Paper presented at the conference
"Germany as a Civilian Power - Results of Recent Research",
Trier University, December 11-12, 1998

A civilian power caught between the lines:
Germany and nuclear non-proliferation

Oliver Meyer

1 Introduction

Germany's stance towards nuclear weapons has shifted dramatically in the last 30 years. In the 1960s and 70s, West Germany distanced itself from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but by the 1990s it has become one of its strongest supporters.[1] The Federal Republic of Germany took seven years to ratify the NPT because of domestic disputes. Opponents argued that the NPT safeguards would interfere with the civilian use of nuclear power and also denounced the treaty as a "nuclear Versailles".[2] In the 1990s this criticism of the NPT has disappeared completely. In addition, Germany has three times made legally binding pledges not to possess nuclear weapons.[3]

Some still think that Germany might be tempted to reevaluate its policy on nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, Germany finds itself in a region that is less stable than during the East-West-conflict. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has two serious implications for German security: The danger stemming from "loose nukes" from the Russian nuclear arsenal could be rising, and at the same time the raison d'être of NATO is being called into question. So if there ever was a time when Germany's non-nuclear commitment could have been challenged, it was in the period between German unification 1990 and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. This argument is not limited to academic discussions. In March 1992, a Pentagon planning document was leaked to the press that warned of Germany and Japan becoming nuclear powers: "Nuclear proliferation, if unchecked by superpower action, could tempt Germany, Japan and other industrial powers to acquire nuclear weapons to deter attack from regional foes."[4]

This paper argues that these fears are unfounded. Germany has become one of the strongest supporters of the NPT and Germany's decision to be a non-nuclear weapon state can be considered permanent. The first part of the paper briefly looks at Germany's non-proliferation policy in the period 1990-95 from national security, domestic politics and normative perspectives. It argues that domestic politics and normative factors can account for Germany's non-proliferation policy, while neorealists have difficulties in explaining the German support for the NPT in the period leading up to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

Based on this finding, the second part of this paper looks in more detail at Germany's non-proliferation policy after 1995 from a civilian power perspective. It concludes that while the underlying principles of Germany's non-proliferation policy cannot be changed and will not change, a number of questions exist with regard to the degree that Germany can be identified as a civilian power. Germany tries to fulfill external and domestic demands that are sometimes contradictory. It wants to be a reliable ally in NATO and advance nuclear disarmament. It wants to prevent proliferation and does not want to restrict industrial activities. These inherent tensions were often driving forces behind German non-proliferation initiatives in the past, but they have paralyzed German arms control and non-proliferation efforts in the last couple of years. This paper argues that these conflicts will become more intense in the future and Germany will be faced with uncomfortable choices.

2 Germany's nuclear non-proliferation policy 1990-95: Explaining nuclear restraint

A state becomes or remains a nuclear/non-nuclear weapon state for one or more of three reasons: threats to national security, pressure from domestic actors or normative beliefs held by decision-makers.[5] Depending on the theoretical perspective taken, Germany's nuclear weapons policy can be explained by the particular type, or lack of threats to its national security, the influence that domestic actors have on the foreign and security policy decision-making, or a set of beliefs and convictions held by decision-makers and the population.

2.1 Neorealism: Germany's national security

Neorealists argue that states make choices about their military defense needs based on threat perceptions. Simply put, the more unstable and threatening the international environment, the more states are likely to spend on defense. Nuclear weapons, because of their immense destructive power, are viewed as being able to equalize military imbalances between states. If a state does not have the resources to develop nuclear weapons on its own, a stable military alliance with a nuclear weapon state can substitute for the possession of nuclear weapons.[6] But such alliances, neorealists argue, are intrinsically unstable because of the dilemmas raised by extended deterrence. Neorealists think that if a non-nuclear weapon state begins to doubt the seriousness of nuclear guarantees, it will consider going nuclear itself: "Without the superpower umbrella to shield them, more states will rely on the mobilization of internal resources, including their own nuclear forces, to secure their survival, with all the associated destabilizing consequences."[7] Nuclear non-proliferation and export regimes work only as long they are not exposed to serious challenges: "[T]he nonproliferation regime is little more than an alliance against the spread of nuclear weapons, not an expression of shared values. (...) And like any alliance, this one will change."[8]

Based on these assumptions, neorealists have not only predicted that Germany will consider possession of nuclear weapons, they have also recommended the managed proliferation of nuclear weapons to Germany and other major European powers, which they expect to be responsible nuclear weapon states. From a neorealist perspective, nuclear deterrence, if managed and implemented wisely, can be stabilizing because the outbreak of conventional hostilities is made less likely. ”Why should nuclear weapons in German and Japanese hands be especially worrisome? Nuclear weapons have encouraged cautious behavior by their possessors and deterred any of them from threatening others’ vital interests.”[9] After the end of the Cold War, Germany was faced with an unstable security situation in Europe: The Soviet Union was collapsing and there was the threat that it might loose control of its weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the "raison d'être" of NATO – the threat of an attack on Western Europe by Warsaw Treaty states – was disappearing. According to neorealists, in this situation, Germany, which had just gained full national sovereignty for the first time in 45 years, could be expected to take a fresh look at the desirability of possession of nuclear weapons.

However, none of the arguments described above played an important role in the post-unification discussion in Germany about the country's future foreign policy. Germany’s participation in multilateral frameworks like the European Community/Union and NATO, as well as the coordination of major foreign policy decisions with European partners and the United States, remained essential ingredients of Germany's foreign policy.[10] Germany stayed one of the driving forces behind deepening and expanding European integration. Unilateralism – let alone possession of nuclear weapons – remained out of the question for German policy makers and the German population. Where neorealists might expect a reevaluation of Germany's position on its possession of nuclear weapons, in the 2+4 Treaty on Unification Germany confirmed for the third time in its history that it does not want to possess any biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

Multilateralism also remained at the core of Germany's nuclear weapons policy. Germany continues to be involved in multilateral consultations on nuclear weapons issues. Under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, German representatives take part in consultations on nuclear doctrine and targeting, and German pilots are trained to use US nuclear weapons in times of war. This commitment can be explained by the German wish to be involved as closely as possible in the nuclear decision-making of the NATO alliance. During the Cold War Germany wanted to influence the politics of the NATO, because it was afraid that the United States’ nuclear guarantees could not be trusted.[11]

This pattern of behavior survived the end of the Cold War and German politics reacted cautiously positive to proposals for a European consultation mechanism on nuclear weapons policies.[12] In September 1995 – shortly before the resumption of French nuclear testing in the Pacific – the French government renewed an old offer for joint consultations on the role of nuclear weapons in European foreign and security policy. The then-prime minister Alain Juppé, arguing that the process of European unification will eventually make a consideration of national control over nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom and France necessary, offered talks on "concerted deterrence" in a European framework. [13] Even though the French government did not publicly elaborate what exactly "concerted deterrence" could or should entail, the Foreign Ministry (which is traditionally pro-European) reacted positively, while the Defense Ministry (which has traditionally a strong transatlantic orientation) rejected the offer. This difference in reaction thus reflects the division between those in the foreign policy establishment that favor a "Europeanization" of security policies and those that put more emphasis on the transatlantic dimension.[14]

In addition to shaping Germany’s policy on nuclear weapons, multilateralism was also the striking feature of German efforts to strengthen the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. Germany was one of the driving forces behind the European Union's very successful political efforts to convince those non-nuclear weapon states that were opposed to an indefinite extension of the NPT or undecided on the issue to be supportive of indefinite extension.[15] At the extension conference itself Germany acted in close coordination with its partners in the European Union. In discussions on nuclear disarmament, where a split existed within the EU, Germany tended to go along with the nuclear weapon states' positions.[16]

These actions make it clear that while the possession of nuclear weapons is ruled out, German politics is not "anti-nuclear". The question then is: Are there relevant actors in Germany that would support a nuclear option?

2.2 Domestic politics: The political debate about nuclear weapons

The view that external threats are the driving force behind decisions on national security is rejected by those who primarily analyze foreign and security policy in terms of domestic decision-making processes. According to this school of thinking, political, military and economic pressure groups often determine political outcomes: "Thus the acquisition of a particular weapon is the product of a 'procurement coalition' shaped by the self-interests of coalition participants."[17] Threat perceptions differ, and domestic actors are willing and able to shape external threats according to their needs. There is no direct link between foreign and security decisions and threats to national security: "Most (foreign-policy) decisions are responses to domestic pressures, and the actions of other nations often figure merely as devices for argument."[18]

Historical studies which focus on domestic politics have shown that nuclear weapon policy decisions are often shaped and driven by a civilian-military nuclear complex. If such a connection does not exist, or if it is too weak to dominate political decision-making, states choose to remain non-nuclear, even if the international context may suggest otherwise. "It is worth noting (...) that three long decades have passed since France acquired the bomb and the first fears mushroomed that the Germans would inevitably follow suit, and still there is no hint of any nuclear yearning in Germany."[19] If domestic alliances which favor nuclear weapons collapse, existing nuclear weapons programs can be frozen or even reversed.[20]

After the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapon and nuclear non-proliferation issues were almost absent from political and public debate in Germany about the future direction of its foreign and security policy. Instead, the debate centered around Germany's involvement in multilateral interventions as well as UN peace-keeping and peace-building missions. Hardly ever did arms control or non-proliferation issues take center stage,[21] and when arms control and non-proliferation issues were debated – for example in the Bundestag before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference – there was general consensus between the main political parties.[22]

There is broad support for nuclear disarmament in the German public. In 1991 50% of West Germans and 61% of East Germans were for the unilateral elimination of NATO nuclear weapons. Only 21% of West Germans and 17% of East Germans believed that a conventional war in Europe would be more likely to occur if all nuclear weapons were eliminated.[23] The anti-nuclear mood in the population is growing with time following the end of the Cold War. A recent poll showed 87% of all Germans believe that "the nuclear weapon states, in order to create a nuclear weapon free world, should start getting rid of their own nuclear weapons as quickly as possible." The same number of Germans supported the statement that "the German government should see to it that the nuclear weapons that are based on German soil are immediately eliminated."[24]

Germany does have a strong civilian nuclear power complex, making it a "virtual" nuclear weapon state.[25] While the German civilian nuclear power complex has no military significance, it had – and still has – an important influence on Germany's non-proliferation policy. The main interest of the civilian industry is to prevent an intrusive inspection regime.[26] Germany's economic nuclear interests also have led to several clashes with the United States. Since the 1970s, the general US approach has been to limit nuclear exports. This policy has led to conflicts with Germany, which has an export-oriented economy. After the export scandals of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, much tighter limits on nuclear exports have been established in Germany.[27]

German commercial interests again collided with US non-proliferation interests when Germany insisted on the use of weapons-grade uranium in a research reactor in Garching, which is the most explicit expression of German unilateralism in the field of non-proliferation. The United States – both informally and later publicly[28] – criticized the German government for planning to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) for research purposes. It argued that the project would not only increase the dangers of theft or loss of HEU but would also set a dangerous precedent for other states at a time when there were great efforts to stop the use of weapons-grade uranium in civilian programs. Germany still insists on this project, even at the cost of being internationally isolated.[29] Germany blocked consensus at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference on language which recommended "that no new civilian reactors requiring high-enriched uranium be constructed”.[30]

It is important to note that the project in Garching survived because of a unique mix of economic and political factors. Proponents of the project included a strong economic lobby and local politics.[31] In addition, this alliance could draw on Germany's status as a middle power by successfully appealing to the bureaucracy that on this topic Germany would not bow to US pressure.[32] Garching, however, is the exception to the rule of German non-proliferation policy in the 1990s, which generally ranks non-proliferation over economic interests.

2.3 Normative models: Arguments about nuclear weapons

New studies on military procurement policies focus on the role and influence of norms and ideas on foreign and security policy decision-making processes. According to this school, there is a tendency towards "isomorphism" in the international system, i.e. states tend to copy the behavior of the states that they perceive to be successful.[33] Applied to the domestic and military procurement levels this suggests that actors attach symbolic value to the weapon systems they buy. "[W]eapons spread not because of a match between their technical capabilities and national security needs but because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry. Weapons have proliferated because of the highly symbolic nature that have become associated with them."[34] This is especially true for nuclear weapons which have often been associated with great power status.

The influence of norms and ideas on political decision-making is difficult to measure.[35] A look at the arguments that are advanced in domestic debates for and against possession of nuclear weapons, however, can be useful. The use of functional arguments for not possessing nuclear weapons (e.g. that the US nuclear umbrella is sufficient or that the current security situation does not warrant nuclear deterrence) indicates that the position on nuclear weapons could shift, if political circumstances change (i.e. if the alliance with the US becomes unstable or new serious threats to national security appear).[36]

Most German politicians – while acknowledging and appreciating the deterrence function of nuclear weapons in NATO – generally make the argument that being a nuclear weapon state does not increase a state's security: "Germany is the best proof, that the renunciation of nuclear weapons is not a disadvantage. We have no privileges to defend in this regard and rejected weapons of mass destruction a long time ago. There can be no doubt that this decision is final." [37]

With regard to nuclear disarmament, Germany sees itself as setting an example: "To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most urgent disarmament task today. Germany is determined to take a lead in these efforts. We are the only state in the world to have unilaterally and without reservations renounced nuclear, biological and chemical weapons." [38] Not possessing nuclear weapons is not seen as a sacrifice, but rather as something that is in Germany's interest.[39]

These arguments are not historically contingent, but proof of the fact that possessing nuclear weapons is not part of the thinking of German politicians. German politicians do neither argue that Germany needs to possess nuclear weapons because it is in an alliance with three nuclear weapon states and nor do they argue that the benign security environment makes possessing nuclear weapons unnecessary. This indicates that considering the acquisition of a national nuclear weapons capability would require a dramatic shift in the way that Germany conceptualizes its national security.

To sum up: The German renunciation of the nuclear weapons option can be considered as solid. Any change to this policy would be difficult to implement because there are no relevant domestic actors in favor of such a policy. Such a policy would also mean a complete change in Germany's foreign policy style of multilateralism and coordination with allies and partners. Furthermore, it would run counter to the conviction of most politicians and the public that possession of nuclear weapons diminishes one's security and does not increase it.

3 German non-proliferation policy after 1995: choices and challenges

The question remains whether Germany's non-proliferation stance qualifies it as a civilian power. Renunciation of nuclear weapons is not a sufficient precondition for being a civilian power. Being a civilian power implies that a state no longer perceives national security primarily in terms of military security, but in terms of "soft" power. Civilian powers favor cooperation with other nations, are very reluctant to use military force and are willing to strengthen supranational institutions.[40] If the relevant political actors have internalized these norms, a state can be considered a civilian power.[41]

This section looks at Germany's post-1995 nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policy, and measures it against the criteria which are part of the definition of a civilian power. To qualify as civilian power a state should:

  • demonstrate a willingness to initiate and promote the institutionalization of international politics;
  • promote the rule of law;
  • act collectively, oppose unilateral action, and promote regimes and international institutions;
  • strengthen cooperative and collective security arrangements.[42]

3.1 Germany as an initiator and promoter

Germany was a driving force behind the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, using its political influence to convince other nations to support this milestone in international non-proliferation efforts. Since the indefinite extension of the NPT, Germany has invested much less political energy in promoting existing arms control and disarmament regimes and initiating new ones.

Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference there has not been much progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues in general.[43] The NPT Review Process, which was agreed upon as part of the 1995 package for the indefinite extension of the NPT, has encountered serious problems. Since 1995, the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) has met twice. While the first meeting in April 1997 achieved some progress on procedural issues, the second (in 1998) ended without any progress, in substance or on procedural issues. A major conflict exists between the nuclear weapon states (and their allies) and the majority of non-nuclear weapon states, over the necessary next steps to strengthen the NPT and advance nuclear disarmament. While Germany was able to establish itself as mediator between these two groups at the 1995 Review Conference (mainly through the EU), very few such mediation efforts can be identified at the 1997 and 1998 meetings of the NPT PrepCom.[44] At both these meetings, the EU tried "to act as a bloc. On nuclear disarmament, this generally means that formal statements express the lowest common denominator positions, out of deference to their nuclear partners, Britain and France."[45]

Nor have there been major efforts to initiate new nuclear arms control or non-proliferation regimes. This lack of German initiative is certainly not due to lack of opportunities to promote progress. Progress in the START process for bilateral US/Russian nuclear disarmament remains stuck. All the nuclear weapon states still refuse to begin multilateral talks on nuclear arms control. Entry-into-force of the CTBT is in doubt. It remains to be seen what progress will be made in the negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty that have been agreed upon in the Conference on Disarmament in August 1998.[46]

If it were a civilian power, Germany could have been expected to continue its mediating role after the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Such efforts would have been possible, but in the last couple of years there have been comparatively few German activities aimed at strengthening existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The fact that since 1995 Germany has made no major effort to break the various political deadlocks that exist in international non-proliferation efforts is surprising, especially as Klaus Kinkel suggested in December 1993 ten German priorities in this field, including strengthening of the political mechanism to fight proliferation, international help to deal with the nuclear legacy in the former Soviet Union, and a nuclear weapons register at the UN.[47] However, the German government made no serious attempts to support Kinkel’s suggestions after it received some harsh criticism from its nuclear allies.[48]

3.2 Promoting international law

Civilian powers are expected to respect international law and take initiatives to strengthen its implementation. In general Germany has supported international law for a long time. But at least on two occasions, Germany has been selective in applying international law.

First, Germany missed an opportunity to support a major undertaking to help shape international law in nuclear disarmament. At the request of the World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 issued an advisory opinion on the question of whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance is permitted under international law. In trying to make a judgement on this question, the ICJ asked all states for a statement regarding the question put before the court. This put Germany in a difficult position because on the one hand it did not want to argue that the use of nuclear weapons is legal, but on the other hand it was afraid of offending its nuclear allies, which were very critical of the initiative. As a result, Germany avoided taking a stand on the issue and argued that the Court did not have the mandate to make a judgement on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.[49]

On July 8, 1996 the ICJ ruled "(...) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law (...)."[50] Despite this clear language, Germany did not see the need to reevaluate its participation in nuclear sharing and support for NATO's first-use policy. While "welcoming" the ruling of the ICJ, the government stated that the Court had not declared possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence illegal; and that the advisory opinion was not legally binding.[51] As a result of the decision by the ICJ an internal NATO review was conducted to look at possible consequences for NATO's nuclear doctrine, which concluded that NATO's nuclear doctrine is compatible with the ICJ's advisory opinion.[52]

A second case in which solidarity with important allies was prioritized over international law development was the German response to the US attacks on August 20, 1998 against Sudan and Afghanistan in retaliation for terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This case has a non-proliferation dimension in that the terrorist group suspected of attacking the US embassies and targeted in the attacks was accused by the US of preparing a chemical weapons attack. The US destroyed a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan because it suspected the facility to produce substances required for the manufacture of chemical weapons. The US also suspected the Sudanese government of financing the terrorists.[53]

The attacks were highly questionable politically, and also from an international law perspective. There was no UN mandate for the attacks. The US government argued that it did not need such a mandate because it acted in self-defense, citing Article 51 of the UN Charter.[54] It also argued that Osama bin Laden, the head of the terrorist group suspected behind the bombings in Africa, had "declared war" on the United States.[55] Attacking a state because one suspects that a non-state actor is hiding on its territory or that the government is involved in the terrorist’s activities, is unprecedented.

However, the German government's reaction to these attacks was unconditional support. Chancellor Kohl stated that "[e]very nation has the right to defend itself against such atrocities as happened at the American embassies in Africa."[56] Later, doubts about the legality of the military attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan were voiced,[57] but Germany did not support the establishment of independent investigations as to the legality of the US attacks or the question of whether the US allegations of chemical weapons precursor-production were correct.[58] Such a step could have provoked a political conflict with the United States. Faced with this uncomfortable choice, the German government decided that supporting an important partner is more important than following its goal to promote international law.

3.3 Multilateralism

Civilian powers do not act unilaterally. They cooperate in multilateral frameworks and institutions. In general, this is a striking feature of German foreign and security policy. Usually, major initiatives are discussed with European partners and NATO allies before launch. This has become Germany's preferred policy style.

However, Germany's non-proliferation policy contains two important exceptions: The German insistence on the use of highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear research reactor in Garching, and the German reluctance to support the "93+2" reform of the IAEA-safeguards system. Both cases are exceptions to the rule of multilateralism, and can be explained by the dominance of economic interests. The two cases of the German position on the use of HEU for research purposes and the 93+2-reform program show that although economic interests play a vital role in the design of German non-proliferation policies they do not have the power to veto political outcomes. The 93+2 reform of the IAEA-safeguards was initiated at the beginning of the 1990s after the problems of detecting Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and was reinforced through the crisis around the suspected North Korean program, with the goal of enabling the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities. It was clear from the outset that a more intrusive verification regime would be part of the result of the reform.[59]

Germany was very reluctant to become involved in reforming the NPT verification regime because it feared that the reformed safeguards would interfere with the civilian use of nuclear energy. Despite the progress in non-proliferation that would be made through an additional verification protocol, Germany at first tried to prevent such an initiative by dragging its feet in the negotiations and also opposing some of the measures. Once the political leadership had taken the initiative (it took a personal call from President Clinton to Chancellor Kohl to support a change of the German position), economic criticisms were overruled.[60]

3.4 Collective defense versus collective security

Civilian powers are interested in strengthening collective security arrangements. For Germany as a European power, this means strengthening the role of the United Nations and the OSCE as a regional organization of the UN under Chapter VIII of the charter. Coordinating foreign policy with its partners in collective defense organizations is also important. Thus Germany views that all coercive measures of a military nature in which civilian powers participate should be UN mandated, unless they are executed in self-defense.

While not acting militarily without a UN mandate has been a principle of German foreign policy until today,[61] this approach is in potential conflict with the US counterproliferation approach. Counterproliferation – as introduced in 1993 by the US government – explicitly includes the option of responding militarily to proliferation, even in cases where no UN mandate exists.[62] The German response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the other hand has traditionally emphasized political strategies.[63] While military responses have never been ruled out as a possibility, a UN-mandate has usually been seen as a necessary prerequisite. Klaus Kinkel's 10 point initiative of December 1993 had, among other things, the goal of emphasizing that military actions taken against proliferators should be mandated by the UN. One of Germany's leading nonproliferation experts emphasized one year before the NPT Review and Extension Conference:

"[W]e must (...) seek to eliminate the danger, which cannot be ruled out with a military nonproliferation policy, of the traditionally cooperative global nonproliferation system being superseded by a regional range of repressive instruments belonging to the North. Such a misunderstanding becomes all the more important as the task next year will be to confirm, with the approval of the majority of the contracting parties belonging to the southern hemisphere, the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the basis of the global nonproliferation system and then to further develop the United Nations' range of instruments compatible with national souvereignty."[64]

This conflict between solidarity with some allies in NATO and strengthening collective security, has surfaced again in the context of NATO's ongoing review of its 1991 Strategic Concept. Two of the core topics in this review include whether NATO should be allowed to act in crises when no UN-mandate exists and a revision of NATO's nuclear doctrine. Both questions are central to the future of German non-proliferation policy.[65]

In both cases, German positions differ from the US approach. Germany believes that NATO should have a UN or OSCE mandate if it does not act in self-defense and differences also exist with regard to the future role of nuclear weapons in collective defense.[66] The United States would prefer to leave the nuclear paragraphs of the 1991 Strategic Concept unchanged.[67] This position is supported by the other NATO nuclear weapons states France and the United Kingdom. Some non-nuclear weapon states in NATO – with Canada being the most outspoken – oppose this policy and at least want a thorough review of NATO's nuclear policy.[68]

In this debate Germany is again caught between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states. The former conservative government clearly stated that "the necessity of nuclear first-use has not been questioned by anyone within NATO" and that Germany sees no reason "to question the principles of cooperation in the context of nuclear sharing".[69] However the new government has a different position, and the government's platform contains the promise to "campaign to lower the alert status of (NATO's) nuclear weapons and for a renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.''[70] Whether Germany will follow through on this commitment remains to be seen.

4 Conclusion

Germany's non-proliferation policy bears many, but not all the characteristics of a civilian power. While Germany generally has no problem in transferring sovereignty to supranational regimes and clearly rules out any unilateral approaches, it sometimes shies away from initiatives that involve putting pressure on other states, especially if they are allies or partners. This has been especially visible in the last three years following the indefinite extension of the NPT. Germany has already used up some of its credibility as a mediator between the different political groupings in the non-proliferation regime, and it will have to revive its more active stance in arms control and non-proliferation to regain its credibility.

In the coming years, Germany is facing new challenges and some uncomfortable choices in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. With the conflict between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states becoming more focused, it will become harder to maintain a middle position. A look at the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation agenda for the near future clearly shows that "muddling through" will no longer suffice: within two years negotiations on a fissile material cut-off are likely to begin, the NPT Review Process will enter its crucial phase before the 2000 Review Conference, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept, a States' Parties Conference to CTBT will decide on the future of the Test Ban Treaty, to name just a few milestones. What is urgently needed to master these challenges is a German non-proliferation approach that is more focused and does not shy away from taking bold initiatives.[71]

Such an approach would build on a good foundation: Germany's non-proliferation policy leading up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference bears many characteristics of a civilian power. After several years of passivity, creative solutions are urgently needed, if a failure of the existing regimes is to be avoided. This will also involve devoting the necessary resources to fighting proliferation dangers, for example by establishing a strong German and European program to fight proliferation dangers stemming from the nuclear heritage of the former Soviet Union. But it will also involve putting some pressure on Germany's nuclear allies who have been dragging their feet on a number of nuclear disarmament issues where progress was possible.




[1] The author would like to thank Henrietta Wilson for her many useful comments on the paper and language. Part of this paper draws on the unpublished research report "A comparison of German and Japanese non-proliferation policies", which was written under a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation. Research for this paper was also done as part of the Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) at the Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS) with the support of the W. Alton Jones Foundation.

[2] See Matthias Küntzel: Bonn und die Bombe. Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt. Frankfurt/ New York: Campus 1992, pp. 126-127.

[3] Germany has renounced possession of weapons of mass destruction in the WEU treaty of 1954. This was reinforced in the 2+4 Treaty on German unification in 1990. By signing and ratifying the NPT in 1969 and 1975 respectively, Germany gave up the option to possess nuclear weapons. These treaties are documented in Auswärtiges Amt: "Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle: Textsammlung", Bonn: Referat für Öffentlichkeitsarbeit November 1990, pp. 17-19, pp. 351-353; Auswärtiges Amt (ed.): Deutsche Außenpolitik 1990/91. Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Friedensordnung. München: Moderne Verlags-Gesellschaft 1991, pp. 167-173, p. 169.

[4] Patrick E. Tyler: "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Ensuring No Rivals Develop", NYT, March 8, 1992. See also Dieter Buhl: "Einfach super, diese Macht", Die Zeit, No. 12, 13 March, 1992.

[5] See Tanya Ogilvie-White: "Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate", in: Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No.1, Fall 1996, pp. 43-60; Scott D. Sagan: "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb", in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 54-86.

[6] See Samuel P. Huntington: "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results", in: Robert J. Art/ Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.): The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, Fourth Edition. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America 1993, pp. 85-118.

[7] Benjamin Frankel: "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation", in: Zachary Davis/ Benjamin Frankel (eds.): The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. London/ Portland: Frank Cass 1993, pp. 37-78, p. 60.

[8] Zachary Davis: "The Realist Nuclear Regime", in: Zachary Davis/ Benjamin Frankel (eds.): The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. London/ Portland: Frank Cass 1993, pp. 79-99, p. 85.

[9] Kenneth N. Waltz: "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", in: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79, p. 67. See also John J. Mearsheimer: "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", in: International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56; Kenneth Waltz: "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better", London: Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Paper No. 171) 1981.

[10] The basic approach to international politics remained therefore unchanged from the Cold War period. See Michael Staack: "Die Entwicklung der internationalen Beziehungen und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in: Werner Süß (ed.): Die Bundesrepublik in den achtziger Jahren. Innenpolitik, Politische Kultur, Außenpolitik. Opladen: Leske + Budrich 1991, pp. 267-285.

[11] See Helga Haftendorn: Sicherheit und Entspannung. Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955-1982. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1986.

[12] For a background on this discussion see Harald Müller: "Kernwaffen und die Europäische Union: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis der 'Europäischen Option' zum nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregime", in: Hans Blix/ et al.: "Probleme der nuklearen Nichtverbreitung: Beiträge zur internationalen Diskussion", Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, 83), May 1994, pp. 19-40

[13] See ”Rede von Premierminister Alain Juppé am Institut des Hautes Études de Defense Nationale”, printed in: Frankreich-Info, No. 27, 11 September, 1995.

[14] See Oliver Meier: "Deutschland, Europa und die Zukunft der Atomwaffen", in: SPW, No. 1, 1997.

[15] One instrument that was especially successful were "demarches" on behalf of the EU to NPT member states and later on, to states that had not joined the regime. These diplomatic visits were first started under German EU presidency and later coordinated with Central and Eastern European states as well as Japan and Canada. See Harald Müller: "European nuclear non-proliferation after the NPT extension: achievements, shortcomings and needs", in: Yves Boyer/ Christophe Carle/ Joachim Krause/ Harald Müller/ Geoffrey Van Orden: "Europe and the challenge of proliferation" (Edited by Paul Cornish, Peter van Ham and Joachim Krause), Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union (Chaillot Paper 24): May 1996, pp. 33-54.

[16] Austria, Ireland and Sweden were the states pushing the disarmament agenda strongest, but were isolated among EU members most of the time in the Main Committee I, where these issues were discussed. See David Fischer/ Harald Müller: "United Divided. The European at the NPT Extension Conference", Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF Reports No. 40): November 1995.

[17] Dana P. Eyre/ Mark C. Suchman: "Status, Norm, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Approach", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.): The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press 1996, pp. 79-113, p. 84. See also Scott Sagan: "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", in: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 66-107.

[18] Morton H. Halperin: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 1974, p. 101-102.

[19] Elizabeth Pond/ Kenneth N. Waltz: "International Politics, Viewed from the Ground (Correspondence)", in: International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 195-199, p. 197.

[20] There is a growing body of literature drawing lessons from cancelled nuclear weapons programs including Wilhelm Agrell: "The Bomb That Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Nuclear Weapons Program", in: Nils Petter Gleditsch/ Olav Njølstad (eds.): Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics. London, Newbury Park, New Dehli: SAGE Publications 1990, pp. 154-174; David Albright: "South Africa and the affordable bomb", in: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/ August 1994, pp. 37-47; Darryl Howlett/ John Simpson: "Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa", in: Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 154-173; Michael J. Mazarr: "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea", in: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2, Fall 1995, pp. 92-122, Mitchell Reiss: Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; Etel Solingen: "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint", in: International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall 1994, pp. 126-169.

[21] There was of course public discussion about the non-proliferation aspects of the 1990/91 Gulf War. As far as German involvement was concerned, these discussions were remained limited to improving German export controls.

[22] Some differences existed on the details of the German position between the Green Party and Socialists on the one hand and the other parliamentary parties on the other hand over the issue of indefinite extension of the NPT and a stronger commitment of the nuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament, with the former arguing for a limited extension of the treaty to keep the pressure on the nuclear weapon states. The vast majority of the parliament urged the government to work towards an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT. See "Unbefristete und unkonditionierte Verlängerung des Nichtverbreitungs-Vertrages" (Bundestagsdrucksache 13/398 vom 8. Februar 1995), printed in: Auswärtiges Amt: "Bericht zur Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle 1995", Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 1996, pp. 121-123, p. 121.

[23] Numbers in Hans-Viktor Hoffmann: Demoskopisches Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik 1991. Waldbröl: Schriftenreihe der Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation 1992, p. 94.

[24] Results of a poll commissioned by IPPNW Germany on June 2, 1998.

[25] See Roland Kollert: Die Politik der latenten Proliferation. Militärische Nutzung "friedlicher" Kerntechnik in Westeuropa. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts Verlag 1994; Erwin Häckel: "Die nuklearpolitische Interessenlage Deutschlands", in: Internationale Politik, 10/1996, pp. 3-8.

[26] See Johannes Preisinger: "Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung: Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick", Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, 76), July 1993.

[27] See Bernd W. Kubbig / Harald Müller: Nuklearexport und Aufrüstung. Neue Bedrohungen und Friedenperspektiven. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer 1993.

[28] See "USA: Sorge über Reaktor", Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 April, 1994.

[29] The new government's platform contains the promise to reevaluate the use of HEU in Garching. See "Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert", Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die GRÜNEN, Bonn, 20 October, 1998.

[30] NPT/CONF.1995/ MC.II/ WP.8. Instead the following compromise was adopted: "The Conference recommends that States planning new civilian reactors avoid or minimize use of highly enriched uranium to the extend that this is feasible, taking into account technical, scientific and economic factors." NPT/CONF.1995/ MC.II/1, para. 36.

[31] Siemens, one of the biggest German companies, together with the University Munich is responsible for the project. These two groups had the support of the Bavarian government.

[32] A Foreign Ministry official in a discussion on Garching emphasized that Germany no longer is the "junior partner" of the US and can decide for itself what kind of research reactors it needs. Presentation of Karin Wurzbacher, Deutsches Umweltinstitut at the IPPNW national conference, 9 February, 1997, Mainz.

[33] In particular four mechanisms through which norms spread can be identified: coercive diffusion; mimetic diffusion; occupational diffusion; and discourse. See Steven Flank: "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation", in: Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1993/94, pp. 259-294 und Dana P. Eyre/ Mark C. Suchman: "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation", in: Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1992, pp. 137-149; Richard Price: "A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo", in: International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 73-103. On the role and influence of ideas and norms in international relations see Judith Goldstein/ Robert O. Keohane: "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein/ Robert O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell 1993, pp. 3-30; Markus Jachtenfuchs: "Ideen und internationale Beziehungen", in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1995, pp. 417-442.

[34] Dana P. Eyre/ Mark C. Suchman: ”Status, Norm, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Approach”, in: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.): The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press 1996, pp. 79-113, p. 86.

[35] For a good summary of the related problem of measuring the influence of cultural factors on foreign and security policy decision-making see Anja Jetschke/ Andrea Liese: "Kultur im Aufwind. Zur Rolle von Bedeutungen, Werten und Handlungsrepertoires in den internationalen Beziehungen", in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1998, pp. 149-179.

[36] In contrast, some functional arguments are used in the Japanese debate about nuclear weapons. Japanese cite the "nuclear allergy" and geostrategic reasons as non-functional reasons for not wishing to have nuclear weapons. But they also argue that going nuclear is unnecessary because of the US nuclear umbrella and would be counterproductive because such a policy would isolate the country. This has led some to believe that Japan's non-nuclear policy may change: "Japan’s military power is artificially limited; the barriers are political (public opinion and constitutional impediments) and strategic (the alliance with the United States and the fierce regional opposition to radical changes in Japanese defense policy). The economic and technological obstacles to building an independent military machine are significant. But all of these obstacles could be overcome by political decisions that change the allocation of resources and the goals of defense strategy." Rajan Menon: ”The once and future superpower”, in: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/ February 1997, pp. 29-34, 30.

[37] Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel quoted in Andreas Zumach/ Niklaus Hablützel: "Kinkel spielt mit Atombomben", taz, 11 May, 1995.

[38] "Rede des Bundesaußenministers vor den Vereinten Nationen am 23. September 1992", printed in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, Nr. 101, 25 September, 1992, pp. 949-953, p. 952.

[39] Accordingly, nuclear weapons are often described as "anachronisms". When it comes to the elimination of nuclear weapons, Germany favors the step-by-step approach and sees a nuclear weapons free world only as the final goal of the nuclear arms control process.

[40] See Hanns W. Maull: "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers", in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 91-106.

[41] See Knut Kirste/ Hanns W. Maull: "Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie", in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1996, pp. 283-312.

[42] These criteria are taken from Ulf Frenkler/ et al.: "Deutsche, amerikanische und japanische Außenpolitikstrategien 1985-1995: eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Zivilisierungsprozessen in der Triade", DFG Projekt Zivilmächte: Schlußbericht und Ergebnisse, Trier, pp. 20-30.

[43] William Walker differentiates between the period of "the great advance 1987-1995" and the period of "the great frustration 1995-1998". See William Walker: "International nuclear relations after the Indian and Pakistani test explosions", in: International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, 1998, pp. 505-528.

[44] The same tendency can be seen in the negotiations on a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention, currently the only ongoing multilateral negotiations on non-proliferation issues.

[45] Rebecca Johnson: "Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes. A Report of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, Geneva, 27 April - 8 May 1998", ACRONYM Report No. 12, September 1998, p. 14.

[46] These negotiations have been ranging high on the German arms control agenda for a couple of years. The breakthrough in the CD in August 1997, however, must be credited to US efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan and draw these two countries into the arms control process. The US also convinced Israel to join FMCT negotiations.

[47] See Klaus Kinkel: "Das Konzept der Erweiterten Sicherheit - Bausteine einer Europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur", Bonn: Auswärtiges Amt, Mitteilung für die Presse Nr. 1153/93, 15 December, 1993, p. 8.

[48] The conflict with the US centered around the question of whether UN-mandates are necessary for military actions against proliferation. In the context of the crisis around the suspected military nuclear program in North Korea, the US had not ruled out using military force unilaterally. Klaus Kinkel suggested that a UN-mandate would be necessary. The German proposal for a nuclear weapons register was opposed by all three nuclear allies. See Harald Müller/ Katja Frank/ Alexander Kelle/ Sylvia Meier/ Annette Schaper: "Nukleare Abrüstung - Mit welcher Perspektive? Der internationale Diskurs über die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle und die Vision einer kernwaffenfreien Welt", Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK-Report 8/1996), September 1996, p. 45.

[49] It also argued that nuclear weapons – unlike biological and chemical weapons – are not banned internationally, and therefore their use cannot be illegal. See "Stellungnahme der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für den Internationalen Gerichtshof zum Antrag der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen auf ein Rechtsgutachten des Gerichtshofs zu der Frage: ‘Ist die Drohung mit Nuklearwaffen oder ihr Einsatz unter irgendwelchen Umständen völkerrechtlich erlaubt?’", Bonn, 9. Juni 1995, Az: 500-371.18.

[50] The court was unable to reach a conclusion "whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." International Court of Justice, Communiqué No. 96/23, 8 July 1996.

[51] Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Christian Sterzing, Winfried Nachtwei, Angelika Beer und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN - Drucksache 13/5709 - "Auswirkungen der Entscheidung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes zur Völkerrechtswidrigkeit des Einsatzes von Atomwaffen bzw. seiner Androhung" Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/5906 vom 28.10.1996.

[52] See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, Christian Sterzing, Ludger Volmer und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN - Drucksache 13/10397 - Nuklearwaffen in Europa, Bonn, 28.4.1998.

[53] See Steven Lee Myers: "Attack Aimed 70 Missiles at Targets 2,500 Miles Apart", NYT, August 21, 1998.

[54] The US then reported its interpretation to the UN Security Council. "U-S Strikes /Article 51", Voice of America, 21 August 1998.

The government later indirectly admitted that, at least in the case of Sudan, there might have been no imminent threat to US national security. US officials later stated that "(...) the United States had wrongly concluded that the plant was a highly secret, secure military facility that was not producing any commercial products. In fact, the U.S. now acknowledges that the plant appeared to be a major production center for medicines and vaccines." "U.S. admits mistakes in Sudan strike", MSNBC News, September 2, 1998,

[55] US Secretary of Defense Cohen's answer to the question whether Bin Laden was a legitimate military target was: "To the extent that he or his organization have declared war against the United States or our interests, then he certainly is engaged in an act of war." DoD News Briefing, Thursday, August 20, 1998 - 2:30 p.m. (EDT), Presenter: Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen.

[56] Dana Lewis: "Russia denounces U.S. missile attacks" MSNBC News, August 21, 1998,

[57] "Whether or not the plant was producing VX for Bin Laden, as the US government alleged, desire to retaliate swiftly seems to have led policy-makers to lower their standard of evidence." Jessica Stern: "Apocalypse Never, but the Threat Is Real", in: Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 176-179, p.179.

[58] Such an investigation had been called for by a number of states in the General Assembly but was blocked by all permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of China. See Andreas Zumach: "Vermutungen reichen für US-Angriff", taz, September 23, 1998.

[59] See Joachim Krause: Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1998, pp. 214-222.

[60] ibid.

[61] The threat of use of force by NATO in Kosovo sets an important precedent here, as it is the first time that Germany was willing to commit troops to a non-UN mandated operation.

[62] See Rolf Hallerbach: "'Counter-Proliferation' Neue Zauberformel Amerikas gegen Terrorwaffen", in: Europäische Sicherheit, 3/94, S. 139-140; Götz Neuneck: "The US Counterproliferation Initiative and NATO", in: Inesap Information Bulletin, No. 12, March 1997, pp. 23-28; Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense: "Proliferation: Threat and Response", Washington, D.C.: April 1996.

[63] This approach is shared by many European NATO states. See Natalie J. Goldring: "NATO: Skittish on counterproliferation", in: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/ April 1994, pp. 12-13.

[64] Johannes Preisinger: "1995 - A pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation: German nonproliferation policy in the run up to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", in: Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin: "German-Japanese Symposium on Nonproliferation Policy". Publications of the Japanese-German Center Berlin, Vol. 10, Berlin: 13.09.1994, pp. 5-18, pp. 15-16.

[65] See Karl-Heinz Kamp: "Das neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme", Arbeitspapier der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Bereich Forschung und Beratung, Sankt-Augustin: August 1998 and Roger Cohen: "Europeans Contest U.S. NATO Vision", IHT, November 28-29, 1998.

[66] See Karl-Heinz Kamp: "Das neue Strategische Konzept der NATO: Entwicklung und Probleme", Arbeitspapier der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Bereich Forschung und Beratung, Sankt-Augustin: August 1998.

[67] US Secretary of Defense stated that with regard to NATO's nuclear policy that "we should adhere to the policy we currently have and not change it." Quoted in "U.S., German Defense Officials on NATO Nuclear Policy", Security Issues Digest No. 226, Brussels, Tuesday, November 24, 1998.

[68] The Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy argued for a revision of NATO's nuclear policy by stating that a new era of "soft power" had begun in the world of diplomacy and security, one that "relies more on negotiation rather than powerful weapons." Quoted in Steven Pearlstein: "Canadian Seeks Shift in NATO Nuclear Policy", Washington Post, Saturday, October 24, 1998.

[69] Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, Christian Sterzing, Ludger Volmer und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN - Drucksache 13/10397 - Nuklearwaffen in Europa, Bonn, 28.4.1998. It did so despite the fact that the majority of non-nuclear NPT members have called on the nuclear weapon states to "refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements." Working Paper Presented by the Members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to The Treaty, Second Preparatory Committee Meeting of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, Geneva, 28 April 1998.

[70] "Aufbruch und Erneuerung - Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert", Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die GRÜNEN, Bonn, 20. Oktober 1998.

[71] A proposal for setting priorties in German nonproliferation is contained in Joachim Krause: Strukturwandel der Nichtverbreitungspolitik. Die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die weltpolitische Transformation. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1998, pp. 392-415.