
19 December 2001
1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint special operations task force (JSOTF) operations across the full range of military operations. It also provides an overview of joint special operations tenets and doctrinal principles. It includes guidance for organizing a JSOTF and delineates responsibilities and functions for a JSOTF headquarters staff. It also includes a discussion of command and control relationships among the JSOTF, supported, and supporting commanders. Further, it addresses the JSOTF training process.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and
procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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Successful conduct of joint special operations (SO) requires a total understanding of SO and its capabilities, objectives, missions, collateral activities, and other tenets. These lay the foundation as to how a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) operates and functions. It also is imperative that those supported and supporting commands, organizations, and agencies that are participants in JSOTF operations, either directly or indirectly, understand SO.

Joint SO are integral to the theater campaign and may be conducted across the range of military operations. Joint SO can support strategic, operational, and tactical level objectives. SO are characterized by certain attributes that, when taken cumulatively, distinguish them from conventional operations. The principles of war apply to SO as they do to conventional forces. However, specific principles may have varied emphasis in the conduct of SO because of the uniqueness of the mission and special operations forces (SOF). SOF should not be construed to be a substitute for conventional forces; rather, they should be considered as an adjunct to conventional forces. Additionally, other Services may provide selected conventional units trained and equipped to support and conduct SO on a mission-specific basis.
A JSOTF may be tailored to accomplish any of the SO principal missions. These are: direct action, combatting terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, civil affairs, information operations (IO), and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A JSOTF also may conduct collateral activities using inherent capabilities. SO collateral activities are: coalition support, combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, humanitarian de-mining, foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and other special activities. As one element of the joint force, the JSOTF must be capable of accomplishing any of the above stated missions or collateral activities.

Establishing and Organizing a JSOTF

The JSOTF is established and the commander designated. The JSOTF is then organized and tailored to accomplish the mission.

The establishing authority creates the JSOTF. It is a temporary entity, usually of short duration to perform a specific mission. Once it is established and a commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF) is designated, a decision process occurs to organize and tailor the JSOTF to accomplish the mission. The COMJSOTF organizes the force and provides operational direction. A key element in the decisionmaking process is organizing the headquarters staff of the command. Staff assignment considerations include the right mix of Service representation, other augmentees, and the potential requirement for Reserve Component personnel. Additionally, JSOTF staff functions and responsibilities need to be delineated.

Command and Control

SOF may be assigned to either the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) or to a geographic combatant commander. Operational control of SOF in theater normally is exercised by the theater SO command. Command and control (C2) relationships must be delineated among commands senior and subordinate to the JSOTF.

Additional C2 considerations should be addressed during planning, deployment, employment, termination, transition, and redeployment of JSOTF operations. These considerations include, but are not limited to, rules of engagement (ROE), combat identification, interagency operations, multinational operations, and coordination and liaison elements. ROE govern the use of force by the military and may change over the course
Executive Summary

Detailed operational techniques and procedures provide a basis for JSOTF mission accomplishment.

of the operation. Combat identification measures should be established early and be consistent with the ROE. The JSOTF may play a key role in the interagency process. During interagency operations, the JSOTF may provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Multinational considerations focus on command authority and use of SOF coalition support teams. Organizations providing coordination and liaison are important to the JSOTF in order to assist in the synchronization and integration of operations.

Operational Techniques and Procedures

JSOTF operational techniques and procedures are discussed in terms of operations, planning, intelligence, logistic support, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support. Operations may be conducted in war and military operations other than war.

Detailed preparation facilitates successful operations.

The COMJSOTF considers such factors as mission execution, concept development, briefbacks, operational rehearsals, mission deconfliction and execution, and mission evaluation during the conduct of operations. Other operational aspects that factor into mission success include operations security, military deception, close air support for SOF, IO, and force protection. The JSOTF joint operations center normally is the focal point for the conduct of operations.

The JSOTF follows deliberate and crisis action planning procedures. Specific attention is placed on targeting and mission planning.

JSOTF planning follows the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System during both deliberate and crisis action planning. Within crisis action planning (CAP), unique characteristics of planning may apply to JSOTF operations. JSOTF planning must support the theater campaign plan objectives. Planning considerations should include interagency and nongovernmental organizations as well as planning with multinational forces. The JSOTF joint planning group, if formed, normally is the focal point for CAP. Detailed planning is conducted on SO targeting and mission planning procedures. Operational missions should: be appropriate for SOF; support the campaign plan; be feasible; utilize available resources; and include risk assessment. SO targeting is conducted for deliberate mission planning and CAP. The COMJSOTF may form a JSOTF targeting panel to facilitate the targeting process. Intelligence support to the JSOTF must be timely, detailed, tailored, and must fuse all-source intelligence.
Executive Summary

National, theater, and operational intelligence assets support the JSOTF. Internal and external intelligence connectivity is a must.

The Services and United States Special Operations Command support the JSOTF logistic effort. Host-nation support and contracting also may be crucial to the support effort.

Logistic support to the JSOTF is provided by either the Service for Service common support of assigned SOF units or United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for SO-peculiar support. Logistic support at the JSOTF level normally includes oversight of the following functional areas: supply and services, transportation, maintenance, contracting, budget, and medical. USCINCSOC may also deploy organic USSOCOM combat service support assets in support of a JSOTF when time, geographic, and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure make it impractical for the theater to provide the requisite support. Host-nation support and contracting support are also integral parts of the JSOTF logistics network. The JSOTF joint logistics readiness center is normally the focal point for logistic operations. The JSOTF surgeon or medical plans officer ensures that an effective medical system is in place to support levels I-IV of care. JSOTF component health service support may be limited. JSOTF medical planning objectives are twofold; one is to provide integrated, augmented conventional support for SO. The second is to articulate the unique aspects of SOF operations that complicate medical support to SOF by conventional units.

C4 support to the JSOTF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. Responsibilities of the JSOTF establishing authority ensure that systems, personnel, communications security, and equipment requirements of the COMJSOTF are supported. The COMJSOTF must develop C4 requirements to support the concept of operations and plan for deployment of communications assets. A baseline C4 interface must be established among the JSOTF headquarters and higher, lateral, and subordinate commands and agencies. JSOTF components must also establish a baseline connectivity among their subordinate units, coordination elements, and the JSOTF headquarters. For multinational operations, C4 systems should be interoperable and procedures developed to facilitate accomplishment of the multinational mission. The JSOTF joint communications control center is normally the focal point for the conduct of C4 operations.
The JSOTF uses a building block approach to training, the culmination of which is a joint exercise that provides the commander with a means of evaluating the JSOTF capabilities.

United States Joint Forces Command and Joint Special Operations University conduct training and education of selected JSOTFs in support of USSOCOM’s collective training program. The training concept supports USCINCSOC’s annual training plan. A building block approach to training initially focuses on individual level of instruction, progresses to institutional level training, and culminates with the training of a JSOTF headquarters staff to accomplish its assigned tasks. The JSOTF participates in a wide range of training exercises to support the training concept. The assessment concept provides a means for assessing the capability of the JSOTF to perform missions in accordance with their joint mission essential task list. The after-action review process provides a mechanism for the COMJSOTF to make an internal evaluation of the JSOTF.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental joint tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the joint conduct of JSOTF operations across the full range of military operations. It also provides guidance for the establishment, organization, employment, and training of a JSOTF.
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

“We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrection, and subversion . . . We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective.”

President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, 1961

1. Purpose

This publication provides doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) applicable to a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). It provides guidance to combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), the Services, combat support agencies, and the commander and staff of a JSOTF, when formed, for the conduct and support of joint special operations (SO). This chapter, by design, reinforces those principles and tenets of joint SO found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. These principles and tenets provide the foundation from which a JSOTF conducts operations toward the accomplishment of its mission.

“Don’t forget nothing.”

Standing Order #1, Rogers’ Rangers, Major Robert Rogers, 1759

2. Special Operations

a. Conduct of Operations. SO are operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-SO forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape SO, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. Integral to Theater Campaign. SO has become an integral part of theater campaigns and major operations across the range of military operations. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign or subordinate major operation. SO must complement, not compete with, conventional operations.

c. Proficiency. The successful conduct of SO relies on individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of special operations forces (SOF) operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military responses. These responses do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.
d. **Direct and Indirect Actions.** SO can be conducted directly against an adversary by forces acting in a single engagement, such as a raid against a critical communications node; or indirectly, for example, by organizing, training, and supporting an indigenous force for foreign internal defense (FID) or unconventional warfare (UW), or through the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) to influence the opposing military or the local civilian populace. In either case, the results are normally disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

e. **SO are Inherently Joint.** Although SO may be conducted as a single-Service operation, they **routinely require joint support and coordination.**

3. **Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations**

   a. **Range of Operations.** Military operations are conducted across a range consisting of two general states: war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). This model assists the geographic combatant commanders in articulating strategic situations within their areas of responsibility (AORs) that are described by a variety of political, economic, and military conditions. Although the following discussion of SO applicability to the two general states within the range of military operations describes each in discrete terms, in actual circumstances there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins. The model gives the National Command Authorities (NCA) and JFCs the ability to describe any strategic situation in clear terms and allows the JFCs to define needs, devise strategies, and project resources to meet the threat.

   For further information on war and MOOTW, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

   b. **Operational Situation.** SO are not bound by any specific operational situations. The principles by which SO are planned and conducted apply equally to both war and MOOTW. In war, SO can be conducted during the preconflict, conflict and, of increasing importance, postconflict phases of the campaign. In MOOTW, the overarching objective is often restoring stability to a country or region. This can take the form of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) after a natural or manmade disaster, caring for fleeing refugees, or some form of peace operation. Small SO units accomplish these objectives indirectly through operations that assist the host nation (HN) authorities, other United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or allies and coalition partners in restoring peace, strengthening the infrastructure of the country, or providing disaster relief assistance. SOF are regularly employed in mobile training teams, joint and combined exercises, professional development program seminars, and other military to military activities which are a vital part of theater engagement strategies.

4. **Special Operations Objectives**

   In addition to being conducted across the full range of military operations, SO may be focused on the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war.

   For further information on the levels of war, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

   a. **Strategic National Objectives.** These objectives are directed toward the attainment of national or multinational objectives. The NCA determines national objectives and approves the employment of military means to achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SO may be conducted under the direct supervision of the NCA.
5. Characteristics of Special Operations

a. Distinguished from Conventional Operations. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. This may involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. SO are inherently offensive in nature, usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical targets. Such operations rely on surprise, security, and boldness and frequently employ deception to achieve success. These characteristics necessitate detailed planning and rehearsals to mitigate the high risk of the operations. These missions are frequently clandestine in nature and offer the potential for high returns.

b. Special Operations. SO normally require operator-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the area where the mission is to be conducted. Rigorous training and rehearsals of the mission are integral to the conduct of the operation. SO are often conducted at great distances from operational bases, employing sophisticated communication systems and means of infiltration, support, and exfiltration to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, non-permissive, or politically sensitive areas. SO frequently require discriminate and precise use of force. This may require development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Department of Defense (DOD) forces. These non-standard weapons, however, remain subject to legal review and compliance with US law and policy and the law of warfare.

b. Strategic Theater and Operational Objectives. Strategic theater objectives are established by geographic combatant commanders, based on national objectives. These objectives drive the theater campaign plan and the theater engagement plan. Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater strategic objectives and lead directly to theater success. SOF provide the JFCs with selective, flexible deterrent options, crisis response, and complementary capabilities to achieve their operational objectives.

c. Tactical Objectives. Although normally targeted at strategic and operational objectives, SO may be conducted in support of conventional force tactical objectives as well. The JFC directing employment of SOF against tactical objectives should balance the expected outcome against the risk of losses and failure as well as the opportunity costs associated with their commitment to a tactical level mission.

SOF are the quiet professionals.
6. Special Operations and the Principles of War

The principles of war apply to SO in the same way as they apply to conventional operations. However, in some cases, specific principles have varied emphasis in the conduct of SO, primarily because SO are conducted by small units that seldom work with large formations or sizable reserves. SO planners must understand the principles of war and how they relate to SO. The principles are an important doctrinal foundation and are essential to understanding and mastering joint SO (see Figure I-1).

a. **Objective.** SO are best employed when they directly support the JFC’s objectives. The focus of each SO is the execution of a mission that accomplishes a strategic or operational objective for the JFC.

b. **Offensive.** The lethal application of SO is inherently offensive in nature because they seek to strike or engage an adversary to compel or deter adversary actions.

c. **Mass.** SO concentrates combat power at critical times and in discriminate places to achieve decisive results before hostile forces can react to overwhelm the SOF executing the mission.

d. **Economy of Force.** Given the small size, specialization, and lack of redundant capabilities in SO units, commanders should employ SO in a manner that will capitalize on their unique capabilities while preserving combat power. Assigning tasks to SO units that are inappropriate or may be performed by conventional forces should be avoided.

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**Figure I-1. Principles of War**
e. **Maneuver.** Maneuver is essential to SO in order to strike adversaries where and when they are most vulnerable and to avoid their strengths.

f. **Unity of Command.** SO require unity of command to **integrate and synchronize SOF with every aspect of the campaign plan.** SO command and control (C2) architecture is often tailored for each mission to achieve this end.

g. **Security.** SO planning and execution require high levels of security to **protect the clandestine nature of missions,** often conducted in remote or denied areas. At the same time, SOF must balance security concerns with the need to rehearse and to integrate operations with other committed forces. In addition, proper security planning and execution is essential to SOF force protection. Given their size, SOF units are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units.

h. **Surprise.** Surprise is often the key to the conduct of successful SO and to SOF survivability. SOF must achieve surprise to the extent that the enemy cannot react effectively prior to mission accomplishment.

i. **Simplicity.** Although SO may require sophisticated and often unorthodox methods and equipment, the plans that drive its employment must be simple and direct in order to facilitate understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and adapt to changing situations.

7. **Characteristics of Special Operations Forces**

a. **SOF Attributes.** The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities. Most SOF personnel undergo careful selection processes or mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities. SOF are composed of mature and experienced personnel, many of whom maintain a high level of competency in more than one military specialty. Selected SOF are regionally oriented for employment; cross-cultural communications skills are a routine part of their training. SOF truths are depicted in Figure I-2.

b. **Adjunct to Conventional Forces.** SO are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces so that they can achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise focused use of force.

8. **Special Operations Principal Missions**

Pursuant to title 10, United States Code (USC), section 164, title 10, USC, section 167, and the Unified Command Plan, eight activities have been designated as principal SO missions for SOF. Pursuant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy, and Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) directive, information operations (IO) have been designated as the ninth principal SO
mission. SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish the nine principal missions shown in Figure I-3.


9. Role of the JSOTF

a. A JSOTF is a joint task force (JTF) composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The JSOTF
may have conventional non-SO units assigned or attached to support the conduct of assigned missions.

b. Adhering to the principles and tenets of SO, the JSOTF must be fully capable and trained to perform a primary SO mission or collateral activity as either an element of a joint force or acting independently subordinate to a geographic combatant commander or subunified command. Further, when assigned a mission that is not a SO primary mission or collateral activity by a controlling joint force headquarters (HQ), that mission then becomes the focus of the JSOTF effort. Under such circumstances, the commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF) must provide the tasking authority with a candid assessment of the JSOTF’s capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with such missions. The COMJSOTF has the obligation to advise the JFC to consider courses of action (COAs) involving the use of conventional forces for those missions that are not appropriate for SOF.
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CHAPTER II
JSOTF ORGANIZATION

“Trust — defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another — is one of the most important ingredients in building strong teams.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. General
   a. A JSOTF is organized in a manner similar to a conventional JTF. A JSOTF normally is established by a senior JFC to plan and conduct SO. It may be established subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a geographic combatant command or subunified command. For example, a geographic combatant commander may elect to form a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific region of the theater and attach SOF (organized as JSOTF) to that JTF to plan and execute SO required to accomplish the JTF mission. Likewise, a theater special operations command (SOC) commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the operational area assigned by the geographic combatant commander. Also, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF afloat embarked at sea in a forward area. This may be required when force protection and security are of concern, when an HN may not allow a land based JSOTF on its territory, and/or in instances when the JSOTF would be conducting operations primarily in a maritime environment.

   b. The initial establishment of a JSOTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect the COMJSOTF’s ability to rapidly fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in joint SO, into a functioning JSOTF. Therefore, key personnel assigned to a JSOTF staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with a JSOTF HQ, should understand joint SO techniques and procedures in order to alleviate this problem and allow for an efficient standup of the JSOTF.

2. Authority
   a. The establishment of a JSOTF may be based on the recommendation of the theater SOC commander. When recommended, the JFC normally becomes the establishing authority. The core of the JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the theater SOC staff or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may also be specifically established as a joint organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater. When a JSOTF is established and combined with SOF from one or more allied or coalition nations, it is designated a combined JSOTF.

   b. The JSOTF, when formed, is a JTF composed of SOF of more than one Service formed to carry out a specific operation or prosecute SO in support of the theater campaign or other operations as directed. It may have conventional non-SO units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

3. Establishing a JSOTF

   Establishing a JSOTF can be a complex process. When established using the nucleus of a theater SOC staff, it does not negate the Commander, Special Operations Command’s (COMSOC’s) responsibility for continued parallel planning that may affect other
missions or operations ongoing in the SOC’s parent theater. The establishment of the JSOTF may impact on the SOC’s other missions by the loss of key SOC staff personnel to the JSOTF.

a. Crisis Development. If a crisis situation develops in a combatant commander’s AOR that could involve the use of military forces, the crisis action planning (CAP) procedures outlined in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will be the framework for the timely development and exchange of information among all participants. As a crisis develops, the geographic combatant commander’s SOC may initiate CAP for that contingency. As the mission evolves, the COMSOC may be tasked to establish a JSOTF, using members of the COMSOC staff as the nucleus or core of the JSOTF staff.

b. Decision Process. CAP provides a basis for higher authority decisions that must be acted upon by the COMJSOTF. JTF and JSOTF establishment normally occurs somewhere between the stages of crisis assessment (Phase II) and COA selection (Phase IV) of CAP. Once a COMJSOTF is designated, the COMJSOTF and JSOTF staff participate in CAP procedures concurrently with the complex task of establishing the JSOTF. Typically the JSOTF HQ will be formed initially for planning only without attached forces.

c. Liaison Officers (LNOs). During CAP, the COMJSOTF may request LNOs from allocated SOF components to assist in mission analysis and COA development. Component LNOs ensure that all capabilities and limitations are considered during the process and that their component commanders remain fully informed of COMJSOTF activities, plans, and intentions. The COMJSOTF may also collocate LNOs with the geographic combatant commander and with the subordinate JFC if designated to assist their staffs on SO capabilities and keep the COMJSOTF informed as to COAs being considered and potential operational requirements. These LNOs can significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance the SOF mission planning and targeting processes. Specific LNO procedures are described in Appendix C, “JSOTF Liaison Personnel Procedures.”
d. **Nucleus of the JSOTF Staff.** The theater COMSOC normally determines how to create the nucleus of a JSOTF staff. A preferred method is to develop JSOTF staffs around a “core” drawn from the theater SOC. Augmentees may then be added to the designated COMJSOTF’s “core staff.” The primary sources of these augmentees will be: a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) augmentation package drawn from the USSOCOM staff and USSOCOM Service component staffs and their subordinate commands; an augmentation package drawn from the staffs of the geographic combatant commander and Service components; and individual mobilization augmentees assigned to the theater SOC.

e. **Timely Establishment of the JSOTF.** A key responsibility is timely establishment of the JSOTF during CAP. Planning should be accomplished in an unconstrained environment and mission analysis completed before forces are determined. It is an incumbent responsibility of the establishing authority to ensure that JSOTF establishment does not inhibit CAP before there has been full evaluation of the assigned mission and COAs.

f. **COMJSOTF Responsibilities.** The COMJSOTF is responsible for making recommendations to the commander, JTF (CJTF) on the proper employment of SOF, and for accomplishing operational missions. The COMJSOTF develops a detailed plan using JOPES for integrated employment of assigned and attached forces based upon an assessment of the operational situation. Other specific responsibilities include the following:

- **Organizing the Force.** COMJSOTF has the authority to organize forces over which he or she has operational control (OPCON) in order to meet mission requirements. The COMJSOTF is also responsible for organizing the JSOTF HQ in a manner to effectively assist in the control of SOF.

- **Defining Operational Areas and Control Measures.** The COMJSOTF may use a variety of means to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same general operational area. To assist in this process, there must be a well-structured deconfliction and coordination process that flows throughout the entire chain of command.

- **Establishing Command Relationships.** The COMJSOTF normally exercises OPCON through subordinate SOF Service component commanders, functional commanders, or task forces. The COMJSOTF also has a variety of command relationships that may be established between subordinate forces. These relationships are discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Command and Control.”

- **Providing SO Operational Direction and Guidance.** The COMJSOTF should provide timely communication of clear-cut missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate. Tasks must be realistic and allow the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.

4. **Organizing a JSOTF Headquarters**

A COMJSOTF may organize the JSOTF HQ as necessary to carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities. There are several options that may be used to form a JSOTF HQ (e.g., use a theater SOC HQ, augment a core SOF component HQ, or form ad hoc from various SOF contributors). Whichever the option, a building process will be necessary. Additionally, this process must support the JSOTF mission and provide the best opportunity for success. When fully organized, the JSOTF staff will be composed...
of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service SOF having significant forces assigned to the command. COMJSOTF will make the final decision on the composition of the HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus, as required. Figure II-1 depicts a notional JSOTF HQ organization.

a. **Staff Assignment Considerations**

- Reasonably representative of force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of members among the participating Service SOF.

- Filling key positions of responsibility with members from Service SOF will be based in part on the mission and type of SO to be conducted.

- JSOTF composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support.

b. **Augmentees.** When mission requirements exceed the JSOTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), the COMJSOTF should request assistance through the JSOTF establishing authority. USCINCSOC also may be tasked to provide assistance through

![Figure II-1. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization](image-url)
its assigned Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces. Staff officers who augment the JSOTF nucleus from combatant commands or the Services should be trained as part of the joint training and exercise program and qualified to fill nominated JSOTF augmentation billets. In addition, the COMJSOTF should consider which organizations or entities need to be augmented to support core SOF components. As examples, does a special forces operations base (SFOB) (location) require augmentation to support Army SO? Is the naval special warfare task group (NSWTG) (a HQ) self-sufficient or does it require assistance? Does the Air Force special operations detachment (AFSOD) (a tailored detachment) require specific augmentee expertise to perform its mission? Are joint or Service space support teams needed to support operations? Will an operational staff be required to operate in a forward area embarked as a JSOTF afloat? Early planning for total augmentation requirements provides a basis for programming resources and training.

c. Response Cells. An establishing authority may have a cell of experts prepared to augment a JSOTF (although normally augmentation is made to a JTF) to provide assistance in the early stages of augmentation and planning. These deployable packages and cells, found at the geographic combatant command level, can be tailored to provide assistance to a JSOTF for a limited duration.

d. Orientation Program. A staff and facilities orientation program should be established to ensure that all individuals assigned to the JSOTF staff become thoroughly familiar with the established staff operating procedures within the JSOTF. It could be accomplished through the establishment of a joint personnel reception center (JPRC), a short training program, or even use of a “buddy” system whereby an experienced JSOTF staff member mentors a newly assigned individual. Whatever the program, the result should improve the efficiency of the staff and lead to joint team building.

5. JSOTF Headquarters Staff Functions and Responsibilities

a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1)

- Functions
The JSOTF J-1 provides oversight of joint personnel planning and operations, joint personnel services coordination, and joint manpower management for the JSOTF. If the mission is limited, the HQ staff will likely be small, and will have few if any, special staff officers. In this event, the J-1 may be responsible for (or under authority of the HQ commandant) oversight of additional staff functions such as legal; public affairs (PA); casualty reporting; finance; religious affairs; safety; provost marshal; postal operations; and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR).

The J-1 must be knowledgeable of the various Service, theater, and USSOCOM personnel policies. However, assigned and attached SOF elements will receive their manpower and personnel support through normal Service channels. Normally, the chief concern for the JSOTFJ-1 is to ensure that the command has the necessary personnel to execute the COMJSOTF’s operation plan (OPLAN).

The majority of the JSOTF J-1 tasks are of a general nature and differ little from those performed by any staff officer charged with manpower and personnel duties in a US JTF HQ. These include the development and coordination of personnel policies and plans; providing appropriate input to the JSOTF Operations Directorate (J-3) and Logistics Directorate (J-4) for the personnel section of JSOTF OPLANs; the maintenance of current personnel estimates, personnel readiness, and casualty reporting; oversight and planning of the JSOTF personnel replacement program; and the projection of future JSOTF personnel requirements, to include RC augmentation. The JSOTF J-1 also manages the command’s evaluation reporting, awards and decorations, and leave programs. Additionally, the J-1 will provide assistance to the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (J-4) on an as-required basis. The JSOTF J-1 assists the mortuary affairs effort by managing the entry points for the casualty reporting and casualty notification systems for the Services. (The HQ commandant, under the purview of the J-1, will ensure that the necessary medical, dental, and preventive medicine facilities and support are available to the HQ element.) Finally, the J-1 establishes and performs the JSOTF message distribution center administrative function, as well as the postal service (may be delegated to the HQ commandant) for the JSOTF HQ.

Some J-1 tasks are performed differently during SO than they are performed in conventional joint forces. What differentiates SO-specific J-1 tasks from general personnel and manpower tasks is that they must be applied to properly address the SO-specific dimensions of manpower and personnel matters. Additionally, because SO missions are often conducted in remote regions outside of established support areas, routine personnel-related duties may require effort beyond that required of a conventional staff.

SO-unique situations affect several of the general joint manpower and personnel J-1 functions and will differ with the principal SO mission being performed. For example, during FID, the JSOTF J-1 may have mission-essential duties in addition to those associated with the JSOTF HQ itself. In these situations, the J-1 may be advising, assisting, and training an indigenous HN military organization. During UW missions, the J-1 may be deeply involved in monitoring personnel strength, health, and readiness of a US-supported insurgent force. Thus,
the J-1 can easily be involved in activities beyond the duties generally associated with a personnel and administrative staff officer. A notional JSOTF J-1 organization is depicted in Figure II-2.

- **Responsibilities**

  - Administer personnel programs, entitlements and benefits, MWR, postal services, and personnel support for contingency operations; prepare evaluation reports, and awards and decorations recommendations.

  - Participate in JSOTF planning, mission analysis, and COA development.

  - Prepare the personnel estimates and annex (Annex E) to the OPLAN.

  - Prepare and maintain the joint manning document. Request augmentation as required.

  - Establish and effectively operate the Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) and JPRC, as directed.

  - Advise the COMJSOTF on matters concerning JSOTF component personnel replacement plans and status.

  - Monitor unit strengths, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports, casualty reports, and critical reports of personnel shortages.

  - Maintain records to support recommendations for joint unit and individual DOD awards and decorations.

**Figure II-2. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-1 Organization**
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The JSOTF J-1 provides appropriate endorsements in accordance with (IAW) COMJSOTF guidance.

• Implement and monitor the JSOTF safety program and recommend remedial actions.

• Ensure that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate operations security (OPSEC) vulnerabilities.

• In consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), administer policies and procedures for enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, other detained persons, and formerly captured or missing US personnel.

• Administer policies and procedures for indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.

• Assist in the planning and administration of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).

• Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on Personnel, refer to JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

b. Intelligence Directorate (J-2)

• Functions

• The primary function of the J-2 is to support the COMJSOTF and staff by providing timely indications and warning and by ensuring the availability of intelligence on the characteristics of the joint special operations area (JSOA) and, in coordination with the CJTF, the joint operations area (JOA). Members of the directorate actively participate in joint staff planning and coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling of intelligence efforts. The JSOTF J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose adversary capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. A notional JSOTF J-2 organization is depicted in Figure II-3.

• The JSOTF J-2 also has the functional responsibility for providing intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) to support JSOTF assigned and attached forces. The JSOTF J-2 must be responsive to intelligence taskings and requests from higher HQs, lateral HQs, and subordinate SOF components. Additionally, the J-2 is the access point for joint force acquisition of JSOTF-produced intelligence and CI products. The J-2 supervises the production and maintenance of target intelligence packages (TIPs) and ensures that intelligence is integrated from all sources.

For further information on Intelligence, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

SO intelligence may differ from that used by conventional forces in that it is often more detailed and more perishable, particularly in missions to combat terrorism and for the insertion or extraction of SOF. It can also be more broad-gauged and all encompassing than most military intelligence. This is especially true for FID, UW, and IO-related missions, in which target-area social, political, and economic information as well as adversary infrastructure data is germane to the missions that SOF are expected to accomplish. The JSOTF J-2 may request the deployment of a national intelligence support team (NIST). A NIST provides a tailored national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations.

• Responsibilities

• Tailor intelligence production, architecture, systems, and support to
the specific, unique mission requirements.

- As required, establish a joint intelligence support element (JISE) and a tactical sensitive compartmented information facility (TSCIF).

- Develop, refine, and update the JSOTF intelligence estimate, based on the CJTF estimates, to provide a common understanding and view of the battlespace.

- Write and provide Annex B and Annex M of the JSOTF operation order (OPORD) to the JSOTF J-3.

- Identify communication link requirements for feeding space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance into key operations and intelligence centers supporting SO.

- Request support from the theater J-2 for TIPs for pre-planned targets, and for assistance and input in the development of TIPs for emerging missions. This support normally is provided by the supported combatant commander’s intelligence assets.

- Act as the central point of contact for intelligence requests for information (RFIs) within the JSOTF HQ and components. Answer RFIs when possible and validate and forward other RFIs as appropriate, using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers. Prioritize and track RFIs, and review RFI responses for content and completeness of answers.

- Provide intelligence support to targeting within the JISE/Joint Operations Center (JOC), and to the joint planning group (JPG).

- Assist the JSOTF J-3 in developing and refining priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information and the commander’s critical information requirements.

- Provide support to the JSOTF J-3 in the planning and execution of IO and its constituent capabilities and related activities such as OPSEC and deception.

- Plan for and conduct CI and human resource intelligence as appropriate.

- Provide intelligence summaries IAW JTF guidance to the next higher HQ, laterally, to components, and other coordinating agencies and pass time-sensitive information collected by SOF assets to the JTF JISE in a timely manner.

- Assign and task intelligence resources within the JSOTF.

- Provide threat assessments to the HQ Commandant in support of antiterrorism and force protection. Update as required.

- Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on Intelligence, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support.

c. Operations Directorate

- Functions

- The JSOTF J-3 assists the COMJSOTF in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the directorate plans, coordinates, and integrates SO with that of the conventional supported commander. Should the JSOTF HQ not include a Plans Directorate (J-5), the J-3 would also perform long-range or future planning functions. A notional JSOTF J-3 organization is depicted in Figure II-4.

- The JSOTF J-3 leads the JSOTF HQ CAP and assists the J-5 (if organized) in deliberate planning. The J-3 plans and coordinates the employment of assigned and attached forces. The J-3 establishes the JSOTF HQ JOC and monitors assigned and attached forces’ readiness to accomplish tasks assigned to the COMJSOTF.
The JSOTF J-3 provides oversight and integration of SOF-relevant IO.

**Responsibilities**

- Provide oversight of current operations and planning for emerging missions.
- Maintain a current operations estimate.
- Maintain the JSOTF standing operating procedure (SOP).
- Prepare OPLANs, OPORDs, reports, and records.
- In coordination with the J-2, J-5 and the SJA, recommend changes and disseminate rules of engagement (ROE).
- Review and recommend approval or disapproval of subordinate unit proposed COAs and OPORDs.
- Recommend SO, priorities for operational support, task organization, and JSOA boundaries.
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- Coordinate staging areas, airspace, and JSOTF operations with those of other friendly forces.

- In coordination with J-2, establish and enforce OPSEC procedures, to include focal point and special access programs.

- Monitor JSOTF HQ liaison elements.

- Plan and coordinate cover and deception activities and review evasion and recovery plans.

- Plan and coordinate comprehensive SOF support to JFC’s personnel recovery strategy.

- Prevent fratricide.

- Coordinate space operations supporting SO with the JFC-designated coordinating or supported authority for space.

- Direct after-action reviews (AARs) and reporting requirements.

- Operate the rescue coordination center (RCC).

- Operate unconventional assisted recovery coordination centers to manage unconventional assisted recovery missions for the operational area.

- Manage the special access program (level of control is based on the criticality of the program and the assessed hostile intelligence threat) and focal point system.

- Provide operational oversight of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of SOF.

- Represent SOF activities to JTF/CJTF groups such as the Joint Coordination and Targeting Board (JTCB) and IO cell.

- Develop Annexes C, G, H, J, N, R, S, T, U, and X, to include COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans. Identify space requirements in these annexes as required.

- In conjunction with J-5 and SJA, participate in ROE development, keep ROE under review, and request changes as they become necessary for mission accomplishment.

- Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on Operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Doctrine for Operations.

d. Logistics Directorate

- Functions

- The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, transportation, field services, general engineering, contracting, host-nation support (HNS), and other logistic activities, as directed. If there is no command surgeon attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 is also responsible for health services; if a command surgeon is attached, health services and medical support planning are stand-alone functions of the surgeon. If there is no budget officer attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 may perform this function. A notional JSOTF J-4 organization is depicted in Figure II-5.

- While SOF logistic support is primarily a Service responsibility unless inter-Service agreements are in effect, the J-4 must monitor the JSOTF’s logistic readiness to ensure successful accomplishment of the COMJSOTF’s assigned tasks. The routine sustainment of attached forces is monitored by the J-4
who is responsible for recommending logistic priorities to the COMJSOTF, monitoring Service support to SOF, arranging inter-Service support agreements when advantageous, and coordinating SO peculiar logistic support with USSOCOM.

**Responsibilities**

- Provide logistic oversight of SOF in the operational area.
- Manage external logistic support for the COMJSOTF and staff. The HQ commandant and/or J-1 normally provides internal support to the JSOTF.
- Comply with logistic procedures established by the JTF.
- Coordinate support requirements for SOF components, first from the parent Service, then with other SOF components. If unsuccessful, then coordinate with the JTF J-4 logistics readiness center (LRC) to satisfy the requirement.
- Coordinate all SOF service component requests for SO-peculiar supplies and equipment items through USSOCOM to the special operations forces support activity (SOFSA).
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• Maintain a current logistic estimate to delineate the specific requirements that apply to logistic estimates or provide references that will clarify what is involved.

• Monitor and report equipment readiness status of the JSOTF.

• Recommend controlled supply rates of critical resources.

• Ensure the accountability of supplies and equipment.

• Plan, coordinate, and monitor administrative movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

• Coordinate with JSOTF Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate (J-6) to ensure that communications and automated systems will support the JTF logistic operations. The JSOTF J-4 should identify those systems to which JSOTF J-4 access is required to support logistic operations and to quantify logistic communication requirements.

• Recommend stock levels for SOF support.

• Provide logistic status to higher HQ.

• Support operational resupply of SOF.

• In conjunction with the J-5, plan and coordinate for strategic and operational movement of SOF via the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL).

• In coordination with the supported combatant commander’s designated component, provide and/or ensure that adequate logistic support is provided to SOF during joint RSOI IAW the supported combatant commander’s reception plan.

• Develop Annex D and P to COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.

• Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those prisoners of war (POWs), civilian internees, and other detained persons.

• Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.

• Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on Logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

e. Plans Directorate

• Functions

• The JSOTF J-5 conducts deliberate planning for the JSOTF, develops and recommends C2 arrangements, coordinates ROE with the J-3, may represent the command at the JTF JTCB, and may chair the JSOTF targeting panel if designated. The J-5 may participate in the JTF or combatant command’s campaign and concept planning. The J-5 also projects future SOF requirements for material, organization, and doctrine based on an analysis of current operations. Additionally, the J-5 develops the JSOTF time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) in coordination with the JSOTF J-3 and J-4 and manages the JSOTF Global Command and Control System (GCCS) link in concert with the J-6. When required, the J-5 provides the JSOTF
input for the JOPES. A notional JSOTF J-5 organization is depicted in Figure II-6.

- SO planning procedures differ from those found in other JTF HQ. While the JSOTF HQ is involved in deliberate planning and CAP, detailed tactical mission planning is accomplished by the implementing SOF element. The JSOTF J-5 normally is occupied with the command’s deliberate or future planning cell. The J-5 also plays an important supporting role to the J-3 in CAP. The J-5 is the primary JSOTF HQ planning representative at the combatant command or JTF HQ for deliberate planning and will normally write and coordinate the SO portion of the higher HQ plans. A JSOTF rarely conducts unilateral SO campaign planning; however, for protracted UW operations, a JSOTF subordinate campaign plan may be appropriate.

- During the execution phase of an operation, the J-5 is the JSOTF’s future planner. The J-5 is responsible for translating strategic guidance into future planning for the JSOTF. In this role, the J-5 develops SO tasks to support each phase of the operation, develops future plans, and passes these plans to the J-3 for coordination and tasking to the subordinate components. The J-5 analyzes the operation and develops SO tasks for operations planned 72 hours in advance and beyond.

### Responsibilities

- Prepare and coordinate required OPLANs or OPORDs in support of the assigned COMJSOTF missions. These plans or orders may exist as a coordinated part of, or in response to, the supported combatant commander’s planning directive or a directive by the COMJSOTF. It also includes preparation, as directed, for OPLANs or OPORDs in support of future operations.

- Develop COAs within the framework of the JSOTF assigned objective or mission, forces available, and
commander’s intent. This includes: anticipating tactical and operational opportunities and risks and recommending supporting ROE; wargaming; synchronizing combat power in support of each COA; consideration of command relationships; and identifying decision criteria to support analysis of the developed COA.

- Promulgate the commander’s decision in planning directives, OPLANs, or OPORDs.
- Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase of the operation.
- Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQ, as required.
- Determine forces required and available and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.
- Ensure that the SOF requirements are entered in JOPES.
- Provide planning recommendations for HNS.
- Provide assistance to the J-3 in the preparation of orders.
- Coordinate and review the TPFDD input through GCCS.
- Coordinate with the J-3 to ensure that politico-military activities such as NEO, civil-military operations (CMO), and civil affairs (CA) activities are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassy and HN governments from a strategy and policy perspective.
- Participate in ROE development.
- Form and operate the JPG as directed.
- Provide input to Appendix 4 to Annex C of JTF OPLAN.
- Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

f. C4 Systems Directorate

- Functions
  - The J-6 has the functional responsibility for communications, electronics, and automated information systems (AIS) in support of the COMJSOTF. This includes development and integration of command, control, communications, and computers (C4) architecture and plans that support the command’s operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the JSOTF mission. A notional JSOTF J-6 organization is depicted in Figure II-7.

  - The directorate not only provides communications and computer systems within the JSOTF HQ, but it effects coordination with second party providers such as the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) and 112th Signal Battalion (SO) to provide circuits over satellite, radio, and other communications links.

- Responsibilities
  - Establish the JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems requirements and participate in COMJSOTF planning meetings,
component planning meetings, and the JSOTF JLG planning meetings.

- Establish communications with the supported combatant commander or higher JFC and with adjacent components.

- Assist J-2 personnel in establishing sensitive compartmented information (SCI) communications (as needed).

- Act as liaison between the JSOTF and second party providers.

- Manage and maintain the JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems during current operations. This responsibility includes: operating a joint communications control center (JCCC) that includes job control and frequency management; operating a message center and video teleconferencing (VTC) center; coordinating information assurance (IA) and computer network defense (CND) activities for JSOTF networks and information systems; and
providing automated data processing equipment (ADPE) administration.

- Prepare communications estimate, communications plans, and communications annexes to OPLANS and OPORDs. Ensure that use of satellite communications (SATCOM) is addressed in these supporting documents.

- Monitor readiness status of communications equipment.

- Establish joint communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI).

- Establish and maintain JSOTF IA and OPSEC defensive information capabilities. This includes maintaining programs such as communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), information operations condition (INFOCON), and CND.

- Other responsibilities as directed.

*For further information on C4, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.*

**Staff Judge Advocate**

*Functions.* The SJA is the COMJSOTF’s legal advisor on all legal issues across all legal disciplines. In order to ensure that the JSOTF complies with international law, domestic law, and DOD regulations, the JSOTF SJA coordinates with the JTF SJA and JSOTF component commands. The SJA performs legal functions as a participant in the JPG.

- Legal professionals provide decision makers with the information and analysis they need to help evaluate options, assess risks, and make informed decisions within the bounds of international and domestic law. The SJA applies a comprehensive understanding of doctrine, strategy, and the law to help commanders evaluate the alternatives necessary to plan, train, mobilize, deploy, employ forces, and then transition to peace. From the earliest stages of planning, execution, and redeployment, legal professionals play a vital role in preparation of the battlespace by identifying and assisting in the resolution of legal and political constraints as well as providing relevant and responsive readiness programs to the military member.

**Responsibilities**

- In consultation with the COMJSOTF, J-5, and J-3, assist in ROE development, both initial and supplemental, and provide expertise on all ROE that apply to an operation or exercise. Once familiar with the ROE, the SJA must apply it to SOF missions and explain and disseminate the legal implications of the ROE to the participating SOF.

- Participate as a member of the JPG and IO cell and provide expertise on legal issues that apply to emerging missions.

- Participate in targeting cells to ensure compliance with the law of war.

- Advise COMJSOTF on the impact of international law and agreements affecting the mission.

- Provide legal advice to COMJSOTF and the JSOTF Targeting Panel as part of the target validation phase of the targeting cycle.

- Draft the legal appendix (Appendix 4 to Annex E) to the JSOTF OPORD that
will include direction and guidance on international law, administrative law, civil law (including contract, environmental, and fiscal law), claims, military justice (to include general orders) and legal assistance.

- Advise the COMJSOTF on all disciplinary and military justice issues, with particular attention to Article 15 and courts-martial convening authority.

- Oversee the reporting and investigation of incidents including law of war violations, claims, loss of equipment or funds, and personal injury or death.

- Coordinate with the J-2 to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements.

- Review, as required, future expenditures to ensure compliance with fiscal law and regulations.

- Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on the SJA, refer to JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.

h. **Public Affairs Officer (PAO)**

- **Functions.** The PAO advises the commander on the impact that JSOTF operations are likely to have on public attitude, PA policies of higher HQ, and the command’s need for media products. Additionally, a PAO will usually serve as the JSOTF public spokesperson and will prepare the PA portion of OPLANs and OPORDs. In FID and UW missions, and those missions involving extensive interaction with an indigenous population, the PAO may also serve as the link between the command and local press and broadcast entities.

- **Responsibilities**
  - Develop a PA plan and guidance prior to deployment and update as required.
  - Ensure that PA assets are deployed with the JSOTF command group.
  - Establish PA communications strategy based on guidance from the COMJSOTF.
  - Develop Annex F (Public Affairs) to the COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate campaign plans.
  - Ensure that the PA, CA, and PSYOP activities are coordinated and deconflicted, while keeping them separate and distinct.
  - Establish and participate in the joint information bureau (JIB), as appropriate. If a JSOTF does not establish a JIB, participate in the JTF JIB.
  - Depending on the scope and duration of an operation, coordinate with the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, as appropriate.
  - Coordinate the use of combat camera assets.
  - Participate in JSOTF or JTF IO cell offensive and defensive capability planning and execution.
  - Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

i. **Surgeon**
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• **Functions.** The surgeon establishes, monitors, and evaluates JSOTF health service support (HSS) for the COMJSOTF and SOF components.

• **Responsibilities**
  • Advises the COMJSOTF on medical support.
  • Plans and manages medical support and medical resupply to joint SOF during operations.
  • Coordinates SOF theater casualty evacuation policy with the JTF or supported combatant commander staffs, as appropriate.
  • Provides medical technical supervision and coordination of SOF treatment facility activities.
  • Coordinates SOF medical support, including medical logistics, to prevent duplication of effort.
  • Manages the command preventive medicine program.
  • Completes all required medical reports and messages.
  • Publishes Annex Q to the COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, and subordinate campaign plans, as appropriate.
  • Identify medical PIR and RFIs to the J-2.
  • Assess allied, coalition, HN, and NGO organizations’ HSS asset availability.
  • As required, coordinate with the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center and the area Joint Blood Program Office and disseminate medical regulating and blood management procedures.
  • Other responsibilities as directed.

*For further information on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.*

j. **Chaplain**

• **Functions.** The chaplain is the COMJSOTF’s primary staff officer in the areas of religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion. The chaplain is the commander’s adviser on indigenous religions and local religious practices. Broadly stated, the chaplain’s mission is to “support the living, comfort the sick or wounded, and honor the dead.” The chaplain is responsible to ensure that adequate religious support is provided to all task force members regardless of service.

• **Responsibilities**
  • Is of rank and experience level commensurate with the size and composition of the task force.
  • Represents, when feasible, the religious denomination of the preponderance of personnel in the task force.
  • Is primarily responsible to the COMJSOTF, but will receive guidance and coordinating instructions from the parent unified command or JTF chaplain.
  • Reports as required to the unified command or JTF chaplain and to the command chaplain of the parent Service component.
  • Performs ministry according to the manner and dictates of his or her
denomination and coordinates ministry within the JSOTF according to service practice.

- Provides technical assistance, coordination, and supervision to task force ministry teams of all Services; ensures that they receive program funding, logistic, and personnel support through appropriate staff channels; coordinates a JSOTF religious support plan which will provide adequate chaplain coverage to all elements of the JSOTF; and recommends chaplain personnel replacement or rotational policies to cognizant staff agencies.

- Performs liaison as appropriate with community, social, welfare, and religious organizations.

- Maintains frequent communications with the unified command or JTF chaplain. Assists all task force chaplains in communicating regularly with their components.

- Drafts the Chaplain Activities appendix (Appendix 6 to Annex E) to the JSOTF OPORD.

- Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on chaplain functions, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.

k. **Budget Officer**

- **Functions.** The budget officer is the COMJSOTF’s financial manager and advisor. In lieu of a budget officer, the J-4 may perform this function. Financial resource management functions include obtaining various obligation authorities, funds control, cost capturing, and cost reporting.

- **Responsibilities**

  - Serves as principal financial management advisor to the COMJSOTF and as focal point for JSOTF financial management matters.

  - Establishes JSOTF financial management responsibilities.

  - Ensures that established fiscal responsibility is maintained.

  - Provides estimates of resource requirements, budgetary guidance and fund control to the JSOTF subordinate commands, the JTF, and the supported combatant commander as required. Provides actual and estimated cost and resource requirements to the supported JTF and/or supported combatant commander. Is prepared to furnish the financial status of the operation.

  - Establishes fiscal controls to ensure the efficient use of resources. This may include publishing procedures as necessary to address items such as ADPE and copier procurement, local purchase thresholds, and the establishment of blanket purchase agreements.

  - Coordinates with the JSOTF J-1 on pay and allowances for the JSOTF personnel.

  - Coordinates with the JSOTF J-4 on logistic requirements and support to ensure that they compliment the financial management responsibilities.

  - Coordinates with the SJA and/or legal advisor on fiscal and contract issues.

  - Coordinates with JSOTF HQ commandant on funding for internal JSOTF sustainment support funding.
• Coordinates with contracting officer for the legal review of contracts.

• Obtains necessary advice from SJA to ensure that expenditures comply with fiscal law and regulation.

• Develops Appendix 3 to Annex E to COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.

• Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on budget functions, refer to JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Financial Management During Joint Operations.

1. HQ Commandant

• Functions. The HQ Commandant is appointed by the COMJSOTF and, working closely with the J-1, is responsible for all aspects of the HQ support activity operations. The HQ commandant assumes initial responsibility for all equipment and facilities assigned to the JSOTF HQ and assigns subsequent responsibilities to personnel and agencies in direct control of those designated areas. The HQ commandant and HQ support activity is capable of providing essential day-to-day administrative and logistic support and sustainment to the JSOTF HQ in a field environment. The myriad of functions and responsibilities of the HQ commandant and the support activity staff require early coordination with the J-1 and J-3 in the planning process. There are numerous possibilities concerning the organization of the HQ commandant element. Each mission will dictate the requirements, capabilities, and structure of the organization. A notional HQ commandant element is depicted in Figure II-8.

• Responsibilities. The task support activity areas that follow are common to most operations for a JSOTF HQ. Certain procedures may vary. Preliminary requirements can be identified through the conduct of a site survey.

![Figure II-8. Notional Headquarters Commandant Element](image-url)
• Unit-level logistic support to include: billeting, transportation, messing, medical and dental facilities, certain preventive medicine support, sanitation, environmental protection, engineering and construction requirements, and supply functions necessary to maintain the operation of the HQ element.

• Postal administration. This may require a terminal capability, distribution, collection, financial support, security, and customs and agriculture support.

• Determines specific personnel and equipment needs, as well as sources to support camp functions. Conducts a mission analysis early in the planning process.

• Assists the J-1 in operating the JPRC. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.

• Ensures the operation of the MWR program. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.

• Provides for camp physical security operations. Coordinates with the J-2 to address intelligence oversight and the J-3 to address force protection requirements. Ensures that a threat assessment is completed and measures identified to combat each threat. Also considers: rear area security, physical security of classified material, visitor control, refugee assistance, traffic control and flow within the HQ area, internment facilities, and other security considerations as warranted.

• Coordinates movement, deployment, and redeployment of base camp operations.

• Ensures that coordination has been accomplished for JSOTF advanced echelon elements.

• Develops Appendix 5 to Annex E to COMJSOTF’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.

• Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on personnel, refer to JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

6. Boards, Centers, and Cells

The COMJSOTF may elect to form any number and type of organizational structures within the JSOTF HQ to support the mission. The first step in that decisionmaking process is to determine what organizational structures (boards, bureaus, centers, and cells) have been formed by the CJTF and/or what organizational structures have been delegated to the COMJSOTF as the principal commander to operate. Then the COMJSOTF formulates which JSOTF HQ organizations (and LNOs or staff officers) are best suited to support both the CJTF concept of operations and the JSOTF mission. Typically, the COMJSOTF forms subordinate organizations, each under the supervision of a specific staff director, to support the mission (Figure II-9). (The JVB and JPRC, under the direction of the J-1, have been discussed previously in this chapter. The remaining organizations will be discussed in the functional chapters that follow.)

7. JSOTF Headquarters Staff Checklists

Detailed checklists that may be of assistance to the JSOTF principal staff (J-1 through J-6, HQ Commandant, and SJA) are provided in Appendix D, “JSOTF HQ Staff Checklists.”
8. **Notional JSOTF Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline**

A theater SOC or Service SOF unit that may be tasked to establish a JSOTF HQ may consider the need for preparing a SOP for use when organizing a JSOTF. It may be used for both exercises and actual contingencies, as appropriate. A notional outline for a JSOTF SOP is provided in Appendix E, “Notional JSOTF Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline.”
CHAPTER III  
COMMAND AND CONTROL

“If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well.”

Stonewall Jackson, Winchester, Virginia, Nov 1861

1. General

SOF may be assigned to either USCINCSOC or a geographic combatant commander. OPCON of SOF (less CA and PSYOP in theater) normally is exercised by the theater SOC, through the CJTF, and further through the COMJSOTF. Normally, C2 of a SOF is exercised by a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or COMJSOTF. Commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

a. Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.

b. Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.

c. Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.

d. Integrate SOF in the planning process.

e. Match mission capabilities with mission requirements.

2. Command Relationships

SOF are most effective when fully integrated and synchronized into the overall campaign plan from war to MOOTW. Given the ability of SOF to operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall campaign, or in support of a conventional commander, effective coordination and integration of the overall effort is dependent on a robust C2

SO missions may emanate from the highest levels of the C2 structure.
structure. Successful execution of SO requires centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2. The limited window of opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 is tailored for each specific mission or operation.

3. Relationship to a Geographic Combatant Commander

a. SOF in the Continental United States (CONUS). USCINCSOC may provide a JSOTF from CONUS-based forces to a supported geographic combatant commander for operational employment as directed by the Secretary of Defense. If this transfer is permanent, the force will be reassigned, with the gaining combatant commander exercising combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over the reassigned force. If temporary, the force will be attached, with the gaining combatant commander normally exercising OPCON over the attached force.

b. SOF in Theater. A JSOTF formed from forces assigned to a theater is under COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. The combatant commander normally exercises COCOM of all assigned and OPCON of all attached SOF (less CA and PSYOP) through the theater SOC, but may choose to exercise COCOM of SOF through other subordinate commanders (see Figure III-1).

4. Relationship to a Subordinate Joint Force Commander

a. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components will
normally have SOF organized as a functional component. As a subordinate component of the joint force, the JFSOCC also may be designated as the COMJSOTF if the JFC establishes a JSOTF. The COMJSOTF controls assigned SOF as well as any conventional forces provided by the subordinate JFC in support of specific missions.

b. If a JTF is constituted and so designated by the establishing authority, a JSOTF may be assigned to the superior JTF. If the JSOTF is to be transferred to the JTF for an unknown but long period of time, the JSOTF may be assigned; if the transfer is of short duration, the JSOTF would be attached. The CJTF exercises OPCON over assigned (and normally over attached) forces through designated component or subordinated task force commanders (the JSOTF). The COMJSOTF also may serve as the JFSOCC for the CJTF. It is the CJTF responsibility to determine the basis on which JTF component and subordinate task force commanders will exercise C2 and to clearly assign responsibilities, authorities, and command relationships (see Figure III-2).

5. JSOTF Command and Control Considerations

a. Planning

• C2 arrangements and relationships during planning should be specified in the initiating directive (such as the warning order, alert or planning order, and execute order) issued by the JSOTF establishing authority.

• If not, the designated COMJSOTF immediately should request this guidance from the JSOTF establishing authority and ensure that this guidance is forwarded expeditiously to designated JSOTF component commanders when received.

• In the continued absence of this guidance, the designated COMJSOTF should review pertinent available OPLANs and operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) for related C2 guidance in the prospective JOA.

b. Deployment. SOF units deploying from CONUS deploy under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Deployment Orders issued through USCINCSOC, following Secretary of Defense approval. Normally, they are not transferred to the designated COMJSOTF until conditions for transfer are met within the deployment orders.

c. Employment

• C2 for employment of JSOTF forces should be clearly established in the appropriate OPORDs of the JSOTF, component, and subordinate task forces.

• Initial C2 arrangements may be designated in OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans and modified as required during JSOTF operations in the JOA.

d. Termination

• Termination C2 considerations should be included in planning from the very beginning.

• Level of attainment of end state objectives will have some impact on the configuration of C2 arrangements and relationships, particularly the requirements to provide organic sustainment and self-protection during the termination phase in a JOA where little, if any, HNS is available. The COMJSOTF should maintain C2 of assigned and attached forces in the JOA until the last increment is redeployed.

e. Transition
• Transition C2 considerations will vary greatly from situation to situation, but should take into account the nature of envisioned continuing operations in the former JOA and the make-up of the forces involved (i.e., other US forces or a multinational force). Transition should also consider if certain SOF will remain in the JOA on continuing missions.

• The supported JFC should provide specific C2 guidance as soon as it is determined that JSOTF operations will transition to follow-on operations.

f. **Redeployment.** C2 of redeploying SOF should remain with the COMJSOTF in the JOA until the CJTF is relieved of responsibility for JSOTF operations in the
JOA. As with deployment, SOF units normally redeploy under CJCS Redeployment Orders issued through USCINCSOC, following Secretary of Defense approval. Transfer of forces from the COMJSOTF occurs when conditions of the redeployment orders have been met.

6. JSOTF Command and Control of Assigned Forces

A notional JSOTF organization, structured in a manner similar to a conventional JTF and one that would likely be established in response to strategic planning process scenarios. The COMJSOTF may exercise C2 of attached SO or conventional forces through a number of organizations. These include, but are not limited to, the following.

a. Army SO. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) denote a subordinate unit, not an HQ.

• Army Special Operations Component (ARSOC). An ARSOC is the Army component of a joint force SO component.

• Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF). ARSOTF is a general term to describe a group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO, organized around the nucleus of a special forces (SF) or Ranger unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The COMJSOTF may establish multiple subordinate ARSOTFs. The COMJSOTF assigns each ARSOTF an area within the JSOA or functional mission under its OPCON.

• SF. SF units normally task organize into a number of operations bases. Used in this sense, the term “operations base” connotes an HQ and support element as well as a physical location. SF operations bases include the SFOB, forward operations base (FOB), and the advanced operations base (AOB).

•• SFOB. The SFOB is established by an SF group to synchronize the activities of subordinate FOBs and/or AOBs. The SFOB normally serves as an ARSOC or ARSOTF HQ directly subordinate to the COMJSOTF.

•• FOB. An FOB is established by an SF battalion to control and support deployed operational elements. Tactical SF elements conduct mission planning and preparation at an FOB. Although generally subordinate to an SFOB, an independent FOB may be established under the OPCON of the COMJSOTF.

•• AOB. An AOB is established by an SF company to extend the C2 and support functions of an FOB. For example, an AOB may function as a launch-and-recovery or radio relay site.

• Rangers. Rangers normally exercise C2 through command posts collocated with other SO or conventional units. They do not have the organic capability to establish their own operations bases.

• Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA). ARSOA are normally assigned to a JSOTF. OPCON may be exercised by the COMJSOTF through either functional or Service components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a JSOAC is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, and under certain circumstances, OPCON of ARSOA may be exercised through the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC).

• Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). Its
function is to synchronize SOF activities with land operations short of the fire support coordination line. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in conjunction with a conventional force. It collocates with the command element of the supported commander. The SOCCE is used by the ARSOF commander to effect tactical control (TACON) to recover ARSOF teams. The SOCCE can also receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed elements of the SOF, and provide them to the supported component HQ. More detailed functions and responsibilities of the SOCCE are provided under “Coordination and Liaison Elements” within this chapter.

b. Air Force SO. AFSOF denote a subordinate unit, not an HQ.

• Air Force Special Operations Component (AFSOC). The AFSOC (not to be confused with the Air Force Special Operations Command that is the Air Force component of USSOCOM) normally is composed of an SO wing or special operations group (SOG). When subordinate AFSOF units deploy to FOBs or AOBs, the Air Force special operations forces (AFSOC) commander may establish one or more of the following provisional units.

  • Air Force Special Operations Detachment. The AFSD is a squadron-size AFSOF unit that could be a composite organization composed of different United States Air Force (USAF) assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC, JSOTF, JSOACC, or JTF depending upon size and duration of the operation.

  • Air Force Special Operations Element (AFSOE). The AFSOE is an element-size AFSOF unit. It normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC or AFSD, depending upon the size and duration of the operation.

  • Aviation Advisory Teams (AATs). AATs are SO teams specifically trained and equipped to provide advisory assistance in interrelated areas of FID and coalition support. They are specifically tailored to assess, advise, and train foreign aviation forces in air operations.

The COMJSOTF has flexibility in the exercise of C2 of attached forces.
employment and sustainability. These teams support the geographic combatant commanders primarily by facilitating the integration and interoperability of US and allied aviation forces support joint or multinational operations. Additionally, they directly support the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) joint air operations plan to ensure appropriateness of air tasks assigned to multinational partners.

c. Navy SO. Navy special operations forces (NAVSOF) denote a subordinate unit, not an HQ.

- **NSWTG or Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU).** NAVSOF assigned to the JSOTF (or Navy component commander) are normally under the C2 of an NSWTG, when activated, or an NSWTU. A task group or task unit staff plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of SO executed by assigned operational elements in support of fleet commanders, JFCs, or the COMJSOTF as appropriate.

- **Naval Special Warfare Task Element (NSWTE).** An NSWTE is a subordinate element of an NSWTU. Should a JSOTF afloat be established, naval special warfare unit (NSW) operational personnel likely would form the core of the JSOTF afloat staff. The staff also may include personnel from other NSWU departments who would function as forward liaison personnel for shore-based administrative and support functions.

d. JSOACC. The JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for planning and executing joint SO air activities, and for ensuring effective coordination, deconfliction, and integration of such activities with conventional air operations. The JSOACC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint SO aviation assets. When a JSOAC is established as a functional component of a JSOTF and under certain circumstances, the COMJSOTF may exercise OPCON of joint SO aviation forces through the JSOACC. However, there are also circumstances where the COMJSOTF may elect to place selected SO aviation assets under separate control. A key responsibility of the JSOACC is to ensure close liaison is accomplished with other SOF components and with the conventional air operations of other Service and/or functional components. The JSOACC ensures liaison with the JFACC is accomplished through the special operations liaison element (SOLE) in the JFACC’s Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). Through the SOLE, the JSOACC ensures SO aviation activities are closely coordinated, deconflicted, and integrated with the JFACC’s operations to ensure airspace deconfliction, flight safety, OPSEC, and unity of effort. The responsibilities of the SOLE are discussed in Paragraph 12, “Coordination and Liaison Elements.”

7. **Logistic Support Relationships**

**Logistic support relationships** among the COMJSOTF, CJTF, geographic combatant commander, and Service components **follow two lines.** Service common support is provided by CJTF Service components. SO-peculiar support is provided by USCINCSOC through the SOF component commands: United States Army Special Operations Command, HQ, AFSOC, and naval special warfare (NSW) command to deployed SOF, or from the SOFSA. For a subset of support functions, the COMJSOTF manages ongoing support provided by the CJTF Service components, based on previous CJTF direction, as well as that support extended by USCINCSOC to SOF components. For example, TPFDD flow requirements are
8. Rules of Engagement

a. Purpose. ROE are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE are the means by which the NCA and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and international law. **ROE are the rules that govern “when, where, against whom and how force can be used.”** ROE may be used to control the use of force in two ways -- self defense or mission accomplishment -- and are based on military, political, and legal considerations. The relative importance of these three considerations can be expected to vary between missions. They must contribute to the morale and fighting spirit of the JSOTF while accomplishing the mission. ROE may change over the duration of an operation. Nothing in the ROE can limit the COMJSOTF’s and subordinate commanders’ inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense to defend the JSOTF and other US forces from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

b. ROE Considerations. ROE issues must be considered during COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection. The supported combatant commander may provide ROE guidance to the subordinate JFC and, in turn, to COMJSOTF via the initial planning documents which precede COA development. Proposed supplemental ROE should be developed, exercised, and modified as necessary to support mission planning during the COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection processes. JSOTF mission objectives must drive the ROE formulation process and not vice versa.

c. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The NCA have provided the SROE for US forces’ stand alone guidance that can be easily and quickly amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in the absence of specific guidance from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular SOF mission. SROE do not apply to multinational forces; civil disturbance operations; disaster relief operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies. Combatant commanders also may augment the SROE in order to respond to mission and threat in their AOR. COMJSOTFs and staffs must understand the military, political, and legal mission objectives that necessitate ROE and be able to distill the SROE and higher authority-specific ROE for the JSOTF.

9. Combat Identification

a. Early Establishment. Combat identification measures must be established early in the JSOTF planning cycle. These measures are particularly important in peace operations and certain traditional noncombat operations conducted in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

b. Consistent with ROE. Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with SOF rights
and responsibilities to engage enemy forces. These measures also must allow the JSOTF to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.

c. Consider in Plans and Orders. Although not required in present OPLAN and OPORD formats, a combat identification appendix to Annex C of the JSOTF OPORD, OPLAN, or subordinate campaign plan outlining COMJSOTF policy and guidance for JSOTF combat identification would provide a basis for combat identification within the JSOA. Supporting component OPORDs or OPLANs would provide the additional detail needed to ensure implementation of a robust JSOTF combat identification program.

10. Interagency Command and Control Considerations

A JTF HQ is the operational focal point for interagency coordination. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ provides the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Dependent on the level of a JSOTF HQ in the command structure of an operation, the JSOTF may play a key role in the interagency process. If the JSOTF is the senior or stand-alone JTF then, de facto, the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal point in the interagency process.

For further information on interagency considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

11. Multinational Command and Control Considerations

a. Command Authority. The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.

b. Use of SOF. When directed, SOF deploy coalition support teams that can provide the COMJSOTF with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating both JSOTF and higher command C2. Coalition support teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations. Coalition support includes assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and combat service support (CSS), and training coalition partners on tactics and techniques. Coalition support may also include providing terminal guidance for employment of munitions by US and coalition aircraft. C2 of coalition support teams will be determined by the JFC.

12. Coordination and Liaison Elements

The COMJSOTF has available to the JSOTF two primary coordination and liaison organizations: the SOCCE to coordinate SOF activities with the conventional land force, and the SOLE to provide liaison to the JFACC or appropriate Service component air C2 facility.

a. SOCCE. The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the
COMJSOTF. Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. The SOCCE normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support of a conventional joint or Service force (for example, a JTF, Army corps or Marine expeditionary force (MEF)). It collocates with the command post of the supported force to coordinate and deconflict SO with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications interoperability with that force. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component HQ. The COMJSOTF and JSOTF component commanders may attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required. The SOCCE is a COMJSOTF C2 element that normally is task-organized around an SF company HQ. The SOCCE remains under the OPCON of the COMJSOTF. The SOCCE performs the following functions.

- Exercise C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct support of, the supported conventional land force.

- Augment or serve as the SO special staff section of the land force HQ.

- Advise the land force commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities, and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.

- Advise the supporting SOF commander(s) of the land force commander’s current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

- Provide required secure communications links.

- Coordinate and deconflict SO activities with land force operations, including SOF support to the land force and land force support to SOF.

- When linkup becomes imminent, assist the land force commander and staff with linkup planning and execution.

b. SOLE

- The COMJSOTF and the JFACC share common operational areas. Therefore, whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with conventional forces, SO aviation and surface assets must be integrated closely with all joint air operations, from planning through execution, to provide integration, coordination, deconfliction, and to prevent fratricide. Integration is crucial, since air assets and SOF are the only forces that routinely operate deep in enemy territory. The SOLE integrates all SO air and surface activity into the air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order (ACO), and serves as the COMJSOTF’s representative to the JFACC or the appropriate C2 facility when a JFACC is not designated. The senior SOLE representative reports directly to the COMJSOTF and coordinates with the JSOTF components.

- The SOLE provides SOF liaison to the JFACC or the appropriate air C2 facility, when a JFACC is not designated. The senior SOLE representative reports directly to the COMJSOTF and coordinates with the JSOTF components. A critical role of the SOLE is to prevent fratricide through shared asset coordination and deconfliction. The SOLE coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates SOF air and surface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance, C2 platforms, and aerial refueling as well as deconfliction of deep battlespace operations. It deploys to the established, alternate, or emerging joint force JAOC, as required. The SOLE is normally staffed
for 24-hour operations in the JAOC. The senior SOLE representative places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel throughout the JAOC staff. Liaison officers must possess the credibility and authority to represent their commanders on time-sensitive and critical issues. SOLE liaison personnel may include SF, ARSOA, sea-air-land (SEAL) team personnel, special tactics personnel, SO weather personnel, aviation advisory personnel, AFSOF fixed-wing and vertical lift operators, space operators, intelligence personnel, targeteers, airspace controllers, logisticians, and operational administrators. These liaisons are provided to the JFACC in the JAOC’s combat plans, combat operations, joint search and rescue center (JSRC), and intelligence staffs. Coordination, deconfliction, and integration of SOF operations are accomplished through the ATO and the airspace control authority’s (ACA’s) ACO. Specific SOLE duties may encompass operations, plans, airspace control, special tactics, combat search and rescue (CSAR), IO intelligence, weather, space support, administrative, and logistic liaison activities. Specific functions include ATO and ACO generation, real-time mission support within the JAOC, operations and intelligence support for targeting, combat airspace control for prevention of fratricide, coordination with special plans functions, and coordination with the JSRC. The SOLE also assists in the deconfliction of JSOAs and unconventional warfare operating areas with the JFACC and JAOC.

- The SOLE ensures that all SOF targets, teams, and air missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated at all planning and execution phases aimed at the prevention of fratricide while accomplishing assigned missions. A typical SOLE organization is shown in Figure III-3.

- The senior SOLE representative may seek COMJSOTF guidance and approval to contribute to joint air operations, as necessary.
Chapter III

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON ELEMENT AREAS OF INTEREST

- Joint Force Commander
- Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force
- Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
- Senior SOLE Representative 0-6, Liaison to JFACC

- COMBAT OPERATIONS DESK IN THE OPS CENTER Coordinates current flying operations in AOC for the SODO
- "SOF" air ops deconflicts current flying monitors drop zone or landing zone operations
- ITO or ATO operations builds SOF section of ITO builds special instructions
- "SOF" ground ops deconflicts SF, SEAL, and STT team locations to prevent fratricide
- Intelligence plans and ops representatives work together
- Logistics representative coordinates logistic concerns including supply, transportation, and contracting
- INTEL coordinates with BCD targeting, airspace, and ops to keep team information current
- COMBAT PLANS INTEGRATE INTO ALL PLANS CELLS coordinates SOF strategy and targets to meet combatant commander’s objectives
- JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER Provides coordination when missions require SOF assists for CSAR
- SPECIAL MISSION COORDINATION SOF liaison officer coordinates to meet commander in chief’s objectives
- "PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS" Advises commando solo deception and leaflet operations; coordinates ITO/ATO inputs
- "GUNSHIPS" Advises on AC-130 Ops
- Combat airspace management builds airspace; Control order protects air and ground assets
- INTEL supports combat ops and plans; attends GAT

AOC: Air Operations Center
ATO: Air Tasking Order
BCD: Battlefield Coordination Detachment
CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue
GAT: Guidance Apportionment Targeting Cell
INTEL: Intelligence
ITO: Integrated Tasking Order
OPS: Operations
SEAL: Sea-Air-Land Team
SF: Special Forces
SODO: Special Operations Duty Officer
SOF: Special Operations Forces
SOLE: Special Operations Liaison Element
STT: Special Tactics Team

Figure III-3. Special Operations Liaison Element Areas of Interest
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

1. General

A JSOTF conducts operations across the full range of military operations from war to MOOTW. In certain situations it may operate independently, but normally operates as part of a joint force. It can conduct operations at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical, depending on the assigned mission and controlling HQ. SOF principal missions and collateral activities may not fall clearly within a specific level of war or range of operations.

2. Operations in War

When directed by the NCA, the geographic combatant commander conducts contingency operations or sustained military operations in response to open hostilities in the theater. As the decisionmaking process evolves, the JSOTF may be established as described in Chapter II, “JSOTF Organization.” When established, the COMJSOTF and staff must consider SOF missions and capabilities as well as expectations of the CJTF before commitment to combat, at the outset of combat, during sustained combat operations, and for considerations for termination and postconflict operations.

a. Considerations Before Combat. During prehostilities, SOF can provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, perform selected offensive IO activities, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access to and influence foreign nations when the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They also can improve the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring. In many instances, SOF may have in-place forces that can have an immediate impact on the transition before combat, at the outset of combat, and termination and postconflict operations. As an example, NAVSOF elements may be operating within or in the proximity of the JOA and could readily form the nucleus of a JSOTF afloat staff. Embarked and operating from a forward platform, they could remain in international waters, prepare the battlefield with sensors, prepare for advance force operations to be conducted by in-theater SOF, and deconflict SOF operations.

b. Considerations at the Outset of Combat. SOF enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative SO can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity (COGs) that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. The JSOTF may frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, IO, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. The JSOTF complements, but is not a substitute for, conventional forces.

c. Sustained Combat Operations. JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space,
and SOF while applying the operational art to conduct the campaign. Examples of likely SOF missions are special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA). At any given point in time during one major operation, one component or major category of operations (such as SO) might constitute the main effort. For example, during the execution of forcible entry operations, SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports and may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They also may conduct SR and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

d. Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations. Termination and transition planning for the JSOTF are covered in Chapter V, “Planning.” However, it is important to note that the JSOTF mission may continue beyond termination and postconflict operations. Continued intelligence gathering and conducting FHA operations are examples. In such events, the COMJSOTF may need to reorganize the JSOTF assets to accomplish the tasks.

For further information on operations in war, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

3. Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and stability, and supporting civil authorities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all aspects of civil and military operations and the military may not be the focus of effort. As a result, the JSOTF may operate under a more restrictive set of ROE. Additionally, the Department of Defense may often be in a support role to another agency such as the Department of State (DOS). In such cases, interagency coordination becomes a critical element of the COMJSOTF planning and operations processes.

a. Types of MOOTW operations are listed in Figure IV-1.

b. JSOTF Key Operational Considerations for MOOTW

• Organizing the JSOTF for the Mission. The COMJSOTF basis for organizing the JSOTF for MOOTW is driven by the range of operations, probable duration of the operation, and potential for evolvement into a semi-permanent organization for extended operations. Additionally, the type of mission may require a range of functional expertise on the part of the JSOTF staff such as linguists, specialized medical personnel, and specific interagency representatives, depending on the mission.

• Consider the Range of MOOTW

• MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Such operations may include peace enforcement, counterterrorism (CT), some FID, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and NEO.

• MOOTW not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Such operations may include FHA, disaster relief, some nation assistance, FID, support to counterdrug (CD) operations, arms control (possible involvement of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)), support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, the
COMJSOTF must consider protection of the JSOTF and be prepared to respond to changing situations.

**Simultaneous Operations.** Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as FHA with peace enforcement operations. It also is possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. In relationship to JSOTF operations, the result could be a change of mission or follow-on mission that could result in a significant change in the JSOTF force structure and the necessity for parallel planning that considers a change from a noncombat to a combat environment.

**Duration of Operations.** Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, in order to achieve the desired end state, some types of MOOTW may continue for an extended period of time. This is particularly true in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or long-term commitment is required to achieve objectives. The duration of the operation depends upon mission objectives and directly impacts the COMJSOTF’s organizational decisions.

*For further information on MOOTW, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.*
4. Joint Operations Center

The COMJSOTF normally organizes a JOC, under the direction of the JSOTF J-3, to serve as the focal point for all operational matters. The JOC should be staffed and equipped to maintain situational awareness; monitor and direct current operations; and plan and coordinate future operations. The JOC, or portions thereof, may be established early during the CAP process, particularly if SOF are considered for early deployment into the operational area. Early establishment of a JOC assists in the timely flow of information during the CAP process since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information.

a. Key Functions. Key functions of the JOC may include the following.

- **Force and Resource Monitoring and Management.** Monitors the current status of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources and provides information to assist in allocating and moving forces and materiel.

- **Planning.** Assists in the preparation of plans relating to current SO. In the absence of a JPG, assimilates these functions and assumes the responsibility for future planning.

- **Direction.** Directs and orchestrates current operations and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the COMJSOTF.

- **Execution.** Supervises and monitors the execution of OPORDs to ensure that COMJSOTF objectives are being met.

- **Situation Monitoring.** Monitors the current situation of JSOTF forces and continuously reviews their progress. Ensures that time-sensitive mission planning is synchronized and integrated with current operational missions.

- **Reporting and Recording.** Prepares operational reports as required; also maintains a staff journal, displays, and files necessary to record operational activities of the JSOTF.


- **Operations Assessment.** Assess actions to identify operational deficiencies and develop methods to improve joint effectiveness.

b. Organization. The JOC’s main organizational divisions are normally current operations and future operations. The JOC may include representation from ground, maritime, and air operations functional cells; an LNO cell; an IO cell; an RCC; a fire support section; and CA and PSYOP representatives as required. Other JSOTF staffs or organizations may be represented in the JOC as the COMJSOTF directs. It may also include the JPG if not organized separately under the supervision of the JSOTF J-5. A notional JOC organization is depicted in Figure IV-2.

5. Mission Execution

The COMJSOTF may direct mission execution personally, or may delegate
OPCON or TACON to a subordinate commander.

a. The COMJSOTF normally delegates OPCON to a SOF component commander for missions conducted primarily by a single SOF element, such as a DA or SR mission conducted by a single SF operational detachment or SEAL platoon. For operations that predominantly are maritime where a numbered fleet commander may be designated as the CJTF, the COMJSOTF may delegate OPCON to a JSOTF afloat. Although the COMJSOTF and component commanders are heavily involved in the targeting and mission planning process, the component commanders normally direct an SF battalion, NSWTU, SO squadron, or similar SOF tactical commander to exercise C2 during mission execution. The COMJSOTF and component commanders monitor execution and deconflict friendly activities that could adversely affect the mission. Mission and mission support status matrices can be used by the COMJSOTF and component commanders to assist in monitoring mission execution. The JOC should also post mission status on its situation maps using the SO mission designation system (Appendix F, “Standard Special Operations Mission Designation”) and use a synchronization matrix and an execution checklist for monitoring of missions (Appendix G, “Execution Checklist”). As an exception to normal C2 procedures, the COMJSOTF or a component commander may exercise direct C2 as the SOF tactical commander of larger and more complex SO
missions, such as a special mission unit hostage rescue, NEO, or a ranger battalion airfield seizure.

b. The SOF tactical commander actively participates in mission preparation (concept development, briefbacks, operational rehearsals, communications exercises) and all phases of execution from staging and infiltration to post mission evaluation.

6. Concept Development

The NCA normally nominate and designate strategic national SOF targets; the geographic combatant commander normally nominates and designates SOF strategic theater and operational targets. Initially, the COMJSOTF may have limited input to the initial targeting process, and higher authority may direct the original mission concept. Political and strategic or operational military considerations may take precedence over tactical considerations at this stage of the mission. However, it is incumbent on the COMJSOTF to ensure that there is command and staff input into the concept development process and that such considerations do not unduly jeopardize mission success or create unacceptable risk to the SOF operational elements. SOF mission selection criteria should be considered in the mission analysis phase of the planning process. In that phase, recommendations are made to the COMJSOTF as to whether the tasked mission is a viable SOF mission.

7. Briefbacks

Briefbacks are decision briefings given by commanders of SOF operational elements to the SOF tactical commander to secure approval of their plans of execution and convince the tactical commander that their elements are fully mission-capable. The tactical commander normally requires briefbacks from each participating element commander before mission execution. Operational elements do not normally provide briefbacks to the COMJSOTF or JSOTF staff; however, given the mission, location, or time available, the COMJSOTF may require a briefback under extraordinary circumstances. Detailed briefbacks are an integral part of mission planning because they:

a. Require subordinate element commanders to conduct a detailed mission analysis and estimate of the situation.

b. Facilitate understanding of the detailed plan of execution by all participating personnel.

c. Provide the tactical commander with the opportunity to evaluate the element’s plan of execution, provide additional guidance and direction if required, and approve the plan for execution.

8. Operational Rehearsals

Rehearsals of key actions, especially actions in the objective area, are a vital part of SO mission preparation.

a. Conventional plans are normally prepared by staff officers sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of the joint force that will ultimately execute the plan. Conventional forces rehearse a plan primarily to understand it and gain efficiencies. The level of training cannot be changed significantly before mission execution. The plan must take into account the level of training of the force that must execute it. In the case of SOF, however, the planners, trainers, and operators are the same personnel. Operational rehearsals evaluate and validate planned tactical actions, ROE, and control measures, as well as provide feedback that may cause the plan to change. The participating SOF elements and their individual members learn the plan to a standard that enables them to perform key
actions, at high tempo, from start to finish without needing further detailed instructions during mission execution.

b. The tactical commander supervises an iterative process of planning, rehearsal, plan modification, and more rehearsal until preparation time runs out or the force is satisfied that the plan can be executed in the most effective and efficient manner. This process exploits the knowledge, experiences, and training of the entire JSOTF to improve the plan and develop a range of options that can be rapidly implemented or modified to improvise a response to unexpected difficulties or mission anomalies that prevent execution of the basic plan. Options rejected as inferior during mission preparation may become paramount during mission execution. Rehearsals enhance the probability of mission success and reduce unnecessary losses of personnel and equipment.

c. For both planning and training purposes, rehearsals should be as realistic as possible. If time and resources permit, rehearsals should be conducted with realistic mock-ups and in real time including, if possible, idle intervals. Real time rehearsals identify the inherent effects of time on the SO force and its activities, and provide an essential element of realism to the pending operation.

9. Mission Deconfliction and Coordination

The COMJSOTF must deconflict SO activities with other joint force component commanders to avoid situations that might lead to mission failure and to avoid fratricide. This process can be difficult when SOF are employed in advance of conventional operations and when an SO activity may be classified or compartmented, and not fully coordinated with other components of the JTF. The COMJSOTF weighs legitimate OPSEC considerations against the need to coordinate and deconflict SO. To assist in this process, there must be a well-structured deconfliction and coordination process that flows from the supported combatant commander, through the CJTF, to the COMJSOTF and other elements of the joint force.

a. Establishment of a JSOA

- For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, the JFC may establish a JSOA. The JSOA is a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace, assigned by a JFC
to the commander of a joint SO force to conduct SO activities. **When a JSOA is designated, the COMJSOTF is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.** The COMJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. For operations conducted in a JSOA that is predominantly a restricted sea mass, the COMJSOTF may consider establishing a JSOTF afloat. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of UW operations. Figure IV-3 depicts a JSOA within operational areas of a theater.

- While establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent operations assists in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide, the JFC should always evaluate the value of isolating SOF against the greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign plan.

b. **SO Aviation.** The COMJSOTF coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates air SO through the use of the SOLE in the JAOC, and through liaisons with other appropriate

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**OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER**

This example depicts a combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR), also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the commander in chief (CINC) has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters of operations. Also within the theater of war is a joint special operations area (JSOA). To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the CINC has established a joint operations area (JOA), within which a joint task force will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

*Figure IV-3. Operational Areas Within a Theater*
C2 organizations. COMJSOTF responsibilities include the following.

- Protecting clandestine and/or covert SOF missions from exposure.

- Integrating SOF air missions into the ATO. This document is published by the JFACC and normally requires submission of key mission information no later than 24 hours before the start of the ATO day. The short suspense of certain SOF air missions may dictate late submission into the ATO process.

- Avoiding fire from friendly air defense systems by having SOF aircraft use identification of friend or foe procedures and by coordinating with the appropriate ACA and area air defense commander(s).

- Placing LNOs aboard the Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to deconflict specific SOF air missions during execution when OPSEC precludes the use of normal deconfliction procedures.

c. Land Based SO. The COMJSOTF deconflicts SO on land through the use of LNOs, SOCCEs, and special operations coordination elements (SOCOORDs) at appropriate joint and land force HQ (corps, MEF, division, or landing force, depending on the actual situation). The role of the SOCCE has been discussed previously in Chapter III, “Command and Control.” A SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to an Army corps, MEF, or joint forces land component commander with regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and coordination. It can also assist with joint fires coordination. COMJSOTF responsibilities include the following.

- Conducting and executing all aspects of fire support coordination. Fire support coordination measures are established by:
  - The COMJSOTF within a JSOA, when established;
  - The commander of an operational area responsible for ensuring synchronization and integration of fires and implementing fire support coordinating measures when SOF tactical elements are operating within that commander’s operational area; and
  - The JFC beyond the boundaries of subordinate area commanders.

- Deconflicting ground maneuver through coordination of LNOs, SOCCEs, and SOCOORDs at the appropriate land force HQ.

  - When SOF tactical elements operate within the boundaries of a conventional area commander, the JFC may establish a JSOA for which the COMJSOTF is responsible. Alternatively, the JFC may direct the COMJSOTF to transfer forces to the OPCON or TACON of the conventional area commander, who then becomes responsible for deconfliction.

  - Consider placing LNOs with the lead elements of a conventional unit conducting linkup operations with SOF elements.

d. Maritime SO. The COMJSOTF deconflicts maritime SO through the use of LNOs at the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) staff (if designated) or appropriate Navy force HQ such as a battle group or amphibious task force. If a JSOTF afloat is established, it would serve as the forward liaison command to deconflict maritime SO and coordinate support for maritime SO with the JFMCC and Navy HQ. Responsibilities include the following.

- Deconflict indirect fires, air strikes, and maritime maneuver to include:
• Airspace control and air defense;

• Surface maneuver and naval gunfire;

• Subsurface maneuver; and

• All aspects of offensive naval air operations against land targets using tactical air and cruise missile assets as well as for air support to ground forces (including SOF), mine warfare operations, and strike rescue planning.

• Deconflict littoral and riverine SO using procedures as outlined for land-based SO.

10. Combat Assessment

a. The COMJSOTF makes a determination of the overall effectiveness of SOF employment during military operations. During combat assessment, the COMJSOTF considers battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and reattack recommendations. **The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations**. The JSOTF J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment for the JSOTF, assisted by the JSOTF J-2 and J-4.

b. After each SO activity, the COMJSOTF should evaluate SOF effectiveness. After-action reports and formal debriefings complete the mission planning and execution cycle. SOF commanders should submit after-action reports IAW the joint reporting structure. SOF planners and operators should review the results of previous missions, the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) database, and the SO debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) for insights applicable to current and future training and operations. USSOCOM should maintain SO databases of compartmented lessons learned. During peacetime, these databases provide continuity for a long-term regional security program that can build incrementally through many small-scale activities. During MOOTW and wartime contingency operations, mission feedback can assist SOF commanders in exploiting enemy vulnerabilities or warn against unforeseen enemy capabilities. Relevant lessons learned are incorporated into JAARS and SODARS. The COMSOC should ensure that SOF leaving the theater are debriefed thoroughly.

**SO mission deconfliction and coordination is necessary to avoid situations that might lead to mission failure and to avoid fratricide.**
11. Operations Security

a. OPSEC is a process for identifying and managing indicators of friendly actions. OPSEC is important to SOF activities because it denies an adversary critical information of intelligence value that might otherwise be deduced from unclassified information, evidence, or observations associated with the planning and conduct of military activities. When combined with traditional security programs, OPSEC enables SOF to achieve essential secrecy. OPSEC is an integral part of all phases of an operation but is especially important in regards to effective SOF employment.

b. The requirement for strict security must be balanced against the need for coordinated planning, execution, and deconfliction of these activities with other operations. OPSEC contributes to coordinated planning, execution, and deconfliction by identifying and then controlling only that information which, in the hands of an adversary, could enable the enemy to cause the SOF operation to fail. The JSOTF OPSEC process must be fully coordinated and integrated with the higher command.

c. Planning and execution of SO are becoming increasingly reliant on computer and information systems. SOF must ensure that these systems are protected from unauthorized activity, including attack or exploitation, in order to protect operational information. Information assurance through defense in depth must be applied to protect SOF information systems from exploitation and to ensure that OPSEC is maintained.

For further information on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

12. Military Deception

a. Most SOF missions rely on secrecy and surprise for mission success. However, the execution of some SOF missions may require, or be enhanced by, deception operations. Such deception initiatives may serve as diversionary operations to focus enemy attention away from actual targets and objectives or prevent their recognition of SOF.

b. SOF may be employed in conducting or supporting military deception operations. Military deception operations that use or support SOF should not inadvertently heighten the enemy awareness of SOF operations.

c. The chosen method of deception must be lawful and should not in any event sacrifice the long-term position for a less important short-term advantage.

For further information on military deception, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

13. Close Air Support for Special Operations

a. Close air support (CAS) begins with a request from the SOF element commander for the support. As the requesting SOF commander plans and conducts a combat operation, the commander identifies situations where CAS can be employed to enhance mission accomplishment. The requesting commander submits either preplanned or immediate CAS requests.

b. Preplanned requests are those that are foreseeable early enough in the planning process to be included in the ATO and may be either scheduled or on-call requests.
Immediate requests arise from situations that develop once the battle is joined to exploit opportunities or to protect the force. Both of these requests normally do not include detailed target and timing information because of the lead-time involved. However, it is important to make the CAS request as soon as the need is anticipated so that it can be included in the JFC’s apportionment and allocation decisions.

c. Preplanned SOF CAS requests normally will be forwarded to the JSOACC for tasking by organic assets. CAS requirements exceeding organic JSOACC capabilities will be forwarded to the JAOC by the JSOACC via an air allocation request (ALLOREQ). This preplanned CAS request is shown in Figure IV-4.

d. SOF elements requiring immediate CAS normally will contact the JSOTF JOC via established communication nets. The JSOTF JOC should attempt to fill the requirement with organic JSOTF assets. If the approved CAS requirement exceeds organic JSOTF capabilities, the requests will be forwarded to the JAOC to be filled by other components of the joint force. This immediate CAS request is shown in Figure IV-5.

For further information on CAS, refer to JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).

e. Coordination Elements. Principal organizations that support CAS for the COMJSOTF are the SOLE, SOCCE, and HQ AFSOC special tactics squadrons.
• **SOLE.** The SOLE coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates SOF air and surface activities with the JFACC. Additionally, it is responsible for coordinating all SOF air activity on the joint ATO submitted by the JSOAC or senior SO C2 air facility. A more detailed explanation of SOLE missions and functions is provided in Chapter III, “Command and Control,” paragraph 14, “Coordination and Liaison Elements.”

• **SOCCE.** The function of the SOCCE is to advise the corps and/or Marine air-ground task force of all SOF air and surface activity. A more detailed explanation of SOCCE missions and functions is provided in Chapter III, “Command and Control,” paragraph 14, “Coordination and Liaison Elements.”

• **Special Tactics Squadron (STS).** Within an STS, SO combat controllers assigned to special tactics teams are trained and certified to perform terminal control responsibilities. SO terminal attack controllers CAS training emphasizes night infrared, laser, and beacon equipment. Additionally, SOF surface teams can perform the terminal guidance function.

f. **SO CAS Communications Connectivity.** SOF communications nets provide a means for both SOF air assets to provide preplanned and immediate CAS and SOF surface teams to request immediate CAS. The majority of SOF surface unit requests will be immediate.
• **SOF Aircraft.** Communications between SOF aircraft and the JSOACC will be used to coordinate preplanned and immediate CAS requests. For preplanned CAS missions where TACON of SOF aircraft has been given to another component, SOF aircraft will access the established requesting component network. For immediate CAS (after COMJSOTF approval), SOF aircraft will access the requesting component communications net to provide requested CAS support.

• **SOF Surface Units.** SOF surface units have a variety of communications capabilities that can be used for CAS. For CAS requests not supported via organic SOF assets, the COMJSOTF will forward the request to the JFACC via established communication links (through the SOLE). Once the asset has been assigned, that information is passed to the requestor via the COMJSOTF. The requesting unit will communicate with the CAS aircraft via the established providing component net (including ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) guard).

14. **Types of Operational Support Available to a JSOTF**

There are external sources of support that a COMJSOTF may request to increase operational capabilities of the command. Sources range from theater to national assets (both DOD and other USG agencies). Several are discussed elsewhere in this publication (intelligence, logistics, C4, PSYOP, CA, PA, legal, and medical). Other types of support may include, but are not limited to, the following.

a. **Space Support.** United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) can provide deployable space support teams (SSTs) and support personnel to the JSOTF upon request through the supported geographic combatant commander. SSTs may be either joint teams or Service component command teams. Component command support can include personnel organic to HQ AFSOC and can provide tailored support to the SOF Air Force component. Army Space Command maintains teams that can provide direct support to the ARSOF component. SSTs and liaison personnel assist the JSOTF staff and SOF components in understanding the capabilities, limitations, and effective application of space systems, and ensure that the JSOTF’s support requirements are clearly understood by USSPACECOM and its components. Specific services provided by a JSOTF space cell may include, but are not limited to the following.

- Status of supporting space systems and the operational impact of space system outages.
- Recommendations to space components to defer scheduled maintenance that might adversely affect SOF operations.
- Precision satellite visibility and look angles to SOF users of US space systems.
- Forecast of times when navigation may be degraded by less than optimal Global Positioning Satellite constellation geometry.
- Schedule of times that SOF activities are vulnerable to foreign space-based intelligence collection platforms.
- Predictions and effects of solar environment on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems functioning in the electromagnetic spectrum.

b. **Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Support.** Environmental intelligence should be included in the COMJSOTF decisionmaking process from
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initial planning to execution. METOC data can provide information by which to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific SOF operations. SO weather teams provided by AFSOF also can assist the COMJSOTF in the collection of METOC data. Task organized weather teams are trained and equipped to collect critical weather observations from data-sparse areas. These teams are trained to operate independently in permissive or uncertain environments, or as augmentation to other SO elements in hostile environments in direct support of SO.

c. Combat Camera Support. Combat camera can provide gun camera image processing for theater and national use. SOF teams may be equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities to increase the probability of mission success. Combat camera also provides still and video products that can support PSYOP and PA.

d. Information Operations Support. JSOTF planners should also consider obtaining IO support from other JTF components or national resources. Specifically, offensive IO capabilities of others such as computer network attack, electronic warfare (EW), military deception, physical attack, and special information operations may be employed to support SOF activities.

15. Force Protection

Force protection must be a top priority during JSOTF operations. It is the responsibility of the COMJSOTF and all subordinate commanders within the JSOTF. The intent should be to accomplish the mission with the least loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies to the engaged SOF. Conducting the mission analysis process should assist in determining forces, means, and ways required to provide force protection. The higher the level of focus for force protection procedures, the less likely the chance of disaster. For SO, force protection takes on a broader meaning than that shown in Figure IV-6. Force protection considerations for the JSOTF should include, but are not limited to the following.

a. Command Emphasis. Prior to deployment of the JSOTF, the COMJSOTF will promulgate a detailed force protection plan. The plan must be based on the most current intelligence and threat assessment for the area to which SOF are being deployed. Consideration will be given for the use of both active and passive measures. The SOF force protection plan must posture the force to protect itself against the most likely threat. The COMJSOTF must adjust the plan as the threat changes. While force protection is the COMJSOTF’s responsibility, the COMJSOTF should appoint a force protection officer to execute the plan. The force protection officer will plan and conduct training prior to deployment of the JSOTF in order to review and practice all aspects of force protection.

b. Protection from the Enemy’s Firepower and Maneuver. COMJSOTFs attempt to counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making SOF and systems difficult to locate, strike, and destroy, as well as protecting those systems and personnel from the effects of WMD. OPSEC and military deception are key elements of this aspect of protection.

c. Detailed Coordination with Friendly Conventional Forces. These measures may include target deconfliction, friendly fires coordination, interface with the SOCOORD, integration of conventional forces in the JSOA when established, combat identification, and readily understood ROE.

d. Prevention of Fratricide. COMJSOTFs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with
Chapter IV

**FORCE PROTECTION**

- Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.

- These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

![Figure IV-6. Force Protection](image)

Figure IV-6. Force Protection

the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. It is a paramount consideration for SOF, particularly when conducting DA or SR missions. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, fire support planning, and total situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity of SO in combat.

e. **Protection from Adversary Information Operations.** Force protection should also include protection from adversary attacks on friendly information infrastructures that provide critical information to SOF. IO protection should include such defensive IO capabilities as information assurance (including CND), counter propaganda, and counter deception. IO protection should be included in the COMJSOTF’s force protection plan.

16. **Operations Messages**

Guidance and instructions for the following messages, requests, and confirmations are described in Appendix H, “Operations Messages.”

- a. Special operations tasking order (SO TASKORD).
- b. Concept of operations (CONOPS).
- c. CONOPS approval.
- d. Support request (SPTREQ).
- e. Support confirmation (SPTCONF).
- f. Air support request (AIRSUPREQ).
- g. Request confirmation (REQCONF).
h. Operation summary (OPSUM).
i. Situation report (SITREP).
j. OPORD.
k. Fragmentary order (FRAGORD).
l. Airspace control means request (ACMREQ).
m. ACO.
n. ALLOREQ.
Chapter V
Planning

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”

George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, 1947

1. General

From inception, the JSOTF is involved in JOPES, both deliberate planning and CAP, and campaign planning. Additionally, the JSOTF has unique SO targeting and mission planning procedures that it must accomplish. JSOTF planners must ensure that their senior HQ understand that bringing SOF in early to the process can significantly improve the SOF contribution to the overall operation. Given the small size of SOF operational units in relation to the total joint force and the type of missions normally conducted that range from strategic to tactical, detailed planning must be conducted by the SOF elements that will execute the mission. The COMJSOTF makes the decision on how planning will be accomplished for the JSOTF. Regardless of how it is accomplished, planning requires the full integration and synchronization of the staff. The requirement for a JSOTF, normally as a component under a JFC, may be identified in either the deliberate planning or CAP process within JOPES.

SECTION A. JOINT PLANNING PROCEDURES

2. JOPES Overview

a. JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into OPLANs and OPORDs. The JOPES planning component consists of deliberate planning, CAP, and campaign planning. JOPES provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition from peace to war through rapid, coordinated planning and execution. Ideally the specific crisis, or an event closely analogous to it, will have been foreseen at the national level and one or more of the combatant commanders will have been instructed to begin planning against the identified threat.

For further information on JOPES, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

b. The deliberate planning process is designed to methodically consider various contingencies so that a variety of responses can be compared in a planning environment devoid of the high operational tempo associated with ongoing or imminent operations. Conversely, the purpose of CAP is to plan for the best employment of assigned or allocated forces in a specific ongoing or imminent situation. CAP is therefore conducted for the actual commitment of allocated forces.

c. There are several critical differences between deliberate planning and CAP. CAP may be completed within a matter of hours or days; deliberate planning is typically accomplished over 18-24 months. Although both forms of planning are classified, CAP is normally close-hold (compartmented), involving only those with a specific reason to know, whereas deliberate planning is extensively coordinated with major HQ and agencies that might provide useful input. CAP is usually initiated with a message, but may be a telephonic warning order to the combatant commander, while deliberate planning is often formally initiated by a fully coordinated CJCS document. At the national level, the CAP process involves the selection
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of a COA by the NCA and the initiation of execution planning while the deliberate planning process may result only in the review of the combatant commander’s chosen COA by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The end result of CAP is an execute order. The deliberate planning process may result only in an OPLAN or CONPLAN.

3. Deliberate Planning: Theater Special Operations Command Level

The deliberate planning process is used to prepare for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that might exist when the plan is implemented. The COMSOC actively participates in all phases of theater-level deliberate planning, both as a component commander and principal theater SO adviser. Normal deliberate planning responsibilities of the theater SOC include developing OPLANs and CONPLANs and supervising special operations mission planning folder (SOMPF) production. The SO portions of plans are modified and revised as necessary. The SOC also participates in theater-level strategy development and campaign planning. Plans developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for JSOTF planning and ease the transition to crisis resolution.

a. Concept Development. The COMSOC prepares or assists in preparation of the theater SO staff estimate and participates in the concept development process that finalizes concepts of operation and support and assigns tasks to subordinate components. COMSOC participation throughout this phase should ensure that SOF are properly integrated into the geographic combatant commander’s strategic concept.

b. Plan Development. As the plan develops, the COMSOC assists the geographic combatant commander in integrating SO and coordinating with USCINCSOC for CONUS-based support.

• Force Planning. The COMSOC assists in preparation of the SO portion of the theater plan and provides the initial SOF force list and TPFDD. Apportioned SOF should deploy as early as possible; the plan may require SOF forward presence during critical time periods when the likelihood of employment is increased.

• Support Planning. The COMSOC coordinates with the theater J-4 and theater Service component commanders to determine support requirements for apportioned SOF and how these requirements will be satisfied. SOF normally plan to deploy with their unit basic loads and at least 30 days of accompanying supplies unless otherwise directed by the geographic combatant commander. The SO TPFDD input should include dedicated SOF support units.

• Transportation Planning, Shortfall Identification, and TPFDD Refinement. If the transportation planning process identifies SOF shortfalls, the COMSOC staff coordinates with theater planners to resolve the shortfalls. If transportation shortfalls cannot be resolved at the planner level, the COMSOC advises the geographic combatant commander and adjusts the plan as directed. As the TPFDD is refined, the COMSOC ensures that SO data is not inadvertently altered.

c. Supporting Plan Development. Concurrent with the theater deliberate planning process, the COMSOC initiates development of SO supporting plans. These
planning should provide COAs linking SO capabilities to overall theater objectives and complement other theater component supporting plans. The COMSOC develops these plans using a modified version of the deliberate planning procedures.

- **Mission Analysis and Target Selection.** Certain JFSOCC missions may already be specified in a theater plan. In addition to these specified tasks, the COMSOC derives other tasks essential to accomplishing the JFSOCC missions assigned by the geographic combatant commander. The COMSOC must consider the window of opportunity (time frame during which the task makes sense or is feasible) for these tasks. The cumulative effect of these tasks must accomplish the assigned JFSOCC mission and complement other USG activities within the theater. Support of conventional military operations is often part of the JFSOCC mission. When specific targets are involved, the JTCB, if formed, provides the mechanism for validation. For missions without a discrete target (FID and UW), the COMSOC coordinates closely with the theater J-3 to validate missions.

- **Tactical Force Planning.** After defining subordinate missions, the COMSOC must assign those missions to the appropriate SOC component commanders and task them to develop their supporting plans. The result of this process is a set of SOC component OPLANs that complement each other and describe in detail how each SOC component commander intends to integrate the component operational scheme into the overall SOC effort.

- **Targeting and Mission Planning.** The COMSOC will normally select a mission planning agent (MPA) to plan and conduct each specific SO mission.

The COMSOC normally selects a SOC Service component as the MPA, but may organize a subordinate JSOTF to be the MPA. An overview of SO targeting and mission planning procedures is provided at Section B of this chapter, “Overview of Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures.”

- To select the best force mix, the COMSOC determines the required operational capabilities and then matches them against available unit capabilities. Initially, the COMSOC may identify multiple MPAs in order to conduct parallel planning. This option provides flexibility in final force selection but commits additional resources to the planning process.

- After selecting the MPA, the COMSOC initiates the joint targeting and mission planning procedures to produce a set of SO mission planning folders that describe in detail how SOF intends to execute each predetermined target.

4. **Crisis Action Planning: JSOTF Level**

At the JSOTF level, CAP is based on the pending or current mission assigned by the appointing authority and conducted in time-sensitive situations and crises using assigned and attached forces and resources. Crisis action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow prescribed CAP procedures that closely parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence, rapid execution planning, and the communication of the decisions of the NCA to combatant commanders, through subordinate JFCs and down to the JSOTF. CAP is normally conducted within the JSOTF J-3. To the extent practical, the JSOTF staff
should involve components in the planning process as early as possible. The COMJSOTF and staff should consider the following planning procedures.

a. **Conduct Mission Analysis**

• **Receipt of Order from Higher HQ.** Mission analysis begins with the receipt of a mission TASKORD, warning order (WARNORD) or FRAGORD from the CJTF. Upon receipt of the order, normally the senior member of the JSOTF HQ plans section will assemble the JPG and begin a mission analysis. A representative from all JSOTF staff sections should be present for the conduct of the JPG. The primary purpose of the JPG is to go through the mission analysis procedures to assist the COMJSOTF in formulating a commander’s intent and restated mission to enable the current operations section to rapidly produce a meaningful WARNORD. This process will also serve to determine if it is a suitable SOF mission and which component should be assigned as the MPA.

• **Procedures.** As the first step in the JSOTF planning process, mission analysis consists of command and staff actions related to gathering facts about the current status, situation, or condition; making assumptions where appropriate to substitute for facts that are not known; analyzing the combatant commander’s and JTF’s WARNORD as appropriate; and analyzing the CJTF’s estimate. If the JSOTF HQ is formed early, the mission analysis would contribute to the input of CJTF’s estimate. For each TASKORD received from the JTF, a mission analysis must be conducted. Appendix J, “Mission Analysis and Checklist,” is a mission analysis checklist provided as a guide for the JPG. This checklist is used as a planning tool to ensure that all planning factors are considered prior to the submission of JSOTF orders to the appropriate current operations section (ground, maritime, and air).

• Information may be found in various parts of the higher order or plan. Much of this information is required in later
steps of the operation planning process; however, it must be identified during mission analysis to determine its impact on the JSOTF mission. To plan properly, the JSOTF staff must understand the mission and commander’s intent at command echelons two levels up from the JSOTF.

- Identify all specified tasks in the JTF order. Specified tasks stated in the JTF order or plan come primarily from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the WARNORD, but may be found elsewhere, such as in coordinating instructions or annexes. Any task that pertains to any element of the JSOTF should be identified and recorded.

- Identify the implied tasks in the JTF order. Implied tasks are those tasks not specifically stated in the order or plan but must be accomplished in order to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Implied tasks come from further analysis of the order and analysis in conjunction with the known enemy situation and the operating area. They may include identifying friendly and enemy COGs and risk assessment, among others. Inherent and routine tasks (e.g., establish liaison) are not included in the list of specified and implied tasks.

- Identify limitations imposed in the higher or JTF order. Limitations are composed of restrictions and constraints. Restrictions are actions that a command prohibits a subordinate unit from doing. Constraints are factors that limit a unit’s freedom of action. Limitations, in most cases, prescribe some detail of force organization, maneuver, or ROE. The limitations will normally be based on military, political, or legal considerations.

- From the list of specified and implied tasks, those that define the success of the mission are identified as essential. To properly identify the essential tasks, the COMJSOTF and staff must fully understand the JTF’s intent as well as the intent of the NCA and combatant commander, as appropriate.

- The JSOTF staff then develops the JSOTF mission statement (called the restated mission). It contains all the elements of a mission statement (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY). The element of WHAT is the essential task(s), the accomplishment of which define(s) mission success. If there are multiple tasks, they are listed in the sequence in which they are expected to occur.

b. **Issue Planning Guidance.** After staff briefings are completed and the COMJSOTF approves the mission analysis and restated mission, initial planning guidance is provided to the staff. This guidance usually includes such information as which enemy COA to consider, the restated mission, commander’s intent, CONOPS, deception objective, priorities, time plan, type of order to issue, and type of rehearsal to conduct. It may also include constraints such as ROE for force employment, identified legal restrictions, and risk acceptance guidance.

c. **Determine End State.** The end state of the operation may be determined at the national level as depicted in Figure V-1. It will state the required conditions that achieve strategic objectives. There may be a military end state, described by a set of military conditions, when military force is no longer the principal means to a strategic objective. There may be a broader strategic end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. Whatever the prescribed end state, the COMJSOTF shall ensure that the end state is considered in all planning
efforts. The approved end state should not be modified without prior approval from the command appointing the JSOTF. Requests for clarification and revisions to end state conditions should be brought to the CJTF or appointing authority early in the planning process.

d. Develop Courses of Action and Prepare Staff Estimates. COA development is the next step in the JSOTF planning process. Its purpose is to anticipate and define multiple, feasible employment options within the framework of the next senior commander’s concept. A COA is usually stated in broad terms with the details determined during the analysis (wargaming) phase. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data in mission analysis. The number of COAs developed should be manageable. The ultimate goal is to develop several “suitable” COAs that consider at least the most dangerous and likely potential enemy COAs developed by the J-2 in the assumptions section of the intelligence estimate. The COAs presented to the commander should be suitable, feasible, acceptable, and distinct from one another. A “suitable” JSOTF COA meets the JTF’s intent and CONOPS. The staff estimate process provides the means for COA development.

e. Analyze Courses of Action. COA analysis follows the development step in the JSOTF planning process. Staff analysis identifies the best COA for recommendation to the commander. Each staff element analyzes the COAs using wargaming techniques. Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of an operation, accounting for friendly strengths and dispositions, enemy assets and possible enemy COAs, and a defined operating area. It considers branches and sequels, and attempts to foresee the action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of an operation. Wargaming also is designed to stimulate thought about the operation in order to enable the staff to obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred. This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. Techniques range from visualization of the operation on a map board to computer simulation of the COAs. Wargaming should adhere to certain rules and guidelines, some of which are as follows:

- List the advantages and disadvantages for each COA as they become apparent during the wargaming process.
- Remain unbiased and keep an open mind. Do not be influenced by the personality of the commander, other staff officers, or your own prejudices.
- Continually assess the feasibility of the COAs to determine if they meet the requirements of the mission. Reject COAs that fail the feasibility test.
- Avoid comparing one COA with another during the wargame.
- Avoid drawing premature conclusions and then presenting facts to support those premature conclusions.
f. **Compare Courses of Action.** After analyzing each COA, the staff compares the feasibility of COAs to identify the one that has the highest probability of success against the enemy COA of greatest concern to the commander. This JSOTF COA also has branches that will facilitate success against other possible enemy COAs. The actual comparison may follow any logical technique that will allow a recommendation to be reached. A decision matrix is one of these techniques. It may compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA previously analyzed, or isolate and compare decisive factors that are selected based on each situation. Comparison criteria may be defined and weighted before comparison begins. Each staff section may use its own matrix for comparison in its own functional area.

g. **Select or Modify Course of Action.** The COMJSOTF decides on the COA that offers the best prospect for success. This also may include modifying a COA previously selected and is a cyclical process. The COAs not selected potentially become sequels and contingencies to phases of the operation as the situation evolves or can be used as a deception plan. This enables the commander to respond to rapidly changing situations. COA selection then becomes a part of the commander’s estimate submitted to the CJTF or higher HQ.

h. **Issue Commander’s Estimate.** The COMJSOTF estimate document provides the staff with clear focus and guidance for continued planning efforts. The precise contents may vary, depending on the nature of the task or crisis, time available to respond, and the extent and value of prior planning efforts. It should restate the mission (to include assigned strategic military objectives), develop the CONOPS for all mission areas, give a clear statement of the commander’s initial intent (aim of the entire campaign or major operation), and identify subordinate tasks and objectives. It also may include a restatement of ROE, risk acceptance authority levels, and other restrictions and constraints.

i. **Prepare OPORD.** The COMJSOTF order should reflect the concept and intent of the geographic combatant commander’s campaign plan or order and the plan of the supported commander (if established), and at a minimum be synchronized with the other components.

5. **JSOTF Joint Planning Group**

First, it should be understood that the COMJSOTF neither has the capability because of lack of personnel to form a fully staffed JPG nor may the type or duration of the mission require a JPG. Should a JPG not be formed, its functions are normally performed within the JOC. However, to enhance the CAP process, a JPG is recommended. The decision on the organization and functions of the JPG should be determined by the COMJSOTF at the onset of the JSOTF organization. It should also be made clear as to how the JPG and staff sections (particularly the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and once operations begin. The JSOTF will also participate as a member in the JTF JPG and maintain linkage and coordination with the various cells corresponding to those of the JSOTF JPB discussed below. Figure V-2 depicts a notional JPG composition to support large-scale operations.

For additional information, see JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

a. **Purpose of the JPG.** The JPG conducts CAP, provides the focal point for OPORD development, performs future planning, and accomplishes other tasks as directed.

b. **Composition.** The composition may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. There are no “hard and fast”
Figure V-2. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Planning Group Composition
rules on how to determine the precise number of personnel required to staff the JPG or on the number of cells to be formed. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment within the life cycle of the JSOTF to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or organizations. The head of the JPG should be a senior officer on the JSOTF staff with experience in joint planning and operations. Further, the deputy COMJSOTF or chief of staff should be involved in the JPG, providing guidance and insight into the COMJSOTF’s critical concerns.

• **Planning Cell.** The planning cell is the core of the JPG. Assigned personnel must be knowledgeable of the CAP process and JOPES products. A small group of planners is recommended. It provides a focused effort during the critical initial stages of CAP. It may be augmented by theater assets, if requested, that can provide planning expertise and continuity from the supported combatant commander’s planning team to jump start the JSOTF planning process. Theater augmentees do not normally remain longer than 30 days. It may also include LNOs and other representatives as required.

• **Orders Cell.** The orders cell may be incorporated to support the administrative effort of publishing COMJSOTF orders and estimates.

• **Information Management Cell.** The information management cell manages the flow of information to and from the JPG. These activities may include: preparing and monitoring message boards, RFI control, acquisition and management of hardcopy geospatial information and services (GI&S), suspense management, and agendas.

• **Deployment Cell.** The deployment cell is organized to concurrently develop the TPFDL in JOPES. The cell is typically active only through the planning and deployment phases of an operation. A similar cell may be organized for redeployment.

• **Joint Information Operations Cell.** The joint IO cell is used to plan and monitor joint IO. Members of the joint IO cell include IO planners as well as representatives from various joint directorates, subordinate commands, supporting organizations and the various IO-related capabilities and activities (including military deception, CA, PA, and PSYOP) that are integrated through the IO cell.

See JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, for more information about the IO cell and IO planning.

6. Campaign Planning and Special Operations

a. **Theater Strategic and Campaign Planning**

• The geographic combatant commander for each theater refines broad national or multinational strategic guidance into a theater strategy or campaign plan. This document provides guidance for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and apportioned US forces (including SOF) and the forces of allied nations to achieve national and alliance strategic objectives.

• The geographic combatant commander will describe the concept for SO in the theater campaign plan (see Figure V-3).

b. **Theater SOC Support to the Theater Campaign Plan**
The theater SOCs participate in the development of theater campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. These plans translate the geographic combatant commander’s concept of SOF employment into a sequence of integrated SOF activities. The theater SOC maintains a theater perspective on the campaign plan and how each component commander intends to support that campaign or major operation. Based on guidance from the geographic combatant commander, the theater SOC develops a supporting plan to allocate forces for operational tasks, including support of component and subordinate JFCs. The theater SOC also identifies and anticipates theater operational and environmental services as well as intelligence requirements that SOF could address, and then develops and recommends pro-active SOF activities that might satisfy those requirements.

To assist in both planning and execution of SOF missions in support of the campaign plan, the theater SOC must maintain liaison elements at appropriate levels of each major theater subordinate command. This coordination is vital in assisting the deconfliction of SOF and conventional activities, determining target selection and apportionment for both conventional and SOF requirements and aiding in the integration of SOF into the theater campaign plan.

c. **Role of the JSOTF.** There is no clear delineation as to when or if the COMJSOTF develops a campaign plan. Subordinate unified commands (a SOC) may develop a campaign plan to accomplish an assigned mission. This plan may then be used or modified by a JSOTF. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be

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**Figure V-3. Campaign Plan Objectives for Special Operations Forces**

The geographic combatant commander will describe the concept for special operations in the theater campaign plan. The campaign plan will:

- **Provide** the concepts for special operations forces (SOF) activities and sustainment that will transform national, alliance, and theater strategic guidance into military objectives
- **Describe** the geographic combatant commander’s vision of SOF employment, to include command relationships
- **Identify** requirements for US Special Operations Command and Service components to prepare, provide, and sustain theater-assigned and augmenting SOF
- **Identify** priority operational, weather, and intelligence requirements that theater SOF must address
- **Define** interagency coordination requirements

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**CAMPAIGN PLAN OBJECTIVES FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**
accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Within these parameters, a JSOTF may be responsible for development of a campaign plan. In either case, subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, theater guidance, and direction developed by the supported combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.

For further information on campaign plans at the JTF level, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

7. Termination Planning

Planning for termination of SO must be ongoing during all phases of COA development, deployment of SOF, and execution of operations. In most cases, operations will be terminated in their own right when stated objectives have been met.

a. The COMJSOTF must establish measures of effectiveness to determine the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. These conditions must be in consonance with the CJTF’s concept.

b. In some operations (for example, peace operations) the COMJSOTF may have to recognize that the mission is not achievable without restructuring and/or commitment of additional SOF assets. In such circumstances, the COMJSOTF may have to recommend to the supported commander that further action will not achieve the desired end state and that the mission should be terminated.

c. The COMJSOTF also must consider the safety of the force when withdrawing from the JOA and what additional support will be required for redeployment.

8. Transition Planning

a. As with planning for conflict termination, planning for transition must extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. Transferring control of an operation to another organization requires detailed planning and execution.

• The process of transferring control of an operation to another military force or organization is dependent on a given
situation and each transfer will have its own characteristics and requirements. Often, high-level interagency approval is required with long-lead times.

- Transition planning should be continuous and requires COMJSOTF guidance.

- JSOTF operations may be transferred to another military force, regional organization, the United Nations, or civilian organizations under the direction of the JFC.

- Regeneration of SOF capabilities after a conflict will be a primary consideration in the transition plan. Additionally, there may be circumstances where there may not be a total transition of SOF. As examples, the JSOTF could retain certain intelligence gathering missions or be given a FID mission in concert with the transition.

b. Transition planning can be accomplished by a number of organizations within the JSOTF, such as the JPG, future operations cell, J-3, or J-5. This will depend on how the COMJSOTF organizes the JSOTF.

c. Mission analysis should provide the initial information to begin transition planning. A desired end state, time frame for operations, guidance from higher authority, and political policy can be determined through the analysis process, which should provide the impetus for beginning transition planning.

d. A JSOTF “transition plan” should be developed as an initial step in the transition process. To commence plan development, identification of the following factors is important: What are the relevant issues that may affect the transition? What further planning is required to accomplish the transition? What is the structure and organization of the military force or other organization taking over control of the operation?

e. All JSOTF staff sections should be involved in the transition process and provide input for inclusion in the plan. Staff sections also should highlight in the plan how they are organized and how they function. No staff input should be considered too routine that it should be excluded. Additionally, the outgoing staff sections should recommend how the incoming staff should be organized.

f. The transition plan culminates with the handover from the JSOTF to the incoming US, multinational, or HN force or government or civilian agency. In any case, handover procedures must be developed in detail down to the SOF tactical unit or team level. Handover procedures for redeployment operations normally are implemented when the operation has reached the desired end state. Handover procedures should be rehearsed and each SOF element involved in the process should be able to clearly articulate the current situation to the tactical unit or civilian organization that replaces it. C2 of the redeploying SOF, sequencing of departing units, and continued emphasis on force protection are critical concerns.

9. Planning Considerations with US Government Agencies

As discussed in Chapter III, “Command and Control,” the JSOTF HQ may play a key role depending on its level of responsibility in the planning for interagency operations. It is essential that the COMJSOTF organize for success early in the planning process. To the extent feasible, the joint planning effort should include all the participants from the outset. Interagency forums established early at the operational level will enable close and constructive dialogue between the engaged agencies. Within the purview of the COMJSOTF’s responsibilities, the following factors should be considered.
a. **Identify the Interagency Players.** This analysis needs to include all interagency organizations that may affect the outcome of the operation. In many cases, initial coordination of interagency organizations may have occurred at a level of command above that of the JSOTF. This identification also considers NGOs.

b. **Understand the Interagency Hierarchy.** If a lead agency has been identified, know which agency has been assigned that responsibility. The COMJSOTF establishes liaison with the lead agency. Conversely, if one has not been established, the players may view themselves as “one among equals.” In such a case, the COMJSOTF should attempt to insert discipline, responsibility, and rigor into the planning process in order to function effectively.

c. **Define the Objectives of the Response Effort.** These should be broadly outlined in tasking orders from higher authority.

d. **Define COAs for Military Operations and Agency Activities.** Include interagency organizations in the COA development and approval process.

e. **Understand the Role of Each Agency.** Understand their operating principles. Know their capabilities and limitations, points of contact, and crisis management organization. Consider with what agencies liaison should be established.

f. **Identify Potential Obstacles to the Collective Effort.** Identify potential obstacles to concurrence and solicit solutions from all participants as the first step towards resolution.

g. **Identify Required Resources.** Determine which agencies are committed to provide resources. Avoid duplication of effort and increase coherence in the collective effort.

h. **Define the End State.** What is the exit criteria? How will transition from military to civilian control occur?

i. **Maximize Assets.** The JSOTF’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to support and complement the broader, long-range objectives of the crisis response.

j. **Establish Interagency Assessment Teams.** These are manpower-dependent teams that are deployed to the crisis area to evaluate the situation.

k. **Implement CAP.** Involve the affected agencies in the planning process at the beginning. Continue the coordination throughout the planning cycle.

10. **Planning Considerations with Nongovernmental Organizations**

NGOs are often on scene in a crisis area prior to the commitment of US forces. They are likely also to remain after the military end state of an operation and may stay for the long term. These organizations are independent, diverse, at times flexible, at times inflexible, grassroots focused, and primarily serve as relief providers. They also may assist or hinder JSOTF operations depending on the JSOTF mission and the objectives of the organizations. When in an operational environment (usually in a MOOTW situation) with these organizations, the COMJSOTF and staff should consider the following.

a. Can these organizations lessen the civil-military resources that the COMJSOTF and staff would otherwise provide to support the operation? There may be a common ground to support unity of effort.

b. What degree of professionalism or capabilities do they bring to the table? Is there a value added? If so, are they included
in certain aspects of the JSOTF planning process?

c. Can they provide information and intelligence in support of JSOTF operations? Conversely, what is the degree of risk to OPSEC of the force, or to the NGO and its personnel?

d. What logistic degree of burden will they place on the JSOTF? Often NGOs are in need of transportation, equipment, and supplies. The COMJSOTF should consider how these potential burdens could be elevated and resolved at the JFC level.

e. Does PA planning include identification of points of contact with NGOs that will operate in the JSOTF affected area? Does it include how referrals by news media queries regarding their operations will be handled?

f. Is a civil-military operations center required to facilitate interaction with these agencies and the HN?

For further information on NGOs, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.

11. Planning Considerations with Multinational Forces

a. Political and military intentions of multinational forces may impact on JSOTF planning and operations. Each nation will have its own agenda and strive to accomplish it. In many instances, multinational forces will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their government and its commitment to the US SO CONOPS and mission.

b. To effectively and efficiently plan for the integration of multinational forces, the COMJSOTF must recognize and accept the differences between US and multinational forces and develop a harmonizing approach planning effort. The COMJSOTF must make multinational forces an integral part of the team. Where possible, the COMJSOTF should develop standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty among multinational forces (e.g., mutually agreeable terminology and objectives).

c. Planning factors that the COMJSOTF may consider when working with multinational forces include, but are not limited to, those listed in Figure V-4.

For further information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

SECTION B. OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING AND MISSION PLANNING PROCEDURES

12. Special Operations Forces in the Targeting and Mission Planning Process

a. Targeting. The COMJSOTF also may identify potential SOF missions to the JFC (depending on the C2 structure of the joint force) to be considered in the joint targeting process. Once assigned a mission, SOF will plan and execute accordingly. However, to avoid the misapplication of SOF, commanders should evaluate potential SOF employment for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability early in the planning cycle and prior to target assignment. To provide clear guidance to commanders for planning and executing SO, use the set of operational mission criteria evolved from combat experience in Figure V-5.

- Appropriate Mission. SOF should be used against those key strategic or operational targets that require SOF’s unique skills and capabilities. If they do not, then SOF should not be assigned.
SOF should not be used as a substitute for other forces.

- **Support the Campaign Plan.** If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, then consider more appropriate missions available for SOF.

- **Operationally Feasible.** SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare and should not be assigned missions that are beyond their capabilities. Planners must take into consideration the vulnerability of SOF units to larger, more heavily armed or mobile forces, particularly in hostile territory.

- **Required Resources Available.** Some SOF missions require support from other forces for success. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and sustaining employed SOF. It can include airlift, intelligence, communications, medical, and logistic support. While a target may be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in supportability may affect the likelihood for success or may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.

- **Outcome Justify Risk.** Does the expected outcome justify the risk? SOF has high value and limited resources. Commanders must ensure that the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission. Assessment of risk should take into account not only

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**Figure V-4. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces**

- Force capabilities.
- Command, control, and communications--will there be problems with transfer of authority?
- Rules of Engagement.
- Logistics--will the United States have to provide support and to what extent?
- Level of training.
- Deployment capability--will US transportation assets be required?
- Procedures for collecting, disseminating, and sharing intelligence (information).
- Status of existing agreements--have there already been agreements established that the joint special operations task force will be expected to support?
- "Degree of risk"--what is acceptable to multinational forces (may be politically driven)?
- Cultural and historical background.
b. **Mission Planning.** The COMJSOTF considers the following factors when conducting mission planning.

- **Detailed Mission Planning.** It is based on specific, comprehensive, and current intelligence that is vital to successful execution of SOF missions and, potentially, the very survival of the SOF element. SOF personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the operational area. For some missions, SOF operators must know the language, customs, and ethnic and religious affiliations and antagonisms of the local population that may affect mission execution. In other missions, SOF operators must have a detailed knowledge of adversary information infrastructure and systems (cognitive, hardware, and software) to accomplish offensive information operations objectives. This often requires an intensive pre-employment study of the intended operational area.

- **Complete Planning Through Life Cycle of the Force.** SOF missions must consider the life cycle of the committed force: insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, and extraction prior to committing the force. The nature of the target, enemy situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area will dictate the size and capabilities of the assigned force, the nature of the tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, logistic requirements, and the size and composition of the command and support structure.

- **Interoperability.** Planners must ensure interoperability of SOF with conventional forces that either host or support their activities, particularly during time-critical contingency operations. For example, if SOF are operating from naval surface vessels during forcible entry operations, they must be prepared to function compatibly with the host vessel in the areas of weapons, communications equipment, and shipboard logistics.

- **Functional Planning Expertise.** Regardless of the level of security involved, key planners from multiple disciplines such as intelligence, fire support, communications, IO, logistics, and PSYOP must be involved in all phases of SOF mission planning.

13. **Targeting Cycle and Special Operations Mission Planning**

SOF follow the joint targeting process. The joint targeting process determines the employment of military force to achieve the JFC’s objectives. The joint targeting process includes the steps by which target intelligence and target materials are produced and applied in support of operational decisionmaking and force employment. It is depicted as a cyclical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL MISSION CRITERIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appropriate mission?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supports campaign plan?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operationally feasible?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Required resources available?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome justifies risk?</strong></td>
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**Figure V-5. Special Operations Operational Mission Criteria**

the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.
process with sequential phases (the targeting cycle), but in reality is a continuously operating series of closely related, interacting, and interdependent functions. While SOF may input into the various phases of the cycle, it is within the force application and execution planning and force execution phases where the preponderance of SOF mission planning occurs. The six phases of the targeting cycle are depicted in Figure V-6.

14. Target Analysis Methodology

Target analysis examines potential targets to determine their military importance, priority of attack scale of effort, and weapons required to attain a certain level of damage, disruption, or lethal or nonlethal casualties. It is a systematic approach to establishing the enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. It also determines what effects can be achieved against target systems and their activities. A target analysis must review the sub-systems and interactions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the overall system functions and, subsequently how to best attack that system so that it becomes inoperable or allows for achievement of the commander’s objectives. Target analysis also allows the JSOTF to determine the best method of attacking the enemy’s COG through attacks on its outer rings, without exposing the SOF element to the full lethality of the enemy’s strength. The SOF mission planning process relies on the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) matrix to determine the feasibility of and methodology for applying SOF to the target.

a. Criticality. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in targeting. This criticality is related to how much its destruction or damage will impair the enemy’s political, economic, or military operations. In determining criticality, individual targets within a target system must be analyzed with relation to the other elements. The value of the target may change as the situation develops, requiring the use of adaptive targeting methods. Critical targets may also be selected for SR missions.

b. Accessibility. In order to destroy, or collect data on a target, SOF must be able to reach it, either physically or via indirect means. During SR missions, SOF must not only have eyes on target but also must remain in the area for extended periods of time. The SOF unit also must be able to exfiltrate from the target area once the mission is complete.

c. Recuperability. In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how long it will take the enemy to repair or replace or bypass the damage inflicted on a target. A target is not a valid SOF target if it can be repaired or bypassed in a short amount of time or with minimal resources.

d. Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if SOF has the means and expertise to conduct the planned mission and achieve the desired level of damage, or other objectives as assigned.

e. Effect. The target should be attacked only if the desired military effects can be achieved. The military advantage achieved also could include political, economic, and psychological effects. In the case of every target, the likely collateral effects must be calculated so that they can be weighed against the expected military benefit to determine if an attack would be lawful under the concept of proportionality. Collateral effects include but are not limited to civilian injuries and deaths, as well as the economic impact of the proposed attack.

f. Recognizability. The target must be identifiable under various weather, light and seasonal conditions without being confused with other targets or target components.
Figure V-6. Special Operations Forces Mission Planning and the Targeting Cycle
Sufficient data must also be available for SOF to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The same requirement exists to distinguish target critical damage points and target stress points from their parent structures and surroundings.

15. Special Operations Targeting and Deliberate Mission Planning Techniques

SO target nomination and selection procedures are applicable to all SOF missions. Deliberate SO targeting and mission planning techniques may consist of the following steps: target nomination, target validation, intelligence production, mission planning, and SOMPF maintenance. A technique for JSOTF targeting as it relates to deliberate planning is depicted in Figure V-7.

a. Target Nomination. Target nominations are generated in a variety of ways. A JSOTF may receive them from its components and the JFC may task its components to nominate SO targets in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives, as examples. The JSOTF targeting panel is the conduit for receiving and processing target nominations. In addition to receiving nominations, the JSOTF targeting panel may conduct an independent analysis of the battle and develop a proposed list of targets and missions.

- To facilitate the target selection process, target nomination format should include:
  - The basic encyclopedia number, target name, target data inventory category code, and/or location coordinates with datum.
  - Specific OPLAN and OPORD objectives for which the nominated target supports and the proposed SO mission such as DA and SR.
  - Statement of target significance to include recommended attack, strike, or surveillance objectives.
  - Time of execution.
  - Exclusive of the target nomination format, the process also requires the following:

    - Gather Target Information. When feasible, JSOTF planners coordinate with joint force planners to determine requirements for SOF in targeting and surveillance to support their operations. Other sources of possible targets may come from theater and Army theater missile defense cells as well as command and control warfare and IO sources.

    - Review Target Information and Other Considerations. After receiving this input, the targeting panel should also examine PSYOP and any unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms requirements.

    - Analyze Target Information. After considering all of the above input, the panel conducts an analysis of all probable targets using the SOF mission criteria and fill out target nomination worksheets on those targets selected.

    - Apply Common Sense Test. The operations element of the JOC should scrub the target list for a “sanity check” concerning the capability of it being executable.

    - Brief COMJSOTF. Once all of the previous steps have been accomplished, the JSOTF targeting panel should provide a formal briefing to the COMJSOTF on the proposed targeting strategy for the upcoming phase of the operation.
Figure V-7. Joint Special Operations Task Force Targeting Deliberate Planning
**Prioritize and Group Target Information.** Once the commander has decided on a strategy for targeting, the JSOTF targeting panel continues to coordinate with the J-3 to prioritize and group targets by date and time for execution.

**Publish and Disseminate Target Nominations.** All processed target information will be considered and published as a target nominations list and placed in target notebooks. The list will serve as the COMJSOTF’s nominations list for approval and coordination with the JFC target approval authority.

b. **Target Validation**

- COMJSOTF commences target validation upon compilation of SO target nominations. The JSOTF targeting panel conducts a gross feasibility analysis, eliminating target nominations inappropriate for SOF employment. Suitable targets are consolidated, prioritized and forwarded to the JTCB as a proposed SO candidate nomination list of targets.

- The JTCB is the planning coordination mechanism for target validation. The JTCB reviews the proposed target nomination list to ensure that targets are supportive of JFC objectives (strategic, operational, and tactical).

- The JFC normally tasks COMJSOTF, via a mission tasking letter, to develop a feasibility assessment (FA) on SO targets approved by the JTCB.

- COMJSOTF assigns a MPA for each target and tasks the appropriate MPA to develop the FA. The MPA prepares the FA while a supporting initial assessment is developed to support infiltration and exfiltration feasibility of the mission.

- COMJSOTF tasking for FA/initial assessment development is transmitted via the mission tasking packet (MTP). All FA/initial assessment tasking is transmitted through the appropriate component. This procedure initiates SOMPF development.

- During FA/initial assessment development, effective coordination is required between the MPA, supporting MPAs and agencies and conventional commanders (if applicable). Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) should be authorized for planning.

- The results of the FA/initial assessments are provided per the distribution schedule. Following a review by the COMJSOTF, if the proposed target is not feasible for SOF, it is deleted. If the proposed targets are feasible for SOF, the results of the FA/initial assessments are forwarded to the JTF intelligence planners. Targets identified as SOF feasible proceed to the intelligence production step.

- The resultant product of this step is a validated and prioritized SO target list. The JTF intelligence planners ensure that the SO candidate nomination list of targets is integrated into the joint target nomination list.

c. **Intelligence Production.** Once validation is complete, the JSOTF J-2 in coordination with JTF intelligence production managers, prepare the TIP.

- A critical part of the FA is the intelligence requirements section, which modifies and amplifies the information required to plan a mission. This becomes the request for information to be addressed in the TIP.

- TIPs are produced using minimum essential elements of information.
required by the MPA to develop the plan of action (POA). The TIP supports the entire mission planning process on the strength of the analysis provided. DIRLAUTH should be authorized between the SOF MPA and the intelligence production agency. The completed TIP initiates mission planning.

d. Mission Planning. SO mission planning is designed to develop a POA against a designated target. COMJSOTF tasks the designated MPA for POA development. Using operational data and intelligence provided in the FA and TIP, the executing MPA develops the POA. Coordination with supported and supporting units is essential for effective POA development. The COMJSOTF facilitates this coordination. The completed POA is forwarded to the COMJSOTF for approval.

e. SO Mission Planning Folder Maintenance. Maintenance is required by the intelligence production agencies and MPAs. This task is monitored to ensure that TIPs and POAs are updated.


SO targeting during crisis operations is based on the deliberate planning methodology adapted to the nature of these operations. A technique for JSOTF targeting as it relates to crisis action planning is depicted in Figure V-8. To effectively evaluate emerging and/or unplanned targets and to respond to changing theater objectives more rapidly, the following general procedures are established to expedite the joint SO targeting and mission planning process:

a. Crisis Action Targeting. Target nominations are submitted to COMJSOTF in the same format as with deliberate planning.

- Target validation is conducted by the COMJSOTF intelligence and operations staff, and assisted by the joint force intelligence and operations staff. The COMJSOTF will use available intelligence or will task an MPA to conduct an abbreviated FA.
- The COMJSOTF will recommend SOF targets to the JTF J-3 for approval or disapproval.
- If approved, the appropriate MPA is tasked (via an MTP) to develop the POA. The MTP must contain all available intelligence on the target. All requests for intelligence support are forwarded through the JSOTF J-2 to the JTF and theater intelligence agencies. Required intelligence is disseminated directly to the MPA.
- The COMJSOTF directs coordination between the supporting SOF and the supporting organizations to ensure rapid, but detailed, planning is completed.
- The COMJSOTF reviews the proposed POA and approves, disapproves, modifies or cancels the mission.

b. Crisis Action Planning. SOF missions are often of a time-sensitive nature. The COMJSOTF should assess the capability of accomplishing such missions based on time available. Certain procedures within the time-sensitive planning process may be condensed when collaborative planning is conducted. Comprehensive planning is required between the JSOTF staff and its components. Sufficient time must be allotted between identification of a mission requirement and the execution of the operation. While “times” are not absolute, the JSOTF normally will be tasked to develop a COA or to conduct mission analysis before the beginning of the SO mission planning process. This is accomplished by means of a tasking order and
begins the sequential time-sensitive planning process.

- **COMJSOTF Mission Type Order.** The COMJSOTF sends a mission type order (TASKORD) (see Annex A, “Tasking Order”, to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) to a SOF component (ARSOC/ARSOTF, NSWTG, or AFSOC). The tasked component becomes the supported component.

- **Supported Component Submits CONOPS.** Prior to mission execution, the supported component sends a CONOPS (see Annex B, “Concept of Operations,” to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) to the JSOTF. The CONOPS states how the supported component plans to execute the TASKORD. The detailed planning required to develop the CONOPS must be accomplished in close coordination with the supporting
components that provide the mission support.

- **COMJSOTF Sends CONOPS Approval.** As soon as possible after receipt of the CONOPS the COMJSOTF sends a CONOPS approval (see Annex C, “Concept of Operations Approval,” to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) to the supported component.

- **Supported Component Sends Support Request and Air Request.** The supported component sends a SPTREQ (see Annex D, “Support Request,” to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) and AIRSUPREQ (see Annex F, “Air Support Request,” to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) to the supporting component (ARSOC/ARSOFT, NSWTG, or AFSOC). The supported component should send the SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ at the same time it sends the CONOPS. The SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ are sent as information to COMJSOTF. The SPTREQ must be sent directly to the JSOTF if other than SOF support (external) is required.


- **COMJSOTF Sends Mission Execution Order.** Prior to mission execution, the COMJSOTF sends a mission execution order to participating components if execution authority is not granted in the CONOPS approval.

- **Component Commanders Send Operations Summary.** As soon as possible after the initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element, the JSOTF component commanders send an OPSUM (see Annex H, “Operations Summary,” to Appendix H, “Operations Messages”) to the JSOTF.

17. **JSOTF Targeting Panel**

The COMJSOTF can form a target panel to facilitate the targeting process as desired. The targeting panel formulates SOF targeting strategy, nominates targets, and coordinates targeting activities. It conducts these activities formally through the JTCB process and with guidance, apportionment, and targeting coordination from within the JFACC JAOC. The target panel is made up of representatives from the appropriate JSOTF staff sections and components with targeting responsibilities. The target panel normally conducts activities within the JOC.

*For further information on joint targeting, refer to JP 3-60, Doctrine for Joint Targeting, and JP 3-05.2, Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning.*
1. General

It is essential that the JSOTF have timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence in identifying relevant SO targets, COA development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national assets is critical to success. By their nature, SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than needed in conventional operations. For example, SOF tasked with DA against a building might need to know the location of doors, the direction that those doors swing, and the internal subdivisions of the building. Similarly, SOF tasked with SR against a target might need to know civilian and security force patrols in the area, uniforms of security personnel, and frequency of patrols. SOF often require intelligence to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage the adversary. Additionally, intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires increased focus of various intelligence disciplines to include political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and specific data related to SOF targets. Because SOF missions are particularly sensitive to adversary collection efforts, CI support must be considered in protecting SOF missions across the range of military operations.

Accurate intelligence assessments of adversary COGs and critical vulnerabilities are essential in facilitating the COMJSOTF’s estimate of the situation.

2. National Level Intelligence Support

a. Responsibilities. The J-2, Joint Staff National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is the focal point for intelligence activities in support of joint operations. Joint force RFIs are forwarded through the combatant command joint intelligence center (JIC) to the NMJIC, where appropriate national assets are tasked. Additionally, the J-2, Joint Staff is the coordinating authority for the NIST program. The NIST mission is to provide a tailored national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations.

For further information on national-level intelligence support and the NMJIC, refer to JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

b. Supporting Agencies. National-level agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (which includes the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of the Treasury (TREAS). Service-level intelligence organizations also provide national-level intelligence that is Service specific.

• DIA. DIA provides the focal point for the DOD intelligence effort. DIA also
ensures that expeditious, tailored all-source intelligence collection, production, and dissemination are provided to DOD entities. If the NMJIC requires DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) support to satisfy a requirement, DI’s Operational Intelligence Coordination Center is contacted. If CI support is required to satisfy a requirement, J2CI/DAC-1B is contacted.

- **NSA.** NSA provides signals intelligence (SIGINT), technical support to IO, and information systems security for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standard of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

- **CIA.** The CIA contributes significant support for joint operations. It includes intelligence used in developing strategy, determining objectives, determining deception objectives, planning operations, conducting operations, and evaluating the effects of operations, among other activities.

- **NRO.** NRO is a DOD agency with the mission to ensure that the United States has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence worldwide.

- **NIMA.** NIMA is a DOD combat support agency responsible for providing responsive imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI&S support. NIMA manages national imagery tasking and procedures. It conducts imagery analysis for routine and crisis intelligence requirements by providing imagery and/or imagery reporting. NIMA also provides a wide range of standard, specialized, and tailored geospatial support during crisis operations as requested.

- **DOS.** The DOS collects overt information relevant to US foreign policy concerns. Each combatant command has a senior foreign service officer assigned who serves as an advisor to the commander.

- **DOJ.** Among its responsibilities, the DOJ can provide intelligence on narcotics trafficking that can assist SOF when conducting CD operations.

- **DOE.** The DOE has elements that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to cope with all forms of nuclear accidents and incidents, including those that may be associated with terrorist activity.

- **TREAS.** The TREAS can provide an interagency source of information during JSOTF CD operations for intelligence on suppression and interdiction of illegal drug trafficking.

3. **Theater Level Intelligence Support**

   a. **Responsibilities.** In general, the supported combatant commander is responsible for defining intelligence support needs, identifying intelligence resources, and establishing intelligence support procedures. The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. The combatant command’s JIC ensures that the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate joint commands are satisfied.

   b. **Supported Combatant Commander’s JIC**

      - The JIC is the primary intelligence organization that provides intelligence support to joint warfighting at all levels.
The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all national, Services, combat support agencies, and combat units into a “one-stop shopping center” for intelligence support and passes the information to the JISE.

- If a particular JIC is not able to completely satisfy every JTF RFI, it will coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon for those it is unable to fulfill.

- The JIC is the focal point for intelligence support to JTF operations, and must provide a complete air, space, ground, maritime, and special operations adversary situation by integrating all intelligence information.

- The JIC is the single source for RFI processing and validation, in-theater intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination.

- The JIC has the mission of providing direct intelligence support to a deploying JTF.

4. JTF-Level Intelligence Support

a. Responsibilities. The JTF provides the conduit for the intelligence flow to and from the JSOTF and theater and national supporting agencies. The mechanism to provide that support is through the JTF JISE.

b. JISE

- A tailored subset of the theater JIC, the JISE provides intelligence support to JTF operational forces and performs common intelligence functions. Its organizational structure normally includes the following: CI; indications and warning; collection management, current intelligence, and target analysis and dissemination. It may have liaison and augmentation support from national agencies. The JISE will coordinate intelligence support to the JTF with the NIST, if a NIST is deployed.

- By design, the JISE is scaleable, can expand to meet the needs of the JTF, and is tailored to fit the operating environment based on identified CJTF requirements. A typical JTF JISE is depicted in Figure VI-1.

- The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the CJTF, JTF staff, and components, to include the JSOTF. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems.
Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all sources; a JISE’s capability for joint and all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.

- JISE should provide support “upward” to the supported combatant commander’s JIC, CJTF, and the JTF staff and should provide support “downward” to the JSOTF and other components assigned, attached, or in support of the JTF.

- Analytical efforts of the JISE should have an operational focus, with responsibility for helping the CJTF to better understand adversary capabilities, intentions, and potential COAs.

- In addition, the JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts, and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands’ intelligence activities. The JISE collection managers must also play an important role in nominating SR missions for tasking to the JSOTF. This should be done in close coordination with SO planning experts on both the JTF and JSOTF staffs to ensure the appropriateness of SOF for the missions being nominated.

For further information on JIC and JISE responsibilities, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, and JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
5. JSOTF Joint Intelligence Support Element

a. Activation. Once a JSOTF is activated, a JISE will be formed under the JSOTF J-2 to provide a robust capability to support the COMJSOTF’s critical warfighting functions and JSOTF component commanders’ mission requirements. Joint personnel augmentation for the JISE will be assigned by the geographic combatant commander and may be requested from USSOCOM.

b. Functions. The JISE is the primary center that serves the COMJSOTF, the J-2, the JSOTF staff, and the SOF component commanders for all vertical and horizontal intelligence requirements. The JISE has reporting ties up the joint intelligence chain, through the JTF JISE, to the supported combatant commander’s JIC and NMJIC, laterally across the intelligence chain to other component intelligence structures, and down the chain to SOF component intelligence centers. If a JSOTF afloat is established, the JISE also must have connectivity with the embarked JSOTF J-2 element. The JSOTF’s JISE structure must be tailored to support the COMJSOTF’s and component commanders’ mission requirements. The JISE concept provides increased timely and tailored intelligence flow as a result of increased tasking of intelligence resources. The JISE utilizes both SCI and collateral communications to establish a connectivity link to the theater JIC. No echelon of command has sufficient assets to collect information and produce intelligence to meet all needs. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) provides SCI systems communications and connectivity between intelligence entities, sources, assets, and databases, to include video teleconferencing, intelink, real-time event-by-event reporting, worldwide intelligence systems applications, and a variety of analytical tools. All functions relative to the intelligence cycle are managed through the JISE.

c. Organization. A typical JSOTF JISE includes the positions of director, senior watch officers, and administrative noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and normally includes the following divisions: all-source production; collection management and dissemination; targets and plans; and joint planning group divisions. An imagery element also may be included. Figure VI-2 depicts a typical JSOTF JISE organization. The JISE watch is the responsibility of the senior watch officer. The JSOTF has a limited organic collection capability and is dependent on theater intelligence systems for indications and warning.

d. Responsibilities. JSOTF intelligence responsibilities are derived from the supported commander’s intelligence requirements. While the JSOTF J-2 retains certain duties for the immediate J-2 staff, there is a great dependency on the synergy of an all-source analytical support entity that can manage the flow of requirements and information. JISE responsibilities include the following.

- Develop threat assessments.
- Determine the adversary situation.
- Evaluate operations effectiveness.
- Recommend redirection and/or termination of operations.
- Provide operational intelligence support to JSOTF components.
- Focus the intelligence effort downward in support of the forward-deployed SOF units.
- Develop target intelligence packages.
- Conduct future target development.
• Coordinate with the SJA to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements.

• Provide information collected by JSOTF assets to the JTF J-2. Information of counterintelligence interest, particularly information derived from low-level source operations, must be coordinated with the JTF/JSOTF task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA).

6. JSOTF Intelligence Operations Relative to the Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence operations follow the intelligence cycle. In this context, the intelligence cycle focuses on the COMJSOTF’s mission and CONOPS. **Intelligence operations have to be integrated into overall joint operations** to achieve not only the COMJSOTF’s objectives but those of the subordinate JFC and/or supported combatant commander. The intelligence cycle is depicted in Figure VI-3.

a. **Planning and Direction.** Intelligence requirements provide the direction for current and future JSOTF intelligence operations during this phase of the cycle. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace enables the J-2 to focus and direct all phases of the intelligence cycle. Planning and direction involve identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and system requirements. To support requirements, joint intelligence architecture enables a “pull down” capability for tailored intelligence to the COMJSOTF and the SOF component commanders. These intelligence structures and assets also can provide a “push down”
• SO Intelligence Requirements. The currency, level of detail, and scope of SO intelligence requirements place unusual demands on theater and national intelligence systems. SO often require more intelligence collection, research, and analysis than most conventional missions. HUMINT is especially important to SO mission planning because it provides detailed information not usually available through technical means. HUMINT collection requirements flow from the JSOTF JISE through the HUMINT operations cell. Graphics and imagery are important to SO planning. Detailed information from theater and national sources must be tailored so that it can be displayed, understood, and used by the tactical SOF element that will plan and conduct the mission. Detailed and current (less than 24 hours old) imagery of the objective area is normally needed. Some missions may require replicas, models, diagrams, and nonstandard GI&S products. The scope of SO intelligence requirements also may include the social, economic, informational, and political dynamics of the operational area. The COMJSOTF’s information requirements compete for limited collection resources and all requirements may not be satisfied. COMJSOTF intelligence requirements
linked to theater PIR will have the best prospects for timely support.

- **Planning.** Early planning for intelligence is essential to conduct successful SO. The very precise information required by SO tactical commanders about operational areas and targets may not be readily acquired by national technical intelligence sources, and may require a long-term, high-risk commitment of resources to develop the intelligence sources capable of accessing the required information. Intelligence planning for SO, as with conventional force intelligence planning, involves managing the JSOTF intelligence staff in the execution of the intelligence cycle to provide mission-specific and oriented intelligence that will support operational objectives, planning, and decisions.

  - The uniqueness of SO intelligence support is in the timeliness, quantity, integrity, authenticity, and specificity of the information required. The planning time lines for SO require responsive intelligence support.

  - **Deliberate Planning Cycle.** This entails detailed mission planning, rehearsal, equipment preparation, deployment, and the commencement of the mission execution sequence.

  - Detailed intelligence is absolutely critical during the planning phase. Intelligence organizations and agencies supporting SOF must be involved at the earliest stage of mission planning to ensure responsiveness to SOF mission requirements.

  - In support of deliberate planning, the J-2 must develop, identify, or review mission-specific intelligence requirements. SO-unique requirements are forwarded through appropriate channels for validation, collection, and reporting.

  - In planning for time sensitive potential or emerging SO missions (adaptive planning), the J-2 must accurately anticipate the information needs to meet mission requirements, use the “push/pull” system to ensure that mission planners access all available information, and expeditiously set into motion those actions as discussed during deliberate planning.

b. **Collection.** This requires validating, prioritizing, and tasking through the J-2 collection manager. The JSOTF point of entry into the collection process is with the JSOTF collection manager through the daily meeting of the intelligence collection synchronization board. Collection includes the identification and positioning of assets and/or resources to satisfy collection objectives. It also includes both the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements. However, neither the JSOTF J-2 nor the JSOTF forces have the organic collection assets to satisfy all information needs.

  - **Intelligence Data Flow.** Intelligence data normally flows to the COMJSOTF through established USSOCOM, theater, Service, or functional component interfaces. “Skip echelon” intelligence support directly from national agencies to the COMJSOTF may provide time-critical intelligence. The JSOTF J-2 acts as the theater SOF collection manager and ensures that validated subordinate unit intelligence requirements are incorporated into the theater intelligence collection plan. The J-2 also initiates and develops intelligence relationships with all theater intelligence organizations and maintains contact with national agency liaison elements (DIA, CIA, NSA,
NIMA) at the theater HQ. These liaison elements can ensure that theater-validated SOF intelligence requirements are addressed rapidly and efficiently within their respective agencies.

- **Collection Management.** Collection management is based on four principles: early involvement in identification of requirements; prioritization by assigning distinct ranking to each collection requirement; taking a multidiscipline approach to the collection effort; and tasking organic assets first. Following these principles, collection management has two distinct functions: collection requirements management (defining what intelligence systems must collect) and collection operations management (specifying how to collect). Within the JSOTF JISE, collection requirements and operations management personnel accomplish the following:
  - Identify, prioritize, and validate requirements originated by components and the JTF TFCICA.
  - Assess collection and reporting implications of each requirement.
  - Develop an all-source collection plan IAW established priorities.
  - Identify to the J-3 potential collection opportunities by component units.
  - Forward intelligence RFIs and PIR to the JTF JISE and on to higher J-2 echelons for disposition.
  - Maintain awareness of the operational capability of collection systems.
  - Evaluate requirements satisfaction for content and timeliness.
  - Validate subordinates’ RFIs and PIR.

- **Processing and Exploitation.** During processing and exploitation, collected data is correlated and converted into forms suitable for analysis and production. Data may be further exploited to gain the fullest possible advantage. The majority of responsibilities during this phase rests with the supported combatant commander’s J-2, who has the most capabilities and assets to perform this function. The JSOTF is both a provider and user of processing and exploitation of data. During SR missions, SOF can provide HUMINT in such areas as target acquisition, area assessment, and battle damage assessment. During DA missions, the results of these operations may provide further data for exploitation. Conversely, the JSOTF is a user of the collected information from sources such as HUMINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and open-source intelligence (OSINT). These are invaluable intelligence sources when used for planning timely, high-risk JSOTF missions.

- **Analysis and Production.** This phase involves integrating, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting information from single or multiple sources into a finished intelligence product. Time constraints, particularly with time-sensitive planning, tend to make the processing and production phases indistinguishable. The all-source production section of the JSOTF JISE is the focal point for producing TIPs.

- **Capabilities.** The JSOTF, subordinate nodes, and tactical elements require a significant amount of external intelligence product and information support, primarily in the preparation or planning phases. The theater JIC is the focal point for conducting and coordinating intelligence production supporting the JSOTF and subordinate
elements. Production done by the JSOTF and subordinate elements is minimal and consists of tailoring existing products, data, or information to operational or tactical requirements. In addition to these theater efforts, the national intelligence community may provide tailored intelligence support. The J-2, Joint Staff will coordinate between a supported command and the National Intelligence Community to meet the intelligence requirements at the JTF or JSOTF level. This support may be in the form of a NIST, comprised of personnel from the Department of Defense or other national intelligence agencies, providing reachback capability to intelligence resources within their respective agencies.

- **Management.** Management of intelligence production at the JSOTF level normally rests within an all-source production division or element. Its functions are to receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements, determine which analyst can best develop and produce the desired information and then schedule, task, and edit the intelligence product. It normally has ground, air, and naval analysts assigned to provide joint Service expertise.

e. **Dissemination and Integration.** Intelligence must be provided in a form that is easily understood and directly usable in a timely manner by the user. The JSOTF JISE will serve as the dissemination center for all information provided from national- or theater-level assets, as well as that generated at the JSOTF level. Intelligence collected by the JSOTF components will be disseminated rapidly upward to the JFC through the JTF J-2 CI/HUMINT staff element structure. The JISE will normally be responsible for all intelligence reports issued at the JSOTF level. All reporting and dissemination will be accomplished via the most expeditious means. Information may be disseminated via redundant means as well. For example, the information will be initially passed either by telephone, fax, or Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS); then the information will be followed up via message traffic. It is critical that as much information as possible be passed at the collateral level to the subordinate elements, since SCI access is limited at the lower echelons. The primary means to disseminate collateral intelligence is the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

f. **Evaluation and Feedback.** Evaluation and feedback are a continuous process throughout the phases of the intelligence cycle. If the intelligence provided to the JSOTF as requestor was complete, timely, and in a usable format, the requirement is satisfied and subsequently closed. All-source production personnel within the JSOTF JISE use the factors of pertinence, reliability, and credibility in their evaluation determination process. During the evaluation and feedback process, the COMJSOTF must ensure that the commander’s intelligence responsibilities as stated in Figure VI-4 have been met.

7. **Counterintelligence**

CI is a critical force protection asset that offers the COMJSOTF varied support including operations, investigations, collection, and threat analysis. The J-2 coordinates with the theater CI support officer to acquire theater and national CI support for joint SO. The COMJSOTF should provide CI liaison to the JTF CI coordinating activity. The COMJSOTF should consider early deployment of supporting CI teams to establish liaison with HN security forces and the US Country Team. An effective CI program can detect, counter and, where possible, exploit foreign intelligence collection activities directed against SOF. CI contributes to the overall aspects of OPSEC.
and force protection by detecting and dealing with possible breaches in security. CI activities support the commander by detecting, evaluating, counteracting, and preventing hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination operations from occurring. CI focuses on the following.

- How the adversary’s intelligence structure works;
- What intelligence systems and platforms are available to the adversary;
- How vulnerable US forces are to adversary intelligence;
- How the adversary has been known to target US forces, as well as how planners can anticipate where the adversary might target US forces;
- How successful adversary intelligence has been, as reflected by:
  - Adversary knowledge of US equipment and how to defeat it;
  - Adversary knowledge of US force deployments; and
  - Adversary knowledge of US commanders and their intentions.
- Force protection and combatting terrorism support.

### 8. Intelligence Support to the Targeting and Mission Planning Process

#### a. Targeting

- The primary function of the J-2 in support of the targeting process is to identify and nominate to the COMJSOTF those critical adversary vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attain objectives. Support includes locating and portraying the components of a target or target complex and providing the information required to effectively apply friendly capabilities to delay, disrupt, debilitating, destroy, or otherwise dissuade or coerce the adversary.

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<tr>
<th>COMMANDER, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
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<tr>
<td>- <strong>Ensure</strong> required intelligence support is provided to the joint special operations task force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- <strong>Prioritize</strong> component intelligence requirements to manage flow of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Provide</strong> a clear assessment of mission, objectives, and prioritize joint task force intelligence requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Emphasize</strong> to all personnel the importance of always being information security conscious.</td>
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Figure VI-4. Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities
Decisions about target integration, force application, and execution may be resolved at the JFC level at the JTCB, or at the JFC-level working groups that precede the formal meetings of the JTCB. This board provides a joint forum for components and staff to ensure that the CJTF’s mission objectives are met by validating targets and advising the CJTF on apportionment issues. The JTF J-2 is responsible for obtaining and managing targeting intelligence for the JTF commander and component forces including the JSOTF. This responsibility is carried out by the targeting and battle damage assessment personnel in the JTF JISE. The JTF JISE is the conduit for targeting intelligence at the tactical and operational levels of war. The supported combatant commander or JFC J-2 is responsible for targeting intelligence at the strategic level. All requirements from the JSOTF for intelligence information, imagery, target materials, and target development support are made through the JTF JISE.

JSOTF intelligence support to the process is normally provided through the JPG targets and plans personnel with support from the collection management and dissemination as well as all-source production branches of the JSOTF JISE. The JSOTF J-2 is responsible also for the TIP to the SO mission planning folder. Examples of a TIP for SR/DA and FID/UW missions are shown in Appendix K, “Target Intelligence Package.”

b. **Mission Planning.** Advanced planning for intelligence is essential for successful SO. The very precise information required about operational areas or targets might not be readily acquired by national or theater intelligence agencies. Obtaining information to support SO may require a long-term, high risk commitment of resources and may require developing new intelligence sources. The J-2 provides SO planners with mission specific intelligence to support the operational decisionmaking process and is involved at the earliest stages of mission planning to ensure responsiveness of the intelligence system.

**Deliberate Planning.** During the deliberate planning process, the J-2 develops mission-specific intelligence requirements that support the operational objectives of the plan. The J-2 should consider the following.

![JSOTF intelligence assets support the targeting and mission planning process.](image-url)
• PIR and other intelligence requirements.

• Existing all-source intelligence collection requirements and collection priorities against the priority and other intelligence requirements.

• Gaps in the basic intelligence databases for recommended changes in collection priorities.

• Unique intelligence production requirements to execute the assigned SO.

• Dissemination of intelligence products.

• Intelligence communication and reporting requirements.

• **CAP.** Time constraints become a key factor in intelligence support to time-sensitive or adaptive planning. Moreover, there may be a lack of specific intelligence data because of these time constraints. The J-2 must accurately interpret indications and warning data to anticipate potential SO intelligence requirements. CAP requirements must be more precise than deliberate planning requirements due to the immediacy of the mission. Rapid coordination, timely production, and reliable dissemination are essential.

9. Multinational Intelligence Operations

a. There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Intelligence collection, production, and dissemination in a multinational environment presents unique challenges and depends on the capability to standardize operations and communications between elements. When operating in a multinational intelligence environment, it is crucial that the COMJSOTF and staff know and understand what their authority, responsibilities, and roles are in the intelligence process. Multinational intelligence principles that should be considered when operating in this environment are depicted in Figure VI-5.

b. Intelligence sharing procedures between multinational partners and counterparts should be agreed upon early in the JSOTF planning process. The JSOTF J-2 should have knowledge in foreign disclosure policy and procedures. Necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the DIA, through the JTF and combatant command, should be obtained as required when it becomes evident that the JSOTF will be involved in multinational intelligence activities.

c. Communication, experience, and standardization all impact the effectiveness of multinational operations. Linguists and liaison personnel play a paramount role in the sharing of intelligence in the multinational environment. Intelligence must be written simply and properly classified to ensure releasability to those concerned.
MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

- Maintain unity of effort
- Adjust for national differences
- Share all necessary information
- Conduct complementary operations

Figure VI-5. Multinational Intelligence Principles
CHAPTER VII
LOGISTIC SUPPORT

“I don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.”

Fleet Admiral E. J. King: To a staff officer, 1942

1. General

The Military Departments are responsible for providing or arranging for the administration and support of Service forces assigned to the combatant commands, including Service common support of assigned SOF units. USSOCOM is responsible for providing SO-peculiar support to SOF units worldwide. However, it is the supported geographic combatant commander who has overall responsibility to ensure that all joint logistic and administrative support, including SOF support, is coordinated and executed. In-theater non-SOF specific logistic support can be provided through Service component and/or common-user logistic (CUL) lead Service or agency support channels. The designated theater executive agent is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of joint SOF HQ. This chapter will provide the details of how this occurs.

2. Logistics Functions

The JSOTF J-4 responsibilities include oversight of several broad functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other support. Functional responsibilities of JSOTF J-4 staff are as follows: inform the COMJSOTF and JTF J-4 of logistic, medical, engineering, and environmental problems impacting mission accomplishment; monitor and synchronize JTF logistic, medical, engineering, and environmental requirements; and maintain liaison with the JTF J-4 and other component commands, JSOTF counterparts, and other agencies or organizations as appropriate, in order to exchange information and resolve problems at the lowest level. The J-4 must ensure that JSOTF forces are supported by their Service executive agents, which is required by title 10, USC. The JSOTF J-4 may have to recommend and/or set priorities of support for common items and consolidated functions. Limited resources available to the JSOTF elements may require the J-4 to provide prioritization information to the JTF J-4.

a. Supply. Each SOF component has particular capabilities to support, sustain, or enhance sustainment of their assigned units. These potential resources can assist the JSOTF J-4 in fulfilling logistic responsibilities. The concept of CUL can save the Service components of the JSOTF considerable resources. The CUL approach reduces potential duplication by capitalizing on those common areas of logistic support that occur between or among Service components and support SOF components. Often, one Service component or agency is designated as the CUL lead to provide selected CUL support to one or more Service components. The intent is not to take control over providing Service-peculiar supplies and services, but to utilize those areas in which economies may be achieved.


• Supplies

•• Class I (subsistence). Consider tasking SOF Service components to provide and distribute subsistence and
water on an area basis at locations where theater Service support is unavailable. The objective is to achieve uniformity, efficiencies, and economies of operation.

- **Class II (clothing, individual equipment, and tools).** Forces should deploy with adequate organic clothing and equipment. Resupply may be consolidated under a single JSOTF component or coordinated through the Service provider.

- **Class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)).** Consider tasking Service components to provide and distribute bulk and package POL to SOF components on an area basis. At locations where theater Service support is unavailable, SOF components may be tasked to perform this function. POL stockage policy and guidance should consider organic unit capabilities, HN or commercial support, and resupply operations as applicable. Class III supplies should be closely coordinated with the JTF J-4 and the supporting direct support (DS) supply unit.

- **Class IV (construction materials).** Maximum use of HN or commercial sources is prescribed, if available, for construction and barrier materials. Service provider supply sources should be utilized once HN or commercial sources are exhausted or if not practical to use.

- **Class V (ammunition).** Service components retain responsibility for Service-unique weapons and ammunition. Consider tasking an SOF Service component to provide a common-use Class V resupply point and storage facility on an area basis at locations where theater Service support is unavailable. Ammunition support to FID and CD operations must be coordinated through SOF supply channels.

- **Class VI (personal demand items).** Forces should deploy with 30 days of supply of personal use items. Establishment of Service exchange retail operations will be situational dependent.

- **Class VII (major end items, racks, pylons, and tracked vehicles).** Major end items require strict accountability which adhere to Service procedures. SOF units will requisition authorized Class VII items through their parent theater Service component. SO-peculiar items will be sourced through USSOCOM SOFSA and provided on a loan basis to the JSOTF component.

- **Class VIII (medical materials).** Ensure that forces deploy with sufficient supply to sustain themselves until theater medical logistic support is established. SOF units will draw Class VIII supplies and receive unit level support through the theater medical provider. Due to the sensitive nature and general scope of SOF medical mission support, Class VIII B products must be addressed in all medical planning actions for prolonged or high risk SOF missions.

- **Class IX (repair parts).** Repair parts for Service common end items remain a Service responsibility. If warranted, in order to achieve economies and efficiencies of scale and to minimize duplication, consider establishing Interservice Support Agreements for common-use spare parts. SO-peculiar repair parts are the responsibility of USSOCOM through the SOF components.

- **Class X (nonmilitary program materials).** Material required for nonmilitary programs will be determined based upon mission requirements.
Humanitarian and security assistance materials will be coordinated through the DOS and DOD agencies respectively.

b. **Transportation.** Given the nature of most SOF missions, either time constraints, planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on common-user transportation assets. Generally, strategic air mobility assets support SOF in the deployment, resupply, and redeployment phases of the operation. SOF organic airlift assets normally provide SOF with intratheater lift support (insertion, extraction, and resupply). When SOF operations exceed organic SOF lift capability, then common-user transportation assets should be considered. The geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing this movement control, normally through a theater joint movement center. Once established, the joint movement center is responsible for coordinating the employment of all modes of theater transportation. The JSOTF J-4 coordinates all administrative moves. Operational and deployment moves are coordinated among the JSOTF J-3 (lead), J-5, and J-4.

c. **Civil Engineering.** The JSOTF J-4, in lieu of an attached engineer, coordinates SOF requirements with the JTF engineer who supervises combat and civil engineer units and operations, real estate activities, and environmental protection, among other activities.

d. **Maintenance.** Service-peculiar maintenance support remains the responsibility of the Service components. SOF components may have the capability to perform limited maintenance or units should deploy with direct maintenance capability for accompanying equipment. When practical, maintenance facilities for cross-Service use and retrograde procedures for returning reparables should be established and interservice use of salvage assets emphasized.

e. **Contracting.** For large contingencies or exercises, the JSOTF J-4 may include a contracting officer and disbursing officer on the JSOTF J-4 manning document. In some instances, the JTF may retain responsibility for contracting. For smaller operations, a designated SOF Service component may provide a contracting officer. Units are responsible for ensuring that funds are in place before any contracting actions are taken. While a contracting officer may support the entire JSOTF, the JSOTF HQ and all SOF components should deploy with organic Class A agents and field ordering officers to handle small purchases. Authorized personnel may deploy with a commercial purchase card, although these cards may not be honored in certain contingency areas. The JSOTF SJA will provide legal advice on contracts and contracting matters. Contracting support is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

f. **Funding.** Funding is typically not provided “up front” for contingency operations, and therefore SOF Service components must capture incremental costs associated with the operation for possible future reimbursement. Guidance to “capture incremental costs” should be provided to SOF components as early as possible. The JSOTF SJA will provide legal advice on future expenditures to ensure compliance with fiscal law and regulations. Medical war reserve materiel (WRM) appropriated funds consumed in support of SOF should be reimbursed by operation and maintenance funds and reported in the total contingency incremental shortfall. Medical units with WRM assets will report consumption of their WRM to the appropriate authorities.

For further information on funding, refer to JP 1-06, Joint Doctrine for Financial Management.
3. JSOTF Logistics Readiness Center

Depending on the size and level of the contingency and as part of the joint theater logistics management concept, the JSOTF J-4 may form an LRC to monitor and coordinate the logistics effort. Upon establishment, the LRC becomes the focal point for all SOF logistics and mobility matters in the JOA. The JSOTF J-4 uses the LRC to monitor the current situation, set priorities, synchronize logistic operations, and allocate resources to allow timely and continuous support of operations. If a JSOTF afloat is established and the J-4 is embarked, the LRC must have communications connectivity with the J-4. The JSOTF LRC personnel work for the JSOTF J-4, but must coordinate extensively with the JOC and other JSOTF staff centers.

The LRC functions may be performed by J-4 watch personnel in the JOC when circumstances or size dictate. If the JSOTF stands alone in the theater, key positions may include representatives from logistic functional areas of supply, services, munitions, and transportation; logistic plans; and maintenance and other personnel as directed by the J-4. A JSOTF LRC also may be organized along Service component lines with ground, air, and naval branches. Normally, engineering, medical, and contracting remain as separate branches. A notional JSOTF LRC is depicted in Figure VII-1.

4. Logistic Support

Specific logistic requirements are initially determined by the components. Logistic support for SOF units can be

![Diagram of JSOTF Logistics Readiness Center](image-url)
provided through one or more of the following means.

a. **Service Support.** The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the SOC, or a JSOTF.

- **Title 10, USC.** Section 165 charges the Services with the responsibility for providing administration and support for forces assigned by the respective Service to the combatant command. The Secretary of Defense may transfer this responsibility in part or in full to another component of the Department of Defense.

- **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), CJCSI 3110.06, Special Operations Supplement.** The JSCP provides that geographic combatant commanders and Service component commanders, in coordination with the theater SOCs, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided. Each type of SOF unit depends on the theater logistic system for a different mix of DS, general support and, in some cases, even unit level support. Other Service logistic support should also be considered, as SOF rarely operate in other than a joint environment.

b. **Joint In-Theater Support.** SOF missions could require joint logistic planning and execution. When the theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the geographic combatant commander determines if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. CUL arrangements also may be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy the requirements and when the geographic combatant commander determines that CUL support is appropriate in order to provide more efficient support and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of support. SOF also have special support considerations such as operating outside of normal theater support areas and security-related issues.

c. **SO-Peculiar Support**

- SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no broad Service common requirement. **Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and services belongs to USCINCSOC.** USSOCOM will provide this support to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures or directly from SOFSA. Store front support can be used by SOF components to expedite SO-peculiar support and for Service items that are impacting on SOF readiness.
• The identification of SO-peculiar requirements is an operational decision that is tied to the supported commander’s concept of the operation and mission requirement. Identification and coordination of these requirements are accomplished through USSOCOM and SOFSA. To ensure that the process is effective, the theater SOC should publish clear procedures for subordinate units to obtain this support. These procedures require close coordination among the customer, the COMJSOTF, and USSOCOM. USCINCSOC monitors the process to assist and expedite it when required. There are two basic procedures for identifying and validating SO-peculiar equipment.

  **Predeployment from CONUS.** The commanders of deploying SOF units will submit requests for additional or above authorization equipment fills through Service command channels, with justification based on the assigned missions and operational requirements.

  **Postdeployment or In-Theater.** The commanders of SOF units will submit requests for SO-peculiar items through the COMJSOTF to the COMSOC, to whom the geographic combatant commander has normally delegated the authority to validate such requirements. The COMSOC will provide the SO-peculiar equipment from theater operational stocks if they are available.
For equipment requiring CONUS sourcing, the COMSOC will forward the validated SO-peculiar requirement to USSOCOM for appropriate action. If the items are unavailable within the command, USSOCOM will take appropriate procurement action to meet identified mission requirements.

**SOR.** As with Service common requirements, there is a similar support process for SO-peculiar items. The fundamental difference is that the SOR is passed through the JSOTF to the theater SOC and on to USSOCOM for action. The notional logistic SOR process for SO-peculiar support is depicted in Figure VII-3.

5. Logistic Planning Considerations

Logistic and operations planning must be done in concert to identify and refine support requirements. It is essential to conduct this planning concurrently during TPFDD development. Commanders at all levels must integrate operations and logistic planning from the beginning of the planning cycle. Complete and integrated staff coordination permits simultaneous planning to ensure logistic readiness of forces and facilities to support operations. An additional part of integrated planning involves reviewing the TPFDD prior to submitting it to a supported combatant commander. Appendix D, “JSOTF HQ Staff Checklists,” provides a tool for
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logistic planning in support of SOF. It is not all-inclusive, but should serve as a point of departure for the planning of SOF support and sustainment.

6. USSOCOM Support to JSOTF HQ and Components

SOF logistic planners should plan and coordinate for parent Service support IAW title 10, USC, section 165 responsibilities. SOF organic capabilities are limited and must be considered the last alternative for stand-alone support. Theater conventional logistic elements offer the most robust support capability and should be integrated into the concept of support early in the planning process. The SOF planner should cultivate habitual support relationships with the Service theater logistic elements. In most cases, theater Service components will be able to support SOF if requirements are known in advance. When operations involving SOF impose time, geographic, and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure, making it impracticable for the theater to provide the requisite support to SOF, the geographic combatant commander may request from USCINCSOC the deployment of organic USSOCOM CSS assets.

Additionally, contracted and HNS assets must be considered during the planning process.

a. Deployment Cell (D-cell). USCINCSOC can provide a D-cell in support of USCINCSOC-directed JSOTFs involved in a major regional contingency, national mission, or exercise. Support includes supply, food service, billeting, security, power production, minor construction, vehicle maintenance, and management.

- D-Cell Concept of Employment. D-cell is meant to bridge the gap for logistic support to the JSOTF until conventional support forces are in place and operational. It deploys by the most rapid means available to the site, establishes a layout of the site, and begins construction of the JSOTF base. The D-cell is capable of providing 24-hour operations. Personnel are cross-trained to assist in areas other than their primary specialty when required. For anything exceeding a small package capability, the D-cell requires augmentation from theater components and/or joint SOF. The primary difference between the small and large packages is the number of personnel it can support and the amount

When time, geographic, and/or resource constraints are imposed on the theater support infrastructure, USSOCOM may deploy organic assets in support of SOF.
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of equipment and personnel required for the package. The D-cell is able to conduct limited split operations at an intermediate staging base (ISB) or forward support base (FSB). The D-cell commander remains in command of all assigned or attached personnel throughout the operation.

• **Functional Capabilities**

  • Design, lay out, and establish a bare base site.
  • Requisition, procure, and inventory control all equipment.
  • Act as a paying or purchasing agent.
  • Provide food service in a fixed or field training dining facility.
  • Manage contract quarters.
  • Provide limited air base ground defense and base defense operations, information security, high value resource protection, convoy escort, courier duties, integrated defense with other SOF units, area damage control, terrorist threats, downed aircraft security, and POW processing and detainment.
  • Construct bare base sites, targets, and defensive fighting positions.
  • Provide bare base electrical power and environmental control systems.
  • Provide vehicle maintenance and management of contracted vehicles.
  • Conduct overland and airland planning, including dangerous cargo and load planning certification.
  • Operate heavy equipment.

b. **ARSOF**

• **Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM).** The SOSCOM mission is to plan and coordinate with the Army Service component command (ASCC) and ARSOF to assure CSS, HSS, and signal support to ARSOF supporting the combatant commanders during operations. SOSCOM is a major subordinate command of USASOC. As such, the SOSCOM commander is responsible for the administration, training, maintenance, support, and readiness of assigned forces. SOSCOM is comprised of an HQ staff, six forward-deployed special operations theater support elements (SOTSEs), the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB), the 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion, and the USASOC material management center (MMC).

• **SOTSE.** The SOTSE is the staff coordinator for ARSOF support requirements at the ASCC. The ASCC normally is located with the theater support command or theater Army area command. Attached to the ASCC, the SOTSE staff has knowledge of the resources available to all other Army forces assigned or attached to the theater. Working with theater logisticians, the SOTSE can therefore identify requirements, plan for, and coordinate ARSOF sustainment.

• **528th SOSB.** Its mission is to provide rapid deployable CSS to ARSOF as directed. The SOSB provides initial entry support or ISB support to SOF. As soon as practical, support is then provided by Service components. The battalion’s strengths lie in its capability to support ARSOF unique and low-density weapons and vehicles. It provides DS-
level support that exceeds organic ARSOF unit capabilities. The support battalion consists of an HQ and main support company, three forward support companies (2 active and 1 RC) and may receive augmentation from the ASCC. Each forward support company is capable of providing support in the following areas: fuel, ammunition, water production, supply (Classes I, II, IV, IX), medical logistics, treatment, holding and evacuation, transportation, movement control, and limited DS maintenance, engineer, and food service. The SOSB can organize along multifunctional lines and tailor deployable companies to meet mission requirements. The SOSB is normally attached to the ARSOF component command and may be tasked to support the JSOTF HQ or other Service SOF on an area basis.

- **MMC.** The MMC provides the ARSOF with centralized and integrated material management of property, equipment, maintenance, logistic automation, and repair parts and supplies (less Classes V, VII, and VIII).

- **ARSOF Logistic Flow Concept**

  - **Mature Theater.** In deployment to a mature theater, partial theater support structures are normally in place. A mature infrastructure facilitates the task of logistic support to the JSOTF. Leveraging the theater support structure for SOF support still must be coordinated. HNS also is a means to meet unresourced logistic needs within acceptable risk limits and can include almost every aspect of logistic support. In a mature theater, the ARSOF may request support directly to the ASCC or through the SOSB with a coordination line to the JSOTF HQ and the SOTSE.

  - **Undeveloped Theater.** In deployment to an undeveloped theater, usually no dedicated or specified theater support structure will be available at the time of deployment. Accordingly, logistic planners must consider the lift priority afforded to CSS forces relative to the amount of supplies and equipment deploying SOF can initially carry. This is a critical consideration, depending on the speed at which the theater support structure matures. Careful coordination and articulation of TPFDD priority requirements are required. To facilitate the logistic flow in an undeveloped theater, the ARSOF may request support directly from the SOSB, which in turn may request support through the theater logistics structure and/or the SOSCOM, with a coordination line to the JSOTF HQ/SOC.

c. **AFSOF**

- AFSOF logistic support is focused on keeping the aircraft flying. Logistics and maintenance emphasis is placed on the cycle of launch, recovery, service, rapid repair, and re-launch. The cycle may be compressed into relatively short time periods of 12 hours or less. This places a significant burden on the support infrastructure, given the level of sophistication of the avionics and the requirement to operate from austere locations.

- The parent wing, group and/or squadron are responsible for determining equipment, spares, and personnel requirements. This determination will be based on the length of the deployment and amount of logistic support available at the deployed location. Once deployed, the AFSOC logistics officer will coordinate and manage logistic support, vehicle requirements, POL, billeting, and
messing, and establish connectivity with the theater and CONUS logistic support systems.

- If time permits prior to deployment, the wing or group logistic planning cell will develop a plan to support deployed flying operations and concomitant logistics objectives. Short term employment will normally be supported by drawing from readiness spares packages. AFSOF units normally tailor their contingency support packages to accommodate the mission options for self-deployment, limited airlift deployments and, when applicable, shipboard operations. Intermediate level maintenance support may be deployed to collocate with AFSOF or be centrally located to support theater operations. The AFSOC LRC may receive requests for unavailable aircraft mission-capable parts and coordinate their sourcing and delivery. Longer term employments will be supported by established supply lines.

- The 16th Logistics Group, comprised of qualified personnel from a composite of support squadrons, provides the primary logistic support for CONUS-based AFSOF. The outside the continental United States (OCONUS) SOGs provide the primary logistic support of OCONUS-based AFSOF. They accomplish their mission by striving to meet the following key objectives: mobilizing personnel, equipment and supplies; training logistics and maintenance personnel; and sustaining combat readiness capabilities.

- From an Air Force logistic flow perspective, support elements are organic to the 16th SO Wing and the two OCONUS SOGs. These support elements deploy, in part, whenever elements of the parent wing or group deploy. In a mature theater scenario, critical mission-capable requests go directly from the AFSOF unit to the AFSOC LRC. All other requests follow the theater chain for resupply. SOF-peculiar requests go through the JSOTF/SOC J-4 to USSOCOM Center for Acquisition and Logistics or directly to SOFSA.

d. NAVSOF

- When supporting fleet operations, the senior Navy commander will support NAVSOF using standard Navy support channels, with NAVSOF peculiar support provided by unit deployment packages.

- When operating ashore, Navy common support is the responsibility of the theater Navy component commander. If Navy support is impractical, the COMJSOTF may coordinate inter-Service support from other SO components and/or theater assets.

- The combat service support teams (CSSTs) are responsible for planning logistic support for wartime operations, contingencies, and exercises. The CSSTs coordinate with theater commands responsible for support, the geographic combatant commander’s staff, the JFC staff, HN, and contractors to ensure that required support is provided to operational elements.

- The CSSTs’ focus is to formalize agreements with theater organizations or coordinate as authorized with established support organizations rather than create an organic capability. The formally promulgated statement of requirement is the foundation of the CSST process that then leads to the more dynamic planning process. In practice, the CSST removes logistic roadblocks by taking whatever action is required on emergent issues through liaison, with appropriate
organizations ensuring that agreements previously reached are honored.

- The NAVSOF logistic flow concept is essential to the Navy command supporting the theater, with coordination to the CSST as a facilitator of requests.

- An NSW CSST is assigned to each NSW group to provide full-spectrum logistic support for designated SEAL teams, SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) teams, special boat units (SBUs), NSW task groups or task units, and/or special mission units.

7. Health Service Support

The JSOTF surgeon or the medical plans officer, as assigned to the COMJSOTF, must ensure that an effective medical system is in place that will provide support for SOF missions IAW the following levels of care.

a. Level of Care

- LEVEL I: Care is rendered at the unit level and includes self-aid, buddy aid, and combat life saver skills, examination, and emergency lifesaving measures such as the maintenance of the airway, control of bleeding, prevention and control of shock, splinting and immobilizing fractures, and prevention of further injury. Treatment may include restoration of the airway by invasive procedure, use of IV fluids and antibiotics; and application of splints and bandages. These elements of medical management prepare patients for return to duty or for transportation to a higher level of care. SOF units possess varying degrees of Level I treatment capability. CA and PSYOP units are limited to self-aid, buddy-aid, and combat lifesaver protocols. Ranger companies add the capabilities of the SO trauma specialist (military occupational specialty 91 W). Special Forces A and B detachments use the special forces medical NCO (military occupational specialty 18D). US Navy SEAL independent duty corpsmen and USAF pararescue personnel provide Level I first responder care for SOF. Additional Level I expertise is provided by physicians and physician assistants at Ranger battalion aid stations (BASs) or special forces BAS/FOB facilities. AFSOF provides independent duty medical technicians that are paramedic qualified. These medical technicians are not SOF operators but are assigned and tasked under direct SOF authority and provide Level I — Level II care. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) capabilities and plans will be coordinated by the primary Level I provider. This CASEVAC plan
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should be enfolded into the personnel recovery, search and rescue, or combat search and rescue plan.

- **LEVEL II:** Casualties are evaluated, emergency care (to include beginning resuscitation) is continued, and any additional emergency measures are instituted not going beyond immediate necessities. Surface or air evacuation is coordinated for transfer to a facility possessing the required treatment capabilities. Level II is the first level where Group O liquid packed red blood cells will be available for transfusion. HSS is provided by a team of physicians, physician assistants, and supported by a limited medical technical and nursing staff. Level II in SOF is extremely austere. Battalion-level facilities may physically permit a holding capability up to 48-72 hours, but conventional Level II nursing staff and ground evacuation assets are not available. SOF units receive Level II support from an SOSB or a conventional forward support battalion when those units are deployed with organic medical companies. Supporting medical companies may be augmented with a forward surgical team that provides additional resuscitative and stabilizing capabilities.

- **LEVEL III:** Casualties are evaluated and treated at a medical treatment facility (MTF) staffed and equipped to provide treatment for all categories of casualties. Restorative surgical intervention begins at this level. SOF does not have a Level III capability. Medical planners must assess availability and transit times to advanced levels of care (Level III, IV, and V) and plan patient care support accordingly.

- **LEVEL IV:** Casualties are treated in an MTF located a safe distance from enemy activity. Level IV facilities possess the same medical and surgical capability as Level III, but with a more robust rehabilitative and recovery capability with a focus of returning the convalescent casualty to duty or awaiting evacuation to a mature theater medical treatment facility. SOF do not require a dedicated Level IV facility but as in Level III, planners must ensure that these facilities are accessible to SOF.

- **LEVEL V:** Care is definitive, convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and is normally provided by military, Department of Veterans Affairs, or CONUS civilian hospitals and combatant commander-approved safe havens. This level may include a period of minimal care and increasing physical activity necessary to restore patients to functional health and allow their return to duty or useful and productive life.

b. **JSOTF HSS Service Component Capabilities**

- **ARSOF.** Special forces operational detachments have two 18D SF medics authorized. Rangers have SO combat medics specially trained in trauma management. Army SO aviation units have flight surgeons, but do not provide Level I capability. PSYOP battalions have no organic medical assets for medical care to their unit and are dependent on area medical support from conventional forces. CA battalions have medical personnel assigned but are organized to provide technical advice and expertise during foreign support missions, and not medical support to the force. Conventional Level II treatment capability is not organic to all ARSOF. Army SF and Ranger battalions have limited Level II capabilities. Casualty evacuation by dedicated aeromedical
aircraft is the preferred method of evacuation, but seldom available for cross forward line of troops evacuation. Preplanned team extraction or CSAR are more likely to be used in support of SOF. ARSOF does not possess this capability. The ancillary services of preventive medicine, lab, veterinary, and dental support are located in the SF group level and the 528th SOSB. Limited medical supply capabilities exist in SF groups and ranger battalions.

**NAVSOF.** HSS assets are organic to SEAL teams and provide Level I care to SEAL platoons, SBU members, and SDV team members. Health care and medical evacuation beyond Level I are supported by various Navy conventional units, such as the floating platform from which the team is staged, Army and Air Force SOF, or conventional medical units providing support on an area basis from ISBs or FSBs. Additionally, conventional Navy and Marine units with organic Level II capability can provide medical support to the SEAL community. Aeromedical evacuation (AE) is not available and must be provided by supporting units. Navy SEAL teams have no preventative medicine, lab, veterinary, and dental support. SEAL teams deploy with basic loads of medical supplies and require frequent resupply.

**AFSOF.** HSS capabilities are aligned with AFSOF operational units and consist of SOF medical elements (flight surgeons, specialized aeromedical physician assistants, independent duty/aeromedical technicians, medical materiel technicians, and medical operational planners) and pararescue specialists (front line trauma specialist) assigned to AFSOC special. AFSOF have Level I and limited Level II capability. Levels III through Level V capability must be available to all SOF. AFSOF medical elements provide Levels I and II care for AFSOF and other SOF, and provide flight medicine, limited military public health and bioenvironmental engineering, medical intelligence, field laboratory, minimal casualty decontamination, medical operational planning, limited medical materiel management, and short-term patient holding and staging capabilities. Mission requirements may dictate deploying a stand-alone personnel package utilizing medical rapid response deployment kits or in conjunction with an AFSOF air transportable treatment unit. Although AFSOF have no organic conventional tactical or strategic AE capability, both SOF medical elements and SOF pararescue have the capability to provide medical treatment during casualty evacuation onboard SOF aircraft. AE for SOF is difficult because SOF frequently operates deep behind the lines or at distant locations away from other medical evacuation assets in theater. Support for remote locations in immature theaters not served by the strategic evacuation system requires close coordination between the supporting unified, subunified, component command, or theater patient movement requirements center and joint medical planners.

c. **JSOTF Medical Support Planning Considerations**

**Objective.** The SOF medical planner must have a thorough understanding of the unique aspects of SOF medical operations. This individual must also possess thorough knowledge of conventional medical support systems and requirements, theater aeromedical evacuation capabilities, and the ability to translate SOF-unique requirements into that support framework.
• **Issues.** These issues are complicated by the nature of SOF operations and the ability of SOF units that routinely work together mixing Army, Navy, Air Force, and multinational assets. SEAL teams, for example, could be evacuated by Air Force aircraft to an Army Level III facility. The issues that warrant attention are matters pertaining to the different methods used by the Services for executing medical services and evacuation that may disrupt continuity or jeopardize medical care for the casualty.

• **Unique Planning and Support Considerations.** Unique aspects of medical support to SOF must be incorporated into medical planning at the theater joint force surgeon staff level, with full knowledge and concurrence of the JSOTF and SOC planning staff. Components are authorized medical planners and command surgeons during full mobilization. Medical support must be planned and coordinated with subordinate joint force elements by the theater medical staff. The integration of conventional medical support extended to the full range of missions conducted by SOF must be synchronized with the SOF OPLANs prior to execution.

• Extended lines of communications (LOCs) and isolated or denied locations create problems for conventional units in support of SOF. Extending the full range of HSS functions to SOF is beyond the normal mission capabilities of the conventional medical units. The level of detail in planning and coordination is much greater, and the difficulty of support to SOF increases. The theater medical staff, down to the JTF staff, must prioritize the missions and plan accordingly.

• Conventional medical units often are tasked beyond their organic capabilities to support the conventional force, and often their support missions are prioritized accordingly at the theater level. This problem of multiple taskings and limited resources makes the integration of support to SOF of high concern among planners at all levels of command.

• Evacuation of casualties during SO missions can be done by SOF aircraft, but these aircraft are not medically equipped or staffed to be used in a backhaul capacity. The planner must understand this limitation when determining how to best support SOF-generated evacuation requirements.

• SOF will often operate in theaters that are underdeveloped with little or no health care support structure. Point-to-point movement or medical regulating and strategic AE might be required.

• Some programs or missions are compartmented, and the need for OPSEC requires restricted access for planning purposes. The medical planner must establish an exchange of only sufficient information to provide and ensure medical support for the plan.

• SOF medical support beyond inherent unit capabilities is totally reliant on the theater or external medical support systems for all other medical support. The theater surgeon has coordinating responsibility for all medical forces assigned to or operating in the geographic area.

• There is often a requirement to safeguard the patient’s identity, which might compromise the unit’s presence or
jeopardize the mission. SOF missions are often politically sensitive.

- A modified evacuation policy for SOF personnel must be published so they can be retained in-theater as a critical asset. Transportation out of theater should be precluded whenever possible, dependent on the condition and welfare of the casualty. Additionally, SOF casualties should be provided recovery treatment at a US standard of care MTF in the theater nearest to a SOF ISB.

- The entry points into the conventional system might include nonmedical aircraft that could transport SOF casualties from point of injury directly to an Army, Navy, or Air Force Level III MTF. The conventional medical planner must ensure that the facility in that area is knowledgeable of this unique method and is prepared to respond. The MTF might be a hospital ship or an Expeditionary Medical Support/Air Force Theater Hospital deployed unit.

- Communications with and control of medical assets may also be a concern. Connectivity plans and the procedures for communicating must be developed in order to pass real-time information so that casualties can be moved efficiently.

d. **Joint HSS Planning for SOF-Unique Missions.** The following list is provided as a guide for developing a joint HSS plan that meets unique SOF operational requirements. It focuses on the health service functions not organic to SOF that the conventional system would provide.

- A statement of the medical situation.

- Defined scope of mission.

- A statement of the medical evacuation policy.

- Clear delineation of the medical responsibilities, organizations, and employment of available medical support system elements. This includes emphasis on shifts in responsibility during the several phases of the operations, and on the measures necessary to ensure coordinated medical action by all elements of the task force.
• Estimate of requirements for medical support and available capabilities.

• Provisions for medical services in connection with the medical evacuation of casualties from the operational area (en route medical care).

• Class VIII (medical material) supply including receiving, storing, and issuing capabilities; resupply methods; and a durable medical equipment exchange policy and blood products transshipment, administration, and disposition.

• Procedures and responsibilities for keeping and safeguarding necessary records and reports on the flow of casualties and individual patient status information and detailed SOPs for reporting and records keeping.

• Provisions for access and availability of ancillary services (e.g., dental, laboratory, and X-ray).

• Provisions for obtaining medical intelligence.

• Measures for preventative medicine, force health protection surveillance requirements, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare medicine, and hygiene and sanitation procedures.

• Detail plans for mass casualty management.

8. Host-Nation Support

While HNS may be encouraged for common support items, the use of HNS in JSOTF operations must be weighed against OPSEC and mission requirements. Additionally, HNS authority must be coordinated with the JSOTF establishing authority and higher chain of command. HNS can also be a significant force multiplier as an alternative to deploying logistic support from CONUS. It may also increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce lift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.

a. Factors for Consideration of HNS

• Nations without a viable government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistic assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through local contractors.

• To maximize the JSOTF logistic effort, HNS functions (i.e., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4 organization.

• CA personnel either assigned or available to the JSOTF are trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

• HNS agreements should include the authority for the COMJSOTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

• Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The JSOTF J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

• A legal advisor must be involved in the HN agreements process.

• It is critical to determine a lead agency for contracting and negotiating for support.

• Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported JFC, up to the supported combatant commander and national military level and through
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the DOS channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories: existing or non-existing HNS agreements.

b. Existing HNS Agreement

• The JSOTF J-4, in coordination with the JFC J-4 and legal advisor, reviews the current HNS agreement and identifies the logistic support items in the HNS agreement that the JSOTF might request the HN to “activate.” The JSOTF then requests, in accordance with procedures established in the general agreement, that these logistic support items be implemented.

• The JSOTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support that is required and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement and as allowed by US law and policy) to obtain that support.

• The JSOTF J-4 ensures that the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

• Component commanders inform the JSOTF J-4 if an acquisition cross-Service agreement (ACSA) exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the COMJSOTF coordinates through the JFC with the supported combatant commander and the DOS, as authorized, to take actions to initiate an ACSA with the HN. An ACSA is a logistic tool for development during peacetime and deliberate planning. It is impractical to try to start the ACSA process for near term operations or during crisis.

c. Non Existing HNS Agreement

• The JSOTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support and develops a concept of requirements for HNS. The JSOTF concept of requirements for HNS is coordinated through the JFC to the combatant commander for approval and action.

• The supported combatant commander reviews and approves the HNS requirements and forwards them to the DOS via the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a request that a framework agreement be established between the HN and the United States. The framework agreement provides the procedures and the authority for the supported combatant commander to conduct military-to-military negotiations to obtain HNS through subordinate implementing agreements. As appropriate, the JSOTF J-4 should review with their legal adviser, JSOTF authority to negotiate and conclude implementing agreements as necessary with the HN. Such authority may lie with the JSOTF, the JTF, or the combatant commander. Once the implementing agreement is established, the JSOTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN either directly or through the element authorized to conduct HN liaison. The negotiations can then begin. A legal officer must be involved in the process to ensure adherence to US laws.

9. Contracting Support

Contracting support can be an effective force multiplier for the JSOTF in terms of reducing the logistic tail. For major operations, the JSOTF may include a contracting and disbursing officer on the J-4 manning document. If the operations are combined, contracting may be consolidated at a centralized activity. For smaller operations, a designated component may provide the contracting officer. Units are responsible for ensuring that funds are in place before any contracting actions are
taken. In nearly all operational situations, the JSOTF J-4 contracting actions should be coordinated closely with and approved by (if required) the higher level JTF J-4 or lead Service or agency contracting organization as appropriate. The JSOTF J-4 should consider the following when planning for contractor support.

a. **Manpower.** In order to provide adequate contracting manpower to support the JSOTF deployment, several factors must be evaluated and compared with the tasked unit type code packages.

- Generally, a JSOTF deployed to an improved site can be supported by a single contracting officer. The individual can be assigned to the JSOTF J-4 or be assigned to one of the collocated SOF components and be available to support other SOF units. The individual may also support other component locations. When determining the required number of contracting personnel, consider the following.

  - Availability of central supply and contracting support within the AOR at locations other than the unit deployment base.

  - The amount of pre-existing facilities available at the deployed location to support unit organizations.

  - Significant distance from the deployment site to contractor sources and difficult travel or communication conditions may require additional contracting manpower.

  - The existence of pre-positioned supplies and preexisting service contracts, or support from other contracting units that can reduce the manpower requirement as long as these assets are made available to the JSOTF in a timely manner.

  - The extent of HNS provided directly to the unit that will affect the contracting workload.

b. **Time Phasing.** Early arrival of the contracting officer in relation to unit personnel is critical. Conditions must ensure secure access to suppliers. Additionally, paying agent support is required during the early deployment, and immediate transportation, communication, and support must be provided to the contracting official.

c. **Contracting Procedures.** Procedures should be pre-coordinated to the maximum extent to include the following.

- Identification of key user personnel that will interface with contracting personnel. They should be trained in fund accountability, purchase request validation, purchase acceptance, quality assurance and any delegated purchasing authority procedures.

- Identification of facilities for the contracting office and delivery sites for users if that can be predetermined from site survey information.

- Communications procedures adapted to existing telephone capabilities, off-base line access, priorities for telephone usage, and radio network availability. It is essential to coordinate and prioritize these communications requirements with the supporting communications elements well in advance of the deployment.

- Identification of Class A agents tasked to provide paying agent support to the contingency contracting officers.

- Identification of the legal advisor.
• Identification of personal security requirements during off base contracting trips.

• Identification of all support services required at the site, to include interpreters, local national drivers, or other support required by circumstances at the deployment location. Coordination with the logistic support functional area manager and the establishment of priorities and time phasing for these needs are essential.

• Identification of contractors and provision of reasonable assurance that these contractors will continue to perform during crisis situations.

• Review of contracts and contracting procedures by SJA.

• Identification of those tasks and elements of the mission from which contractors will be excluded because of their nonmilitary status.

d. Command Responsibilities for Essential Contract Services. The commanders, relying on contractor support, shall take action in accordance with DOD Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises, to ensure the following.

• Review contractor services annually to determine which services will be essential during crises and include appropriate provisions in statements of work furnished to the contracting office. This review also should include identifying essential services in statements of work and include provisions for contractor contingency plans to provide reasonable assurance of continued performance during crises. Data on the contractors as well as plans for replacement personnel should be reviewed.

• Conduct an annual assessment of the impact of unanticipated or premature loss of essential contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing and deployed forces.

• Where reasonable assurance of continued contractor performance cannot be provided, include provisions in contingency plans for obtaining essential services from other sources.

• Include provisions in contingency plans to assume or supplement the contractor-supplied essential services at the earliest opportunity during crisis situations when alternate sources can be identified to perform essential DOD contractor services.

• Conduct an annual assessment of the impact of unanticipated or premature loss of essential contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing and deployed forces.

• Where reasonable assurance of continued contractor performance cannot be provided, include provisions in contingency plans for obtaining essential services from other sources.

• Include provisions in contingency plans to assume or supplement the contractor-supplied essential services at the earliest opportunity during crisis situations when alternate sources can be identified to perform essential DOD contractor services.

• Handle information on essential contractor employees overseas as sensitive data, safeguarded under the direction of the contracting officer and released to authorized personnel only.

• Provide for the retention of contractor employees in contracts supporting foreign military sales requirements.

10. Environmental Considerations

All JSOTF operations (to include tactical, logistic, and engineering) must follow environmental guidelines disseminated by the JFC and arising out of US and international law. Accordingly, the COMJSOTF should prepare Annex L, “Environmental Considerations,” of the OPORD. It should include a purpose statement, assumption, and limiting factors; responsibilities; and an environmental CONOPS at a minimum.
1. General

a. Range. C4 support to JSOTF and its assigned SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission, and it must add value to the SOF’s operational capability. **C4 systems support the full range of SO worldwide.** SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit requires a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. IA must be applied to all SOF information systems in order to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. C4 systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit on the ground, in the air, or at sea.

b. Support. SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. C4 systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control up to and including the national level. To provide for necessary control, SOF C4 systems must offer seamless connectivity from the lowest operational unit to the highest levels of command.

c. Interoperability. SOF C4 systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs as determined by the scope of the operations. If necessary, they must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems, but must also be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. Multiple C4 systems may be needed to meet these objectives. With respect to C4 systems, the policy in CJCSI 2700.01, *International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and other Friendly Nations*, focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities for US military forces and to communicate and share data and information.

d. C4 Principles. To ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow and processing of information, joint warfighters must have systems that adhere to the C4 principles of interoperability, flexibility, responsiveness, mobility, discipline, survivability, and sustainability. Additionally, C4 systems must provide IA through authentication, non-repudiation, availability, confidentiality, and integrity and should provide for the defense of computer networks against adversary attack.

2. Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations C4

SOF C4 architecture should allow operators at all levels access to a world-wide
communications backbone and seamless information transfer through a robust, global infrastructure known as the Global Information Grid (GIG). It contains the total combination of information sources, fusion centers, and distribution systems available to pursue SO operational objectives. This architecture utilizes the full spectrum to connect into the GIG and to support SOF operational elements. It is compliant with national and international standards to create a fully automated, operationally responsive, tailored C4 support system. C4 tenets are depicted in Figure VIII-1.

a. Seamless. Seamless C4 must provide connectivity to SOF in garrison, in transit, and while deployed. It must have a reach back capability to normal sources of information for planning, execution, and status from any location. Seamless communications architecture is digital and supports every phase of mission profile. It includes requirements for entry ports, high speed networks, and assured C2 connectivity.

b. Robust. Robust networks must be flexible, interactive networks that can adapt to the changing information requirements of SOF. Multiple means must be a part of the robust network. It requires multiple routes, alternative sources of connectivity, bandwidth on demand, and modularity and scalability.

c. Automated. SOF operators require information from numerous data sources that can be rapidly integrated and analyzed to make C2 decisions at all levels, from the JSOTF to the operational elements. To achieve a fully automated architecture requires human-computer interface, data element discipline, fused databases, multilevel secure local area network (LAN) and wide area network capability, digital switching, and a client server environment.

d. Standards Compliant. Adherence to standards and to the joint technical architecture ensures a capability to interchange hardware and software plus the ability to interface and exchange data among SOF, with other Services, or with multinational forces as required.

e. Full Spectrum. The nature of SO demands the use of the entire frequency spectrum and is not limited to those assets controlled by the JSOTF operational C2
structure. Full spectrum depends on using national systems to the extent possible in order to drive access to the infosphere down to the lowest SOF operational level.

f. Protected. SOF C4 will become lucrative targets for adversaries of all types including foreign military, terrorist groups, special interest groups, and “hackers”. It is therefore imperative that SOF C4 architectures consider the need to protect these critical resources from IO attacks. Creation and maintenance of sound COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and information security (INFOSEC) programs are a few of the methods to provide IA.

3. Joint Force Commander Responsibilities

The JFC ensures that C4 systems, personnel, COMSEC, and equipment requirements of the COMJSOTF are supported based on mission requirements. The JFC coordinates with the supported combatant commander for Service, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and Global Space Support Center or Regional Space Support Center for SATCOM assets, and the Joint Staff for those assets controlled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as a JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications System, or for coordination with other government agencies, as appropriate. The geographic combatant commander may provide a theater communications package or individual communications personnel as augmentees to the JSOTF to help establish a complete, interoperable joint communications package. In addition, the JTF J-6 prepares policy and guidance to enable its subordinate forces to operate within the supported geographic combatant command C4 structure.

4. COMJSOTF Responsibilities

a. The COMJSOTF must identify the C4 requirements to support the JSOTF CONOPS. The JSOTF J-6 reviews candidate COAs for communications supportability and coordinates with the JTF J-6 staff during COA development.

b. The COMJSOTF J-6 also is responsible for the following.

- Provide overall technical control of all C4I systems supporting the JSOTF.
Chapter VIII

- Ensure that adequate and effective C4 systems are available to support the JSOTF C2 architecture.

- Publish C4 plans and instructions to support the assigned mission.

- Review and coordinate C4 plans prepared by subordinate commands.

- Request CJCS-controlled transportable communications assets, including JCSE assets, in accordance with CJCSI 6110.01, CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets, and other established procedures.

- Ensure that both passive and active defensive information operations are conducted continuously to preserve the integrity and security of networks and nodal C4 systems from hostile attack.

- Ensure compatibility of JSOTF C4 systems.

- Ensure adequate bandwidth is available to support JSOTF communications requirements.

- Ensure that the criteria standards for information quality are met as depicted in Figure VIII-2.

5. Joint Communications Control Center

The JSOTF J-6 establishes and supervises the operations of the JCCC (depicted in Figure VIII-3) to support command network control, management of tactical communications systems within the JOA or JSOA, and strategic communications connectivity within the JOA. The COMJSOTF may direct that the JCCC take any organizational form that suits the

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**INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA**

- **ACCURACY** - information that conveys the true situation
- **RELEVANCE** - information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand
- **TIMELINESS** - information that is available in time to make decisions
- **USABILITY** - information that is in common, easily understood format and displays
- **COMPLETENESS** - all necessary information required by the decision maker
- **BREVITY** - information that has only the level of detail required
- **SECURITY** - information that has been afforded adequate protection where required

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*Figure VIII-2. Information Quality Criteria*
accomplishment of the mission. The final structure of the JCCC may be dependent on resource availability. A JCCC may consist of current operations, computer systems support, networks, HQ support, future operations and plans elements, jobs control, frequency management cells, and supporting administrative elements as necessary. It also may include the COMSEC custodian who is responsible to provide or coordinate all COMSEC material required by the JSOTF, to include changes required by the JTF. In addition, the JCCC might have a DISA LNO to serve as the interface between the JSOTF J-6 and DISA. It might also have a regional space support LNO who serves as the primary point of contact to advise the JSOTF J-6 concerning the planning and implementation of military satellite support.

a. **JCCC Elements**

- The current operations element serves as the JCCC liaison with the JOC.
- The computer systems support element manages automated data processing support to the JSOTF.
- Network elements manage and control joint communications circuits and systems.
- The HQ support element provides all communications support for the HQ JSOTF.
- The jobs control element maintains entry control, message logs, and master station
logs as required. It also downloads and uploads message traffic into and from the tactical LAN as required.

- The security element is responsible for ensuring that C4 systems are protected from unauthorized activity, including attack or exploitation. This element coordinates information assurance and computer network defense activities to protect and defend JSOTF information systems.

- The future operations and plans element supports JCCC operations elements.

- The frequency management element prepares, publishes, and distributes the SOF portion of the JCEOI. In addition, it is responsible for coordination with second party communication and computer support providers on any changes to SOF frequencies.

b. JCCC Requirements. Requirements for the JCCC are evaluated by the JSOTF J-6 Director. This will be based on the amount of communications required to support operations. Normally, a JCCC will be established to maintain control over all communications and computer support for the JSOTF. The JCCC tracks all equipment, circuits, and systems in use by the JSOTF and its subordinate units. Typically, the COMJSOTF will task, through appropriate channels, either the 112th Signal Battalion (SO) or JCSE to assist in accomplishing communications functions of the JCCC. Additional JCCC requirements include the following.

- The JCCC will be responsible for the development of all circuit charts, equipment status boards, and network diagrams.

- The JCCC will maintain a log of events. This log will be maintained on the tactical local area network (TACLAN) and will contain all significant events, such as equipment outages, circuit outages, estimated repair times, and J-6 personnel status.

- The JCCC will prepare briefings as required. Normal operations require a daily status briefing for the commander and staff.

- The JCCC will prepare the following messages.
  - Communications status summary is submitted daily and reflects AIS status as of 2359Z the previous day.
  - Communications spot report is submitted after initial establishment of communications and whenever a significant AIS outage or event occurs.
  - Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution report is submitted whenever meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion is suspected.
  - All messages pertaining to INFOCON's and computer emergency response team support.

- The JCCC will coordinate with the JISE and JOC on the development of the communications section of the unit SITREP.

- The JCCC will act as the coordinating center among all staff functions as to equipment location and staging of J-6 information storage containers. In conjunction with the COMSEC custodian, the JCCC must ensure that keying material is available and under appropriate control at all times. Two-person control may, due to the tactical situation, be waived to allow safeguarding by only one person. This
is on a case-by-case basis and must be approved by the approval authority or COMJSOTF.

• The JCCC will ensure that adequate protection in the form of IA and CND is applied to JSOTF C4 information systems and networks. In addition to internal systems, the JCCC must maintain awareness of and protect against vulnerabilities in higher, lower, and lateral systems and networks that connect to JSOTF systems.

• The JCCC will be responsible to coordinate all COMSEC changes required by the COMSEC custodian or JTF. The JCCC must ensure that keying material is available and under two-person control at all times, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise. Users of keying material must be notified in time to make the changes to ensure mission accomplishment.

• The JCCC will be the primary organizational element responsible for IA and CND. As such, the JCCC will establish and maintain COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and INFOSEC programs.

6. C4 Planning Considerations

The JSOTF J-6 requires specific information to adequately determine communications requirements and plan for deployment of communications assets.

a. Forces and Task Organizations. What forces are in the region, what additional forces will be deployed, and what task organizations exist or will be established? This information provides the basis for determining communications connectivity requirements.

b. Radio Nets. The JSOTF J-6 must determine radio net connectivity requirements based upon the identification and selection of JSOTF and component radio nets that are to be activated. The JSOTF J-6 must also determine who the subscribers are and what media (to include specifics on type of equipment) will be supporting a subscriber on a given net.

c. Networks and Circuits. It must be clear as to which Defense Communications Systems and non-DOD networks exist and are operational. It should also be determined if there are commercial, HN military, and/or civilian networks that are required to satisfy
connectivity requirements. Planners must also determine vulnerabilities associated with these networks and circuits and develop methods to address these vulnerabilities.

d. Communications Equipment. With accurate information about communications equipment, the JSOTF J-6 can then build interoperability into the C4 system. The J-6 requires technical information on the equipment, its availability, and a list of systems that are interoperable. The use of automated planning tools is helpful in this effort.

e. JCEOI. Geographic combatant commanders develop contingency JCEOIs to support joint operations. These are finalized and distributed when required. Call signs and frequencies are also coordinated with component staffs. USCINCSOC develops, maintains, and disseminates standard contingency JCEOI systems. These systems support joint operations worldwide, use established joint frequency allocation, and are not oriented toward a specific theater. When necessary, the JSOTF J-6 may tailor or create JCEOI to support contingency requirements. Whenever possible, JCEOI information should be compiled using an automated system. At a minimum, call signs, radio net frequencies, cryptographic material, and times of changes are needed to establish radio nets.

f. Predeployment. Communications support is an incremental process beginning with the gathering of JSOTF AIS requirements. Based on these requirements, communications personnel will attend higher and lower AIS planning meetings; conduct site surveys (terrestrial and shipboard as required); formally request second party AIS support; deploy to the JSOTF location to do the initial AIS set-up; provide AIS support to the JSOTF; and redeploy after the JSOTF mission is completed.

- **Second Party AIS Support.** The JSOTF J-6 reviews all JSOTF component frequency requirements and forwards a consolidated JSOTF list to the JTF J-6. Predeployment coordination should also be conducted with the joint frequency management office in the supported theater, the JCSE, and 112th Signal Battalion as necessary.

- **Notional AIS Set-Up.** JSOTF J-6 personnel should arrive with the JSOTF advance element to allow for initial set up of AIS support. Set-up includes the integration of organic AIS and second party AIS support packages.
  
  - Travel to a JSOTF deployed location. Begin initial set-up and ensure that force protection measures are in place. Start laying cable and access single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) and high capacity multi-channel SATCOM systems. Install secure telephone unit-III (STU-IIs) and/or secure telephone equipment (STE) on HN’s commercial telephone system if available.

  - Configure TACLAN file server and set up peripheral equipment (i.e., printers, facsimile machines, GateGuard/Message Dissemination Subsystem (MDS), GCCS, JDISS, and contingency theater automated planning system (CTAPS)/Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS)). Configure router and work through address conflicts. Establish initial tactical telephone service.

  - Complete TACLAN and peripheral equipment set-up within 12 hours of arrival. Establish the SIPRNET and unclassified but sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network connectivity within 24 hours. Complete GCCS, JDISS and CTAPS/TBMCS connectivity. Conduct initial VTC test.
• Establish or coordinate for IA and CND tools and services (such as firewalls, intrusion detection devices, secure phones, etc.) to protect information and information systems from attack, interruption, compromise, and/or exploitation.

• Conduct end-to-end sensitivity tests on all AIS.

• Resolve outstanding issues and conduct augmentee training.

• Ensure that all AIS are operational.

• As the main body arrives, the TACLAN and all its services, to include peripheral equipment, may need to be expanded. The time line is dependent on the size of the JSOTF and how mature it is. Is this a jump or a first time set-up? Time is of the essence when establishing C4 for the JSOTF.

g. **JSOTF Communications “Crash Out” Package.** Some theater SOCs have an attached Army signal detachment that installs, operates, and maintains the “crash out” communications capability package that provides initial deployable communications for the JSOTF during the initial 72 hours of a contingency operation. **These packages include high capacity SATCOM, cryptographic, terminal equipment, power generation assets, UHF TACSAT, international maritime satellite, high frequency (HF) radios, STU-III and/or STE, and computer terminals.** As the higher capacity SATCOM networks are established, the JSOTF is provided access to the tactical switched telephone, data, automatic data information network, and Defense Switched Network services across a backbone of multi-channel SATCOM systems. These systems tie the JSOTF, JTF, and components together, and must be managed by the JCCC and subordinate control elements throughout the operation to provide circuit control and operational planning support until the JSOTF is stood down.

h. **C4 Systems Threats.** A C4 planning consideration that should be reviewed prior to and during deployment is the known or suspected threats to communications and computer systems that can be expected in the operational area. Intelligence and CI sources can provide valuable information on threats to SOF C4 systems. These threats impact the C4 defensive information operations posture and activities. SATCOM information, to include the type of information, should be provided to J-2, J-3, and J-5 personnel to identify support requirements in ensuring space protection of these systems, as well as for establishing contingency plans in the event that critical information provided by SATCOM is lost.

7. **JSOTF Baseline C4 Interface**

A notional baseline of the JSOTF C4 interface with supported and supporting commands, conventional force component commands, and HN agencies is depicted in Figure VIII-4. This is the baseline communications connectivity that can be modified depending on the command relationships established by the supported command.

8. **JSOTF Component Baseline C4 Interface**

These HQ may be forward-deployed independently or located at the JSOTF HQ, conventional, multinational, or HN facility. Component HQ utilize organic, pooled, and supporting C4 assets. All C4 capability is mission-tailored to meet specific information transfer requirements. The volume and bandwidth requirements for information transfer at the component HQ will be greater than at the controlling element one echelon down.
a. ARSOF. Figure VIII-5 depicts a baseline connectivity for two notionally deployed ARSOTFs (Rangers and SF) reporting to the COMJSOTF. ARSOF normally reports to the COMJSOTF vice the JSOACC (the single air manager concept). The Ranger regimental HQ is the entity that plans, coordinates, supports, and sustains Ranger operations. The Ranger battalion HQ provides C2 and performs combat missions. Highly detailed communication planning is conducted at this node to prepare subordinate Ranger forces to fulfill assigned tasks. The SFOB is a C2 and support base established and operated by an SF group. It provides C4 connectivity between the FOBs and JSOTF HQ.

b. NSWTG. Figure VIII-6 depicts a baseline connectivity for a notional deployed NSWTG reporting to the COMJSOTF. Tactical C4 of Navy SOF is normally conducted by the NSWTG that establishes an operations base from which to plan, support, and execute missions. It may be located afloat or ashore. The location of the NSWTG may have impact on C4 connectivity, particularly for intelligence support. Like the NSWTG, the NSWTU may be established afloat or
As with the FOB, the NSWTU is organized to isolate, launch, and direct missions. The task unit van provides a communications bridge among the NSWTG, NSWTUs, and the JSOTF.

c. **AFSOC.** Figure VIII-7 depicts a baseline connectivity for a notional deployed AFSOC reporting to the COMJSOTF. In this scenario, the ARSOA regiment is controlled by the JSOACC under the single air manager concept. The JSOACC is the commander within the JSOTF responsible for planning and executing joint SO aviation missions and for deconflicting SOF and conventional air operations. The JSOACC will normally be the commander of the JSOTF component providing the preponderance of SO aviation assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint SO aviation assets. Under the JSOACC concept, there can exist a mix of AFSOOD, AFSOE, Army aviation FSBs, and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). In the scenario depicted, the JSOACC is dual hatted as the Air Force component of the JSOTF. The JSOACC normally collocates with the JSOTF HQ.
9. **Intelligence Communications**

The JSOTF J-2 is heavily dependent on reliable communications and rapid information processing that is only available through the integration of effective communications and automated information systems. The installation, operation, and maintenance of intelligence communications and systems require meticulous planning and a mutually supporting execution effort by the J-2 and the J-6. Only through positive interaction of these two staff sections can the intelligence needs of the commander be met.

a. **JSOTF Sources of Intelligence Communications Support.** Sources of intelligence communications support for the JSOTF J-2 essentially mirror the support available to the CJTF or theater Army forces. The JSOTF must be significantly augmented when committed to an exercise or operation.
Augmentation normally comes from theater assets, USSOCOM, and Service SOF components. Communications support may also come from the JCSE. Responsive communications support is essential. Mission planning for SOF missions depends on flexible and responsive communications. Since the JSOTF and SOF may be employed at some distance from conventional forces, J-2 communications between the JSOTF and forces in the field represent a tenuous lifeline for the operation and members of the
operational teams. Additionally, Single Channel Antijam Portable Interface may be used to terminate critical intelligence circuits. These include SOF intelligence vehicle, VTC, and the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). JSOTF intelligence communications flow is depicted at Figure VIII-8.
b. Intelligence Communications Concept

- **Planning.** Communications planning must support the “push/pull” concept of moving intelligence to the requesting organization, and the “who else should know” principle of dissemination. During planning, it is critical that planners identify specific communications requirements for point-to-point communications nodes. Many SOF programs may be special category or close hold. Using a WAN such as SIPRNET may not be a viable option. Point-to-point communications nodes may need to be established for intelligence dissemination to limit access to only those with a need to know.

- **Flexibility.** Access to both long-range and short-range secure communications resources is necessary to ensure support for the wide variety of SO missions.

- **Interoperability.** SO elements must be able to communicate securely with all other SO elements as well as with conventional forces involved in the mission.

- **Multi-Channel Systems.** A secure multi-channel communications system will be established to support the operating forces. This system consists of a tactical satellite terminal, line-of-sight communication systems, and tropospheric scatter systems. Parallel, redundant, and diverse routing is necessary to ensure communications connectivity.

- **Supplemental Communications.** The use of commercial communications leased lines can be used when available if acceptable within the constraints of communications security.

- **Telecommunications Services.** These services consist of voice (secure and unsecured), record or message services, data services from large host computers or other authorized computers, imagery transmission services, and facsimile transfer (secure and unsecured).

c. External Intelligence Connectivity

- **Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System.** This terminal system provides the DOD information interchange standards for communicating via e-mail, chat, official message traffic, and file transfer protocol at the SCI level using JWICS as its communications path, and provides access to various theater and national intelligence community databases. It includes both rudimentary imagery exploitation and GI&S software.

- **Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications System.** This is a voice and data net available at the national level and may be requested through the supported combatant commander.

- **Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System.** This system, known as SOCRATES, is the USSOCOM version of JDISS. In addition to the theater JDISS it is used by the JSOTF J-2 to support JSOTF components. This system includes some services and applications that are unique to the SOF community.

10. Multinational C4 Systems Standardization and Procedures

a. Standardization among allied nations and the United States is achieved through international forum IAW policy and
procedures in CJCSI 2700.01, *International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations*. With respect to C4 systems, this policy focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities for US military forces to communicate and share data and information.

b. Frequency managers and communications personnel must be given the authority to maintain control over communications frequency allocations, use, and communications discipline in operations involving multinational forces.

11. Global Command and Control System

a. GCCS provides the commander with a complete picture of the battlespace and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate C4 information. Along with many other capabilities, GCCS will integrate the following.

- Deliberate planning and CAP.
- Force deployment and employment.
- Force status as provided in the Status of Resources and Training System.

b. GCCS provides the means for both strategic and operational direction as well as technical, administrative, and decision support for the C2 of US military forces.

c. GCCS does not include the operating forces, but it links with designated communications that extend from GCCS subsystem C4 facilities to subordinate commanders or operating forces extend one echelon below the C4-related facilities of the Defense agencies and the Service HQ of the Military Departments. Figure VIII-9 depicts the basic GCCS elements that can support JSOTF operations.

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**GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ELEMENTS**

- Tactical warning systems that notify command centers of threatening events
- Automated fused picture of friendly and enemy forces
- Defense Information Systems Network is used to convey and exchange information between users or commanders, hold conferences, and issue orders
- Data collection and processing systems
- Executive decision aids, such as documents, procedures, reporting structures, and an interactive capability allowing the user to connect with the system, enter data, and receive output reports, fused tactical pictures, and displays

*Figure VIII-9. Global Command and Control System Elements*
CHAPTER IX
TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND ASSESSMENTS

“IT CANNOT BE TOO OFTEN REPEATED THAT IN MODERN WAR . . . THE CHIEF FACTOR IN ACHIEVING TRIUMPH IS WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN THE WAY OF THOROUGH PREPARATION AND TRAINING BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF WAR.”

Theodore Roosevelt, Graduation Address, US Naval Academy June 1902

1. General

This chapter provides a training concept, types of training exercises, and an assessment process that are applicable to a JSOTF HQ. It is intended to provide the commander and staff assigned to a JSOTF with a means to enhance the training and readiness of the force. It describes the concept upon which the JSOTF HQ training is based, includes the various types of exercises in which a JSOTF may participate, and provides a description of the process for assessing the capability of the JSOTF to perform selected principal missions IAW their Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). Additionally, the theater SOC may influence the JSOTF training, exercise, and assessment program. The theater COMSOC uses approved OPLANs and SOMPFs to develop the theater SO JMETL. The JMETL influences SOC resourcing and drives SOF and JSOTF training. Development of theater SO exercise and training programs are designed to meet OPLAN-driven requirements and to evaluate the adequacy and feasibility of current plans. These programs often serve as deployment mechanisms for SOF conducting operations in support of theater peacetime plans.

SECTION A. TRAINING

2. JSOTF Training Team

When and where directed, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) will conduct training of selected JSOTFs (to include joint PSYOP task force and joint CMO task force) and evaluate the execution of SOF-related joint doctrine in support of USSOCOM’s collective training program. This program incorporates this training into the CJCS-sponsored worldwide exercise series through US Joint Forces Command’s joint training infrastructure.

a. Purpose. To improve JSOTF operations and the integration of SOF into joint warfighting at the JTF level.

b. Methodology. Commander, SOCJFCOM, will conduct this training by providing full support packages (exercise development, observers/trainers, senior mentors, models and simulation, and analysis), in conjunction with US Joint Forces Command and the Joint Warfighting Center, to participate in selected CJCS-sponsored worldwide exercises.

c. End State. SOCJFCOM will enhance the training for selected JSOTFs and then provide feedback to the COMJSOTF, geographic COMSOC, and geographic combatant commander on the effectiveness of the execution of SOF-related joint doctrine and on the training needs of the force in joint warfighting. Feedback to USCINCSOC will be as coordinated between the geographic combatant commander and USCINCSOC.

3. Training Concept

The JSOTF HQ must perform mission analysis, define training tasks, define the audience and resources, and provide effective training techniques preparatory to the conduct of training. Training is normally mission-
dependent and mission-oriented; however, there remains a core of basic functional responsibilities common to any mission. Further, while there are methods and procedures common to SO, these may not be common to other elements of the joint force. Training should ensure that the JSOTF HQ staff understands conventional operations and, conversely, that conventional commanders and staff have knowledge of JSOTF operations. The training concept must also support the geographic combatant commanders’ and USCINCSOC’s annual joint training plans by providing a structure that ensures achievement of the commands’ training objectives. The training concept must also be flexible in order to meet the needs of a JSOTF that may be professionally diverse in skills, background, and experience. The training challenge is exacerbated by the fact that JSOTF staffs usually are not standing organizations, but are formed normally from the nucleus of a SOC staff (or other SO HQ) with a complement of augmentees.

a. Training Audience. The training audience consists of officers and NCOs, including designated AC and RC augmentees who may serve on a JSOTF HQ. They should be Service and branch qualified, but they may not necessarily be joint or SOF qualified. Levels of training should be conducted based on the training audience.

• Level One Training Audience. This training should include all staff officers, NCOs, and personnel, including AC and RC augmentees who may serve on a JSOTF HQ or who are in the process of being assigned to a theater SOC. It may be conducted using a compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) computer-based mode for individual self-paced training. The Joint Special Operations University is responsible for maintaining and updating Level One JSOTF training.

• Level Two Training Audience. This training should include the theater SOC commander, potential theater SOC commanders, and selected key and primary SOC or JSOTF identified personnel. It is conducted in a formal instruction environment at the Joint Special Operations University.

• Level Three Training Audience. This training should include all staff officers, NCOs, and personnel assigned to or supporting a theater SOC or JSOTF HQ in support of a JTF or higher joint force. The focus of this chapter, particularly the section on AARs, is on the Level Three training audience. USSOCOM-sponsored SOF training teams conduct Level Three training.

b. Joint Training. The JSOTF training effort must maintain a focus on interoperability. It must use established joint planning and execution systems that are doctrinally based, and use accepted joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

• Individual Joint Training. This training prepares individuals to perform individual tasks in joint organizations and to operate unique joint systems. JSOTF individual joint training is normally centered on computer-based training methods.

• Collective Joint Training. This training builds upon the foundation created from individual training. Training objectives are derived from the command’s JMETL, and may address the training requirements of other commands. Collective joint training includes a variety of tools, such as operational rehearsals, joint field training exercises, command post exercises (CPXs), and computer-assisted exercises (CAXs).
4. Building Block Approach to Training

The JSOTF joint program of instruction should use a progressive building block approach to joint training. It begins with the individual level of instruction. It is stand-alone training and focuses on the JSOTF as a whole: what it is, what it does, and how it operates. It provides an overview of command and staff functional areas to include their interrelationships. The next level is institutional instruction to be conducted at the USAF Special Operations School. Its focus is on the planning process to include developing COAs, staff estimates, and commander’s estimate. It should also include participation in the AAR process. The third level is designed to train the SOC or JSOTF HQ staff member to theater specific subjects, to include tasks, techniques, and procedures of a JSOTF HQ staff in support of a senior joint force or JTF. It is driven by a SOC commander’s training requirements and is designed to fine tune the JSOTF HQ staff’s ability to operate in an efficient, effective, and cohesive manner. Training is performance-oriented, requirements-based, and focuses on theater-specific collective and functional tasks.

SECTION B. EXERCISES

5. Range of Exercises

There is a range of training exercises available to the JSOTF to support the training concept. These exercises provide the capability to focus on the commander’s JMETL while addressing the training requirements of other commands. They should be designed with the flexibility to meet time demands and use available resources. Types of exercises that may be used as training tools by a JSOTF are as follows.

a. Joint readiness exercise (JRX).

b. Field training exercise (FTX).

c. No-notice interoperability exercise (NIEX).

d. CJCS exercise.

e. CPX.

f. CAX.

g. Joint combined exercise for training (JCET).

6. Joint Readiness Exercise

a. Purpose. JRXs are designed to train and assess USCINCSOC’s requirement to provide a standing JSOTF. JRXs are conducted several times a year, and are targeted at training a JSOTF staff and the operational units they control. JRXs are multi-echelon training events in that they may exercise several levels of HQ and staffs and their assigned forces. They provide the opportunity for exercising a broad range of individual and collective skills.

b. Resource Intensive. JRXs require the assembly, support, and transportation of large numbers of forces to geographically distant training areas. Training costs increase as conditions become more realistic in terms of operational time, distance, locations, and number of forces. Furthermore, JRXs require a significant organizational effort. This effort includes, but is not limited to the following.

- Conducting exercise development conferences, to include exercise preparation schedule, scenario development, and coordination for support.

- Establishing exercise director’s staff and control group.
• Coordinating opposing forces participation.

• Identifying, surveying, and preparing training locations.

• Preparing and publishing exercise directives.

• Developing assessments and AAR plans.

• Maintaining cost estimates.

• Coordinating PA.

• Coordinating distinguished visitor procedures, if required.

• Preparing training support products.

c. Coordination and Deconfliction. JRXs also require the coordination and deconfliction of maneuver, air, and sea space. Consideration must be given to environmental factors throughout the planning process. In addition, a scenario must be developed that considers all aspects of planning and coordination for the JSOTF mission. The JRX normally is presented and controlled by an exercise control group.

d. Key Objectives. In addition to exercising command and staff functions, JRXs may be used as a tool to accomplish broad training objectives. These may include, but are not limited to, the following.

• Deploy, move, and/or maneuver joint forces over realistic distances.

• Plan, synchronize, and conduct large scale combat and noncombat joint operations.

• Plan, synchronize, and conduct supporting fires and IO activities.

• Plan, synchronize, and conduct logistic activities to support extensive joint operations; develop and/or exercise inter-Service support agreements and arrangements.

• Promote joint interoperability at the JTF level.

• Exercise joint mission essential tasks at both tactical and operational levels.

• Build joint teamwork and cohesion.

7. Field Training Exercise

The FTX is an exercise performed in the field under simulated operational conditions. Joint field training normally focuses on performing tasks at the tactical level of war and typically exercise JTTP. However, interaction among the JSOTF staff and higher HQ may elevate the performance of tasks at the operational or strategic theater levels of war depending on the mission. The primary target audience is the JSOTF staff and its subordinate units, including an embarked JSOTF afloat operating in a forward area. The emphasis is placed on combatant commander-sponsored interoperability requirements, and is derived from operational mission analysis. FTXs may also satisfy multinational interoperability requirements.

8. No-Notice Interoperability Exercise

The NIEX program is a CJCS-sponsored exercise program. NIEX examines issues of strategic interoperability and focuses on resolving problems related to interoperability, command, control, and communications (C3), and challenges of special interest to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NIEX provides an opportunity to train key individuals, staff, and operational elements at the interagency, joint staff, combatant command, JTF, and JSOTF levels in time-sensitive crisis action procedures. This exercise also allows participants to observe
and, if required, amend procedures, policies, and systems that support staffs and decision makers. A JSOTF HQ can anticipate some level of participation in a NIEX involving the affected geographic combatant commander’s AOR.

9. CJCS Sponsored Exercise Program

The CJCS program is described within Joint Training Master Plan and developed for training audiences at the Joint Staff and NCA level. Training is typically focused on strategic national-level joint tasks. The exercises within this program provide training for national-level decision makers and their staffs, aid in determining the readiness and effectiveness of worldwide C4I, and exercise appropriate plans and procedures in crisis response situations.

10. Joint Command Post Exercise

a. Purpose. CPXs train commanders and staff in staff operations, C2 procedures, and decision making. The primary focus is on chain of command and communications networks. As such, they are conducted by and between HQ that may be at home station or in deployed locations. All other forces are simulated.

b. Resources. CPXs may require reduced resources while providing focused training. Even though the resource requirements are less than those of a JRX, CPXs still require significant support depending on the format, scope, extent of HQ and chain of command involvement, and training objectives. CPXs can train all the appropriate HQ for a particular type of mission at realistic operational distances, or they can train a reduced number of HQ and a smaller slice of the chain of command. The non-playing HQ and units can be represented by simulation or response cells. Higher HQ may be represented by exercise control groups. Depending on their scope, CPXs may use strategic, operational, and tactical C4I and logistic networks. CPXs may be combined with modeling and simulations dependent on the scenario.
11. Computer-Assisted Exercise

CAXs are computer driven exercises used to present a scenario and simulate the conditions, environment, and progression of events. They also use analytical models to aid decisionmaking and portray responses to and results of friendly and enemy actions. CAX requirements depend on the scope of the supported exercise, level of detail required in the information presented, and the complexity of interoperability among the different models used. Exercise designers must ensure that the JOA or JSOA, and force structure designated for the exercise can be supported by the desired simulation model and databases.

12. Joint Combined Exchange Training

JCET is an overseas training event primarily designed to benefit US SOF mission-essential task list and JMETL training. It may be joint and utilizes 2011 training procedures, is major force program-11 funded, uses no foreign military assistance funds, and is coordinated by the geographic combatant commander and the senior USG country representative and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

SECTIONS C. ASSESSMENTS

13. Assessment Concept

Joint training encompasses the conduct of multiple types of training events, including joint exercises. Execution of training events is conducted using planning, preparation, execution, and post exercise evaluation process (see Figure IX-1). Evaluation of each training event is conducted as part of the execution phase. Training proficiency evaluation is a command responsibility to determine whether individuals and units have met specific training objectives. Assessments are conducted continuously during exercise execution to identify problems early and apply mid-course corrections when such corrections will do the most good.

14. After-Action Review Process

This process is embedded in the execution phase of the Joint Training System. It enables COMJSOTFs to evaluate their training objectives, derived directly from joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs). The AAR process also produces a high impact facilitated after-action review (FAAR) and a training objective evaluation within a commander’s summary report (CSR). The FAAR provides an analytical review of training events that enables the training audience, through a facilitated professional discussion, to discover for themselves what happened during a training event, why it happened, and how it could have been done better. The CSR contains all data collected related directly to commander’s training objectives and provides the commander with a summation of how well the JSOTF accomplished its training objectives. Key to the AAR process is a dedicated team of analysts who are functional matter experts that have extensive knowledge of the Universal Joint Task List manual which provides a standardized tool for describing requirements for the planning, conducting, evaluating, and assessing of joint and multinational training. It is their mission, along with subject matter expert observer/trainers, to execute this process (see Figure IX-2).

15. Planning the After-Action Review

Based upon the joint training event directive, the scope of the AAR is derived using seven planning factors as follows.

  a. Exercise Objectives. Knowledge of the exercise objectives ensures that training information is not skewed in relation to
training objectives. Exercise objectives are usually broad based and normally are not based on specific JMETs.

b. **Training Objectives.** It is important to note that the commander of the JSOTF begins the planning process by developing the training objectives to be evaluated. These objectives are derived from the commander’s training analysis and usually focus on the critical tasks that are key to mission success. These are drawn directly from the JMETLs, supporting tasks, and corresponding conditions and standards. They become the initial focus of the AAR team’s planning.

c. **Training Audience.** The training audience is drawn directly from the joint exercise directive or training plan. Normally, it involves the COMJSOTF and staff, and may or may not include the components.

d. **Training Method.** This is based on the type of exercise as discussed in Section B.
e. **Duration of Training Event.** This factor considers the length of the training event in both numbers of days and length during a day (12/24 hours).

f. **Distribution and Location.** Assessment of the distribution and location considers the physical location of the training audience and what facilities and capabilities are available at those locations.

g. **Number and Type of FAARs.** A FAAR may be conducted at key points during the exercise. It may also be conducted at multiple locations depending on the intended training audience. The recommended approach is a single, final FAAR for the primary training audience. If desired that it reach an audience in a remote location, then an audio-visual conference is recommended. If a mid-course event is desired by the commander, this may be accomplished through informal updates between the AAR team designated subject matter expert and affected staff element. The FAAR is not intended to replace nor replicate a “hot wash-up” that a COMJSOTF may desire to conduct immediately following the end of an exercise.

16. **Preparation for the After-Action Review**

   a. It is during this stage that the **AAR team conducts doctrinal research, reviews command plans and pertinent documents, and prepares a collection management plan that details the what and how analysts and observers will collect data on the training objectives.** This stage also includes an in depth training period prior to deployment of the AAR team.

   b. **Preparing for the AAR**

      - **Development of Potential AAR Topics.** Through execution of the collection effort, systemic issues and potential AAR topics will begin to surface during the
conduct of the exercise. Analysts then consult with the facilitator to identify and further refine these potential topics and ensure that they are relevant to the commander’s training objectives. The facilitator will normally apprise the command leadership of potential topics worthy of discussion during the FAAR.

- **Facilitator.** The **facilitator is responsible to the joint exercise director** as designated by the COMJSOTF, and ensures that data is collected for every training objective and compared against its performance standard under established conditions. In addition, the facilitator is normally a senior officer who has direct access to the COMJSOTF (senior DOD or contractor personnel may also serve as facilitators if properly trained); advises the commander on developing issues and topics; receives commander’s guidance; and executes the FAAR.

### 17. Execution of the After-Action Review

a. **Establishing the AAR Operations Center.** The AAR operations center is established at the training site and is located as close to the training audience as possible. It is established a few days prior to the start of the exercise when certain preparatory tasks are performed. These tasks include, among others: establishing a communications network with all exercise event locations; training of observers and augmentees by the core analyst AAR team; and meeting with the senior leadership of the command participating in the exercise. These meetings provide a forum for the analysts to discuss the assessment process and receive feedback and guidance from the leadership.

b. **The Facilitated After-Action Review.** The highlight of the execution phase is a FAAR with the training audience, its higher HQ, and the supporting commanders. The **objective of the FAAR is to allow the training audience to discover for themselves what happened during training and why.** This process enhances learning, promotes effective problem solving, and allows the training audience to determine if they accomplished what they set out to accomplish during the exercise. Critical to the success of the FAAR is the accuracy of data used to reconstruct the training events. Often, issues discussed during the FAAR will result in decisions on future training plans and direct follow-up corrective actions. Normally, a FAAR agenda is planned for approximately 2 hours.

c. **AAR Process Post Exercise Actions.** Upon completion of an exercise, the AAR team completes a CSR, including the task performance observations (TPOs) for each of the exercise training objectives. CSRs become a key input for the commander’s use in assessing training proficiency for the entire training cycle (i.e., “T” = Trained, “P” = Needs Practice, “U” = Untrained, or “N” = Not Observed) of the JSOTF. It is a comprehensive document consisting of several chapters that replay the entire training event and provides data and information on TPOs related directly to each training objective. While the FAAR focuses on four to seven major issues, the CSR is the mechanism to report on all of the exercise training objectives. It normally is completed within 20 days of completion of the training event. Also, the COMJSOTF may use this document in the development of the joint AAR or to identify and define issues that may be used internally or published externally to the JSOTF. This document may also lead to recommended changes to doctrine.

### 18. Assessment

Joint training is realized in the assessment phase, where assessment refers to the compilation of evaluations providing the
commander with valuable information about the overall command’s capability to perform assigned missions. The commander uses the aggregate AARs to determine the command’s mission capabilities and to identify training strengths and/or deficiencies in doctrine, plans, organization, training, material, leadership, and people.
APPENDIX A
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Unconventional Warfare

Conventional PSYOP techniques may be applicable during UW operations, but because of the changing operational environment, different target groups exist. The four major UW targets of PSYOP are listed below.

a. The uncommitted.

b. Hostile sympathizers.

c. Hostile military forces.

d. Resistance sympathizers.

2. Foreign Internal Defense

a. PSYOP supports the achievement of national goals by targeting specific audiences. In FID, specific PSYOP goals exist for the following target groups.

• Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces.

• Civilian Populace. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs.

• Military Forces. To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of the HN forces.

• Neutral Elements. To gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the HN.

• External Hostile Powers. To convince hostiles that the insurgency will fail.

b. PSYOP can assist an FID mission by achieving many or all of the following goals.

• Improving popular support for the HN government.

• Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.

• Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States.

• Supporting defector programs.

• Providing close and continuous support to CMO.

• Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent activities.

• Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.

• Informing the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.

• Passing instructions to the HN populace.

• Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

3. Direct Action

PSYOP support for DA missions depends on the situation, mission, and type of forces involved. PSYOP support of DA missions needs to be closely coordinated and linked to US public diplomacy and command information programs. The following are common PSYOP objectives in DA operations.
Appendix A

a. Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the enemy reaction and ensure that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.

b. Establish control of noncombatants, neutrals, and other groups in the operational area.

c. Reduce interference in the DA operation by hostile forces and nations.

d. Exploit target audiences that might not otherwise be accessible. Exploitation includes demoralizing potential adversaries with the results of the operation.

e. Assess the psychological impact of the operation.

f. Reduce the adverse effects of mission failure.

g. Capitalize on DA mission success in strategic PSYOP.

h. Support DA missions in contingency operations.

4. Special Reconnaissance

PSYOP support SR by the following means:

a. Assessing the psychological impact of the operation, to include the impact of compromised clandestine or covert operations.

b. Limiting or negating the effects of compromise.

c. Conducting cover and deception operations.

d. Providing personnel to help in area assessments.

5. Counterterrorism

PSYOP must integrate with other security operations to target the forces employing terrorism. The aim is to place the terrorist forces on the psychological defensive. To do so, PSYOP personnel analyze the terrorists’ goals and use PSYOP programs to frustrate those goals. PSYOP supports CT by the following means.

a. Countering the adverse effects of a terrorist act.

b. Lessening popular support for the terrorist cause.

c. Publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups.

d. Persuading the terrorists that they cannot achieve their goals and that they are at personal risk (from a responsible government that will not negotiate).

e. Promoting legitimacy of US and HN governments.

For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.
1. Foreign Internal Defense

CA, as part of CMO, can assist other SOF, indigenous forces, and HN government agencies in planning and implementing population and resource controls, civic action, security and clearance operations, and other initiatives aimed at achieving political mobilization and internal stability.

2. Unconventional Warfare

CA can train, advise, and assist other SOF and indigenous forces in planning and executing programs for population and resource control, civic action, political mobilization, civil administration, and infrastructure development aimed at expanding their legitimacy within contested areas.

3. Direct Action

CA can advise and assist other SOF and intelligence elements in mission planning relating to civilian contacts and control, area assessments, ROE, and compatibility between operational and postconflict objectives.

4. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

CA can advise and assist other SOF, other DOD units and organizations, other government agencies, NGOs, and HNs in planning, conducting, and supporting FHA activities.

For further information on CA and CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO).
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APPENDIX C
JSOTF LIAISON PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

1. General

LNOs provide the critical link between the COMJSOTF and higher, lateral, subordinate, supporting, and supported HQ. LNOs from subordinate and supporting units provide the COMJSOTF with current information about their parent units’ capabilities, activities, and intentions. LNOs sponsored by the COMJSOTF at higher and supported HQ improve the COMJSOTF’s coordination with those HQ by providing dedicated communications links and simply being present during critical phases of mission planning and execution. The size, composition, and duration of liaison elements vary with the situation. Operation JUST CAUSE required a significant number of LNOs for short-term attachment. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM required large SO liaison elements at supported conventional HQ on a permanent basis. The COMJSOTF must identify liaison personnel and equipment requirements in all plans. It is critical that both the theater SOC and JSOTF understand that they are responsible for liaison to their higher and lateral units. Subordinate JSOTF units are responsible to the JSOTF HQ for liaison and may be tasked to provide or augment personnel that the JSOTF HQ provides to higher HQ or units. LNOs work for their parent commanders, not the commanders of the units to which they have been sent.

2. Functions

In concise terms, liaison functions are: to monitor, coordinate, advise, and participate in operation planning; assist the command to which liaison is attached; and keep the parent commander informed of the situation, intentions, and operational requirements of the command to which LNOs are attached.

“During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit’s capabilities, and make recommendations.”

LTG C. W. Stiner, USA
Cdr, JTF South,
Operation JUST CAUSE

3. Procedures

a. The COMJSOTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity. Specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the COMJSOTF.

- The COMJSOTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel. This could be accomplished through a JPRC, JSOTF SOP, review of the JSOTF Joint Program of Instruction (Level 1 CD-ROM), attendance of Level 2 Joint Special Operations University courses, an initial train up period, or other means.

- The COMJSOTF must determine which staff officer or staff section will provide overall direction and supervision of all liaison personnel reporting to the JSOTF HQ for duty (e.g., D/COMJSOTF, chief of staff, or J-3).

b. The effective use of liaison personnel will enhance interoperability, synchronization,
and integration while reducing fratricide and contributing significantly to mission success.

c. The JSOTF should exchange liaison personnel with the other joint force components, provide liaison personnel to the JFC and supported commands (other than the other joint force components), and receive and support liaison personnel from supporting and subordinate forces.

- Liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ perform their duties within the JSOTF staff division that is normally responsible for JSOTF functions related to the liaison personnel’s assigned duties.

- As the personal representatives of their commanders, LNOs will normally attend all staff meetings and briefings that affect their parent commands.

d. Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services.

- SOF component liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ should be of sufficient rank to influence the decisionmaking process.

- Liaison personnel may be authorized to answer certain routine COMJSOTF queries on behalf of their commands. In addition, the COMJSOTF should not formally task components through the component liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ. Formal tasking of components by the COMJSOTF should be accomplished through normal command channels. However, effective LNOs will keep their parent commanders informed of pending taskings and provide informal advance copies as they become available.

4. LNO Checklist

The following checklist may assist liaison personnel in performing their functions.

a. Before departure for the gaining HQ, liaison personnel should be thoroughly briefed on the following:

- The JTF and JSOTF OPORD or OPLAN.

- The current situation activities and intentions of their parent unit.

- Their commander’s intent, including details of the CONOPS (e.g., unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistics considerations).

- The current status and missions of the unit to which they are being sent.

- OPSEC applicable to the mission.

b. Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each staff section.

c. Understand clearly their mission and responsibilities.

d. Ensure that arrangements for communication and transportation will meet mission requirements.

e. Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.

f. If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter requirements.
g. Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of their unit and, to the extent possible, those of the unit to which they are being sent.

h. Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.

i. On arrival at the HQ to which they are sent, the liaison personnel are responsible for the following:

- Report to the supported commander or their representative (e.g., deputy commander, chief of staff, or J-3); state their mission and exhibit their directive or credentials (if in writing); offer assistance; and be prepared to brief them on their unit’s situation, activities, intentions, and capabilities.

- Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all information required to be transmitted to their unit.

- Establish communication with their unit and exchange updated information, as required.

j. During the liaison tour, liaison personnel should be responsible for the following.

- Keep informed of the situation of their own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which they are sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison personnel of attached or supporting units.)

- Find out how their parent command will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, and commander’s intent).

- Accomplish their mission without interfering with the operations of the HQ to which they are sent.

- Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.

- Report to their parent command on those matters within the scope of their mission.

- As permitted by official orders, inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison personnel’s parent HQ.

- Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about significant problems being experienced by the liaison personnel’s parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa; make suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their parent command; and recommend improved procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of their parent commands.

- Ensure that the liaison location at the HQ is known at all times (e.g., inform the joint operations center’s duty officer or chief of staff of daily activities).

- Advise parent unit (if possible) of departure from the liaison location.

- Attend the visited unit’s daily situation update briefings and other meetings and briefings that affect the parent unit, as required.

- Keep an appropriate record of their actions and reports.

- Report their departure to the visited unit commander at the completion of their mission.
k. Upon return to their own HQ liaison personnel should complete the following.

- Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (e.g., detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander’s intent).

- Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.

- Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited HQ.

- Transmit information required by higher HQ in each staff area.

- Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.
The following checklists are provided to assist the JSOTF staff in the preparation, planning, and execution of their functional responsibilities. They are not intended to be all inclusive and should be modified to suit the accomplishment of the stated JSOTF mission.

1. JSOTF J-1 (Personnel) Checklist

a. General

- Does a joint system exist for the J-1 that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualties accounting; and personnel requisitions?

- Do current plans include a current summary of unit personnel needs?

- Are critical unit positions identified?

- Do the following issues pertain to JSOTF personnel?
  - Have JSOTF augmentation shortfalls and requirements been identified and submitted to the combatant commander?
  - Are minimum grade, security clearances, and requirements by sex specified?
  - Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?
  - Have instructions been issued for passports, visas, immunizations, uniform requirements, and travel restrictions?

- Have administrative procedures been established by Service component commanders, before deployment, for the following JSOTF personnel actions?
  - Giving members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney and to seek other Service-provided legal assistance (as available)?
  - Giving members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit?
  - Making provisions to pay members while deployed?
  - Providing passports and visas as required?
  - Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening, identification cards or tags, and Service record updates (including a record of emergency data)?

- Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?
  - Special leave?
  - Hostile fire or imminent danger pay?
  - Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion?
  - Free postage?
  - Sole surviving son?
  - Absentee voting?

- Have MWR activities for JSOTF personnel been coordinated?
Appendix D

- Is military postal support adequately and equitably addressed in JSOTF and Service component commands’ plans?

- Have supporting US disbursing officers been requested to provide US and indigenous currencies for official purposes and for use by JSOTF members?

- Are planning factors for computing personnel attrition developed IAW existing Service procedures?

- Which component within the JSOTF will handle POWs, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

- Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of POWs, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

- Which component within the JSOTF will handle indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

- Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

- Has liaison been established with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding transfer of POWs, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

- Have procedures been developed between the J-1 and J-2 for the in-theater processing of returned formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel?

- Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning through medical channels?

- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?

- Are there procedures and formats for reporting to the COMJSOTF all alleged serious crimes and incidents of national or international interest involving JSOTF personnel (e.g., a serious vehicle mishap)?

- Are there procedures and authority to administer non-judicial punishment or to take other administrative actions for less serious crimes and incidents?

- Have legal advisors been identified through coordination with Service component for all legal support required by COMJSOTF?

- Consistent with operational requirements, is the maximum practical use being made of local civilian labor?

- Have appropriate liaison positions been established with local civil authorities?

b. Plans and Policies

- Has the COMJSOTF been briefed on the provisions of international law and applicable treaties and agreements that may affect their relations with local citizens and civil authorities?

- Have all policies regarding use of indigenous labor by the JSOTF been coordinated with component CA officers? (The JSOTF J-1 and J-3 should coordinate CA issues.)

- Have J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatants?
• Has the JSOTF staff chaplain been provided necessary support (e.g., transportation, rations, and orientation)?

• Have internal SOPs been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?

2. JSOTF J-2 (Intelligence) Checklist

a. General

• With inputs from the JSOTF J-3, have the JSOTF J-2’s missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the COMJSOTF?

• Has a complete intelligence assessment of the situation been developed?

• Have the current intelligence indications and warning indicators in the JSOA been identified?

• Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?

• Are situation assessments periodically updated?

• Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the COMJSOTF and up the chain of command?

• Are the COMJSOTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional and/or theater assessments?

• Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?

• Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of the JSOTF’s, JTF’s and combatant commander’s organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?

• Has NIST support been requested, as appropriate?

• Have the JSOTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, and/or reservists, been identified?

• Have the deployable elements to support the JSOTF’s efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been identified?

• Have the JSOTF JOPES managers been kept abreast of intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?

• Have the requirements for a JISE to support the JSOTF been determined? (Establishment of a JISE will be situation dependent.)

• Has the JSOTF J-2, in coordination with the JSOTF J-6, developed a JSOTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability and adequate and appropriate security laterally, vertically, and with multinational forces? (JSOTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and LAN to carry intelligence information.)

• Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIR and RFIs been determined?

• Have intelligence responsibilities been clearly delineated among the JSOTF, supported JTF, combatant commander, and national levels?
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- Have any JSOTF subordinate units been receiving intelligence support directly from the supported combatant commander or national levels?

- Has the JSOTF coordinated, through the JTF, with the supported combatant commander’s JIC to determine whether PIR have already been established for the current situation? (PIR should be built around COMJSOTF’s requirements.)

- In concert with the JSOTF J-3, JTF J-3, and the supported combatant commander’s JIC, have PIR been tailored for the current situation?

- Have PIR been kept current, and are they updated periodically?

- Have the COMJSOTF and component commanders been fully apprised of all relevant current events?

- Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?

- Have the JSOTF J-2’s automated data processing equipment requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported JTF’s, combatant commander’s and subordinate’s systems (to include compatibility for multinational JSOTF operations when required)?

- In concert with the supported commander’s J-2 and the JSOTF J-3, have all the JSOTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?

- Have JSOTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities been identified?

- Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded through the JTF and supported combatant commander’s JIC for subsequent tasking at the appropriate echelon?

- Have requirements for all GI&S support been identified?

- Have JSOTF GI&S shortfalls been identified?

- Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed, through channels, to DIA?

- Has the Annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the COMJSOTF’s OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan?

- Can the JSOTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

- Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

- Have procedures been established and coordinated with the supported combatant commander’s JIC to support the production of TIPs?

- Have SOF IO requirements and sources been identified?

b. HUMINT, IMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and MASINT

- Have the JSOTF’s requirements for HUMINT, IMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?

- Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?
• Has the requirement for establishment of a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC) (or joint documentation exploitation center (JDEC) at the JTF or JSOTF level) and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?

• Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC if determined to be necessary?

• If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?

• Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?

• Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?

• Has emergency dissemination authority for imagery and imagery products been obtained?

• Has tailored imagery been requested (once target has been identified)? Has imagery been forwarded to requesting command?

• Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? (If not, work with cryptologic support group and command NSA and/or Central Security Service representative to obtain.)

• Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?

c. Counterintelligence

• Have JSOTF CI and CT intelligence requirements been identified?

• Has the J-2, if required, been appointed the CI coordinating authority?

• Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?

• Has CI been included in collection management planning?

• Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

d. Multinational Interaction

• Has liaison been established between joint and multinational force intelligence structures?

• Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with multinational forces?

• Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

• Have interoperability and security of C4 systems been ensured?

• Has release and/or disclosure of imagery information to multinational forces been considered?

3. JSOTF J-3 (Operations) Checklist

a. Current and Future Operations

Note: A number of the checklist items refer to the planning process and may fall under the responsibility of the J-5 depending on how the JSOTF is organized and who is directed to accomplish the planning.

• Have current plans been evaluated?
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• Have SO options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?

• Have SO strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?

• Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?

• Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting modification if necessary.)

• Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized?

• Has the commander’s estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?

• Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA or JSOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?

• Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?

• Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

• What is the deployment status of reserve units?

• Have replacement units and personnel been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?

• Has the superior commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

• Has guidance been developed for components?

• Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?

• Have pre-hostility SO (SR, UW, PSYOP, CA, CT) been considered during COA development?

• Have IO capabilities, requirements, and coordination been considered in SOF missions and activities?

• Has the CJTF or superior commander been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?

• Has the JSOTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements, any special requirements of the law of armed conflict that affect the particular operation, or the ROE authorized for the mission?

• Have joint fire support capabilities, requirements, and coordination, to include fire support coordinating measures, been considered in SOF missions and activities?

• Has a GCCS teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?

• What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?

• Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the superior commander?

• How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied publics?
• Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?

• Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander’s guidance?

• Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan?

• Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan complete and in the proper format?

• Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?

• Has an EXECUTE ORDER been received?

• Has the OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan been adjusted for the superior commander’s EXECUTE ORDER before issuing the commander’s EXECUTE ORDER?

• Are plan objectives being met?

• Is a reassessment of objectives required?

• Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?

• Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

• Does the situation call for termination of operations?

• Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

• Can the JSOTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

• Have US and friendly government agencies and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CA operations?

• Has the superior commander’s political adviser provided guidance on CA priorities?

• Has PSYOP support been coordinated?

• Have combat identification measures been established?

• Has space support been coordinated through channels with USSPACECOM?

• Have the effects of WMD been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations units been notified?

b. Monitoring and Tracking the Flow of SOF

• In the absence of a JPG, the JSOTF J-3 may establish an operations planning and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (at a minimum), to complete the TPFFD planning tasks, monitor the flow of SOF, and track forces to their destination. The following questions may be of use to this team.

  • Have plan identification numbers been established in JOPES for each COA?

  • Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?

  • Has plan information been entered in JOPES?

  • Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified in JOPES?
• Have NEO, medical evacuation, and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

• Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?

• Has the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

• Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

• Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

• Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the superior commander?

• Have deployment requirements been verified?

• Has transportation lift allocation been verified?

• Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

• Have intratheater movement plans been developed?

• Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?

• Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is under way?

• Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPORD requirements?

• Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?

• Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?

• Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the JTF, supported combatant commander, and USTRANSCOM?

• Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the JOPES? (Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment database.)

• Is unit status being reported after arrival?

c. **Staffing, Centers, and Cells**

• Has a JOC been established and properly staffed?

• Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the CAP process?

• If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?

• If directed by the COMJSOTF (based on J-3 recommendation), are the following true?

• Has an RCC been established?

• Has a JSOTF targeting panel been established?

• Has a ROE planning cell been formed?

• Has a weather cell been formed?

• Has an IO cell been formed?

• Has the COMJSOTF provided initial guidance concerning the functions and
responsibilities of the above organizations?

- Have these organizations been properly staffed?

- Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?

- If directed by the COMJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and coordinate execution of joint SO air operations?

- If directed by the COMJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JSOA?

- If directed by the COMJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JSOA?

4. JSOTF J-4 (Logistics) Checklist

a. General

- Is there a concise statement of the purpose for which the logistic support plan is prepared?

- Does this paragraph provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and CONOPS that the logistic planning supports?

- Are the objectives specified?

b. Assumptions

- Does this paragraph list the assumptions upon which the CONOPS and logistic support are based?

c. Responsibilities

- Joint Staff?

- USSOCOM?

- USTRANSCOM?

- Military Services?

- Unified commands and their component commands?

- Theater SO commands?

- Defense Security Assistance Agency?

- NIMA?

- DOS and American Embassies?

- Security assistance organizations?

- Liaison offices?

- Defense Logistics Agency?

- Army and Air Force Exchange Service?

- Units or elements providing logistic support to SOF components?

d. Concept of Logistic Support

- Does this paragraph describe how supply, maintenance, transportation, and field service support will be provided?

- Does this paragraph specify which logistic elements will provide the support? Are the forces provided adequate?

- Does the planned support complement the tactical plan? Is it adequate and feasible?

- Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the impact on logistic support?
• Has the deployment flow been properly analyzed to determine the time phasing for introduction of logistic elements to support the combat forces?

• Have HNS availability and subsequent risks been considered?

• Has the support of SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been adequately addressed?

• Have validation procedures for SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been clearly established?

• Is there an ACSA with HNs in the JOA or with other coalition nations in the operation?

• Are provisions made for adequate logistic support of POWs, civilian internees, and other detained persons?

• Are provisions made for adequate logistic support for those indigenous and displace civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

e. Supply

• General

  • Are the supply system and procedural guidance provided?

  • Is the flow of requisitions described?

  • Is the flow of materiel described?

  • Is a project code required and identified?

  • Is a force activity designator upgrade required?

  • Are in-country DOD activity address codes required?

  • Are LOC procedures described?

  • Is the number of days of supplies required to accompany troops identified?

  • Are provisions made for contracting and local purchase support?

  • Are the stockage objectives by class of supply specified?

  • Will automated or non-automated procedures be used?

  • Will automated systems of supported units and task-organized CSS units interface?

  • Have the inter-Service support requirements been identified and common-, cross-, and joint-servicing arrangements coordinated for support of SOF?

  • What support will be provided by HN or foreign nation support?

  • What in-theater support is required?

  • Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?

  • What are the provisions for emergency resupply?

  • Are space support teams available that can enable access to space capabilities (reconnaissance and surveillance, environmental monitoring, imagery, communications, positioning and navigation) that can help resolve logistic issues through in-transit visibility?

  • Have initial preplanned supply support and emergency support packages been considered?
• Is the communications capability provided and compatible with the automated systems being deployed?

• Are changes to the DOD activity address file required, such as “ship-to” address?

• Are some supply support activities to be designated as air LOCs?

• Are procedures described for cancellation or diversion of materiel in-process or in-transit at the termination of the operation or exercise?

• Are provisions made for logistic support of displaced civilians, POWs, and indigenous personnel?

• Is there covered storage in the operational area to protect supplies from the elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?

• Are materials handling equipment (MHE) requirements provided?

• Is sufficient rigging material available for conventional and SO airdrop operations?

• Is the Defense Automatic Addressing System aware of the communications routing identifier and DOD activity address codes to be used for processing direct requisitions and direct supply status?

• Have distribution procedures for maps been addressed?

• Class I

• Are mess facilities identified and adequate?

• Are the ration cycles described by phase? Is a ration cycle proposed?

• Are fresh eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, juices, milk, and canned soft-drink supplements to ration meals considered?

• Do local fresh fruits and vegetables meet US standards?

• Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and accountability?

• Are cash meal payment procedures established?

• What method of distribution will be used (unit distribution or supply point distribution)?

• Are bakery supplements to ration meals considered?

• Are veterinary personnel adequate for the subsistence support requirements?

• Are hospital rations required?

• Are chill, freeze, and refrigeration requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point addressed?

• Are water support requirements satisfied?

• Are the water sources fresh, brackish, or salty?

• Is the water source local systems, surface, or wells?

• What type of water purification unit is required?

• Are chillers required?
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• What is the water planning factor in gallons per person per day?

• What are the treatment, storage, distribution and cooling requirements? Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?

• What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells? What is the quality of water from existing wells?

• Are potable ice considerations covered? What is the requirement planning factor?

• Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?

• Class II

• Are requirements for individual clothing and mission-essential consumables addressed?

• Have requirements for mission rehearsals and training been identified?

• Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal clothing and chemical protective clothing?

• Which self-service supply center listing will be used as the basis for the Class II stockage?

• How will the logistic support element replenish organizational clothing and individual equipment and self-service supply center items?

• Do any of the following items require special consideration?

• SO-peculiar materials.

• Class II

• Tentage and tentage repair kits.

• Administrative and office supplies.

• Folding cots.

• Insect bars with mosquito netting.

• Banding material and tools.

• Water purification chemicals and test kits.

• Insect repellent and sun screen.

• Field laundry and bath supplies and hospital laundry supplies.

• Dining facility supplies, including paper and plastic products.

• Trash disposal supplies.

• Vector control equipment and supplies.

• Latrine chemicals and supplies.

• Batteries.

• Cold weather clothing and equipment.

• Air conditioners or fans.

• Maps, distribution, and storage.

• Class III

• Are Service requirements by location for each type of product established?

• Is the use of contractor-provided bulk fuels considered?

• Are ordering and accountable officer requirements addressed?
**JSOTF HQ Staff Checklists**

- Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline and storage capabilities?
- Are remote refueling sites or FARPs required? What capabilities are required?
- Are inter-Service support billing and reimbursement procedures specified?
- Are POL-quality surveillance procedures specified? Are the required test kits on hand?
- Is there a petroleum laboratory available?
- Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide them?
- Are any unique package product requirements addressed?
- Are industrial gasses addressed?

**Class IV**

- Are unique requirements for construction, security, and rehearsal materials addressed?
- Is in-country procurement considered?
- Have Class IV data sources been queried on pre-existing databases describing locally available construction materials?
- Are basic loads to be deployed?
- Will the use of pre-positioned materiel stocks be permitted?

**Class V**

- Are unit basic loads to be deployed?
- Is the logistic support structure prescribed?
- Are explosive ordnance disposal support requirements and procedures addressed?
- Are SO-peculiar ammunition requirements addressed?
- Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements been reviewed and addressed in the planning?
- Are requirements identified by category of munitions?
- Are sustaining rates of munitions addressed?
- Are special permits needed? Who issues them?

**Class VI**

- Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?
- Are sundry packs available?
- Is indirect or direct exchange support considered?
- If exchange support is required: (1) Has HQ Army and Air Force Exchange Service (Plans) been notified? (2) Have the exchange staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements been identified and coordinated? (3) Is finance support for the exchange identified? (4) Has the policy on rationing and check cashing been determined?

**Class VII**

- Are unit basic loads to be deployed?
• Are SO-peculiar equipment requirements identified and validation procedures established?

• Does the plan specify the equipment fill level for deploying units?

• Are equipment redistribution (cross-leveling) requirements specified?

• Are replacement actions for salvage equipment specified?

• Are operational readiness float requirements addressed?

• Class VIII

• Are medical supply procedures prescribed?

• Does this portion of the logistic support plan complement the medical support plan?

• Are medical resupply procedures established?

• If applicable, are policies concerning medical treatment of non-US personnel provided?

• Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on medical mission and the operational area?

• Are memoranda of understanding established with medical logistic providers to ensure that these medical supplies are stored, maintained, and ready to meet all operational contingencies?

• Are special storage requirements satisfied?

• Is the disposal of salvage medical supplies addressed?

• Are medical oxygen and other medical gas requirements (such as anesthesia) identified and resupply procedures established?

• Is local purchase an option? Are procedures and guidelines established?

• Class IX

• Are SO-peculiar repair requirements specified?

• Are common repair parts requirements, including repairables, specified?

• Are cannibalization procedures addressed?

• Are requirements for non-expendable components addressed?

• Is stockage of major assemblies addressed?

• Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries, classified repair parts, high dollar, and pilferables, etc.?

• Is disposal of hazardous materials, such as lithium batteries and radioactive residue, specified?

• Class X

• If Class X materials are required, does the plan describe the source?

• What is the source of funding for Class X supplies?

f. Maintenance

• Does the plan describe how unit, intermediate (direct support and general
support), and SO-peculiar equipment maintenance will be performed?

• Is missile maintenance support required and available?

• Does the plan address calibration requirements?

• Is maintenance exchange addressed?

• Have extreme weather aspects been considered (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, and dust)?

• Are site security and storage requirements identified?

• Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (e.g., voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in kilowatts)?

• Are building suitability screening factors identified by type of maintenance facility (e.g., minimum height and width for doors, floor load bearing requirements, and environmental control necessities)?

• Are operational readiness floats addressed?

• How will repairs under warranty be performed in the operational area?

• Is the evacuation of unserviceable repairables addressed?

• Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been specified?

g. **Transportation**

• **General**

  • Is there a requirement for expedited cargo distribution to the operational area?

  • Are the transportation support systems for supply distribution and air LOC validation procedures outlined?

  • Have MHE requirements been addressed?

  • What is the availability of USTRANSCOM, DIA, or NIMA data analysis regarding the country transportation infrastructure, to include ports, airfields, roads, railroads, and inland waterways?

  • Is there a rail system available? What are schedules and capability?

  • Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?

  • What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?

  • Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements addressed?

  • Are the transportation movement priority and transportation account codes provided? Are transportation funding procedures established?

  • Has a dedicated in-country, intratheater, or intertheater movement system for personnel and high-priority cargo been established?

  • Has coordination been made with USTRANSCOM for personnel and equipment movements?

  • Has the use of foreign flag carriers been addressed?

  • What agency will accept and coordinate administrative transportation requirements for SOF?
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• What HNS support is available?

• Have medical evacuation requirements been included in the planning?

• Airfields

• What airfields are available to support military operations?

• Has a coordinating HQ been designated for all airlift support?

• Has support been planned for USAF mobile aeromedical staging facilities?

• What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation?

• What is the maximum on ground of the airfield?

• What are the characteristics and capabilities of the roads that access the airfield?

• What contract civilian or HN personnel and equipment assets are available to assist at the aerial ports of debarkation and embarkation?

• Has an arrival/departure airfield control group organization been designated?

• Have aerial port squadron and/or airlift control element requirements been identified?

• What airfield facilities are available for military use during arrival/departure airfield control group operations?

• What is the best source for additional information on the airfields?

• Have channel airlift requirements been specified?

• Have airbase defense requirements been properly addressed?

• Are procedures in place to pay for landing fees, as required?

• Supply Routes

• What are the road movement and convoy restrictions?

• What routes are available to support military operations?

• What are the characteristics and capabilities of the routes available to support military operations?

• What are the dimensions and classifications of tunnels and bridges along the routes?

• What capabilities exist to repair damaged segments of routes?

• What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?

• What are the most likely routes fleeing refugees would use?

• Are traffic control measures in place?

• What is the best source for additional information on the routes?

h. Field Services

• Are laundry, bath, clothing renovation, and latrine requirements addressed? Local sources?

• Are graves registration and mortuary capabilities adequate to support the anticipated requirements?
• Are procedures for salvage collection, evacuation, and disposal covered?

• Are base or post exchange services required and provided?

• Is fire protection provided for aviation, ammunition, and bases?

• Are procedures for waste disposal addressed?

• Are field bakery services required and provided?

• Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet customs and agriculture requirements to enter CONUS?

i. Miscellaneous

• Have billeting and support requirements at ISBs and FSBs been addressed?

• Are HN military personnel with experience in US military schools identified?

• Have arrangements been made with US and HN customs and immigration?

• Are procedures for logistic reporting established?

• Is delousing support required?

• Are isolation or rehearsal facilities required?

• What are the funding aspects of logistic support?

• Are procedures in place for transference of equipment to allies or partners during multinational operations?

• Have all requirements been costed?

• Has an account processing code been established?

• Have SO-peculiar equipment resourcing procedures been identified?

• What is the electrical power cycles of the country? Are transformers required?

• Are printing and duplicating requirements identified?

• Are the communications to support logistic operations provided for in the communications planning? Telephone? Facsimile (secure and non-secure)? Secure copiers and storage and handling facilities? Computer connectivity for operation planning, situational awareness, and Standard Army Management Information System and other logistic systems? Secure and non-secure VTC, if required? Are these systems protected using information assurance and defense in depth?

• Have requirements for aerial delivery, personal parachutes, and air items been identified?

• Is a source of liquid oxygen required?

• Have diving-support requirements been addressed?

• Have administrative-use vehicle requirements been identified?

• Are audio-visual requirements identified?

• Have communication frequencies been cleared with the HN government?

• Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting support?
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• Has an adequate number of contracting officers with the proper warrant been provided?

• Is adequate finance support available?

• Is adequate legal support available?

• Is adequate linguist support available?

• Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver or war damage claims resulting from logistic operations?

• Are automated logistic systems procedures properly addressed?

• Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate from the primary master files?

• Are maintainers, operators, and managers assigned and well trained?

• Have site selection and preparation for automated equipment considered accessibility, geographic, terrain, and security requirements?

• Is there a continuity of OPLANs?

• Are sufficient copies of user manuals on hand and current?

• Are sufficient repair parts available for the computer hardware, including generators and other subsystems?

• Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages?

• Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher and lower echelons?

• Will customer units require training? Are customer user manuals available for automated system support?

• Have OPSEC requirements been integrated into logistic planning? Has the logistic signature been minimized?

• Have security police requirements for SO bases, facilities, training areas, rehearsal sites, and storage sites been identified and resourced?

5. JSOTF J-5 (Plans) Checklist

a. General

• What is the current politico-military situation?

• Have current plans been evaluated?

• Have SO strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the supported commander?

• Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

• Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JSOTF establishing authority for resolution?

• Has the JSOTF supported commander’s tasking and guidance been analyzed?

• Has guidance been developed for components?

• Have OPORD or OPLAN shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?

• Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?

• Is the OPORD or OPLAN complete and in the proper format?
• Does the JOPES database accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission?

• Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?

• Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

• Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities?

• Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

b. CAP

Note: The following checklist is arranged by JOPES CAP phase that the COMJSOTF and planning staff should consider during a crisis situation. All items in the checklist may not apply directly to the COMJSOTF, but are provided to illustrate the overarching CAP process.

c. CAP Phase I — Situation Development

• What are the national and military strategies and US national security policy for the region or CAP phase country?

• What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military resources to resolve it?

• What are or might be the potential missions or tasks from the NCA?

• Will action be unilateral or multinational?

• What is the current situation (who, what, when, where, and why)?

• How will the adversary conceptualize the situation? What are the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss?

• What steps can be taken to collect additional information?

• What is the status of communications with key US and foreign government agencies and personnel? Has a list of key phone numbers been established?

• Has the supported commander developed an intelligence collection plan?

• Has the supported commander deployed sufficient organic reconnaissance resources? Should national assets be tasked or repositioned?

• Has the supported commander established a JCCC?

• Are any US or multinational forces conducting operations within the JSOTF JSOA? What type? Duration? Who commands those forces?

• What is the status of communications to and/or from and within the JSOA?

• Has the supported commander established an IO cell?

d. CAP Phase II — Crisis Assessment

• Is NEO needed?

  • Are there any US or other DOD civilian noncombatants in the JSOA? How many? Where are they located? Are they in any danger?

  • Is there a NEO plan for this JOA? Has the DOS authorized a NEO? Has the DOS asked for DOD assistance?
• Should PSYOP assets be used during the NEO?

• Have agencies or commands (e.g., USSPACECOM, NIMA, or environmental support facilities) that provide specialized or long-lead support been notified of the ongoing analysis and the potential for future support?

• What dedicated communications should be established with these agencies or commands for use by operations, intelligence, and logistic personnel?

• What requests, if any, have been made by the foreign government(s)? What is the DOS position?

• What security assistance may be provided to the foreign government(s) concerned?

• What humanitarian assistance may be provided to the foreign government(s)?

• What sources have been identified to fund assistance efforts?

• Does the United States have any treaty or legal obligations?

• Are there status-of-forces agreements with the foreign government(s)?

• Is a military coordinating committee required?

• Is a CMO center established at the JTF to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational force operations with other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and foreign nation agencies and authorities?

• What coordination and assistance will be required for other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and foreign national agencies and authorities?

• Is there a current plan for the area or situation?

• What type and level of SO are most advantageous for the current situation?

• What are the key friendly, enemy, and neutral target groups and their SO vulnerabilities?

• Has a teleconference been established to support the operation?

• What is the JOPES plan identification number applicable to the operation?

• Is a database maintained by the supported commander that is current or applicable to the situation?

• Are there adequate provisions to maintain secrecy, achieve surprise, and preserve the security of SOF against attack?

• What OPSEC and military deception measures are required? Is a cover story required or available? Are diversionary actions needed to support the preparation, deployment, and employment of forces?

• What national-level actions are necessary to protect secrecy and execute deceptions?

• What are foreign governments’ (including hostile) attitudes toward US intentions and military capabilities? How could these be shaped to US advantage?

• What are the reactions of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly foreign governments?

• What level of opposition can be expected from hostile governments?
• What support can be expected from friendly and allied and coalition governments?

• What access and overflight assurances do friendly forces have for deployment or employment operations?

• What are the PA implications and responsibilities for the area?

• Has a DOD media pool been activated?

e. **CAP Phase III — COA Development**

• What precisely must be accomplished in the crisis to strengthen or support the objectives established by the NCA?

• What are the general operations, intelligence, and logistic requirements to support the actions so as to bring about the NCA objectives?

• Do the military objectives identified take into account exploitable enemy vulnerabilities that are critical to the COMJSOTF’s responsibilities and intent or are critical to the enemy’s intent?

• From the COMJSOTF’s perspective, are the SO objectives attainable?

  • What is the commitment of the adversary to own COA?

• What are the current ROE in the area?

  • Do they need to be changed because of the current situation?

  • Who should recommend changes?

• What SOF are readily available and when could they arrive on scene?

• What reception and operations support facilities are needed and available?

• What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly and allied nations?

• Are joint or multinational interoperability considerations involved?

• Is medical support adequate to support planned operations?

• Has DIRLAUTH been established, as applicable, within the operational, intelligence, and logistic nets, with the committed forces, supported and supporting commands (as applicable), and national agencies?

• What medical support is available in the objective area or provided for in the OPLAN or OPORD?

• What additional SOF are required (e.g., USSOCOM, theater SO command, or HN SOF)?

• What is the unit readiness of the available or allocated forces?

• What are the major constraints before forces can be committed?

• What is the status of GI&S support within the area?

• What are the environmental (meteorological, oceanographic) support capabilities and constraints within the area? Who is coordinating environmental support?

• Will special CJCS-controlled communications assets, such as the JCSE, be required?

• Are PSYOP units required?

• What is the command relationship of CA and PSYOP forces?
Appendix D

- Will the use of deception or other IO capabilities enhance mission success for each COA being considered?

- Have subordinate and supporting commands or agencies been tasked to enter JOPES database requirements for development of deployment estimates by USTRANSCOM?

- Has tactical exploitation of national capabilities program support from the supported combatant commander been requested?

- Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance and surveillance, warning, positioning and navigation, communications, imagery, environmental monitoring) been integrated into JSOTF plans?

- What is the status of strategic mobility resources and supporting elements? Are facilities, airports, seaports, and LOCs capable of supporting the operation?

- What are the logistic factors that affect actions under consideration?

- Is aerial refueling required during deployment and/or employment?

- Will ISBs be required?

- What is the backup COA?

- What all-source intelligence resources are available? Has the full range of intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support to planning efforts by the supported combatant commander? By the NCA? Has COMJSOTF declared emergency reconnaissance and implemented SIGINT operational tasking authority? Will a NIST be requested?

- Has coordination been conducted with USSPACECOM to determine whether repositioning or launch of space systems is required for JSOTF operations?

- Will electronic warfare units, such as radar jammers or communications jammers, be required?

- Which airports and seaports are available to SOF?

  - Are runway lengths and weight-bearing capacities adequate for the planned forces?

  - Are pier capabilities and depth of water sufficient to accommodate sealift?

- Will use agreements need to be coordinated with other nations?

- Have sufficient contracting officers with adequate contracting authority been assigned?

- Has a sufficient amount of local currency been obtained to support the exercise or operation?

- Has local civilian labor support been acquired?

- Have adequate funds been identified to support the COA?

- Have procedures been established to ratify irregular purchases?

- What procedures must be established to protect information exchange between the United States and foreign forces and governments?

- Have standard JSOTF special technical operations billets been activated and indoctrination conducted on special access programs?
f. **CAP Phase IV — COA Selection**

- What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each alternative, with regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)?

- What decisions have yet to be made? What changes to ROE are required?

- Have the functional component commands’ staffs been organized so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force?

- Are commanders of the other JTF components aware of the functional component commanders’ assigned authority and responsibilities?

- Have LNOs from the other JTF and JSOTF components been assigned to functional component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force operations?

- Has an ACA been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if a JFACC is designated.) Is required liaison provided?

- Has an area air defense commander been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided?

- What is the status of communications?

- Have multiple means of communications been provided for?

- Is there frequency deconfliction?

- Are the joint communications-electronics operation instructions adequate?

- Is there a requirement for joint airborne communications assets?

- Have common communications security materials (authenticators, operations codes, and keylists) been identified for all circuits, networks, and users?


g. **CAP Phase V — Execution Planning**

- Is the mission clear? Is COMJSOTF’s intent clear?

- Are the ROE adequate for the JSOTF mission?

- Will the selected COA accomplish the objectives?

- If it will not, has this been clearly outlined to the supported commander?

- Is the COA consistent with the laws of armed conflict and other aspects of the legal regime affecting the operation?

- Are command relationships clear, unambiguous, and understood by all parties?

- Between supporting and supported commanders?

- For C2 for SOF?

- Before operations commence, has the theater J-2 established a JIC? Has the JSOTF J-2 established a JISE?

- Has a JSRC been designated or established?

- Has the CJTF elected to designate functional component commanders?
• Are there any other special C4 requirements, to include GCCS capability for JSOTF components?

• What country clearances are required for overflight, landing, or staging? What are the existing (or needed) agreements for overflight; staging; transit and refueling for combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft; and basing rights?

• What forces and CONOPS are available if the adversary escalates operations abruptly?

• Has sufficient coordination with allies been conducted?

• What constraints have been placed on USTRANSCOM’s components (e.g., allocation of lift assets)?

• What is the status of space system support coordination?

• If a theater missile threat exists, has a special request for tactical warning support been made to USSPACECOM’s J-3 (in accordance with the Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems manual)? Additionally, has USSPACECOM been requested to provide support from the theater event system, to include equipment required to receive downlink data (e.g., constant source and joint tactical terminal)?

• Has military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) support been coordinated with the USSPACECOM and with DISA MILSATCOM Systems Office?

• Has an ROE planning cell been formed?

• Has Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Facility support been coordinated with USSPACECOM and the appropriate regional space support center, as required?

• Has USSPACECOM been requested to provide a joint space support team to support the JSOTF and to serve as a focal point for the coordination of space systems support?

• Has the enemy situation changed appreciably? If so, what are the effects on the selected COAs?

• Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of JSOTF forces?

• Will the predicted environmental conditions adversely affect the operation? Who will provide environmental updates to decision makers?

• Is logistic and administrative planning adequate?

• Has the OPORD been published?

• Do the component commanders’ plans adequately address the coordinated employment, direction, and control of their forces in conformity with the JSOTF CONOPS?

h. CAP Phase VI — Execution

• Has intelligence identified enemy movements or changes in the disposition of rear echelon, strategic, or other critical units that may affect SO?

• What is the status of the deployment as planned? Are any phasing or prioritization changes required based on changes in the situation, mission, or strategic or operational lift availability? Are additional SOF required?
• Are any other changes necessary to ensure that military action will accomplish the objectives intended?

• Are there sufficient civil-military planners to coordinate escalation in military assistance to civilian governments and infrastructure?

6. JSOTF J-6 (C4) Checklist

a. General

• Is the C4 planner brought into the planning process early?

• Is a joint C4 planning meeting scheduled? Is a C4 planner from each organization attending the C4 planning meeting?

• Are the C2 relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and C4 decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?

• Are the C4 planners familiar with the C2 relationships for the JSOTF operation and are these relationships adequately covered in C4 planning documents?

• Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?

• Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the OPLAN or implementing instructions?

• Can C4 systems support each COA being addressed?

• Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?

• Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF SATCOM narrowband secure voice terminals)?

• Have adequate IA and CND protections been applied to C4 systems? Have vulnerabilities been identified and appropriate risk mitigation strategies been evaluated and applied to reduce these vulnerabilities to an acceptable level of risk?

• Is the use of the Intertheater COMSEC Package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying materiel? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) COMSEC been considered for operations in NATO?

• Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?

• Is there adequate planning to ensure that JCEOI are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed?

• Are operations codes available at all commands?

• Is planning for SOF and conventional forces interoperability adequate for this operation?

• Are procedures in place to adequately plan C4 for SO under both SO and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?
Appendix D

- Are theater and tactical C4 system interfaces (Defense Information System Network entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to superior commanders, the Joint Staff, and the NCA?

- Does C4 planning for deployment include command relationships, SO operational control procedures, SO communications for underway sea or airlift, and for Air Mobility Command C4?

- Are deployable GCCS terminals needed and planned for?

- Does the JSOTF have qualified GCCS and SO-unique communications operators?

- Is planning adequate to have communications move into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the operation?

- Have the functions of the JCCC, if established, been developed and published?

- Has the J-6 determined what communications assets are already in the JOA (military, commercial, and other civilian) and can they be used?

- Is planning adequate to have the buildup of communications into the objective area early enough to prevent overload of initially deployed communications systems?

- Are CJCS-controlled assets requested to support the plan?

  - Is there a request for assets in accordance with CJCSI 6110.01, *Controlled Tactical Communications Assets*?

  - Have transportation requirements for CJCS-controlled assets been coordinated?

- Are communications units, equipment, and personnel, including CJCS-controlled assets, included in the TPFDD?

- Has the operational impact of communications equipment arrival times been brought to the attention of the COMJSOTF?

- Is there enough detail in the TPFDD about communications assets to assist in communications planning?

- Are there any special communications needs for the use and transfer of imagery or geospatial information?

- Is the impact of IO considered in planning? Are IO considerations and communications frequency deconfliction addressed by the IO cell JCCC LNO?

- Are emission control procedures, requirements for OPSEC, military deception, and avoiding mutual interference addressed in planning?

- Are C4 relationships with the Coast Guard understood?

  - Are C4 needs of the Coast Guard adequately addressed in planning?

  - Does the Coast Guard have sufficient interoperable C4 equipment and COMSEC for this operation?

- Are communications planners included early in planning for communications support for intelligence systems?
• Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?

• Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?

• Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the spectrum?

• Are adequate C4 systems available to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the COMJSOTF?

• Is the COMJSOTF aware of various global positioning system (GPS) user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?

• Has a GPS CONOPS been disseminated?

• Has the JSOTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

• Have search and rescue, medical personnel, and C4 personnel coordinated communications early?

• Are search and rescue and medical evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?

• Are plans for search and rescue and medical evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the JSOTF?

• Are dedicated and secure communications for public affairs and the media pool adequately covered in planning?

• Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation?

• Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

• Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

b. Communications and Computer Systems

• Are the following systems available and operational, as required?
  • VTC
  • JSOTF LAN
  • GCCS
  • JDISS
  • CTAPS or TBMCS
  • METOC
  • Commercial new(s) stations
  • Message center, tactical
  • Message center, GateGuard/MDS (general service and special category)
  • Commercial telephone, STU-III/STE
  • Secure facsimile
  • Tactical telephone, digital secure voice terminal
  • UHF, JTF command network
  • UHF, JFACC network
7. Headquarters Commandant

Site Survey Checklist

a. J1/HQ Commandant, primary contact, and telephone number.

b. Mailing address.

c. Emergency leave procedures.

- Red Cross telephone numbers.
- Scheduled airline ticket office.

- Telephone number.

- Location (street address or road directions).

- Special requirements on temporary duty orders, (i.e., variation authorized).

- Nearest civilian airport (road location).
• Vehicle transport availability.
• If in remote control base, configure same requirement as 1b(1)-1b and (2e) above for local area.

d. **Check cashing facilities.**

e. **Laundry facilities, telephone number.**

- Washers, dryers, and commercial power available.
- Contract service.
- Conventional unit supported.

f. **Currency conversion.**

- Required?
- Cost?
- Nearest bank, money exchange facility, or Class A agent required.

g. **Religious service availability.**

- Denominations.
- Time.
- Location of facilities.
- Requirements for chaplain assistance.

h. **Availability of post exchange service (fixed location or mobile).**

i. **Availability of MWR items.**

- Audio/visual rentals.
- Movie theater, library, book loan, and newspaper service.
- Gym and/or pool.

- Officer and NCO Club membership requirements.
- Athletic equipment issue.
- Off site buses.

j. **Orders requirements.**

- Temporary duty orders.
- Orders for attachments.
- NATO travel orders.

k. **Special Post Operation Report Requirements.**

l. **Plaques or certificates for HNs (special language requirements), engraving.**

m. **Barber shop availability.**

n. **PAO and JVB contact.**

o. **Medical evacuation procedures.**

- Air.
  - On-call reaction time to maneuver area.
  - Standby.
  - Contact procedures.
- Ambulance availability.
- Aid Station/TROOD Medical Clinic availability.
  - How many beds?
  - What type of equipment?
  - Capabilities?
• Medical, dental, and pharmacy coverage; flight surgeon for airborne operations

• Hospital facilities, contact, and telephone number.
  • Military — contact, location, and telephone number.
  • Civilian — contact, location, and telephone number.
  • Distance from maneuver area.

p. Requirements for manifest at arrival airfield.

q. J-1/HQ commandant office space requirements.

r. Equipment (typewriters, computers, desks, chairs, other).

s. Military police support availability, contact, and telephone number.

t. Civilian administrative support, contact, and telephone number.

u. Reproduction and copying capabilities.

v. Interpreter requirements and availability.

w. Uniform requirements (on and off site).

x. Passport required?

y. Safety and environmental concerns, contact, and telephone number.
  • In local area.
  • In maneuver area, are fires permitted, cutting of trees allowed, digging holes, trash, disposal, and other activities allowed?

z. Medical.

• Diseases and medical situation in local and maneuver areas.

• Water purification requirements and testing (nitrates, lead, iron, other).

• Recent and ongoing epidemics in local and maneuver area.

• Resupply procedures.
  • Nearest US facility.
  • Local purchase.
  • Method of payment — Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, operational fund, and/or local contract.

aa. Other.

• LNO with HN civil authority.

• Off limits areas.

• Availability of very important person quarters, transportation, and meals.

• Reception station procedures for augmentees messing supportability (hours, personnel, costs).

Specific responsibilities from the above checklist may be performed, as directed by the JFC, COMJSOTF, J-1, or HQ commandant.

8. Staff Judge Advocate

• Provide pre-deployment legal assistance, as necessary.
• Interpret and provide advice on status-of-forces agreement, if one exists, and other relevant international agreements between the United States and HN.

• Brief status of forces to all personnel.

• Brief and interpret ROE.

• Assist in development of supplemental ROE, as necessary.

• Provide appropriate law of armed conflict training to all personnel.

• Provide advice during target selection development, including the review of prohibited and limited target lists.

• Ensure that proper command relationships are identified.

• Ensure proper processing of all general orders.

• Review and provide advice on noncombatant evacuation plans and procedures.

• Review and provide advice on procedures for handling POWs, refugees, and displaced persons.

• Provide advice on procedures for addressing asylum and temporary refuge.

• Provide commanders tools to maintain good order and discipline, including prosecutions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, non-judicial punishment, and other adverse administrative actions.

• Adjudicate claims.

• Advise the staff on contract law issues, including fiscal law, military construction, and humanitarian assistance (Denton shipments).

• Advise the staff on HN labor law.

• Advise the staff on environmental law, including hazardous waste disposal.

• Brief all personnel on appropriate ethical standards.

• Provide legal advice to other staff agencies, as appropriate.

• Identify NGOs.

• Identify appropriate intelligence oversight reporting responsibilities.

• Determine what other US legal services in the area are available.
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APPENDIX E
NOTIONAL JSOTF HEADQUARTERS STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE OUTLINE

1. Personnel
   a. Purpose
   b. Responsibilities
   c. Organization
   d. Policies and Procedures
   e. Annexes and Appendices
      • Safety
      • Joint Personnel Status Reports
      • PA
      • Checklist
      • JSOTF Manning Models
         • Exercise-Specific
         • Contingency Operations
   • Sample Mission Folder Checklist
   • TIP: SR and DA Missions
   • TIP: FID and UW Missions
   • TIP: IO.
   • Intelligence Requirements Planning Guide

2. Intelligence
   a. Purpose
   b. Responsibilities
   c. Organization
   d. Policies and Procedures
   e. Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs
      • JISE
      • Intelligence Support to Targeting and Plans
   • Collection Management and Dissemination
   • All-Source Production
   • Reporting and Dissemination
   • TSCIF
      • Checklist
      • Guard Orders
      • TSCIF Emergency Action Plan
   • Support Functions
      • Intelligence Communications
      • Field Security
      • Geospatial Information and Services
   • References
      • Predeployment Checklist
      • Site Survey Checklist
      • Shift Change Briefing Format
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- Shift Change Checklist
- Augmentee In-Processing Survey
- Security Checklist
- Sample Emergency Action Plan
- Intelligence Disclosure and Sanitation Worksheet
- Daily Intelligence Summary Format
- Intelligence Summary Format
- Graphic Intelligence Summary Format
- Mission Report Format
- Mobility Supply Inventory
- Mission Tracking Summary
- Intelligence Systems

3. Operations

a. Purpose
b. Responsibilities
c. Organization
d. Policies and Procedures
e. Annexes and Appendices

- Fire Support
- Space Support
- SO Mission-Essential Task List
- CSAR
- IO

- Standard SO Mission Designation
- Messages
- SO TASKORD
- CONOPS
- CONOPS Approval
- SPTREQ
- SPTCONF
- AIRSUPREQ
- REQCONF
- OPSUM
- SITREP
- OPORD
- FRAGORD
- ACMREQ
- ACO
- ALLOREQ

- OPSEC Procedures
- JOC Shift Organization
- Commander’s Brief

4. Logistics

a. Purpose
b. Responsibilities
c. Organization
d. Policies and Procedures
e. Annexes

- Format for Logistics Portion of JSOTF SITREP
- Logistic Planning Considerations
  - Logistic Estimate of the Situation
  - Logistic Checklist for Developing OPLANs and OPORDs
- Reporting Emergency POL Format
- Civil Engineering Support Plan Format
- Environmental Management Support Plan Format
- Logistics Status Report
- JOPES Letter of Instruction and Validation process
- Sample OPORD
- Contracting Planning

5. Plans

a. Purpose
b. Responsibilities
c. Organization
d. Policies and Procedures
e. Annexes
- JPG Mission Analysis
- Warning Order Format
- OPORD Format
- Plans Checklist

6. Staff Judge Advocate

a. Purpose
b. Responsibilities
c. Policies and Procedures
d. Annexes
- Applicability of ROE
- Legal Annex to OPORD
- Compliance with Intelligence Oversight
- Discipline and Military Justice

7. Communications

a. Purpose
b. Responsibilities
c. Organization
d. Policies and Procedures
e. Annexes and Appendices
- Communication and Computer Systems (C-CS) Requirements Checklist
- Site Survey Checklist
  - Terrestrial Site Survey
  - Shipboard Site Survey
  - SATCOM Site Survey
- Deployment Checklist
- C-CS Support to JSOTF
  - JCCC
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- Message Center
- VTC
- ADPE Administration
- INFOCON Program
- Redeployment Checklist

8. Headquarters Commandant
   a. Purpose
   b. Responsibilities
   c. Organization
   d. Policies and Procedures
   e. Annexes
      - Billeting Support
      - JSOTF Camp Layout
      - Postal Activity
      - Physical Security Operations

9. Medical
   a. Purpose
   b. Responsibilities
   c. Policies and Procedures
   d. Annexes
      - Sample Medical OPORD
      - Sample Preventive Medicine OPORD
      - Sample for Medical Reports Format

10. Chaplain
    a. Purpose
    b. Responsibilities
    c. Policies and Procedures

11. Joint Personnel Reception Center
    a. Purpose
    b. Responsibilities
    c. Organization
    d. Policies and Procedures
    e. Annexes
       - Layout of JPRC
       - Joint Personnel Reception Briefing
       - Processing

12. Budget
    a. Purpose
    b. Responsibilities
    c. Organization
    d. Policies and Procedures
    e. Annexes
       - DOD Authorities
       - Resource Management
       - Financial Management Battlefield Deployment Phases
13. **Information Management**

a. Purpose

b. Responsibilities

c. Policies and Procedures

d. Annexes

- J-1 Data Flows

- J-2 Data Flows

- J-3 Data Flows

- J-4 Data Flows

- J-5 Data Flows

- J-6 Data Flows

14. **Glossary**
APPENDIX F
STANDARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION DESIGNATION

1. Purpose and Scope

This appendix provides a convention for assigning discrete SO mission numbers. These numbers are assigned by the JSOTF, announced in the planning order or TASKORD, and are used by SO HQ to track missions.

2. General

The standard format serves two purposes. At the most basic level, it allows an individual to ascertain quickly certain basic aspects of the mission. During heavy activity, this saves time, reduces confusion, and facilitates effective coordination. On a broader level, standardizing mission designation means that “part time” staff augmentees or liaisons do not need to master a different system for each theater SOC or JSOTF.

3. Operations Security

Planning documents listing SO missions should be classified and limited to those with a need to know, as the shifting emphasis in SO activity may foretell other operations (surge of SR in preparation for an advance, for example). Missions within the mainstream of operations may still be masked by a notional designator, if necessary. Exceptionally sensitive missions should be compartmented and kept within discrete special category channels.

4. Basic Format

The standard mission designation for SO has three components: mission designator, operational unit designator, and mission support designator. For example, the mission “UW041/ODA101/ADI010” may be separated as follows.

a. Mission Designator. The first set of characters indicates the type of mission and assigned number. Numbers need not be in numerical order, but they must be discrete. In this example, “UW041” designates unconventional warfare mission number forty-one. Mission code examples are listed in Figure F-1.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mission Designator Codes</th>
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<td>WMD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F-1. Mission Designator Codes
b. **Operational Unit Designator.** The middle set of characters designate the mission’s primary executor. In the example, this is Special Forces Operational Detachment ODA101. The MPA designates this unit and adds it to the mission designation. Some common SOF units are listed in Figure F-2.

c. **Mission Support Designator.** The last set of characters refers to mission support action (infiltration, resupply, exfiltration, etc.). The first three characters are determined during CONOPS development and are identified by the MPA. The mission supporting agency provides the remainder of the characters, representing the supporting mission number (normally sequential). In the example, “ADI010” indicates airdrop infiltration mission number ten. Figure F-3 lists some commonly used codes.

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**Figure F-2. Operational Unit Designator Codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAB</th>
<th>CA Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>CA Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>CA Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCE</td>
<td>SO Command &amp; Control Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>Dry Deck Shelter Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Mobile Communications Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>SF Operational Detachment A (Company HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODB</td>
<td>SF Operational Detachment B (Company HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>SF Operational Detachment C (Battalion HQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTA</td>
<td>Support Operations Team A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLT</td>
<td>SEAL Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POB</td>
<td>PSYOP Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>PSYOP Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>PSYOP Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>PSYOP Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB</td>
<td>Ranger Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>Ranger Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Ranger Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>SOA Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>SOA Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBU</td>
<td>Special Boat Unit Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDV</td>
<td>SEAL Delivery Vehicle Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFG</td>
<td>SF Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOD</td>
<td>SO Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>SO Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>SO Liaison Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>SO Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>SO Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQD</td>
<td>SEAL Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STG</td>
<td>Special Tactics Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Special Tactics Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STT</td>
<td>Special Tactics Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull #</td>
<td>Maritime Vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tail #</td>
<td>Individual Aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

CA: Civil Affairs  
HQ: Headquarters  
PSYOP: Psychological Operations  
SEAL: Sea-Air-Land Team  
SF: Special Forces  
SO: Special Operations  
SOA: SO Aviation
### Mission Support Designator Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Mission Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Airborne Command &amp; Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADI</td>
<td>Infiltration (Airdrop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Resupply (Airdrop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALE</td>
<td>Exfiltration (Airdrop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALI</td>
<td>Infiltration (Airland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALS</td>
<td>Resupply (Airland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Armed Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Air Refueling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>Air-Sea Rendezvous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTE</td>
<td>Beacon Emplacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>Cache Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Diver Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRF</td>
<td>Ground Refueling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Exfiltration (Maritime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Resupply (Maritime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Infiltration (Maritime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Mine Search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPU</td>
<td>Message Pickup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFD</td>
<td>Leaflet Drop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSB</td>
<td>Loudspeaker Broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLE</td>
<td>Exfiltration (Overland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLI</td>
<td>Infiltration (Overland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Resupply (Overland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSR</td>
<td>Offshore Sea Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTR</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Photo-Recce Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRY</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Recovery (Fulton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAS</td>
<td>Tactical Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEW</td>
<td>Tactical Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure F-3. Mission Support Designator Codes**
Intentionally Blank
1. Purpose

 This appendix provides the format and procedures for preparing and using an execution checklist for monitoring of a COMJSOTF directed mission. The checklist is prepared as Annex X. The checklist reflects the detailed sequence of events necessary for mission execution according to the approved CONOPS. The approved checklist has the effect of an order. Reports rendered in accordance with the checklist keep the COMJSOTF informed of the current status of the mission from the launch of the first element to the recovery of the last element.

2. Procedures

 The execution checklist is a sequential list of all key actions associated with mission execution and the codewords or alphanumeric characters assigned to each action. As each action is completed, designated personnel transmit the codeword or alphanumeric character over a specified frequency to a specified station, normally the JOC or airborne battlefield C2 center. Some codewords or alphanumeric characters, such as those for an aborted landing or early compromise of the mission, are transmitted only by exception. To preclude minimize message transmissions, other stations in the net monitor all transmissions to obtain operational information. These stations do not acknowledge any report unless it is directed to them.

 a. Events labeled “M” (mandatory) on the checklist require a report when the event occurs or if the event cannot or has not been accomplished as scheduled.

 b. Events labeled “X” (by exception) on the checklist require a report only if the event occurs.

 c. Reports are rendered by call sign, codeword or alphanumeric character, and time event occurred (for example, “TANGO 35, THIS IS BRAVO 40, GOOSE AT 2136”).

 d. When inquiring about the status of an event, use only the line number for the event. If the event has not occurred to plan, the appropriate codeword for the situation should be used in the response. Examples of exception codewords might include TURTLE = event delayed or PYTHON = event aborted (for example, “TANGO 35, THIS IS BRAVO 40, SAY STATUS OF LINE 101 – BRAVO 40, THIS IS TANGO 35, LINE 101 IS TURTLE 20 MINUTES”).

 e. Figure G-1 shows a simplified sample execution checklist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT NUMBER</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CALL (TO)</th>
<th>SIGN (FROM)</th>
<th>CODE WORD</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>SF RECON TM IN POSITION</td>
<td>M/CMP</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>W28</td>
<td>BUZZARD</td>
<td>0145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>SEAL TM IN POSITION</td>
<td>M/CMD</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>B40</td>
<td>GOOSE</td>
<td>0150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>#1 MC-130 DEPARTS MOB</td>
<td>M/CMP</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>R06</td>
<td>CHICKEN</td>
<td>0200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>#2 MC-130 DEPARTS MOB</td>
<td>M/CMD</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>C06</td>
<td>MARTIN</td>
<td>0400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>RGR CO TOT</td>
<td>M/CMD</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>C06</td>
<td>EAGLE</td>
<td>0400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>AIRDROP</td>
<td>X/CMD</td>
<td>T35</td>
<td>C06</td>
<td>VULTURE</td>
<td>0400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure G-1. Sample Execution Checklist
APPENDIX H
OPERATIONS MESSAGES

Annex A Special Operations Tasking Order
B Concept of Operations
C Concept of Operations Approval
D Support Request
E Support Confirmation
F Air Support Request
G Request Confirmation
H Operations Summary
I Situation Report
J Operation Order
K Fragmentary Order
Appendix H

OPERATIONS MESSAGES

1. General

This appendix provides guidance and instructions for drafting the various messages that a JSOTF JOC will produce or receive from the MPA. These messages will be drafted, published, and transmitted in accordance with procedures established by the JSOTF J-6. Messages provided are to be used as examples. Actual message formats will be IAW Service and/or USSOCOM authoritative directives.

2. Annexes

a. SO TASKORD. The COMJSOTF uses the SO TASKORD to assign missions to the appropriate SOF component HQ.

b. CONOPS. The supported HQ submits a CONOPS to the COMJSOTF in response to the original FRAGORD.

c. CONOPS Approval. The COMJSOTF submits a CONOPS approval to the supported HQ in response to the CONOPS.

d. SPTREQ. The supported HQ submits initial and follow-on SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ.

e. SPTCONF. The supporting HQ submits a SPTCONF to the supported HQ, JSOTF, and tasked subordinate units to confirm all details of the SPTREQ except for confirming aircraft.

f. AIRSUPREQ. An AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions.

g. REQCONF. A REQCONF is used to inform the requesting command, the tasking authority, and the tasked units of action being taken, and to provide additional information about the missions. It is used for both preplanned and immediate air tasking cycles.

h. OPSUM. An OPSUM is provided by the JSOTF component commanders to the COMJSOTF after post mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element.

i. SITREP. An example of a JSOTF SITREP, which normally covers activities over the last 24 hours and projected activities for the next 48 hours, is provided in this annex.

j. OPORD. An example of a JSOTF OPORD to assign missions to subordinate tactical units is provided in this annex.

k. FRAGORD. The COMJSOTF uses the FRAGORD to issue new or different guidance or changes to a published OPORD, without restating the information provided in the basic order.

l. ACMREQ. The ACMREQ is used to request that a defined block of airspace be designated as having special significance for air operations within an AOR. These areas include drop zones, ground free-fire zones, landing zones, pickup points, restrictive fire plans, selected areas for evasion, and potential evasion locale. These zones may be defined as a circle around a central point, a corridor centered on a line, an area bounded by line segments, or airspace bounded by attitude.

m. ACO. The ACO is used to provide specific detailed orders for airspace management and control from a higher command to subordinate units.

n. ALLOREQ. Upon receipt of all AIRSUPREQ messages, the JSOACC prepares an ALLOREQ for transmission to the JFACC not later than (NLT) 24 hours prior to the air tasking day. The message
basically addresses how the JSOACC plans to allocate available air sorties, including excess sorties not needed by the JFACC and requests from the JFACC for additional air assets beyond the capability of the JSOACC.
1. **General**

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the TASKORD for all SOF missions. The theater SOC will push available information and intelligence down to the supported unit; (i.e., if mission essential information is currently available, it will be forwarded with the TASKORD).

2. **TASKORD**

The JSOTF uses the TASKORD to assign missions to the appropriate SOF component HQ (ARSOF, NAVSOF or AFSOF). Missions contained within a TASKORD or other controlling directive should be referenced, rather than repeated. The TASKORD should be transmitted NLT 96 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs. Upon transmission, the tasked component becomes the supported component. The TASKORD designates the MPA (MPA = supported unit), supporting agencies, and the intelligence production agency; grants DIRLAUTH; and establishes an earliest anticipated launch time (EALT). Acknowledgment of the TASKORD is required.

3. **Special Operations Mission Numbers**

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number. The COMJSOTF normally assigns or allocates SOF mission designator sets to subordinate components to support mission analysis and specific C2 requirements of SOF elements for mission execution.

4. **Procedures For TASKORD**

   a. Sent By: JSOTF

   b. Sent To: Supported HQ.

   c. When Sent: As soon as possible (ASAP) but NLT 96 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs

   d. Responds To: N/A

   e. Expected Response: CONOPS NLT 72 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs

5. **TASKORD Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)**

   a. Baseline Format
• Basic Message Name. ORDER

• Message Identification (MSGID). ORDER

• Order Type (ORDTYP). TASKORD

• Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, Acknowledge Message (AKNLDG)

b. Special Instructions

• SITUATION

  • Enemy Forces. Express this information in terms of two enemy echelons below yours (for instance, corps address brigades; battalions address platoons). Describe the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous course of action. Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against USG interests in the area of operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or the current intelligence estimate or intelligence summary. If you need to reference more sources, use the final subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation.

  • Friendly Forces. Include the mission, the commander’s intent, and CONOPS for HQ one and two levels up. Subparagraphs state the missions of flank units and other units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the issuing HQ.

  • Attachments and Detachments. Do not repeat information already listed under “Task Organization” or in Annex A (Task Organization). Try to put all information in the task organization or in Annex A and state, “See Task Organization” or “See Annex A”. However, when not in the task organization, list units that are attached or detached to the HQ that issues the order. State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when the OPORD or OPLAN is effective (such as “on order,” “on commitment of the reserve”). Use the term “remains attached” when units will be or have been attached for sometime.

• MISSION. State the mission derived during the planning process. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement. The mission statement will cover on-order missions.

• EXECUTION. Intent: State the commander’s intent derived during the planning process:

  • Concept of Operations. The CONOPS may be a single paragraph, may be divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The CONOPS should be based on the COA statement from the decisionmaking process and, at a minimum, will address close, deep, rear, security, and reserve operations as well as describe the type or form of operation and designate the main effort. The commander uses this subparagraph when he or she feels that sufficient detail must be
supplied to ensure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. The concept statement should be concise and understandable. The concept describes:

1. The employment of major maneuver elements in a scheme of maneuver.

2. A plan of fire support or a scheme of fires supporting the maneuver with fires.

3. The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation. These include reconnaissance and security elements, intelligence assets, engineer assets, and air defense.

4. Any other aspects of the operation that the commander considers appropriate to clarify the concept and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination are too lengthy for this paragraph, that integration and coordination are addressed in the appropriate annexes.

5. Any “be-prepared” missions.

When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the CONOPS may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Designate phases as “Phase” followed by the appropriate Roman numeral, for example, Phase I.

NOTE: Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of any given operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the CONOPS.

1. Maneuver. State the scheme of maneuver derived during the planning process.

2. Fires. Clarify scheme of fires to support the overall concept.

3. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. This paragraph should specify the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and how it ties in with the basic CONOPS.

4. Intelligence. State the intelligence system concept supporting the scheme of maneuver.

5. Engineer.


7. Information Operations. State overall concept of information operations in support of the scheme of maneuver. Establish priority of support and refer to appropriate annexes as required.

• Tasks to Maneuver Units. Clearly state the missions or tasks for each maneuver unit that reports directly to the HQ issuing the order. List units in the same sequence as
in the task organization, including reserves. Use a separate subparagraph for each maneuver unit. Only state tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place tactical tasks that affect two or more units in subparagraph 3d.

**Tasks to combat support (CS) units.** Use these subparagraphs only as necessary. List CS units in subparagraphs in the same order as they appear in the task organization. Use CS subparagraphs to list only those specific tasks that CS units must accomplish and that are not specified or implied elsewhere. Include organization for combat, if not clear from task organization.

(1) **Intelligence.** Address the function or support roles of organic or attached combat C-W or MI units, if not clear in the task organization. Designate any special use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

(2) **Engineer.**

(3) **Fire Support.** Include fire support information here rather than in an annex.

(a) **Air support.** Show tactical air reconnaissance sorties here or in the intelligence annex.

(b) **Field artillery support.** Cover priorities such as counterfires or interdiction.

(c) **Naval gunfire support.**

(d) **Fire support coordinating measures.**

(4) **Air Defense.**

(5) **Signal.** List organization for combat, if not in the task organization. Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions or support roles of organic or attached signal units if it is not clear in task organization. Establish priorities of work if not addressed in unit SOPs.

(6) **NBC.**

(7) **Provost Marshall.**

(8) **PSYOP.**

(9) **CMO.**

**Coordinating Instructions.** List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. Subparagraphs d (1)-d (5) below are mandatory.

(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
(2) **Commander’s critical information requirements.** List once only here. Do not list in Annex B (Intelligence).

(a) Priority intelligence requirements.

(b) Essential elements of friendly information.

(c) Friendly force information requirements.

(3) **Risk reduction control measures.** These are measures unique to this operation and can include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.

(4) **Rules of engagement.** (NOTE: ROE can be addressed within Appendix 6 to Annex C.)

(5) Environmental considerations.

(6) Force protection.

(7) Any additional coordinating instructions.

• **SERVICE SUPPORT.** Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Refer to annexes, if required. Subparagraphs can include the following.

  • **Support concept.** State the concept of logistics support to provide non-CSS commanders and their staffs a visualization of how the operation will be logistically supported.

  • **Materiel and services.**

  • **Medical evacuation and hospitalization.**

  • **Personnel support.**

• **COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

  • **Command.** State the map coordinates for the command post (CP) locations and at least one future location for each CP. Identify the chain of command.

  • **Signal.** List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs; identify the Communications-electronics operating instructions addition in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are submitted.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the plan or order by addressees. The word acknowledge may suffice or you may refer to the message
reference number. Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.

- **GENTEXT/Administration (ADMIN) AND Logistics (LOG).** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to OPORD annexes when appropriate.

- **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the communications and electronics (C&E) policy, HQ locations, code words, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”
1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the CONOPS for all SOF missions.

2. CONOPS

The supported HQ submits a CONOPS to the JSOTF in response to the original TASKORD. The supported HQ should also send its SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ at the same time. The CONOPS should be sent NLT 72 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs. The CONOPS provides the MPA’s CONOPS in sufficient detail for the JSOTF to evaluate the concept and approve it for execution planning.

3. SO Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. CONOPS

a. Sent By: Supported HQ.

b. Sent To: JSOTF.

c. When Sent: ASAP but NLT 72 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs.

d. Responds To: TASKORD/FRAGORD.

e. Expected Response: JSOTF sends CONOPS approval ASAP after receipt of CONOPS (normally within 8 hours).

5. CONOPS Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

• Basic Message Name. ORDER.

• MSGID. ORDER.

• ORDTYP. CONOPS.

• Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, AKNLDG.
b. Special Instructions

- **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** State relevant additional information that was not included in the FRAGORD or other references. If no change, state “NO CHANGE.”

- **GENTEXT/MISSION.** Provide the MPA’s restated mission as derived during analysis of the FRAGORD. Repeat the mission designator from the FRAGORD.

- **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Include the following.
  
  - **CONOPS.** Enter a general statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission, including the major forces involved, time phasing, cross-service support, and necessary coordination.
  
  - **SUBUNIT TASKS.** Enter a paragraph for each operational subunit. Include the operational unit designator; time, place, and means of infiltration and exfiltration; and specific mission tasks. This section forms the basis for information transmitted in the accompanying SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ.
  
  - **COORDINATION.** Identify coordination requirements for mission support from other SOF components. Indicate what SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ have been sent, to whom, and when coordination must be completed. Identify necessary JSOTF assistance.
  
  - **OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS.** Include estimate for probability of mission success (high, medium, or low) once in the JSOA. If none, state “NONE.”

- **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to OPORD annexes when appropriate.

- **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the C&E policy, HQ locations, codewords, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

c. Notional CONOPS

OPER/ROBIN SAGE/

MSOID/ORDER/COMJSOTF NORTH/

ORDTYP/CONOPS/UW-001/

TIMEZONE/Z/

ORDREF/TASKORD/COMJSOTF UW-001 AND UW-002/

GENTEXT/SITUATION/NO CHANGE/

GENTEXT/MISSION/
1. ( ) SFOB 9 CONDUCTS JOINT/COMBINED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA(S) BATCH AND SUBMIT COMMENCING 081200Z SEP XX IN SUPPORT OF COMJSOTF OBJECTIVES. ON ORDER CONDUCTS NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS TO SECURE AMEMB NORTH PINELAND AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF FROM AMEMB TO FRIENDLY CONTROL. (UW-001/SFG9 AND UW-002/SFG9)).//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

2. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: SFOB 9 PLANS, PREPARES, AND CONDUCTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS WITH FOB 91, FOB 92, 1/75TH RGR, AND AFSOB ON NIGHT 09/10 SEP XX SFOB ELEMENT ESTABLISHES STAGING BASE AT US NAS RIO BRAVO TO SUPPORT SPECIAL OPERATIONS WITH A COMBINATION OF JOINT AND COMMON SERVICING.

A. ( ) FOB 91: ON NIGHT 10/11 SEP XX, FOB 91 INFILTRATES SF DETS (ODA 911/913/914) BY MC-130 AC TO CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA BATCH TO ORGANIZE, TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST, AND PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO RESISTANCE FORCES TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WITHIN NORTH PINELAND, AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY PINELAND FORCES AND AGAINST OPFORLAND FORCES; EXTRACT BY MH-60 ON ORDER.

B. ( ) FOB 92: ON 130030Z SEP XX, FOB 92 INFILTRATES SF DETS (ODA’s 942, 944, 951) BY MC-130 TO CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA SUBMIT TO ORGANIZE, TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST, AND PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO RESISTANCE FORCES TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WITHIN NORTH PINELAND, AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY PINELAND FORCES AND AGAINST OPFORLAND FORCES; EXTRACT BY MH-60 ON ORDER.

C. ( ) 1/75 RGR: ON ORDER, GROUND TASK FORCE (TF RANGER) AIR ASSAULTS INTO AMEMB COMPOUND BY MH-53 TO SECURE COMPOUND PERIMETER AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF USING SAME AIRCRAFT. AFSOB AC-130 AIRCRAFT PROVIDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. SEPARATE CONOP TO FOLLOW WITH DETAILED EXECUTION MATRIX ONCE TASKORD RECEIVED.

3. ( ) 3RD SOW: INFILTRATE 6 EACH SF UW TEAMS BY MC-130 AND EXTRACT BY MH-60. INSERT AND EXTRACT AIR ASSAULT RGR GROUND TASK FORCE BY 9 EACH MH-53 INTO AMEMB COMPOUND AND EVACUATE AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF TO STAGING BASE. PROVIDE AC-130 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT CSAR.

4. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. ( ) SPTREQ 001/081601/SEP AND 002/081701/SEP.
B. ( ) AIRSUPREQ 001/081602/SEP AND 002/081523/SEP.

C. ( ) ASSIGNED ARSOTF 9 MISSION DESIGNATORS BASED UPON SFOB 9 MISSION ANALYSIS.

(1) JSOA BATCH DIVIDED INTO THREE SEPARATE JSOA(S).

(A) UW-101/ODA 911/JSOA ARMOR.
(B) UW-102/ODA 913/JSOA BADGE.
(C) UW-103/ODA 914/JSOA CAPER.

(2) JSOA SUMIT DIVIDED INTO THREE SEPARATE JSOA(S).

(A) UW-201/ODA 942/JSOA DEMON.
(B) UW-202/ODA 944/JSOA EATON.
(C) UW-203/ODA 951/JSOA FLUKE.

5. ( ) OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS:

A. AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF UW-001 AND UW-002 NOT RECEIVED.

B. PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS - HIGH.// AKNLDG/NO// DECL/OADR//
1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for CONOPS approval for all SOF missions.

2. CONOPS Approval

The JSOTF submits a CONOPS approval to the supported HQ in response to the CONOPS. The response could approve or modify the CONOPS. The CONOPS approval is sent ASAP after receipt of the supported HQ CONOPS (normally within 8 hours).

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedure for CONOPS Approval

a. Sent By: JSOTF

b. Sent To: Supported HQ

c. When Sent: ASAP after receipt of supported HQ CONOPS (normally within 8 hours)

d. Responds To: CONOPS

e. Expected Response: None

5. CONOPS Approval Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

• Basic Message Name. ORDER.

• MSGID. ORDER.

• ORDTYP. Other (OTH).

• Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, Order Reference (ORDREF), AKNLDG.
b. Special Instructions

- **ORDTYP.** Use EXORD if order constitutes approval to execute mission. Use OTH if mission is cancelled or authority is given to continue execution planning and preparation pending execution authority.

- **ORDREF.** Reference the CONOPS message that the CONOPS approval approves, cancels, or modifies.

- **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** Briefly state additional general situation information significant to this message. If no change, state “NO CHANGE.”

- **GENTEXT/MISSION.** Restate mission if it has changed. Otherwise, state “NO CHANGE.”

- **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Approve referenced CONOPS or provide additional guidance.

- **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** Provide any changes. Otherwise, state “NO CHANGE.”

c. Notional CONOPS approval

OPER/ROBIN SAGE//

MSGID/ORDER/JSOTF NORTH//

ORDTYP/QTR/JSOTF NORTH/001//

TIMEZONE/Z//

ORDREF/CONOPS/CDR 9TH SFG/UW001/UW002//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/ ( ) SITUATION IN NORTHERN PINELAND REMAINS GRAVE. NCA HAVE NOT YET AUTHORIZED USE OF MILITARY FORCE. AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED NEO FOR AMCITS. NEO TASKORD TO FOLLOW//

GENTEXT/MISSION/ ( ) NO CHANGE (UW001/SFG9 AND UW002/SFG9).//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/ ( ) CONOPS APPROVED FOR EXECUTION PLANNING AND PREPARATION AS SUBMITTED FOR UW001/UW002. DO NOT DEPLOY FORCES FROM PRESENT LOCATIONS WITHOUT EXECUTE ORDER FROM THIS HQ. EXECUTE ORDER WILL CONTAIN AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPNS IF NOT RECEIVED SOONER //

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/ ( ) NO CHANGE.//
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX H
SUPPORT REQUEST

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for SPTREQ for all SOF missions.

2. SPTREQ

a. Initial Support. The supported HQ submits a SPTREQ for all support not requiring air assets to the supporting component HQ and provides information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. The SPTREQ will be submitted ASAP but NLT 72 hours prior to commencement of the supporting event. It should be sent at the same time the supported component sends the CONOPS. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF (such as a submarine or naval gunfire), the SPTREQ is sent to only the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the designated JFC. The SPTREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional SPTREQs as planning continues.

b. Follow-on Support. The supported HQ submits the SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ for action and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting follow-on support for a team already on a mission. The SPTREQ will be submitted ASAP. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF, the SPTREQ is sent to only the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the designated JFC.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for Support Request

a. Sent By: Supported HQ.

b. Sent To: Supporting HQ, info the JSOTF (for support from sources outside of the JSOTF, send directly to the JSOTF for action).

c. When Sent: ASAP, but NLT 72 hours prior to commencement of the supporting event. (In the case of follow-on support, sent ASAP)

d. Responds To: TASKORD (indirectly).

e. Expected Response: SPTCONF from supporting HQ NLT 48 hours prior to commencement of the supporting event. Confirmation is from the JSOTF if support comes from an external source or if the JSOTF must resolve a support conflict.
Annex D to Appendix H

5. Support Request Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

- Basic Message Name. System-Reply or Remarks Message
- MSGID. SYS.RRM
- Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, REPLY, RMKS

b. Special Instructions. Enter the following information in the “RMKS” data set:

- Type Support Requested. Indicate whether the SPTREQ is for:
  - “PERSONNEL” (personnel augmentation). Include skill requirements, number requested, and any pertinent additional information.
  - “OPERATIONS” (naval gun fire, submarine, off-shore rendezvous, etc.). Date-time group for execution (specify by type of event, such as a time on target for insertion), method of execution (lock-in/lock-out, etc.). Indicate number of personnel and amount of cargo.
  - “TRAINING” (ranges, material, vessels, etc.). Identify specific training requirements that are beyond organic capabilities. Specify any joint preparation required, including Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System and mission rehearsal. Include times and dates.
  - “ADMINISTRATION” or “LOGISTICS” (material, supplies, services, and facilities). Identify specific administrative or logistic requirements that are beyond organic capabilities. Refer to OPLAN annexes, memoranda of agreement, or statements of requirements if appropriate. Include times and dates.

- Supporting Agency. When using multiple addressees, clearly indicate what support each supporting agency is expected to coordinate.

- Number of Personnel. Indicate number of personnel requiring support.

- Cargo. Include material and supplies carried for infiltration as well as resupply. Annotate if the cargo is hazardous.

- Location. Identify or request a point, site, or zone. Refer to a specific reception site or beach-landing site nomination or confirmation message, or specifically request the supporting agency to nominate primary and alternate sites. Transmit sufficient data to positively identify locations.
c. COMMENTS. Include in this section any additional information facilitating coordination or highlighting special requirements. Such information may include on-load and off-load locations and team briefing requirements.

d. Notional SPTREQ

OPER/ROBIN SAGE/

MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR 9TH SFG/

REF/A/ORDER/JISOTF NORTH/07213ZSEPXX/

AMPN/TASKORD NEO-001/

REB/B/ORDER/CDR 9TH SFG/081600ZSEPXX/

AMPN/CONOPS NEO-001/

RMKS/
1. ( ) TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: TRAINING. SUPPORTING AGENCY; SFOB 9 ARSOTF 9 REQUESTS MOUT FACILITIES BE MADE AVAILABLE; EFFECTIVE 9 SEP XX THRU 19 SEP XX. THREE SIX (36) PERSONNEL WILL BE INVOLVED IN TRAINING AND DEMOLITIONS WILL BE USED FOR BREACHING.

2. ( ) TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: LOGISTICS. SUPPORTING AGENCY; US NAS, RIO BRAVO. REQUEST PRECOORDINATED STAGING BASE COMSOC MOA BE MADE AVAIL EFFECTIVE 9 SEP XX FOR DURATION OF NEO IN NORTH PINELAND.

DECL/OADR//
Intentionally Blank
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX H
SUPPORT CONFIRMATION

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for SPTCONF for all SOF missions.

2. SPTCONF

The supporting HQ submits a SPTCONF to the supported HQ, JSOTF, and tasked subordinate supporting unit(s) to confirm all the details of the SPTREQ. (NOTE: SPTCONF is not used for confirming air support. Use the standard REQCONF format to confirm air support.) If the resources available for the support don’t match those requested, the supporting HQ will coordinate with the supported HQ to determine the impact on overall mission accomplishment. Support that cannot be satisfactorily resolved between supporting and supported HQ will be referred to COMJSOTF for resolution. The SPTCONF will be submitted ASAP but NLT 48 hours prior to commencement of the supporting event. The SPTCONF is sent directly to the JSOTF if the supporting HQ is outside of the JSOTF. The JSOTF may grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of supported JFC.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedure for SPTCONF

a. Sent By: Supporting HQ

b. Sent To: Supported HQ, info the JSOTF (for support from services outside the JSOTF send directly to the JSOTF).

c. When Sent: ASAP but NLT 48 hours prior to commencement of the supporting event.

d. Responds To: SPTREQ

e. Expected Response: Acknowledgement by supported HQ.

5. SPTCONF Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

• Basic Message Name. Response to Request for Information.

• MSGID. RRI.
Annex E to Appendix H

- Mandatory Data Sets. REF and RMKS.

b. Special Instructions. Insert an amplification (AMPN) free-text set after each formatted set to provide additional information. Additionally, a RMKS set is available as the last set in the main text.

- REF. The REF set should reference the SPTREQ(s) requesting mission support confirmed in the message.

- RMKS. Use the RMKS set for the following.
  
  - Confirm details such as the number of personnel, amount of supplies, type of vessel or vehicle to be used, location of offshore rendezvous point (to eight digit coordinates when possible); and beach landing site (BLS) clear signal (if required).
  
  - Highlight problems or request action, such as MPA acknowledgement and acceptance of a change to the support requested.
  
  - Request additional information from the MPA or JSOTF. Provide a point of contact and time that the additional information must be received.

c. Notional SPTCONF

OPER/ROBIN SAGE/

MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR 9TH SFG/

REF/A/ORDER/COMJSOTF/072130ZSEPXX/

AMPN/FRAGORD 001/

REB/B/ORDBR/CDR 9TH SFG/081600ZSEPXX/

AMPN/CONOPS NEO-001/

RMKS/

1.  ( ) TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: TRAINING. SUPPORTING AGENCY; JSOTF. MOUT FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE; EFFECTIVE 9 SEP XX THRU 19 SEP XX AS REQUESTED. FACILITIES WILL ACCOMMODATE 30 PAX. LIVE DEMOLITIONS ARE APPROVED FOR BREACHING NOT TO EXCEED 20 LBS EACH CHARGE.

2.  ( ) TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: LOGISTICS. SUPPORTING AGENCY: US NAS, RIO BRAVO. PRECOORDINATED STAGING BASE PER COMSOC MOA IS AVAIL EFFECTIVE 10 SEP XX FOR DURATION OF NEO.//

DECL/OADR//
1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for AIRSUPREQ for all SOF missions.

2. AIRSUPREQ

The AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions. The supported HQ submits an AIRSUPREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. The AIRSUPREQ will be submitted ASAP but NLT 72 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs. It should be sent at the same time the supported component sends the CONOPS. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the supported designated JTF. The AIRSUPREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional AIRSUPREQs as planning continues.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for AIRSUPREQ

a. Sent By: Supported HQ
b. Sent To: Supporting HQ, info the JSOTF
c. When Sent: ASAP, but NLT 72 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs.
d. Responds To: TASKORD (indirectly)
e. Expected Response: JSOAC must transmit ALLOREQ message to JFACC to provide an estimate of the total air effort, to identify any excess and joint force general support aircraft sorties, and to identify unfilled air requirements. Submitted NLT 24 hours prior to start of air tasking day. REQCONF from supporting HQ NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.
5. **AIRSUPREQ Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)**

a. Baseline Format

   - Basic Message Name. AIRSUPREQ.

   - MSGID. AIRSUPREQ.

   - Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, Period (PERID), 8 REQUEST.

b. Special Instructions. See *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Format (JUH-MTF)*, Annex 26 to Chapter 3 (AIRSUPREQ) for detailed instructions on preparing message map.
1. **General**

This annex provides guidance and instructions for REQCONF for all SOF missions.

2. **REQCONF**

The REQCONF is used to inform the requesting command, the tasking authority, and the tasked units of action being taken, and to provide additional information about the mission(s). It is used both in the preplanned and immediate air tasking cycles. It should be sent NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.

3. **Special Operations Mission Numbers**

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. **Procedures for Request Confirmation**

a. **Sent By:** Supporting HQ

b. **When Sent:** ASAP, but NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.

c. **Responds To:** AIRSUPREQ

5. **REQCONF Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)**

a. **Baseline Format**

   • Basic Message Name. REQCONF.

   • MSGID. REQCONF.

   • Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, PERID.

b. **Special Instructions.** See *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Format (JUH-MTF)*, Annex 176 to Chapter 3 (REQCONF) for detailed instructions on preparing message map.
Intentionally Blank
1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the OPSUM for all SOF missions.

2. OPSUM

JSOTF component commanders submit an OPSUM to the JSOTF as soon as possible after the post-mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for OPSUM

a. Sent By: Component HQ

b. Sent To: JSOTF

c. When Sent: Submit as soon as possible after the element’s initial debriefing. Submit changes to this initial OPSUM after final debriefing if appropriate.

d. Responds To: N/A

e. Expected Response: N/A

5. OPSUM Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

• Basic Message Name. OPSUM.

• MSGID. OPSUM.

• Mandatory Sets. MSGID, PERID.

b. Special Instructions

• PERID. Use field one to indicate the day and time the mission began, field two to indicate the day and time the mission was completed.

• GENTEXT/GROUND OPSUM. Use this data set after the PERID set. Field two is for the following free-text comments, as appropriate.
• Target location and identification.

• Purpose of mission.

• Composition of team.

• Evaluation of results. State whether original plan was followed (if not, outline deviations and rationale). State whether mission was successful or unsuccessful (if unsuccessful, outline the reasons).

• Friendly losses.

• Enemy losses. Indicate count or estimate.

• Significant observations.

• Essential elements of information.

• Other significant information.

• Recommendations.
ANNEX I TO APPENDIX H
SITUATION REPORT

(EXAMPLE)

CLASSIFICATION

OTTCZYUW 1211644-UUUU--
ZNY UUUUU
O P 131559Z MAY 9_
FM CJTF ZERO ONE ZERO//JOC//
TO CJTF ZERO ONE ONE
INFO CINCUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J64/J34/J35/JOC//
CTF ZERO ONE TWO
CTF ZERO ONE THREE
CTF ZERO ONE FOUR
CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT ONE
CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT TWO
ZEN CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT THREE
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//DOX//
CDRUSASOC FT BRAGG NC//AOOP-POP-E//
COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORANADO CA//N32//
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
CDR 1ST PSYOP BN FT BRAGG NC//COMJPOTF//
CDRSOSCOM FT BRAGG NC
JOINT MTF ANALYSIS/ALL MTF TFC/FT HUACHUCA AZ
DJECG LANT//J3/J7//
Annex I to Appendix H

BT

CLASSIFICATION

EXER/OCEAN VENTURE 9_/

MSGID/SITREP/COMJSOTF/017/MAY/

PERID/121600Z/TO:131600Z/ASOF:131400Z/

HEADING/OWN SITUATION/

UNIT

/UNITDES    /UNITLOC     /CMNTS

/COMSOCJFCOM (COMJSOTF) /ST CROIX     /CJTF

/-6 SOSC(A) (-) /ST CROIX     /SUPPORT ELEMENT

/-ARSOC

/—3RD SFG(A) (SFOB) /FT BRAGG     /TG

/——ARSOC FWD (FOB) /ST CROIX     /TG

/-NAVSOC

/—NSWTG LANT    /FT PICKETT    /TG

/——ST-2 OCE DET /ST CROIX     /TG

/——ST2A       /ST CROIX     /TG

/——ST2B       /ST CROIX     /TG

/——SDVT-2 TU   /EMB ARCHERFISH /TG

/——SBU24 DET FWD /ST CROIX     /TG

/-AFSOC

/—1ST SOGS     /ST CROIX     /TG

/——193SOGP     /BORINQUEN PR

/——2-160 SOAR   /ST CROIX     /TG
Situation Report

/314AW /ST CROIX/

GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/

1. PAST 24 HOURS.
   A. DA004 - TRUJILLO C2 COMPLEX - MISSION COMPLETE. RANGERS OFF LOADED RRNAS.
   B. DA007 - MISSION CANCELLED DUE TO ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS. SDV RETURNED TO ARCHERFISH.
   C. CTG CONDUCTED MC130/MH60 AIR REFUEL TRAINING.
   D. CTG CONDUCTED EC130E COMMANDO SOLO MISSION.
   E. DA008 - AGENT DEBRIEFED AT HEADQUARTERS OF CJTF.

2. NEXT 48 HOURS:
   A. STAND DOWN CJTF AS OF 131600Z. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY 15 AND 16 MAY.

GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE-RECONNAISSANCE/OWN SOURCE INFO-NONEVALUATED, RAW INTEL:

INTERROGATION INFORMATION ON AGENT CAN BE OBTAINED FROM CJTF DISUM 13 MAY 9.

GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/

CATEGORY/STATUS/DAY1/DAY2/DAY3/DAY4/DAYS5-7/DAYS7-15/DAYS15-30/

MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION/A/G/G/G/G/G/

AMMO/G/G/G/G/G/G/

POL/G/G/G/G/G/G/

OTHER SUPPLY/G/G/G/G/G/G/

ENGINEERING/G/G/G/G/G/G/

MAINTENANCE/A/G/G/G/G/G/

HOST NATION SUPPORT/G/G/G/G/G/G/

COALITION SUPPORT/NA
REMARKS/

MOBILITY AND MAINTENANCE:

MH47 - OIL PUMP AND ENGINE TAIL CONE INOP. ETR 151200Z.

AC130 ANP 59 RADAR (WEATHER RADAR). BARRING THUNDERSTORM CAN STILL PERFORM MISSION. ETR 151200Z.//

GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY/

BEGINNING TO PHASE OUT COMMUNICATIONS.//

GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/

1. A. CJTF HQ
   - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 64/ 3/ 189/ 4/ 260/
   - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / / / / / / 
   - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
   - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
     - (A) KILLED: 0
     - (B) INJURED: 0
     - (C) TRANSFERRED: 0

B. NAVSOC
   - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 15/ 1/ 60/ 2/ 78/
   - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / -15/ / -28/ -2/-45/
   - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
   - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
     - (A) KILLED: 0
     - (B) INJURED: 0
     - (C) TRANSFERRED: 45
C. AFSOC

- (1) CURRENT: 0/ 57/ 7/ 220/ 0/284/

- (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / -8/ -1/-16/ /-25/

- (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0

- (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0

  - (A) KILLED: 0

  - (B) INJURED: 0

  - (C) TRANSFERRED: 25

D. ARSOC

- (1) CURRENT: 0/ 60/ 10/ 355/ 0/425/

- (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / / / / / /

- (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0

- (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0

  - (A) KILLED: 0

  - (B) INJURED: 0

  - (C) TRANSFERRED: 0

E. VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL GUARD

- (1) CURRENT: 0/ 10/ 3/ 75/ 0/88/

- (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / / / -1/ /-1/

- (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0

- (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0

  - (A) KILLED: 0

  - (B) INJURED: 0

  - (C) TRANSFERRED: 1
2. PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

A. UNUSUAL PROBLEMS - NONE

B. MORALE

1) GOOD -

2) BAD -

C. REST AND RECREATION - NTR

D. JOINT AWARDS: NTR

3. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THEATER: DOD-5/NONDOD-1/TOTAL-6/

GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/

ALL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MISSIONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF RECOVERING OUR REMAINING FORCES ALONG WITH THE LNO PACKAGE ABOARD THE USS MT WHITNEY. OPERATIONS WILL CEASE AT 131600Z MAY 9._/

DECL/OADR/

BT

#

NNNN
1. ( ) ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SAN SEBASTIAN HAVE OVERTHROWN FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT OF SAN SEBASTIAN AND DECLARED MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT. AIRPORT CLOSED TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. ESTIMATED 200 AMCITS IN COUNTRY HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN AMEMB. AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED NEO.

A. ( ) ENEMY FORCES: SAN SEBASTIAN HAS 500 MAN LIGHT INF BN AND 100 MAN POLICE FORCE VIC CAPITAL. AIR FORCE HAS 12 A-37 AIRCRAFT AND 4-6 SA-2/SA-3 SYSTEMS.

B. ( ) FRIENDLY FORCES: AFFOR AND NAVFOR SUPPORT NEO AS REQUIRED. AMEMB MARINE GUARD WILL PROVIDE TERMINAL GUIDANCE AT COMPOUND.

C. ( ) ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS: 1/75TH RANGER BN ATTACHED 9TH SFGA TO FORM ARSOTF 9.
GENTEXT/M I S S I O N/

2. ( ) JSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN CONDUCTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO EVACUATE APPROX 200 AMCITS AND 60 AMEMB STAFF FROM AMEMB SAN SEBASTIAN (SO00 I/SFG9).// GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 9TH SFG ESTABLISHES JSOTF AND DEPLOYS JOINT SOF FROM SFOB 9 USING 3RD SOW ASSETS TO SECURE AMEMB AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF MEMBERS TO FRIENDLY CONTROL.

4. ( ) 9TH SFG: PLAN AND CONDUCT NEO AS COMJSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN.

5. ( ) 3RD SOW: PLAN AND CONDUCT SPECIAL AIR OPERATIONS AS JSOACC OF JSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN.

6. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
   A. ( ) 9TH SFG IS MPA. 3RD SOW IS SUPPORTING AGENCY. THEATER JIC IS IPA.
   B. ( ) EALT IS 122300ZMAY.
   C. ( ) PEACETIME ROE IN EFFECT.
   D. ( ) SUBMIT CONOP NLT 082300Z MAY/I/

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

7. ( ) ANNEX D (SERVICE SUPPORT) AND ANNEX E (PERSONNEL), ORDREF IN EFFECT./IGEBTEXT.COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

8. ( ) ANNEX K (C-E), ORDREF IN EFFECT.//

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/BANKS, BE OFFICIAL: SMITH, COL SOJ3//

AKNLDG/Y/

DECL/OADR/
1. **General**

   This annex provides guidance and instructions for the FRAGORD for all SOF missions. The issuing command uses the FRAGORD to issue changes to an existing order to supporting units, without restating the entire base order.

2. **FRAGORD**

   The JSOTF uses the FRAGORD to issue changes to missions and OPORDs for the appropriate SOF component headquarters (ARSOF, NAVSOF, or AFSOF). Acknowledgment of the FRAGORD is required.

3. **Special Operations Mission Numbers**

   JSOTF FRAGORDs are numbered sequentially and do not use specific mission identification numbers as per TASKORD.

4. **Procedures for FRAGORD**

   a. **Sent By:** JSOTF
   
   b. **Sent To:** Supported HQ
   
   c. **When Sent:** ASAP, as soon as a change in the mission is ordered.
   
   d. **Responds To:** OPORD (from the original mission).
   
   e. **Expected Response:** Supported unit acknowledges FRAGORD in message traffic to issuing HQ and submits new CONOPS.

5. **FRAGORD Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)**

   a. **Baseline Format**
   
      • Basic Message Name. ORDER
   
      • MSGID. ORDER
   
      • ORDTYP. FRAGORD
   
      • Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, AKNLDG
b. Special Instructions

- **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** Provide an overview of the general situation using the following headings:
  - **ENEMY FORCES.** Provide enemy composition, disposition, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Refer to intelligence annexes, summaries, or other reports. If no change from the last referenced intelligence summary, indicate “NO CHANGE.”
  - **FRIENDLY FORCES.** Provide information on friendly forces other than those subordinate to the JSOTF. If no change from the last referenced intelligence summary, indicate “NO CHANGE.”
  - **ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.** List units attached to, or detached from, subordinate units of the JSOTF. If no change from the last referenced order, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

- **GENTEXT/MISSION.** Provide a clear, concise statement of the task and purpose. Include the mission designator from the base OPORD/TASKORD for clarity and to avoid confusion.

- **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Include the following as necessary. If no change from the base OPORD/TASKORD indicate “NO CHANGE.”
  - **CONOPS.** Summarize what the JSOTF wants the mission to accomplish without specifying how to do it. Provide the JSOTF’s intent and the desired end state.
  - **SUBORDINATE TASKS.** List tasks by component, with each component receiving its own paragraph. List tasks common to two or more components under coordinating instructions.
  - **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.** Establish the EALT, assign JSOAs, and allocate mission designator numbers to component HQ, and state any other instructions for coordination when the mission will be joint and/or involve conventional forces.

- **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to COMJSOTF OPORD annexes when appropriate or indicate “NO CHANGE.”

- **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the C&E policy, HQ locations, code words, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

  c. Notional FRAGORD follows.
MSGID/ORDER/JSOTF/

REF/A/OPORD/COMJTF/

AMPN/JTF OPORD/3SEPXX/

REF/B/OPORD/JSOTF/

AMPN/JSOTF OPORD/20SEPXX/

REF/C/DOC/SOC USJFCOM/-/

AMPN/AREA STUDY, PRP/

REF/D/DOC/SOC USJFCOM/-/

AMPN/ORDER OF BATTLE, PRP/

REF/E/DEPLOYORD/USASOC/201815ZSEPXX/

AMPN/DEPLOYMENT ORDER/

ORDTYP/FRAGORD-01/JSOTF/

ORDREF/OPORD/COM JSOTF/20SEPXX/

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION/

5UNIT

/UNITDES /UNITLOC/CMNTS/

/3RD SOW /AFSOB 3/6 AC-130, 5 MC-130, 10 MH-60, 8 MH-53/

/9TH SFGA /SFOB 9/ARSOTF 9/

/1/75th RGR BN /SFOB 9////

NSWTG-1 /NA VSOB 1/ 

/2/160TH SOAR /AFSOB 3//6 MH-47, 10 MH-60/ 

/TIME ZONE/Z/ 

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. ( ) THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF PINELAND (PRP) HAVE THREATENED TO INCREASE THEIR AUTHORITARIAN DICTATORSHIP BY EMPLOYING HARSH POPULATION RESOURCE CONTROL (PRC) MEASURES TOWARD THE GENERAL POPULATION AND BY AUTHORIZING OPFORLAND MILITARY FORCES TO PROTECT THE PRP BORDER AGAINST UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF PINELAND (ROP) AGGRESSION. PRP THREATS ARE THE RESULT OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AT THE ROP EMBASSY IN ATLANTA, NEUTRASTATE, ON 30 JAN XX (W+160) AND ARE BACKED BY THE USG AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COALITION HAS ASKED BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH PINELANDERS TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER AND REUNITE AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF NICHOLAS CHRISTIAN AND HIS ALLY, OPFORLAND.

A. ( ) ENEMY FORCES: NO CHANGE.

B. ( ) FRIENDLY FORCES: SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND USJFCOM ESTABLISHES JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (JSOTF NORTH) AND CONDUCTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THEATER TO SUPPORT COMJTF OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF PINELAND AND TO ELIMINATE OPFORLAND AS A THREAT.

(1) REF C (AREA STUDY, REPUBLIC OF PINELAND).

(2) REF D (ORDER OF BATTLE, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF PINELAND).

(3) US MILITARY. JTF PINELAND.

(A) MISSION AND COMMANDER’S INTENT. REF A.

(B) OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW. JTF PINELAND IS PREPARING TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE PRP. ELEMENTS OF THE 21ST INF DIV (LT) HAVE DEPLOYED INTO INITIAL STAGING BASES (AA COMANCHE) WHERE THEY ARE FINALIZING PREPARATIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN AO WARRIOR.

(C) US AIR FORCE. COMMENCING 7 JAN XX, 6TH US AIR FORCE PROVIDES COUNTERAIR (CA), AIR INTERDICTION (AI), CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS), ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) SUPPORT, AND TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE TO JTF PINELAND.

(D) US NAVY. COMMENCING 5 JAN XX, CARRIER TASK GROUP 21 (CTG-21) PROVIDES NAVAL GUNFIRE (NGF), CA, AI, CAS, AIR DEFENSE EARLY WARNING (ADEW), AND EW SUPPORT TO JTF PINELAND. TWO DESTROYERS FROM CTG 21 PROVIDE NGF AND ADEW IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF 21ST INF DIV (LT) OPERATIONS.

(E) SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION. SEE REF B.
C. ( ) ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS: 1/75TH RANGER BN ATTACHED TO 9TH SFGA FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO). 2/160TH SOAR ATTACHED 3RD SOW.//

GENTEX MISSION/

2. ( ) MISSION. NO CHANGE.

3. GENTEX/EXECUTION/

A. COMMANDER’S INTENT.

(1) PURPOSE. ENABLE JTF PINELAND TO PLAN AND CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENTS LOCATED IN NORTH PINELAND.

(2) DESIRED END STATE. JSOTF NORTH COLLECTS INFORMATION ON PRP AND OPFORLAND ACTIVITIES, CONDUCTS GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, AND DEVELOPS A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF PRP CAPABILITIES IN NORTH PINELAND. BASED UPON THESE ACTIVITIES, JTF PINELAND ACQUIRES THE MEANS TO SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCH COMBAT OPERATIONS INTO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF PINELAND.

B. ACCEPTABLE RISK.

(1) TO FORCE. LOW.

(2) TO MISSION. MEDIUM.

C. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: JSOTF NORTH ESTABLISHES SOF OPERATIONAL BASES TO INFILTRATE JOINT SOF ELEMENT(S) USING 3RD SOW AND 2/160TH SOAR ASSETS TO CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL (GUERRILLA) WARFARE, SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE, DIRECT ACTION, AND NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) OF AMCITS AS DIRECTED. SOF ELEMENT(S) EXFILTRATE UPON MISSION COMPLETION. PREPARE TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMBAT OPERATIONS AND FOLLOW-ON POST CONFLICT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE.

D. ( ) SUBORDINATE TASKS.

(1) 9TH SFG/SFOB 9/ARSOTF 9.

(A) PLAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) OPERATIONS IN JSOA BATCH AND JSOA SUMIT TO ORGANIZE, TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST, AND PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO RESISTANCE FORCES TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS BY CONVENTIONAL PINELAND FORCES IN ORDER TO LIBERATE NORTHERN PINELAND AND REUNITE PINELAND UNDER THE COALITION GOVERNMENT.
(B) PLAN TO COMMENCE SPECIAL RECON (SR) IN JSOA DEMON NLT 121200Z SEP XX AND CONTINUE OPERATIONS UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED. FOCUS RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS ON IDENTIFYING: PRP LOC’S, C2 NODES, AND LOGISTICAL ACTIVITIES; THE LOCATION, COMPOSITION, AND STRENGTH OF PRP MILITARY UNITS; QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS TO FACILITATE A SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN JSOA.

(C) ON ORDER, CONDUCT LIMITED DIRECT ACTION THROUGHOUT JSOA BATCH AND JSOA SUMIT.

(D) PLAN TO CONDUCT NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) OF AMERICAN CITIZENS (AMCITS). TASKORD WITH MISSION DESIGNATOR TO FOLLOW.

(2) 3RD SOW/AFSOB 3: PLAN AND CONDUCT SPECIAL AIR OPERATIONS AS JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT (JSOAC).

(A) COORDINATE, ALLOCATE, AND TASK REQUISITE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION SUPPORT.

(B) DECONFLICT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR MISSIONS WITH CONVENTIONAL JTF PINELAND AIR OPERATIONS.

(C) NLT 60 HRS PRIOR TO SPECIFIED EALT, TASK SPECIFIC SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION ELEMENTS TO EXECUTE REQUIRED AIRLIFT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.

(D) NLT 24 HRS PRIOR TO SPECIFIED EALT, SUBMIT AIRLIFT REQUEST CONFIRMATION(S).

(E) NLT 24 HRS AFTER RECOVERY OF EMPLOYED SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT, SUBMIT AN AIR POST-MISSION REPORT.

(F) PLAN AND CONDUCT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR) FOR JSOTF ELEMENTS AS DIRECTED. CSAR MISSION DESIGNATORS COMMENCE WITH CSAR-001 UPON RECEIPT OF TASKORD.

(3) NSWTG-1: PLAN AND CONDUCT SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE (SR) AND DIRECT ACTION (DA) MISSIONS AS DIRECTED IN JSOA HAZEL AND JSOA GRAPE.

E. ( ) COordinating Instructions:

(1) MISSION DESIGNATORS ASSIGNED FOR USE BY COMPONENTS:


(B) NSWTG-1: DA-201 THRU DA-225 AND SR-201 THRU SR-225.
C) AFSOB-3: DA-301 THRU DA-325.

2) EALT IS 121100Z SEP XX FOR ALL MISSIONS.

3) SUBMIT AND COORDINATE E&R PLAN NLT 24 HRS PRIOR TO EALT.

4) JSOA DEMON EFFECTIVE 080800Z SEP XX.

5) JSOA BATCH EFFECTIVE 080800Z SEP XX.

6) JSOA SUMIT EFFECTIVE 080800Z SEP XX.

7) JSOA GRAPE EFFECTIVE 120800Z SEP XX.

8) JSOA HAZEL EFFECTIVE 120800Z SEP XX.

9) FIRE SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX B.

10) CONDUCT MOPP ANALYSIS. SUBMIT MOPP LEVEL DETERMINATION IN CONOPS.

11) ROE IAW JTF PINELAND AND JSOTF NORTH OPORDS. TACROE IN EFFECT UPON INFILTRATION.

12) PROVIDE COMMANDER’S INTENT (I.E. PURPOSE AND DESIRED ENDSTATE) WITH CONOPS.

13) DEVELOP UNIT SUCCESS, ABORT, AND RISK CRITERIA. SUBMIT THESE CRITERIA TO JSOTF NORTH WITH CONOPS.

14) EXORD IS DEPENDENT UPON RECEIPT AND APPROVAL OF CONOPS, AIRLIFT REQUEST(S), AIRLIFT REQUEST CONFIRMATION(S), FIRE SUPPORT PLAN, AND E&R PLANS.//

4. GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

(A) ANNEX D (SERVICE SUPPORT) SEE REF E.

(B) ANNEX E (PERSONNEL), SEE REF E.//

5. GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

(A) COMMAND. ON ORDER, SOF GROUND ELEMENTS IN JSOA DEMON BECOME TACON TO THE 1ST BDE, 21ST IN DIV (LT). TACON WILL BE CONDUCTED THROUGH THE 21ST INF DIV’S ATTACHED SOCCE. (REF B).
(B) SIGNAL. SOF GROUND ELEMENTS IN JSOA BATCH AND JSOA SUMIT WILL INITIALLY REPORT ALL COLLECTED INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO FOB 91. FOB WILL SUBSEQUENTLY MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE 21ST INF DIV ATTACHED SOCCE, OBTAIN INFORMATION COPIES OF ALL GROUND ELEMENT SITREPS, AND REPORT IAW JSOTF’S COLLECTION PLAN. (REF B).

(C) PRIOR TO INFILTRATING JSOA DEMON, SOF GROUND ELEMENT WILL CONDUCT DEDICATED COMMUNICATION REHEARSALS WITH FOB 92 AND 21ST DIV’S ATTACHED SOCCE. //GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/BANKS BG USA OFFICIAL: DAVIS, COL USA SOJ3//

AKNLDG/Y/

DECL/OADR//

BT
MISSION ANALYSIS AND CHECKLIST

1. Understand the mission and intent of the CJTF.
2. Analyze and review the operational area, CONOPS, and task organization.
3. Identify specified and implied tasks.
4. Identify essential tasks and prepare a preliminary restated mission statement.
5. Review available assets.
6. Determine restrictions and limitations.
7. Determine broad C2 weapons considerations.
8. Propose acceptable risk and attempt to identify the adversary’s COG.
9. Determine critical facts and assumptions that will directly affect successful accomplishment of the mission.
11. Prepare a restated mission for the commander’s approval.

Restated Mission: _______________________________________________
Assumptions: ___________________________________________________
Constraints: _____________________________________________________
Limitations: _____________________________________________________

CHECKLIST

This checklist establishes a step-by-step process to conduct a mission analysis. Normally, mission analysis is conducted by the JPG. Representatives from all staff sections should contribute to the mission analysis effort.

Sample Plans Checklist

Date Time Group: Mission # :_________

Log in tasking in folder. (J-3)
Plot mission location and infiltration and exfiltration corridors. (J-3)
Mission-specific legal constraints?

Identify enemy threat in operational area. (J-2)

Cross reference with TIP. Modify to generate enough information for TASKORD?

SOF Mission Criteria

1. Is it an appropriate SOF mission? Y or N
2. Does it support the theater campaign plan? Y or N
3. Are the required resources available to execute? Y or N
4. Is it operationally feasible? Y or N
5. Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Y or N

Convene JPG

-Mission Overview Brief (J-3)

-Conduct Mission Analysis (JPG)

-Identify and task unit most suited for mission. (J-3)

-Designate supporting units and assets. (J-3)

-Political effects on mission. (J-2)

-Effects on populace. (J-2)

-Cross check fire control measures and coordinate deconfliction. (Fire Support Officer (FSO))

-Are assets available to support infiltration and exfiltration? Impact of bad weather and sea state? (J-3Air/J-3 Maritime)

-Anticipated RFIs? (J-2, J-3 Ground, Air, Maritime, Allied)

-NBC threat? (J-2)

-EW threat? Impact? (J-2)

-Does the mission remain within the ROE constraints? (SJA)

-Do the ROE unnecessarily restrict the COMJSOTF’s freedom of action?

-Is the mission logistically supportable? (J-4)
- Unique communications and cryptologic requirements? (J-3, J-6)

- End state? (J-3, Ground, Air, Maritime, Allied)

- Critical requirements/CARVER?

Mission TASKORD assigned to _________________ Estimated time for Review ______

Staff Attendance:

J-1       J-2       J-3A       J-3G       J-3N_______

Allied       FSO       J-4       J-6       SJA_______

Control Unit_______ Chaplain_______

Review TASKORD for J-3 Director/JOC Director Release ________
As part of the SO mission planning folder, the J-2 is responsible for preparing TIPs with the support of the theater JIC to support the targeting and mission planning process. TIPs provide information on target identification, environment, threat, demographics, LOCs, infiltration and exfiltration routes, survival data, and other intelligence information required for study by the SOF unit assigned the mission. Examples of TIPs for SR/DA and FID/UW missions are provided on the following pages.

**TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE**

**SR/DA MISSIONS**

1. **TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION**
   
   a. Target identification data
   
   b. Description and significance
   
   c. Detailed target description
   
   d. Target vulnerability assessment

2. **NATURAL ENVIRONMENT**

   a. Geographic data (including terrain, vegetation, and hazards to movement)

   b. Meteorological data (climatological overview and tables, illumination data)

   c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, luminescence, etc.)

3. **THREAT**

   a. Ground forces (including border guards)

   b. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and security police services)

   c. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and maritime border guard)

   d. Air forces

   e. Air defense forces (including radar, passive detectors, C3)

   f. Electronic order of battle

   g. Space capabilities (ground stations and their infrastructure, uplinks and downlinks, and space-based systems)
4. DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL FEATURES

a. Area population characteristics

b. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition

c. Social conditions

d. Religious factors

e. Political characteristics

f. Economic conditions

g. Miscellaneous (e.g., currency, holidays, dress, customs)

5. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

a. Airfields

b. Railways

c. Roadways

d. Waterways

e. Ports

f. POL

g. Power grid

h. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone, Internet, etc.)

6. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

a. Potential landing zones, drop zones, helicopter landing zones, and BLSs

b. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective
7. SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, RECOVERY AND SURVIVAL DATA

    a. Survival, evasion, resistance, escape, recovery and safe areas

    b. Survival data

8. UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission specific requirements not covered elsewhere)

9. INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: IMAGERY

APPENDIX D: GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION AND SERVICES

APPENDIX E: SCI (if applicable)

TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE
FID/UW MISSIONS

1. OBJECTIVE AREA (OA) IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION

    a. OA identification data

    b. Description and significance

2. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

    a. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement)

    b. Meteorological data (climatological overview tables and illumination data)

    c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, etc.)

    d. Water sources (color coded overlay)

    e. Flora and fauna (plants and animals of tactical importance)
3. THREAT

a. Objective country (enemy order of battle)

b. Opposition and resistance forces

4. DEMOGRAPHICS, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL FEATURES

a. PIR must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces

b. Area population characteristics (including resistance potential)

c. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition

d. Social conditions

e. Religious factors

f. Political characteristics

g. Available labor force

h. Customs (social, weapons, religion, cultural, mores, etc.)

i. Medical capabilities

j. Health and sanitation conditions

k. Economic conditions

l. Currency, holidays, dress

5. LOCS, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND LOGISTICS

a. Airfields

b. Railways

c. Roadways

d. Waterways

e. Ports
APPENDIX L
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-05.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. **US Government Publications**

   Title 10, United States Code, and as specifically amended by:


2. **DOD Publications**


   b. DOD Directive 4630.5, *Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Systems*.


   d. DOD Instruction 4630.8, *Procedures for Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Systems*.

3. **Joint Publications**

   a. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.

   b. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

   c. JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.


   e. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.


Appendix L

i. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.


l. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

m. JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*.


o. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.


r. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.


w. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.


z. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.


bb. JP 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)*.


ee. JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.


jj. JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.


ll. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.

mm. JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.

nn. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

oo. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.


qq. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.


tt. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*.


**4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

a. CJCSI 3110.01B, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998*.

b. CJCSI 3110.05A, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1998*.

c. CJCSI 3110.06, *Special Operations Supplement to JSCP FY 1998*.

d. CJCSI 3110.12, *Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP*.
Appendix L

e. CJCSI 3210.01, Joint Information Warfare Policy.

f. CJCSI 3270.01, Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense.

g. CJCSI 6212.01B, Compatibility, Interoperability, and Supportability of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.

h. CJCSI 6510.01B w/CH 1, Defensive Information Operations Implementation.

i. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).


l. MCM 1196, 17 Jan 96, Unified Command Plan (UCP).


5. Multiservice Publications

Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System (FM 100-103-2; MCWP 3-25.2; NWP 3-56.2; AFTTP[I] 3-2.17).

6. Air Force Publications

a. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine.

b. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power.

c. AFDD 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue.

d. AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control.

e. AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

f. AFDD 2-5.3, Psychological Operations.

6. Army Publications

a. FM 1-108, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Aviation Forces.

b. FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades.
APPENDIX M
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JE//
   INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

   Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.*

- **Army:**
  - US Army AG Publication Center SL
  - 1655 Woodson Road
  - Attn: Joint Publications
  - St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

- **Air Force:**
  - Air Force Publications Distribution Center
  - 2800 Eastern Boulevard
  - Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

- **Navy:**
  - CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
  - 700 Robbins Avenue
  - Bldg 1, Customer Service
  - Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

- **Marine Corps:**
  - Commander (Attn: Publications)
  - 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321
  - Albany, GA 31704-0321

- **Coast Guard:**
  - Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard
  - 2100 2nd Street, SW
  - Washington, DC 20593-0001

  - Commander
  - USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102
  - Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)
  - 116 Lake View Parkway
  - Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program.*
### GLOSSARY
#### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
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<td>aviation advisory team</td>
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<td>air tasking order</td>
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<table>
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<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
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<td>crisis action planning</td>
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<td>CARVER</td>
<td>criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability</td>
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<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>casualty evacuation</td>
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CAX  computer-assisted exercise
C-CS  communication and computer systems
CD  counterdrug
CD-ROM  compact disc read only memory
CI  counterintelligence
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF  commander, joint task force
CMO  civil-military operations
CND  computer network defense
COA  course of action
COCOM  combatant command (command authority)
COG  center of gravity
COMJSOTF  commander, joint special operations task force
COMPUSEC  computer security
COMSEC  communications security
COMSOC  Commander, Special Operations Command
CONOPS  concept of operations
CONPLAN  operation plan in concept format
CONUS  continental United States
CP  command post
CPX  command post exercise
CS  combat support
CSAR  combat search and rescue
CSR  commander’s summary report
CSS  combat service support
CSST  combat service support team
CT  counterterrorism
CTAPS  contingency theater automated planning system
CUL  common-user logistic

DA  direct action
D-cell  deployment cell
DI  DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH  direct liaison authorized
DISA  Defense Information Systems Agency
DOD  Department of Defense
DOE  Department of Energy
DOJ  Department of Justice
DOS  Department of State
DS  direct support

EALT  earliest anticipated launch time
EW  electronic warfare
<table>
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<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>frequency modulation</td>
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<td>forward operations base</td>
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<td>general text</td>
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<td>Global Information Grid</td>
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<td>global positioning system</td>
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<td>joint communications-electronics operating instructions</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>message identification</td>
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<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>not later than</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>plan of action</td>
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<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
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<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>rescue coordination center</td>
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<td>request confirmation</td>
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<td>request for information</td>
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<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<td>satellite communications</td>
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<td>special boat unit</td>
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<td>sensitive compartmented information</td>
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<td>sea-air-land</td>
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<td>SIPRNET</td>
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<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>special operations</td>
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<td>special operations command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System</td>
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<td>special operations debrief and retrieval system</td>
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<td>TBMCS</td>
<td>Theater Battle Management Core System</td>
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<td>task performance observation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>tactical sensitive compartmented information facility</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>video teleconferencing</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARNORD</td>
<td>warning order</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>war reserve materiel</td>
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advanced operations base. In special operations, a small temporary base established near or within a joint special operations area to command, control, and/or support training or tactical operations. Facilities are normally austere. The base may be ashore or afloat. If ashore, it may include an airfield or unimproved airstrip, a pier, or an anchorage. An advanced operations base is normally controlled and/or supported by a main operations base or a forward operations base. Also called AOB. (JP 1-02)

Air Force special operations component. The Air Force component of a joint force special operations component. Also called AFSOC. (JP 1-02)

Air Force special operations element. An element-size Air Force special operations headquarters. It is normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations component or detachment, depending upon size and duration of the operation. Also called AFSOEC. (JP 1-02)

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

architecture. A framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity. (JP 1-02)

area assessment. The commander’s prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (JP 1-02)

Army special operations component. The Army component of a joint force special operations component. Also called ARSOC. (JP 1-02)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)
civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

collateral mission. A mission other than those for which a force is primarily organized, trained, and equipped, that the force can accomplish by virtue of the inherent capabilities of that force. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the
recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-02)

**combatting terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**command and control warfare.** The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information operations in military operations. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (JP 1-02)

**computer network defense.** Defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction. Also called CND. (JP 1-02)

**conventional forces.** Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. (JP 1-02)

**counterdrug.** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

**counterinsurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

**counterterrorism.** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

**deception.** Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02)

**direct action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage;
and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

**earliest anticipated launch time.** The earliest time expected for a special operations tactical element and its supporting platform to depart the staging or marshalling area together en route to the operations area. Also called EALT. (JP 1-02)

**emergency resupply.** A resupply mission that occurs based on a predetermined set of circumstances and time interval should radio contact not be established or, once established, is lost between a special operations tactical element and its base. (JP 1-02)

**evasion and escape.** The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. Also called E&E. (JP 1-02)

**exfiltration.** The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 1-02)

**force multiplier.** A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**forward operations base.** In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. A forward operations base may be the location of special operations component headquarters or a smaller unit that is controlled and/or supported by a main operations base. Also called FOB. (JP 1-02)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

**Global Information Grid.** The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and
managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid (GIG) includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority. It also includes National Security Systems as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The GIG supports all Department of Defense (DOD), National Security, and related intelligence community missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical and business), in war and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms and deployed sites). The GIG provides interfaces to coalition, allied, and non-DOD users and systems. Also called GIG. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Guerrilla force.** A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02)

**Guerrilla warfare.** Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (JP 1-02)

**In extremis.** A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (JP 1-02)

**Infiltration.** 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); and white (legal). (JP 1-02)

**Information assurance.** Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

**Information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**Information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**Inter-Service support.** Action by one Military Service or element thereof to provide logistic and/or administrative support to another Military Service or element thereof. Such action can be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. (JP 1-02)
joint combined exchange training. An overseas, combined training event primarily designed to benefit US special operations forces mission essential task list and/or joint mission essential task list training. It may be joint and utilizes 2011 reporting procedures, is major force program-11 funded, uses no foreign military assistance funds, and is coordinated by the geographic combatant commander and the senior US government country representative and approved by the Secretary of Defense. Also called JCET. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. They assist the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**joint special operations area.** A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

**joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.** The actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They are authoritative; as such, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands and Services. Also called JTTP. (JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called a JTF. (JP 1-02)

**low visibility operations** Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-02)

**main operations base.** In special operations, a base established by a joint force special operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical support to special operations activities in designated areas. Also called MOB. (JP 1-02)

**Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable).** The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)) is a Marine expeditionary unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment, that is trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized missions of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, *in-extremis* hostage recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The MEU(SOC) is not a
special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities, the combatant commander, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. Also called MEU(SOC). (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

mobile training team. A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. Also called MTT. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational joint special operations task force. A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The multinational joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called MJSOTF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

naval special warfare. A designated naval warfare specialty which conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent application of force. Also called NSW. (JP 1-02)

naval special warfare forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NSWF. (JP 1-02)

naval special warfare group. A permanent Navy echelon III major command to which most naval special warfare forces are
assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. It consists of a group headquarters with command and control, communications, and support staff; sea-air-land teams; and sea-air-land team delivery vehicle teams. Also called NSWG. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare special operations component.** The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called NAVSOC. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare task element.** A provisional subordinate element of a naval special warfare task unit, employed to extend the command and control and support capabilities of its parent task unit. Also called NSWTE. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare task group.** A provisional naval special warfare organization that plans, conducts, and supports special operations in support of fleet commanders and joint force special operations component commanders. Also called NSWTG. (JP 1-02)

**naval special warfare task unit.** A provisional subordinate unit of a naval special warfare task group. Also called NSWTU. (JP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations.** Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows. a. permissive environment — Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control
as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.
b. uncertain environment — Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. c. hostile environment — Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

**paramilitary forces.** Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

**pararescue team.** Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors. (JP 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**raid.** An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 1-02)

**Rangers.** Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (JP 1-02)
rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02)

sea-air-land team. A naval force specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called SEAL team. (JP 1-02)

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft (land or water), submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. Also called SAR. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

special activities. Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives which are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (JP 1-02)

special boat squadron. A permanent Navy echelon III major command to which two or more special boat units are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. The squadron is tasked with the training and deployment of these special boat units and may augment naval special warfare task groups and task units. Also called SBS. (JP 1-02)

special boat unit. Those US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support naval special warfare, riverine warfare, coastal patrol and interdiction, and joint special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft designed primarily for special operations support. Also called SBU. (JP 1-02)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. (JP 1-02)

special forces group. A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate
battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, special forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. Also called SFG. (JP 1-02)

**special forces operations base.** A command, control, and support base established and operated by a special forces group or battalion from organic and attached resources. The base commander and his staff coordinate and synchronize the activities of subordinate and forward-deployed forces. A special forces operations base is normally established for an extended period of time to support a series of operations. Also called SFOB. (JP 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

**special operations command.** A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

**special operations command and control element.** A special operations command and control element that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces. It performs command and control functions according to mission requirements. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. They can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. They remain under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

**special operations forces liaison officer.** A special operations forces officer that is provided by the joint special operations component commander to a joint task force or any other major command (US or multinational) operating in the same operational area. This officer is the liaison for coordinating, deconflicting, and integrating special operations forces into air, land, and maritime operations with conventional forces operations (US or multinational). (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)
special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (JP 1-02)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations mission support for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. This includes standard items used by other DOD forces but modified for special operations forces (SOF); items initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adapted for use as Service-common by other DOD forces; and items approved by the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission but not normally procured by USCINCSOC. Also called SO-peculiar. (JP 1-02)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (JP 1-02)

special tactics team. US Air Force special operations forces consisting of combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to establish and control the air-ground interface at an airhead in the objective area. Functions include assault zone reconnaissance and surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; special operations terminal attack control; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. Also called STT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense.
Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 1-02)

target. 1. A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. (JP 1-02)

target analysis. An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (JP 1-02)

target complex. A geographically integrated series of target concentrations. (JP 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 3-60.)

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a “list of targets” that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes. (JP 1-02)

target system. 1. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related. 2. A group of targets which are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect desired by the attacker. (JP 1-02)

tasking order. A method used to task and to disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected targets and specific missions. In addition, the tasking order provides specific instructions concerning the mission planning agent, targets, and other control agencies, as well as general instructions for accomplishment of the mission. Also called TASKORD. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)
time-sensitive special operations planning. None. (This term and its definition will be removed from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

unconventional assisted recovery. Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. (JP 1-02)

unconventional assisted recovery coordination center. A compartmented special operations forces (SOF) facility
suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and tactical planners to coordinate, synchronize and de-conflict non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR) operations on a 24-hour basis within the geographical area assigned to the joint force commander. The unconventional assisted recovery coordination center (UARCC) is an integral part of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) comprehensive personnel recovery architecture and the functional equivalent of a component rescue coordination center. When directed by the JFC, through the joint force special operations component commander, the special operations command Operations Directorate establishes the UARCC (normally within the Joint Operations Center (JOC)) to serve as the focal point for all NAR operations. The UARCC interfaces and coordinates with the JOC, joint search and rescue center, component rescue coordination centers (RCCs) (including the SOF RCC) and the special activities cell. Also called UARCC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**unconventional warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

**weapons of mass destruction.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1**
Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2**
Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3**
Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4**
CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5**
Assessments/Revision
- The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised