PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidelines for planning and executing joint rear area operations primarily in terms of the major functions of infrastructure development, communications, intelligence, security, combat operations, sustainment, survivability, area management, movements, and host-nation support. It also addresses command and control. It places particular emphasis on the joint rear area coordinator’s responsibility for the overall security of the joint rear area.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and guidance not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Describes the Concept of the Joint Rear Area (JRA)
• Discusses Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Requirements for JRA Operations
• Provides Guidance on JRA Security Considerations
• Covers Combat Operations in the JRA
• Discusses Logistics, Area Management, and Movements in the JRA
• Describes the Role of Host-Nation Support in JRA Operations

The Joint Rear Area

A joint rear area (JRA) is a specific land area within a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operational area.

The joint rear area (JRA) is designated by the joint force commander (JFC) to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. Rear areas are becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern enemy forces with sophisticated surveillance devices and systems, accurate, long-range weapon systems, and transport assets capable of inserting forces deep behind friendly lines. The JFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator (JRAC), which is a critical link in coordinating security. The JRAC establishes reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support as well as secure and survivable communications with all forces operating in the JRA. The JRA will typically evolve and expand as a theater develops in accordance with requirements to support and defend the joint force. It may be preceded by a maritime area of operations before establishing a lodgment in a single country. Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint force and include security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and host-nation support.
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Threat Levels

Typical **level I** threats include enemy-controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, terrorism, demonstrations, and riots. **Level II** threats include guerrilla forces, unconventional forces, and small tactical units. **Level III** threats are conventional forces, air or missile attacks, and nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

Command and Control Responsibilities

Successful planning and execution of operations using reliable command, control, communications, and/or computer systems and intelligence functions allows the JFC to exercise command authority by designating a JRA, selecting a JRA command structure, and establishing a command and control network through subordinate commanders to direct and coordinate the actions of all components toward achieving common security objectives. **The geographic combatant commander is ultimately responsible for all joint rear area operations conducted in the area of responsibility.** Those responsibilities include assigning responsibility to subordinate joint force commanders and component commanders, determining command relationships, and making base classification decisions.

**The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA.** The JRAC accomplishes this by coordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure that they maintain the security of their respective area of operations (AO) in order to facilitate sustainment, host-nation support (HNS), infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The JRAC also ensures that commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice area management within their AOs with due consideration of security requirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the JRA. **Component commands, normally Army or Marine Corps commands, operate in single geographic areas under a single command and help with security responsibilities and command and control elements.**
Executive Summary

The base and base cluster are the fundamental building blocks for planning, coordinating, and executing base defense operations.

Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of contributing to the security and defense of the rear area in consonance with legislated Service functions. At the base level, the component in command of a base has overall responsibility for defense of the base. The base cluster commanders are responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within their base cluster and integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense plan. Base commanders are responsible for base defense, including establishing a base defense operations center (BDOC) and alternate BDOC and planning for employment of transient forces. Individual component commanders are responsible for tenant forces of each component at a base.

The JFC is responsible for providing sufficient forces to ensure the security of the JRA.

Base Defense Operations

Rear Area Security

The objectives of security operations in JRA include: to prevent or minimize disruption of support; prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; protect personnel and facilities; protect JRA lines of communications (LOCs); find, fix, contain, and defeat the enemy; plan and execute area damage control; and assess and prioritize bases. Security-related operations such as populace and resource control operations, enemy prisoner of war operations, civilian control operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations are not the exclusive responsibility of US forces, but do impact on the security of the JRA. US forces are frequently involved in these types of operations and should be prepared to provide assistance as necessary. Combatting terrorism is the responsibility of the JRAC and can be responded to by antiterrorism or counterterrorism. Important aspects of JRA which are coordinated by the JRAC include nuclear, biological, and chemical operations; deception operations; psychological operations; civil affairs operations; and operations security. Early threat warnings, such as air, surface, and land warnings, are essential to the protection of US forces in the JRA. Reliable, responsive, and redundant early warning systems are established from the joint force level to the base level in the JRA. The JRAC will ensure that a standardized alert system is implemented throughout the JRA to ensure warning and uniform response to threats. Area damage control ensures prevention, containment, and rapid restoration of operations.
Executive Summary

**Laws and Agreements**

Treaties, agreements, and national interests determine relationships and support between allies and friendly nations. They provide a primary basis for the legal aspects of security operations and, in general, regulate the status and activities of US forces across the range of military operations. The laws of war include treatment of combatants, insurgents, prisoners, and rules of engagement. US law, international agreements, and host-nation laws also need to be considered in JRA operations.

**Combat Operations**

The JFC must develop and organize plans for a tactical combat force (TCF) that is trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place in the JRA in order to maintain the integrity of the JRA and continue sustainment operations. The JFC must also ensure that appropriate active and passive measures are taken in the JRA to protect US forces and equipment. The JFC determines the need for a TCF based on the threat, friendly forces available, and amount of risk the JFC is willing to accept. The JFC plans for combat and recovery operations must be designed to optimize the use of all available combat, combat support, combat service support, and host-nation forces. Ground, air, and naval operations should be mutually supporting, able to support a TCF if required, and fulfill the requirements of the overall concept of operations. Specific planning considerations include key asset defense plans, positioning considerations, unit movement plans, and area damage control. The tenets for successful combat operations in the JRA are knowledge of the enemy, unity of command, economy of force, and responsiveness. Fire support and counterair operations help safeguard friendly installations and personnel as well as help gain control of the air environment. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) may be conducted in crisis situations that present a definite threat to US interests. A JFC (normally a commander, joint task force) is designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a combatant commander, by the commander of a subordinate unified command, or the commander of an existing JTF. Security requirements will vary greatly and are highly dependent on the area in which the MOOTW is being conducted.

In the event of armed conflict involving US forces, it is US law that the law of war and the obligations of the US Government under that law are observed and enforced by the US forces.

The JFC must consider and plan for combat operations in the JRA.
Logistics in the Rear Area

Rear area logistics include balancing the necessity for security with the logistic principles of responsiveness, simplicity, sustainability, survivability, flexibility, economy, and attainability. Identifying logistic principles necessary for the successful execution of an operational plan is critical. The combatant commander is authorized to exercise directive authority over logistic operations within his area of responsibility. Sustaining the force is the responsibility of the forces in the rear area; their technical duties are explained in Service doctrine and field manuals. Medical evacuation operations, reception and preparation of reinforcements in JRA, and reconstitution actions are also considerations for the rear area sustainment units when supporting the units farther forward.

Area Management

The security implications of positioning assets that may provide protection for the JRA or determining locations for vital support facilities that require security assistance are critical for effective area management. The JRAC and component commanders support the assigned responsibilities given by the JFC such as review of the positioning considerations and competing risks (clustering, location, and dispersal). Joint forces deployed to developed areas should be able to capitalize on established infrastructure and the use of existing facilities. Assistance for host nation (HN) governments to rebuild HN infrastructure will be based on US law.

Movements

The following movements need to be coordinated within the JRA: movement of materiel, replacement personnel, and support forces; evacuation of patients and other casualties; evacuation of US nationals; evacuation of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, detainees, and refugees; and retrograde of materiel. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, protecting key reception and transshipment points, and obtaining HNS are critical requirements in preserving freedom of movement throughout the JRA. In wartime or during crisis action deployments, the JFC should as a minimum consider having an agency, center, or cell to execute the movement control function. This is normally the joint movement center. In peacetime the JFC should also establish
Executive Summary

a similar organization in order to perform the planning and resolution of conflict function and to coordinate transportation issues with HN activities as required.

Host-Nation Support

HNS is normally based on agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions. Agreements are made at various levels including national, theater, subordinate joint force command, Service component command, and unit. In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on both the operational capabilities of the HN and its support for US policies. The National Command Authorities are responsible for establishing treaties and agreements for HNS. The JFC ensures that available HNS is consolidated and prioritized to support the requirements of the joint force. JRAC and component commanders coordinate and expedite the directions and guidelines from the JFC. HNS is particularly valuable during periods of transition, such as going from peacetime military operations to war, and includes civilian movements, reception and onward movement, and medical care and health service support as well as support for security-related activities. Commanders at all levels can be expected to be involved in civil affairs (CA) activities and should use CA personnel to monitor those activities and assist in the communicating of information concerning all aspects of joint rear area operations to the HN. The public affairs role in the HN is to gain support and understanding from all publics. Commanders at all levels can expect to be involved in psychological operations (PSYOP) activities and should use PSYOP personnel to support and exploit efforts to obtain maximum cooperation from the populace in the JRA.

CONCLUSION

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the conduct of joint rear area operations during joint and multinational operations. It focuses on achieving local and overall security of the joint rear area by establishing reliable command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence at every command level. It also provides guidelines for commanders of combatant commands, subordinate joint force commands, and subordinate component commands for coordinating and integrating security operations with their other operational responsibilities. This publication defines a joint rear area, defines joint rear area operations in terms of major functions, and establishes criteria for and responsibilities of a joint rear area coordinator.
“The person who wants to wage war securely against an enemy must first make sure that his own lands are secure. By secure I mean not only the security of the army but of the cities and the entire country, so that the people who live there may suffer no harm at all from the enemy.”

Anonymous Byzantine General

1. General

   a. A geographic combatant commander or a subordinate joint force commander (JFC) must expect and be prepared to engage the enemy in every sector of the operational area. **Rear areas are increasingly vulnerable to modern enemy forces** with sophisticated surveillance devices and systems, accurate, long-range weapon systems, and transport assets which are capable of inserting forces deep behind friendly lines. Foreign intelligence and security services will continue to pose espionage, disinformation, and psychological operations threats. Threats posed by indigenous elements capable of the full spectrum of unconventional operations ranging from sabotage to large-scale raids and ambushes are also likely.

   b. The **rear area** may be small or it may span several national boundaries with divergent cultures. It will contain **units and facilities from all components** that are critical to successful joint force support operations. It may also contain the units and facilities of one or more allied nations or coalition partners. Vital **sea lines of communications (LOCs)**, through which the bulk of logistic support for forward-deployed forces flows, have their greatest vulnerability where they converge at the rear sector of the theater. Likewise **air LOCs**, which bring in forces and critical supplies, frequently terminate at airfields within range of enemy action. **Numerous other support units and facilities located in rear areas are inviting targets** because of their importance in sustaining theater operations. **Support units** located in rear areas are required to perform their support missions and provide for their own defense. There may be exceptions to this requirement, such as military airlift or civilian reserve air fleet crews and Military Sealift Command crews who may not have the capability for self-defense and would fall under the protection of the base commander. Other exceptions are medical units, which are included under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

   c. A geographic combatant commander is a JFC and may form subordinate joint commands whose commanders are JFCs. The general term “JFC” will be used throughout the remainder of this publication to identify the commander of a joint force, except where specific responsibilities or functions are vested solely in the geographic combatant commander’s authority, in which case the term “CINC” will be used.

2. Joint Rear Area

   a. A joint rear area (JRA) is a **specific land area within a JFC’s operational area** designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The size of a JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the operational area, logistic support requirements, threat, or scope of the joint operation. A JRA is usually to the rear of the combat zone, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the combat zone. The airspace above the JRA is normally not included in
GENERAL OF THE ARMY WILLIAM T. SHERMAN
ON THE NATURE OF THE REAR AREA

“I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but [when observing troops in the rear] I feared that some calamity had happened at the front - the apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete - perfect order, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy’s shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.”

SOURCE: The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 1885

the JRA; airspace is normally considered a combat zone governed by procedures promulgated in Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

b. A JRA may be collocated with the communications zone but normally would not include a naval area of operations (AO). Operations in sea areas are considered to be part of a combat zone and will not normally be included in a JRA. When a naval AO and a JRA meet along a coastline, the high water mark will normally designate the boundary between the two. Ports and harbors (but not the built-up areas around them) are normally included in the naval AO.

c. A JRA in a joint operation may adjoin the rear areas of one or more of the combat forces making up the combat power of the joint force.

d. A JRA can be adapted to any modern environment. In any circumstance, a JRA may be segmented and may contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that may collectively make up a JRA.

e. Concurrent with the designation of a JRA, the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC is responsible for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA as directed by the JFC. The JRAC’s responsibilities are addressed throughout this publication. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and ensuring secure and survivable communications with all forces operating in the JRA. However, in cases of level III threat or other emergencies, the JFC may assign a subordinate commander the responsibility to counter the threat and restore JRA security. In this case, the assigned subordinate commander would be tasked with restoring the JRA security and assume those JRAC responsibilities required to accomplish his mission. The JRAC will support any requirements requested by the assigned subordinate commander. This option would be exercised for the duration of the threat or as directed by the JFC. The area air defense commander (AADC) is responsible for the defense of the airspace above the JRA.

3. Evolution of JRA

a. Austere Rear Area to Developed Theater. The JRA will typically evolve and
expand as a theater develops in accordance with requirements to support and defend the joint force. It may be preceded by a maritime amphibious objective area before establishing a lodgment in a single country. A lodgment would normally be expanded to an area including existing ports and air strips from which bare base operations could be conducted, and then eventually evolve to areas including multiple countries and sea boundaries. A developed theater would generally have the characteristics of numerous forward deployed forces: extensive transportation infrastructure (ports, highway networks, airfields, and railroads); in-place command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems; and significant host-nation support (HNS).

b. Other Environments. In other operations, the dimensions and configuration of a JRA may be particularly fluid. However, locales established within the area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) may be “de facto” JRAs; i.e., areas such as metropolitan zones or regions isolated by geographic boundaries that become relatively segregated from the main areas of conflict. The JFC may designate such areas as a part of the JRA. Austere conditions should be anticipated. Support facilities, population receptiveness, and overall HNS may be unpredictable and unreliable. The joint force will normally have to rely on its own resources for support until LOCs can be established.

4. Operations Within the JRA

Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint force. They are best described as broad functions and include, but are not limited to, the items shown in Figure I-1 and described below.

a. Security. The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats in order to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the joint force. Security is the principal concern of this publication. Other functions are discussed as they relate to the security of the JRA. Security, within the context of this publication, includes area damage control.

b. Communications. A command, control, communications, and computer (C4) system should be established throughout the JRA that will provide for interoperable, secure, reliable, and redundant communications.

c. Intelligence. Effective intelligence support, merged with counterintelligence and law enforcement agency information, is essential to conducting successful security operations in the JRA. Current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates focused on
the JRA should incorporate intelligence from all US, multinational, and host-nation sources.

d. **Sustainment.** The primary mission of many of the forces in the JRA is to sustain the joint force. All security and counterintelligence activities are focused on providing a secure JRA in which force sustainment can continue. The time support units spend performing security and self defense operations may detract from their ability to meet support requirements.

e. **Area Management.** The effective utilization and positioning of military assets in the JRA is critical to successful operations. Both mission support and security should be considered when positioning assets throughout the JRA.

f. **Movements.** The planning, routing, scheduling, control, and security of the movement of personnel and materiel in the JRA is vital to the support of the joint force. The JFC normally centralizes transportation movement control at the highest level by designating a joint movement center (JMC) where it can be exercised to ensure that common-user transportation resources are allocated to support command missions and priorities.

g. **Infrastructure Development.** The availability of adequate and secure facilities in the JRA for elements of the joint force is essential. Close coordination with HN forces and governing agencies is required for use of their facilities or for construction of new facilities on their territory as well as forces necessary to establish and maintain security of the facilities. The required level of base development should be established as early as possible in order to prevent overloading of transportation modes with excess construction material.

h. **Host-Nation Support.** A viable and friendly host nation (HN) can provide invaluable civil and/or military assistance to US forces throughout the range of military operations. This assistance, backed by mutual agreements between nations, can significantly contribute to support of the joint force and security of the JRA. The completion of a range of HN agreements is required in order to define relationships and roles explicitly in areas of strategic interest to the United States. When more than one HN is involved, careful...
management is required to ensure that specific national restrictions are met. Joint operations areas encompassing more than one HN may require significantly different restrictions and sensitivities for each nation involved. Violations could result in loss of HNS, which could significantly affect US forces’ ability to achieve national objectives. Operations may occur in a foreign nation whose sovereignty remains viable and where HNS agreements are in effect. In such cases, responsibility for selected JRA functions may be passed to the HN. In any case, overall responsibility for JRA operations remains with the JFC.

5. Threat

Threats to the JRA exist throughout the range of military operations. These threats may be related or independently prosecuted, but their effects are frequently cumulative. Threats to JRA operations are usually theater-dependent and are not limited to those outlined in this document. Commanders must be aware that nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) munitions may be used. The threat to the JRA is divided into three levels in order to provide a general description and categorization of threat activities, identify the defense requirements to counter them, and establish a common reference for planning guidelines. This does not imply that threat activities will occur in a specific sequence or that there is a necessary interrelationship between each level. The threat to JRA begins with collection by foreign intelligence services using signals intelligence or human resources intelligence. Throughout the operation of the JRA, foreign intelligence services will continue to collect against air and sea ports, LOCs, marshalling areas, troop strength, and types of equipment.

a. Typical Level I Threats

• Enemy-Controlled Agents. Enemy-controlled agents are a potential threat throughout the JRA. Their primary missions include espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy-controlled agent activity spans the range of military operations and may increase during both military operations other than war and war to include assassination of key military and civilian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targets in the JRA.

• Enemy Sympathizers. Civilians sympathetic to the enemy may become significant threats to US and multinational operations. They may be the most difficult to neutralize because they are normally not part of an established enemy agent network and their actions will be random and unpredictable. During military operations other than war and war, indigenous groups sympathetic to the
enemy or those simply opposed to the United States can be expected to provide assistance, information, and shelter to guerrilla and enemy unconventional or special purpose forces operating in the JRA.

- **Terrorism.** Terrorists are among the most insidious and difficult threats to neutralize and eradicate. Their actions span the range of military operations.

- **Civil Disturbances.** Although civil disturbances such as demonstrations and riots in a host country may not be sufficiently pervasive or violent enough to threaten the stability of the society, commanders should be aware of the direct or indirect threats that they may pose to military operations.

b. **Typical Level II Threats**

- **Guerrilla Forces.** Irregular and predominantly indigenous forces conducting guerrilla warfare can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians and can cause significant disruptions to the orderly conduct of local government and Services.

- **Unconventional Forces.** Special operations forces are highly trained in unconventional warfare techniques. They are normally inserted surreptitiously into the JRA before the onset of armed conflict. They establish and activate espionage networks, collect intelligence, carry out specific sabotage missions, develop target lists, and conduct damage assessment of targets struck.

- **Small Tactical Units.** Specially organized reconnaissance elements, as well as other potential threat forces, have the capability of conducting raids and ambushes in addition to their primary reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions.

c. **Typical Level III Threats**

- **Conventional Forces.** Potential threat forces have the capability of rapidly projecting combat power by land, air, or sea deep into the JRA. Specific examples include airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations; large combined arms ground force operations; and infiltration operations involving large numbers of individuals or small groups infiltrated into the JRA, regrouped at predetermined times and locations, and committed against priority targets.

- **Air or Missile Attack.** Threat forces may have the capability of launching an air or missile attack throughout the JRA. It is often difficult to distinguish quickly between a limited or full-scale attack before impact; therefore, protective measures will normally be based upon maximum threat capability.

- **Nuclear, Biological, Chemical.** Commanders must be aware that NBC munitions may be used in conjunction with air or missile or other conventional force attacks. NBC weapons could also be used at level I or II by terrorists or unconventional forces in order to accomplish their political or military objectives.

d. **Threat Levels.** The threat level matrix, shown in Figure I-2, lists threat levels with likely appropriate responses. The threat levels listed are based on the type of threat. The matrix should not be construed as restricting the response options to any particular threat.

e. **Threat Priorities.** Operations against targets in the JRA will be characterized by air, ground, space, surface, and subsurface efforts to perform the following: detect and
identify targets; destroy or neutralize operational weapon system capabilities; delay or disrupt the timely movement of forces and supplies; weaken the command and control (C2) network of the joint force; disrupt support to combat forces; set the stage for future enemy operations; and create panic and confusion throughout the JRA. Typical examples of enemy priority targets include: NBC weapon storage sites and delivery systems; key C4I facilities; air defense artillery (ADA) sites; airfields and air bases; port facilities; main supply routes (MSR) and MSR chokepoints; key LOCs; reserve assembly areas; troop barracks; and critical civilian and logistic facilities.

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<tr>
<td>LEVEL II</td>
<td>Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guerrillas</td>
<td>Self-defense measures and response force(s) with supporting fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL III</td>
<td>Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration,</td>
<td>May require timely commitment of tactical combat force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure I-2. Threats to the Joint Rear Area
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CHAPTER II
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE

“Rear guards are the safety of armies and often they carry victory with them.”
Frederick the Great, Instructions to his Generals, 1747

1. Introduction

Achieving local and overall security of the JRA requires establishing unity of command and unity of effort among all forces in the JRA, to include combat forces transiting and operating in the JRA. It also requires successful planning and execution of operations using reliable C4 systems and intelligence functions. The JFC works toward this end by designating a JRA, selecting a JRA command structure, and establishing a command and control network through subordinate commanders to direct and coordinate the actions of all components toward achieving common security objectives. This network, supported by reliable and interoperable communications and intelligence, enables the JFC to exercise command authority and to achieve the desired goal of JRA security.

2. Responsibilities

a. Geographic Combatant Commander’s General Responsibilities. A geographic combatant commander, as commander of a unified command, is ultimately responsible for all joint rear area operations conducted in the combatant commander’s (CINC’s) AOR (See Figure II-1). Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” provides a listing of a geographic combatant commander’s primary responsibilities, the first of which states: “Planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion.”

b. Geographic Combatant Commander’s Force Protection Responsibilities. Additional direction on the security responsibilities of a geographic combatant commander is provided by Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” which includes the following.

- **Peacetime.** Geographic combatant commanders establish measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces.

- **Wartime.** Geographic combatant commanders carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives derived from national and alliance or coalition strategic goals. Force protection responsibilities are modified as necessary in order to ensure security of assigned forces and to protect US interests in their AORs.

c. Geographic Combatant Commander’s Base Defense Responsibilities. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for the following.

- **Assigning Responsibility.** The geographic combatant commander assigns responsibility for local defense of a base and establishes the method of command or coordination to be exercised by the local base commander.

- **Command Relationships.** The geographic combatant commander ensures that appropriate command relationships between subordinate area, subarea, and local base defense
Figure II-1. Geographic Combatant Commander’s Responsibilities

- **GENERAL**
  - Ultimately responsible for all joint rear area operations conducted in the area of responsibility

- **FORCE PROTECTION**
  - Peacetime:
    Establishes measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces
  - Wartime:
    Carries out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives

- **BASE DEFENSE**
  - Assigning Responsibilities: assigns responsibility for local defense of a base and establishes the method of command or coordination to be exercised by the local base commander
  - Command Relationships: ensures that appropriate command relationships between subordinate area, subarea, and local base defense commanders are established and local defense areas are delineated
  - Base Classifications: determines the classification of bases in the theater in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (unless determined by higher authority)

***Base Classifications.*** Unless determined by higher authority, the geographic combatant commander will determine the classification of bases in the AOR in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see subparagraph 3d below for general criteria for base classifications).
d. **Other Command Responsibilities.** The geographic combatant commander normally assigns subordinate commanders responsibility for operations in the JRA in accordance with mission requirements, force capabilities, and the nature of the strategic environment, including the threat. The geographic combatant commander ensures that subordinate commanders are given authority commensurate with their responsibilities.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Commander.** Subordinate JFCs may be subunified or joint task force commanders.

- **Component Commanders.** This publication discusses a joint force command structure with a Service component alignment. It is equally adaptable, however, to a functional alignment.

- **Naval Coastal Warfare Commander.** The JFC assigns responsibility for security of territorial seas contiguous to the rear area to the Navy component commander, who may delegate this responsibility to a naval coastal warfare commander (NCWC). The NCWC conducts naval coastal warfare (NCW) missions within a designated naval coastal geographic area. The NCWC and the JRAC, if designated, will coordinate all relevant aspects of their missions and responsibilities for their respective areas of operations as well as provide mutual support to ensure the security of the JRA and the coastal area. The common boundary between the NCWC’s area of operations and the JRA will normally be the high water mark. The NCWC, or designated subordinate commanders, will coordinate security operations with the JRAC (if designated) and the appropriate area or base commander(s). See Appendix A, “Naval Coastal Warfare,” for an expanded discussion of naval coastal warfare.

> “It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in the front. The only difference is the danger.”

**Colonel John S. Mosby, Mosby’s War Reminiscences, 1887**

e. **Joint Rear Area Coordinator**

- **General.** Establishing and maintaining security in the JRA, although vital to the survivability and success of the joint force, is nevertheless an economy of force mission. The JFC dedicates assets for force protection operations in proportion to the severity of the threat in order to conserve resources and prevent degradation of support, which is the primary mission of most of the forces in the JRA. In a low-threat environment, where the inherent defensive capabilities of bases and support or HN forces are generally adequate to deter the threat and the focus of most security efforts is on thorough security planning, the JFC may determine that a JRAC working closely with appropriate commanders, staff, and HN commands has sufficient authority to manage the overall security of the JRA.

- **JRAC Selection Options.** The JFC may designate a subordinate commander or a member of the JFC’s staff as the JRAC. The JFC considers mission requirements, force capabilities, the nature of the JRA, and the threat in determining the JRAC.

- **General Responsibilities.** The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC accomplishes this by coordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure that they
maintain the security of their respective AOs in order to facilitate sustainment, HNS, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The JRAC also ensures that commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice area management within their AOs with due consideration of security requirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the JRA. The JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area security requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint rear area.

**Security Integration Responsibilities.** Although other agencies or components may have primary responsibility for specific JRA functions, the JRAC is responsible for coordinating the security aspects of all functions throughout the JRA. The JRAC’s overall coordination responsibility for security of the JRA does not lessen the responsibility that component elements residing or operating in the JRA have for their own security.

**Specific JRAC Responsibilities.** Specific responsibilities across the range of military operations include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that the following applies.

- The security posture in the JRA supports the JFC’s concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations.

- The overall JRA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, multinational, and HN commands in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines.

- The chain of command established by the JFC and the degree of authority granted to the JRAC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US personnel and assets in the JRA. (See Figures II-2 and II-3 depicting a generic JRA C2 network for security operations and possible selection options for the JRAC.)

- Sufficient response forces are identified to respond to anticipated threats to the JRA.

- The intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement networks are responsive to the needs of commanders operating in the JRA.

- Objective criteria are developed and disseminated for assessing the criticality and vulnerability of bases in the JRA in order to prioritize security improvements and position reaction forces or area damage control assets.

- Coordination with the AADC has been completed to ensure that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, multinational, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations.

- Positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.

- Defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and procedures for NBC defense, to include NBC warning and reporting procedures.
JOINT REAR AREA COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER DESIGNATED AS JOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR

Figure II-2. Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operations with Army Component Commander Designated as Joint Rear Area Coordinator

1. Candidates for Joint Rear Area Coordinator
2. May be intermediate commands

COCOM/OPCON
Coordinating authority, unless coinciding with previously established command lines or as otherwise directed by the joint force commander
Figure II-3. Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operations with Joint Rear Area Coordinator Selected from the Joint Force Commander’s Headquarters

1. May be intermediate commands
   COCOM/OPCON
   Coordinating authority, unless coinciding with previously established command lines or as otherwise directed by the joint force commander
• Appropriate **liaison** is established with **multinational** and **HN commands** for coordination of security issues.

• All relevant international and domestic (US and HN) **legal guidelines** impacting on security within the JRA (such as HNS agreements, Law of War guidance, status-of-forces agreements, and rules of engagement [ROE]) **are disseminated** to appropriate command levels.

• **Civil Affairs and Judge Advocate support** are available to assist in resolution of security issues.

• Development and positioning of **infrastructure** are made with due consideration of security requirements.

• **Component commander(s) in the JRA coordinate security** at the boundaries of their AOs (if the JRA is divided) to ensure coordinated JRA security efforts.

• **Threat estimates** to the JRA are developed and disseminated to appropriate commands in a timely manner.

• A **tactical combat force (TCF)**, if established by the JFC, is positioned and given the appropriate mission in accordance with JFC directives.

• Any **additional security forces** (US, multinational, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JRA defense plan.

• **Key LOCs** through the JRA are protected to support current and future operations.

• **Key movements** and **sustainment operations** have priority for security, mine detection and clearing, and area damage control (ADC) assets.

• **Liaison is established with the NCWC to coordinate security operations.** (NOTE: If it is necessary to plan and/or execute an amphibious operation in the JRA, the JRAC also establishes liaison with the Commander, Amphibious Task Force [CATF], and the Commander, Landing Force [CLF], as required. The JRAC’s authority will not infringe on the authority granted the...
CATF and CLF as delineated in Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”)

- **JRAC Staff Element.** The JRAC may form a joint rear tactical operations center (JRTOC) using elements from the JRAC’s staff and representatives from components operating in the JRA to assist in meeting joint rear area security responsibilities. Component and staff representation will vary in accordance with mission, forces, and area requirements and should support the planning, coordination, and execution of joint rear area operations. The JRAC will ensure that component representation and representation on the JRAC’s own staff are sufficient to support assigned mission responsibilities. Critical to the planning and execution of JRA operations is the interface with the joint intelligence center (JIC) or joint intelligence support element (JISE), as appropriate, to provide current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates on the situation in the JRA. A counterintelligence representative from the JIC/JISE is essential to the timely flow of JRA requirements to and from the JIC/JISE. The JRTOC serves as the JRAC’s centralized planning, coordinating, monitoring, and advising agency for JRA operations. It coordinates with other elements on the JRAC’s staff (with higher, lower, and adjacent command staffs and with HN and/or multinational command staffs) to assist the JRAC in accomplishing his responsibilities.

  - Security Responsibilities. Component commanders with area responsibilities are responsible for the defense of the area, and the overall defense of bases located in the area, against enemy forces that may interfere with area or base operations. Area defense responsibilities are usually modified by HN agreements when operating in the sovereign territory of allies who normally retain responsibility for the overall security of the JRA. In these circumstances, the component commanders would continue to execute their security responsibilities (other than overall area security) as directed by the JFC through other appropriate commanders and in coordination with the JRAC, to include the following.

f. **Component Commands.** The JFC may elect to segment the JRA by forming component commands with area responsibilities. These commands, normally Army or Marine Corps commands, operate in a single geographic area under a single commander. Component commanders may further elect to subdivide their area of operations with subordinate commands, which also have area responsibilities. The purposes for establishing area commands include achieving unity of command and effort for assigned operations and coordinating defense, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and use of available facilities. An example of an Army area command that may be located, either partially or entirely, in a designated JRA includes a Theater Army with its subordinate Theater Army area commands (TAACOM) and the TAACOM’s subordinate area support groups. An example of Marine Corps area commands are Marine air-ground task forces, the largest of which is the Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The MEF may locate support forces that comprise its combat service support elements in a designated JRA and may have some or all of its aviation combat element in a JRA as well. Navy forces may also locate facilities in the JRA that provide a CSS function. Navy forces may receive operational logistic support in forward areas through advanced logistic support sites and/or forward logistic sites.
With the concurrence of the JFC, organizing appropriate bases into base clusters and designating base and base cluster commanders. (NOTE: Statement applies only to designation of bases and base commanders within JFC’s authority. Selected bases may have their commanders determined at a level of authority higher than JFC.)

Coordinating the local security of US bases and base clusters to include establishing priorities for security and ADC in accordance with JFC directives.

Establishing a command and control network linking US bases and base clusters, and ensuring that adequate coordination is established with multinational forces and HN activities within or bordering their area of operations. The JRTOC should have a dedicated radio net.

Ensuring that US base and base cluster defense plans are adequate, coordinated, and complementary to applicable HN security plans.

Serving as the US single point of contact for coordinating security issues within their area of operations with the HN (if so designated by the JFC).

Ensuring that US bases that are other CINC or national assets, but located in their area of operations, are adequately defended.

Ensuring that response forces are identified, trained, and positioned in accordance with JFC directives and priorities.

Performing other security responsibilities as directed by the JFC through the JRAC. In the absence of a viable HN with existing security agreements, component commands with area responsibilities will have both overall area responsibility for security and the responsibilities inherent in coordinating local security of US bases and base clusters in their area of operations. Area command responsibilities for other JRA functions will vary in accordance with HN agreements and capabilities and with the level and capabilities of the area command.

C2 Elements. Army and Marine Corps component area and subarea commands usually have rear area operations centers (RAOC) or rear tactical operations centers (RTOC) to assist their commanders in accomplishing their joint rear area operations missions. Specific responsibilities for these C2 elements should be complementary to those of the JRTOC and are found in appropriate Service manuals. Area commands without these organizations should create equivalent organizations to accomplish the mission. RAOCs or RTOCs, upon approval from higher headquarters, will establish connectivity with the JRTOC in order to coordinate defense, exchange intelligence information, request support, and respond to information.

“Most terrible, or rather most effective of all manoeuvres, is sudden attack against the enemy’s rear... For no hope of safety would remain for them in flight, and they would be unable to turn backwards, since the opposing army would attack, or to go forward, because of the detachment assailing their rear.”

Onasander, The General, 58 AD
3. Base Defense Operations

a. General. The base and base cluster (designated when required) are the fundamental building blocks for planning, coordinating, and executing base defense operations. Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of contributing to the security and defense of the rear area in consonance with legislated Service functions. The base commander coordinates the forces of the various Service or functional components to best capitalize on their combined capabilities, synergies, and mutual supportiveness, while minimizing the vulnerabilities of each. At the base level, the component in command of a base has overall responsibility for defense of the base; hosted forces from other Service or functional components defend their own facilities and may be tasked to contribute to the overall base defense, commensurate with their capabilities and the circumstances. Medical personnel may only guard their own unit and wounded and sick without jeopardizing their protective status under the Geneva Convention. The basic principles governing these responsibilities are addressed in this section.

b. Responsibilities

- **Base Cluster Commanders.** Base cluster commanders (when designated) are responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within their base cluster and integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense plan. Their specific responsibilities for base cluster defense include the following.
  - Establishing a base cluster operations center (BCOC) from available base or cluster assets to serve as the base cluster’s tactical operations center and focal point for planning, directing, coordinating, integrating, and controlling base cluster defense activities. This tactical operations center usually serves as both the base defense operations center (BDOC) and the BCOC. An alternate BCOC and base cluster commander will be designated and will have the capability to assume BCOC and/or command functions should the primary facility and/or commander be neutralized. The BCOC will establish connectivity with the JRTOC through the RAOC or RTOC as required.
  - Providing appropriate facilities and housing for necessary liaison personnel from bases within the cluster.

- **Base Commanders.** The base commanders are responsible for base defense. The forces of components other than their own, assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense, will be under their operational control. Forces of other Services or functional components assigned or attached to the base for primary purposes other than local base defense will support local base defense during an imminent attack or threat of an attack. The base commanders’ specific responsibilities for defense of the bases include the following.
  - Establishing a BDOC from available base assets to serve as the base’s tactical operations center and focal point for security and defense. The BDOC will assist with the planning, direction, coordination, integration, and control of base defense efforts. The BDOC will establish connectivity with the JRTOC through the RAOC or RTOC.
  - Establishing an alternate BDOC from base resources or, if base assets cannot support this requirement, designating a headquarters element from units dedicated to the base for its local
• Participating in the preparation of base defense plans.

• Providing, staffing, and operating base defense facilities in accordance with the base defense plans. The tasks assigned each commander will follow, in general, the Service functions identified in DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.”

• Planning for employment of transient forces by ensuring that base defense plans include provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base defense forces present at the base during an attack or when the base is threatened with attack. In an emergency, the base commander will be considered an area commander insofar as establishing authority and command relationships for base defense are concerned. All other principles governing support provided by a transient force during an emergency to a commander in whose area the transient force is located, and the responsibilities of the commanders concerned, are fully addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAAF).”

• Conducting individual and unit training of assigned and attached forces, as necessary, to ensure their readiness to perform their assigned tasks in defense of the base.

• Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel for a BDOC for the base commander, and providing liaison and support as necessary for the base cluster commander at the BCOC.

• Providing liaison personnel to advise the base commander on matters peculiar to their Service and, if a joint staff is established, to be regular working members of the staff.

Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of base defense commensurate with their capabilities and circumstances.

defense. The alternate BDOC may be located on or off base, but must be able to provide the necessary C4 for base defense if the primary BDOC is neutralized.

• Planning for employment of transient forces by ensuring that base defense plans include provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base defense forces present at the base during an attack or when the base is threatened with attack. In an emergency, the base commander will be considered an area commander insofar as establishing authority and command relationships for base defense are concerned. All other principles governing support provided by a transient force during an emergency to a commander in whose area the transient force is located, and the responsibilities of the commanders concerned, are fully addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAAF).”

• Individual Component Commanders. Commanders of tenant forces of each component at a base are responsible for the following.
• Providing for the **internal security** of the command.

• Providing **housing** for the forces under their command.

• Providing **C2 communications systems**, to include common-user communications within the command.

• Providing **health service support** (HSS) for the forces under their command.

c. **Determining Service Identity of the Base Commander.** The commander of a base is determined by the **classification of the base** and by the **functions assigned to the individual Services**. The Service designated with base command responsibilities provides the C2 structure for base defense operations.

d. **Classification of Bases.**

See Figure II-4.

e. **Base Clusters.** Base clusters can perform a valuable C2 role in security operations and can enhance the support and security of numerous individual bases in an AO.

• **Base clusters may be designated when:**

  • The **large number of bases** in an area or subarea exceeds the commander’s normal span of control;

  • Their designation would lead to **improved support and security** for bases in a localized area;

  • Bases are located in such close geographic proximity as to require **deconfliction** of their respective defense plans; and when

  • Directed by appropriate **higher authority**.

• Large, single-Service bases and joint bases that are **geographically isolated** may be **independent of base clusters**.

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**CLASSIFICATION OF BASES**

The combatant commander will determine (unless determined by higher authority) and announce the classification of bases in the area in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be:

- A single-Service base
- A joint base in which either
  - One Service has primary interest
  - Two or more Services have coequal interest

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**Figure II-4. Classification of Bases**
4. C2 in Multinational Operations

a. General. The JRA will normally be sovereign territory presided over by viable and capable HN governments. These governments, represented by forces and their law enforcement agencies, will generally have overall responsibility for many of the functions identified with joint rear area operations. In these circumstances, the CINC will be responsible for coordinating US requirements for selected functions with HN commands (and receiving significant HN assistance) while assuming full responsibility for other functions. (NOTE: Even though all functions are generally coordinated with the HN, selected functions like sustainment are usually US responsibilities.) In certain operational areas, however, and in many contingency operations, the JFC may have no HNS or may operate in a noncooperative HN and will have full responsibility for all functions conducted in the JRA. Therefore, the JFC must plan for and be prepared to execute all joint rear area functions with or without HNS. C2 responsibilities will vary by functional area, by theater, or by contingency operation, and are determined to a great extent by HN agreements and by US force composition and capabilities.

b. Coordination Responsibilities. The JFC establishes coordination with HN commands in accordance with existing agreements at all appropriate levels within the joint force. In some instances or contingencies, the JFC will have access to the US Ambassador and his country team for help in the coordination process. Details of HNS are addressed in Chapter VIII, “Host-Nation Support.”

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

WORLD WAR II

A graphic example of disruptive operations in an opposing force’s rear area was the Soviet partisan movement against invading German forces in WW II. At its height, it grew to a well-organized force of a quarter million members and forced the Germans to commit up to 25 divisions to maintain their supply lines against this sustained rear area threat. Typical missions for partisan forces were to blow up bridges and railroads; damage telephone and telegraph lines; set fire to forests, stores, and transports; support partisan welfare; and, later in the war as their strength and capabilities grew, attack German combat support forces. In general, they made the occupied areas unbearable for the Germans and, in effect, created a front behind the front. The net result of their efforts was to disrupt communications and transport, deny raw materials and local supplies, remove potential local labor sources, and divert front-line German combat forces for rear area security missions.

German operations in the allied rear areas were nowhere near as extensive as those of the Soviet partisans but were, nonetheless, credited with delaying allied advances. For example, the Ardennes campaign was slowed by successful infiltration of German sabotage detachments, who disrupted logistic and communications support behind US lines. These German operations resulted in allied follow-on and support units having to be redirected from the front routinely and tasked to eliminate pockets of resistance in mop-up actions behind the allied front lines.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources
5. Communications

a. General. The JRAC must have interoperable, secure, reliable, flexible, and survivable intertheater and intratheater networks in order to accomplish the mission. Existing military or commercial communications systems will be used to the maximum extent possible. However, additional communication systems may be required to reconfigure or expand the network.

b. Responsibilities

- JRAC. The JRAC, in conjunction with the JFC C4 Directorate (J-6), normally designates a joint rear area communications officer (JRACO) to provide overall management of organic communications systems (i.e., single channel radios and internal switching or terminal equipment supporting the JRA headquarters element only) and to coordinate with the appropriate system manager for nonorganic C4 systems supporting the JRA. The JRAC also designates units to establish HN connectivity in order to fulfill rear area responsibilities. (NOTE: The JRAC will establish necessary liaison with the J-6 and/or JRACO to ensure that all communications requirements for the rear area intelligence activity are met.)

- JRACO

  - Provides overall management of organic communications systems supporting the JRAC and coordination with the appropriate system manager for nonorganic C4 systems supporting the JRAC.

  - Publishes C4 plans, annexes, directories, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission.

  - Coordinates network connectivity with units operating in, and transiting, the rear area.

  - Coordinates the use of communications security materials.

  - Coordinates with HN agencies for communications support.

- Individual Components. In accordance with joint procedures, each component is responsible for its own internal C4 systems. Each component command should be prepared to support establishing communications with the JRAC. Deficiencies in communications assets should be identified and requested through the JFC.

c. C4 Systems Employment. The JRACO must coordinate with the joint force communications officer, components, allies, and HNs to support the rear area mission. Within an established theater communications support is built on an existing communications infrastructure, but an undeveloped theater may require a tailored theater communications system.

d. Reference. A further discussion of C4 systems support to joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations,” and the 6-series publications.

6. Intelligence

a. General. Effective collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence and counterintelligence are essential for planning and conducting successful security operations in the JRA.

b. Responsibilities. The JRAC is responsible for identifying the intelligence
and counterintelligence requirements of JRA units and activities with rear area security responsibilities to the Intelligence Directorate (J-2). The J-2, through the JIC/JISE, is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate resources and operations are allocated to support these requirements. The theater J-2 and JIC will use interoperable, secure communications and/or data processing systems with existing intelligence and counterintelligence liaison or coordination channels to transmit the information. The J-2 will ensure that chains of command are fully utilized in order to convey essential information and intelligence to support all forces engaged in rear area operations.

c. Intelligence Considerations

• Operational Intelligence. The JRAC requires timely and accurate operational intelligence in order to coordinate appropriate defensive actions. For the JRA, this operational intelligence will come from supporting counterintelligence elements operating in the JRA. This is particularly important because of the limited availability of combat forces in the JRA. Friendly forces operating in the JRA are also a lucrative source of information regarding potential unconventional, subversive, NBC, guerrilla, and terrorist threats. This information is usually reported through counterintelligence and operational channels simultaneously. The JRAC, in conjunction with the combatant command counterintelligence support officer (CISO) or the joint task force (JTF) counterintelligence coordination authority, coordinates with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that reporting means and procedures are established and utilized for the timely reporting of suspicious activities or incidents to the JRTOC; that adequate liaison is established with HN military commands and government agencies in the JRA to collect valuable information from those sources; that component command and tactical chains of command are fully utilized in order to convey essential information and intelligence to support all forces engaged in rear area operations; and that separate or transient forces that may have been diverted from other tasks, and which may not otherwise have access to critical information, receive effective intelligence support.

• Counterintelligence. An effective counterintelligence process is one of the most important ways in which commanders can contribute to maintaining security in the JRA. The counterintelligence process includes the complementary functions of investigations, operations, collection and reporting and analysis, production, and dissemination. The J-2, through the CISO and in conjunction with the Service supporting counterintelligence organizations, should develop a counterintelligence plan for collection requirements, liaison operations with HN intelligence and security services, incident investigations, and analytical support. The counterintelligence plan should include an assessment of all foreign intelligence services that could affect the JRA. Counterintelligence is particularly effective in assisting commanders and staff in identifying the espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist threats to the JRA. Counterintelligence can provide commands and staff with identification and analysis of threats from unconventional forces, partisans, and civilian groups sympathetic to the enemy. The CISO is responsible for providing the commander with current counterintelligence estimates that
include analysis of enemy or other foreign intelligence capabilities and other threats as appropriate. The CISO must ensure that effective communication networks and liaison with HNs, allies, joint forces, and law enforcement agencies are established and that this information is reported in a timely and consolidated manner to the impacted components in the JRA.

d. Reference. Aspects of intelligence support to joint operations and the integration of intelligence in support of joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.” Counterintelligence support to joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.”
CHAPTER III
SECURITY

“Even in friendly territory a fortified camp should be set up; a general should never have to say: ‘I did not expect it.”

The Emperor Maurice, The Strategikon, c. 600 AD

1. Introduction

a. General. The JFC is responsible for providing sufficient forces to ensure the security of the JRA. All US forces in the JRA have an inherent responsibility to contribute as many forces as possible for base defense and local security for themselves, their facilities, installations, and activities. This must be done without seriously degrading their capabilities to perform their primary mission. Major aspects of security are introduced in this chapter. The fundamental principles of base defense analysis and planning are addressed in Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.” Headquarters will frequently be collocated with HN counterparts. The security of the area will be enhanced by close cooperation with HN authorities. Additionally, the integration of HN security personnel with US facility and personnel detachments is invaluable in evaluating and resolving issues and incidents with the local population and with HN authorities.

b. Objectives of Security Operations in the JRA

See Figure III-1.

- Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations. Commanders should take all reasonable measures, including camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and movement, to avoid becoming engaged with threat

Figure III-1. Objectives of Security Operations in the Joint Rear Area

OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT REAR AREA

- Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations
- Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
- Protect Personnel and Facilities
- Protect Joint Rear Area Lines of Communications
- Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions
- Plan and Execute Area Damage Control
- Assess and Prioritize Bases
forces that could disrupt forward support of combat forces.

- **Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.** US forces should establish effective C4I for day-to-day operations and for successful security operations. Security forces should protect key C4I facilities to prevent or minimize enemy interference.

- **Protect Personnel and Facilities.** Units should take active and passive measures that protect themselves and high value assets in the JRA.

- **Protect JRA Lines of Communications.** Protection of land, water, and air routes within the JRA that connect an operating military force with its theater base of operations is essential to sustaining campaigns. Geographic features may be used, and friendly security forces and uncommitted combat units should be employed to maximize LOCs security. **Responsibility for overall protection of JRA LOCs is assigned to the JRAC,** with active participation and coordination by the respective component commanders.

- **Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions.** US forces should use all means of intelligence, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, law enforcement agency support, surveillance, and detection to anticipate and locate enemy incursions. Surveillance and warning assets as well as fighting forces should be linked together as simply, robustly, and reliably as possible. Once located, enemy forces should be contained or defeated quickly.

- **Plan and Execute Area Damage Control.** Commanders at all levels must **prepare plans, establish specific responsibilities, and ensure that all available assets are prepared for operations** to ensure continuous support and restoration of assets. Comprehensive intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agency information regarding threats to the rear area are key to the prior planning in ADC that will prevent or minimize casualties or
III-3

Security

physical damage associated with enemy attacks against JRA facilities and personnel.

- **Assess and Prioritize Bases.** The JRAC ensures that component commanders, in accordance with JFC priorities and the nature of the threat, assess and prioritize bases for **protection and damage repair** in order to ensure that operational and logistics planners are able to identify key bases, establish security and ADC requirements for those bases, and position other assets. This process should help to maximize defense force and ADC efforts.

2. **Security-Related Operations**

   a. **General.** Security-related operations such as populace and resource control (PRC) operations, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations, civilian control operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are **not the exclusive responsibility of US forces**, but do impact on the security of the JRA. US forces are frequently involved in these types of operations and should be prepared to provide assistance as necessary.

   b. **Responsibilities**

      - **JRAC.** The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs concerning security-related operations, ensuring that JFC-directed security measures and priorities are established, disseminated, executed, and coordinated with HN commanders.

      - **Component Commanders.** Component commanders are responsible for **ensuring that adequate security is maintained** for security-related operations within their area of operations and that these operations are coordinated with appropriate HN authorities.

   c. **PRC Operations.** PRC operations are designed and conducted to **detect, isolate, and neutralize insurgent or guerrilla activities.** These operations are normally carried out by HN police or military forces, but US forces are frequently called on to conduct PRC operations until HN forces are available to relieve them. PRC operations are **generally accomplished in concert with civil affairs (CA) efforts.** Additional guidance may be found in Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

   d. **EPW Operations.** Military police and/or **security police** are normally responsible for EPW operations in their respective Services; however, **additional forces may be required** to ensure control. The JRAC should establish procedures for all phases of EPW operations and coordinate with appropriate HN commands to ensure a smooth flow of EPWs through the JRA. Procedures for security of sick, injured, or wounded EPWs in medical treatment facilities will also be established. US military police have the lead in preparation for and receipt, processing, and transfer of EPWs. US-captured EPWs are the **responsibility of the United States** and must be processed through the EPW channels before either transfer to HN or retention in the JRA by US Army military police at EPW facilities.

   e. **Civilian Internees, Detainees, and Refugees.** Civilian control operations are the responsibility of HN authorities (excluding US NEOs), but US forces may be tasked to **collect, retain, and interrogate civilian internees and detainees** until they can be evacuated. US military forces do not assume control of refugee movements unless requested to do so by the HN or unless operating in an environment with a hostile government. US forces may have to assist, direct, or deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions place them in jeopardy and/or hinder military operations.
Chapter III

f. NEOs. US forces will be responsible for the safety and security of US citizens during NEOs. Commanders must ensure that joint operation planning for NEOs addresses security and that security is maintained throughout the execution of NEOs. Additional guidance may be found in DOD Directive 3025.14, “Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad;” Joint Pub 3-07.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;” and in Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.”

“... give the enemy a spanking from behind. You can kill more soldiers by scaring them to death from behind with a lot of noise than by attacking them from the front.”

General George S. Patton, Jr., The Patton Papers, 1940

3. Combatting Terrorism

a. General. Acts of terrorism span the globe and are an inescapable element across the range of military operations. Each JFC must institute continuous and aggressive programs to combat terrorism in his AOR/JOA. These include use of psychological operations (PSYOP) support to develop operations that encourage international acceptance of US actions.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC’s responsibilities for combating terrorism in the JRA vary in accordance with the JRAC’s capabilities and JFC directives. The JRAC may serve as a coordinating authority for these actions or assist another office or agency in this responsibility. Additionally, the JRAC monitors terrorist acts and ensures that component commanders are informed of their security implications.

• Component Commanders. Component commanders’ responsibilities for combating terrorism in their area of operations, to include ensuring that all US forces meet their required responsibilities, are in accordance with JFC directives.

c. Response to Terrorism. Responses to terrorism can occur with either of the two measures summarized in Figure III-2 and explained below.

• Antiterrorism (Defensive Measures). The basis of this program includes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of threat awareness programs, and the implementation of sound defensive programs. The JRAC and component commanders ensure that these measures are incorporated into security operations. Counterintelligence serves as the main source for collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorism information for the JRAC. Details of this support are found in Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.” The primary source for guidance on antiterrorism is Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTP for Antiterrorism.”

• Counterterrorism (Offensive Measures). The responsive phase of combatting terrorism is based on extensive preparations and planning, as well as response measures that can include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The type forces and command and control structure used depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. The JRAC and area commanders support counterterrorism operations within force capabilities. Additional guidance on combatting terrorism can be found in
4. NBC Defensive Operations

a. General. NBC defensive operations are of primary importance to joint rear area operations and must be incorporated into all appropriate plans and procedures. Enemy NBC operations pose a significant threat to rear area security. Many potential threat forces have the capability to employ NBC weapons that can reach critical facilities located in the JRA. All US forces in the JRA must be prepared to actively participate in planning and execution of NBC defensive operations.

b. Responsibilities

- JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with component commanders and other appropriate commanders and staffs, ensuring that they incorporate appropriate NBC planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination measures, and preventive measures into overall security planning and operations throughout the JRA. This responsibility includes due consideration for positioning of friendly NBC assets to support current mission requirements and anticipated follow-on actions.

- Component Commanders. Component commanders incorporate NBC planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination measures, and preventive measures into area and

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**Figure III-2. Response to Terrorism**

Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.”
base or base cluster defense plans within their area of operations. They also position friendly NBC personnel and assets in their AO to support current mission requirements and facilitate future operations, in accordance with JFC directives and priorities.

c. Additional guidance on NBC defensive operations can be found in Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

5. Military Deception Operations

a. General. The destructive power of modern weapons and possible numerical superiority of enemy personnel and weapons make it imperative that military deception is integrated into operations at every possible level. In the JRA, effective military deception can reduce the vulnerability of friendly facilities, installations, and activities.

b. Responsibilities

- JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs, ensuring that the JFC’s deception planning and operations are incorporated into security plans and operations throughout the JRA. The JRAC makes recommendations to the JFC on deception operations designed and/or required to protect assets in the JRA. Additionally, the JRAC ensures that all deception proposals, concepts, plans, and activities are coordinated to ensure their mutual consonance and to prevent unintended negation of effort in the JRA and the combat zone.

- Component Commanders. Component commanders plan and execute, or assist in the execution of, deception operations in their area of operations in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. Component commanders make recommendations to the JRAC on deception operations designed and/or required to protect assets in the JRA.

c. Objective. The overall objective of deception in support of joint rear area operations is to mislead the enemy by providing manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence in order to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

d. Planning. Deception planning and preparation should be considered for all major joint rear area operations and incorporated into those operations when it is determined that it will aid in the accomplishment of the mission. Planning deception efforts should be an integral part of the planning process, not an afterthought. Planning must be coordinated with all appropriate headquarters to ensure the accomplishment of those actions that will make the deception believable to the enemy. Counterintelligence personnel are available to assist the commander and his staff in determining enemy intelligence collection capabilities and in developing military deceptive indicators and strategies. For additional guidance on military deception operations and counterintelligence procedures, see Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception,” and Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations.”

6. Psychological Operations

a. General. PSYOP activities should be planned and conducted as an integral part of joint rear area operations. PSYOP includes the use of various communications techniques to reduce potential or actual enemy prestige and influence and increase friendly prestige or influence in hostile, neutral, or friendly areas.
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“... a move round the enemy’s front against the rear has the aim not only of avoiding resistance on its way but in its issue. In the profoundest sense, it takes the line of least resistance. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the line of least expectation. They are the two faces of the same coin, and to appreciate this is to widen our understanding of strategy.”


b. **Responsibilities.** The JRAC coordinates with component commanders to ensure that they follow the PSYOP program when appropriate to enhance the security of the JRA and that each PSYOP concept, activity, plan, and proposal is complementary to other JRA and combat zone efforts.

c. **Considerations.** PSYOP elements advise commanders and staffs on psychological effects and implications of proposed courses of action and assist in negating or minimizing effects of hostile disinformation. PSYOP elements develop and conduct activities to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under hostile control. PSYOP planning for the JRA, as with the main battle area, should be done in coordination with military deception and operations security (OPSEC). Successful PSYOP can provide significant support to the JFC concept of operations by gaining the confidence of friendly populations, reducing the effectiveness of the enemy forces, and facilitating informational and goodwill programs. To preclude PSYOP activities working at cross purposes with HN security efforts and to prevent possible miscalculation of US intentions, PSYOP normally requires prior coordination with friendly HN authorities. See Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” for additional guidance.

7. **Civil Affairs Operations**

a. **General.** CA operations assist JRACs in establishing and maintaining positive relationships between assigned forces and civil authorities and population in a JRA. They are integral to efforts to ensure civil authority and popular understanding of, as well as compliance with, military security and stability measures. They enhance support for US forces and alleviate conditions that may result in local interference with military operations.

b. **Responsibilities**

- **JRAC.** The JRAC coordinates with component commanders, ensuring that they incorporate CA procedures into all joint rear area operations throughout the JRA.

- **Component Commanders.** Component commanders are responsible for CA procedures within their area of operations in accordance with JFC directives.

c. **Considerations.** CA personnel and forces can assist in conducting security operations by providing assessments on local civilian capabilities and vulnerabilities in such areas as public facilities, transportation, and supplies. They can provide interface and coordination directly with designated civil agencies and authorities to facilitate or develop the objectives shown in Figure III-3. Additional information on CA can be found in Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

8. **Operations Security**

a. **General.** OPSEC must be an integral part of joint rear area operations at all levels of command. Because of the relatively static
OBJECTIVES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS IN THE JOINT REAR AREA

- Force protection measures
- Essential population and resource control measures
- Organization of civil security and defense forces
- Civilian movement or evacuation plans
- Relief efforts by governmental and international agencies
- Civil information activities, in conjunction with psychological operations programs, to dispel rumor and disinformation generated by hostile elements

Figure III-3. Objectives of Civil Affairs Operations in the Joint Rear Area

nature and predictable, repetitive activities of most units in the JRA, OPSEC takes on a special significance and must be aggressively pursued by the chain of command. All-source intelligence and counterintelligence threat information are essential to understanding the threat and implementation of effective countermeasures. Within the JRA will often rely heavily on host-nation telephone systems. Care must be taken to prioritize the employment of Secure Telephone Units where vulnerability to exploitation is most damaging. Additional information on operations security can be found in Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

b. Responsibilities

- **JRAC.** The JRAC coordinates with component commanders, ensuring that they incorporate OPSEC procedures into all joint rear area operations throughout the JRA.

- **Component Commanders.** Component commanders are responsible for OPSEC procedures within their area of operations in accordance with JFC directives.

c. Considerations. Additionally, US personnel in the JRA are frequently working with HN personnel who may not be cleared for classified information. Communications within the JRA will often rely heavily on host-nation telephone systems. Care must be taken to prioritize the employment of Secure Telephone Units where vulnerability to exploitation is most damaging. Additional information on operations security can be found in Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

9. Alert Notification System

a. General. Early threat warning is essential to the protection of US forces in the JRA. Alert notification systems are divided into two general categories.

- **Air Warning.** The air defense and missile warning system is a critical link in the JRA early warning system. Early warning and identification of enemy air threats, enemy air- and surface-to-surface missiles, and airborne and air assault operations are provided by several types of forward collection methods, including forward-deployed combat reconnaissance units, air defense systems and the Airborne Warning and Control
Security

Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for ensuring that adequate early warning systems are established in their area of operations in accordance with JFC directives.

c. HN Support. HN intelligence and alert systems, if the HN is viable and supports

10. Laws and Agreements

a. General. Treaties, agreements, and national interests determine relationships and support between allies and friendly nations. They provide a primary basis for the legal aspects of security operations and, in general, regulate the status and activities of US forces across the range of military operations. This section provides a summary of principal legal instruments that may impact on the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that a reliable, responsive, and redundant early warning system is established from the joint force level to the base level in the JRA. The JRAC will ensure that a standardized alert system is implemented throughout the JRA to ensure warning and uniform response to threats.

Air defense forces are critical to rear area defense.

threats is provided by various sea, land, air, and space intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems. The counterintelligence element at the JIC/JISE will provide fused intelligence early warning of surface or land threats to the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that a reliable, responsive, and redundant early warning system is established from the joint force level to the base level in the JRA. The JRAC will ensure that a standardized alert system is implemented throughout the JRA to ensure warning and uniform response to threats.
ensure that ROE procedures and other legal issues are addressed throughout the JRA in accordance with JFC directives.

- **Component Commanders.** Component commanders ensure that ROE, consistent with National Command Authorities (NCA) and JFC ROE, are published and disseminated to all members of the joint force operating in or passing through their area of operations. They ensure that laws, regulations, and procedures regarding treatment of belligerents, insurgents, and prisoners are published and disseminated to all appropriate US forces and that adequate liaison is established with HN authorities in order to coordinate these actions when required. If hostilities are likely, they also ensure that legal representatives are available to assist US forces and to coordinate with friendly HN authorities on such matters as HN supply of US forces, acquisition of HN and enemy materiel, responsibility for handling of EPWs, division of police authority between HN and US forces, and responsibility of area damage control. The Army component commander normally has primary responsibility for EPWs.

- In certain operational areas and in many contingency operations, the JFC may have no HNS or operate in a noncooperative HN and will have full responsibility for all functions conducted in the JRA. Therefore, the JFC must plan for and be prepared to execute all joint rear area functions with or without HNS.

  c. **Law of War** (See Figure III-4). In the event of armed conflict involving US forces, it is US law that the law of war (also called law of armed conflict) and the obligations of the US Government under that law are observed and enforced by the US forces. US commanders will ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) Law of War Program is implemented in accordance with DOD and Service directives and that adequate procedures are in place for the prompt reporting and thorough investigation of any allegations of violations of the law of war by or against US or enemy personnel. Three general categories within the law of war relating most closely to security operations are briefly discussed below. Legal representatives should be consulted concerning implementation of these basic laws.

- **Treatment of Combatants.** During armed conflict, treatment of combatants is governed by the law of war and

![Figure III-4. Categories of the Law of War Relating to Security Operations](image-url)
relevant HN and domestic laws. Enemy personnel acting in accordance with the law of war will be accorded enemy prisoner of war status. All enemy combatants will be accorded the protection of the law of war and will be treated in a manner consistent with EPW status until an Article 5 tribunal makes a determination of the merits of the claim to EPW status.

**Treatment of Insurgents.** US policy requires and directs **humane care and treatment for insurgents held in US military custody** during counterinsurgency operations from the moment of capture until release or repatriation. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**Treatment of Prisoners.** The treatment of EPWs is **outlined in the 1949 Geneva Convention**, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, which prescribes specific protective measures for EPWs captured during armed conflict.

d. **Rules of Engagement.** The CINC establishes ROE for the AOR in accordance with ROE established by NCA and in coordination with Department of State representatives through authorized military command channels. **ROE must conform to the law of war**, but the formulation process also takes into account operational, political, and diplomatic factors such as HN laws concerning defense of others, self defense, and protection of military facilities. (NOTE: ROE may change at national boundaries.)

e. **US Law.** US forces, regardless of location, follow US law, executive orders, DOD directives, Service regulations, and CINC regulations promulgated under the law as well as international agreements concluded pursuant to US law.

f. **International Agreements.** International agreements are the **primary source of rules of international law** applicable to US, multinational, and HN forces. The most comprehensive are **status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs)**; however, these may be modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. Other important types of international agreements concern security assistance and HN support agreements.

g. **HN Laws.** HN laws apply to official activities of the US forces in the HN to the extent provided by international agreement. HN laws apply to individual members of the US forces in the HN, engaged in other than official activities, unless specifically modified or made not applicable to US forces by the terms of an international agreement. HN laws have broad as well as finite implications on the conduct of all functions involved in joint rear area operations.

11. **Area Damage Control**

a. **General.** The improved destructive capabilities of modern weapons systems significantly increase the need for effective damage control. **Effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets are necessary to conduct ADC** and to ensure prevention, containment, and rapid restoration of operations.

b. **Responsibilities**

- **JRAC.** The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that **ADC operations in the JRA are conducted** in accordance with the JFC’s directives and priorities.
• **Component Commanders.** Component commanders are responsible for ensuring that ADC plans in their area of operations are developed, prioritized, coordinated, and executed in accordance with the JFC’s priorities and concept of operations.

• **Host Nation**

  • **Authority.** The HN, depending on applicable agreements, may have overall responsibility for ADC within their territorial boundaries. In these circumstances, **US forces will retain responsibility for ADC within US base perimeters** and be prepared to assist the HN within its unit capabilities with ADC operations outside US base perimeters. Assistance should be provided with the concurrence of the appropriate US command authority and should support the JFC’s ADC priorities and concept of operations.

  • **Assistance.** HN agreements frequently address **HN assistance for ADC operations.** Component commanders usually serve as single points of contact for coordinating ADC operations within their respective area of operations and, in that capacity, should ensure that HNS for ADC is planned, coordinated, prioritized, and executed in accordance with the JFC’s priorities and concept of operation.

c. **ADC Planning Requirements**

• **General.** Effective ADC planning is decentralized and executed at the lowest level. Base and base cluster defense plans should have ADC annexes identifying responsibilities, priorities, requirements, and procedures for conducting ADC operations. These plans will be coordinated and integrated at the component and subordinate command levels to ensure rapid response and efficient utilization of limited ADC assets. **Vulnerability analysis is necessary** to ensure that units and facilities are not positioned in such a manner that could place units at unnecessary risk; e.g., a hospital unit should not be within the danger zone of an HN ammunition storage site or fuel facility.

• **Specific Planning Responsibilities.** Base and base cluster ADC annexes should identify responsibilities and procedures required before, during, and after an incident. Plans should also include responsibilities for all units occupying the base or located in the base cluster that can make contributions to ADC. Examples include, but are not limited to, military and security police, engineers, ordnance, NBC decontamination or reconnaissance, civil affairs, maintenance, health service support, C4 systems, supply, and transportation.
CHAPTER IV
COMBAT OPERATIONS

“A general should direct his whole attention to the tranquillity of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.”

Attributed to Frederick the Great

1. General

a. Introduction. The JFC must consider and plan for combat operations in the JRA. The JFC must develop and organize plans for a TCF that is trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place in the JRA in order to maintain the integrity of the JRA and continue sustainment operations. The JFC must also ensure that appropriate active and passive measures are taken in the JRA to protect US forces and equipment. These general guidelines for planning and conducting combat operations in the JRA should be supplemented by the joint pubs referenced in this chapter.

b. Responsibilities

• JFC. The JFC ensures the following.

  • Determines the need for a TCF based on the threat, friendly forces available, and amount of risk the JFC is willing to accept. If required, the JFC designates a TCF and a TCF commander.

  • Establishes C2 relationships of the TCF with JRAC, component commanders, allies, HN commands, and other subordinate commanders.

  • Determines when and under what conditions the TCF may be used.

  • Establishes ROE for the TCF.

• JRAC. The JRAC is responsible for the following.

  • In coordination with the component commanders advises the JFC, who designates the operational area for the TCF and provides mission guidance.

  • Effects coordination to ensure that the TCF has the required fire support, intelligence, counterintelligence, logistics, liaison, and other support to accomplish the mission.

  • In coordination with component commanders, recommends combat forces (air, ground, naval) that may be designated as a TCF or directed to support a TCF.

  • Establishes liaison and communications with TCF, normally through the JRTOC.

  • Coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that JFC priorities for security and ADC are disseminated and executed in the JRA.

• TCF. The TCF commander's duties are as follows.

  • May receive operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of security response forces designated by the JFC in the designated operational area.

  • May receive OPCON of transient forces in an emergency, as directed by appropriate higher headquarters and in accordance with conditions established in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
• May receive **augmented fire support and air defense** as directed by appropriate higher command.

• Receives necessary **liaison** from component or other joint force commands (normally, liaison from component commands with area responsibilities comes from RAOCs or RTOCs).

- **Service Component Commands.** Service component command support to the TCF includes the following.

  • **Fire support, intelligence, counterintelligence, logistic, liaison,** and other support as directed by higher command.

  • **Coordination with appropriate bases and base clusters** to ensure that local defense efforts are complementary with TCF objectives.

  • **Supply combat forces** for the TCF as directed by the JFC.

c. **Designation of TCF.** Actual and potential level III threats to the JRA mandate the requirement to designate a TCF that can respond to the threat and protect the forces in the JRA. The **geographic combatant commander** normally determines the subordinate JFC’s options and parameters for **selection and commitment of a TCF.** The geographic combatant commander may allocate combat forces to the subordinate JFC for use as a TCF, give a TCF mission to an element of the geographic combatant commander’s strategic reserve, direct the subordinate JFC to use the subordinate JFC’s own forces for a TCF mission, or select another option as appropriate. Based on the geographic combatant commander’s direction and guidelines, the subordinate JFC’s options for a TCF include the items listed in Figure IV-1.

d. **Planning Considerations.** The JFC’s plans for combat and recovery operations must be designed to **optimize the use** of all available **combat, CS, CSS, and HN forces.** Ground, air, and naval operations should be mutually supporting, able to support a TCF if required, and fulfill the requirements of the overall concept of operations. HN and other friendly forces should be integrated as appropriate. **Specific planning considerations** include the following.

- **Key Asset Defense Plans.** Plans must be developed for **defense and reinforcement of key assets or sensitive areas** in the JRA that have major implications for the success of joint force operations. Key asset defense must also consider attack from theater missiles, aircraft, artillery, and naval forces.

- **Positioning Considerations.** The placement of reserves, ADA units, military police, engineers, response forces, field artillery, aviation assets, naval assets, and command posts all **require special consideration of the threat to the JRA, the vulnerability of the JRA, and the JFC’s concept of operations.**

- **Unit Movement Plans.** All rear area unit defense plans should include **plans to displace,** if necessary, rather than be overwhelmed. These must be coordinated with the Movement Control Center.

- **Area Damage Control.** ADC is particularly important before and after combat operations and **must be executed by all units in the JRA.** ADC operations **reduce the spread of damage and restore essential assets** by assessing damage, neutralizing or eliminating unexploded ordnance, providing HSS, making essential repairs, and removing hazards. **Preventive ADC**
Figure IV-1. Options for a Tactical Combat Force

- A theater strategic reserve force
- Tactical units passing through the joint rear area (JRA) to the forward-deployed combat forces
- Units assigned to security missions in the JRA or units being reconstituted in the JRA
- Multinational tactical units under operational control or tactical control of the joint force commander (JFC)
- Tactical units from forward-deployed combat elements
- A task-organized force from assets disembarking in the theater
- Combat elements assigned to the JFC
- Other combat forces as directed by the JFC

**Options for a Tactical Combat Force**

actions before combat operations can also minimize expected damage.

e. **Tenets.** The tenets for successful combat operations in the JRA are knowledge of the enemy, unity of command, economy of force, and responsiveness. These tenets, described in Figure IV-2, are also valid within the more constrained context of security operations.

f. **Fire Support**

- **Considerations.** The JFC may provide the TCF commander additional fire support assets. The TCF commander coordinates actions and fire support with the JRAC, through the JRTOC, and with appropriate component and HN commanders. The TCF commander must be cognizant of SOFA and other treaties which establish ROE that may severely restrict activities in the JRA. Fire support planning must be detailed and take into account air and naval assets (close air support [CAS] and naval surface fires support) and the nonlinear and dispersed nature of friendly forces in the JRA. CAS aircraft are effective for countering deep enemy attacks against support forces operating in the friendly rear area. The responsiveness and firepower of CAS greatly augment the combat power of rear area forces. The potential for fratricide is high in rear area operations because of the larger number of support personnel and activities located there. CAS aircrews and terminal controllers must take special care to identify friendly forces and ensure that they are not subject to direct attack or weapons effects from CAS ordnance delivered against enemy forces operating in friendly rear areas.
Chapter IV

TENETS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMBAT OPERATIONS

Knowledge of the Enemy

Knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions is essential to prepare for combat operations, prevent surprise, and protect the joint rear area (JRA).

Unity of Command

Unity of command is the cornerstone for uninterrupted support of the main effort and the protection of the rear area. It may be achieved by the joint force commander (JFC) through the joint rear area coordinator, component commanders, base cluster commanders, and base commanders. A tactical combat force (TCF), if required, may be employed directly by the JFC, a component commander, or another commander as directed by higher authority. The TCF will normally operate in a specified area of operation within the JRA.

Economy of Force

Protection of the JRA should not detract from the overall combat tasks of the joint force. Consequently, only the minimum means necessary to accomplish the mission should be employed in the JRA.

Responsiveness

Responsiveness requires immediate reaction and rapid deployment of sufficient combat power to destroy the enemy and area damage control resources to minimize damage. Responsiveness is enhanced by timely intelligence and reliable communications.

Figure IV-2. Tenets for Successful Combat Operations


- **Fire Support Coordination Measures.**
  The TCF must use effective fire support coordination measures to assist in expediting fires and safeguarding friendly installations and personnel. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,” provides doctrine for fire support in joint operations.
g. Counterair Operations

• **Responsibilities.** The JFC may designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC), an airspace control authority (ACA), and an area air defense commander (AADC). Because of the integrated nature of airspace control and air defense, ACA and AADC duties should normally be performed by the same person, who may also be the JFACC. The AADC is responsible for air defense requirements above the JRA and will ensure that these requirements are integrated into joint force air defense plans. The JFC normally assigns the JFACC responsibility for planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking for counterair operations based upon the JFC’s concept of operations and air apportionment decisions. The JRAC ensures that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, multinational, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations. The JRAC ensures that this integration is accomplished by establishing coordination with the JFACC or a designated representative.

• **Coordination.** The JRAC will maintain close coordination with the JFACC and AADC in order to maximize the contributions of all the capabilities available to protect friendly forces. In accordance with the JFC’s priorities, protection of priority assets in the JRA should be coordinated by the JRAC and integrated into the JFC’s airspace control plans and orders.

• **Defensive Counterair Operations.** The common aim of all counterair operations, including active and passive air defense operations and measures, is to gain control of the air environment and protect friendly forces. Combat zone airspace control procedures must prevent mutual interference from all users of the airspace, facilitate air defense identification, and safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the theater of operations. Defensive counterair (DCA) operations are both active and passive. Active DCA operations are normally conducted near...
or over friendly forces such as the JRA, and are generally reactive to enemy offensive air (theater missile and aircraft) operations. Passive DCA measures are required by all elements of the joint force, to include units in the JRA. These measures are implemented before, during, and after attack and include:

- Camouflage, concealment, and deception to frustrate effective enemy targeting;
- Dispersal to decentralize critical assets;
- NBC defense to counter NBC effects; and
- Enhanced facility construction or expedient hardening to reduce attack damage.

• References. The two primary references for additional information are Joint Pub 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats,” and Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

2. Military Operations Other Than War

a. General. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) may be conducted in crisis situations that present a definite threat to US

KOREA

The allied assault at Inchon and subsequent penetration of North Korean rear area LOC provide one of history’s best examples of the implications of a successful thrust of a major combat force into an enemy’s vulnerable rear area. It demonstrated the impact of disrupting or destroying an enemy’s logistic tail, severing LOC, isolating C2 elements, and shutting off reinforcements.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources
interests. A JFC, normally a Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), is designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a CINC, or by the commander of a subordinate unified command or an existing JTF. For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that a CJTF and JOA have been designated. Joint C2 is frequently complex, especially during the early phase of operations. Commanders must be prepared to adjust quickly to new task organizations and be prepared to serve multiple roles to support the MOOTW.

b. Responsibilities

• **Commander, JTF.** The CJTF may task a combat force commander assigned to the joint force or a member of the JTF staff with the mission for the overall security of the JOA. This officer’s specific responsibilities are tailored to fit MOOTW but parallel those of the JRAC as identified in this publication. A JRTOC or equivalent organization may be designated to assist in accomplishing this mission.

• **Subordinate Commanders.** All subordinate commanders have area and/or local security responsibilities commensurate with the responsibilities they would have during normal operations or as directed by the CJTF or the designated representative.

c. **Security Considerations.** Security requirements will vary greatly and are highly dependent on the area where the MOOTW is being conducted. General considerations include HNS, lack of HNS, and planning factors.

• **HNS.** If the MOOTW is in support of an allied nation and valid agreements for support and security exist, the HN may provide overall security for the JOA or segments of the AO. US forces will retain responsibility for their local security and will coordinate their local security measures with HN commands as appropriate.

• **Lack of HNS.** If the HNS is not viable, the CJTF is in a hostile country, or HN agreements do not exist, the CJTF must ensure that US forces take adequate measures for local security and that forces are identified to ensure security for MOOTW as required. If the risk is too great, the JTF commander may position bases outside the JOA until security of JTF forces is ensured.

• **Planning Factors.** Security requirements in MOOTW depend on several key factors and will only be specifically decided as the mission is planned. Key planning factors that affect the C2 and force structure required for security operations are shown in Figure IV-3.

d. **Planning and Employment Considerations.** Military operations other than war are often of limited duration and scope, but commanders must prepare for a wide range of mission requirements and employment considerations. Commanders must be prepared for the possibility that such operations may lead to extended combat operations. See Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” for a discussion of the range of military operations. See Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,” for a discussion of JTF considerations. See Joint Pubs 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” and 2-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations,” for a discussion of counterintelligence support to JTFs in the planning, predeployment, and deployment phases.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PLANNING FACTORS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

- Military operations other than war force mission and support requirements
- Threat capabilities
- Terrain and weather
- Friendly force capabilities
- Time available
- Intelligence and counterintelligence assessment (tactical, operational, and strategic)
- Posture of host-nation government and military
- Degree of acceptable risk

Figure IV-3. Security Requirements Planning Factors in Military Operations Other Than War
CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS

“Co-equal with the security of flanks, the maintenance and full use of the lines of communications to the rear are of major concern to the commander. It is his responsibility that the incoming supply is equal to the needs of his deployments and that the supporting arms and fires which have been promised him keep their engagements. Or if they do not, he must raise hell about it.”

BG S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 1947

1. General

Joint rear area logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical level logistic operations. Planners abide by requirements necessary for effective CS/CSS, while seeking to prevent or minimize the disruption of support operations because of rear area security requirements.

2. Rear Area Logistic Principles

a. To support the CINC’s strategy, joint rear area logistics must balance the necessity for security with the logistic principles (cited in Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations”) of responsiveness, simplicity, sustainability, survivability, flexibility, economy, and attainability. Identifying logistic principles necessary for the successful execution of an operation plan is critical to the joint rear area logistic system. Operationally, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate of buildup or theater movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance. Often, the logistician will be faced with conflict between various principles, operational requirements, and rear area security.

b. Responsiveness ensures that any concept of operations of the supported commander is supported. Simplicity fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of any operation. Sustainability requires control measures that can adjust the flow of supplies and services in the pipeline or in the theater to meet changing situations and requirements. Survivability requires some degree of dispersion and duplication during transit to and within the theater of operations. Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion and limitation of the size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission. Survivability may dictate dispersion and decentralization at the expense of economy. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to survivability. Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible in order to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The principle of flexibility also includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized operations. Economy is the provision of support at the least cost in terms of the resources available and necessary to accomplish the mission. Unwise use of logistic resources may deprive combat forces of either manpower, equipment, supplies, or opportunities to pursue other options. Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The inability to attain the
necessary level of support in any functional area can jeopardize success.

3. Responsibilities

a. CINC

- Commanders of combatant commands may exercise **directive authority for logistics** (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The CINC’s directive authority over logistic operations does not release the Services from their responsibility to staff, equip, train, and sustain their respective components.

- Under wartime conditions, or when critical situations mandate diversion from the normal logistic process, this authority is expanded to **authorize combatant commanders to use all necessary facilities and logistic resources** for the accomplishment of their missions.

b. JRAC

- **Sustaining the force is the responsibility of the forces in the rear area**; their technical duties are explained in Service doctrine and field manuals. These rear area forces operate under appropriate C2 structures using the JRAC as the means of coordinating cross-Service, joint, or multinational requirements.

- The JRAC coordinates the overall security in the rear area and seeks efficient joint support of the theater campaign’s logistic concepts, scheme of maneuver, and operations timing. **The JRAC should coordinate with the JMC on employment of all theater transportation.** (Additional responsibilities are discussed in Chapter VII, “Movements.”)

4. Considerations

Rear area sustainment units are generally wholesale outfits that move support to retail units farther forward. There are some retail (direct support) units in the rear area, but they are generally geared toward supporting other rear area units. They may not be organized, equipped, or trained to defend against or engage high level or

Aeromedical evacuation operations are dependent on the level of security in the rear area.
emergency threat forces unassisted. Understanding the limitations of the Services components’ rear area units is essential in order to avoid assigning missions for which they will be unsuited or requirements that they will be unable to provide. Specific considerations are shown in Figure V-1 and described below.

a. Medical Evacuation Operations. Enemy operations in the JRA may interdict LOCs and disrupt sustainment activities. This could seriously impact on the ability of HSS personnel to retrieve and evacuate wounded, sick, and injured personnel and provide timely medical care. Although forbidden by the Geneva Convention, attacks on medical organizations, personnel, or medical materiel may occur and result in serious degradation of HSS and morale of US forces.

b. Reception and Preparation of Reinforcements in JRA. There will be requirements in all operational areas to receive and prepare reinforcing units for further deployment and employment. These units may not be fully organized for combat during these operations, and thus may be particularly vulnerable to a hostile threat.

c. Reconstitution. Reconstitution actions taken by a commander to restore a unit to a desired level of combat effectiveness include reestablishment of command and control; cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment; and conduct of essential training. Reconstitution sites in the JRA may require security augmentation and should be considered in JRAC and component command security plans.

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Medical Evacuation Operations

Reception and Preparation of Reinforcements in the Joint Rear Area

Reconstitution

Figure V-1. Logistic Considerations
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CHAPTER VI
AREA MANAGEMENT

“He is best secure from dangers who is on his guard even when he seems safe.”
Publilius Syrus, Sententiae, c. 50 BC

1. Introduction

a. General. Effective area management is critical to the success of joint rear area operations because of the security implications of positioning assets that may provide protection for the JRA or of determining locations for vital support facilities that require security assistance.

b. Responsibilities

• JFC. The JFC has overall responsibility for area management in the JRA and assigns specific JRA area management responsibilities to subordinate commanders as appropriate.

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates area management in the JRA within JRAC capabilities and in accordance with directives and guidelines established by the JFC. The JRAC’s primary area management responsibility is ensuring that positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.

• Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for area management in accordance with directives and guidelines established by the JFC. They ensure that positioning and stationing of units and facilities are made with due consideration for security.

c. Positioning Considerations

• Unit Positioning. Factors affecting unit positioning include the implications of the current JRA threat assessment, the suitability and survivability of available facilities, and the subordinate unit’s mission requirements. Component commanders and their staffs should use these factors and their own risk assessments to determine whether units should be dispersed in order to enhance their survivability or grouped together for mutual support.

• Facility and Supply Positioning. Factors affecting facility or supplies positioning include the current JRA threat assessment, the security implications, the requirements of the units operating or using the facility and/or supplies, the impact of the facility or supplies on the joint force mission and/or concept of operation, LOCs, and accessibility.

• Competing Risks. Commanders at all levels must balance mission and security requirements when they position assets. Considerations include those described in Figure VI-1.

2. Infrastructure Development

a. General. Infrastructure is a term generally applicable to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities that can be used for the support and control of military forces. Joint forces deployed to developed areas should be able to capitalize on established infrastructure and the use of existing facilities. Infrastructure development should focus on facility security modification and battle damage repair. HNS in manpower, HSS, equipment, and materiel should be maximized. Joint
forces deployed to less developed areas must rely more on construction of new but austere, initial, or temporary facilities in accordance with established base development criteria. HNS should be sought but will normally be less available than in developed areas.

b. Responsibilities

- **JFC.** The JFC, in conjunction with allies and involved HN, is responsible for identifying the wartime facility and construction requirements for US forces prior to hostilities. During hostilities, the geographic combatant commander specifies theater construction policy through the civil engineering support plan for each operation plan.

- **JRAC.** The JRAC coordinates with component commanders to ensure that the JFC’s construction policy in the JRA is implemented with due consideration to security concerns and requirements.

- **Component Commanders.** Component commanders are responsible for implementing construction policy in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines. They plan and implement construction projects with due consideration to security concerns and requirements.

c. **US Assistance to HN Governments.** Assistance for HN governments to rebuild HN infrastructure will be based on US law. CA assets can provide assistance in negotiating agreements concerning this matter, including providing advice on tailoring proposed support agreements to HN experience, institutions, and expectations. For additional discussion of infrastructure development, see Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”
Even though a “rear area” in Vietnam could not be defined by established linear boundaries, there were isolated pockets (de facto rear areas) that were considered to be relatively secure and yet found to be vulnerable to a determined enemy attack. The city of Saigon before the 1968 TET Offensive is an example. Saigon was an insulated city. Aside from occasional incidents of small-scale terrorism during more than 20 years of civil strife, the Communists had done little to disturb the sense of security enjoyed by most Saigonese. Defended by 10 ARVN battalions and a division-sized national police force, and encircled by a series of major US command centers and bases, the capital seemed invulnerable to serious attack. TET would change that. Despite initial success, North Vietnamese attacks into the “rear area” eventually failed, but not before changing the course of the war.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources
“Roads that lead from an army’s position back to the main sources of food and replacements, and that are apt to be the ones the army chooses in the event of a retreat, have two purposes. In the first instance they are lines of communications serving to maintain an army, and in the second they are lines of retreat.”

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

1. General

Movements within a JRA involve the activities listed in Figure VII-1. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, protecting key reception and transshipment points, and obtaining HNS are critical requirements in preserving freedom of movement throughout the JRA.

2. Responsibilities

a. JRAC. The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA so that all movements can take place. The JRAC may become involved in critical movement operations (movements of special weapons, critical cargo, reception and onward movement operations, and noncombatant evacuation services) to ensure that security and ADC assets are adequate and prioritized, if necessary, to support the operation.

b. Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for movements in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines. Their responsibilities include planning, coordinating, and providing adequate security for movement operations.

3. JRA Movement Considerations

In wartime or during crisis action deployments, the JFC should consider as a minimum having an agency, center, or cell to execute the movement control function. In peacetime the JFC should also establish a similar organization to perform the planning.
and resolution of conflict function and to coordinate transportation issues with HN activities as required. **The JFC normally designates a JMC to manage these activities.** The JRAC should establish liaison with the JMC through the JRTOC to monitor movements in the JRA. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control,” addresses joint movements and movement control organizations in detail.

*Airfield perimeter security is a vital component in movement control.*
CHAPTER VIII
HOST-NATION SUPPORT

“Never break the neutrality of any port or place, but never consider as neutral any place from whence an attack is allowed to be made.”

Nelson, Letter of Instruction, 1804

1. General

The effective use of HNS enhances the capability of US forces to maintain successful combat operations on any battlefield. Many HNs can provide valuable support for conducting security operations. The JRAC and appropriate subordinate commanders must consider their HN capabilities when planning and conducting security operations in the JRA. HN personnel and organizations can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better than, US personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local customs, terrain, transportation and communication networks, facilities, and equipment. The scope of HNS is limited only by the availability of resources and the ability of the United States and the HN to reach agreements concerning their use.

2. Responsibilities

a. National Command Authorities. The NCA, working through the Department of State, its embassies, and embassy country teams, are responsible for establishing treaties and agreements for HNS.

b. Geographic Combatant Commanders. Geographic combatant commanders must coordinate with the HN for the acquisition and use of facilities and real estate. Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders will ensure use of existing HN support, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

c. Subordinate JFCs. The subordinate JFC is responsible for ensuring that available HNS is consolidated and prioritized to support the requirements of the joint force and that legal agreements are in place to allow full execution of operations. The subordinate JFC should establish a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate HNS. This office would serve as the single point of contact with the HN and resolve conflicts between components seeking the same HN assets.

d. JRAC. The JRAC, coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff, ensures that HN security assets in the JRA are used to enhance the overall security of the JRA and support the JFC’s current and future concept of operations.

e. Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for the use and employment of HNS in accordance with JFC directions and guidelines. When HNS security assets are available, component commanders’ responsibilities include ensuring that the following applies.

- HN security assets dedicated to US forces are used and positioned to help defend critical operations or facilities in the JRA and can support the JFC’s current and future concept of operations.
- US base and base cluster defense plans are coordinated with and complement HN overall security plans.
3. Considerations

HNS is normally based on agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions. Agreements are made at various levels, including national, theater, subordinate joint force command, Service component command, and unit. In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on both the operational capabilities of the HN and its support for US policies.

a. Planning Factors. The JFC must determine functional types and levels of HNS that can be accepted with a high assurance that the HN will be able to deliver on the commitments. Factors to be considered in determining whether to use HNS for specific missions and functions include the items shown in Figure VIII-1.

Figure VIII-1. Host-Nation Support Planning Factors

- Capability, dependability, and willingness of the host nation to provide and sustain resources
- Shortfalls in US forces supplemented by host-nation support (HNS) and reductions in US forces made possible by using HNS
- Effects of HNS on morale
- Effects of HNS on the political structure within the host nation
- Effects on security, to include operations security
- Host nation international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement in the area of operations
- Capability of US forces to accept and manage HNS
- Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed upon across the range of military operations
- Capability of US forces to supplement and assist host nation forces executing rear operations
b. Command and Control. US and HN personnel command their respective units and normally work in cooperation with or TACON of (but not usually under OPCON of) each other. The degree of coordination between US forces and HNS activities depends on the type of HNS involved, the location, tactical situation, the political environment, and existing agreements. The United States coordinates its control of HN resources through local officials or HN territorial commands and defines control with treaties or HNS agreements. When an established Armed Forces of the US structure is absent, the US security assistance organization assigned to the country team will normally be the point of contact for US forces’ coordination of HNS requirements.

c. HNS During Transition Periods. HNS is particularly valuable during periods of transition, such as going from military operations other than war to war. Three examples of operations that normally begin during transition periods and may extend into conflict and/or war include the following.

- **Civilian Movements.** HNS is invaluable in controlling and assisting in the evacuation of all civilians located in or moving through the JRA, including US NEO activities, movement of third country nationals, and planned or unplanned movement of HN civilians. Details for these civilian movements are found in appropriate Service publications.

- **Reception and Onward Movement.** Unit reception and movement will occur simultaneously with civilian movement and materiel arriving and moving in the theater. All of these movements will require considerable HNS, especially in the areas of port and airport operations, highway regulation, traffic control, and security.

- **Medical Care—Health Service Support.** Before and after initial onset of hostilities, HN medical HSS may be critically needed until US medical HSS capability is established in the joint rear area. After US medical care HSS capability is established significant HNS may be necessary, particularly in areas of base operating and infrastructure support.

- **Special Military Units.** These units are designed during peacetime to perform specific wartime missions, such as guarding enemy prisoners of war and securing valuable facilities, materiel, or ammunition. Included in this group are HN military police units, which provide support but are not necessarily assigned or totally dedicated to US forces.

- **Individual Military Personel Units.** These personnel may be used as fillers for selected HN units which provide individual HN personnel in order to support US forces, such as the Korean augmentation to the US Army in Korea.

- **Paramilitary Units.** Some nations’ police are paramilitary in nature, such as Belgium’s Gendarmerie, and function in both civilian and military roles. They have significantly more utility for HNS policies.
in a hostile environment than normal civilian police.

- **Light Infantry and Security Units.** Most HN countries use these type of units as their primary security forces. They are frequently given both area and point security missions.

- **Civilian Police.** These organizations frequently assist US military police and security police forces during peacetime, but have significantly less capability during wartime. Under the Geneva Conventions, civilian police are classified as noncombatants and as such are not required to provide any support to friendly military units.

- **Intelligence Units and Agencies.** Intelligence organizations located in the rear area must be employed to satisfy the JFC’s requirement for rear area essential elements of information. **HN organizations can provide tactical intelligence** on enemy ground, naval, and air forces; counterintelligence on foreign intelligence and security service threat (through the CISO); terrorist intentions and collection capabilities; and interrogation and debriefing reports from EPWs, refugees, returnees, and threat sympathizers.

e. **HNS in NBC Environment.** In the event of an NBC attack or NBC environment, many types of HNS support may be needed. The need of HNS may be due to limited NBC supplies and/or units. Some of the types of HNS that can be requested are decontaminates, water, water transportation assets, NBC detection devices, engineer digging equipment or units, and decontamination equipment or units.

4. **Role of Civil Affairs Personnel in HNS**

Commanders at all levels can be expected to be involved in civil affairs activities and should use CA personnel to monitor those activities and assist in the communicating of information concerning all aspects of joint rear area operations to the HN. **CA personnel efforts are critical to the success of US-HN interface efforts in the JRA.** They can also provide assistance in negotiating HNS agreements and treaties. See Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,” for additional guidance.

5. **Public Affairs (PA)**

The PA role in the HN is to gain support and understanding from all publics. The JFCs, through their subordinate commanders and staffs, should coordinate PA activities to ensure that all actions are complementary. PA offices plan flexible

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**Figure VIII-2. Specific Types of Host Nation Security Support**

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<td>Civilian Guard and Labor Service Units</td>
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<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<td>Intelligence Units and Agencies</td>
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internal media and community relations programs in order to support the mission in a dynamic threat environment. Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs) are frequently established in order to improve dissemination to internal audience and other publics. The JIB also provides a central location for news and media access and support. See Joint Pub 1-07, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations,” for more details.

6. Role of PSYOP in HNS

Commanders at all levels can expect to be involved in PSYOP activities and should use PSYOP personnel to support and exploit efforts to obtain maximum cooperation from the populace in the JRA. Additionally, PSYOP personnel can assist in search or identification of indigenous hostile equipment, supplies, personnel, and communications media. See Joint Pub 3-53, “Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations,” for additional guidance.
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APPENDIX A
NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE

1. Mission

NCW forces plan and conduct operations to ensure strategic mobility and provide a safe haven for US and multinational forces in NCW areas, during time of war or other contingency situations, in support of the JFC’s concept of operations.

2. Concept

a. NCW is the responsibility of the JFC. This responsibility is exercised through the Navy component commander (NCC), who will normally assign a NCWC for an appropriate NCW area. The NCWC plans and conducts NCW operations within a defined geographic area, normally designated as the NCW area. NCW encompasses coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security. NCW operations include but are not limited to:

   • Intelligence gathering;
   • Reconnaissance and surveillance;
   • Interdiction;
   • Security and safety; and
   • Supporting operations.

   These operations may be done independently or in support of other operations.

b. The NCWC may assign subarea operational commanders as needed for coastal sea control and harbor defense in order to conduct these operations. Supporting functions such as mine countermeasures or search and rescue may be assigned to the NCWC. The conceptual organization is illustrated in Figure A-1.

3. Command Relationships

a. Geographic combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders have the responsibility for NCW within their respective AOR/JOA. This responsibility is exercised through the NCC. The NCC tasks the NCWC to conduct NCW operations. The NCC will assign supporting forces to the NCWC as
required and available. The NCWC may request Coast Guard support before the transfer of the Coast Guard as a Service to the Navy. A notional NCW organization outside the United States is illustrated in Figure A-2.

b. **Naval Coastal Warfare Commander.** The NCWC conducts NCW operations within a designated NCW area. The NCWC may identify one or more coastal sea control commanders (CSHCs), harbor defense commanders (HDCs), and supporting function commanders, as appropriate.

c. **Liaison With Other Commands and Authorities**

- **Forces Ashore.** The NCWC conducts liaison with Service component forces ashore via the JRAC or the JRA commander, if designated, during joint operations. Close coordination is essential. CSCCs and HDCs establish corresponding relationships with Service component forces ashore to coordinate security operations.

- **Host Nation.** The NCWC is subject to all agreements between the US and HN governments. Close liaison between the NCWC and appropriate HN agencies is necessary in order to operate within that country’s territorial waters and to coordinate support from local, civil, and military authorities.

- **Reference.** Details of the organization, functions, and liaison requirements of the NCWC and subordinates are discussed in detail in NWP-39, “Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine.”
Figure A-2. Notional Naval Coastal Warfare Organization Outside the US
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The development of Joint Pub 3-10 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense


2. Joint Pubs


   d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”


   g. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”


   k. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “JTTP for Base Defense.”

   l. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.”


   q. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”
Appendix B

r. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”
t. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “JTTP for Movement Control.”

3. Multi-Service Pubs

d. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-47/TAC, USAFE, PACAF, “Joint Concept and Procedures for Close Air Support in the Rear Battle.”

4. Army Pubs

a. FM 1-111 (Draft), “Aviation Brigades.”
c. FM 9-6, “Munitions Support in Theater of Operations.”
d. FM 11-23, “Theater Communications Command.”
e. FM 19-1, “Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle.”
f. FM 33-1, “Psychological Operations.”
g. FM 34-1, “Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.”
h. FM 34-37, “Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.”
i. FM 34-60, “Counterintelligence.”
j. FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”
k. FM 55-10, “Movement Control in a Theater of Operations.”
References

m. FM 63-4, “Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command.”

n. FM 90-14, “Rear Battle.”

o. FM 100-5, “Operations.”

p. FM 100-7, “Decisive Force, the Army in Theater.”

q. FM 100-16, “Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps.”

r. FM 101-5, “Staff Organization and Operations.”

s. TRADOC Pam 11-9, “Army Programs: Blueprint of the Battlefield.”

5. Air Force Pubs


6. Marine Corps Pubs

a. FMFM 2-6, “MAGTF Rear Area Security.”

   b. OH 6-1, “Ground Combat Operations.”

   c. FMFM 3-5, “Employment of Military Police in Combat.”

7. Navy Pubs

a. NWP 39, “Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine.”

   b. NWP 40, “Inshore Undersea Warfare.”
APPENDIX C
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-10, 29 April 1993, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

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### GLOSSARY

#### PART I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>air defense artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>area damage control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCOC</td>
<td>base cluster operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDOC</td>
<td>base defense operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>commander, amphibious task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISO</td>
<td>counterintelligence support officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>commander, landing forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>coastal sea control commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>defensive counterair</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
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<td>HDC</td>
<td>harbor defense commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>C4 Directorate of a Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Joint Information Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Movement Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>JRA</td>
<td>Joint Rear Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAC</td>
<td>Joint Rear Area Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRACO</td>
<td>Joint Rear Area Communications Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRTOC</td>
<td>Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Lines of Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Main Supply Route</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>Naval Component Commander</td>
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<td>NCW</td>
<td>Naval Coastal Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCWC</td>
<td>Naval Coastal Warfare Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Populace and Resources Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAOC</td>
<td>Rear Area Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTOC</td>
<td>Rear Tactical Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status-Of-Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAACOM</td>
<td>Theater Army Area Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>Tactical Combat Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAAAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area command.** A command which is composed of those organized elements of one or more of the armed services, designated to operate in a specific geographical area, which are placed under a single commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area damage control.** Measures taken before, during or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of operations.** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base.** 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base cluster.** In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base cluster commander.** In base defense operations, the senior officer in the base cluster (excluding medical officers, chaplains, and commanders of transient units), with responsibility for coordinating the defense of bases within the base cluster and for integrating base defense plans of bases into a base cluster defense plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base commander.** In base defense operations, the officer assigned to command a base. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base defense.** The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, so as to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**civil-military operations.** Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**coastal sea control.** The employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore coastal area by friendly forces and, as appropriate, to deny the use of the area to enemy forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support elements. Those elements whose primary missions are to provide combat support to the combat forces and which are a part, or prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force formed for combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of logistic support. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing, chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and
intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called EEI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, United States and foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

high-water mark. Properly, a mark left on a beach by wave wash at the preceding high water. It does not necessarily correspond to the high-water line. Because it can be determined by simple observation, it is frequently used in place of the high-water line, which can be determined only by a survey. When so used, it is called the high-water line. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint logistics. The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Military Departments of the same nation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint movement center. The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned area of responsibility, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area. A specific land area within a joint force commander’s operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area coordinator. The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to
facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called JRAC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint rear area operations.** Those operations in the joint rear area that facilitate protection or support of the joint force. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**joint rear tactical operations center.** A joint operations cell tailored to assist the joint rear area coordinator in meeting mission responsibilities. Also called JRTOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**lines of communications.** All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military capability.** The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. force structure—Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings. b. modernization—Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit readiness—The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. sustainability—The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**movement control.** 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**naval advanced logistic support site.** An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacement units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistic support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic
support sites should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called ALSS. See also naval forward logistic site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**naval coastal warfare.** Coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy and in the United States as part of this Nation’s defense. Also called NCW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**naval coastal warfare area.** An assigned geographic area of operations which includes offshore waters, harbor approaches, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and those internal waters and rivers which provide access to port facilities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**naval coastal warfare commander.** An officer designated to conduct naval coastal warfare missions within a designated naval coastal geographic area. Also called NCWC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**naval forward logistic site.** An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistics support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistics support sites (ALSSs) by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called FLS. See also naval advanced logistic support site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**port.** A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term “ports” should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**port security.** The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities and cargo from internal threats such as: destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**rear area.** For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**reception.** 1. All ground arrangements connected with the delivery and disposition of air or sea drops. Includes selection and preparation of site, signals for warning and approach, facilitation of secure departure of agents, speedy collection of delivered articles, and their prompt removal to storage places having maximum security. When a group is involved, it may be called a reception committee. 2. Arrangements to welcome and provide secure quarters or transportation for defectors, escapees, evaders, or incoming agents. (Joint Pub 1-02)
reconstitution site. A location selected by surviving command authority as the site at which a damaged or destroyed headquarters can be reformed from survivors of the attack and/or personnel from other sources, predesignated as replacements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainability. See military capability. (Joint Pub 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-10 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised