TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ABA
(Note: Certain dates and deadlines of the Treaty have been modified by the
START II Protocol signed in New York
on September 26, 1997, which is subject to ratification by both the United States
Senate and the Russian Duma. These changes have been incorporated in the following
text.)
The United States of America and the Russian
Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991,
hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,
Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire
to contribute to its strengthening,
Taking into account the commitment by the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties,
Mindful of their undertakings with respect
to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions
of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement
on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,
Desiring to enhance strategic stability and
predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms,
in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,
Considering that further progress toward that
end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values
that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,
Recognizing their special responsibility as
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international
peace and security,
Taking note of United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992.
Conscious of the new realities that have transformed
the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations
of partnership that have been established between them, ABA
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
and SLBM launchers, heavy
bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads,
and heavy bomber armaments, so that [seven years after entry into force of the
START Treaty] no later than December 31, 2004
and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance
with Articles III and IV of this Treaty,
does not exceed, for warheads attributed
to deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers,
a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide
for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250. [ABA]
2. Within the limitations
provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each
Party shall not exceed:
3. Upon fulfillment of the
obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further
reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM
launchers, s, ICBM warheads,
SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than [January 1,
2003] December 31, 2007, and thereafter, the
aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles
III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads
attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMS, and deployed heavy bombers,
a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide
for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500. [ABA]
4. Within the limitations
provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each
Party shall not exceed:
- (b) zero, for warheads
attributed to deployed ICBMs of types
to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
5. The process of reductions provided for
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this
Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in
paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than [seven years
after entry into force of the START Treaty] December
31, 2004. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further
reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also
be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs
3 and 6 of this Article. ABA
6. [Provided that the Parties conclude, within
one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of
assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the
obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article
II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31,
2000.] The Parties may conclude an agreement on a
program of assistance for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the
provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating such implementaton.
ABA
Article II
1. No later than [January 1, 2003] December
31, 2007, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted
to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead
is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article
III of this Treaty (including test launchers
and training launchers), with the exception
of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy
ICBMs at space launch facilities
allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs
to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been
converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching
an ICBM of the former type. Each Party
shall carry out such elimination or conversion
using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise
provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article. [ABA]
2. The obligations provided for in paragraph
1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers
of ICBMs on which the number of warheads
has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III
of this Treaty. [ABA]
3. Elimination of silo
launchers of heavy ICBMs, including
test launchers and training
launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:
- (b) conversion to silo
launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs
in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures
Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion
of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination
and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may
be so converted. [ABA, Memorandum
of Attribution]
4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an
ICBM, the launch canister of which has
a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy
ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article. [ABA]
5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs
at space launch facilities shall only
be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article. [ABA]
6. No later than [January 1, 2003] December
31, 2007, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and
non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch
canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination
and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects
into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch
canisters thereafter. [ABA]
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy
ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with
the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.
Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination
and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to
the applicable provisions of the START Treaty. [ABA]
8. Each Party undertakes
not to transferheavy ICBMs to any recipient
whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty. [ABA]
9. Beginning on [January 1, 2003] December
31, 2007, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire,
flight-test (except for flight tests from
space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START
Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under
Article III of this Treaty. [ABA]
Article III
1. For the purposes of attributing warheads
to deployed ICBMs and deployed
SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for
in Article III of the START Treaty, except
as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article. [ABA]
2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce
the number of warheads attributed to deployed
ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing
types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction
in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of
existing types that are not heavy ICBMs
shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty,
except that: [ABA]
- (c) each Party
shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads,
but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each
ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to
which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with
this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of
that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; ABA
and
- (d) the reentry
vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads
is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry
vehicle platform. [ABA]
3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads
attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START
Treaty, each Party undertakes not to: [Memorandum
of Attribution]
- (b) increase the number of warheads
attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed
to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article. [ABA,
Memorandum of Attribution]
Article IV ABA
1. For the purposes of
this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed
to each deployed heavy bombers shall be
equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same
type or variant of a type is actually
equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role
as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear
weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead
toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty.
For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range
nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles
with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs. [ABA]
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number
of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber
is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that
type and variant of a type in the Memorandum
of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to
as the Memorandum on Attribution. [ABA]
3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any
heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear
weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant
of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.
[ABA]
4. No later than 180 days
after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy
bomber of each type and variant of
a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.
The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the
number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant
of a type is actually equipped. [ABA]
5. If either Party intends
to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum
on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber
of a type or variant of a type is actually
equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to
the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later
date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons
for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber
of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall
be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for
which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually
equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and
variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the
notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear
weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other
Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data
contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.
[ABA]
6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance
with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections
of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol
on Exhibitions and Inspections. [ABA]
7. Each Party shall have
the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range
nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented
to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among
its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to
the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a
conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No
conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified
as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role. [ABA]
8. Heavy bomber
reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements
- (a) the number
of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time; [ABA]
- (b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers
with nuclear roles; [ABA]
- (c) such
heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers
shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall
not train or exercise for such missions; ABA
and
- (d) heavy bombers reoriented
to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that
type or variant of a type that are observable by national
technical means of verification and visible during inspection. ABA
9. Each Party shall have the right to return
to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have
been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article
to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to
the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return
a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such
action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently
be reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional
role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences
observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection
from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been
reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type
and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role. [ABA]
10. Each Party shall locate storage areas
for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air
base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based. [ABA]
11. Except as otherwise provided for in this
Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject
to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.
[ABA]
12. If not all heavy bombers
of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role,
one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented
to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating
to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph
8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by
the other Party. [ABA]
13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type
or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear
role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned
to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating
to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article.
Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party. [ABA]
14. The exhibitions and inspections provided
for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance
with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.
[ABA]
Article V
1. Except as provided for
in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification
provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty. [ABA]
2. To promote the objectives and
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish
the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either
Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral
Implementation Commission to:
- (a)
resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
- (b) agree
upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of this Treaty. [ABA]
Article VI
1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum
on Attribution., Elimination and Conversion
Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections,
all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall
enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification,
but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty. [ABA]
2. The provisions of paragraph
8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties
from the date of its signature. [ABA]
3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long
as the START Treaty remains in force. [ABA]
4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized
its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party
six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests. [ABA]
Article VII
Each Party may propose amendments to this
Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures
governing entry into force of this Treaty. [ABA]
Article VIII
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. [ABA]
DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two
copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
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FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION |
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