundeswehr accounting system is listed, the author could not find one.
Small Firearms in NVA Stockpile
Light Arms GDR FRG Difference FRG Remarks 1992 1994 Machine guns 42,526 40,991 - 1,535 55,575 Sniper rifles 1,749 1,509 - 240 n.a. listed by FRG only in 1992 Kalashnikow 7.62mm AK-47 705,03 731,050 + 25,988 783,217 FRG numbers vary 2 Kalashnikow 5.45 mm AK-74 163,03 163,039 171,925 9 Pistol 9mm 267,12 270,681 + 3,556 266,537 diff. caused by 5 FRG Automatic rifle 3,518 3,862 + 344 4,279 Automatic grenade launcher 184 173 - 11 651 AGS-17 Light assault weapons RPG 26,526 26,346 - 180 22,032 7 LAW RPG 18 n.a. n.a.
'Small Firearms' are a good example of the confusion about data, which consists of two parts:
1. The Definition Problem
NVA and GDR figures calculating small firearms probably include AK-47s, AK-74s, 9mm pistols, the sniper and automatic rifles plus the machine guns, and thus roughly total 1.2 million weapons at the beginning of 1990-i.e., at a time when the process of bringing stocks from outside the NVA into NVA custody was ongoing.
FRG and Bundeswehr figures include in addition the AGS-17 grenade launcher and the 40mm LAW RPG-7, but for unknown reasons list the sniper rifle only until January 1992. Because the holdings of these weapons were not very large, Bundeswehr totals also were around 1.2 million.
West German Heckler & Koch submachine guns, machine guns and sniper rifles illegally exported to the GDR do not appear in either definition. This also appears to be true for a small number of submachine guns, 'Skorpion,' which were mentioned when taken into Bundeswehr stocks.
2. The Accounting Problem
Neither the NVA nor the Bundeswehr figures used publicly may be viewed as reliable. The problem with the NVA figures is related to their obtainment during the ongoing process of bringing in stocks from other armed groupings in the GDR-totaling some 518,220 weapons according to GDR definitions-which did not allow a complete figure for small firearms to exist within the NVA before the Bundeswehr takeover started. It may have been as low as about 700,000 weapons, but it may have been much higher, between 1 and 1.2 million weapons.
The Bundeswehr/FRG figures may also be completely artificial, since the accounting was accomplished during the process of scrapping and exporting these weapons-this gives the Bundeswehr complete freedom to list or not list weapons without supervising control. To make the problem worse, even the Bundeswehr figures given after the process of scrapping and exporting weapons was completed are inconclusive, and contradict other Bundeswehr reports about exports. Thus, the Bundeswehr figures are likely not trustworthy as well. According to the final figures published by the Bundeswehr in 1994, the unified Germany had scrapped 891,217 small firearms, retained 4,784 and exported another 408,215 weapons of this category (according to the FRG definitions). But after cross-checking with the individual exports reported officially beforehand, this figure proves to be too low:
This already adds up to more than 411,000 small fire arms exported, excluding lower numbers that were exported to many other countries as well as additional substantial exports-for example, another 7,000 RPG-7 and 2,500 heavy machine guns for Turkey were under consideration and were at least partially delivered by the end of March 1994.
The minimum number of small firearms in NVA stockpiles was therefore about 1.3 million; the highest possible figure may have been around 1.7 million.
Sources: Goldbach, 1990, p.124f.; Ministerium für Nationale Verteidigung(DDR)/MAV, 1990; Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, 1992; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, RüZ II,2, 1994; Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 6 April 1994; Scheuer, 1992.
NVA equipment delivered to Greece and Turkey
Part I: NVA Equipment Exported to Turkey
Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered* Light MGs 2,500 2,491 Ammunition for Light MG 132,000,000 ? Field hospital 3 3 Light assault RPG-7 12,000; later 4,996 weapons 5,000 Ammunition for 250,000 197,139 RPG 7 APC BTR/SPW-60 PB 300 300 Ammunition 14.5mm for BTR-60 cannon 30,000,000 4,993,228 Ammunition 7.62mm for BTR-60 MG 30,000,000 30,000,000 Machine pistols Kalashnikov 256,125 303,934 Ammunition for M-43 100,000,000 83,000,000 Kal. Heavy MGs 2,500 222 Ammunition for Heavy MG 132,000,000 23,878,000 Mine clearance KMT-5 20 20 equip. RPG-18 100,000 one delivery canceled Trucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 15 50 Trucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 16 100 Decontamination Various equip. Trucks (fire Tatra 38 bdes) Steel helmets 500,000 500,000 Trucks Tatra 800 perhaps canceled Trucks (POL) Tatra 148 CA-17 30 perhaps canceled Missiles unnamed 100 Bombs with fuz unnamed 100 Equipment, other various small incl. 5 SAMs, etc. Trucks POL Tatra 100 Mine laying equip. 3 unknown (mech) Tank transporter Ural 4320 C 90 unknown Field hospitals 3 unknown Bridging equipment 3 unknown
* Examples for deliveries listed for October 1990 until March, early April 1994
Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered* Search and Rescue RSB 5 5 Boat River engineer BMK-103 M 4 4 boats AD-gun 23mm ZU-23 316 306 Ammunition 23mm 8,000,000 8,000,000 Ammunition 23 mm 4,500,000 294,928 Self-propelled AD ZSU 23/4 120 unclear whether guns canceled or 72 delivered ACV BMP-1 500 501 Ammunition 73mm three types 200,000 140,000 Rocket launcher RM-70 150 158 Ammunition 122mm for RM-70 200,000 205,000 Air defense msl OSA-AK 3 3 (with 12 systems launchers) AD-missiles 9 K-33 M2 and 3 408, later more 924 LAW RPG-18 21,500 21,675 AT-missiles 9 M-111 and 9 11,500 7,051 M-111M Ammunition 7.62mm M-39 and M-43 40,000,000 5,473,712 Ammunition 7.62mm M-39 16,210,228 16,210,228 Light trucks UAZ 469 B 2,000 292 Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 20 Trucks Ural D 375 1,000 MT-LB unknown at least 1 Multi-purpose ABPC 500 probably canceled towing veh. Bridging Ribbon 8 equipment Electrical GAB-2, GAD-40 etc. 200 generators Field kitchens 650 Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357 NBC-protection 260,000 260,000 masks Trucks LO 2002 A 56 56 Additional different types small small equipment
* Examples for deliveries listed for October 1990 until March/April 1994
Part III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Turkey
Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered* Air defense guns 20mm twin gun 300 300 Ammunition AD gun 1 DM-81 4,000 4,000 20mm Ammunition AD gun 4 DM-101 16,000 16,000 20mm Steel helmets 500,000 500,000 (NVA?) Main battle tanks Leopard 1 85 + 85 170 APC M-113 350 + 137 537 Bridge-laying tanks M-48 10 + 10 20 Engineer tanks M-48 A2G1 20 20 ARV tanks M-88 20 20 Ammunition 105mm DM-23 KE 100,000 100,000 Ammunition 105mm DM-456 HEAT 15,000 15,000 Surface to Air Redeye 300 300 Missiles Howitzers 203mm M110 131 131 Ammunition 203mm HE 30,000 30,000 Ammunition 203mm Bomblet 9,900 9,900 Ammunition 175mm DM-12 and DM-21 68,004 68,004 AA-missiles Sidewinder AIM 1,000 1,000 9B Ammunition 40mm for DM-28 138,000 138,000 L70 Ammunition 40mm for DM-31 257,000 257,000 L70 AD guns L-70 260 260 RPV-systems CL-89 unspecified unspecified Aircraft RF-4 46 46
* Examples for Deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994
Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered* Support ship Class 701 1 1 Landing boats Class 521 11 11 Landing boats Class 520 2 2 Harbor tug Class 723 5 5 Torpedo recovery Class 430 2 2 (plus 2 vessel delivered earlier) Tetis Class Class 420 5 5 corvettes FPB Class 148 2 2 Machine gun MG-3 75 75 AD guns 20mm 20mm twin gun 546 546 Ammunition 20mm DM-101 1,092,000 1,092,000 Ammunition 20mm DM-81 1,092,000 1,092,000 Aircraft RF-4 E 20 (plus 7 in 20 (plus 7 in spares) spares) Aircraft F-104 G 12 (plus more 12 (plus more earlier) earlier) Naval mines DM-21/DM-39 n.a. 150 Machine guns MG-3 and MG-3 A1 675 675 Howitzers M-110 (203mm) 88 72 Main battle tanks Leopard 1 GR2 75 75 ARV M-88 25 25 Tank (bridging) 10 10 APC M-113 200 200 Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357
* Examples of deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994
Sources: Bundesministerium der Verteidung, 15 April 1994, Attachment (an older version of this computer printout from the MoD, dating from 2 December 1993, was used to check the reliability); Wehrdienst 1315/1992 pp. 2-4; Wehrdienst 28/1993, p.4; Wehrdienst 13/1993, p.2; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.
Examples of NVA Deliveries for Technical Intelligence, Testing and Evaluation Purposes
Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient Remarks AT-missiles and about 20 n.a. France different types, launchers partly on vehicles, delivery intended Small fire arms different types SS-missile Frog-7 2 France intended for delivery Telecommunications various France probably delivered equip. IFF-Systems SRZO-2 3 1990 Israel SSM P-15 1 1990 Israel SSM P-21 1 1990 Israel SSM P-22 1 1990 Israel Air-to-air missiles 7 or 8 1990 Israel AA-8, AA-10a and b, AA-11 and AA-7 were available Air-to-surface missiles 6 1990 Israel CH-25ML, MR; CH-29L,T and CH-58Ä were available Radar for Mig-29 1 1990 Israel returned in 1991 SAM SA-5 Seeker 1 1990 Israel (warhead) SAM SA-13 3 1990 Israel likely to have included launcher vehicle Spares T-72 tank 1990/1991 Israel FROG-7 warheads n.a. 1990 Israel two types available Mine clearance equip. Israel EMT-7 and KMT-6 most likely included Range finders 3 Israel Laser recon. system 1 Israel LPR-1 Radar 'Big Fred' 1 1990 or Israel 1991 AT-missiles 15 1991 Israel AT-3,-4 and 5 available SA-16 Israel launcher and missiles AP- and AT-mines ca 100 1991 Israel Spares Mig-23 1 1991 Israel included engine, ext. tanks Torpedo SAET 40 2 1991 Israel ECM-Pod 1 1991 Israel SA-6 reconnaissance + 1 1991/1992 Israel intercepted in fire control Hamburg SA-6 launch vehicle 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Long track radar P40 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) adv. ECCM sys. AD-gun ZSU 23/4 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Schilka maintenance 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) vehicle Truck KRAZ 214 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Truck KRAZ B-255 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg; msl trsp. veh. P21 P22 missiles ?) Truck Zil 157 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) msl trsp. veh. P15? Truck Zil 131 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) msl trsp. veh. P 15? Truck GAZ 66 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Light truck UAZ 469 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Spares for BMP-2 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Spares for BMP-1 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Chaff and flares 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) launcher Mine clearance equip. 2 1990 UK EMT-7 AT-missiles 1991 UK AT-4 and AT-7 Small arms 27 1991 UK different types Fighterbomber SU-22 M4 1 1991 UK SSM P21 with seeker 1 1991 UK warhead SSM P22 with seeker 1 1991 UK warhead Missile launcher RUBESH 1 1991 UK Torpedo SAET-40 2 1991 UK Naval mines 1991 UK different types Chaff and flare 1 1991 UK dispenser PK-16 AD-gun AK-630 1 1991 UK SSM P-15 1 1991 UK Fighter bomber Mig-23BN 1 1992 UK SSM P21/P22 1 1992 NL one each Torpedo SAET-40 1 1992 NL FROG-7 SS-missile 1 1992 USA launcher, four msl, system two warheads Mine clearance equip. 1 1991 USA KMT-6 Mine clearance equip. 2 1991 USA EMT-7 Funkstörgranate DZW 90 12 1991 USA different types AP-mines PMP-2 192 1991 USA AT-mines TM-46 120 1991 USA AT-mines TM-62 M 128 1991 USA AT-mines TM-62 P3 112 1991 USA SA-13 missile 6 1991 USA SA-8 missile 12 1991 USA Battlefield surv. radar 1 1991 USA 1RL232 Acc. measurem. sys. 1 1991 USA AZK-5 AAM AA-8 1 1990 USA AAM AA-10 1 1990 USA AAM AA-11 2 1990/1991 USA AAM AA-7 Guidance 1 1991 USA Mig-29 fighter ac. 1 1991 USA returned Mig-29 engines 2 1991 USA Mig-29 pilot helmet 1 1991 USA Spares package for 1 1991 USA SU-22 SSM P21 with seeker 1 1991 USA warhead SSM P22 with seeker 1 1991 USA warhead SAM SA-5 missiles ? ? USA planned ASM CH-25 3 1990 USA three types ASM CH-29 2 1990 USA two types ASM CH-58 6 1991 USA ASM CH-25 2 1991 USA Tarantul Class corvette 1 1991 USA MI-14 Haze helicopter 2 1991 USA Naval ASW version Naval mines 11 1992 USA different types AD-gun AK-630 1 1992 USA Torpedo SAET 40 2 1992 USA Chaff and flare 1 1992 USA dispenser PK-16
Examples of Deliveries to the United States for Training Purposes
Type of Equipment Number Year Remarks T-72 MBT 59 1991 T-72 MBT 27 1993 T-55 MBT 11 1991 BMP-1 AFV 19 1991 BMP-2 AFV 15 1991 BMP 2 1993 MB-LT 14 1991 MTP-LB 3 1991 BTR-70 5 1991 BTR-70 2 1993 BTR-60 PB 3 1991 BTR-50 PK 1 1991 BTR-40 P2 2 1991 BTR-40 with 9 P148 5 1991 AT-system 122mm howitzer D-30 1 1991 152mm howitzer D-20 2 1991 SPH 2S1 5 1991 SPH 2S1 6 1993 SPH 2S3 5 1991 SPH 2S3 4 1993 RM-70 MRL 2 1991 BM-21 MRL 4 1991 AKLPz BRDM-1K 2 1991 BM-24 2 1991 100mm canon (AT) 7 1991 Mig-23 ML/MLD aircraft 5 1991 Mig 23 9 1993 SU-22 M4 aircraft 2 1991 Su-22 2 1993 Mi-24 helicopters 2 1991 Mi-24 1 1992 SAM 9M33M3 72 1991 SAM launcher 9A 338 12 1991 120mm grenade launcher 1 1991 Ammunitions small 1991 100mm, 125mm, 122mm, various versions Trucks 1991 various Guided missiles 182 1992 various, not specified
Examples of Additional Exports from NVA Stocks
Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient Remarks Spares from SPH 2S1 228 1994/5 Sweden MB-LT Armored Personnel 809 ? 1992-?? Sweden 5 in 1992, 9 in 1993 Carrier T-72 MBT 5 1992 Sweden BMP-1 5 1993 Sweden planned A/S- missiles S5 8 1992 Sweden item not clearly identified T-72 MBT 8 1992 Canada T-72 MBT 1 1992 Belgium T-55 MBT 1 1992 Belgium BMP-1 1 1992 Belgium BTR-70 1 1992 Belgium SPH 122mm 2 1992 Belgium Mig-21 1 1992 Belgium Mig-23 1 1992 Belgium Parchim Class 16 1993/94 Indonesi a FROSCH I class landing 12 1993/94 Indonesi ships a FROSCH II class supply 2 1993/94 Indonesi ships a Kondor-II Class miners 9 1993/94 Indonesi a Spares and ammunition 5,000 1993-95 Indonesi only incomplete details (tons) a known, fitting with ships Electrical generators 75 1994/95 Indonesi a Field kitchens 150 1994/95 Indonesi a Kondor Class 1 1991/92 Guinea demilitarized; via illegal deal Kondor-II Class 4 1991/2 Uruguay without weapon systems Tug (unspecified) 1 1991 Uruguay Piast Class 1 1991 Uruguay Mi-24 attck helicopters 30-40 1995/6 Hungary planned Medical equipment for 3 n.a. 1992 Hungary co. PTS 6 1993 Hungary Kondor-I Class coastal 4 1992 Tunisia BGS stocks patrol boat Bremse Class CPB 5 1992 Tunisia BGS stocks Kondor-I Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks; corruption investigated Bremse Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks; corruption investigated SAB-12 Class CPB 5 1992 Cyprus BGS stocks Bremse Class CPB 2 1992 Jordan BGS stocks OSA Class 6 1993 Estonia partially demilitarized Kondor-I Class 2 1993 Estonia partially demilitarized* OSA Class 3 1993 Lithuani partially demilitarized a Kondor-I Class 1 1993 Lithuani partially demilitarized a Kondor-II Class 2 1993 Latvia partially demilitarized OSA Class 3 1993 Latvia partially demilitarized OSA and Kondor 4 1993 Lithuani intended a Trucks 200 1992/3 Estonia Trucks 200 1992/3 Latvia Trucks 200 1993 Lithuani possibly not all a delivered L-410 transport aircraft 2 1992/3 Estonia L-410 transport 2 1993 Latvia aircraft L-410 transport aircraft 2 1993 Lithuani a Trucks 9,000 1992 CIS i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan AK-47 Kalashnikows 100,000 Finland MBT T-72 100 1991/2 Finland Artillery 447 1993 Finland incl. 218 HD-30 howitzers Finland BMP-1 110 1993 Finland MB-LT 3 1992 Finland Ammunition 46,000 Finland tons + BTR 70 149 + 149 UN for UNPROFOR AK-74 1 1991 NL AK-47 1 1991 NL AK-74 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds ammunition AK-47 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds ammunition KM-46 130mm mortar 92 1994/5 GR/US/FI not clear from source, /SW possibly Finland, planned Iljuschin -62 3 1993 Egypt private businessman
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Deutscher
Bundestag, 21 January 1994, p.12; Feldmayer, 1992; Schibli, 1992; Casdorf,
1992; Der Spiegel 29/1994, p.16; Gießmann, 1992, pp. 211-248;
Mierzwa, 1993, pp. 59-69; Thielbeer, 1992.