Joint Publication 3-05.2

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning

21 May 2003
1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for joint special operations (SO) targeting and mission planning. It builds on the foundation of joint SO, targeting, and planning doctrine. It discusses SO operational mission criteria with regard to joint planning and targeting, and describes the methodology for integrating SO into the supported commander’s targeting and planning processes. A major part of this publication discusses the SO deliberate and crisis action planning processes. It also includes discussions on: delineation of authority and responsibilities; SO target criteria and considerations; SO integration at the theater and subordinate joint force levels; and mission analysis procedures.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures
not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05.2 (FORMERLY 3-05.5)
DATED 10 AUGUST 1993

• Treats special operations targeting as an integral part of the joint targeting process

• Details the targeting responsibilities of the commander, special operations command (COMSOC) and commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF)

• Outlines the combatant command and subordinate joint force organizations for joint operation planning and targeting

• Updates the discussion of special operations missions for consistency with JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

• Discusses special operations integration into the subordinate joint force commander’s planning and targeting process

• Provides a complete description of the joint targeting process consistent with JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting

• Details special operations mission planning and targeting during the five phases of the deliberate planning process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

• Discusses special operations mission planning and targeting during the six phases of the crisis action planning process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

• Adds an appendix on target analysis methodology
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Overview of Joint Planning and Targeting
- Discusses Special Operations Integration into Joint Planning and Targeting
- Discusses Special Operations Deliberate Mission Planning and Targeting
- Discusses Special Operations Crisis Action Mission Planning and Targeting

Overview of Joint Planning and Targeting

**Joint targeting and planning are interrelated functions.**

The joint targeting process supports planning by providing commanders and component-level planners with a methodology, access, and information concerning targets as expressed within the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Authority and responsibility for joint targeting and planning are delineated at each level of a joint force.**

Each level of a joint force has certain authorities and responsibilities relative to joint targeting and planning. Supported and supporting commands, organizations, and agencies must ensure that special operations (SO) targeting and planning are integrated and deconflicted in all aspects of planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations.

**The geographic combatant commander’s strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) in peacetime and in response to crises.**

Special operations forces (SOF) commanders and their staffs must understand the geographic combatant commander’s joint operation planning process, organization for planning, and have knowledge of the combatant command planning and targeting supporting organizational structures. **Joint operation planning includes campaign planning, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning (CAP).** SOF commanders and their staffs must have a specific understanding of the supported combatant commander’s joint intelligence directorate, joint operations directorate, and joint planning directorate. SOF commanders and their staffs must also know the functions of the supported combatant commander’s boards, centers, teams, and cells that can contribute to the planning and targeting processes.
Within joint operation planning, the joint force commander (JFC) normally conducts CAP. The JFC develops an operation order (OPORD) as a result of an iterative planning process. SOF commanders and their staffs also must have a specific understanding of the supported JFC’s organization for planning, with attention to current and future operations. The joint force planning and targeting supporting organizational structures, as determined by the JFC, support the planning and targeting effort.

Targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.” Targeting is both a joint- and component-level command function that determines desired effects necessary to accomplish JFC objectives; selects targets that achieve those effects; and selects or tasks the means to best engage those targets. The joint targeting process follows a six-phase joint targeting cycle. The joint targeting cycle phases are: commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent; target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization; capabilities analysis; commander’s decision and force assignment; mission planning and force execution; and combat assessment.

Key strategic national organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental agencies, can provide critical support and information to joint targeting and planning efforts.

DOD policy is that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the Law of Armed Conflict, United States laws, and certain international law considerations when conducting joint planning and targeting.

Integration of SO into joint planning and targeting is based on what must be accomplished. The starting point is to understand SOF principal missions and operational mission criteria. The linkages for integration for SO with the supported geographic combatant commander are the theater special operations command and utilization of deliberate planning. The linkage to a supported joint force normally is through the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) and utilization of CAP.
**Executive Summary**

*In order to ensure successful integration of SO into the supported commander’s targeting and planning processes, a supported commander must understand SOF principal missions.* SO principal missions are: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, combatting terrorism, counterproliferation, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, civil affairs, and information operations. SO operational mission criteria consist of answering the following: Appropriate mission? Support the campaign plan? Operationally feasible? Required resources available? Outcome justify risk?

The theater commander, special operations command (COMSOC) has several ways to integrate SOF. Integration can be achieved through the COMSOC’s roles as the theater SO advisor and joint force special operations component commander, or commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF) if designated. The COMSOC also provides input into the theater security cooperation plan, combatant commander’s operation plans, and theater campaign plans.

The COMJSOTF has several ways to link with the supported JFC’s planning process. Key among these links are the JSOTF joint planning group; certain boards, centers, teams, and cells; and coordination and liaison organizations. SO targeting considerations include the political, military, economic, and psychological effects on the adversary. SOF use a distinct target analysis methodology and have specific intelligence support considerations and requirements.

**Special Operations Deliberate Mission Planning and Targeting**

The theater COMSOC normally assists the geographic combatant commander in the initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans phases of the deliberate planning process. *As plans are refined, SO deliberate mission planning and targeting also occur in a detailed and methodical manner.* The COMSOC may adapt certain SO targeting and mission planning techniques necessary to accomplish a mission.
The COMJSOTF provides SO input into the supported JFC’s crisis action planning process, develops the COMJSOTF’s orders, and conducts mission planning.

During Phases I-V of CAP, the COMJSOTF’s planning efforts are directed toward two types of products: the joint force OPORD and development of the JSOTF’s own OPORD. The COMJSOTF provides SO input into the joint force OPORD through collaborative planning between the joint force and JSOTF planners. As the joint force OPORD is developed, the COMJSOTF OPORD is also developed, refined, and tailored to provide guidance to the JSOTF components. The process for SO execution phase mission planning is a dynamic, interactive process among the joint force, JSOTF, and other components of the joint force.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the joint conduct of SO targeting and mission planning across the full range of military operations.
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF JOINT PLANNING AND TARGETING

“The decisions a general has to make would furnish a problem of mathematical calculations not unworthy of the powers of a Newton or an Euler.”

Clausewitz
On War, 1832

1. Introduction

Joint planning and targeting are interrelated functions. Neither is accomplished in isolation of the other. The joint targeting process supports planning by providing commanders and component-level planners with a methodology, direct access, and detailed information concerning targets as expressed within the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent.

a. The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events.

b. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.

Joint planning and targeting are interrelated functions.
Targeting is both a joint- and component-level command function that determines desired effects necessary to accomplish joint force commander (JFC) objectives; selects targets that meet those effects; and selects or tasks the means to best engage those targets. An effective and efficient joint targeting process is essential for the JFC and components to plan and execute operations. Effective targeting maximizes joint force capabilities against the adversary.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM)

(1) Organizes, trains, equips, and provides forces for the conduct and support of special operations (SO).

(2) Develops SO targeting and mission planning doctrine and procedures.

(3) Develops requirements to support SO targeting and mission planning.

(4) Coordinates with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to incorporate templated and/or generic SO collection, analysis, and production processes.

(5) Develops concepts and determines program supporting requirements, such as for personnel, communications, data handling systems, and mobile facilities to enhance the near real time flow of target intelligence, and facilitate the effective peacetime exercise of the adaptive SO mission planning process.

(6) Ensures that assigned forces respond in a timely manner to targeting and mission planning requirements established by supported joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF).

(7) Establishes contact with other nations’ special operations forces (SOF).

b. Geographic Combatant Commanders

(1) Develop and establish overall campaign objectives, guidance, and intent.

(2) Develop targeting and mission planning objectives that integrate and deconflict SOF missions with missions of other components and agencies in support of the overall campaign objectives.

(3) Support SOF in the development of target intelligence packages (TIPs) by the theater joint intelligence center (JIC).

(4) Support SO priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
c. **Subordinate JFCs**

   (1) Develop and establish objectives, guidance, and intent in support of the overall campaign objectives.

   (2) Establish targeting and mission planning objectives and priorities.

   (3) Establish and direct the target nomination process that fully integrates all joint force components to include SOF. The JFC may establish a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) or similar body to perform the functions of a JTCB.

   (4) Review and validate SO target nominations.

   (5) Direct the development and maintenance of the special operations mission planning folders (SOMPFs).

   (6) Establish mission approval levels and authorities.

   (7) Establish command relationships between the COMJSOTF and other joint force components.

   (8) Ensure that SO targeting and mission planning are integrated and deconflicted with attack options for other forces or weapon delivery systems operating within the joint operations area (JOA).

d. **Other Component Commanders**

   (1) Nominate targets to the JFC or the JFC’s designated representative for possible SOF employment.

   (2) As appropriate, ensure that assigned or attached SOF respond to mission planning requirements established by the JFSOCC or COMJSOTF.

   (3) Develop supporting plans and procedures, as required, to support SOF mission support requests (MSRs).

   (4) Direct Service component intelligence production agencies to respond to tasking by the combatant commander in support of SOMPF production and maintenance.

   (5) Develop and disseminate specific targeting guidance and mission objectives for SO.

e. **Commander, Special Operations Command (COMSOC) and COMJSOTF.** Each geographic combatant commander has a theater special operations command (SOC). The theater SOC serves as the functional SO component for the theater and must maintain a long-term
perspective when it comes to theater planning. A joint special operations task force (JSOTF) is normally established to conduct a specific SO mission or a campaign of limited duration and therefore has a more focused planning perspective. The COMSOC and the COMJSOTF:

(1) Translates the JFC’s operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs), and guidance into a supporting OPLAN/OPORD to provide a conceptual framework for SO targeting and mission planning (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(2) Coordinates, deconflicts, synchronizes and integrates SOF missions with conventional force missions (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(3) Consolidates and nominates deconflicted and prioritized targets for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(4) Develops SOMPF for validated targets in supporting OPLANs (deliberate planning process) and orders (COMSOC).

(5) Conducts periodic reviews of SOMPFs (deliberate planning process) (COMSOC).

(6) Prepares and provides the mission tasking packages (MTPs) (a section of the SOMPF) to designated mission planning agents (MPAs) (COMSOC).

(7) Establishes a SO target library that maintains all current and canceled (retained for reference) SOMPF and other targeting data (COMSOC).

SOF must understand the authority and responsibilities for planning and targeting of a JFC.
(8) Tasks SOF MPAs to evaluate and develop mission plans for assigned targets (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(9) Tasks MPAs and coordinates SOMP,F production and maintenance (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(10) Validates, prioritizes, and submits SO collection requirements and requests for information (RFIs) to the JFC (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(11) Develops and maintains statements of intelligence interest in accordance with DIA procedures (COMSOC).

(12) Ensures coordination among SOF components and supporting forces to develop feasibility assessments (FAs) and concept of operations (CONOPS) (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(13) Reviews and approves FAs and CONOPS (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(14) May convene and chair a target panel (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(15) Provides representation on the JFC’s JTCB (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(16) Provides liaison to other components and joint force staff elements as necessary (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

(17) Provides combat assessment (CA) input to the JFC for incorporation into the JFC’s CA efforts (COMSOC, COMJSOTF).

3. Geographic Combatant Commander

*Combatant command strategic planning provides the framework for employing conventional forces and SOF in war and military operations other than war.* Joint operation planning provides a process to achieve these ends. SOF commanders and their staffs must have a specific understanding of the supported geographic combatant commander’s organization for planning and knowledge of the combatant command planning and targeting supporting organizational structures.

a. **Joint Operation Planning.** Joint operation planning is intended to address contingencies that can be reasonably anticipated in an area of responsibility (AOR) or JOA of the command. Three categories of planning are associated within the scope of joint operation planning and all categories can involve SOF planning contributions.

   (1) **Campaign Planning.** Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational objectives through the development of theater campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the
President and Secretary of Defense select the course of action (COA) during crisis action planning (CAP). Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. Campaign planning is based on evolving assumptions. Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crises action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through CAP, thus unifying both planning processes. The COMSOC contributes to campaign planning and may develop a subordinate campaign plan or supporting plans that contribute to achieving combatant commander objectives.

(2) Deliberate Planning. The deliberate planning process results in the development of a geographic combatant commander’s OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), and functional plans (FUNCPLANs) for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on assumptions. The SOC normally is the primary SO planning headquarters (HQ) during deliberate planning.

(3) CAP. CAP is conducted for the actual commitment of forces based on the current situation when a contingency response is imminent. This planning process results in the time-sensitive development of either a joint OPLAN or OPORD in response to an imminent crisis. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occur in response to a situation may result in actual military operations. The JSOTF, if established, normally is the primary SO planning HQ during CAP.

b. Combatant Command Organization for Planning. SOF commanders and their staffs must have specific understanding of the supported combatant commander’s joint intelligence directorate (J-2), joint operations directorate (J-3), and joint planning directorate (J-5) inner structures. Depending on the levels and delegation of responsibility, SOF planning and targeting personnel should have direct coordination with the combatant command staff through the use of liaison officers (LNOs) or collaboration tools. Normally, at the combatant command J-3 directorate level, the primary divisions are the J-3 current operations and J-3 future operations. Within the J-5 directorate level, there are the J-5 future plans, J-5 policy, and J-5 strategy divisions. Within the J-2 directorate level, there are staffs that support current and future operations, strategy, and provide the bulk of the targeting expertise. Each has its specific roles and functions in the targeting and planning processes.

c. Planning and Targeting Supporting Organizational Structures. The combatant commander may form certain boards, centers, teams, and cells with specific functions that can contribute to the planning and targeting processes. Some have more defined roles and degrees of importance. Activation of functional boards, centers, teams, and cells may occur incrementally throughout the CAP process as the scope of effort to support crisis assessment and crisis response receive increased command emphasis and priority. Several of these organizations
are formed, in a similar manner, at the subordinate joint force and JSOTF levels of command. Supporting structures are shown in Figure I-1.

Figure I-1. Theater-Level Planning and Targeting Supporting Organizational Structures
(1) **Intelligence**

(a) **JIC.** The JIC is the combatant commander’s primary intelligence organization providing support to joint forces at the operational and tactical levels. The JIC coordinates support from other intelligence organizations at all levels. It is the conduit for intelligence support for the operation planning and targeting effort.

(b) **Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center (JCMEC).** The JCMEC exploits the recovery of adversary equipment. Exploitation of captured adversary equipment can provide critical information on adversary strengths and weaknesses that may influence operation planning and facilitate targeting.

(c) **Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC).** The JDEC assesses captured documents that may provide information on adversary intentions and planning; deception; locations; dispositions; tactics; communications; logistics; intelligence requirements and assessments; and other information of value.

(d) **Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).** The JIDC provides a source to collect tactical intelligence from enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). In addition to EPWs, the JIDC may also interrogate civilian detainees and debrief refugees for operational and strategic targeting information.

(2) **Operations**

(a) **Joint Operations Center (JOC).** The JOC is the combatant commander’s core operations organization that is established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the commander’s decisions. It is the focal point for all operational matters. A key for JSOTF commanders and their staffs is understanding the roles of the current operations branch (monitor, assess, and direct) and the future operations branch (future operations planning and branch planning).

(b) **Information Operations (IO) Cell.** The IO cell has primary responsibility for developing and promulgating IO guidance for plans that are passed down to the components or subordinate joint forces for decentralized execution. The IO cell is formed from representatives from each staff element, component (to include SOF), and supporting agencies. IO is considered a universal element common to all SO principal missions.

(c) **Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC).** The JSRC is the focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force.

(d) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** During foreign humanitarian assistance operations, the geographic combatant commander may organize a HACC as part of the larger crisis action organization. The HACC assists with interagency coordination.
and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernment agencies, and international and regional participating organizations. Information obtained through HACC coordination may be a corollary benefit to the planning and targeting processes.

(3) **Planning: Joint Planning Group (JPG).** The JPG consists of designated representatives of the combatant commander’s staff, components, and other supporting agencies as necessary. JPG membership should be long-term. JPG responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, CAP to include COA development, coordination of the joint force OPORD development, and planning for future operations and sequel planning.

(4) **Communications: Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC).** The JCCC serves as the single control agency for command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems. The JCCC, among other capabilities, can provide system control and frequency management in support of targeting and mission planning.

(5) **Targeting**

(a) **Joint Targeting Coordination Board.** Typically, JFCs organize a JTCB. If the JFC so designates, the JTCB may be an integrating center for the targeting oversight effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it must be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components and, if deemed necessary, their subordinate units. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. The JTCB provides a forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated. The JTCB normally facilitates and coordinates the targeting activities of the components to ensure that the JFC’s priorities are met. The JTCB and/or JFC typically address specific target issues not previously resolved. The JTCB normally refines the draft JIPTL for approval by the JFC. In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational targeting coordination board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board. Directorship of the JTCB will be determined by the JFC. (See Joint Publication [JP] 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*) The JTCB is often led by the deputy JFC or designated representative to provide the appropriate level of rank, experience, and focus. Component and JFC staff representation on the JTCB should also possess the necessary rank, experience, and knowledge to speak authoritatively for their respective components and staff elements. According to JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,* the JTCB is typically responsible for the following:

1. Reviews targeting information;
2. Develops targeting guidance and priorities;
3. Refines the draft JIPTL (this responsibility may be delegated);
4. Maintains a complete list of restricted targets and areas where SOF or
component reconnaissance units are operating to avoid fratricide and conflicts with other current or future operations;

5. Maintains a macro-level view of the JOA and ensures that targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC’s CONOPS; and

6. Ensures that IO considerations are adequately addressed.

(b) **Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB).** Some JFCs organize a JCMB. For more information refer to JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.

(c) **Joint Targeting Steering Group (JTSG).** To assist the combatant commander in developing targeting guidance and reconciling competing requests for assets (within a combatant commander’s AOR), a JTSG may be established. If a combatant commander has more than one subordinate joint force operating in the theater requiring targeting support or resources, the JTSG can assist the combatant commander and the J-3 and/or J-5 in deciding how limited assets and resources will be deployed and employed (e.g., missiles, aircraft, and personnel). The JTSG should have appropriate Service and functional component, national agency, multinational, and combatant commander-level joint staff representatives (as appropriate) to make recommendations regarding theater strategic and/or operational issues.

(d) **Joint Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting (JGAT) Team.** The joint force air component commander (JFACC) may organize a JGAT team. The JGAT team may be a separate section where component representatives reside to provide input to the targeting process or it may be a meeting that convenes on a periodic basis (normally daily). The JGAT team responsibilities are varied but key to the targeting process. The JGAT team links targets to be attacked by aviation assets to commander’s (JFC and component) guidance, deconflicts and coordinates target nominations based on estimates of how many targets can be attacked, makes a recommendation for the air apportionment, and provides other targeting support requiring component input at the JFACC level. If the JFC delegates joint targeting coordination authority to the JFACC, the JGAT team also receives all target nominations and prioritizes them into the
Overview of Joint Planning and Targeting

draft JIPTL. Common organizational guidelines of the JGAT team include the following:

1. Chaired by the deputy JFACC or the designated representative;

2. Senior component LNOs and key JFACC staff members comprise the JGAT team membership; and

3. The Combat Plans Division provides the staff support to the JGAT team during the air-tasking planning and execution process.

*For further information on the JTCB, JTSG, and JGAT teams, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.*

4. **Subordinate Joint Force Commander**

A subordinate joint force performs joint planning functions similar to those of the supported combatant command for a specific mission or designated JOA. Within joint operation planning, the joint force normally conducts CAP.

a. **CAP.** The subordinate joint force can enter the CAP process during any phase (usually upon receipt of the supported combatant commander’s warning order [WARNORD] or planning directive); however, once entered, the joint force goes through specific procedures for developing its own OPORD based upon guidance from the supported combatant commander. The JFC and staff develop an OPORD as a result of an iterative planning process that is dynamic and in a constant state of refinement and change. Concurrent planning with the combatant commander’s and components’ staffs is a must whenever feasible. This same process applies to the COMJSOTF and JSOTF staffs.

*For further information on specific CAP process, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, and JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.*

b. **Subordinate Joint force Organization for Planning.** As with understanding the combatant command level J-3 and J-5 roles, JSOTF planners also must be cognizant of the joint force organization for planning, as shown in Figure I-2. Planning responsibilities are delineated by functions. Current operations (normally the J-33) monitors, assesses, and directs operations. Future operations (normally the J-35) develops plans for the near term or branches to the basic plan. Future operations serves as the bridge between current operations and future plans. Future plans (within the J-5) is responsible for long term plans or sequels.

c. **Planning and Targeting Supporting Organizational Structures.** The JFC determines the requirements for and provides guidance on the establishment of the necessary boards, centers, teams, and cells to support the planning and targeting effort. The JFC should require that the joint force proponent of a joint board, center, team, or cell provide an analysis of the requirement for a joint activity, with supporting rationale. Which boards, centers, teams, or cells are formed are at the discretion of the JFC. What is important is that there is a degree of parallelism to those structures formed at the combatant command level.
command level of organization. In certain cases, a planning and targeting structure may be delegated as a primary responsibility of the JFC, such as the JTCB, if the JFC has sole responsibility for a JOA. Also, as an example, the JFC may form a joint intelligence support element to provide intelligence support to the joint force. The COMJSOTF, in turn, must be aware of the authority, responsibilities, and delegation of boards, centers, teams, and cells of both the supported JFC and combatant command.

For further information on boards, centers, teams, and cells, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

5. Strategic National Support Organizations

Many organizations can provide critical support to joint targeting and planning efforts at the national and combatant command levels. Key organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD) include the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate, National Military Joint Intelligence Center, DIA, National Security Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Other organizations within the DOD that can provide targeting data support include a joint space
support team, the Joint Information Operations Center, the joint warfare analysis center, the Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures, and the Joint Spectrum Center. Other primary non-DOD government agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.

For further information on strategic national targeting and planning support organizations, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, and JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

6. International Law and Legal Considerations

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and, unless otherwise directed by competent authorities, will comply with the principles and spirit of the LOAC during all other operations. International law considerations will directly affect all phases of the joint targeting process. SOF commanders and their staffs must understand and be able to apply the basic principles of international law as they relate to targeting. A detailed discussion of international law and legal considerations is in JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Appendix A, “International Law and Legal Considerations in Targeting.”
CHAPTER II
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT PLANNING AND TARGETING

“Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”

Sun Tzu
The Art of War

1. Introduction

There are several factors that determine the methodology for integrating SO into the joint planning and targeting processes. First, integration must be based on what must be accomplished. The starting point is an understanding of SO principal missions and SO operational mission criteria. The next major consideration is how SO are to be integrated in these processes. The linkage to the supported geographic combatant commander normally is through the theater SOC and utilization of deliberate planning. The linkage to a supported subordinate JFC normally is through the JSOTF and utilization of CAP.

2. Special Operations Overview

SO are operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

a. SO Principal Missions. SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish the principal missions shown in Figure II-1.

For further information on SO principal missions, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
b. **SO Operational Mission Criteria.** The COMJSOTF may also identify potential SOF missions to be considered in the joint targeting process by the JFC, depending on the command and control (C2) structure of the joint force. Once assigned a mission, SOF will plan and execute accordingly. However, to avoid the misapplication of SOF, commanders should evaluate potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability early in the planning cycle and prior to target assignment. **To provide clear guidance to commanders for planning and executing SO, the following set of operational mission criteria**, as shown in Figure II-2, has evolved from combat experience.

1. **Appropriate Mission.** SOF should be used against those key strategic or operational targets that require SOF’s unique skills and capabilities. If they are not, then SOF should not be assigned. SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces.

2. **Support the Campaign Plan.** If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, then consider more appropriate missions available for SOF.

3. **Operationally Feasible.** SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. SOF commanders and their staffs must take into consideration the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly in hostile territory.

4. **Required Resources Available.** Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. It can include airlift, intelligence, communications, IO, medical, logistic, space, weather, and numerous other types of support. While a target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in supportability may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.

5. **Outcome Justifies Risk.** Does the expected outcome justify the risk? SOF has high value and limited resources. Commanders must ensure that the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission. Assessment
of risk should take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

3. Special Operations Integration into the Geographic Combatant Commander Planning Process

The theater SOC is the primary link for integration of SOF into the combatant commander’s planning process. The theater COMSOC has several ways to integrate SOF. Integration can be achieved through the theater COMSOC’s principal roles as the theater SO advisor and the theater JFSOCC, or COMJSOTF if designated. The COMSOC provides input into combatant commander’s OPLANs, the theater campaign plan, subordinate campaign plan, and theater security cooperation (TSC).

a. **Theater SO Advisor.** The theater COMSOC advises the geographic combatant commander and the other component commanders on the proper employment of SOF. The theater COMSOC may develop specific recommendations on assignment of SOF in theater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The theater COMSOC also may be dual-hatted as a special staff officer in the theater staff.

b. **JFSOCC and COMJSOTF.** When designated by the geographic combatant commander, the theater COMSOC may function as the theater JFSOCC and/or COMJSOTF.

c. **Operation Plan.** The COMSOC ensures SO input into the geographic combatant commander’s OPLANs. Specifically, the COMSOC should provide input into Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex B (Intelligence), and Appendix 3 (Information Operations) and Appendix 4 (Special Operations) to Annex C (Operations) and Annex N (Space) of the OPLAN, as well as other annexes and appendixes as necessary.

d. **Theater Campaign Plan.** The theater COMSOC provides SO campaign planning input for the geographic combatant commander’s campaign plan. Campaign planning may begin during the deliberate planning process and continue during CAP.

e. **Subordinate Campaign Plan.** The theater COMSOC may develop a subordinate campaign plan, as directed, that integrates SOF into the combatant commander’s strategic theater objectives, guidance, and intent.
f. **TSC.** These are deliberate engagement plans for all military activities involving other nations in the theater and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. The theater COMSOC can influence SOF integration by providing SO input into the phased planning procedures and engagement activities prescribed in the TSC. Specific SO inputs may be provided to Appendix 3 (Security Assistance), Appendix 4 (Combined Training), Appendix 7 (Humanitarian Assistance), and Appendix 8 (Other Engagement) of Annex A (Engagement Activities).

4. **Special Operations Integration into the Subordinate Joint Force Commander’s Planning and Targeting Process**

The COMJSOTF has available several means to link with the supported JFC to integrate the planning and targeting processes. Key among these links are: the JSOTF JPG; certain boards, centers, teams, and cells; and coordination and liaison organizations.

a. **JSOTF Organization for Planning**

(1) **JSOTF JPG.** The JSOTF JPG synchronizes the planning effort for the COMJSOTF. A methodology for JPG synchronization is shown in Figure II-3. It is the direct link to the supported joint force JPG and, depending on established command relationships, also provides the link to the supported combatant commander’s JPG to synchronize SO planning and targeting. The JPG conducts CAP, provides the focal point for OPORD development, performs future planning, and accomplishes other tasks as directed. However, it should be understood that the COMJSOTF might not have the capability because of lack of personnel to form a fully staffed
Special Operations Integration Into Joint Planning and Targeting

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE
ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

“Joint Planning Group Synchronizes Planning Effort”

- Future Operations Planning
  - Operational
  - Time-Sensitive
- Branch Planning
- Future Plans and Sequel Planning

- Monitor
- Assess
- Direct

Current Operations
J-33

Future Operations
J-35

Future Plans
J-5

Joint Operations Center

Figure II-3. Joint Special Operations Task Force Organization for Planning

JPG, nor may the type or duration of the mission require a “full-up” JPG. Should a JPG not be formed, its functions are normally performed within the JOC. However, to enhance the CAP planning process, a JPG is recommended. The decision on the organization and functions of the JPG should be determined by the COMJSOTF at the onset of the JSOTF organization. It should also be made clear as to how the JPG and staff sections (particularly the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and once operations begin.

(2) JPG Composition. The JPG composition may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. There are no “hard and fast” rules on how to determine the precise number of personnel required to staff the JPG or the functions that are to be performed. The full JPG consists of all core and staff/component representatives associated with planning in the JSOTF. The full JPG should meet at the beginning of any planning effort. For example, if a
campaign plan is required for an operation or a new mission is received during the execution of an operation, the full JPG should meet. This allows an information flow both in and out from the immediate JPG members to the entire JSOTF staff and components. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment within the life cycle of the JSOTF to provide continuity of focus and procedural consistency. These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or organizations. A notional JSOTF JPG composition is shown in Figure II-4. Not shown but extremely valuable in the JSOTF JPG are the political advisor, and representatives from the embassy/country team, psychological operations, and civil affairs. Functions determine the internal organization of the JPG. Some of the organizations and individuals associated with a JPG may include the following:

(a) **JPG Chief.** The JPG chief provides overall direction for the planning efforts of the JSOTF JPG. The JPG chief should be a senior officer on the JSOTF staff with experience in joint planning and operations.

(b) **Core/Lead Planners.** These are individuals in the JSOTF whose primary duties include understanding the planning process and leading the full JPG or planning cell through that process to produce the appropriate planning products, such as the OPORD. They normally are personnel who are assigned to the J-5 planning element of the JSOTF on a permanent basis.

(c) **Planning Cells.** In many instances, there is no requirement for the full JPG to meet after the initial planning session (such as the FA or mission analysis). It may be appropriate for a smaller group to work in developing the planning products necessary for the JSOTF to accomplish a mission. This is especially true for the JSOTF planning efforts during execution planning where individual missions are planned. In these instances a core/lead planner is designated to plan and coordinate the mission from inception through handover to the current operations section of the JSOTF (and in some instances through execution of the mission). These lead planners form small cells of only those individuals required for planning. If others are required as the planning progresses, the lead planner adds them to the group as required. There may be several planning cells working at any given time. These cells are coordinated through the efforts of the JPG chief and meetings of the full JPG.

b. **JSOTF Boards, Centers, Teams, and Cells.** The COMJSOTF may elect to form any number and type of organizational structures within the JSOTF HQ to support the mission, provide linkage to the JFC, and facilitate planning and targeting. The first step in that decision-making process is to determine what organizational structures (boards, centers, teams, and cells) have been formed by the JFC and/or what organizational structures have been delegated to the COMJSOTF. Then the COMJSOTF formulates which JSOTF HQ organizations (and LNOs or staff officers) are best suited to support both the JFC’s CONOPS and the JSOTF mission. These organizations (less the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff and logistics directorate of a joint staff [J-4] boards, centers, teams, and cells), along with linking joint force organizations, are depicted in Figure II-5.
c. **SO Command and Control, Coordination, and Liaison Elements.** The COMJSOTF has available specific elements that facilitate command and control, coordination, and liaison. They include the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) to command and control, and coordinate SOF activities with conventional forces; the special operations liaison element (SOLE) to provide liaison to the JFACC or appropriate air C2 facility; and SOF LNOs placed in a variety of locations as necessary to coordinate, synchronize,
and deconflict SO within the operational area. Although not part of the JSOTF, there is also the special operations coordination element (SOCCORD) that advises Army corps commanders on SO. All of these elements can significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance the SOF mission planning and targeting processes.

For further information on the SOCCE, SOLE, SOF LNOs, and SOCOORD, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.
5. Other Special Operations Integrating Considerations and Concepts

a. Operational Mission Taskings. Theater-specific mission taskings may require capabilities of SOF that are not normally trained to in the conduct of their principal missions. Such taskings affect the training of forces apportioned to that theater but will not affect SOF worldwide. The theater COMSOC must clearly communicate theater-specific requirements so that CDRUSSOCOM can prepare forces to meet the needs of the supported geographic combatant commander.

b. Principles of SO Mission Planning. There are three principles of SO mission planning. These are:

   (1) Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute substantially to the strategic objective or campaign plan being executed. Limited resources and the extensive planning required dictate that a commander selectively employ SOF for high priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may dictate that the President and/or Secretary of Defense place specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force size constraints upon the supported and supporting force.

   (2) SOF missions are complete packages that include insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, and extraction that must be thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, adversary and friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key planning factors. They will dictate the size and capability of the assigned force, the nature of tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of
force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support structure.

(a) SO targeting and mission planning must be conducted in coordination with all applicable geographic combatant commander and/or subordinate joint force agencies through the appropriate supported JFC. During an ongoing crisis or during sustained combat, conventional targeting and strike response time for ordnance delivery is extremely quick and may affect SOF mobility corridors, infiltration routes, hide sites, or target areas. Conventional force planners must be involved during the early planning stages to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of all assets and to allocate conventional resources to support and augment SOF activities, and vice versa. SO mission planning must be supportive of, and supported by, all applicable aspects of the geographic combatant commander’s OPLANs.

(b) Detailed targeting and mission planning is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival of deployed operational elements. Based on assigned strategic theater objectives and operational direction provided by the supported JFC, the COMSOC or COMJSOTF provides mission guidance to the subordinate SOF commanders, providing those commanders with the basis for the development of a comprehensive mission plan that allows for the flexible execution required by SOF.

(3) SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fail, since SO targets normally are perishable either from a military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, detailed and, whenever possible, repeated rehearsal is critical. Commanders should recognize and plan for such preparation time.

c. Mission Evaluation. No mission should be declared feasible or unfeasible for SOF based solely on time available to plan and prepare for a mission. A careful evaluation should be made of the specific mission requirements to determine if there is enough time available for mission success.

d. Automated Targeting Systems. The use of automated targeting systems enable SO planners to participate collaboratively within the joint targeting process. Automated targeting systems support and enhance all phases of the joint targeting cycle by allowing users access to near real time targeting information. SO planners may access updated commander’s objectives and guidance for the conduct of FAs. These applications can be used to analyze target system components and for submitting target nomination lists to support SO missions. Electronic target folders with imagery and target intelligence to support SO missions also can be accessed through these automated targeting systems.

6. Joint Special Operations Task Force Integration into the Supported Command’s Targeting Process

a. Targeting

(1) SO targeting considerations include, but are not limited to, the political, military, economic, informational, and psychological effects on the adversary. From the integration of
Special Operations Integration Into Joint Planning and Targeting

the above factors, targeting recommendations are made to use SOF for particular targets in support of a theater campaign plan’s long- and short-term objectives.

(2) SO should be integrated as much as possible with other missions to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives. Examples of this include the following:

(a) Integration of SO infiltration, exfiltration, and target attacks.

(b) Integration of special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), and unconventional warfare (UW) operations against a specified target system.

(c) Integration of SO attacks and those of other components; for example, SO attacks against a rail net are timed so that the stalled trains may be subsequently destroyed by air, naval, or land forces.

(d) Integration of SO attacks and the overall campaign; for example, the decision to use SO attacks against a rail net must be weighed against the need to use that node for subsequent transport of friendly troops and supplies.

b. Levels of Targets. In the context of this publication only, targets may be classified as strategic, operational, and tactical.

(1) Strategic targets are vital to both friendly objectives and the adversary’s overall political, military, and economic operations or psychological stability. The use of SOF against strategic targets in support of a campaign or major operation may be part of the combatant commander’s theater strategy. SOF employed in a DA, SR, or UW role can contribute to the combatant commander’s strategic objectives.

(2) Operational targets are deemed critical to the adversary’s capability to conduct successful campaigns. Such targets may include logistic as well as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence functions required to support and direct tactical operations. For example, the employment of a SOF unit in a DA or SR role against an operational target can support a major operation of a JFC.

(3) Tactical targets affect the adversary’s capability to conduct battles on a relatively localized basis. Typical SO tactical targets could include command posts, individual ships, police stations, local telephone exchanges, and individual aircraft. SOF employed in a UW or foreign internal defense (FID) role may be tasked to attack or reconnoiter a tactical target using indigenous forces or to exploit a particular aspect of the adversary’s economic, psychological, or operations base.

c. Target Analysis Methodology. Target analysis is the examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. It is a systematic approach to establishing the adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. This is accomplished through the methodical
examination of all information pertaining to a given target. The target analyst must determine a given target’s vulnerability to attack, examine down-time and destructive effects, and determine how to satisfy the commander’s objective or success criteria specified in the mission tasking package (during deliberate planning) or in the request for support or fragmentary order (FRAGORD) (during execution phase planning). Examples of target analysis methodologies are in Appendix A. “Target Analysis Methodology.”

d. **Timing of Actions Against Targets.** The timing of actions taken against a target is an important consideration for SO. Given the estimates of the adversary conduct of operations versus the JFC’s plans and objectives, targets developed during both deliberate and crisis action planning fall into two general categories, planned and immediate (see Figure II-6).

(1) **Planned Targets.** Planned targets are those known to exist in an operational area with actions scheduled against them to generate the effects desired to achieve JFC objectives. Examples range from targets on joint target lists in the applicable campaign plan, to targets detected in sufficient time to list in the air tasking order (ATO), mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Planned targets have two subcategories: scheduled or on-call.

   (a) **Scheduled targets** are planned targets upon which fires are to be delivered at a specific time.

   (b) **On-call targets** are those that do not have fires scheduled to be delivered at a specific time, are known to exist in an operational area, and are located in sufficient time for deliberate planning to meet emerging situations specific to campaign objectives.
(2) **Immediate Targets.** Immediate targets are those that have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the normal targeting process, and therefore have not been scheduled. Immediate targets have two subcategories: *unplanned* and *unanticipated*.

(a) **Unplanned Immediate Targets.** Unplanned immediate targets are those that are known to exist in an operational area but are not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in the normal targeting process.

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**Figure II-6. Types of Targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Immediate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action against targets helps achieve campaign objectives</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of target during normal targeting process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action planned against target during normal targeting process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time for action specified during normal targeting process</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example of time-sensitive target in this category</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unplanned

- Know ahead of time that an important military convoy will cross a specific bridge, but do not know when during the day.
- Find out about same convoy after normal targeting process.

Unanticipated

- Detect previously unknown convoy of significance just before or while crossing the bridge.
(b) **Unanticipated Immediate Targets.** Unanticipated immediate targets are those targets that are unknown or unexpected to exist in an operational area but, when detected or located, meet criteria specific to campaign objectives.

  e. **Centers of Gravity (COGs), Decisive Points (DPs), and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).** SOF may be tasked by the supported command to conduct SR and DA missions to identify and/or attack adversary COGs and DPs that support JFC strategic and operational objectives. In addition, SOF also may be tasked to assess MOEs of attacked targets to determine whether or not individual component missions, campaign phases, or a theater campaign in general are meeting JFC objectives.

  f. **No-Strike and Restricted Targets.** The JSOTF must ensure that it is included, at every level, in the coordination process with the supported JFC for identifying and nominating facilities for the inclusion on the no-strike list and restricted targets (targets that have restrictions imposed that can not be exceeded).

  g. **High-Payoff and High-Value Targets.** High-payoff targets (a target whose loss to the adversary will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly COA) and high-value targets (a target the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission) may be tasked to the JSOTF by the supported JFC. Normally, these types of targets are high-risk targets. It is incumbent on the COMJSOTF during wargaming to conduct a thorough risk assessment and apply the SO operational mission criteria to these designated targets in order to determine if the targets are appropriate for SOF.

  h. **Time-Sensitive Targets.** SOF’s primary contribution against **time-sensitive targets** (TSTs) is clandestine and/or covert reconnaissance, surveillance, terminal guidance and control of weapons systems. If required, SOF can be employed to destroy or disable a TST, but if not planned for well in advance of the operations, this may compromise their primary mission and require extraction of the team.

     (1) **Time-Sensitivity.** Time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and determining its appropriateness as a SO target. **Time-sensitivity can be viewed from either a targeting or mission planning perspective** or a combination of both, as in the case of personnel recovery missions.

        (a) A target is **time-sensitive** when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity.

        (b) A mission is **time-sensitive** when there is a limited window of opportunity during which the objective of the mission must be attained. In this case, the target may be available for SOF attack or reconnaissance over a long period, but the value is high only at a specific time.
(2) **Time Compression.** The SO time-sensitive targeting process will compress and/or truncate phases of the targeting cycle. For a complete discussion of the TST process, see Appendix B, “Time-Sensitive Target Considerations,” of JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting.*

(3) **Risk Assessment.** Particular TSTs may be of such risk to SOF or to mission accomplishment that the COMJSOTF is willing to accept a higher level of risk in order to attack the target immediately upon its detection. Normally, the risk associated with TSTs involves the possible trade-off of diverting SOF assets from another mission to that of the TST. The COMJSOTF and JSOTF planners must weigh the risks involved and balance the time required for proper planning and execution against the danger of not engaging the target in time.

   i. **Intelligence Support Considerations.** Intelligence support to SO mission planning is typified by its time-sensitive nature and the uniqueness of some intelligence requirements. A JSOTF is reliant on the national, joint force, or theater intelligence structure and architecture to satisfy intelligence requirements. At times, requirements for intelligence in certain geographical areas to support SO initially may not exist due to previously set priorities for collection. Additionally, although some SO missions require reliance on certain intelligence disciplines for collection, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI), generally a multi-disciplined approach with cross-cueing among assets is employed.

   (1) **Time-Sensitive Nature.** The compressed decision-making cycle under which some SO missions are planned requires early identification of PIRs to provide focused collection, analysis, and production. The JSOTF J-2’s participation in the JPG from the onset is critical in formulating PIRs. Moreover, permanent J-2 representation in the JPG also is essential for supporting future operations and planning. The JSOTF J-2 is responsible principally for the timely management of JSOTF staff and component collection requirements and intelligence RFIs. The use of JSOTF J-2 LNOs to the joint force J-2 or the combatant command JIC can facilitate the responsiveness of a supporting intelligence organization. Seamless JSOTF integration into the theater intelligence architecture also will enable the use of the “push” and “pull” concept. This will enable JSOTF connectivity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence operations for access to products and databases.

   For further information on the “Push” and “Pull” control principles, refer to JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

   (2) **Unique Intelligence Requirements.** Intelligence support to SO mission planning generates intelligence requirements that generally require greater analytical fidelity than requirements normally encountered at theater and national levels. The use of the JSOTF J-2 LNOs to the joint force J-2 or the combatant command JIC can facilitate the understanding of SO intelligence requirements. Most combatant command JICs have SOF production element or intelligence personnel from the theater SOC to oversee SO intelligence production. Some SO missions, such as FID and UW, are supported by general military intelligence products, generated
at the theater and national levels, that contain military, political, economic, and social aspects of foreign countries. Specific SO intelligence requirements are discussed in Appendix J, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Missions”, and Appendix K, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Insertion and Extraction.”
CHAPTER III
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DELIBERATE MISSION
PLANNING AND TARGETING

“Don’t never take a chance you don’t have to.”

Major Robert Rogers
Standing Order #5, Rogers’ Rangers, 1759

1. Introduction

The theater COMSOC normally assists the geographic combatant commander in concept development, plan development, and supporting OPLAN development during the deliberate planning process. As plans are refined, SO deliberate mission planning and targeting also occurs in a detailed and methodic manner. SO deliberate planning is provided as input to the geographic combatant commander deliberate planning process. Also, specific SO deliberate mission planning and targeting techniques may be used by the theater COMSOC to further refine the SO part of deliberate planning.

2. Special Operations Deliberate Planning in Support of the Geographic Combatant Commander

Deliberate planning is preparation for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SOF commanders and their staffs rely heavily...
on assumptions regarding the circumstances that might exist when the plan is implemented. The COMSOC actively participates in all phases of theater-level deliberate planning, both as a component commander and principal theater SO adviser. Deliberate planning responsibilities of the theater SOC include developing OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, and supervising SOMPF production. A SOMPF format is in Appendix, B, “Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Formats.” The SO portions of plans are modified and revised as necessary. The COMSOC also participates in theater-level strategy development and campaign planning. Plans developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for COMSOC planning and ease the transition during CAP. SO deliberate planning is accomplished in five phases as follows (see Figure III-1):

a. **Initiation.** During this phase, planning tasks are assigned to supported commanders, forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued. Broad scenarios are identified for plan development and the type of plan required is specified. A combatant commander also may initiate deliberate planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities. During this phase, the COMSOC reviews tasks applicable to SO, ensures that the SOF apportionment is adequate, and provides SO input into the preparation of additional plans, among other responsibilities.
b. **Concept Development.** The COMSOC prepares, or assists in preparation of, the theater SO staff estimate and participates in the concept development process that finalizes CONOPS and supports and assigns tasks to subordinate components. COMSOC participation throughout this phase should ensure that SOF are properly integrated into the geographic combatant commander’s strategic concept.

c. **Plan Development.** As the plan develops, the COMSOC assists the geographic combatant commander in integrating SO and coordinating with CDRUSSOCOM for continental United States based support.

   (1) **Force Planning.** The COMSOC assists in preparation of the SO portion of the OPLAN and provides the initial SOF force list and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Apportioned SOF should deploy as early as possible; the plan may require SOF forward presence during critical time periods when the likelihood of employment is increased.

   (2) **Support Planning.** The COMSOC coordinates with the theater J-4, Service component commanders, and the SOF parent Services to determine support and replenishment requirements for apportioned SOF and how these requirements will be satisfied. SOF normally plan to deploy with their unit basic loads and a limited amount of supplies, unless otherwise directed by the geographic combatant commander. The SO TPFDD input should include dedicated SOF support units.

   (3) **Transportation Planning, Shortfall Identification, and TPFDD Refinement.** If the transportation planning process identifies SOF shortfalls, the COMSOC staff coordinates
with theater planners to resolve the shortfalls. If transportation shortfalls cannot be resolved at the planner level, the COMSOC advises the geographic combatant commander and adjusts the plan as directed. As the TPFDD is refined, the COMSOC ensures that SO data is current and correct, and that it is not inadvertently altered.

d. **Plan Review.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. To facilitate that review, the theater COMSOC must have identified to the geographic combatant commander whether SO taskings have been met and whether SO resources have been used effectively within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. Additionally, the COMSOC would assist in the resolution of unresolved shortfalls in SOF resources and capabilities.

e. **Supporting Plans.** The supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting plans to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved OPLAN. The COMSOC focuses on the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of SOF in support of the concept described in the supported commander’s approved plan.

3. **Special Operations Targeting and Deliberate Mission Planning Techniques**

**SO target nomination and selection procedures are applicable to all SOF missions.** Deliberate SO targeting and mission planning techniques may consist of the following steps: target nomination, target validation, intelligence production, mission planning, and SOMPF maintenance. A technique for SOC targeting as it relates to deliberate planning is depicted in Figure III-2.

a. **Target Nomination.** Target nominations are generated in a variety of ways. A SOC may receive them from its components or the combatant commander may task other components of the joint force to nominate SO targets in support of the combatant commander’s objectives. The SOC targeting panel, if formed, can be the conduit for receiving and processing target nominations. In addition to receiving nominations, the SOC targeting panel may conduct an independent analysis of the plan and develop a proposed list of targets and missions. The role of the target panel is to formulate SOF targeting strategy and coordinate targeting activities for the SOC JOC. The target panel conducts these activities through the combatant commander and component commander staffs. Also, the SOC J-2 initiates and coordinates the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and production of IPB products. These products are updated throughout the planning processes and form the basis of the TIP.

(1) To facilitate the target selection process, target nomination format should include:

(a) The target’s basic encyclopedia (BE) number, name, functional category code, description and significance, critical damage point(s), effect(s) desired on the target, and collateral damage concerns.
Figure III-2. Theater Special Operations Command Deliberate Planning Techniques
(b) Location coordinates with datum to include latitude/longitude and elevation in mean sea level/height above the ellipsoidal. All coordinates should be defined using World Geodetic Survey-84 datum.

(c) Specific OPLAN/OPORD objectives for which the nominated target supports and the proposed SO mission such as DA and SR.

(d) Statement of target significance to include recommended attack, strike, or surveillance objectives.

(e) Time of execution.

(2) Exclusive of the target nomination format, the process also requires the following:

(a) **Gather Target Information.** When feasible, SOC planners coordinate with joint force planners to determine requirements for SOF in targeting and surveillance to support their operations.

(b) **Review Target Information and Other Considerations.** After receiving this input, the targeting panel should also examine psychological operations (PSYOP) and any unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms requirements.

(c) **Analyze Target Information.** After considering all of the above input, the panel conducts an analysis of all probable targets using the SOF mission criteria and fills out target nomination worksheets on those targets selected.

(d) **Apply Common Sense Test.** The operations element of the JOC should scrub the target list for a “sanity check” concerning the capability of it being executable.

(e) **Brief COMSOC.** Once all of the previous steps have been accomplished, the SOC targeting panel should provide a formal briefing to the COMSOC on the proposed targeting strategy for this phase of the operation.

(f) **Prioritize and Group Target Information.** Once the commander has decided on a strategy for targeting, the SOC targeting panel continues to coordinate with the J-3 to prioritize and group targets by date/time for execution.

b. **Target Validation**

(1) COMSOC commences target validation upon compilation of SO target nominations. The SOC targeting panel conducts a gross feasibility analysis, eliminating target nominations inappropriate for SOF employment. Targets are also vetted against the no-strike list and restricted target list. Suitable targets are consolidated, prioritized and forwarded to the JTCB as a proposed SO target nomination list (TNL).
(2) The JTCB reviews the proposed TNL to ensure targets are supportive of JFC objectives (strategic and operational).

(3) The combatant commander normally tasks COMSOC, via a mission tasking letter, to develop a FA (Appendix D, “Special Operations Feasibility Assessment”) on SO targets approved by the JTCB.

(4) COMSOC assigns a MPA for each target and tasks the appropriate MPA to develop the FA. The MPA prepares the FA while a supporting initial assessment (IA) (Appendix E, “Special Operations Initial Assessment”) is developed to support infiltration/exfiltration feasibility of the mission.

(5) COMSOC tasking for FA/IA development is transmitted via the MTP (Appendix C, “Special Operations Mission Tasking Package”). All FA/IA tasking are transmitted through the appropriate component. This procedure initiates SOMPF development.

(6) During FA/IA development, effective coordination is required between the MPA, supporting MPAs and agencies and conventional commanders (if applicable).

(7) The results of the FA/IAs are provided per the distribution schedule. Following a review by the COMSOC, if the proposed target is not feasible for SOF, it is deleted. If the proposed targets are feasible for SOF, the results of the FA/IAs are forwarded to the combatant commander. Targets identified as SOF feasible require an intelligence production requirement to be submitted by the SOC to the combatant command JIC.

(8) The resultant product of this step is a validated and prioritized SO target list. The combatant command intelligence planners ensure that the SO target list is integrated into the combatant commander’s JIPTL.

c. Intelligence Production. Once validation is complete, the SOC J-2 in coordination with combatant command intelligence production managers, prepares the TIP (Appendix F, “Special Operations Target Intelligence Package”).

(1) A critical part of the FA is the intelligence requirements section, which modifies and amplifies the information required to plan a mission. This becomes the request for information to be addressed in the TIP.

(2) TIPs are produced using minimum priority information requirements required by the MPA to develop the CONOPS (Appendix G, “Special Operations Concept of Operations”). The TIP supports the entire mission planning process on the strength of the analysis provided. Direct liaison should be authorized between the SOF MPA and the intelligence production agency.

d. Mission Planning. SO mission planning is designed to develop a CONOPS against a designated target. COMSOC tasks the designated MPA for CONOPS development. Using operational data and intelligence provided in the FA and TIP, the executing MPA develops the
CONOPS. Coordination with supported and supporting units is essential for effective CONOPS development. A supporting unit may be tasked to develop a mission support plan (MSP) (Appendix H, “Mission Support Plans”). A MSP complements the CONOPS. The COMSOC facilitates this coordination. The completed CONOPS is forwarded to the COMSOC for approval.

e. Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Maintenance. Maintenance is required by the intelligence production agencies and MPAs. This task is monitored to ensure that TIPs and CONOPS are updated.
1. **Introduction**

During a crisis situation, both the JFC and COMJSOTF should identify, coordinate, and quickly respond to the mutual planning requirements. The COMJSOTF also must be able to shift the JSOTF planning focus as a crisis event unfolds and operations begin. SO CAP and targeting procedures are addressed in terms of events that occur from an initial request for support through execution of the SO mission. For the purpose of clarity during the discussion of SO CAP and targeting, the terms JFC and COMJSOTF will be used to delineate responsibilities and functions of the supported and subordinate commanders.

2. **Special Operations Crisis Action Planning in Support of the Joint Force Commander**

During a crisis situation, a JSOTF conducts both operational planning and execution phase planning as part of CAP. These planning phases are depicted in Figure IV-1. Note that as a joint force is working through the six phases of CAP, the JSOTF also is conducting its planning process. Each of these phases is explained in subsequent paragraphs.
3. **Special Operations Operational Planning (Crisis Action Planning Phases I-V)**

During Phases I-V of CAP, the JSOTF’s planning efforts are directed toward two types of products. These products are inputs to the joint force’s OPORD (with its organic TPFDD) and development of the JSOTF’s own OPORD to provide JSOTF components with **overall guidance and direction**. The processes used to develop these two products usually are conducted concurrently.

a. **Providing Input to the JFC’s OPORD.** The focus of the JSOTF’s planning efforts in this phase of SOF operational planning is development of input to the JFC’s OPORD (see Figure IV-2). The JSOTF staff should provide information for all aspects of the JFC’s order (base order, all annexes, and appendices). This should be done as a collaborative planning effort between the joint force and JSOTF planners. Although all aspects of the joint force order will impact the JSOTF, it is especially important that the JSOTF provide input to the “Special Operations” appendix to the “Operations” annex (Appendix 4 to Annex C) of the joint force OPORD. Major operational issues that also should be discussed in developing input to the joint force’s OPORD include the following: operational capabilities required, forces required, command
relationships, targeting priorities, force allocation, task organization, deployment and basing options, mission approval procedures, and TPFDD input. The process that allows the JSOTF to contribute to the joint force’s OPORD is depicted in Figure IV-3 and includes the following:

1. **Contributing to joint force’s Overall Mission Analysis**

   (a) Determining known facts. This includes:

   1. Analyzing the geographic combatant commander’s mission and intent from a SO perspective;

   2. Describing the friendly situation of the joint force, JSOTF, components, and other commands;
3. Determining current status or conditions of SOF already provided by the geographic combatant commander;

4. Describing how possible SOF missions relate to the joint force’s plans; and

5. Describing other facts that may impact on the possible missions.

(b) Developing assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts. As examples, but not limited to:

1. Status-of-forces at probable execution;
2. Availability and support requirements of host nation (HN) or multinational forces;

3. Available time;

4. Support from other government agencies (such as obtaining over-flight rights);

5. Rules of engagement (ROE) changes if required; and

6. Political considerations that may affect the mission.

(c) Reviewing SOF constraints and limitations.

1. Constraint: Restrictions placed on the command by a higher command to dictate an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action the subordinate commander has for planning a mission by stating things that must or must not be done.

2. Limitation:

   a. Control measure, instruction, or order that restricts freedom of action.

   b. An action, activity, or task that a unit is not capable of executing. This condition may be due to natural reasons such as terrain and weather or reasons such as training or equipment.

(d) Identifying tasks to be performed by SOF. These include:

1. Determining specified tasks;

2. Determining implied tasks; and

3. From (1) and (2) above, determining essential tasks.

(e) Conducting initial SOF force structure analysis. Tentatively identifying required and available SOF assets, and required capabilities.

(f) Conducting an initial risk assessment.

(g) Determining end state (or success criteria) for SOF.

(h) Identifying intelligence requirements. As early as possible, include support required beyond that of the capability of the joint force and identify PIR. Clear, routine communication between the JSOTF J-2 and the joint force J-2 will facilitate the review of joint force intelligence products supporting the planning process.
(i) Assisting in developing the joint force’s mission statement.

(j) Assisting in developing a mission analysis briefing for the JFC.

(2) **Assisting Mission Analysis Briefing and receiving JFC Planning Guidance.** The JFC should provide guidance at this point. Planning guidance should be disseminated to the JSOTF and other joint force components.

(3) **Developing SOF Options for the JFC's COA.** The joint force staff should develop multiple friendly COAs. The JSOTF should perform the following:

(a) Develop options for initial SO COAs.

(b) Review mission analysis and JFC’s guidance.

(c) Develop/refine a comparison of adversary forces and current friendly force relative force ratios in combat power.

(d) Review options for attacking/neutralizing the adversary’s COGs and accomplishing the joint force’s mission/tasks.

(e) Provide options for SOF operational movement. These options include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Formulating options for strategic deployment of SOF to the JOA which further consist of developing/integrating the deployment concept consistent with the JFC’s supporting campaign scheme and sequence of operations and balancing requirements for initial combat and non-combat operations, force reception and buildup, and timing of required follow-on operations.

2. Considering options for intratheater deployment of SOF within the JOA. Identifying positions from which SOF could initiate major operations. Developing options for logistic support for the movement of SOF from ports of debarkation to initial positions. Also consider transportation, existing transportation infrastructure and required improvements, available bases/airfields to support movement, intermediate staging bases (ISBs), and forward operations bases.

(f) Provide options for SOF operational maneuver. Develop options for the concentration of SOF in the JOA and develop options to conduct operations in-depth.

(g) Provide options for SOF operational mobility. Consider effective use of existing facilities or infrastructure, the capture or isolation of facilities or infrastructure, and preparation of routes and operating bases.

(h) Provide options for SOF counter-mobility. These include options in support of a quarantine/embargo and options in support of a blockade.

(i) Provide options for SOF firepower.

1. Describe relationships between SO-based combat power and conventional air/naval/land combat power. Consider command relationships from the perspective of JFC objectives.

2. Identify/nominate or receive joint force component nominations for operationally significant targets affecting SO. Balance targeting requirements in support of maneuver with requirements in support of other joint force interdiction. Integrate SO-based interdiction capabilities into interdiction options, and identify and integrate both lethal and nonlethal means of attack.

(j) Provide options for SOF force protection.

1. Consider options for protection of operational forces, means, and noncombatants to include evacuation of noncombatants from the JOA, establishing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection measures, and coordinating personnel recovery operations.

2. Provide options for operations security (OPSEC).
3. Provide options for deception in support of the JFC’s and combatant commander’s deception plan.

4. Provide options for security of SOF.

(k) Provide options for the SOF C2.

1. Plan to incorporate SOF in the joint force information architecture.

2. Develop options to task SOF.

3. Develop options for organizing the joint special operations areas (JSOAs) in the JOA.

(l) Test each COA input for validity.

(m) Provide input to the JFC COA statement and sketches.

(4) Participating in COA Analysis (Wargaming). Contribute to the process of wargaming by mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The process may use the structure of “action — reaction — counteraction” sequences for critical events. Key elements the staff should determine include details about:

(a) Required SOF operational capabilities (specific tasks to capabilities).

(b) Required SOF.

(c) Task organization of the JSOTF throughout the operation.

(d) Command relationships.

(e) Targeting priorities.

(f) Deployment options and basing rights.

(g) Decision points and intelligence requirements related to major events.

(h) Operational support needed.

(i) Identification of branches (what if) and sequels (what then).

(5) Participating in COA Comparison
(a) Participate in determining the criteria to be used for comparing COAs. Criteria for comparison of SO options could come from the commander’s intent and factors of mission accomplishment, adversary, terrain, troops available, time available, and political factors.

(b) Ensure recommendations for SO have been coordinated with SO components of the joint force.

(6) **Receiving JFC’s Decision on COAs.** The JFC may select or modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, the JFC’s “Commander’s Estimate” document (or slides) normally will be sent/briefed to the supported geographic combatant commander for approval.

(7) **Providing SO Perspective in the Joint Force Order.** After the COA is selected, the order is developed. Most of the information needed for this task already should have been developed through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA selection). SO input can be in many sections of the order, but the primary area should be Appendix 4 (Special Operations) to Annex C (Operations) of the order.

b. **Development of the JSOTF OPORD.** Another product of Phases I-V of CAP for the JSOTF is the JSOTF OPORD (see Figure IV-4). As discussed previously, it is important that the JSOTF OPORD and the JSOTF’s input to the joint force’s OPORD be conducted almost simultaneously. The processes used to develop the OPORD follow the same process used for input to the joint force’s order, but are refined and tailored to provide guidance to the JSOTF’s components.

(1) **Conduct Mission Analysis.** Information obtained while developing input for the joint force’s order should be updated and applied to the JSOTF level of planning. Topic areas include:

(a) Review known facts.

1. Describe the friendly situation: joint force, JSOTF, components, and other requesting commands.

2. Describe how possible missions relate to the joint force’s plans.

3. Describe other facts that may impact on the possible missions.

(b) Review assumptions. Assumptions replace unknown facts. Assumptions must be valid and necessary for planning to continue. Consider support from other government agencies (such as for obtaining overflight rights); ROE changes if required; availability of forces; and political effects on the mission.

(c) Review limitations. Limitations placed on the JSOTF can include:
1. Constraints which are required actions (must do) that limit freedom of action (such as coordination required with conventional units);

2. Restraints which are prohibited actions (cannot do) (as an example, cross border operations that are prohibited until a certain date); and

3. Other, such as limitations due to terrain, weather, logistics, political, legal, and other considerations.

(d) Review required tasks. Include specified, implied, and essential tasks.

(e) Review required and available assets and capabilities. This includes SOF assets that are required to accomplish possible joint force directed missions.
(f) Review previous IPB products and initial collection plan associated with the target. As early as possible, include support required beyond that of the capability of the JSOTF and identify PIR.

(g) Review risks to SOF.

1. Identify and assess risks that the JFC is willing to take to accomplish the mission, address SOF force protection issues, and assess time available as determined by JFC imposed limitations.

2. Estimate risk of collateral damage to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities, and visibility of mission forces for possible detection.

3. Compare the value of the missions to the possible loss of SOF and the negative impact to the nation or the theater campaign.

4. Consider not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

5. Assess the risk of failure due to possible inadequate preparation, incorrect intelligence estimates, and time to obtain support from non-SOF assets.

(h) Review mission success criteria. State the criteria to measure progress and success in terms that are quantifiable and realistic. Ensure that specified targeting effects can be achieved.

2) Develop, Analyze, Compare, and Recommend SOF COAs. This step is dependent on time available. COAs can be as simple as force options, or more complex and detailed. Specifically, the JSOTF should develop COAs to support the joint force as a whole. These COAs identify/confirm:

(a) Who (type of SOF) will execute the task.

(b) What type of SO mission, action, or task is contemplated.

(c) Where the mission will occur.

(d) Why each element of the force will conduct its part of the operation.

(e) How the JSOTF will employ available SOF.

(f) COAs are analyzed to identify strengths and weaknesses and further identify many of the elements of execution planning for each COA. Friendly COAs are then compared to reveal which COA has the highest probability of success. The end product of this step is a
recommendation to the COMJSOTF on a COA for the various types of missions the joint force has assigned the JSOTF.

4. Special Operations Execution Phase Mission Planning

The process for SO execution phase mission planning is a dynamic, interactive process (see Figure IV-5). It requires continual coordination and communications among the joint force, JSOTF, and other components of the joint force. Collaborative planning can be of immense value during CAP.

a. Requests for Support. Requests for support (which include, but are not limited to, targets for SOF) can come from a variety of sources. Among these are the joint force HQ (elements such as the JTCB and JPG); the joint force components; JSOTF components; and multinational forces. These requests, depending on command relationships and mission approval
levels already established, may come from a supported command direct to the JSOTF or may go through the joint force to the JSOTF.

b. **Conducts FA.** The JSOTF conducts a FA to provide an initial determination of the viability of a proposed mission/target for SOF employment. It is an abbreviated version of mission analysis, and COA development, analysis, and selection. It essentially answers the following SO criteria questions of: Is it an appropriate SOF mission? Does it support the JFC’s mission and intent? Is it operationally feasible? Are required resources available? Does the expected outcome justify the risk? See Appendix D, “Special Operations Feasibility Assessment.”

c. **Submit FA to Joint Force.** Submission of the FA to the joint force provides the JFC with an assessment of SOF ability to accomplish specific requests for support.

d. **Provide WARNORD to Subordinates.** The components should be informed early on if a mission is likely to be tasked. Critical intelligence products should be pushed to the MPA at this point. This provides the components with more time to begin their mission planning. This step is not necessary if the FA determines that the “SOF mission criteria” are not sufficiently satisfied for execution by SOF.

e. **Provide Input for Developing the Joint Force FRAGORD.** The JSOTF JPG should be coordinating with the joint force JPG (through the JSOTF LNO or other means) to provide input to the joint force for development of the joint force FRAGORD that tasks the JSOTF for the mission.

f. **Develop the JSOTF’s FRAGORD.** Once the joint force FRAGORD has been sent to the JSOTF, the JPG reviews it to confirm and/or update the information that was developed during the FA. In some instances, a verbal WARNORD or FRAGORD may be the JSOTF’s first indication of a mission. In this case the JPG will have to conduct a rapid and abbreviated mission analysis and COA selection process.

   (1) **Confirm or Conduct Mission Analysis.** This is the same process as discussed in the FA, but the COMJSOTF must now select the most feasible COA.

   (2) **Confirm and Conduct COA Selection.** This is also the same process as discussed in the FA.

   (3) **Confirm and Identify MPA.** Ideally, the MPA has been identified and given a WARNORD during the FA phase. However, this may not be possible in all instances therefore this step formally designates the MPA. At this point, push intelligence products to the MPA and coordinate TIP production.

   (4) **Allocate Resources.** If necessary, the COMJSOTF provides direction and assistance on the identification and coordination for additional resources that may be necessary for the MPA to conduct the mission. The COMJSOTF must identify to the JFC those specific support requirements.
(5) **Identify Supporting Components.** In most missions, the MPA will require assistance from supporting commands and components. The type of support (direct, mutual, general, or close) should be specified. In addition, the JSOTF (as the directing HQ for the support arrangement) should provide the following information when establishing support command relationships in an establishing directive:

(a) Specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

(b) Forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.

(c) Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.

(d) Priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.

(e) Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

(f) Degree of authority granted to the supported commander (the MPA) over the supporting effort.

(6) **Confirm and Identify Intelligence Requirements**

(7) **Confirm and Identify ROE Requirements**

(8) **Identify Supporting Plans.** There may be instances where the JSOTF/MPA will be the supporting command. In these cases, the plans of the supported unit need to be identified and reviewed. This may also occur when the JSOTF is conducting a transition (or handover) to or from another command.

(9) **Identify Mission Approval Authority.** Clearly identify mission approval authorities for each mission.

(10) **Write and Transmit the FRAGORD.** The FRAGORD designates the MPA and supporting agencies; identifies specific taskings, planning timelines, and CONOPS requirements; grants direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH); and sometimes establishes the earliest anticipated launch time. Acknowledgment of the FRAGORD is required.

g. **MPA Develops CONOPS and Support Requests**

(1) **CONOPS Requirements.** The COMJSOTF should clearly specify the requirements for the MPA in submitting the CONOPS for approval in accordance with the JSOTF standing operating procedure or as stated in the FRAGORD. Among those items that
should be included in the CONOPS are the situation, mission (restated MPA mission), and execution (CONOPS, subordinate unit tasks, coordination, and operational limitations).

(2) Mission Support Requests

(a) Support request (SPTREQ). For initial support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time that the MPA sends the CONOPS message. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF (such as submarine and naval surface fire) the SPTREQ is sent only to the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may grant liaison between SOF components and components of the joint force. The SPTREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional SPTREQs as planning continues. For follow-on support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ for action and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting follow-on support for a team already on a mission. The SPTREQ should be submitted as soon as possible.

(b) Air support request (AIRSUPREQ). For initial support, the AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions. The MPA submits an AIRSUPREQ to the appropriate supporting joint force air component HQ and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time the MPA sends the CONOPS. The JSOTF may grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the joint force. The AIRSUPREQ should list all MPA air support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional AIRSUPREQs as planning continues. Immediate close air support requests should be submitted using the joint tactical air strike request per JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). Requests should be submitted through the JSOTF to deconflict fire support assets and expedite tasking to preplanned or alert close air support assets. SOF LNOs and coordination elements should be aware of mission coordination in progress.

(c) Airspace Control Means Request. It is used to request that a defined block of airspace be designated as having special significance for air operations within an AOR. These areas include drop zones (DZs), ground free-fire zones, landing zones (LZs), pickup points, restrictive fire plans, designated areas of recovery, selected areas for evasion (SAFEs), and potential evasion locale. These zones may be defined as a circle around a central point, a corridor centered on a line, an area bounded by line segments, or airspace bounded by attitude. This request is submitted to the joint special operations air component who will forward them to the SOLE to enter into the airspace control order (ACO).

(d) MSR confirmations. Prior to mission execution, the supporting SOF components send support confirmations in response to the support requests, or request confirmations in response to the AIRSUPREQs to the MPA with information copies provided to the JSOTF.
h. CONOPS Approval

(1) **COMJSOTF Has Mission Approval Authority.** If the COMJSOTF has approval authority for execution of the mission, a JSOTF CONOPS is not submitted to the joint force. Once the COMJSOTF is satisfied with the MPA’s CONOPS, the JSOTF sends a CONOPS approval to the MPA and supporting components. Approval is sent as soon as possible after receipt of the MPA’s CONOPS.

(2) **COMJSOTF Does Not Have Mission Approval Authority.** If the COMJSOTF does not have approval authority for the mission, a JSOTF CONOPS is sent to the JFC for approval.

i. **Monitor Other Support Plans.** There could be instances where commands or agencies, either within or outside the joint force, could provide support or follow-on actions to the JSOTF. The JSOTF should monitor the planning activities and coordinate actions to ensure unity of effort. Some examples of such efforts include the following:

(1) **Mission/Target Handover.** The JSOTF could handover a mission or target to another joint force component, another USG agency, or even another nation’s forces. JSOTF forces could be hampered in the handover if the incoming unit has not properly prepared for the actions.

(2) **Joint Air Operations.** The JFSOCC/JSOTF will monitor the ATO and ACO to ensure that support and deconfliction are provided as requested. The SOLE integrates all SOF air and surface activity into the JFACC’s ATO.

j. **Mission Backbriefs.** Mission backbriefs are briefings by subordinate commanders to the mission approving authority (the COMJSOTF or JFC) explaining how the SOF operational element intends to accomplish the assigned mission. Representatives from the JSOTF JPG and JOC should attend the backbrief if at all possible. At this point planning has not ended and changes can still be made to the plan.

(1) The major benefits of backbriefs are that they allow the approving commander to:

(a) Clarify the commander’s intent.
(b) Identify and emphasize the commander’s critical information requirements.

(c) Understand problems that the MPA may be having in planning the mission.

(d) Understand the MPA’s CONOPS.

(e) Modify and/or approve the MPA’s CONOPS.

(2) The approving commander should expect the following from the MPA:

(a) Information concerning the MPA’s assumptions, task organization, mission statement, commander’s intent, CONOPS, threat assessment, and risk.

(b) Discussion of any issue that needs clarification.

(c) Requests for support and assistance in resolving issues.

k. Plans Handover Procedures. At some point prior to mission execution, the JSOTF’s planning effort should be handed over to the JOC for execution. This handover should be a formal process in which the JPG ensures that the JOC personnel are thoroughly familiar with the plan. The plans handover briefing should include the following:

(1) Situation. Include the general situation, target and mission description, and threat assessment.
(2) **Mission.** Include specified and implied tasks, and expected results of action taken in as specific terms as possible.

(3) **Task Organization.** Identify SOF operational elements. Include support and logistic elements as required.

(4) **CONOPS.** Include infiltration plan, actions on the objective, exfiltration plan, fire support plan, and emergency action plan.

(5) **Other.** Include limitations, ROE, support plans, status of support requests, status of the TIP, and command and signal.

1. **Requests for Execution and Execute Order (EXORD).** The MPA requests authority for mission execution (verbal or via message/e-mail). If the COMJSOTF has mission execution authority, approval is granted through an EXORD. If the JFC (or higher level of command) has execution authority, the COMJSOTF prepares a request for execution and submits it to the JFC. The higher authority provides an EXORD and the COMJSOTF subsequently issues an EXORD to the MPA and supporting commands.

   m. **Operation Summary (OPSUM).** Once the mission is complete, the MPA submits an OPSUM to the COMJSOTF.
APPENDIX A
TARGET ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

1. Target Analysis

Target analysis is the detailed examination of potential targets to determine their military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and lethal or nonlethal weapons required to attain a specified effect. It is a systematic approach to establishing the adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. This is accomplished through the methodical examination of all information pertaining to a given target. The target analyst must determine a given target’s vulnerability to attack, examine down-time and destructive effects, and determine how to satisfy the commander’s objective or success criteria specified in the MTP (during deliberate planning) or in the request for support or FRAGORD (during execution phase planning).

2. Targeting Analysis Focus

a. SOC planners, JSOTF planners, and MPAs all conduct target analysis; however, the focus of the analysis differs at each level. SOC planners focus on the strategic and operational levels while most JSOTFs evaluate targets from an operational and tactical perspective. The components of the JSOTF that are designated as the MPAs focus on the tactical level (see Figure A-1).

![Figure A-1. Targeting Analysis Focus](image-url)
b. At the strategic level, the analyst determines which target system to attack. For example, the strategic analyst may determine that disabling the power system in a country would cause factories to close thereby undermining economic stability. At the operational level, the analyst determines which sub-system to attack. For instance, the operational level analysis might reveal that disabling a particular power plant would lead to failure of the entire power system or grid in the country or JOA. At the tactical level, the analyst determines which particular component of a target or node should be attacked to achieve the desired effect. In this case, a tactical analyst might determine that disabling a particular turbine or boiler would result in disabling the targeted power plant. A target can consist of a target system, subsystem, complex, component, or critical damage point or node.

c. Generally the SOC staff conducts analysis at the strategic and operational level during deliberate planning while determining how to support the geographic combatant commander’s strategic objectives. The JSOTF conducts analysis at the operational level during CAP execution phase planning when determining how to satisfy joint force objectives. The JSOTF should also consider the tactical level of analysis, but not dictate to the MPA how to attack the target. The JSOTF should understand the intelligence and operational information requirements of the MPA and facilitate quick, collaborative FAs and planning by requesting and “pushing” that required information to the MPA. The MPA will conduct tactical level analysis during both deliberate or execution phase planning.

d. Once the systems, complex, or subsystems have been selected, the analyst must develop concrete evaluation criteria. If loss of a component results in an immediate halt of output, then that component is very critical. If loss of the component results in a halt of output, but only after several days or weeks, then that component is less critical. Similarly, a percentage of output curtailed might be used as the evaluation criterion. Utilizing the factors of criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) is a simple method used by SOF commanders and their staffs during target analysis to evaluate the relative merit of striking a target under consideration.

3. **CARVER Evaluation Criteria**

Once all the evaluation criteria have been established, the SOF analyst uses a numerical rating system (1 to 5) to rank order the CARVER factors for each potential target. In a one to five numbering system, a score of five would indicate a very desirable rating (from the attacker’s perspective) while a score of one would reflect an undesirable rating. A notional CARVER value rating scale is shown in Figure A-2. The analyst must tailor the criteria and rating scheme to suit the particular strategic, operational, or tactical situation.

a. **Criticality.** Criticality or target value is the primary consideration in targeting. Criticality is related to how much a target’s destruction, denial, disruption, and damage will impair the adversary’s political, economic, or military operations, or how much a target component will disrupt the function of a target complex. In determining criticality, individual targets within a target system must be analyzed with relation to the other elements critical to the function of the target system or complex. Critical targets may also be selected for SR missions.
### CARVER VALUE RATING SCALE (NOTIONAL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Loss would be mission stopper</td>
<td>Easily accessible. Away from security</td>
<td>Extremely difficult to replace. Long down time (1 year)</td>
<td>Special operations forces definitely have the means and expertise to attack</td>
<td>Favorable sociological impact. OK impact on civilians</td>
<td>Easily recognized by all with no confusion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Loss would reduce mission performance considerably</td>
<td>Easily accessible outside</td>
<td>Difficult to replace with long down (&lt;1 year)</td>
<td>Special operations forces probably have the means and expertise</td>
<td>Favorable impact; no adverse impact on civilians</td>
<td>Easily recognized by most, with little confusion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Loss would reduce mission performance</td>
<td>Accessible</td>
<td>Can be replaced in a relatively short time (months)</td>
<td>Special operations forces may have the means and expertise to attack</td>
<td>Favorable impact; some adverse impact on civilians</td>
<td>Recognized with some training</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Loss may reduce mission performances</td>
<td>Difficult to gain access</td>
<td>Easily replaced in a short time (weeks)</td>
<td>Special operations forces probably have no impact</td>
<td>No impact. Adverse impact on civilians</td>
<td>Hard to recognize. Confusion probable</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Loss would not affect mission performance</td>
<td>Very difficult to gain access</td>
<td>Easily replaced in short time (days)</td>
<td>Special operations forces do not have much capability to attack</td>
<td>Unfavorable impact. Assured adverse impact on civilians</td>
<td>Extremely difficult to recognize without extensive orientation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For specific targets, more precise, target-related data can be developed for each element in the matrix.

**Figure A-2. CARVER Value Rating Scale (Notional)**
b. **Accessibility.** In order to damage, destroy, disrupt, deny, or collect data on a target, SOF must be able to reach it with the necessary equipment, either physically or via indirect means. During SR missions, SOF not only must observe the target, but also must remain in the area undetected for extended periods of time. The SOF unit also must be able to safely exfiltrate once the mission is complete. Weather, light data, physical security measures, and the adversary disposition at the target area are all considered. Sometimes, accessibility is judged as either feasible or infeasible.

c. **Recuperability.** In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how long it will take the adversary to repair, replace, or bypass the damage inflicted on a target. Primary considerations are spare parts availability and the ability to reroute production. A target is not a valid SOF target if it can be repaired or bypassed in a short amount of time or with minimal resources.

d. **Vulnerability.** A target is vulnerable if SOF has the means and expertise to attack it. At the strategic level, a much broader range of resources and technology is available to conduct the target attack. At the tactical level, resources may be limited to organic personnel, weapons, and munitions or assets that can be attached, borrowed or improvised.

e. **Effect.** The target should be attacked only if the desired military effects can be achieved. These effects may be of a military, political, economic, informational, or psychological nature. The effect on the populace is viewed in terms of alienating the local inhabitants, strengthening the resistance movement, or triggering reprisals against the indigenous people in the immediate target area. The effect on the populace may also impact on the detachment’s infiltration, exfiltration, and evasion and recovery (E&R) routes. Collateral damage must also be calculated and weighed against the expected military benefit to determine if an attack would be advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage includes, but is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic impacts of the proposed attack.

f. **Recognizability.** The target must be identifiable under various weather, light and seasonal conditions without being confused with other targets or target components. Sufficient data must also be available for SOF to find the target on the ground and to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The same requirement exists to distinguish target critical damage points and target stress points from similar components and their parent structures and surroundings. SOF also should be able to recognize appropriate computer programs, communications circuits, or similar targets of IO missions.

4. **Strategic CARVER Evaluation Criteria**

The purpose of strategic target analysis is to determine the critical systems or sub-systems that must be attacked to progressively destroy or degrade the adversary’s warfighting capacity and will to fight. Strategic operations are designed to have long-range, rather than immediate, impact on the adversary and its military forces. For strategic level analysis, list the adversary’s systems or subsystems (examples are electric, power, and rail facilities). The result of strategic target analysis, as well as any additional guidance received from the President and Secretary of
Defense, determines priorities as to which system and/or sub-system will be targeted (see Figure A-3).

5. Operational CARVER Evaluation Criteria

The purpose of operational target analysis is to determine the critical subsystem or target complex within the strategically critical system for interdiction (see Figure A-4).

6. Tactical CARVER Evaluation Criteria

The purpose of tactical target analysis is to determine the military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired effect on a target or set of targets within a target system in order to obtain a desired effect on a node or component of a target. For tactical level analysis, list the complexes or components of the subsystems or complexes selected for attack (see Figure A-5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET SYSTEMS</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulk Electric Power</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk Petroleum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Systems</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports and Waterways</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Networks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates target systems suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric Power target system has been selected.

Figure A-3. Sample Strategic CARVER Matrix Application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET SUB-SYSTEMS</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates target sub-systems suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric/Generation sub-system has been selected.

Figure A-4. Sample Operational CARVER Matrix Application
### SAMPLE TACTICAL CARVER MATRIX APPLICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET COMPONENT</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Intake</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Filters and Pumps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ion Filter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-heater and Pumps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Intake</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blowers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docks and Oil Pumps</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage Tanks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-heaters and Pumps</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fuel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiler</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbine/Generator</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power lines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switching station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates target components suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric /Generation/ Turbine target has been selected.

Figure A-5. Sample Tactical CARVER Matrix Application
APPENDIX B
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER FORMATS

The two types of SOMPF formats are for deliberate planning and CAP. The formats are as follows:

1. Deliberate Planning Format (used by the theater SOC)
   I. MISSION TASKING PACKAGE.
   II. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT (with supporting INITIAL ASSESSMENT).
   III. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE.
   IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
   V. MISSION SUPPORT PLANS.

2. CAP Format (used by a JSOTF during CAP and execution):
   I. REQUEST FOR SUPPORT.
   II. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE (as available).
   III. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT.
   IV. WARNING ORDER (if necessary).
   V. JFC FRAGMENTARY ORDER.
   VI. COMJSOTF FRAGMENTARY ORDER.
   VII. MISSION PLANNING AGENT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
   VIII. MISSION SUPPORT REQUESTS.
   IX. COMJSOTF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (if required based on mission approval level).
   X. JFC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL (if required based on mission approval level).
   XI. COMJSOTF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL.
   XII. MISSION PLANNING AGENT MISSION BACKBRIEF (if required).
Appendix B

XIII. COMJSOTF REQUEST FOR EXECUTE ORDER (if required based on mission approval level).

XIV. JFC EXECUTE ORDER (if required based on mission approval level).

XV. COMJSOTF EXECUTE ORDER.

XVI. MISSION EXECUTION INFORMATION.

XVII. OPERATION SUMMARY.

XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS.
APPENDIX C
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

The MTP provides documentation and guidance provided by the COMJSOTF to the MPA that provides basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and administrative framework within which a given SOF target is planned.

SECTION I: Tasking and Transmittal Documents

A. Tasking to COMJSOTF.

B. Subordinate tasking from COMJSOTF.

C. Coordinating instructions or DIRLAUTH.

SECTION II: Target Identification Data

A. Name.

B. BE number (or other distinguishing identification if BE number does not apply).

C. Mission number (if applicable).

D. Mission tasks.

E. Functional classification code.

F. Country.

G. JSOA coordinates (geographic reference [GEOREF] and universal transverse mercator [UTM]).

H. Geographic coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).

I. General description and target significance.

SECTION III: JFC Mission Guidance (JFC’s Mission Statement, Objectives, and Intent)

A. Mission statement.

B. Specific targeting objectives.

C. Commander’s intent.
Appendix C

D. C2.

E. ROE.

SECTION IV: Record of Changes

SECTION V: Record of Distribution
APPENDIX D
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

The FA is an initial determination of the viability of a proposed mission/target for SOF employment. It essentially answers the SOF operational mission criteria questions: **Is it an appropriate SOF mission?** **Does it support the JFC’s operation plans?** **Is it operationally feasible?** **Are required resources available?** **Does the expected outcome justify the risk?** The method used to answer the above questions is an abbreviated version of mission analysis and COA development, analysis, and selection. The process steps are as described below:

1. **Initiate SOMPF** (see Appendix B, “Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Formats”)

2. **Conduct Mission Analysis**
   a. **Review the Request for Support**
      (1) Who is asking for support?
      (2) What are they asking for?
      (3) When is the support requested?
      (4) Where is support required?
      (5) Why are they asking for support?
   b. **Assess Threat/Target Situation**
      (1) Review target IPB products.
      (2) Conduct detailed target analysis. Use of the CARVER methodology may assist in conducting the analysis.
      (3) Analyze the threat en route to the target, at the target location, and along egress routes.
      (4) Evaluate the adversary’s most dangerous COA and threats or contingencies not only at the target but also during ingress and egress.
   c. **Determine Known Facts.** Describe the friendly situation. Determine known facts. This determination should:
      (1) Describe the friendly situation of the joint force, JSOTF, components, and other requesting commands;
(2) Describe how this mission relates to the requester’s situation; and

(3) Describe other facts that may impact on the feasibility of the mission.

d. **Develop Assumptions.** Assumptions replace necessary, but unknown facts. Assumptions must be valid and necessary for planning to continue. Consider support from other government agencies (such as for obtaining overflight rights); ROE changes if required; availability of forces; and political considerations on the mission.

e. **Determine Limitations.** Restrictions that are placed on the JSOTF can include:

   (1) Constraints. Required actions (must do) that limit freedom of action (such as coordination required with conventional units).

   (2) Restraints. Prohibited actions (cannot do) (as an example, cross border operations that are prohibited until a certain date).

   (3) Other. Limitations due to terrain, weather, logistics, political, and other considerations.

f. **Identify Required Tasks**

   (1) Identify Specified Tasks (any task specified in the support request).

   (2) Identify Implied Tasks (tasks not specifically assigned but must be accomplished to perform the mission).

   (3) Identify Essential Tasks (from those listed above, the tasks that define success).

g. **Identify Required and Available Assets and Capabilities.** These include SOF assets required to perform the mission that will be available for mission planning and execution, as well as any deltas in the requirements.

h. **Identify Intelligence Requirements.** As early as possible, the JSOTF and components identify intelligence requirements through collaborative planning. Intelligence requirements that are vital to mission accomplishment are recommended to the COMJSOTF as PIR. If the mission is feasible and intelligence does not exist to answer the requirements at the JSOTF level, PIR are submitted either as RFIs or collection requirements to the joint force.

i. **Assess Risks to SOF**

   (1) Identify and assess risks associated with the mission (risks the JFC is willing to take for mission accomplishment, such as forward presence versus risk of provocation); force protection issues (such as high risk of significant casualties, medium risk of fratricide, low risk
of terrorist activities, threat to own COGs, and other risks as determined); and time available as provided by JFC imposed limitations.

(2) The JFC may state or imply acceptable risk (as examples, it could be addressed in the JFC’s intent, CONOPS, or as additional guidance).

(3) Estimate risk of collateral damage to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities.

(4) Compare the value of the target to the possible loss of the force and the negative impact to the nation or the theater campaign.

(5) Take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

(6) Assess the risk of failure due to possible inadequate preparation time.

j. **Determine Success Criteria.** State the criteria to measure progress and success. How much (to what degree) do we want to affect adversary activity? The criteria should use quantifiable terms and be realistic. Targeting effects are:

(1) Delay: Slow down the arrival of a unit.

(2) Disrupt: To break apart, disturb, or interrupt a function.

(3) Divert: Divert means to restrict the adversary’s capabilities to pursue a particular COA.

(4) Destroy: Damage to a target so that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition.

(5) Deny: Hinder the adversary’s use of space, personnel, or facilities.

(6) Observe/Collect: Provide timely, relevant and accurate information. State the criteria to measure progress and success in terms that are quantifiable and realistic. Ensure that specified targeting effects can be achieved.

3. **Develop, Analyze, Compare, and Recommend COAs**

a. Develop the COA as a broad statement of possible ways the JSOTF can accomplish the mission. COAs can be as simple as force options, or much more complex and detailed. This depends on the type of mission, the expected MPA, and time available. COAs should answer the following six questions:

(1) **WHO** (type of forces) will execute the tasks?
Appendix D

(2) WHAT type of action or task is contemplated?

(3) WHEN will the task begin?

(4) WHERE will the task occur?

(5) WHY (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?

(6) HOW will the JSOTF employ the available forces?

b. Analyze COAs to identify strengths and weaknesses and further identify many of the elements of execution planning for each COA. Compare friendly COAs to reveal which COA has the highest probability of success. The end product of this step is a recommendation to the COMJSOTF on a COA.

4. Assess SO Operational Criteria

The purpose of the feasibility assessment is to answer the following questions:

a. Is it an appropriate SO mission?

b. Does it support the JFC’s operational plans?

c. Is it operationally feasible?

d. Are required resources available?

e. Does the expected outcome justify the risk?
APPENDIX E
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INITIAL ASSESSMENT
(Include fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, subsurface and airborne platforms)

The IA provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed SOF mission.

SECTION I: Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, or other distinguishing means)

SECTION II: Assumptions

SECTION III: Mission Data

A. Launch base(s), ISBs, and recovery base(s).

B. LZs, DZs, seaward launch point(s) (SLPs), beach landing site(s) (BLSs), recovery zone(s) (RZs), and seaward recovery point(s) (SRPs).

C. Abort and emergency divert base(s).

D. Air refueling track(s) and forward arming and refueling point(s) (FARPs).

E. Flight and seaward approach routes.
   1. Ingress.
   2. Egress.
   3. Orbiting and holding.

F. Range factors.

G. Time factors.

H. Route factors.

I. Refueling factors.

J. Crew factors.

K. Weather.
SECTION IV: Mission Assessment

A. Threat.
   1. Air defenses.
   2. Deception of air defenses.
   3. Surface and/or subsurface water defenses.

B. Probability of team insertion.

C. Probability of team resupply.

D. Probability of team extraction.

E. Overall probability of mission success.

F. Other factors.

SECTION V: Limiting Factors

A. Intelligence.

B. Weather.

C. Terrain and hydrography.

D. Equipment.

E. Munitions.

F. Tactics.

G. Logistics (including combat service support).

H. Personnel.

I. Training.

J. Supporting forces.

K. ROE and legal issues.
L. Other factors.

SECTION VI: Supporting Data

A. Photography and imagery requested.

B. Intelligence information requested.

C. Other information as necessary.

SECTION VII: Initial Assessment Board

A. Composition.

B. Recommendation.

(NOTE: Some of the information may not readily be available. Information on hand normally will suffice to conduct the IA. However, all effort should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the IA.)
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APPENDIX F
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

Annex  A  Target Intelligence Package Special Reconnaissance/Direct Attack Missions
        B  Target Intelligence Package Foreign Internal Defense/ Unconventional Warfare Missions
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

As part of the SO mission planning folder, the J-2 is responsible for coordinating with the theater JIC for the production of TIPs. TIPs provide information on target identification, environment, threat, demographics, lines of communications, infiltration/exfiltration routes, survival data, and other intelligence information required for study by the SOF unit assigned the mission. Examples of TIPs for SR/DA and FID/UW missions are provided in Annex A, “Target Intelligence Package Special Reconnaissance/Direct Attack Missions,” and Annex B, “Target Intelligence Package Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare Missions.”
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX F
TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE/
DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS

1. **Target Identification and Description**
   
a. Target identification data.

b. Description and significance.

c. Detailed target description.

d. Target vulnerability assessment.

2. **Natural Environment**
   
a. Geographic data (including terrain, vegetation, and hazards to movement).

b. Meteorological data (climatological overview and tables, illumination data).

c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, luminescence, other).

3. **Threat**
   
a. Ground forces (including border guards).

b. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and security police services).

c. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and maritime border guard).

d. Air forces.

e. Air defense forces (including radar, passive detectors, and command, control, and communications).

f. Electronic order of battle.

 g. Space capabilities (ground stations and their infrastructure, uplinks/downlinks, and space based systems).

h. Other.
4. **Demographics and Cultural Features**
   
a. Area population characteristics.
   
b. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
   
c. Social conditions.
   
d. Religious factors.
   
e. Political characteristics.
   
f. Economic conditions.
   
g. Miscellaneous (such as currency, holidays, dress, customs).

5. **Lines of Communications and Information Systems**
   
a. Airfields.
   
b. Railways.
   
c. Roadways.
   
d. Waterways.
   
e. Ports.
   
f. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
   
g. Power grid.
   
h. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone, other).

6. **Infiltration and Exfiltration**
   
a. Potential LZs, DZs, helicopter landing zones (HLZs), BLSs.
   
b. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.
7. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Data
   a. E&R data and safe areas.
   b. Survival data.
8. Unique Intelligence (Mission specific requirements not covered elsewhere)
9. Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDICES TO THE TIP:

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
APPENDIX C: IMAGERY
APPENDIX D: GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES
APPENDIX E: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) (if applicable)
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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX F
TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE/UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MISSIONS

1. Objective Area Identification and Description
   a. Objective area (OA) identification data.
   b. Description and significance.

2. Natural Environment
   a. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).
   b. Meteorological data (climatological overview tables and illumination data).
   c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, other).
   d. Water sources (color coded overlay).
   e. Flora and fauna (plants and animals of tactical importance).

3. Threat
   a. Objective country (adversary order of battle).
   b. Opposition and resistance forces.

4. Demographics, Cultural, Political, Social Features
   a. PIR must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces.
   b. Area population characteristics (including resistance potential).
   c. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
   d. Social conditions.
   e. Religious factors.
   f. Political characteristics.
   g. Available labor force.
   h. Customs (social, weapons, religion, cultural, mores, other).
i. Medical capabilities.

j. Health and sanitation conditions.

k. Economic conditions.

l. Currency, holidays, dress.

5. **Lines of Communications, Information Systems, and Logistics**

   a. Airfields.

   b. Railways.

   c. Roadways.

   d. Waterways.

   e. Ports.

   f. POL.

   g. Media systems.

   h. Telecommunications capabilities.

   i. Civilian transportation modes.

   j. Power grids.

   k. US provided equipment.

   l. War industries (capabilities).

6. **Infiltration and Exfiltration**

   a. Potential LZs, DZs, HLZs, BLSs.

   b. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

7. **Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Data**

   a. E&R data and safe areas.

   b. Survival data.
8. Unique Intelligence (Mission specific requirements not covered elsewhere)

9. Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDICES TO THE TIP:

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

APPENDIX D: GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES

APPENDIX E: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) (if applicable)
APPENDIX G
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The CONOPS is a detailed plan of precisely how the assigned SOF will carry out the validated assigned mission. This plan, in conjunction with mission rehearsals, is the end result of the targeting and mission planning process. The term also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting organization.

Commander’s Estimate of the Situation

References:

a. Maps and charts

b. Other pertinent documents

SECTION I: Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, or other distinguishing identification means)

SECTION II: The Situation and COAs

A. Considerations affecting the possible COAs.

1. Characteristics of the JSOA.

   a. Military geography.

      (1) Topography.

      (2) Hydrography, luminescence data, other.

      (3) Climate, weather, illumination data, other.

   b. Transportation.

   c. Telecommunications.

   d. Politics.

   e. Economics.
f. Sociology.

g. Science and technology.

2. Relative combat power.

a. Adversary.

(1) Strength.

(2) Composition.

(3) Location and disposition.

(4) Reinforcements.

(5) Logistics.

(6) Time and space factors.

(7) Combat efficiency.

b. Friendly.

(1) Strength.

(2) Composition.

(3) Location and disposition.

(4) Reinforcements.

(5) Friendly force assistance.

(6) Logistics (including combat service support).

(7) Time and space factors.

(8) Combat efficiency.

3. Assumptions.

B. Analysis of adversary capabilities.

C. Comparison of friendly COAs.
1. Statement of COAs.
3. Comparison of COAs.

D. Decision (recommended COA)—mission profile.
   1. Method and location of insertion.
   2. Movement to target area.
   3. Actions at the objective.
   4. Movement to and method of extraction.

SECTION III: Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule.
   1. Preparation/rehearsal.
   2. Insertion/infiltration.
   3. Actions at objective.
   4. Exfiltration/extraction.
   5. Debrief.

B. Logistics (including combat service support).

C. Resupply.

D. Communications and electronics procedures and equipment needs (publish joint communications-electronics operating instructions [JCEOI]).

E. Survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE).

F. Indigenous forces support.

G. Time and distance charts.

H. Deployment.
Appendix G

I. Weaponeering.
J. Target recuperability.
K. Command relationships.
L. OPSEC.
M. PSYOP.
N. Civil Affairs.

SECTION IV: Limiting Factors

A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Equipment.
D. Tactics.
E. Logistics (including combat service support).
F. Personnel.
G. Training.
H. Supporting forces.
I. C4.
J. LOAC, ROE, US law, and legal issues.
K. CI environment.
L. Other factors.
SECTION V: Unsatisfied Requirements

A. Operational.

B. Intelligence.

C. Support.

(Signed)
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)
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MISSION SUPPORT PLANS
(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, and submarines)

Mission support plans complement the CONOPS. The mission support plan is written by the supporting agency that will be tasked to conduct the insertion or exfiltration should the mission be tasked.

SECTION I: Mission

A. Target identification data.

B. Mission statement.

SECTION II: Mission Summary

A. Mission tasking.

B. OA.

C. General concept.

D. Summary of limiting factors.

E. Probability of mission success.

SECTION III: Assumptions

SECTION IV: Threat Assessment

SECTION V: Navigation and Overall Mission Portrayal

NOTE: This represents the entire infiltration and exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart annotating all information deemed necessary by the planning cell for portrayal of the mission. This should include, but is not limited to, the following:

A. Launch base(s).

B. ISB(s).

C. LZ(s), DZ(s), RZ(s), SLP(s), BLS(s), and SRP(s).

D. Recovery base(s).

E. Abort and/or emergency divert base(s).
F. Air refueling track(s) and FARPs.

G. Routes.
   1. Ingress.
   2. Egress.
   3. Orbiting and holding.
   4. Safe passage procedures.
   5. Strip charts, navigation logs, global positioning satellite receivers, and other aids (as required).

SECTION VI: Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule of events.

B. Prelaunch requirements.
   1. Updates to orders of battle.
   2. PIR.
   3. Problem areas and key factors.

C. Insert and extract platform(s) factors and logistic considerations.

D. C4.
   2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).
   3. Communications equipment requirements.
      a. Insertion and extraction platform(s).
      b. SOC/JSOTF.
   4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.
   5. Radio silence areas.
6. Go and/or no-go point.

7. Publish JCEOI for air mission.

8. Deception.

E. Emergency procedures.

1. Engine-out capability.

2. Weather.

3. Faulty intelligence.

4. Insertion and extraction platform(s) abort procedures.
   a. Late departure procedures.
   b. Maintenance problems.
   c. Battle damage.
   d. Platform destruction.
   e. Bump plan.

5. Drop tank or other fuel-related malfunctions.

6. Lost communications procedures.


F. Evasion plan of action.

1. Crew/embarked personnel responsibilities.

2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailout.

3. Evasion movement.

4. SAFE area intelligence descriptions.

5. SAFE.

6. Evasion team communications.
7. Search and rescue contact procedures.

SECTION VII: Limiting Factors

A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Equipment.
D. Munitions.
E. Tactics.
F. Logistics (including combat service support and hazardous material).
G. Personnel.
H. Training.
I. Supporting forces.
J. ROE and legal issues.
K. CI environment.
L. Other Factors.

SECTION VIII: SO Aviation, Surface Ship, and Submarine Requirements for JSOTF Components to Conduct IAs

A. Target coordinates.
B. Maximum and minimum distances the LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, and SRPs can be from the target.
C. Time frame in OPLAN or CONPLAN scenario.
D. Desired launch and recovery base(s).
E. Type of delivery or recovery required (e.g., airdrop, airland, fast rope, sea-air-land team delivery vehicle, combat rubber raiding craft), and platform preferred.
F. Number of personnel to be transferred and approximate weight per person.
G. Approximate size and weight of additional equipment.

H. Type and quantity of hazardous material (such as gasoline, lithium batteries).

I. Assumptions made during supported unit’s FA and CONOPS.

J. Desired time over target.

K. Resupply and/or extraction requirements.

(NOTE: Some of the information may not be readily available. Information in hand normally will suffice to conduct the CONOPS. However, all efforts should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the CONOPS.)
APPENDIX J
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: MISSIONS

Annex  A  Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions
         B  Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: MISSIONS

PIR provide SOF with the critical items of information regarding the adversary and environment for particular SO missions. PIR are required by the COMJSOTF, JSOTF component commanders, and operational element commanders by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. This appendix provides PIR requirements for DA and SR in Annex A, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions,” and requirements for FID and UW in Annex B, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare.”
NOTES:

1. PIR coding for FA, TIP and ISOLATION (ISO) planning steps. Alpha code: “D”=DA MISSIONS; “S”=SR MISSIONS; “B”=BOTH. Numeric coding: Priority “1”=ESSENTIAL; “2”=MISSION ENHANCING

2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.

3. Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection; annotate TIP with collection request date, number, and agency.

4. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Target Identification and Description

FA TIP ISO

A. Target identification data.

B1 — — 1. Target name.


B1 — — 3. BE number.

B1 — — 4. Target coordinates: give geographic, source, datum, UTM, and graphic reference(s).

B1 — — 5. Special operations aviation coordinates.

B1 — — 6. Category code.

B1 — — 7. SAFE area number.


B. Description and significance.

B1 — — Reference MTP SECTION II:1.
C. Detailed target description.

— B1 — 1. Physical layout or functional organization.

— B1 — a. Description.

— B1 — b. Layout of structures and areas.
   Annotated photo or line drawing.

— B1 — c. Key component list (see Section C5 that follows for details).

   (1) First component.

   (a) Critical damage point.

       1. Stress point.

       2. Stress point.

   (b) Critical damage point.

   (2) Second component.

— S1 — 2. Line-of-sight study (if required by the mission type or specified by the MTP or FA).

— B1 — 3. Primary and alternate power sources.

— B1 — a. Number.

— B1 — b. Type.

— B1 — c. Location.

— B1 — d. Conduits.

— B1 — (1) Location (power lines, communications cables, relationships).

— B1 — (2) Type (color, construction, diameter, thickness).

— B1 — e. Associated facilities (transformers, switches, yards, relays, spares).
Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions

— B1 — f. Fuel supply.

— B1 — (1) Location (above, partially below, or below ground; containers types).

— B1 — (2) Type fuel(s).

— B1 — 4. Communications associated with the target.

— B1 — a. Type (telephone [land line/cell], radios (frequency modulation/amplitude modulation/high frequency/ultra high frequency), satellite communications (SATCOM) voice/Morse code, data facsimile).

— B1 — (1) Methods and procedures for securing communications (scrambling, frequency jumping, one-time pads, brevity codes).

— B1 — (2) Visual signals (smoke, panels, flags).

— B1 — (3) Noise (rifle shots, klaxons, sirens).

— B1 — (4) Country of origin, year manufactured, model.

— B1 — (5) Number and type of antennas.

— B1 — b. Number (by type).

— B1 — c. Location.

— B1 — d. Associated facilities (link sites, switch centers, repair centers).

— B1 — (1) Power supply.

— B1 — (2) Switchboards and rerouting centers.

— B1 — (3) Antenna array.

— B1 — (4) Cables and number and location of personnel.

— D1 — 5. Components, critical damage points and stress points. Support to CARVER. The piece of equipment, portion of bridge, building, section of power line, staff member that, if destroyed, killed, or captured, will result in the
inability of the target to function.
First component: 1. Name (list each component separately with all items in subparagraph a and b below).
Second component: 2. Name (list each component separately with all items in paragraph a and b below)
(continue listing components as needed).

— B1 — a. Physical structure (equipment, machinery, room. Annotated photograph, sketch, floor plan, diagram).

— D1 — (1) Dimensions (length, width, height, separation).

— D1 — (2) Construction materials (masonry wood).

— D1 — b. Critical damage points — one (list each critical damage point separately with each item below).

— D1 — (1) Type (provide damage point and parent structure).

— D1 — (2) Location (be as specific as possible).

— D1 — (3) Dimensions.

— D1 — (4) Construction material (type, thickness).

— D1 — (5) First stress point (second stress point is [5b]. List each stress point separately with 6, 7, and 8 below).

— D1 — (6) Criticality (destruction or damage will have significant influence on target function).

— D1 — (7) Accessibility (ability to each point either physically or by indirect fire weapons).

— D1 — (8) Recuperability (time to replace, repair, or bypass and return to normal operations).

— D1 — (9) Vulnerability (means and expertise to conduct mission and achieve desired level of damage).

— D1 — (10) Effect (possible political, economic, or sociological impact of damage or destruction or the target on the populace).
6. On-site security.

- **B1**
  a. Location (guard posts, bunkers, trenches, security force barracks, motor pools). Annotated photo, sketch.

- **B2**
  b. Security procedures.

  - **B1**
    (1) Patrols.

  - **B2**
    (a) Type (air, ground — on foot or in vehicle, surface, subsurface).

  - **B2**
    (b) Frequency and pattern (route, timing).

  - **B2**
    (c) Size.

  - **B2**
    (d) Armament.

  - **B2**
    (2) Lighting (power source and location).

  - **D2**
    (3) Detection systems (perimeter barriers, fences, buildings, extent and integration of defenses).

  - **D2**
    (a) Overhead cameras.

  - **D2**
    (b) Ground (seismic, infrared, motion, and metallic).

  - **D2**
    (c) Water alarms.

  - **D2**
    (d) Electromagnetic (frequency spectrum).

  - **D2**
    (4) Barrier and obstacles (height, width, depth, special features — electrification, booby traps, detection devices. Include intentional barbed wire and incidental telephone poles).

  - **D2**
    (5) Entry, internal procedures (keys, cipher locks using cards or numbers, personnel, vehicle badges, decals, and colors).
c. Military or internal security facilities and forces.

(1) Location (coordinates of units that could interfere with operations).

(2) Types of forces (garrison, artillery, surface-to-air missile [SAM], antiaircraft artillery [AAA], paramilitary, bandit).

(3) Strength (table of organization and equipment [TO&E] strength).

(4) Weapons (type, number, location).

(5) Ammunition (type, number, location).

(6) Communications (type, number, frequency).

(a) Connectivity with target.

(b) Location of links and conduits (telephone switch points, microwave towers, radio relay sites).

(7) Alternate means of communication.

(a) Number, type, location.

(b) Interruption alarms.

(8) Organic and available transport.

(a) Type (vehicles, helicopters, civilian and military, maintenance).

(b) Number.

(9) Fuel supply.

(a) Type (diesel, gasoline, water-driven turbine).

(b) Location (source, tankers).

(c) Access (hydrant, hose, hand pump).
Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions

— B2 B2 (d) Storage (tanks, barrels, above ground, underground [depth]).


— D2 D1 8. Target site alert procedures.

— D2 D1 a. Security procedures.

— D2 D1 b. Changes in procedures and posture (more guards at gates, entrances, in towers, emplacements, entrenching, barbed wire, obstacles).

— D2 D1 9. Adversary reaction capability.

— D2 D1 a. Dedicated (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time).

— D2 D1 b. Incidental (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time).

— B1 10. Latest target and target area intelligence (examples: updated order of battle, target status, SERE and SAFE areas).


SECTION II: Natural Environment

FA TIP ISO

A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).

— B1 — 1. Geographic terrain features.
Annex A to Appendix J

— B1 — a. Natural obstacles.

— B1 — b. Manmade obstacles.

— B2 B1 2. Avenues of approach (including road, rail, waterway, air. Trace approaches to the target using an overlay or graphic).

— B2 B1 a. Most likely approach to be used by the adversary.

— B2 B1 b. Exploitable approaches to impede reinforcement.


— B2 B1 d. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— B2 B1 e. Fording sites (depth, width, type bottom).


— B2 B1 g. Exploitable civilian transport.

B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data).


— B1 — 2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards).

— B1 — C. Hydrographic data (coastal and otherwise).

— B1 — 1. Tidal activity.


— B1 — 3. Temperatures.

— B1 — 4. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— B1 — 5. Beaches (natural and manmade obstacles).

SECTION III: Threat

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FA</th>
<th>TIP</th>
<th>ISO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>A. Ground forces (including border guards — type, number, NBC capability, night operations).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (type, number, NBC capability, night operations).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>C. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guards — type, number, NBC capability, night operations).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>D. Air forces (type, number, NBC capability, night operations).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>E. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, passive detectors — type, numbers).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>F. Electronic order of battle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>G. Space-based assets.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>I. Other (including indicators of adversary COA within a 24-hour period including reinforce, defend, delay, NBC operations).</td>
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</table>

SECTION IV: Demographics and Cultural Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FA</th>
<th>TIP</th>
<th>ISO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>A. Area population characteristics.</td>
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<td>B1</td>
<td>B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition (national and in target area).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>C. Social conditions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>D. Religious factors.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>E. Political characteristics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>F. Economic conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
— B1 — G. Miscellaneous (including currency, holidays, dress, customs, foreign influences, and personnel).

SECTION V: Lines of Communications and Information Systems

FA TIP ISO

— B1 — A. Airfields.

— B1 — 1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart — type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft).

— B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.

— B1 — B. Railways.

— B1 — 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).

— B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.

— B1 — C. Roadways.

— B1 — 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).

— B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.


— B1 — D. Waterways.

— B1 — 1. Description (graph, overlay, chart).

— B1 — 2. Beaches suitable for amphibious landing.

— B1 — a. Beach length and configuration.

— B1 — b. Usable beach length.

— B1 — c. Beach interruptions and obstacles.

— B1 — d. Type of coastline.

— B1 — e. Backshore description.

— B1 — (1) Width.
**Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions**

— B1 — (2) Gradient.
— B1 — (3) Composition.
— B1 — (4) Vegetation.
— B1 — (5) Exits.
— B1 — f. Foreshore description.
— B1 — (1) Width.
— B1 — (2) Gradient.
— B1 — (3) Composition.
— B1 — g. Nearshore.
— B1 — (1) Width.
— B1 — (2) Gradient.
— B1 — (3) Composition.
— B1 — E. Ports.
— B1 — 1. Depth.
— B1 — 2. Tides.
— B1 — F. POL.
— B1 — G. Power grid.
— B1 — H. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone).

**SECTION VI: Insertion and Extraction**

FA TIP ISO

1 — A. Potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs.
SECTION VII: SERE and Survival Data

A. SERE and SAFE areas.

— B2 B1 5. Contact, recovery points, and procedures.

B. Survival data.

— B1 — 2. Water (identify all known water sources).
— B1 — a. Type.
— B1 — b. Source.
— B1 — c. Capacity.
— B2 B1 c. Plants and animals of medical importance.
SECTION VIII: Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements, to include CI environment, not covered above)

SECTION IX: Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

FA TIP ISO

A. Imagery.

— B1 — 1. Area (20-25 nautical miles (nm) radius from target center).

— B2 B2 2. Intermediate (5-6 nm or 10 kilometers (km)).

— B1 — 3. Target (entire target).

— B1 — 4. Broad-area-coverage (to identify, select, plan, and execute overland infiltration and exfiltration routes).

B. Photography.

— D1 — 1. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of key components and critical damage points of target (such as building room, van, missile, warhead).

— D1 — 2. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of stress points of critical damage point(s) (the bulls-eye: such as a junction box, bridge girder, valve).

APPENDIX D: GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES

FA TIP ISO

— B1 — A. A copy of all maps and charts used to create the TIP.

— B1 — B. Map of the target area (1:50,000).
—     B2    —    C. Digitally manipulated imagery (line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).

APPENDIX E: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (if applicable)
NOTES:

1. PIR coding for FA, TIP and ISO planning steps.
   b. Numeric coding: Priority “1”-ESSENTIAL; “2”-MISSION ENHANCING.

2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.

3. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Objective Area Identification and Description

FA    TIP    ISO

A. OA identification data.


B1 — — 2. Geographic limits of OA (geographic or UTM).

B1 — — 3. Plan or operations (number and name).

B. Description and significance.

B1 — — Reference Appendix A, SECTION II:I.

SECTION II: Natural Environment

FA    TIP    ISO

A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).

— B1 — 1. Geographic terrain features.

— B1 — a. General description of OA.

— B1 — b. Key natural and manmade features.
— B1 — 2. Avenues of approach into OA (road, rail, waterway, air. Trace approaches using an overlay or graphic).

— B1 — a. Most likely approach of reinforcement.

— B1 — b. Potential obstacles, terrain features, and choke points.

— B1 — c. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— B1 — d. Fording sites (depth, width, type bottom).

— B1 — e. Exploitable points and segments to impede reinforcements.

B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data).

U1 F1 — 1. Current data.

U1 F1 — 2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards).

C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes).

— U1 — 1. Tidal activity.

— U1 — 2. Currents.

— U1 — 3. Temperatures.

— U1 — 4. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— U1 — 5. Depths, underwater obstacles.

D. Water sources (color-coded overlay).

U1 F1 — 1. Type.

U1 F1 — 2. Source.

U1 F1 — 3. Capacity.
E. Flora and fauna (plants and animals). Include information of tactical value, such as plants and animals that would impede or assist movement routes or rates, massing, dispersal, acquisition, and weapon capabilities, security including location, numbers, size, type).

SECTION III: Threat

A. Objective country.

1. Summary (strategy, force disposition, threat to US personnel).

a. Objective country’s military strategy.

b. Disposition of combat units.

c. Principal military targets.

d. Threat to US personnel and advisors.

2. Ground forces (TO&E strength, including border guards and reserves. Give type, number, capability of equipment, weapons, night vision capability, field defense positions located in UTMs to nearest 100 meters).

3. Paramilitary and/or indigenous forces, internal security forces or police (TO&E strength. Type, number, capability, equipment, weapons, night operations).

4. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guard — type, number, capability, equipment, weapons).

5. Air forces (type, numbers, capability, ordnance, reaction time, loiter times, sortie rate, performance characteristics, operating schedules, alert factors).

6. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, antiaircraft weapon systems type and deployment, passive detectors — type, numbers, capability. For ground control intercept (GCI) include proficiency, operating schedules, flexibility, and responsiveness).
— B1 — 7. Electronic order of battle.

— B2 B2 8. Force communications (C4: hierarchy and protocols, capabilities, TO&E operating characteristics, communications security equipment, and material type).

U1 U1/F2 — 9. Electronic warfare (EW) (types, capabilities, operational characteristics, frequencies, power output, locations of units, equipment, and electronic attack).


— B1 — 11. Weapon systems (both US and foreign. Type, availability, maintenance and logistic capabilities, suppliers, training).

— B1 — 12. Intelligence collection capability (include agency and means, effectiveness of each, and predisposition or bias toward or against).

— B1 — a. HUMINT and counterintelligence.

— B1 — b. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) environment.

— B1 — c. Imagery intelligence.

— B1 — d. Reconnaissance patrols.


B2 B1 — 14. NBC capability (types, sources, and storage locations. For NBC-capable units — type, specify launcher or weapon system location, availability, ranges, employment or alert times, communications, and units’ ammunition load; that is, 50 percent nuclear, 25 percent conventional high explosive, 25 percent chemical).

— B2 — 15. NBC protection and decontamination (locations and types).

B1 B1 — 16. SO and PSYOP (plans, programs, capabilities to conduct. Vulnerability to PSYOP).
17. Civil disturbance and riot control training (units and their capabilities).

18. Government resistance potential (internal and external threats. List indigenous peoples and vulnerabilities).

19. Support of regional insurgencies (groups, movements, type of support).

20. Support of terrorist and guerrillas.

a. Groups supported (name, type, affiliation, operational techniques, capabilities, equipment).

b. Training and staging areas, infiltration or escape routes (location, techniques, equipment).

c. Safe houses (disposition, size, location).

d. Reaction to introduction of US forces.

1. Groups and forces (names, organization, leaders, political affiliation, size, population support).

2. Military capabilities (organization, equipment training, ability to conduct sabotage, subversion, and deception).

3. Groups and force communications (types, vulnerability to covert or overt attack).

4. US use of groups and forces (methods of contact and probability of cooperation).

5. Threat to US personnel and advisers.

6. Indicators and warning (indicators of preparation by the objective country or opposition forces for action within a 24-hour period for the following: attack, withdraw without engaging, reinforce, defend, delay, conduct special or NBC operations).
SECTION IV: Demographics, Cultural, Political, Social Features (PIR must be answered for both objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA TIP ISO

A. Area population characteristics.


— B1 — 2. Refugee movement(s).

— B1 — 3. Attitude of civilians and civilian groups to US involvement (friendly, unfriendly, or neutral).


— B1 — b. Key civilians.

— B1 — c. Biographic data.

— F2 F2 4. Attitude of neutral population toward HN, threat policies, and actions.

— F2 F2 5. Local sources that could help our position through liaison or other means (used by multinational, friendly, or US HUMINT organizations).

— F2 F2 a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).

— F2 F2 b. US policy toward HN’s human rights actions.

— F2 F2 6. Friendly contacts (embassies, businesses, missionaries, teachers, students).

— F2 F2 a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).

— F2 F2 b. US policy toward HN’s human rights activities.

— B1 — B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.

— F1 — C. Social conditions.

— F1 — D. Religious factors.
E. Political characteristics.

— B1 — 1. Internal groups (identify groups, indigenous elements who are members, level of popular support).

— B1 — 2. Key military leaders (biographic data, backgrounds, talents, connections, political affiliation, and orientation).

— F1 — 3. Attitude toward planned US operations (support, oppose, or tolerate action).

— B1 — 4. Opposition to existing US forces, facilities, or interests (general population and significant groups and forces).

— B1 — a. Who (biographic data).

— B1 — b. When.

— B1 — c. Where.


— F1 — 5. Assistance available to US forces (extent and capabilities).

B1 B1 — 6. Vulnerabilities of objective country government to insurgent attack (prioritize).

— B2 B2 7. Tensions (regional and national; causes, intensity, degree, and exploitability by the US or opposition).

— F2 F2 8. Information service, apparatus, or organization (key personnel, attitude toward the USG, usable by US forces).


F1 U1 — 11. Foreign influences (identify sources, leaders, themes, influence on government, unions, students, insurgent forces and general public).
Annex B to Appendix J

| — | B2 | B2 | F. Available labor force (location, numbers, equipment). |
| — | B1 | —  | G. Customs (social, weapons, religious, cultural, mores). |
| F2 | F1 | —  | H. Medical capabilities (use by US forces, limitations). |
| F2 | B1 | —  | I. Health and sanitation conditions (facilities, agencies, capabilities). |
| — | F1 | —  | J. Economic conditions. |

SECTION V: Lines of Communications, Information Systems, and Logistics

FA | TIP | ISO |
---|-----|-----|
A. Airfields. |
| — | F1/U2 | — | 1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart — type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft). |
| — | F1/U2 | — | 2. Limiting factors for use. |
| — | F1/U2 | — | 3. Available for US use (include any limitations). |
B. Railways. |
| U2 | B1 | — | 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart). |
| U2 | B1 | — | 2. Limiting factors for use. |
C. Roadways. |
D. Waterways. |
| — | B1 | — | 1. Description (graph, overlay, chart). |
| — | B1 | — | 2. Identify beaches suitable for amphibious landing. |
E. Ports (include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations).

F. POL (refining, storage, and distribution).

— U1 — 1. Vulnerabilities.

— U1 — 2. Exploitability by US forces.

G. Power grid (generating and distribution networks).

— U1 — 1. Vulnerabilities.

— U1 — 2. Exploitability by US forces.

H. Public information media and telecommunications.

— B2 1. Signal allocation controlling authority (agency and procedures).

— B2 2. Radio and television broadcast (controlling agency, key personnel, station locations, channels and frequencies, output transmitters, operating hours, political affiliations).

— B2 3. Newspapers (controlling agency, key personnel, printing locations, political affiliations, distribution).

— B2 4. Communications network or system.

— B2 (a) Equipment type and switching system.

— B2 (b) Cable vaults and layouts.

— B2 (c) Transmission media for trunk groups (open wires, microwave).

— B2 (d) Relay towers (location).

— B2 (e) System manning (civilian, military).

— B2 (f) For multiple systems, indicate interconnections.

— U1/F2 — I. Exploitable civilian transportation (trucks, buses, river craft).
Annex B to Appendix J

— F2/F2 — J. Primary modes of transportation (public and commercial).

B1 B1 — K. US-provided materials, services urgently needed or required (by cooperating indigenous military, paramilitary, resistance forces, or local nationals. List and prioritize).

— F1/U2 — L. Stockpiles (equipment, supplies. Give location, type, volume).

B2 F1/U2 — M. War-sustaining industries (ability to produce warfighting supplies).

— F1/U2 — N. War-sustaining resupply (outside suppliers of end items and war material, country, agent, company, storage location).

— U1 — O. Movement control centers.

SECTION VI: Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs. Include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations)

FA TIP ISO

U2 B1 — A. List potential zones.

U2 U1 — B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII: Military Assistance (PIR must be answered for objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA TIP ISO

A. Military assistance provided (countries committed to or providing assistance).

— F2 F2 1. External military assistance (legal or de facto).

B2 B1 — 2. Foreign military advisers (country represented, adviser location, type of assistance).

F1 F1/U2 — 3. Foreign combatants, paramilitary (strengths and locations).

C. Foreign military material (trucks, heavy equipment).

D. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment (types, frequency, number, represented country, purpose, and projections).

E. Foreign contractors services and construction (type of work, equipment, location, represented country or company).

F. US support (current and projected).

SECTION VIII — SERE and Survival Data

A. SERE and SAFE areas.

1. Population.

2. Characteristics and culture.

3. Location.

4. Approaches.

5. Contact and recovery points and procedures.


7. Cover and concealment.

B. Survival data.

1. Food.

2. Water (identify all known water sources).

a. Type.

b. Source.

c. Capacity.

3. Shelter.

— B2 B1 c. Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION IX: Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

SECTION X: Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

FA TIP ISO

A. Imagery for FID.
  — U2 U2 1. Imagery of infiltration and exfiltration routes.
  — U2 U2 2. Imagery of DZ, if specified.
  — U1 — 3. Requester-specified requirements may include: choking points, critical bridges, water and road junctions, terrain features that could hamper movement or tactically endanger friendly or adversary forces (no more than 10 requirements, no request for scale larger than 1:12,000, and no imagery requested larger than 5 km radius center of mass of target).

— F1 — B. Imagery for UW. Requester-specified requirements may include: imagery of lines of communications (LOCs), major cities, and choking points. List items, scales, and radius.
APPENDIX D: GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES

FA  TIP  ISO

A. Maps and charts for FID.

U1  U1  —  (Maps or charts of the entire OA [overall area chart and 1:50,000s]).

B. Maps and charts for UW.

1  F1  —  (Maps or charts of the country [1:1,000,000]).

F2  F2  —  C. Digitally manipulated imagery (such as line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).

APPENDIX E: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (if applicable)
Intentionally Blank
NOTES:

1. PIR Coding for FA, TIP and ISO Planning steps: Priority “1” = ESSENTIAL; “2” = MISSION ENHANCING.

2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.

3. Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection: annotate TIP with collection request date, number and agency.

4. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Air Defense

FA   TIP   ISO

A. Adversary C2 structure.

2   1   —   1. Type of center.

2   1   —   2. Location of centers.

2   1   —   3. Type of communication assets (landline, radio frequencies, microwave, SATCOM).

—   1   —   4. Doctrine and employment methods.

2   2   1   5. Ability to direct intercepts and SAM engagements.


—   1   —   a. Who?

—   1   —   b. How long?


—   2   2   8. Reaction to one aircraft in their area.

2   2   1   9. Defensive capability (AAA, SAM, combat air patrol).
B. Listening/visual reporting posts.

1. Locations.

2. Hours of operation/shift change times.

3. Status (alert, overall readiness).

4. Communications ability.

5. Night vision capabilities.

6. Defensive capabilities.

C. Passive detection devices.

1. Type.

2. Location.

3. Capabilities.

a. Equipment reliability.

b. Operators/limitations.

4. Hours of operation/shift change times.

5. Reporting network, procedures (links with direct threats).

6. Defensive capabilities (SAMs, AAA, small arms).

D. Early warning radars.

1. Type.

2. Location.

a. Site elevation.

b. Antenna height.
2 1 —  3. Operating frequencies.


2 1 —  a. Status.

2 1 —  b. Mobile?

— 2 2  c. Hours/shift change.

— 2 2  d. Down times.

5. Capabilities.

— 1 —  a. Electronic protection capability.

— 1 —  b. Emission control (EMCON).

— 2 2  c. Operator proficiency.


— 1 —  7. Communication capabilities.

— 1 —  8. Defenses around radar sites.

E. Air interceptors/helicopters.

1 — —  1. Airfield locations.

2. Aircraft.

1 — —  a. Type.

1 — —  b. Number.

1 — —  c. Armament.

— 2 1  d. Tactics and employment doctrine (low level GCI).

— 2 1  e. GCI dependence and pilot proficiency at attacking a large aircraft.

1 — —  f. Radar.
Appendix K

3. Operation.

a. Readiness.

b. Alert status.

c. Response times.

4. Airborne early warning tracks.

5. Combat air patrol locations.

6. Training areas.

7. Night capable?

8. Identification friend or foe capability.

F. Missile information (SAMs).

1. Type include model/quantity.

2. Location.

a. Site elevation.

b. Antenna height.

3. Operations.

a. Status.

b. Mobile?

c. Alert/status.

d. Hours/shifts.

e. Down times.

f. Actual frequencies of radars.
4. Tactics/doctrine.

5. Capabilities.

a. Non-standard capabilities.

b. Electronic protection.

c. Night.

d. EMCON.

e. Operator proficiency.

6. Weapons status (free, hold, tight)/reaction time.

7. Limitations.

8. Number of systems per army unit.

G AAA information.

1. Type (both gun and radar).

2. Locations.

a. Site elevation.

b. Antenna height.

3. Operation.

a. Actual frequencies.

b. Status.

c. Alert/status.

d. Hours/shifts.

e. Down times.

4. Fire control system.

5. Tactics and doctrine.
6. Capabilities.

— 2 2
— 2 1
   b. Electronic protection.
— 2 1
   c. Night.
— 2 1
   d. EMCON.
— 2 2
   e. Operator proficiency.
— 1 —
7. Weapons free/reaction time.
— 2 1
8. Limitations.

9. Numbers of systems per battalion/brigade/division.

SECTION II: Ground Order of Battle

FA TIP ISO

1 — —
1. Units, to include C4 link.
1 — —
2. Location.
1 — —
3. Patrol area.
1 — —
4. Composition.

2 1 —
5. Associated air defense equipment w/location.
— 2 1
6. Readiness posture.

7. Capabilities.

— 2 2
   a. Special.
— 2 2
   b. Chemical warfare.
2 1 —
8. Assessment of future movement/location.
### SECTION III: Naval Order of Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FA</th>
<th>TIP</th>
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<th>1. Type.</th>
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<td>2. Location.</td>
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<td>3. Patrol areas.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>4. EW radar types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies.</td>
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| 1  | 1   |   | 5. SAM types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies. |
| 1  | 1   |   | 6. AAA types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies. |

| 2  | 2   | 7. Crew proficiency. |

### SECTION IV: Paramilitary/Internal Security Forces

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<th>FA</th>
<th>TIP</th>
<th>ISO</th>
<th>1. Type and size.</th>
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<td>2. Location.</td>
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<td>3. Patrol areas.</td>
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<td>4. Organization/command structure.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5. Air defense capabilities/locations and links.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6. Readiness/proficiency.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7. Operating schedule.</td>
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| 2  | 1   | 8. Uniforms/markings. |

9. Capabilities.

| 2  | 1   | a. Special. |
| 2  | 1   | b. Chemical. |
## SECTION V: Planning Materials

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FA</th>
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1. Charts.

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<td>a.</td>
<td>Tactical pilotage charts (TPCs).</td>
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<td>b.</td>
<td>Joint operations graphics (JOGs).</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency support.</td>
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<td>d.</td>
<td>Specials.</td>
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2. Imagery.

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<td>b.</td>
<td>Critical en route points (no more than 10).</td>
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<td>c.</td>
<td>Critical air defense points.</td>
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<td>d.</td>
<td>Survival, escape and evasion.</td>
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3. Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System data.

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<td>b.</td>
<td>Radar update points.</td>
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<td>c.</td>
<td>Critical turn points.</td>
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4. Joint Information Operations Center nodal analysis information and overlays.

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<td>TPC (detection).</td>
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| b. | JOG |

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<td>(2)</td>
<td>Kill.</td>
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</table>
5. Surveys.

2 1

- a. DZs, LZs, HLZs, and RZs.

SECTION VI: Physical Characteristics

FA TIP ISO

1. Weather data.

1 — —

- a. Climatology.

1 — —

- b. Solar data.

1 — —

- c. Lunar data (night vision goggles lunar data).

— 2 1

- d. Tactical decision aid.

— 2 1

- e. Infrared data, best and worst cases.

— — 1

- f. Unusual weather phenomenon.

— 2 2

2. Prominent terrain features.

— 1 —

3. Location of population, industrial concentrations.

— 2 —

4. Location of strategic/choke points.

1 — —

5. Location of usable airfields (3000-4000 feet).

— 1 —

- a. Water.

- b. POL.

— 1 —

6. Location of prominent LOCs (roads, rail, water, airways, telecommunications).

— 1 —

7. Power lines.

SECTION VII: Survival, Evasion and Escape Information

FA TIP ISO

— 2 1

1 SAFE (wells, food, pickup locations, hazards).
Appendix K


— 2 1 3. Location of dissident groups.

— 1 — 4. Travel restrictions, locals and foreign nationals.

— 1 — 5. Ways to blend with the local population.

— 2 — 6. Phone codes to use to contact friendly forces.

— 1 — 7. Evasion charts.

— 2 1 8. Evasion kits.

— 2 1 9. Contents of suggested personal survival kit.


— 2 — 11. Medical (diseases, plants/animals of medical importance).

SECTION VIII: Intelligence Gaps (Information Still on Request)

SECTION IX: Friendly Forces

FA TIP ISO

1. Strike package.

— 2 1 a. Ingress routes (times, altitudes).

— 2 1 b. Egress routes (times, altitudes).

— 2 1 c. Location of control points.

— 2 1 d. Climb and descent.

— 2 1 2. Defense suppression support available/requested (jamming, destruction, monitor).

— 2 1 3. Combat air patrol location and capability.

— 2 1 4. SIGINT/electronic intelligence support available/requested.
— 2 1 5. Tanker support available/requested.
— 2 1 6. Location of ground forces and air defense assets.
— 2 1 7. Combat search and rescue support available and contact procedures.
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The development of JP 3-05.2 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by: 


4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01B, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998.

5. CJCSI 3110.05A, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1998.

6. CJCSI 3110.06, Special Operations Supplement to JSCP FY 1998.

7. CJCSI 3110.12, Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP.

8. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy.

9. CJCSI 5810.01A, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).


14. Memorandum in the name of the Chairman 1196, 17 Jan 96, Unified Command Plan (UCP).

15. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.


17. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.
Appendix L

18. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

19. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.


22. JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.


24. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.


27. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.


30. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.


32. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

33. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I.

34. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

35. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.


38. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.


41. JP 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)*.


44. JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)*.

45. JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.


47. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.


49. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

50. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.

51. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

52. JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.


54. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*.

APPENDIX M
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05.5, 10 August 1993, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO:      CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AF FL//SOOP-JE//
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             CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

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### Glossary

#### Part I — Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<td>airspace control order</td>
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<td>AIRSUPREQ</td>
<td>air support request</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ATO</td>
<td>air tasking order</td>
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<td>BLS</td>
<td>beach landing site</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>C2W</td>
<td>command and control warfare</td>
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<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>combat assessment</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
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<td>CARVER</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
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<td>COMJSOTF</td>
<td>commander, joint special operations task force</td>
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<td>intermediate staging base</td>
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<td>JFSOCC</td>
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<td>JGAT</td>
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<td>JIDC</td>
<td>joint interrogation and debriefing center</td>
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<td>JSRC</td>
<td>joint search and rescue center</td>
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<td>joint targeting steering group</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
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<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>survival, evasion, resistance, escape</td>
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<td>seaward launch point</td>
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<td>special operations command and control element</td>
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<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>universal transverse mercator</td>
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<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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<td>WARNORD</td>
<td>warning order</td>
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PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather
than on concealment of identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

**collateral mission.** A mission other than those for which a force is primarily organized, trained, and equipped, that the force can accomplish by virtue of the inherent capabilities of that force. (JP 1-02)

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**combat search and rescue.** A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-02)

**combatting terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**command and control warfare.** The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information operations in
military operations. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (JP 1-02)

**conventional forces.** Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)

**counterdrug.** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

**counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

**counterterrorism.** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

**course of action.** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

**deception.** Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02)

**direct action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

**earliest anticipated launch time.** The earliest time expected for a special operations tactical element and its supporting platform to depart the staging or marshalling area together en route to the operations area. Also called EALT. (JP 1-02)

**evasion and escape.** The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. Also called E&E. (JP 1-02)
exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 1-02)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (JP 1-02)

infiltration. 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); gray (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); and white (legal). (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)
**insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**joint force air component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint integrated prioritized target list.** A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by the joint force commander or designated representative and maintained by a joint force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander’s objectives and guidance. Also called JIPTL. (JP 1-02)

**joint psychological operations task force.** A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations air component commander.** The commander within the joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special operations air component commander normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander or to any nonspecial
operations component or joint force commander as directed. Also called JSOACC. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations area.** A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

**joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.** The actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They are authoritative; as such, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures will be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands and Services. Also called JTTP. (JP 1-02)

**joint targeting coordination board.** A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called a JTF. (JP 1-02)

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

**mobile training team.** A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is
to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

**national security.** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NSW forces or NAVSOF. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare special operations component.** The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called NAVSOC. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows: a. permissive environment — Operational environment in which host-nation military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent
and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct; b. uncertain environment — Operational environment in which host-government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area; and c. hostile environment — Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

**priority intelligence requirements.** Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIRs. (JP 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**raid.** An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 1-02)

**sabotage.** An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02)
sea-air-land team. A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral and riverine environments. Also called SEAL team. (JP 1-02)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft (land or water), submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. Also called SAR. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

special activities. Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (JP 1-02)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations command and control element. A special operations command and control element (SOCCE) that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities primarily with land operations. It performs command and control functions
special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (JP 1-02)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (JP 1-02)

special tactics team. US Air Force special operations task-organized element that may include combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to establish and control the air-ground interface at an airhead in the objective area. Functions include assault zone reconnaissance and surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; terminal attack control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. Also called STT. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities
at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

target.  1. An area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. Targets fall into two general categories: planned and immediate. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst that hits the target. Also called TGT. (JP 1-02)

target analysis. An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (JP 1-02)

target complex. A geographically integrated series of target concentrations. (JP 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02)

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list of targets” that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes. (JP 1-02)

target nomination list. A list of targets nominated by component commanders, national agencies, or the joint force commander staff for potential inclusion on the joint integrated prioritized target list to support joint force commander objectives and priorities. Also called TNL. (JP 1-02)

target system. 1. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related. 2. A group of targets that are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect desired by the attacker. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

time-sensitive targets. Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. Also called TSTs. (JP 1-02)

unconventional assisted recovery. Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. Also called UAR. (JP 1-02)
unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.2 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

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**JP 1**
- JOINT WARFARE

**JP 0-2**
- UNAAF

**JP 1-0**
- PERSONNEL

**JP 2-0**
- INTTELLIGENCE

**JP 3-0**
- OPERATIONS

**JP 4-0**
- LOGISTICS

**JP 5-0**
- PLANS

**JP 6-0**
- C4 SYSTEMS