

Joint Publication 3-70



Joint Doctrine for Strategic Attack



Second Draft

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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the conduct of strategic attack operations across the range of military operations. This publication will address operational-level considerations for the commanders of combatant commands, joint task forces, and the subordinate components of these commands to plan, coordinate, and execute successful strategic attack operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

1 **3. Application**

2

3 a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of
4 combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate
5 components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when
6 significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when
7 significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

8

9 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be
10 followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
11 dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the
12 contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of
13 joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination
14 with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and
15 specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or
16 coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified
17 by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
18 commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and
19 procedures, where applicable.

20

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

21

22

S.A. FRY
Vice Admiral, US Navy
Director, Joint Staff

23

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT STRATEGIC ATTACK

1. Definition of Joint Strategic Attack

A joint strategic attack (JSA) is a JFC-directed offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, that is selected specifically in order to achieve an strategic objective of the National Command Authorities (NCA) or of the combatant commander (CINC). These attacks could be part of a campaign or could be conducted in parallel with, but independently from, the campaign. They could also, if so directed by the NCA, be conducted alone. They can, themselves, take the form of campaigns. JSAs sometimes offer a means to achieve strategic objectives without the necessity of setting and achieving operational objectives as a precondition.

2. Characteristics

a. The usual aim of JSA is to significantly weaken the opposing leaders' ability or will to resist. It does this by denying something that is critically important to them. That could be a physical, palpable object, which it might deny by blockading the enemy or stripping them of a particular territory or resource. It could be a capability, which might be denied by destroying enemy forces and their industrial support, or by isolating the enemy economy. Or a non-material asset might be denied, like political support, intelligence or even confidence or trust. On some occasions in the past, strategic attack

1 has been designed to weaken the opposing leaders' ability or will by influencing civilian
2 populations, or the enemy's internal politics, or international opinion. It has sometimes
3 dramatically impacted the viability of the enemy effort, even though it caused no material
4 change in the correlation of friendly/hostile forces or their respective freedom to operate.

5
6 b. Whatever its form, JSA is distinguished by aiming at something which is so
7 important to the opposing leaders that, when its loss becomes apparent, they will realize
8 they have been confronted with a significant, perhaps insurmountable, complication. The
9 targets selected for JSA are likely to be enemy strategic centers of gravity (COGs) when
10 the desired condition is a disrupted enemy offense or defense. However, targets other
11 than COGs can be selected to establish equally-useful conditions, such as circumstances
12 in which the opposing decision-makers discover that they are misled, frustrated, or
13 trapped.

14
15 c. Joint strategic attack is also distinguished by the fact that its success will lead
16 directly **either** to one of the conditions which the NCA has directed the combatant
17 commander to create in support of the national strategy, **or** to one of the conditions which
18 the combatant commander has directed a subordinate commander to create in support of
19 the theater strategy. Joint strategic attack is not used to pursue operational level
20 objectives. It may, however, contribute to their achievement.

21
22 d. Joint strategic attack can be conducted by ground, air, sea, amphibious and special
23 forces. The attacks, themselves, are executed according to joint doctrine and the

1 participating forces' service doctrine. Consequently, there is no need for joint doctrine to
2 specifically address the execution of such attacks. However, the development and
3 planning of such attacks involve unique considerations and procedures. Because that
4 activity normally is based in a joint headquarters staff, there is a joint doctrine which
5 describes the factors which confront those involved in the development and planning.
6 This comprises the doctrine for JSA*.

7

8 **3. Elements of Effective Operations**

9

- 10 a. Effective JSAs are developed and planned on the basis of accurate intelligence.
11 Like most operations, JSAs require basic knowledge of the opponent's important systems
12 and assets- military, political, economic and so on. However, they can be reliant to a
13 greater degree than other operations upon knowledge of who influences opponent
14 decision-making and a correct assessment of those leaders' motivations, objectives and
15 strategy. The assessment attempts to capture what is important to each of the opposing
16 leaders, what each of them seek, why they have adopted the policy which has led to
17 conflict, and how they intend to succeed. Because JSA planning does not assume that the
18 targets will be opponent armed forces, it requires such an assessment in order to
19 determine what system or asset to attack. Analysis of extensive and detailed intelligence
20 is therefore critical to planning effective JSA.

21

* The words "strategic attack" have diverse service-specific and popular meanings or connotations. The term "Joint Strategic Attack" is used to distinguish the activity discussed herein from those other meanings.

1 b. JSA can only be effective when the proper conditions exist. First, something must
2 be identified as having extraordinary importance to the opposing leaders' will to resist, or
3 to their ability to resist. Second, the joint force must be capable of depriving the
4 opponent of that thing. These are not necessarily straightforward issues. Opposing
5 leaders may place extraordinary importance on, or depend upon, things other than the
6 success of a military adventure or the operational readiness of their armed forces. They
7 might not even place extraordinary importance on, or depend upon, retaining office or
8 their government's capability to rule. The effectiveness of a JSA depends upon the denial
9 of that which is truly important to the opponent. Even when such things can be
10 identified, it might not be possible to deprive the opponent of them. For example, an
11 opponent may ultimately depend upon income from smuggling operations, yet it might be
12 impossible for the joint force to stop smuggling operations. JSA should only be
13 attempted when both identification and denial are feasible.

14
15 c. Planning effective JSA operations requires the combatant commander and staff to
16 have a full understanding of the strategies that they support, including in particular the
17 national, political-level strategy. This strategy might be aimed at establishing some end
18 state which is different than *status quo ante*. It could require the joint force to establish
19 specific conditions beyond defeating the opponent's armed forces, or it might not require
20 that those forces be defeated at all. It cannot be assumed that the reason for invoking US
21 armed forces is pure-and-simply to oppose and defeat the adversary forces. Especially
22 when JSA is appropriate, it is likely that joint force planning will be expected to support

1 something other than a force-on-force contest, and the mindset of the planners must be
2 prepared to accommodate asymmetrical attack.

3

4 d. Effective JSA planning often requires extensive coordination with agencies outside
5 the Department of Defense. The best time to consider the factors that militate for or
6 against JSA is at the earliest possible point in contingency development, because those
7 very factors are also important in selecting a potential end state and a top-level, national
8 strategy for achieving it. Therefore, JSA development must start as soon as the
9 combatant commander recognizes a situation or event with national security implications.
10 Depending on the urgency of the circumstances, this will result in either the beginning of
11 deliberate mission analysis, or the creation of a Commander-in-Chief's assessment for the
12 CJCS and the NCA. Both of these begin a recursive process in which the joint force's
13 ability or inability to contribute effectively to the end state affects the National Security
14 Council (NSC) system's deliberations regarding what that end state will be. These
15 deliberations involve all relevant government agencies and evaluate possible roles for
16 each of the nation's instruments of power. The potential value of JSA can be properly
17 determined only in this environment, due to its direct link to national strategy and due to
18 the fact that it can affect, or be affected by, the actions of all other instruments of power.
19 To a degree that can far exceed that of other military operations, JSA development begins
20 within the NSC system, and its effectiveness depends upon continued coordination within
21 that system throughout JSA planning and execution.

22

23

1 4. Centers Of Gravity

2

3 The systems and assets targeted in JSA are likely to be COGs of the opponents’
4 political, economic, or military systems. JSA may also target COGs in informal or non-
5 national power structures, such as those which support individual opponent leaders or
6 groups, provided that the circumstances of the conflict make these legal targets.

7 However, effective JSA may also be planned against systems or assets which do not
8 appear to meet the definition of COGs which appears in JP 3-0. In particular, a JSA
9 might be appropriate to deprive the opponents of an asset which is not, at that time, a
10 source of power or mobility. Such an attack could achieve a strategic objective of
11 seriously limiting the options available to the opposing leaders in the future, even though
12 the opponents might not be aware of the implications of the attack when it occurs. Also,
13 JSA can achieve objectives of a defensive strategy by attacking targets other than COGs.

14

15 5. Physical Effects

16

17 Due to the fact that most JSAs are conceived as high-return “short cuts” that achieve a
18 strategic objective in a *coup de main*, the physical effects are often expected to be small
19 in proportion to their result, in terms of the opposing leaders’ calculations. However, the
20 physical effects of a JSA might need to be extensive and enduring, requiring high risk
21 and a heavy investment of military effort. This is often the case if the JSA deprives the
22 opponent of movement, as in a blockade, or of freedom to operate or exert influence in a
23 particular zone, as in a seizure of territory. Heavy physical damage can also result from

1 the opponents' attempt to reconstitute or replace systems or assets previously damaged,
2 which could require the JSA to be planned as a campaign of recurring attacks.

3

4 **6. Psychological Effects**

5

6 JSAs are planned to achieve an objective which has been specified by the national or
7 theater strategies. The attacks usually aim to achieve that goal by significantly
8 decreasing the will or ability of the opposing leaders to resist. Planners target will to
9 resist, or ability to resist, based upon strategic guidance which has taken into
10 consideration the circumstances of the conflict. Primary among those circumstances is
11 whether it appears that US interests will be better served by leaving most of the opposing
12 leaders in place, or by deposing them in favor of others. If they are to be left in place,
13 then emphasis is likely to fall on decreasing their will to resist. In such a case, there is
14 still value in decreasing their ability to resist, but the main part of that value derives from
15 the fact that discovering that they have lost some important means to resist might greatly
16 reduce their will to resist. In short, when there is no intention to depose the opposing
17 leaders, the ultimate aim of all military actions –including actions designed to destroy the
18 opponents' military capability- shifts toward convincing those leaders to agree to US
19 terms. Therefore, JSAs might be planned on the basis of the expected psychological
20 effect on those leaders, alone, with the physical effects treated as a secondary
21 consideration. JSA targeting and timing must consider, and in some cases maximize, the
22 psychological impact of the attacks upon the opposing leadership, unless the strategic

1 guidance indicates that the will of opposing leaders is unlikely to be swayed, or that their
2 ability to resist is to be the primary consideration.

3

4 **7. Integration and/or Synchronization**

5

6 a. Planning for JSA must provide for integration with the efforts of other government
7 departments. These might be directed by the President to employ the economic,
8 diplomatic or other instrument of national power as part of the national strategy. One of
9 these non-military instruments might carry the main effort, in which case DOD activities
10 would play an enabling role. In any case, JSA planners must take part in interagency
11 coordination to ensure that their operations do not countervail those of a concurrent
12 operation by another department. Further, initial planning of JSA and other departments'
13 operations should attempt to synchronize the character and timing of these efforts to
14 avoid contradictory indications and to complement or enhance each other. As examples,
15 weaving them together in the proper sequence can present an escalating or accelerating
16 trend. Issuing diplomatic pronouncements immediately before or after an attack can
17 increase their impact. Integration of economic actions with JSA on particular sectors of
18 the economy can enhance the impact of both. Planning for inter-agency integration and
19 synchronization can confront the opponent with a strategic level "battle rhythm" which
20 undermines their ability to regain initiative.

21

22 b. If JSA is to be planned as part of a campaign or will be parallel with, but separate
23 from, a campaign, then it must be integrated like any operation within the campaign.

1 That is, its potential impact on the opposing leadership must be evaluated in the context
2 of the other operations in the campaign. JSA's impact on enemy decision-making can be
3 sharpened or dulled by the effects of other operations, to a degree. However, it does not
4 usually rely on the impact of other operations to succeed. While the intended results of a
5 JSA are unlikely to interfere with the outcome of other operations, those operations might
6 depend heavily on the JSA's result for their own success.

7
8 c. The impact of a JSA on the sustainment, mobility and readiness of the enemy
9 forces which will be engaged in the joint campaign, and the JSA impact on the joint
10 force's own logistics must be examined for the opportunities or difficulties it might
11 present for the campaign, and for the overall effort. Synchronization of the JSA with
12 other operations will be necessary if it attacks targets in, or passes through, geographic
13 zones where those operations are being conducted. Synchronization will also be
14 necessary if the JSA relies on combat units, logistic support or lines of communication
15 which are involved in other operations. Conflicts or tradeoffs between the JSA and other
16 operations are evaluated on the basis of their respective risks and contributions to the
17 national or theater strategy, rather than the basis of geography or command relationships.

18 19 **8. Systems: Weapons and Platforms**

20
21 All weapons and platforms in the inventories of all services might be useful in JSA.
22 This includes non-lethal weapons, since JSA can be used at the low end of the range of
23 conflict, where there may be a desire to minimize opponent casualties. It does not

- 1 include nuclear weapons and platforms exclusively used for their delivery. Nuclear
- 2 weapon use is beyond the scope of JSA, and associated doctrine is discussed in the JP 3-
- 3 12 series.
- 4

1 CHAPTER II

2 COMMAND AND CONTROL

3
4 **1. Command and Control Relationships**

5
6 a. Joint Strategic Attack can be used across the range of conflict, and the level of
7 interest in its planning and execution is higher in more politically-sensitive situations,
8 such as certain operations other than war. This fact will result in different, and
9 sometimes unique, command and control arrangements and reporting requirements. For
10 example, in some cases the NCA might require a personal go-no go decision for a JSA.

11
12 b. The relationships explained in JP 0-2 apply to JSA, just as they do to any joint
13 operation. The supported combatant commander will direct planning and will execute
14 JSA, or will delegate those responsibilities to a JFC, if appropriate. In all cases, unity of
15 command must be provided for JSAs. If execution of a particular JSA requires an
16 elaborately joint effort, or if the JSA must span over a long period to destroy a large
17 target set or to prevent the opponent from reconstituting, a Joint Task Force might be
18 created for that JSA. If that is necessary, the command and control doctrine in JP 5-0X.X
19 applies.

20
21 c. The combatant commander or the JFC might select a course of action for a
22 particular JSA which involves combat units from one component, only. In such a case
23 the relevant joint force component commander will take over the planning effort, and

1 base it upon operational-level guidance from the JFC. In single-component JSAs,
2 Secretary of Defense approval for any additional forces needed by the component
3 commander from outside the theater is requested through the combatant commander per
4 JP 0-2. The forces then come under the component commander's tactical control at the
5 appropriate time.

6

7 d. Strategic attacks might be conducted by combatant commanders other than the
8 geographic CINC, who have been designated as supported commanders for that purpose
9 by the NCA, in accordance with the strategic guidance provided to them. Both planning
10 and execution of such attacks should be coordinated closely with the JFC and relevant
11 joint force components to permit integration and, if necessary, synchronization.

12 However, such actions are not necessarily JSAs, as defined by this publication.

13

14 **2. Battlespace Control and Coordination**

15

16 For executing JSAs, control and coordination measures are the same as for any other
17 joint operation, as specified in JP 3-XX.

18

19 **3. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)**

20

21 For executing JSAs, C4 equipment and architecture are the same as for any other joint
22 operation, as specified in JP 6-XX. The only factor which is unusual is the possibility of

- 1 a requirement to support faster, more detailed reporting to the NCA, or to provide real-
- 2 time voice connectivity between the NCA and the operational or tactical level.
- 3
- 4

1 CHAPTER III

2 PLANNING AND EXECUTING JOINT STRATEGIC ATTACK

3 OPERATIONS

4
5 **1. Joint Strategic Attack Objectives**

6
7 The objectives of JSA are derived directly from the national strategy or the theater
8 strategy. Based on the national strategy for a particular contingency, the NCA provide
9 guidance, set objectives or define tasks for the supported and supporting CINCs. The
10 supported CINC(s) use these as the basis for a contingency strategy for their command(s).
11 Both the national and the CINC strategies will attempt to achieve a desired outcome, or
12 “end state,” by establishing one or more conditions which, it is expected, will lead to or
13 produce the end state. The NCA assign responsibility for establishing one or more of the
14 national strategy’s conditions to the military. The theater CINC defines conditions which
15 might be within the capacity of available forces to establish, which will lead to or
16 produce each of the conditions assigned to the geographic combatant command by the
17 NCA. The aim of a JSA is to generate effects that establish one of the conditions
18 required by the CINC to satisfy the theater strategy, or one of the conditions assigned to
19 the armed forces by the NCA, which are required to satisfy the national strategy for the
20 contingency. JSA objectives which aim to satisfy the national strategy are defined in a
21 development process which occurs mainly at the interagency level. JSAs aimed at theater
22 strategy also usually require interagency coordination during development and planning.
23 These are further discussed in a subsequent section.

1

2 **2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Requirements**

3

4 The requirements for ISR to support JSA, and procedures for meeting them, are the
5 same as for any other joint operation, as specified in JP 3-55.

6

7 **3. Interagency Coordination**

8

9 a. As stated above, JSA objectives are derived directly from national or theater
10 strategy. However, the national strategy is formulated on the basis of assumptions
11 regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of various actions by each of the instruments of
12 national power. When JSA might have a dramatic effect on the opposing leadership in a
13 relatively short time, perhaps at a low cost, that possibility is reflected in the assumptions
14 regarding the contribution that the armed forces might make. Because such assumptions
15 might become a central factor in NSC or Presidential consideration, the Chairman
16 requires an early estimate of the feasibility and value of JSA in a given contingency, well
17 before the national strategy for that contingency has been fully worked out. Therefore
18 the Joint Staff and the CINC's staff begin to develop an understanding of JSA's potential
19 under any plausible strategy, at the first indication that a contingency might have US
20 national security implications.

21

22 b. At that point, the military staffs do not know what conditions a notional JSA might
23 be intended to establish. When ultimately decided, the national strategy might seek the

1 removal of the opposing leaders, or it might seek to leave the opponents in place but
2 convince them to alter their policy to something more acceptable to the United States. Or
3 it might simply seek to limit the implications of the opponents' policy. Therefore
4 development of several different JSA scenarios, each of which might be appropriate
5 under a different national strategy, is often necessary.

6

7 c. The aim of JSA development is not to present operational options for NCA
8 selection, but to be prepared to advise the NCA of whether the armed forces might be
9 capable, under the particular circumstances, of directly and significantly modifying the
10 strategic conditions with which the opponent is working.

11

12 d. To undertake JSA development the military staffs require considerable detailed
13 intelligence regarding the politics, economics and other social factors at play. One of the
14 reasons interagency cooperation is required at this stage is because it is unlikely that the
15 CINC's planners will have early access to such intelligence through their J-2. Another
16 reason is that final determination of the national strategy also takes into consideration
17 those conditions that the non-military instruments of power are capable of establishing,
18 and what end states those conditions might produce. Therefore, JSA development is fully
19 integrated with early thinking in the National Security Agency and other departments
20 about the roles of the other instruments. As a result, JSA development is greatly
21 influenced by the interagency process.

22

1 e. In the event that the national strategy which is ultimately selected assigns
2 conditions to the armed forces which might be established by a JSA, the regional
3 combatant commander will decide whether to proceed with JSA planning. Each of the
4 other departments which have been assigned a role by the national strategy are kept
5 informed of the timing and other particulars of the JSA as it is planned, and the plan is
6 modified as needed to achieve full integration with the rest of the US government effort.
7

8 **4. Multinational Considerations**

9
10 a. Due to the close relationship between JSA and top-level strategy, JSA is only
11 feasible when a single strategy is being served. Therefore, it is not practical for a
12 multinational coalition of peers unless the coalition members agree that one leading
13 nation will establish the strategy for the entire coalition. Otherwise it is highly likely that
14 the conditions to be established by JSA will be regarded as counterproductive by a
15 number of coalition members, from their own strategic perspective. The risk of
16 politically disrupting the coalition might outweigh any advantages that could be gained
17 by employing JSA.

18
19 b. The single strategy which JSA might serve can be an alliance strategy, developed
20 under alliance guidelines. However, it is unlikely that early JSA development will
21 proceed in parallel with top-level strategy definition, as it would in the United States.
22 Rather, the alliance strategy might largely be pre-ordained by tradeoffs between the
23 strategic goals, agendas, and domestic politics of the alliance members. In such a case,

1 JSA development would have to be carried out after the fact, and within severe
2 limitations. A flawed development might result. It is also possible that an alliance might
3 not be able to create a single, alliance strategy or strategic guidance that leads to any end
4 state, due to disagreements among members. In such circumstances, JSA development is
5 very likely to produce poor results. The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 provides an
6 example.

7
8 c. The NATO members could not agree on an end state or a strategy. Without
9 providing strategic guidance, they asked military planners how armed force might stop
10 Yugoslav armed forces, paramilitaries and special police from persecuting minority
11 members in part of Yugoslavia. The military planners proposed a JSA (although the
12 concept is not recognized in NATO doctrine) which would use aircraft to destroy a
13 number of military targets across Yugoslavia in rapid succession. The effects of these
14 attacks were to be a dramatic decrease in the operations tempo of the Yugoslav armed
15 forces, and a fracturing of the Belgrade elite between the armed forces and the hard line
16 ideologues who favored expulsion of the minority. Within three or four days this was to
17 produce a loss of conviction on the part of the elite and their leader. The unspoken
18 strategy was that this condition would produce the desired end state: Yugoslavia
19 willingness to suspend persecution and return to negotiations. This calculus was
20 accepted by NATO decision-makers, but it did not allow for the fact that Yugoslavia's
21 armed forces were not regarded by most of the Belgrade elite as being very important to
22 their continued rule. Despite the augmentation of the attack's effects, with a massing of
23 ground forces on the border, the fracture did not develop until over two months of air

1 attacks, and it is doubtful that the air raids or ground deployments were a decisive factor
2 in causing it. This outcome was the result of errors made during the JSA development,
3 which was attempted without JSA planning doctrine, in circumstances that allowed no
4 interplay with strategy definition.

5

6 **5. Complementary and Overlapping Operations**

7

8 a. JSA can be conducted as part of a campaign, separate but parallel to a campaign, or
9 by itself in advance or in lieu of a campaign. In the first option, JSA seeks to establish
10 the same strategic condition as the campaign, but its effects alone, and those of the
11 campaign alone, would not be sufficient. In the second option, JSA seeks to establish a
12 different strategic condition than the campaign, but neither campaign or JSAs by
13 themselves can efficiently establish all the strategic conditions required for the strategy to
14 be successful. In the third option, JSA is sufficient to establish the condition required for
15 the strategy to work, or to establish a pre-condition required by the strategy.

16

17 b. Unity of command for each of these options is vested in the Joint Force
18 Commander, unless the NCA specify otherwise. The command and control provisions
19 cited above apply, as appropriate.

20

21 c. Operations that are complementary to, or overlap with, JSA are likely to be
22 conducted using non-military instruments of power as well. These will be integrated with
23 JSA, and coordinated if necessary, through liaisons to the supported commander for JSA,

1 directly with the departments exercising operational control over the other instruments
2 involved. If not provided for in the President's strategic guidance or in Presidential or
3 NSC Directive, such liaison personnel must be provided on initiative of the other
4 department, or of the supported commander for JSA. Integration between instruments is
5 essential to the success of the national strategy. It can be particularly critical when JSA is
6 employed, during planning and through execution.

7

8 **6. Targeting Principles**

9

10 The fundamentals and process for JSA targeting are the same as for any other joint
11 operation, as specified in JP 3-60, except that development and validation of JSA targets
12 might be largely done in conjunction with formulation of national strategy. The duties
13 and responsibilities for targeting activity in that case do not necessarily follow the
14 description in Chapter III of JP 3-60, which regards activity at the JFC level and below.

15

16 a. Target development is the phase that chiefly distinguishes JSA as a distinct mode
17 of operation. Development principles do exist that are more relevant to JSA, in terms of
18 its strategic-planning inputs, than to many other operations. The following are principles
19 which can be useful to those involved in early development of JSA.

20

21 b. When "developing JSA," (i.e. searching for opportunities in which JSA might
22 work), the President might have not yet decided on an end state, or a strategy to achieve
23 it. It might be necessary to consider how JSA might fit in a strategy that involves

1 **deposing the enemy leadership**, as well as in a strategy that involves **undoing the**
2 **enemy leadership's resolve to resist a solution** that is agreeable to the United States,
3 and in a strategy that simply **strips them of the means to do anything that is**
4 **disagreeable** to the United States.

5
6 c. In addition to ammunition, fuel, foodstuffs, transportation, power, command &
7 control, heavy industry and all the other traditional inputs, an opponent must maintain
8 conviction that continuing to resist will produce a more favorable end state than giving
9 up. In the Falklands War, Argentina provided an example of a belligerent which still had
10 an essentially untouched military reserve that far outweighed that of its perilously over-
11 stretched opponent, but which lost conviction. Ireland, on the other hand, provides an
12 example of a clandestine independence movement, repeatedly crushed and without a
13 fraction of the military means of its opponent, which prevailed because it continually
14 regenerated its conviction. **Depending on the strategy, conviction might be a center of**
15 **gravity.**

16
17 d. The opposing leadership is never entirely monolithic. Even the most dictatorial
18 leaders rely on other people, including subordinates and informal associates, for
19 information, judgement and cooperation. As a result, the overall policy of a government
20 or group is not the product of a single person, but of a group of persons. Such persons
21 might be military or non-military, and may not even be official members or employees of
22 the government. The particular policies that have led to conflict with the United States
23 might be dictated by a "strong-man" contrary to the judgement of all other members of

1 the leadership circle, or they might be supported by some or all of the other members.
2 There are, almost always, "hard-liners" and a "peace party" within any leadership. **The**
3 **internal dynamics of the leadership are a likely source of vulnerabilities for any**
4 **opponent.** In particular, the conviction of the group depends on the conviction of each of
5 its individual members, which might be open to manipulation by the application of well-
6 targeted effects.

7
8 e. The populations of **most countries and groups usually include powerful or**
9 **influential individuals who are not a part of, or directly associated with, the**
10 **leadership.** They might be rivals who are in contention with the leadership, or potential
11 rivals who acquiesce in the policies of the leadership. They might also be individuals
12 whose interests are best served by adapting to, rather than influencing or participating in
13 decision-making in their country or region. Until approximately 1976, the heads of
14 cocaine-exporting organizations in Columbia offered an example of extremely powerful
15 and influential parties which abstained from involvement with national policies. Iraq's
16 Kurd and Shia leaders exemplify in-country figures who oppose the government. Such
17 individuals and groups are important parts of the conflict circumstances. Intelligence
18 preparation for JSA therefore attempts to identify them, so the effects on their interests
19 can be recognized and the potential for them to influence the conflict can be considered.

20
21 f. The conviction of individuals affects their judgement, their cooperation and even
22 the information they provide to others. As the news and effects of combat (and other
23 initiatives such as diplomacy or information operations) reach individuals, it affects their

1 personal estimate of their chances of success and their risk of failure. That estimate
2 influences their conviction. **Minimizing the delay and attenuation that occur while**
3 **the news and effects reach decision-makers is important for speedy resolution.**
4 WWI Germany provides an example of how isolation from the news and effects of the
5 war allowed the Kaiser's War Cabinet to imagine that military victory was still possible
6 long beyond the culmination of their defensive effort, leading to a surprising total
7 collapse of their army, and necessitating surrender on terms far less favorable than might
8 have been negotiated months earlier.

9

10 g. **That which affects the interests of enemy decision-makers and decision-**
11 **influencers is more likely to impact their conviction and policy than actions and**
12 **events that do not affect their interests.** Such interests are not limited to the military
13 situation, and normally the military situation ranks low among the interests of individuals
14 who make policy at a national level, even in wartime. These other interests might (but do
15 not necessarily) include the individual's political viability, exercise of power, personal
16 security, family, property, income, prestige, perquisites of office, status within clan or
17 profession, or the success of a particular project, plan or industry. Note that some of
18 these interests are not likely to offer valid opportunities for military action.

19

20 h. When the opponent is engaged in combat, or relies heavily on a very large
21 organization such as secret police, then the opponent will require considerable wealth to
22 sustain these things. **If these things are important to the success of the opponent's**
23 **strategy, then the uninterrupted supply of wealth can be viewed as a center of**

1 **gravity.** Wealth might be derived from industry or natural resources within part of the
2 opponent's territory, or it might come from trade outside the country, or it might come
3 from illicit sources such as drug trafficking or smuggling. It might also be donated, from
4 groups or individuals, inside or outside the country. In such cases, there will be an
5 organization with the mission of ensuring that the wealth continues to flow to the regime.
6 For governments with few economic resources, and for non-governmental movements
7 with no legitimate economy, the collection of operating funds is a major strategic
8 consideration. **The opponents' sources of wealth and their organization for collecting**
9 **it have the potential to play a major role in any of the three types of strategy** the
10 President may wish to consider.

11

12 i. The usefulness of wealth, or any other individual or group interests that might be
13 identified with Intelligence, depends upon a number of factors. First is the **policy of the**
14 **opponent and the strategy** it is using to institute it. Second is **how the opponent is**
15 **constituted internally and the dynamics within** its leadership. Third is **the US end**
16 **state and its strategy** to achieve it. Fourth, and most relevant to the targeting process, is
17 **the existence of valid and vulnerable targets**, the capture or destruction of which will
18 affect those interests. The procedure followed for JSA development identifies as many
19 promising interests as possible based on intelligence and assumptions regarding the first
20 and second factors, then examines what sort of US strategy might be supported by acting
21 against those interests. It then investigates for possible targets, as a feasibility test. Once
22 the national strategy is defined and the NCA's' strategic guidance is available, if JSA is
23 appropriate, planning is refined by repeating the JP 3-60 targeting process.

1

2 j. The effects generated by **a particular JSA might not be sufficiently strong to**
3 **establish the condition specified by US strategy, unless those effects are amplified or**
4 **aggravated by another attack** against the same, or a related, interest. Because some
5 relevant interests might not be valid subjects of military action, **such "attacks" are**
6 **likely to be actions by other instruments** of national power. JSA development takes
7 this into account via the interagency process.

8

9 **7. Legal Considerations**

10

11 International law and legal considerations, discussed in Appendix A of JP 3-60, apply
12 to the entirety of JSA, just as they do for all military operations. JSA often aims at
13 targets other than armed forces. This can lead into questions regarding whether particular
14 systems, assets or individuals may be attacked. Such questions can become critical in
15 contingencies where the national strategy intends to convince the opposing leaders to
16 accept US terms, rather than deposing them. In such cases, the objectives set for the
17 armed forces might call for military planners to design and select courses of action on the
18 basis of their potential to generate a psychological impact among the opposing leaders.
19 The chief difficulty for JSA arises when most of those leaders are technically civilians,
20 even though they individually influence, and jointly determine, their country's policy and
21 its military activity. The answers to such questions are no different for JSA than they
22 would be for similar targets proposed for any other type of operation, however JSA has
23 the potential to raise such questions more often than other operations. That makes the

1 involvement of qualified experts in the Law of Armed Conflict in JSA planning a
2 practical necessity.

3

4 **8. Constraints, Restraints and Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Considerations**

5

6 There are no constraints, restraints or ROE considerations unique to JSA.

1 APPENDIX A

2 JOINT FORCE STRATEGIC ATTACK CAPABILITIES

3
4 **1. Attack Capabilities**

5
6 JSAs are conducted in the same manner as other attacks in other operations, and there
7 are no special capabilities especially developed for JSA.

8
9 **2. Enabling Capabilities**

10
11 JSAs are enabled by interagency cooperation on intelligence requirements and
12 dissemination, and on options development for the NSC process. They are also enabled
13 by liaison between the supported commander for JSA and the other departments
14 employing instruments of national power against the opponent. In many cases, a robust
15 human intelligence network in the opponents' territory could also be a valuable enabler
16 for measuring JSA effects. Because the planning and execution of JSAs are largely
17 indistinguishable from those for any other joint operation, the enabling capabilities are
18 largely the same, as well.

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APPENDIX B
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-70 is based upon references to be determined.

APPENDIX C
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CINC	combatant commander
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COG	center of gravity
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
DOD	Department of Defense
JFC	joint force commander
JSA	joint strategic attack
NCA	National Command Authorities
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ROE	rules of engagement

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PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

TBD

