Joint Pub 4-05

Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

22 June 1995
1. Scope

This publication provides a conceptual foundation for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization and some additional methods of force expansion, including use of volunteers and Presidential Selected Reserve Callup. It also provides the context for joint participation in the planning and programming activities undertaken within the Department of Defense under the Graduated Response framework, especially those activities aimed at the reconstitution of military capability to deter any future threat to national security.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrines and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ vii

CHAPTER I
MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

• Introduction .................................................................................................................. I-1
• The National Perspective ......................................................................................... I-1
• The Joint Military Perspective ................................................................................ I-4
• Summary .................................................................................................................... I-9

CHAPTER II
MOBILIZATION TENETS

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... II-1
• Mobilization Tenets ............................................................................................... II-1
• Summary ................................................................................................................ II-6

CHAPTER III
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... III-1
• National Direction and Control ............................................................................ III-1
• Military Command and Control ........................................................................... III-1
• Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution ........................................... III-1
• Summary ............................................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IV
RESOURCE AREAS

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... IV-1

SECTION A. MANPOWER ............................................................................... IV-2
• Sources of Military Manpower .......................................................................... IV-2
• Mobilization Personnel Management Policy .................................................... IV-2
• Civilian Manpower ........................................................................................... IV-2
• Manpower Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-4
• Effects of Manpower Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ......................... IV-5

SECTION B. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT ................................................. IV-6
• Sources of Materiel and Equipment .................................................................. IV-6
• Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options ................................................ IV-7
• Effects of Materiel and Equipment Mobilization on Other Resource Areas IV-7

SECTION C. TRANSPORTATION ................................................................. IV-8
• Sources of Mobilization Transportation ........................................................... IV-8
• Transportation Mobilization Options .............................................................. IV-10
• Effect of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .................. IV-11
SECTION D. FACILITIES ................................................................. IV-12
  • Sources of Facilities ................................................................. IV-12
  • Facilities Mobilization Options .............................................. IV-12
  • Effect of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .......... IV-16

SECTION E. INDUSTRIAL BASE ...................................................... IV-16
  • Industrial Mobilization Sources .............................................. IV-16
  • Industrial Mobilization Options .............................................. IV-16
  • Effect of Industrial Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .......... IV-16

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE ......................................................... IV-18
  • Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity .......... IV-18
  • Effect of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas .......... IV-18

SECTION G. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ....................................... IV-19
  • General ................................................................................ IV-19
  • Sources of Emergency HSS .................................................. IV-19
  • Options for Mobilizing HSS .................................................. IV-20
  • Effect of HSS Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ................. IV-21

SECTION H. COMMUNICATIONS .................................................. IV-21
  • Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support .... IV-21
  • Effect of Communications Mobilization Activities Other Resource Areas IV-21

SECTION I. HOST-NATION SUPPORT ........................................ IV-22
  • Sources of HNS ...................................................................... IV-22
  • Options for Mobilizing HNS ................................................... IV-22
  • Effects of Mobilizing HNS on the Other Resource Areas ............... IV-22

SECTION J. THE ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL
  AUTHORITIES, FUNDING ......................................................... IV-23
  • General ................................................................................ IV-23

SECTION K. SUMMARY ............................................................. IV-27
  • Summary ................................................................................ IV-27

CHAPTER V
MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION
  • Introduction ........................................................................... V-1

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING ........................................ V-2
  • Mobilization Planning and OPLANs ......................................... V-2
  • Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans ...................... V-2
  • Mobilization Estimate of the Situation ...................................... V-3
  • Mobilization and Deliberate Planning ....................................... V-4
  • Mobilization and Crisis Action Planning .................................... V-7
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV-3</td>
<td>Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options</td>
<td>IV-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-4</td>
<td>Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options</td>
<td>IV-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-5</td>
<td>Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options</td>
<td>IV-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-6</td>
<td>Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options</td>
<td>IV-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-7</td>
<td>Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options</td>
<td>IV-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-8</td>
<td>Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization</td>
<td>IV-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-1</td>
<td>Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems</td>
<td>V-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-2</td>
<td>Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process</td>
<td>V-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-3</td>
<td>Mobilization and CAP</td>
<td>V-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-1</td>
<td>Demobilization Planning Guidelines</td>
<td>VI-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI-2</td>
<td>Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas</td>
<td>VI-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Mobilization and National Security Strategy
- Describes the Objectives of Mobilization Tenets
- Covers the Roles and Responsibilities of Mobilization Planning
- Provides the Resource Areas Available for Mobilization Planning
- Discusses the Planning and Execution of Mobilization
- Considers the Joint Planning and Execution of Demobilization

Mobilization and National Security

The mobilization process of preparing for war or other emergencies includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this definition: the Military Mobilization Process and the National Mobilization Process.

The United States preserves its security by the judicious application of national power to achieve national objectives derived from national interests. A strong national defense depends on maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure, and viable network of multinational and regional political alliances. The National Military Strategy implements the Defense agenda which asserts that we can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than was required in the past but still a total force. The graduated response process provides a planning framework for the national direction and control of military and national mobilization activities. The graduated response concept comprises three stages of mobilization preparedness activity: planning and preparation, crisis management, and national emergency or war.
Executive Summary

The Total Force Policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built.

From the joint operation perspective, the Total Force Policy shifted significant military missions from the Active component (AC) to the Reserve component (RC). This policy increased reliance on military retirees, Department of Defense civilians, contractor personnel, and host-nation support, and ensured that mobilization actions will be considered for most military operations. Mobilization and demobilization are also functions of the joint operation planning process which complement and support the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of joint forces in crisis and war.

Mobilization Tenets

The four tenets that provide the foundation for mobilization doctrine are as follows: Objective includes the clearly defined, attainable, and decisive objectives that are imperative to joint operations. Operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting impacts clearly identified. Unity of effort demands the integrated efforts of the nation’s military and national sectors toward achievement of common objectives established by the President. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. Timeliness is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place and requires the coordination of resources, personnel and information in order to react faster than the enemy.

Roles and Responsibilities During Mobilization

The members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community plan and execute joint military mobilization. The primary executors of mobilization are the Military Departments. They develop mobilization plans to support the combatant commanders’ operation plans (OPLANs). They are guided in these efforts by policy and resource levels established by the Secretary of Defense and by planning tasks specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Combatant commanders’ OPLANs specify the level of mobilization and the RC forces needed to support the plan. The Joint Staff is responsible for integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments, United States Special Operations Command, and supporting Defense agencies; recommending resource
The major mobilization activities are viewed by resource area and are essential for timely force expansion and sustainment.

**Executive Summary**

priorities and allocations; recommending levels of mobilization; and monitoring the status and progress of mobilization execution.

**Resource Areas**

There are 12 interdependent resource areas that are included in military mobilization. Mobilization planners and decisionmakers should understand that activities occurring on any one area may have an influence on each of the others. On occasion, additional industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, communications support, and host-nation support is needed. The appropriate legal authorities and funding may also need to be provided if conflicts or statutes need to be resolved. **Thorough coordination and effective communications will ensure that mobilization activities initiated in a resource area can be supported by the other areas.** Logistics provides the foundation of combat power and is the bridge connecting the economy with the warfighting forces.

**Manpower**, including personnel management, civilian manpower, manpower mobilization options, and the effects on other resource areas, is an important aspect of mobilization and involve personnel from all levels. **Materiel and equipment** includes all classes of supply, equipment on hand in units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. **Transportation** resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. **Facilities** are used to house, train, equip, and support troops as well as storage space, maintain equipment, and conduct operations. The **industrial base** includes domestic commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. **Training bases** are used to train nonprior Service personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure as well as offer reclassification and refresher training for pretrained individual manpower. **Health service support** is expanded to serve the mobilized force and provide the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties. The Federal Government relies primarily upon commercial providers for the **communications** required for national defense and crisis response. **Host-nation support** provides manpower, equipment, facilities, and services during war or emergency offset requirements. Mobilization planners must consider the effect of mobilization activities on the **environment** as well as the necessities of **legal authorities**
Executive Summary

The relationship between mobilization plans, operation plans, and campaign plans is very important for planning and executing mobilization.

Mobilization Planning and Execution

The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the Military Departments and combatant commanders in preparing mobilization plans that will support the OPLANs developed in the deliberate planning process. A campaign plan describes how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. The mobilization estimate of the situation provides a tool for mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilization requirements and options in either a deliberate or crisis action plan situation. A mobilization base must be maintained at all times and requires resources, manpower and industrial base capacity being the most important, which can be made available to permit force expansion and sustainment when necessary. Successful mobilization planning during crises depends upon the availability of accurate data regarding the readiness of RC units and personnel, pretrained individual manpower, civilian employees, and other support. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends to the Secretary of Defense the assets that are to be called up and their planned use when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC.

Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

Military demobilization planning is as important as mobilization planning.

Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisis situation or from a wartime military establishment and defense-based economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Demobilization plans must reflect the post-conflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Ideally, demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization commences. The proposed demobilization policies should include joint force readiness, the health of the national economy, and morale of and benefits for Service members and the Department of Defense civilian employees and their families. The supported and supporting commanders play a coordinating and synchronizing role in order to ensure readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future conflicts. Military personnel are released from active duty or returned to reserve status while materiel and equipment may be mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations, destroyed,
sold for scrap or turned over to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication defines joint mobilization and demobilization doctrine for joint forces within the broader context of joint doctrine. It describes the role of mobilization and demobilization in national security and military strategy and defines joint mobilization tenets. It describes mobilization roles and responsibilities at the national level and relates them to roles and responsibilities for mobilization planning and execution within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). It identifies the major mobilization decisions and activities in each of 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) and describes how they affect each other. Finally, it outlines the nature of military mobilization and demobilization planning in joint operations and JPEC participation in planning and programming activities.
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I
MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

“The Congress shall have power...To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

Constitution of the United States, Amendment II

1. Introduction

a. Mobilization is the process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this definition.

- The Military Mobilization Process by which the nation’s Armed Forces are brought to an increased state of readiness.

- The National Mobilization Process of mobilizing the national economy to meet non-defense needs and sustain the Armed Forces in war or military operations other than war.

b. From a national perspective, the importance of a responsive mobilization capability to our national security is implicit in the President’s National Security Strategy and its derivative military strategy. The national process of graduated response (GR) provides the framework for achieving the desired mobilization capability and is a model for coordinating resources and plans for military and national mobilization. GR is the process by which the United States responds to early ambiguous or explicit warning of an emerging national security emergency. It includes preplanned measures in the areas of force readiness, industrial base preparedness, operational requirements, and sustainability. From a joint operations perspective, mobilization is a function of the joint command and control process, which together with the Department of Defense (DOD) Total Force Policy provides the basis for joint military mobilization planning and execution. This chapter examines the relationship between mobilization and national security from both perspectives. It concludes with a definition of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security after a crisis or war.

2. The National Perspective

“The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.”

Edward Meade Earle
Makers of Modern Strategy

a. National Security Strategy. As a nation, the United States preserves its
security by the judicious application of national power to achieve national objectives derived from national interests. The President identifies national interests and objectives in the National Security Strategy of the United States. National interests and objectives are the ends of our national security strategy. The ways and means for achieving these ends are explained in broad terms by the President in his political, economic, and defense agendas. Each agenda includes a set of policies and programs aimed at achieving national objectives. Programs for maintaining a strong national defense depend on our maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure, and viable network of multinational and regional political alliances.

b. Military Strategy

• The National Military Strategy implements the Defense Agenda of the President’s National Security Strategy. It is a strategy reflecting new and enduring realities in a rapidly changing post-Cold War world characterized by instability and uncertainty and in which the United States provides leadership. Explicit in the military strategy is the assertion that we can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than was required in the past, but still a total force—a carefully tailored combination of Active component (AC) and Reserve component (RC), together with retired military personnel, DOD civilian employees, DOD contractors, and host-nation support (HNS). Implicit in the strategy is retention and improvement of the capability for rapid and efficient mobilization of forces and resources to respond to natural disasters at the low end of the range of military operations and to deter or counter a broad spectrum of threats to our national security.

• Figure I-1 depicts a representative range of military operations together with the levels of mobilization available to the

![Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations](image-url)
President when RC forces are needed for an appropriate response. Congress has provided the President with a comprehensive menu of authorities for tailoring an appropriate response in a crisis. Several of these are available without a declaration of national emergency. Others require Presidential or congressional emergency declarations. Detailed discussions of mobilization levels and emergency authorities are provided in Chapter IV, “Resource Areas,” and Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution.”

c. Graduated Response

- As shown in Figure I-2, the GR process provides a planning framework for the national direction and control of military and national mobilization activities. Overall responsibility for GR rests with the National Security Council (NSC) and its interagency structure. Virtually every Federal agency has a role to play in managing a national response to a crisis. National resources in the 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) are focused on defense needs. The DOD provides support to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during natural disasters under the Federal Response Plan. FEMA coordinates the actions and programs of the other Federal agencies in support of the DOD during regional contingencies and mobilization efforts.

- The GR concept comprises three stages of mobilization preparedness.
activity: planning and preparation, crisis management, and national emergency or war.

**Stage III—Planning and Preparation.** In Stage III, the United States maintains vigilance, observing national and international events for developing threats to national security. Federal departments and agencies develop emergency plans and maintain the capability to carry out the plans within funding limitations. Although essentially a period of peace, it is during this stage that the gradual emergence of a potential new threat would be perceived and actions could be taken to deter the threat.

**Stage II—Crisis Management.** Stage II activities are designed around options for responding to specific crisis situations as they develop. The Department of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies initiate preparatory actions that are not feasible during Stage III because of resource constraints or the absence of a more specific basis for focused planning and preparation. During this stage, the nation’s civilian leadership may elect not to risk political capital and significant economic disruption; these are characteristic of overt mobilization actions, but leaders may approve limited actions for improving US preparedness. Such actions would be designed to maximize response potential with minimum disruption of the economy. Limited surge of the defense industrial base, a Presidential declaration of national emergency, and a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) could occur as Stage II actions.

**Stage I—National Emergency or War.** In Stage I, the United States begins a mobilization of the economy for a crisis or war. A Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency should be expected at an early point in Stage I activities. The principal distinguishing feature between Stages I and II is a substantial increase in the magnitude of defense industrial production and other essential national defense activities. Industrial base expansion will be characterized by expanding facilities, building new facilities, and conversion of non-defense producers. Critical resources could be diverted from nonessential production, and significant disruption of the national economy would be a consequence. The increased demand for resources would mandate increased interagency coordination and support of mobilization actions and prioritization of resource shortages.

• Successful GR requires effective interagency coordination in each stage to synchronize production capacity, labor force expansion and stabilization, economic and trade policies, energy and transportation allocations, and other actions that prepare the United States to respond to hostilities and signal its commitment to national security.

3. The Joint Military Perspective

a. Total Force Policy. The Total Force Policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and missions to the RC along with the resources necessary to maintain high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis. As the Total Force Policy matured, military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support personnel were brought under its umbrella to reflect the value of their contributions to our military capability.
During the 1980s, major improvements were made in Reserve Component (RC) force readiness to perform wartime missions. By the fall of 1990, modernization efforts had given the RC the ability to field approximately 84 percent (in dollar value) of the equipment they required for war. The DOD policy of “First to fight, first to equip” required resourcing both Active and RC units in the sequence in which they were required to perform their wartime missions. Successful recruiting efforts, the assignment to the RC of important peacetime and wartime responsibilities, and substantially improved training opportunities, also contributed significantly to improved RC force readiness.

The increase in RC readiness levels in the 1980s occurred concurrently with the largest ever expansion of the RC peacetime structure. From 1980 to the end of the decade, the number of Selected Reservists increased by 35 percent, growing from approximately 850,000 to more than 1,150,000. This growth did not come at the expense of personnel readiness. On the contrary, throughout the decade, the Services devoted considerable resources to ensure individual proficiency of Selected Reserve members. During this same period, more emphasis was placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the pool of pre-trained individuals.

Individual RC volunteers were integrated into the Active force from the start of the Persian Gulf crisis, even before the involuntary Reserve call-up. By 22 August, more than 10,500 volunteer RC members already were serving on active duty. Their contributions were essential to provide capabilities required from the first days of the crisis—particularly strategic airlift—and to perform missions almost exclusively assigned to Reserve units including, for example, water purification and port security.

Thousands of Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel volunteered within hours of the initial US response to support the time-sensitive movement of US personnel and materiel to the Persian Gulf. ARC volunteers flew 42 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions. They also provided continental United States (CONUS) base maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police support to deploying Air Force units and airlift mission. By 22 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers had moved seven million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater. As of 25 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers began operating Westover AFB, MA as a major eastbound staging operation on a 24-hour basis. Westover continued to operate on a volunteer basis for four months until these same volunteers were mobilized on 3 December.
US Naval Reserve (USNR) volunteers contributed medical, logistics, and cargo handling skills to CONUS base support operations. While approximately 50 percent of all USNR volunteers were involved in health care, Naval Reservists also were deployed outside the United States for other tasks. For example, a detachment of Active Seabees at Subic Bay, Philippines, was deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA) in August with their parent battalion. When a strike by 3,000 civilians of the public works center was imminent, 150 volunteers from a Reserve public works center augmented units deployed to Subic Bay and helped keep essential services in operation. As a result, the base suffered no interruption in operations, and response time to trouble calls noticeably improved. Some volunteers subsequently were deployed to Bahrain to augment the Navy Logistics Support Force’s public works force.

Approximately 1,100 US Marine Corps Reserve volunteers supported the preparation for deployment of Marine Corps (USMC) forces to SWA. They not only provided maintenance and logistical support for deploying Active USMC units but also transport services, to include KC-130T crews who flew transatlantic refueling missions. In addition, they were assigned liaison and linguist duties with deploying Active units.

US Coast Guard (USCG) Reserve volunteers provided port security and supervised the loading of explosives and hazardous cargo at US east and Gulf Coast ports. The USCG activated Port Security Harbor Defense Units from its Ninth District (Cleveland) to work with US mobile inshore underwater warfare units in SWA. This marked the first extended use of USCG volunteers for this mission.

More than 5,580 Army RC personnel volunteered for temporary tours of active duty. For example, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Army Reserve (USAR) terminal transportation unit members volunteered to work with the Military Traffic Management Command to manage the flow of combat forces from US east and Gulf Coast ports. Other USAR and National Guard (ARNG) volunteers provided maintenance and logistics support, chemical defense training, and aviation operations assistance for AC forces. RC medical personnel also backfilled active Health Service Command professionals, who deployed during the first days of the crisis. Some volunteers deployed directly to theater. South Carolina ARNG members deployed with Third US Army to help establish strategic communications for the headquarters.

The large number of RC members who volunteered during the conflict’s early stages vividly demonstrates their commitment and dedication. Individual volunteers also provided essential manpower before the decision to involuntarily activate the Reserves had been made. This provided excellent support during a difficult time. Ironically, the extent of the volunteering was so wide-spread that a short-lived personnel problem was created when units were particularly “short-manned” because their members were made up largely of early volunteers. While corrected by cross-leveling and other personnel actions, the irony of such a problem attests to the general success with RC volunteers and, further, demonstrates the feasibility of using such measures early in future crises.

b. Mobilization and Demobilization in Joint Planning and Operations. Military forces fulfill their role in maintaining our national security by preparing for and, if necessary, conducting joint operations across the range of military operations (Figure I-1, on page I-2). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) defines the functions, planning systems, and information management tools for accomplishing these tasks. Joint operation functions are arrayed in the Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle in Figure I-3. One complete cycle is shown. It is meant to depict an era of relative peace interrupted by a crisis and war requiring the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It shows the major steps in the deliberate planning process that produced the operation plan used as the basis for crisis response. It also depicts a gradual return to a peacetime environment secured by the return to the pre-crisis force structure. The mobilization and demobilization functions have been emphasized to place them in perspective with the other joint operation functions.

- Mobilization

- The mobilization function includes activation of the RC and surging and expanding the industrial base. Lessons learned from the war in the Persian Gulf and the emergence of a new national military strategy at the end of the Cold War have led US military planners to a broader understanding of the scope of activities that should be included under the umbrella of the term, mobilization. Planners have also acquired an awareness of the importance of mobilization planning for contingencies requiring less than full mobilization.
Because the most visible mobilization activity is activating members of the RC serving in units or in individual manpower pools, there has been a tendency to focus planning on manpower issues. Mobilization, however, involves much more than expanding and filling the military force with people. The force must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is to achieve and maintain its designed capability. These activities require the support of the DOD civilian work force and contractor support. They also require increased resources in the areas of materiel, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, command and control communications, and host-nation support. Extraordinary actions may be required to ensure continued compliance with, or temporary waivers of, environmental protection laws. Funding and legal authorities are also required to enable mobilization activities. Mobilization, therefore, must include determining and satisfying demands for these resources to support the total force during deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

Mobilization planning complements and supports joint operation planning conducted by the combatant commanders. It is accomplished primarily by the Military Services, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and their major subordinate commands based on guidance received from the Secretary of Defense. It requires development of supporting plans by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), FEMA, Selective Service System (SSS), Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Energy, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and other Federal agencies. Just as the Military Services mobilize their reserve organizations and individuals to augment military capability, supporting Federal agencies must oversee mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force. The Joint Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his role as principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities (NCA); facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources among the Services, combatant commanders, and Defense agencies; provides input for resolution of claims for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization planning.

Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a crisis or wartime military establishment and defense-based national economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Implied in this definition are two types of activities: those associated with reducing the percentage of the nation’s production capacity devoted to the Armed Forces and defense industry, and those undertaken to maintain national security and economic vitality. These tasks, which historically compete for resources, can make the management of demobilization even more complex and challenging than mobilization. Demobilization planning and execution are covered in Chapter VI, “Resource Areas.”
4. Summary

This chapter has examined the relationships between mobilization and national security from the national perspective and from the perspective of joint military operations. From the national perspective, a rapid, efficient mobilization capability is required to respond to a broad spectrum of emergencies. National mobilization capability is achieved through coordinated planning and resource management within the DOD and between the DOD and other Federal agencies. The GR process provides a planning framework for national direction and control of military and mobilization activities. From the joint operation perspective, the Total Force Policy shifted significant military missions from the AC to the RC. This policy increased reliance on military retirees, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and host-nation support, and ensured that mobilization actions will be considered for most military operations. Mobilization and demobilization are also functions of joint operations, which complement and support the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of joint forces in crises and war.
Intentionally Blank
1. Introduction

As shown in Figure II-1, there are four mobilization tenets that describe the characteristics of successful mobilization and provide the foundation for mobilization doctrine. The tenets are: objective, unity of effort, flexibility, and timeliness.

2. Mobilization Tenets

a. Objective. Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined, attainable, and decisive objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the basis for determining whether the mobilization of reserve forces and other resources is required to achieve the objectives. Operational planners must clearly understand the mobilization implications associated with their plans to ensure that needed resources are identified, mobilized, and used effectively. Requirements for activating RC forces must be clearly identified, as well as the need to expand the capability or capacity of other resource areas. Operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting impacts clearly identified. The supported combatant commander must be apprised of the mobilization actions required of the supporting commanders and the supporting establishment.

“The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire that theory, and lodge it in our heads—otherwise we will never get very far.”

Frederick the Great

Figure II-1. Mobilization Tenets

OBJECTIVE: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War serves as a model for defining and articulating objectives. In successive announcements, the NCA provided clear objectives: the liberation of Kuwait, the defense of Saudi Arabia, the protection of US citizens, and the restoration of stability to the region.

Initial mobilization and deployment supported a strategy based on international economic, political, and diplomatic isolation of Iraq in addition to military pressure. After several months, the United States and its coalition partners concluded that the initial strategy would not achieve the objectives within a reasonable period of time, given the continued buildup of Iraqi forces in the occupied emirate and the concerted effort by the Iraqis to supplant Kuwait’s political infrastructure. Accordingly, the original strategy evolved to one calling...
b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated efforts of the nation's military and national sectors toward achievement of common objectives established by the President. Integration is achieved through the effective use of planning and execution processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain of command and among the DOD, other Federal agencies, and the civil sector. A manpower callup alone, for example, would not be sufficient to provide unit and individual replacements to sustain a theater force in a protracted conflict. At the time of callup or induction, there must be enough organizational clothing and equipment for each Service member, as well as training base capacity and facilities to provide necessary training. At the time of deployment, there must be enough strategic transportation to the theater of operations. At the time of employment, there must be enough combat equipment in the theater, as well as food, ammunition, fuel, and repair parts to sustain peak performance. Additionally, there must be adequate health service support available in the event of injury or sickness. Unity of effort requires the integration of mobilization activities within each and among the various resource areas. If integration is not accomplished, insufficient resources in one or more areas could delay the arrival of unit and individual replacements on the battlefield or impair their combat effectiveness.

Training bases must have the capacity to satisfy manpower mobilization requirements. This may require additional training for prior service and initial basic training for nonprior service personnel.
Mobilization Tenets

c. Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. Flexibility for mobilization planning and execution has been provided for in joint planning and execution systems and in the comprehensive set of legislated emergency powers that give the President, in his constitutional role as commander in chief, wide latitude in crafting a response to a developing crisis. There are substantial emergency authorities available to the President before a declaration of national emergency, such as the PSRC authority and authorities ensuring priority of industrial production for defense needs. Other authorities are made available to the President upon a declaration of national emergency. The National Emergencies Act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, he must specify the powers he is invoking. Although the powers are limited to those specifically invoked, others may be invoked subsequently. This means that the President has the flexibility to act incrementally to signal US resolve in a developing crisis and authorize certain preparatory actions without causing undue provocation. Joint planning and execution systems also provide

UNITY OF EFFORT: WORLD WAR I

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful World War I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning had been accomplished before the declaration of war in April 1917. This was based largely on the nation’s reluctance to become involved in a European war, resistance to war planning, and failure to coordinate US foreign and military policies.

Months after war was declared, military leaders still had no idea of the size of the force that would have to be raised. Lack of knowledge concerning the situation in Europe and failure to use available intelligence resulted in a succession of ever-growing estimates, which concluded that 1.3 million men and 30 divisions would be needed by the end of 1918 and 100 divisions by mid-1919.

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition activities. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily constructed training installations that would not be supplied with enough organizational clothing, equipment, and weapons to properly equip them for several months.

The government, civilian economy, and Services competed for resources without a competent coordinating authority. War production was chaotic. Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were determined in ad hoc negotiations among public and private officials. East Coast ports of embarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland transportation became so congested that the President was forced to seize the nation’s railroad system.

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began sinking merchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast doubts on the nation’s ability to deploy forces to Europe even after they were trained and equipped. The net result was that half-trained US forces were sent to France in British vessels. The forces were largely equipped with British and French artillery, tanks, machine guns, and aircraft, and were required to undergo further training before they could be used effectively on the battlefield.
Flexibility in mobilization by delegating authority to the maximum extent consistent with control in order to promote freedom of action by subordinates and ensure continuity when communications are disrupted. The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) also contributes to flexibility by adaptive planning (i.e., developing a wide range of military response options for consideration by decisionmakers) and maintaining reserve forces and other resources at optimum readiness levels. Flexibility also demands a system for accurately monitoring the status and progress of mobilization and the ability to replan and redirect mobilization activities to work around bottlenecks, resource shortfalls, and for providing protection of the force, equipment, and infrastructure being mobilized.

**FLEXIBILITY: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and capabilities in a number of instances during the Persian Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991. The availability of pre-positioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nation infrastructure enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of a fully developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical advantage at the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the deployment of combat elements at the expense of logistic and administrative support units.

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation capability to carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint Staff and the Department of State mobilized critical ground transport from host-nation and allied assets to execute the planned offensive.

The decision to deploy the US Army’s VII Corps from Europe showed considerable flexibility. The absence of the Soviet threat allowed what would otherwise have been a dangerous gamble. Besides powerful combat forces, VII Corps also included a fully structured support command, which proved extremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls.

Although the Persian Gulf crisis did not provide a truly strenuous test of production surge capabilities, industry did accelerate output of critical supplies, equipment, and munitions. Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this area was the deployment of a system prototype still undergoing developmental testing, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advanced technology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor the battlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before possible.
d. **Timeliness.** Timely mobilization of all resources is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place. It is also essential to seizing and maintaining the initiative. We must be able to react faster than the enemy is able to react. **Achieving a capability for timely mobilization of resources requires timely indications and warnings** of the threat and appropriate response to such indications and warning; **efficient mobilization procedures** and frequent exercises; RCs with the resources necessary to maintain required readiness levels; a **civilian work force** prepared to support military missions; **contractors** prepared for their roles; **stockpiles** of materiel and equipment to sustain the force until industrial base output can be expanded; and **synchronized plans** for the expansion of transportation, facilities, training base, health service support, communications, and host-nation support necessary to deploy, employ, and sustain the mobilized force. Timeliness requires obtaining relief from environmental and any other legal or regulatory constraints, when necessary, as well as legal authorities and funding to enable each mobilization activity.

---

**LESSONS ON TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS**

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World War I, industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push planned for the summer of 1919. The surprising success of the last-ditch German offensive in the spring of 1918, followed that autumn by the climactic Allied counteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of US troops to combat armed and equipped with British and French rather than American supplies and weaponry.

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely synchronized with requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and bust cycle with regard to enlisted and junior officer replacements. Partially trained troops repeatedly had to be stripped out of units in training to fill up units in combat or about to be deployed, thereby delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units.

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military readiness in the immediate postwar period, left the United States without a viable capability for responding to a crisis that arose with little or no warning. The unfortunate result was that we were woefully unprepared for the surprise North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950. We conducted a desperate delaying action, and were nearly forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan, before reinforcing units and other resources could be mobilized and deployed to effectively counter the initial North Korean offensive.

Major mobilization decisions during the Persian Gulf crisis were deliberately synchronized with United Nations resolutions and US congressional action. In so doing, these decisions not only satisfied the operational requirements of our joint military forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve to adversaries, allies, and the US public, whose continuing support for our Persian Gulf policy was critical to its success.
3. **Summary**

This chapter identified and defined four mobilization tenets that, together, describe the characteristics of successful mobilization. Historical examples, drawn from selected 20th century mobilizations, provide examples of success or the consequences of failure to heed each tenet.
CHAPTER III
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“Prepare war, wake up the mighty men.”

Joel III:9

1. Introduction

This chapter describes roles and responsibilities for joint military mobilization planning and execution. The roles and responsibilities for exercising command and control of our military forces and for military mobilization are the principal focus of this chapter. The roles and responsibilities of the various Federal agencies that mobilize national resources to support and sustain the nation’s military forces in time of war are outside the scope of this publication, but it is important to understand that virtually every Federal department and agency would provide significant support to the Department of Defense if warranted by an emergency situation.

2. National Direction and Control

The Constitution of the United States divides responsibility for and authority over the nation’s Armed Forces between Congress and the President. The NCA is the highest authority that directs the nation’s military—including mobilization. The NSC at the direction of the President establishes national security emergency preparedness policy, normally by means of an Executive order that assigns emergency preparedness responsibilities, including mobilization, to the DOD and other Federal departments and agencies.

3. Military Command and Control

For joint military operations, which include the preparation and execution of integrated mobilization plans, this fundamental responsibility extends from the President and the Secretary of Defense, as the NCA, to the combatant commanders.

4. Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

- Basic guidance to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within the Department of Defense is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG), which implements DOD responsibilities under the NSC national security emergency preparedness policy. The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning. It identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense agencies.

- Mobilization planning is heavily influenced by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which tasks the combatant commanders, their Service components, and the Military Departments to develop and refine operation plans (OPLANs) and supporting mobilization plans. Another influence on mobilization planning is DOD Directive 1225.6, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” which specifies the DOD policy of first to fight, first to equip regardless of component.
• In time of crisis and war, OSD assists the Secretary of Defense in managing **mobilization** by developing implementing guidance for issuance by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense agencies. OSD assembles cost data and compiles reports on the costs of military operations, as required by law.

b. **Joint Planning and Execution Community.** The JPEC collectively plans for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. JPEC members concerned with mobilization include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Military Departments, combatant commanders and their Service components, and selected Defense agencies. Their mobilization responsibilities are covered in the following paragraphs:

• **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepares integrated plans for military mobilization. Through the Mobilization Guidance to the JSCP (CJCS Instruction 3110.13), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes planning relationships. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops mobilization options and provides mobilization recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also responsible for preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense general strategic guidance for the development of industrial mobilization programs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for submission by the President to the Congress.

• **Joint Staff.** The Joint Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments and Defense agencies. The Director of Logistics, J-4, is the focal point in the Joint Staff for integrating mobilization plans and coordinating mobilization execution during crises and war. The mobilization roles of the Joint Staff are shown in Figure III-1.

• **Combatant Commanders.** The combatant commanders organize and employ assigned and attached forces. They are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of OPLANs. They participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and participate in the **Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System** (PPBS) in addition to their operations planning responsibilities. As part of their operations planning responsibilities, they determine mobilization requirements and, based on additional planning guidance, incorporate information on specific force levels projected to be available into OPLANs and OPORDs.

• **Supported Commanders.** Supported commanders are tasked in the JSCP or by other joint operation planning authority to prepare specific plans in their respective areas of responsibility. They specify the level of mobilization needed to support the plan; identify time-phased requirements for RC forces; and identify the RC forces needed for reinforcement, for deployment and movement of the force, and for backfill of deployed units. This planning establishes the requirements for forces and sustaining resources upon which supporting mobilization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATE</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Manpower and Personnel, J-1 | Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements.  
| | Identifies options for personnel augmentation and recommends appropriate authorities.  
| | Monitors the allocation and prioritization of Inductees to the Services.  
| | Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis. |
| Intelligence, J-2 | Serves as the intelligence staff officer for the Joint Staff.  
| | Provides information and warning about foreign intelligence and security service threats to the force. |
| Operations, J-3 | Provides the combatant commander’s requirements and the J-3’s recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the J-4 concerning the need for mobilizing Reserve component units.  
| | Recommends military courses of action in crisis and war. |
| Logistics, J-4 | Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies.  
| | Prepares mobilization planning guidance for use by the combatant commanders.  
| | Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans.  
| | Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization.  
| | Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for submission by the President to the Congress.  
| | Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under the Selective Service Act.  
| | Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to mobilization of manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, host-nation support, and their impact on the environment and the economy.  
| | Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions. |
| Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5 | Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives.  
| | Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war. |
| Command, Control, Communications and Computers, J-6 | Provides Joint Staff position to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments concerning mobilization requirements for command, control, communications, and computers systems, facilities, and services.  
| | Ensure the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the National Command Authorities, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant commanders during mobilization. |
| Operational Plans and Interoperability, J-7 | Plans, conducts, and evaluates mobilization exercises. |
| Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8 | Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve component mix and other force and resource development issues. |

Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities
plans are based. This planning requires extensive coordination among the supported commander, supporting commanders, and the Services. Supported commanders request invocation of emergency mobilization authorities when ordered to execute operation orders (OPORDs) requiring mobilization support.

**Supporting Commanders.** Supporting commanders are tasked in the JSCP or by other joint planning authority to provide augmentation forces and other support to a designated supported commander or commanders. In this role they may also require mobilized assets to accomplish their respective support mission. Their supporting plans include mobilization requirements when appropriate. As noted above, extensive coordination is required to ensure that all mobilization requirements are identified.

• Military Departments and USCG. The Military Departments provide forces and logistic support to the combatant commanders at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. In peacetime, and until transferred to the Department of the Navy in time of war, the USCG serves under the control of the Secretary of Transportation. USCG units under DOT control may be assigned to a combatant commander with the approval of the Secretary of Transportation. They provide forces to the combatant commanders, except for forces under the control of the Secretary of Defense and those assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations. They prepare detailed mobilization plans identifying the actual forces and support to be provided and execute mobilization at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the Military Departments have the responsibilities shown in Figure III-2.

• Defense Agencies. Four Defense agencies have significant responsibilities for supporting joint military mobilization. They are DISA,
DLA, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and DMA. DISA and DMA receive operational direction from and report through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. DLA reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, but is responsible for providing materiel and services to the combatant commanders and Military Departments. DFAS reports to the Secretary of Defense through the DOD Comptroller. The following paragraphs summarize the roles and responsibilities of each of these agencies in support of joint military mobilization.

**Defense Information Systems Agency.** During peacetime, DISA participates in all command, control, communications, and computers (C4) mobilization planning activities with OSD, the Joint Staff, DOD components, combatant commanders, and commercial vendors. DISA collects and analyzes the telecommunications requirements derived from this participation and develops mobilization plans. During war and military operations other than war, DISA modifies its mobilization plans, if required, and ensures the responsiveness of the Defense Communications System (DCS) to the actual requirements of the NCA, OSD, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and Services. DISA also manages the National Communications System and employs the nation’s commercial communications resources to support Defense requirements.

**Defense Logistics Agency.** Based on the Services’ mobilization plans, DLA, in peacetime, develops mobilization plans to support the Military Departments and other authorized customers with DLA-managed materiel and services. These plans include substantial industrial preparedness planning based on the combatant commanders’ critical item list (CIL) and extensive production base analysis conducted in coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments. Across the entire range of military operations, DLA provides logistic support to the Services, advises the Joint Staff on the status of inventories of DLA-managed items, and recommends resource allocations and production priorities when appropriate.

**Defense Finance and Accounting Service.** DFAS is the focal point for joint financial management issues. DFAS works with the combatant commanders to develop the financial management annexes to joint operation plans. DFAS develops guidance regarding personnel pay issues, providing entitlement and tax information to members and dependents, and ensuring that the financial systems are able to support mobilization efforts. DFAS has formed a DFAS-wide crisis management system to ensure that all DFAS Crisis Coordination Centers are informed of financial management issues as they occur.

**Defense Mapping Agency.** In peacetime, DMA develops and maintains mobilization plans to ensure continued mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) support to joint forces under crisis and wartime conditions. It provides the combatant commanders with operational levels of MC&G stocks sufficient to meet initial mobilization requirements. In crisis and war, DMA executes its plans and procedures for increased data collection and increased production and distribution of its products.
Chapter III

5. Summary

This chapter identified and described the roles and mobilization management responsibilities of the NCA and JPEC. The members of the JPEC plan and execute joint military mobilization. The primary executors of mobilization are the Military Departments. They develop mobilization plans to support the combatant commanders’ OPLANs. They are guided in these efforts by policy and resource levels established by the Secretary of Defense and by planning tasks specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatant commanders’ OPLANs specify the level of mobilization and the RC forces needed to support the plan. The Joint Staff is responsible for integrating the mobilization plans of the Military Departments, USSOCOM, and supporting Defense agencies; recommending resource priorities and allocations; recommending levels of mobilization; and monitoring the status and progress of mobilization execution.
CHAPTER IV
RESOURCE AREAS

“The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; women will make tents and serve in the hospitals; the old men will have themselves carried into the public squares to rouse the courage of the fighting men, and to preach the unity of the Republic. The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions factories. All suitable firearms shall be turned over to the troops; the interior shall be policed with fowling pieces and cold steel. All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and the supply wagons.”

Decree by the Committee on Public Safety, (French Revolution, 23 August 1793)

1. Introduction

a. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas as listed in Chapter I, “Mobilization and National Security.” Mobilization planners and decisionmakers should understand that activities occurring in any one area may have an influence on each of the others; (e.g., activating additional manpower creates demands for additional materiel and equipment, transportation, and additional workloads at affected facilities). Depending on the situation, it could also generate requirements for additional industrial production, training base capacity, HSS, communications support, and HNS. Increasing levels of manpower and other resources may also create conflicts with environmental protection statutes, especially at various facilities in the United States. Some mobilization actions may be delayed until these conflicts are resolved by either complying with environmental protection standards or by requesting temporary waivers. The appropriate legal authorities and funding would also have to be obtained to enable the callup. Mobilization decisions in each resource area, therefore, should be made with an understanding of the effect the decision could have on other resource areas.

b. Mobilization planners deal with resource area interactions during deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP) through staff coordination and the exchange of information among supported and supporting organizations. Thorough coordination and effective communications will ensure that mobilization activities initiated in a resource area can be supported by the other areas.

c. This chapter provides an overview of major mobilization activities by resource area. The discussion of each area is presented from a joint perspective; i.e., mobilization activities common to two or more Military Departments or undertaken to support and sustain joint operations. The discussion in each resource area includes listing the sources of the resource, the options available to decisionmakers for using the resource, and the likely effect a mobilization decision made in the area could have on the other areas.

d. Logistics provides the foundation of combat power and is the bridge connecting the economy with the warfighting forces.
Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It deals with the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; and the acquisition or furnishing of services. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within a combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR), while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of the combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by the ability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Operational planners must understand the importance of effective and integrated logistics and mobilization planning for joint operations at a time when demands on military resources are increasing.

SECTION A. MANPOWER

“People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome of war.”

General Lo Jui-Ching
May 1965

2. Sources of Military Manpower

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime AC military end strength. Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service personnel who volunteer or are drafted. These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. Figure IV-1 associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the actions required to initiate a callup. The legal authorities required for the callup of the various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option.

3. Mobilization Personnel Management Policy

In addition to the callup of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools and conscription, three other actions can be taken to ensure optimum availability and utilization of manpower during mobilization. These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. Stop-loss actions allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be taken by the Military Departments to stabilize AC personnel and ensure the maximum number are available for assignment to theaters of operation or other high-priority duties. These activities may include canceling temporary and permanent change of station travel, changing tour length policies, and curtailing attendance at Service schools. Redistribution actions are also taken within the Military Departments during a crisis to ensure that high-priority units are maintained at the highest level of personnel readiness until an efficient personnel fill and replacement pipeline can be established.

4. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower is an integral part of the DOD Total Force Concept. Future crises across the range of military operations will require careful management of the civilian work force to support military operations in overseas theaters of operations and CONUS.

a. In theaters, civilians with skills essential to support military missions may
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF MANPOWER</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Emergency (e.g., natural disaster, civil disturbance)</td>
<td>Army National Guard and Air National Guard</td>
<td>Federalize National Guard troops under 10 USC 12406 and 331-333</td>
<td>President publishes proclamation and an executive order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency (with or without a declared national emergency)</td>
<td>Volunteers from the National Guard and Reserve</td>
<td>Call for volunteers under 10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments solicit volunteers with needed skills and publish callup orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular and Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service</td>
<td>Recall retirees under 10 USC 688(a)</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments publish callup orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer enlistees</td>
<td>Enlist qualified volunteers</td>
<td>Military Departments accept qualified applicants in accordance with DOD and Service standards and policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selected Reserve - Units - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)</td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 200,000 Selected Reservists under 10 USC 12304 (Presidential Selected Reserve Callup)</td>
<td>President publishes Executive order. Military Departments publish callup orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions. President must report to the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use of forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draftees</td>
<td>Initiate conscription</td>
<td>National Command Authorities requests amendment to the Selective Service Act (50 USC app. 451 et seq.) authorizing conscription.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or National Emergency</td>
<td>Ready Reserve - Units - Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) - IMAs</td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists for up to 24 months under 10 USC 12302(a) (Partial Mobilization)</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an Executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call up orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining Ready Reserve Retired Reserve Standby Reserve</td>
<td>Call to active duty remaining Reserve component personnel under 10 USC 12301 (Full Mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress declaring war or national emergency. Military Departments publish callup orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New units and personnel</td>
<td>Add new force structure and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives (Total Mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-1. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options
remain after other US civilians and their families have been evacuated. **The Services and Defense agencies designate these personnel as emergency-essential** and provide necessary training and other support for their crisis and wartime duties to include the intrinsic responsibility of providing protection to US civilians in the AOR consistent with the capabilities and operational mission. **Other civilian employees with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with supported military units.** The geographic combatant commander determines admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services and agencies implement those requirements for their employees. **Some foreign-national civilian employees (local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission** based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host country.

b. In the United States, **the Services and Defense agencies reallocate incumbent civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions** through detailing, reassignment, and cross training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies activate **Recruiting Area Staffing Committees** to find joint, local solutions for meeting these requirements. Solutions can include:

- **Overtime** and extended workweek authorizations.
- Implementing plans for **replacing employees ordered to active duty** because of RC or retired-military obligations.
- Using **civilian retirees** and **retired military personnel** not expected to be recalled.
- Using **employees on loan** from other Federal, State, or local agencies.
- Using **contractors**.
- Joint advertising and allocation of **new employees** after hiring.
- Activating applicable crisis procedures with OPM regional offices and with State and local employment offices to **provide required applicants** on an expedited basis.

5. **Manpower Mobilization Options**

Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the NCA for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war as shown in Figure IV-1 and Figure I-1. **Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for RC volunteers** who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled retirees were used in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf. PSRC authority makes up to 200,000 Selected Reservists available for up to 270 days (10 USC 12304). It was also used effectively in the Persian Gulf and during recent operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization. **A Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial mobilization authority makes up to one million Ready Reservists available for up to 24 consecutive months.** This partial mobilization authority, also used for the first time in the Persian Gulf crisis, includes members of the IRR, which is a source of
pretrained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PSRC, activations under this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it develops. A congressional declaration of a national emergency or war is required before full mobilization may be ordered (10 USC 12301(a)). Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. Manpower requirements for force expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a protracted conflict may require legislation authorizing activation of the SSS for the conscription of additional forces.

6. Effects of Manpower Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

a. Selected Reserve Manpower. Mobilized Selected Reserve units create time-phased demands for all classes of supply, especially rations, fuel, and ammunition; major items of equipment; and repair parts. They also create temporary, but significant, demands for intra-CONUS transportation as they move from home stations to mobilization sites and for strategic airlift and sealift for deployment overseas. They create workloads at existing facilities for personnel support, energy, housing, training areas, and storage and may require construction of new facilities. They create demands for additional industrial base output of all classes of consumables and for major end-items when war reserve stocks are depleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve units and personnel may impose limited demands on the training base if some unit members are unskilled or have not completed mandatory training. They may create significant demands on health service support (HSS) as they mobilize, deploy, and sustain casualties. Dependents of RC members will also impose additional workloads on CONUS health care resources. When deployed overseas, Selected Reserve units and personnel will create demands for available HNS such as transportation and facilities. Finally, they require a legal authority to authorize their callup and funds to pay for tours of active duty and benefits.

b. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). Individuals mobilized from the various sources (IRR, military retirees, and Standby Reserve) place the same demands on other resource areas, as described above, once they report to their assigned units. Before they are assigned to a unit, however, they create demands for intra-CONUS transportation; for an initial issue of clothing and individual equipment; and for subsistence, housing, and health care. Most individuals mobilized from PIM sources will need reclassification or refresher training in the training base. If assigned overseas as unit fillers or replacements, they will place a demand for a nonunit personnel space on the strategic transportation system and require weapons, ammunition, and mobility bags.

c. Nonprior Service (NPS) Manpower. NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers) imposes essentially the same demands as PIM imposes on the other resource areas. Because they are untrained at accession, they will impose demands on the training base for basic and initial skills training.

d. Civilian Manpower. Civilian personnel create demands on resource areas based on their employment categories. DOD civilian employees at military installations normally live at home and only require a salary and workspace to do their jobs. A DOD civilian or contractor employee required in the theater of operations may require clothing, chemical and biological defense equipment and training, passports and visas, housing, and subsistence; intra-CONUS, strategic, and intratheater transportation; basic battlefield
survival training; and health care. The use of DOD civilian and contractor personnel or local nationals makes military personnel available to fight. They are used because they have critical skills that are not available in the Military Services.

### SECTION B. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

"When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army."

**Napoleon I**

*Maxims of War*

#### 7. Sources of Materiel and Equipment

The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It includes equipment on hand in units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign commercial sources. These sources and the options and actions for obtaining them are listed in Figure IV-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Equipment on hand in units</td>
<td>Redistribute based on emergency priorities</td>
<td>Military Department decisions based on supported commanders requirements and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War reserve and pre-positioned stockpiles</td>
<td>Release stocks</td>
<td>Military Department decisions for retail items. Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board decisions for wholesale stocks insufficient to meet demands of all claimants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depot system</td>
<td>Accelerate output</td>
<td>Military Department decisions based on supported commanders’ requirements and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial base</td>
<td>Accelerate output</td>
<td>Military Departments and Defense agencies act to surge production of needed materiel and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materiel and equipment in security assistance pipelines</td>
<td>Divert needed equipment from security assistance pipelines</td>
<td>National Command Authorities decision based on a determination that national security requirements outweigh political consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic and foreign commercial vendors</td>
<td>Purchase off-the-shelf products that meet military requirements</td>
<td>Military Department and Defense agency decisions based on Federal acquisition regulations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-2. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options**
8. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: (1) increasing the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force, and (2) alleviating shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with emergency priorities. These activities can be undertaken either separately or in combination to equip and sustain the mobilized force.

a. Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability. Decision options that increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot stocks, accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system, diverting items from foreign military sales and other security assistance programs, accelerating production rates of existing contracts for consumable items like clothing and rations, and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign sources. Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply pipeline. Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these options are exercised by the Military Departments, DLA, and other Defense agencies as they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the combatant commanders. Action to divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant effect on our relations with affected allies and must be taken at the NCA level. However, once diverted and allocated to a Military Department, they are distributed as determined by the owning Military Department.

b. Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions taken internally by the Military Departments based on OPLAN priorities and guided by the DOD policy to equip earlier deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US military claimants, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines priorities among the Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility. The JMPAB is chaired by the J-4, Joint Staff and includes other Joint Staff directors as well as general or flag officer representatives from the Military Departments. In coalition warfare, the United States may be responsible for providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies. When shortages occur, priority and allocation decisions for resolving conflicts among allies, or between US claimants and allies, are made by the NCA.

9. Effects of Materiel and Equipment Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Increased materiel and equipment densities create work loads requiring additional manpower for operations and maintenance. Higher equipment densities generate requirements for additional repair parts, tools, and test equipment. Additional transportation resources would be required to move items from storage or production sites within the United States to destinations outside the United States. Additional storage and maintenance facilities may be required at transshipment points and receiving organizations. Industrial base output must be capable of meeting the added demand for spares. Training base capacity might have
to be expanded to provide additional operator and maintenance personnel. HSS might also have to be expanded to care for the increased number of operator and maintenance personnel. Additional funding would also have to be obtained. Additional communications support will be required to process greater volumes of inventory management and transaction data between unit customers and points of supply and repair.

SECTION C. TRANSPORTATION

"You can’t have any more of anything than you can haul."

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, USA

10. Sources of Mobilization Transportation

Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. Mobilization activities are supported principally by intra-CONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, port facilities, and inland waterway assets of commercial firms. These assets move units and unit equipment through the mobilization process from home stations to mobilization sites and to ports of embarkation; nonunit personnel from their homes to reception and training sites and then to replacement centers and ports of embarkation; and nonunit equipment from production and storage sites to ports of embarkation. Deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations are supported primarily by strategic airlift and sealift, which move units, nonunit personnel, and sustainment items (nonunit equipment and supplies) from the United States to the theaters of operation. RC transportation terminal brigades and battalions provide the military interface at commercial seaports of embarkation, deployment support brigades assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation, and port security companies provide security at military ocean terminals. All of these units must be mobilized early to support deployment from CONUS. The sources of additional transportation resources for mobilization and the options for mobilizing them are listed in Figure IV-3. It is important to note that transportation assets

Activating the CRAF is a proven option for augmenting organic airlift capability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF TRANSPORTATION AUGMENTATION</th>
<th>TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STRATEGIC AIRLIFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve component airlift assets</td>
<td>Task Air Mobility Command, Reserve</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy activate units and individuals with an appropriate callup order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary charter</td>
<td>Charter available commercial aircraft.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS obtains commercial charter airlift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Stage I</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS activates and operationally directs CRAF I assets with SECDEF approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRAF Stage II</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS activates and operationally directs CRAF II assets with SECDEF approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STRATEGIC SEALIFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary charter</td>
<td>Charter available commercial vessels when required to augment USTRANSCOM controlled fleet.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS obtains commercial charter shipping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOD reduced operational status ships</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS requests reduced operational status approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ready Reserve Force</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS requests through CJS; SECDEF approves (by agreement with the Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS); Maritime Administration (National Defense Reserve Fleet) implements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sealift Readiness Program vessels</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS, with approval of SECDEF, activates with the concurrence of SECTRANS, and commands assets of the SRP/VTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA)</td>
<td>Augment when required to augment sealift (tanker) capacity.</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM activates as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fast Sealift Ships</td>
<td>Activate when necessary to augment sealift capacity.</td>
<td>USCINCTRANS obtains commercial charter airlift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONUS TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td>Activate the Contingency response program.</td>
<td>The Contingency response program team assembles at the call of USCINCTRANS to prevent or resolve transportation shortfalls. Secretary of the Army publishes callup order for transportation terminal units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options
must be mobilized before substantial deployments can be executed.

### 11. Transportation Mobilization Options

a. A variety of decision options are available for mobilization of strategic and intra-CONUS lift assets. As **Air National Guard** and **Air Force Reserve assets of the Air Mobility Command (AMC)** and **airlift assets of the Naval Reserve** are being activated, **voluntary and contract AMC charter, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil Aircraft Program airlift** (in NATO emergencies) can be called to provide the needed capacity. Limited peacetime sealift, operated by Military Sealift Command, can be augmented by voluntary or contract charter, activation of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), chartering, requisition of US-flag and effective United States Controlled shipping (US owned but under foreign registry), and a limited number of NATO ships (in NATO emergencies). Foreign-owned flag ships are also a potential source of additional sealift through chartering. Activation of any ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet which remain after activation of the RRF would only occur as attrition fillers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF TRANSPORTATION AUGMENTATION</th>
<th>TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC AIRLIFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craf Stage III</td>
<td>Activate when necessary to augment airlift capacity.</td>
<td>USCINTRANS activates and commands Craf III assets with the approval of SECDEF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign voluntary charters</td>
<td>Charter available foreign aircraft.</td>
<td>USCINTRANS enters into agreements with foreign carriers consistent with the Fly American Act.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO allied pre-committed civil aircraft program aircraft</td>
<td>Request NATO resources when required to augment US airlift capacity.</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements and responds to requests for airlift.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC SEALIFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requisitioned US-flag and effective United States controlled shipping vessels</td>
<td>Requisitioned as required to meet sealift requirements.</td>
<td>With declaration of National emergency, SECTRANS requisitions ships at the request of SECDEF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval inactive fleet of the national defense reserve fleet</td>
<td>Activate when required to augment sealift capacity.</td>
<td>With declaration of National emergency, USCINTRANS requests through CJCS; SECDEF orders activation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO vessels</td>
<td>Request NATO resources when required to augment US sealift capacity.</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements and responds to requests for NATO ships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air, rail, highway, and barge</td>
<td>Seek priorities and allocations of domestic transportation when required to augment capacity.</td>
<td>With declaration of National emergency, the President invokes priorities and allocations for DOD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options (continued)
b. Defense priority for the various modes of intra-CONUS transportation resources can be obtained through the USTRANSCOM/Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Contingency Response Program (CORE). CORE provides quick acquisition of domestic surface transportation resources during peacetime, national emergencies, or major military deployments. The CORE network, a major component of the CORE program, is an association of members from DOT, the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies, and the commercial transportation industry. The CORE network functions as a rapid response team to prevent or resolve transportation shortfalls.

12. Effect of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Mobilization of transportation resources will substantially affect the manpower resource area because highly skilled operators and crews are required, as well as maintenance and cargo handling personnel, at ports and transshipment points. The effect on ports, airfields, highways, pipelines, railroads and inland waterways; facilities required for activation, maintenance, and storage; and repair parts and materials handling equipment may be significant. Legal authorities and funding are required to enable transportation resource expansion. Influence on the training base could be significant in a protracted conflict with high attrition rates of operator or crew personnel.

a. Augmenting Strategic Airlift. Each additional aircraft affects runway, throughput, marshalling, and temporary storage capacity at airfields; these factors could become constraints at departure, en route and arrival airfields. Aircrews require subsistence and transient quarters, and aircrew shortages and crew rest considerations could also become constraints. Influence on the military training base should be minimal unless commercial carriers lose their capability to conduct their respective training. Some additional demands will be placed on the industrial base as stocks of repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviation fuel, lubricants, repair parts, hull and liability insurance, and qualified mechanics could become constraints.

b. Augmenting Strategic Sealift. In addition to applicable constraints listed above, the charter, requisition, or activation of each additional ship draws on the available pool of licensed officers, and certified merchant seamen. The withdrawal of commercial vessel insurance and war-risk exclusion for crew life insurance may also constrain the use of commercial vessels. To surmount this constraint, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Secretary of Transportation, to issue war-risk insurance under Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 USC 1285. Crew shortages could become a constraint, particularly if market forces and mortality rates result in a reduced pool of available private sector US merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships from normal commercial service can have adverse long-term impacts on the commercial sealift carrier’s business. Ships require berthing and anchorage space at ports, which, together with temporary storage, staging areas, cargo handling capabilities, and transportation mode links, determine throughput capacity. Laws governing the handling of hazardous materials, such as ammunition, limit the number of ports that can handle such loads. Drydocks, shipyard facilities, and skilled labor are required for activation and periodic refitting. Constraints in the other resource areas should be minimal except in extreme conditions marked by high attrition. Additionally, shortages of stevedores may be experienced if heavy demands are placed on multiple commercial ports within the same geographic area.

c. Augmenting Intra-CONUS Transportation Resources. The response and assistance of the CORE Program
Network enables the Department of Defense to obtain transportation resources (air, rail, highway, barge, pipeline, and port facilities) not available through normal procurement channels. If the voluntary efforts of the CORE network members still result in transportation shortfalls, the Department of Defense can request that DOT issue priority service or allocation orders to the commercial transportation industry to support DOD requirements. Demands in the other resource areas should not be significant, except in extreme circumstances. Spot shortages in operator, crew, or maintenance personnel could occur if large numbers of commercial carrier employees are ordered to military duty or if local transportation demands are heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repair parts, maintenance, and transshipment facilities could also occur during peak periods. At some installations, capacity of railheads and spurs could be a constraint.

**SECTION D. FACILITIES**

"Fleets cannot operate without bases."

Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC (testimony to House Naval Affairs Committee, 13 March 1920)

13. Sources of Facilities

The Department of Defense uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and support troops. Facilities are also needed to provide storage, maintain equipment, and conduct operations. Military bases, depots, medical treatment facilities, airfields, and seaports are representative examples. Facilities with the capacity for supporting increased workloads during mobilization are obtained from the following sources: commercial facilities that support the Department of Defense in peacetime; unused and standby capacity at existing government facilities; and new capacity developed on property acquired by the Department of Defense through lease, purchase, or exercise of other legal means. These are listed in Figure IV-4, together with the options and actions for acquiring needed facilities during mobilization.

14. Facilities Mobilization Options

Options for expanding facilities during mobilization include reopening unused capacity with actions short of new construction, initiating emergency military

The Department of Defense exercises its legal authority to provide for port facilities during mobilized sealift operations.
### Table: Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF FACILITIES</th>
<th>FACILITIES MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Existing government property</td>
<td>- Standby capacity: Activate standby capacity</td>
<td>Military Departments act within available funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unused capacity: Develop unused capacity</td>
<td>Military Departments initiate emergency military construction projects using unobligated funds (10 USC 2803) or SECDEF Contingency Construction Authority (10 USC 2804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newly acquired property</td>
<td>Lease, purchase, and develop as required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National emergency or war</td>
<td>Existing government property</td>
<td>Develop unused capacity</td>
<td>Military Departments initiate emergency military construction projects with additional authorities available upon declaration of national emergency:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newly acquired property</td>
<td>Lease, purchase, and develop as required</td>
<td>- SECDEF authority to modify current military construction program within military construction appropriations and unobligated family housing funding (10 USC 2808).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recaptured former government property</td>
<td>Recapture and develop as provided by law</td>
<td>SECDEF acts under statutory provisions for recapture of specified parcels of former Federal property.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Construction Projects and Housing

- **Construction Projects** to increase capacity at existing facilities, and **acquisition of new facilities** through the recapture of former federal property. Facilities can include all kinds of military installations, airfields, and seaports. CONUS and outside CONUS facilities are included.

- **a. Initiate Emergency Military Construction.** The Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the Military Departments can initiate emergency military construction projects with unobligated balances of military construction funds, the Secretary of Defense contingency construction authority, or with a modified military construction program, enabled with a declaration of national emergency and unobligated military construction and family housing funds. Beyond these options, construction of new or expanded facilities requires a request for a supplemental military construction appropriation. Waivers or relief from environmental protection statutes and some occupational health and safety regulations may also be required.

- **b. Acquire Additional Real Property and Commercial Facilities.** Under the law, hundreds of parcels of former federal property may be recaptured to provide land and improved infrastructure for conversion into needed facilities. In addition, privately owned lands may be acquired by condemnation for defense purposes, such as training or manufacturing of ammunition and other items of materiel.
CRAF: A MIDDLE-AGED SUCCESS

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a 43-year old program designed to augment the organic capability of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) with civil aircraft, was called into service first time ever on 18 August 1990. On that date, Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command (AMC)) activated the 38 cargo and passenger aircraft of Stage I to meet the initial surge requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Secretary of Defense followed 5 months later, on 16 January 1991, by activating CRAF Stage II, adding more aircraft to meet the pressing sustainment requirements of Operation DESERT STORM.

Established in 1952, CRAF was sized and structured to meet the threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Its purpose was “to augment US military airlift forces with civil air carriers to support emergency airlift requirements.” Under CRAF, US air carriers voluntarily commit cargo and passenger aircraft to support airlift requirements that exceed airlift capabilities. The carriers pledge specific aircraft by tail number to one of three stages of crisis escalation: Stage I—Committed Expansion; Stage II—Defense Airlift Emergency; or Stage III—National Emergency. The CRAF support is also divided into five functional segments: long-range international, short range international, domestic, Alaskan, and aeromedical. Once activated, the carriers continue to operate the aircraft and provide full support, including fuel, spare parts, and maintenance. AMC, however, assumes mission control. Several carriers also have agreed to serve as senior lodgers during Stage III. In that capacity, they provide expanded ground support services to all aircraft and their crews, using designated commercial airports.

Each stage of CRAF is designed to meet the increased airlift requirements of escalating levels of emergency. The Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM can call up Stage I aircraft on 24-hour notice to meet crisis requirements. The Secretary of Defense can activate Stage II aircraft, also on 24-hour notice, during an emergency that is less than a full mobilization. The Secretary of Defense also can activate Stage III aircraft, under either of the following conditions: one, the President or Congress declares a Defense-oriented national emergency, or, two, in a situation short of a declared Defense-oriented national emergency. In Stage III, the air carriers have 48 hours to make their aircraft available to the government.

Although principally aimed at augmenting organic airlift capabilities during wartime, the CRAF Program is also used to allocate some of AMC’s peacetime values to carriers that commit aircraft to, for example, the long-range international segment of CRAF, based upon aircraft type (cargo or passenger), payload, block speed, and range, etc. AMC then uses the mobilization values to establish “entitlements,” expressed in annual dollar shares of its cargo or passenger business.

A “joint venture” concept provides another incentive for carriers to join the CRAF Program. Under this concept, carriers are not required to convert the mobilization values associated with their commitment into peacetime business. Instead, they can trade those mobilization values to their joint-venture CRAF partners that want to augment normal commercial business with military
movements. The concept was established to induce carriers, particularly small-package carriers, to join CRAF that may not do so otherwise.

The process for CRAF activation begins when the combatant commanders specify their requirements, expressed in a variety of terms (military units, equipment end items, ammunition, resupply materiel, etc.), and the date they are needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves those requirements, and USTRANSCOM translates the requirements into time-phased deployment data and designates them for movement by either airlift or sealift. USTRANSCOM then provides the airlift deployment data to AMC to develop detailed lift requirements and the flight schedules necessary to meet them. After programming its organic lift capability, AMC determines the civil augmentation necessary, taking into consideration the amount currently available by expanding the scope of on-going contracts (expansion buy). AMC also assesses, as warranted, the CRAF stage that best meets the unsatisfied airlift requirements, notifies the carriers of possible CRAF activations, and either activates CRAF Stage I (with USTRANSCOM approval, sends a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through USTRANSCOM) requesting declaration of an airlift or national emergency to activate either Stage II or III. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then notifies the Secretary of Defense, who, if he concurs with the CJCS’s position, apprises the Secretary of Transportation of his intent to activate CRAF. Once activated, the Chairman assigns airlift priorities to meet the CINC’s requirements.

Shortly after the President’s decision to launch a military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, US air carriers voluntarily began supporting the airlift requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD through an AMC “expansion buy.” They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990. By the 17th, they had completed in excess of 100 passenger and cargo missions (i.e. international flights) involving more than 30 aircraft. On 18 August 1990, AMC activated the 38 aircraft from 16 carriers in CRAF Stage I. In one month, those aircraft flew 391 missions in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Over the next four months, the number of CRAF missions increased to 1,903.

On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of CRAF Stage II to meet the additional cargo airlift requirements of Operation DESERT STORM. Consequently, by 12 February, the daily CRAF mission capability increased to an average 23.4 missions per day, an 86 percent increase over support for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The CRAF Program is a DOD success story. This program, first originated to satisfy Cold War requirements, has proven its worth through the years in satisfying peacetime airlift requirements that exceeded organic military lift capabilities. Further, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US commercial carriers responded to both the program’s incentives and the Stage I-II activations completing in excess of 4,700 missions to move units, equipment, and resupply materiel. This proved invaluable in providing AMC with the means to satisfy the combatant commander’s surge, sustainment, and redeployment requirements.

Chapter IV

15. Effect of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

Expanding facilities will require more manpower, both military and civilian, to staff tenant organizations and provide required services. The greatest effect will be on the civilian side in the form of contract construction workers and DOD personnel employed to expand tenant support services. Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk of this support overseas. There will be a significant local demand for construction materials and equipment—from stocks and from the industrial base. As the facility grows in capacity or expands operations, the increased population will require more health care and other support services. If these resources are available, the effect on planned facilities expansion will be minimal. Shortfalls in these areas will reduce capacity and constrain productivity.

SECTION E. INDUSTRIAL BASE

“It is a war of smokestacks as well as of men.”

George C. Marshall
(Address to the US Chamber of Commerce, 29 April 1941)

16. Industrial Mobilization Sources

The US industrial base includes domestic commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are government operated and some are contractor operated. Foreign producers of essential components and parts must also be included, because foreign producers may be the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique relationship existing between the United States and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. The capabilities of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning. Figure IV-5 lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand their output.

17. Industrial Mobilization Options

Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from offshore sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.

18. Effect of Industrial Mobilization on the Other Resource Areas

a. Expand the Industrial Base. Surge production and industrial base expansion will require additional skilled manpower from the nondefense sectors of the national economy. Local manpower shortages could develop in areas hard hit by extensive military manpower mobilization and competition between DOD contractors and others for limited numbers of the same skills. Materiel and equipment stocks, transportation, and facilities could be significantly affected if raw materials, finished products, tools, and test equipment become short; local and long distance hauling is not sufficiently manned; and new construction does not meet the demand. Additional legal authorities may be invoked or requested from the Congress upon the determination that DOD production in a crisis is being adversely affected. Environmental and occupational health and safety regulations may also require
The Department of Commerce is responsible for DPAS activities concerning industrial resources. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will coordinate with the Department of Commerce concerning industrial resource issues requiring resolution through DPAS.

c. Obtain Allied Production Support. The Department of Defense has become increasingly reliant on offshore production of essential components, repair parts, tools, and test equipment needed for domestic production of virtually all major weapons systems and other key items of materiel and equipment. Wartime surge and industrial base waivers. Substantial additional funding may be required to enable increased production.

b. Implement the DPAS. The DPAS is authorized by the Defense Production Act (50 USC app. 2071) and allows preferential treatment for contracts or orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs for military production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling. This authority specifically includes reordering national priorities and rationing available industrial resources (articles, materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials).

The Department of Commerce is responsible for DPAS activities concerning industrial resources. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will coordinate with the Department of Commerce concerning industrial resource issues requiring resolution through DPAS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL BASE SOURCES</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Commercial producers of goods and services</td>
<td>Accelerate production from current sources of goods and services</td>
<td>Military Departments and Defense Logistics Agency contract for accelerated production from current producers of materiel based on planned or actual consumption rates and prioritized requirements of the combatant commanders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand production base capacity</td>
<td>-Under provisions of Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), 50 USC app. 2071, obtain priority performance on DOD contracts and orders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Using DPAS authorities and streamlined acquisition procedures, increase industrial capacity for production of materiel and equipment required to sustain the mobilized force.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government-owned/ government-operated production facilities</td>
<td>-Accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity at government-owned/government-operated facilities and government-owned/contractor-operated facilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government-owned/ contractor-operated production facilities</td>
<td>-Seek additional production from foreign suppliers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-5. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options
expansion can be expected to have a significant effect on offshore producers as well. The reliability of these sources could significantly influence the ability to provide needed materiel and equipment to support and sustain operations. Conversely, the availability of offshore production support in areas where the domestic production base can no longer expand, could have substantial positive results on the manpower, materiel and equipment, and facilities resource areas. Similar to domestic source problems, foreign supplier problems should be forwarded through the DPAS chain for resolution by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Commerce.

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE

19. Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity

The Services expand their institutional training bases to train NPS personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure. The training base also provides reclassification and refresher training for PIM who need it. Based on the rate of force expansion and attrition due to casualties, training base output requirements, over time, are determined and compared to available capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations from the RC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, and by contracting for additional instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in Figure IV-6.

20. Effect of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas

Training base expansion may cause significant effects on the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, health service support, and funding resource areas. It may also affect the environmental, transportation, industrial base, communications, and legal areas. It is not expected to have any measurable influence on HNS, although the training of allied military personnel, along with security assistance and other agreements, could affect the training base capacity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING BASE CAPACITY</th>
<th>TRAINING BASE EXPANSION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Wartime policies and programs of instruction</td>
<td>Implement wartime training policies and programs</td>
<td>Implement wartime programs of instruction; extend the training day and training week; increase class size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve component training units</td>
<td>Expand existing training centers and schools</td>
<td>Call up Reserve component training base augmentation units as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New training centers and schools</td>
<td>Add new training centers and schools</td>
<td>Call up remaining Reserve component training base augmentation units; activate new training units; acquire new training facilities and support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-6. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options
SECTION G. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

“No price is too great to preserve the health of the fleet.”

Lord St. Vincent
Letter to the Admiralty, (1796)

21. General

Theater, CONUS, and aeromedical evacuation HSS is expanded to serve the mobilized force and provide the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties in CONUS. HSS requirements are determined from decisions establishing the theater medical support and theater evacuation policy. Several factors, such as casualty rates, availability and readiness of HSS units, transportation resources, blood supplies, and HNS assist in determining the theater HSS required. CONUS hospital beds and facilities are increased to accommodate the expected flow of casualties and increases in the population of the CONUS support base. The aeromedical evacuation system is increased to employ the necessary contingency aeromedical evacuation elements needed to support the increased intratheater, intertheater and CONUS evacuee requirements. The nonactive duty beneficiary population eligible for government health care may be transferred to the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) Program or a Managed Care/TRICARE contract as requirements for serving uniformed military beneficiaries approach the available capacity. Experience from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM indicated, however, that costs may be too high for the CHAMPUS Program. The Military Departments were required to backfill vacancies created by deploying HSS personnel with reservists in order to maintain the same level of HSS care for dependents and retirees. Military Department mobilization plans should include provisions for activating RC HSS professionals for immediate backfill at CONUS medical treatment facilities.

22. Sources of Emergency HSS

The sources of skilled HSS manpower and hospital beds to meet emergency and wartime requirements for health care are listed in Figure IV-7, together with the options and actions required to mobilize additional health care capacity.

During mobilization, health services support may be provided by reassigning personnel from CONUS to hospital ships deployed to the theater of operations.
Chapter IV

Joint Pub 4-05

23. Options for Mobilizing HSS

a. Options for mobilizing additional health service support professionals parallel those for other manpower skills. In time of national emergency, the transfer of members of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) commissioned corps to the Department of Defense may also provide additional health service professionals.

b. Theater HSS and aeromedical support is expanded by calling up, transferring, and reassigning health service professionals from the CONUS base to AC and RC HSS units and hospital ships deployed to the theater. Additional callup of reserves is required to backfill CONUS health service facilities vacated by their peacetime staffs.

c. The CONUS HSS base is expanded, as necessary, to provide care for casualties returned from combat theaters. In addition to expanding CONUS military hospitals, this process may also include implementing, in turn, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)-DOD Contingency Plan and the National Defense Medical System (NDMS), which provide additional beds and professional staff from DVA and commercial civilian resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT</th>
<th>MOBILIZING HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Reserve component health service support units and individuals</td>
<td>Mobilize volunteer individuals and units of the Selected Reserve</td>
<td>Military Departments order units and volunteer individuals to active duty within the limits of Presidential authorities invoked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals</td>
<td>Implement the Department of Veterans Affairs-DOD Contingency Plan</td>
<td>DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs act in accordance with the Department of Veterans Affairs and DOD Health Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (38 USC 8111A) when DOD requirements exceed supply of continental United States military hospital beds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-nation health care systems</td>
<td>Activate host-nation support agreements</td>
<td>Geographical combatant commander requests support in accordance with agreements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve component health service support units and individuals</td>
<td>Mobilize remaining Reserve component health service support units and individuals</td>
<td>Military Departments order Reserve component units and individuals to active duty.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic civilian health care system</td>
<td>Transfer United States Public Health Service commissioned members to DOD or United States Coast Guard</td>
<td>United States Public Health Service assigns members to DOD or USCG with SECDEF or SECTRANS request and Presidential Executive order.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National emergency or war</td>
<td>Activate National Disaster Medical System</td>
<td>SECDEF acts under provisions of Public Health Service Act when bed requirements exceed capacity of DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV-7. Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options
24. Effect of HSS Mobilization on Other Resource Areas

The process of expanding theater HSS may significantly burden the manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HNS, and legal resource areas. Increasing the CONUS HSS base may significantly influence the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, industrial base, and legal resource areas. Some effects could also be felt in the transportation and training base areas. The transfer of dependent and retiree health care support to the CHAMPUS Program or Managed Care/TRICARE contract may have a significant effect on funding. The effect of mobilization in the remaining resource areas is not expected to be significant. Few or no changes are expected in the communications or HNS areas.

SECTION H. COMMUNICATIONS

“Communications dominate war...they are the most important single element...political or military.”

Mahan
The Problem of Asia, 1900

25. Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support

The Federal Government relies primarily upon commercial providers for the communications required for national defense and crisis response. For this reason, the Communications Act of 1934 provides the President with substantial authority during the entire range of military operations to regulate and control virtually every form of telecommunications resource at the national and local levels. Included within this authority are devices and stations for wire, radio, and microwave transmissions. In operations other than war, the DCS and the Federal Communications Commission jointly operate a telecommunications services priority system, which prioritizes the provisioning and restoration of critical Federal, State, local, and private circuits needed for national security. DISA, the manager of the National Communications System (NCS), monitors situations that could develop into emergencies, provides recommendations for the use of resources, and maintains liaison with commercial providers. In time of national emergency or war, the President may invoke special war powers under Section 706 of the act (47 USC 606). These powers allow the President to take immediate measures to ensure the continuous operation and security of telecommunications services without negotiations or the consent of those who are affected. The DCS assets of the NCS are reserved for the exclusive use of the DOD. Other NCS assets support other departments and agencies of the Federal government. These other assets are made available to the DOD during emergencies to provide additional communications in the theater of operations.

26. Effect of Communications Mobilization Activities on Other Resource Areas

Virtually all communications resources required across the range of military operations come from unused and redirected capacity maintained in peacetime. Some increases in personnel to accommodate additional operations, maintenance, and security needs may be required. The effect on other resource areas is expected to be minimal, except as the result of unexpected attrition or protracted global war, which would generate requirements to replace fixed infrastructure.
SECTION I. HOST-NATION SUPPORT

“We must take a powerful armament with us from home to a distant land...Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country which is entirely strange to you...”

Nicias of Athens
(on the Syracusan expedition, 415 BC)

27. Sources of HNS

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations during war or emergency offset requirements for corresponding US military resources that are not affordable or practical to maintain in peacetime. **A number of agreements are maintained with an ever-growing array of allies for defense cooperation** during the entire range of military operations. Every effort should be made through the Department of State and the Department of Defense to establish some form of **mutual support, defense cooperation** and/or **cross-serving arrangements** with US allies and emerging democracies around the globe. Initial cooperation can be achieved by helping to establish a data base of military and commercial capabilities available in each nation, as well as standardized procedures to allow for rapid communication and understanding in a crisis situation. Additionally, this process enhances diplomatic efforts during peacetime and facilitates crisis management/contingency decisionmaking by quickly providing more options to US and coalition NCA. **Direct HNS is that which can be provided by an ally’s military units that are organized and equipped for that specific purpose.** Financial stipulations may have already been established on a bilateral basis with a formula spelled out formally in a defense cooperation agreement. However, other arrangements may be made based on the situation at hand, to include multinational agreements with a regional or coalition organization or the United Nations (UN). Financial reimbursement policies and procedures may be developed through the use of in and out audit surveys (UN system) or some other process. Indirect support may be provided by host-nation commercial entities with licensing agreements or permissions granted by an allied government.

28. Options for Mobilizing HNS

a. Implement Existing Agreements. Mutual support or defense cooperation agreements can be implemented upon the mutual consent of the United States and the providing nation throughout the full range of military operations.

b. Obtain Additional Support. The variable and uncertain nature of global security threats may create unforeseen situations where it may be necessary to seek ad hoc HNS. Such support is normally obtained through government-to-government negotiations or through negotiations conducted at a mutually agreed lower level.

29. Effects of Mobilizing HNS on the Other Resource Areas

Implementation of existing or additional mutual support or defense cooperation agreements, depending on the nature of the support provided, will affect the providing nation or nations’ resource areas, particularly manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation assets, and possibly facilities. In addition to offsetting US resource requirements for the specified support, the ability of the host-nation may greatly influence one or more US resource areas,
particularly if the host nations are unable or unwilling to provide the level of support expected by the United States.

**SECTION J. THE ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL AUTHORITIES, FUNDING**

"Modern war is a death grapple between peoples and economic systems, rather than a conflict of armies alone."

Bernard M. Baruch
1870-1965

30. General

Each of the nine resource areas discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter contributes to developing, expanding, sustaining, or positioning military capability so that it may be applied to protect our national security interests in an emergency. Mobilization planners, however, must also consider the effect of mobilization activities on the environment as well as the necessities of legal authorities and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization activities. This section discusses, in turn, the sources of these enabling resources as well as the options available and actions necessary to obtain them.

a. Environment

- **General.** The United States has a substantial framework of environmental laws. Awareness of environmental issues, requirements for compliance, and the liabilities or penalties associated with noncompliance mandate the identification and resolution of environmental issues that affect mobilization. Most environmental laws and regulations do not provide automatic relief or waivers in time of emergency, and **DOD policy in the United States is to maintain environmental standards to the maximum extent practicable during emergencies.** The implications of this policy affect several resource areas. For example, emergency legislation may be required to exempt temporarily critical industries and military organizations from a wide array of regulatory requirements. Some issues regarding environmental matters in the United States may require resolution through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), such as fines levied against the Department of Defense by EPA or state authorities for violation of environmental statutes. **Additional manpower and other resources may be required** to ensure continued compliance with environmental protection requirements. **Military personnel may be accountable in criminal proceedings for failing to comply with environmental statutes.** The Department of Defense is ultimately responsible for compliance, cleanup, and conservation involved in CONUS military locations. Overseas, US policy is to follow Final Governing Standards developed by the designated DOD executive agent. These standards are based on host-nation law and the DOD Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, whichever is more stringent, unless status-of-forces agreements or other international agreements require another standard.

- **Types of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization.** As shown in Figure IV-8, four categories of environmental statutes concern mobilization planners.

  - **Compliance.** Compliance statutes require DOD facilities to meet pollution emission standards; to obtain and maintain Federal, state, and local permits...
to release pollutants; and to meet record keeping and training requirements. EPA, Coast Guard, state, and local inspectors conduct periodic inspections for compliance. In cases of severe or long-standing noncompliance, agreements are often negotiated between the regulatory agency and the installation commander. If an agreement cannot be reached, issues are referred to successively higher levels of authority for resolution. Examples of compliance statutes include:

- Clean Air Act (42 USC 7401 et seq.)
- Clean Water Act (33 USC 1251 et seq.)
- Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 USC 6901 et seq.)

**Cleanup.** Cleanup statutes obligate the DOD to protect human health and the environment from past activities that have contaminated the land (e.g., firing ranges and waste disposal sites). Included are sites the Department of Defense now owns, or has owned in the past, and non-DOD property where DOD operations have been conducted or DOD waste disposal has been arranged with the property owner. Enforcement of cleanup statutes normally relies on cleanup orders or agreements. The Department of Defense is required to survey all of its property in CONUS and US territories for potential hazardous waste disposal sites and identify those that require cleanup. The worst cases are identified on the EPA National Priorities List, and their cleanup is regulated by EPA. Examples of cleanup statutes include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Department Environmental Restoration Program.
Resource Areas

• Options for Obtaining Relief from Environmental Requirements

• The potential impact that mobilization might have upon the environment should be identified in supporting mobilization plans and should provide for compliance with applicable environmental laws. When compliance is not possible, negotiations may be conducted with Federal, state, and local agencies to develop acceptable alternative means of compliance. During some critical mobilization activities, existing national security exemption authorities may be exercised. As a last resort, requests for emergency legislation may be submitted to exempt critical industries and DOD organizations from regulatory requirements.

• Planning for actions to remedy damage caused as the result of waivers or noncompliance with environmental standards during mobilization should be taken as soon as possible. For example, additional military and civilian personnel with needed skills such as explosive ordnance disposal may be required to clean up the area of operations.

• As most major contingencies have the potential to significantly affect the environment, planners should consult with their supporting environmental and legal offices at the earliest possible time. Clean Air Act conformity exclusion determinations should be maintained in a single office along with any agreements negotiated with regulators.

b. Legal Authorities

• Categories of Legal Authority. There are nearly 400 legal authorities drawn
directly from, or based on, provisions of the US Code, that enable or limit mobilization and emergency actions. As seen in the sources and options figures in this chapter, many of these are available to the President in any level of emergency; others become available with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Still others have been reserved by the Congress pending passage of a public law or joint resolution of national emergency or declaration of war.

• Action Required to Obtain Legal Authorities. All emergency authorities specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked and implemented. Once invoked, the President may delegate authorities to lower levels, if allowed by law (e.g., the Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, combatant commanders) (3 USC 301). As provided in the National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 USC 1631, the President must explicitly invoke the desired emergency authorities in Executive orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. For example, requests for manpower mobilization authorities from the Military Departments and combatant commanders are integrated by the Joint Staff and forwarded with a draft executive order to the Secretary of Defense as a recommendation for Presidential action. Generally, for major mobilization actions such as involuntary manpower callups, which may be sensitive in both the domestic and international political arenas, authorities are invoked for incremental levels of personnel callup. Failure to obtain the requested authority, waiver, or relief precludes initiation of the desired activity in a particular resource area and may affect one or more other resource areas. Appendix A, “Legal Authorities,” contains a more complete description of key legal authorities relative to mobilization.

c. Funding

• Although financial considerations will not necessarily be a major factor in deciding on military action, funding does often require special attention. To facilitate funding mobilization for unplanned military operations, it may be necessary to cite special legal authorities to provide financial resources before receiving appropriated funds from the Congress. At the outset of an operation, senior decisionmakers should be aware of the magnitude of associated costs and recognize the possible impacts on other areas. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not make funding decisions. In peacetime, the Chairman assesses the effect of operational resource requests made by the Military Departments and Defense agencies in the PPBS process and recommends to the Secretary of Defense how available funding should be distributed in order to implement National Military Strategy. In wartime, the Chairman, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide advice to the NCA concerning funding priorities.

• Major mobilizations will affect virtually all resource areas, well beyond the costs of salaries, benefits, and subsistence of the personnel involved. The costs of transportation, housing, HSS, training, and equipping the force should be included in estimating the total cost and should be included in supplemental or amended funding requests submitted to the Congress.
31. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of major mobilization activities by resource area. Mobilization planners and decisionmakers at all levels in the JPEC should understand that activities initiated in any one area influence each of the others. Thorough coordination and integration of mobilization plans between resource area proponents is essential for timely force expansion and sustainment until the termination or resolution of the emergency that required mobilization.
Intentionally Blank
1. **Introduction**

   a. **Mobilization plans** support combatant commanders’ OPLANs, selected CONPLANs, functional plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans. They are detailed plans prepared by the Military Departments, USSOCOM, and Defense agencies. They are based on policy and planning guidance in the DOD MMG and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and in tasks specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. They reflect requirements for force expansion with RC units and PIM and for expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for as long as necessary to achieve military and national security objectives. They explain how force and resource expansion is to be accomplished.

   b. Mobilization is a complex, time-sensitive process with many participants and activities spanning the 12 resource areas. **Mobilization plans must be carefully integrated** among participants and resource areas. **Mobilization execution must be sequenced and carefully synchronized** to ensure that resources are available to the supported and supporting commanders when needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Joint Staff, integrates mobilization planning and monitors the status and progress of mobilization execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the Secretary of Defense on establishing priorities; allocating resource shortages among claimants; and redirecting execution activities, when necessary, to eliminate bottlenecks and overcome unforeseen problems.

   c. Opportunities to determine the validity of mobilization plans and practice mobilization procedures are provided by periodic CJCS-sponsored worldwide command post exercises. These exercises involve the NCA, OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands, and other selected Federal agencies.

   d. **This chapter provides a joint perspective of mobilization planning and execution.** It explains the relationships between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaign plans. It introduces the Mobilization Estimate of the Situation, a tool to assist the thought processes of mobilization planners and decisionmakers. It describes the joint mobilization planning that takes place within the deliberate planning and CAP processes. It also provides an overview of the mobilization execution process.
SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING

“The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I don’t believe in it...You think out every possible development and (when) one of these developments occurs, you put your plan in operation, and everyone says, ‘What genius...’, whereas the credit is really due to the labor of preparation.”

Ferdinand Foch
Interview, April, 1919

2. Mobilization Planning and OPLANs

a. The MMG, Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the DPG provide SECDEF guidance for mobilization planning in support of joint operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplifies the guidance in the mobilization annex (CJCS Instruction 3110.13) of the JSCP.

b. The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the Military Departments and combatant commanders in preparing mobilization plans that will support the OPLANs developed in the deliberate planning process. Mobilization planning guidance in the JSCP is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization. Manpower mobilization requirements derived for each contingency establish the level of mobilization assumed for each contingency and drive the determination of mobilization requirements in the 12 resource areas. The industrial mobilization guidance requires the Military Departments to conduct industrial preparedness planning and to maintain a production base that will support contingency requirements.

c. During the deliberate planning process, the Military Departments and USSOCOM furnish mobilization-related information to the combatant commanders, who incorporate it into the OPLANs under development or revision.

d. The major mobilization plans and planning systems are shown in Figure V-1.

e. Manpower mobilization information furnished by the Military Departments and USSOCOM for inclusion in OPLANs provides the foundation for detailed planning in the other resource areas. This information comprises the number of AC and RC personnel required by Service and skill for each option included in the OPLAN. The functions are:

- Direct support for each option; i.e., units and individuals needed to augment the supported commander’s combat and support force.

- CONUS base; i.e., units and individuals required for the level of CONUS-base expansion to support each option.

- CONUS and outside CONUS backfill; i.e., units and individuals required to replace those deployed to the theater of operations.

- Strategic transportation; i.e., units and individuals needed to augment peacetime strategic airlift and sealift capabilities.

3. Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans

a. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. They are the
Mobilization Planning and Execution

Operational extension of the combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into joint plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater objectives. Campaign plans communicate the commander’s purpose, objectives, concept, and intent to his subordinates and also to supporting components, the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments so they can develop supporting plans. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning, thus unifying both planning processes. A more complete discussion of campaign plans is provided in Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning.”

b. A campaign plan has important implications for mobilization planners. Firm strategic objectives, force levels, and the added dimension of time provide key elements of information with which the mobilization planner can extend mobilization planning and initiate additional force and resource expansion options if needed. Additional industrial mobilization and the reinstatement of the draft may be indicated in the expectation of a long war with high materiel and personnel attrition. Conversely, if the campaign plan expects a short war with low attrition, mobilization planners can concentrate on managing mobilization at a lower level.

4. Mobilization Estimate of the Situation

a. A commander’s estimate of the situation provides a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission (Joint Pub 1-02). A staff estimate is similar, with the major difference being that the culmination of the staff estimate process is a conclusion or recommendation communicated to the commander.

Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems

MAJOR MOBILIZATION PLANS AND PLANNING SYSTEMS

- Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
- Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
- Air Force War and Mobilization Plan
- Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan
- Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan
- Defense Logistics Agency Basic Emergency Plan
b. The mobilization estimate format in Appendix C, “Mobilization Estimate,” applies the staff estimate concept to mobilization planning. **The mobilization estimate provides a tool for mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of mobilization requirements and options** in either a deliberate or CAP situation. Although designed from the point of view of the Joint Staff, J-4, the format may be adapted to fit the circumstances of mobilization planners on the combatant commander and Service staffs.

c. Like other staff estimates, the **purpose of the mobilization estimate is to determine whether the mission can be supported and which COA is best.** The mobilization estimate requires input from all functional areas of the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and the corresponding staff sections at the combatant commands. Although not every situation demands an extensive planning effort, the **mobilization process is complex and involves interactions among resource areas that may influence the outcome of the analysis.** It is important, therefore, that the mobilization proponent on a staff establish and maintain effective communications with the other staff sections.

d. **The accuracy of the information gathered to complete paragraph 2 of the estimate and the quality of the analysis made in paragraph 3 of the estimate are essential to the validity of the mobilization estimate.**

- In paragraph 2, a **net assessment is made of the mobilization capability in each resource area.** The net assessment consists of the time-phased mobilization capability or capacity in each resource area compared to the requirements of each COA. Shortages or overages should be identified and quantified in terms of the unit of measure used in the area (e.g., number of personnel, training seats, short tons, hospital beds, and days of supply).

- In paragraph 3, estimates of the effects of mobilization activities in each resource area on the other areas are made to determine if the mobilization action is feasible. For example, when a COA requires training base expansion, the analysis process for paragraph 3 should establish that there are enough qualified instructors, facilities, equipment, and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A shortage in one or more of these areas will limit the training base expansion and may render the COA infeasible.

e. The completed analysis should support conclusions concerning the feasibility or infeasibility of each COA with respect to mobilization and the ultimate staff recommendation on the best COA.

5. Mobilization and Deliberate Planning

During peacetime, mobilization planners in the JPEC participate in two primary activities: maintaining a mobilization base and participating in the deliberate planning process to develop detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs.

a. **Maintaining a mobilization base at resource levels adequate to support the mobilization requirements of OPLANs is a full-time peacetime task** for mobilization planners in all resource areas. The mobilization base is defined as a pool of resources that can be made available to permit force expansion and sustainment when necessary. The two most critical resources in the mobilization base are manpower and industrial base capacity because of the time and expense involved in developing skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military equipment.
• Manpower Programs. With policy and planning guidance provided by OSD, the Military Departments and USSOCOM manage manpower programs, which include RC manpower pools with the numbers of personnel and the skill mix required to meet estimated wartime sustainability requirements. The IRR and other PIM pools are maintained by a combination of laws and policies, such as the 8-year military service obligation (10 USC 511) and programs for recruiting and retaining skilled RC personnel. Manpower programs are funded through the PPBS process. Manpower mobilization base maintenance is also supported by the SSS, which will draw on a pool of 18- to 26-year-old registrants if a military draft is required to sustain the force and is enabled by legislation.

• Industrial Preparedness Programs. Military Department and Defense agency objectives for materiel and equipment sustainability are to maintain war reserve stocks of critical equipment in sufficient quantities to fulfill estimated sustainability requirements until industrial base output can be expanded to meet expected consumption rates. The basis for industrial preparedness planning is the combatant commanders’ CILs. The CIL is the accumulation of current inventory items (consumable and nonconsumable) that each combatant commander has identified as deficient through routine reporting in the Chairman’s Joint Monthly Readiness Review.

• Maintaining a mobilization base in the other resource areas requires planning and investment by the Military Departments for mobilization activities such as facilities and training base expansion, mobilization of strategic and CONUS transportation resources, and expanding HSS capabilities.

WE’LL MUSTER IF WE MUST

In sharp contrast to the dedicated professionals serving in the Reserve Component today, the common, or enrolled, militia — every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 — was not quite what one might expect it to be during the period 1820-1850. To say it was loosely organized and trained would be, in most cases, an understatement. It appears the general male population of that time was neither interested in military affairs nor in the pomp and circumstance of war. In the East, where the enrolled militia was hardly necessary since the frontier had been conquered at least to the Mississippi River, the enrolled militia met rather irreligiously once or twice a year for militia muster and drill, according to the law. If one had “the common defense of the nation” in mind when he came to view such musters, it was quickly dispelled as the day turned from muster to picnic to drunken brawl in rather too rapid succession. Accounts of common militia musters are myriad in newspapers and writings of the period; we shall savor a sample from Georgia Scenes:

“At twelve, about one third, perhaps one half, of the men had collected, and an inspector’s return of the number present, and of their arms, would have stood nearly thus: 1 captain, 1 lieutenant; ensign, none; fifers, none; privates, present, 24, ditto, absent, 40; guns, 14; gunlocks, 12; ramrods, 10; rifle pouches 3; bayonets, none; belts, none; spare flints, none; cartridges, none; horsewhips, walking canes, and umbrellas, 10.”
In going through the manual, the captain had some choice words:

“‘Tention the whole! Please to observe, gentlemen, that at the word ‘fire!’ you must fire; that is, if any of your guns are loaden’d, you must not shoot in yearnest, but only take pretense like; and you, gentlemen fellow-soldiers, who’s armed with nothing but sticks, riding-switches, and corn-stalks, needn’t go through the firings, but stand as you are, and keep yourselves to yourselves.”

The drill proved just as ludicrous:

“‘Tention the whole! To the left—left, no—right—that is, the left—I mean the right—left, wheel, march!’ In this the captain was strictly obeyed; some wheeling to the right, some to the left, and some to the right-left, or both ways.

‘Stop! Halt! Let us try it again! I could not just then tell my right hand from my left! You must excuse me, if you please; experience makes perfect, as the saying is. Long as I have served, I find something new to learn every day; but all’s one for that.’ ”

Before the aforementioned evolutions, however, the captain had twice sent for some grog “for their present accommodation” to settle the dispute about quitting or at least omitting the drill. Following the aforementioned mix-up, the whole were dismissed. They immediately returned to you-know-where for more of you-know-what. So much for another militia muster.


Reserve component assets are available to augment Air Mobility Command Strategic airlift.
b. CJCS Instruction 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance),” establishes the standard formats and guidance for developing OPLANs. Mobilization planning takes place in every phase of the deliberate planning process, as shown in Figure V-2.

c. Detailed mobilization planning is conducted and documented in each OPLAN for the RC units and non-unit personnel spaces (for estimated filler and replacement requirements) scheduled in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Mobilization plans in other resource areas are more general and will normally include provisions that are adaptable for support of any OPLAN.


a. The JPEC uses CAP procedures to plan, mobilize, and deploy forces in time-sensitive situations. Successful mobilization planning and execution during crises depends on the availability of accurate data regarding the readiness of RC units and personnel, PIM, civilian employees, and other

![Figure V-2. Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process](image-url)
required support. The readiness of the mobilization base and the quality of prior planning for drawing on its resources is also key. Prescribed requests for legal authorities, environmental waivers, and standby legislation should be ready to submit to decisionmakers. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) should be current and familiar to all military and civilian personnel with major mobilization responsibilities. Reference material supporting the SOPs should be current and readily available. Mobilization plans should be exercised and validated as part of joint and Service exercise programs. Ongoing mobilization base planning and a well-coordinated exercise program will increase the likelihood of successful mobilization efforts during war or other national emergencies.

b. Figure V-3 summarizes mobilization planning activities by CAP procedure phase.

c. In a time-sensitive environment, mobilization planners must continuously monitor the developing situation in order to determine the mobilization implications and initiate the mobilization estimate process as soon as possible. Joint Staff mobilization planners should determine and advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the mobilization feasibility of each COA under consideration. Crisis action teams on the Joint Staff and in the Military Departments should prepare mobilization orders and requests for legal authorities so that they are ready for decisionmakers during execution.

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION

7. Mobilization Decisions and Orders

a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends to the Secretary of Defense the assets that are to be called up and their planned use when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC. NCA approval is required for the execution of an OPORD. In preparing a mobilization recommendation to the NCA, the following should be considered:

- Assessments of the Services, combatant commanders, and Service component commanders.
- Input from the Joint Staff.
- Technical advice, legal opinions, and policy considerations from OSD.

b. After the NCA decision to initiate mobilization, the Secretary of Defense directs the Military Departments to proceed. The Services publish mobilization orders in accordance with their respective procedures. OSD may issue implementation instructions and provide additional policy guidance, if required.

c. Some mobilization actions require the President or Secretary of Defense to notify the Congress. For example, some legal authorities require reports at specific intervals. Others require specific information on how the authority is being used and how long it will be needed. Reports on expenditures related to the crisis are also required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DOD Comptroller are normally responsible for preparing these reports, which require continuous coordination throughout the JPEC.

8. Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization

Because mobilization involves interrelated activities in 12 resource areas, the NCA, OSD, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Departments,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I Situation Development</th>
<th>PHASE II Crisis Assessment</th>
<th>PHASE III COA Development</th>
<th>PHASE IV COA Selection</th>
<th>PHASE V Execution Planning</th>
<th>PHASE VI Execution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event occurs with possible National security implications</td>
<td>CINC’s report/assessment received</td>
<td>CJCS sends warning order</td>
<td>CJCS presents refined and prioritized courses of action to National Command Authorities (NCA)</td>
<td>CINC receives alert order or planning order</td>
<td>NCA decide to execute operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor world situation</td>
<td>Increase awareness</td>
<td>Develop COAs</td>
<td>CJCS advice to NCA</td>
<td>CINC develops operation order</td>
<td>CJCS sends execute order by authority of SECDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize problem</td>
<td>Increase reporting</td>
<td>CINC assigns tasks to subordinates by evaluation request message</td>
<td>CJCS may send planning order to begin execution planning before selection of COA by NCA</td>
<td>Refine time-phased force and deployment data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit CINC's assessment</td>
<td>Joint Staff assesses situation</td>
<td>Force preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Staff advice on possible military action</td>
<td>CINC reviews evaluation response messages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCA-CJCS evaluation</td>
<td>Create/modify time-phased force and deployment data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates</td>
<td>Evaluate COAs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOB ACTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor situation</td>
<td>Review plans</td>
<td>Complete mobilization estimates</td>
<td>Continue planning</td>
<td>Request mobilization authority</td>
<td>Monitor progress of mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate mobilization requirements</td>
<td>Recommend mobilization COA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess that event may have national implications</td>
<td>NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA</td>
<td>CINC sends commander's estimate with recommended COA</td>
<td>NCA select COA</td>
<td>CINC sends operation order</td>
<td>Crisis resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report event to NCA/CJCS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CINC releases NCA COA selection in alert order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Redeployment of forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure V-3. Mobilization and CAP
USSOCOM, and other members of the JPEC need accurate and timely information on the status and progress of mobilization. Information received by proponents in each of the resource areas is analyzed and coordinated with the other resource area proponents to provide decisionmakers with recommendations for controlling, replanning, redirecting, or stopping mobilization operations. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Vol I (Planning Policies and Procedures),” provides detailed procedures and automated information to support operations planning and execution.

SECTION C. SUMMARY

9. Summary

This chapter covered mobilization planning and execution from the perspective of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It explained the relationship between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaign plans. It introduced the Mobilization Estimate of the Situation, which is a logical process for determining feasible mobilization COAs to support OPLANs. The chapter also described mobilization planning activities that take place within the various phases of the deliberate and CAP procedures and concluded with an overview of mobilization execution.
CHAPTER VI
JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental Congress (disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)

1. Introduction

   a. Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisis situation or from a wartime military establishment and defense-based economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and reorganizing the RC. Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in mobilization, activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each of the others. For this reason, close coordination between resource area proponents is just as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization.

   b. This chapter provides the national and joint military perspectives of demobilization planning and execution. It relates demobilization to national security strategy, the range of policy options available to the national leadership, GR, total force policy, and the range of military operations discussed in Chapter I, “Mobilization and National Security.” It also provides guidelines for demobilization planning and execution and an overview of demobilization activities in the 12 resource areas.

SECTION A.
DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

2. Demobilization and National Security

   a. From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process should put the United States in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security. Policies would be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security commitments during the transition to a peacetime environment. The Armed Forces would eventually be returned to their precrisis structure by releasing RC units from active duty. The size of the total force, as well as the size of the AC, RC, and civilian components could also be changed as a result of the crisis, but any such force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict would be released to fuel the post-conflict national economy. Planning and preparation for a future crisis would be characterized by a return to GR Stage III activities.
b. The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the preceding mobilization. As shown in Figure I-1, the scope of mobilization can range from a relatively brief use of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the original peacetime levels. Demobilization of volunteers following Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada and the massive demobilization following World War II are examples of the range of the demobilization activities. Demobilization planners and decisionmakers, therefore, could be challenged anywhere within these extremes. The demobilization guidelines in paragraph 3 provide guidance for planners throughout this spectrum.

c. From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The demobilization personnel management programs of the Military Departments will be challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life and will need to provide transition assistance as members reenter an economy that could be depressed because of economic conditions brought on by the crisis. National Guard and Reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible.

3. Demobilization Planning Guidelines

Study of the demobilizations following the two World Wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for today’s demobilization planners and have been distilled into the following guidelines illustrated in Figure VI-1 for demobilization planning and execution:

a. Mission First. Demobilization plans must support the post-conflict mission as it evolves. The supported commander’s immediate postwar priorities should come first. As the transition to a peacetime state proceeds, long-range national security objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the Armed Forces are prepared for the next crisis.
b. **Begin Planning Early.** Ideally, demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization commences.

c. **Understand Possible Consequences.** The proposed demobilization policies should include consideration of the following:

- Joint force readiness.
- The health of the national economy.
- Morale of and benefits for Service members and DOD civilian employees and their families.

d. **Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies.** The demobilization policies and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside the Department of Defense. Public information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain public support.

4. **Planning Considerations**

a. **Demobilizing the Armed Forces** could be a relatively straightforward return of mobilized RC units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, and a major reorganization of the RC, which might be necessary after a long war. Similarly, **demobilization of the defense industry** could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis.

b. **Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization.** These include activities for restoring force readiness and controlling the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

c. **Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels.** At the national level, NCA must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and composition of the post-conflict force structure and its resource base. These **national-level decisions** drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the **theater and supporting levels**. They also guide the post-conflict activities of the supported and supporting commanders.

d. **The key to military demobilization is the supported commander.** The commander’s mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. **Other general planning factors should include:**

- The situation and requirements in other theaters. The NCA, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should establish a priority of support.
- Future missions in the theater.
- Availability of strategic lift for redeployment.
- CONUS reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel.

5. **Recovery Planning**

a. **Recovery planning should be closely coordinated with demobilization planning.** Recovery includes the actions necessary in the theater of operations and CONUS base to restore a credible capability to respond, in the short term, to a future threat. **Included are activities such as:**
• Rebuilding of major equipment items.

• Restorating personnel strength and training readiness to required wartime levels for future contingencies.

• Restoring war reserve stocks to acceptable levels.

• Maintaining essential industrial surge and expansion capabilities.

• Finalizing recovery of redeployed equipment returned to CONUS.

• Terminating war-related contracts for the convenience of the government.

• Reestablishing contracts at garrison or home base as troops return.

b. The planning and resourcing of these activities are the responsibility of OSD and the Military Departments. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA in providing strategic direction for these efforts.

SECTION B. EXECUTION

6. General

Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need for resources declines and assets for demobilization support become available. Most demobilization actions, however, will commence following the conflict when immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported commander and requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like mobilization, is essentially a Military Department responsibility, the supported and supporting commanders play a coordinating and synchronizing role when the resources of two or more Services are involved or when two or more Services are competing for the same resources. In any event, the combatant commanders monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent recovery operations to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future conflicts.

Military air bases with the capacity for supporting increased workloads are demobilized during peacetime, but can be activated to provide the needed facilities for conducting airlift staging operations during mobilization.
7. Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the Military Departments and USSOCOM deactivate units or return them to a reserve status. **Military personnel** are released from active duty or returned to reserve status. The number of **civilian employees** may be reduced. **Materiel and equipment** may be mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security assistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices. As with mobilization, assets in the other resource areas are required to support the demobilization of manpower and equipment; but as these support requirements decline, **demobilization activities are accomplished in the other resource areas.** Representative actions in other resource areas are listed in Figure VI-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOURCE AREA</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Strategic airlift and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the Reserve component or to the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>Buildings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nation. Staffing is reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced or terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Base</td>
<td>Contracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid-away or converted to commercial use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Base</td>
<td>Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and other resources to provide capacity based on future demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
<td>Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical System or the Department of Veteran Affairs-DOD Contingency Plan are released when no longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to a reserve status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers are terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Support</td>
<td>National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment from commercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation Support</td>
<td>Agreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers are renegotiated or terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Military Departments and Defense agencies act to meet environmental standards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Authorities</td>
<td>The President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisis are no longer needed and are revoked or rescinded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Funding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided in accordance with established peacetime procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure VI-2. Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas

8. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of military demobilization planning from national and joint military perspectives. It explained the relationship of demobilization with national security strategy and the concepts of GR, total force policy, and the range of military operations introduced in Chapter I, “Mobilization and National Security.” It provided a set of demobilization planning guidelines derived from the lessons and experience of past demobilizations. It also provided a brief discussion of demobilization execution and a representative listing of demobilization activities in the 12 resource areas.
Intentionally Blank
1. General

a. Flexible and adaptive mobilization planning requires a range of options available before a declaration of national emergency, as well as after. Legal authorities for mobilization actions can be categorized as being available in peacetime, or available after a Presidential declaration of a national emergency or a congressional declaration of a national emergency or war.

b. Authorities available without a declaration of national emergency may be invoked by the President or, in some cases, a department head like the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of a Military Department. Examples of such authorities are the PSRC; the President’s option to suspend any provision of law pertaining to promotion, retirement, or separation of a Service member during an RC activation (the stop-loss authority); the Military Department Secretaries’ authority to recall regular and reserve military retirees with more than 20 years of active service; and authorities requiring priority performance on defense contracts.

c. A national emergency can be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. Current law regarding national emergencies is contained in the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (50 United States Code (USC) 1601-1651). The act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, the specific authorities being invoked be included in the declaration or in subsequent Executive orders. Presidential powers are limited to those authorities invoked until the President subsequently announces the invocation of additional specified authorities (50 USC 1621(b), 1631). Congress may terminate the President’s declaration at any time with a concurrent resolution and must review the declaration and situation every six months (50 USC 1622).

d. Before 1976, a declaration of national emergency, which made virtually all of the President’s emergency powers available at once, could be interpreted as an all-or-nothing response regardless of the nature or perceived severity of a crisis. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that a declaration of national emergency would send overly provocative signals of US intent to adversaries and unduly alarm allies. With the same broad menu of emergency powers, the President can now tailor the national response in a crisis, without undue provocation, and convey more accurate signals of US intent to allies as well as adversaries.

e. The War Powers Resolution (50 USC 1541-1548) is a statute enacted over Presidential veto that is intended to enforce Congress’ war-making powers under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. The resolution declares that the President, as Commander in Chief, may introduce US Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where hostilities are imminent, only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its Armed Forces. The law requires the President to consult with Congress in every possible instance before introducing US Forces into hostilities, or into situations where hostilities are imminent. The resolution also requires the President to report periodically to Congress on the status of US Forces’ involvement in hostilities and withdraw the forces within 60 days unless Congress has either declared war or extended the 60-day period.
NOTE: Since passage of the resolution in 1973, Presidents have consistently held the position the law unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s power to carry out his role as Commander in Chief; however, no President has yet challenged the resolution in court. Rather, Presidents have generally consulted Congress before introducing troops into potentially hostile situations (e.g., the Persian Gulf conflict and humanitarian assistance in Somalia). This issue has not been resolved and could affect the US response in some future crisis.

f. The “Digest of War and Emergency Legislation Affecting the Department of Defense, 1991” lists nearly 400 emergency authorities available for mobilization and crisis planning. This Appendix identifies and briefly describes those emergency authorities most likely to affect joint mobilization planning and execution in each resource area.

2. Manpower

Individual and unit members of the RC may be ordered to active duty voluntarily or involuntarily under authorities provided in title 10, USC.

a. Voluntary Order to Active Duty. The Secretaries of Military Departments may order any member of the RC to active duty with the consent of the member (10 USC 12301(d)). Members of the Army and Air National Guard, however, cannot be activated under this statute without the consent of the governor of the state, commonwealth, or territory. RC volunteers may be employed to augment the active force for any operational mission or contingency operation.

b. Presidential Selected Reserve Callup. The President may authorize the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of Transportation with regard to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a Service of the Navy) to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for any operational mission for not more than 270 days (10 USC 12304). This authority can be invoked with or without a declaration of national emergency.

c. Partial Mobilization Authority. Following a Presidential declaration of national emergency or when otherwise authorized by law; the President may authorize the Secretaries of the Military Departments, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to order to active duty up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve (Selected Reserve, IRR, and Inactive National Guard (ING)), without their consent, for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months (10 USC 12302).

d. Full Mobilization Authority. The President, upon a declaration of national emergency or war by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law, may invoke 10 USC 12301(a) authorizing the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to order to active duty any member of the RC (Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve), without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months.

e. Stop-Loss Authority. This authority stops normal attrition of experienced military personnel through expiration of enlistments, retirements, and other routine releases from active duty. With this authority, during any period RC members have been involuntarily ordered to active duty, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to retirement, promotion, separation of military personnel determined to be essential to the national security (10 USC 12305).

f. Retiree Recall. Under 10 USC 688 and regulations established by the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are authorized to recall to active duty military retirees (AC or RC) who have completed 20 or more years of active service. Retired members may be assigned duties the Secretary concerned considers necessary in the interest of national defense.

g. **Recall of the Retired Reserve.** Reserve members in a retired status (with less than 20 years of active service) can only be called involuntarily to active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. In addition, this authority requires that the Secretaries of the Military Departments first determine, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, that there are not enough qualified Reserves available in other categories, including the ING, to fill the required spaces (10 USC 12301(a)).

h. **Recall of the Standby Reserve.** Units and members in the Standby Reserve may be ordered to active duty (other than for training) only as provided in 10 USC 12301. In addition, this authority requires that the Service Secretaries first determine that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in the required categories who are readily available.

i. **Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry Program Personnel.** Qualified personnel with no prior military service may be enlisted as untrained members of the IRR for up to 365 days before reporting for active duty under 10 USC 513. All such persons may be ordered to active duty under all provisions of the law and regulations applying to the IRR.

j. **Conscription.** If Congress deems it necessary under the Selective Service Act (50 USC app 451-473), the Selective Service System can begin involuntarily drafting eligible, non-exemption men for military service. Repeal of section 17(c) of 50 USC app 467(c) is necessary before the Selective Service System may initiate an involuntary draft of nonprior service personnel.

3. **The Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA)**

Authority for expanding capability or capacity in the materiel and equipment, transportation and industrial base resource areas is provided by the DPA. This act (50 USC app. 2061-2171), which has been periodically revised and renewed by Congress, provides that basis for the DPAS. It authorizes the President, in peace, conflict, and war, to divert national resources, deemed critical to the national defense, from civil to military use, and reorder economic priorities to provide for the national defense and national security. Specifically, the President may require private sector providers of materials and services, identified as essential and critical to national defense, to give priority performance to defense contracts and orders. The President may also authorize government agencies, like the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, and Department of Commerce, to guarantee loans needed by defense contractors to expedite production, deliveries, or service.

4. **Facilities**

There are three fundamental emergency authorities available to facilitate construction projects required to expand facilities during mobilization.

a. **Emergency Construction Authority.** The Secretary of a Military Department is authorized by 10 USC 2803 to execute emergency military construction projects if the Secretary determines: (1) the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment; and (2) the requirement for the project is so urgent that to defer it for the next military construction authorization act...
would be inconsistent with National security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment. The maximum amount a Secretary may obligate is $30 million taken from the unobligated balances of funds appropriated for military construction.

b. **Contingency Construction.** The Secretary of Defense is authorized by 10 USC 2804 to execute contingency military construction projects, before a declaration of national emergency, upon determination that the deferral of the projects would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.

c. **Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency.** In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency requiring use of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense may undertake construction projects needed to support the Armed Forces without specific legislative authorization. Such projects, however, must be able to be completed within the total amount of unobligated military construction funds, including funds appropriated for family housing per 10 USC 2808.

d. **Recapture and Condemnation of Real Property.** There are more than 60 permanent laws in the US Code authorizing the President, Secretary of Defense, or specified Secretary of a Military Department to recapture specific parcels of former federal property for defense purposes. In general, the availability of these authorities is contingent on a declaration of national emergency by the President or Congress or the existence of a state of war. As a practical matter, many of these sites have been rendered virtually unusable for defense purposes, because of commercial development undertaken over the years since some of these laws were enacted (some as early as 1925). The US Army Corps of Engineers, however, maintains a list of properties still usable for national defense purposes. In addition, 10 USC 2663 and 2664 authorize Secretaries of the Military Departments to bring condemnation proceedings, in courts with appropriate jurisdiction, to acquire land or facilities deemed necessary for a variety of defense purposes including construction of training sites, and production of munitions and lumber.

5. **Training Base Expansion**

There are no legal authorities specifically directed to expansion of the military training base in connection with mobilization. Training base expansion activities, however, may require activation of RC training units and individual manpower, expansion of facilities, equipment and transportation resources, under emergency authorities pertaining to these resource areas. Training base expansion plans must also take into account the provision of 10 USC 671, which requires a minimum of 12 weeks of basic training (or its equivalent) before assigning any member of the Armed Forces to duties outside CONUS. The intent of this law is to ensure that no Service member is assigned overseas without essential battlefield survival skills.

6. **Health Service Support**

a. Activation of RC HSS units and individuals is governed by the same authorities for mobilizing other manpower skills as discussed in paragraph 2 above.

b. The President is authorized by 42 USC 217 to declare the commissioned corps of the USPHS a military service in time of war or national emergency.

c. Under the provisions of the DVA and Department of Defense Health Resources
Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (38 USC 8111A), the DVA will make available to the DOD beds for the care of military casualties.

d. The NDMS, established and administered by the DHHS under the authority of Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,” provides backup support to the DOD and DVA HSS in caring for military casualties. Although not legally obligated, nonfederal public and private hospitals have agreed to provide about 100,000 beds to augment DOD and DVA resources, if needed in an emergency. This commitment is triggered when the Secretary of Defense determines military casualties threaten to overburden the DOD and DVA systems.

7. Communications

Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 606) authorizes the President, during times of emergency or war, to exercise extraordinary management or control over national telecommunications resources to meet requirements for telecommunications services beyond those normally provided by individual commercial suppliers or government agencies.

8. Host-Nation Support

Authorities for obtaining HNS manpower and services are provided in various treaties in force to which the United States is signatory, by 20 major agreements with foreign nations, and over 400 logistic agreements.

9. Environment

Major environmental protection statutes affecting mobilization are discussed in Chapter IV, "Resource Areas." The President has authority, when in the national interest, to exempt Federal facilities from certain provisions of environmental law. DOD policy relating to environmental statutes, stems from statutes and Executive Order 12088, which requires the Department of Defense, together with other Executive branch agencies, to be in full compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. The Department of Defense has never sought exemption from any provision of environmental law.

10. Funding

The following emergency authorities are available to the DOD to provide essential funding for mobilization and other emergency defense expenditures.

a. Budget Supplemental. The Secretary of Defense may submit additional appropriations requests to Congress to meet urgent requirements.

b. Budget Amendment. The Secretary of Defense may submit budget revisions to Congress before the congressional appropriations process has been completed.

c. Reprogramming. The Secretary of Defense may reprogram funds within appropriations thresholds established by Congress to meet the requirements of any emergency. Reprogramming actions above established thresholds must be submitted to Congress for approval.

d. Transfer Authority. Authority and thresholds for transferring funds between appropriations are established in the current appropriations act. Transfers that exceed thresholds require congressional approval.

e. Deficiency Authority (Food and Forage Act). 41 USC 11 permits the DOD to obligate funds in excess of amounts authorized and appropriated to cover necessities of the current year, under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing, subsistence, fuel, quarters,
transportation, or medical and hospital supplies are exhausted. This authority ensures the availability of sufficient funds to care for the unexpected increases in DOD personnel strength as a result of a crisis and mobilization.
APPENDIX B
AUTOMATED TOOLS

1. General

JPEC:

a. Prepares systems to monitor forces and phases of the crisis or mobilization.

b. Plans for information management systems to consolidate automated data processing (ADP) support for all functional areas of a mobilization, thereby reducing the total number of varying systems carrying similar data.

c. Reduces administrative functions to meet mobilization surge requirements.

d. Reviews ADP procedures that stimulate development of effective C4 capabilities for enhanced crisis response.

e. Designs and tests mobilization-related ADP systems to ensure their ability to operate effectively.

2. Planning

The Services mobilize, train, equip, and prepare forces, including the RC, for movements in CONUS to meet scheduled deployment and employment dates. Movement of mobilized RC units from home station to mobilization station is a support installation responsibility. MTMC, a USTRANSCOM component command, is responsible for planning intra-CONUS movements to support mobilization and deployment using OPLAN TPFDD files and intra-CONUS movement data. The Services and Defense agencies will provide significant RC mobilization-related movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. The supported combatant commander prioritizes and validates requirements to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM then coordinates with the support installation and supported combatant commander to resolve movement constraints and advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of transportation capabilities in CONUS. During deployment, USTRANSCOM monitors the movement of forces and materiel by common-user lift from home station to the port of debarkation. In this circumstance, USTRANSCOM will immediately be able to identify a conflict so resolution can be obtained from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant commander.

3. Reporting Systems Supporting Mobilization

a. JOPES Deployment Data Base. JOPES is the primary system for use in planning joint military operations. It consolidates policies and procedures for developing, coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint OPLANs and bridges the gap between deliberate planning and the CAP process and execution. In most cases, data derived from JOPES are also used during execution. The CAP Procedures contained in JOPES delineate the procedures for developing response actions under time-constrained conditions.

b. Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES). FAPES is being developed as a military manpower mobilization decisionmaker’s tool to capture and integrate manpower capabilities for both deliberate and crisis situations. FAPES will assist the decisionmaker in determining whether force augmentation is necessary to satisfy time-phased requirements specified in deployment, employment, and sustainment planning. Monitoring the status and progress
of mobilization is key to this process. FAPES was used during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to generate reports on the status and progress of mobilization for the Joint Staff.

c. Medical Planning and Execution System (MEPES). The Joint Staff, J-4, is tasked to coordinate the HSS mission for the theater of operations and CONUS sustaining base. MEPES is programmed to be the medical module in JOPES. It is an operational information management system that provides the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and component commands the capability to analyze and evaluate alternative courses of action (COAs) for allocation of health service resources. MEPES aids the Services with mobilization and provision of HSS services and the commanders who are responsible for deployment and employment of health service resources. Each level of command has specific and separate health service management and information requirements and responsibilities. Each level within the JOPES process has the ability to provide appropriate information to any other level. With this information, joint and Service health service planners support the other levels. The current description of MEPES identifies two components:

- **Medical Planning Module (MPM) (Phase I).** The MPM is designed to forecast the theater HSS resource requirements based on the warfighting scenario. The forecast includes:
  - The different spectrum of patients by category and sector of employment in the theater.
  - Selected HSS requirements across the battlefield as well as within the afloat battle groups.
  - Assistance in the development of the HSS force structure.
  - Projections of the aeromedical evacuation lift requirements.
  - Planning parameters for processing patients at different echelons of care, logistic region, and zone of operation.
  - Baseline values for determining consumption rates and flow patterns for Class VIII supplies.

- **Medical Mobilization Planning and Execution System (MEDMOB) (Phase II).** MEDMOB serves as the integrator of both MEPES components. As a conventional planning and execution information system, MEDMOB is the integrator and interface module within the Reconstitution-Mobilization (RECMOB) System to provide:
  - The integrated time-phased requirements versus capability analysis for manpower, Class VIIIA (medical supplies), Class VIIIB (blood), deployable hospitals, and medical evacuation assets.
  - The capability to monitor the status, progress, and medical readiness of mobilizing units.
  - The time-phased availability of DOD, host nation, and allied HSS.
  - The assessment information needed to integrate the CONUS HSS planning provided by the Services, DVA, and NDMS.

  
  
  
d. Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP)

- **JIMPP** is the generic term for the planning and analytic process to be used by the Services, Defense agencies, and Joint Staff to:
Automated Tools

• Prepare industrial mobilization plans linked to deliberate and crisis action planning procedures, development, and execution.

• Provide the analytical framework to perform the industrial analyses required by the Joint Strategic Planning System and OSD.

• Establish base line national industrial base capability assessments tied to potential military demand.

• JIMPP is used during deliberate planning to conduct capability and risk assessments, emergency procurement budget mechanisms, time-phased requirements lists, and narrative COAs. Output may be forwarded to OSD and other Federal agencies for use in broader industrial mobilization planning. As an analytical tool, JIMPP allows planners to address what if questions from both the supply and demand sides. Expected outputs of the process include supply-side option summaries for GR, estimates of a mobilizable force, and assessments of plan feasibility. JIMPP consists of three components: a Requirements Module (REQMOD), which produces weapons and munitions requirements, associated shortfalls, replacement of losses, and consumption rates; a Vendor-Level Module for specific options and capabilities (compares each item requirement with its production rate and produces surge and mobilization requirements and shortfalls); and an Industry-Level Module for a macroeconomic sectoral-level analysis of mobilization requirements and capabilities for 240 industrial sectors.

e. **Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP).** DOD Directive 5160.54, 26 June 1989, “DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP),” provides policy guidance for planning to protect key assets, assigns responsibilities for administering KAPP, and authorizes the publishing of the Key Asset List (KAL) as part of the KAPP. DOD policy requires actions to protect key assets that are included in military contingency plans for military support to civil authorities and land defense of CONUS. The functional purpose of KAPP is:

• To support and assist the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command in the continuing review of the KAL in preparation for war.

• To facilitate the employment of military and civilian resources to ensure protection of key assets.

• To promote the security of key assets within the United States and in US territories and possessions by providing to the owners or managers of such assets appropriate advice, guidance, and planning assistance on the application of physical security and emergency preparedness measures.

• To provide to the NCA guidance and direction concerning the priority of key asset protection missions upon execution of plans that support KAPP.

f. **Logistic Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimate (LOGSAFE).** LOGSAFE provides planners the capability to estimate the logistical requirements of an OPLAN and to determine logistic supportability for various COAs. LOGSAFE performs a series of three activities: generate general and sustainment requirements plus supply buildup, compare sustainment requirements with available stockages for logistical sustainability assessment, and provide decision aid outputs and interface of suitable data for various transportation models.
g. Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES). JEPES provides a common automated system for the civil engineer planners at the unified commands and their components to determine the feasibility of the civil engineering force, construction material, and facilities to support OPLANs. Further, it is used to:

- Generate time-phased facility requirements based on an OPLAN.
- Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements to in-theater facility assets and host nation, contract, and troop engineering capability.
- Provide facility feasibility assessment, manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargo requirements for other processes.

h. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST). JFAST provides rapid analysis of the transportation feasibility of OPLANs and COAs before scheduling by the transportation component command.

i. Defense Emergency Authority Retrieval and Analysis System (DEARAS). DEARAS is a specialized computer-assisted legal research system for items such as statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that defines DOD legal authority to act in an emergency.

j. Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems Automated Message Preparation System (JAMPS). JAMPS provides automated aids to reduce operator training times for creation of tactical messages, reduce errors in message creation, and speed message generation and transmission. Message preparation and formats are standardized in order to expedite message traffic across the Services.

k. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). SORTS is an information management system designed to support the decisionmaking process of the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SORTS supports the registration of units, reporting of basic unit identity elements, monitoring of unit status, and distribution of unit information throughout the JPEC. Distributed information includes unit location, strength, readiness factor, and category levels for equipment and personnel. Individual units update the SORTS data base by a Defense Information Systems Network communications link. The system constitutes the single automated tool for maintaining and updating unit status.

l. Joint Pub 1-03, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The JRS contains approved reporting structures for information interchange between military commanders. It prescribes formats, codes, data element definitions, and reporting procedures.

m. Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART). DART is an integrated set of automated data force and processing tools and a data base management system that provides joint operators and planners the ability to rapidly edit and analyze TPFDDs for data accuracy.
Mobilization Estimate Number ___________________

            b. Other Pertinent Documents.

1. () Mission. State the combatant commander’s missions, taken from the mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for Reserve component missions; e.g., offload the maritime pre-positioned ships, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other appropriate items.)

2. () Situations and Considerations

   a. () Assumptions

   b. () Mobilization Situation

      (1) () Availability of Manpower
      (2) () Transportation
      (3) () Equipment/Materiel
      (4) () Health Service Support
      (5) () Facilities
      (6) () Industrial Base
      (7) () Training Base
      (8) () Communications
      (9) () Host-Nation Support
      (10) () Environment
      (11) () Legal Authorities
      (12) () Funding

3. () Mobilization Analysis of Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the manpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health service support, industrial, training bases, communications, and legal authority resource areas that affect the proposed courses of action to determine the manner and degree of that effect. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether the mobilization requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the combatant commander in the commander’s estimate.

   a. () Analyze each course of action from a mobilization point of view.
b. ( ) The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for each
course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint
of time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect the
mobilization course of action.

c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. The
analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicable
mobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisons
in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Courses of Action

   a. ( ) List the effect that manpower mobilization (for each level, including PSRC) has on
   the other resource areas from a J-4’s point of view.

   b. ( ) Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resource
   areas based on the mobilization decision.

5. ( ) Conclusions

   a. ( ) State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a mobilization
   standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which mobilization course of action can best be supported from a transportation,
   equipment/materiel, and health service support standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention of
   the combatant commander. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods to
   eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

   (Signed) _________________________
1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics, J-4.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4-SMED/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE NUMBER</th>
<th>COPY NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF CHANGE</th>
<th>DATE ENTERED</th>
<th>POSTED BY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office
Distribution Division (Code 03443)
5801 Tabor Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automated data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Air Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAMPUS</td>
<td>Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL</td>
<td>critical items list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander of a combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in concept format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Contingency response program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Defense Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEARAS</td>
<td>Department of Defense Emergency Authorities Retrieval and Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAS</td>
<td>Defense Finance and Accounting Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Defense Production Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPAS</td>
<td>Defense Priorities and Allocation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVA</td>
<td>Department of Veterans Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIS</td>
<td>environmental impact statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPES</td>
<td>Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>graduated response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ING</td>
<td>Inactive National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>individual ready reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMPS</td>
<td>JINTACCS Automated Message Preparation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEPES</td>
<td>Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFAST</td>
<td>Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIMPP</td>
<td>Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMPAB</td>
<td>Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPEC</td>
<td>Joint Planning and Execution Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Joint Reporting Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAL</td>
<td>key assets list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPP</td>
<td>Key Assets Protection Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGSAFE</td>
<td>logistic sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC&amp;G</td>
<td>mapping, charting, and geodesy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDMOB</td>
<td>Medical Mobilization Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPES</td>
<td>Medical Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMG</td>
<td>Master Mobilization Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPM</td>
<td>medical planning module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTMC</td>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>nonprior service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
<td>pretrained individual manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Presidential Selected Reserve Callup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECMOB</td>
<td>Reconstitution-Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Ready Reserve Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTRANS</td>
<td>Secretary of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORTS</td>
<td>Status of Resources and Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sealift and Readiness Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>Selective Service System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINTRANS</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>United States Naval Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPHS</td>
<td>United States Public Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTA</td>
<td>Voluntary Tanker Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activation. Order to active duty (other than for training) in the Federal service. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

active duty. Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the Reserve Components serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called AD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

availability date. The date after notification of mobilization by which forces will be marshalled at their home station or mobilization station and available for deployment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

C-day. See times.

D-Day. See times.

demobilization. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Delayed Entry Program. A program under which an individual may enlist in a Reserve component of a Military Service and specify a future reporting date for entry on active duty in the Active component that would coincide with availability of training spaces and with personal plans such as high school graduation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

draft. The conscription of qualified citizens for military service. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

F-Hour. See times.

Federal service. A term applied to National Guard members and units when called into the service of the United States under Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and 10 USC 12401-12408. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force module. A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called FM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force shortfall. A deficiency in the number of types of units available for planning within the time required for the performance of an assigned task. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

home station. The permanent location of Active units and Reserve component units (location of armory or reserve center). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the
wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**host-nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Inactive National Guard.** Army National Guard personnel in an inactive status not in the Selected Reserve who are attached to a specific National Guard unit but do not participate in training activities. Upon mobilization, they will mobilize with their units. In order for these personnel to remain members of the Inactive National Guard, they must muster once a year with their assigned unit. Like the Individual Ready Reserve, all members of the Inactive National Guard have legal, contractual obligations. Members of the Inactive National Guard may not train for retirement credit or pay and are not eligible for promotion. Also called ING. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**individual mobilization augmentee.** An individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an active component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Individual Ready Reserve.** A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some training and who have served previously in the Active component or in the Selected Reserve and have some period of their military service obligation remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and promotion with or without pay. Also called IRR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**industrial mobilization.** The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and contributory items and services essential to the industrial program. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**industrial preparedness program.** Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes industrial preparedness measures such as modernization, expansion, and preservation of the production facilities and contributory items and services for planning with industry. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**M-day.** See times.

**mobilization.** 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes
activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization base. The total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization materiel reserves and facilities, continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, and standby legislation and controls. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization site. The designated location where a Reserve component unit or individual mobilizes or moves to after mobilization for further processing, training, and employment. This differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a military installation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization station. The designated military installation to which a Reserve component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an aerial port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or
successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Presidential Callup. Procedures by which the President brings all or a part of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard into active Federal service of the United States under section 12406 of title 10 U.S.C. and Chapter 15 of title 10 USC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority. Provision of a public law (10 USC 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 270 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ready reserve. The Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law. (10 USC 10142, 12301, and 12302). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

reserve component category. The category that identifies an individual’s status in a reserve component. The three reserve component categories are Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each reservist is identified by a specific reserve component category designation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Reserve Components. Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States are: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the Naval Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; g. and the Coast Guard Reserve. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Retired Reserve. All Reserve members who receive retirement pay on the basis of their active duty and/or Reserve service; those members who are otherwise eligible for retirement pay but have not yet reached age 60 and who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Selected Reserve. Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. All Selected Reservists are in an active status. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. See also ready reserve. (Joint Pub 1-02)

standby reserve. Those units and members of the Reserve Components (other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only as provided in 10 USC 10151, 12301 and 12306. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. f. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. g. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. h. R-day. Redevelopment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. i. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). j. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). k. W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Joint Pub 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 4-05 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: