PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, and execution of personnel recovery during joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-50 (FORMERLY 3-50.2
DATED 26 JANUARY 1996, 3-50.21 DATED 23 MARCH 1998,
AND 3-50.3 DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1996)


• Updates joint doctrine for consistency with Department of Defense policy on the joint personnel recovery (PR) system of the preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions

• Updates the definitions of the key terms combat search and rescue, evasion, and personnel recovery

• Replaces the concept of rescue coordination center with the personnel recovery coordination cell

• Replaces the joint search and rescue center with the joint personnel recovery center

• Discusses the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell and nonconventional assisted recovery

• Introduces the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate

• Covers the three PR options of military, diplomatic, or civil or a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel

• Provides the five PR categories of individual, component, joint, multinational, and other government agency

• Adds an appendix on military support to civil search and rescue

• Adds an appendix on reintegration administration
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of the Department of Defense Personnel Recovery (PR) System

• Outlines PR Functions and Responsibilities

• Covers PR Command and Control

• Discusses PR Preparation

• Covers PR Planning

• Lists PR Procedures and Techniques

Overview

Preserving the lives of those participating in a US-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Isolated personnel are those US military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense [SecDef]) who are separated (as an individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. Additionally, when directed by the President of the United States or the SecDef, DOD shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

Personnel recovery (PR) is a system comprised of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions. PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty; sustain morale; increase operational performance; and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions. Although presented in the apparent sequential order of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation, it is important to understand that these activities can occur simultaneously or in any sequence. The PR system is iterative and the individual activities are
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interdependent; a change occurring in one portion can affect what is happening in the other three.

**Preparation.**

Every person, process, and material and nonmaterial capability utilized for personnel recovery activities must be aimed at one thing — successful recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. In PR, success is far more likely if the people involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information (situational awareness) and to take appropriate action. Every DOD PR process, product, or service is aimed at one or more of the following force elements: commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Each of these force elements must be thoroughly trained and properly organized and equipped to perform its responsibilities and interface effectively with the other elements in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The foundation for everything DOD does to prepare these elements must be rooted in sound PR policy, validated doctrine, current tactics, techniques, and procedures, and enhanced by a robust education and training program.

**Planning.**

Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs must consider all available PR options and categories to successfully plan for recovery operations within their operational areas. JFCs cannot control or, in many cases, influence the nonmilitary options. JFCs and their staffs work to ensure that all military efforts are coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with any diplomatic and civil options being exercised. The President of the United States can choose to exercise military, diplomatic, or civil options, or a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel.

The JFC is responsible for accomplishing PR execution tasks throughout the operational area. During mission analysis and planning processes, commanders continually assess operational PR requirements against the force PR capabilities. If the PR capability does not exist, commanders must either assume or mitigate the risk, or delay operations until the capability is established. Commanders can expand and achieve maximum effectiveness of their PR capabilities by employing those capabilities in the context of one or more of the five categories: individual, component, joint, multinational, and other government agencies. The five categories represent a PR operational capability environment that, if exploited correctly, offers a commander flexibility to effectively mitigate the risk of personnel becoming isolated.
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**Execution.**

The DOD PR system is centered on tasks and supporting activities that must be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred. The capability to complete the five PR execution tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements (including components), forces, and isolated personnel. The Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible to prepare and present forces to the geographic combatant commanders that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform PR tasks consistent with the roles and functions established in law and by the President and SecDef and the missions specified by the JFC.

**Adaptation.**

Adaptation is the ongoing function that assures continuous improvements to the PR system through lessons learned, assessments, requirements determination, concept development, wargames, and experimentation, and enables forces to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission. Adaptation impacts the other functions of the system while they are being accomplished; it is not restricted to post-mission input. Adaptation must be responsive and continuous and considered during all the functions of the PR system.

**Functions and Responsibilities**

**Overall responsibilities.**

The SecDef develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy and plans for recovering and accounting for isolated personnel. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for operational implementation of PR policy and development of PR doctrine. The Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) is the DOD Executive Agent for PR, less policy. CDRUSJFCOM has designated the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for DOD-wide personnel recovery matters responsible for executing these Executive Agent functions.

The combatant commands, the Military Departments, and USSOCOM establish a PR OPR to assist them in carrying out their PR responsibilities. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) may also establish joint personnel recovery centers (JPRCs) within their command as specific operations progress in their areas of responsibility to coordinate PR missions for an operational area.
CCDRs, or their designated subordinate JFCs, should establish a JPRC to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. The JPRC also is the JFC’s primary coordinator for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President of the United States, the SecDef, or by US-approved prior agreements. CCDRs should establish a JPRC in the earliest stages of operational planning, or designate a supported commander for PR or joint task force (JTF), to ensure integration with other command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance entities. The JPRC should be integrated into the JFC’s or designated supported commander’s appropriate operations center.

Component commanders establish a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to coordinate all component PR activities, with the JPRC and other component PRCCs. The PRCC should be collocated in the operations center or, at a minimum, where it can obtain and maintain the best situational awareness of the isolating events and the environment in which they are occurring, and exercise its authority to coordinate and control the execution of the five PR tasks. The PRCC director is responsible to the component commander for the coordination of component forces in the performance of PR missions.

The JFC normally designates the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) with overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing all nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) operations in support of the PR plan. The JFSOCC retains operational control (OPCON) of all special operations forces (SOF) unconventional assisted recovery forces in the operational area. The JFSOCC exercises control through the operations officer, who designates an unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC) director and, when directed, establishes the UARCC. The UARCC is a compartmented SOF facility staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners who are representative of each NAR capability.

The specific command relationships for a particular joint force is tailored to the situation and evaluated against the mission, the environment, and the specific force structure. Coordination of PR planning is vital to effective and successful PR mission execution. PR often requires coordination with staff elements at the JTF and...
integration of recovery operations. subordinate levels. Command relationships and PR coordination authority should be clearly defined and delineated in appropriate JTF and component operation orders and, as required, fragmentary orders.

Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) and are responsible for planning and executing PR across the range of military operations and throughout their area of responsibility.

CCDRs may exercise combatant command (command authority) of PR for a specific joint operation through a designated subordinate JFC. The CCDR should delegate OPCON of assigned and/or attached forces to the designated subordinate JFC to plan and conduct PR operations within the subordinate JFC’s operational area. JFCs may coordinate PR through their operations directorate or through a component commander. If a component commander is designated to coordinate PR, the JPRC should be integrated into the designated component’s operations center. In the case where a component commander is designated to coordinate PR for the joint force, the component also retains a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions.

Coordination and Liaison.

Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Coordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously. Personnel recovery command authority is retained by the JFC; coordination authority is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for personnel recovery. PR coordinating authority enables a commander or individual to require the participation of other commanders for planning or other purposes, but it cannot be applied to compel agreement.

Communications.

Communications play a major role in PR missions. Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for component communications interoperability including air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or subsurface. PR communications must be rapid, reliable, secure, and flexible.

Preparation

Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and instructions, further amplified by executive agent instructions and
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guidance for personnel recovery, are the seminal documents for providing guidance to the commanders and staffs, forces and isolated personnel. In addition to this over-arching guidance, Services and CCDRs should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Lastly, JFCs must provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas. Necessary and sufficient guidance can be an instrumental facilitator in the joint force accomplishing the PR execution tasks.

Education and Training. PR education and training efforts focus on three force elements — commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation. Education and training programs for commanders and staffs are designed based on the following learning levels: fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Formal education and exercises should stress commanders’ and staffs’ responsibilities to account for personnel, report missing personnel and take steps to recover them. Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Isolated personnel training consists of various types and degrees of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. Specialized SERE training is available to select personnel meeting established criteria.

Products and Equipment. The capability to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks is enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command’s minimum evasion requirements.

Planning

The CCDR develops and promulgates strategic intent, concepts, and operational focus and responsibilities through plans and orders. The detailed joint force PR plan is located within Appendix 5 to Annex C of the plan. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the PR concept of operations (CONOPS), and directs PR guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. Regardless of the type of plan, subordinate commanders must be aware of the joint force commander’s overall intent and concept of operations, to complete a PR mission analysis and a PR supporting plan. In turn, subordinate commanders provide their PR appendix to their commands for tactical planning. The planning process is not necessarily linear; therefore the development of the situation, joint force commander’s CONOPS, mission analysis, PR Appendix 5 to Annex C of the plan, and subordinate command plans may progress concurrently.
Commanders and staffs must complete a PR mission analysis; develop the foundation of and authority for PR in the basic plan; and, develop the PR appendix to the basic plan.

Personnel Recovery Joint Procedures and Techniques

PR missions can be complex.

A response may be required in any land or sea location, threat environment, and at a time and place not of the isolated person’s or recovery force’s choosing. Many military operations can be successfully planned based on intelligence and targeting data; however, successful execution of PR missions often require creativity, improvisations, and real time intelligence, even when forces are well-trained, prepared, and pre-positioned. Military PR missions may involve single or multiple aircraft, ground elements, surface or subsurface naval assets, and/or space assets. Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Once a PR incident report is received by the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC, planning, to include incorporating the capabilities resident in one or more of the PR components, will begin and should result in the employment of forces to accomplish the other tasks. In some cases, the component reporting the isolation event will become the component responsible for locating, supporting, recovering, and reintegrating the isolated person. As a minimum, the component reporting the isolation event should maintain situational awareness until such time as the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC can coordinate additional forces and assets needed to accomplish the five execution tasks.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the preparation, planning, and execution of personnel recovery during joint operations.
Executive Summary

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“By pledging to put every effort into recovering our highly trained personnel, we send a powerful signal about their importance and help sustain their spirit under the stress of combat.”

General Hugh Shelton
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 October 1997 – 30 September 2001

1. Overview

   a. **Scope and Policy.** Preserving the lives of those participating in a US-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense (DOD). Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Isolated personnel are those US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense [SecDef]) who are separated (as an individual or group) from their unit while participating in a US-sponsored military activity or mission and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. Additionally, when directed by the President of the United States or the SecDef, DOD shall provide PR support to other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals in accordance with (IAW) all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

   b. Military commanders must prepare for, plan, and execute recovery operations for isolated personnel. Within the US, coordination for such support should be made with the appropriate regional rescue coordination center (RCC) that has responsibility for the operational area. Commanders may provide support to civil authorities during search and rescue (SAR) missions for other than isolated personnel as long as that support does not interfere with the military mission and is accomplished IAW the US National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan. DOD supports domestic and international search and rescue efforts of the general public IAW the US National Search and Rescue Plan (Appendix A, “Military Support to Civil Search and Rescue”).

2. The Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System

   PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty; sustain morale; increase operational performance; and deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation functions. Although presented in the apparent sequential order of preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation, it is important to understand that these activities can occur simultaneously or in any sequence. The PR system is iterative and the individual activities are interdependent; a change occurring in one portion can affect what is happening in the other three. The functions are not discrete steps, but rather activities that continuously interact with one another and adjust or adapt to ensure the system remains relevant and effective (see Figure I-1).
a. **Preparation.** Every person, process, and material and nonmaterial capability utilized for personnel recovery activities must be aimed at one thing — successful recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. In PR, success is far more likely if the people involved are properly organized, trained, equipped, and employed to gain and maintain the ability to process relevant information (situational awareness) and to take appropriate action. Situational awareness (SA) is the state of one’s ability to perceive relevant information within one’s sphere of interest, understand the impact of that information on the task(s) at hand, and project future states based on possible actions. The ability to take appropriate action in a given situation is based on one’s knowledge, skills, physical capability, confidence, will, and
often courage. Every DOD PR process, product, or service is aimed at one or more of the following force elements: commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Each of these force elements must be thoroughly trained and properly organized and equipped to perform its responsibilities and interface effectively with the other elements in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The foundation for everything DOD does to prepare these elements must be rooted in sound PR policy, validated doctrine, current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and enhanced by a robust education and training program.

b. Planning

(1) General. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs must consider all available PR options and categories to successfully plan for recovery operations within their operational areas. JFCs cannot control or, in many cases, influence the nonmilitary options. JFCs and their staffs work to ensure that all military efforts are coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, with any diplomatic and civil options being exercised.

(2) PR Options. The President of the United States can choose to exercise military, diplomatic, or civil options, or a combination thereof, to recover isolated personnel. The military option includes the planning and execution of activities by commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel across the range of military operations to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate isolated personnel. In 2003, the US Marine Corps rescued five 507th Maintenance Company prisoners of war (POWs) and two Army aviator POWs during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as a result of exercising the military option. Special operations forces (SOF) rescued an eighth POW. The diplomatic approach may include negotiation, armistice, and/or treaty. In 2001, a US Navy EP-3 performed an emergency landing in the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese government detained the crew and the Department of State (DOS) assigned the Defense Attaché to assist the United States Government (USG) effort to successfully recover the isolated crew through diplomatic means. Civil efforts may include sanctioned or unsanctioned intervention by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), influential persons, and/or private citizens. The 1984 return of a US Navy aviator from Syria was achieved through a civil effort, sanctioned by the US, and led by an influential US citizen. In some cases, civil organizations, especially non-US, may act independently without the knowledge of the US military or government. Diplomatic and civil options can be imposed upon or requested by the military commander and are most often used when the isolated personnel are captured or detained.

(3) PR Categories. The JFC is responsible for accomplishing PR execution tasks throughout the operational area. During mission analysis and planning processes, commanders continually assess operational PR requirements against the force PR capabilities. If the PR capability does not exist, commanders must either assume or mitigate the risk, or delay operations until the capability is established. Commanders can expand and achieve maximum effectiveness of their PR capabilities by employing those capabilities in the context of one or more of the five categories in Figure I-2. The five categories represent a PR operational capability environment that, if exploited correctly, offers a commander flexibility to effectively mitigate the risk of personnel becoming isolated. As an example, a commander may need all of the forces employed to prosecute a forcible entry that is estimated to take six hours. Therefore, a commander has no resources left to establish a recovery force without degrading the successful execution of the forcible entry task. By effectively exploiting PR capabilities, a JFC could
plan for and prepare potential isolated personnel to survive and evade unassisted until the entry force begins to redeploy allowing them to recover the isolated personnel. Using the categories as a planning tool enables the commander to focus on PR capabilities and visualize optimal combinations and redundancies. The JFC, staff, and each component need to be fully cognizant of the benefits and limitations of the categories to optimize the employment of PR assets and capabilities.

(a) The **individual** category consists of the capabilities possessed by individuals who are well trained in survival and evasion TTP. These capabilities are described in two subcategories, unassisted and opportune.

1. **Unassisted.** Isolated personnel have a responsibility to facilitate their own recovery as much as possible, especially when situations or environments may hamper other methods of recovery. The unassisted recovery category contains the capabilities that enable an isolated person to survive and independently evade back to friendly control. Most isolated personnel will be unassisted for a period of time. The commander’s ability to draw on the capabilities inherent in the unassisted category is dependent on an evader’s education and training, health, willingness to act, and proximity to hostile forces. Preparation is accomplished through education and training, sufficient guidance, and proper
equipment. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) establish survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training criteria as part of their theater entry or training requirements and promulgate them through theater clearance guides and routine policy messages. Additionally, evasion aids (See Chapter IV “Preparation”) may be issued to assist the evader to successfully survive and avoid capture (i.e., evasion charts [EVCs]), or for use if assistance is ultimately required (i.e., blood chits, pointee-talkees).

2. **Opportune.** The opportune category represents the capability of an isolated person to enlist the aid of others who are not normally considered in friendly force planning. When isolated, personnel are normally advised to avoid contact with people who are not recognized as friendly forces. The isolated person may be apprehended by person(s) seeking gain or reward, or be inadvertently discovered. Additionally, the isolated person may make a conscious decision to seek an act of mercy. In any of these three cases, the isolated person may use the opportunity to facilitate their return to friendly control. These opportune events may warrant the use of a blood chit (see Chapter IV, “Preparation”). The isolated person may be at great risk in these circumstances.

(b) **Component.** The JFC will most often desire the components to provide capabilities to conduct the five PR execution tasks for their own forces and for other isolated personnel within their areas of operation. The JFC will need to balance component area of operation PR responsibilities with the capabilities of a PR effort for the operational area. Depending on the situation, the JFC may want to rely entirely on component PR capability, or joint or multinational capability, or some combination of all or several categories. Components identify their capability and shortfalls to meet the JFC’s requirements and adjust assigned forces or capabilities where required. Service capabilities and methods are further discussed in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

(c) **Joint.** Combining the capabilities of two or more components in the operational area may give the JFC a very potent tool for conducting PR. Consideration of joint capabilities also includes DOD agencies such as the Defense Human Intelligence Service or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, whose services are routinely used in PR. Identifying capabilities and reducing shortfalls ensures the flexibility required for the JFC to make these transitions when needed. The successful use of joint capabilities requires proper preparation (providing guidance, educating, training, organizing, and equipping) and planning of different forces to jointly conduct the same PR mission. For these reasons, the JFC must state the commander’s intent regarding PR by providing clear and concise specified PR tasks, and direct components to provide their operating procedures in support of the joint effort. PR using a joint force can be a difficult mission under the best of circumstances, and risk increases when performed by an ad hoc force.

(d) **Multinational.** Combining US capabilities with one or more coalition or allied nations’ capabilities provides the commander more options and flexibility to meet PR requirements. While multinational capabilities may provide the JFC with a broader range of PR capability, it could also increase interoperability concerns. However, the differences may provide unique solutions to identified shortfalls. Exercises and prior planning are critical to overcoming challenges such as security classification restrictions, interoperability of command and control (C2), rules of engagement (ROE) and recovery force equipment, capabilities, procedures, and language.
(e) **Other Government Agencies (OGAs).** Employing or exploiting these agencies’ capabilities enhance the JFC’s ability to successfully plan and accomplish the five PR execution tasks. As is the case in other categories, OGAs may fill a critical joint force requirement, and may have a presence or wield some influence in the JFC’s operational area. A thorough understanding of these agencies’ capabilities enables the JFC to effectively integrate them into the joint force PR effort.

(4) **Methods.** The recovery methods depicted in Figure I-2 are representative, but not all-inclusive, of ways a recovery can be accomplished. Evasion, for example, is an action on the part of individuals, and they may recover themselves without assistance or by taking advantage of an opportunity to ask for assistance. Alternatively, the other methods require some type of organized assistance, either through a component or joint military activity, or perhaps with the assistance of an NGO. Those alternative methods are more fully explained in Chapter V, “Planning,” and in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

c. **Execution**

(1) **General.** The DOD PR system is centered on tasks and supporting activities that must be accomplished once an isolating event has occurred. The capability to complete the five PR execution tasks does not reside within a single entity, but instead resides among command and staff elements (including components), forces, and isolated personnel. The Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible to prepare and present forces to the geographic combatant commanders that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform PR tasks consistent with the roles and functions established in law and by the President and SecDef and the missions specified by the JFC. The five PR execution tasks are discussed briefly below; however, the joint procedures used to accomplish them are thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.” In addition, individual Service PR capabilities, including Service-unique PR methods and terminology, are further amplified in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery,” of this publication.

(2) The **report** task consists of actions required to provide notification that personnel are or may have become isolated. The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate command and control authorities are informed. Anyone can report isolated individuals based on actual sighting, a missed report time or waypoint, observation by intelligence collection assets, etc. Various procedures are used to notify appropriate organizations to validate the isolation event and collect information. All reports pertaining to known or suspected isolated personnel will be forwarded through component operational channels to the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), if established, as rapidly as possible. If a JPRC is not activated or established, reporting should be IAW theater PR architecture. In addition, Service or functional components and combatant commands should ensure there is direct and immediate reporting between the staff element responsible for personnel accounting and casualty affairs with the staff section responsible for PR. As discussed later, all reports must be passed as quickly as possible to the appropriate command and control authorities who then initiate
validation and location procedures. When reporting, remain mindful that in a nonpermissive environment information on missing or downed aircraft or missing vehicles or vessels while search and recovery operations are being planned or underway is not releasable, since its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives. It is also important to be aware that in the asymmetric battlefield, persons without means of communications and those who have not attended advanced level SERE training are just as likely to become isolated. Comprehensive plans must include provisions for personnel who are trained in the personnel recovery program as well as those who are not.

(3) The **locate** task involves the effort taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. Locating may be accomplished by various means, such as intelligence collection assets, aircrews or ground forces, etc. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces. However, this does not preclude the positioning of recovery forces to an area from which they can provide a faster response once the location and positive authentication is made. Location and authentication must be continually maintained and crosschecked throughout the support and recovery execution tasks.

(4) The **support** task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s next of kin (NOK). The support to the isolated person may begin upon recognition that an individual is isolated and ends when the person is recovered. Support efforts include: establishing two-way communications, increasing the isolated person’s situational awareness, providing morale-building support, suppressing adversary threats, delivering subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. Once the isolated individual is located and authenticated, support efforts can intensify. Commanders must be creative in developing support activities using all categories of capabilities, that can be understood by isolated personnel who may not be equipped with radios and compasses (e.g., predetermined signal lights as a reference point for orienting an isolated person). These activities must be embedded in deception and evasion plans. The support to NOK begins when the JFC or Service or functional component determines it is appropriate (e.g., when it becomes public knowledge that a person is isolated) and ends when the reintegration task begins. JFCs must be aware of other DOD and Service responsibilities and efforts to provide NOK support (e.g., casualty assistance, public affairs [PA], family support networks). Support to NOK during isolation or captivity is designed to increase the likelihood that isolated personnel will not be inadvertently harmed by well-intentioned public comments made by NOK.

(5) The **recover** task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or the engagement of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. Once in custody, the recovery force will normally perform one last authentication. Isolated personnel have a significant responsibility in the recovery process. Recognizing that each Service or USSOCOM may use different terminology to describe their recovery methods, this publication prescribes joint recovery as the standard term to be used for all joint PR missions. Joint recovery operations are thoroughly addressed in Chapter VI, “Personnel Recovery Joint Procedures and Techniques.” Since hostage rescue (HR) is a recovery method, commanders
need to plan for their PR capabilities to coordinate with, and support those organizations involved in HR. The JFC’s PR C2 architecture will likely be the reporting vehicle for a hostage event, and a valuable source of information regarding the isolated person.

(6) The **reintegrate** task begins when the recovery force relinquishes positive control of the recovered isolated personnel to a designated member of a reintegration team or organization. The reintegrate task employs systematic and controlled methods to process recovered isolated personnel from the time they are recovered until they are fully reintegrated with their unit, their family, and society (see Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques,” Section E, Reintegrate). The goal of the reintegrate task is to gather critical information from recovered isolated personnel and conduct the plethora of processes inherent in their reintegration, while protecting their health and welfare. This allows them to return to duty as expeditiously as possible, physically and emotionally fit. All isolated personnel should be entered into the reintegration process immediately following recovery. The reintegration task may be as simple as a SERE debriefing, or as involved as the complete three-phase reintegration process that terminates in the US, depending on the recovered person’s situation (health, length and type of isolation, etc.). The execution of the reintegrate task requires the cooperative efforts of the geographic combatant command staff, the components, and the Services. The conduct of, and procedures involved in, the reintegrate task are directed by theater standing operating procedures (SOPs) and directives, and operation orders (OPORDs), all of which are governed by the guidance in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*.

d. **Adaptation** is the ongoing function that assures continuous improvements to the PR system through lessons learned, assessments, requirements determination, concept development, wargames, and experimentation, and enables forces to adapt to new ideas and concepts in order to better accomplish the mission. Adaptation impacts the other functions of the system while they are being accomplished; it is not restricted to post-mission input. Adaptation must be responsive and continuous and considered during all the functions of the PR system.
“Personnel recovery is the task of bringing our warriors home. It is part of the warrior ethos and must be embedded into every fabric of the Army. That fabric includes soldiers, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, and DA contractors. Every leader is responsible to plan and prepare their unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities. This includes the complete integration of vertical and horizontal systems and personnel.”

LTG James J. Lovelace, US Army G-3/5/7
in a message dated 220057Z Jun 05

1. General

a. The SecDef develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy and plans for recovering and accounting for isolated personnel. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for operational implementation of PR policy and development of joint doctrine for PR. The Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) is the DOD Executive Agent for PR, less policy. CDRUSJFCOM has designated the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for DOD-wide personnel recovery matters responsible for executing these Executive Agent functions.

b. The PR responsibilities of the CCDRs, the Services, and others are listed in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.2, Personnel Recovery; DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel; DODI 2310.6, Nonconventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense; DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC); DODI 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education; DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for Department of Defense Civilian and Contractors; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, Personnel Recovery within the Department of Defense, (Secret).

c. DODD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, directs the combatant commands, the Military Departments, and USSOCOM to establish a PR OPR to assist them in carrying out their PR responsibilities. They are best served when this staff function resides within the operations directorate to ensure appropriate horizontal (i.e., all staff directorates, other combatant commands) and vertical coordination is accomplished on PR issues. A dedicated staff may be required to carry out the CCDR’s extensive responsibilities (see Appendix M, Annex F, Typical Combatant Command PR OPR Functions and Responsibilities).

d. CCDRs may also establish JPRCs within their command as specific operations progress in their areas of responsibility (AORs) to coordinate PR missions for an operational area.
2. **Combatant Commanders and Staffs**

CCDRs and staffs are responsible for accomplishing the five PR execution tasks throughout a specified operational area. (Specific staff considerations are included in Appendix M, “Sample Checklists,” Annex E, “Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery”). Services and combatant commands must provide commanders and their staffs the criteria to help them discern when their forces are considered isolated. The key capabilities to fulfill this responsibility are:

a. Plan for effective and comprehensive PR.

b. Establish command relationships and clearly articulate procedures required to employ forces from different components to execute PR jointly.

c. Establish a PR coordination architecture and ensure PR trained personnel are included and fill critical positions.

d. Identify command, component, and subordinate unit PR intelligence requirements, produce intelligence to support theater PR planning and operations, and establishing procedures and architecture to obtain national level PR intelligence support.

e. Develop standards, in coordination with the components, Services, and USSOCOM, for determining the SERE education, training, and equipment required for DOD personnel within a specified operational area.

3. **Service and United States Special Operations Command Responsibilities**

The Military Departments normally establish a PR OPR within their Service organizations. Each Service Chief and Commander, United States Special Operations Command is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their forces for PR, and providing forces and processes, as required, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks, consistent with DOD guidance and operation plans (OPLANS). (See Appendix M, “Sample Checklists,” Annex G, “Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities.”) The Services:

a. Develop doctrine and Service-level policy for PR, to include concept development and new technologies, that helps Service members prepare for deployment with the confidence that they can survive, evade, resist, and escape, or will be recovered if the need arises.

b. Provide the appropriate SERE training, commensurate with combatant command guidance, and as directed in DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*, DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, DODI 1300.23, *Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilians and Contractors*, DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*, and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) executive agent instructions (EAs) for PR.
c. Assist CCDRs in developing standards for determining training for personnel at risk of isolation.

d. Develop PR command and control capability by organizing, training, and equipping personnel to execute the functions and responsibilities of a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC), JPRC, and unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC) as listed in paragraphs 4 and 5 below.

e. Ensure policies and procedures are in place to identify and track personnel who have been trained or are experienced in recovery operations and ensure components have access to this data for coordination and sourcing.

f. Establish reintegration plans incorporating guidance from applicable DODIs, the combatant commands, and JPRA and exercise this capability in order to maintain required effectiveness.

4. Joint Personnel Recovery Center

JFCs, CCDRs, or their designated subordinate JFCs, should establish a JPRC to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area. The JPRC is also the JFC’s primary coordination center for PR assistance to another nation or other appropriate civil entity, when such assistance is authorized by the President of the United States, the SecDef, or by US-approved prior agreements. CCDRs should establish a JPRC in the earliest stages of operational planning, or designate a supported commander for PR or joint task force (JTF), to ensure integration with other C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) entities. The JPRC should be integrated into the JFC’s or designated supported commander’s appropriate operations center.

a. The JPRC, as well as the component’s PRCCs, must be in place and functioning well before operations begin and a potential isolating event occurs. PRCCs should practice augmenting and/or train to act as the baseline footprint of a JPRC in the event their component is tasked to act as lead component for PR in their assigned operational area.

b. Typical JPRC functions and responsibilities include the following:

(1) Coordinate and plan joint recovery operations.

(2) Review all component PR plans and orders to ensure consistency with OPLANs.

(3) Develop or continue to refine appendix 5 to annex C of the basic OPLAN and be prepared to coordinate joint recovery missions based on this plan. Publish additional PR guidance as required.

(4) Ensure that the JPRC authority, responsibilities, and support requirements are clearly identified to the JFC, component commanders, PRCCs, and all other agencies and multinational forces through operating instructions and activation message traffic.
(5) Establish PR reporting requirements for component PRCCs.

(6) Coordinate and ensure establishment and dissemination of operation-specific isolated personnel guidance, theater risk-of-isolation preparation, evasion aids, and SERE-related intelligence.

(7) Ensure the JFC and appropriate staff establish training and theater entry requirements as appropriate.

(8) Develop requirements for country/theater specific PR materials. Recommend SERE TTP and appropriate clothing and equipment.

(9) Develop a backup/contingency system of signals for isolated personnel when radio use is not an option and incorporate alternatives in plans (e.g., OPLANs, OPORDs, and deception, evasion, and recovery plans).

(10) Develop the reintegration plan, using existing theater directives, in coordination with command staff directorates and the PRCCs.

(11) Develop joint force PR communications plans; use existing plans if available. Coordinate with joint force and Service communications directorates to ensure the JPRC has sufficient and redundant secure communications as required.

   (a) Ensure component PRCCs identify PR satellite coverage requirements through their commands.

   (b) Request and establish required satellite coverage.

   (c) Ensure component PRCCs identify specific survival radio waveform frequencies and blue-force tracking devices used by recovery forces and isolated personnel to appropriate organizations.

(12) Coordinate with the joint psychological operations (PSYOP) task force on ways to favorably influence the local population regarding PR efforts.

(13) Integrate PR into all information operations (IO) planning and execution.

(14) Coordinate with the special operations liaison element (SOLE), the battlefield coordination detachment, naval and amphibious liaison element, Marine liaison officer, Air Force liaison element, and the multinational liaisons to access assets available to support theater PR plan.

(15) Submit ROE requirements for PR (legal status of isolated personnel, recovery force use of nonlethal and deadly force, recovery force interaction with civilians, etc.) through the chain of command.
(16) Develop a standardized notification process (i.e., special instructions [SPINS], communication or signals instructions) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word of the day, etc.) to all components.

(17) Coordinate and disseminate launch and execute criteria, responsibilities, and procedures. Criteria should include approval by all applicable foreign nations to transit their sovereign territories IAW international law and bilateral/multinational treaties, agreements, and arrangements.

(18) Coordinate with the joint force surgeon to obtain current locations of medical treatment facilities and pass that information to all PRCCs and recovery forces, if required.

(19) Develop and disseminate guidelines for completion and compilation of isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) and evasion plan of action (EPA), and, when needed, obtain ISOPREP and EPA data for further dissemination to recovery forces.

(20) Recommend to the JFC the tasking of component commands to support PR missions requiring joint capabilities, or to support PR missions when another component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission, or when another component command has better capability to respond.

(21) Ensure the UARCC receives all pertinent information so they can plan in parallel and are fully prepared to support or assume control of the mission, as necessary.

(22) Monitor and support all PR missions prosecuted by component PRCCs and the UARCC.

(23) Coordinate with all sources, to include the appropriate component and multinational forces operations centers, etc., to obtain assets in support of PR missions, as required.

(24) Coordinate with component PRCCs to maintain a current location and status of PR resources.

(25) Coordinate and deconflict mutual PR support operations by joint force components, multinational forces, and OGAs.

(26) Recommend a component for the overall tactical control (TACON) of a PR mission on a mission-by-mission basis and ensure supported and supporting relationships are defined.

(27) Ensure that available data, including all-source intelligence, on the evasion environment in the theater is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriate commands.

(28) Coordinate with appropriate intelligence organizations to gather information relating to the location and status of isolated personnel and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.

(29) Coordinate with the joint force deception planners for tactical deception support.
(30) Coordinate the status of isolated personnel with appropriate command’s staff directorates.

(31) Alert appropriate organizations of the known or probable location(s) of isolated personnel.

(32) Maintain current location(s) of isolated personnel.

(33) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted within the JFC’s operational area.

(34) Coordinate preparation for short-notice overflight clearance requests with US Embassies for all affected countries IAW DODD 4500.54-G, DOD Foreign Clearance Guide.

(35) Coordinate PA releases with joint force and component public affairs offices (PAOs), US embassies, and other required participating agencies through appropriate hierarchical levels. If the isolated person is a contractor, coordinate with the contracting company’s public relations and/or human resources departments to ensure critical information is not divulged.

(36) Keep affected component and DOD organizations informed on the status of ongoing PR missions.

(37) Ensure DD Form 2812, Commander’s Preliminary Assessment and Recommendation Regarding Missing Persons, is completed on every isolated person and forward through personnel and command channels (per command directives or SOPs). This form authorizes a Military Department to establish a board for determining an isolated person’s legal status to energize subsequent financial, medical, and other support actions (see DODI 2310.5, Accounting for Missing Persons).

(38) Maintain a database and file on each isolated person until recovery is complete. Forward all completed recovery mission files and databases to JPRA for review and storage. The files should not be destroyed, regardless of whether a recovery operation was executed successfully or not. Ensure important/long term information (social security number, home of record, etc.) of key personnel, especially nonmilitary, are included in the file in the event the case/file is reopened and the isolated person’s status is reviewed at a later date.

(39) Ensure PR plans address and provide for the appropriate debrief and after action review of all recovered isolated personnel participants in the recovery effort, and commanders and staffs. Additionally, if nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) recovery mechanisms are employed, adhere to specific debriefing requirements.

(40) Assist the JFC and the components in executing their reintegration plans.

(41) Ensure debriefs of recovered isolated personnel are forwarded to the JPRA IAW the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, and observations, after action reviews (AARs), and lessons learned (LL) are forwarded to joint and Service LL databases.
(42) Review recovery missions to determine if forces are establishing patterns that can be used by the adversary, and take advantage of those patterns or eliminate/disrupt the pattern as appropriate.

5. **Component Commanders, Staffs, and Subordinate Organizations**

   a. **General.** Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting PR in support of their own operations and for isolation events occurring within their assigned operational area or as tasked by the JFC. Component planners should consider the availability and capabilities of forces of the other components, multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs operating in the operational area. Additionally, component commanders may take the following actions to ensure that they are capable of conducting PR in support of their own operations, or in response to JFC taskings:

   1. Clearly define the circumstances, which may be specific to an operation or specific military skill specialties, when personnel are considered in a survival or evasion situation.

   2. Ensure subordinate units and key personnel, such as the PRCCs, personnel at risk of isolation, and recovery forces, are familiar with PR TTPs, directives, PR notification processes (e.g., air tasking order (ATO) SPINS, data bursts), theater SERE procedures, and any unique or specific PR TTP that may pertain to their operational area and/or component operations.

   3. Ensure that a capability is established to coordinate all pre-combat PR preparations, and to respond to PR events once they occur. The most common and effective means to achieve this capability is through the establishment of a PRCC with a trained staff and appropriate authorities to accomplish PR missions and objectives.

   4. Publish a component PR supporting plan to appendix 5 to annex C of the OPLANs.

   5. Be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. This will not negate the requirement to perform component PRCC functions as well. This will require that the education, training, and staffing requirements of component PR staffs be maintained to meet the requirements of this be prepared to mission.

   6. Ensure subordinate commanders routinely address actions to be taken when personnel become isolated.

   7. Ensure designated units and personnel develop and maintain a current EPA and ISOPREP that is readily available to the JPRC through the PRCC.

   8. Ensure subordinate units are familiar with component PRCC(s) and immediately transmit information on isolated personnel to the PRCC or C2 node that coordinates PR events.

   9. Ensure isolated personnel authentication procedures are coordinated with the JPRC and disseminated in subordinate PR plans.
(10) Provide PR functionally trained augmentees to the JPRC as directed by the JFC. These personnel also represent their component and assist in coordinating, and deconflicting their component’s PR capabilities at the joint level.

(11) Clearly articulate PR launch (or pre-position) and execute procedures in support of other component commanders to the JPRCs, PRCC(s), and subordinate commanders.

(12) Ensure intelligence data to support PR planning and training are sent in a timely manner to subordinate units.

(13) Provide mutual support to the recovery operations of the other components to the greatest extent possible. Such support normally is requested and coordinated through the JPRC using established PR communications channels maintained and monitored in the PRCC.

(14) Support higher headquarters (HQ) and Service reintegration plans by crafting supporting plans and identifying reintegration team key personnel. Ensure those personnel attend training as directed by the JFC.

b. **Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell.** Component commanders establish a PRCC to coordinate all component PR activities, including coordination with the JPRC and other component PRCCs. The PRCC should be collocated in the operations center or, at a minimum, where it can obtain and maintain the best situational awareness of the isolating events and the environment in which they are occurring, and exercise its authority to coordinate and control the execution of the five PR tasks. The PRCC director is responsible to the component commander for the coordination of component forces in the performance of PR missions. To be most effective, the PRCC requires dedicated, equipped, and functionally trained personnel to effectively prepare, plan, exercise, and execute both the PR functions and missions of the component commander. Typical PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

(1) Develop the PR support plan as an appendix of the operations annex to the OPLANs.

(2) Maintain cognizance for preparing and maintaining ISOPREPs, EPAs, isolated personnel guidance, and NAR options for the operational area. Monitor the development of ROE and legal status decisions as they affect isolated personnel and recovery forces.

(3) Establish points of contact (POCs) and filing locations for EPAs, ISOPREPs, survival radio identification (ID) numbers and codes, personal locator beacons (PLBs) (or other PR alerting or communications equipment), and blue force tracker device numbers within subordinate commands.

(4) Establish communications with the JPRC and other PRCCs and develop procedures to ensure the timely flow and protection of PR-related information. During preparation, establish standards for redundant communications, if possible, among the C2 and ISR nodes, as well as with the isolated person.
(5) Establish PR reporting requirements for component units.

(6) Develop and promulgate component PR communications plans. These plans are coordinated with the component commands and the JPRC, and included in plans.

(7) Coordinate for short-notice aircraft diplomatic authorization through command channels and with JPRC.

(8) Develop a standardized notification process (e.g., communication or signals instructions, data bursts, SPINS) to disseminate daily PR information (authentication, word of the day, etc.) to all subordinate units. Ensure ground force signals (daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS.

(9) Coordinate with the component staff legal officer for ROE issues, legal status, and other matters as required.

(10) Coordinate with other component staff sections and elements, including multinational organizations, OGAs, and NGOs.

(11) Monitor all recovery operations prosecuted by component forces and remain ready to assist as directed by the JPRC.

(12) Notify the JPRC when isolated personnel are reported. Keep the JPRC informed on component intentions or actions.

(13) Forward pertinent data regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRC, recovery force and others as required.

(14) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support provided to or received from other components.

(15) Coordinate with the component medical treatment facility. If no component facility exists, establish liaison with primary facility within the operational area, and develop procedures for receiving recovered isolated personnel and preparing for Phase I reintegration, at a minimum.

(16) Maintain a file on each isolated person until recovery has been completed or confirmation of death has been verified. Pass files on successful recoveries or closed incidents to the JPRC for forwarding to JPRA for review and storage.

(17) Exercise the system to ensure the units can locate and transmit ISOPREP/EPA efficiently and that it is in a usable format for JPRC, PRCC, and recovery forces.

c. Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell. The JFC normally designates the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) with overall responsibility for planning, coordinating and executing all NAR operations in support of the PR plan. The JFSOCC retains
operational control (OPCON) of all SOF unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) forces in the operational area. The JFSOCC normally exercises control through the operations officer, who designates an UARCC director and, when directed, establishes the UARCC. The UARCC is a compartmented SOF facility staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners who are representative of each NAR capability. The UARCC integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all existing unconventional and NAR capabilities and activities in support of the JFC’s PR requirements. The UARCC interfaces with the JFSOCC’s operations center, the JPRC, and the other component PRCCs. Other organizations supporting theater NAR operations normally retain OPCON of their forces or capabilities. Once established, the UARCC responsibilities include:

1. Coordinating and preparing NAR and UAR plans for the JFC. Coordinate planning with the JPRC.

2. Providing time-critical information between NAR forces and other PR nodes.

3. Advising the JFSOCC on the development and employment of NAR capabilities in support of the JFC’s PR plan.

4. Integrating NAR into the JFC’s PR plan. The JPRC director must be fully aware of NAR capabilities. The UARCC should provide a liaison to the JPRC to coordinate and deconflict NAR capabilities with conventional capabilities.

5. Acting as the conduit through which NAR launch and execute criteria are passed.

6. Deconflicting NAR operations internally with all NAR forces conducting a single recovery operation, and externally with other joint and component operations to aid mission execution and avoid disruption of ongoing operations and fratricide.

7. Synchronizing ground tactical plans between NAR forces; and synchronizing and deconflicting NAR operations and other recovery operations, military operations, and interagency activity.

6. Intelligence Organizations

a. General. An understanding of relevant organizations, products, and procedures is essential to effectively apply intelligence in recovery operations. Intelligence organizations at every level must have PR-knowledgeable personnel integrated into their staffs. The JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-dedicated forces should be manned with personnel knowledgeable in PR intelligence requirements and intelligence capabilities to facilitate the timely dissemination of all-source intelligence from supporting intelligence organizations.

b. Intelligence Organizations. Commanders and staffs should be aware of the capabilities of intelligence assets and how to leverage their use throughout the conduct of the five PR execution tasks. A thorough understanding of the appropriate procedures to request a specific requirement
is essential to avoid critical delays in obtaining time-sensitive information, and helps ensure that available intelligence resources are applied most effectively (see Figure II-1).

(1) **Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).** The theater PR OPR and the JFC’s JPRC receive their intelligence support from the JIOC, which can assign or attach dedicated intelligence personnel to service PR requirements. The JIOC is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the CCDR and staff, components, subordinate joint forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Requests for external intelligence resources, including national agency support, are validated by the combatant command intelligence directorate (J-2) and submitted by the JIOC.

(2) **Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** A subordinate joint force forms a JISE as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the JFC, joint staff, and components with the complete air, land, maritime, and space adversary situation. The JISE supports the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC at the JTF- or component-level, and, in turn, receives its intelligence support from the JIOC.

(3) **National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** During crisis or contingency operations, a JTF or component may have a NIST assigned. The NIST is composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), or any combination of these agencies. The JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC can draw upon NIST expertise and connectivity, through the JISE, to pursue time-sensitive information that is beyond the reach of theater resources.

(4) **Intelligence Community (IC) POW/Missing in Action (MIA) Analytic Cell.** Established within the DIA by statute and Director of Central Intelligence memorandum, the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell is responsible for national-level intelligence in support of activities relating to unaccounted for US personnel. The command PR OPR, JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC can request analytic support from this organization through the JISE and/or the JIOC.

(5) **Organic Intelligence Support.** Units typically have organic personnel to perform routine intelligence tasks in support of operations at the tactical level. Unit commanders should ensure that assigned intelligence personnel are familiar with other intelligence organizations at higher echelons of command that function in support of PR operations. Unit intelligence personnel must maintain continuous channel of communication with their supporting intelligence support element to facilitate mission planning and maintain SA.
Figure II-1. Personnel Recovery Intelligence Nodes

- Personnel Recovery Policy
- Executive Agent for Personnel Recovery (Less Policy)
- Intelligence Community Lead for POW/MIA and Missing Personnel Issues

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DCCC Defense Collection Coordination Center
DPMO Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
INTEL Intelligence
J-2 Intelligence Directorate (also A-2/G-2/N-2)
JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JISE Joint Intelligence Support Element
JPRC Joint Personnel Recovery Center
NMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence Center
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
POW/MIA Prisoner of War/Missing in Action
PRCC Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell
UARCC Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell
CHAPTER III
COMMAND AND CONTROL

“Of course, we couldn’t start anything until CSAR was in place, so let’s talk about getting the CSAR in place.”

General Richard Myers to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 30 September 2001

1. Command Relationships and Organization

   a. General. Delineating appropriate command relationships for PR facilitates the synchronization and integration of recovery operations. The specific command relationships for a particular joint force is tailored to the situation and evaluated against the mission, the environment, and the specific force structure (see PR mission analysis Chapter V, “Planning”). Coordination of PR planning is vital to effective and successful PR mission execution. PR often requires coordination with staff elements at the JTF and subordinate levels (see Staff Considerations listing at Appendix M, “Sample Checklists”). Command relationships and PR coordination authority should be clearly defined and delineated in appropriate JTF and component OPORDs and, as required, fragmentary orders.

   b. Command Authority

      (1) CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and are responsible for planning and executing PR across the range of military operations and throughout their AOR. CCDRs may exercise COCOM of PR for a specific joint operation through a designated subordinate JFC. The CCDR should delegate OPCON of assigned and/or attached forces to the designated subordinate JFC to plan and conduct joint PR operations within the subordinate JFC’s operational area.

         (a) JFCs may coordinate PR through their operations directorate (J-3) or through a component commander. If a component commander is designated to coordinate PR, the JPRC should be integrated into the designated component’s operations center. In the case where a component commander is designated to coordinate PR for the joint force, the component also retains a PRCC capability to conduct component PR missions.

         (b) If the JFC’s assigned missions require establishing multiple subordinate joint force commands with separate missions and/or operational areas, multiple JPRCs within the operational area may be required. The commander has the option to establish multiple JPRCs (one for each subordinate joint force command), or consolidate PR coordination functions under one JPRC. The decision should be carefully evaluated with respect to PR joint requirements. Considerations include the following:

            
            * Ability of the joint force C2 infrastructure to support recovery operations if the JPRC is established at the joint force HQ.
2. Ability of the component’s C2 architecture to adequately control and support component recovery operations if it is also designated the JPRC.

3. Potential operations tempo of the component’s PRCC, while also staffing a JPRC, and its ability to handle additional PR mission activity.

4. Availability and experience level of JPRC personnel, including the JPRC director(s).

5. Capability and/or availability of forces within each joint force.

6. Distances between the operational areas.

7. Relationship between (e.g., support, separate entities) and responsibilities of the JPRCs.

8. Command level(s) where each JPRC will reside and their responsibilities (i.e., joint force HQ, component command HQ).

9. If more than one JPRC is established, the overall authority for PR in theater should be identified.

(c) The JFC, or the designated supported commander for PR, will normally designate the JFSOCC as the supported commander for NAR. Supporting relationships are established and proper authorities are delegated to ensure unity of command and efficient and flexible NAR operations. The JFSOCC normally coordinates NAR and unconventional assisted recovery through the J-3 who establishes a UARCC within the operations center. (See Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques,” and Appendix G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”)

(2) A component experiencing an isolation event within its force or operational area may be able to conduct the recovery mission without external support. However, if two or more components are involved, the JPRC must coordinate the augmentation of forces and recommend PR mission-specific supported and supporting command relationships to the JFC or designated supported commander for PR. Respective component commanders normally retain OPCON of their forces and the JFC or designated supported commander for PR will delegate TACON of participating forces to the supported commander.

(3) Coordinating authority should be delegated to the JPRCs and PRCCs to accomplish ongoing tasks that require collaboration with the staffs of the JTF, components, Joint Staff, DOD agencies, and other government organizations and NGOs (see Figure III-1). This PR coordination architecture is the backbone to a commander’s ability to make timely and accurate PR mission decisions. Although commanders cannot control the time or place of an isolation incident, they can be prepared for it.
c. **Composition and Organization.** The JPRC should consist of a director, deputy director, watch supervisors, controllers, personnel recovery duty officers (PRDOs), SERE experts, dedicated intelligence support, and general communications support to provide 24-hour coverage. Representation from each participating component is key. All personnel assigned to the JPRC must have proper security clearances and be trained and integrated to perform specific JPRC functions while simultaneously bringing their particular service skill sets to the JPRC staff. Joint staffing facilitates timely coordination of component PR requirements, provides quick access to information relative to specific component PR resources and operational concepts, fosters component interest and participation in the overall PR effort, and spreads additional personnel.
support requirements throughout the joint force. A notional JPRC organizational chart is provided in Figure III-2. Grades and numbers of personnel staffing the JPRC will vary based on the size of the joint force involved and availability of qualified individuals. Each JPRC requires a minimum number of controllers to be available during ongoing or projected PR missions, and to be immediately available at all other times based on ongoing operations and projected plans. Intelligence specialists should either be assigned to the JPRC director/watch supervisor or provided as dedicated support to provide recurring updates and respond to JPRC intelligence requirements. Typically, the JISE will provide 24-hour intelligence support for a JTF-level JPRC and the combatant command JIOC will provide such support to a theater PR OPR during contingency planning, or a theater-level JPRC if established.

2. Coordination and Liaison

![Figure III-2. Notional Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization](image-url)
a. **General.** Coordination is a key element for successful prosecution of PR missions. Coordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously. Personnel recovery command authority is retained by the JFC; coordination is delegated to the JPRC or a designated supported commander for personnel recovery. PR coordinating authority enables a commander or individual to require the participation of other commanders for planning or other purposes, but it cannot be applied to compel agreement. Principal nodes where coordination takes place and information is shared are described below.

b. **By the JPRC.** The JPRC should be granted direct liaison authorized with all agencies and organizations, as required. The JPRC is responsible for coordinating PR related matters for the JFC with all C2 nodes as well as joint, nongovernment, and multinational agencies. Other key coordination nodes may include the Joint Staff and elements of the joint force such as representatives of the special operations command (SOC), pertinent joint force staff directorates (J-2, J-3, etc.), air operations, supporting arms, medical representatives, other US governmental agency liaison officers (LNOs), friendly government LNOs, as well as NGOs and other liaisons.

c. **Between the JPRC and the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC).** The JAOC is the focal point for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations. Since recovery operations often rely on air assets to accomplish some of the PR execution tasks, coordination between the JPRC and JAOC is essential. The JPRC is responsible for providing the information that goes into the PR portion of the ATO SPINS. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) should ensure the ATO includes air assets sufficient to accomplish PR tasks. During execution, the JFACC is the command authority for revising the tasking of joint air operations, unless authority to redirect and task is delegated to a subordinate C2 organization. Deconfliction of PR missions from other air missions is accomplished through the ATO. If the JPRC is not collocated and integrated into the JAOC, it is essential the JPRC director establish a liaison element within the JAOC to facilitate tasking of dedicated PR assets in the ATO, coordinate tasking or redirection of air assets to support PR mission execution, monitor ATO and PR mission execution, coordinate changes to PR information in the ATO SPINS, assess the effectiveness of PR operations, and recommend changes to JFC/JFACC guidance for PR.

For further information of ATO development and C2 of joint air operations, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

d. **Between the JPRC and Component PR Coordination Cells.** The JPRC coordinates and tasks PR support requirements when those PR missions involve forces from more than one component, forces from another nation, forces from one component that need the support of another component to conduct PR missions, or nonmilitary agencies, other than NAR missions. When the JPRC receives a request for PR support, it initiates action to locate the isolated person(s), makes recommendations for, and coordinates the tasking of forces. This coordination is essential to prevent duplication of PR efforts, facilitate efficient exchange of PR information, and provide the most efficient use of PR resources. Coordination is particularly important when a PR incident occurs near the boundary between two component operational areas. **When a component independently initiates a PR mission, it is**
required to notify the JPRC through its PRCC to help ensure effective coordination and deconfliction. Thereafter, the JPRC will monitor the mission and be prepared to support as required.

e. **Between the JPRC and UARCC.** The UARCC will conduct parallel planning during all PR incidents. The UARCC articulates its capability and feasibility to the JPRC and will coordinate with and keep the JPRC informed of ongoing NAR operations to prevent fratricide. The JPRC may recommend the UARCC plan for the mission if it deems that NAR is the best option to prosecute the recovery. If the UARCC needs external support to complete a recovery mission, it coordinates requests for PR support with the JPRC.

f. **Between the JPRC and External Agencies.** The JPRC coordinates joint force PR operations with OGAs and NGOs. This coordination is accomplished through the external agency’s designated representative (i.e., PR POC or PR LNO). The coordination enhances relationships to facilitate PR support to other agencies, which either have limited or no PR capability, or from other agencies that want to participate in theater recovery operations. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an organization established at each geographic CCDR to provide a venue for interagency cooperation. The JIACG can be an excellent conduit for the JPRC to coordinate the activities of OGAs and NGOs within each AOR. Determine if the OGA have duress or emergency codes that should be included in the SPINS or other signaling instructions, and that PR staffs and recovery forces should be made aware.

g. **Between Component PR Coordination Cells and their Respective Forces.** Each PRCC will coordinate recovery operations with the assigned and attached forces within its designated operational area, consistent with the component commander’s guidance. This coordination is essential to facilitate timely tasking and accurate reporting of PR events.

h. Effective use of established liaison channels is critical to successful PR coordination. LNOs and/or their elements can foster valuable information exchange regarding other component operations, deconfliction of those operations, and force capabilities. However, these channels must not supersede operational coordination between the component PRCCs and JPRC.

3. **Communications**

   a. **General.** Communications play a major role in PR missions. Joint and component communications planning should include potential PR requirements, to include requirements for component communications interoperability including air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or subsurface. PR communications must be rapid, reliable, secure, and flexible. A combination of secure/non-secure commercial and Defense Switched Network (DSN) landline, satellite communications (SATCOM) radios and phones, ultrahigh frequency (UHF)/very high frequency/high frequency (HF) radios, and computer/network “chat” capabilities should be built into communications plans. These communications nodes should be dedicated and integrated systems in the JPRC, PRCCs, UARCC, and other pertinent organizations and functions that must interact real time to prosecute PR missions.

   b. **Communications Plan.** An effective PR communications plan should:
(1) Provide for the use of communications systems to support C2 of forces, carry out operations security (OPSEC) measures, and execute military deception actions.

(2) Provide for secure transmission and cryptographic security to deny the adversary OPSEC indicators, isolated personnel locations, and classified information.

(3) Provide for low probability of detection, interception, and jamming.

(4) Provide redundancy (where practical) while ensuring proper authentication and physical defense of communications systems.

(5) Provide for avoidance of mutual interference and jamming by friendly communications.

(6) Exploit the capabilities of advanced survival radios and other electronic signaling/communication devices (such as blue force tracker and PLBs) to provide support to isolated personnel. PLB use has been shown to energize the PR system within 5 minutes after a PLB is activated. This alert provides the recovery staffs and forces early warning of a potential isolating event and also gives the staffs information to confirm the isolating the event and refine the search. It is important to understand though, that this is an alerting device. Its initiation does not ensure that it is a friendly force using it; or that a friendly force is actually in an isolating situation. Verifying the event with subordinate HQ should be initiated. Authenticating the identity of the isolated person is still required.

(7) Include the use of local or host nations communications. While not the most effective and secure mode of communication, the varied circumstances in which a PR event could arise may make host nation capabilities a viable or only option.

(8) Have near real time audio linkage/video feeds to provide a link between line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight participants. Often this can be provided by using unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems.

(9) Provide a method to exchange information amongst and between the United States and Allied commands. Both the tactical digital information link (TADIL) and a situation awareness data link (SADL) can provide this capability. A TADIL is a Joint Chiefs of Staff approved standardized communication link suitable for transmission of machine-readable, digital information. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designation, Link-16, is synonymous with TADIL-J. SADL is a data link capability that provides the means of obtaining mission critical information regarding the isolated personnel, mission, and threat as quickly as possible over a highly secure, jam-resistant means.

(10) Provide a capability to receive critical PR intelligence through the integrated broadcast service (IBS). The IBS delivers threat warnings and other critical information to forces operating within a combatant commander’s AOR and to the operating forces of IBS collaborating nations.
(11) Provide a capability to detect and locate the signals of distress beacons. This can be provided by search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (SARSAT) which is designed for civil use but is highly susceptible to adversary detection. The capability of the threat must be weighed against the advantages of using the system.

(12) Provide capabilities to report, locate, authenticate, and facilitate their recovery. This includes some means of voice or data transmission and reception to include over the horizon (OTH), with secure or low probability of adversary intercept, beacon capable, multiple frequency settings, and ability to obtain and transmit global positioning system (GPS) location.

(13) Establish a capability for isolated personnel to be located and recovered in the absence of technical communications. This includes isolated personnel articulating contact and signaling procedures in their EPAs. Ensure ground force signals (daily challenge and password, near and far recognition signals) are included in the SPINS.

c. **Voice Communications and Circuits.** The number of voice circuits established to prosecute a PR mission should be kept to a minimum, but backup circuits should be preplanned and available as necessary. Secure voice circuits must be used whenever possible. Use of communications equipment with a low probability of detection or intercept mode should be considered to decrease the risk to the isolated person and the recovery force.

(1) **Radio Use.** Because of the distances typically involved and the requirement for speed and flexibility, radio communications are the best (and most common) means of sending and receiving information and instructions during recovery operations. However, this form of communications is also the most susceptible to adversary exploitation. The possibility of adversary monitoring requires that secure radio communications equipment be provided to the JPRC, component PRCCs, participating PR units, and potential isolated personnel. Communications means resulting in low probability of detection and intercept should be used to the maximum extent possible. The requirement for JPRC and component PR coordinators to maintain an active two-way dialogue during every phase of a PR mission also dictates the need for dedicated or planned backup radios for the JPRC and component coordination centers. SATCOM will usually be required to provide support when PR operations extend beyond the range of terrestrially-based communications systems.

(2) **Landline Use.** Landlines secured by secure voice devices (e.g., secure telephone unit-III, secure terminal equipment, and secure wireline terminals) should be available in all PR coordination organizations and related operations centers. Secure devices provide end-to-end encryption, allowing secure voice and data to be exchanged over non-secure commercial and DSN circuits.

(3) **Frequency Management/Deconfliction.** A well-planned communications matrix is essential to any PR mission. Detailed communications plans are a prominent part of the overall PR plan. It is extremely important that dedicated PR frequencies be developed for use by only isolated persons and the recovery units. Uncoordinated use of PR frequencies can result in poor communications because the weak transmissions of the isolated person’s radio are easily overpowered.
d. **Authentication.** Depending on the specific situation and operational environment, isolated personnel may not receive assistance until their identity has been authenticated. The JPRC must coordinate authentication procedures among the joint force and strive to establish the most efficient system possible to support successful recovery operations. Authentication methods (ISOPREPs, EPAs, challenge/password) will vary among the components of a joint force, and must be secure, adequate to allow multiple verifications, and be flexible enough to continue to authenticate individuals over a long period of time. A notice that authentication information has been compromised must be promulgated as quickly as possible to prevent continued use.

(1) **Methods of Authentication.** Authentication of isolated personnel may be accomplished by several means, depending on the situation. The principal method of authentication is by radio using published word/color/letter/number of the day, unit authentication numbers, or challenge and password, near and far recognition signals data or information from the isolated personnel’s ISOPREP. Locally developed authentication codes are not recommended but, if used, should be minimized and reported to the PRCC and the JPRC. All instructions concerning authentication procedures should be published through component standard notification programs. Personal survival radios may be capable of transmitting various types of secure locating information depending on the model of the radio. However voice communications may still be necessary in some situations. Authentication can also be accomplished using visual signals, time on target requirements, or near and far recognition signals. Isolated personnel authentication may also include a description of physical characteristics.

(2) **Security.** Authentication information must be kept from adversary forces because they could use this information to deceive forces or deprive these forces of the ability to authenticate isolated personnel.

(3) **Durability.** Authentication information must be adequate to allow multiple authentications and it must be used in a manner that allows forces to continue to authenticate isolated personnel over a long period of time. Forces involved in recovery operations should exercise judicious use of information to ensure adequate and appropriate authentication is not compromised for use at a later time. The JPRC and/or component PRCC must monitor and track compromised authentication information and immediately promulgate that compromise through established protocols.

e. **Compromised Assets.** Communications personnel should be notified immediately of all compromised communications equipment or cryptographic keying material. When planning PR operations it is important to know which systems and information have been compromised so as to not place the recovery force in jeopardy (e.g., an ambush).

f. **Data Communications.** The capability to complete, store, and transmit ISOPREPs and EPAs is critical. This capability is now possible using digital technology, although planners and executers should be aware that other government agencies and NGOs may not have access to specific DOD classified systems. Additionally, current survival radios are data capable. The SECRET Internet Protocol...
Router Network (SIPRNET) has been widely used as the primary means of communications via collaborative tools such as Internet relay chat. Computer software that tracks personnel information, ISOPREPs, EPAs, and other authenticating information, and provides text messaging and transmission can be an effective tool for successfully completing the PR mission. Personnel recovery mission software (PRMS) has the advantage of accessing an ISOPREP/EPA database that units can populate from any SIPRNET terminal with access to the web and provides a joint standard for ISOPREP and EPA data elements, export format, and order format. (Procedures are available for ISOPREP and EPA preparation. If clearance or access is an issue, see the Personnel Recovery Security Classification Guide.) Electronic transmission provides a significant tool to rapidly disseminate ISOPREP and EPA data; however, OPSEC must be assured. ISOPREP and EPA hardcopy backups should be produced and available.

g. **Message Traffic.** The Defense Message System (DMS) is used to backup verbal communications that cross Service or functional component lines, or are forwarded to joint commands and activities. A DMS message or record message traffic is a formal means of tasking, providing direction, or guidance. Planners and operators should remain aware that many government agencies, including US embassies and NGOs, may not access DMS and may therefore require PR messages to be transmitted via another means. The following PR specific US message text formats are transmitted over DMS:

1. **Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR).** SARIR is used to report a situation that may require a PR mission. Normally, the parent unit of the isolated personnel reports the incident. However, anyone observing a potential PR incident should initiate a voice report to be followed by a backup record message. Within component chains of command, unformatted or other designated message formats may be used up to the component PRCC. The SARIR must contain as much of the following information as possible, with missing data sent in subsequent search and rescue situation summary reports (SARSITs) as it is discovered.

   (a) Sea, air, or ground event leading to the PR incident.

   (b) Adversary activity, terrain, and weather in the PR incident locale.

   (c) Number of isolated personnel and their status.

   (d) Location of isolated personnel and objective area.

   (e) Unit and component PR resources available.

   (f) Designated areas that may affect the PR mission.

   (g) Communications capability of isolated personnel.

   (h) Date-time group of incident and last sighting and/or contact with isolated personnel.

   (i) Any other evidence that isolated personnel are still alive and evading capture.
(j) Identification and location of known media outlets (friendly or non-friendly) that could compromise recovery operations.

(2) **Search and Rescue Situation Summary Report.** SARSIT coordinates, summarizes, or terminates joint recovery operations. The SARSIT should be transmitted at least once daily from the component PRCCs to the JPRC and forwarded as appropriate to the joint force operations officer.

   (a) PR mission number (standardized assignment of mission numbers by utilizing theater, year, and sequential numbering is recommended, example: USCENTCOM 2005-011).

   (b) Status (e.g., in progress, completed, on hold).

   (c) Call sign of disabled vehicle, aircraft, ship etc.

   (d) Type of disabled craft.

   (e) Location of the isolating incident.

   (f) Number of personnel involved.

   (g) Status of personnel involved (e.g., recovered, located, missing).

   (h) Narrative — short explanation to enhance information.

(3) **Search and Rescue Request (SARREQ).** SARREQ is used to request forces to participate in a PR mission. This message normally is sent from the JPRC to component PRCCs and any designated functional commanders to record arrangements made to employ resources from two or more components to prosecute a PR mission. The SARREQ must contain the following minimum information:

   (a) Lost (or suspected lost) ships, aircraft, ground units, or individuals.

   (b) Capabilities required from the various components to support a specific PR mission.

   (c) Coordinating instructions for resources supporting a specific PR mission.

   (d) Adversary activity that may affect a specific PR mission.

(4) **Search Action Plan.** A search action plan delineates the C2, communications, search area, and search methods to be used to locate the isolated personnel. This message normally is sent from the requesting or executing unit to the JPRC.
(5) **Other DMS formats** that may be used in conjunction with planning, supporting, and prosecuting PR missions include the following:

(a) Air allocation request.

(b) Sortie allotment.

(c) ATO confirmation.

(d) Aircraft diplomatic clearance request.

(e) Request confirmation.

(f) Air mission request status tasking.

(g) Alert launch order.

(h) Joint launch report.

(i) In-flight report-voice only.

(j) Airlift mission schedule.

(k) Mission report.

(l) Designated area message.

(m) Acknowledge message.

(n) Recovery force problem report.

(o) Recovery force C2 report.

(p) Recovery operation communication report.

(q) Time-specific available recovery forces report.

(r) Beacon location and frequency report.

(s) Recovery force execute order.

*For further information on the format of PR-specific DMS, refer to Military Standard (MIL-STD) 6040, US Message Text Formatting Program.*
1. Introduction

Proper preparation enables commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to achieve SA in order to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Preparation is a combination of command guidance, education and training, and products and equipment.

2. Command Guidance

DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and instructions, and further amplified by EAls and guidance for personnel recovery are the seminal documents for providing guidance to the commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. In addition to this overarching guidance, Services and CCDRs should provide command-specific implementation guidance. Lastly, JFCs must provide definitive PR guidance as it relates to the assigned missions for their operational areas. Necessary and sufficient guidance can be an instrumental facilitator in the joint force accomplishing the PR execution tasks.

3. Education and Training

PR joint education and training efforts focus on three force elements — commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals at risk of isolation. Education and training programs for commanders and staffs are designed based on the following learning levels: fundamentals, PR specialties, and PR program management. Formal education and exercises should stress commanders’ and staffs’ responsibilities to account for personnel, report missing personnel and take steps to recover them. Recovery force training is a Service and component responsibility. Isolated personnel training consists of various types and degrees of SERE training. Specialized SERE training is available to select personnel meeting established criteria.

a. Service and USSOCOM Education. Services and USSOCOM must provide Service-specific education and training for their personnel. Services must adhere to the joint and interoperable standards, developed by JPRA, when developing Service-specific education and training for their personnel. Education and training programs and material should be coordinated with JPRA to ensure its interoperability with joint and multinational forces and capabilities of other agencies, and its compliance with joint standards. Services should coordinate with JPRA for joint-specific education training requirements, as well as to ensure interoperability of Service-specific education and training. Information on available Service education and other training is provided in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”
b. **Joint Education.** JPRA is responsible for developing and conducting PR joint education and training programs, and providing oversight of, and assistance to, other DOD PR training and education. JPRA develops joint and interoperable standards for DOD component education and training. Courses are available in residence at designated JPRA training facilities or, on a limited basis, through educational materials and mobile training teams.

c. **On-the-Job Training (OJT).** OJT should be provided regularly for all currently assigned or potential JPRC/PRCC/UARCC personnel, but should not be used as a substitute for essential pipeline and predeployment training. Instead, OJT should be used to refine and improve the skill sets that JPRC/PRCC/UARCC trained personnel bring with them.

d. **In-Unit Training.** Commanders and staffs at all levels should develop training programs and integrate them into unit training plans to ensure the appropriate personnel are skilled on applicable joint, Service, component, and unit PR doctrine/TTP and SOPs. This can be accomplished through regular classes, required self-study, distance learning, mission briefs, and correspondence courses.

e. **Training Exercises**

   (1) Joint exercise planners should incorporate robust PR scenarios to exercise commanders and staffs, forces, and potential isolated personnel. Combatant command PR OPRs, JPRA representatives, “standing” component PRCCs and JPRCs (if established) can assist exercise planners in designing the specific scenario.

   (2) The JFC’s PR OPR should organize and conduct PR mission training exercises (preferably integrated into broader, established joint exercises) for the joint force, to include multinational forces and other agencies, before and after deployment when practical or until stand up of a JPRC.

   (3) Forces performing and supporting PR tasks should be exercised on a regular basis to promote joint interoperability, evaluate PR practices, demonstrate new PR capabilities and allow for a smooth transition to combat operations. Exercises should be included in-theater to ensure newly arrived units are prepared and veteran units are maintaining skills in spite of personnel turnover.

f. **Predeployment Training.** It is essential that commanders prepare their forces to meet the PR requirements of their specific theater prior to deployment for military operations. CCDRs set theater entrance requirements for SERE training (pipeline and theater-specific), for those at risk of isolation, small arms training, chemical warfare, etc. Commanders should develop a predeployment program that identifies individuals for specific PR education and training, (e.g., SERE training, PRCC formal training) to ensure training is accomplished prior to any possible deployments. The nature of an operational environment will help determine the scope of required training. Commanders prioritize attendance at JPRA formal PR training, and track trained PR personnel with a skill identifier to build and sustain PR expertise.
Preparation

g. Commanders and Staffs. Professional military education through joint and Service schools is the basis for personnel recovery familiarization for commanders and staffs. Commanders at all levels are responsible for ensuring their personnel are adequately prepared to accomplish the functions in the DOD PR system (prepare, plan, execute, adapt).

(1) JPRC Qualifications and Responsibilities

(a) JPRC Director and Deputy Director. The JPRC director and deputy director advise and inform the supported commander for PR and/or the JFC on PR matters, and manage all activities of the JPRC. The JPRC director is normally a field grade officer and must be knowledgeable of PR procedures, theater component recovery procedures, and have the appropriate security clearance. Additionally, the JPRC director should be experienced in recovery operations and have completed an executive agent approved PR education/training regimen that prepares the individual to perform the assigned duties. The deputy director will ideally have similar qualifications as the director and should normally be from a different Service than the JPRC director, to provide a breadth of knowledge at JPRC supervisory levels.

(b) Watch Supervisor. The watch supervisor is the supervisor of the JPRC watch crew responsible for tending to JPRC current operations and monitoring and coordinating active missions. Watch supervisors should be PR experienced and graduates of an executive agent approved PR controllers course.

(c) Coordinators (officers and enlisted). Coordinators assist with all aspects of an isolating incident by monitoring the report, locate, support, and recover tasks of an isolating event, and supporting, coordinating, and responding to the requirements of the recovery force and the isolated individual(s). Coordinators should be PR experienced and graduates of an executive agent-approved PR coordinators course.

(d) Personnel Recovery Duty Officer. PRDOs function as a liaison between the JPRC and the JFC’s joint operations center (JOC) and/or the JFC’s designated supported commander for PR to ensure effective and efficient coordination of PR plans and mission taskings. The PRDO should be an officer with PR experience and preferably a graduate of an executive agent approved PR coordinators course.

(e) Intelligence Personnel. Dedicated intelligence personnel must be familiar with collection management procedures, the processing of requests for information (RFIs), and procedures for obtaining national intelligence support; and they must be able to effectively apply the various intelligence disciplines to all phases of a PR incident. They should be a graduate of an executive agent approved intelligence course that includes PR objectives (e.g., PR 220), be a graduate of the DOD Strategic Debriefer’s Course, and any available courses that focus specifically on intelligence for PR.

(f) SERE Expert. The SERE expert should be a noncommissioned officer experienced in PR subject matter, who has completed appropriate JPRA training and education, with extensive background in operational PR procedures and possess the appropriate security clearance. SERE
experts must conduct theater SERE planning, coordinate theater SERE support, and conduct theater SERE training as necessary. They must be familiar with the reintegration process for recovered isolated personnel, as well as DOD and theater reintegration plans, and be a trained reintegration debriefer.

(2) PRCC. PRCCs may vary from component to component in size, composition, and location. They are typically located within the operations directorate where coordination of active PR missions is possible. The PRCC must be integrated into the organizational structure of a component in a manner where PRCC personnel gain immediate access to the component’s designated command/tasking authorities in order to expedite responses to component PR missions or requests for support to PR joint missions. Additionally, PRCC personnel must have visibility of and input into component plans to ensure PR requirements and capabilities are properly addressed. The PRCC typically consists of a PRCC chief and enough trained personnel to coordinate PR missions on a 24-hour basis. The PRCC staff members must be trained and experienced in joint and component PR doctrine and TTP, and preferably be graduates of appropriate PR courses.

(3) UARCC. The UARCC staff is typically a director, shift supervisor, a controller, and representatives of tactical organizations possessing NAR capabilities. Their mission is to coordinate, synchronize, deconflict, and manage NAR operations within the JFC’s operational area. UARCC personnel must possess an appropriate security clearance and be intimately familiar with joint NAR TTP, all represented NAR capabilities, and the comprehensive NAR ground tactical plan. The UARCC director, shift supervisor, controller, and tactical planners should be a graduate of a NAR plans and operations course.

(4) PR OPRs. Service and combatant command PR OPRs should receive appropriate PR education and training commensurate with their responsibilities. Ideally, the combatant command PR OPR would have tactical PR expertise and have served at least one tour as a JPRC/PRCC director.

(5) Other Staff Elements. Staff elements throughout the joint and component staff have PR responsibilities and must be adequately prepared prior to deployment. Commanders should pay special attention to certain special staff and directorates’ responsibilities (PAO, legal, chaplain, operations, personnel, intelligence, etc.) with regard to PR. The application of this education and training can be found in the specific list of responsibilities in Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities,” and the list of staff planning considerations in Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.”

h. Forces. Force preparation is a Service/component responsibility. Forces must be cognizant of their inherent capabilities to perform PR tasks. All force PR education and training efforts must include joint considerations and build interoperability, while maximizing component PR capability. In many cases, processes can be adjusted to increase capability without incurring increased resource requirements or equipment shortages. Forces operating in a joint or multinational environment need a fundamental understanding of theater recovery operations.

i. Isolated Personnel. Individuals have specific responsibilities to prepare for the possibility of being isolated. Thorough preparation will increase the probability of mission success and decrease the
amount of time that recovery forces must operate in a hostile or uncertain operational environment. The well trained and educated isolated person will be capable of adapting to the various isolation situations and methods of recovery. The definition of the term “isolated personnel” specifically mentions the need to survive and evade, and SERE training provides personnel at risk of isolation the skills to survive and react appropriately and legally, as a survivor, resistor, or escapee. Evaders have to survive in order to evade. Attention to personal needs can be postponed temporarily, but eventually these survival needs must be met, or evaders won’t be physically or mentally fit to continue to evade. Dehydration, the effects of hot or cold environments, lack of sleep, sickness, and starvation contribute to physical weakness and poor decision-making. Recovery is the end stage of survival and evasion. Preparing to survive while evading is preparation for recovery.

For further detailed information on specific survival TTP refer to Appendix J, “Evasion” of this publication, Army Field Manual (FM) 21-76-1, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02H, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-50.3, Air Force TTP (AFTTP) (I) 3-2.26, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, and appropriate Service publications such as FM 21-76, Survival.

(1) SERE Education and Training

(a) **Formal SERE Curriculum.** Combatant commands dictate minimum SERE training requirements for entry into their theater. The Services and USSOCOM, in coordination with Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), JPRA, and the combatant commands, develop standards, using the JPRA-developed template, to identify personnel requiring SERE training. Military personnel and DOD civilians and contract personnel shall receive appropriate SERE training commensurate with theater admission and combatant command requirements prior to deployment to overseas locations. JPRA, in coordination with the Services, develops United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) EAIs to identify joint requisites for SERE training. The current SERE training paradigm, outlined briefly below, is changing rapidly to meet today’s dynamic, asymmetric threat to isolated personnel. Sweeping transformational changes are expected in how personnel are identified for various types of SERE training and how and when that training is provided. Upon codification of these changes, either through updated policy documents or memoranda, the paradigm outlined below will be superceded.

For further information regarding current SERE training for military personnel, refer to DODD 1300.7, Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC), and DODI 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education, or subsequent policy memoranda.

For further information regarding current civilian and contractor employee SERE training, refer to DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilian and Contractors, or subsequent policy memoranda.

1. **Level A** training is Code of Conduct (CoC) familiarization. All United States military personnel receive this training upon entry into the Armed Forces.
2. **Level B** training is for DOD military, civilians, and contractors whose jobs, specialties, or assignments entail at least a moderate risk of isolation. This training is available through various electronic media, to include a web-based application and a series of interactive compact discs containing both classified and unclassified modules. Level B training is normally limited to academic instruction only, but some portions can be augmented with practical application training. As a minimum, the following categories of personnel shall receive Level B training at least once in their careers: members of ground combat units, security forces for high threat targets, and anyone in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge of the battle area or the forward line of own troops. Training shall be conducted for such Service members as soon as they assume a duty that makes them eligible.

*For further information regarding current Level B training, refer to USJFCOM Executive Agent Instructions, Requirements for Peacetime Level B Training in Support of the CoC, and Requirements for Wartime Level B Training in Support of the CoC, or subsequent policy memoranda.*

3. **Level C** training is an application learning level conducted at formal schools. Per DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, personnel whose roles entail a relatively high risk of isolation, or make them vulnerable to greater-than-average exploitation by a captor (e.g., aircrews and special mission forces such as Navy special warfare combat swimmers, Army special forces and Rangers, Marine Corps force reconnaissance units, Air Force Special Tactics and Pararescue teams, PSYOP personnel, and military attaches) must attend a Level C SERE School (or complete Level C SERE course/training). Training shall be conducted for such Service members as soon as they assume duties or responsibilities that make them eligible.

*For further information on Level C training, refer to USJFCOM EAIs, Requirements for Peacetime Level C Training in Support of the Code of Conduct, and Requirements for Wartime Level C Training in Support of the Code of Conduct.*

(b) **In-Unit Training.** SERE refresher training (classroom and field) at the unit level is essential if personnel at risk of isolation are to be adequately prepared to participate in combat operations at a moment’s notice. Training should be tailored to the specific environments and mission profiles into which the individual is expected to deploy. DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of resistance training laboratories and practical resistance and escape hands-on training or exercises without approval of the Commander, JPRA.

(c) **Training Exercises**

1. All personnel at risk of isolation should participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible. This training should include communications techniques and procedures, signaling devices, and other actions that enhance successful recovery.

2. DOD policy and Service regulatory guidance prohibit operation of captive role-play activities without Service approval and prior written notification to JPRA.
(2) **Individual Preparation Responsibilities.** Personnel at risk of isolation should:

(a) Obtain required formal SERE training prior to deployment (see SERE training discussed later).

(b) Undergo geographic CCDR/subordinate JFC-directed theater-specific SERE training.

(c) Acquire a comprehensive knowledge of their survival radio and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques, and evasion techniques and aids (e.g., EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees).

(d) Understand the impact of the isolation environment (e.g., adversary threat, terrain, and weather considerations) for survival and evasion in theater.

(e) Know how to access and become familiar with the pertinent PR guidance or other published notification documents that are updated regularly (e.g., PR SOPs, ATO SPINS, isolated personnel guidance (IPG), SERE updates), to include a thorough understanding of PR authentication and reporting requirements.

(f) Know what information the recovery forces likely will need, and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces.

(g) Understand their legal status and ROE as an isolated person, and how that affects their moral and legal responsibilities.

4. **Products and Equipment**

The capability to survive, evade, and help facilitate the other PR execution tasks is enhanced by preparing personnel with adequate PR equipment and products. For instance, personnel at risk of isolation should carry evasion aids. Evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment or may not have time to sort through it to select the most useful evasion items. Because space considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids that can be carried, consider selecting items of information and/or equipment that serve more than one purpose. Suggested equipment items include EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees, or other means of communicating with the local populace; general reference materials on medical, survival, or cultural information; collapsible water containers; water purification products; large leaf bags for shade, wind, moisture protection, floatation, or water storage; camouflage or environmental protection items; and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife, hand-held GPS device, or signaling devices like a small mirror, flashlight, glint tape, or brightly colored piece of cloth. Personnel at risk of isolation should also be familiar with and follow the combatant command’s minimum evasion requirements. Several PR products are designed to enhance their ability to survive and evade.
a. **Evasion kits** provide isolated personnel with essential equipment, tools, and other items necessary for successful survival, evasion, and recovery. They should be tailored to a specific operational environment and supplement/augment a standard survival vest/kits that are designed to support a much wider range of operating conditions.

(1) Evasion kit composition considerations are as follows:

(a) Tailored to specific units, missions, and PR plan, when possible.

(b) Fits the operational area and specific environmental conditions.

(c) Based on individual employment and space available.

(d) Supplements issued survival and signaling equipment.

(e) Emphasizes survival, signaling, and surface navigation.

(2) **EVCs** are managed by JPRA and jointly developed and printed with NGA. The EVC is designed to assist evaders to avoid capture and survive in hostile territory and to provide them with a means of locating and securely transmitting their position or navigating as necessary to follow their EPA. EVCs are a series of charts that cover geographic areas specifically identified by combatant commands. The EVC is produced on very strong material, which is waterproof and resistant to tearing. Tailored to cover the individual area concerned, it is a unique, multi-purpose product that combines standard navigation charts with evasion and survival information located on the margins. A typical EVC contains localized information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal protection, and water and food procurement as well as color pictures of edible and poisonous plants. Additionally, the chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding if the EVC is used as a shelter/cover. The chart is designed to fit in a military uniform or survival vest. Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in NGA’s compact disk, “Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products.”

(3) The **blood chit** (see Figure IV-1) is a small sheet of material on which is imprinted an American flag, a statement in English and several languages common to the populace in the operational area, and numbers in each corner and, in some cases, centered under the flag, that identify the particular chit. The blood chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward by the USG to anyone providing assistance to the bearer or helping the bearer to return to friendly control. The evader has no authority to barter or quote a price for the reward. When the blood chit number is presented to US authorities, the isolated person has been returned to friendly control, and the claim has been properly validated, it represents an obligation of the USG to provide compensation to the claimant for services rendered to evaders. All instances of assistance are classified to protect the assistor and their families. NGA maintains the capability to produce and reprint blood chits at the request of JPRA. The blood chit has certain limitations as an evasion aid and form of identification; therefore training in the use of the
Figure IV-1. Sample Blood Chit

"I am an American and do not speak your language. I will not harm you! I bear no malice towards your people. My friend, please provide me food, water, shelter, clothing, and necessary medical attention. Also, please provide safe passage to the nearest friendly forces of any country supporting the Americans and their allies. You will be rewarded for assisting me when you present this number and my name to American authorities."
blood chit is essential and must be a prerequisite to their issue. Some of the limitations in the use of the blood chit are:

(a) The person providing aid may be skeptical of the value of a “number” as something that may produce a reward. Overcoming this difficulty will depend largely on the salesmanship of the evader.

(b) When the evader is in the hands of a friendly group or individual, use of the blood chit as a means of reward may depend largely on the effectiveness of communications between the group and the evader. The evader should expect to encounter some reticence by the recipient who may suspect the chit to be stolen or counterfeit, or the bearer to be an adversary.

(c) Low literacy rates in certain parts of a country, or among certain groups, can hinder the use of a blood chit. In addition, only a small amount of translations have been made of the thousands of languages and dialects in the world. Evaders may have to resort to sign language. See the discussion on pointee-talkees below.

(d) Training of potential evader/blood chit users on when, where, and how to best use the device within the culture is necessary for safety. The blood chit should not be issued without the training to accompany it.

*For further guidance on the blood chit program, see Appendix H, “Blood Chit Program Administration.”*

(4) **Pointee-Talkees** (see Figure IV-2) are in a three column format with English phrases on the left side of the page, the same phrase in the foreign language in the middle, and the phonetic pronunciation on the right side. The evader selects the desired English phrase and points to the translation of the phrase beside it or tries to phonetically pronounce the desired phrase. The evader may augment the pointee-talkee by making drawings and signs to help communicate with a local national whose language the evader does not speak or understand. Request new pointee-talkees through combatant command PR requirements to JPRA.
### INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Farsi</th>
<th>Farsi Phonetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am an American and I need your help, but I do not speak your language. I'll point to the question in your language and you can point to the answer in your language.</td>
<td>من آمریکایی هستم و به کمک شما احتیاج دارم و با زبانی که آنها نیستم از روی آین ورته سوال مورد نظرم را نشان خواهم داد و شما با استفاده از آن ورته جواب مورد نظرتان را نشان بدهید.</td>
<td>MAHN EHM-bree-koh EE ehhs TAHM, vah beh koh-MAH-koh shoh-MOH ehx-teh-OOH dUH-RUHM, vah-LEE boh zah BAH-reh shoh-MOH shoh noh NEE-stahm. MAHN ahr-ROO yeh EEN-rah-RAH yah-eh soh-OOH-leh MOH-reh deh NAH ZAH-rahm roh neh SHUHN HOH-hahn DOHT VAH-shoh-MOH BOH EH-seh roh DAH-zeen vah-rah-GAY jah VOH-veen MOH-reh-deh nah ZAHR mahn-DOOH nee SHUHN BEH-dah-HEET.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Farsi</th>
<th>Farsi Phonetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will you help me?</td>
<td>میتوانند به اینجا بیایند؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-voh NAHND voh EEN-joh byoh-YAHND?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there someone that speaks English?</td>
<td>باید الان بروم وی میخواهم از شما پرسی؟</td>
<td>BOH-YAHD ahl OHN BEH-reh VAHM, vah-LEE nee koh-NAHM ahs-shoh-MOH bah-roh YEH koh MAH keh tohn tah shah-KUHR KOH-nahm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are they willing to help me?</td>
<td>میتوانند از شما پرسی؟</td>
<td>NAHM mahn BOH-hahn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can they come here?</td>
<td>میتوانند به اینجا بیایند؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-voh NAHND voh EEN-joh byoh-YAHND?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I must go now but, I want to thank you for your help.</td>
<td>یکان شکرکارم.</td>
<td>DOH LAH-tay-mahn azh boh BAH-tay koh-MAH-kay-TOHN beh MAHND beh shoh-MOH poh DOHSIH koh-HAHD-doh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My government will repay you for your kindness.</td>
<td>از کمک‌های افتخارم به شما پاسخ خواهیم داد.</td>
<td>AHR koh-MAH-koh shoh-MOH voh-RAHN mahn WOO-nahm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I greatly appreciate your assistance.</td>
<td>AHR koh-MAH-koh shoh-MOH voh-RAHN mahn WOO-nahm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### COMMUNICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Farsi</th>
<th>Farsi Phonetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May I have some water?</td>
<td>میتوانید بمن کم آب بدهید؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet beeh MAHN KEH-mee-OHB BEH-dah-HEET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May I have some food?</td>
<td>میتوانید بمن کم غذا بدهید؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet beeh MAHN KEH-mee RAH-zoh BEH-dah-HEET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am injured. Is there someone that can help me?</td>
<td>چگونه شدیدکه؟ کسی که میتواند بمن کمک کند؟</td>
<td>ZAHM MEE-shoh DAHM. KA see NEE-tah VOH-nahd beeh MAHN koh-MAH koh NAHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any bandages?</td>
<td>تسلیم پانسان داردی؟</td>
<td>VAH-soh YEH-leh POHN-say-MOH DOH-rect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you contact someone to help me?</td>
<td>میتوانید یکی از کسانی که تماس پگیرد؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet beeh KE-seed BAH-roh-yeh koh-MAH-koh TAHS-beh-yeh-REET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the latrine?</td>
<td>کجا است؟</td>
<td>RAH-shooh-EE koh JOHST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am very tired. Is there a place I can sleep?</td>
<td>داریم خسته‌ام. جایی برای خواب داریم؟</td>
<td>XAY-leh XAHS-tahm JOH-ce BAH-roh-yeh HOH DOH-rect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May I have a blanket, or more clothing?</td>
<td>میتوانید پرایم پیت یا لباس نازمی کنید؟</td>
<td>MEE-tah-VOH-neet BAH-roh-YAHM YEHK pah-TOO YOH lay-BOHS FAH-roh hahn koh NEET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-2. Sample Portion of a Pointee-Talkee**
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CHAPTER V
PLANNING

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. General

The CCDR develops and promulgates strategic intent, concepts, operational focus and responsibilities through plans and orders. The detailed joint force PR plan is located within Appendix 5 to Annex C of the plan. The PR appendix supports the basic plan, promulgates the PR concept of operations (CONOPS), and directs PR guidance and responsibilities to subordinate organizations. Regardless of the type of plan, subordinate commanders must be aware of the JFC’s overall intent and CONOPS, to complete a PR mission analysis and a PR supporting plan (see paragraph 4 below). In turn, subordinate commanders provide their PR appendix to their commands for tactical planning. The planning process is not necessarily linear; therefore the development of the situation, JFC’s CONOPS, mission analysis, PR appendix 5 to annex C of the plan, and subordinate command plans may progress concurrently. PR planning is a vertical and horizontal collaborative process that incorporates the principles of joint operations to ensure the comprehensive preparation of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel; and efficiently employs capabilities from all available PR categories to accomplish the PR execution tasks.

Commanders must:

a. Complete a PR mission analysis.

b. Develop the foundation of and authority for PR in the basic plan.

c. Develop the PR appendix to the basic plan.

2. Personnel Recovery Mission Analysis

a. PR requirements and planning tasks are developed through a coordinated mission analysis based on the situation, the commander’s overall CONOPS, other parts of the basic plan as it develops, master attack plans, time/phase projection of losses, and coordination with staff and component planners (component recovery plans and the JFSOCC’s supporting plan). Mission analysis will be enhanced by adhering to the joint operation planning process. Commanders must identify the tasks their staffs, forces, and isolated personnel must perform, under various conditions, to accomplish the PR execution tasks. Mission analyses completed during contingency planning will be of benefit during crisis action planning. The scope and depth of the analysis may be affected by the time allowed; however, the quality of the analysis is directly proportional to the quality of the PR plan that follows. In the PR mission analysis, the commander first determines the context in which the mission must be performed and specifies tasks necessary to accomplish the PR execution tasks. Next, the commander determines the capability to accomplish those specified tasks with assigned forces, identifies shortfalls, and decides whether to build requirements to address the shortfalls or accept the risk of not doing so.
b. In determining the context in which the mission must be performed, commanders and their planners must consider the threat, the physical environment, and friendly capabilities.

(1) **Threat.** Adversaries will most likely exploit our national will, military strategy, isolated personnel, and target recovery forces.

(a) National will/military strategy. The power of the media and information technology as tools to rapidly shape public opinion can give an innovative or devoted adversary the ability to directly affect a nation’s will and/or its military strategy. Such gain, when measured against the relatively low cost and ready access to the media, technology, and “soft targets” makes specific targeting of DOD personnel an attractive strategy for an adversary that cannot match US strength on the traditional battlefield or in the markets. An adversary targeting a nation’s will may be trying to persuade a government to make concessions (withdraw troops, give up land, release prisoners, change objectives, etc.) or to increase public support (and indirectly a government’s support) for their cause.

(b) An adversary targeting a nation’s military strategy may be trying to: refocus efforts away from the military’s primary objectives; reduce the effectiveness by inducing fear, doubt, dissent, and lack of confidence; and/or reduce the number of forces.

(c) Isolated Personnel. Personnel may become isolated as a result of poor decisions, improper procedure, equipment malfunction, or enemy action. An adversary’s ability to successfully exploit isolated personnel or their situation depends on skill and access to people to exploit. Technology and innovation can increase effectiveness. An adversary may attempt to exploit the situation or the isolated person directly for intelligence, propaganda, or economic purposes.

1. Intelligence. Exploitation for intelligence depends on the isolated person’s knowledge of technical/procedural information or military plans.

2. Propaganda. For propaganda purposes, one’s knowledge is irrelevant. What an isolated person represents or is willing to do or say may be of value to the adversary.

3. Economic. Some criminal or terrorist elements may be seeking monetary compensation for the turnover of isolated personnel to either friendly or hostile forces, families, or organizations.

(d) Recovery Forces. The threat to recovery forces is primarily due to the capability of the adversary to apply firepower through a C2 architecture. They may target the recovery force as a normal response to a military operation or they may attempt to use isolated personnel as bait to ambush recovery forces. An adversary’s technology, imagination, flexibility, will, audacity, and use of extremist measures can increase the threat to all forces.
(2) **Environment.** Terrain (mountainous, desert, jungle, forest, urban, maritime), vegetation (mountainous, desert, jungle, forest, urban, maritime), weather (day/night, temperature, wind direction and speeds), and populace (density, hostile, neutral, friendly) have direct affects on PR C2, forces and isolated personnel. The mission analysis should consider the affects of the environmental conditions on:

(a) PR C2 to:

1. Conduct, timing, and tempo of PR missions.
2. Communicate with forces and isolated personnel.

(b) Forces to:

1. Communicate with isolated personnel.
2. Locate isolated personnel.
3. Recover isolated personnel.

(c) Isolated personnel to:

1. Communicate (radio or visual signal) with recovery forces.
2. Evade.
3. Survive.

(3) **Factors that impact friendly force** capabilities to successfully accomplish the five PR execution tasks could include:

(a) An adequate number of trained and/or dedicated PR personnel to staff the JPRCs, PRCCs, and recovery forces; and plan for PR.

(b) Sufficient air, ground, and maritime platforms/equipment (dedicated, designated) to execute a successful recovery.

(c) Adequate policies and procedures for completing EPAs and ISOPREPs.

(d) Adequate guidance for developing PR ROE.

(e) Adequate policies and procedures to communicate PR information and requirements to all personnel in the operational area.

(f) An adequate number of SERE-qualified personnel to ensure programs are in place to prepare personnel for a possible isolation event.
(g) Innovative and effective employment of the joint force PR capabilities and doctrine.

(h) The JFC’s procedures for conducting PR (e.g., standardized checklists and processes for evasion aides, ISOPREPs, recovery mission planning).

(i) Properly equipped personnel who provide a robust C2 capability to report, locate, and recover isolated personnel (e.g., compatible or interoperable radios, emergency locator transmitters, cell or international maritime satellite phone, GPS devices, PLB, and/or alerting devices).

(j) Properly equipped personnel to support isolated personnel with:

1. Effective communication.
2. Protection from adversary threats, environmental conditions, etc.
3. Morale support to maintain mental well-being and positive attitude.
4. Resupply kits and exercised resupply delivery capability.
5. Situational awareness to enable them to make rational decisions.

(k) Accurate map and chart coverage of the entire operational area.

(l) Adequate policy and procedures for coordinating the reintegration of isolated personnel.

(m) Adequate procedures to collect lessons learned and forward them through the proper channels.

(n) International law and arrangements, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), where appropriate.

c. Determining the PR subtasks identifies those actions that must be taken to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. The identification of the subtasks will enable the planner to subsequently identify PR conventional and NAR capabilities and shortfalls. These PR subtasks are made up of directed tasks (see Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities”), doctrinal tasks, and mission analysis tasks. Directed tasks are derived from DOD directed PR responsibilities. Doctrinal PR execution tasks are derived from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*. Mission analysis and planning for recovery operations generally employs the joint operation planning process as outlined in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Using common processes that are understood throughout the military helps commanders and staffs standardize procedures. Standard processes facilitate effective planning between echelons and with adjacent units.
d. PR capabilities are determined by analyzing the ability of the joint or multinational force to perform the five PR execution tasks and subtasks in the context of the PR operational environment. When gaps are identified, the commander can direct action to resolve the shortfall, develop requirements for higher HQ to resolve, or accept risk.

3. The Basic Plan

The OPLAN and supporting subordinate plans establish the joint force PR command authorities and responsibilities, coordination and communication architecture, force placement, force posture, and force response. The PR planner should coordinate with and assist other staff planners in developing the basic plan to ensure it establishes the foundation for the scope, authorities, and priority for PR. The PR appendix 5 to annex C of the basic plan will expand on this foundation. The basic plan should:

   a. Incorporate the JFC’s priority for isolated personnel, accomplishing the five PR execution tasks and concept for PR in support of the joint force.

   b. Specify subordinate commanders’ responsibility to establish and disseminate the criteria that designates personnel as isolated and to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

   c. Include the JFC’s concept for integrating all PR capability (based on PR categories) within the operational area, to include support requirements outside the operational area.

   d. Establish the command and coordinating relationships for PR. (See Chapter III, “Command and Control.”)

   e. Design the PR architecture to facilitate timely, efficient, and effective PR mission planning at all levels of the joint force.

4. The Personnel Recovery Appendix in the Operation Plan

   a. The basic plan’s operational situation, the JFC’s overall CONOPS and intent, the mission analysis and ongoing joint planning, and the collaboration with other operation planners becomes the foundation of information that focuses the development of the “PR operations plan,” in appendix 5 to annex C, of an OPLAN (see Figure V-1). Appendix 5 contains the JFC’s PR CONOPS for a specific campaign or operation and tasks commanders and staffs, isolated personnel, and forces with actions that, when completed, will develop the PR capability envisioned by the JFC.

   *Detailed planning considerations and other guidance to develop appendix 5 is in CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats. Additional planning considerations are discussed below.*

   b. PR Planning Considerations
Interoperability. Successful PR depends on the accurate identification of interoperability requirements and shortfalls, including those of multinational organizations and OGAs. Interoperability concerns are always a relevant consideration when executing a recovery. Interoperability between the isolated person, the forces, and the C2 is essential. Interoperability issues are usually identified when PR
planning and operations involve forces from two or more joint force components. Since PR missions normally require an urgent response, an understanding of potential interoperability requirements is essential to successful and timely PR planning and execution. Interoperability is essential to joint shipboard helicopter operations, communications, intelligence automated data processing, fuel and refueling, and maps and charts.

(a) **Ship-Helicopter Interoperability** should be considered during recovery operations in the maritime and coastal environments. The extended range of some helicopters makes the use of shipboard support facilities feasible in certain inland PR scenarios. Generally, US Coast Guard and Navy flight-deck-equipped vessels are capable of recovering, supporting, and launching US Army and US Air Force (USAF) helicopters operated by deck-landing qualified aircrews. Specific procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped vessels must be employed for safe execution. Procedures for Coast Guard and Navy vessels, to include hospital ships, are contained in JP 3-04.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations*; NWP 3-04.1M, *Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships*; Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 00-80T-105, *CV Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual*; NAVAIR 00-80T-106, *LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual*; and Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*. Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance information are contained in Naval Air Engineering Center — Engineering (NAEC-ENG)-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*.

(b) **Communications Equipment.** Interoperability of communications equipment in recovery operations is essential, particularly when a personnel recovery task force (PRTF) is employed. Adequate, secure communications that support the timing and coordination necessary for successful recovery operations becomes considerably more difficult as additional resources are added to the PRTF. Depending upon the composition of the joint force, specific communications interoperability considerations should include the potential for PR-related air-to-air, surface-to-air, and/or surface-to-surface communications. Communications equipment that is not interoperable could preclude the effective usefulness of a PRTF and may be a factor for assigning the PR mission to a single component as a mission-type order.

1. Communications interoperability issues will typically challenge multinational forces.

2. **Tactical Data Links** provide a standardized communication link capability suitable for transmission of digital information. This is a key communication capability for effective PR C2 and successful accomplishment of the PR execution tasks. Without data links, the user would be required to revert to voice systems, possibly compromising recovery operations or the location of isolated personnel, due to the substantial difference in transmission times. Data link network capacity must take into consideration the number and variance of terminals (US, NATO, and coalition) in a geographic area, and the gateways must allow interoperability among new, emerging gateways to/from other communications networks.
Fuel and Refueling. Interoperable fuel and refueling equipment must be considered during PR planning. Cross-tasking of PR assets, particularly helicopters, may result in unanticipated fuel requirements. Refueling interoperability requirements include both ground and aerial refueling considerations. Nozzles, fittings, and couplings vary among Service helicopters. Cross-tasking of helicopters for PR may also require cross-tasking of refueling support (ground and/or aerial) for these aircraft. Various ground vehicles also have different fuel and lubricant requirements that should be considered.

Maps and Charts. Maps and charts play a key role in the planning and execution of recovery operations. The necessity for PR planners, isolated personnel, and operators to use the same map and/or chart datum is particularly crucial to a successful PR mission. With a search capability already limited by scarce resources and probably further debilitated by hostile capabilities and intent, it is essential that forces use the same reference points and same reference system (e.g., grid or latitude and longitude, to include coordinate format) for ingress, recovery, and egress. Using the same map and/or chart series or sheet also facilitates timely and accurate coordination and use of supporting arms in PR.

PR Categories. With the direction and authority of the basic plan, PR planners can expand on the responsibilities for, and use of, all theater PR capabilities. (See Figure I-2, “Personnel Recovery Options, Categories, and Methods.”)

Individual

1. Unassisted. In the unassisted category, evaders independently exercise their capability to make their way back to friendly control or travel toward a point where contact with friendly force can be accomplished based on an EPA. However, in many instances the best technique is to find a hide site and wait for recovery forces to arrive. From the enemy’s perspective, watching for movement is one of the best techniques for hunting. Evasion and recovery takes as long as it takes. Being patient and maintaining SA can be a valuable tool in maintaining freedom. The plan should promulgate the component and Service responsibility to identify personnel at risk of isolation and prepare them to survive, evade, or escape to effect their own recovery if it becomes necessary. This may be necessary when friendly forces are not aware that an isolation event has occurred, it is not possible to execute a recovery or support mission, or it is a back-up option to a failed recovery mission. In addition, to the extent possible and depending on the operational requirement, the JFC should place the same responsibility on DOD contractors, other agencies, and multinational partners.

For further information on evasion, refer to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

2. Opportunity. Planning guidance should detail responsibilities for theater SERE briefs to, and the preparation of, potential isolated personnel to increase their capability to facilitate opportune situations. The SERE brief and isolated personnel guidance will provide the potential isolated person knowledge of individuals, groups, and organizations in the area of operations that will enhance their ability to successfully negotiate opportune situations. Plans
should also ensure potential isolated personnel have the equipment, such as blood chits and pointee-talkees, to enhance the success of an opportune situation.

(b) **Component.** Components are responsible for PR planning that encompasses the accomplishment of the five PR execution tasks within their operational area. Component commanders should coordinate PR plans with the joint force plans. Components may not be organized, trained, or equipped to accomplish all aspects of the five PR execution tasks. Shortfalls in capabilities must be reported to the JFC and JPRC. NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capabilities do not exist, are not feasible, or are not acceptable.

(c) **Joint.** JFCs should exploit all available appropriate component resources to develop the optimum PR capability. Unity of effort and the integration of capabilities are the JFC’s major challenges in joint recovery operations; and require planning, training, and rehearsal to develop synergistic mission-capable skills.

(d) **Multinational.** JFCs must address their intent to work with and support allies and coalition partners for PR. A PR relationship with multinational forces may be the deliberate intent of the JFC or it may be directed from higher authority. In most cases, the JFC will at a minimum have to consider the PR coordination between US forces and the host nation military. As discussed in the previous categories, multinational PR capabilities may offer the JFC leverage (force multiplier) that entails gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power. The JFC’s PR CONOPS should address the multinational PR architecture to promote detailed planning, coordination, and the implementation of legal agreements to affect a multinational PR effort and recognize constraints. Achieving balance and unity of effort among multinational forces is a major challenge that can be mitigated by planning, training, and rehearsal.

(e) **Other Governmental Agencies.** The JFC may be directed to provide PR support to OGAs in the operational area or incorporate their PR capabilities into military recovery operations. Directed or not, JFCs should investigate the activities of OGAs and determine the possibility of those personnel becoming isolated in hostile or uncertain areas within the operational area. Personnel of other governmental agencies operating over, in, or near the operational area can be at risk of becoming isolated. JFCs should take the initiative to request these organizations plan PR with the use of organic PR capabilities in support of their own personnel to mitigate the use of combat forces. Should military support be required, taking the opportunity to do advance planning is a better choice than confronting a crisis during operations. As in joint and multinational considerations, unity of effort and integration of capabilities are the JFC’s major challenges in recovery operations involving OGA capabilities, and require planning, training, and exercise.

1. Although a part of the civil option, exploitation of NGOs’ capabilities may offer the JFC a PR force multiplier. PR planning should include NGO considerations and the coordination processes and responsibilities for diplomatic support to PR. Diplomacy can emphasize agreements that can affect isolated personnel (e.g., Geneva and Hague conventions), and implement negotiations that directly accomplish the recovery of isolated personnel.
Chapter V

2. The DOS and the US missions abroad are most likely to have resources to support recovery operations, especially when diplomatic options are required or host nation laws and agreements or internationally recognized territorial sovereignty rights have to be considered. The CIA and Department of Justice also may offer capabilities or need military PR assistance. In most countries, the host nation will have responsibility for all PR with DOS having USG lead. US forces will provide support as required and capable.

3. Where a JTF has not been established (and the chief of mission remains in charge) in a host nation with hostile or uncertain conditions, the security assistance organization (SAO), as part of the American ambassador’s country team, must coordinate host nation and interagency support for the country team’s PR plan. A combined, country-team JPRC organization, led by the SAO commander, provides a focal point for the host nation and US interagency coordination.

A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION

During the negotiations leading up to the Paris Peace Accords, the chief US negotiator, Dr. Henry Kissinger explicitly worked to include the release of all American prisoners as a major component of any agreement. Signed on 17 January 1973 in Paris, France, the agreement led to the release of 591 American prisoners of war, 566 military and 25 civilians. The releases were conducted as the last US forces departed South Vietnam.

Article 8, paragraph (a). “The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later that same day as troop withdrawal…”

SOURCE: Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam

(3) Assets and Availability. Planners should identify the PR resources, delivery date, and employment location that will be required for a particular operation and ensure these requirements are supported by the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Integration of Service and component warfighting requirements with PR requirements avoids duplication of effort, establishes complementary systems, and exploits unique and specialized resources. Interoperability of dissimilar joint force assets is essential to safe and successful recovery operations. Commanders must ensure the force flow includes mission capable PR forces that are commensurate with the risks of incurring an isolating event. Commanders must efficiently employ a broad range of PR abilities that may consist of:

(a) Forces that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped for PR and identified to the JFC by their component commander as the PR force for planning purposes. Identified forces should include dedicated component PR coordination elements, if established.

(b) Forces that have not been designated as primary PR assets but, because their capabilities can be applied to PR situations, have been identified as the assets to be tasked, if required.
(c) Forces that are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for PR, but have a recognized ability to perform some elements of the five PR execution tasks.

(4) **Force Placement.** Precautionary planning involves the pre-positioning of PR aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities close to an area most likely to have a PR incident before an operation commences. The planning of precautionary PR is usually done by the JPRC, PRCC, or operations staff with PR expertise and background. Precautionary PR planning may also be conducted concurrently with mission planning or as a corollary planning effort when one joint force or component is tasked to provide PR support to another joint force or component. Options should also be established to support an unsuccessful recovery that requires an additional PR mission. **Precautionary postures** include the following:

(a) **Lifeguard.** Naval vessels may be pre-positioned along ingress and egress routes for rescue purposes when the mission indicates a potential need for waterborne assistance or the PR function is compatible with or becomes the primary assigned mission of a submarine or surface vessel. Maritime vessels, when involved with recovery operations, maintain the vessel voice call sign “Lifeguard.” Aircraft providing cover for a Lifeguard vessel should establish contact immediately upon arriving on station and then, when practical, search the area around the Lifeguard’s position for adversary vessels. An aircraft commander involved with recovery operations who wants to establish communications with an unknown Lifeguard vessel will maintain the aircraft voice call sign “Rescue.” A Lifeguard vessel commander who wants to establish communications with an unknown PR aircraft should use the voice call sign “Rescue.”

(b) **Duckbutt** is a precautionary PR procedure normally used in environments where the risk from adversary threats is low. Aircraft are positioned along or over a water route to provide a recovery resource if required, support deployment of single-engine aircraft, or meet other specialized situations. Duckbutts often are used as a precaution when single-engine aircraft, or aircraft with certain very important persons aboard, have to cross large bodies of water, in the event the pilot has to ditch the aircraft. Duckbutts should be multi-place aircraft with sufficient endurance and refueling, communication, airdrop, and navigational capabilities to support recovery requirements. If unable to effect the extraction of isolated personnel, duckbutt aircrews should be prepared to locate isolated personnel; airdrop survival equipment, medical supplies and pararescue jumpers (PJs) or equivalent; and coordinate additional PR assets. Commanders are responsible for coordinating duckbutt support with the component PRCC or JPRC.

(c) **Airborne Alert.** Suitable fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters when practicable, may be tasked to provide PR airborne alert in support of operations. These aircraft should monitor operating frequencies and may function as the mission coordination platform to coordinate recovery operations. Supporting PR aircraft should establish radio contact with the JPRC or PRCC immediately upon departure from their home stations. If extraction is not imminent, recovery forces must avoid compromising the isolated personnel’s position. Airborne alert locations should be outside the threat area and should not compromise PR mission intentions. Recovery helicopters may land in a permissive area and maintain a listening watch through airborne platforms or satellite communications networks.
Planners using air recovery assets should consider the feasibility of establishing clandestine forward arming and refueling point (FARP) where aerial refueling might be too hazardous to risk.

(d) **Quick Response Posture (QRP).** Suitable combat and support forces may be fueled, armed, and positioned (strip alert, maneuver force) for rapid employment in support of PR missions. A QRP can be accomplished from main operating bases or with forces pre-positioned at forward operating locations (e.g., forward arming and refueling point, forward operating base) near combat operations. This may include staging the forces physically in their vehicles or aircraft with the engines running. Though response time is decreased, a QRP can adversely impact force endurance over extended periods of time.

(5) **Search and Rescue.** Plan for the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, ground forces, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to support SAR for distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. This plan should include coordinated procedures or agreements with host nation, allies, and other organizations. Discuss all other capabilities and activities, plans, and operations pertinent to SAR missions. List the specific tasks assigned to each subordinate commander required to implement SAR in the operational area. Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary.

(6) **Nonconventional Assisted Recovery**

(a) NAR capabilities are developed to recover isolated personnel in areas where conventional recovery capability does not exist, is not feasible, or is not acceptable, or where complementary PR coverage is required. NAR planning must be a coordinated effort of joint
force PR planners, component recovery planners, and NAR planners. NAR requires pre-conflict contingency planning, training, exercise of C2, and ISR support to develop credible NAR capabilities for employment.

(b) The employment of and processes to properly use NAR capabilities. Initial PR planning will identify conventional recovery capabilities. Analysis of these capabilities will reveal the gaps where conventional capabilities do not exist, are not feasible or are not acceptable. PR planners must take into consideration SOF unilateral UAR capabilities. If PR gaps still exist, they serve as a basis for NAR planning and identifying NAR requirements for submission to the Joint Staff. These identified gaps serve as the basis for NAR planning.

(c) Nonconventional assisted recovery (SOF). It is DOD policy to complement its personnel recovery capabilities with NAR to recover isolated personnel in those instances when the use of conventional recovery forces in adversary-held or hostile areas is neither feasible nor acceptable, or is nonexistent. NAR is PR conducted by SOF, unconventional warfare (UW) ground and maritime forces, and OGAs who are specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures for PR. NAR operations involve the employment of recovery teams (RTs) and recovery mechanisms (RMs). NAR operations may be covert or clandestine. Although NAR supports the five execution tasks of PR, the tactical execution of NAR focuses primarily on the recover task. NAR relies on the capability of NAR forces to conduct five specified tasks. These tasks remain constant, regardless of the mission profile. The tasks are separate but may be conducted concurrently or sequentially, however all tasks must be conducted to complete the mission. The five specified tasks of NAR are: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel to friendly control. Though these specified tasks remain constant, the TTP employed to accomplish them may be many and varied, allowing for a unit’s or an individual’s particular training strengths, equipment, or employment criteria. During the recovery process, contingencies must be considered in the event the isolated person becomes separated from the recovery force. These contingencies will facilitate re-contact with the isolated person at a later time IAW the capabilities and limitations of the recovery force. During all phases of the recovery process, the isolated person should be briefed on pertinent procedures, restrictions, and re-contact plans while in the custody of the NAR recovery force. NAR capabilities are especially advantageous in areas where adversary air or ground threat prevents recovery by conventional forces. IAW Title 10, US Code (USC), DODI 2310.6, USSOCOM Directive 525-21cc, FM 3-05.220, Advanced Special Operations, UAR is NAR conducted by SOF, specifically US Army special forces and US Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs). UAR is a subset and integral component of UW. Further discussion of NAR is in Appendix G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

(7) Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape

(a) Document Preparation and Review. The plan should include detailed guidance for survival radio programming data and procedures, EPA development and documentation, ISOPREP review and handling, daily authentication codes, challenge and password, near and far recognition signals, communications procedures and schedules, procedures
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when radio use is not an option, contact plans and procedures, uniforms and equipment, isolated personnel immediate actions, authentication, evasion, survival, recovery, and capture procedures.

1. **Evasion Plan of Action.** All individuals or maneuver unit organizations operating in or over hostile or uncertain territory should develop an EPA and review it prior to each mission. The EPA is one of the critical documents for successful recovery planning. It is the vehicle by which personnel at risk of isolation document their evasion intentions and can facilitate their recovery by giving recovery forces a predetermined direction to follow as well as signs or signals to look for. It should be based on a thorough knowledge of current theater briefings, risk of isolation guidance, instructions like those found in the ATO SPINS, lessons learned, IPGs, SERE updates, etc., or other distress notification documents, as well as the operational environment where isolation may occur. Sources of information that should be used to develop EPAs include, but are not limited to the theater and component concepts to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel, and the ISR resources described earlier in this manual. Guidance on preparing EPAs should include consideration of both open and urban terrain. The signals instruction of both the EPA and the deception plan should include procedures to direct isolated persons toward recovery forces if radio communications are not possible. Personnel are responsible for ensuring that the information they put in their EPA complies with JFC’s policies and the contact procedures outlined in their component’s isolation notification procedures. If isolated, they should follow their EPA as closely as possible. Because extended unassisted recovery or being in a situation where technical communications devices are unavailable is always a possibility, EPAs should address such contingencies. Accurate EPA data, and the evader’s subsequent adherence to the EPA once isolated, are the principal factors in successful contact and recovery operations. When possible, EPAs should be stored electronically using a secure system to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. See Annex D, “Evasion Plan of Action,” to Appendix J, “Evasion,” for details on the content of an EPA.

2. **Isolated Personnel Report.** Specific information is necessary to positively authenticate isolated personnel during a recovery mission. Information is collected by a process that directs the user to provide statements containing personal information known only to them. These statements must be durable, able to be protected, and easily remembered by the individual. It is an important source of authentication data when communicating with US (and some allied) forces. Proper completion, use, and archiving of authentication information could be critical to a successful recovery. As a permanent record, it is a vital part of long-term POW or MIA accountability and individuals must have two completed ISOPREPs on file prior to deployment. When possible, ISOPREPs should be stored electronically using a secure system to facilitate rapid transmission during contingencies. The automated DD Form 1833, ISOPREP, provides the standardized data elements, export data, and order format to collect individual information and should be used by all personnel IAW theater entry requirements. Detailed procedures for completing, maintaining, and controlling ISOPREPs can be found in Annex F “Guidance for Completing and Controlling DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report,” to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

(b) **ROE/Legal Aspects.** Coordinate, as required, to ensure ROE address unique PR requirements (e.g., legal status of isolated personnel: evader vs. escapee, use of forces during recovery operations, access to potential recovery sites, host nation restrictions). See Appendix J,
“Evasion.” Identification of rules for “what if situations” in the planning process may represent a time-critical element in a decision process that will save a life during a crisis situation.


(c) **Contact Procedures.** A critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated personnel and the recovery force initially come together. That moment of contact is very tense because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either adversary forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party’s security. Consequently, the JPRC assisted by component representatives, joint and unit intelligence personnel, and recovery operations specialists will ensure that appropriate contact procedures are developed for use in the operational area. When developing contact procedures, recovery planners should adhere to JFC’s policies to ensure operational consistency throughout the joint force, and should address various recovery methods because each involves different considerations (e.g., interface with air, ground, sea, and special operations forces). Ground forces should adhere to the near and far recognition signals and treat this operation in the same manner as a link up with friendly force operation. The JPRC also will ensure that joint force components, commanders, personnel at risk of isolation, recovery forces, mission planners, and briefers are familiar with the contact procedures by publishing them in broadly disseminated operation instructions. General contact procedures for NAR operations should be published in appropriate instructions as well. To facilitate contact with NAR forces, potential isolated personnel should articulate contact procedures with and without communications in their EPA. Procedures should be passed by the UARCC to NAR and UAR assets, when required.

For detailed information on signaling, see Annex C, “Signaling Techniques and Procedures,” to Appendix J, “Evasion.”

(8) **Reintegrate.** Geographic CCDRs are responsible for the initial processing of recovered isolated personnel.

(a) Reintegration planning should be coordinated with all components, agencies, national forces, and others whose members are at risk of isolation. The plan should address the following objectives:

1. Attend to the medical needs of the recovered isolated person(s).

2. Conduct operational debriefing and capture time-sensitive intelligence.

3. Protect and treat the mental health of the isolated person(s).


5. Protect sensitive PR sources and methods.
6. Collect SERE information.

7. Provide SERE psychologist oversight to ensure proper decompression.

8. Attend to personal and family needs.

9. Enable the decompressed isolated person(s) to return to duty as soon as possible.

(b) Reintegration plans will be formatted as described in Tab D, “Reintegration,” to Appendix 5, “Personnel Recovery,” to Annex C “Operations,” of CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation and Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats, and must:

1. Establish procedures that ensure the proper care for recovered isolated personnel, the collection of SERE and intelligence information, and the recovered isolated personnel’s return to duty or family. The procedures will be specific for each location phase as detailed in Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

2. Ensure procedures exist to notify promptly the Service organization responsible for coordinating reintegration activities, DPMO, JPRA, and the Service casualty offices of the initial release and of subsequent information, including medical information, on recovered isolated personnel.

3. Establish procedures to take custody of returned isolated personnel from a host nation, in cases where DOS is the lead USG organization, IGO or NGO representatives as soon as possible after release.

4. Establish teams and procedures for reintegration of isolated personnel. Normally, reintegration is conducted at three locations that are referred to as phases. Phases I and II are the responsibility of the CCDR. Phase III is usually in the United States and is the responsibility of the isolated person’s Service. The JFCs coordinate through the JPRC with the PRCCs to establish phase I and II reintegration locations and teams. A more detailed discussion of reintegration activities and phases is in Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques,” Section E, “Reintegrate.” The plan should be as detailed as possible for phase I and II reintegration teams and team chiefs, and outline their authorities and responsibilities to coordinate and conduct the activities listed in paragraph g (1) above. Team composition is dependent on circumstances; circumstances may also dictate adjustments to the amount and type of reintegration activities conducted during phases I and II.

For further detailed information on reintegration, refer to Section E, “Reintegrate,” of Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

(9) **Accounting.** Commanders must implement timely and effective procedures to accurately determine the status of those who are isolated and coordinate that information through command, PR, and personnel channels.
(10) **OPSEC.** The commander and his PA staff should develop guidance that avoids inadvertent disclosure of critical information that could ultimately increase the risk to the lives of isolated personnel or negatively affect national will. Public affairs guidance should stress close coordination between the operational command and the PAO. The JPRC, PRCCs, contracting company (if the isolated person is a contractor), and PAOs must collaborate to ensure information is released in a deliberate, controlled manner that will not bring harm to isolated personnel. Consider the ramifications of a well-meaning friend immediately notifying the isolated person's family by cell phone. The family will probably request confirmation from authorities, which may alert the media and, in turn, alert adversarial forces in the objective area. Specific, identifying information on missing or downed aircraft and ships, or isolated personnel will not be released to the press while planning or conducting recovery operations. Information may be released after recovery is complete only when approved by the appropriate commander, JPRC, and PAO.

*For more discussion on media, refer to Section C, “Support,” in Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”*

(11) **Electronic Warfare (EW).** The electronic attack (EA) and electronic protection (EP) portions of EW are used to support PR mission accomplishment. EA is used to deny an adversary commander use of the electronic spectrum to effectively detect and locate isolated personnel and rescue forces. EP guarantees use of the electronic spectrum by isolated personnel, coordinating agencies, and forces conducting the recovery. Determine if the adversary forces are discussing the isolating event or person in their communications.

(12) **PSYOP.** The PSYOP portion of OPLANs and OPORDs should include products that are designed to influence the local population to aid isolated personnel and recovery forces. These products should be designed to decrease the potential that isolated personnel will be mistreated if captured and increase the probability that they will be helped, or at least not harmed, if they contact indigenous personnel. Consider using PSYOP capabilities for communicating with isolated personnel who may not have radio communications capability.

(13) **Operational Constraints.** Typical PR operational constraints include a limited capability of airborne assets to conduct searches in uncertain or hostile operational environments, although ground force search capabilities are not as limited; and a scarcity of PR-dedicated resources in forces, to include shortages of personnel knowledgeable in PR to staff the JPRC, PRCCs and PR liaisons. Alternate courses of action (COAs) should be developed to overcome these operational constraints. The use of ground forces can serve to overcome some of these constraints. Armored vehicles increase survivability and have extensive “loiter” time. The exact location of the isolated personnel is not always an absolute requirement for ground forces as they can move into or through an area searching for an isolated person and can stay until they are withdrawn, depending on the nature of the threat.

(a) **Search Capabilities.** Sensor searches or monitoring for radio and beacon transmissions by standoff airborne platforms, UAVs, intratheater aircraft engaged in ongoing air operations, and/or satellites should be considered and planned as appropriate. In some cases, aerial, ground, or sea
search cannot be conducted; increasingly sophisticated weapons, especially air defense weapons, that are available to military forces worldwide, including insurgents and terrorists, make extended searches by aircraft for isolated personnel in adversary-held territory highly prohibitive. However, ground combat forces can greatly increase the search capabilities of an organization. For example, a Bradley, Stryker, or Abrams battalion conducting a movement to contact to link up with isolated personnel has robust firepower, survivability, and staying ability. Time constraints for a successful rescue must be weighed against the risk of sending valuable personnel or assets into a hostile environment.

(b) **PR-Dedicated/Capable Resources.** The ability of the Services to deploy PR-dedicated/capable forces and PR coordination elements may be constrained by the combination of time and priorities to meet all mission requirements, synchronizing force deployment with other competing interests in a TPFDD, PR-dedicated/capable forces engaged in other operations, and readiness conditions. To mitigate these constraints, JFCs may consider coding PR requirements on the TPFDD to enable the extraction of that data for comparison to the flow of the other forces and scheduling PR deployments to properly support the force.

(14) **Intelligence**

(a) **Determining and Managing Intelligence Requirements.** The JIOC, JISE, or component intelligence support element must establish procedures with the JPRC, PRCCs, and UARCC to promptly satisfy their standing or ad hoc intelligence requirements. Many situations may require external resources (i.e., satellite imagery collection or other national-level capability). Commanders, their staffs, and recovery forces should be aware of the national organization’s intelligence capabilities and how to request support from them to enhance PR planning and decision-making. A comprehensive PR-focused intelligence collection and production plan gives the JIOC and JISE the framework to produce relevant finished intelligence prior to commencement of combat operations. Intelligence organizations must maintain sensor situational awareness and have procedures in place to cross-cue or dynamically re-task collection and support assets during PR mission execution.

1. **Connectivity.** Intelligence personnel supporting the JPRC, PRCC, and UARCC need direct access to dedicated intelligence communications systems with connectivity among intelligence entities from national to unit level.

   a. **Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS).** All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS. Security and facility constraints permitting, a JDISS terminal should be collocated with or in close proximity to the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC.

   b. **SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network.** Because JWICS is a dedicated intelligence network operating at the sensitive compartmented information (SCI) level, much of the information carried on it is not available to operational users reliant on SIPRNET systems. Regardless of the proximity of JWICS terminals to PR C2 nodes, intelligence personnel must act as a bridge...
between the two networks and ensure that commanders and forces have the information they need. Intelligence products and analysis disseminated via JWICS must be replicated on SIPRNET, within security restrictions, to afford maximum utility to the end users.

2. Collection Plan. Collection managers should be familiar with PR planning and operational needs, enabling them to match requirements to appropriate collection platforms and intelligence disciplines. In addition to providing SA and support to general intelligence analysis, collection carried out under each intelligence discipline has its own unique role in satisfying PR requirements. Collection managers, in conjunction with the combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC, should plan for and exercise intelligence collection management in response to a PR incident.

   a. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Although establishment of a HUMINT capability requires a long lead time to develop sources, HUMINT can provide PR information unreachable or unobtainable by other sources. Assessment of the mind-set of a country’s population and their attitude toward friendly PR activities relies heavily on HUMINT reporting. HUMINT plays a significant role in NAR planning. However, HUMINT operational matters that involve NAR support are handled separately from routine intelligence collection management channels.

   b. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT can be used to assess adversary threat to forces’ and isolated personnel communications and navigation systems, and to perform direction finding and geolocation of distress signals. SIGINT analysis of the available frequency spectrum can provide channel selection recommendations for PR forces’ communications to reduce the risk of interference or adversary exploitation.

   c. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Imagery support for personnel recovery mission and for the creation of geospatial products such as EVCs is essential. IMINT can provide detailed characteristics of potential detention facilities, recovery sites, and other operationally significant features. Properly cued, imagery collection assets can be used to detect, locate, and analyze possible visual signals.

   d. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). GEOINT unites the complementary fields of IMINT and mapping, charting, and geodesy into a single integrated intelligence discipline. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical feature and geographically referenced activities on the earth. The use of GEOINT can provide increased appreciation and understanding of the area as viewed and perceived by the isolated personnel. This capability can prove helpful in understanding the situation as being experienced by the isolated person; can identify structures and terrain that can be used for orienting the recovery force and isolated personnel; and can identify features that are helpful in SERE (water sources, depressions, etc.) that might not be visible to the isolated person from their hide site.

   e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Advanced MASINT technologies and analytic methods can complement other disciplines by detecting PR-related items that other sensors might miss. In large areas, the capability to discern aircraft
wreckage from background clutter, identify potential mass grave locations, or to determine whether or not a prison camp is occupied, are examples of possible PR applications for MASINT.

f. **Open Source Information.** Although not an intelligence discipline, openly available materials from an adversary’s own government or press services can be used to confirm that a missing person is in captivity, provide insight into the thoughts and beliefs of the nation’s people and leaders, and help gauge the potential use of persons in captivity for propaganda purposes.

g. **UAVs** are capable of providing streaming video in real time of an objective area. Depending on system capabilities this can range from a few kilometers to hundreds of nautical miles from home base with short to long loiter times. This resource could provide PR mission planners with key information on the adversary and pinpoint the location of isolated personnel.

h. **Reconnaissance.** The JPRC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements to conduct air, ground, amphibious, electronic, etc., reconnaissance, as dictated by the threat, environment, and time requirements to locate isolated personnel.

*For further guidance regarding intelligence support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

3. While specific **intelligence requirements** will vary depending on the nature of an operation, fundamental PR intelligence needs are fairly constant. The following are some generic PR-related intelligence requirements:

a. **Adversary order of battle,** to include disposition, strength, capabilities, and activities of air, ground, maritime, special operations, paramilitary, and security forces. While order of battle information is already a standard requirement for operating forces, adversary capabilities to threaten recovery forces, especially rotary-wing aircraft and ground recovery teams, must be given special emphasis.

b. **Adversary electronic capabilities** to detect, locate, track, jam, or deceive recovery forces or survival communications equipment.

c. **Adversary resources** used to find isolated personnel (direction finding equipment, helicopters, dogs, infrared (IR) trackers, night vision goggles, etc.).

d. **Policy, practices, and intentions** of adversary or neutral countries toward friendly isolated personnel, hostages, detainees, POWs, and recovery forces.

e. **Attitude of the populace** toward isolated personnel, including their susceptibility to adversary pressure to provide information about or assist in the search for isolated personnel. This includes information about minority or opposition groups that may assist, or at least not oppose, isolated personnel and the report, locate, support and recover execution tasks.
f. **Information about the physical environment** pertinent to isolated personnel and recovery forces to include terrain, climate and weather, food and water sources, flora and fauna, concealment, lines of communications, and avenues of approach.

g. **Location and characteristics** of potential detention, interrogation, and medical treatment facilities where isolated personnel may be held.

4. **Requests for Information.** The intelligence organizations supporting the command PR OPR, the JPRC, component PRCCs, UARCC, and PR-capable units submit formal RFIs to higher echelons to satisfy intelligence requirements that exceed local capabilities and resources. Responses must be tailored to the needs of the requestor and must be timely, accurate, and in a usable format. Formal RFIs will be submitted and tracked using the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers (COLISEUM) to facilitate visibility at all levels of command. Critical, time-sensitive RFIs in support of an emergent PR incident may require temporary suspension of formal RFI procedures. Direct point-to-point exchanges of information should be followed up with record communications and documented in COLISEUM as soon as time permits.

*For further information regarding RFIs from national agencies and NISTs, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

5. **Skip-Echelon Intelligence Support.** If the first indication of a possible PR incident is obtained through intelligence means, intelligence personnel must be able to transmit that information immediately and securely to all participating units, agencies, and command centers to facilitate deconfliction and parallel planning. Commanders should consider authorizing procedures for “skip-echelon” direct intelligence support for forces preparing to conduct recovery operations. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not negate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations. Nor should skip-echelon measures be used to circumvent the chain-of-command or transmit operational information outside of proper channels.

(b) **Intelligence Plans.** The combatant command or subordinate joint force J-2 that produces the intelligence annex to OPLANs and OPORDs should address PR-specific requirements and support architecture. Annex B, “Intelligence,” to OPLANs and OPORDs will provide a foundation for the procedures for intelligence support, identify intelligence gaps, and establish standing collection and production requirements and task theater intelligence resources to support PR. It must clearly address specialized communications and reporting procedures tailored to the unique nature of recovery operations. Lessons learned should be continuously applied throughout the planning process to improve intelligence support to PR. Appendix 5, to annex C, should reflect the guidance in annex B, and provide the concept of intelligence support to PR.

(c) **Intelligence Products.** A variety of off-the-shelf resources are available to support PR activities. However, finished products are intended for contingency planning, and
are not a substitute for dynamic operational or tactical level intelligence support for recovery operations. Most existing products are available in electronic form on INTELINK, the principal electronic means for intelligence product dissemination. Requests for new production should be submitted via COLISEUM through the command validation chain.

1. **Joint PR Support Product (JPRSP).** The JPRSP is the primary reference document for PR-specific information on a particular country or region of interest (see SIPRNET website http://intelink-s.jfic.jfcom.smil.mil/directorates/de_resource/jprsp/index.cfm). The JPRSP is the successor to traditional printed intelligence products (e.g., selected area for evasion, selected area for evasion area intelligence descriptions, and SERE contingency guides which are no longer produced, but some of which have been archived as legacy products). JPRSP production is a collaborative process among multiple intelligence centers and PR subject matter experts.

2. **Special Assessments.** When standardized references such as a JPRSP are insufficient, special assessments can be produced. Country, region, or operation-specific assessments can provide information such as an adversary government’s policies for handling POWs or hostages, unique technologies that can threaten recovery forces, or other topics.

3. **Legacy Products.** Although the JPRSP supersedes previously used hardcopy and digital PR support products, archived materials available in intelligence libraries or via INTELINK contain useful background information for general planning and study. However, care should always be taken to supplement information contained in legacy products with current intelligence when conducting evasion planning or PR mission preparation.

4. **Other Products.** Although not intelligence products, the following supplemental publications may assist personnel at risk of isolation, recovery forces, and intelligence personnel: EVCs, pointee-talkees, IPGs, PR update messages, and joint and component standardized notification system (e.g., ATO SPINS).

(d) **Intelligence Support.** Current intelligence briefings, situation displays, and intelligence documents should be available to recovery forces early in the mission planning process. Planned PR mission go/no-go criteria should be developed based upon an assessment of adversary capabilities and weather effects in order to characterize the environment and to formulate measures that mitigate the threat. PR procedures published in the PR portion of operating instructions must incorporate intelligence to establish effective communications/signaling procedures and recommendations that avoid adversary exploitation.

1. **Report.** Intelligence organizations must ensure that possible PR event information obtained through intelligence collection assets is securely transmitted, IAW proper reporting procedures, to appropriate operational PR coordination nodes as quickly as possible.

a. Intelligence units with SIGINT collection capabilities can preemptively monitor friendly distress frequencies and beacons, report on possible PR incidents, and monitor adversary reactions.
b. Intelligence staffs of operational units may obtain initial or follow-up information regarding isolated personnel through tactical reporting or debriefs of unit personnel.

2. **Locate.** The ability to ascertain the location of isolated personnel and assess the adversary threat in the mission area will have the greatest impact on the recovery force. Use of intelligence resources to recognize friendly signals and detect adversary deception efforts and other false reports is a critical part of the authentication process. Intelligence collection tasking should commence immediately upon confirmation of a PR incident to refine and characterize the location of the isolated personnel. Timeliness and effectiveness of collected information varies widely depending on platform and intelligence discipline applied; therefore, collection managers must have plans in place that can be tailored for each PR incident.

   a. **IMINT and MASINT collection platforms,** properly cued using other information, can help pinpoint the location of isolated personnel and obtain details about surrounding terrain and adversary activity. Broad area searches conducted without cueing information from other sources can be time consuming, and are reliant on significant visual signals or signatures for there to be any reasonable probability of detection. Tactical or theater-controlled airborne imagery platforms are likely to be more flexible and responsive than space-based national systems for short notice collection in support of locating isolated personnel, but competition with other collection priorities may affect availability. Collection managers should select the platform most readily available for dedicated tasking that performs nearest to real time.

   b. **SIGINT** provides the fastest and most effective intelligence means to locate isolated personnel, provided there are signal emitters available to exploit. SIGINT collectors can supplement the direction finding (DF) capabilities of other reconnaissance, search, or recovery forces; however, caution should be exercised with location information due to the inaccuracies inherent in DF systems. Continuous monitoring of adversary communications and emitters in the area may provide indications of hostile search activity or deception attempts.

*For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office Information Memorandum, Personnel Recovery/Combat Search and Rescue Concept of Operations for National SIGINT Support, (Secret).*

3. **Support.** Commanders must be kept abreast of the intelligence situation surrounding all ongoing PR events. Intelligence must continue to evaluate the adversary situation and assess the potential threat to isolated personnel and support forces. Adversary forces must be constantly monitored to detect and disrupt hostile search efforts. Intelligence personnel involved in targeting must ensure that ongoing combat missions are deconflicted from isolated personnel locations to avoid fratricide. Mission planners will require current intelligence on adversary detection capabilities to avoid revealing an isolated person’s position during support or resupply missions.

4. **Recover.** Recovery forces require detailed mission planning information on adversary disposition, threat environment, en route and objective/terminal area terrain, and
adversary detection, deception, and disruption capabilities. Whenever possible, JIOC or JISE collection managers should stage collection assets before mission execution to monitor adversary reactions to recovery forces and to provide rapid warning of emerging threats once a mission is underway.

5. **Reintegrate.** Intelligence personnel will perform debriefs of recovery force members and recovered personnel. Tactical intelligence will be reported via established channels IAW command guidance. Under no circumstances will intelligence debriefers seek information pertaining to sensitive or covert PR activities unless properly cleared for those activities and specifically designated to do so.

(15) **Authentication.** Recovery forces need to be familiar with the use of products and procedures for authenticating isolated personnel.

(a) **Using ISOPREP for Authentication.** Effective authentication procedures require creativity and standardization among joint forces. Guidelines for using ISOPREP data and other authentication methods must be clear and properly sent to subordinate unit personnel. The following techniques have been used effectively:

1. ISOPREP information must be durable, providing usable authentication during multiple or future recovery attempts. This is best accomplished by initially providing recovery forces with only two facts from the ISOPREP leaving the remaining information for future missions. Isolated personnel must not provide, nor be asked to provide any full ISOPREP item during a given recovery. Recovery forces in contact with an isolated person, but unsure of the individual’s identity, should ask a question derived from a portion of the four-digit number, or a portion of one of the two authentication statements being used. The best methods are adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing two of the digits, or asking a question using a single element from one of the statements. Examples: If the evader’s ISOPREP number is 8147, then a question is “Subtract your third digit from your first digit,” and the evader should respond with “4.” If the evader’s first ISOPREP statement reads, “My first dog was a three-legged, yellow, golden retriever named Lucky,” then a question is “What color was your first dog?” and the response should be “yellow.”

2. During initial contact, forces may need to validate their own authenticity to the isolated person prior to obtaining further information. Forces can do this by using the personal authentication statement. This method allows the recovery force to identify itself and ask an authentication question to the isolated person. Another method is to use the isolated person’s authentication number. For example, “Jack 10, this is Jolly 50. The sum of your first and third numbers is 9.”

3. ISOPREP data can be used effectively to validate instructions to the isolated person. If adversary forces are attempting to deceive the isolated person with false radio calls, the PR force can instruct the individual to follow only instructions accompanied by valid combinations of the authentication number.
(b) **Theater Code Words.** The JPRC should develop *standardized operational area codes and symbols* for PR purposes. These usually are in the form of a PR word, letter, duress number, color of the day, week, or month, challenge and password, near and far recognition signals, and are published in the operation and mission orders and instructions throughout the operational area. The JPRC should coordinate with PRCCs and multinational liaisons to ensure mechanisms are in place to provide published PR information to all forces. Consideration must be given to classification, releasability, and dissemination of this information to multinational forces that have a need to know. The use of these daily or frequently changed codes can provide immediate authentication of isolated personnel. When using a word of the day, using just one of the letters can extend durability of the code. For example if the word of the day is “BOXER,” a quick authentication can be made by the recovery force asking the evader, “The third letter of the word of the day is X-RAY, what is the second letter?” The evader should respond, “OSCAR.” This authenticates the recovery force to the evader while having the evader authenticate back.

(c) **Local-Authentication Codes.** This authentication method is often used by forces when codes are not disseminated through operating instructions. JFCs should recognize the potential for confusion when local authentication codes are implemented, and should pursue a policy that standardizes the use of ISOPREPs and codes published in operational instructions. If local authentication codes are absolutely necessary, then they must be passed by the originating unit to the component PRCC and JPRC. Local authentication codes for long-term evaders should be kept on file with the parent unit and component PRCC.

(16) **Communication Plan.** An effective communication plan is an important part of a successful recovery operation. A generic recovery communication plan should be developed for the operational area and distributed through the ATO SPINS or other appropriate mechanism. To the maximum extent possible, all recovery forces should be secure voice capable (see Figure V-2).

5. **Personnel Recovery Mission Planning and Execution**

   a. **PR Mission Decision-making.** Commanders and staffs from the JPRC and PRCCs to unit levels need to develop a systematic process to enhance decision-making during a PR mission (i.e., save time) and develop a “battle-rhythm” between C2 nodes. The decision process will be improved as PR missions are completed, and updated as personnel, resources, environmental, and other factors change. A decision process tool, whether it is a flow chart (e.g., go/no-go) or procedure document, will guide decision makers from the time a report of isolated personnel is received through the reintegration of those personnel. A decision process allows some criteria to be decided in advance and provides a reminder (checklist) of other items that must be remembered during times of crisis. See Figure V-3 for an example of a decision flow chart. This preplanned decision map assists commanders in developing and delegating launch and execute criteria. Recovery efforts normally are not committed until after authentication. Further, recovery forces normally will not enter hostile battlespace until the location and authentication of isolated personnel has been verified and recovery is feasible. However, theater specific SOPs may authorize some recovery forces to launch, but not enter hostile battlespace, upon initial distress notification. There may be occasions when the political climate in the operational area would make it impractical or impossible for US forces to be involved in the recovery of isolated personnel. In such cases, the direct assistance of indigenous forces may be necessary to successfully
complete the recovery mission. Although each PR mission is unique, a preplanned thought process can be mapped that will incorporate the known factors from the PR mission analysis, the PR CONOPS, and the variables that form the PR essential information. This essential information — communication, authentication, location, intentions, condition, and situation (CALICS) — must be satisfied to some predetermined degree before committing recovery forces in hostile or uncertain operating environments. The decision process can assist in developing the acceptable launch and execution criteria by weighing the values and impacts contained in the essential information, risk assessment, recovery selection process, and the PR operational risk management analysis.

Figure V-2. Sample Personnel Recovery Task Force Communications Plan
(1) **Essential Information.** The objective of the decision-making process is for the decision maker, regardless of the level of command, to obtain a level of confidence based on the information available to execute a PR mission. The decision to execute will be primarily based on the accuracy of CALICS, which are necessary to establish SA. The accuracy of the information will normally depend on the time allowed to collect it and the source. The decision maker will usually have to balance the requirement for more or improved information with the need to execute a PR mission as soon as possible. The most accurate source of information is from isolated personnel, followed by observers in visual contact with the isolated personnel, and then all other information. OTH data-transmission capable hand-held survival radios allow communication with isolated personnel to obtain location, condition, and situation directly from them. It is possible that all three sources will be involved in developing the following essential elements of information about the isolated person:

(a) **Communication.** To permit interaction and coordination with available recovery forces, JFCs must ensure that all personnel at risk of isolation have access to appropriate contact and communications procedures. Commanders should also ensure that these personnel are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment. This element includes information on how and when isolated personnel are communicating, their ability to communicate with recovery forces (secure or non-secure), and other essential data, for example:

1. Contact radio frequency, call sign, and date/time group of call.
2. Day and time of incident.
3. Cause of the isolation event.
4. Type/number/color of downed aircraft or disabled/hijacked vehicle to include last known location, speed, and course/direction.
5. Number of isolated personnel.
6. Departure points, rally points, traffic control points, phase lines, and last known location.

(b) **Authentication.** Authentication will continuously assure the decision maker and recovery forces that isolated personnel are an identifiable friendly target not under duress. This is also an important element in identifying adversary ruses or tactics using isolated personnel as bait. Authentication information can be acquired using ISOPREP data or, if not available, other information provided by isolated personnel’s organization.

(c) **Location.** This may be the isolated person’s last known position and/or course and speed with reference to landmarks or navigation aids. Accurate information concerning the location and physical condition of isolated personnel prior to launching an air-transported recovery mission is crucial, but not absolutely essential if using ground combat forces. With this knowledge, planners can more
Figure V-3. Sample Threat Decision Matrix
readily determine the optimum force composition, identify any requirements for special equipment and personnel, and plan recovery force ingress and egress routes to minimize contact with hostile forces. There are many ways to determine the isolated person’s location, with varying degrees of accuracy, and they are discussed in detail in Section B, “Locate,” of Chapter VI, “Joint Personnel Recovery Procedures and Techniques.”

(d) **Intentions.** This can be satisfied by using the isolated person’s EPA and/or communication with isolated personnel to determine their future activities—where are they going to do it and when. Individuals will not always be isolated within the range of recovery forces. For example, individuals isolated in the vicinity of the forward line of own troops (FLOT) may be in an area where unconventional recovery forces normally do not operate or where intense adversary activity restricts air-transported recovery forces. In this case, isolated personnel will be expected to follow an EPA and hide or move to areas offering better recovery opportunities. However, a ground force may be able to conduct an attack to divert and engage enemy forces, allowing for a recovery using air assets or its own forces.

(e) **Condition.** This is critical to determine the physical condition of isolated personnel and their ability to survive and/or move (e.g., survival equipment and available food, water, medicine). With isolated personnel condition information, along with other elements of information, planners can more readily identify requirements for special equipment and personnel, and considerations for recovery force egress routes that are conducive to ambulatory or non-ambulatory isolated personnel (especially if ground routes have to be used).

(f) **Situation.** This includes adversary activity, OPSEC concerns, terrain, climate and weather information, and astronomical conditions.

1. **Climate and weather information** including temperature, precipitation, humidity, visibility at ground level, predicted winds, fog, cloud cover, dust storms, radio frequency propagation, and other hazards to survival and recovery will have a great effect on PR mission planning and execution. The decision maker will use this information to determine the affects on the conduct, timing, and tempo of PR missions.
2. **Astronomical conditions** including sunrise, sunset, moonrise, phases of the moon, predicted ambient light, and hydrographic data affect recovery operations much the same as weather and also play an important role in the timing and tempo of PR missions.

(2) **PR Operational Risk Management.** PR missions are subject to cost and benefit considerations in the same manner as any other military operation. The benefit to be gained from a successful recovery should equal or outweigh the cost of the risk accepted in executing the mission. The psychological impact of the effort on remaining personnel should be weighed against the risk to recovery forces and the effect of diverting resources (if necessary) from the ongoing military effort. Recovery operations should not unduly risk isolating additional combat personnel, preclude execution of higher priority missions, routinely expose certain unique assets to extremely high risk, divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations, or allow the military situation to deteriorate. Commanders at all levels should carefully evaluate these factors before ordering or authorizing a PR effort.

(3) **Risk Assessment/Threat Decision Matrix.** The threat to recovery forces can be affected by multiple factors such as geography, adversary weapons systems and tactics, weather, etc. During risk management, commanders and their staffs should identify, assess, and mitigate risks arising from operational factors and make decisions that balance risk with mission benefits. The PRTF commander and forces participating in recovery operations should carefully analyze the threat to aircraft, ground, and maritime recovery forces. Development of a standing joint force PR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis will assist the JPRC and component PRCCs in tasking forces and/or determining recovery methods. In some operational situations, it will be necessary to first determine whether a permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational environment exists. The threat will not affect all elements of a recovery force equally, therefore, go/no-go criteria based on a threat to type of resource (e.g., air, ground, sea, slow-mover, fast-mover) matrix should be developed during planning. Each component should develop a PR go/no-go criteria matrix. Joint recovery planners should understand the interrelationships of the various component decision matrices. These matrices provide commanders with a framework for making informed go/no-go or abort decisions. Component PR go/no-go criteria shall be forwarded to the JPRC. The matrix will assist the joint decision maker in making a timely risk assessment especially when recovery forces consist of a combination of airborne, surface, and/or subsurface resources. Threats should be evaluated carefully by the component PRCC or JPRC to determine the appropriate recovery method to be used.

b. **Considerations During Development of Recovery Courses of Action**

(1) **Recovery Force Selection.** Commanders and their staffs should be knowledgeable of the type and characteristics of the resources that can be used for recovery operations, and their unique capabilities and limitations in order to properly employ them. This in-depth knowledge also enables commanders and recovery planners to quickly develop alternative COAs in response to changing scenarios. In addition, the following considerations could affect the selection of an appropriate recovery force:

(a) **Activate Alert Forces.** As discussed earlier in precautionary planning, alert forces can be activated to execute the preplanned PR mission if decision makers are satisfied
that the appropriate execute criteria have been met (i.e., CALICS and the results of the decision process).

(b) **Divert Forces from other Missions.** In some cases, forces assigned to other missions may be diverted to effect an immediate recovery. This option can be applied when the diverted forces are familiar with PR TTP and/or have conducted contingency PR plan briefings as part of their primary mission, or the risk (decision process) associated with an ad hoc mission is considered acceptable.

(c) The **tactics, training, capabilities, and limitations** of available recovery or supporting forces.

(d) **Capacity.** Recovery forces and assets are based or pre-positioned in locations where they are expected to most effectively facilitate recovery operations. Since individuals are often isolated in unexpected areas and numbers, in some cases the capacity of available recovery forces may be inadequate for the number of isolated personnel. Commanders must be prepared to reallocate recovery assets to compensate for this imbalance or to establish priorities to determine which categories of isolated personnel will be recovered.

(e) **Other Combat Operations.** Other ongoing combat operations often contribute to a PR mission by diverting adversary activity from the area of the PR incident or by providing on-scene resources that may either complement a PR effort or conduct the recovery. Examples include aircraft returning with unexpended ordnance, airborne C2 platforms, Bradley-equipped brigade combat teams, and surface supporting arms within range of the PR objective.

(f) **Location of orbits** for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms that are often required for PR missions. Because these assets are normally employed in a standoff role, range and altitude capabilities of threat systems will affect the usefulness of these support platforms.

(g) **Supporting Arms.** The development of supporting arms requirements and subsequent supporting arms coordination are often factors in PR mission planning. Units capable of conducting recovery operations will develop appropriate fire support coordinating measures to safeguard friendly forces and provide responsive support to recovery operations.

*For further guidance on supporting arms refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.*

(2) Considerations in the **selection of a recovery site** are: whether there is air, land, or sea access to the site, and the spatial relationships of the site with respect to bordering friendly, neutral, or adversary controlled territory. PR can be successful in any environment. Local conditions should be considered as exploitable, surmountable factors rather than absolute barriers to success. For example, diplomatic permission from a foreign government to stage or fly over sovereign territory outside the operational area may be critical to the success of the PR mission by enabling recovery forces to execute the PR mission in a shorter period of time, and reduce the exposure of the recovery force to threats.
(3) **Airspace and Ground Operation Deconfliction.** The PRTF commander, in coordination with the JPRC and PRCC, should deconflict both ground and airspace activities with PR mission plans to ensure safety and prevent adverse effects on other combat operations. The JPRC’s and PRCCs’ planner can prepare some deconfliction actions in advance by considering artillery fire zones, amphibious objective areas (AOAs), strike aircraft airflow patterns, no fire zones, restricted fire zones, altitude restrictions, and unit boundaries in ground recoveries. Coordination with the airspace control authority and reference to the airspace control order is essential to deconflicting joint air operations. The JPRC and component PRCCs normally visualize spatial relationships by including the following on their situation maps:

(a) Adversary threat order of battle, disposition of friendly forces, and locations of future targets.

(b) Information from the airspace control order, to include planned PR mission routes or waypoints, bullseye, and search and rescue point (SARDOT).

(c) Location of orbits for support aircraft such as EW, aerial refueling, and airborne C2 platforms that are often required for PR missions.

(d) Location of ground force established FARPs.

*For further guidance on airspace deconfliction refer to JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.*


(5) **PR Mission Execution Decision.** Based on the PR command authorities established, a commander’s awareness of the situation, and level of confidence in CALICS, recovery forces can be launched and/or given an execute order at anytime after a PR incident report is received.

(a) **Immediate.** Immediate PR mission responses are generally used in low risk situations (can be high risk, especially for immediate on-scene, and dependent on prior instructions and human reactions) as determined in the risk assessment, using available assets that are in the immediate vicinity of the isolated person’s location (e.g., on-scene force such as remaining ground forces, maritime vessels, or air forces (wingman)), on alert, or can be expediently diverted from other missions.

(b) **Deliberate.** The threat, asset availability, current operations, and isolated personnel situation may preclude using an immediate PR response option in favor of more detailed planning and real time intelligence information. Consequently, the PR mission coordinator will need to plan and organize a deliberate PR response that could involve the creation of a
recovery force comprised of assets from a single component, joint or multinational forces, or multi-agency organizations.

(c) **Hold.** A PR mission placed on “hold” status typically reflects a lack of confidence in the accuracy of, or amount of data collected on CALICS, and/or the outcome of the decision-making process does not meet the criteria to execute the mission (e.g., the location of isolated personnel is unknown and there is no contact). Missions also may be placed in a “hold” status by the CCDR due to overriding political concerns, or to preclude compromise of strategic or operational objectives. Every incident placed in this category should remain open and be continuously reviewed until the isolated personnel have been recovered or declared dead by the appropriate authorities. It is possible for isolated personnel to survive for long periods of time, or escape captivity, before finally making contact with friendly forces.

(6) **PR Mission Closure.** A PR mission is closed when the death of an isolated person is confirmed or when the recovered isolated person has been reintegrated. A report of “no chute seen” or “duty status-whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN)” is not justification for closing the PR mission. If the JFC has exhausted all means to locate and recover an isolated person and the case is still open, the JPRC should formally transfer it to DPMO for final resolution IAW established procedures normally developed by DPMO for transferring POW or unaccounted for personnel information. If a recovered isolated person is returned to duty at the end of phase I or phase II, or once a JFC transfers the person back to their Service for phase III, the JPRC will close the case folder and transfer it to the JPRA, when no longer needed in theater by JPRC, or operations cease, whichever is sooner. The JFC will provide a copy of the file to the Service personnel or casualty branch. The JPRA will continue to monitor and assist the Services with phase III reintegration of returned isolated personnel from theater.

(7) **Mission Reports.** All data connected with a specific mission will be consolidated into one full-spectrum PR mission package and sent to the JPRA for archival purposes. The AAR and LL will be provided to joint and Service LL databases by the JFC.
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CHAPTER VI
PERSONNEL RECOVERY JOINT PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

“In critical and baffling situations, it is always best to refer to first principles and simple action.”

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill

1. Introduction

PR missions can be complex. A response may be required in any land or sea location, threat environment, and at a time and place not of the isolated person’s or recovery force’s choosing. Many military operations can be successfully planned based on intelligence and targeting data; however, successful execution of PR missions often require creativity, improvisations, and real time intelligence, even when forces are well-trained, prepared, and pre-positioned. Military PR missions may involve single or multiple aircraft, ground force maneuver units, surface or subsurface naval assets, and/or space assets. Commanders and staffs, forces, and personnel at risk of isolation should use the following validated procedures and techniques to accomplish the five PR execution tasks. Once a PR incident report is received by the JPRC, PRCC, UARCC, or other C2 node capable of coordinating a PR event, planning, to include incorporating the capabilities resident in one or more of the PR components, will begin and should result in the employment of forces to accomplish the other tasks. In some cases, the component reporting the isolation event will become the component responsible for locating, supporting, recovering, and reintegrating the isolated person. As a minimum, the component reporting the isolation event should maintain situational awareness until such time as the JPRC, PRCC, or UARCC can coordinate additional forces and assets needed to accomplish the five execution tasks. This chapter describes the joint procedures and techniques of the PR methods to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

SECTION A. REPORT

2. Distress Notification

The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when appropriate C2 authorities are informed. JFCs may be notified of a PR requirement through any means within the joint or component force C2 structure (see Figure VI-1). The distress indicator may be detected by multiple assets, each relaying the incident directly to the PRCC or JPRC, causing multiple reports of the same incident. Nevertheless, personnel should adhere to the procedures outlined below. Be aware that adversaries may employ counter-PR techniques to lure assets to an ambush. Confirmation of actual reported PR events is essential to protect recovery forces. The report task may be accomplished by the JPRC or PRCC as a result of active coordination with other staff sections. For example, reports may come through personnel or logistical channels that suggest that a member of the organization is missing.
3. Notification Methods and Procedures

a. **Any ground or maritime unit, agency, aircrew, or individual** first observing an isolation event; first making contact with isolated personnel; or first recognizing that a potential isolating event is about to occur should immediately notify their appropriate C2 elements. For the observer, an isolation event may be indicated by an intercepted MAYDAY call, a unit’s or individual’s failure to return from a mission, an overdue positive procedural control contact, a receipt of an emergency beacon/transponder transmission, a sighting of an aircraft or vessel going down, a report of personnel being isolated by adversary activity, and/or receipt of a voice transmission from isolated personnel. A report should be made by potential isolated personnel, for example, when aircrews detect significant aircraft problems, or bailout, ejection, crash landing, or ditching appear imminent; or when ground personnel sense being lost or cut off from other friendly forces. The opportunity to report after the event has happened may be hindered by lost or damaged communications equipment or because of incapacitation or capture.

b. **Methods.** Initial notification should be made as soon as an isolation event occurs or potential isolation event is recognized, if possible.
(1) **Observer Reporting.** Attempt to establish radio contact with isolated personnel by using established radio procedures on the frequency of last contact, an established common frequency, or the international emergency frequencies.

(2) When communication is established, obtain and retransmit essential information such as location, call sign, number of individuals, and health status. These elements of information help establish an accurate location of the isolated personnel, their status and their environment. All transmissions with the isolated personnel should be as brief as possible, depending on adversary and equipment capabilities.

(3) **Self-Reporting**

   (a) **General.** The ideal method to validate the occurrence of an isolation event, and to convey the accurate location and physical health of the isolated person, is through self-reporting by the isolated person. All personnel should attempt to report their situation as soon as feasible after isolation with consideration given to blending in with the environment, avoiding adversary threats, and not compromising the security of the contact area. Isolated personnel should attempt to establish radio contact with any friendly forces in the area (wingman, squad, unit, aircraft, vessel, etc.). Mission orders and instructions dictate local notification methods and procedures. Transmissions should be brief to avoid detection or localization by hostile forces. Isolated personnel should generally not display international distress signals or transmit blind distress calls unless prebriefed to do so or if forces in the immediate vicinity are known to be friendly (e.g., permissive environment).

   (b) **Signaling.** Isolated personnel should attempt to report their situation by any means available. Radio transmissions, visual signals, or other predetermined methods should only be employed after assessing the adversary’s ability to intercept is weighed against the ability of friendly forces to receive the distress signal. In some circumstances (i.e., radio silence procedures), visual signals may be the best (or only) way to communicate with friendly forces. Information on ground-to-air signals should also be available in common signaling instructions.

   (c) **Emergency Personal Locator Beacon.** Some personnel (typically aircrew from all Services) may possess some type of emergency PLB such as a UHF transmitter designed to emit a timed transmission (10-minute cycle) on international guard frequency 243.0 megahertz (MHz) or 406 MHz. When properly configured, it activates automatically upon parachute deployment. Consideration should be given to disabling the automatic activation if flying over adversary territory. In an evasion situation, personnel should remove the PLB from the seat or survival kit and maintain it as an alternate signaling device. The PLB should only be used as briefed, as it is susceptible to adversary DF. Ground force personnel may be issued 406 MHz beacons to alert recovery staff that an isolating event has occurred or there is a high probability of an event occurring. Although not as versatile as survival radios, the PLB provides maximum signaling power upon initiation. Conversely, radio batteries might be near the end of their life cycles, thereby not providing maximum output when most needed.
c. **Emergency Frequency Monitoring.** If equipped, all forces should monitor emergency frequencies and acknowledge, record, and relay distress transmissions. The forces receiving isolated personnel emergency transmissions should transmit their location to the C2 nodes at time of receipt.

d. **Communications Relay.** Any friendly force receiving information about potential isolating events or isolated personnel should forward the details (by secure means if possible) to the nearest C2 authority (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], local unit, E-2C, control and reporting center, component PRCC or the JPRC). Extreme care should be taken to ensure the isolated personnel’s situation is not compromised, and that relay transmissions do not interfere with distress calls.

e. **Reporting forces** may assume the role of the on-scene commander (OSC), and should remain in the area as conditions permit or until relieved or replaced by rescue mission commander (RMC) or other forces. (See OSC responsibilities in Section D below.) Forces should be sensitive to compromising the isolated person’s position to adversary forces. The reporting/supporting forces, if capable, should:

1. Keep personnel or equipment in sight.

2. Note the current location of, or last known location of the isolation site. In case of pilot ejection, note the approximate ejection site and winds at altitude so that PR planners can compute the isolated personnel’s probable landing position.

3. If in radio communication with the isolated person, consider switching the individual to a discrete frequency. Aircraft should consider switching identification, friend or foe to EMERGENCY and transmitting “MAYDAY” on GUARD frequency. This technique should be carefully weighed against the probability of adversary detection.

4. Provide communications relay and defensive cover if possible.

5. Provide necessary updates, using CALICS, to include possible isolated personnel injuries, disposition and movement of hostile forces, terrain factors, and potential recovery sites.

4. **Notification Responses**

a. **Unit.** When notified of a subordinate element or individual’s isolation, the unit commander confirms the identity of the isolated personnel, notifies the parent PRCC of the incident, decides if immediate support using nearby forces is appropriate, designates an OSC accordingly, and forwards ISOPREP and EPA data as required. Unit commanders also need to report their present capability to conduct recovery operations or the status of ongoing activities in support of their own operations. **History shows that acting quickly and using all immediately available resources improve the chance of successful recovery.** When immediate recovery is not possible or not approved by higher authority, the unit commander expeditiously requests assistance from
the parent joint force component, using the most secure communications system available. Such requests should be followed by appropriate message traffic (e.g., SARIR, SARREQ).

b. The PRCC assumes responsibility for coordinating the response initially and reports the incident to the JPRC by the quickest and most secure means. (Such reports should be followed up using the applicable DMS or other electronic means as directed.) The component PRCC then initiates PR mission planning, continuously updated CALICS, determines the isolated person’s location, notifies JPRC and the recovery force, receives an intelligence briefing on the threat surrounding the objective area (if known), tasks subordinate forces when authorized, and informs the JPRC if component recovery forces will attempt recovery. The component PRCC reports to the JPRC the present capabilities to conduct the PR mission and requests for PR support. The component PRCC will be the vital link between the OSC and joint force support that may be available within or adjacent to the operational area. The component PRCC obtains ISOPREP and EPA data from the isolated person’s unit, or retrieves the information from an electronic database.

c. The JPRC forwards PR incident reports and information to higher authority as directed and alerts all forces operating in the area of the isolation event to report any evidence of isolated personnel. The JPRC also provides follow-up PR incident reports and information to higher authority, adjacent JPRCs, and component PRCCs, as appropriate. Depending on the situation, the JPRC also should:

   1. Notify theater and national-level intelligence agencies to initiate collection efforts to refine the location of the isolated personnel and to assess the adversary threat in the objective area.

   For further information on national PR support capabilities, refer to NSA and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Information Memorandum, Personnel Recovery/Combat Search and Rescue Concept of Operations for National SIGINT Support, (Secret).

   2. Direct component(s) (parallel) planning as required.

   3. Coordinate JFC tasking of another component(s) (per the PR CONOPS) to execute the PR mission when notified that a component is unable to do so or requires support.

   4. Coordinate with the components, as needed, for use of PR resources.

   5. Coordinate development of a PRTF.

   6. Coordinate with the UARCC to alert NAR forces.

   7. Continuously update CALICS.

d. Documentation Requirements. Accurate reporting and tracking of each PR incident and mission is essential. The following documentation must be completed by the JPRC and
maintained on file until no longer needed. When the files are no longer needed, they should be forwarded to the combatant command PR OPR, who in turn forwards them to JPRA for final disposition. Incident logs, mission folders, or case files will not be destroyed.

(1) The controller’s log maintains a chronological record of all incidents and daily activity.

(2) Mission folders are prepared each time an incident receives mission status. A PR incident transitions to mission status when the available information reasonably validates the need for a PR effort. Mission folders should include:

(a) Authentication information in effect at the time of isolation, the isolated personnel’s evasion plans and ISOPREP, and any other specific information or special instructions about, or briefed to, isolated personnel before their departure. This type of information becomes more important the longer a person is isolated and becomes increasingly more difficult to gather as time progresses.

(b) A numbering system for use in tracking the mission.

(c) Participating PR units or assets.

(d) Date mission opened, suspended, or closed.

(e) Mission results.

(3) The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) and emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) worksheet documents all ELT and/or EPIRB incidents received by the JPRC.

(4) The aircraft incident log documents awareness and the response to aviation PR incidents.

(5) The non-aircraft incident log records the receipt and response to all nonaircraft, non-ELT incidents.

SECTION B. LOCATE

5. General

The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally required prior to committing recovery forces.
6. Determine and Maintain Location

a. A successful recovery generally depends on the accuracy and reliability of the coordinates or description of the isolated personnel’s location. Ideally, an isolated person would be under direct friendly visual contact from the time of the isolating event until recovered. Normally, accurate and reliable location coordinates, and the ability to rapidly transmit and receive those coordinates between the force elements in a secure manner are necessary to ensure proper support to and recovery of isolated personnel. However, some ground force maneuver units can conduct searches of large areas using their movement techniques (e.g., movement-to-contact to link up with friendly forces or isolated personnel). The preferred device or technique to be used by isolated personnel is dependent on the situation in which they find themselves and the recovery force dispatched to find them. The environmental situation or the individual’s situational awareness may be an impediment to finding an exact, accurate location. The JPRC/PRCC, working with employed forces, supporting functions and, when possible, the isolated personnel, must continue to refine the accuracy and reliability of location information (coordinates and description) until the isolated person is recovered. There are various search methods to ascertain an isolated person’s location. Each method must be evaluated prior to employment for the risk it poses to the isolated personnel and the forces involved and the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness it provides. The risk of conducting an overt search in the objective area, which may highlight the isolated person’s location to the adversary, must be weighed against the need to rapidly recover the isolated personnel. Appropriate forces must be employed to mitigate all risks while meeting mission requirements. For example, a UAV could minimize the risk to forces but may not be able to provide needed protection to the isolated personnel. The JPRC/PRCC must weigh all factors when advising commanders of options and coordinating assets.

b. Using Information Sources. Each PR mission is unique, therefore innovative thinking to include devising signals that can be recognized by isolated personnel not equipped with communications devices as well as the use of established techniques will serve the PR force well. The commander’s analysis, and planned exploitation, integration and interoperability, of all capabilities available among the six categories (see Chapter I, “Introduction”) should pay large dividends in accomplishing the location execution task. All agencies, nations, and military, governmental, nongovernmental and external (outside the operational area) organizations form an operational area network with enormous capability to assist in the location of isolated personnel. Adequate charts, route overlays, patrol reports, and available photos or imagery of the objective area, can assist in determining the isolated personnel’s last known location, physical condition, direction of travel, and proximity to population centers or threats. EPA information, recorded contact information, the last known direction of travel and other pertinent information should be superimposed on a chart of the objective area to provide the recovery force with an isolated personnel movement pattern. Note natural boundaries and features such as hills, foliage, streams, or lakes that may enhance or restrict isolated personnel movement.

c. Search methods include electronic, ground force reconnaissance, and/or visual search methods that are specifically tailored for each isolation incident. The operational environment, adversary activity, weather, time of day, terrain and available resources all play an important role in selection of the search area and method.
Electronic Searches (1) require an electronically permissive environment. Current radio systems are all subject to some degree of adversary jamming, deception, monitoring, or DF intrusion. Initial radio contact with isolated personnel usually occurs on an emergency (Guard) frequency, but subsequent transmissions should be on a predesignated PR frequency. Standoff electronic support aircraft and satellites should be used. Electronic searches involving use of DF or homing equipment may be limited initially by the sending (i.e., emergency locator beacon) and receiving (i.e., homing adaptor) capabilities of isolated personnel and recovery forces and subsequently by adversary activity. Some additional isolated personnel radio and electronic equipment limitations and capabilities to consider are:

(a) The adversary can intercept its signal, so isolated personnel should limit radio transmissions and use code words until the recovery phase.

(b) Some radios are limited to LOS capability thereby presenting a major concern for helicopters operating in a threat environment at low altitudes.

(c) Final authentication must still be ascertained to ensure the radio operator is indeed friendly personnel.

(d) For GPS equipped radios, the PR mission coordinators should always check time of GPS fix against transmission time stamp and coordinates to ensure accuracy of information prior to relay to recovery forces.

(e) Similar to US and multinational forces, adversary forces also employ DF techniques to locate isolated personnel. Adversary DF and intelligence-gathering methods should be understood by all recovery mission participants prior to utilizing DF locating methods. Use of aircraft with high speed, accurate DF equipment, such as the ALD-9, will minimize required transmissions by the isolated personnel and reduce the probability of adversary detection.

(f) Radios have limited life due to battery constraints, making it critical that monitoring and transmission times be controlled by PR forces to maximize communication time with the isolated personnel. Transmitting also uses battery life much more rapidly than listening, another factor to be considered by PR forces during the recovery process. Alternatively, some isolated personnel may not be equipped with radios but may have a 406 MHz personal locator beacon with a 24 hour battery life.

(g) SARSAT and associated ground systems are capable of monitoring interference signals and transmitters that malfunction on Guard frequencies. Malfunctioning transmitters could adversely affect the location process or compromise unit or aircraft locations. The JPRC should ensure that SARSAT visibility and availability schedules are published in the applicable instructions. They should also ensure that procedures are established to disseminate SARSAT visibility periods and ground station data to PR organizations and support agencies. Placing a SARSAT downlink station in the JPRC and/or PRCC and coordinating for national support can greatly reduce delays in notifying the recovery staffs and forces of an isolating event.
(2) **Visual Searches** using manned aircraft to conduct searches is not recommended in other than permissive environments. However, reconnaissance flights are a viable option when the isolated personnel’s location has not been refined. Reconnaissance flights (can use aircraft that is passing by) can be armed or unarmed, high-speed and give the commander the flexibility to search in higher threat environments. The JPRC or PRCC should be prepared to coordinate with appropriate elements of the operations center and the JAOC for reconnaissance flights over threat areas. Again, the decision process will assist the mission coordinator in assessing threats, isolated personnel training, equipment capabilities, etc., to develop a plan that has fully considered, to the extent possible under unique conditions, the risks and options (e.g., day or night operations and passive or suppressive threat neutralization). Communications plans and frequency emission control procedures must be kept as simple and as streamlined as possible without decreasing the SA of the search force. Another visual search technique is to employ ground forces in this role. Ground combat forces are robust and have staying power; employing armored forces can increase the survivability of the reconnoitering assets.

(a) **Airborne Search.** Recovery planners may be able to define an air search pattern if the operational environment allows. Otherwise, the only viable airborne search option may be the use of unmanned or stand-off platforms. Searching along the isolated personnel’s intended flight or surface route, areas offering concealment, and prebriefed locations should be considered. Search patterns should avoid major lines of communications, such as roads, railroads, large rivers, or open valleys. These areas are normally frequented by people and often pose the greatest threat to recovery forces and isolated personnel. Combat reconnaissance assets and, in some situations other aircraft, can conduct modified visual searches of specific areas in all operational environments. However, their effectiveness is best if used once the search has been narrowed, as the evasion or concealment site of isolated personnel may be some distance from initial contact or the point of loss. The airspace above oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, and coastal areas (including AOAs) is considered part of the maritime
environment. Night vision device (NVD) or forward-looking IR-capable assets are preferred for night searches.

**SANDY MISSION**

On 1 September 1968, Lt. Col. William A. Jones III, commander of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, launched in an A-1H Skyraider on a combat rescue mission. The Navy had retired the Skyraider from combat service the previous April . . . but the United States Air Force continued to employ the prop-driven machine for the Sandy mission, the perilous job of escorting helicopters on combat rescue missions. On this day, with the call sign Sandy One, Bill Jones was flight leader and on-scene commander of an attempt to rescue the crew of an F-4D Phantom, downed by antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fire the previous day. Lt Col Jones’ wingman was Captain Paul A. Meeks in Sandy Two.

Entering North Vietnam from Laos, Lt. Col. Jones heard Phantoms talking to the downed pilot. The second crew member had apparently already been captured. Though the downed pilot remained in voice contact, his exact location was not clear.

As Jones and Meeks turned toward the scene, an explosion shook Jones’ aircraft and the cockpit began to fill with smoke. He had been hit but the tough, durable Skyraider was not ready to go down yet.

Lt Col Jones’ mission now depended upon two factors: fuel and time. Jones in the injured Sandy One led Meeks in Sandy Two beneath the overcast, provoking enemy fire, still trying to pinpoint the survivor’s exact position. Finally, the downed pilot reported on voice radio that two Skyraiders were directly over-head. While trolling for fire (Jones was so low that an AAA gun was actually firing down at him from a slope) and taking damage, Lt. Col. Jones had pinpointed the survivor.

More gunfire ripped into his Skyraider and pierced its thin metal skin . . . the rocket motor for the Skyraider’s ejection system had been ignited by the AAA fire . . . he decided that there was no choice but to bail out . . . the ejection seat didn’t work!

In excruciating pain, choking, but with a functioning radio, Lt. Col. Jones struggled to transmit the location of the downed pilot and the AAA batteries. The familiar screeching, as the airwaves again were overloaded with pilots in the area as they shouted at Bill to get out of his burning Skyraider. Just when he thought he had broken through to pass the vital information to the rescue force, his transmitter gave off electrical smoke and died.
Somehow, with Meeks helping on his wing, (Jones could still receive), Lt. Col. Jones coaxed the mortally damaged A-1H back towards Nakon Phanom. His eyes were rapidly swelling from the burns when he set up a bad-weather approach to Nakhon Phanom. After he landed the “totaled” aircraft, the survivor still foremost in his mind, Lt Col Jones debriefed the mission from an ambulance stretcher, giving vital information, which led later to a successful “save” of the downed F-4D pilot.


(b) **Ground Search.** If terrain, vegetation, isolated personnel condition, or the threat makes an airborne search unfeasible; a ground search may be required. A ground team or a ground combat unit with a secure communications capability is highly recommended. Recovery planners also should investigate the possibilities of using HUMINT assets and other resources (IGOs, NGOs, etc.) in the area to locate isolated personnel and to determine their status (i.e., health, captured, evading, direction of movement).

(3) **Search Areas and Patterns.** Electronic and visual searches may be conducted in inland and maritime areas using the listed search patterns. Repeated searches of the same area are almost always necessary. The grid pattern is unique to inland searches and the following are some of the patterns that may be used in inland or maritime searches.

(a) Boundary method.

(b) Corner point method.

(c) Center point method.

(d) Trackline method.

(e) Counter method.

*For further guidance on visual searches and search area designation methods, refer to United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, May 2000.*

(4) **Objective Area Search.** The objective area is the designated vicinity surrounding the isolated personnel’s expected position. Once in the objective area, it may be difficult to visually obtain the isolated personnel’s exact location. A visual search in the objective area can increase the risk to the recovery force, other assets, and isolated personnel. A limited visual or electronic search employing radio DF capability may be employed. Every effort should be made to minimize highlighting recovery assets and isolated personnel. The recovery force should be prepared to use the isolated personnel to signal their location, and if possible, direct the recovery vehicle(s) to their selected extraction location.
(a) A **terminal area search** is normally conducted by the OSC. The **objective/terminal area** is the immediate vicinity around the extraction site, which becomes the primary focus for force protection and recovery activities. Recovery vehicles remain at a holding point with some escort assets, if available, while the OSC locates and authenticates isolated personnel. Extraction site location and ingress and/or egress routes will be relayed to the recovery vehicles.

(b) **Electronic Search.** All recovery force participants should be prepared to establish communications with isolated personnel. Radios should be preset to PR missions channel frequencies. Unless a radio silence recovery is required and planned, a transmission with the isolated personnel’s call sign should be made when LOS/OTH communications are expected. When communications are established, the recovery vehicle can be vectored to the precise extraction location. The recovery force may be able to “home-in” on the isolated personnel’s radio transmission or receive an encrypted data burst transmission, if the equipment and systems are available. If no response is received (isolated personnel may be able to receive but not transmit) the recovery force should continue to monitor and transmit on designated frequencies, or attempt contact with the isolated personnel on other PR frequencies. Some recovery radios have the capability to transmit authentication and GPS location. These advanced survival radios include not only voice and beacon capability but the ability to send/receive secure voice and data through both LOS and OTH methods. There are also current technology solutions such as Blue Force Trackers which are constantly adapting and evolving that can offer capabilities to accomplish the locate execution task. Once contacted and authenticated, isolated personnel should be asked to identify, within acceptable risks, their position using established procedures.

7. **Authenticate**

   Every effort will be made to authenticate isolated personnel prior to committing recovery forces in a threat environment. The recovery force may follow detainee handling procedures to minimize risk to the recovery force and the isolated person, whether or not authentication has occurred. Effective authentication methods include use of ISOPREP data, theater code words, challenge and password, and visual signals discussed earlier. The recovery force should conduct a face-to-face authentication once isolated personnel are in custody. Even if the isolated person says and does all of the correct things during the authentication and recovery, the recovery force may still continue to authenticate the person while being transported in a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft.

**SECTION C. SUPPORT**

“This morning our family joins America in rejoicing over the news of the safe return of seven brave heroes to US military custody in Iraq. . . . This is certainly an answer to our prayers and — we’re certain — the prayers of literally millions of other concerned citizens.”

Family of PFC Jessica Lynch,
April 12, 2003
8. General

The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the isolated person’s family, with specific objectives for each. The forces used to support the isolated personnel must know the objectives and be capable of executing the TTP to achieve them. Decision makers must properly assess and mitigate risks in order to successfully execute the support task. There are several aspects of support.

9. Support to Isolated Personnel

The support to the isolated person may begin upon recognition that an individual is isolated and ends when the individual is recovered. There are five objectives in supporting isolated personnel:

a. Communication. Establishing communication with the isolated person will facilitate all other tasks. Two-way voice communication would be ideal, but any type of overt or covert communication can increase the likelihood of a successful recovery. PSYOP communications platforms can provide loudspeaker commentary that would be understood by isolated personnel. OTH data-transmission capable hand-held survival radios can provide SA and moral support to isolated personnel until a recovery can be accomplished.

b. Situational awareness. Gaining, maintaining, and increasing the isolated person’s situational awareness by providing information on adversary and environmental threats, recovery procedures, and other pertinent information will enable the isolated person to better plan actions and make accurate decisions.

c. Morale. All interaction with the isolated person should consider the need to establish, maintain, and enhance their positive attitude. A high morale enhances the isolated person’s ability to focus on proper application of their knowledge and skills to survive, evade, resist, and escape. Communication with isolated personnel can provide positive reinforcement to offset the effects of emotional stress, fear, or injuries. Creative planning, PSYOP support, and imbedding visual signals into plans can serve to boost the morale of isolated personnel. Resupply can also be a morale-booster.

d. Protection. Protection activities can range from fire support (close air support, artillery) to deception techniques designed to make an adversary believe the isolated person is someplace other than the actual location.

e. Resupply

(1) Caches may be pre-positioned in adversary-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by adversary forces, and their use should be considered in environments where extended evasion is necessary. Evaders and ground recovery forces can use caches as sources of supplies, communications equipment, and other evasion aids. In denied areas, nonconventional forces may emplace caches before and/or after the outbreak of hostilities. Agencies and organizations that direct
the establishment of caches to support potential evaders need to keep the JPRC advised of the status and locations of those caches.

(2) **Resupply Operations.** When there are no pre-positioned caches, it is possible to deliver resupply packages to isolated personnel by aircraft. The need for this type of activity must be weighed against the risk to the isolated person and the forces involved, and the capability to mitigate that risk.

10. **Support to Families of Isolated Personnel During Isolation**

Support to the families begins at a time deemed appropriate by the Service or combatant command. Such support may be necessitated if and when the isolated person’s situation or name is publicly released or when personnel witnessing or knowing about the isolation might call the family. When deemed appropriate, PR-trained combatant command and Service personnel, assisted as necessary by DPMO and JPRA, should make positive contact with the family members of concern (which may not always be the immediate family or NOK). The objective is to make them aware of the commitment and capability of the USG to recover the isolated person and to educate them on themes they should project and information they should protect to best support the isolated person. Planners should coordinate with the employer, if the isolated person is a contractor. The contracting company may have a public relations office and family support program to assist in the support efforts.

a. **Family awareness.** Informing the family about the USG commitment and, in broad terms, the capability to recover isolated personnel should reduce the frustration experienced by the family. The Service or combatant command (depending on location of the family) should provide a POC that will provide timely, accurate, and pertinent information (consistent with OPSEC and other security concerns) to the family in a sensitive manner.

b. **Themes to project/protect.** DOD cannot keep the family out of the media. However, if they choose to speak publicly or get cornered into a media event, it is essential to the survival of the isolated person that the family be aware of the possible effects of certain types of information.

(1) Project. The following themes can serve to express what most families feel during these situations and should not harm the isolated personnel.

(a) Confidence that the USG is doing all it can to recover the isolated personnel.

(b) Expectation that the captors will treat isolated personnel IAW the Geneva Conventions.

(c) Love/respect/etc. for the isolated person.

(2) Protect. Family members should be cautioned about releasing information or visual images that may be harmful to the isolated personnel.
(a) Specific personal information.
(b) Professional information of any kind (assignments, qualifications, etc.).
(c) Negative emotions.

SECTION D. RECOVER

“Subject: Operation DESERT STORM Evasion and Escape Tips.

Combat search and rescue recovery may be executed by any of the following: helicopters with or without protective fighter aircraft; naval vessels with possible air cover; armored vehicle reconnaissance [sic]; infantry units as part of an advance. All of these methods may involve a surprise move by the recovery force to at least temporarily overwhelm the enemy with superior firepower in the vicinity of the evader(s). Such efforts usually require speed to prevent the enemy from increasing his strength. Evaders that can move may be able to improve their chances of being successfully recovered by conducting initial evasion travel to a suitable hole-up site, employing discreet communication and signaling procedures, and selecting a site for recovery that considers the potential enemy opposition in the area.”

Message 021200ZFEB 91 from CENTAF/DO

“Our country will do everything in its power to rescue [our troops] or to bring them home safe and sound.”

Senator John McCain
April 18, 2003

11. General

The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or the engagement of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. The recover task is accomplished through PR operation and mission planning, individual and synergistic actions of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional and nonconventional recovery capabilities should be available for employment. Failure to establish multiple recovery capabilities or to adapt standardized recovery capabilities to local conditions invites failure. The decision-making process, established early during planning and preparation, will greatly assist decision makers and PR mission coordinators to launch and execute a timely and successful recovery effort.
12. Recovery Methods

Methods that may be employed independently or as part of a joint recovery include immediate, deliberate, or external supported recovery (US Army), combat search and rescue (CSAR) (US Air Force and US Navy), and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (US Marines Corps), nonconventional assisted recovery, hostage rescue, or any TTP employed for a PR mission. Details for many of these methods are found in Appendices B, “US Army Personnel Recovery,” through G, “Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery.”

13. A Personnel Recovery Task Force

A PRTF is comprised of US or multinational military forces and/or other US agencies to execute a specific PR mission to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel. It is coordinated by the JPRC and may work closely with a PRCC. A PRTF is capable of locating and authenticating isolated personnel, protecting isolated personnel from adversary threats, providing force protection for itself, providing mission C2 systems support, and recovering isolated personnel. A PRTF can be dedicated, put on alert, or designated and tasked when needed by the JFC and is a cohesive, interoperable force that may consist of any variety of dissimilar aircraft, ground vehicles, or maritime vessels. Its size can range from a single recovery vehicle operating within a joint C2 context, to dozens of air, ground, or sea elements working in concert. A successful PRTF depends on the effective integration of all assets with a well thought out recovery and communication plan. Short-notice PRTF operations are extremely dependent on the ability to quickly and effectively marshal the required interoperable forces to effect a recovery.

14. Recovery Force Elements

a. Personnel Recovery Task Force Commander. Appointed by the JFC or the supported commander for PR, the PRTF commander is responsible for the planning for the recovery mission and the execution of the locate, support, and recover PR tasks, using a force comprised of US and/or multinational military forces and/or US agencies. The PRTF commander also coordinates the efforts of the OSC, the airborne mission coordinator (AMC) and any other elements participating in the recovery.

b. On-Scene Commander. The OSC is an individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command with the best ability to communicate with C2 nodes, recovery forces, and isolated personnel. Once communications have been established with the isolated personnel, the OSC should continue to monitor the isolated personnel’s radio frequency in case immediate actions are required to prevent capture. Communications on the isolated personnel’s radio frequency should be minimized in order to decrease an adversary’s ability to locate the isolated personnel via radio transmissions. Once a qualified RMC is in
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position to take control of the recovery effort, the OSC should perform a turn-over to include: isolated personnel’s condition, authentication methods, location, threat, supporting assets, and other applicable information that will affect the recovery. A checklist is located in Annex C, “On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist,” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.”

c. **Rescue Mission Commander.** The RMC is the individual designated to control recovery efforts in the objective area, as opposed to an OSC who may be first on-scene, and is not necessarily best-qualified to lead and coordinate the recovery execution. The RMC is designated through the JPRC, or by the component commander through the PRCC. The RMC initial actions are to collect essential information in the objective area that is threatening to the isolated personnel or recovery force. The RMC will have to balance the need for more accurate information with the possibility of compromising the safety of the isolated personnel. The RMC and the lead recovery vehicle commander should plan and coordinate closely to select ingress and egress routes and objective area tactics. All recovery force participants must contact the RMC before entering the objective area or communicating with the isolated personnel. The call sign ‘SANDY’ may represent an individual (typically an A-10, F-16C/D or F/A-18 pilot) specifically trained to conduct RMC duties in support of PR missions. A checklist is located in Annex C, “On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist,” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists.”

d. **Airborne Mission Coordinator.** Though capabilities may differ slightly among the joint force components, the primary role of any AMC is to serve as an extension of the component commander or supported commander responsible for the PR mission, through the PRTF commander. The desired AMC aircraft is an airborne platform with the best combination of on-station time and organic communications capability. The AMC should be placed on alert and positioned to control likely missions and should have the prerogative to move the orbit location in response to operational situations and be capable of coordinating multiple airborne assets. AMC crews should be trained in this role. The AMC mission is normally conducted at high altitude, but threat and communications considerations dictate actual altitudes. The AMC mission requires radio LOS with the OSC, RMC, and OTH (HF or SATCOM) communications with the PRTF commander. The supported commander for PR through the JPRC or PRCC designates the AMC platform. The AMC coordinates mission activities between the OSC, RMC, other recovery force elements, and the PRTF commander (including the JPRC and the PRCC), monitors the status of all elements; requests additional assets as required; and ensures that recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the recovery mission. The AMC also ensures safety of flight of airborne recovery assets by providing altitude separation, airspace and ground deconfliction, environmental information, and monitoring fuel states and the crew supports the recovery effort by providing navigation assistance and relaying isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to appropriate C2 agencies and recovery force elements. The AMC and crew coordinates establishment of the recovery mission communications nets, manages the flow of aircraft to and from the objective area, relays isolated personnel intelligence and authentication data to other C2 agencies and recovery force elements, as required. The AMC coordinates refueling of air recovery assets, keeps the recovery force elements and PRTF commander and the RMC informed of all pertinent information such as threats, aborts, and EW information, advises the PRTF commander, RMC, and JAOC of mission support requirements, and coordinates the designation and use of appropriate fire support coordinating measures. The AMC advises the PRTF commander and the recovery force elements of mission progress with predesignated execution calls and weather conditions or any other

e. **Rescue Escort (RESCORT).** The number and type of RESCORT aircraft may determine the success of a recovery operation. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft assigned RESCORT responsibilities should be capable of providing the recovery vehicles with reconnaissance, suppressive fire support, and, if possible, communications relay. RESCORT pilots should be specifically trained for recovery operations. When employed, the RESCORT and recovery vehicles of the task force should operate initially under the mission control of an OSC at a predetermined, prebriefed point and time near the objective area. Recovery operations at night and in high-risk situations require unique weapon system capabilities. Because of the differences in the lethality of threats to helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, knowledge of the threat in the recovery area should be assessed in the risk management analysis and carefully evaluated in the decision process that will include the assignment of RESCORT assets. RESCORT aircraft should have the ability to sweep an ingress route and rendezvous with the escorted asset in the event of a route change or other action. RESCORT aircraft should also be able to respond quickly to all threats en route to, from, and in the vicinity of the recovery location and deliver accurate suppressive fire. Coverage should continue through egress until the recovery vehicles reach a permissive operational environment. RESCORT tactics, routing, potential threat encounters, and countermeasures should be understood by all participants. On other than immediate response missions, recovery element briefings (Annex D, “Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist” to Appendix M, “Sample Checklists”) are mandatory and should include rendezvous points, communications, navigation points, number of helicopters, number of ground vehicles, number of maritime assets, helicopter landing zone (HLZ) positions, objective rally points, near and far recognition signals, and code words. Typical RESCORT responsibilities may include conducting route reconnaissance of the flight route, ground route, maritime route, and area reconnaissance of the objective area, determining the level of adversary activity and suppressing surface threats to, from, and within the objective area. RESCORT also assist recovery helicopters, ground forces, and maritime vehicles in locating (i.e., objective area search) and authenticating isolated personnel, can function as the RMC when designated by the PRTF commander, and coordinate and control activities of supporting recovery force elements in the objective area.

f. **Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP).** RESCAP aircraft are counterair aircraft assigned to protect the recovery force and isolated personnel from airborne threats. RESCAP forces should be available before committing recovery forces if adversary air activity is forecast along the intended flight route, ground or maritime route, or in the objective area. RESCAP may assist in detecting and establishing communications with isolated personnel due to their higher operating altitudes. Typical RESCAP tasks include the following:

1. Maintaining patrol over and protecting isolated personnel until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.

2. Assisting in locating isolated personnel.
(3) Maintaining protection against and ensuring suppression of airborne threats.

(4) Functioning as OSC until other elements of the recovery force arrive in the objective area.

g. **Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A])**. The FAC(A) can provide the recovery force with significant tactical advantages. Either a planned or diverted FAC(A) can locate and authenticate isolated personnel prior to arrival of the recovery force, and provide a current threat assessment near the objective area. Initial on-scene coordination of the PR effort may be assumed by the FAC(A) when no dedicated RESCORT, or other (i.e., wingman) assets are available, or until the RESCORT arrives. The FAC(A) is trained in terminal attack control and can provide a link between the recovery vehicles and other threat suppression assets. Fast-strike aircraft may require FAC(A) assistance to effectively support the recovery force. FAC(A) requests or diversions should be considered to provide an OSC capability prior to recovery force arrival, or when threats in the objective area require extensive suppression.

h. **Support Aircraft.** Tankers, AWACS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), EW/intelligence, and other aircraft provide vital support to the recovery force. Availability of support aircraft is often the difference between the success or failure of a recovery operation. Air refuelable fixed-wing assets can play a critical role in extending the operational range of refuelable helicopters. While refueling operations in a permissive environment are highly desirable, the depth of the battlespace and the isolated personnel’s location may require such operations be conducted in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

i. **Electronic Warfare/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).** SEAD forces are designed to minimize the surface-to-air threat to friendly forces executing a PR mission. Joint SEAD operations can be accomplished through destructive and disruptive means described below, and using combinations of the two can maximize their effectiveness.

   (1) **Destructive Means.** Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive SEAD capabilities are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air scatterable mines, and artillery.

   (2) **Disruptive Means.** Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive. Active means include electronic attack (anti-radiation missiles, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming, and electromagnetic deception) expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), tactics such as deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles, and UAVs. Passive means include emission control, camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

j. Some forces, like USAF PJs or combat rescue officers (CROs) are specifically trained to provide direct support to isolated personnel. They may be airdropped from any capable platform, or
inserted via land or sea at an offset location to conduct a limited ground search, link-up, and recovery. PJs provide emergency trauma treatment, field/crash extrication, field medical care, field survival skills, and security and movement of isolated personnel to friendly control or a suitable extraction zone.

15. Recovery Vehicles and Forces

a. **Rotary-Wing Aircraft.** Operational experience shows that helicopters with advanced avionics, navigational systems, and terrain following/terrain avoidance radar systems are excellent pathfinders and recovery vehicles. Smaller assets (such as the H-60 variants) generate less dust and debris during landing, and reduce the probability of detection in the objective area. Knowledge of PR aircraft capabilities and procedures and improved interoperability between components can best be ensured through PR training and exercises. A variety of helicopter formation and extraction techniques and procedures exist within and between joint force components and subordinate units. Terrain, visibility, high-density altitude limitations, aircraft and component capabilities, and aircrew experience should be carefully considered when selecting these techniques and procedures. Recovery mission briefs should address flight integrity criteria, mission roles, and individual aircraft responsibilities. In certain situations, recovery missions should be conducted with minimal radio transmissions; relaying safety of flight, threat, and critical mission data only when required.

b. **Fixed-Wing Aircraft.** Circumstances may warrant using fixed-wing aircraft as the recovery vehicle. The concept of employment would be similar to that of combat delivery aircraft conducting air-land operations. Airfields should be designated and surveyed by special tactics teams or other personnel qualified in landing zone preparation procedures. Fixed-wing aircraft provide greater range and speed, which are invaluable capabilities when transporting critically injured personnel over vast distances. PR planning should identify suitable locations to transload recovered personnel from rotary-wing to fixed-wing aircraft to take advantage of the speed differential, when appropriate.

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**THE RECOVERY OF JUMP 42**
**25 JANUARY 1991**

Early one morning during DESERT STORM, as the bad weather lingered over the Kuwaiti battlefields, Captain Scott Walsh launched on the wing of Major Dan Peters out of their base at King Abdul Aziz Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Their first sortie took them to a large enemy column opposing the Marine 2nd Division. Recovering at the forward operating location at Tanjib, they refueled and rearmed their aircraft and took off again to fly another mission in support of their fellow Marines. Entering the target area, Walsh got separated from his flight lead. While staying below the clouds, he attempted to rejoin on another flight of Harriers. As he maneuvered, his aircraft was hit by a heat-seeking missile. The missile impacted the right rear exhaust and severely damaged the aircraft. Initially angered at having been hit, Walsh quickly surveyed the damage. “The blast blew a lot of the right flaps off, put several holes in the wing, and set fire to the fuel in the wing tanks,” he remembered. The Fast Forward Air Controller (FAC) working with him, Combat 13, joined up on him to inspect his aircraft. He was not impressed.
with the flames streaking behind Walsh’s aircraft and suggested that he eject.

Walsh quickly surveyed the savage ground battle raging below him and decided to stay with the aircraft as long as possible. He jettisoned all of his ordnance to lighten his aircraft. The Fast FAC suggested that he land at the Al Jabbar Airfield which was in the process of being liberated that morning. As the squadron intelligence officer, Scott knew that the airfield was scheduled to be seized that morning by the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, which was part of Task Force Ripper. He concurred with the Fast FAC and set a course for the airfield. But as he prepared to land there, Captain Walsh realized that the airfield was not in fact, under friendly control. Additionally, his landing gear would not lower. He quickly considered making a vertical landing, but his nozzle control was not responding properly and the aircraft was barely controllable. All of these factors ruled out landing at Al Jabbar. Walsh shoved his throttle forward and over-flew that airfield. He would try to make it to friendly lines before ejecting. But as he turned to head south, his hydraulic system pressure slowly depleted and his flight controls froze. No longer able to control the aircraft, he was forced to eject. As the F-18 capped him from above, he floated to the ground in sight of forward elements of the task force. Immediately, the pilot in Combat 13 called the Marine tactical air command center and reported that Jump 42 had been shot down and the pilot was alive on the ground. They quickly began to form a helicopter task force to get him out. Simultaneously, commanders in Task Force Ripper called their forward elements and directed that a patrol be sent out to recover the pilot.

Landing near an abandoned Iraqi bunker just west of the runways, Walsh oriented himself and quickly took shelter in an old trench. He took out his pistol and radio. Then he called the aircraft above to let them know that he was okay. When they acknowledged, he started moving south. Within a few minutes he encountered one of the Marine infantry teams who had been dispatched by the task force. They rescued him and took him back to the rear. There, he gave their intelligence section a quick briefing on what he had seen and then got on a helicopter which took him back to his base.

SOURCE: Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm by Darrel D. Whitcomb

Ground Forces. The same principles of C2 and SA apply to ground forces as they do for air or maritime forces. Ground forces may be used unilaterally or with air or naval forces, and they may be from the same Service or joint or multinational. Ground combat forces, specifically infantry and armor units, can provide the JFC a viable capability for recovery of isolated personnel when the isolating event is in their vicinity, or in an area where they can move to or be delivered. Armored forces can fight through adversary forces to reach isolated personnel, and provide the PRTF with a survivable recovery vehicle. Ground forces can move into and through an area to search for isolated personnel when the exact location is unknown. Additionally, these forces are trained to establish check points to seal off
small urban areas and prevent hostage takers from moving out of the area, and can conduct cordon and search operations to look for isolated personnel. Ground combat forces provide the JFC with survivability and staying power in the area of the isolating event.

d. **Maritime Vessels**

(1) **General.** Naval vessels maintain a viable capability for recovery of isolated personnel, but have a large radar signature and are vulnerable to coastal defenses. The threat from coastal defenses may be degraded through naval surface fire support (NSFS), other suppressive fire assets, and the employment of special boat unit (SBU) craft. SBU craft launched OTH from other naval vessels and coordinated with other fixed- or rotary-wing assets provide an enhanced, low-radar signature capability. Additionally, some helicopters can insert SOF in rigid hull inflatable boats. In general, submarines have no means of self-protection while surfaced.

(2) **Search and Recovery Using Submarines.** Attack submarine, nuclear (SSN), and dry deck shelter (DDS) submarines are the most effective submarine platforms for PR. The principal advantage of the submarine is the capability to clandestinely position close to the adversary coastline. Depending on the environment and threat, the submarine may elect to surface and conduct the extraction with little external support. SSNs have the ability to operate independently in most anti-air warfare threat environments. SSNs can also clandestinely insert special teams to conduct overland PR missions in coastal areas. Submarines have a limited capability to search large areas compared to aerial search assets. However, SSN search and objective/terminal guidance can be enhanced by the locating capabilities of the AN/ARS-6 (personal locator system [PLS]/downed aviator locator system [DALS]/lightweight airborne recovery system). To effect recoveries within a threat envelope, the SSN may employ the “snag and tow” technique, or “lock-in swimmers” through DDS. The “snag-and-tow” consists of the isolated personnel catching or “snagging” a line with the submarine’s periscope and being towed beyond the threat envelope. When clear of adversary threats, the submarine surfaces to complete the extraction or position the isolated personnel for transfer to a helicopter or surface vessel. The DDS recovery may consist of SEALs escorting the isolated personnel into the DDS by means of the SEAL delivery vehicle.
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or surface swimmers. The advantage of the DDS system is that the SSN is not required to surface to recover the isolated personnel.

e. **Recovery by NAR Forces.** NAR missions are conducted in those circumstances beyond the capabilities of conventional forces and in which NAR forces may act with indigenous or surrogate personnel, other elements of DOD, OGAs, or multinational forces to effect a recovery. NAR RIs or RMs are directed and trained to conduct the five specified tasks of NAR: contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate.

(1) **Contact.** Contact entails all actions that lead to the positive control of isolated personnel. This may include locating the isolated personnel, use of technical and nontechnical communications, and employment of various conventional and unconventional PR techniques and procedures.

(a) **Process.** NAR force TTP employed to locate isolated personnel must maximize and exploit the opportunities for success. TTP must be tailored to the operational environment, NAR force training and equipment, and the applicable recovery considerations (availability of resources, capabilities and limitations, task organizing, recovery criteria, location and physical condition of the isolated personnel, access, time, movement, capacity, and risk assessment). A NAR force must be able to locate isolated personnel in all weather and light conditions, and in both rural and urban environments.

(b) **Guidelines.** When developing standards and guidelines for contact procedures, several factors should be considered. These include, but are not limited to, the type of terrain in the operational or recovery area, the equipment and evasion aids that may or may not be available to isolated personnel, and enemy capabilities (e.g., air superiority, reconnaissance, and DF capabilities). The JPRC coordinates and disseminates the theater-specific policies that will guide isolated personnel and recovery teams conducting a mission, to the contact and recovery of an isolated person. These policies need to be widely available to ensure commanders, potential isolated personnel, recovery forces, and mission planners understand their respective roles in the operation. The isolated person must initiate a series of specific actions leading to successful contact.

(c) **Contact Considerations.** Whenever an isolated person is recovered with the assistance of a NAR force, the most critical aspect of the recovery is the moment the isolated person and the recovery team first meet. This period is very dangerous because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either enemy forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party’s security. Contact between isolated personnel and a recovery team requires comprehensive preplanning. The JPRC, assisted by component intelligence and operations specialists, must ensure the appropriate contact procedures are developed and provided in appropriate operating instructions (e.g., SPINS and communication or signal instructions) and other operational procedures for authentication. The JFC must ensure that joint force components are familiar and comply with these procedures to preclude placing recovery forces at great risk, and avoid significant recovery delays or the capture of the isolated person by enemy forces.

(d) **Intent.** All measures must be taken to keep the procedures for contact as simple as possible, while still affording the requisite security measures essential to the protection of both the NAR
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force and the isolated person. The isolated person must make a conscious decision to deviate from the planned evasion routine in order to initiate actions that will signal their intent to make contact with a NAR force. The isolated person is no longer evading from all unknown persons; the individual is now looking for someone that will carry out a specific act indicating the intent to assist. There are two basic scenarios for coordinating contact:

1. **Technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires the isolated person to establish technical communications (e.g., radio communications) with friendly forces. The NAR force will be alerted to service a coordinated contact point by the UARCC. All contact procedures are coordinated at the JPRC and UARCC and then passed to both the isolated person and the NAR force. The isolated person would know when to expect contact, and the NAR force would know the isolated person is in place prior to initiating contact procedures. Technical communications with the isolated person affords the NAR force greater flexibility, and greatly increases its ability to make contact.

2. **Absence of technical communications with isolated personnel.** This situation requires that the isolated person include in his or her EPA potential contact procedures with a recovery force without the use of technical communications. For example, the isolated person would describe in his or her EPA how they will emplace the signals that would assist a recovery force in finding his or her location and the procedures for making contact. The isolated person must consider both day and night signals as well as urban verses rural signals. Operating instructions serve as comprehensive guide as to what signals an isolated person should consider to facilitate their recovery.

(e) **EPA Application.** The unit’s PR coordinator is responsible for ensuring potential isolated personnel provide a comprehensive EPA that complies with theater policies. Adherence to, and skill in execution of, EPA activities are crucial to successful contact and recovery operations.

2. **Authenticate.** As soon as tactically feasible, the NAR force will initiate the authentication process to determine that the isolated person is in fact the person it has been tasked to recover.

(a) **Control.** Once an isolated person has been located, contacted, and taken into the custody of the NAR force, control of the isolated person must be maintained throughout the remainder of the operation and the isolated person must be authenticated. Until the authentication is complete, the isolated person is safeguarded not only from the enemy, but also to protect the OPSEC of the NAR force. While the level of control exerted over the isolated person will be much more stringent prior to authentication, it should be proportional to the situation. Sensory deprivation and physical restraints should be used only if commensurate with the level of perceived risk, not as a matter of SOP. Once the isolated person is authenticated, the control measures exerted over the individual may be relaxed; but control must be maintained throughout the isolated person’s association with NAR forces. Due to significant physical, emotional, or mental stress, exposure and/or deprivation, or injuries sustained, safeguarding isolated personnel also means protecting them from their potential impaired judgment and decision-making abilities.
(b) **Authentication Management.** Within an operational area, the JPRC manages and establishes thresholds for authentication. In the conduct of NAR operations, the NAR force facilitates the process. The UARCC is the linkage between the two. The JPRC forwards the isolated person’s ISOPREP and EPA information to the UARCC. Only the minimum amount of information required to perform authentication is forwarded to the NAR force, usually in the form of questions. Definitive authentication may be based on the information contained in operating instructions, the ISOPREP card or EPA, a detailed physical description, a digital photo, digital fingerprint information, or any combination thereof. The NAR force conveys to the UARCC the isolated person’s responses to the authentication questions. The JFSOCC has the authority to positively authenticate the identity of an isolated person under the control of NAR forces, which the JFSOCC may delegate to the UARCC director. The UARCC confirms or denies authentication. Since the NAR force or parts thereof may only have access to nontechnical, clandestine communications, the process of authenticating some isolated personnel may take days or weeks. This potential time lag needs to be factored into the considerations for control and support of the isolated personnel.

(3) **Support.** Support includes all actions taken to provide sustainment to the isolated person, and ensure their well-being. Isolated personnel may not be in the best physical, mental, or emotional condition upon making contact with NAR forces. The NAR force will provide the greatest degree of support possible without compromising OPSEC. NAR forces may provide the following support:

(a) **Sustain.** When possible, NAR forces will provide sufficient nourishment, clothing, shelter, safeguarding, and medical care to restore and sustain the isolated person’s health and physical condition.

(b) **Monitor and Assess.** Isolated personnel must be continually monitored and assessed throughout the duration of the recover process. It is important that isolated personnel not deteriorate physically and mentally. It may be beneficial to reassure them occasionally to help maintain morale and focus on the successful return to friendly control.

(c) **Procedures and Contingencies.** The NAR force should inform recovered isolated personnel, as soon as possible, on procedures, restrictions, and recontact plans.

(d) **Security.** Direct interface between recovered isolated personnel and the NAR force should be strictly limited to preserve OPSEC and the future viability of the NAR force. The logistic support to sustain an injured person while moving, or waiting to move, without violating OPSEC is one of the primary planning considerations of the NAR force.

(4) **Move.** The movement phase of the recovery process consists of all actions taken to transport isolated personnel from a contact point to an exfiltration site. The movement may include multiple segments, multiple methods, or multiple elements. To ensure the future viability of the NAR force and the safety of the isolated person, OPSEC procedures practiced by the NAR force will impact the speed at which the isolated person is moved from place to place. The logistical austerity of both the environment and the NAR force, and the distance over which the isolated person
must be transported will also affect the movement process. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the isolated person cannot, for operational, security, or other reasons, deliver the isolated person safely to friendly control. In such cases, the isolated person may be turned over to another NAR asset or to a conventional recovery force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The UARCC is responsible for coordinating all turnovers of isolated personnel recovered by a NAR force.

(5) **Exfiltrate.** Exfiltration is the final action to remove isolated personnel from hostile territory to definitive US Government control in a permissive environment. Exfiltration will occur by the most secure means available, be it an exfiltration point serviced by a PRTF, by clandestine aircraft or watercraft, by ground movement crossing an international border, or through the passage of friendly lines.

16. Isolated Personnel Responsibilities Prior to Recovery

a. **General.** Isolated personnel are an integral part of any recovery effort. Consequently, they must perform their portion of each PR task successfully to aid their own recovery. During recovery, isolated personnel should:

   (1) Respond quickly and accurately to authentication procedures and requests for ISOPREP information.

   (2) Provide positional assistance to recovery forces to the greatest extent possible.

   (3) Properly use all issued signaling devices and improvise signals, as needed, to improve the chances of being sighted.

   (4) Provide pertinent information about the dispersal of other group members, if applicable.

   (5) Inform recovery forces if operational developments require altering their EPA and hence, the recovery plan.

   (6) Be prepared to receive and follow instructions from the recovery force that require EPA alterations to adapt to operational exigencies.

   (7) Pay close attention to and explicitly follow instructions of recovery forces to the maximum extent possible given the tactical situation (including adversary positions and medical condition).

   (8) Continue to communicate with inbound recovery forces, as required, to ensure their authentication and location is understood and retrieval is efficiently executed.

   (9) Remember the word of the day/letter of the day/number of the day/challenge/ password and near and far recognition signals.
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(10) Do not run toward the recovery vehicle until or unless directed. Weapons should not be held in a manner that could be perceived as threatening.

(11) Be prepared to be treated as a captive until you are authenticated. Authentication might not occur until you are handed over by the recovery forces.

b. Recovery by Helicopter or Tilt Rotor. Isolated personnel should reposition near an HLZ large enough to accommodate at least one helicopter. The HLZ should provide concealment, be fairly level and free of major obstacles (particularly high tension lines or telephone wires), and allow easy identification by the aircrew. The use of chemical lights or other visual markings can aid in identification. If the recovery helicopter cannot land, the isolated personnel will have to be hoisted aboard or moved to another location. Isolated personnel should be aware that a hoist recovery greatly increases exposure and risk to the recovery helicopter, and may adversely affect the timeliness of their recovery. Therefore, HLZ suitability must be determined as early in the recovery process as possible so that this information can be passed to the recovery helicopter prior to entering the objective area. Isolated personnel should turn away from the landing helicopter to avoid flying debris and hold their position in sight of the cockpit or side door until signaled or instructed to enter the helicopter.

c. Recovery by Ground Forces. Isolated personnel should follow their EPA until contacted by ground forces. The isolated personnel should not make any threatening moves, assume a passive position (e.g., drop to one knee) and explicitly follow the ground force instructions. Recovery by ground forces could be employed in four general scenarios:

Component commanders should plan for and conduct recovery operations using all capabilities available.
(1) **The isolated person is not in communications with friendly forces and an exact location is unknown.** Ground forces may conduct a movement to contact, or hasty attack in uncertain or hostile terrain, to secure an objective and link up with friendly forces. The isolated person should be prepared to use the far recognition signal to alert the ground force of their presence. As the ground force responds and moves closer, the forces will use the near recognition signals for the final link up.

(2) **The isolated personnel may or may not be in communication, but their location is known.** The ground force may fight through to link up with isolated personnel in contact with the enemy. The isolated personnel will be brought on board, or be escorted by the ground recovery vehicles and returned to friendly control.

(3) **The location (or general vicinity) of the isolated personnel is known, but they are already captive.** Ground forces can conduct a raid to release the isolated personnel.

(4) **The general location of the isolated personnel is known but they are presumed captive and the adversary is expected to transport the isolated personnel to another location.** Ground forces can establish checkpoints around an urban area and conduct a cordon and search mission to find the isolated personnel. This would probably be used if the isolating event had just occurred, and the unit involved determines that personnel are missing during an accountability check. This unit or a nearby unit would cordon the area to ensure the captives are not transported out of the area, and begin a systematic search of the buildings and vehicles.

17. Physical Custody

   a. **Initial Actions of Recovery Force.** Recovered isolated personnel should be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be confiscated. Recovered isolated personnel should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the recovered isolated personnel is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures as described in existing ROE and operations procedures. The status of the recovered isolated personnel can change once their identity has been ascertained and the recovery force commander has evaluated the situation. The recovered isolated person(s) could be held as an unarmed detainee. Recovered isolated personnel may or may not be briefed on what to expect during the remainder of the recovery operation.

   b. **Conduct while in Custody of Recovery Force.** Recovered isolated personnel must never appear as a threat to the recovery force and they should make no movements that could be interpreted as hostile. While in a RM or under the control of a foreign force, recovered isolated personnel should project a favorable image of the US and its values, avoid acts that violate international law or discredit the US, avoid expressing ideas that could be misconstrued as official US policy or popular American attitudes, and refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the US.
c. **Transfer of Custody.** The recovery force should pass all pertinent information on, and possessions taken from, the recovered personnel to the reintegration team. Pertinent information includes authentication status, significant information passed by the recovered isolated personnel, and physical status. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the recovered isolated personnel cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the individual safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the recovered isolated personnel may be handed over to another group or PR force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. The recovered isolated personnel should be kept informed (as much as necessary). At no time will isolated personnel be abandoned. The recovered isolated personnel will be under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force, according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline by all are essential for mission success.

**SECTION E. REINTEGRATE**

“Today is a great day for the families, comrades, and loved ones of the seven MIAs who are now free. . . . It’s a good way to start the morning, to be notified that seven of our fellow Americans are going to be home soon in the arms of their loved ones.”

President George W. Bush, April 13, 2003

“We feel like we won the lottery of life.”

Chief Warrant Officer Two Ronald Young
Upon his return from Iraq, April 2003

18. **General**

Reintegrate is a critical task that allows the DOD to gather necessary intelligence and SERE information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting the health and well-being of returned isolated personnel. In their planning, CCDRs establish a reintegration process, to include locations, teams, and responsibilities. The reintegration process should also be included in combatant command PR directives. Two key components of this process are qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists and others who assist the recovered isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family, and society. It is important for planners to include provisions for the recovery of DOD civilians and contractors.

19. **Process**

a. **General.** The combatant command’s PR directive, the OPLAN/OPORD, and PR SOPs specify the reintegration process and required teams, to include their composition and responsibilities
(see Chapter V, “Planning”). The JFC usually coordinates all reintegration procedures through the JPRC, which executes the reintegration plan and the oversight of, and assistance to, component reintegration teams. The JPRC should coordinate all joint requirements necessary to conduct reintegration at phase I and II locations, and to transition to phase III when necessary (as described below). Latitude and flexibility should remain with the component commander to conduct reintegration procedures within the context of on-going military operations, allowing for sequential, concurrent or, if necessary, delayed conduct of reintegration procedures. The scope and complexity of the process will vary depending on the classification of the recovered isolated personnel (i.e., survivors and evaders may require less debriefing and psychological attention than captives, detainees, and POWs).

b. An inherent and critical part of the reintegration process is the **decompression protocols**. The long-term successful reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into military and social/civil environments is directly affected by proper decompression. Protocols have been established to maximize the benefit of decompression and, at the very least under “normal” conditions, require a minimum of 72 hours to be effective. Deviating from established protocols can have a severe impact and, under certain circumstances, create permanent psychological trauma to the recovered isolated personnel. From past detention incidents, this trauma has manifested itself in recovered isolated personnel separating themselves from military Service, having dysfunctional family relationships, and, in severe cases, committing suicide. Some of the decompression protocols include: normalizing physical and emotional reactions to their isolation experience; providing an opportunity to predict and control their environment; allowing them to repeatedly tell their story in a positive manner; allowing a group of recovered isolated personnel from the same event to have time together to recount their experience in a positive manner; allowing individual down time to come to grips with the whole event; assisting them in developing an action plan for dealing with the media, integrating into family, returning to duty, etc.; providing access to Service chaplains and opportunities to receive religious support, at the request of the returned isolated personnel; offering and providing follow-up care after the formal reintegration process is over. A key to successful decompression is creating an environment where isolated personnel feel they are safe and can relax.

c. **Debriefing.** The debriefs are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. SERE and intelligence debriefs may run separately or concurrently as dictated by mission circumstances, but must be coordinated with one another. The SERE debrief must be allowed to follow accepted protocols to produce verbal and visual recordings that are essential to the SERE analysis and development of lessons learned. If it is determined during the conduct of the debriefing that the isolated person has knowledge of any sensitive or covert recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, or equipment (e.g., NAR), that portion of the debriefing will cease until the isolated person can be debriefed by a qualified theater or JPRA NAR representative. The recovered isolated person will be advised not to disclose details of this information to anyone except specified theater or JPRA debriefers who are knowledgeable of sensitive theater recovery programs. The trained debriefer will also stop the debrief process if they become aware of information that may indicate possible violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and follow the reintegration team SOP or consult with a staff judge advocate (SJA).
(1) **Intelligence Debrief.** The intelligence debrief should occur as soon as possible pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel. It should be conducted by a qualified and trained intelligence debriefer.

(a) The intelligence debrief seeks specific time-sensitive and perishable information related to the tactical circumstances leading to the isolating event and, if applicable, the eventual capture, the presence of other isolated personnel, the physical and security characteristics of the detention facilities, observed adversary tactics, force disposition, equipment, or other information of value to ongoing operations. Information collected helps the intelligence community update its overall evaluation of the detaining or adversary organization, as well as determine the extent of possible compromise of US information, methods, and/or materials.

(b) Intelligence gained during the debrief is quickly reported via established dissemination channels IAW standard intelligence reporting procedures. Intelligence reports include only information that is relevant to operational requirements, and contain no derogatory information or direct references to the identity of the source. All information collected is assigned proper security classification based on its content prior to dissemination to appropriate intelligence community recipients.

(2) **SERE Debrief.** The SERE debrief should occur as soon as possible, pending the approval of medical personnel caring for the recovered isolated personnel, and should be conducted by a trained SERE debriefer and/or SERE psychologist. To ensure full disclosure of information, SERE debriefs will be disseminated on a need to know basis, protected from public disclosure according to The Privacy Act and other legal protections and primarily used to develop lessons learned to adapt joint and Service-level SERE training products and TTP. The initial debrief material is normally classified secret until the subsequent analysis determines a more appropriate classification. In addition, the SERE debrief, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, focuses on mental and psychological health and well being of the recovered isolated personnel, and provides an avenue for isolated personnel to decompress and come to terms with the circumstances encompassing the time in isolation. The SERE debrief focuses on the isolation experience in an effort to evaluate the adequacy and usefulness of:

(a) SERE operational guidance, education, and training.

(b) SERE equipment to include evasion aids and radios.

(c) The PR processes that either assisted or hindered their isolation. Focus on processes to report, locate, support, and recover the isolated person.

(3) **Other Debriefs.** Depending on the circumstances surrounding the isolating event, other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or CIA, Service criminal investigation organizations, and safety investigation boards may need to debrief the returnee. These requests for debriefing must be coordinated with the reintegration team chief and SERE psychologist.
(4) **Debrief Team.** Intelligence and SERE debriefing team is normally established as part of a reintegration team to focus on obtaining accurate and complete intelligence and SERE information to be forwarded to JPRA for further analysis. The SERE debriefer will be experienced and trained in correctly eliciting SERE information. The ideal ratio of debriefers to debriefees is one-to-one. It is difficult for a debriefer to track and encourage the story of more than one debriefee, especially if the debriefees experienced the same event together. The JPRA may provide a SERE debriefer or SERE psychologist if required to maintain oversight of the debrief process.

(5) **Debrief Team Preparation.** Intelligence and SERE debriefers should meet in advance to compare information requirements and deconflict interview questions to avoid duplication. All available information pertaining to the recovered isolated personnel should be obtained from the JPRC and reviewed when refining debrief checklists and developing questions. Visual aids such as maps and photographs should be available to assist the recovered isolated personnel in providing a chronicle of their experiences.

(6) **Sequence of Events.** The SERE debriefer will coordinate with the intelligence debriefer and agree upon a sequence of events for interview sessions. Because they have different uses, the team must ensure that the recovered isolated personnel clearly understand the distinction between intelligence and SERE debrief sessions. If possible, intelligence and SERE debriefers may attend the other’s debrief sessions to monitor the information exchange and develop follow-up questions to be covered in subsequent sessions provided the terms of Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement (DD Form 2810) are not violated. The intelligence and SERE debriefs will take place in a sequence decided among the debriefers and approved by the reintegration team chief. The sequence will be heavily influenced by the physical/mental stability of the recovered isolated personnel, availability of debriefers, and other limiting factors. A possible debriefing sequence of events is as follows:

   (a) Recovered isolated personnel provide a narrative account of their experience while both debrief team components monitor and build an understanding of the incident.

   (b) The SERE debriefer, in collaboration with the other debriefers and SERE psychologist, asks a series of structured questions during sessions that are orchestrated for duration and attendees. The structured questions are designed to elicit the most accurate details from the debriefee based on their story and other information available. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four hours per day.

   (c) Both debrief teams, SERE and intelligence, conduct follow-up interviews as required.

   (d) The SERE psychologist assists the debriefer and interacts with the recovered isolated personnel as they feel necessary.

   (e) The SERE debriefer must ensure the SERE debrief recordings and all other pertinent information is forwarded to JPRA for processing immediately upon completion of the debriefing process.
d. **SERE Psychologist.** The SERE psychologist is primarily focused on the decompression and long-term welfare of the recovered isolated personnel. Decompression is a critical activity that can prevent psychological damage to recovered isolated personnel and the loss of accuracy in recalling critical intelligence and operational information. It should be noted that the activities of the SERE psychologist on occasion can overlap with the debriefing process. The SERE psychologist:

1. Provides an explanation of the reintegration procedures to include the behavioral assessment.
2. Conducts a behavioral assessment and addresses critical elements of long-term evasion, capture, detention/captivity, and liberation in terms of their impact on the adjustment of recovered isolated personnel.
3. Monitors and advises the reintegration team leader regarding the coordination of all aspects of the reintegration task, to ensure the health and stamina of recovered isolated personnel are maintained.
4. Provides the behavioral assessment of the recovered isolated personnel to the reintegration team leader who makes the recommendation on disposition (i.e., return to duty or continue to next phase) to the component commander.

e. **Phases.** Reintegration is normally conducted in three phases which may be conducted at multiple locations. The first two are directed by the geographic CCDR in coordination with the components, and the final phase is conducted by the respective Service in the US. The JFC coordinates through the JPRC, with the component commanders (PRCCs) to determine the location(s) of phase I and II, the composition of the phase I team (or other process if a team is not required), the transition process from phase I to phase II, the phase II location reintegration process and team and the transition process to phase III. Phase I encompasses the process of transporting the recovered isolated person to a safe area to conduct initial medical assessment and debriefings. Phase I will end with the recovered isolated personnel being returned to duty or recommended for phase II. Phase II encompasses the transition from phase I to a theater treatment and processing facility and further SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression. Phase II will end with the recovered isolated personnel being released to duty or recommended for phase III. Phase III begins with the transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service. Phase III does not have a prescribed time limit and depends on the needs of the recovered isolated personnel in coordination with the concerns of the Service, SERE and intelligence debriefers, and the SERE psychologist.

1. **Phase I.** All recovered isolated personnel must undergo, at a minimum, an initial reintegration assessment, which is normally accomplished at a phase I location. Before recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty they must be medically cleared, complete a SERE/intelligence debrief, and have some form of decompression. With proper support all of these essential activities can occur at phase I and, when appropriate, the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty within 48 hours. In some cases, a more comprehensive SERE debrief, and other lessons learned activities, can be accomplished at a later date. Based on the reintegration assessment and
theater guidance, the component commander has the authority to reintegrate isolated personnel to their DOD duties or transfer them to the next phase. Phase I begins as soon as the recovered isolated personnel are in the care of the phase I team, or other established process, and must be accomplished as soon as possible. The JPRC, in coordination with the PRCCs and the reintegration team chief, will determine the most appropriate place and means to accomplish phase I. Based on the CCDR’s guidance, and component requirements, phase I will normally consist of:

(a) Immediate medical attention.

(b) An intelligence debrief to collect any appropriate tactical or perishable intelligence and/or any appropriate isolated personnel identification and status information.

(c) Information debriefs necessary to collect perishable SERE and intelligence information and determine whether recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty or require additional time for decompression and medical treatment. Questions will be composed to ascertain the following:

1. Name, rank, serial number, organization, and health and physical condition.

2. Recovery details such as location, date, time, and method.

3. Did isolated personnel make contact with a RM? If yes, the recovered isolated personnel will be advised not to disclose details of this information except to a specific NAR representative.

4. Were isolated personnel held captive or detained at anytime?

5. Other information that will give the SERE psychologist anecdotal or defined evidence that further decompression may, or may not, be needed.

(d) Providing the recovered isolated personnel information about the reintegration process and events before they occur. This is an essential element of decompression for phase I, giving back to the recovered isolated person their ability to predict and control the world around them, thus giving them the ability to make some decisions about phase I activities.

(e) The phase I team chief or other responsible organization, based on an assessment of debrief requirements, and mental and physical condition of the isolated personnel, will make a recommendation to the appropriate commander and PRCC about their further continuation in the reintegration process. The PRCC keeps the JPRC informed. If the recovered isolated personnel can be returned to duty, they will remain under the auspices of the parent command. If it is determined that additional time is required for debriefing and decompression, the recovered isolated personnel will be recommended for phase II and all records, to include the personnel processing file (PPF) (see paragraph 22a(2) below) will be transferred to the designated JFC phase II reintegration team chief.
(2) **Phase II** will be conducted at the theater designated facility where the recovered isolated personnel will receive more structured SERE and intelligence debriefings and decompression. Phase II is executed by the JFC’s designated reintegration team and includes medical treatment services rendered by a SERE psychologist who will be available to address any recovered isolated personnel psychological concerns or problems.

(a) The reintegration team chief will ensure coordination with members of the JFC’s staff, components, Services, and other agencies who should be involved in the reintegration processing of the recovered isolated personnel or require proprietary debriefings. The reintegration team chief will be charged with prioritizing and monitoring, in coordination with the SERE psychologist, all reintegration processes to prevent confusing, or adversely affecting the mental or physical health of the recovered isolated personnel. To fully meet its responsibilities, an ideal reintegration team would consist of:

1. **Team chief.** An individual familiar with the reintegration and SERE debriefing processes and procedures, the combatant command’s requirements for the administrative processing (personnel, financial, legal, accident investigations, etc.) of personnel and the theater joint coordination processes. Team chiefs, faced with a large number of joint force returnees (and corresponding increase in reintegration team members), may consider requesting a deputy team chief of a sister Service to assist in addressing Service unique reintegration issues and to share the workload. The team chief should be in the grade of O-6, with the authority to coordinate with component commanders.


4. **Medical officer.** Will advise the team on the physical condition of the returned isolated personnel and their ability to undergo the reintegration process.

5. **Legal representative.** This person can assist with the reintegration and debriefing procedures especially when there are sensitive UCMJ procedures to consider.

6. **Chaplain.** Chaplains perform or provide essential religious support to recovered isolated personnel as required. Religious support can be beneficial to the immediate mental and psychological welfare of recovered isolated personnel and contribute to their successful long term reintegration. Recovered personnel who request pastoral care or counseling from Service chaplains must be clearly advised that their communications with the chaplain, as a formal act of religion or matter of conscience, are privileged communications and confidential under Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 503 (b). In order to ensure this right of confidentiality for recovered isolated personnel, chaplains will not be used at any time to participate in or conduct SERE, intelligence, or other debriefings.
7. **Public Affairs Officer.** This person is very important to advise on the proper disposition of media inquiries. This assistance is valuable to the team as well as recovered isolated personnel and their families.

8. **Personnel representative.** This person ensures that the procedures required by the theater joint personnel center or other personnel procedures are accomplished. This person is also the CCDR’s key coordination link to the appropriate Service casualty assistance office to ensure family support is provided.

9. **Service support representative(s).** The Service team member is an individual that can provide for the personal needs of the recovered isolated personnel. This person should have the ability to obtain clothing, hygiene items, Service ID cards, credit cards, and other personal items as required. If possible, this should be someone familiar to the recovered isolated personnel, and should be available to offer support and be a confidant.

10. **Service casualty assistance representative.** This is a very important team member who ensures the continuation of family support that should have started during the recovered isolated personnel’s isolation. This team member provides for critical situational awareness and coordination among the theater reintegration team chief, the PAO, the SERE psychologist, the Service casualty assistance office in direct support of the family and the recovered isolated person. This casualty assistance representative will also play a key role in family visits and the transition of family support from phase II to phase III.

11. **Other team members,** such as administrative specialists, can be added as deemed appropriate to the situation.

(b) Phase II is where reintegration with family members may begin initially with contact by telephone. Rarely is there any benefit for family members to travel to phase II locations. In fact, until decompression/debriefing is complete, the primary concern of recovered isolated personnel is the objective assessment of how they conducted themselves while isolated — they have a need to know the answer to “did I conduct myself well and with honor?”

(c) The reintegration team chief determines the completion of phase II and recommends to the component commander or the JFC the disposition of the recovered isolated personnel to either return them to their DOD duties or transfer them into phase III where the recovered isolated personnel will come under the control of their respective Service in the US. The JFC, JPRC, and respective PRCCs will be informed on all decisions.

(d) If the recovered isolated personnel are returned to duty, the JFC’s reintegration team chief will transfer the PPF and other records as directed in theater guidance. Normally, if the recovered isolated personnel are recommended for phase III, the PPF and other records will be positively controlled by the reintegration team chief until properly transferred to the phase III team chief or JPRA.
Phase III. Phase III begins with the pre-coordinated transition of recovered isolated personnel to the phase III team of the appropriate Service in the US. Ideally, a phase II team consisting of a personal escort, PA representative, physician, chaplain, and SERE psychologist normally will accompany the recovered isolated personnel to the phase III location, where the isolated personnel will be received by a phase III team representative. These arrangements must be coordinated by the teams involved, preferably before an event has occurred. At a minimum, this coordination will consist of an exchange of contact information among the phase II and phase III reintegration team chiefs and the combatant command and Service PR OPRs. Phase III details are described in DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*.

Process Flexibility. Though conducted by phase, the critical tasks within each phase are not necessarily conducted sequentially or on a rigid time schedule. Latitude and flexibility remain with the Service and Service component commander to accomplish the reintegration process based upon the needs of the recovered isolated personnel and within the context of ongoing military operations.

20. Challenges During Reintegration

“In a political democracy, every soldier’s death is a public event.”

Rick Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers*, page 2

The greatest challenge during reintegration is when well-intended actions are implemented without understanding their full ramifications. These actions may impact the reintegration of recovered isolated personnel into a healthy family, social, and professional life. The following are some of the common ways that senior executives have negatively impacted the reintegration process while trying to be helpful.

a. **Overwhelming the recovered isolated personnel with a show of support.** Regardless of how well they performed during isolation, all recovered isolated personnel are in a mild state of shock when they return and need time to regroup. Parades, bands, media events, ceremonies, and celebrations have their place but not during the early stages of reintegration. These types of activities serve to increase the state of shock of recovered isolated personnel and usually end up overwhelming them and complicating the reintegration process.

b. **Awarding medals too early.** Expediting medal processing is not recommended as it takes time for recovered isolated personnel to work through the intensity of their emotional reactions to the isolating event. Medals that are given while recovered isolated personnel are still struggling with intense emotional reactions complicate the reintegration process and in many cases isolates/alienates recovered isolated personnel from unit members.

c. **White House and command presentations/visits.** Attempts to honor recovered isolated personnel with high level visits serve necessary political purposes but are not in the best interest of the recovered isolated personnel if conducted during the early stages of reintegration. Recovered isolated personnel will remember these events as positive if they are conducted at the proper time and IAW the
wishes of the recovered isolated personnel. Brief telephone calls may be appropriate during early stages if coordinated with the reintegration team.

d. **Transporting families to phase II locations.** Families are an essential part of reintegration. Introducing families too early not only complicates the reintegration process but it is harmful to long-term family relationships. Recovered isolated personnel try to protect families from the horrors of their ordeal while family members tend to overwhelm recovered isolated personnel and do not allow them time to decompress. Recovered isolated personnel should be allowed to make telephone contact with families during the early stages of the reintegration process. Family reunions are more appropriate when the reintegration process is nearing completion or when recovered isolated personnel return to the US.

e. **Working with Contractors.** PR planners face multiple challenges in coordinating the reintegration of a contractor who has been isolated. Entry into the reintegration process for contractors is voluntary, and the contracting company may not provide the level of cooperation anticipated. The family support group that military forces enjoy at home station may not be available to the contractor’s family. The company may release information to outside sources that the recovery forces or the isolated personnel do not want made public. Developing a close relationship with the contracting company can assist the reintegration team in ensuring that all aspects of the reintegration run smoothly.

21. **Follow-Up**

SERE psychologists will follow-up with recovered isolated personnel, as needed, for at least one year. All POWs are eligible for follow-up medical and psychological services at the Robert Mitchell Center for Repatriated POW Studies. Intelligence organizations may require follow-up contact with recovered isolated personnel to pursue additional intelligence requirements, particularly to support investigations of unresolved POW and/or MIA incidents.

22. **Legal and Administrative**

a. **Initial Control**

(1) **Administration.** The command gaining initial control of recovered isolated personnel will ensure that an escort is assigned until the designated reintegration team assumes control of the recovered isolated personnel. Thereafter, recovered isolated personnel normally will complete a nondisclosure agreement and a debriefing statement.

(2) **Personnel Processing File.** The reintegration team chief should coordinate with the designated component commander to obtain each recovered isolated person’s PPF from the appropriate Service or PRCC. This file will be used during the entire reintegration task as a debrief document and will be disseminated to the Service and JPRA once reintegration has been completed. If the reintegration task is accomplished prior to receiving the PPF, the PPF will be included in the final disposition of debrief documents.
(3) **Initial Recovery Report.** This report will be transmitted by the JPRC as soon as possible to the returned isolated person’s parent Service, with copies to the theater reintegration team chief, JPRA, the appropriate JOC, and the recovered isolated personnel’s commander. Along with critical recovered isolated personnel data, the report will include an assessment of potential support required, a road map for reintegration activities, and a reintegration team chief recommendation to return the individual to duty or proceed to phase II.

b. **Debriefs.** All debriefs shall be focused, timely, and will last only as long as the recovered isolated personnel are able to mentally and physically continue. The maximum total hours of debriefing should not exceed four hours per day. Debriefers will ensure DD Form 2810, Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statement, has been signed before beginning the debriefings. Typically, information obtained in the SERE and intelligence debriefings is immediately disseminated. The verbatim text/transcription of debriefings is statutorily protected and is not releasable until approved by the Commander, JPRA. JPRA is required to analyze raw debrief material, summarize it, and provide synopses of lessons learned to all DOD organizations that have a need to know. SERE debriefs are initially classified secret until the information can be further analyzed and reclassified according to the Personnel Recovery Classification Guide and other guidance as applicable. SERE debriefs are property of the Department of Defense, and shall not be released to the public without the approval of USJFCOM and the completion of required DOD document release processes.

For further guidance on reintegration, refer to DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel; Appendix T, “Personnel Recovery Considerations,” of JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations; and Appendix N, “Reintegration Administration,” to this publication.

23. **Medical Considerations During Reintegration**

Medical personnel play a key role in the successful debriefing and reintegration of returned isolated personnel. The objective of medical support during reintegration is to provide returned isolated personnel with appropriate and complete medical evaluation and treatment, establish a detailed medical record for future reference, maintain or restore dignity, and to facilitate readjustment to society. During reintegration, immediate medical care or mental health treatment is always addressed first. The medical treatment of returned isolated personnel shall include the services of a SERE psychologist who will address any psychological concerns or problems.

a. **Medical Triage, Evaluation, and Stabilization.** Recovered isolated personnel should receive a comprehensive medical triage and any medical treatment necessary to medically stabilize their condition. Many recovered isolated personnel have been subjected to physically traumatic experiences and require immediate medical evaluation and treatment for life threatening injuries or conditions. A hands-on medical assessment is necessary to avert missing any serious medical conditions that may go undetected.
due to shock, ensure medical stabilization, and assure the health and well-being of recovered isolated personnel.

b. **Medical Treatment and Debriefing.** Medical stability is the top priority of all debriefing and reintegration processes; but gathering time-sensitive information specifically during tactical debriefings, which have the potential to save lives during on-going hostilities, can be equally important in some instances. After the tactical debriefing is completed, necessary medical treatment becomes the number one priority. In-depth debriefings may continue, but medical treatment takes precedence.

c. **Return to Duty Recommendations.** Not all recovered isolated personnel will require phase II and III of reintegration. Often definitive and essential medical care will take place at forward locations within the theater. The lead medical officer is responsible for consulting with the reintegration team chief and the SERE psychologists in providing return to duty recommendations.
1. General

a. Search and rescue of the civilian population in an emergency is carried out as a humanitarian and legal obligation under the overall arrangements and principles described in the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). The NSP is formulated and maintained for the purpose of coordinating civil SAR services to meet both the domestic and international commitments of the USG, and to document related basic national policies. The plan is intended to integrate all available resources into a cooperative network for greater protection of life and property, to ensure greater efficiency and economy, and to provide guidance for the development of SAR-related systems. The NSP integrates the US civil SAR system into the global SAR system. The DOD, as a signatory to the NSP, contributes to the national and international goal of using all available resources for civil SAR. Military support of civil SAR is carried out on a not-to-interfere basis with primary military missions. There are a number of civil SAR-related treaties to which the US is a party. In most cases, either the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO) sponsors the treaties.

b. US search and rescue coordinators (SCs) are designated, and agency responsibilities are established with overall direction to support civil SAR operations of other countries in territory and international waters beyond recognized US aeronautical and maritime search and rescue regions. Combatant commands are directed to provide such support, as appropriate and within their capabilities, to their respective geographic AORs. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs/DPMO is the policy lead for civil SAR, and participates in both the National Search and Rescue Committee and the Mass Rescue Working Group.

c. It is US policy, under the NSP, to use all available resources to carry out national civil SAR responsibilities. These include Federal civil and military resources, state and local resources, private and volunteer resources, and resources available through international cooperative efforts, as appropriate. IAW international procedures, planning and coordination of civil SAR operations are normally carried out under the oversight of an internationally recognized RCC. Plans to provide civil SAR services worldwide are developed for civil aeronautical and maritime civil SAR by the ICAO and IMO, respectively. The US civil SAR system is an integral part of the ICAO-IMO global system. DOD support of civil SAR is predicated on a noninterference basis with primary military missions in accordance with the NSP and DOD policy.

d. Civil SAR Services

   (1) Civil SAR includes aeronautical, maritime, and land SAR. It does not include:

       (a) Air ambulance services which did not result from a rescue or recovery operation.
(b) Rescues from space (although rescue of persons returned from space can be included).

(c) Military operations, such as CSAR or other types of PR to remove military or civilian personnel from harm’s way.

(d) Salvage operations.

(e) Overall response to natural or manmade disasters or terrorist incidents.

(f) Typical disaster response operations such as locating and rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures or other assistance provided under the scope of the National Response Plan (NRP).

(2) In cases where the President declares a “major disaster,” a number of possible national mechanisms are activated to assist state and local governments in the alleviation of the suffering and damage resulting from a major disaster or emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), of the Department of Homeland Security, becomes the lead response agency in such cases as provided in the NRP. The DOD is signatory to the NRP. The circumstances that exist before and after a disaster declaration may involve civil SAR operations carried out under the NSP, and may even involve mass rescue operations as discussed below. When a presidential declaration authorizes actions in relation to the NRP, provisions of the NRP supplement rather than replace those of the NSP. Civil SAR continues to be carried out IAW this publication and other applicable guidance. However, civil SAR activities will need to be coordinated with FEMA and take into account other aspects of the disaster response operations.

(3) **Mass rescue operations** (MROs) are civil SAR operations demanding a substantial surge in response capabilities. MROs are described as civil SAR services characterized by the need for immediate assistance to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the capabilities normally available to local civil SAR authorities are inadequate. Examples of events that could result in the need for MROs include severe weather incidents (e.g., hurricanes, floods, tornadoes), earthquakes, avalanches, volcanic eruptions, and hazardous material incidents. Such events have the potential to quickly overwhelm and exceed the rescue capabilities of other Federal, state, local, and volunteer entities. CCDRs shall ensure that appropriate plans and preparations are in place to be able to effectively conduct or support MROs when tasked.

2. **Responsibilities**

   a. **Civil Authorities.** The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the lead federal agency for matters relating to civil SAR. The NSP describes the federal responsibilities of its signatory agencies and sets forth general principles of civil SAR in a manner valuable to personnel at both the command and unit operating levels. Military personnel who have tasks to carry out related to civil SAR should take time to become familiar with the NSP.
b. **Military Authorities.** The DOD has certain civil SAR responsibilities over land areas of the US, and certain support responsibilities within US SAR geographic divisions. These responsibilities are also detailed in the NSP.

3. **Procedures**

a. There are two key civil SAR documents that military personnel should understand and apply as appropriate. They are the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR), and the US supplement to the IAMSAR, the *National Search and Rescue Supplement* (NSS). IAMSAR is jointly published by ICAO and IMO and adopted for the US by the NSP. The National Search and Rescue Committee, which oversees implementation of the NSS and of which the DOD is a member (DPMO is the DOD representative on the National Search and Rescue Committee and the Chair for the DOD SAR Working Group), developed the NSS and is responsible for its content. Together, the three-volume IAMSAR and the NSS provide extensive information for personnel who may be responsible for civil SAR management, civil SAR planning and coordination, and civil SAR operations involving use of ships, aircraft, or other craft or persons on scene. The NSP and NSS are available to DOD personnel from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library web site. The IAMSAR is a copyrighted publication to which typical restrictions apply regarding reproduction, etc. Combatant commands should use the Publication Section of ICAO in Montreal, Canada, as their primary source for obtaining copies of IAMSAR. A secondary source for this publication is the Publication Section of IMO in London, United Kingdom. Electronic access to IAMSAR also may be found on the USCG web site at [www.uscg.mil](http://www.uscg.mil). Follow the links under “Search & Rescue.” Other pertinent civil SAR references also are found on this site.

b. Military forces supporting civil SAR should be aware that significant terminology and procedural differences exist between the DOD and civil SAR system. Familiarity with civil SAR terminology and procedures will enhance interoperability.
APPENDIX B
US ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY

“We need to focus on Soldiers being able to take care of themselves, then able to take care of their buddies, then able to take care of their larger team . . . It’s all part of the Warrior Ethos: Place the mission first, never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade.”

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, United States Army, 2003

1. General

   a. The Army defines PR as “The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel as determined by the SecDef, who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment.”

   b. IMDC personnel are those US military, DOD civilians, or DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel as designated by the President or the SecDef, who are beyond the positive or procedural control of their unit, in an operational environment requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or escape.

   c. Readily evident from this definition is the fact that we are not just concerned with the recovery of Soldiers. It is every unit’s task to have procedures in place to be ready to recover our own personnel, whether Soldier, civilian, or contractor. Examples of IMDC personnel include:

      (1) Individuals who are unaccounted for as a result of a break in contact (e.g., while on patrol or during a convoy operation) or during a routine 100% personnel and accountability check.

      (2) Hostages.

      (3) POWs.

      (4) Individuals illegally detained by foreign governments.

      (5) Crew of an aircraft experiencing a mishap or shoot down.

   d. The Army’s PR philosophy is one of leadership and accountability. It comprises primarily the Soldier’s Creed, directed responsibilities, and practical considerations. The Soldier’s Creed is a major portion of our PR philosophy. By never accepting defeat, never quitting, and never leaving a fallen comrade behind we ensure that IMDC personnel benefit from core beliefs that demand we expend every possible effort to recover them should they become IMDC on the battlefield.
e. By creating a well-trained and properly equipped force capable of conducting PR we ensure that our adversaries are denied the ability to exploit IMDC personnel for purposes detrimental to the USG or US military forces. An effective PR capability also increases force morale by demonstrating that we will employ every effort possible to recover our IMDC personnel.

2. Responsibilities

a. The Army’s directed PR responsibilities stem from Title 10 USC, directives, and instructions issued by the Office of the SecDef and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, policy issued by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and PR doctrine.

b. Army component commanders are responsible for PR within their operational area unless directed otherwise by the JFC. They may task organize their forces as necessary for PR mission accomplishment. Army component commanders are also responsible for providing PR capability to other components of the joint force when directed by the JFC. Army component commanders establish a PRCC to coordinate PR missions within their operational area and with other components (see FM 3-50.1).

c. While commanders have the authority and responsibility for PR, they cannot fulfill this responsibility alone. Commanders exercise control of military operations through a C2 system that integrates personnel, information management, procedures, equipment, and facilities. The staff members perform a pivotal function in the C2 system providing relevant information to the commander. The commander uses relevant information to achieve situational understanding and make effective PR decisions. The staff then transmits those decisions to subordinate forces in the form of plans, orders, and procedures.

d. **JPRC/PRCC/Personnel Recovery Officer (PRO).** While the staff members collect PR related information in their specialty areas, a central point for gathering the information from all the staff members is required to establish a usable operational picture. The JPRC at the joint level, and the PRCC at the component level, are the fusion points for the staff’s collaborative efforts to gather PR related information. PROs at brigade and below are the fusion points for their respective units. JPRC/PRCC/PRO personnel coordinate with the individual staff members to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate this information.

(1) **JPRC Responsibilities.** The JPRC is responsible for coordinating all PR related matters for the JFC, including PR missions employing joint, interagency, or multinational forces and capabilities. JPRC responsibilities include:

   a. Recommending recovery COAs to decision makers.
   
   b. Developing PR SOPs for the joint force.
   
   c. Coordinating external supported recoveries with interagency and multinational organizations (including host nation capabilities).
(d) Assisting PRCCs in fulfilling their requirements.

(e) Coordinating for theater and national intelligence support to PR.

(2) The JPRC is manned by PR trained and knowledgeable personnel representing each component of the joint force. These personnel provide PR expertise specific to their respective commands. The number of personnel assigned to the JPRC varies based on the size of the operation. Large joint forces require significant capability in the JPRC.

(3) **PRCC Responsibilities.** The PRCC is responsible for coordinating all PR related matters for the component or major subordinate command (MSC) commander. The PRCC also coordinates PR planning, preparation, and execution vertically with the JPRC and horizontally with other PRCCs. PRCC responsibilities include:

(a) Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate unit PROs, other PRCCs and JPRC.

(b) Coordinating deliberate recoveries for the component.

(c) Reviewing accountability and movement reporting procedures of subordinate units.

(d) Army airspace C2 deconfliction during PR missions.

(e) Assisting in immediate recoveries when requested by subordinate units.

(f) Coordinating for component fire support to the operation.

(g) Ensuring subordinate units have access to SOPs developed by the JPRC.

(h) Ensuring subordinate units have sufficient evasion aids.

(4) Commanders must staff PRCCs with appropriate representation from subordinate commands. Personnel representing air, land, maritime, intelligence, and combat service support forces provide a robust capability for the PRCC to coordinate missions with subordinate commands.

e. **PRO Responsibilities.** PROs perform PRCC-like functions at brigade and below. Recommended grades for PROs are combat arms E-7s and above with top secret/SCI access and intermediate PR skills training. Their responsibilities include:

(1) Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate units.

(2) Coordinating immediate recoveries for their units.
(3) Gathering PR-specific information developed by JPRC/PRCCs and disseminate to subordinate units.

(4) Coordinating for unit fire support coordination measures and control measures.

(5) Ensuring subordinate units have access to SOPs developed by the JPRC/PRCC.

(6) Identifying subordinate unit PR equipment shortfalls to the PRCC.

(7) Ensure sufficient evasion aids are available within subordinate units.

3. Command Relationships

There are three principal echelons of command Army commanders may be charged with: command of a joint force component, command of a subordinate JTF, and command of a JTF MSC.

a. Joint Force Component

(1) JFCs may task organize the elements of the joint force by Service or functional capability for operations. They may elect to retain PR C2 authority at their level or task a subordinate component commander to coordinate PR for the joint force. If JFCs retain PR coordinating functions at their level, they establish a JPRC in the operations section of their staff. The JPRC coordinates PR for the commander across the entire joint operations area (JOA). If the JFC tasks a subordinate component to coordinate PR in the JOA for him, this component then becomes the supported commander for PR. It will establish a JPRC to perform the PR functions, as well as maintain a separate PRCC for the component PR function. If a JFC tasks a subordinate component commander with overall PR authority and responsibility in the JOA, it should be the component that possesses the most robust capability to provide effective coordination of joint PR missions and/or mission support capability.

(2) When the JFC task organizes by functional capability, he combines land forces from different Services, such as the Marine Corps and multinational land forces, into a single component. The land component HQ is then built around an existing Army or Marine HQ staff. If Army forces constitute the bulk of the land component, the JFC typically designates an Army commander as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). In this situation, the commander and staff must integrate not only the PR capabilities of attached and assigned Army forces; they must also integrate the PR capabilities of other military forces in the land component. Marine Corps forces have significant PR capabilities that must be integrated. Host nation or multinational forces may also be placed under the JFLCC and must be integrated into the PR plan and C2 system as well.

b. Joint Task Force. JTF commanders have overall responsibility and authority for PR within their JOAs. The JTF commander determines the PR command relationships among the JTF components and establishes a JPRC to coordinate PR throughout the JTF JOA.
c. **Major Subordinate Commands and Below.** JTF MSCs establish PRCCs to coordinate PR within their operational areas and with other MSCs. MSC subordinate units coordinate PR through their respective PROs. As PR missions are executed during operations, the current operations section (or its equivalent) is the optimal location for PROs at echelons below the MSC.

4. **Planning and Preparation**

   a. **General.** PR planning is conducted in six phases. The six phases are: pre-mobilization; mobilization; deployment; employment; sustainment; and redeployment. Pre-mobilization encompasses all activities conducted prior to mobilization. The remaining five phases parallel the five phases of force projection. During pre-mobilization, the commanders and staffs visualize the requirements, conduct in-depth planning and focused training, and integrate rehearsals of PR for all phases. By visualizing the PR requirements and conducting contingency planning for every phase when more time is available, the unit establishes a baseline to effect time-constrained planning during operations.

   b. **Pre-mobilization PR Preparation.** Pre-mobilization preparation includes all efforts during peacetime to organize, train, and equip to accomplish PR missions. Pre-mobilization preparation actions are necessary for commanders and their staffs, units, and individuals and consist of reviewing and developing PR guidance, acquiring PR equipment, and conducting PR focused education and training.

   c. **Mobilization.** During mobilization activities, commanders and staffs obtain specific PR guidance from the supported combatant command. This allows the commander to focus previous training and tailor existing guidance to the specific requirements of the supported combatant command. Examples of combatant command guidance include theater PR regulations, appendix 5 to annex C of OPLANs and OPORDs, theater PR SOPs, PR special instructions, and IPGs.

   d. **Deployment**

      (1) An advanced echelon (ADVON) typically deploys ahead of the main body of forces. The PR cell director or deputy director accompanies the advance party. PR responsibilities of the ADVON include:

      (a) Identify C2 facilities/equipment already in place.

      (b) Verify sufficient facility space for PR cell.

      (c) Confirm PR planning guidance provided by JFC.

      (d) Establish connectivity with the PR architecture for the supported commander.

      (e) Identify ports of debarkation (PODs) locations (PR equipment and personnel accountability).
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(f) Identify/confirm reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) sites and procedures (personnel accountability and PR training location considerations).

(g) Identify PR training requirements not noted during pre-mobilization and confirm training site locations.

(h) Confirm PR equipment requirements for arriving forces.

(2) During deployment, commanders must determine who will be providing PR coverage for their arriving forces. Until commanders can build sufficient combat power to provide PR for their forces, other forces in theater must provide PR support. Early and continuous connectivity with the theater PR architecture enables commanders to report IMDC incidents during deployment. This also allows commanders to report unit status when ready to assume responsibility for assigned PR missions.

(3) Accountability of equipment and personnel can be challenging during deployment. Personnel and equipment arrive at the POD and begin RSOI at different times. Personnel and equipment may even arrive at different PODs. This requires that forces link up with equipment and supplies, sometimes at an intermediate location prior to movement to the staging location. Strict accountability during this phase prevents triggering erroneous IMDC events and ensures that actual events are quickly reported to the theater PR architecture.

e. Employment. Preparation does not stop when employment begins. Rehearsals and battle drills continue and should become more demanding as skills increase. Procedures are refined as after action reviews from PR operations identify changes required in task organization, command relationships, and recovery TTP. New and replacement personnel will require training and equipment. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals continue to refine their skills throughout the employment phase of operations.

f. Redeployment. As units redeploy, actions accomplished for PR are similar to those undertaken during deployment. An important task is the transfer of PR responsibility, including the key task of transferring lessons learned gathered during AARs. If units are redeploying to the continental United States, PR responsibility for the operational area is transferred to incoming forces. If redeploying to another operational area, units must integrate into that operational area’s established PR architecture, or build one if it does not exist. Accountability is another concern during redeployment. As units begin movement, commanders must maintain accountability of personnel that are often at different locations during the redeployment process.

g. Planning Considerations

(1) Commanders and staffs plan for PR tasks by analyzing the organization, training, and equipment required through the three focal lenses; commander and staff, units, and individuals. This helps to determine the activities to be incorporated into plans, orders, and SOPs. Optimally, the plan will identify all the activities that take place during each phase.
(2) With the Army operating around the world, consideration must be given to PR planning throughout full-spectrum operations. PR is conducted on linear and nonlinear battlefields with contiguous or noncontiguous operational areas. PR cell personnel must be creative and proactive in their approach to providing PR capabilities to the ground forces, considering the following fundamentals:

(a) The primary mission continues parallel to the recovery effort.

(b) The goal is recovery of the IMDC person.

1. Plan a system that enforces timely reporting; accurate report validation and location determination; and rapid dissemination of the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.

2. Ensure that the system provides for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.

(c) Prevent the IMDC event.

1. Enforce strict accountability of all Soldiers, contractors, Department of the Army civilians (DAC), and other assigned civilians.

2. Constant training of core warrior skills.

3. Continuously gather information on the nature and level of the threat.

4. Integrate PR into education and training.

5. Reinforce the use of troop leading procedures throughout the force.

6. Anticipate potential IMDC events and develop countermeasures.

7. Emplace positive and procedural controls.

8. Establish a system of reporting channels that cross-queue and interrogate each other.

(d) Prepare for an IMDC event.

1. Identify and train the PR cell personnel.

2. PR cell personnel educate and train commanders, leaders, and fellow staff members in PR system.
3. Plan for all PR tasks from commander and staff, units, and individual perspectives.

4. Integrate the full range of staff directorate capabilities, supporting PR through all six phases.

5. Integrate theater entry requirements for PR into the OPORD.

6. Integrate the rear detachment into the PR family support plan.

7. Organize to be prepared to locate IMDC personnel using all resources.

(e) Design the PR architecture within the C2 system.

1. Design the PR organization.

2. Establish the PR cell.

3. Ensure primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency PR reporting means (software, hardware, formats, dedicated information pipeline, etc.).

4. Integrate PR vertically and horizontally.

5. Ensure the PR system is adaptive in order to flex with operational requirements based on continual AARs, integrating lessons learned into new products, processes, and procedures.

(f) Organize, train, and equip for PR.

1. Organize, train, and equip the PR cell appropriate for the unit’s echelon.

2. Enforce and integrate individual SERE requirements into all training and exercises (e.g., evasion and survival exercises with individuals).

3. Integrate PR events into all collective training to refine staff operations and identify gaps and shortfalls in the organization’s capabilities (e.g., a patrol member missing from a combat patrol; a convoy overdue and out of contact or several vehicles missing; or someone taken hostage in the operational area).

(g) Integrate contractors and DAC into OPLAN/OPORD.

1. Design system to account for contractors and DAC on the battlefield.

2. Establish interface with contractor and DAC representatives.
3. Establish procedures for sharing the common operational picture/situational understanding.

4. Establish procedures to ensure contractors and DAC meet theater entry requirements and maintain proficiency.

(h) Transition the PR capability.

1. Plan for early deployment of the PR capability in the TPFDD.

2. Develop procedures for relief in place of the PR capability.

3. Ensure PR capabilities are available until all forces, including contractors and DAC, have redeployed.

(i) Plan for integrated rehearsals.

1. Throughout all six phases of PR planning.

2. Incorporate the five PR tasks.

(j) Employ the recovery force based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC).

1. Develop and maintain the situational understanding to select the most appropriate unit/force for recovery operation.

2. Ensure PR cell capability to monitor PR asset status.

5. Army Personnel Recovery Options

The Army uses four principal methods when planning and executing military recoveries: immediate, deliberate, external supported, and unassisted.

a. Immediate. Immediate recovery is the sum of actions conducted to locate and recover IMDC personnel by forces directly observing the isolating event or, through the reporting process, determining that IMDC personnel are close enough for them to conduct a rapid recovery. Immediate recovery assumes that the tactical situation permits a recovery with the forces at hand without detailed planning or coordination.

b. Deliberate. Deliberate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by Army forces when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. Weather, enemy actions, IMDC personnel location, and recovery force capabilities are examples of factors that may require the detailed planning and coordination of a deliberate recovery.
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**c. External Supported Recovery (ESR).** ESR is the sum of actions conducted when immediate or deliberate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. ESR is either the support provided by the Army to other JTF components, interagency organizations, or multinational forces or the support provided by these entities to the Army. Close air support (CAS), ISR, and airborne command and control are examples of capabilities that may be required from different components to execute an ESR.

**d. Unassisted Recovery.** Unassisted recovery comprises actions taken by IMDC personnel to achieve their own recovery without outside assistance. An unassisted recovery typically involves an evasion effort by IMDC personnel in order to get back to friendly forces, or to a point where they can be recovered via another method. While the CoC requires IMDC personnel to make every effort to evade or escape, commanders must strive to recover these personnel via one or a combination of the other methods.

6. Capabilities and Limitations (Five Personnel Recovery Tasks)

**a. Commanders should not presume that only Army combat forces possess PR capabilities.** Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces are located across the Army’s battlespace and can provide a variety of support including recovery within their local areas, support to recovery forces such as security, medical or providing C2 for recovery units/forces. Employment of units/forces are based upon METT-TC factors.

**b. Report.** The Army uses several technical means and written formats to report information. The ability of a PRCC or PR element to respond to an IMDC event depends largely on the information it receives in the initial report. Since the initial report may not come to the PRCC or PR element directly from the IMDC person, the intermediate reporting entity (on-scene observer, aircraft that heard it, unit with lost accountability) performs a pivotal role in the PR reporting process. PRCCs depend on these reporting “middlemen” to provide accurate, timely information about the event. If the PRCC or PR element does not receive the initial report, it must be retransmitted immediately to them. The initial report cannot stay in personnel reporting, intelligence, or subordinate unit channels — it must get to the PRCC or PR element. Conversely, if the report goes directly to the PRCC or PR element, it must be retransmitted throughout the PR architecture once validated. Report requirements, including reporting time requirements, will be stated in the policies, plans, or orders. If an immediate recovery attempt is in progress, the details need to be communicated to the PRCC or PR element. This allows the PRCC or PR element to determine what support is required, if any, by the units conducting the immediate recovery. It also permits notification of the other staff and support elements to begin a coordinated effort to support the reintegration of IMDC after a successful recovery.

**c. Locate.** The Army uses technical and nontechnical means to locate IMDC personnel. Army methodology may include air, ground, and riverine search by personnel, Army sensors, and requests for or planned external support. In order to better support the locate task, the Army policy, plans or orders will include the planned Army methodology for commanders and staffs, units/forces, and the general means that IMDC personnel will assist in their own recovery by using either technical or nontechnical means to identify themselves.
d. **Support.** While planning continues, IMDC personnel require support until units can conduct a recovery. The support task includes any and all support required by Army units/forces to conduct recovery, the prepared actions to support IMDC personnel, and the coordinated actions to support families of IMDC personnel, as applicable. Support includes the use of all available assets up to and including national level assets, agencies, and organizations. As more information is gathered about the event, coordination with rear detachment personnel to ensure the family is adequately supported should be confirmed. For immediate recoveries, the first indication that the family receives that their loved one was IMDC may be news of the recovery. For long duration events, such as known captivity, support to the family by casualty affairs officers, public affairs offices, chaplains, etc., becomes more important and can play a pivotal role in the successful recovery of IMDC personnel. Maintaining communications with IMDC Service representatives and with home station/unit representatives facilitates family support by these individuals during the event. For contract personnel, coordinate these actions through the contractor’s company. The Department of the Army Reintegration OPLAN reintegration checklist provides family support considerations.

**HISTORICAL VIGNETTE — ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY IN THE KOREAN WAR**

“In April 1951, Air Force observation pilot Melvin J. Shadduck found himself caught in a canyon with an airplane full of holes from ground fire. After landing his dying aircraft, Shadduck, hampered by an injured arm and hand, attempted to evade capture, but six Chinese soldiers found him and took him prisoner . . .

When he made his move, he walked to the bluff where he usually dumped refuse, then kept on going to the closest escape line, the Imjin River.

[He found help from a Korean boy who helped lead him back to American lines. Initially, they almost bumped into a Chinese unit.]

“Later the boy rushed to Shadduck with the good new, “Americans. Americans. Come. Come.” Wary of another false alarm, Shadduck and the boy carefully approached the United Nations troops and discovered that they were Greeks on patrol with the US 7th Cavalry. His ordeal of thirty-four days in captivity was far from over, however.

As soon as he reached the United Nations lines, Shadduck reported that he had left other prisoners behind waiting for rescue. Being an airman, Shadduck thought immediately of a helicopter rescue and an air assault, but those tactics would have to wait for the next war in Vietnam. He was with the Army now, and the colonel said, “We’ll do it with tanks.” With combat air cover searching for Shadduck’s earlier marker signal, “6 PW,” the tanks rumbled into the prisoner of war (POW) area, and under enemy fire, the remaining Americans and the Turk were loaded into the vehicles and taken away. The wounded POWs were soon transferred to waiting
helicopters that took them to hospitals. For them it was a good day; Shadduck had kept his promise.”

SOURCE: *A Prisoner’s Duty, Great Escapes in US Military History*, by Robert C. Doyle

e. **Recover.** Normally, recovery in uncertain, hostile, or denied environments requires Army combat assets to recover IMDC personnel. However, CS and CSS forces should not overlook their supporting role as they are employed across the Army footprint in a nonlinear environment. Recovery can as simple as immediately locating IMDC personnel after a break in contact.

(1) **Maneuver Units.** Infantry, armor, aviation, cavalry, and long range surveillance units are normally not tasked to provide dedicated units or task forces to cover possible PR incidents. However, mission planning for a specific operation, tasking by the JFC, or METT-TC may require the Army component commander or subordinate commander to task organize a dedicated capability.

(2) **Army ground forces** conduct recovery the same way they would execute a combat patrol similar to a raid or movement to contact to execute a link up operation. They use the same organization, planning, preparation, and support commensurate with the size of recovery force and environment. Physical contact with IMDC personnel requires planning, preparation, and execution and should follow the same general considerations as a friendly forces linkup in uncertain or hostile terrain.

(3) **Army aviation units** are capable of rapidly recovering isolated personnel over extended distances compared to Army ground forces. However, they are usually general support forces and not intended to be used in prolonged or dedicated use such as USAF/US Navy (USN) CSAR task forces (CSARTFs). Army aviation units can task organize similar to a CSARTF, but they do not possess the same capabilities.

(4) **Army maritime/riverine units** are multi-mission resources that can be considered potential resources for PR missions. Army watercraft may be the asset of choice after analyzing adversary capabilities, mission requirements, and forces available. The Army uses watercraft primarily for resupply, logistics over-the-shore operations, and other troop support in littoral areas and inland waterways. Army vessels normally operate in lower threat maritime environments within the protection of other military forces. They have limited weaponry (self defense) and combat survivability. PR missions performed by Army watercraft in a combat environment should be limited to their operational area.

(5) **Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF).** US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is the major command that organizes, trains, and equips ARSOF. USASOC consists of Special Forces, special operations aviation, Ranger, civil affairs, and PSYOP units. Special Forces, aviation, and Ranger units are often task organized to provide a capability to support special operations
missions and recoveries for the joint force. ARSOF normally operate under SOF C2 such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), SOC, or SOF functional command. Under this configuration SOF C2 is a component of a joint force and provides the JFC their plans or orders and capabilities for employment. During those times when ARSOF may be placed under an Army component command, they will be employed IAW their doctrine and within their capabilities. As a subordinate command under the Army component, they will establish a PR C2 node consistent with their doctrine and SOPs. The Army PR policies, plans, or orders will include ARSOF capabilities when ARSOF are subordinate to an Army component. The use of USASOC assets for PR missions is often desired because of their unique capabilities to penetrate and operate within hostile areas. Special Forces units also provide UAR in areas where conventional recovery is not feasible, not acceptable, or not available. The Army component will make maximum use of, and assist, ARSOF planning and preparation of UAR in support of the Army policies, plans, or orders and JFC. FM 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery, describes UAR and other PR missions as performed by Special Forces units.

f. **Reintegrate.** PR execution does not stop with the successful recovery of IMDC personnel — it continues through the reintegration process. The goal of reintegration is two-fold: attend to the medical needs of the recovered personnel, and gather information about the event having immediate impact on current and future operations. The overriding concern during reintegration is the health and welfare of the recovered personnel. These factors take precedence over all others during the reintegration process. Reintegration team personnel must often balance these factors with the need to gather pertinent information from the recovered personnel. Commanders and staff will ensure that this activity is planned, prepared, and rehearsed IAW the Army PR policies, plans, and orders. This will ensure that IMDC personnel are properly debriefed and thoroughly decompressed before deciding to either return and reintegrate them with their units/forces after phase I of reintegration, or continue the reintegration process IAW the Army Reintegrate Plan, theater regulations, and DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*. Ultimately, the Army desires to have all IMDC personnel reintegrated with their units. The Army PR policies, plans, and orders, consistent with the JTF or theater plan, will address expectations, locations, capabilities, limitations, and reports associated with phase I, phase II, and phase III reintegration.

6. **Concept of Operations**

   a. **Planning.** Army units can be widely dispersed and may operate independently for extended periods of time. The fluid nature of these operations requires commanders to plan and conduct linkup operations with isolated forces or personnel on a routine basis. This includes the recovery of Army personnel as well as those designated by the JFC. These missions will require a unique combination of individual and unit training, equipment, and tactics.

   (1) PR planning and execution of IMDC personnel should be expedited. Expedited, does not imply that units cease or suspend operations or rush to conduct the search and recovery. On the contrary, a fully integrated PR plan permits the commander and/or staff to handle an IMDC incident with little or no interference to operations. Immediate recovery is most feasible before an adversary has an opportunity to react. Before an immediate recovery is initiated, however, the on-scene or local commander
should evaluate the overall mission, tactical situation, and the potential risk to personnel and equipment. Commanders should remember that emotion does not dictate recovery when a unit member is isolated or missing. For example, commanders and/or staffs must decide between using speed versus compromising security in uncertain and hostile terrain. If PR operations are well planned, coordinated, and rehearsed, units/forces can normally execute their missions and recover personnel simultaneously.

(2) METT-TC will influence the tactics and resources utilized by Army commanders to plan and execute PR missions. METT-TC and the situation will dictate COAs and solutions between immediate, deliberate, and external supported recovery.

b. Execution

(1) Immediate PR. Immediate PR occurs as soon as commanders or staffs recognize there is an accountability issue with a Soldier they own. This can occur as a result of the daily personnel reports, missed checkpoints, overdue aircraft or vehicles, or even during consolidation and reorganization in the middle of combat operations. It is the sum of actions that local or on-site commanders and staff take to immediately report an IMDC situation, and execute the locate and recover tasks within their assigned operational areas. During on-going combat operations, a unit that experiences an IMDC situation may not be able to conduct a significant search and recovery due to the continuing mission requirements of that unit. That is why the immediate report is critical to produce the deliberate PR options by vertical or horizontal elements.

(2) Deliberate PR. Deliberate PR is the sum of plans and actions that occur across the Army component capability beginning with an IMDC incident report. Deliberate PR is the direct use of a particular unit or type of force. It includes a variety of integrated Army capabilities including air, ground, and riverine. PRCCs are responsible to conduct multi-echelon coordination and deconfliction internal and external to the Army. This continues until the IMDC personnel are recovered successfully regardless of the Army’s recovery capability.

(3) External Support Recovery. External support recovery is the sum of coordination and support provided by any entity external to that component. This is the responsibility of the PRCC and the commander’s staff. Routinely, components of a joint force have arranged for various national and operational level support to conduct PR. This support should be cited in the joint CONOPs for PR and should be exercised and rehearsed routinely.

7. Education and Training

a. General. There are many aspects to PR education and training. Army Service component commands (ASCCs) and MSCs must focus PR education on the three principal focal lenses in this appendix: commanders and staffs, units/forces, and individuals.

b. Commanders and Staffs

(1) ASCCs have identified PR offices and personnel IAW Army Policy 525-03-1. ASCCs and MSCs are required by policy to have personnel functionally trained in PR. Most often, ASCCs do
not deploy. Therefore it is even more critical that MSCs and maneuver elements ensure they have personnel functionally trained in PR commensurate with their levels of actions. The lead for PR normally resides within the G/S-3; more specifically current operations or plans. It is essential that all staff directorates are familiar with PR and their roles in supporting operations. As an example, the G/S-1 could receive a report of DUSTWUN. While this normally falls into personnel reports and accountability, it is incumbent with the commander and his or her PR C2 to ensure that the whole G/S-1 section realize that this is an IMDC situation and G/S-3 operations must be notified immediately. Since this IMDC situation triggers planning and preparation for operations it is equally critical that the G/S-2 be involved for providing intelligence and combat information for planning and execution. Likewise, the G/S-4, G/S-5, and G/S-6 must be included in planning and execution. The commander and staff may elect to obtain education and training internal to the Army, send personnel externally to other Service schools, or coordinate for a variety of education and training provided by the Services, USJFCOM, and JPRA.

(2) **Units/Forces.** The commander designates or dedicates units and forces to conduct PR functions. Units/forces are required to plan, prepare, execute, and assess PR execution. Units must include exercises and rehearsals for PR. These units or forces are responsible to prepare their SOPs for execution and provide their COAs for the PR plans and orders. To properly train units or forces, the commanders must ensure they are educated and trained. To that end, education and training refers to PR specific functional training and specific PR education regarding the country they are deploying to. The commander and staff may elect to obtain education and training internal to the Army, send personnel externally to other Service schools, or coordinate for a variety of education and training provided by the Services, USJFCOM, and JPRA.

(3) **Individuals.** Education and training for individuals refers to the preparation of Soldiers to deploy to a specific country. Theater requirements may set the SERE training level for forces deploying. The historical terms high-risk-of-capture (HRC) and the new term high risk-of-isolation do not have specific meaning to the Army in general as PR currently applies to uncertain, hostile, and denied territory. The Army considers all its personnel at risk because of these three environments, the Army footprint across a nonlinear battlespace, and the asymmetrical threat. Commanders must ensure all forces are prepared for the deployment to specific environments. Commanders must prepare and implement typical control measures for the accountability and reporting of individuals and rehearse reporting immediately of a suspected or known situation. Commanders and staffs, units/forces, and individuals should repeatedly rehearse isolating situations that require specific actions from all three groups. Commanders and staff plan, disseminate, and rehearse actions taken by individuals in the event they become IMDC. Some traditional PR actions, such as preparing EPAs, are considered HRC plans. The Army does not plan evasion for every individual Soldier nor does it allow every Soldier to plan independent evasion and record that on an EPA. The Army uses centralized planning and dissemination by staffs to all forces to provide for individual actions. PR’s focus is in operations. The Army’s maneuver elements are task organized into brigades. PR is the staff responsibility of the Brigade S-3 with subject matter expertise provided by the PRO. All other staff sections support daily operational plans and SOPs for IMDC Soldiers. This responsibility resides down to battalions for aviation units. The same is true for DD1833 ISOPREP cards. Historically, the DD1833 focused on high-risk-of-capture personnel. Soldiers should be briefed routinely on the up-to-date methods of employed PR forces.
8. Incorporating Contractor Personnel into the Army Personnel Recovery Program

The Army recognizes that contractor support has become a vital asset to mission success on the modern battlefield. As such, the Army is obligated to properly support and protect contractors who are authorized to accompany the force. Because of this new operational reality, the Army force commander supporting Army contracting organizations, and contractor organizations themselves will use a designated automated contractor personnel accountability/contract visibility system. The system will provide the Army force commander by-name accountability of all contractors deploying with the force (required per DOD policy), as well as other contract personnel, the government furnished support requirement information as directed by the JFC or Army force commander. The system assists the Army force commander to incorporate designated contractor personnel into the PR program. The policies and procedures for the contractor accountability program are codified in all applicable Army policy.
23 January 1991
Wolf 01

“This F-16 from the 614 TFS was the lead aircraft in a flight of four fragged for an interdiction target near Kuwait City. Immediately after it dropped its bombs the aircraft burst into flames. The pilot, Major Jon Ball, was able to glide over the Persian Gulf before ejecting. The orbiting AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] monitored his ‘MAYDAY’ call and notified the JRCC [Joint Rescue Coordination Center] who tasked the mission to the US Navy. The Navy RCC [Rescue Coordination Center] launched an SH-60, call sign Spade 50, from HSL-44. It was stationed aboard the USS Nicholas on combat recovery duty in the northern Gulf area.”

Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm
Darrel D. Whitcomb

1. General

   a. Navy units are tasked and trained to execute a full spectrum of PR missions, including over water recovery, underwater recovery, and over land recovery. NWP 3-50.1, Navy Search And Rescue (SAR) Manual, spells out Navy PR missions in permissive environment (includes surface, air, and submarine disaster SAR missions).

   b. For isolated personnel located in low or medium anti-air threat areas, recoveries are assigned to units specialized in CSAR. Traditionally, CSAR assets have been trained and equipped to rescue forces most likely to be isolated during combat, including downed aviators and distressed SOF. Naval CSAR doctrine can be found in NWP 350.22, Combat Search and Rescue Manual, and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare. Navy CSAR includes all previous CSAR requirements, but places increased emphasis on integrating rescue planning and coordination into planning and execution of all strike operations.

2. Responsibilities

   a. A Navy component commander (NCC) or joint force maritime component commander may establish a RCC as directed by the JFC or in support of component operations. However, the senior member (usually the officer in tactical command [OTC]) of any deployed unit or group of units is directly responsible for conducting unit PR operations. In most cases, the carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group commander is the OTC. To ensure effective and expeditious execution of CSAR missions, the OTC establishes a rescue coordination team (RCT) as described in NTTP Publication 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare. The RCT is the Navy’s functional equivalent of a component PRCC. The RCT is the planning and operations nucleus responsible to the strike warfare commander for conduct and execution of all CSAR operations. RCT responsibilities include planning, coordination, control, and recovery of downed aircrews in combat operations.
b. The carrier air wing is responsible for providing assistance in planning and executing all CSAR missions through the RCT. Additionally, the air wing commander ensures that trained crews and aircraft are available to meet potential CSAR mission requirements. The carrier intelligence center is the central clearing point and storage center for intelligence specific to the CSAR mission. The carrier intelligence center is also directly responsible for information pertaining to planning and executing all CSAR operations.

c. The senior member of the RCT should function as the CSAR mission controller, and be directly responsible to the strike warfare commander for the conduct and execution of CSAR missions.

d. **Amphibious Operations.** During an amphibious operation, the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), is responsible for CSAR in the AOA. CSAR planning is coordinated with the commander, landing force (CLF).

   (1) The CLF staff is not structured to support landing force (LF) CSAR requirements. Consequently, the CATF staff should coordinate CSAR assets or request CSAR support from the JPRC.

   (2) If a carrier strike group (CSG) is in support of the amphibious operation and not under the OPCON of the CATF, the CATF should coordinate with the CSG commander to ensure clarity of CSAR responsibilities.

   (3) Once C2 of the LF has been passed ashore, the CLF is responsible to the CATF for CSAR in the land portion of the AOA until the amphibious operation is terminated.

3. **Command Relationships**

   a. **Component**

      (1) Figure C-1 shows the Navy’s CSAR command relationships.

      (2) The Navy component commander should relinquish TACON of forces capable of CSAR as directed by the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander or the JPRC when these forces are committed to a joint recovery operation.

   b. **Joint.** The Navy forces should relinquish TACON of forces capable of CSAR as directed by the JFC to a JFC-designated component commander or to the JPRC when these forces are committed to a joint recovery operation.

4. **Capabilities and Limitations**

   a. **General.** Determination of assets employed in a CSAR role is affected by the operational area and the threat. Types of assets and capabilities available to the OTC to execute the five PR execution tasks are:
b. **Report.** Most naval platforms have inherent reporting capabilities (radio, other signaling devices). Aircraft, combatants, and self-contained units (naval special warfare, naval construction battalions, etc.) normally have LOS radio and are likely integrated with theater or component C2 systems. Individual personnel who become separated from their unit/platform may or may not be equipped with reporting capabilities depending on their mission and status. Aircrew and SOF, for example, normally employ individual tactical or survival radios and beacons, which may have self-reporting and location capabilities.

c. **Locate.** Most naval aircraft are equipped with direction-finding equipment that can assist in locating isolated personnel. Additionally, navy carrier air wings deploy with a limited number of PRC-112B/G interrogators that can derive encoded GPS locations from PRC-112B/G radios. Navy aircrew and SOF may also employ the combat survivor evader locator radio. HH-60 and MH-60S helicopters can be equipped with the DALS, which can note range/bearing to PRC-112 radios. Finally, all Navy tactical air and embarked helicopter assets deploy with NVDS, which can be integrated with isolated personnel IR signaling devices. The Navy RCC or RCT should be consulted to determine what tools isolated personnel may have in their possession.
d. Support. The Navy has no dedicated assets for resupply of isolated personnel. Additionally, Navy helicopter aircrews, while capable of providing some direct fire and medical support to an isolated person, are not specifically trained as combat recovery personnel. Therefore, Navy recovery forces may include SOF for such support if required. The RMC or other tactical aircraft can provide CAS for isolated personnel prior to the recovery phase. For additional information, see paragraph 4e “Recover” below and consult NWP 3-50.22, Combat Search and Rescue Manual, and NWP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare.

e. Recover

(1) Helicopters

(a) Direct Recovery. The types of organic platforms available to the OTC include helicopters of varying size and capability. Only specific helicopter communities are trained and equipped to operate in hostile overland environments.

1. Organic battle group CSAR assets consist of selected CSAR-trained crews within each carrier-based helicopter antisubmarine (HS) squadron or helicopter sea combat (HSC) squadron. HS squadrons operate the legacy HH-60H helicopter. HSC squadrons operate the newer MH-60H helicopter. The MH-60S is being upgraded to replace the HH-60H with survivability equipment, armament, and range enhancements. Upon completion, HS squadrons will be replaced by HSC squadrons. Both squadron types are capable of forming independently operating detachments that can operate from smaller ships and land bases. Squadrons equipped with HH-60H or appropriately configured MH-60S helicopters are trained to conduct day and night CSAR and naval special warfare (NSW) operations in a hostile small arms and IR missile environment. HH-60H and MH-60S crews are specially trained in terrain flight, flying in hostile environments, night vision goggles (NVGs), and NSW support. Ingress and egress routes using terrain masking, when combined with suppression of adversary air defenses, facilitate operations in medium-threat levels.

2. If there are no designated joint CSAR assets, organic assets within CSG are prioritized as follows:

   a. Embarked HS/HSC helicopters.

   b. Embarked helicopter strike maritime squadron helicopters (over water only).

   c. Other helicopter (over water only).

3. CSAR assets external to the CSG should be planned for, coordinated, and requested as part of the initial strike planning activities. Requests for support are forwarded via the PRCC. Requests for Reserve forces should be coordinated via the NCC.
4. Helicopters capable of performing night rescues over water are the SH-60B/F, HH-60H, and MH-60S.

(b) **Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force.** If a direct airborne recovery is not feasible, helicopters and crews may be used within their threat-level capability in a support role for NSW CSAR operations. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, helicopter range, and threat assessment, helicopters may insert and/or extract recovery forces.

(2) **Special Operations Forces.** Because of their inherent capabilities, SOF can provide a viable contingency recovery option. Planners should carefully analyze the threat so that the recovery force is not unduly exposed to the adversary.

(a) **NSW Forces.** In general, NSW strike and rescue forces use SEALs, various nonorganic air assets, and/or organic surface craft, including high-speed special operations (SO) craft, rigid hull inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding craft, riverine craft, and subsurface craft. These personnel and assets can be pre-positioned aboard or in the vicinity of a carrier conducting strike operations, with an amphibious ready group, aboard a submarine for clandestine insertion and recovery, or at other locations in close proximity to the area where rescue operations may be required. These forces are organized to:

1. Facilitate contact, authentication, security, medical treatment, movement, and exfiltration for recovery of isolated personnel in high-threat areas.
2. Clandestinely recover evaders to safeguard the integrity of designated evasion areas.
3. Coordinate NSFS or CAS in support of NSW recovery efforts.
4. Collect data for intelligence support of ongoing or future operations.

(b) **Other SOF.** Based upon the availability of other US or friendly SOF and depending upon the situation and compatibility of forces, SOF other than NSW forces may be employed in support of Navy CSAR operations.

(3) **Surface and Subsurface**

(a) **Direct Recovery.** The Navy uses surface ships and submarines to recover isolated personnel in an open water environment.

(b) **Insert and/or Extract Recovery Force.** Surface and subsurface platforms may be used to support CSAR operations in the event neither direct airborne recovery nor airborne insertion and/or extraction of the recovery force is feasible. Based upon such factors as the size of the recovery force, OTH navigation requirements, and threat assessment; surface and subsurface platforms may insert and/or extract the recovery force. Submarines, because of their
ability to clandestinely insert and extract recovery force personnel, are particularly valuable for situations in which local surface and/or air superiority is not assured.

(4) Other Forces. The following forces are best suited to support the recovery task as described.

(a) Tactical Aircraft. Typical air assets available within a CSG include fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft; helicopters; surveillance, electronic countermeasures, and command, control, and communications aircraft; and a few tactical aerial refueling aircraft. Also, land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft may be operating in direct support of a CSG. MPR aircraft include the P-3 and EP-3. Long endurance, multiple sensors, and extensive communications capability make the P-3 an ideal overwater search platform. A Navy-led recovery force will normally include a designated RMC. The RMC is a specially-trained tactical aircrew (normally a FAC(A)-designated F/A-18F crew) who will relieve the OSC and direct the recovery mission. The RMC will authenticate and locate isolated personnel (if required), defeat ground threats in the vicinity of a recovery zone, and ensure the safety of recovery assets. RMC aircraft should be placed in an alert status if assets allow. More specifics on RMC employment can be found in NWP 3-50.22, Combat Search and Rescue Manual, and NWP 303.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare. Considerations for using tactical aircraft in a CSAR mission, in order of importance, are as follows:

1. Fuel Considerations and Time on Station. Tactical aircraft are heavily dependent upon proximity of the carrier to the isolated personnel location and/or availability of in-flight refueling. Because of endurance limitations, it might be feasible to only provide a RESCORT during the last phase of a CSAR pickup (i.e., from initial point to pickup to initial point).

2. Threat Level. Standardized tactics for fixed-wing RESCORT are based upon a low-threat environment. Under medium-threat conditions, RESCORT tactics, including threat-suppression tactics, if considered at all, should be thoroughly briefed to all CSAR mission participants and vary based upon location and type of threat.

3. Night Capabilities. For night CSAR operations necessitated by elevated daytime threat levels, fixed-wing support aircraft employing NVDs and/or radar terrain avoidance systems should be used. Such equipment greatly enhances the ability of the OSC, RMC, and RESCORT to locate and sanitize, while decreasing their detectability to adversary troop and air defense forces.

4. Support Ordnance. Ordnance requirements depend upon threat weapon systems. For any threat level, use of advanced weapon systems for increased standoff and pinpoint delivery would enhance the suppression of adversary capabilities and minimize aircraft exposure.

5. Weather. Weather minimums differ for individual elements of the CSARTF, and are not always adequate to conduct a CSAR mission. Each mission should have
planned and briefed minimum weather criteria based on the threat, terrain, and requirements for mission accomplishment. Should the situation require RESCORT in limited airspace and/or adverse weather, extreme vigilance and precision are paramount. The OTC, through the RCT, makes the ultimate mission go/no-go decision.

(b) **C2 Aircraft.** Embarked E-2C Hawkeye aircraft will normally be designated as an AMC for a Navy-led recovery task force. The AMC will coordinate threat-suppression efforts, maintain long-range and SATCOM communications with the RCC, and can assist in locating and authenticating isolated personnel. Normally the AMC will be trained in the airborne battle command, control, and communications role. The AMC should track fuel and weapons states, maintain datalink connectivity to and from rescue forces, and coordinate for the use and release of external assets as the recovery situation dictates. More specifics on E-2C AMC employment can be found in NWP 3-50.22, *Combat Search and Rescue*, and NWP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*.

(c) **Ships.** Ships may be tasked with providing NSFS, lifeguard functions, on-deck refueling, helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR), and emergency landing decks.

f. **Reintegration.** The Navy retains a limited number of SERE psychologists and debriefers at the Navy SERE schools to support joint and Service reintegration plans. Should a large-scale reintegration of Navy personnel become necessary, the Navy may request support from JPRA or other Services.

5. **Concept of Operations**

a. **General.** CSAR forces may employ any one of a variety of procedures to recover isolated personnel. The situation and threat will dictate the specific TTP employed. Personnel in nontactical, permissive environments can expect to be recovered using SAR procedures. Independent helicopter operations in conjunction with NSW are an additional option. Recovery methods employed in hostile environments may vary considerably. Plans should be flexible to ensure efficient employment of available resources with respect to the specific level of threat. The OTC should establish a basis for go/no-go criteria to provide the conditions and circumstances in which the OTC is willing to risk additional assets to conduct CSAR.

b. **Planning**

(1) Planning for the CSAR mission begins during predeployment training. A complete CSAR posture should be developed using an orderly and logical planning process. Planners should apply the following three criteria to each phase of CSAR planning:

(a) Theater or subordinate joint force PR guidance or CONOPS.

(b) Strike planning and associated rescue contingencies.

(c) Final rescue mission planning.
(2) The PRCC and the RCT should make an inventory of organic and external resources available to the battle group. This should include all aviation and non-aviation resources, their respective capabilities and limitations, proper request channels, and the estimated time needed from receipt of CSAR requests to availability on station.

(3) Planning for a CSAR mission requires specialized intelligence. In the preplanning and predeployment phases, the PRCC, the RCT, and carrier intelligence center are responsible for acquiring applicable intelligence publications and developing a database for CSAR mission planning.

(4) The CSAR mission often involves coordinated operations using fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Because of differences in flight regimes, aircraft-specific threats should be carefully evaluated by the PRCC and the RCT to determine the appropriate rescue vehicle to be used or requested. The threat varies with weapon systems as well as the employment doctrine and tactics of the adversary.

c. Execution. The modern battlefield relies heavily on control of the air and immediate reaction for targeting. In a time-sensitive environment, PR missions are allocated resources for an immediate recovery if a survivor’s location is known and valid. In the sea or coastal area, the NCC should have forces that can feasibly execute rapid PR and be able to suppress adversary defenses effectively in small areas for short periods. Recovery of personnel inland requires extensive planning to circumvent air defense and surface threats, localize and authenticate isolated personnel, and coordinate support forces such as tactical aircraft, NSFS, shore-based artillery and ground forces, and SOF. Options include the following:

(1) Clandestine or supported helicopter recoveries.

(2) Direct or supported surface recoveries.

(3) Direct or clandestine subsurface recoveries.

(4) SOF recoveries.

6. Education and Training

a. Commanders and Staffs

(1) An integral part of CSAR training is training given to air wing intelligence personnel. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, provides classroom and mission planning training to air wing intelligence officers responsible for coordinating the intelligence requirements of the RCT and CSARTF, and integrates them into each CSAR rehearsal conducted with their particular air wing.
(2) Naval forces commanders, component commanders, and fleet commanders need a working knowledge of the PR architecture from both the naval and joint perspective. PR planners and RCC staffs should be manned by personnel who have completed PR joint training.

b. **Recovery Forces.** A limited number of fighter/attack aircrews in each carrier air wing are specially trained as FAC(A)s and to respond to CSAR missions, as a qualified RMC. Currently, a minimum of five crews within each HS/HSC squadron are trained in threat awareness and avoidance, terrain flight, CSAR tactics, NVG flight, and the preparation of ISOPREPs and EPAs during predeployment training. Additionally, NSAWC provides detailed integrated CSAR training that includes all tactical air, airborne early warning, HS/HSC, MPR, and ICs as well as the specific NSW and HCS unit that may be part of later battle group operations. This training attains a CSAR capability up to medium threat as defined in NTTP 3-03.4, *Naval Strike and Air Warfare*, but achieves an overall air wing CSAR capability up to and including the high-threat environment when using the NSW forces.

c. **Isolated Personnel.** All Navy personnel receive Level A CoC training at their accession point, followed by continuing training during annual general military training. Level B training is conducted by individuals, as required by CCDRs. High-risk of capture (aircrew and some NSW personnel) receive Level C training at least once during their careers.
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APPENDIX D
US MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

The Marine Corps views PR as an implicit requirement in all combat operations. All elements of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) possess the ability to support PR operations, or participate in the recovery of isolated personnel. The MAGTF commander may, or may not, elect to dedicate forces to perform this mission; however, additional capability to perform self-supporting recovery operations and external PR support is provided through a concept known as tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP). Aviation, ground, or waterborne assets, or any combination of these may conduct a TRAP mission. The TRAP mission differs from CSAR in that it usually does not involve extended visual search procedures to locate isolated personnel, particularly in a medium- or high-air threat environment. TRAP assets may also be employed in the conduct of other, non-recovery, missions, and called upon to perform a recovery as it becomes necessary. The TRAP concept emphasizes detailed planning and the use of assigned and briefed personnel for the specific purpose of recovering personnel and/or aircraft. The MAGTF commander may utilize the TRAP force when an immediate recovery is impractical, or the tactical situation necessitates the additional capabilities a TRAP force provides. Confirmation of a survivor(s) status and location is typically required prior to committing a force to a recovery.

2. Responsibilities

a. US Marine Corps (USMC) forces deploying to an operational area should be prepared to conduct self-supporting recovery operations.

b. The MAGTF commander is responsible for the conduct of TRAP operations involving his forces. The MAGTF commander should also be prepared to provide augmentation personnel to the JPRC and component PRCC, if established, as required and directed by higher authority.

c. The MAGTF commander should ensure that all MAGTF personnel committed to a hostile environment are familiar with tactics employed by PR forces during recovery operations.

d. The MAGTF commander should provide mutual support to PR operations of other joint force components to the greatest extent possible.

e. MAGTF subordinate commanders should ensure that their personnel are familiar with evasion and PR tactics and are capable of meeting individual responsibilities.

f. MAGTF commanders are responsible to ensure personnel identified to organize, prepare, and conduct PR are functionally trained commensurate with their responsibilities. Likewise the commander must ensure that subordinate commanders are directed to plan and execute their PR specified tasks.
3. Command Relationships

a. Component. For military operations, Marine forces are formed into MAGTFs under a single commander. MAGTFs are task organizations consisting of command, aviation, ground, and combat service support elements. The MAGTF is a self-sufficient, integrated, air-ground combined arms force organized for combat. TRAP is a MAGTF mission. As such, all elements of the MAGTF may participate in the TRAP mission.

(1) The MAGTF commander should retain OPCON of assigned forces in order to take advantage of the unique and balanced combined arms capability of the force.

(2) When MAGTF assets deploy in advance of the main body, a MAGTF forward command element (FCE) should be established. OPCON remains with the MAGTF commander and is exercised by the MAGTF’s FCE.

(3) The MAGTF commander may be tasked with supporting other component PR efforts. When tasked to support these efforts, the MAGTF commander, as a supporting commander, may attach the forces designated by the MAGTF commander to the supported component commander. The command relationship (normally TACON) will be specified in the governing directive.

b. Joint. The JFC can task the Marine component commander to establish a JTF, or Marine Corps forces may make up the preponderance of forces within a JTF. In either case, the Marine forces must be prepared to establish a capability to coordinate and execute PR missions within their assigned area of operations. Marine components will exercise command and control through operations centers and staffs using policies, PR CONOPS, and orders within their operation centers. It is incumbent on the JTF commander to require components to plan, prepare, and provide PR capabilities, PR C2 nodes, PR CONOPS, and conduct exercises and rehearsals.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. General. Commanders should not presume that only the aviation element of a MAGTF possesses PR capabilities. Units from the ground combat, combat service support, and command elements are located across the Marine Corps’ battlespace and can provide a variety of support including recovery within their local areas, support to recovery forces such as security or medical, or providing C2 for recovery units/forces. Employments of units/forces are based upon mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available — time available dependent.

b. Report. The Marine Corps uses various technical means and written formats to report information. Regardless of the means or format a suspected or known isolated person be reported through the chain of command and local PR C2 nodes immediately. Without operational visibility of an isolating situation, the prospect of a timely, successful recovery diminishes rapidly. Marine Corps units will report an isolating incident to their chain of command immediately. The isolating incident will also be reported to the theater or JFC PR architecture immediately, as the Marine Corps
US Marine Corps Personnel Recovery

plans and executes both immediate and deliberate recovery measures. Report requirements, including reporting time requirements, will be stated in operational orders or PR CONOPS.

c. **Locate.** The Marine Corps uses technical and nontechnical means to locate isolated personnel. Marine Corps methodology may include air, ground, and maritime search by personnel, sensors, and requests for or planned external support. Unit CONOPS and SOPs should include the planned methodology for commanders and staffs, units/forces, and the general means that isolated personnel will assist in their own recovery.

d. **Support.** Support includes any and all support required by Marine Corps units/forces to conduct recovery, the prepared actions to support isolated personnel, and the coordinated actions to support families of isolated personnel family as applicable. Support includes the use of all available assets up to and including national level assets, agencies, and organizations.

e. **Recover.** Normally, recovery in an uncertain, hostile, or denied environment requires Marine Corps combat assets to recover isolated personnel. All elements of the MAGTF may be called upon to support or conduct a recovery of an isolated person.

1. **Command Element.** The command element (CE) is the MAGTF HQ and is composed of the commander; the commander’s staff; and a surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (SRI) capability. The commander is responsible for the C2 and coordination of all MAGTF elements, including assigning tasks and providing the direction needed to accomplish the TRAP mission. The CE can provide information and intelligence to develop adversary, terrain, and weather databases to be used to plan and execute a TRAP mission. SRI resources have a capability to perform clandestine extracts.

2. **Aviation Combat Element**

   (a) Although assault support normally will be the main supporting function executed for the aviation combat element portion of TRAP, all six functions of Marine aviation may be applied in the mission. Antiair warfare assets may be needed to ensure freedom of action for the recovery force (airborne or surfaceborne); offensive air support may provide deep air support and CAS; RESCORT may be required to ensure safe passage; and EW assets may be employed to support the TRAP mission. Two functions that will always be used are air reconnaissance and control of aircraft and missiles. Air reconnaissance should provide continuous observation of the pickup area.

   (b) USMC assault transport helicopters are not specifically configured for PR with the extra armor and defensive armament required. Such configuration would reduce the troop and cargo carrying capacity of the aircraft.

3. **Ground Combat Element (GCE).** The traditional role of the GCE in TRAP has been to provide various types and sizes of teams to provide security at the recovery site. The GCE can be tasked to conduct the TRAP mission by surface means to include rigid raiding craft, light armored
vehicles, or organic forces to conduct clandestine extracts. Fire support assets of the GCE may be tasked to support the TRAP mission.

(4) The **Combat Service Support Element** may be tasked to provide a variety of support, including medical, HLZ (helicopter support teams, slings), explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and other selected service support (e.g., supply; water; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; utilities).

f. **Reintegrate.** Commanders and staff will ensure that this phase is planned, prepared, and rehearsed. This will ensure that isolated personnel are properly returned and thoroughly assessed before deciding to either returned and reintegrated with their units/forces or repatriated IAW the Marine Corps Reintegration Plan, theater regulations, and DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*. Capabilities to establish facilities and execute procedures for reintegration phases I and II may be available depending on the composition of the MAGTF (Marine expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade, or Marine expeditionary force).

5. **Concept of Operations**

a. **General.** Recovery missions should not supersede assigned mission objectives and resource requirements, but in a typical situation should be accorded a priority level of importance. The prerequisites for conducting a recovery mission are as follows:

   (1) There should be reasonable certainty that isolated personnel are alive.

   (2) The location of the personnel, equipment, or aircraft must be known.

b. **Planning**

   (1) It is critical that as much recovery mission planning as possible be done before deployment of the MAGTF to minimize confusion at the time of mission execution. Such planning comprises three phases:

       (a) Analysis of theater PR guidance or CONOPS.

       (b) Assault contingency planning.

       (c) Final recovery mission planning.

   (2) The MAGTF CONOPS for TRAP missions should include possible scenarios and geographic areas in establishing basic policy. The concept should also describe the conditions under which other resources external to the MAGTF will be requested. The concept should include a specific decision matrix that will assist in determining basic go/no-go criteria. Figure D-1 is a typical TRAP decision matrix.
There is no standard TRAP mission because each tactical situation is unique. The key to success is proper attention to the planning process. A simple, concise CONOPS that accurately reflects theater policy, a thorough contingency TRAP plan for each assault, and rapid final planning after each initial loss report will greatly reduce uncertainty and confusion during the recovery mission.

c. **Execution.** In many cases, isolated personnel will be in a no-go sector. In this situation, other resources may be requested or a clandestine recovery may be employed. In some situations, isolated personnel will have to evade to a viable recovery area. The ultimate goal of a TRAP, or any other means of recovery is to effect the expeditious return of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft without further loss of friendly forces.

(1) **Immediate Recovery.** Immediate recovery occurs as soon as commanders or staffs recognize there is an accountability issue with a Marine they own. This can occur as a result of the daily
personnel reports, missed checkpoints, overdue aircraft or vehicles, or even during consolidation and reorganization in the middle of combat operations. It is the sum of actions that local or on-site commanders and staff take to immediate report an isolating situation and execute the locate and recover phase within their assigned areas of operation. Immediate recovery efforts must be tempered by considering the effects that an immediate recovery would have on assigned mission accomplishment. Some threat levels will permit a quick reaction effort to conduct a successful recovery. An immediate report is critical to prepare deliberate PR options by vertical or horizontal elements, if an immediate recovery is impossible. The ideal time to execute a TRAP mission is immediately after the incident occurs. Immediate recovery is most desirable because friendly forces may still be in the area, adversary forces may not have had an opportunity to react, and required medical treatment can be rendered quickly.

(2) Deliberate PR. Deliberate PR is the sum of plans and actions that occur across the Marine component capability beginning with an isolating incident report. Deliberate PR is the direct use of a particular unit or type of force, such as the TRAP. It includes a variety of integrated capabilities including air, ground, and maritime. Marine operations centers or PRCCs are responsible to conduct multi-echelon coordination and deconfliction internal and external to Marine forces. This continues until the isolated personnel are recovered successfully regardless of the recovery capability. In many instances a delayed recovery may be necessary because of assigned mission requirements or the adversary threat. Upon completion of an assigned mission, TRAP-capable resources may then be directed to plan and conduct the delayed recovery. In the face of an overwhelming adversary threat, isolated personnel may be directed to evade to a viable recovery area.

(3) External Support Recovery. ESR is the sum of coordination and support provided by any entity external to that component. This is the responsibility of the operations center, PRCC, and the commander’s staff. Routinely, components of a joint force have arranged for various national and operational level support to conduct PR. This support should be cited in the joint CONOPS for PR and should be exercised and rehearsed routinely.

6. Education and Training

a. Commanders and Staffs. It is critical that all elements of the MAGTF ensure that they have personnel functionally trained in PR commensurate with their levels of actions. The lead for PR normally resides within the G/S-3; more specifically current operations or plans. It is essential that all staff directorates are familiar with PR and their roles in supporting operations. An example is the G/S-1 could receive a report of a DUSTWUN. While this normally falls into personnel reports and accountability it is incumbent with the commander and his or her PR C2 to ensure that the whole G/S-1 section realize that this is an isolating situation and operations must be notified immediately. Since this isolating situation triggers planning and preparation for operations it is equally critical that the G/S-2 is involved for providing intelligence and combat information for planning and execution. Likewise, the G/S-4, G/S-5, and G/S-6 must be included in planning and execution. The commander and staff may elect to obtain education and training internal to the Marine Corps, send personnel externally to other Service schools, or coordinate for a variety of education and training provided by Services, USJFCOM, and JPRA.
b. **Recovery Forces.** The commander designates units and forces to conduct PR functions. Units/forces are required to plan, prepare, exercise, and rehearse for PR execution. These units or forces are responsible to prepare their SOPs and COAs for execution. Their COAs should include the three phased options cited in this appendix. To properly train units or forces, the commanders must ensure they are educated and trained. To that end, education and training refers to PR specific functional training and specific PR education regarding the country they are deploying to. The commander and staff may elect to obtain education and training internal to the Marine Corps, send personnel externally to other Service schools, or coordinate for a variety of education and training provided by Services, USJFCOM, and JPRA. MAGTF units train for TRAP missions as part of their overall training. TRAP is viewed as an important category of assault support. Assault support and attack aircrews maintain a high level of proficiency by including TRAP and PR in applicable training events.

c. **Isolated Personnel.** Education and training for individuals refers to the preparation of Marines to deploy to a specific country. Theater requirements may set the training level for forces deploying (i.e., SERE). The Marine Corps considers all its deployed personnel at some level of risk. Commanders must ensure all forces are prepared for the deployment to specific environments. Commanders must prepare and implement typical control measures for the accountability and reporting of individuals and rehearse reporting immediately of a suspected or known situation. Commanders and staffs, units/forces, and individuals should repeatedly rehearse isolating situations that require specific actions from all three groups. Commanders and staff plan, disseminate, and rehearse actions taken by individuals in the event they become isolated. The Marine Corps does not plan evasion for every individual Marine nor does it allow every Marine to plan independent evasion and record that on an EPA. The Marine Corps uses centralized planning and dissemination by staffs to all forces to provide for individual actions. PR’s focus is in operations. All staff sections support daily operational plans and SOPs for isolated Marines. During the predeployment program period, Marines are taught skills that are directly related to TRAP, including evasion and recovery TTP, night operations, and rapid planning.
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APPENDIX E
US COAST GUARD PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

All USCG cutters, aircraft, and boats are potential PR resources. USCG cutters range from high and medium endurance cutters, which operate offshore for extended periods of time, to coastal patrol and utility boats capable of operating in coastal and local waters for shorter durations. USCG aircraft include fixed-wing aircraft capable of extended long-range PR, and rotary-wing assets for medium-range and short-range operations. Rotary-wing assets also have hoisting capability and a deployable rescue swimmer.

2. Responsibilities

a. National SAR Plan designates the Coast Guard as the lead federal agency for responding to SAR cases within the International Maritime Organization recognized maritime search and rescue regions (SRRs) of the US. To perform this mission, the Coast Guard maintains SAR coordinator command/RCCs throughout the US, in addition to a rescue sub-center (RSC), as follows:

   (1) Atlantic Area — Norfolk, Virginia.
   (2) First District — Boston, Massachusetts.
   (3) Fifth District — Norfolk, Virginia.
   (4) Seventh District — Miami, Florida.
   (5) Eighth District — New Orleans, Louisiana.
   (6) Ninth District — Cleveland, Ohio.
   (7) Pacific Area (no SRR) — Alameda, California.
   (8) Eleventh District — Alameda, California.
   (9) Thirteenth District — Seattle, Washington.
   (10) Fourteenth District — Honolulu, Hawaii.
   (12) Sector San Juan (RSC) — San Juan, Puerto Rico.
b. In wartime, all designated RCC/RSCs maintained by the Coast Guard will continue to function at their present location and retain their RCC/RSC capability and function. Figure E-1 shows the locations and SRR operational areas for each of the Coast Guard’s designated RCC/RSCs, in addition to those operated by DOD in the inland regions of the US, and those operated by Canada for their inland and maritime regions.

c. Upon request via all appropriate echelons of command, and at the discretion of the respective area commanders (Pacific and/or Atlantic), the USCG may be able to provide qualified personnel who can augment deployable JPRCs or PRCCs operating outside the continental US, to include contingency establishments of JPRCs and PRCCs.

d. The JFC may request additional USCG resources for recovery operations from Commandant, USCG, via all appropriate echelons of command.

Figure E-1. National Search and Rescue System Search and Rescue Regions
3. Command Relationships

a. The Commandant, USCG, as the Service chief, controls the administrative, managerial, and technical aspects of all USCG functions and report directly to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Upon declaration of war or when the President so directs under the provisions of Title 14, USC 3, the USCG will transfer to the Department of the Navy. The Commandant will report directly to the Secretary of the Navy for the continued performance of all USCG missions and tasks assigned by statute.

b. For SAR, area and district commanders (by virtue of their designation as SC) are charged with overall responsibility for establishing and providing CSAR/PR services within their specific SRR, and ensuring that planning for those services is properly coordinated. In the SAR hierarchy, a search and rescue mission coordinator (SMC) is responsible to the SC to coordinate a response to an actual or apparent distress situation. For most SAR cases the Coast Guard performs, SMC will be handled at the sector or group command level one step below the district command/RCC hierarchy. Depending on the type of case, the extent of a probable search and number of search rescue units deployed, however, the area/district may decide to hold/retain SMC authority and work the case at their respective RCC.

c. When USCG units are made available to a JFC for PR, those USCG organization commanders will attach these units to the appropriate JFC-designated component commander for the duration of the joint recovery operation.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. General. The following are the capabilities and limitations, focused on mobility and SA, to accomplish the five PR execution tasks.

b. Ship-Helicopter Compatibility

(1) Procedures and requirements for operating helicopters on flight-deck-equipped USCG cutters are contained in COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual, and NWP 3-04.1M, Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships. In general, for a non-USCG helicopter to operate from a USCG cutter, current directives require “favorable” conditions such as no more than two degrees pitch and four degrees roll of the vessel (unless otherwise determined by dynamic interface trials); and adequate clearance from vessel structures for the aircraft to land and take off from the flight deck. The pilot of the helicopter should be shipboard qualified IAW parent Service or component directives. Physical dimensions and flight-deck clearance measurement information is contained in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume.

(2) Use of USCG helicopters on non-USCG ships and non-USCG helicopters on USCG cutters is authorized for those combinations shown to be acceptable in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume. Generally, for both situations, the provisions of subparagraph 6a apply. Additionally, for operations on vessels not covered by NAEC-ENG-7576,
Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume, sufficient vessel deck strength and a buffer distance of at least 10 feet between rotor blades and obstructions above 24 inches in height are mandatory. Requests for waivers and situations not covered in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume, should be addressed to the Chief of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations, US Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC. Time-critical requests for waivers should be forwarded through the cutter or aircraft commander.

(3) Aviation-capable USCG cutters can provide varying degrees of navigation and communications support, depending on the class of ship. These cutters also carry a supply of JP-5 and have the capability of filtering and testing fuel for water and particulate matter as well as HIFR. Some cutters have hangars but require a rotor blade folding capability for helicopters to be hangared. External electrical power is also available for engine starting and maintenance. Specifications for these systems are expanded on in NAEC-ENG-7576, Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume.


d. Locate. The USCG’s computer-assisted search planning model is a valuable asset in search planning for extended, open-ocean searches. Access to the model is available through USCG PRCCs.

e. Support. Includes isolated personnel, family, and media.

f. Recover. The RESCAP and RESCORT capabilities of USCG aircraft are extremely limited. “Intercept and escort” missions in a low-threat environment will be the upper limit of RESCORT capability for USCG aircraft, some of which have sniper weaponry and all have very limited combat survivability. The services provided to the escorted resources will be generally the same as in a nonhostile intercept and escort of a distressed aircraft; specifically, communications and navigation services, potential rescue or aerial delivery of survival equipment, and vectoring of resources capable of accomplishing recovery.

g. Reintegrate. USCG will support phase I and phase II reintegration of personnel recovered by USCG units until such time as those personnel can be returned to their parent Service.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning. The PR role of the USCG is an extension of its SAR mission. The USCG participates in the joint contingency planning process. When planning military operations, it is prudent to plan for PR as early in the planning phase as possible. Although all operation plans and orders contain a PR appendix, a PR plan of action and allocation of resources are frequently not identified before they are needed or placed on standby for PR operations. This CONOPS assumes JPRC functionality before the mission begins and that USCG coordination and support efforts, and force transfer procedures for USCG units will be identified in the planning phase.
b. **Execution**

(1) USCG cutters, boats, and aircraft routinely operate in a low-threat maritime environment under the defensive protection of other military forces. USCG cutters, aircraft and small boats carry little or no defensive capability; most have no offensive weaponry. Offensive capability or increased defensive capability may not be necessary for USCG PR taskings, even though some cutters have the capability to operate in medium- to high-threat scenarios. Planning the search phase of PR is quite similar to the SAR planning and coordination the USCG performs on a daily basis. USCG personnel are well suited to perform in this similar capacity during joint operations. USCG cutters and fixed-wing aircraft are equipped and their crews are trained for, and regularly perform, OSC duties. USCG resources are ideal for low-threat, precautionary PR missions such as duckbutts.

(2) USCG units are accustomed to operating independently and are equally adept at responding to changing missions in mid-sortie. For example, a buoy tender whose primary function is the maintenance of navigation aids may be diverted from that function at any time to perform a higher priority mission. Cutters and aircraft assigned to perform surveillance and interdiction patrols could also be employed as an immediate PR resource. Thus, the multi-mission capability of USCG forces becomes a PR force multiplier. Given the latitude of automatic response, USCG forces will respond to a PR incident and complete it without further guidance.

(3) Large USCG cutters are fully capable of operating as part of a Navy task force. USCG aircraft are fully capable of operating from non-USCG shore-based facilities, military or civilian. Several similarly Coast Guard patrol boats (WPBs) may be deployed, using a squadron concept, with additional spare parts and a small cadre of support personnel. When designated, a squadron commander will direct patrol boat employment. These squadrons may be sea-based as an independent force or part of a Navy task force.

(a) USCG small boats (less than 65 feet in length) are normally shore-based and are designed to operate in the coastal environment. Although they could be deployed aboard ships similar to the squadron concept mentioned above for WPBs, these boats are not designed for open-ocean operations.

(b) Some types of USCG helicopters can be deployed with USCG cutters and/or Navy ships, subject to restrictions described in COMDTINST M3710.1 (Series), *Air Operations Manual*; COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*; and NAEC-ENG-7576, *Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume*. Normally, the ship commander will task deployed helicopters.

6. **Education and Training**

The USCG SAR Program Manager is assigned to the Office of Search and Rescue, Response Directorate, USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC. The SAR Program Manager is responsible for defining the curriculum for all SAR training in the USCG. The USCG hosts the National SAR School at Coast Guard Training Center, Yorktown, VA, and, with the US Air Force, jointly staffs
The school provides maritime, inland, and SOF planning and coordination training for USCG, DOD, and foreign students. The school does not teach PR in any detail. A USCG correspondence course for basic SAR plotting and planning is available from the USCG Institute in Oklahoma City, OK.
APPENDIX F
US AIR FORCE PERSONNEL RECOVERY

1. General

CSAR is the primary USAF recovery method utilized to conduct component and PR joint taskings. It involves the specific task performed by rescue forces to recover isolated personnel across the range of military operations. It is normally accomplished with a mix of dedicated and augmenting assets. CSAR forces may also conduct collateral missions such as: noncombat SAR, emergency aeromedical evacuation, humanitarian relief, international aid, noncombatant evacuation operations, counterdrug activities, support for National Aeronautics and Space Administration flight operations, support to SOF, and other missions as directed by the CCDR and the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). For more specific information on USAF PR and CSAR, see Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations.

2. Responsibilities

a. The USAF organizes, trains, and equips, dedicated PR staffs, fixed and vertical lift airborne assets, and ground recovery forces. Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead command and proponent for USAF CSAR; however, Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces Europe, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard (ANG) all contain USAF rescue squadrons and expertise. In addition, other theater air commands will normally contain rescue squadrons and expertise when PR assets and other aircraft are deployed to their theaters.

b. All joint force requests for CSAR assets are made to USJFCOM through ACC and provided/presented back through ACC and USJFCOM to the JFC and JFACC. The Air Force presents its forces to a JFC as air and space expeditionary task forces (AETFs). Through effective scheduling, each AETF is provided comparable force capability and a predictable pattern of deployment eligibility.

3. Command Relationships

a. Component. The COMAFFOR should establish a PRCC integrated with the Air Force air and space operations center (AFAOC) to coordinate all USAF PR activities. In this case, the COMAFFOR normally exercises OPCON of assigned USAF CSAR forces through their respective command structure.

b. Joint. When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC by the JFC, and is the supported commander for PR, the USAF PRCC and associated communications structure may be collocated and form the nucleus of the JPRC. In this case, the USAF PRCC, when augmented by other members of the joint force, is normally designated as the JPRC and the JPRC director is tasked with coordinating all PR joint activities. Coordination of PR missions employing JFACC assets requires integration with the J-3 and combat operations division.
4. Capabilities and Limitations

a. General. The unique makeup of ACC rescue squadrons and other ACC units provide geographic CCDRs a small-footprint package of efficient, full-spectrum PR capability across the range of military operations. A geographic CDR can also request a scalable/tailored package to suit a specific capability requirement. USAF CSAR forces are capable of self-deployment; however, rotary-wing assets and logistic support typically require strategic mobility airlift for intertheater movement. Rotary-wing CSAR forces possess a rapid response (rapid on-load and off-load) capability. USAF CSAR assets provide JFCs a robust capability to affect isolated personnel across the five PR tasks.

b. PR Tasks

(1) Report. Report is the notification that personnel have or may have become isolated. All reports are usually passed as quickly as possible to the component PRCC or the JPRC, which initiates validation and location procedures. USAF PR assets which aid the report task include: SERE trained isolated personnel, survival radios with PR architecture integration (combat survivor evader location, PRC-112, etc.), robust C2 networks and AFAOCs, and numerous airborne platforms with communications relay capability.

(2) Locate. Locate is the action taken to precisely find and confirm the identity of isolated personnel. It starts as soon as the report of an isolated person is received and continues until the isolated personnel are recovered. An accurate location and positive ID are normally required prior to committing recovery forces, however, forces may be launched to selected air/ground lager positions closer to the initial reported isolated personnel location to save valuable time. The location and ID must be maintained throughout the mission. USAF PR assets which aid in the location task include: well-trained JPRC/PRCC personnel, survival radios with GPS location and data-link capabilities, national asset assistance and liaison teams established within AFAOCs (satellite support), pretrained OSC, ground RTs, and numerous airborne theater sensor surveillance and C2 assets (e.g., TR-1, U-2, AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, SENIOR SCOUT, GLOBAL HAWK, PREDATOR, and global satellites). The concept of “combat search” associated with USAF CSAR is limited in scope. Traditional USAF CSAR forces should only be launched to a known isolated personnel location (within 1 mile) and “search” should be minimized in uncertain and hostile operational environments. Regardless of the threat level, friendly forces must first locate and authenticate isolated personnel before initiating combat rescue operations.

(3) Support. Support is the planned effort necessary to ensure the mental, physical, and emotional sustainment of the isolated person. These efforts can include establishing two-way communications, providing morale-building support using all available means, suppressing enemy threats, dropping of subsistence and supplies, or providing directions to a cache. It may also encompass the protection of isolated personnel from capture and, as necessary, the disruption of any adversary response to friendly recovery operations. USAF PR/CSAR assets which aid the support task include: survival radios with two-way voice/data capability, combat airdrop platforms for required resupply, CAS platforms (A-10, AC-130), and SERE psychologists.
(4) **Recover.** Recover is the process of coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel to bring, isolated personnel under the control of a recovery force. CSAR is the primary USAF recovery method. Prerequisites for recovery force execution of this task are mission planning, a responsive decision process, and command authorization.

(a) **Dedicated Airborne CSAR Assets.** Although most Air Force resources have the inherent capability to support CSAR, the air assets normally assigned to perform CSAR operations consist of HH-60G and HC-130P/N or MC-130P/N (ANG only) aircraft. A complete description of each system’s capabilities, equipment, and TTP may be found in AFTTP 3-1.24 (HH-60G) and 3-1.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P).

(b) **Dedicated Ground Recovery CSAR Assets.** USAF ground recovery forces assigned to support CSAR or limited/extended surface operations are recovery teams, normally consisting of CROs and pararescuemen, which are part of the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapon system. These forces are normally collocated with dedicated airborne CSAR assets. A complete description of the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapon systems’ capabilities, equipment, and TTP may be found in AFTTP 3-1.8, *Tactical Employment of Guardian Angel & Special Tactics*.

(c) **USAF CSAR assets (air and ground)** should be used to the maximum extent possible for dedicated CSAR, allowing other forces possessing collateral PR capabilities to focus on their primary mission.

(d) **Force protection (FP) assets** augment CSAR missions as the threat level dictates and cover the combat missions of RESCORT, RESCAP, and SEAD. RESCORT is an FP capability comprised of aircrews trained in CSAR procedures, isolated personnel location and ID, and helicopter and fixed-wing escort operations. Aircrews performing the role of RESCORT significantly increase the chances of successful recovery operations. RESCORT assets are capable of and designated to provide protection to PRTF recovery vehicles from ground based threats. Normally, Air Force aircraft are tasked to perform RESCORT operations and include the A-10, F-16, F-15E, and AC-130. RESCORT aircraft require voice and data communications capability to/from the isolated person, other RESCORT aircraft, and the recovery vehicle/aerial delivery vehicle/recovery teams.

(e) **RESCAP aircraft are air superiority assets** assigned to protect recovery forces from airborne threats while en route to and from the objective area. RESCAP aircraft may assist RESCORT aircraft in locating and authenticating the isolated personnel. USAF F-15C and F-16 aircraft are normally assigned as RESCAP. Additionally USN F-18s can be assigned as RESCAP platforms.

(f) **SEAD forces** are designed to minimize the surface-to-air threat to friendly forces executing a PR mission. The F-16CJ is currently employed as the Air Force’s SEAD aircraft. Integrated and interoperable communications between SEAD forces, recovery forces, FP assets, and ISR aircraft are critical. When assigning SEAD platforms, the threat environment must be defined for all CSAR forces participating in the mission.
(5) **Reintegrate.** The PR reintegration task focuses on gathering essential intelligence and SERE information while protecting the health and welfare of recovered isolated personnel and allowing them to reintegrate into their DOD duties. The intelligence and SERE debrief are designed to obtain specific information regarding the experience of recovered isolated personnel. Reintegration encompasses the decompression process which is overseen by a SERE psychologist and focuses on the health and well-being of recovered isolated personnel. USAF PR assets that aid the reintegration task include: USAF SERE specialists, psychologists, and mental health specialists, PR trained commanders and staffs, USAF medical treatment facilities and physicians, intelligence specialists, public affairs personnel, chaplains, family support, and SJA.

5. **Concept of Operations**

a. **Planning.** USAF PR/CSAR forces proactively accomplish mission planning tasks to execute the mission based on theater OPLANs and concept plans (CONPLANs). Effective pre-mission planning is essential due to the unpredictability and time-critical nature associated with PR operations. Pre-mission planning permits CSAR forces to anticipate multiple responses to common scenarios significantly reducing response times. Real-time battlespace management will enhance recovery units’ ability to pre-mission plan. Planning requirements include, but are not limited to: weather, threat awareness of isolating event and counter-rescue intentions, mission status (ground versus airborne alert), staging/basing, assigned/tasked forces and capabilities, route of flight (preplanned waypoints/spider routes), communications plan, decision matrix for go/no-go, time-sensitive-targeting procedures, insertion/extraction procedures, isolated personnel recovery procedures, and roles and responsibilities of assets used for FP. Recovery operations are subject to operational risk assessment and threat analysis in the same manner as other operations.

b. **PR planning involves coordination with C2 assets and supporting forces.** PR missions have unique planning considerations and requirements. The planning process will be executed at several levels, starting at the component PRCC and in coordination with the JPRC (if established) for missions requiring joint assets, and continuing down to the tasked recovery unit. Mission planning, composite force tactics, unit-level TTPs, training, and operational employment must focus on exploiting the unique characteristics of the recovery forces. To leverage effectiveness, actions must be integrated, mutually reinforcing, and clearly focused on compatible objectives. Recovery forces must be pre-positioned to react quickly and minimize mission response time.

c. **Execution.** Execution includes mission launch, ingress to the objective/terminal area, aerial delivery of recovery team or supplies, terminal area operations, and combat egress. To gain a better understanding of employment concepts and system capabilities, see AFTTP volumes 3-1.24 (HH-60G), 3-1.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P), and 3-1.8 (CRO/PJ/SERE). These volumes, in conjunction with AFTTP volumes 3-3.24 (HH-60G), and 3-3.33 (HC-130P/N, MC-130E/H/P) should serve as a baseline for current and future employment concepts.

(1) **Launching** CSAR forces requires certain methods, timing, and technology to generate and disseminate an operationally sound launch order. Characteristics are timeliness,
coordination and clarity, contingency tolerance, and inclusiveness of all necessary forces. This employment subtask considers actions taken by C2 and recovery forces. This subtask normally presumes that isolated personnel are detected in the battlespace and located/identified sufficiently (PR execution tasks report and locate) to initiate the recovery phase of the mission being conducted. To reduce the time an enemy has to react and possibly thwart a recovery operation, CSAR forces must have timely and accurate reporting/locating mechanisms in place in order to assume appropriate alert postures and enhance situational awareness.

(2) **Ingress to the Terminal/Objective Area.** This subtask accounts for CSAR operations from the staging point (orbit, airfield) to the terminal/objective area. Threat avoidance tactics include detailed mission planning, low altitude terrain masking, high altitude penetration, and marginal weather/night penetrations. When threat avoidance is not feasible, threat suppression techniques can include the use of countermeasures and jammers, as well as the use of available FP assets. Night missions and crew workload require the use of artificial aids to enable night operations. These include NVGs, IR detection set, helmet mounted displays, or other sensor fusion technologies. CSAR forces must be capable of penetration into marginal weather conditions to include moderate icing. Depending on the theater of operation, air-refueling support for rotary-wing assets, in either permissive or hostile/contested environments, may be essential. Air-refueling support for receiver capable fixed-wing assets will normally be conducted in permissive environments.

(3) **Terminal/Objective Area Operations.** Terminal/objective area operations address arrival, confirmation and fixing of the isolated personnel’s position, and their extraction (directly or via employment of a ground recovery team), their support (via aerial delivery of ground recovery teams and/or equipment) and protection of CSAR forces from localized threats. Recovery team employment may be accomplished by landing, alternate insertion/extraction, parachute, amphibious surface/subsurface, ground vehicle or a combination of employment methods. Fixing of the isolated personnel’s position requires increasingly precise location to allow ground teams to quickly locate an isolated person, and to allow weapons employment in close proximity to CSAR forces.

(4) **Egress.** Egress is the return of recovery forces. It includes en route medical treatment, refueling if necessary, transload operations, and the transition to reintegration teams at the appropriate medical or predesignated phase I reintegration site.

6. **Training**

   a. **Commanders and PR Staffs.** PR education for commanders and PR staffs typically consist of joint and Service-specific training programs offered by JPRA, USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS), and the 505th Training Squadron (formerly the C2 Warrior School). Links to available courses are as follows:

   JPRA: http://www.jpra.jfcom.mil/
   USAFSOS: https://www.hurlburt.af.mil/jsou/
   505th TRS: https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505trs/
b. **USAF Aircrew.** Air Force aircrew members can effectively assist rescue forces only if they are familiar with PR doctrine, CSAR TTP, and personal survival techniques. All CSAR crewmembers receive combat survival training and threat systems capabilities and limitations training on a recurring basis. Combat air forces (CAF) aircrews are trained to respond to PR incidents when tasked, as part of a CSARTF, as their aircraft capabilities permit. A limited number of fighter/attack aircraft pilots receive RESCORT, RESCAP, OSC, and RMC training. All Air Force crewmembers receive water survival and SERE training. Aircrews designated as primary “AMC,” such as the E-3 crews, should receive AMC training. High-risk-of-capture personnel must complete a Level C SERE school and receive periodic refresher SERE training IAW DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC)*, and this publication.

c. **Recovery Team.** Air Force recovery teams are part of the GUARDIAN ANGEL weapon system. GUARDIAN ANGEL is an Air Force human/equipment based weapon system that provides the ground element of the Personnel Recovery forces and is designed to assist in the execution of all five tasks of PR. Recovery teams may deploy into uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Recovery teams consist of CROs, pararescuemen, and SERE specialists and are specially trained to assist or conduct PR operations from initial training through reintegration.

d. **Isolated Personnel.** All USAF high risk of capture personnel should be trained in both initial and refresher SERE training programs. Some USAF support personnel require other levels of SERE training across the spectrum of captivity. Theater entry requirements should specify required SERE training prior to theater entry.

e. **Exercises.** To ensure interoperability and a smooth transition to combat, Air Force PR staffs and CSAR forces should exercise regularly with augmentation personnel and forces. Commanders at all levels should participate in these exercises to familiarize themselves with the complexities and details of PR/CSAR doctrine and operations. The focus should be on exercising the system as a whole, including the JFACC, JAOC, AFAOC, JPRC, PRCC, CSARTF elements, AMC, OSC, RMC, and the isolated personnel. The top priorities are joint, coalition, interagency, and CAF flag exercises. The second priority is to participate in AFAOC exercises allowing for JPRC/PRCC employment and emphasizing command, control, communications, and intelligence coordination procedures. These exercises provide invaluable experience for PR staffs. The CAF exercises include active duty, ANG, and air reserve component forces. Additionally, rescue forces from foreign militaries often possess unique expertise and experience in the particular area in which they routinely operate. Combined training with these forces can improve USAF PR/CSAR capabilities.
1. General

SOF provide JFCs with an extremely flexible force. As a result, SOF may be tasked to perform missions for which they are either the best suited among available forces or the only force available; but are not necessarily organized, trained, or equipped to conduct. SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct specific core tasks. Each joint force component is responsible for performing PR in support of its own operations. As such, SOF regularly train to conduct PR functions in support of their own operations. When specifically tasked, SOF may perform PR for other members of the joint force. It is important for commanders to be aware, however, that unlike some other joint force components, SOF do not maintain dedicated PR forces. Since PR taskings often involve forces being placed on alert status awaiting mission execution orders, such taskings would be at the expense of the SOF’s ability to perform their core tasks. Therefore, greatest utility of SOF to the conduct of PR is in the conduct of SOF recovery operations and UAR.

2. Responsibilities

USSOCOM maintains a Service-like responsibility to perform PR in support of its own operations, consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and IAW the requirements of the supported commander. Because PR and emergency exfiltration planning and operations are an inherent part of every SO mission, SOF must maintain an organic capability to conduct recovery within their core task force structure.

a. SOC PRCC. Joint force component commanders are responsible for planning and conducting recovery operations in support of their own operations while executing the JFC’s campaign and OPLANs. The SOC PRCC is the primary SOF component SAR facility. The SOC PRCC is staffed and equipped for coordinating and controlling SOF component recovery operations. The SOF component PRCC coordinates PR activities with the JPRC and other component PRCCs, as appropriate. If the SOF component commander does not establish a PRCC, another component staff organization, usually the operations section (J-3), coordinates those PR activities and assumes the responsibilities normally assigned to the SOC PRCC. For example, the JFSOCC/JSOTF may designate its JOC to coordinate recovery operations that use SOF component forces. Other typical SOC PRCC responsibilities and functions include the following:

(1) Develop and review PR appendices to annex C (Operations) for component supporting plans, CONPLANs, and OPORDs.

(2) Extract planning factors from the theater PR CONOPS and provide them to subordinate units to assist in the development of supportable and feasible EPAs.

(3) Coordinate and develop unit and personal EPAs, as required.
(4) Maintain staff awareness for preparing and maintaining ISOPREPs.

(5) Coordinate for component augmentation personnel to the JPRC.

(6) Develop specific component PRCC procedures.

(7) Notify and coordinate with the JPRC when conducting unilateral PR missions.

(8) Coordinate with the JPRC for PR support; for example, RESCAP, RESCORT, SEAD, and so on, provided to or received from other components.

(9) Maintain a file on each isolated individual until recovery has been completed.

(10) Forward, but do not destroy, all files and the database regarding isolated personnel, their status, and/or location to the JPRA, via the JPRC, once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files.

b. **Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell.** The branch of the SOC J-3 normally responsible for compartmented operations forms the nucleus of the UARCC. The mission of the UARCC is to integrate and coordinate all theater NAR capabilities in support of the JFC’s PR operations. The UARCC fulfills similar responsibilities and functions as a component PRCC, but tailors those roles and functions from the perspective of NAR support for the theater. A more complete explanation of the UARCC can be found in Chapter II, “Functions and Responsibilities.”

3. **Command Relationships**

a. **Component.** The SOF components are required to plan and prepare, within their capabilities, to effect the recovery of SOF component isolated personnel during all operations. The SOF component PRCC informs and coordinates with the SOC/JSOTF PRCC. The JPRC monitors the situation.

b. **Joint**

(1) The JFSOCC, operating either as a theater SOC or as a JSOTF (see note 1), has command responsibility to perform SOF PR consistent with capabilities and assigned functions and IAW requirements of the supported CCDR. The JFSOCC establishes a PRCC, or functional equivalent, as the focal point for interface with the JPRC to coordinate all SOF PR activities. The JFSOCC may choose to task the air operations section within its JOC to coordinate all SOF PR activities (minus NAR). The joint special operations aviation component (JSOAC) is manned, trained, and equipped for PR. The JSOAC is the proponent for SOF recovery TTP and communications infrastructure. As such, the JFSOCC may elect to task the JSOAC to conduct PRCC functions.
Note 1: In some cases, a JSOTF is established separate from the JFSOCC and OPCON to a JTF. In this case, the JSOTF would establish a SOF PRCC and perform similar PR functions as the theater SOF PRCC.

(2) The JFSOCC integrates and deconflicts the contingency planning of SOF operations via the SOLE, which is generally located in the JAOC or combined air operations center. The SOLE conducts synchronization of SOF plans within the standard ATO production schedule. Because of time sensitivity during dynamic recovery operations, the SOC PRCC may coordinate directly with the JPRC. When necessary and as directed by the JFC, the JFSOCC may provide TACON of SOF to the JFACC to conduct specific recovery operations in support of a PRTF.

(3) Not only is the JFSOCC/JSOTF responsible for SOF PR, he is responsible to the JFC for all NAR operations in support of the JFC’s comprehensive PR program. The JFSOCC or JSOTF commander normally exercises OPCON of all SOF UAR forces in the theater. OGAs in support of NAR normally retain C2 of their respective forces. To integrate, coordinate, and synchronize compartmented NAR support to the JFC’s PR plans and procedures, the JFSOCC, on order, establishes a UARCC with established and expeditious lines of communications with the JPRC.

4. Capabilities and Limitations

SOF normally do not dedicate assets solely for PR. However, most of the SOF elements will have the ‘Be Prepared to’ mission to execute PR in support of other SOF, or in support of the JPRC. SOF possess unique capabilities that complement the JFC’s ability to conduct PR across the range of military operations. Three SOF core tasks — direct action (DA), UW, and counterterrorism — encompass activities that provide the JFC unique capabilities to accomplish recovery operations that are outside the capability of other forces.

5. Concept of Operations

a. Planning

(1) SOF view PR from the dual perspective of potential consumer and potential force provider. SOF PR coordinators are responsible for planning, coordinating, and tracking all SOF PR operations. SOF PR coordinators should be formally trained; for example, the JPRA Personnel Recovery Plans and Operations Course, PR301. SOF PR coordinators should also have a thorough understanding of theater PR architecture, roles and missions, and coordination process. The logistic planner, signal planner, and the operations planners must have periodic meetings to ensure resources are available to meet PR mission requirements.

(2) PR planning such as intelligence preparation of the operational environment and operational preparation of the environment is a continuous process. SOF PR coordinators must be familiar with all aspects of PR, to include SERE, CSAR, joint combat search and rescue, and NAR. PR planning is inherent to force protection, and recovery planners should address PR in all missions. All planning should be based on the five tasks of PR (report, locate, support,
recover, and reintegrate). SOF PR coordinators must assume that every mission may result in an evasion situation and should prepare the SOF forces for unassisted evasion. Plans for both assisted and unassisted evasion must be developed IAW theater PR guidance to ensure a coordinated recovery by PR forces.

b. **Execution**

   (1) **SOF Recovery Operations.** DA operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or SO-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. One of the activities that fall within the DA mission area is SOF recovery operations. These are operations to locate, recover, and restore personnel or material held captive, isolated, or threatened in areas sensitive, denied, or contested to friendly control. SO recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations may employ unconventional tactics, techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements. SOF recovery operations offer an additional capability to conduct the specific PR task of recovery. Historical examples of SOF recovery operations would be the Son Tay Raid in Vietnam, Operation EAGLE CLAW (the Iranian hostage rescue mission), and the rescue of Kurt Muse in Operation JUST CAUSE.

   (2) **Unconventional Assisted Recovery.** A unique contribution of SOF units to a CCDR’s PR architecture is their capability to conduct UAR. NAR is the recovery of isolated persons by SOF, UW air, ground, and maritime forces, and OGAs specially trained to develop NAR infrastructure and interface with or employ indigenous or surrogate personnel. These forces operate in uncertain or hostile areas where PR capability is infeasible, is inaccessible, or does not exist, to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel back to friendly control. NAR forces generally deploy into their assigned areas before strike operations and provide the JFC with coordinated PR capability for as long as the forces remain viable. UAR is NAR conducted by SOF. As a subset of UW, SOF conduct UAR unilaterally with indigenous or surrogate personnel or OGAs IAW Title 10 or Title 50, USC, employing compartmented TTP. The military aspects of UAR require sensitive TTP for which SOF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped. In the conduct of UAR, SOF units are normally deployed into a joint special operations area before strike operations to support recovery operations. SOF personnel conduct a thorough analysis of the area before insertion. The theater SOC is normally tasked by the JFC to plan for and execute UAR in coordination with the JPRC in support of the theater PR plan. The intent of UAR is to bring isolated personnel into contact with, and ultimately into the custody of, a recovery force as soon as possible and then move the isolated personnel to an area where exfiltration to definitive USG control can occur.

6. **Training**

   a. **Commanders and Staffs.** SOF PR coordinators and personnel assigned in PRCCs should complete appropriate PR courses provided by JPRA. Commanders and staff should also conduct continuation training during unit collective training and joint training exercises.
b. **Recovery Forces.** Units that anticipate being tasked as a recovery force should conduct training on recovery operations during unit collective training exercises and mission rehearsals.

c. **Isolated Personnel**

   (1) SOF isolated personnel have the responsibility to assist in their own recovery to the maximum extent possible. Successful unassisted evasion is dependent on effective predeployment and premission preparation and training.

   (2) USSOCOM policy requires all operational forces to complete SERE Level C training with the priority going to national mission and major theater of war apportioned forces followed by all remaining personnel, as required.
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1. General

The following procedures have been established for the administration of the DOD Blood Chit Program. The JPRA is the DOD OPR for blood chit policy and for authorizing the production, distribution, and use of blood chits.

2. Program Administration

a. JPRA will maintain a master control record for all blood chits.

b. Each organization, where blood chits are received, held in custody, and issued, will maintain strict accountability by serial number.

c. Units will maintain a record of the blood chit serial number issued to each individual. An individual may be assigned a specific blood chit for the duration of an assignment to a unit. However, to ensure positive control, the chit will only be issued before employment or deployment to areas where the commander has decided the risk of personnel being isolated warrants the issue. Blood chits will be collected immediately after completion of operations or specific missions.

d. The CCDR will appoint a theater blood chit program manager or coordinator. This manager will maintain records reflecting which blood chits, by number, have been issued to component organizations. The program manager needs to establish procedures within the theater to maintain positive control of chits, including annual inventories. A copy of the initial inventory, and subsequent annual inventories, must be forwarded to JPRA during the month of December each year.

e. Additional inventories may occur at organizations possessing blood chits whenever there is a change of program manager or custodian; however, inventory results need not be forwarded unless a discrepancy is noted.

f. The loss or theft of blood chits is subject to appropriate investigation as would any controlled item. The report of loss or theft (specifying the blood chit serial number(s)), along with a report of investigation and a determination or reason for the loss or theft will be forwarded to the theater program manager and to JPRA as soon as possible after the loss or theft is discovered.

3. Reporting Use of a Blood Chit

a. Upon notification that an individual possessing a blood chit is isolated in hostile territory, the theater program manager will immediately forward to JPRA and DPMO the individual’s name, rank, Social Security number, organization, location where missing, date missing, and blood chit number. This information will help in processing potential future claims against the
government on a particular chit and will provide basic record data on individuals who may subsequently become POWs.

b. Any individual who has made use of their blood chit and has received assistance, must report the circumstances of the incident upon their return to US control. This information may be provided as part of a SERE debrief IAW existing plans. A copy of the individual’s debrief, along with the blood chit, must be forwarded to JPRA, as soon as practicable. These operationally used blood chits will not be reissued but will become part of JPRA’s permanent case files. The organization or organizations responsible for control of the blood chit will be simultaneously relieved of accountability for the particular blood chit by JPRA.

4. Claims for Compensation

The commander, JPRA, makes the final determination of the amount and form of the compensation on all blood chit claims. As necessary, JPRA will provide or appoint an individual in-theater as their representative to facilitate the gathering of information about, and the subsequent payment of, the claim. All USG organizations to which claims are presented will forward a report detailing the circumstances surrounding the claim through the JPRA representative to JPRA for final determination. Because claimants, their families, or even their community may be in extreme danger should their identity or the fact they assisted an evader become known, the report will be classified according to the PR Security Classification Guide.

5. Program Classification Guidance

a. While most aspects of the Blood Chit Program are unclassified, under certain circumstances classification rules apply. Refer to JPRA’s Personnel Recovery Security Classification Guide for particular instances that warrant classification.

b. Additionally, ensure appropriate security measures are used during SERE or other debriefings when assistance activity is discovered. Limit access to essential personnel only. Personnel Recovery Debriefing Statements (DD Form 2810) are appropriate for all who become aware of such activities. Release of such information could seriously jeopardize the lives or well being of those persons who have assisted, are currently assisting, or could assist US personnel. Inadequate protection could result in the compromise of classified tactics, methods, or programs. Identifying specifics of such events will not be used as examples in Lessons Learned reports or in training courses.
# APPENDIX J
## EVASION

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EVASION

1. General

Evasion is the process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. This appendix provides factors that may affect, and techniques and procedures of, evasion to assist commanders in planning for and accomplishing the five PR execution tasks. Evasion techniques and procedures, as well as the evader’s legal status, vary among the types of military operations and the conditions (peace or war) in which they are conducted.

2. Types of Military Operations

a. Military Operations During Peacetime. There may be occasions when individuals will become isolated in a friendly or neutral foreign country as the result of an aircraft mishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similar circumstance. In such situations, the individuals’ goals should be to return to friendly control openly and as soon as possible. Individuals isolated under these circumstances should approach local authorities and request assistance in returning to friendly control or, if possible, openly approach a U.S. embassy or consulate or a representative of a friendly government. On the other hand, evasion may be the proper COA when an individual accidentally and unintentionally becomes isolated in a foreign country that is unfriendly to the U.S, in an area where there is no effective local government, or when there is reason to believe that the local population would mistreat the individual. Whenever “covered persons” operate in or near such areas during peacetime, CCDRs should ensure that appropriate PR plans have been developed, personnel at risk of isolation have been properly trained and briefed, and that recovery forces are prepared to execute the plans when appropriate.

b. Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Isolated personnel are faced with contrasting concerns depending on whether the U.S. is supporting an insurgency or a counterinsurgency. For example, individuals whose mission is to support an insurgent movement can expect to receive assistance in areas controlled by the insurgents or where the local populace is sympathetic to the movement. They should avoid government forces, government controlled areas, and areas where the population supports the government in power. Evaders can also anticipate that any recovery effort will most likely be conducted in a clandestine manner. On the other hand, personnel isolated while providing support to a counterinsurgency are faced with a completely different scenario. In a counterinsurgency, evaders should move to government-controlled areas, seek out government forces, and expect recovery by a force operating in a more overt manner. Because each situation has unique requirements, personnel at risk of isolation involved in either of these scenarios should be fully briefed prior to the onset of operations on the TTP and resources that will be used to effect their recovery.

c. Combating Terrorism. Isolated personnel who were participating in counterterrorism activities are faced with a dilemma similar to that for insurgencies. The key variables in this situation are the location where the action has occurred and where the individual is evading.
(e.g., is the country where the individual is evading supportive or hostile to the US presence and action?). Evasion, even in a country where the government supports the US action, can be dangerous because the evasion area could be populated by elements supporting the terrorist group.

d. **Peacekeeping Operations.** Although a prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping force is the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute (a negotiated truce), the peacekeeping force is often required to deal with extreme tension and violence. Such conditions could lead to a situation where members of the peacekeeping force find themselves in an evasion situation. Once again, the territory where the evasion takes place and the controlling power’s political attitude toward the US will influence evader actions. Members of the peacekeeping force should be well briefed on the current political climate, on the attitudes of the parties to the dispute, and proper evasion guidance that includes various possible evasion scenarios. In addition, planning for quick-response recovery operations should always precede the initial deployment of the force.

e. **Other.** Certain crisis avoidance or consequence-management situations may require the use of military force to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, or protect US citizens. Detailed PR plans should be developed for these operations to the extent allowed by the crisis situation.

f. **War**

    (1) **General.** Evasion may be severely restricted by the large number of adversary forces along the FLOT, by combat operations, and by the possibility that adversary forces may possess sophisticated NVDs and various sensors. Evaders along the FLOT should concentrate on hiding and surviving. After the battle has passed over, the evader should try to link-up with other friendly forces without surprising friendly patrols. Isolated personnel should make no fast or threatening moves and allow themselves to be captured. Once contact is made, authentication procedures will identify personnel as bona fide US isolated personnel.

    (2) **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Planning should include procedures and responsibilities to ensure personnel at risk of isolation are provided the training and equipment to survive in a post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) environment. The evader should be trained to employ individual CBRNE recognition and avoidance techniques.
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX J
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. General

The actions of isolated personnel will be governed by applicable law and policy including US law; international law; the law of war, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions; and, the laws of the nation in which the isolated person is located. Whether a particular body of law or policy applies will depend both on the type of conflict that is taking place and the status of that isolated individual.

2. During an International Armed Conflict

a. Prisoner of War Status. In order to achieve the status of a POW, one has to be the right kind of person in the right kind of conflict. The question of status as a POW is important as it directly related to important benefits. First, a POW, if a lawful combatant, will receive combatant immunity (i.e., warlike acts are not criminal). Second, a POW is entitled to the rights and protections under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POWs (GPW). (See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949.)

   (1) GPW, in its entirety, applies only when the conflict is an international armed conflict. Under Common Article 2, GPW, the “Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other conflict which may arise between two or more [countries].” Common examples include World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

   (2) Once the conflict is determined to be an international armed conflict, Article 4, GPW determines who is entitled to the status of a POW. They include members of the regular armed forces involved in the international armed conflict but also include members of militias or resistance fighters belonging to a party to the conflict if they meet certain criteria set forth in Article 4. These individuals are lawful combatants.

   (3) In addition, numerous other individuals who are captured are entitled to POW status if “they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.” These include contractors; reporters; civilian members of military aircraft crews; merchant marine and civil aviation crews; and dependents. Although such persons are entitled to the benefits of POW status, they are not considered lawful combatants.

b. Pre-Capture (evasion) vs. Post-Capture (escape). The law of armed conflict makes a distinction between isolated personnel depending on whether they are still evading initial capture or have escaped after being captured. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and militias, if they meet the requirements set forth above, who are evading capture are still considered lawful combatants. As a lawful combatant, they will continue to have combatant immunity until captured. However, once captured, the individual is now considered hors de combat, or out of combat, and no longer has combatant immunity for post-capture warlike acts. If the individual evading capture is a civilian accompanying the armed forces (see paragraph 2.a(3) above), such as a contractor,
the civilian is only authorized to use force for individual self-defense. Unless immune from host nation jurisdiction by virtue of an international agreement or international law, inappropriate use of force could subject them to US or host nation prosecution and civil liability.

c. Although escape attempts are legal under the law of armed conflict, a POW whose escape is unsuccessful may be punished for the unsuccessful escape. Offenses committed by POWs with the sole intention of facilitating their escape that do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing; shall occasion disciplinary punishment only. (See generally GPW, Articles 91 to 94.) They may be charged with a crime if the offense involves violence to life or limb or self-enrichment. (See GPW, Article 93)

d. An escape is deemed successful once the POW has rejoined their, or an ally’s, armed forces; or the escapee has left the territory of the detaining power or its ally. If the escape is successful, the escapee cannot then be later punished for crimes committed during the escape. However, this concept is not universally accepted. Therefore, if later recaptured, there is a real possibility that the detaining power will attempt to punish the escapee. Accordingly, US policy is not to return successfully escaped POWs to the same theater of operations.

e. Neutral Countries. Instead of being captured by an enemy state who is a party to the conflict, isolated personnel may find themselves in the territory of a country which is not a party to the conflict. In such a situation, there are rights and duties of that country and issues regarding the status of the isolated personnel.

(1) Rights and Duties of a Neutral State. A state which chooses not to take part in an international armed conflict is called a “neutral state” or a “neutral power.” Rights and duties of a neutral state are governed by a number of treaties, in particular the 5th Hague Convention. Consistent with the United Nations’ Charter, a neutral state is normally required to adopt an attitude which should lead to a de-escalation of the conflict. If isolated personnel cross into a neutral country’s territory and are captured, the neutral state has an obligation to disarm, intern them, and take such measures necessary to prevent them from rejoining their forces.

(2) Status of Captured Personnel. Isolated personnel in neutral states shall be treated in the same way as POWs under the GPW. Therefore, interned isolated personnel must receive at a minimum the same treatment as POWs (but they do not have the formal status of POWs). The GPW also adds that the neutral State might give them “more favorable treatment.” This is justified by the fact that neutral countries were not adversaries as far as the internees were concerned. Isolated personnel who enter neutral territory should attempt to successfully return to friendly lines as if in a hostile party’s territory but should not, to the extent possible, do anything that would be considered a criminal act. There is no combatant immunity, or immunity from criminal prosecution [absent a SOFA with the host nation], in the neutral state.

(3) Internment and Repatriation. Although the detaining power can give more favorable treatment, it cannot escape its obligation under international law to intern troops belonging to the belligerent armies (this implies groups of military forces). They have the
obligation to ensure that those troops do not perform military acts against the enemy during the conflict. Additionally, internees are protected against the forced return to their original country of origin (repatriation). Finally, the internees must be repatriated at the end of the conflict. With respect to individual isolated personnel, the neutral state that receives escaped POWs will leave them at liberty. If the state allows escaped POWs to remain in its territory, it may assign them a place of residence (See generally, Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Cases of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October, 1907, Chapter II, Article 13.).

f. The law of armed conflict places certain restrictions on isolated personnel, but also provides them with certain latitude in what is considered acceptable conduct. This is particularly true in the case of disguises.

(1) **Wearing of Adversary Uniforms.** It is a violation of the law of armed conflict to “make improper use of” the uniform of the adversary. Persons captured while fighting in the adversary’s uniforms have traditionally been subject to criminal prosecution and possible execution for war crimes and espionage. It is, however, still permissible for personnel isolated in hostile territory to use an adversary’s uniform to evade, as long as no other military operations are conducted while so attired. Persons who use the adversary’s flag, uniform, insignia, markings, or emblems solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account, as long as they do not attack the adversary, gather military information, or engage in similar operations. However, wearing an adversary uniform is extremely dangerous because it could result in the mistaken, but likely, treatment as a spy.

(2) **Disguises.** Under certain circumstances during an escape or an evasion, the adoption of varying degrees of disguise may be logical and appropriate. For instance, if the population density is such that movement in uniform is not possible, isolated personnel may be required to adopt some sort of disguise to transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, isolated personnel may disguise themselves to facilitate movement. In these instances, the judgment of the assistance group should be respected. However, isolated personnel need to understand that in the event of capture they will likely be treated exactly like members of the assistance group, unless they can convince their captors that they are lawful combatants. If the disguise is essentially civilian clothing, they should retain at least some of their uniform (e.g., ID tags, US Armed Forces/Geneva Conventions ID card, blood chit) to use as proof of status in the event of capture.

(3) **Misuse of the Red Cross and Other Protected Emblems.** Protected emblems may not be used as disguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict. Only bona fide medical personnel, chaplains, and relief agency personnel may wear these emblems during armed conflict. Misuse of these protected emblems could result in extremely adverse effects on the organizations and personnel they represent.

3. **During Operations Short of International Armed Conflict**

   a. **General.** Legal considerations for evasion during operations falling short of international armed conflict differ from those during an international armed conflict. Because many military operations
involve conflicts of a noninternational nature or situations where the parties to the conflict are not nation
states, the national domestic criminal laws of the country in which the operation is taking place and/or the
law of armed conflict applicable to noninternational armed conflicts will apply.

b. Because POW status and combatant immunity are international armed conflict concepts, a participant in an operation short of international armed conflict, upon capture, is not entitled to POW status, nor does combatant immunity apply. Therefore, if captured, isolated personnel operating under such circumstances face the possibility of prosecution by the host nation for any warlike acts committed. However, because these operations generally tend to support the host nation, the possibility for such an occurrence is reduced. Furthermore, it is also likely that the host nation will be a party to an international agreement, such as a SOFA, prior to the operation, which may provide a sufficient degree of immunity from host nation laws. Furthermore, if the United Nations (UN) sponsors the operation, the participants may be entitled to “expert on mission” status, and be returned to the UN forces upon capture.

c. If isolated personnel are captured by an insurgent group, as opposed to the host nation, or if captured where there is no functioning host nation and the fighting is between warlike clans, practically speaking, isolated personnel should have a reduced expectation for protections under the law. Although insurgents would be subject to criminal prosecution by the host nation, this may have little real impact on their willingness to provide protections to captured isolated personnel.

d. International law does contain some guidance as to the treatment of captured soldiers or others who are hors de combat. The minimum treatment is prescribed in Additional Protocol II [while the US has signed Protocol II, it has not been ratified by the US, and is therefore not binding; however, some items of the Protocol are considered customary international law] and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. These standards include protection from violence, extra-judicial killing, and “outrages upon personal dignity;” wounded and sick should be cared for and all those who are hors de combat should be treated humanely. The minimum humane treatment standards outlined in those documents should be applied to captured personnel in a noninternational (or internal) armed conflict.
1. **General Considerations**

   Distance from friendly forces may have no bearing on the duration of evasion. An evader isolated one mile behind adversary lines may require many days for concealment and traveling and many miles to walk around the flanks of strong adversary forces to friendly lines or a place that will allow a safe recovery.

   a. **Psychological Attitude**

   (1) Do not become discouraged. The will to survive, training in survival and evasion TTP, and equipment, coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, are essential to staying alive and successfully evading.

   (2) Value clothing and equipment. Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies are not likely to be replenished behind the lines, therefore, maintenance may be vital to survival.

   (3) Focus on the situation and the EPA, develop a physical and mental pace and be methodical. The entire journey to friendly or neutral areas may require living off of the land and traveling on foot.

   (4) Patience and knowledge of the adversary’s population controls and internal security measures such as patrols, travel restrictions, security checkpoints, rationing, etc., may be key to a successful evasion.

   (5) Understand that delay of a recovery effort is likely due to recovery force capabilities, threats, or environmental conditions.

   b. Modification to the evader’s EPA will be dictated by the situation, however, changes should be considered carefully, since recovery forces expect execution as promulgated. For example:

   (1) Travel plans may change due to restrictions such as unexpected enemy action, curfews, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

   (2) Unanticipated local customs may need to be imitated to avoid being conspicuous.

   c. **Equipment.** The evader may be forced to decide what equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder (preplanning, based on training and experience, will facilitate making the appropriate decisions for a given situation). Evaders should presume an adversary has observed the isolation event. The important thing is to avoid capture, even if it means leaving the scene of initial isolation and leaving valuable equipment behind. Breaking visual contact with the enemy is essential for evasion success.
2. **When Forward Line of Own Troops is Known**

   a. **Static FLOT.** Evasion along the FLOT is always difficult, especially along a relatively static FLOT. Evaders with radios may find friendly assistance close at hand and within radio range; but the capability of enemy forces in the immediate area may prevent a quick recovery. Evaders should prepare themselves for a worst-case situation. Evaders without radios will have to decide on their own unassisted COA. All must guard against fratricide. If evaders near the FLOT feel sure that friendly forces are moving in their direction, they could seek concealment and allow friendly forces to overrun their position. Evaders can expect to face stiff opposition from both sides. Authentication procedures may assist evaders to safely make contact in or around the FLOT and when approached by friendly forces. Evaders may also be able to move away from the FLOT to a safer area and use a visual signal as indicated in the EPA. Contact with friendly reconnaissance elements is dangerous and must be done carefully.

   b. **Advancing FLOT.** Evaders in front of advancing friendly units should immediately take cover and wait for the friendly units to overrun their position. In these situations, the evader’s primary goal is to seek protection from friendly and adversary fire while trying to avoid capture. In some cases, the evader may be able to assist the friendly forces by reporting on key adversary elements. Evaders should not engage the adversary unless they have been appropriately trained and equipped and the probability of success outweighs the risks involved.

   c. **Retreating FLOT.** Attempting to catch up with retreating friendly units dangerously exposes the evader. Evaders between opposing forces should immediately take cover and wait for adversary units to pass over their position. After most adversary units have moved on, evaders should try to link up with other isolated friendly elements and return to friendly forces.

3. **Assistance From the Local Population**

    Under some circumstances, especially when seriously injured in such areas as the Arctic or desert, it may become necessary to seek assistance from local people in order to survive. However, this should be done only as a last resort. Even when evaders do not require emergency assistance and are doing everything possible to avoid contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. All such contacts are very risky; but if handled properly, they could result in life saving- assistance during evasion. Assistance will normally occur in one of the following situations.

   a. Contact with **opportunists** may occur when an individual or a group of people seek financial or political gain by assisting or apprehending a US evader. The blood chit may be useful in this situation.

   b. **Accidental** contact occurs when a local person and an evader accidentally encounter one another. Neither is comfortable with the situation and both are apprehensive about the outcome. Pre-mission study of the local people may make the evader aware of local attitudes toward Americans and provide some guidance as to how to communicate. A pointee-talkee or blood chit may also assist in communication and soliciting aid. This aid may range from the local person not sounding an alarm, to providing directions, survival assistance or information,
to the best-case scenario where the evader is returned to friendly control. Generally speaking, the best COA for an evader subsequent to accidental contact is to clear the contact area as covertly as possible since the inclinations and resources of the local person are unknown.

c. Evaders in danger of dying because of environmental extremes or injuries may elect to seek an act of mercy from an individual in the local populace. This contact is very dangerous and may result in death or capture. The blood chit may be useful in communicating and convincing an individual to engage in an act of mercy.

d. Potential isolated personnel should receive specific cultural training to prepare them for the above situations. Assistance to the evader might be improved if the evader can represent himself as a polite fellow human being and empathize with the assistor’s position of being accused of aiding an abetting a criminal or the enemy. Cultural preparation can also be provided through theater isolated personnel guidance and briefings. Potential isolated personnel receive training in evasion aids through Service SERE schools, unit or mission-specific training, and theater briefings. This training provides the capability commanders may be seeking in the opportune category, discussed in Chapter V, “Planning.” CCDRs can ensure their personnel at risk of isolation possess the required knowledge and skill levels by publishing minimum SERE skill requirements in OPLANs, OPORDs, and theater entry requirements.

See Appendix L, “Classified Planning Supplement” (published separately) for recommended contact procedures.

4. Evasion in an Urban Area

The likelihood of being isolated in an urban area is increasing. With so few available HLZs and the high vulnerability of recovery vehicles or forces in any given urban area, it is likely that isolated personnel will need to evade for a substantial amount of time, avoiding observation and contact. The evader must always be ready to fight, if necessary, and travel extended distances to get to a feasible recovery site or friendly forces. Generally, successful evasion in an urban area requires an in-depth knowledge of the local area and attitude of the populace, and a detailed map/diagram of the urban area. Isolated personnel should leave urban areas as quickly as possible.
1. General

   a. The most important action the evader can take to assist in their recovery is to periodically provide evidence to friendly forces that they are alive, their location, and their status. This action can be best accomplished by effective signaling. Radios are the best form of signaling and communication, but are not always viable. The evader can also indicate his or her location to overhead assets via ground-to-air signals IAW the individual’s EPA and theater and unit PR instructions.

   b. Pre-Mission Signaling Considerations. Personnel at risk of isolation should know how to use issued communications and signaling equipment, including radio silence procedures, for a specific contingency. Issued equipment should include primary and alternate signaling devices that facilitate detection in both day and low-light conditions. Further, environmental factors, the chance of discovery by local civilians, and the adversary threat should be major considerations when determining which particular signaling devices to utilize within the operational area.

   For a detailed discussion of signaling refer to Appendix L, “Classified Planning Supplement,” (published separately).

   c. Evaders who are trained in various SERE tactics and techniques can decrease the risks to themselves and the recovery force by being able to:

      (1) Overcome signaling problems associated with terrain, weather, medical status, capabilities of the signaling devices, and adversary activity.

      (2) Improvise and use signals to improve their chances of being sighted.

      (3) Select signaling sites that enhance signaling efforts and the likelihood that it will be detected by friendly forces (i.e., use the terrain to maximize radio transmissions to friendly forces). The signal site should also have materials readily available for immediate use in the construction of visual signals. Materials may be either natural, manmade, or a combination. Consideration should be given to being recovered from or near that site (e.g., large enough for a helicopter, no flying hazards, terrain masked to reduce the potential of adversary observation/ground fire).

      (4) Employ clandestine TTP to avoid disclosing their position to any unintended people while signaling (i.e., use the terrain to mask radio transmissions from the adversary).

   d. The evader, as a minimum, should be prepared to use both types of visual ground to air signals: strip and load.
2. **Electronic Signals**

   a. **Radio transmitters** (e.g., radios and beacons) may be used to attract recovery forces to a specific or general location and to authenticate the evader’s identity using the DD 1833 ISOPREP data.

   b. **Strobe lights**, with IR or colored shields, and pyrotechnic signals should be used only as prebriefed and annotated in the EPA or requested by recovery forces.

   c. **Fireflies** are IR light emitting diodes, powered by a 9-volt battery. Multiple fireflies can be used like strip signals and annotated in the EPA (see strip signals below).

3. **Visual Signals**

   a. Parachute panels, signal tarpaulins, space blankets, and other manmade or natural materials set in specific patterns and configurations may provide excellent visual signals. Natural material includes sticks, logs, snow, grass, leaves, brush, rocks, etc.

   b. **Ground-to-air signals** (GTAS) can assist recovery forces in the objective area to determine the evader’s exact location.

      (1) A **strip signal** is a pre-coordinated GTAS from an evader to a receiving or observing source. The strip signal could be issued in theater PR instructions or developed by the individual and in either case must be annotated in the EPA.

      (2) A **load signal** is a precoordinated, close proximity signal that indicates the evader is positioned and prepared to make direct contact with recovery forces. This type of signal is classified, and articulated in the EPA of the evader.

   c. **Glint tape** is a very sensitive IR reflecting cloth that is lightweight, durable, and very reliable. It is very useful as an emergency night signaling device (e.g., a one-inch square piece of tape is detectable by airborne systems).

   d. **Signal mirrors** can sweep the horizon to attract aircraft or naval craft along a coast during daylight or during moonlit nights. Inland, they are meant to be a directional signaling device, should only be used on authenticated targets (land or air), and should be covered when not in use. Caution must be taken to avoid inadvertent flashes to unintended observers.

   e. **Infrared chemical lights** (IR chem lights), used in a pre-briefed manner, is an effective and readily discernible visual signal.

4. **Additional Signaling Methods**

   In combat situations, most hand-held, nondirectional visual signals are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset, or when prescripted in the individual’s EPA. Use of a visual signal without pre-coordination will likely be suspected as hostile activity. Use
before coordination with the recovery asset may pinpoint the evader’s location to the adversary, and result in death or capture of the evader. Furthermore, it may allow an adversary time to set up an ambush for the recovery asset.

a. **Pyrotechnics** (e.g., flares, tracers, smoke grenades) are best used with radio communications during final approach of a recovery asset or when prescribed in the individual’s EPA. Fire and/or smoke fire generators are dangerous to the evader and should only be used in peacetime situations, extremely remote areas, or as a desperate act when death is the only other alternative.

b. **Improvised.** Alternative, multiple-use visual signaling devices (e.g., laser pointers, flashlights with colored lenses, foil reflectors) are best used with radio communications during the final approach of a recovery asset or when prescribed in the individual’s EPA.

c. **Sea marker dye** may be used during daylight in any body of water (e.g., open seas, lakes, ponds, swamps streams, rivers) or to color snow.

5. **Authentication Procedures**

Once an evader is detected, the recovery force will require ID authentication to confirm that an adversary attempting to entrap a recovery force has not replaced the evader. Recovery may not be immediate, and depends on the situation. After an evader has been out of contact, even for a short time, reauthentication may be required and could occur multiple times. Definitive authentication will be based on the information contained in the ISOPREP, which contains questions the evader should recognize. Generally, the recovery force does not carry the ISOPREP with them on the mission, to preclude loss or compromise; they must contact the JPRC or unit holding the ISOPREP to obtain the information. If the evader is unable to respond to questioning, the ISOPREP (blocks 6, 7, 10, 11, and 24) contains information on the individual’s physical attributes that may assist in confirming an identity. If identity is in doubt, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures pending authentication or return to friendly territory.
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1. Minimum Information

   a. **General.** EPAs should contain the minimum information outlined below IAW theater instructions, and tailored appropriately for the scope of the operation and mission of the unit. Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement “PER ATO SPINS” as substitute information. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document or an electronic database, i.e., PRMS, enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. Before beginning EPA preparation, the planner must have a thorough understanding of the friendly and adversary situation at the time of the mission. EPAs must be classified to at least the level of the OPLAN/OPORD for the mission they support. Paragraphs must be individually classified to the appropriate level. The following information should be completed with assistance from appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, SERE and support/life support personnel as needed.

   b. **Identification**

      (1) Name and rank (for each team or crew member).

      (2) Mission number, aircraft, vehicle or team call sign or identifier, crew or team position, type aircraft or vehicle, call sign suffix, other.

   c. **Planned route of flight, travel, and/or delta points on file**

      (1) If not on file, the route points must be described in the EPA for the ingress, target area, and egress.

      (2) Describe emergency plans for each leg or phase of the mission.

   d. **Immediate evasion actions and/or intentions for the first 48 hours, uninjured**

      (1) Hide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation from team (distance and heading).

      (2) Evade alone or linkup with crew or team (rally points).

      (3) Travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and other such details).

      (4) Intended actions and/or length of stay at initial hiding location.
e. **Immediate evasion actions and/or intentions, if injured**

   (1) Provide hiding intentions if injured.

   (2) Provide evasion intentions if injured.

   (3) Provide travel intentions if injured.

   (4) Provide intended actions at hiding locations if injured.

f. **Extended evasion actions and/or intentions after 48 hours**

   (1) Destination (recovery area, mountain range, coast, border, FLOT).

   (2) Travel routes, plans, and/or techniques (either written and/or sketched).

   (3) Actions and/or intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.

   (4) Recovery/contact point signals, signs, and/or procedures (written out and/or sketched).

   (5) Back-up plans, if any, for the above.

g. **Communications and authentication**

   (1) Word, number, color and/or letter of the day, month, or quarter; bona fides; SARDOT; search and rescue numerical encryption group (SARNEG); duress code word; other (e.g., challenge/response, running password).

   (2) Available communications and signaling devices: type and quantity of radios, programmed frequencies, PLS code, encryption code, quantity of batteries, type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, handheld radio ID, other.

   (3) Primary communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies (initial/extended contact procedures).

   (4) Back-up communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies.

2. **Supplementary Information**

   a. **General.** The following information should be completed with assistance from appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, SERE, and support/life support personnel as needed; and attached to the EPA.
b. **Other useful information**

(1) SERE training completed.

(2) Weapons and ammunition carried.

(3) Personal evasion kit items.

(4) Listing of issued signaling, survival, and evasion kit items.


(6) Clothing and shoe sizes.

(7) Medical allergies.

(8) Signature of reviewing official.
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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX J
IMMINENT CAPTURE

1. Members of the Armed Forces may never surrender voluntarily. Even when isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the adversary or otherwise defend themselves, it is their duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force. Surrender is the willful act of members of the Armed Forces turning themselves over to adversary forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the adversary, members of Armed Forces should view themselves as “captured” against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily “surrendering.” They must remember that the capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming adversary strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.

2. There are many potential actions that could assist the “about to be captured” evader. Preparation activities should be performed clandestinely to not draw the adversary’s attention. Even when the situation looks insurmountable, the adversary could make a mistake and miss finding an evader, even one that is not well hidden. This is a situation where maintaining patience and flexibility may result in continued freedom — not panicking is critical. The individual weapon the evader has is for self-defense not for starting a new front in the war. Possible steps to consider when capture looks imminent include:

   a. Communicate with friendly forces or broadcast in the blind, for as long as possible, your situation, health, and if applicable, status of other members of your team or crew if known; and inform them of possible capture. Theater procedures normally will dictate the disposition of radio, GPS, and other signaling and communication devices.

   b. Sanitize for any information that you may have such as knee boards, authentication books/tables, cryptological items, marked maps, survival radios, GPS, pocket litter, etc.

   c. Note the time and your location for future reference.

   d. Consume all the water and food available.

   e. Scatter small survival/medical items within the clothing. These items may make it through a search. Initial searches concentrate on weapons, maps, watches, and wallets.

   f. Disable your weapon(s).

   g. Zeroize and disable/destroy radio equipment.

For further information regarding SERE planning considerations and actions for isolated personnel while detained or captured, refer to Appendix L, “Classified Planning Supplement,” (published separately).
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX J
GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING AND CONTROLLING
DD FORM 1833, ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

1. Completion

   a. As personnel recovery information and storage transitions from paper format to electronic
data, the guidance below will need to be adapted to the circumstances present at the time of the
operation, and the capabilities of the individuals, units and recovery assets involved. Commands
may want to retain paper copies of electronic data, if they are concerned about the viability of
electronic systems. Regardless of the medium in which the data is maintained, what will not
change are the security classification and forwarding/archival requirements of the ISOPREP.

   b. Digital preparation is the preferred method for creating an ISOPREP. However, the data
may be entered on a paper DD Form 1833 if electronic means are not available. If ISOPREPs
are handwritten, they must be printed legibly. Items of a permanent nature (name, social security
number, etc.) should be done in ink; entries that may change (rank, unit, etc.) should be written
in pencil.

   c. When choosing numeric codes, use a number that can be easily remembered. This
number should not be in the individual’s military records or be public information. The number
should not be sequential (1234, 9876, etc.), have repeated numbers (7777, 2299, etc.), or have
zeros.

   d. Blank spaces on the form are usually reserved for use by the JPRC or PRCC for PLS
codes, blood chit numbers, etc.

   e. Personal authentication statements require declarative sentences, not questions and
answers. They should involve personal details that are easily remembered and not subject to
change. Details of friends, relatives (other than immediate family), pets, vehicles, vacations,
and other such details would be appropriate (e.g., “My first car was a blue, 4-door, 1979 Trans
Am.”). Avoid references to dates, ages, or other information from the individual’s military
records or public information. Recovery forces will be able to derive several questions from
each statement to authenticate the individual. Some simple guidelines are listed below:

   (1) Do not invent stories that may not be remembered during an actual recovery due to
the stress of the situation.

   (2) Do not use memories subject to change, (i.e., My favorite ice cream is…, My
current dog is).

   (3) Do not use slang or jargon that may not be understood by the recovery forces. If
the recovery force cannot understand the statement, they cannot formulate a question.
(4) Avoid referencing information that is public knowledge or can be found in the individual’s military records.

(5) Avoid using culturally sensitive information.

(6) Avoid using information that would cause embarrassment if disclosed.

f. Additional data entered, as a minimum, should provide SERE/CoC training courses and year attended, known medical conditions (e.g., allergies, medication), and other information as directed for local use, or as stated in theater guidance.

g. Provide current front and side view photographs of the individual in the appropriate uniform without headgear. Provide digital photographs when using a digital ISOPREP.

2. Maintenance and Control

a. ISOPREPs are CONFIDENTIAL once the authentication data is filled in, per combatant command guidance and the PR Security Classification Guide.

b. Electronic databases can facilitate the immediate transmission of ISOPREP information to the parent/component PRCC or JPRC when an isolating event occurs. Units who maintain only paper copies should archive at least two ISOPREP cards per individual at the individual’s assigned unit or next capable level of command to ensure cards can be easily accessed and reviewed. During military operations, paper ISOPREPs should be stored with, or in close proximity to, the individual’s EPA.

c. The individual must review their ISOPREP at least every six months during peacetime, and prior to each mission during military operations.

d. The individual must never carry a copy of the ISOPREP or the information with them on a mission. Individuals en route to a deployment location may transport copies of ISOPREPs as part of a classified courier package only if this package is stored at a staging location prior to entering the tactical operational area. Electronic ISOPREPs are forwarded using secure means.

e. Theater or joint force PR plans will establish guidelines for ISOPREP data transfer timeliness and methods. ISOPREP data may be released to coalition recovery forces with authorization. The JFC operations staff routinely requests authorization from the CCDR foreign disclosure office.

f. Unit commanders should establish and periodically exercise procedures to ensure that accurate ISOPREP data can be immediately provided through secure means. They should also ensure that the parent component PRCC and the JPRC have been provided 24-hour contact procedures to obtain ISOPREP information.
g. ISOPREPs used in successful recoveries will remain classified and forwarded to JPRA as part of the mission folder. Should the formerly isolated person require a new ISOPREP in the future, only the uncompromised authentication information may be reused.

h. As long as the recovery mission is open and an active search is still being conducted, the paper ISOPREP will be maintained at the PRCC managing the recovery.

i. Upon notification that a recovery mission has been unsuccessful and/or terminated, the authentication information on the ISOPREP will remain classified, and it will be retained within the mission folder at the PRCC. The JPRC will transmit copies of the ISOPREP and other pertinent information to the theater PR OPR and JPRA for permanent archiving. Upon the cessation of hostilities and redeployment of US forces from the theater of operations, all open mission files will be forwarded to JPRA for archiving. These files remain classified per theater and PR classification guidance.

j. If the death of the isolated person has been verified, the ISOPREP may be declassified, and maintained in the archival mission folder. The information will continue to be afforded protection under the Privacy and Missing Persons acts.

k. Upon separation from government service, or when no longer needed by the individual, the paper ISOPREP should be destroyed (unless used during an isolation event) and any electronic data deleted from all databases.
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APPENDIX K
PERSONNEL RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. General Instructions

PR instructions which are appropriate to all participants in a joint operation should be included in OPORDs and remain applicable for the duration of the operation. PR guidance should be included in the coordinating instructions to alert commanders to more detailed responsibilities and guidance in the appendices per formats in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

2. Specific Mission Personnel Recovery Instructions

a. PR guidance for a specific mission will be included as part of mission tasking orders. The PR instructions should address specific PR plans that are unique to that mission, e.g., PR call signs and frequencies, PR air and ground methods and preplanned tactical prepositioned locations (ground and air).

b. PR Information

(1) The JFACC publishes a daily ATO to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces for targets and specific missions. For PR operations, the daily ATO will contain tasking for dedicated or designated PR air assets by country, Service, and unit, to include call signs, number/type aircraft, alert periods, response times, etc.

(2) Published along with the daily ATO are SPINS used to disseminate information that is not available in the ATO otherwise, but needed to execute the ATO missions. The initial SPINS, normally called the “standing SPINS,” will be developed during operational planning for a contingency operation. During the course of the operation, these standing SPINS will be revised and/or updated on weekly basis. Additionally, daily SPINS, not affecting the standing/weekly SPINS, will be published which contain information such as daily changing call words, codes, challenge and password, near and far recognition signals, frequencies, etc.

(3) The JPRC director is the functional OPR for the PR section of the ATO SPINS. PR information may also be contained in other sections of the SPINS (e.g., commander’s guidance, ROE, communications plan, EW plan). The JPRC must coordinate approval of changes to PR information contained in those sections with the applicable OPR. JPRC and component PRCC personnel need to be familiar with the format and contents of the daily ATO and weekly/daily SPINS.

(4) Many ground forces, especially small tactical units, will not be able to access or store the SPINS information due to physical security limitations, lack of classification access, or constant force maneuvering in the operational area. Often these elements will create their own operational instructions, including authentication or password codes, or predesignated escape and evasion procedures. It is imperative that this information be documented locally and forwarded to the component PRCC. Should
an isolating event occur, this information, combined with the ISOPREP, will be readily available to the recovery planners and forces at the PRCC and JPRC.

3. Personnel Recovery Instructions Template

The following are PR elements of information that should be considered for inclusion in operation and fragmentary orders. Some information remains current for a month or more, while others are changed weekly and daily. The information contained in each item would be determined by theater requirements.

a. PR General Information

   (1) JPRC.

   (2) Pre-mission preparation.

   (3) Brevity codes.

   (4) SARDOTs.

   (5) SARNEG

   (6) Departure points.

   (7) Phase lines.

   (8) Rally points (en route, objective, etc.)

   (9) Duress word.

   (10) PR word, number, and letter.

   (11) Challenge and password.

   (12) Near and far recognition signals.

b. Communication/Navigation Procedures

   (1) PR communications plan.

   (2) Tactical checkpoints or navigation waypoints.

   (3) Communications check times.

c. Isolated Personnel
(1) Initial actions.

(2) Immediate actions for isolated personnel.

(3) Radio communications.

d. Extended Evasion

(1) Support procedures.

(2) Procedures when radios are not available.

e. Recover Task Procedures

(1) General.

(2) Signaling devices and procedures.

f. Personnel Recovery Task Force

(1) General.

(2) Air/ground navigation.

(3) Mission execution checklist.

(4) Radio interrogation procedures.

(5) PRTF checklist.

(6) OSC/RMC checklist.

(7) AMC immediate action checklist.

(8) AMC changeover procedure.

(9) Coalition force member ID card formats (if any).

(10) Medical report.

(11) PRC 112B and combat survivor evader locater radio canned databurst messages.

(12) Abbreviations and acronyms.
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ANNEX A Personnel Recovery Task Force Mission Planning Checklist
B Airborne Mission Coordinator Checklist
C On-Scene Commander/Rescue Mission Commander Checklist
D Personnel Recovery Task Force Checklist
E Joint Force Staff Considerations for Personnel Recovery
F Typical Combatant Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities
G Typical Service and United States Special Operations Command Personnel Recovery Office of Primary Responsibility Functions and Responsibilities
1. Date-time group notified: __________

2. Pre-mission:
   a. Record event on appropriate incident form.
   b. Plot isolated personnel on situation map.
   c. Determine PR plan of action.
   d. Complete PR worksheet:
      1) Obtain current intelligence brief.
      2) Obtain ISOPREP, authentication data, and EPA.
      3) Determine threat level.
      4) Obtain weather brief.
      5) Study terrain/obtain sea conditions.
      6) Determine survival equipment.
      7) Determine CBRNE contamination.
      8) Determine medical status.
      9) Special considerations.
   e. Complete PR planning:
      1) PR plan (forces, timing, locations).
      2) Communications plan including backups.
      3) Recovery forces informed.
      4) Support forces requested (as required).
      5) OSC/RMC appointed/notified.
f. Coordination complete with all PR forces.

3. Mission progress:

a. Monitor mission progress:

(1) Start times.

(2) Keep component PRCC/JPRC advised of actions.

(3) Arrival times at scene.

b. Arrange for transport of injured (as required).

c. Obtain additional recovery forces (as required).

d. Complete reports (as required).

4. Closing actions:

a. Rescue forces/personnel debriefed.

b. Intelligence debriefed (as required).

c. Component PRCC/JPRC notified of mission results.

d. Recovered personnel entered into the reintegration process; status confirmed.

e. Mission file completed, log updated, SARSIT message transmitted.

f. Mission file forwarded to JPRC and/or JPRA, accordingly.

g. Results of recovery force and intelligence debriefing passed to follow-on teams.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX M
AIRBORNE MISSION COORDINATOR CHECKLIST
(Checklist based on air recovery; may need to be modified to be applicable to a ground recovery where air assets are assisting)

PR Information

PR A: _____ PR B: _____  
PR Primary: _____ PR Secondary: _____
PR Bullseye: _____ Elevation: _____ SARDOT and Location: _____
PR Code word: _____ Number: _____ Letter: _____ Color: _____

Checklist

1. Downed A/C or isolated vehicle type: _____ Notified by: _____ Time: _________

2. Notify PRCC/JPRC. Relay following information as available:
   a. C/S of downed A/C:
   b. Type of A/C/souls on board/# chutes:
   c. Location of survivor(s)/qualifier (GPS, estimated, last known, ground, water):
   d. Physical status of survivor(s):
   e. OSC C/S/fuel state/load out:
   f. Authentication status:
   g. Cause of loss/time/notified by:
   h. Weather/terrain:
   i. Threats (ground/air):
   j. Assets available in area:
   k. Recommended spider route:
3. Designate OSC (air-to-ground ordnance availability preferred), if required by the tactical situation. Switch to PR primary and survivor’s frequency.

4. Request alert or support forces if required.

5. Establish communications with recovery force on PR primary. Control radio discipline.

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<th>Number/Type A/C:</th>
<th>Station:</th>
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<td>Number/Type A/C:</td>
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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX M
ON-SCENE COMMANDER/RESCUE MISSION COMMANDER CHECKLIST

1.___ AUTHENTICATION
    a.___ Authenticate.
    b.___ Number of isolated personnel.
    c.___ Establish order of communication.
    d.___ Determine injuries.
    e.___ Determine isolated personnel intentions.
    f.___ Determine adversary activity.
    g.___ Check all assets on station time, ordnance, and other relevant factors.

2.___ LOCATION
    a.___ Attempt location via electronic means (PRC-112, GPS and/or chart position passed over radio by survivor, high-speed DF).
    b.___ Determine signal devices.
    c.___ Request general terrain description.
    d.___ Request isolated personnel give vectors to their position.
    e.___ Locate isolated personnel position within 1 nm.

3.___ ENEMY FORCES
    a.___ Neutralize threats detrimental to rescue.
    b.___ Note all other adversary positions.
    c.___ Determine ingress and egress routes.

4.___ RECOVERY
    a.___ Brief recovery vehicle and remainder of recovery force on:
       (1) Number and condition of isolated personnel.
(2) Distance to isolated personnel from initial point.

(3) Describe terrain.

(4) Isolated personnel location.

(5) Elevation of recovery area.

(6) Wind speed and direction.

(7) Describe isolated personnel signal devices.

(8) Known or suspected adversary activity.

(9) Describe ingress and egress routes.

(10) Emergency safe landing area.

b. Direct isolated personnel to:

   (1) Prepare signaling devices for use and/or ignition, but use only as prebriefed or when directed by authenticated rescue forces.

   (2) Call threatening adversary positions.

   (3) Vector helicopter if necessary.

   (4) Approach the helicopter, ground force recovery assets, or maritime recovery vehicles only when directed, and follow instructions.
Items 1 through 7 are required to be briefed to the rescue mission commander prior to mission execution. All other information should be provided to the PRTF as applicable.

____ ISOLATED PERSONNEL INFORMATION

1.____ Tactical Call Sign(s).

2.____ Number of isolated personnel.

3.____ Location(s) (latitude/longitude, grid, range/bearing to/from SARDOT).

4.____ Condition/injuries: Walking? YES NO UNKNOWN

5.____ Equipment (communications/signal).

6.____ Authentication complete? NO/YES When _________METHOD:

____ RECOVERY AREA INFORMATION

7.____ Threats (air/ground/missile).

8.____ Elevation _____(Nearest 1,000 feet, mean sea level).

9.____ General terrain description.

____ RESCORT PLAN

10.____ Initial point.

11.____ Link up point (if not at initial point).

   (a)____ Ingress.

   (b)____ Egress.

12.____ Ordnance.

13.____ RESCORT tactics.

____ RECOVERY VEHICLE PLAN

14.____ Rescue tactics.
15. Communications/signaling procedures.

REFUELING PLAN

16. Fixed-wing assets.

17. Rotary-wing assets.

18. Ground force assets.

19. Maritime assets.

ADDITIONAL ITEMS/QUESTIONS
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX M
JOINT FORCE STAFF CONSIDERATIONS FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY

The following considerations do not constitute a checklist of tasks to be accomplished by joint force staff sections. They are a starting point for considering actions to be taken in support of a PR event, and for integrating with and support of the PR annex to an OPLAN.

1. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE (J-1) CONSIDERATIONS

   a. Notify respective Military Service or agency (if DOD civilian) casualty support center once an individual is determined to be isolated from US control and request that they prepare a PPF.

   b. If activated, augment JPRC/JOC with J-1 PR representative.

   c. Identify, coordinate and provide component PRCC personnel to augment US military group (USMILGP)/MSC and support of recovery operations.

   d. Source components with augmentees for the JPRC/component PRCC as required.

   e. Be prepared to initiate reintegration plan if required.

   f. Provide guidance to PAO to ensure factual information is provided to the news media.

   g. Assist JPRC with sourcing personnel to support designated component commander responsible for the reintegration of isolated personnel.

   h. Obtain PPF from isolated person’s respective Military Service or agency (if DOD civilian or contractor) and forward to the JPRC.

   i. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

   j. In conjunction with SJA determine legal rights the individual is entitled to, and convey those rights to the recovered person through the reintegration team/designated component commander.

   k. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

   l. Notify the Service and Joint Staff immediately upon notification of an isolating event. If fingerprints are needed and not included in the ISOPREP, request a copy from the FBI. The Service can access photos and an index fingerprint from Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System/Common Access Card records.
2. J-2 CONSIDERATIONS

a. Prior to the onset of hostilities, establish communications with combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC. Ensure J-2 PR representative coordinates with the combatant command PR OPR and the JPRC/component PRCC for briefing, threat assessment, and development of intelligence and information requirements.

b. Augment JPRC with J-2 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Conduct initial threat assessment (using joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment criteria) and intelligence update and immediately forward information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

d. Identify all available national assets and task/request national support to assist in locating and recovering the isolated individual(s).

e. Facilitate coordination of national intelligence support to PR and ensure information is being pushed to the JPRC/component PRCC.

f. Obtain and provide to the JPRC/component PRCC updated terrain, vegetation, and threat information in the vicinity of isolated personnel.

g. Update national intelligence systems/agencies when isolated personnel location is known. **Send requirements to queue national systems/agencies/theater assets if location is unknown.**

h. Through the JPRC/component PRCC provide the PRTF with updated intelligence situation reports (SITREPs).

i. Determine the threat to rescue force capabilities.

j. Continue to provide intelligence updates to the PRTF through the JPRC/component PRCC.

k. Evaluate threat level at recovery sites when the JPRC/component PRCC or PRTF provides location(s).

l. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US personnel. Identify any threat counter-recovery trends and pass to theater and national level.

m. Stand down national intelligence systems when JPRC/component PRCC transmits final PR SITREP.

n. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.
3. J-3 CONSIDERATIONS

   a. Establish JPRC and implement crisis action planning procedures/battle drill. Augment JPRC with J-3 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

   b. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, designate a PRTF to direct, coordinate support and assist in planning the PR mission.

   c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director, task components and request other agencies and coalition partner/host nation (through JOC/USMILGP) to identify and report availability of their recovery capabilities to the JPRC/component PRCC.

   d. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC’s PR incident report.

   e. Activate the IO cell and implement the IO plan.

   f. Alert theater airlift to plan and prepare for airdrop of emergency supplies to isolated personnel and coordinate with the PRTF.

   g. Request JPRA provide support to isolated personnel’s families and reintegration effort through the PRCC.

   h. Through the JPRC/component PRCC director and PRTF, designate a recovery force commander to evaluate the probability of success, plan and execute the recovery mission.

   i. In conjunction with PRCC and JOC/USMILGP, alert designated initial reception point facilities to prepare for the returnee’s initial medical evaluation, stabilization, and debriefing.

   j. In coordination with JPRC/component PRCC determine task force composition requirements. (on scene-immediate, maneuver force, joint)

   k. Prepare to deploy debriefing team to initial reception point. (May involve requesting JPRA assistance.)

   l. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC director with identifying requirements/capability to support search operations if necessary.

   m. Authorize reintegration team to deploy to initial reception point to assist in reintegration activities (if not already deployed).

   n. Coordinate and obtain approval for supplemental ROE required to accomplish recovery operations. (Must be on-the-shelf.)

   o. Through the PRCC, designate a component commander that will support the return and reintegration of isolated personnel and be responsible for the returnees initial processing.
p. Through JPRC/component PRCC director, task components to support the PRTF in planning and executing recovery mission.

q. In conjunction with the JPRC/component PRCC, and J-2, review and validate PR COAs.

r. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

s. Review and authorize release of JPRC/component PRCC’s PR SITREP.

t. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

4. **JOC CONSIDERATIONS**

a. Receive report of isolated personnel IAW Initial PR Response Notification Checklist:

   (1) Notify JPRC/component PRCC of PR incident.

   (2) Notify staff.

   (3) Transmit an operational report.

   (4) Transmit announce on JOC floor (coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC).

b. Forward all incoming PR information to the JPRC/component PRCC.

c. Assist the JPRC/component PRCC with transmission of SARIR.

d. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US forces.

e. Assist JPRC/component PRCC with transmission of their respective PR SITREP.

f. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

5. **LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE (J-4) CONSIDERATIONS**

a. Identify and request support for recovery operations (intermediate staging bases [ISBs] and forward staging bases, forward operating locations [FOLs], logistic requirements, C2, intelligence, strategic air and reintegration support).

b. Identify possible ISB/FOL to be used in support of recovery operations.

c. Augment JPRC with J-4 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Coordinate support for pre-positioned PR forces or other PR support assets.
e. Identify theater air assets to load and drop survivor support kits.

f. Identify transport requirements for personnel and equipment into and throughout theater to include aeromedical evacuation for returnees.

g. Notify the JPRC/component PRCC of all actions and any available support.

h. Monitor recovery mission and support return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

i. Ensure returnee’s transportation requirements to phase III location are in place.

j. Assist in coordinating the return of deployed PR forces and equipment.

k. Be prepared to coordinate and provide mortuary affairs support as required.

l. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

6. PLANS DIRECTORATE (J-5) CONSIDERATIONS

a. Coordinate with US embassy to obtain foreign nation diplomatic clearances for entry and over flight of US aircraft/personnel in support of recovery operations. Consistent with DODD 4500.54-G, DOD Foreign Clearance Guide, information, ensure clearances are obtained from all nations affected by the recovery operation, as appropriate.

b. Augment JPRC with J-5 PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Through the JPRC/component PRCC, update the PRTF when diplomatic clearances are approved.

d. Assist JPRC with identifying and coordinating an in-theater treatment and processing facility.

e. Coordinate through JOC/USMILGP to obtain coalition partner/host nation approval of cross border operations in support of isolated personnel.

f. In conjunction with JPRC identify, coordinate, and plan for the initial reintegration point.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel.

h. Coordinate diplomatic clearances for flights supporting redeployment missions. (Memorandum of agreement in place)

i. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.
7. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM DIRECTORATE (J-6) CONSIDERATIONS

a. Ensure PR communications (SATCOM, SIPRNET, etc.) are operational.

b. Augment JPRC with J-6 PR representative to coordinate communications support.

c. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to determine if additional radio frequencies are required.

d. Monitor status of PR communications channels to ensure C2 is not degraded or interrupted.

e. Assist in identifying and locating equipment required by deploying recovery and support forces.

f. Identify communications equipment and/or cryptographic keying material which may have been comprised, contact the appropriate communications security manager, and ensure widest dissemination across the joint force.

g. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

h. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

8. PAO CONSIDERATIONS


b. Notify the Officer of the Secretary of Defense PAO of isolated personnel situation and coordinate for information flow to isolated personnel’s family members through Service survivor assistance officer.

c. Augment JPRC with PAO PR representative to coordinate PR support.

d. Manage command PR information to media, higher HQ and through the services to the isolated personnel’s family.

e. Manage command PR information to media and higher HQ in coordination with subordinate commands and other organizations as required. (Ensure integration with IO plan.)

f. Coordinate with JPRC/component PRCC to ensure no compromise of sensitive information or isolated personnel status.

g. In conjunction with JPRC, coordinate with the respective Military Service or agency to ensure NOK receive timely and accurate information concerning their isolated family member.

h. Coordinate and provide support to recovery forces as required
i. Make periodic releases to keep the public updated on mission progress, and a final release summarizing the entire mission made when the case is concluded.

j. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

k. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

9. SJA CONSIDERATIONS

a. Determine legal status of isolated personnel and forward to the JPRC.

b. Augment JPRC with SJA PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Update/confirm isolated personnel’s legal status after location is known and forward to the JPRC.

d. Coordinate and publish appropriate ROE for potential isolated personnel.

e. Notify the JPRC if isolated personnel’s legal status changes.

f. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

g. Identify and task legal representative for recovered personnel.

h. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.

10. MEDICAL SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

a. Be prepared to request forensic capability as required to support recovery operations.

b. Augment JPRC with medical PR representative to coordinate PR support.

c. Validate/confirm capabilities of appropriate in-country/theater hospitals and determine required medical capability for the return of isolated personnel.

d. Reassess required medical capabilities after communication is established with the isolated personnel and their medical status is confirmed.

e. Be prepared to provide recommendations to J-3 and J-4, if medical supplies must be air dropped to isolated personnel.

f. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

g. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.
11. CHAPLAIN CONSIDERATIONS

   a. Provide religious support to recovered personnel.

   b. Coordinate religious support team (RST) activities to provide religious support to families.

   c. Augment JPRC with RST PR representative to coordinate PR support.

   d. Monitor recovery mission and return of isolated personnel to US personnel.

   e. Submit after action and lessons learned to JPRC/component PRCC.
1. Ensure a coordinated PR program for the assigned operational area is developed and that all assigned forces possessing PR capabilities and assets are prepared to execute component PR responsibilities and contribute to PR joint efforts, if required.

2. Assist in developing the command joint mission essential task list, and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.

3. Develop combatant command PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide command guidance on staff and component PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks must address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.

4. Develop an integrated PR CONOPS, across the range of military operations, in coordination with the component commands.

5. Develop appendix 5, to annex C, of OPLANs and OPORDs. Ensure that appendix 5 and associated tabs are complementary to related annexes or appendices for personnel; intelligence; medical services; processing of formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel; mortuary affairs; public affairs; and reports. Ensure the PR appendix and relevant supporting plans are properly distributed to all required agencies.

6. Maintain direct and continuous liaison with all combatant command PR coordination elements and other designated recovery assets, as required.

7. Act as liaison for local/host nation forces who are capable of PR. Assist in establishing procedures between forces and establish formalized relations at the tactical and operational level for future planning. This liaison will be important if the JPRC is not established initially and the PR OPR must act as the primary POC until a JPRC is operational.

8. Coordinate with the components, Services, USSOCOM (for NAR), USJFCOM (for theater support) and other pertinent combatant commands and DOD agencies to meet PR requirements and responsibilities.

9. Establish procedures to provide support to recovery forces and monitor mission progress and status of recovery assets.

10. Establish procedures to locate and communicate with isolated personnel.
11. Determine requirements for JPRA intelligence support, isolated personnel guidance, evasion aids, support team assistance, and training. Coordinate with JPRA for the production of evasion aids as appropriate.

12. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure coordination with Service reintegration plans.

13. Recommend supplemental ROE to support PR.

14. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans and review them for supportability.

15. Develop the PR portion of communications plans.

16. Establish reporting requirements for the JPRC and component PRCCs.

17. Ensure JPRC and component PRCCs are capable of accomplishing their assigned duties and meeting their functional responsibilities.

18. Organize and conduct PR mission training exercises for the joint force. Ensure PR scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic, adequate, and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions.

19. Develop a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations, and back to peacetime to include:

   a. Developing augmentation personnel requirements.

   b. Establishing additional communications support requirements.

20. Designate a NAR OPR. Plan, coordinate, and prepare to execute NAR. Coordinate with the theater SOC, and with USSOCOM as necessary, for all command NAR requirements.

21. Coordinate with combatant command PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media by DOD personnel.
1. Develop PR policies, directives, and SOPs to provide guidance on PR responsibilities, coordination procedures, requirements, etc. Develop policy, plans, and exercise tasks that outline component operating procedure construct requirements. Policy tasks must address planning, preparation (to include exercise and rehearsal), and execution tasks to ensure joint interoperability.

2. Assist in developing the Service mission essential task list and training and exercise scenarios, ensuring PR equities are sufficiently represented.

3. Coordinate PR training, equipment, intelligence, and product requirements to support PR mission readiness.

4. Develop appendix 5, to annex C, to all plans and orders.

5. Maintain direct and continuous liaison with combatant command PR OPR, coordination elements and other designated recovery assets, as required. (See CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II (Planning Formats)*, for content and format.)

6. Develop a reintegration plan for processing returned isolated personnel; ensure synchronization with combatant command/JTF reintegration plan.

7. Coordinate and deconflict component PR plans with combatant command/JTF PR plans and review them for supportability.

8. Coordinate with appropriate PA agencies for establishment and dissemination of specific guidance on the release of PR information to media.
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1. Administrative Processing of DOD Personnel Who Have Returned to Friendly Control

   a. General. IAW guidelines delineated in DODI 2310.4, Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel, the following procedures are established for the administrative processing of DOD individuals who are recovered from isolated territory.

   b. The unit or organization that initially receives a member of the DOD who has returned from isolation, captivity, or MIA status is expected to:

      (1) Provide care, custody, and safeguards for recovered isolated personnel, including all required physical and mental health care and protection from idle curiosity.

      (2) Confirm the identity of recovered isolated personnel and receive necessary disposition instructions by contacting the:

         (a) Service component or unit of assignment.

         (b) JPRC.

         (c) Combatant command PR OPR.

         (d) JPRA.

      (3) If the individual’s identity cannot be confirmed, provide care, custody, and security controls and request appropriate instructions from the JPRC or nearest counterintelligence agency.

   c. Before any debrief or questioning, recovered isolated personnel will be asked if any assistance was received during evasion or if the recovered isolated personnel have any knowledge of any sensitive or covert recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs or equipment. If the recovered isolated personnel indicate that to be the case, they will be directed to complete a classified information nondisclosure agreement (Standard Form 312). The individual will then be advised to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical intelligence, but will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert PR information with anyone except a specific representative identified by the JPRC director in coordination with JPRA. The fact that recovered isolated personnel had access to certain classified programs may, in itself, be classified, and that fact will be treated as such when directed by the JPRC director.

   d. If the debriefer suspects recovered isolated personnel of an offense under the UCMJ, the debriefer will seek the advice of the SJA.
e. Recovered isolated personnel will be notified that they may not publish or disclose the
details of their experience while isolated or evading without prior approval through official
DOD PA procedures. The SF 312 is the basis for prohibiting the publishing or disclosure of the
classified portions or the isolated person’s experience.

f. The unit or organization that initially receives recovered isolated personnel and theater intelligence
collection agencies may debrief recovered isolated personnel for tactical intelligence. During this debrief,
recovered isolated personnel will not be debriefed about sensitive or covert PR plans, procedures,
organizations, programs, or equipment unless coordinated and approved by JPRA. Results of these
debriefs must be included in the PPF and forwarded to subsequent debriefing teams if the returnee
continues to phase II reintegration.

g. JPRA will determine if the recovered isolated personnel’s exposure to sensitive
information warrants a subsequent special debrief or assignment restrictions. JPRA will notify
the recovered isolated personnel’s parent Service, if such action is required, to institute appropriate
assignment restrictions.

h. The combatant command’s PR OPR will establish appropriate command procedures to
ensure recovered isolated personnel under its control are debriefed by qualified personnel. The
purpose of the debriefs is to capture tactical and operational level intelligence, assist the recovered
isolated person in their decompression, and determine the effectiveness of theater PR concepts,
plans, operations, tactics, procedures, techniques, security, and training. The conduct of special
debriefs is restricted to personnel identified by JPRA. The results of these debriefs and any
associated operational after-action reports will be forwarded to JPRA, who will:

(1) Evaluate the debriefs and reports to determine worldwide trends.

(2) Disseminate associated briefings, reports, and analyses to DIA, Service SERE
schools, and theater PR resources or organizations.

(3) Determine the effectiveness of existing theater policy, doctrine, and procedures
and recommend changes as required.

(4) Maintain historical files of the debriefs, reports, and analyses.

i. Once the debrief has been completed and properly classified, the document will be marked
IAW Executive Order 12958, as amended.

2. Administrative Processing of Non-Department of Defense or Non-United States
Personnel

As has happened in the past, the DOD may be tasked to recover non-DOD and/or non-US
personnel. In such cases, the recovered individuals will be treated IAW paragraphs 1b and 1c
above, will be requested to complete a classified information nondisclosure agreement (SF 312),
and will be requested to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical intelligence. However, they will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert PR information with anyone except a specific representative identified by the JPRC and approved by JPRA.
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The development of JP 3-50 is based upon the following primary references:

1. **DOD Directives, Memorandums, and Publications**
   a. DODD 1300.7, *Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC).*
   d. DODI 1300.21, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education.*
   g. DODI 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.*
   h. DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons.*
   i. DODI 2310.6, *Nonconventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense.*
   j. DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces.*

2. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions/Manuals**
   a. CJCSI 3150.25B, *Joint Lessons Learned Program.*
   b. CJCSI 3270.01A, *Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense,* (Secret).
   c. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System.*
   d. CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II, Planning Formats.*
   e. CJCSM 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).*
3. **Joint Publications**

   a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

   b. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

   c. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.


   e. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Operations*.

   f. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

   g. JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

   h. JP 3-04.1, *Shipboard Helicopter Operations*.

   i. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

   j. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.


   m. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

   n. JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.

   o. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

4. **Multi-Service Publications**


5. **US Navy Publications**


   b. NAVAIR 00-80T-105, *CV Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual*.

   c. NAVAIR 00-80T-106, *LHA/LPH/LHD NATOPS Manual*. 
d. NWP 1, *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*.

e. NWP 3-04.1M, *Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships*.


g. NWP 3-50.4, *Joint Recovery Operations*.


i. NWP 5-01, *Naval Operational Planning*.

j. NWP 6-00, *Command and Control*, (Confidential).

k. NSAWC Strike TACMEMO.

l. US Navy CVW TACMEMO.


a. AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*.

b. AFDD 2, *Operations and Organization*.

c. AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.

d. AFDD 2-1.6, *Personnel Recovery Operations*.


f. AFI 14-101, *Intelligence Contingency Funds*.

g. AFI 14-105, *Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities*.

h. AFTTP 3-1, *Mission Employment Tactics*.

7. **US Army Publications**

a. FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations*.


c. FM 1-564, *Shipboard Operations*.
Appendix O

d. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

e. FM 3-04.111, *Aviation Brigades*.

f. FM 3-05.231, *Special Forces Personnel Recovery*.

g. FM 3-05.60, *Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations*.

h. FM 3-05.70, *Survival*.

i. FM 3-14, *Space Support to Army Operations*.


k. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*.

l. FM 8-10-6, *Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.


8. **US Marine Corps Publications**


b. MCWP 3-2, *Aviation Operations*.

c. MCWP 3-23, *Offensive Air Support*.

d. MCWP 3-23.1, *Close Air Support*.

e. MCWP 3-25, *Control of Aircraft and Missiles*.

9. **US Coast Guard Publications**

a. COMDTINST M16130.2, *US Coast Guard Addendum to National Search and Rescue Manual*.

b. COMDTINST M3710.1 (Series), *Air Operations Manual*.

c. COMDTINST M3710.2 (Series), *Shipboard-Helicopter Operational Procedures Manual*.
10. Allied Publications

   a. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-10(C), *Search and Rescue*.
   
   b. ATP-33, *Tactical Air Doctrine*.
   
   c. ATP-40, *Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.
   
   d. ATP-62 (draft), *Combat Search and Rescue*.

11. Other Publications

   
   
APPENDIX P
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JPRA FT BELVOIR VA//J71//
   JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
   CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

   Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
Appendix P

c. Record of Changes:

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a. This publication is not programmed for printing. However, if printed, additional copies of this publication can be obtained through the Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

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By Military Services:

**Army:** US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

**Air Force:** Air Force Publications Distribution Center
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Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

**Navy:** CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
5450 Carlisle Pike, Box 2020
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0788

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Albany, GA 31704-0321
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action report</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CDRUSJFCOM</td>
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<td>DUSTWUN</td>
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<td>forward arming and refueling point</td>
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<td>global positioning system</td>
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<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>hostage rescue</td>
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<td>identification</td>
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<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>isolated personnel guidance</td>
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<td>JDISS</td>
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<td>JFLCC</td>
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<td>JFSOCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
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<td>JISE</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>joint operations center</td>
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<td>JPRC</td>
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<td>JPRSP</td>
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<td>JSOAC</td>
<td>joint special operations aviation component</td>
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<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
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<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>MASINT</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
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<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (Army)</td>
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<td>mass rescue operation</td>
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<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>NSAWC</td>
<td>Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center</td>
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<td>over the horizon</td>
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<td>personal locator system</td>
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<td>rescue coordination center</td>
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<td>RESCORT</td>
<td>rescue escort</td>
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<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>recovery mechanism</td>
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<td>RMC</td>
<td>rescue mission commander</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>rescue sub-center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<td>religious support team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>recovery team</td>
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<td>situational awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADL</td>
<td>situation awareness data link</td>
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<td>search and rescue point</td>
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<td>SARREQ</td>
<td>search and rescue request</td>
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<td>special boat unit</td>
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<td>search and rescue coordinator</td>
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<td>sensitive compartmented information</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAD</td>
<td>suppression of enemy air defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>sea-air-land team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>survival, evasion, resistance, and escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>situation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>search and rescue mission coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLE</td>
<td>special operations liaison element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPINS</td>
<td>special instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI</td>
<td>surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (Marine Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>search and rescue region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>attack submarine, nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADIL</td>
<td>tactical digital information link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAP</td>
<td>tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (Marine Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>unconventional assisted recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UARCC</td>
<td>unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFSOS</td>
<td>USAF Special Operations School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>US Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMILGP</td>
<td>United States military group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPB</td>
<td>Coast Guard patrol boat</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

act of mercy. In personnel recovery, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders’ cause or plight. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airborne mission coordinator. The designated individual that serves as an airborne extension of the component commander or supported commander responsible for the personnel recovery mission, through the designated personnel recovery task force to manage requirements for the rescue force by monitoring the status of all its elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the mission. Also called AMC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “airborne mission commander” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (JP 1-02)

assistance mechanism. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

assisted recovery. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

authentication. 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator. 2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information. 3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official. 4. In personnel recovery missions, the process whereby the identity of an isolated person is confirmed. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

blood chit. A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (JP 1-02)

bona fides. Good faith. In personnel recovery, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another, to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**bullseye.** An established reference point from which the position of an object can be referenced. (JP 1-02)

**cache.** A source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support isolated personnel. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**combat search and rescue.** The tactics, techniques, and procedures performed by forces to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat. Also called CSAR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**combat search and rescue mission coordinator.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**combat search and rescue task force.** All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to locate, identify, support, and recover isolated personnel during combat. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and to protect the recovery vehicle(s) from attack. Also called CSARTF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**component search and rescue controller.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**contact point.** 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact. 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. 3. (DOD only) In personnel recovery, a location where isolated personnel can establish contact with recovery forces. Also called CP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**contact procedure.** Those predesignated actions taken by isolated personnel and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of isolated personnel to friendly control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**conventional recovery operation.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two
or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

**CSAR-capable assets.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**CSAR-dedicated assets.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

decompression. In personnel recovery, the process of normalizing psychological and behavioral reactions that recovered isolated personnel experienced or are currently experiencing as a result of their isolation and recovery. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

distressed person. An individual who requires search and rescue assistance to remove he or she from life-threatening or isolating circumstances in a permissive environment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

ditching. Controlled landing of a distressed aircraft on water. (JP 1-02)

**electronic warfare.** Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or
localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

**emergency locator beacon.** A generic term for all radio beacons used for emergency locating purposes. (JP 1-02)

**escapee.** Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in getting free. (JP 1-02)

**escape route.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evader.** Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (JP 1-02)

**evasion.** The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion aid.** In personnel recovery, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in avoiding capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion and escape intelligence.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion and escape net.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion and escape route.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion and recovery.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion chart.** A special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. Also called EVC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**evasion plan of action.** A course of action, developed prior to executing a combat mission, that is intended to improve a potential isolated person’s chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader’s action and movement. Also called EPA. (This term and its
forward arming and refueling point. A temporary facility — organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area where operations are being conducted than the aviation unit’s combat service area — to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP. (JP 1-02)

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The FLOT may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy FLOT indicates the forward-most position of hostile forces. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-02)

go no-go. The condition or state of operability of a component or system; “go,” functioning properly; or “no-go,” not functioning properly. Alternatively, a critical point at which a decision to proceed or not must be made. (JP 1-02)

handover/crossover. In personnel recovery, the transfer of isolated personnel between two recovery forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

high-risk-of-capture personnel. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

homing. The technique whereby a mobile station directs itself, or is directed, towards a source of primary or reflected energy, or to a specified point. (JP 1-02)

homing adaptor. A device which, when used with an aircraft radio receiver, produces aural and/or visual signals that indicate the direction of a transmitting radio station with respect to the heading of the aircraft. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

hostage rescue. A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

initial reception point. In personnel recovery, a secure area or facility under friendly control where initial reception of recovered isolated personnel can safely take place. This point is ideally associated with a medical treatment facility, can safeguard recovered isolated personnel for up to 48 hours, and is where the reintegration process begins. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
isolated personnel. US military, Department of Defense civilians and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a US sponsored military activity or mission and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

isolated personnel report. A Department of Defense Form (DD 1833) containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint air operations center. A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander’s operation or campaign objectives. Also called JAOC. (JP 1-02)

joint combat search and rescue operation. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint personnel recovery center. The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. Also called JPRC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “joint search and rescue center” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint personnel recovery support product. The basic reference document for personnel recovery-specific information on a particular country or region of interest. Also called JPRSP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint search and rescue center director. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

load signal. In personnel recovery, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

locate. In personnel recovery, the task where actions are taken to precisely find and authenticate the identity of isolated personnel. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

maritime environment. The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 1-02)
measurement and signature intelligence. Technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. Also called MASINT. (JP 1-02)

mission type order. 1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nonconventional assisted recovery. Personnel recovery conducted by indigenous/surrogate personnel that are trained, supported, and led by special operations forces, unconventional warfare ground and maritime forces, or other government agencies’ personnel that have been specifically trained and directed to establish and operate indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. Also called NAR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

on-scene commander. 1. An individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of the incident. 2. The federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence management efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also called OSC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)
**operational environment.** The air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (i.e., political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, legal, and others) that are relevant to a specific joint operation. (JP 1-02)

**orbit point.** A geographically or electronically defined location used in stationing aircraft in flight during tactical operations when a predetermined pattern is not established. (JP 1-02)

**personnel locator system.** A system that provides rough range and bearing to isolated personnel by integrating the survival radio (if equipped with a transponder) with an airborne locating system, based on an encrypted communications homing system. Also called PLS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**personnel locator system code.** A six digit number programmed into survival radios and used by recovery forces to covertly locate isolated personnel. Also called PLS code. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**personnel recovery.** The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**personnel recovery coordination cell.** The primary joint force component organization responsible for coordinating and controlling component personnel recovery missions. Also called PRCC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “rescue coordination center” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**personnel recovery task force.** A force comprised of US or multinational military forces and/ or other US agencies formed to execute a specific personnel recovery mission to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel. Also called PRTF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition JP 1-02.)

**pointee-talkee.** A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (JP 1-02)

**precautionary personnel recovery.** The planning and pre-positioning of aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities before an operation to provide personnel recovery assistance if needed. Precautionary postures include: duckbutt; lifeguard; airborne alert; and quick response posture. Also called precautionary PR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “precautionary search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery.** 1. In air (aviation) operations, that phase of a mission which involves the return of an aircraft to a land base or platform afloat. 2. The retrieval of a mine from the location where emplaced. 3. In personnel recovery, actions taken to physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return them to the initial reception point. 4. Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for
return to friendly control or repair at another location. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery activation signal.** In personnel recovery, a precoordinated signal from an evader to a receiving or observing source that indicates, “I am here, start the recovery planning.” Also called RAS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery force.** In personnel recovery, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of locating, supporting, and recovering isolated personnel, and returning them to friendly control. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery mechanism.** Designated indigenous or surrogate infrastructure that is specifically developed, trained, and directed by US forces to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate designated isolated personnel from uncertain or hostile areas back to friendly control. Recovery mechanisms may operate with other US or multinational personnel recovery capabilities. Also called RM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery operations.** Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery site.** In personnel recovery, an area from which isolated personnel can be recovered. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery team.** In personnel recovery, designated US or US-directed forces, who are specifically trained to operate in conjunction with indigenous or surrogate forces, and are tasked to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel. Also called RT. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**recovery vehicle.** In personnel recovery, the vehicle on which isolated personnel are boarded and transported from the recovery site. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**reintegrate.** In personnel recovery, the task of conducting appropriate debriefings and reintegrating recovered isolated personnel back to duty and their family. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**repatriation.** 1. The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are officially processed back in the United States subsequent to an evacuation. 2. The release and return of enemy
prisoners of war to their own country in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (JP 1-02)

**rescue combat air patrol.** An aircraft patrol provided over that portion of an objective area in which recovery operations are being conducted for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Also called RESCAP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**rescue coordination center.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**safe area.** A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he or she can be evacuated. (JP 1-02)

**search and rescue.** The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Also called SAR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**search and rescue mission coordinator.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**search and rescue numeric encryption grid.** A predesignated ten-letter word without repeated letters used exclusively by recovery forces or isolated personnel to encrypt numerical data such as position, time, headings, etc., in a covert manner. Also called SARNEG. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

**search and rescue point.** A predesignated specific location, relative to which isolated personnel provide their position to recovery forces. Also called SARDOT. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

**selected area for evasion.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**selected area for evasion area intelligence description.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)
**suppression of enemy air defenses.** That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called SEAD. (JP 1-02)

**survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.** Actions performed by isolated personnel designed to ensure their health, mobility, safety, and honor in anticipation of or preparation for their return to friendly control. Also called SERE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

**tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel.** A Marine Corps mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called TRAP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery.** Nonconventional assisted recovery conducted by special operations forces. Also called UAR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell.** A compartmented special operations forces facility, established by the joint force special operations component commander, staffed on a continuous basis by supervisory personnel and tactical planners to coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict nonconventional assisted recovery operations within the operational area assigned to the joint force commander. Also called UARCC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “unconventional assisted recovery coordination center” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery mechanism.** A recovery mechanism developed and managed by special operations forces. Also called UARM. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery team.** A designated special operations forces unconventional warfare ground or maritime force capable of conducting unconventional assisted recovery.
unconventional recovery operation. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised