This revised edition of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, reflects the current guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations. This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.

Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, the overarching constructs and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint operations in cooperation with our multinational partners, other US Government agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. This document addresses key aspects of joint operations and campaigns across the range of military operations.

As our Nation continues into the 21st century, the guidance in this publication will enable current and future leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States to organize, train, and execute worldwide missions as our forces transform to meet emerging challenges.

I encourage all commanders to study and understand the guidance contained in this publication and to teach these principles to their subordinates. Only then will we be able to fully exploit the remarkable military potential inherent in our joint teams. To that end, I request you ensure the widest possible distribution of this keystone joint publication. I further request that you actively promote the use of all joint publications at every opportunity.

PETER PACE
General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0
DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 2001

- Consolidates JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, and JP 3-0 formally titled Doctrine for Joint Operations
- Discontinues use of the term and acronym “military operations other than war (MOOTW)”
- Introduces Department of Defense support to homeland security (i.e., homeland defense, civil support)
- Revises the range of military operations
- Establishes 12 “principles of joint operations” by adding three “other principles” — restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy — to the traditional nine “principles of war”
- Updates the terms and discussions for various operational areas
- Replaces the term “battlespace” with the term “operational environment”
- Establishes six joint functions — command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment
- Revises the definitions and relationship between “operational art” and “operational design”
- Introduces a “systems perspective of the operational environment”
- Introduces the application of “effects” in operational design and assessment
- Establishes the relationship between tasks, effects, and objectives, i.e., tasks are executed to create effects to achieve objectives to attain an end state
- Establishes 17 operational design (formerly operational art) elements and revises the order, scope, and description of several
  - Adds new operational design elements of “end state and objectives” and “effects”
  - Revises the definition of “center of gravity” and includes a discussion of its “critical factors”
  - Expands “lines of operations” to include logical lines
Summary of Changes

- Expands the “phasing model” to six phases, i.e., shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority

- Revises the “commander’s critical information requirements” discussion and provides a process to develop them

- Establishes the construct of “assessment”

- Establishes a “stability operations” construct and military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)

- Adds the application of “flexible deterrent options”

- Discusses the integration of special operations forces and conventional forces

- Establishes the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment

- Discusses the “combat identification” construct

- Discusses “crisis response and limited contingency operations”
  - Updates the discussion on “peace operations” and “consequence management”
  - Establishes a distinction between “strikes” and “raids”
  - Adds discussions on homeland defense and civil support operations

- Discusses “military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence”
  - Introduces “emergency preparedness”
  - Updates the discussion on “DOD support to counterdrug operations”

- Establishes new definitions for the terms “adversary,” “combat identification,” “effect,” “friendly force information requirement,” “measure of performance,” “stability operations,” “standing joint force headquarters,” “system,” and “termination criteria”

- Modifies significantly the definitions for “assessment,” “fires,” “line of operations,” “link,” “node,” “operational art,” “operational design,” and “strategy determination”
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER I
STRATEGIC CONTEXT

- Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1
- Security Environment ................................................................................................. I-1
- Strategic Guidance and Responsibilities ................................................................. I-2
- Theater Strategy Determination ............................................................................... I-10
- Range of Military Operations .................................................................................. I-12
- Termination of Operations ....................................................................................... I-15

CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

- Principles ...................................................................................................................... II-1
- Levels of War ............................................................................................................. II-1
- Unified Action ............................................................................................................ II-3
- Organizing the Joint Force ....................................................................................... II-10
- Organizing the Operational Areas .......................................................................... II-15
- Understanding the Operational Environment ......................................................... II-19

CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS

- General ....................................................................................................................... III-1
- Command and Control ............................................................................................. III-1
- Intelligence ............................................................................................................... III-16
- Fires ............................................................................................................................. III-17
- Movement and Maneuver ....................................................................................... III-22
- Protection .................................................................................................................. III-24
- Sustainment .............................................................................................................. III-30
- Other Activities and Capabilities .......................................................................... III-36

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING, OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN, AND ASSESSMENT

SECTION A. PLANNING OVERVIEW ........................................................................ IV-1
- Joint Operation Planning ....................................................................................... IV-1
**Table of Contents**

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN ..................................................... IV-3  
- Operational Art ....................................................................................................... IV-3  
- Operational Design ................................................................................................. IV-3  

SECTION C. PLAN OVERVIEW .............................................................................. IV-20  
- Operational Design and the Campaign .................................................................. IV-20  
- Key Plan Elements ................................................................................................  IV-24  

SECTION D. ASSESSMENT ..................................................................................... IV-30  
- General ................................................................................................................. IV-30  
- Levels of War and Assessment .............................................................................. IV-31  
- Assessment Process and Measures ........................................................................ IV-32  

CHAPTER V  
MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS  

SECTION A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................. V-1  
- General Considerations ............................................................................................. V-1  

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS BY PHASE .................................................... V-2  
- Considerations for Shaping ....................................................................................... V-3  
- Considerations for Deterrence ................................................................................... V-4  
- Considerations for Seizing the Initiative .................................................................... V-9  
- Considerations for Dominance ................................................................................  V-16  
- Considerations for Stabilization .............................................................................. V-23  
- Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority ............................................................ V-27  

CHAPTER VI  
CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS  

- General ................................................................................................................... VI-1  
- Typical Operations .................................................................................................. VI-2  
- Unique Considerations ............................................................................................ VI-15  

CHAPTER VII  
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE  

- General .................................................................................................................. VII-1  
- Types of Activities and Operations ......................................................................... VII-2  
- Unique Considerations ............................................................................................ VII-10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Security Environment and Strategic Guidance as the Context for Joint Operations
- Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations
- Discusses Joint Functions in Joint Operations
- Addresses Operational Art, Operational Design, Joint Operation Planning, and Assessment
- Describes the Key Considerations for the Conduct of Major Operations and Campaigns
- Discusses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations
- Addresses the Characteristics of and Specific Considerations for Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Security Environment

The security environment is complex and interconnected in terms of the various threats and their targets, its global scope, and number of nonmilitary participants. Political and military leaders conduct operations in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment encompassing the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment. Some adversaries possess weapons of mass destruction, advanced ballistic/cruise missile technology, or are willing to conduct terrorism and cyber attacks to achieve their objectives. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large number of other [US] government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and regional organizations in the operational area. Further, the homeland and other US interests are being targeted for direct and indirect attack. Within this security environment, maintaining national security and striving for worldwide stability will be a complicated, continuous process. It will require well-planned joint campaigns and operations that account for numerous potential changes in the nature of an operation and simultaneous combat and stability operations.
The President and the Secretary of Defense ensure the national strategic end state and joint operation termination criteria are clearly defined. Various national strategies that integrate ends, ways, and means provide strategic direction and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides specific guidance to combatant commanders (CCDRs).

CCDRs facilitate the integration and synchronization of military operations with the actions of other [US] government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations, and multinational forces. The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), direct the national effort to ensure the national strategic objectives (i.e., the national strategic end state) and joint operation termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable. They also make certain that the Department of Defense (DOD), allies, coalition partners, and/or OGAs are fully integrated during planning and subsequent operations.

National security strategy (NSS), national defense strategy (NDS), National Strategy for Homeland Security, and national military strategy (NMS), shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders (CCDRs). These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). Further, the Security Cooperation Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides CCDRs with specific planning guidance for preparation of their security cooperation plans and operation plans respectively.

CCDRs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) that conduct military operations. Military operations must be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals. Consequently, CCDRs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military forces that are coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational forces. Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) provide support to and may be supported by geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and other FCCs as directed by higher authority, normally as indicated in the JSCP and other CJCS-level documents. When a FCC is the supported commander and operating within a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), close coordination and communication between the affected CCDRs is paramount.
Theater Strategy Determination

**Theater strategy** consists of strategic concepts and courses of action (COAs) directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. CCDRs develop **strategic estimates** after reviewing the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs. **Theater strategic concepts** are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. Theater strategic concepts consider, among many items, the law of war; implementation of national policies; and protection of US citizens, forces, and interests; and identification of termination criteria.

Range of Military Operations

The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations that vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity. The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keeps the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. A **crisis response or limited contingency operation** can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to **protect** US interests and **prevent** surprise attack or further conflict. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a **major operation or campaign** involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to **prevail** against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the host nation (HN) and the United States and its multinational partners.

Simultaneous joint operations with different end states can be conducted within a GCC’s AOR. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose; however, other military operations will have multiple purposes and be influenced by a fluid and
Executive Summary

changing situation. US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats, influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends, and promoting peace and stability with a variety of capabilities. Consequently, as directed, the US military conducts some operations on a global rather than a theater scale (e.g., special operations (SO) in the war on terrorism, network operations, space control).

Termination of Operations

Termination of operations is an essential link between NSS, NDS, NMS, and the desired national strategic end state. Further, military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Stability operations will be required to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort.

For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives that comprise the desired national strategic end state. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. Therefore, considering all of the objectives necessary to reach the national strategic end state will help the supported CCDR formulate proposed termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the President and/or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.

Implementing military commanders should request clarification of the national strategic end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives is supported following the conclusion of sustained combat. These stability and other operations require detailed planning, liaison, and coordination at the national level and in the theater among diplomatic, military, and civilian leadership.
Principles of Joint Operations

Although the historical **nine principles of war** have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified **three additional principles**; i.e., restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy; that also may apply to joint operations. Together, they comprise the **12 principles of joint operations**. However, the **chief principle for employment of US forces** is to ensure achievement of the national strategic objectives established by the President through decisive action while concluding operations on terms favorable to the United States.

Levels of War

The three levels of war — **strategic, operational, and tactical** — help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. The **strategic level** is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. The **operational level** links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives through the design and conduct of operations using operational art. The **tactical level** focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Unified Action

Unified action highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying actions; however, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.
Joint forces likely will be employed within the framework of a multinational force that presents challenges in command and control (C2) and logistics among many other factors.

Joint forces should be prepared for operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or other-than-US leadership. The glue that binds the multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. In all multinational operations, even when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. Alliances typically have developed command and control (C2) structures, systems, and procedures. Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 structure or a combination of the two. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant liaison structure. The success of a multinational operation hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. Multinational logistics is a challenge; however, many issues can be resolved or mitigated by a thorough understanding of capabilities and procedures before operations begin. Multinational force commanders typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

The CCDR’s joint interagency coordination group establishes collaborative working relationships between nonmilitary and military planners.

CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with OGAs, foreign governments, NGOs, and IGOs in a variety of circumstances. Integration and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. The joint interagency coordination group, an element of a CCDR’s staff, establishes and/or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA representatives and military operational planners. Another method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination is to establish a civil-military operations center.

Organizing the Joint Force

The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s vision and concept of operations (CONOPS). Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis. A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. When authorized, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified
Joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations through Service or functional component commanders or a combination. The President and Secretary of Defense or geographic CCDRs may designate theaters of war and/or theaters of operations for each operation. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Conducting joint operations using Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

Organizing the Operational Areas

An AOR is a geographical area established on an enduring basis by the President and SecDef that is associated with a geographic combatant command within which a GCC has authority to plan and conduct operations. When warranted, the President and SecDef or GCCs may designate theaters of war and/or theaters of operations for each operation. The theater of war is that area of the air, land, and maritime domains that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns that may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs. A theater of operations is that area required to conduct or support specific military operations normally associated with major operations and campaigns. The communications zone usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the continental United States base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR’s AOR.
Subordinate JFC-level operational areas include the joint operations area, joint special operations area, joint security area, amphibious objective area, and the land and maritime force component commander’s areas of operations.

A joint operations area (JOA) is a temporary geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint special operations area is a restricted geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of SO. A joint security area is a specific surface area within a JFC’s operational area that may be designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and security operations of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The amphibious objective area is a geographical area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. JFCs may define areas of operations (AOs) large enough for land and maritime force component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Understanding the Operational Environment

Understanding the operational environment helps commander’s understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions.

The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation.

Joint Functions

C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment are the basic groups of common functions to joint operations.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Information operations core, supporting, and related capabilities are applied across the joint functions and independently.
JFCs exercise combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support through subordinate commanders and over assigned and attached forces.

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. JFCs exercise an array of command authorities (i.e., combatant command [command authority], OPCON, tactical control, and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. Control is inherent in command to regulate forces and functions and execute the commander’s intent. The land and maritime force commanders are the supported commanders within the AOs designated by the JFC. The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC) who normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction and counterair effort.

Effective C2 makes use of collaboration among commanders and staffs and identifies decision points through the commander’s critical information requirements.

Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs collaborate in planning (e.g., determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, and tasks), preparing for, executing, and assessing joint operations. Commander’s critical information requirements (i.e., priority intelligence requirements and friendly forces information requirements) are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess the adversary, operational environment, and friendly capabilities; and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations.

Intelligence provides an understanding of the operational environment. The intelligence function includes planning and direction to include managing counterintelligence activities, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

Intelligence provides JFCs with an understanding of the operational environment. The intelligence function includes planning and direction to include managing counterintelligence activities, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

The fires function encompasses targeting, joint fire support, counterair, interdiction, strategic attack, electronic attack, and computer network attack.

The fires function encompasses a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and processes). Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the component level. Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat. Interdiction is a tool used by JFCs to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be
Executive Summary

used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise meet objectives. JFCs also conduct strategic attacks — offensive action against a target; whether military, political, economic, or other; that is specifically selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives — when feasible. Computer network attack operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks (relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the computers and networks themselves. Electronic attack involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.

The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs. Military forces also provide civil support (CS) to OGAs responsible for execution of law enforcement interdiction activities, although federal law and DOD policy impose significant limitations on the types of support that may be provided. This support may include actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo.

Movement involves the deployment of forces into an operational area and maneuver is their employment in combination with fires to achieve positional advantage. Movement and maneuver includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed or even multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity (COGs) or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.
Executive Summary

**JFCs strive to ensure the sustainment of personnel, logistics, and other support throughout joint operations.**

The **protection function** focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in four primary ways — (1) **active defensive measures** (e.g., air defense) that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from an adversary’s attack; (2) **passive measures** (e.g., concealment) that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; (3) **applying technology and procedures** to reduce the risk of fratricide; and (4) **emergency management and response** to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. The protection function extends beyond **force protection** — preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information — to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the context of homeland defense and CS.

**Sustainment** is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. Key considerations include employment of logistic forces, facilities, environmental considerations, health service support, host-nation support, contracting, disposal operations, legal support, religious support, and financial management.

**Joint Operation Planning**

Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)** and the **joint operation planning process (JOPP)**. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities. Joint operation planning includes two primary sub-categories: **contingency planning** and **crisis action planning**. The **JOPP steps** are initiation, mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development.
Operational Art

Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means and considers risk across the levels of war.

Operational Design

Operational art is applied during operational design — the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. Operational design is particularly helpful during COA determination. During execution, commanders and their staffs continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as the joint operation unfolds.

A systems perspective of the operational environment is fundamental to operational design. It considers more than just an adversary’s military capabilities, it also strives to provide a perspective of the interrelated systems that comprise the operational environment relevant to a specific joint operation. It helps with COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes in each system and the links (relationships) between the nodes.

JFCs and their staffs use the operational design elements (e.g., termination, end state and objectives, effects, COG, decisive points, lines of operations, arranging operations) to help them visualize the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish their mission. The result of this process should be a framework that forms the basis for the joint campaign or operation plan and the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.
Operational Design and the Campaign

Operational design elements are applied in joint campaigns — a series of related military operations. However, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign — a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. There are three general types of campaigns: global, theater, and subordinate.

Key Plan Elements

The mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations are key plan elements that result from mission analysis and the planning process. Key elements that result from mission analysis and the planning process include a draft mission statement, commander’s intent, and CONOPS. The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

Phasing assists JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual number of phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the six-phase model (i.e., shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) provides a flexible arrangement for smaller, related operations.

Assessment

Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. The assessment process uses measures of performance to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and measures of effectiveness to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives.
Major Operations and Campaigns

Major operations and campaigns are the most complex and JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with offensive and defensive operations within each phase of the campaign or operation.

JFCs should organize and train forces, rehearse key actions, establish operational area access, secure space capabilities, and conduct stability operations as needed during the “shape” phase of a major operation of campaign.

JFCs can dissuade planned adversary actions by implementing military and nonmilitary flexible deterrent options.

Organizing and training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. JFCs establish and maintain access to operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing, freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. Space capabilities help shape the operational environment by providing strategic intelligence and communications. Stability operations may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

Considerations for Deterrence

At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates and focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation and identify additional intelligence requirements. Both military and nonmilitary flexible deterrent options — preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict — can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to
Executive Summary

deter further aggression during a crisis. Special operations forces (SOF) play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities also should establish a sound foundation for operations in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary and to separate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Weather, terrain, sea conditions, and other factors of the physical environment such as urban and littoral areas can significantly affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before sustained combat operations.

Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. Consequently, the JFC must sequence, enable, and protect the opposed or unopposed deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. Forcible entry operations (amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations) may be required to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities. JFCs also seek superiority early in air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment to prepare the operational area and information environment and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential “stabilize” phase adversaries and conditions may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be protected. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventive measures.
Executive Summary

Considerations for Dominance

During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional and SOF and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area in linear and nonlinear orientations. Direct and indirect attacks of enemy COGs should be designed to achieve the required military strategic and operational objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting the potential undesired effects on operations in follow-on phases. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level. Within their AOs, land and maritime commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime commander, a component commander designated as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO. If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

Considerations for Stabilization

Operations in the “stabilize” phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Several lines of operations may be initiated immediately (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security). Consequently, the JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area, even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. Of particular importance will be civil-military operations initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, US Government, multinational, or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once
legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.

Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority

The joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. JFCs may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., United Nations [UN] observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as the termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability operations as described above. 

Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, joint operations often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. Typical crisis response and limited contingency operations include noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, recovery operations, consequence management, strikes, raids, homeland defense operations, and civil support operations.
Executive Summary

Short duration crisis response or limited contingency operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve strategic objectives. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. Human intelligence often may provide the most useful source of information. Even in permissive operational environments, force protection measures will be planned commensurate with the risks to the force. The impartiality of the force and effective engagement with local community members often contribute to force protection in these operations.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force or enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary.

Emergency preparedness, combating terrorism, and show of force operations, among many others, contribute to national security and the deterrence of harmful adversary actions.

Emergency preparedness, arms control and disarmament, combating terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, nation assistance, protection of shipping, show of force operations, counterinsurgency operations, and support to insurgency all contribute to national security and/ or deterrence. To plan and conduct these operations and activities, there is an increased need for the military to work with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities; share information; and obtain a firm understanding of the HN’s political and cultural realities.
CONCLUSION

This publication is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations.
1. Introduction

The above quote reflects the nature of the current security environment and emphasizes the importance of the military instrument of national power. The Armed Forces of the United States are most effective when employed as a joint force. Further, joint force success requires unified action — the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and other government agencies (OGAs); intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve unity of effort. Accordingly, this publication provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of joint operations and campaigns.

2. Security Environment

a. Today’s security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats constantly appearing and disappearing. Some adversaries possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), advanced ballistic/cruise missile technology, or are willing to conduct terrorist attacks to achieve their objectives. Joint operations may occur more often in urban terrain and the information environment than they have in past conflicts. The operational area often contains humanitarian crisis conditions requiring population control or support. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large number of OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations in the operational area. Each agency/organization has an agenda that may complement or compete with another organization/agency’s activities and the overall joint operation.

b. Political and military leaders conduct operations in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This increase in the scope of the operational environment may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an overextended or distracted United States or coalition. These adversaries encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad hoc state coalitions and individuals.
c. Hostile states and terrorists in possession of WMD represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. Some states, including supporters of terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest.

d. The US homeland and other US interests are being targeted for direct and indirect attack. Rather than directly confronting US military operations, adversary attacks may orient on political and public institutions. Lines of communications (LOCs), access points, staging areas, civilian populations, economic centers, and regional allies and friends likely will be targeted.

e. The importance of rapidly expanding global and regional information architectures, systems, and organizations, both private and public, cannot be overstated. Advances in technology are likely to continue to increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Vulnerabilities also will continue to arise out of technological advances.

f. Displacement and migration of people will expand existing cultural and demographic factors well beyond the limits of state or regional borders. This may expand local conflicts and increase the difficulties of conflict resolution. In many regions, “demographic time bombs” will explode (e.g., large shifts in the age and health of populations during periods of rapid population growth or decline, large numbers of unassimilated immigrants). In such cases, correction of the immediate conflict causal factors may not return the area to previous norms or stability.

g. Within this security environment, maintaining national security and striving for worldwide stability will be a complicated, continuous process. It will require well-planned joint campaigns and operations that account for numerous potential changes in the nature of an operation and simultaneous combat and stability operations.

3. Strategic Guidance and Responsibilities

a. National Strategic Direction. The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure the following:

   (1) The national strategic objectives and joint operation termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable.
(2) Active Component (AC) forces are ready for combat and Reserve Component (RC) forces are in a proper state of readiness for mobilization to active service.

(3) Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational environment.

(4) Strategic direction is current and timely.

(5) The Department of Defense (DOD), allies, coalition partners, and/or OGAs are fully integrated during planning and subsequent operations whether the JFC is the supported commander, a component commander of a multinational force, or is providing support to a federal agency with lead responsibility.

(6) All required support assets are ready.

(7) Forces and associated sustaining capabilities deploy ready to support the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS).

b. Policy and Planning Documents. National security strategy (NSS), national defense strategy (NDS), National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), and national military strategy (NMS), shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders (CCDRs). These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military plans (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). Further, the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide CCDRs with specific planning guidance for preparation of their security cooperation plans (SCPs) and operation plans respectively. Figure I-1 illustrates the various strategic guidance sources described below in the context of national strategic direction.

(1) National Security Strategy. The NSS of the United States is based on American interests and values and its aim is to ensure the security of the nation while making the world a safer and better place. Its goals are political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The NSS includes strengthening alliances and working with others to defeat global terrorism and defuse regional conflicts; preventing our enemies from threatening the United States, its allies, and friends with WMD; and transforming America’s national security institutions. For example, the three pillars of the US national strategy to combat WMD (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and WMD consequence management [CM]) are seamless elements of a comprehensive international approach. The NSS also states that, “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise the right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”

(2) National Defense Strategy. The NDS further focuses DOD actions in support of the NSS. It establishes four DOD objectives:

(a) Secure the United States from direct attack.
(b) Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.

(c) Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.

(d) Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.

(3) **National Strategy for Homeland Security**

(a) The homeland is the physical region that includes the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, US territories and possessions, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace. The NSHS states that the United States Government (USG) has no more important mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks and that **homeland security (HS) is a national effort**. The NSHS complements the NSS by providing a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. Critical to understanding the overall relationship is an understanding of the distinction between the role that DOD plays with respect to securing the Nation and the policy in the NSHS, which has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead. Military application of the NSHS calls for preparation, detection, deterrence, prevention, defending, responding to, and defeating threats and aggression aimed at the homeland.
(b) DOD’s responsibilities for securing the homeland fall into three areas — homeland defense (HD), civil support (CS), and emergency preparedness (EP) planning activities — discussed in Chapters VI, “Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations,” and VII, “Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.” It is important to note that EP is considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It is not a stand-alone activity, but an integral part of training, mitigation efforts, and response. Although DHS is the lead agency for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, DOD is the lead for the HD mission (i.e., responding to military attacks with armed force) and will be supported by designated OGAs. An OGA will be designated the lead for a CS mission and EP planning activities and DOD will play a supporting role. Figure I-2 reflects this relationship. Regardless of whether DOD is conducting HD or CS, military forces will always remain under the control of the established Title 10, 32 United States Code (USC), or State active duty military chain of command.
(4) **National Military Strategy.** The NMS conveys CJCS’s message to the joint force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the NSS, NSHS, and NDS. It describes the military ways and means that are integrated with, supported by, or used to support the other instruments of national power in protecting the United States, preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from which the Service Chiefs and CCDRs identify desired capabilities and against which CJCS assesses risk.

(5) **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).** The CPG is written guidance from the SecDef to CJCS for the preparation and review of contingency plans for specific missions. This guidance includes the relative priority of the plans, specific force levels, and supporting resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective. **It is a primary source document used by CJCS to develop the JSCP.**

(6) **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The JSCP provides planning guidance to the CCDRs and the Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions using current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits exploitation of the weaknesses of those who may threaten US national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice to the President and SecDef.

(7) **Security Cooperation Plan.** A SCP is a strategic planning document intended to link a CCDR’s military engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

(a) A SCP is based on planning guidance provided in the SCG. A SCP identifies the prioritization, integration, and synchronization of military engagement activities on a command basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from coordinated engagement activities. SCPs represent a large portion of “shape” phase operations (subparagraph 5d of Chapter IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment”) outlined in the CCDRs’ operation plans. For planning purposes, geographic CCDRs (GCCs) use assigned forces, those rotationally deployed to the theater, and those forces that historically have been deployed for engagement activities. Each CCDR’s SCP is forwarded to CJCS for review and integration into the global family of SCPs.

(b) Supporting combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies routinely conduct security cooperation activities within a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR) or involving foreign nationals from countries within an AOR. These organizations will coordinate with and provide required information to the supported GCC for the development of, and inclusion in, the GCC’s SCP. When approved, SCPs are used by the Services, supporting commanders, DOD agencies, and OGAs to develop programs and budgets.

c. **Strategic Communication Planning**

(1) **Strategic communication (SC)** is focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement
of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. **Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD)** provides the ability to engage, influence, and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests and to collaboratively shape the operational environment. Primary communication capabilities (e.g., information operations [IO], public affairs [PA], visual information) coupled with DSPD and military diplomacy activities should be harnessed to implement a holistic SC effort.

(2) **Planning for SC, consistent with the national SC strategy, will be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in operation plans, and coordinated and synchronized with OGAs and multinational partners.** SC planning will, among other things, determine objectives, themes, messages, and actions; identify audiences; emphasize success; and reinforce the legitimacy of national strategic objectives. Based on continuous evaluation of the effects of military operations and communication efforts, SC elements will be updated and incorporated into SCPs. CCDRs should be actively involved in the development, execution, and support of the national SC strategy. SC activities are particularly essential to shaping and security cooperation activities, stability operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and combating terrorism.

d. **Global Strategy**

(1) The SecDef, with assistance from CJCS, determines where the US military should be focused and where the nation can afford to accept risk. Because resources are always finite, hard choices must be made that take into account the competing priorities of the combatant commands. Continually assessing the relative importance of the various theater operations remains imperative. Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, CCDRs, and OGAs ensures that changing strategic priorities are appropriately translated into clear planning guidance and adequate forces and capabilities for CCDRs.

(2) The combined efforts of all combatant commands can defeat an adversary through strategies that include:

(a) Direct and continuous military action coordinated with OGAs to apply the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power within their geographic areas.

(b) Attacking in concert with multinational partners to defeat the threat before it reaches US borders.

(c) Preemptively attacking in self-defense those adversaries that pose an unmistakable threat of grave harm and which are not otherwise deterrable.

(d) Denying future sponsorship, support, or sanctuary through cooperation or by convincing states to perform their international responsibilities.
e. Law of War

(1) Commanders at all levels ensure their forces operate in accordance with the “law of war,” often called the “law of armed conflict.” The law of war is international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, and is binding on the United States and its individual citizens. It includes treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, as well as applicable customary international law. The law of war, among other items, governs proper treatment of combatants, prisoners of war, and noncombatants alike in any operation across the range of military operations.

(2) Rules of engagement (ROE) are developed by the Joint Staff and CCDRs and reviewed and approved by the President and SecDef for promulgation and dissemination. ROE ensure actions, especially force employment, are consistent with military objectives, domestic and international law, and national policy. Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by their commanders. Military objectives are justified by military necessity and achieved through appropriate and disciplined use of force. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense consistent with the lawful orders of superiors, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the use of Force for US Forces, and other applicable ROE/rules of force (RUF) promulgated for the mission or operational area. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

(3) RUF are not the same as ROE but also are used to provide guidance on the use of force by military forces. RUF are typically used in CS operations and select other military operations.

For further guidance on ROE, refer to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

For further guidance on the law of war, refer to CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

f. Role of the Combatant Commanders

(1) CCDRs have responsibility for a geographic AOR or a function (e.g., special operations [SO]) assigned by the President and SecDef. Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) support (or can be supported by) GCCs or may conduct operations in direct support of the President and SecDef. CCDRs are responsible to the President and SecDef for the preparedness of their commands and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them. Based on guidance and direction from the President and SecDef, CCDRs prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish assigned missions. Supporting CCDRs and their subordinates
ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy. General responsibilities for CCDRs are established by law (Title 10, USC, section 164) and expressed in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

(2) CCDRs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the CCDRs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. However, successful military operations may not, by themselves, attain the national strategic end state. Military operations must be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals. Consequently, CCDRs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military forces that is coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational forces.

(3) Using their strategic estimate(s), CCDRs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. CCDRs’ plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate ROE; establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and CONOPS to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans.

g. **Functional Combatant Commanders.** FCCs provide support to and may be supported by GCCs and other FCCs as directed by higher authority, normally as indicated in the JSCP and other CJCS-level documents. The President and SecDef direct what specific support and to whom such support will be provided. When a FCC is the supported commander and operating within a GCC’s AOR, close coordination and communication between them is paramount.

h. **Role of the Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).** The Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (in areas unique to SO) under authority established in Title 10, USC, organize, train, and equip AC and RC forces, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and selected host nation (HN) personnel. The AC and RC are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy. **Spontaneous, unpredictable crises** call for trained and ready forces that are either forward deployed or are rapidly and globally deployable. These forces should be initially self-sufficient and must possess the capabilities needed to effectively act in the US national interest or signal US resolve prior to conflict. Such forces are usually drawn from the **active force structure** and normally are tailored and integrated into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and US Special Operations Command. RC forces enhance an already robust, versatile joint force. **RC individuals or forces** often are required to facilitate the deployment of forces; provide continuous support and manpower augmentation to ongoing CCDR, Service, and SO; conduct HD operations; and participate in SCP activities.

i. **Role of the United States Coast Guard (USCG).** In addition to performing its role as a Military Service under Title 10 USC, the USCG, under Title 14 USC, is responsible for the
coordination and conduct of maritime security operations carried out under civil authorities for HS in the US maritime domain. In its maritime law enforcement role, the USCG has authority to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. It is the only Military Service, in addition to Army and Air National Guard under Title 32 USC, not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act or its extension by DOD directive.

4. Theater Strategy Determination

a. General. Theater strategy consists of strategic concepts and COAs directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. Theater strategy is determined through an analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of prudent ideas to respond to those events. CCDRs and their staffs develop strategic estimates that facilitate development of theater strategic concepts and joint campaign/operation plans. When directed to conduct military operations in a specific situation, the supported CCDR refines previous estimates and strategies and applies operational design elements to modify an existing plan(s) or develops a new plan(s) as appropriate. The resulting operation plan/order establishes the military strategic objectives, effects, operational concepts, and resources that contribute to attainment of the national strategic end state.

b. Strategic Estimate. This is a tool available to CCDRs and subordinate JFCs as they develop strategic concepts, campaign plans, and subordinate operation plans. CCDRs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the operational environment, nature of anticipated operations, and national and multinational strategic direction. JFCs use strategic estimates to facilitate a more rapid employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy. In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze COAs. Items contained in the strategic estimate are summarized in Figure I-3 and described in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Commanders employ the strategic estimate to consider the adversary’s likely intent and COAs and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support other CCDRs prepare estimates for each supporting operation. The strategic estimate process is continuous.

c. Theater Strategic Concepts. These are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, command and control (C2) capabilities, intelligence assets, mobilization, deployment, sustainability, and anticipated stability measures. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces (SOF) and capabilities, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, multinational forces, and interagency resources in each COA. Theater strategic concepts should provide for unified action and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the
Strategic Context

favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one group, nation, or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events. CCDRs use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. CCDRs also consider and integrate the contributions of the other instruments of national power in gaining and maintaining strategic advantage. Theater strategic concepts determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and consider the following:

1. The law of war, implementation of national policies, and protection of US citizens, forces, and interests.

2. Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.

3. Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or IGO circumstances.

4. Identification of termination criteria.

5. Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.

6. Support for security assistance or nation assistance.

7. Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.
5. **Range of Military Operations**

   a. **General.** The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations (see Figure I-4). These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities to **crisis response and limited contingency operations** and, if necessary, **major operations and campaigns** (see Figure I-5). Use of joint capabilities in **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with **crisis response and limited contingencies**, such as CS and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual **major operations and campaigns** often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF] is part of the war on terrorism [WOT]). The nature of the security environment is such that the US military often will be engaged in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability missions and activities to accomplish the objective. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity. Note: Although this publication discusses each type of operation under the various categories in the range of military operations (chapters V through VII), a particular type of operation is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range (e.g., counterinsurgency operations escalating from a security cooperation activity into a major operation or campaign).

   b. **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** These ongoing and specialized activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and

---

### TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

- Major Operations
- Homeland Defense
- Civil Support
- Strikes
- Raids
- Show of Force
- Enforcement of Sanctions
- Protection of Shipping
- Freedom of Navigation
- Peace Operations
- Support to Insurgency
- Counterinsurgency Operations
- Combating Terrorism
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Recovery Operations
- Consequence Management
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
- Nation Assistance
- Arms Control and Disarmament
- Routine, Recurring Military Activities

---

**Figure I-4. Types of Military Operations**
domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interest at home and abroad.

(1) **Military engagement** is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.

(2) **Security cooperation** involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations and a pillar of WMD nonproliferation. Note: Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.

(3) **Deterrence** helps prevent adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of counteraction.

(4) Joint actions such as nation assistance to include foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA); antiterrorism; DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations; show of force operations; and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.

c. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and prevent surprise attack or further...
conflict. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which a joint operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis plan is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., Joint Task Force [JTF] SHINING HOPE in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. A crisis may prompt the conduct of FHA, CS, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace operations (PO), strikes, raids, or recovery operations.

d. Major Operations and Campaigns. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN and the United States and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often require conducting stability operations to restore security, provide services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Major operations and campaigns typically are comprised of multiple phases (e.g., Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990-1991) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) (2003)). Note: Some specific crisis response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could be considered major operations/campaigns depending on their scale and duration (e.g., Tsunami relief efforts in 2005).

e. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations

(1) Simultaneous joint operations with different military end states can be conducted within a GCC’s AOR. Major operations and campaigns can be initiated while security cooperation activities are ongoing in the same or another part of the theater (e.g., OEF during the enforcement of United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq). Further, a crisis response or limited contingency operation may be initiated separately or as part of a campaign or major operation (e.g., the 1991 NEO in Somalia during Operation DESERT SHIELD). In the extreme, separate major operations within a theater may be initiated/ongoing while a global campaign is being waged (e.g., OEF and OIF during the WOT). Consequently, GCCs should pay particular attention to synchronizing and integrating the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting forces through subordinate and supporting JFCs for the purpose of achieving national, theater, and/or multinational strategic objectives. Additionally, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must work with US ambassadors (or diplomatic missions), Department of State (DOS), and other agencies to best integrate the military actions with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to promote unity of effort.

(2) Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike may be conducted for the specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence (e.g., Operation EL
DORADO CANYON, the 1986 operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism). Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes and be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and sequel events may require additional tasks by the joint force (e.g., Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, 1992-93, peace enforcement operations (PEO) evolved from FHA efforts, challenging the command with multiple missions). Joint forces must strive to meet such challenges with clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.

f. **Global Nature of Operations.** US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats, influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends, and promoting peace and stability with a variety of capabilities. However, global reach and influence is not just the purview of nation states. Globalization and emerging technologies will allow small groups to use asymmetric approaches to include criminal activity, terrorism, or armed aggression on a transnational scale with relative ease and with little cost. Adversaries are placing greater emphasis on developing capabilities to threaten the United States directly and indirectly. Increased interdependence of national economies and rapid movement of information around the world create significant challenges in the defense of the nation’s interest. Identifying potential threats (nations and non-state actors) created by these changing global dynamics and operating independently or in loose coalitions, determining their intent, and determining the best COA to counter their actions is a continuing interagency and multinational challenge for the United States. The elusive nature of adversaries and the ever increasing speed of global communications and the media demand greater adaptability and networking from US joint forces, particularly communications and intelligence resources. Consequently, as directed, the US military conducts some operations on a global, not theater, scale (e.g., SO in the WOT, network operations [NETOPS], space control). These operations are conducted in depth, focusing on the threat source across geographical regions that includes forward regions, approaches, and the homeland and the Global Information Grid (GIG). The divisions among the three geographical regions are not absolute and may overlap or shift depending on the situation and threat.

6. **Termination of Operations**

   a. **General.** The design and implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of operational design and are discussed in Chapter IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations or groups, it is fundamentally important to understand that termination of operations is an essential link between NSS, NDS, NMS, and the national strategic end state. Further, military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of sustained combat operations. Stability operations will be required to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. These stability operations historically have required an extended presence by US military forces. This contingency should be considered during the initial COA development and recommendation for execution.

   b. **Political Considerations.** There are two approaches for obtaining national strategic objectives by military force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by destroying critical functions and assets such as C2 or infrastructure or by making the adversary helpless to resist the
imposition of US will through the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s military capabilities. The second seeks a **negotiated settlement** through coordinated political, diplomatic, and military actions which convince an adversary that yielding will be less painful than continued resistance. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and sets the stage for negotiations. Military potential may compel the opposing nation or group to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. Before agreeing to one, the United States needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

(1) Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the USG requires some means of communication with the adversary. Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the adversary considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance.

(2) The issue of termination centers on adversary will and freedom of action. Once the adversary’s strategic objective shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts need to be coordinated toward causing and exploiting that shift. **Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort that is refined as operations move toward advantageous termination.** The first and primary political task regarding termination is to establish an achievable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives.

c. **The National Strategic End State.** For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of national strategic objectives. **This set of objectives comprises the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.** The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is established. Thinking of this “end state” as an integrated set of aims is useful because national strategic objectives usually are closely related rather than independent. The supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. Therefore, considering all of the objectives necessary to reach the national strategic end state will help the supported CCDR formulate proposed termination criteria — the specified standards approved by the President and/or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Commanders and their staffs must understand that many factors can affect national strategic objectives, possibly causing the national strategic end state to change even as military operations unfold.
d. **Military Considerations.** In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the attainment of the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly than those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. Implementing military commanders should request clarification of the national strategic end state and termination criteria from higher authority when required. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives is supported following the conclusion of sustained combat. These stability and other operations primarily support OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Planning for these operations should begin when the JOPP is initiated. Among many considerations outlined in Chapter IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment,” the JFC and staff should consider conducting early collaborative planning with interagency and multinational members, harmonizing the civil and military effort, and establishing the appropriate organization to conduct operations during the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases.
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Principles

a. Foundation. Joint operations doctrine is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience. Its foundation includes the bedrock principles of war and the associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States. It seeks to provide JFCs with basic guidance to defeat an adversary. Joint doctrine recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of unified action, and the synchronization and integration of military operations in time, space, and purpose. The chief principle for employment of US forces is to ensure achievement of the national strategic objectives established by the President through decisive action while concluding operations on terms favorable to the United States.

b. Principles of Joint Operations. Joint operations doctrine is dynamic. Although the historic nine principles of war have been consistent in joint doctrine since its inception, extensive experience in missions across the range of military operations has identified three additional principles that also may apply to joint operations. Together, they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations listed in Figure II-1 and discussed in Appendix A, “Principles of Joint Operations.”

2. Levels of War

a. General. The three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical — help clarify the links between national strategic objectives and tactical actions. There are no finite limits or boundaries between them. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types and location of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are also significant resources to tactical operations. Forces or assets can be employed for a strategic, operational, or tactical purpose based on their contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives; but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single action may have consequences at all levels.

b. Strategic Level. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. The President establishes policy, which the SecDef translates into national strategic objectives
that facilitate theater strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate in strategic discussions with the President and SecDef through CJCS and with allies and coalition members. The combatant command strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived from national strategy and policy and shaped by doctrine, provides a framework for conducting operations.

c. **Operational Level.** The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the design and conduct of operations using operational art — the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. JFCs and component commanders use operational art to determine when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and to influence the adversary disposition before combat. Operational art governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

d. **Tactical Level.** The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (TFs). An engagement normally is a short-duration action between opposing forces. Engagements include
a wide variety of actions between opposing forces. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and normally affect the course of a campaign. Forces at this level generally employ various tactics to achieve their military objectives. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.

3. Unified Action

a. General. Whereas the term “joint operations” is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term “unified action” has a broader connotation. The concept of unified action is illustrated in Figure II-2 and highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

b. The JFC’s Role. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying actions (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions normally are present at the CCDR’s level). However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All

![Figure II-2. Unified Action](image-url)
JFCs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef, alliance or coalition leadership, and military commanders.

(1) JFCs integrate and synchronize the actions of military forces and capabilities to achieve strategic and operational objectives through joint campaigns and operations. JFCs also ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose, as much as possible, with the actions of OGAs, allied/coalition forces, IGOs, and NGOs. Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable coordination by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders. This effort is essential to successfully integrate the instruments of national power and leverage the capabilities of all participants to achieve national strategic objectives.

(2) The complex challenge of achieving unified action includes operating with diverse participants having a variety of objectives and unique command or reporting arrangements. Their goals may or may not be explicitly and clearly stated. This diversity requires an intentional JFC effort to understand other participant interests. From this knowledge, the JFC can build consensus on common objectives or take actions to deconflict their divergent efforts.

(3) JFCs also may support a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian organization. For example, in some FHA operations, the United States Agency for International Development, through its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, may be designated as the federal agency with lead responsibility with the CCDR in a supporting role. Under such circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for coordination, liaison, and information and intelligence sharing. Further, it is important that all levels of command understand the formal and informal military-civilian relationships to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.

c. Multinational Participation

(1) General. Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role. The military leaders of member nations must emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect. Additionally, the cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships between each counterpart is fundamental to achieving success. UN resolutions also may provide the basis for use of a multinational military force. The uneven capabilities of allies and coalition partners complicates the integration of multinational partners and the coordination and synchronization of their activities during multinational operations. Varying national obligations derived from international treaties and agreements and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Other members in a coalition may not be signatories to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. Nevertheless, US forces will remain bound by US treaty obligations;
even if the other members in a coalition are not signatories to a treaty and need not adhere to its terms.

(2) **National Goals.** No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Consequently, perceptions of progress may vary among the participants. JFCs should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the national strategic end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

(3) **Cultural and Language Differences.** Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religion, and economic and social outlooks. Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Information lost during translation can be substantial, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs should employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. Linguists must be capable of translating warfighting-unique language to military forces of diverse cultures.

(4) **Command and Control of US Forces.** By law, the President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the achievement of assigned missions. JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. In all multinational operations, even when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. Further, the President may deem it prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place appropriate US forces under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is required.

(5) **Command and Control Structures.** Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Allied forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the allied force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, close military cooperation, and robust diplomatic relations characterize alliances. **Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 structure or a combination of the two.**
(a) **Parallel command** exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces (e.g., Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: the implementation force remained under allied command while UN protection forces remained under UN command). Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often is the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces.

(b) **Lead Nation Command.** In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force (e.g., OEF: the formation of Combined JTF 76 provided a single joint command structure with a lead nation construct). The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership and is frequently proportioned to force contribution levels through a force balancing process.

(c) **Combination.** Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces (e.g., the command arrangement employed during Operation DESERT STORM: Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership).

(6) **Liaison.** Coordination and liaison are important considerations. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions and alliances require a significant liaison structure. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation through, among other things, liaisons. Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers (LNOs) at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between SOF units or maritime forces. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible. LNOs serving with multinational partners should be operationally proficient, innovative, tenacious, and diplomatic; with the authority to speak for their parent commander. Desired capabilities of LNOs include:

(a) Authority to speak for the JFC or other parent commander.

(b) Familiar with the combat identification (CID) capability of both parties.

(c) Able to speak the language of the command assigned.

(d) Secure communications with JFC.

(e) Trained to understand US disclosure policy.
(f) Cultural experience or training with the home country of the command assigned.

(7) **Information and Intelligence Sharing.** The success of a multinational operation hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. As DOD moves toward a net-centric environment, it faces new challenges validating intelligence information and information sources, as well as sharing of information required to integrate participating multinational partners. This information sharing can only occur within a culture of trust, based upon an effective information-sharing environment, that uses the lowest classification level possible, must support multilateral or bilateral information exchanges between the multinational staff and forces, as well as the military staffs and governments for each participating nation. Actions to improve the ability to share information such as establishing metadata or tagging standards, agreeing to information exchange standards, and using unclassified information (e.g., commercial imagery) need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). SecDef, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CCDRs play an important role determining and providing disclosure criteria guidance early in the planning process for a multinational operation. JFCs, in accordance with national directives, need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. To the degree that security permits, the limits of intelligence sharing and applicable procedures should be included in disclosure agreements with multinational partners. These agreements should incorporate limitations imposed by US law and/or the US National Disclosure Policy; which promulgates specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective
implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, facilitates CID, and is perishable.

(8) **Logistics.** Multinational logistics is a challenge; however many issues can be resolved or mitigated by a thorough understanding of capabilities and procedures before operations begin. Potential problem areas include differences in logistic doctrine, stockage levels, logistic mobility, interoperability, infrastructure, competition between the Services and multinational partners for common support, and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate for the effective and efficient use of all logistic support to include lift, distribution, and sustainment assets as well as the use of infrastructure such as highways, rail lines, seaports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. **The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in seeking multinational solutions.** Multinational force commanders (MNFCs) typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations. Careful consideration should be given to the broad range of multinational logistic support options; from lead nation and role specialization nations, to the formation of multinational integrated logistic units to deliver effective support while achieving greater efficiency. Standardization of logistic systems and procedures is an ongoing, iterative process and MNFCs should ensure that the latest techniques, procedures, and arrangements are understood for the current operation. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and should be considered during concept development. The **acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA)** is a tool for mutual exchange of logistic support and services. ACSA is a reimbursable, bilateral support program that allows reimbursable logistics-exchanges between US and foreign military forces. An ACSA provides the necessary legal authority to allow mutual logistic support between the US and multinational partners. This agreement increases flexibility for operational commanders by allowing fast response when logistic support or services are requested.

For further guidance on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

(9) There are numerous other important multinational considerations relating to mission assignments, organization of the operational area, intelligence, planning, ROE, doctrine and procedures, and PA. Expanded discussions on these and the previously discussed considerations are provided in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

d. **Interagency Coordination and Coordination with Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations**

(1) **General.** CCDRs and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with OGAs, foreign governments, NGOs, and IGOs in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Other agencies may be the lead effort during some operations with DOD providing
support; however, US military forces will remain under the DOD command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, a federal agency with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.

(2) Civil-Military Integration. All operations will require some civil-military integration. The degree of integration depends on the complexity of the operation and mission (e.g., large-scale PO). Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action; which is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. Integration and coordination among the military force and OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the C2 of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unified action. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

(3) Formal Agreements. Formal agreements such as memoranda of understanding or terms of reference are more common among military organizations and OGAs or HNs than between military organizations and NGOs. Although formal agreements may be established, commanders should not expect that formal agreements with NGOs exist. Heads of agencies or organizations and authorized military commanders negotiate and co-sign these agreements.

(4) Information Sharing. Unified action requires effective information sharing among DOD, OGAs, and state and local agencies, with the Director of National Intelligence playing a key role. Accordingly, JFCs should develop habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For example, DOD support to HS requires detailed coordination and information sharing with the DHS.

(5) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG, an element of a GCC’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes or enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between OGA (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Treasury Department) representatives and military operational planners at the combatant commands. There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG. Its size and composition depends on the specific operational and staff requirements at each combatant command. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council System. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs.

(6) Joint Task Force Staff. There are several means available at the JTF level to conduct interagency coordination. This coordination can occur in the various boards, centers,
cells, and/or working groups established within the JTF. The commander, JTF (CJTF), and OGAs also may agree to form an executive steering group to coordinate actions.

(7) Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for civil-military operations (CMO) is to establish a CMOC. There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces, OGAs, multinational partners, HN organizations (if outside the United States), IGOs, and NGOs. Civil affairs (CA) units may be used to establish the CMOC core. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of IGOs and NGOs and how they influence mission accomplishment.

For additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

4. Organizing the Joint Force

a. General. How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s vision and CONOPS. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and SOF tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function generally as they were designed. Organization of joint forces must also take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

b. Joint Force Options

(1) Combatant Commands. A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of CJCS. Unified commands typically are established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating single strategic direction and/or other criteria found in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), are met. Specified commands normally are composed of forces from one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments. The UCP defines geographic AORs (i.e., theaters) for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Other combatant commands are established to perform functional responsibilities such as transportation, SO, training, or strategic operations. Functionally oriented CCDRs operate across all geographical regions and normally provide supporting forces and
capabilities to the GCCs. They also may conduct operations as a supported commander when directed by the SecDef or President.

(2) **Subordinate Unified Commands.** When authorized by the President and SecDef through CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands, and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally of attached forces within the assigned operational or functional area.

(3) **Joint Task Forces.** A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing CJTF to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. JTFs normally are established to achieve operational objectives. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required. JTF headquarters basing depends on the JTF mission, operational environment, and available capabilities and support. JTF headquarters can be land- or sea-based with transitions between both basing options. JTFs are normally assigned a joint operations area (JOA).
c. **Component Options.** Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, personnel support, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations. Further, functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate, and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

(1) **Service Components.** The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Conducting joint operations using Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. This arrangement is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. While logistics remains a Service responsibility, there are exceptions such as arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-directed common-user logistics (CUL) lead Service, or DOD agency responsibilities.

(2) **Functional Components.** The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and the JFC’s attention must be divided between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated, it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders.

(a) JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (Note: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.)

(b) Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationship between Service component commanders and the JFC.

(c) The functional component commander’s staff should reflect the command’s composition to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ its forces and those made available for tasking. Functional component staffs require advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination and support.
(d) When a functional component command will employ forces and/or military capabilities from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces and/or military capability made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and the individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.

(e) The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capabilities that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) that the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC] normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a joint force air component commander [JFACC] normally is delegated tactical control [TACON] of the sorties or other military capabilities made available, except for land forces that provide supporting fires which normally are tasked in a direct support role). JFCs also may establish a support relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the CONOPS and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

(f) The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of forces and/or the military capabilities made available for tasking to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

(3) Combination. Joint forces often are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. For example, joint forces organized with Service components normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC and conventional air forces organized under a designated JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s CONOPS.

d. SOF Employment Options

(1) SOF in CONUS are normally under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides CONUS-based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally exercises COCOM of assigned and OPCON of attached SOF through a commander, theater special operations command (TSOC), a subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and independent TFs concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple joint special operations tasks forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/TF SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish support or TACON command relationships between the JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF commanders.
Chapter II

(2) CDRUSSOCOM performs the role of lead CCDR for planning, synchronizing, and (as directed) executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCDRs. When directed to execute global operations, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ JSOTFs as a supported commander. SOF used independently or integrated with conventional forces provide additional and unique capabilities to achieve objectives that otherwise may not be attainable. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through proper SOF C2 elements employed intact, centralized, and fully responsive to the needs of the supported commander. SOF C2, coordination, and liaison elements normally provided to supported and supporting commanders are described in JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

e. Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element). The standing joint force headquarters (core element) (SJFHQ [CE]) is a staff organization that provides CCDRs with a full-time, trained joint C2 element, fully integrated into the CCDR’s planning and operations. The SJFHQ (CE) is staffed during peacetime to provide a core element of trained personnel that may serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 expertise and a foundation on which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific mission areas. Its principal roles are to enhance the command’s peacetime planning efforts, improve operational area awareness for specific focus areas, accelerate the formation of a JTF headquarters, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. It helps the CCDR determine where to focus joint capabilities to prevent or resolve a crisis. There are three primary employment options:

1. The SJFHQ (CE) can form the core of a JTF headquarters. In this case, the CCDR designates the SJFHQ (CE) director or another flag officer as the CJTF and augments the SJFHQ (CE) from the combatant command headquarters and components as required.

2. The SJFHQ (CE) can augment a designated JTF headquarters. The SJFHQ (CE) (in its entirety or selected portions) can provide additional expertise to an existing JTF headquarters, JTF-designated Service component headquarters, or an OGA.

3. The SJFHQ (CE) can support the combatant command headquarters. In this case, the CCDR is the JFC. The SJFHQ (CE) can remain part of the combatant command staff or serve as the forward element of the joint force headquarters.

f. The deployable JTF augmentation cell (DJTFAC) is another C2 augmentation capability that a CCDR may establish. It is composed of planners and operators from the combatant command and components’ staffs, which report to the CCDR’s operations directorate until deployed to a JTF. The DJTFAC has utility, along with the SJFHQ (CE), to CCDRs that anticipate responding to multiple contingencies simultaneously.

For additional and more detailed guidance on the organization of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
5. Organizing the Operational Areas

a. **General.** **Operational area** is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area (AOA), joint special operations area (JSOA), and area of operations (AO). Except for AOR, which is normally assigned in the UCP, the GCCs and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of these operational areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.

**OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE**

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the Marine Corps forces rear area was centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound, port, and airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was widely scattered around the towns and villages of the interior. The area of interest included the rest of the country and particularly those population and relief centers not under the joint force commander’s supervision.

Various Sources

b. **Combatant Command-Level Areas.** GCCs conduct operations in their assigned AORs across the range of military operations. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation (see Figure II-3). GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these operational areas, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader AOR.

(1) **Area of Responsibility.** An AOR is an area established by the President and SecDef on an enduring basis that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef.

(2) **Theater of War.** A theater of war is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes of C2, logistics, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not normally encompass a GCC’s entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.
Chapter II

Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is a geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains established for the conduct of joint operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what can normally be accommodated by a JOA. One or more theaters of operations may be designated. Different theaters of operations will normally be geographically separate and focused on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns.

Combat Zones and Communications Zones (COMMZs). Geographic CCDRs also may establish combat zones and COMMZs, as shown in Figure II-4. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war (if designated) and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting CCDR’s AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It usually is
Fundamentals of Joint Operations

contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.

c. **Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas.** For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, the following operational areas can be established.

(1) **Joint Operations Area.** A JOA is a temporary geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains, defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a CJTF) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

(2) **Joint Special Operations Area.** A JSOA is a restricted geographical area comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force in the conduct of SO. A JSOA is defined by a
JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO. Within the JSOA, the JFSOCC is the supported commander.

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(3) **Joint Security Area.** A joint security area (JSA) is a specific surface area, designated by the JFC as critical, that facilitates protection of joint bases and supports force projection, movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat (see Figure II-5). JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. JSAs may be used in both linear and nonlinear situations, which are outlined in paragraph 5b of Chapter V, “Major Operations and Campaigns.”

For additional guidance on JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in a Theater.

(4) **Amphibious Objective Area.** The AOA is a geographic area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and SO.

For additional guidance on amphibious objective areas, refer to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

(5) **Area of Operations.** JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and achieve unity of effort.

d. **Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas.** Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see Figure II-5). When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are noncontiguous, they do not share a boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the force. A noncontiguous operational area normally is characterized by a 360-degree boundary. The higher headquarters is responsible for the area between noncontiguous operational areas.

e. **Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an Operational Area.** The assigned operational area should be activated formally at a specified date and time. Many considerations for assuming responsibility for an operational area will be mission and situation specific. These considerations should be addressed during COA analysis/wargaming. A few of the common considerations that may be applicable for any operational area include C2, the information environment, intelligence requirements, communications support; protection, security, LOCs, terrain management, movement control, airspace control, surveillance, reconnaissance,
air and missile defense, personnel recovery (PR), providing or coordinating fires, OGA/IGO/NGO/HN interfaces, and environmental issues.

*For specific guidance on assuming responsibility for an operational area, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

6. **Understanding the Operational Environment**

   a. **General.** Factors that must be considered when conducting joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of the JFC’s assigned operational area. The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the
information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the operational environment helps commander’s understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts achieving the military end state.

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) Physical Areas. The pertinent physical areas in the operational environment include the assigned operational area (discussed in paragraph 5 above) and the associated areas of influence and interest described below. Designation of the areas of influence and interest help commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution.

(a) An area of influence is a geographic area in which a commander can directly influence operations by maneuver or fires capabilities normally under the commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the assigned operational area. The extent of a subordinate command’s area of influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate’s operational area. Understanding the command’s area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside the assigned operational area. The commander can describe the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

(b) An area of interest (AOI) is an area beyond the area of influence that contains forces and/or other factors that could jeopardize friendly mission accomplishment. In combat operations, the AOI normally extends into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned friendly operations if those objectives are not currently located within the assigned operational area. An AOI serves to focus intelligence support for monitoring enemy, adversary, or other activities outside the operational area that may affect current and future operations. The commander can describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider numerous physical factors associated with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains. These factors include terrain (including urban settings), weather, topography, hydrology, electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and environmental conditions in the operational area; distances associated with the deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and other joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; and both friendly and adversary forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors greatly affect the operational design and sustainment of joint operations.

c. Information Environment. The information environment transcends the four physical domains and is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors in the information environment include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The
information environment is where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment of decision-making. The information environment is a pervasive backdrop to the physical domains of the JFC’s operational environment. It extends beyond the operational area to encompass those theater and national capabilities (e.g., systems, databases, centers of excellence, subject-matter experts) that support the JFC’s C2 and decision-making requirements. JFCs leverage these capabilities through the GIG — the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The three dimensions of the information environment are **physical**, **informational**, and **cognitive**.

1. The **physical dimension** is composed of the C2 systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, land, maritime, and space domains. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations.

2. The **informational dimension** is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where C2 of modern military forces is communicated and where commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of information, and links the physical and cognitive dimensions.

3. The **cognitive dimension** encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience. This is the dimension in which commanders and staff think, perceive, visualize, and decide. This dimension also is affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other personal motivations. Battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension.

*For more information on the information environment, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. For specific information on the GIG, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

d. **Systems Perspective**

1. Joint operations can benefit by a comprehensive perspective of the systems in the operational environment relevant to the mission and operation at hand. Developing a systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the operational environment among members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team, thereby facilitating unified action.

2. A **system** is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. A systems perspective of the operational environment strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and others) relevant to a specific joint operation (see Figure II-6), without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this
perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC’s knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems understanding also supports operational design by enhancing elements such as centers of gravity (COGs), lines of operations (LOOs), and decisive points. This allows commanders and their staffs to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired effects, avoid undesired effects, and achieve objectives. See Chapter IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment,” for more information on the use of a systems perspective in operational design.

Figure II-6. The Interconnected Operational Environment
e. **Visualizing the Operational Environment**

(1) Figure II-7 illustrates a theater of operations within a GCC’s AOR. Using grid coordinates, planners have depicted an area of influence that represents the reach of the joint force’s combat capabilities. Figure II-7 also shows the AOL, which includes an enemy mechanized force that is located outside the theater of operations, but close enough to influence the JFC’s operations at some point in time.

(2) Although the operational environment normally would not be depicted in graphic form, it is presented in Figure II-7 to help visualize the scope of an operational environment. Within this notional operational environment is a forward base established by the GCC outside the theater of operations. There also is a CONUS installation, which could represent any of the myriad supporting capabilities outside the AOR that are crucial to successful joint operations. These capabilities typically reside at USG facilities such as military reservations, installations, bases, posts, camps, stations, arsenals, vessels/ships, or laboratories, which support joint functions such as C2, intelligence, and logistics. Although DOD installations normally lie outside the designated operational area and area of influence, they are part of the JFC’s operational environment. For example, the JFC would desire visibility of deploying forces throughout the deployment process to the completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. DOD installations provide support to deployed forces until they return. The ability to receive support from DOD installations can reduce the size of the forward deployed force. To a significant degree, events occurring at DOD installations affect the morale and performance of deployed forces.
forces. Thus, the JFC’s operational environment encompasses all DOD installation functions, including family programs. Although not depicted in Figure II-7, the operational environment also includes a wide variety of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems.
CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS

“Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. An ability to adapt will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security environment.”

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Remarks to the National Defense University
January 31, 2002

1. General

   a. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as required by the JFC’s mission.

   b. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function. Some tasks, missions, and capabilities could apply to more than one joint function. For example, IO core, supporting, and related capabilities are applied across the joint functions and independently (see Figure III-1).

   For a more detailed discussion of IO see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

   c. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. The operation plan/order describes the way forces and assets are used together to perform joint functions and tasks. However, forces and assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. A single force or asset can perform multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while executing a single task. This chapter discusses the joint functions, related tasks, and key considerations.

2. Command and Control

   a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses a number of tasks, including the following:

      (1) Communicating and maintaining the status of information.

      (2) Assessing the situation in the operational environment.
(3) Preparing plans and orders.

(4) Commanding subordinate forces.

(5) Establishing, organizing, and operating a joint force headquarters.

(6) Coordinating and controlling the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal capabilities.

(7) Coordinating and integrating joint, multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO support.

(8) Providing PA in the operational area.

“The key is not to make quick decisions, but to make timely decisions.”

General Colin Powell
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
b. **Command** includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. The art of command lies in conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision-making, and leadership. Using judgment and intuition acquired from experience, training, study, and creative thinking; commanders visualize the situation and make sound and timely decisions. Effective decision-making combines judgment with information; it requires knowing if to decide, when to decide, and what to decide. Timeliness is the speed required to maintain the initiative over the adversary. Decision-making is both art and science. Information management, awareness of the operational environment, a sound battle rhythm, and the establishment of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) facilitate decision-making. Decision-making authority should be decentralized appropriately — it should be delegated to those in the best position to make informed, timely decisions. The C2 function supports an efficient decision-making process. Enabled by timely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly than the adversary. This decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.

(1) JFCs exercise command and influence the outcome of joint campaigns and operations by performing the following.

(a) Delegating OPCON/TACON and establishing support relationships.

(b) Assigning tasks and operational areas as needed.

(c) Developing and communicating commander’s intent.

(d) Designating the main effort.

(e) Prioritizing and allocating resources.

(f) Distributing allocated forces.

(g) Assessing and mitigating risks to both the mission and forces.

(h) Deciding when and how to redirect efforts.

(i) Committing reserves.

(j) Staying attuned to the needs of subordinates, seniors, and allies/coalition partners.

(k) Guiding and motivating the organization toward the military end state.
(2) **Command Authorities.** JFCs exercise an array of command authorities (i.e., COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. These authorities also are referred to as command relationships. Specific authorities associated with each command relationship, summarized in Figure III-2, are outlined in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).* Unity of command in joint operations is maintained through the application of the various command relationships as follows.

(a) **COCOM** is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, USC, section 164 (or as directed by the President in the UCP) and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM includes the authority to exercise directive authority for logistic matters (or to delegate directive authority to a subordinate JFC for as many common support capabilities as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s assigned mission). Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of CCDRs enables them to use all logistic capabilities of all forces assigned, and/or attached to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. Under peacetime

---

**Figure III-2. Command Relationships**

- **Combatant Command (command authority) (COCOM)**
  - (Unique to Combatant Commander)
  - Budget and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Input
  - Assignment of subordinate commanders
  - Relations with Department of Defense Agencies
  - Convene courts-martial
  - Directive authority for logistics

  When OPERATIONAL CONTROL is delegated,
  - Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
  - Organize and employ commands and forces
  - Assign command functions to subordinates
  - Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
  - Suspend from duty subordinate commanders

  When TACTICAL CONTROL is delegated,
  - Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

  When SUPPORT relationship is delegated,
  - Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization
Joint Functions

conditions, logistic authority will be exercised by the CCDR consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the SecDef or CJCS.

(b) **OPCON** is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated to and exercised by subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders over assigned and attached forces. The exercise of OPCON involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON in and of itself does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic JOAs of subordinate JFCs.

(c) **TACON** is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and exercised over assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or forces made available for tasking. **TACON typically is exercised by functional component commanders over military capabilities or forces made available for tasking.** It is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

(d) **Support.** Establishing support relationships between components (as described in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. **Support relationships can be established among all functional and Service component commanders,** such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the joint force land component commander and the JFACC. **Within a joint force, more than one supported command may be designated simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different missions, functions, or operations.** For instance, a joint force SO component may be supported for a direct action mission while simultaneously providing support to a joint force land component for a raid. Similarly, a joint force maritime component may be supported for sea control while simultaneously supporting a joint force air component to achieve air superiority over the operational area.

---

**COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**

In December 2002, representatives from United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States European Command (USEUCOM) met in Stuttgart, Germany to discuss Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The two broad issues were organizing the operational area and coordinating the command relationships for all OIF phases.

The USCENTCOM OIF theater of operations would by necessity cross the Unified Command Plan (UCP) designated USCENTCOM and USEUCOM.
areas of responsibility (AORs) boundary. Specifically, the land and airspace of Turkey was recognized for its potential to contribute to opening a northern line of operations. Discussions over the potential options for organizing the OIF operational area led to an agreement to not request a temporary change in the UCP modifying the AORs, but to rely on the establishment of appropriate command relationships between the two combatant commanders (CCDRs).

Discussions over the potential command and control options led to the decision to establish a support relationship between USCENTCOM (supported) and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was established by the Secretary of Defense. It enabled the development of coherent and supporting campaign plans.

In the campaign design and plan, USEUCOM retained tactical control (TACON) for the coordination and execution of operational movement (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistic and personnel support; and protection in support of USCENTCOM forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR; specifically Turkey. Once USCENTCOM-allocated joint forces were positioned and prepared to cross the Turkish – Iraqi Border (to commence offensive operations) operational control (OPCON) would be given to USCENTCOM. Throughout the operation, USEUCOM would exercise TACON of all USCENTCOM-allocated forces transiting the USEUCOM AOR (into Turkey). For OIF Phase III and Phase IV operations, USCENTCOM would exercise OPCON over any USEUCOM forces entering Iraq.

Maintaining UCP AOR boundaries and the establishment of an umbrella support relationship between the CCDRs with conditional command authorities exercised over the participating forces based on their readiness and operation phase provided a workable solution to the integration and employment of joint forces on the boundary of two AORs.

Various Sources

(3) Other authorities granted to commanders, and to subordinates as required, include administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized. The definitions for each authority are provided in the glossary and the specific authorities associated with each are outlined in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

c. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and integrate
and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

d. **Area of Operations and Functional Considerations**

(1) **Command and Control in an Area of Operations.** The land and maritime force commanders are the supported commanders within the AOs designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

(a) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commander’s AOs. The JFACC is normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

(b) In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime AOs. Any commander executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

(2) **Command and Control of Space Operations.** A supported JFC normally designates a space coordinating authority (SCA) to coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The JFC considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available, and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. The SCA is responsible for coordinating and integrating space capabilities in the operational area, and has primary responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint force. The SCA normally will be supported by assigned/attached embedded space personnel. The processes for articulating requirements for space force enhancement products are established, are specifically tailored to the functional area they support, and result in prioritized requirements. Thus the SCA typically has no role in prioritizing the day to day space force enhancement requirements of the joint force. To ensure prompt and timely support, the supported GCC and Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) may authorize direct liaison between the SCA and applicable component(s) of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Joint force Service component commands should communicate their requirements to the SCA, or designated representative, to ensure that all space activities are properly integrated and synchronized.
For detailed guidance on C2 of space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

(3) Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC and assign responsibilities. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally include, but are not limited to planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations, and the allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the JFC’s CONOPS and air apportionment decision. The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction and counterair effort. When the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFACC normally assumes the area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority (ACA) responsibilities since air defense and airspace control are an integral part of joint air operations. When the situation dictates, the JFC may designate a separate AADC or ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire, and deconfliction of joint air operations.

(a) The JFC designates the ACA. The JFC is ultimately responsible for airspace control in the operational area. The ACA coordinates and integrates the use of the airspace under the JFC’s authority. The ACA develops guidance, techniques, and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among units within the operational area. The ACA establishes an airspace control system (ACS) that is responsive to the needs of the JFC, integrates ACS with the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. The airspace control plan (ACP) and airspace control order (ACO) express how the airspace will be used to support mission accomplishment. The ACA develops the ACP, and, after JFC approval, distributes it throughout the operational area and to all supporting airspace users. The ACP begins with the distribution of the ACO, and is executed when components and users comply with the ACO as described in JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

(b) The JFC designates the AADC. The AADC is responsible for defensive counterair (DCA) (which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The AADC must identify those volumes of airspace and control measures that support and enhance DCA operations, identify required airspace management systems, establish procedures for systems to operate within the airspace, and ensure they are incorporated into the ACS. The AADC may also designate regional air defense commanders and sector air defense commanders to ease C2 of airspace based on the size and scope of the mission/operation.

e. Command and Control System. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 system; which consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, information management function, and personnel essential for planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing operations. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the JFC’s ability to adjust plans for future operations, while focusing on current operations. The JFC’s staff works within the JFC’s intent to assist in the direction and control of forces assigned, attached, or made available for tasking to support mission accomplishment. They also are alert to spotting adversary or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the JFC accordingly.
Joint Functions

(1) **Liaison** is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters and should be assigned early in the planning stage of joint operations. LNOs from supporting to supported commanders are particularly essential in ascertaining needs and coordinating supporting actions.

(2) **Control and Coordination Measures.** JFCs establish various maneuver and movement control, airspace coordinating, and fire support coordination measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures may include, but are not limited to, boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, operational areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and no-fire areas.

*For additional guidance on control and coordination measures, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.*

(3) **Communications and ISR Systems** provide commanders with critical support in communications, navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, ballistic missile warning, and environmental sensing that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly improves the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders at all levels exchange, both vertically and laterally, thereby enhancing their awareness of the operational environment. Effective command at varying operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure, interoperable, and sustainable communications. Communications and ISR planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications sensor systems necessary to collect, transport, process, and disseminate critical information at decisive times. These communications and sensor systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations.

(a) **Communications System Planning.** The communications system provides the JFC the means to collect, transport, process, disseminate, and protect information. The mission and structure of the joint force determine specific information flow and processing requirements. In turn, the information requirements dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the communications system. Therefore, communications system planning needs to be integrated and synchronized with operational planning. Through effective communications system planning, the JFC is able to apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission success.

(b) The communications system must be planned with unified action in mind and provide communications links to appropriate multinational partners, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs. Therefore, **interoperability and communications security (COMSEC) planning is critical.** Oftentimes, US forces are assigned to multinational forces to provide secure communications and to protect US COMSEC and crypto devices. Further, routine communications and backup systems may be disrupted and civil authorities might have to rely on available military communications equipment. Additionally, communications system planning must consider the
termination of US involvement and procedures to transfer communications system control to another agency such as the UN. Planning should consider that it may be necessary to leave some communications resources behind to continue support of the ongoing effort.

*For additional guidance on the communications and ISR systems support refer to JPs 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

f. **Network Operations.** NETOPS include activities conducted to monitor, manage, and control the GIG. NETOPS incorporate network management, information dissemination management, and information assurance (IA). **Joint NETOPS are the means by which C2 is established and maintained throughout the GIG.** CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global NETOPS. While this support relationship gives CDRUSSTRATCOM global authority, it does not negate the other CCDRs’ authority over assigned NETOPS forces. CDRUSSTRATCOM also is a supporting commander for nonglobal NETOPS. In this capacity, CDRUSSTRATCOM will provide support to the affected combatant command, Service, and/or DOD agency. The FCCs are also supporting commands for nonglobal NETOPS that affect or have the potential to affect a GCC’s AOR or mission. OGAs also may provide support per intragovernmental agreements.

*For additional guidance on NETOPS refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.*

g. **Collaboration**

(1) **Effective C2 demands that commanders and staffs collaborate** in forming and articulating commander’s intent and determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, and tasks. Additionally, they must be able to synchronize execution across all domains and the information environment; coordinate operations with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and multinational partners; and assess unintended effects. Although the value of face-to-face interaction is undisputed, capabilities that improve long-distance collaboration among dispersed forces can enhance both planning and execution of joint operations. These capabilities not only can improve efficiency and common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among participants, they also can enhance combat effectiveness during time-compressed operations associated with both combat and noncombat operations.

(2) A collaborative environment is one in which participants share data, information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts, often in real time regardless of physical location. Collaboration capabilities can enable planners and operators worldwide to build a plan in discrete parts or sub-plans concurrently rather than sequentially and to integrate their products into the overall plan. Collaboration also provides planners with a “view of the whole” while working on various sections of a plan, which helps them identify and resolve planning conflicts early. Commanders at all levels can participate in COA analysis and then select a COA without the traditional sequential briefing process. They can post plans and orders on interactive Web pages, accompanied by proper notification, for immediate use by subordinate elements.
(3) An important result is a compression of the planning/decision timeline. With collaboration, JFCs can foster an environment that ensures joint operation or campaign ends, ways, and means are known and understood at every echelon from the start to the termination of operations. Similar benefits apply during execution, when commanders, planners, and others can decide quickly on branches and sequels to the campaign or operation and on other time-critical actions to respond to changes in the situation. This can occur with improved understanding of commander’s intent, objectives, desired effects, and required tasks. If properly managed, collaboration can contribute to more effective planning and increase execution efficiency.

h. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. CCIRs are elements of information required by the commander that directly affect decision-making. CCIRs are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points throughout the conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.

(1) Characteristics. CCIRs result from the analysis of information requirements in the context of a mission, commander’s intent, and the concept of operation. Commanders designate CCIRs to let their staffs and subordinates know what information they deem necessary for decision-making. In all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. Staffs may recommend CCIRs; however, they keep the number of recommended CCIRs to a minimum. CCIRs are not static. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision-making.

(2) Key Elements. CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). Not all proposed PIRs and FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to information requirements. PIRs focus on the adversary and the environment and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. FFIRs focus on the friendly force and supporting capabilities and drive reporting and requests for information (see Figure III-3). Although CCIRs generate PIRs and FFIRs for management, the staff focuses on answering the CCIRs to support the commander’s decision-making.

(3) Process. To assist in managing CCIRs, commanders should adopt a process to guide the staff. This process should include specific responsibilities for development, validation, dissemination, monitoring, reporting, and maintenance (i.e., modifying/deleting). Figure III-4 is a generic process for developing CCIRs. This process may be tailored for a specific mission or operational area.

i. Battle Rhythm. A command headquarters battle rhythm is its daily operations cycle for briefings, meetings, and report requirements. A battle rhythm is essential to support decision-making, staff actions, and higher headquarters information requirements and to manage the dissemination of decisions and information in a coordinated manner. A battle rhythm should be designed to minimize the time the commander and key staff members spend attending meetings and listening to briefings — it must allow the staff and subordinate commanders time to plan,
communicate with the commander, and direct the activities of their subordinates. The battle rhythms of the joint and component headquarters should be synchronized and take into account multiple time zones and other factors. Other planning, decision, and operating cycles (intelligence collection, targeting, and air tasking order cycles) influence the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Further, meetings of the necessary boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups must be synchronized. Consequently, key members of the joint force staff, components, and supporting agencies should participate in the development of the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. Those participants must consider the battle rhythm needs of higher, lower, and adjacent commands when developing the joint force headquarters battle rhythm. The chief of staff normally administers the joint force headquarters battle rhythm.

j. **Risk Management.** Risk is inherent in military operations. Risk management is a function of command and is based on the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to accept. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment. Risk management does not inhibit commanders’ flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero defects mindset), require a GO/NO-GO decision, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for development of standing operating procedures (SOPs). Risk management should be applied to all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and all phases of an operation to include

---

**Figure III-3. Information Requirements Categories**

PIRs (Priority Intelligence Requirements), FFIRs (Friendly Force Information Requirements), and other intelligence collection addressing facets of the adversary, civil-military collection addressing economic, political, meteorological, and infrastructure, and reported information addressing assigned and attached forces.
any branches and sequels of an operation. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may change the CONOPS or concept of fire support, execute a branch plan, or take other measures to reduce or bypass enemy capabilities.

(1) Safety is crucial to successful training and operations and the preservation of military power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, and training lessen those risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety planning factors could include the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards.

(2) To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their particular mission or operational area. Figure III-5 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

k. Public Affairs. The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s strategic and operational objectives through the communication of truthful, timely, and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the operational area to foreign, domestic, and
internal audiences. PA provides advice to the JFC on the implications of command decisions on public perception and operations, media events and activities, and the development and dissemination of the command information message.

(1) JFCs must recognize the changing nature of how people get information (or disinformation). The speed and methods with which people and organizations can collect and convey information to the public makes it possible for the world populace to quickly become aware of an incident. Internet sites are increasingly the preferred means of terror organizations to engage audiences worldwide in the information environment. This instantaneous, unfiltered and often incomplete, intentionally biased, or factually incorrect information provided via satellite and the Internet makes planning and effective execution of PA more important than ever before.

(2) The JFC should develop a well-defined and concise PA plan to minimize adverse effects upon the joint operation from inaccurate media reporting/analysis, violations of operations security (OPSEC), and promulgation of disinformation and misinformation. Well-planned PA support should be incorporated in every phase of operations. PA plans should provide for open, independent reporting and anticipate and respond to media queries, which provide the maximum disclosure with minimum delay and create an environment between the JFC and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. An effective plan provides proactive ways to communicate information about an operation and fulfills the US military’s obligation to keep the American public informed while maintaining requisite OPSEC.

(3) Communication Coordination. Communication activities should be fully integrated in command operational planning and execution processes, so there is consistency in intent or effect between command actions and information disseminated about those actions.
While audiences and intent may at times differ; the JFC, through the SC process, should ensure planning for PA, IO, psychological operations (PSYOP), CMO, and DSPD is coordinated to make certain consistent themes and messages are communicated that support the overall USG SC objectives.

(4) **PA and IO Relationship.** PA and IO must be coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses. As with other related IO capabilities, PA has a role in all aspects of DOD’s missions and functions. Communication of operational matters to internal and external audiences is just one part of PA’s function. In performing duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the PA officer’s interaction with the IO staff enables PA activities to be coordinated and deconflicted with IO. While intents differ, PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives, for instance, by countering adversary misinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate information. PA also assists OPSEC by ensuring that the media are aware of the implications of premature release of information. The embedding of media in combat units offers new opportunities, as well as risks, for the media and the military; the PA staff has a key role in establishing embedding ground rules. Many adversaries rely on limiting their population’s knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces’ messages to these populations.

*For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.*

1. **Civil-Military Operations.** CMO denote the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. CMO may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They also may occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

*For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.*

m. **Language and Regional Expertise.** Language skills and regional knowledge are crucial “warfighting skills” that are integral to joint operations. Deployed joint forces must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, local and national government officials, and coalition partners. Lessons learned from OIF and OEF prove that this force-multiplying capability can save lives and is integral to successful mission accomplishment. Consequently, commanders will integrate foreign language and regional expertise capabilities in contingency, security cooperation, and supporting plans; and provide for them in support of daily operations and activities.

*For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional expertise, refer to CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning.*
For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime operations; refer to JPs 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, and 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.

3. Intelligence

a. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to joint operations. Intelligence provides this understanding to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their enemies or adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The intelligence process also attempts to identify what the adversary is able to discern about friendly forces. This function assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the operational environment and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future COA. During deployment, employment, and redeployment; the operational environment generates threats to joint forces that likely will produce combat-related battle injury (BI) and/or disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) casualties. Intelligence provides information that assists decision makers with devising protection measures to mitigate these threats. Consequently, a complete intelligence picture, to include medical intelligence is required.

b. Intelligence is critical in all joint operations. In military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities; intelligence operations seek to provide the national leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives, while providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and implement the NSS. During major operations and campaigns, intelligence identifies enemy capabilities, helps identify the COGs, projects probable COAs, and assists in planning friendly force employment. During crisis response or limited contingency operations, intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission.

c. The intelligence function includes:

   (1) Planning and direction, to include managing counterintelligence (CI) activities that protect against espionage, sabotage, and assassinations.

   (2) Collection to include surveillance and reconnaissance.

   (3) Processing and exploitation of collected data.

   (4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence.

   (5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations.
(6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality.

d. **Key Considerations**

(1) **Responsibilities.** JFCs and their component commanders are the key players in planning and conducting intelligence tasks. Commanders are more than just consumers of intelligence. They are ultimately responsible for ensuring that intelligence is fully integrated into their plans and operations. Commanders establish the operational and intelligence requirements and continuous feedback is needed to ensure optimum intelligence support to operations. This interface is essential to support the commander; to support operational planning and execution; to avoid surprise; to assist friendly deception efforts; and to evaluate the effects of operations.

(2) **Collection Capabilities.** Surveillance and reconnaissance are important elements of the intelligence function that support the collection of information across the levels of war and range of military operations. Computer network exploitation involves intelligence collection conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.

(3) CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. For additional information on CI, refer to JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (SECRET).

For additional guidance on the intelligence function, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and other subordinate JPs that address intelligence support to targeting, CI, human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).

4. **Fires**

a. To employ **fires** is to use available weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. **Policy, guidance, and planning for the employment of operational and strategic fires is primarily a joint function.** Joint fires are delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but some ways and means (such as electronic attack [EA]) can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function encompasses the fires produced by a number of tasks (or missions, actions, and processes) including:
(1) **Conduct joint targeting.** This is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.

(2) **Provide joint fire support.** This task includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters.

(3) **Countering air and missile threats.** This task integrates offensive and defensive operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and force protection. These operations are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.

(4) **Interdict enemy capabilities.** Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise meet objectives.

(5) **Conduct strategic attack.** This task includes offensive action against targets — whether military, political, economic, or other — which are selected specifically in order to achieve strategic objectives.

(6) **Employ IO Capabilities.** This task focuses on military actions involving the use of EM and directed energy and computer networks to attack the enemy.

(7) **Assess the results of employing fires.** This task includes assessing both the effectiveness and performance of fires as well as their contribution to the larger operation or objective. For more guidance on assessment, refer to Section D, “Assessment,” of Chapter IV, “Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment.”

b. **Key Considerations.** The following are key considerations associated with the above tasks.

(1) **Targeting** is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the component level. Commanders, planners, and legal advisors must consider the national strategic end state, political goals, and legal constraints when making targeting decisions. Successful integration of IO considerations into the targeting process is important to mission accomplishment in many operations.

(a) **Oversight.** JFCs may establish and task their staff to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it should be comprised of representatives from the staff, all components
Joint Functions

and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to ensure target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects are linked to the JFC’s objectives. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that targeting efforts are coordinated and synchronized with intelligence and operations (by all components and applicable staff elements).

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC is responsible for all aspects of the targeting process. The JFC may appoint a component commander with the authority to conduct the joint targeting process or the authority may be retained within the joint force staff. The JFC normally appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair the JTCB. When a JTCB is not established and if the JFC decides not to delegate targeting oversight authority to a deputy or subordinate commander, the JFC performs this task at the joint force headquarters with the assistance of the joint staff operations directorate (J-3). In this instance, the JFC may approve the formation within the J-3 of a joint fires element to provide recommendations to the J-3. The JFC ensures that this process is a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whomever the JFC delegates joint targeting planning, coordination, and deconfliction authority to must possess or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, joint planning expertise, and appropriate intelligence.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is part of the targeting process. JFCs must pay particular attention to air apportionment given the many missions and tasks that joint air forces can perform, its operational area-wide reach, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another. Air apportionment assists JFCs to ensure the weight of the joint force air effort is consistent with the JFC’s intent and objectives. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the air apportionment recommendation to the JFC who makes the air apportionment decision. The methodology the JFACC uses to make the recommendation may include priority or percentage of effort against assigned mission-type orders or categories significant for the campaign or operation such as the JFC’s or JFACC’s objectives. Following the JFC’s air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made available.

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. Joint fire support may include, but is not limited to, the lethal effects of air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects of some EA actions and space control operations, as well as other nonlethal capabilities. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force is essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
(3) **Countering Air and Missile Threats**

(a) The JFC normally seeks to gain and maintain **air superiority** as quickly as possible to allow friendly forces to operate without prohibitive interference from adversary air threats. Air superiority is achieved through the counterair mission, which integrates both offensive counterair (OCA) and DCA operations from all components to counter the air and missile threat. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, artillery, SOF, ground forces, and EA. US military forces must be capable of countering the air and missile threat from initial force projection through redeployment of friendly forces. Proliferation of missiles, advances in missile technologies (perhaps coupled with WMD), and the often fleeting nature of adversary missile targets; make missiles a particularly difficult and dangerous threat. Close coordination and synchronization is paramount between DCA and OCA operations to counter the missile threat. **DCA (both air and missile defense) is essential to the protection function described in paragraph 6 of this chapter.**

(b) **OCA** operations are the preferred method of countering theater air and missile threats. OCA consists of offensive measures to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize adversary aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close to the source as possible. Ideally, joint OCA operations will prevent the launch of, or destroy adversary aircraft and missiles and their supporting infrastructure prior to launch. OCA includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses.

*For additional guidance on air superiority and countering air and missile threats, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.*

(4) **Interdiction**

(a) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction operations are actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; or to otherwise meet objectives. Fires and/or maneuver can be used to interdict. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. The JFC is responsible for the planning and synchronization of the overall interdiction effort in the assigned operational area. The JFACC normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

(b) Military forces also provide CS to OGAs responsible for execution of law enforcement interdiction activities which include actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. Federal law and DOD policy impose limitations on the types of support that may be provided.

(c) Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, maritime, and special operations
forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing land and maritime forces inside the AOA as part of the overall amphibious plan. Similarly, at the direction of appropriate authorities, forces performing a HD or CS mission may perform interdiction against specific targets.

(d) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort). Interdiction during warfighting is not limited to any particular region of the operational area, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly surface forces. Likewise, interdiction in HD or CS operations is not restricted to any region or environment, but is to a greater extent than other interdiction operations, guided and restricted by domestic and international law. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding effects on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad operational effects; however, deep interdiction may have a delayed effect on land and maritime operations. Interdiction closer to land and maritime forces will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to surface maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers, depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

For more guidance on joint interdiction operations, refer to JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

AIR INTERDICTION DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, most of the effort against Iraqi ground troops was focused on Republican Guard divisions and on a handful of stalwart regular divisions that formed part of the defensive ring south of Baghdad.

One prominent air interdiction success story involved the Iraqi Republican Guard’s redeployment of elements of the Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzar, and Al Nida divisions after 25 March 2003 to the south of Baghdad toward Karbala, Hillah, and Al Cut. Their road movements were steadily bombed by US Air Force A-10s and B-52s (dropping 500-pound bombs) and British Tornados. An Iraqi commander concluded that their movement south had been one of the Iraqi regime’s major errors because it exposed the Republican Guard to coalition air power and resulted in large casualty figures.

SOURCE: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #30
Carl Conetta, 26 September 2003

(5) Strategic Attack. The JFC should consider conducting strategic attacks, when feasible. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against a target — whether military, political, economic, or other — that is specifically selected to achieve national or military
strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or SecDef. Additionally, these attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include but are not limited to enemy strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks.

(6) IO Capabilities

(a) Computer network attack (CNA) operations disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks (relying on the data stream to execute the attack), or the computers and networks themselves.

(b) EA involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. The effects of EA can be both lethal and nonlethal. EA can be used against a computer, but it is not CNA, since CNA relies on the data stream to execute the attack while EA relies on the EM spectrum. Integration and synchronization of EA with maneuver, C2, and other joint fires is essential.

For additional guidance on EA, refer to JP 313.1, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

(7) Limiting collateral damage — the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or adversary forces — is a consideration when delivering fires. JFCs must deliver fires discriminately to create desired effects while balancing the law of war principles of military necessity, proportionality, and limiting unnecessary suffering.

5. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. This function includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function encompasses a number of tasks including:

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint formations within the operational area by any means or mode (air, land, or sea).

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy.

(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.
(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. This includes operations that employ obstacles (i.e., countermobility), enforce sanctions and embargoes, and conduct blockades.

(5) Control significant areas in the operational area whose possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.

b. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-deployed or even multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate time and place. Alert may come with little or no notice.

(2) JFCs must carefully consider the movement of forces and whether to recommend the formation and or movement of multinational forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces may deter adversary aggression or movement.

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at a disadvantage through the flexible application of movement and fires. The goal of maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) by moving to a point of advantage to deliver a decisive blow. This may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, airspace, populations, key waters, and LOCs through air, land, and maritime maneuvers.

(2) There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner, land and air expeditionary forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and have the means and opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have positional advantage. Maintaining full-spectrum superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

(3) At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating
and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movements seek to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.

(4) JFCs should consider the contribution of SO in attaining positional advantage. SOF may expose vulnerabilities through special reconnaissance and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels through direct action or unconventional warfare using indigenous or surrogate forces. Additionally, the use of PSYOP and CMO may minimize civilian interference with operations as well as the impact of military operations on the populace.

6. Protection

a. The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in four primary ways — active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and LOCs from an adversary’s attack; passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; applying technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide; and emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. Protection capabilities apply domestically in the context of HD, CS, and EP.

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including:

(1) Providing air, space, and missile defense.

(2) Protecting noncombatants.

(3) Providing physical security for forces and means.

(4) Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counter-deception and counterpropaganda operations.

(5) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense.
(6) Conducting OPSEC, computer network defense (CND), IA, and electronic protection activities.

(7) Securing and protecting flanks, bases, base clusters, JSAs, and LOCs.

(8) Conduct PR operations.

(9) Conducting chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) CM.

(10) Conducting antiterrorism operations.

(11) Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide.

(12) Provide emergency management and response capabilities and services.

c. There are protection considerations that affect planning in every joint operation. The greatest risk — and therefore the greatest need for protection — is during campaigns and major operations that involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. These typically will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning and execution. Although the operational area and joint force may be smaller for a crisis response or limited contingency operation, the mission can still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of protection considerations. Permissive operating environments associated with military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require that planners consider protection measures commensurate with potential risks. These risks may include a wide range threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Thus continuous research and access to accurate, detailed information about the operational environment along with realistic training can enhance protection activities.

d. Force protection includes preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. It does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Force health protection (FHP) complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, and conserving the mental and physical well being of Service members. Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk. Intelligence sources provide information regarding an adversary’s capabilities against personnel and resources, as well as providing timely information to decision makers regarding force protection considerations. Foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies can contribute to force protection through the prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crime; and by sharing information on criminal
and terrorist organizations. Consequently, a cooperative police program involving military and civilian law enforcement agencies is essential.

e. **Key Considerations**

(1) **Security of forces and means** enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks, LOCs, bases, base clusters, and JSAs. Physical security includes physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats; applying appropriate deterrent, control, and denial safeguarding techniques and measures; and responding to changing conditions. Functions in physical security include facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol operations, special land and maritime security areas, and other physical security operations like military working dog operations or emergency and disaster response support. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

(2) **Defensive Counterair.** DCA (i.e., active and passive measures for air and missile defense) also contributes to force protection by detecting, identifying, intercepting, and destroying or negating enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace to include WMD delivery systems.

(a) **Active air and missile defense** includes all direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air and missile defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW), and other available weapons. Ideally, integration of systems will allow for a defense in depth, with potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success. Active air and missile defense recognizes both air defense and missile defense as unique and separate capabilities that are closely integrated. The JSA coordinator coordinates with the AADC to ensure that air and missile defense requirements for the JSA are integrated into air defense plans.

(b) **Passive air and missile defense** includes all measures, other than active air and missile defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction.
(3) **Defensive use of IO** ensures timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries opportunities to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes.

(a) **OPSEC** is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain essential secrecy about the JFC’s actual capabilities, activities, and intentions. History has shown the value and need for reliable, accurate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore vital and advantageous to deny adversary commanders the critical information they need (essential secrecy) and cause them to derive timely but inaccurate perceptions that influence their actions (desired appreciations). OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and mitigate friendly vulnerabilities through protection of critical information. The JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance as early as possible. By maintaining liaison and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success. OPSEC and security programs must be closely coordinated to ensure that all aspects of sensitive operations are protected.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to JP 313.3, Operations Security.

(b) **CND** includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks.

(c) **IA** is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. IA incorporates protection, detection, response, restoration, and reaction capabilities and processes to shield and preserve information and information systems. IA for DOD information and information systems requires a defense-in-depth that integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayer and multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must account for the possibility that access can be gained to its information and information systems from outside of DOD control. Conversely, information obtained directly from sources outside of DOD is not subject to DOD IA processes and procedures. Lack of DOD IA control over information and information systems neither guarantees that the quality of information obtained within DOD is unimpeachable, nor that non-DOD information and information systems is implicitly of lower quality.

(d) **Electronic protection** is that division of EW involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

(4) **Personnel Recovery.** PR missions are conducted using military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. There are five PR
tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete and coordinated recovery of DOD military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint, multinational, and OGA capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.

For further guidance on PR, refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(5) **CBRN Defense.** Preparation for potential enemy use of CBRN weapons is integral to any planning effort. Even when an adversary does not possess weapons traditionally regarded as WMD, easy global access to materials such as radiation sources and chemicals represents a significant planning consideration. It may not be the sheer killing power of these hazards that represents the greatest threat. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design. CBRN defense measures provide defense against attack using WMD and the capability to sustain operations in CBRN environments using the principles of avoidance of CBRN hazards, particularly contamination; protection of individuals and units from unavoidable CBRN hazards; and decontamination. Effective CBRN defense also deters enemy WMD use by contributing to the survivability of US forces.

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, and JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(6) **Antiterrorism** programs support force protection by establishing defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. They also consist of personal security and defensive measures to protect Service members, high-risk personnel (HRP), civilian employees, family members, DOD facilities, information, and equipment. Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Service member. They also include use of individual protective equipment (IPE), use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms. Security of HRP safeguards designated individuals who, by virtue of their rank, assignment, symbolic value, location, or specific threat are at a greater risk than the general population. Terrorist activity may be discouraged by varying the installation security posture through the use of a random antiterrorism measures program; which may include varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals; and conducting vehicle and vessel inspections, personnel searches, and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

For additional guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

(7) **CID** is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by providing confidence in the accuracy of engagement decisions throughout the force. The JFC’s CID procedures serve to optimize mission effectiveness by maximizing enemy engagements while minimizing fratricide and collateral damage.
(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID characterization may be limited to, “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown.” In some situations, additional characterizations may be required including, but not limited to, class, type, nationality, and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of lethal weapons and nonlethal capabilities.

(b) The JFC’s CID procedures should be developed early during planning. CID considerations play an important role in force protection. The JFC’s CID procedures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with unit or individual’s ability to engage enemy forces. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures, important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants including multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs.

(c) The CID process includes adequate staffing across all command levels for effective integration of CID in joint operations. Effective integration of CID procedures uses the employed communications system and available technology to enable accurate and timely decisions at all levels of command throughout the force. Timely and accurate CID requires preplanned information exchange among commanders, military forces, and other participants involved in the operation.

(d) CID-related information exchange orients on situational awareness for friendly and neutral forces, restrained sites and structures, and identification of threat objects. During mission execution CID information requires constant coordination and should be conveyed to decision makers in an understandable manner.

For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(8) **Force Health Protection.** FHP complements force protection efforts and includes all measures taken by the JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, and conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service members. FHP measures focus on the prevention of illness and injury. The JFC must ensure adequate capabilities are available to identify health threats and implement appropriate FHP measures. **Health threats** arise from potential and ongoing enemy actions to include employment of CBRNE capabilities; environmental, occupational, industrial, and meteorological conditions; endemic human and zoonotic diseases; and other medical considerations that can reduce the effectiveness of military forces. Therefore, a robust **health surveillance system** is critical to FHP measures. Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk; identifying and assessing hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to eliminate or mitigate exposures; and utilizing procedures to monitor and report BI/DNBI rates and other measures of monitoring health outcomes. Occupational and environmental health surveillance enhances the joint force’s ability to minimize BIs and DNBIs including combat and operational stress and prevent or minimize its exposure to CBRNE effects.
For further guidance on FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

7. Sustainment

a. **Sustainment** is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations; allowing the JFC to seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

(1) **Logistics** is the science of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the movement and maintenance of forces. In its broadest sense, logistics includes the design, development, and acquisition of equipment and systems. Logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of forces and materiel in support of the supported JFC’s CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. **Logistics covers the following broad functional areas:**

   (a) Supply.
   (b) Maintenance.
   (c) Transportation.
   (d) Health service support (HSS).
   (e) Explosive ordnance disposal.
   (f) Field services.
   (g) General engineering.

(2) **Personnel services** are those sustainment functions provided to personnel. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel so that the JFC may be optimally prepared to accomplish the mission. They include the following:

   (a) Human resources support.
   (b) Religious ministry support.
   (c) Financial management.
(d) Legal support.

b. JFCs should begin building sustainment capabilities during the earliest phases of a campaign or operation. Sustainment should be a priority consideration when the timed-phased force and deployment data list is built. Sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required.

c. The **sustainment function** encompasses a number of tasks including:

   (1) Coordinating the supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment.

   (2) Providing for maintenance of equipment.

   (3) Coordinating support for forces, including field services, personnel support, HSS, mortuary affairs, religious ministry support, and legal services.

   (4) Building and maintaining sustainment bases.

   (5) Assessing, repairing, and maintaining infrastructure.

   (6) Acquiring, managing, and distributing funds.

   (7) Providing CUL support to OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and other nations.

   (8) Establishing and coordinating movement services.

*For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistic Support. For further guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.*

d. **Key Considerations**

   (1) **Employment of Logistic Forces.** For some operations, logistic forces may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistic forces also may have continuing responsibility after the departure of combat forces in support of multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, or NGOs. In such cases, they must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) and ACSAs to which the United States is a party. Logistic forces also must be familiar with and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in the operation. The JFC must be alert for potential legal problems arising from the unique, difficult circumstances and the highly political nature of operations such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Logistic forces, like all other forces, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.
(2) **Facilities.** JFCs need to plan for the early acquisition of real estate and facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned and/or inadequate or no property is provided by the HN. Early negotiation for real property can be critical to the successful flow of forces.

(3) **Environmental Considerations.** Environmental considerations are broader than just protection of the environment and environmental stewardship. They also include continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more operationally focused aspects of environmental considerations that have an affect on US military forces and the military end state. The focus of military operations is generally not on environmental compliance and environmental protection, but rather compliance with the command guidance on the range of environmental considerations received in the operation plan/order (command guidance) and the implementation of environmental considerations included in unit SOPs. Environmental considerations are tied directly to risk management and the safety and health of service members. All significant risks must be clearly and accurately communicated to deploying DOD personnel and the chain of command. Environmental considerations, risk management, and health risk communications are enabling elements for the commander, and as such, are an essential part of military planning, training, and operations. While complete protection of the environment during military operations may not always be possible, careful planning should address environmental considerations in joint operations, to include legal aspects. JFCs are responsible for protecting the environment in which US military forces operate to the greatest extent possible consistent with operational requirements. In this regard, JFCs are responsible for the following.

(a) Demonstrating proactive environmental leadership during all phases of joint operations across the range of military operations. Instill an environmental ethic in subordinate commands and promote environmental awareness throughout the joint force.

(b) Ensuring environmental considerations are an integral part in the planning and decision-making processes for all staff members. Logistic support should be planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of the environment in accordance with applicable international treaties and conventions, US environmental laws, policies, and regulations and HN agreements. Early planning is essential to ensure that all appropriate environmental reviews have been completed prior to initiating logistic support activities. A critical aspect of this is planning for base camps and the associated environmental baseline survey and environmental health site assessment that each base camp, or similar site, will require. The JFC’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) liaison team can provide the CCDR key geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) graphic products depicting critical environmental or manmade features that are of special concern or requiring appropriate legal or environmental sensitivity throughout an operation.

(c) Identifying specific organizational responsibilities and specific joint force environmental requirements. These responsibilities should have clearly defined goals, strategies, and measures of success.
(d) Ensuring compliance, as far as practicable within the confines of mission accomplishment, with all applicable environmental laws and agreements, including those of the HN. The goal of compliance is to minimize potential adverse impacts on human health and the environment while maximizing readiness and operational effectiveness.

*For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.*

(4) **Health Service Support.** HSS provides services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. HSS includes, but is not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the sick, wounded, or injured; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. CCDRs are responsible for HSS of forces assigned or attached to their command and should establish HSS policies and programs accordingly.

(a) **Medical threat information** must be obtained prior to deployment and continually updated as forces are deployed. Disease and injury occurrences can quickly affect combat effectiveness and may adversely affect the success of a mission. The incidence and exposure to infectious diseases is inherent in manmade and natural disaster areas and in developing nations. Environmental injuries and diseases, field hygiene and sanitation, and other preventive medicine concerns have the potential for greater impact on operations when the forces employed are small independent units with limited personnel.

(b) The **early introduction of preventive medicine personnel** or units into theater facilitates the protection of US forces from diseases and injuries. It also permits a thorough assessment of the medical threat to and operational requirements of the mission. Preventive medicine support to US and multinational forces, HN civilians, refugees, and displaced persons includes education and training on personal hygiene and field sanitation, personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations, pest management, and inspection of water sources and supplies. JFCs and joint force surgeons must be kept apprised of legal requirements in relation to operations conducted in this environment. Issues such as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies used and manpower expended, and provisions of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater must be reviewed.

(c) **Medical and rehabilitative care** provides essential care in the operational area and rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing quality of care. It encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury through rehabilitative care.

*For further guidance on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support in Joint Operations.*

(5) **HN Support.** HN support will require interaction with the HN government to establish procedures for requesting support and negotiating support terms. Logistic planners
should analyze the capability of the HN economy to supplement the logistic support required by US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Accordingly, early mission analysis must consider distribution requirements. This analysis should be done collaboratively with all applicable sources of input and will support development of a systems analysis for designated focus areas when established. Airfields, seaports, and road networks must be assessed, particularly those in underdeveloped countries where their status will be in question. Delay in completing the assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces may be required to build or improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate follow-on force closure as well as the delivery of humanitarian cargo. Procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the operation. Availability of fuel and other key support items may impinge on transportation support.

(6) **Contracting.** Providing logistic support may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, IGOs, and NGOs. Contracted support will be a part of all joint operations and depending on different operational factors, may be of critical importance to the effective deployment and sustainment of joint forces. Contracting support to joint operations consists of theater support, external support and system support contracts. Theater support contracts are contracts with local vendors let through in-theater Service or joint contingency contracting offices. External support contracts include the Services civil augmentation programs such as the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program and the Navy’s Construction Capabilities Contract and other logistic and combat support contracts that let through authorities outside the theater. System support contracts are contracts awarded by program manager offices that provide technical support to newly fielded or, in some cases, life-cycle support of a wide variety of weapon, C2, or other military systems.

(a) Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy or before external support contract programs can provide support. Theater support contracting also is valuable when host-nation support (HNS) agreements do not exist, or when HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. Close coordination with CA, financial managers, and legal support also is essential. A **contracting support plan** should be developed per the guidance outlined in JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, to ensure contracting solutions receive consideration during logistic planning and become part of the operation or campaign plan.

(b) External support contracts can also be vital to meet the immediate and long-term logistic and other support needs of the joint force. These contracts must be carefully planned and integrated into the overall JFC logistic plan, especially when considering that many of these contracts are “cost plus” which are not intended to be used for long-term sustainment operations. DOD policies as well as political implications of using contractor employees for sensitive functions such as security and interrogation also must be carefully considered.

(c) System support contracts are less visible to the JFC, but are extremely critical to the support of the joint force. These contracts normally provide field service representatives to provide technical support of high-tech military systems that operate throughout the battlefield.
The JFC must be aware of, and consider the effects of any restrictions on contracted support due to the criticality of system support contracting.

(7) **Disposal Operations.** Disposal is an important link in the overall logistic chain. Planning for disposal must take place from the onset of joint operation planning and continue throughout redeployment. Inadequate understanding of disposal operations may cause conflicts with public and international law, confusion over roles and requirements, increased costs, inefficient operations, and negative health implications for Service members. Defense Logistics Agency support to the CCDR’s Service component commands includes the capability to receive and dispose of materiel in a theater. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service element in theater establishes theater-specific procedures for the reuse, demilitarization, or disposal of facilities, equipment, and supplies, to include hazardous materiel and waste.

*For further guidance on disposal operations, refer to JP 4-09, Global Distribution.*

(8) **Legal Support.** Legal counsel participation is paramount in all processes associated with planning and executing military operations. Nearly every decision and action has potential legal considerations and implications. The legal implications of displaced and detained civilians, fiscal activities, ROE, contingency contractor personnel, international law and agreements, SOFAs, claims, and contingency contracting on joint operations must be considered. The JFC’s staff judge advocate (SJA) can help the JFC and planners with advice on how the law of war applies in any particular situation. The SJA should review the entire operation plan for legal sufficiency. Further, HN legal personnel should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs.

*For more detailed information and guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Joint Operations.*

(9) **Financial management (FM)** encompasses the two core processes of resource management (RM) and finance operations. The joint force comptroller is the officer responsible for providing the elements of RM and finance operations. RM process normally is comprised of costing functions and the effort to leverage appropriate fund sources. Finance operations provide the necessary funds to conduct contracting and the full range of pay support needed by members of the joint force. The joint force comptroller management of these elements provides the JFC with many necessary capabilities; from contracting and banking support to cost capturing and fund control. JTFs may conduct operations in austere environments and, in many cases, at great distances from CONUS. FM support for contracting, subsistence, billeting, transportation, communications, labor, and a myriad of other supplies and services will be necessary for successful mission accomplishment.

*For more detailed information and guidance on financial management support, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management During Joint Operations.*
Chapter III

8. Other Activities and Capabilities

a. Psychological Operations. All military operations can have a psychological effect on all parties concerned — friendly, neutral, and hostile. PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP have strategic, operational, and tactical applications. PSYOP must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect. The PSYOP approval process, consistent with the JSCP, should be addressed and specified early in the planning process. PSYOP forces assigned to a joint force will provide PSYOP planning and C2 for PSYOP units that execute PSYOP in support of the JFC’s mission. For additional guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. PSYOP support to non-US military is outlined in DOD Directive (DODD) S-3321-1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U).

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, operations security (OPSEC) and deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of what the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying or disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limiting the leadership’s ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the frontline Iraqi soldier's confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began.

b. Military Deception. Military deception (MILDEC) includes actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations; thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ mission. The intent is to cause adversary commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their ISR assets; and/or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage. As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets adversary leaders and decision makers through the manipulation of adversary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort. This
deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decision-making processes. During the formulation of the commander’s concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFC would like the adversary to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired adversary actions then become the MILDEC goal. MILDEC is focused on causing the opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking.

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

**MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973**

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

Various Sources
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING, OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN, AND ASSESSMENT

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well-prepared plan.”

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

This chapter presents a broad overview of joint operation planning, operational art and design, joint plans, and assessment for the JFC and staff when faced with a specific contingency. More detailed guidance on joint operation planning and operational design is provided in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

SECTION A. PLANNING OVERVIEW

1. Joint Operation Planning

   Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. This section focuses on joint operation planning.

   a. The President and SecDef direct joint operation planning to prepare and employ American military power in response to actual and potential contingencies. In this context, a “contingency” is an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Joint operation planning satisfies the Title 10, USC requirement for the CJCS to provide for the preparation and review of contingency-related plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and SecDef. Joint operation planning is directed toward the employment of military power within the context of a military strategy to attain objectives by shaping events, meeting foreseen contingencies, and responding to unforeseen crises.

   b. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative, and adaptive processes — the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the JOPP. JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and COA development.

   (1) JOPES is described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to an expected contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of JOPES activities and products occur prior to the point when SecDef approves and CJCS transmits the execute order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission. As described in JOPES, joint operation planning includes two primary sub-categories: contingency planning and crisis action planning.
See CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), for more information on JOPES.

(2) The JOPP is a less formal but proven analytical process, which provides an orderly approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. The steps of JOPP (see Figure IV-1) provide an orderly framework for planning in general, both for JOPES requirements and for organizations that have no formal JOPES responsibilities. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, and the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands. Although an ultimate product is the operation plan or order for a specific mission, the process is continuous throughout an operation. Even during execution, the planning process produces operation plans and orders for future operations as well as fragmentary orders that drive immediate adjustments to the current operation.

See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning for more information on JOPP.
SECTION B. OPERATIONAL ART AND DESIGN

2. Operational Art

a. **Operational art** is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.

b. In applying operational art, the JFC draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements.

c. The JFC uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the JFC overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve military operational and strategic objectives. Among the many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.

(1) What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)

(2) What **sequence of actions** is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)

(3) What **resources** are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(4) What is the likely **cost or risk** in performing that sequence of actions?

3. Operational Design

a. **General.** Operational art is applied during operational design—the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint operation plan and its subsequent execution. While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical process of design. Operational design is particularly helpful during COA determination. Resulting
design alternatives provide the basis for selecting a COA and developing the detailed CONOPS. During execution, commanders and their staffs continue to consider design elements and adjust both current operations and future plans as the joint operation unfolds.

b. **Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment**

(1) A systems perspective of the operational environment, discussed in Chapter II, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations,” is fundamental to operational design. Each system in the operational environment is composed of various nodes and links. System nodes are the tangible elements within a system that can be “targeted” for action, such as people, materiel, and facilities. Links are the behavioral or functional relationships between nodes, such as the command or supervisory arrangement that connects a superior to a subordinate, the relationship of a vehicle to a fuel source, and the ideology that connects a propagandist to a group of terrorists. However, many nodes and links in the various systems will not be relevant to the JFC’s specific mission. After appropriate analysis, certain nodes and the links between them can be identified as key to attacking or otherwise affecting operational and strategic COGs. Figure IV-2 portrays a notional systems analysis and illustrates that identifying key nodes and links can enhance understanding of the relationships between COGs; and thereby influence operational design.

(2) A systems perspective facilitates the planning and operational design of all joint operations. It supports unified action by providing the JFC and staff with a common frame of reference for collaborative planning with OGA counterparts to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the JFC’s command authority.

(3) The intelligence function helps the JFC and staff understand the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of the operational environment. As part of JIPOE, the joint force intelligence directorate (J-2) is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide an understanding of the adversary systems and environment. A full understanding of the operational environment typically will require cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements and collaboration with various intelligence organizations, OGAs, and nongovernmental centers of excellence.

*For more information on developing a systems understanding of the operational environment, refer to JPs 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, and 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

c. **Design Process.** JFCs and their staffs use a number of operational design elements (see Figure IV-3) to help them visualize the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish their mission. These elements can be used selectively in any joint operation; however, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign or major operation. The result of this process should be a framework that forms the basis for the joint campaign or operation plan and the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.

d. **Design Elements.** The elements of operational design described below are tools to help commanders and their staffs visualize the campaign or operation and shape the CONOPS.
Some design elements (e.g., objectives, COGs, LOOs) can be described tangibly in the text or graphics of an operation order or plan. Other elements (e.g., balance, synergy, leverage) typically cannot be described in this manner. These elements will vary between COAs according to how the JFC and staff develop and refine the other elements of design during the planning process. For example, in the JFC’s judgment one COA could result in better balance and leverage, but not provide the tempo of operations that results from another COA. In the end, the JFC must be able to visualize these intangible elements and draw on judgment, intuition, and experience to select the best COA. Their detailed application to joint operation planning is provided in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

(1) **Termination**
Figure IV-3. Operational Art and Design

Operational Art

Operational Art

National Strategic End State

Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

Joint Operation Planning Process

Operational Art

Design Elements

Termination
End State and Objectives
Effects
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points
Direct versus Indirect
Lines of Operations

Operational Reach
Simultaneity and Depth
Timing and Tempo
Forces and Functions
Leverage
Balance
Anticipation
Synergy
Culmination
Arranging Operations

Operational Art

Arrangement of Capabilities in Time, Space, and Purpose

Linkage of Ends, Ways, and Means

Courses of Action

Commander's Intent

Concept of Operations

Joint Operations

Operational Art
(a) Knowing when to terminate all types of military operations and how to preserve achieved military objectives is key to bringing the national strategic end state (discussed in paragraph 6, “Termination of Operations,” of Chapter I, “Strategic Context”) to fruition. Once established, the national strategic end state and termination criteria enable development of the military strategic objectives and military end state.

(b) Termination design is driven in part by the nature of the conflict itself. Disputes over territorial or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Conflicts based on ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that may be more difficult to negotiate. Often, conflicts are a result of both value- and interest-based differences. The underlying causes of a particular conflict — cultural, religious, territorial, resources, or hegemonic — should influence the understanding of conditions necessary for joint operation termination and conflict resolution. National and multinational decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to terminate military involvement. Passing the lead from the military to other authorities usually requires extensive planning and preparation prior to the onset of operations. Joint operations also should be conducted in a manner that will ease this transition.

(c) Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other forms of resistance such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

(d) Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. The supported JFC and the subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the national strategic end state, and the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy’s judgment of cost and risk to determine the conditions necessary to bring it to a favorable end. The CCDR then will consult with CJCS and the SecDef to establish the termination criteria. To facilitate development of effective termination criteria, it must be understood that US forces must follow through in not only the “dominate” phase, but also the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases to achieve the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. If the termination criteria have been properly set and met, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities and to dissuade other adversaries from interfering. Moreover, the national strategic end state for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces have gained and can maintain.

(2) **End State and Objectives.** Once the termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of the military strategic objectives, which comprise the military end state conditions. This end state normally will represent a point in time or
circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic end state. While the military end state typically will mirror many of the conditions of the national strategic end state, it may contain other contributory or supporting conditions. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing both the national and military strategic objectives, clearly defining the military end state conditions promotes unified action, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the joint campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent statement.

(3) Effects

(a) Identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational environment connects military strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks. Combined with a systems perspective, the identification of desired and undesired effects can help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the operational environment that promotes unified action. CCDRs plan joint operations by developing strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational effects and assessment indicators. At the operational level, the JFC develops operational-level objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component missions, tasks, or actions.

Objectives prescribe friendly goals.

Effects describe system behavior in the operational environment – desired effects are the conditions related to achieving objectives.

Tasks direct friendly action.

(b) An “effect” is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A set of desired effects contributes to the conditions necessary to achieve an associated military objective. For example:

The President might make the following statement regarding impending military operations in Country X: I want a secure and stable government in country X before US forces depart. During mission analysis, the CCDR considers how to achieve this national strategic objective, knowing that it likely will involve the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and multinational partners. The CCDR designates the following strategic effect associated with the President’s objective: Country X security forces maintain internal and border security. In consultation with the US ambassador to Country X, the ambassador states that successful national elections following the expected regime change are essential to a stable government. Consequently, the CCDR designates a second strategic effect: Country X’s population votes in nationwide elections.
(c) In the above example, these desired strategic effects are statements about the behavior of systems in Country X necessary for Country X to have a secure and stable government. Creating these conditions likely would not be sufficient alone to achieve the President’s national strategic objective, so the CCDR would establish other desired effects and identify undesired effects as required. **The full set of desired effects would represent the conditions for achieving the national strategic objective.** The CCDR also would designate conditions related to other national strategic objectives. An understanding of the systems and their behavior in the operational environment supports the determination of desired and undesired effects. The JFC helps guide initial systems analysis by describing desired military strategic and operational objectives and desired/undesired effects as part of the commander’s planning guidance and intent. This guidance helps the staff focus their efforts on specific systems in the operational environment and identify potential tasks for the joint force components. For example, a possible task for a subordinate JTF or component could be: **Train and deploy Country X security forces to conduct independent internal and border security operations for the election.**

(d) A desired or undesired effect can be created directly or indirectly. A **direct effect** is the proximate, first-order consequence of an action (i.e., the destruction of a target by precision-guided munitions) which usually is immediate and easily recognizable. An **indirect effect** is a delayed or displaced consequence associated with the action that caused the direct effect. Indirect effects often are less observable or recognizable than direct effects, particularly when they involve changes in an adversary’s behavior. However, an indirect effect may be the one desired.

(e) Thinking in terms of establishing conditions for success helps commanders and their staffs amplify the meaning of military strategic and operational objectives, understand the supporting desired and undesired effects, determine the best sequence of actions to create these effects, and develop more precise assessment measures. This effects-based approach remains within the framework of operational art and design helping commanders and their staffs clarify the relationship between tasks and objectives by describing the conditions that need to be established to achieve the military objectives and attain the end state. The JFC and staff continue to develop and refine the necessary conditions for success (the desired effects) throughout the planning process. Monitoring progress toward attaining these effects, as part of the assessment process, begins during planning and continues throughout execution. See Section D, “ASSESSMENT,” below for a more thorough discussion on assessment and the assessment process.

(f) In tactical-level combat operations, weapons employment typically creates low-level, discrete effects on specific systems, while strategic and operational effects relate more to changing the larger aspects of various systems’ behaviors. At the strategic and operational levels, commanders and staffs should understand the relationships (links) between system nodes when considering whether a direct or indirect approach is the best way to produce a desired operational or strategic effect.

(4) **Center of Gravity**
(a) A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” A COG **comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight.** COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum. Centers of Gravity are inherently singular in nature, in that each entity in the operational environment has but one per level of war. At the strategic level, a COG might be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the operational environment associated with the adversary’s political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems. Commanders consider not only the enemy COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs (e.g., During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War the coalition itself was identified as a friendly strategic COG, and the CCDR took measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems).

(b) All COGs have inherent “critical capabilities” — those means that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary’s COG to function and essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). These critical capabilities permit an adversary’s COG to resist the military end state. In turn, all critical capabilities have essential “critical requirements” — those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of the adversary’s critical requirements which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects disproportionate to the military resources applied. Collectively, these are referred to as “critical factors.”

(c) The essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it in a manner that best helps achieve military objectives and attain the military end state. In theory, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment. However, COG analysis is continuous and a COG can change during the course of an operation for a variety of reasons. For example, a COG might concern the mass of adversary units, which has not yet formed. Likewise, the JFC must plan for protecting friendly potential COGs such as agreements with neutral and friendly nations for transit of forces, information and networks, coalition relationships, and US and international public opinion.

(d) The adversarial context pertinent to COG analysis takes place within the broader operational environment context. A systems perspective of the operational environment assists in understanding the adversary’s COGs. In combat operations, this involves knowledge of how an adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions, and of their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the JFC and staff must understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military system (see Figure IV-2). **This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and decisive points to formulate LOOs and visualize the CONOPS.**
OPERATIONAL DESIGN FOR OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict, the President established a number of national strategic objectives that comprised the national strategic end state. These included the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, a guarantee of safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad, and the enhancement of security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Consequently, the combatant commander (CCDR) determined that his mission would include deploying to the Persian Gulf region and ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait if diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, and other nonmilitary efforts failed to achieve this objective. The CCDR also anticipated the use of United States Central Command forces after large-scale combat to achieve the national strategic objectives.

A condition necessary for achieving the national strategic objectives was the formation of a substantial coalition, which included Arab states, to demonstrate significant formal regional opposition to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Another condition was obtaining United Nations support in the form of resolutions and sanctions. A condition related to conducting major operations (to include land attack) was securing Saudi Arabia's agreement to receive and base deploying US forces. Further, after reassessing the preliminary campaign plan, the CCDR determined that an operational level condition for a successful ground attack was the deployment of an additional corps to provide sufficient ground combat power.

Saddam Hussein was identified as the strategic center of gravity. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, attempts to convince him to withdraw Iraqi forces (the desired effect associated with a specified national strategic objective) included economic sanctions, coalition building, and deployment of US forces into the region. These actions caused direct effects related to the Iraqi economy, world opinion, and the increasing ability of the coalition to conduct military operations. However, these and other efforts proved insufficient to achieve the desired effect of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, thus leading to Operation DESERT STORM.

Various Sources

(5) Decisive Points. In determining where and how to apply friendly capabilities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, commanders and their staffs will have to identify decisive points. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success. Decisive points can be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, WMD capabilities, or an air base; but they could include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or communications or intelligence nodes.
In some cases, specific key events also may be decisive points; such as attainment of diplomatic permission for overflight of foreign nations, air or maritime superiority, commitment of the enemy’s reserve, repairing damaged infrastructure, or providing clean water. In still other cases, decisive points may be systemic, such as political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. Although decisive points are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking protected COGs or defending them. Decisive points can be thought of as a way to relate what is “critical” to what is “vulnerable.” Consequently, commanders and their staffs must analyze the operational environment and determine which systems’ nodes or links or key events offer the best opportunity to affect the enemy’s COGs or to gain or maintain the initiative. The commander then designates them as decisive points, incorporates them in the LOOs, and allocates sufficient resources to produce the desired effects against them.

(6) **Direct versus Indirect.** In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory — if it can be done in a prudent manner (as defined by the military and political dynamics of the moment). Where direct attacks against enemy COGs mean attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For example, if the operational COG is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs, and defeating or degrading its protection capabilities. In this way, JFCs employ a synchronized and integrated combination of operations to weaken enemy COGs indirectly by attacking critical requirements, which are sufficiently vulnerable.

(7) **Lines of Operations.** As JFCs visualize the design of the operation they may use multiple LOOs. Generally, a LOO describes the linkage of various actions on nodes and/or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective. Commanders may describe the operation along LOOs that are physical or logical (see Figure IV-4). A **physical** LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). A **logical** LOO connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). Normally, joint operations require commanders to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary physical and logical LOOs working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.

(a) Commanders use **physical LOOs** to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor. Physical LOOs may be either interior or exterior. A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOOs by providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver.
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment

(b) JFCs use logical LOOs to visualize and describe the operation when positional reference to an enemy has little relevance. In a linkage between military objectives and forces, only the logical linkage of LOOs may be evident. This situation is common in many joint force operations. JFCs link multiple actions on nodes and/or decisive points with military objectives using the logic of purpose—cause and effect. Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.

(8) Operational Reach

(a) Operational reach is the distance and duration over which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination and is a crucial factor in the campaign planning process. Although reach may be limited by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents, it may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, increasing the range and effects of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contracting support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture.

(b) Permission to establish bases on foreign soil and overfly foreign nations; whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the United States; directly affects operational reach and influences the combat power that a joint force is capable of generating. The arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced
configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to conduct rapid, continuous, sustained combat operations throughout the operational area. Basing, often affected directly by political and diplomatic considerations, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact and is fundamental to the ability of the JFC to maintain or extend operational reach. However, in international waters, seabasing is less constrained by political and diplomatic considerations.

(9) **Simultaneity and Depth**

(a) **Simultaneity** refers to the simultaneous application of military and nonmilitary power against the enemy’s key capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy’s collapse by placing more demands on enemy forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause failure of their moral and/or physical cohesion.

**SIMULTANEITY AND DEPTH DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM**

Following 38 days of intensive and highly synchronized and integrated coalition air operations, land forces initiated two major, mutually supporting, offensive thrusts against defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Simultaneously, amphibious forces threatened an assault from the sea, creating confusion within the enemy leadership structure and causing several Iraqi divisions to orient on the amphibious threat. This deception and the attack on the left flank by Army forces contributed to the defeat of Iraqi forces by coalition air and land forces striking into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, coalition air operations continued the relentless attack on deployed troops, C2 nodes, and the transportation infrastructure. The result was a swift conclusion to the Persian Gulf Conflict in 1991.

Various Sources

(b) Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operation plan. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation or campaign to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. Geographic CCDRs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon, but must understand how their actions contribute to the military end state.

(c) The concept of **depth** seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the operational area in multiple domains; creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s speedy defeat. Depth applies to time as well as to
space. Operations extended in depth shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Operations in depth contribute to protection of the force by destroying enemy potential before its capabilities can be realized or employed. Interdiction is an application of depth in joint operations.

(d) Simultaneity and depth place a premium on shared, common situational awareness. Consequently, JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a comprehensive common operational picture (COP).

(10) **Timing and Tempo**

(a) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react (e.g., Germany’s 1940 attack on France combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations).

(b) Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the **timing** of the application of those capabilities. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that integrates and synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate

---

*Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked, overwhelmed, and continued relentless pressure on the retreating opposition.*
impact, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be integrated and synchronized. An example of strategic mobility timing impacts would be the opening of sea and air ports of debarkation (PODs) in a region or theater at designated times to match the required throughput of forces in concert with the plan.

(c) **Tempo** is the rate of military action. Controlling or altering that rate is necessary to retain the initiative. JFCs adjust tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the enemy’s ability to react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage. During some phases of a joint operation, JFCs may elect to conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm enemy defensive capabilities. During other phases, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. Suitable ports and adequate throughput, with sufficient intertheater and intratheater lift, preserves the JFCs ability to control tempo by allowing freedom of theater access. Information superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables the JFC to dictate tempo.

(11) **Forces and Functions**

(a) JFCs and their staffs can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently to overwhelm enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological or numerical superiority over an opponent.

(b) Attack of an enemy’s functions normally is intended to destroy or disrupt the enemy’s ability to employ its forces, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. JFCs typically focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as C2, logistics, and air and missile defense. The direct effect of destroying or disrupting critical enemy functions can create the indirect effects of uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will. When assessing whether or not functional attack should be the principal design concept; JFCs should evaluate several variables such as time required to cripple the enemy’s critical functions, time available to the JFC, the enemy’s current actions, and likely responses to such actions.

(12) **Leverage**

(a) Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains and the information environment. Leverage can be achieved through asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy vulnerabilities and the concentration and integration of joint force capabilities. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

(b) JFCs arrange asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history
of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs must aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (e.g., the air interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval air and surface attacks against troop transports (e.g., US air and surface attacks against Japanese surface reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (e.g., allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites).

(13) **Balance** is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions and pressing the fight. JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

(14) **Anticipation**

(a) Anticipation is key to effective planning and execution and applies across the entire range of military operations. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with senior leaders; adjacent commanders; subordinates; allies; coalition members; and key members of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in the operational area. During combat operations, JFCs may avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command and throughout the operational area, thus forcing the enemy to react rather than initiate; and by thoroughly and continuously wargaming to identify probable enemy reactions to joint force actions. JFCs also should realize the effects of operations on the enemy, multinational partners, other nations, and noncombatants and prepare for their reactions.

(b) A shared, common understanding of the operational environment aids commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities; enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and the location, activities, and status of dislocated civilians enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives. JIPOE assists JFCs in defining likely or potential enemy COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. As such, JIPOE significantly contributes to a JFC’s ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities. In stability operations, JIPOE must help to collect — then fuse — political, criminal, economic, linguistic, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and other information.
regarding conditions and forces that influence the society. Similar information is critical to all military operations. For example, where and when food, water, and fuel will be available to a force is as important in CS operations as combat operations. Combined with the COP and other information, intelligence products provide the JFC with the tools necessary to achieve situational awareness. The COP is produced by using many different products to include the operational pictures of lower, lateral, and higher echelons. Liaison teams to the JFC from the national intelligence agencies can provide the staff a wealth of information for the COP, including imagery derived measurement and signature intelligence imagery and digital graphic products.

For additional guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

(c) Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and their staffs that tend to lean forward in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational MILDEC efforts. Therefore, commanders and their staffs should carefully consider all available information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the decision-making process.

(15) Synergy

(a) JFCs integrate and synchronize operations and employ military forces and capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, in a manner that results in greater combat power and applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Further, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various domains and the information environment, all culminating in achieving the assigned military objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. Additionally, JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities, but also the enemy’s morale and will. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, contains the basis for this multidimensional concept — one that describes how JFCs can apply all facets of joint capabilities to accomplish their mission.

(b) In today’s complex operational environment, it is impossible to accurately view the contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains and information environment in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated. Given the appropriate circumstances, any element of military power can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into joint operations. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of conventional and special operations forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains enables JFCs to maximize available capabilities and minimize potential seams or vulnerabilities. JFCs are especially suited to develop joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available in joint forces. The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational environment.
(16) Culmination

(a) Culmination has both an offensive and a defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the offense at all levels is to achieve the military objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite emergence of the enemy’s defensive culmination. During stability operations, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. A well-developed assessment methodology is crucial to supporting the commander’s determination of culmination, both for enemy and friendly actions.

(b) Integration and synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, commanders and their staffs forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable achievement of military strategic and operational objectives before reaching culmination. If the commanders cannot generate these resources, they should rethink their CONOPS.

(17) Arranging Operations

(a) JFCs must determine the best arrangement of operations to accomplish the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve full-spectrum superiority and the military end state conditions. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, Service-unique deployment capabilities, diplomatic agreements, changes in command structure, protection, level and type of OGA and NGO participation, distribution and sustainment capabilities, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose.

(b) Critical to the success of the entire operation is timely and accurate time-phased force deployment. However, the dynamic nature of the operational environment may require adaptability concerning the arrangement of operations. During force projection, for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. Therefore, in-transit and theater asset visibility along with an en route planning and rehearsal capability are critical to maintaining flexibility. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

(c) Sustainment is crucial to arranging operations and must be planned and executed as a joint responsibility. CCDRs and their staffs must consider, among other items,
logistic bases, LOCs, location and security factors as they relate to current and future operations, as well as defining priorities for services and support and CUL functions and responsibilities. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands.

(d) Phases. Reaching the military end state usually requires the conduct of several operations that are arranged in phases. Consequently, the design of a joint campaign or a operation normally provides for related phases implemented over time. In a campaign, each phase can represent a single or several major operations, while in a major operation a phase normally consists of several subordinate operations or a series of related activities. See paragraph 5d(2), “Phasing,” in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of the phasing model.

(e) Branches and Sequels. Many operation plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into their plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing.

1. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

2. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. In joint operations, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

SECTION C. PLAN OVERVIEW

4. Operational Design and the Campaign

a. Section B focused on operational design using a variety of design elements (e.g., COG) to help the commander and staff visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. Operational design elements can be used selectively in any joint operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of a joint campaign.

b. A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. The Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM series is an example of a campaign. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of large-
scale combat operations, but can be used across the range of military operations. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives. Figure IV-5 provides key aspects of campaign planning.

c. A campaign plan is not a unique type of JOPES joint operation plan. JFCs normally prepare a campaign plan in operation plan format. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning challenges. There are three general types of campaigns, which differ generally in scope.

(1) **Global Campaign.** A global campaign is one that requires the accomplishment of military strategic objectives within multiple theaters that extend beyond the AOR of a single GCC.

(2) **Theater Campaign.** A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a supported GCC, which accomplish military strategic or operational objectives within a theater of war or...
theater of operations, primarily within the supported commander’s AOR. OEF has shown that
adjacent GCCs will conduct supporting operations within the AOR of the supported commander,
or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the supported GCC.

(3) **Subordinate Campaign.** A subordinate campaign plan outlines the actions of a
subordinate JFC, which accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) military strategic
or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop
subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial
size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single
major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and
operational guidance and direction provided in the supported JFC’s campaign plan.

---

**THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991**

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of
the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of
that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began.
Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a
series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all
necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with
UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to
force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military
campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series
of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of
the international military coalition and included operations in war and
operations other than war throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be
viewed in the following major phases.

- **DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP** (to include crisis action planning,
mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)

- **DEFENSE** (with deployment and force buildup continuing)

- **OFFENSE**

- **POSTWAR OPERATIONS** (to include redeployment)

**DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP.** While diplomats attempted to resolve
the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid
planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World
War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deception, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist CDRUSCENTCOM's selected course of action before engaging adversary forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by attacking or designating for attack forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain air supremacy, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to adversary commanders, destroy adversary forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the adversary. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.
POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Various Sources

5. Key Plan Elements

a. General. The steps of the JOPP produce a number of important products. Some support a subsequent planning step. For example, the staff’s initial estimates are key inputs during mission analysis. Key elements that result from mission analysis include a draft mission statement and the JFC’s initial intent statement, planning guidance, and critical information requirements. Some of these products emerge from the planning process as key elements of the operation plan or order. Examples include (but are not limited to) the mission statement, commander’s intent, and CONOPS.

b. Mission Statement. The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why; but seldom specifies how. It forms the basis for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the commander’s estimate, the CONOPS, and as paragraph 2, “Mission,” of the completed operation plan or order. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success.

c. Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the initial impetus for the planning process. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. It is typically written in paragraph 3,
“Execution,” as part of the operation plan or order, but it could be stated verbally when time is short.

d. Concept of Operations

(1) General. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The joint force staff writes (or graphically portrays) it in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During its development, the JFC determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link between joint operation planning and force planning.

(2) Phasing

(a) Purpose. The purpose of phasing is to help the JFC organize operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing is most directly related to the “arranging operations” and “LOOs” elements of operational design. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in systematically achieving military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk.

(b) Application. The JFC’s vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign/operation’s intermediate objectives. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. Phasing can be used across the range of military operations.

(c) Number, Sequence, and Overlap. Working within the campaign phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases are designed and protracted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase (see Figure IV-6). The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.
(d) **Transitions.** Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations in the “dominate” phase to a preponderance of stability operations in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint force begins to reestablish order, commerce, and local government; and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions while the US and international community takes steps to establish or restore the conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other organizations—OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

(e) **Phasing Model.** Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure IV-7 and described below provides a flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. This model can be applied to various campaigns and operations. Operations and activities in the “shape” and
“deter” phases normally are outlined in SCPs and those in the remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed operation plans. By design, operation plans generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model in Figure IV-7 to link the pertinent SCP and operation plan operations and activities.

1. **Shape.** Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shape” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve effects in another.

2. **Deter.** The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence that occurs in the “Shape” phase in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial overflight permission(s) and/or deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign. Many actions in the “Deter” phase build on activities from...
the previous phase and are conducted as part of SCPs and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

3. **Seize Initiative.** JFCs seek to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny their initial objectives. If an enemy has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge enemy forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the “Dominate” phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

4. **Dominate.** The “Dominate” phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. When a campaign is focused on conventional enemy forces, the “dominate” phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives.
Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment

Against unconventional enemies, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional/unconventional, information, and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and relieve suffering. In noncombat situations, the joint force’s activities seek to control the situation or operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase of the campaign.

5. **Stabilize.** This phase is required when there is limited or no functioning, legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, OGA, IGO, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. The “Stabilize” phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

6. **Enable Civil Authority.** This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance. This support will be provided to the civil authority with its agreement at some level, and in some cases especially for operations within the United States, under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO participants and influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the US and local civil authority’s objectives. The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the “enable civil authority” phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. The military end state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. The joint operation is concluded when redeployment operations are complete. Combatant command involvement with other nations and OGAs, beyond the termination of the joint operation, may be required to achieve the national strategic end state.

3) The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3, “Execution,” also provides the basis for developing the concept of fires, concept of intelligence operations, and concept of logistic support; which also are included in the final operation plan or order.

*For more information on fires and joint fire support planning, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.*
For more information on intelligence support and planning, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and other JP 2-0 series publications.

For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, and other JP 4-0 series publications.

SECTION D. ASSESSMENT

6. General

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure military objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the commander’s need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander’s critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

b. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.

c. Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end state. Normally, the joint force J-3, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders’ staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination
of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters’ battle rhythm. Various elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

d. Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest of unified action. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFC’s authority. Accordingly, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations — such as USG interagency elements from the Departments of State or Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other combatant commands — to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

7. Levels of War and Assessment

a. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. **As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed.** To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process (see Figure IV-8).

b. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the military end state. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve its objectives, not just “doing things right.”

c. Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance (MOPs) to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; destruction of enemy forces; control of key terrain, peoples, or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and strategic progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

d. **Combat assessment** is an example of a tactical level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process (see JP 3-60,
Joint Targeting). Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations. However, combat assessment methodology also can be applied by joint force functional and Service components to other tactical tasks not associated with joint fires (e.g., disaster relief delivery assessment, relief effectiveness assessment, and future relief recommendations.).

8. Assessment Process and Measures

a. The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance at all levels of war and MOEs to measure effects and determine the progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs help answer questions like: “are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?” MOEs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: “was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?” Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

(1) MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment. MOEs measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or
creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than MOPs, and can be crafted as either qualitative or quantitative. MOEs can be based on quantitative measures to reflect a trend and show progress toward a measurable threshold.

(2) **MOPs measure task performance.** MOPs are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. They are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks, but have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

b. The **assessment process and related measures should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment.

(1) **Relevant.** MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the military end state, and the commander’s decisions. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(2) **Measurable.** Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(3) **Responsive.** Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. Time for an action or actions to take effect within the operational environment and indicators to develop should be considered. Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(4) **Resourced.** To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid duplication of tasks and avoid taking unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

c. Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the JFC’s initial planning guidance and in commander’s and staff’s estimates, wargame the measures during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order.

d. Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and
using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, the commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, as well as any required modifications to the plan. Well-devised MOP and MOE, supported by effective information management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between tasks, effects, objectives, and end state.
CHAPTER V
MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

SECTION A. OVERVIEW

1. General Considerations

   a. Complexity. Major operations and campaigns are the most complex and require the greatest diligence in planning and execution due to the time, effort, and national resources committed. This chapter discusses those areas that must be considered and addressed when planning and conducting major operations and campaigns involving large-scale combat. Many of these same factors must be considered for other operations across the range of military operations, since they may be precursors to large-scale combat or, if successfully resolved, may forestall escalation to that level.

   b. Offensive and Defensive Operations. Major operations and campaigns, whether or not they involve large-scale combat, normally will include some level of both offense and defense (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, counterair, CND, and base defense). Although defense may be the stronger force posture, it is the offense that is normally decisive in combat. In striving to achieve military strategic objectives quickly and at the least cost, JFCs normally will seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures that are required throughout each joint operation or campaign phase. Forces at all levels within the joint force must possess the agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense, then, is a complimentary one. Defensive operations enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

   c. Stability Operations. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. Many of these missions and tasks are the essence of CMO. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations are likely will be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGA, IGOs, and/or NGOs.

   For further guidance on the SSTR, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.
d. **Balance and Simultaneity.** JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. However, major operation and campaign plans must feature an **appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations in all phases.** Most importantly, **planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated.** Planning for the transition from sustained combat operations to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all phases of a campaign or major operation. An uneven focus on planning offensive and defensive operations in the “dominate” phase may threaten full development of basic and supporting plans for the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases and ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained combat operations are ongoing, there will be a need to establish or restore security and control and provide humanitarian relief as succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed. Figure V-1 illustrates the notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout a major operation or campaign.

**SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS BY PHASE**

![Figure V-1. Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations](image-url)
2. Considerations for Shaping

a. **General.** JFCs are able to take actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing.

b. **Organizing and Training Forces.** Organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When possible, JFCs and staff should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in training to ensure a common understanding and for building a working relationship prior to actual execution. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the CCDR’s joint mission-essential task list.

c. **Rehearsals.** Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting joint and multinational forces to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but they must exercise caution in adjusting the plan. Changes must be coordinated throughout the chain of command to prevent errors in integration and synchronization. While rehearsals usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, the JFC should identify key elements for rehearsal.

d. **Maintaining Operational Area Access.** JFCs establish and maintain access to operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing (to include availability of airfields), freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. Supporting CCDRs can greatly enhance this effort.

e. **Space Considerations.** Space operations are a critical enabler that supports all joint operations. Commanders need to ensure US, allied, and/or coalition forces gain and maintain space superiority, which is achieved through global and theater space control, force enhancement, space support, and space force application operations. Also, commanders must anticipate hostile actions that may affect friendly space operations. Commanders should anticipate the proliferation and increasing sophistication of commercial space capabilities and products available to the adversary. USSTRATCOM is the focal
point for global space operations. **The CCDR has responsibility for conducting theater space operations.** Global and theater space operations require robust planning and skilled employment to synchronize and integrate space operations with the joint operation or campaign. Space capabilities help shape the operational environment in a variety of ways including providing ISR and communications necessary for keeping commanders and leaders informed worldwide. JFCs and their components should request space support early in the planning process to ensure effective and efficient use of space assets.

f. **Stability Operations.** Activities in the “shaping” phase primarily will focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent phases. These activities should include conducting collaborative interagency planning to synchronize the civil-military effort, confirming the feasibility of pertinent military objectives and the military end state, and providing for adequate intelligence, an appropriate force mix, and other capabilities. Stability operations in this phase may be required to quickly restore security and infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions of the operational area to dissuade further adversary actions or to help ensure access and future success.

3. **Considerations for Deterrence**

a. **General.** Before the initiation of hostilities, the JFC must gain a clear understanding of the national and military strategic objectives; desired and undesired effects; COGs and decisive points; actions likely to create those desired effects; and required joint, multinational, and nonmilitary capabilities matched to available forces. The JFC must visualize how these operations can be integrated into a campaign with missions that are communicated via commanders intent throughout the force. An early analysis and assessment of the adversary’s decision-making process must be performed to know what actions will be an effective deterrent. Emphasis should be placed on setting the conditions for successful joint operations in the “dominate” and follow-on phases.

b. **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment**

(1) JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture or to conduct an analysis of adversary systems. These supporting capabilities include combat support agencies and national intelligence agencies (e.g., National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, NGA). A national intelligence support team provides the joint force J-2 with the means to integrate national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive intelligence effort designed to support the joint force. J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.

(2) At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process, JFCs focus intelligence efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context of the current situation. They look for specific
indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

For additional guidance on intelligence support to joint operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

c. Preparing the Operational Area

(1) Special Operations. SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining a potential adversary’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM develops strategy and synchronizes planning and execution of global operations and provides SOF to the GCCs to conduct operational preparation of the environment.

For further guidance on special operations, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(2) Stability Operations. Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task should ease the transition to operations in the “stabilize” phase and shorten the path to the national strategic end state and handover to another authority. Considerations include:

(a) Limiting the damage to key infrastructure and services.

(b) Establishing the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces.

(c) Providing for the availability of cash.

(d) Identifying and managing potential “stabilize” phase enemies.

(e) Determining the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational).

(f) Availability of HN law enforcement and HSS resources.

(g) Securing key infrastructure nodes and facilitating HN law enforcement and first responder services.

(h) Developing and disseminating SC themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.
(3) CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA units can assess the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisons between the military and civil organizations. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or coalition, HN forces, as well as OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces can provide expertise on factors that directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS capabilities. CA may be able to perform functions that normally are the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Employment of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned.

For further guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

(4) Sustainment. Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. For example, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified, resourced, and emplaced in a timely manner. Planning must include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces.

d. The theater patient movement policy is set by SecDef in coordination with the GCC prior to joint operation execution. It states the maximum number of days (hospitalization and convalescence) a patient may be held within the command for treatment prior to further movement or return to duty. Patients who cannot be returned to duty within the specified number of days are evacuated to the next category of care outside the operational area for further treatment. The theater patient movement policy, in part, determines how many HSS assets will be deployed to the theater. A short patient movement policy limits the HSS personnel ceiling for the operation and places a heavier reliance on medical evacuation support out of the theater to definitive care facilities in the United States or other designated areas.

For further information on HSS and theater patient movement, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

e. Isolating the Enemy

(1) With President and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs also may be tasked by the President and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.

(2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the use of PSYOP and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.
f. **Flexible Deterrent Options.** Flexible deterrent options (FDOs) are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power, but they are most effective when used in combination.

(1) **Military FDOs** can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response generally requires economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. Military FDOs must be carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and effectiveness. They can rapidly improve the military balance of power in the operational area; especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, PSYOP, and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Care should be taken to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an armed response should adversary leadership perceive that friendly military FDOs are preparation for a preemptive attack.

(2) **Nonmilitary FDOs** are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by OGAs to dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs need to be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus all instruments of national power.

For further guidance on planning FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning.

g. **Protection.** JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to accomplish their mission. This protection dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but be aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as much time on protection as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

h. **Space Force Enhancement.** JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space capabilities. During this phase, space capabilities are limited to already deployed assets and established priorities for service. As the situation develops, priorities for space force enhancement may change to aid the JFC in assessing the changing operational environment. Most importantly, the JFC and component commanders need to anticipate “surge” space capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capabilities.

i. **Geospatial Intelligence Products and Services.** It is essential that any maps, charts, imagery products, and support data — to include datum and reference systems — to be used in a joint operation be fully coordinated with JFC components as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of the SecDef, and the NGA. Requests for or updates to GEOINT products, including maps or annotated imagery products, should be submitted as early as possible through the NGA liaison team at the JFC’s headquarters. US products should be used whenever possible as the accuracy, scale, and reliability of foreign maps and charts may vary widely from US products. In any joint operation, the World Geodetic System-1984 should be the common system. If US products are to be used in a coalition environment or within a
combined headquarters, the release of US mapping materials or imagery products may first require foreign disclosure/release adjudication.

*For further guidance on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support to Joint Operations.*

**j. Physical Environment**

(1) **Weather, terrain, and sea conditions** can significantly affect operations and logistic support of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before sustained combat operations. Mobility of the force, integration and synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic planning tools, studies, and forecast products help the JFC determine the most advantageous time and location to conduct operations.

(2) **Urban areas** possess all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction and the associated infrastructure, resulting in a complicated and dynamic environment that influences the conduct of military operations in many ways. **The most distinguishing characteristic of operations in urban areas, however, is not the infrastructure but the density of noncombatants.** Joint urban operations (JUOs) are conducted in large, densely populated areas with problems unique to clearing enemy forces while possibly restoring services and managing major concentrations of people. For example, industrial areas and port facilities often are collocated with highly populated areas creating the opportunity for accidental or deliberate release of toxic industrial materials which could impact JUOs. During JUOs, joint forces may not focus only on destruction of adversary forces but also may be required to take steps necessary to protect and support noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUOs may be more restrictive than for other types of operations. When planning JUOs, the JFC and staff should consider the impact of military operations on noncombatants to include their culture, values, and infrastructure; thereby viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system — not solely as terrain. This implies the joint force must be capable of understanding the specific urban environment; sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy among noncombatants; and applying combat power precisely and discriminately.

*For additional guidance on JUOs, refer to JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations.*

(3) **Littoral Areas.** The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is essential to maritime superiority. Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project power, fires, and forces to support achieving the JFC’s objectives; and facilitate the entry of other elements of the joint force through the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or air base to allow entry and movement of other elements of the joint force. Depending on the situation, mine warfare may be critical to control of the littoral areas. When this is the case, adequate assets must be made available.
4. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

a. **General.** As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC coordinates with OGAs to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.

b. **Force Projection**

(1) The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs as discussed above to preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, follow-on strikes and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and/or the use of multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the CCDR must sequence, enable, and protect the deployment of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. The CCDR should not overlook enemy capabilities to affect deployment from bases to ports of embarkation (POEs). The deployment of forces may be either opposed or unopposed by an adversary.

(a) **Opposed.** Initial operations may be designed to suppress adversary anti-access capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations may require a forcible entry capability (see subparagraph 4d below). In other cases, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by amphibious forces would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of pre-positioned forces and materiel into the theater. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

(b) **Unopposed** deployment operations provide the JFC and subordinate components a more flexible operational environment to efficiently and effectively build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful combat operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces, to include significant theater opening logistic forces, that best facilitates the CONOPS. In these situations, logistic forces may be a higher priority for early deployment than combat forces, as determined by the in-theater protection requirements.

(2) Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and force protection requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the operational area. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not
directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation. A frequently overlooked concern is friendly POEs where forces are massed for deployment.

(3) During force projection, US forces and PODs must be protected. JFCs must introduce forces in a manner that provides security for rapid force buildup. From a C2 perspective, echelon is essential. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats. Early entry forces also should include a deployable joint C2 capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

(4) **Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)** operations must be considered. JRSOI occurs in the operational area and comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements.

c. **Unit Integrity During Deployment**

(1) US Service forces normally train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness may be decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force takes more time to form and adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but also may have an impact on force protection.
(2) Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select elements for deployment that have established internal procedures and structures, have trained and operated together, and possess appropriate joint force combat capabilities. In order to provide a JFC with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve complete unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements that are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. In this instance, units not accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to normally unrelated units.

(3) The CCDR, in coordination with Commander, United States Transportation Command, subordinate JFCs, and the Service component commanders, needs to carefully balance the desire to retain unit integrity through the strategic deployment process with the effective use of strategic lift platforms. While maximizing unit integrity may reduce JRSOI requirements and allow combat units to be employed more quickly, doing so will often have a direct negative impact on the efficient use of the limited strategic lift. In some cases, this negative impact on strategic lift may have a negative effect on DOD deployment and sustainment requirements beyond the GCC’s AOR. A general rule of thumb is that unit integrity is much more important for early deploying units than for follow-on forces.

d. **Forcible entry** is a joint military operation conducted either as a major operation or a part of a larger campaign to **seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition** for the continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at the enemy COGs and can open new avenues for other military operations.

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. The joint forcible entry operation commander will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the adversary before the adversary has time to react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat of any adversary reaction and facilitates follow-on operations, if required.

(2) **Forcible entry normally is complex and risky** and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.
Chapter V

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander, US Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from bases in the continental United States, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision-making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

Various Sources

(3) The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on operations and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward presence, preparing the operational area, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting decisive operations.

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the adversary and ease forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the theme(s) and message(s) portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to be believable.
(5) **SOF may precede forcible entry forces** to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

(6) **The sustainment requirements and challenges** for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces required to transition to follow-on operations.

*For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.*

e. **Attack of Enemy Centers of Gravity.** As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs using conventional and special operations forces and capabilities. These attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive operations throughout the enemy’s depth that can create dilemmas causing paralysis and destroying cohesion.

f. **Full-Spectrum Superiority.** The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference is essential to joint force mission success. JFCs seek superiority in these domains to prepare the operational area and information environment and to accomplish the mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC may have to initially focus all available joint forces on seizing the initiative. A delay at the outset of combat may lead to lost credibility, lessen coalition support, and may provide incentives for other adversaries to begin conflicts elsewhere.

(1) **JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime superiority early.** Air and maritime superiority allows joint forces to conduct operations without prohibitive interference from opposing air and maritime forces. Control of the air is a critical enabler because it allows joint forces both freedom from attack and freedom to attack. Using both defensive and offensive operations, JFCs employ complementary weapon systems and sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority.

(2) **Land forces** can be moved quickly into an area to deter the enemy from inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an operational advantage. The introduction of land forces, deployed and employed rapidly with support of other components, enables sustained operations to control people and land, contribute to defeat of an adversary, and support the goal of stability.

(3) **Space superiority must be achieved early to ensure freedom of action.** Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing,
and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space control operations are conducted by joint and allied and/or coalition forces to gain and maintain space superiority.

(4) Early **superiority in the information environment** also is vital in joint operations. It **degrades the enemy’s C2 while allowing the JFC to maximize friendly C2 capabilities.** Superiority in the information environment also allows the JFC to better understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions and influence foreign attitudes and perceptions of the operation.

g. **Operations and C2 in the Littoral Areas**

(1) **Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations,** especially in operational areas with limited or poor infrastructure for supporting US joint operations ashore. The ability to project fires and employ forces from sea-based assets combined with their C2, ISR, and IO capabilities are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Maritime forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas and rapidly generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Maritime forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Maritime forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

(2) **JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea.** Depending on the nature of the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC’s CONOPS. In other cases, a maritime headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or subordinate JFCs or other component commanders may use the C2 and intelligence facilities aboard ship.

(3) **Transferring C2 from sea to shore** requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint force commanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.
Major Operations and Campaigns

One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training and rehearsals in this transition is evident.

h. SOF-Conventional Force Integration. The JFC, using SOF independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and specialized capability to achieve objectives that might not otherwise be attainable. Integration enables the JFC to take fullest advantage of conventional and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through proper SOF C2 elements responsive to the needs of the supported commander. Such SOF C2 elements are provided to supported or supporting conventional force commanders and include joint special operations task forces to conduct a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a joint campaign or operation, special operations C2 elements to synchronize integrated SOF/conventional force operations, and special operations liaison elements to coordinate SO with conventional operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force LNOs is also essential to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning and training for integrated operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES INTEGRATION DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces integration demonstrated powerful air-ground synergies in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. SOF, while performing the classic special operations core task of unconventional warfare, organized and coordinated operations of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, and frequently directed massive and effective close air support from Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets. The effects of the continuous SOF directed air strikes so weakened the Taliban and al Qaeda that the Northern Alliance was able to quickly capture the major cities of Afghanistan early in the campaign.

Various Sources

i. Stability Operations. The onset of combat provides an opportunity to set into motion actions that will achieve military strategic and operational objectives and establish the conditions for operations at the conclusion of sustained combat. Operations to neutralize or eliminate potential “stabilize” phase enemies may be initiated. National and local HN authorities may be contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be seized or otherwise protected. Intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure, government organizations, and humanitarian needs should be increased. PSYOP used to influence the behavior of approved foreign target audiences in support of military strategic and operational objectives can ease the situation encountered when sustained combat is concluded.

j. Protection. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations. Further, HN infrastructure and logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the force must be protected. JFCs counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force
from enemy maneuver and fires, including the effects of WMD. OPSEC and MILDEC are key elements of this effort. Operations to gain air, space, and maritime superiority; defensive use of IO; PR; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment also contribute significantly to force protection at the onset of combat operations.

k. **Prevention of Fratricide.** JFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for reducing fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, SOPs, technology solutions (e.g., identify friend or foe, blue force tracking), rehearsals, effective CID and enhanced awareness of the operational environment. Commanders should seek to minimize fratricide while not limiting boldness and initiative.

5. **Considerations for Dominance**

a. **General.** JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ conventional and special operations forces and capabilities throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. The JFC may designate one component or line of operation to be the main effort, with others providing support, or the JFC may have a main effort with other components and functions performing operations in their own mission areas. When conditions or plans change, the main effort and focus of the operation might shift to another component or function. Some missions and operations (i.e., strategic attack, interdiction, and IO) continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action or informational advantage. These missions and operations, when executed concurrently with other operations, degrade enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer to culmination. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

b. **Linear and Nonlinear Operations**

(1) **In linear operations,** each commander directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. **Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs).** In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. A linear operational area organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In
these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily. Coalition operations also may require a linear design. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

(2) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat). Simultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and allows the JFC to retain the initiative. In nonlinear operations, sustaining functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or aerial delivery. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations were applied during Operation JUST CAUSE. The joint forces oriented more on their assigned objectives (e.g., destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. To protect themselves, individual forces relied more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on the communications, intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

(a) During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces must focus offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum essential combat power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility. JFCs may be required to dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend and attacking forces are exposed over a larger operational area. Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The potential for fratricide increases due to the fluid nature of the nonlinear operational area and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces. The presence of noncombatants in the operational area further complicates operations.

(b) During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on destroying enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFC's intent and maintain a COP. Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct area defenses to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas. Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment security will still be a test and may require allocation of combat forces to protect LOCs and other high risk functions or bases. The JFC must ensure that clear command relationships are established to properly account for the added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC security.

(3) Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations
(a) **General.** JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational design. They choose the combination that fits the operational environment and the purpose of the operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations creates the four combinations in Figure V-2).

(b) **Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs.** Linear operations in contiguous AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure V-2) typify sustained offensive and defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces. The contiguous areas and continuous FLOT focus combat power and protect sustainment functions.

(c) **Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs.** The upper right-hand pane of Figure V-2 depicts a JFC’s operational area with subordinate component commanders conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that portion of the operational area outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.

(d) **Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs.** The lower left-hand pane in Figure V-2 illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned operational area divided into subordinate AOs. Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear operations within their AOs. This combination typically is applied in stability operations and CS operations.

(e) **Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs.** The lower right-hand pane of Figure V-2 depicts both the JFC and subordinate JFCs conducting nonlinear operations (e.g., During 1992 in Somalia, joint forces conducted nonlinear stability operations in widely separated AOs around Kismayu and Mogadishu). The size of the operational area, composition and distribution of enemy forces, and capabilities of friendly forces are important considerations in deciding whether to use this combination of operational area organization and operational design.

c. **Operating in the Littoral Areas.** Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of maritime forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving military operational objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. **Attack on Enemy Centers of Gravity.** Attacks on enemy COGs typically continue during sustained operations. JFCs should time their actions to coincide with actions of other operations of the joint force and vice versa to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. As with all operations of the joint force, direct and indirect attacks of enemy COGs should be designed to achieve the required military strategic and operational objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting potential undesired effects on operations in follow-on phases.
# COMBINATIONS OF AREAS OF OPERATIONS AND LINEAR/NONLINEAR OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contiguous Areas of Operations</th>
<th>Noncontiguous Areas of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linear Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Linear Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Line of Own Troops</td>
<td>Rear Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Edge of the Battle Area</td>
<td>Rear Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Urban operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Forcible entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonlinear Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nonlinear Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure V-2. Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations*
e. **Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction**

(1) Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and maritime) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver usually are considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather normally are considered complementary operations designed to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces can be conducted to interdict enemy military potential. Potential responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create a dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces may be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully balance the needs of surface maneuver forces, area-wide requirements for interdiction, and the undesirability of fragmenting joint force capabilities. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements often will exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and maritime force commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and authority assigned and delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through the CONOPS and clear statements of intent for interdiction conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations. In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to achieving military strategic objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying capabilities to meet them. JFCs must define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

(3) All commanders should consider how their operations can complement interdiction. These operations may include actions such as MILDEC, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction. Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. This complementary use of maneuver and interdiction places the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.
(4) Within the joint force operational area, all joint force component operations must contribute to achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish AOs within their operational area. **Synchronization and/or integration of maneuver and interdiction within land or maritime AOs is of particular importance**, particularly when JFCs task component commanders to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions.

(a) Air, land, and maritime commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and future operations. Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on air, land, and maritime maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

(b) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize execution of land and maritime component operations, allow rapid maneuver, and provide the ability to fight at extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs will be based on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or maritime commanders’ requirements to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. **Within these AOs, land and maritime commanders are designated the supported commander for the integration and synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction.** Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or maritime commander, a component commander designated as the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO. If theater/JOA-wide interdiction operations would have adverse effects within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting those operations must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

(c) The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of maneuver operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the land or maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent and CONOPS should clearly state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in the AO and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be avoided, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable commanders normally can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with the land or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide other interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of interdiction operations within the AO.

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral operational areas often requires additional coordination among the maritime commander and other interdiction-capable commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime operations, such as antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commanders maintain communication with the maritime commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in maritime operational areas can result in fratricide and failed missions. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in land or maritime operational areas.
(5) JFCs need to pay particular attention and give priority to activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver and interdiction needs of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or maritime force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to engage with organic assets within their operational areas that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by category, specified geographically, or tied to a desired effect or time period. Interdiction target priorities within the land or maritime operational areas are considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute the theater- and/or JOA-wide air interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces.

f. Operations When WMD are Employed or Located

(1) **Enemy Employment.** An enemy’s use of WMD can quickly change the character of an operation or campaign. The use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs. Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other alliance or coalition members, especially those with little or no defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the alliance or coalition.

(a) Intelligence and other joint staff members advise JFCs of an enemy’s capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that enemy is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these weapons. It is important to ensure that high concentrations of forces do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

(b) Known threat of use and preparedness is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of IPE, and proper use of terrain for shielding against blast and radiation effects. Enhancement of CBRN defense capabilities reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with WMD.

(c) The combination of active defense and passive defense can reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. JFCs may also use offensive operations to eliminate enemy WMD capabilities. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons.

(d) JFCs should immediately inform HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, or NGOs in the operational area of enemy intentions to use WMD. These organizations do not have the same intelligence or decontamination capabilities as military units and need the maximum amount of time available to protect their personnel.

For additional guidance on defensive CBRN measures, refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.
(2) **Friendly Employment.** When directed by the President and SecDef, CCDRs will plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is a Presidential decision. USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to assist in the collaborative planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives.

(a) The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using IO or other means. Regardless, JFCs must implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and special operations forces.

(b) If deterrence is not an effective option or fails, JFCs will respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response may include the employment of conventional, special operations, or nuclear forces.

### 6. Considerations for Stabilization

**a. General.** Operations in this phase ensure the national strategic end state continues to be pursued at the conclusion of sustained combat operations. These operations typically begin with significant military involvement to include some combat, then move increasingly toward enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. As progress is made, military forces will increase their focus on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs. National Security Presidential Directive – 44 assigns US State Department the responsibility to plan and coordinate US government efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. SecState is responsible to coordinate with SecDef to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations. Military support to SSTR operations within the JOA are the responsibility of the JFC.

**b. Several LOOs may be initiated immediately** (e.g., providing humanitarian relief, establishing security). In some cases the scope of the problem set may dictate using other nonmilitary entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems. The goal of these military and civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies that create the problems (e.g., strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government institutions, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for economic reconstruction). With this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to harmonize CMO with the efforts of participating OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs.

*For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.*

**c. Forces and Capabilities Mix.** The JFC may need to realign forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area even while sustained
combat operations still are ongoing in other areas. For example, CA forces and HUMINT capabilities are critical to supporting “stabilize” phase operations and often involve a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that supported the previous phases. Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and scope of forces and capabilities required. These forces and capabilities may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from the RC. The JFC should anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely manner to facilitate their opportune employment.

d. Stability Operations

(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift their focus to stability operations, which likely will involve combat operations. Of particular importance will be CMO; initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary. SC will play an important role in providing public information to foreign populations during this period.

(2) The military’s predominant presence and its ability to command and control forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However, some stability operations likely will be in support of, or transition to support of, US diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting stability operations require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of OGAs, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Military forces should be prepared to work in integrated civilian military teams that could include representatives from other US departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IGOs, NGOs, and members of the private sector with relevant skills and expertise. Typical military support includes, but is not limited to, the following.

(a) Work as part of an integrated civilian-military team ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

*For further guidance, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.*

(b) CA forces are organized and trained to perform CA operations and activities that support CMO conducted in conjunction with stability operations. PSYOP forces will develop, produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular support for the JFC’s objectives. Complementing conventional forces, other SOF will conduct FID to train, advise, and support indigenous military and paramilitary forces as they develop the capacity to secure their own lands and populations.

*For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.*
(c) **CI activities** to safeguard essential elements of friendly information. This is particularly pertinent in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities, IGOs, and NGOs working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to adversary elements that enables them to interfere with stability operations. Members of the local populace often gain access to US military personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry and cooking and provide information gleaned from that interaction to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. The JFC must consider these and similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an estimate of the threat and recommend appropriate actions.

(d) **PA operations** to provide command information programs, communication with internal audiences, media and community relations support, and international information programs.

(e) Reconstruction, engineering, logistics, law enforcement, HSS, etc. needed to restore essential services.

(3) During stability operations in the “stabilize” phase, **protection** from virtually any person, element, or group hostile to US interests must be considered. These could include activists, a group opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will have to be even more alert to force protection and security matters after a CBRNE incident. JFCs also should be constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. **Protection may involve the security of HN authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized**
by higher authority. For contractors, the GCC must evaluate the need for force protection support following the guidelines of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces.

(4) Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or no perceived risk. JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. However, security requirements should be balanced with the military operation’s nature and objectives. In some stability operations, the use of certain security measures, such as carrying arms, wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure communications may cause military forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may degrade the force’s legitimacy and hurt relations with the local population.

(5) Restraint. During stability operations, military capability must be applied even more prudently since the support of the local population is essential for success. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. These ROE often will be more restrictive and detailed when compared to those for sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. The use of nonlethal capabilities should be considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of conflict unnecessarily. The JFC must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal technology is available, how well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE authorize its employment. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member, because a single act could cause adverse political consequences.

(6) Perseverance. Some “stabilize” phases may be short, others may require years to transition to the “enable civil authority” phase. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national strategic end state conditions for as long as necessary to achieve them often is the requirement for success.

(7) Legitimacy. Joint stability operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the emerging or host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Effective SC can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of stability operations.

(8) OPSEC. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that OPSEC be an integral part of stability operations. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.
7. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority

a. **General.** In this phase the joint operation normally is terminated when the stated military strategic and/or operational objectives have been met and redeployment of the joint force is accomplished. This should mean that a legitimate civil authority has been enabled to manage the situation without further outside military assistance. In some cases, it may become apparent that the stated objectives fall short of properly enabling civil authority. This situation may require a redesign of the joint operation as a result of an extension of the required stability operations in support of US diplomatic, HN, IGO, and/or NGO efforts.

b. **Peace Building.** The transition from military operations to full civilian control may involve stability operations that initially resemble PEO to include counterinsurgency operations, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism; and eventually evolve to a peace building (PB) mission. PB provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to the HN populace. Stability operations establish the conditions that enable PB to succeed. PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. The ultimate measure of success in PB is political, not military. Therefore, JFCs seek a clear understanding of the national/coalition strategic end state and how military operations support that end state.

c. **Transfer to Civil Authority.** In many cases, the United States will transfer responsibility for the political and military affairs of the HN to another authority. JFCs may be required to transfer responsibility of operations to another authority (e.g., UN observers, multinational peacekeeping force, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) as the termination criteria. This probably will occur after an extended period of conducting joint or multinational stability operations and PB missions as described above. Overall, transfer likely will occur in stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN mandate, termination of all US military participation). Joint force support to this effort may include the following:

   (1) **Support to Truce Negotiations.** This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguists for all participants.

   (2) **Transition to Civil Authority.** This transfer could be to local or HN federal governments, to a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) after PEO, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a NGO in support of refugees.

d. **Redeployment**

   (1) **Conduct.** Redeployment normally is conducted in stages — the entire joint force likely will not redeploy in one relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of contracts and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting records and files, clearing and
marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring that appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises. Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require refresher training prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.

(2) **Redeployment to Other Contingencies.** Forces deployed may be called upon to rapidly redeploy to another theater. Commanders and their staffs should consider how they would extricate forces and ensure that they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include such things as a prioritized redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking intra- and intertheater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and supporting GEOINT products for the new contingency, and some consideration to achieving the national strategic objectives of the original contingency through other means.

*For further guidance on considerations for termination of operations, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*
1. General

a. **Crises and Contingencies.** US forces need to be able to respond rapidly to certain crises, either unilaterally or as a part of an interagency and/or multinational effort, when directed by the President or SecDef. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, a joint operation often may be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in PEO, a single precision strike, a NEO, or CS mission.

b. **Initial Response.** When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or manmade disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct CS/HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention also can deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor or achieve destabilizing objectives; or mitigate the effects of a natural or manmade disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive operations and the national leadership is willing to employ that force and to deploy more forces if necessary.

c. **Scope.** Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational objective in an operational area. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis (e.g., NEOs) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may be conducted to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives.

d. **Political Aspects.** Two important factors about political primacy in crisis response and foreign limited contingency operations stand out. **First, having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects.** It is not uncommon in some operations, such as PKO, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant political implications. **Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change**
in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. Therefore, commanders must strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes, which over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.

e. Economy of Force. The security environment requires the United States to maintain and prepare joint forces for crisis response and limited contingency operations simultaneous with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and/or coalition partners when appropriate. This approach recognizes that these operations will vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of many crisis response and limited contingency operations may lend themselves to using small elements like SOF in coordination with allied HNs. Initial SOF lead of these operations as an economy of force measure may enable major operations and campaigns with conventional focus to progress more effectively.

2. Typical Operations

a. NEOs are operations directed by the President of the United States and managed by DOS or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may include citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad
and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, is responsible for preparation of emergency action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans is the responsibility of the GCC, as directed by SecDef.

1. **NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty.** They may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic or military relations with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.

2. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

3. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves **swift insertion** of a force, **temporary occupation** of physical objectives, and ends with a **planned withdrawal**. It differs from a raid in that **force used normally is limited** to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees.
Chapter VI

OPERATION EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu’s international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

Operation EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in the midst of the Gulf War.

Various Sources

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-07.5, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
b. **Peace Operations.** PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national power; including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions; to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, **PO encompass PKO, predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, peacemaking (PM) processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.**

> “Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.”

**Dag Hammarskjold**
**UN Secretary-General, 1953-61**

(1) **PKO are military operations** undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, **designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement** (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.
Chapter VI

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Beginning in December 1995, US and allied nations deployed peace operations forces to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Task Force EAGLE, comprised of 20,000 American soldiers, is implementing the military elements of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation marked the first commitment of forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) history as well as the first time since World War II that American and Russian soldiers have shared a common mission. Today, thousands of people are alive in Bosnia because of these soldiers’ service.

During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, deployed intelligence personnel provided aircrews and staffs at several locations with critical threat information and airfield data. Taking advantage of the Combat Intelligence System (CIS) capabilities and an emerging global connectivity to military networks and databases, intelligence personnel provided the best and most timely support ever to air mobility forces. This improvement was particularly evident during the Mission Report (MISREP) process, when intelligence analysts used CIS to provide MISREP data very quickly to aircrews and staffs, ensuring the people in need of this intelligence received it while the data was still useful.

The European Command’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was assigned as theater reserve for NATO forces, while Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 133 and 40 constructed base camps for implementation force personnel. In addition, from June to October a Marine Corps unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron, VMU-1, supported the operation with Pioneer UAV imagery both to US and multinational units. VMU-2 continues to provide similar support.

Various Sources

(2) PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict (e.g., Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE, 1995-2001 in Bosnia and JOINT GUARDIAN, 1999-2001 in Kosovo).

(3) Peace Building. PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic, economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.
(4) **Peacemaking.** PM is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that **arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues** that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, and IO. The purpose is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative to fighting. The military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and mechanisms that promote reconciliation. Military activities that support PM include military-to-military exchanges and security assistance.

(5) **Conflict prevention** consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities. These actions are normally conducted under Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” of the UN Charter. Conflict prevention activities include diplomatic initiatives, efforts designed to reform a country’s security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, and deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to hostilities. Other conflict prevention activities may include military fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. Military forces used for conflict prevention should be focused on support to political and developmental efforts to ameliorate the causes of tension and unrest. Military activities will be tailored to meet political and development demands.
Chapter VI

Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of integrating peace operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed the Commander, US Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 December the President directed CDRUSCENTCOM to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms,
it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US special operations forces and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, as well as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

Various Sources

For additional guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

c. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease,
hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond (see Figure VI-1).

(1) The US military is capable of rapidly responding to emergencies or disasters and restoring relative order in austere locations. US forces may provide logistics (e.g., HSS), planning, and communications resources required to initiate and sustain FHA operations.

(2) FHA operations may be directed by the President or SecDef when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the United States, or when the SecDef deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. DOS or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international FHA operations.

(3) FHA operations may cover a broad range of missions (Figure VI-1, 4th checked item) and include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in three basic types of FHA operations — those coordinated by the
UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally.

*For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

### OPERATION ATLAS RESPONSE

In the early part of February 2000, Cyclone Connie drenched the Southern Africa region with over 40 inches of rain causing many rivers in the region to overflow and flood populated areas. US European Command sent a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to get “eyes on the ground.” Just as the effects of Connie were lessening and the HAST was preparing to head home, Cyclone Eline hit Madagascar. The storm pushed further inland and rain fell in Zimbabwe, adding to reservoirs that were already full. This forced the release of water from reservoirs, causing even more flooding. Mozambique (MZ) was the country with the greatest needs in the region. Consequently, between 18 February and 1 April 2000, Joint Task Force (JTF)-ATLAS RESPONSE, under the command of Major General Joseph H. Wehrle, Jr., US Air Force, was sent to aid the people of Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

The joint force commander established a small, main headquarters in Maputo, MZ to be near the US Ambassador. The majority of forces and staff resided at Air Force Base Hoedspruit, South Africa. Eventually, a small contingent of forces would deploy to Beira, MZ to work at a supply distribution hub. The primary predeployment tasks of the JTF: 1) Search and rescue (SAR), 2) Coordination and synchronization of relief efforts and 3) Relief supply distribution changed during the operation. Upon arrival, the JTF discovered SAR efforts were essentially complete and a fourth key task became the ability to conduct aerial assessment of the lines of communications (LOCs). This fourth task was important because it was also a key indicator in the exit strategy.

During the brief time of the operation, the JTF’s aircraft carried a total of 714.3 short tons of intergovernmental organization (IGO)/nongovernmental organization (NGO) cargo, most of it for direct support of the local population. Helicopters and C-130s also moved 511 non-US passengers. The majority were medics or aid workers carried on special operations forces HH-60s bringing immediate relief to populations cut off from the rest of the world.

Important lessons were learned during this operation. First, the best course of action (COA) may not be bringing enough manpower and resources to dominate the running of a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operation. In this case, supporting the essentially civil-run operation and providing effective counsel worked far better than trying to control the operation as a
supported commander. Political feathers were not ruffled and future operations with these nations or aid agencies likely will be that much easier. Second, the civil-military operations center (CMOC) was key to working with the participating IGOs and NGOs. CMOC personnel were able to set up information nodes that moved information among aid agencies that were sometimes in competition with each other. Because of CMOC's low key approach, it was able to steer each organization it touched to greater organization and efficiency. Finally, early development of an exit strategy provided decision points with tangible measures. All parties must have buy-in to execute it together and there must be “top cover” from the civilian side to ensure national objectives are met.

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE was a political and military success. Not only was humanitarian aid provided to the people of Mozambique, but good relations with South African military and many IGOs and NGOs were forged.


d. **Recovery Operations** may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human remains (e.g., JTF - FULL ACCOUNTING to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning in order to execute. Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the operational environment is hostile, uncertain, or permissive.

e. **Consequence Management.** CM is actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. CM may be planned and executed for locations within US-owned territory at home and abroad and in foreign countries as directed by the President and SecDef. Military support for domestic CM will be provided through Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM), Commander, United States Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), or Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) depending upon the location of the incident. DOS is the federal agency with lead responsibility for foreign CM and DHS is the “Primary Agency” for domestic CM. US military support to foreign CM normally will be provided to the foreign government through the combatant command within whose AOR the incident occurs.

For further CM guidance, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation; CJCSI 3214.01A, Foreign Consequence Management Operations; JPs 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; 3-26, Homeland Security; 3-28, Civil Support; and 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.
f. Strikes and Raids

(1) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own attacks (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin. The strike achieved significant political objectives.).

**OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON**

The strike was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi’s ability to export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him “incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior.” The final targets were selected at the National Security Council level “within the circle of the President’s advisors.” Ultimately, five targets were selected. All except one of the targets were chosen because of their direct connection to terrorist activity. The single exception was the Benina military airfield which based Libyan fighter aircraft. This target was hit to preempt Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Navy A-6 Intruders were assigned the two targets in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One F-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike.

Various Sources

(2) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible entry, in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy an objective or capability (e.g., Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada 1983, to protect US citizens and restore the lawful government). Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

“The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful operation offset the risks. A swift, precise strike probably would rescue most of the students and avert a hostage situation. Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of US military prowess would convey US determination to protect its vital interests.”

Operation URGENT FURY
Ronald H. Cole
Joint History Office

---

g. Homeland Defense and Civil Support Operations. Security and defense of the US homeland is the Federal Government’s top responsibility and is conducted as a cooperative
effort among all federal agencies as well as state, tribal, and local security and law enforcement entities. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions — HD and CS. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. CS consists of support of US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement activities within the scope of the restraints mandated by the Posse Comitatus Act, and other support approved by the SecDef. Requests for federal assistance of this nature must be submitted to the DOD Executive Secretary.

1. **Homeland Defense.** The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies, in defending against external threats/aggression. However, against internal threats DOD may be in support of an OGA. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with OGAs. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security through the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information environment. These include invasion, CNA, and air and missile attacks.

2. **Civil Support.** CS includes using the Armed Forces of the United States and DOD personnel, contractors, and assets for domestic emergencies and law enforcement and other activities when directed by the President or SecDef. For CS operations, DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. Within a state, that state’s governor is the key decision maker.

   a. The majority of CS operations are conducted in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP is the primary Federal mechanism through which DOD support is requested for domestic emergencies. The NRP describes the policies, planning assumptions, and a CONOPS that guide federal operations following a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. The NRP is coordinated and managed by DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is the result of agreements between DHS/FEMA and the primary and supporting federal agencies responsible for providing disaster relief and other emergency support. DOD support is described in the NRP as “defense support of civil authorities” and is provided with the provision that it does not conflict with DOD’s mission or its ability to respond to military contingencies.

   b. Other CS operations can include CD activities, intelligence or investigative support, or other support to civilian law enforcement in accordance with specific DOD policies and US law.

3. **Global Perspective.** CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and CDRUSPACOM have specific responsibilities for HD and CS. These include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their assigned AORs and, as directed by the President or SecDef,
providing CS including CM. However, DOD support to HD is global in nature and is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward regions outside US territories the objective is to detect, deter, or when directed, defeat threats to the homeland before they arise.

For detailed guidance on homeland security, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.

3. Unique Considerations

a. **Duration and End State.** Crisis response and limited contingency operations may last for a relatively short period of time (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or for an extended period of time to attain the national strategic end state (e.g., US participation with ten other nations in the independent [non-UN] PKO, Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982). Short duration operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve national strategic objectives. Nevertheless, it is imperative to have a clear national strategic end state for all types of contingencies.

b. **Intelligence Collection.** As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systems analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some contingencies (such as PKO), the term “information collection” is used rather than the term “intelligence” because of the sensitivity of the operation.

1. **HUMINT** often may provide the most useful source of information. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT also supplements other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the motivations or enthusiasm of the crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, thereby denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. **HUMINT is essential to supplement** other forms of intelligence and information collection to produce the most accurate intelligence products.

2. Where there is little USG or US military presence, open-source intelligence (OSINT) may be the best immediately available information to prepare US forces to operate in a foreign country. OSINT from radio broadcasts, newspapers, and periodicals often provide tip-offs for HUMINT and other intelligence and information collection methods.

3. **Intelligence collection** requires a focus on adversary system factors that affect the situation. This requires a depth of expertise in, and a mental and psychological integration with, all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion,
economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. In addition, intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the operational area, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface LOCs.

(4) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF headquarters level) should include foreign area officers. They add valuable cultural awareness to the production of useable intelligence.

c. Constraints and Restraints. A JFC tasked with conducting a crisis response or limited contingency operation may face numerous constraints and restrictions in addition to the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important, not only because military forces may be used to support international sanctions, but also because of the probability of involvement by IGOs. As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation should be addressed by the CCDR’s staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.

d. Force Protection

(1) Even in permissive operational environments, force protection measures will be planned commensurate with the risks to the force. These risks may include a wide range of nonconventional threats such as terrorism, exotic diseases (medical threat), criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Within any AOI, the CBRNE threats including those transiting the area should be considered. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and JIPOE will contribute to adequate force protection. The impartiality of the force and effective engagement with local community members contribute to force protection. ROE and weapons control policies are important to effective force protection. In developing these policies, planners take into account the capabilities of the force to avoid situations where policies and capabilities do not match. Measures taken to identify and plan for possible hostile acts against a force can be successful only if the force is given commensurate ROE to protect itself.

(2) Limited contingency operations may involve a requirement to protect nonmilitary personnel. In the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address when, how, and to what extent he will extend force protection to civilians and what that protection means.

e. Health Service Support. In addition to providing conventional HSS to deployed forces, HSS resources may be used in operations such as CS, FHA, and disaster relief to further US national goals and objectives. Based on the very humanitarian nature of HSS activities, assistance from HSS forces may be more readily accepted by the civilian populace.

f. Education and Training. The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to conduct a crisis response or limited contingency operation with very little notice. Further, for some contingencies (e.g., NEOs, PO) warfighting skills are not always appropriate. To be effective in these types of situations, a mindset other than warfighting is required. Readying forces to
successfully cope in these conditions requires a two-pronged approach — education and training. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency coordination with special emphasis on the importance of ROE, use of force, and nonlethal weapons should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from coalition partner governments, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs should be invited to participate in these programs.

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.”

LTG T. Montgomery, USA
US Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, 1997

(1) Professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the most senior levels. The focus is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the purpose, principles, and characteristics of crisis response and limited contingency operations; and can plan and conduct these operations. Leader education will include discussions, lessons learned, and situational exercises, and should culminate with senior leaders performing in a command or staff position during a joint exercise.

(2) The focus of crisis response and limited contingency training is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given operation, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation. Depending on the anticipated operation, predeployment training could include individual skill training, situational training exercises, field training exercises, combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, command post exercises, and simulation exercises to train commanders, staffs, and components. If there is sufficient time prior to actual deployment for an operation, units should culminate their predeployment training in a joint training exercise based on the anticipated operation. The unit tasked for the operation should participate in the exercise with the supporting units with which it normally deploys, and if possible, with the next higher headquarters for the actual operation. Once deployed, and if the situation allows, military skills training at the individual and unit level should continue.

(3) Participation in or around the operational environment of certain types of smaller-scale contingencies may preclude normal mission-related training. For example, infantry units or fighter squadrons conducting certain protracted PO may not have the time, facilities, or environment in which to maintain individual or unit proficiency for traditional missions. In these situations, commanders should develop programs that enable their forces to maintain proficiency in their core competencies/mission essential tasks to the greatest extent possible.
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VII
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”
George C. Marshall
22 January, 1948

1. General

   a. Scope. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in a complementary fashion. Because DOS is frequently the federal agency with lead responsibility and nearly always is a principal player in these activities, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to share information and facilitate future operations.

   b. Engagement. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. SCPs provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed force or the threat of force to change the security environment.

   c. Presence and Deterrence. Sustained joint force presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible sign of US commitment — to allies and adversaries alike. However, if deterrence fails, committed forces must be agile enough to rapidly transition to combat operations. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy.

      (1) Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-
military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first that a CCDR commits when responding to a crisis.

(2) **Deterrence.** At all times of peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter adversaries from using violence to reach their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the threat of large-scale nuclear war has diminished, proliferation of WMD and conventional advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the United States, allies, or other friendly nations — including terrorism involving CBRNE weapons — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Effective deterrence requires a SC plan that emphasizes the willingness of the US to employ forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force and enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary. Others (e.g., nation assistance and FHA) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

2. **Types of Activities and Operations**

a. **Emergency Preparedness.** EP encompasses those planning activities undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a designated national security emergency.

   (1) **Continuity of operations (COOP)** ensures the degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the NMS. COOP includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander.

   (2) **Continuity of government** involves a coordinated effort within each USG branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency. Continuity of government activities involve ensuring the continuity of minimum essential branch functions through plans and procedures governing succession to office and the emergency delegation of authority (when and where permissible and in accordance with applicable laws); the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities, and records; the improvisation and emergency acquisition of vital resources necessary for the continued performance of minimum essential functions; and the capability to relocate essential personnel and functions to alternate work sites and to reasonably sustain the performance of minimum essential functions at the alternate work site until normal operations can be resumed. Continuity of government is dependent upon effective COOP plans and capabilities.

   (3) **Other EP roles.** In addition to COOP and continuity of government, if the President directs, DOD may be tasked with additional missions relating to EP.
b. **Arms control and disarmament** means the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (i.e., enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material. One important method of arms control treaty verification that US military personnel may be involved in is monitoring using space-based systems. All of these actions help reduce threats to regional security and afford the opportunity to shape future military operations. Other examples include military support for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament reductions. Finally, the US military’s implementation of Vienna Document 1999 and confidence and security building measures such as unit/formation inspections, exercise notifications/observations, air and ground base visits, and military equipment demonstrations are further examples of arms control.

c. **Combating Terrorism.** This effort involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat exists. It includes antiterrorism — defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts — and counterterrorism — offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.

   (1) **Antiterrorism** involves defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces and civilians. Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for effectively combating terrorism. The basics of such programs include training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. DOD provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to federal agencies with lead responsibility. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries under the provisions of Title 22, USC (under Antiterrorism Assistance).

   For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

   (2) **Counterterrorism** involves measures that include operations to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Within the Armed Forces of the United States, counterterrorism is primarily a SO core task.

   For further details concerning counterterrorism and SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. For US policy on counterterrorism, refer to the National Response Plan and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
d. **DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations.** DOD supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their effort to **disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the United States.** Specific DOD CD authorities are found in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, Public Law Number 101-510, Section 1004, as amended; as well as Title 10, USC, Sections 371-382. DOD support to CD operations:

(1) Enhance the readiness of DOD.

(2) Satisfy DOD’s statutory detection and monitoring responsibilities.

(3) Contribute to the WOT.

(4) Advance DOD’s security cooperation goals.

(5) Enhance national security.

---

**JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)-NORTH**

An example of Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations was the establishment of JTF-6 in 1989. Its mission originally focused exclusively along the Southwest border of the United States. A succession of National Defense Authorization Acts expanded the JTF-6 charter by adding specific mission tasks for the organization. In 1995, the JTF-6 area of responsibility expanded to include the continental United States. In June 2004, JTF-6 was officially renamed JTF North and its mission was expanded to include providing support to federal law enforcement agencies in countering transnational threats.

**Mission:** JTF-NORTH detects, monitors and supports the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to CONUS; fuses and disseminates intelligence, contributes to the common operating picture; coordinates support to lead federal agencies; and supports security cooperation initiatives in order to secure the homeland and enhance regional security.

Various Sources

---

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

e. **Enforcement of sanctions** are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. **Maritime interception operations** are a form of maritime interdiction that may include seaborne coercive enforcement measures. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The **political objective** is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body, while the military objective focuses on establishing a barrier that is selective, allowing only authorized goods to enter or exit. Depending on the geography,
sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of **complementary mutual support** and **full communications interoperability**.

### MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

Maritime Intercept(ion) Operations were conducted to enforce United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) imposed against Iraq in August 1990 in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The UN prohibited cargo originating from Iraq and any imports not accompanied by a UN authorization letter. Although, under the food for oil agreement, Iraq could sell oil and import approved goods into Iraq. The enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq was a multinational operation. Ships from 15 countries, and members of the US Coast Guard served together to help enforce these sanctions. UN Sanctions Resolutions were: UNSCR 661 (established economic embargo), UNSCR 665 (called for naval forces to enforce the embargo), UNSCR 687 (Gulf War cease-fire; authorized shipment of food, medical supplies, UN approved goods), and UNSCR 986 (oil for food program).

Various Sources

f. **Enforcing Exclusion Zones.** An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to **prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area.** Exclusion zones can be established in the air (i.e., no-fly zones), sea (i.e., maritime), or on land (i.e., no-drive zones). Its purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning...
body or face continued imposition of sanctions or threat or use of force. Such measures usually are imposed by the UN or another international body, of which the United States is a member, although they may be imposed unilaterally by the United States (e.g., Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March 1993 to December 1995). Exclusion zones usually are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant violations of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations that may warrant such action include the persecution of the civil population by a government, and efforts to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. Sanctions may create economic, diplomatic, military, or other effects where the intent is to change the behavior of the offending nation.

g. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right accorded by international law.

(1) International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is “innocent” as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

(2) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. The International Civil Aviation Organization develops these norms.

ENSURING OVERFLIGHT AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS

The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990, which allowed air access to West Berlin, were taken to maintain international airspace to an “air-locked” geographical area. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 were freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

h. Nation Assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation (e.g., Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama). Nation assistance operations support the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and HCA. Collaborative
planning between the JFC and OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities can greatly enhance the effectiveness of nation assistance. The JIACG can help facilitate this coordination. All nation assistance actions are integrated into the US ambassador’s country plan.

(1) Security Assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are the Foreign Military Sales Program, the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International Military Education and Training Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act. Security assistance surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. Security assistance surges are military in nature and are focused on providing additional combat systems (e.g., weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of security assistance, to include financial and training support.

(2) FID programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on the operational assistance to HN personnel and collaborative planning with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping a nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its lawful government. US FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support operations as authorized by the SecDef and combat operations as authorized by the President, to HN forces in executing an IDAD program. While FID is a legislatively-mandated core task of SOF, conventional forces also contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct limited FID. For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. For further guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JPs 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

(3) HCA programs are governed by Title 10, USC, section 401. This assistance may be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, HCA programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories.

(a) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.
(b) Construction and repair of basic **surface transportation systems**.

(c) **Well drilling** and construction of basic **sanitation facilities**.

(d) Rudimentary construction and repair of **public facilities** such as schools, health and welfare clinics, and other nongovernmental buildings.

(e) Activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance concerning detection and clearance of explosive hazards (i.e., landmines). Note: US forces are not to engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines (unless it is part of a concurrent military operation other than HCA).

i. **Protection of Shipping.** When necessary, **US forces provide protection** of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and US property **against unlawful violence in and over international waters** (e.g., Operation EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged under the US flag in 1987). This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law and with the consent of the flag state. Actions to protect shipping include **coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine operations,** and **environmental defense,** in addition to operations on the high seas. Protection of shipping requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons; as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat and a logistic base. Protection of shipping may require a combination of operations to be successful.

(1) **Area operations,** either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against hostile bases or facilities.

(2) Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by **escort operations.** Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose.

(3) **Mine countermeasures operations** are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations.

(4) **Environmental defense operations** provide for the coordinated USCG/DOD response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. **While environmental defense operations are typically focused on maritime concerns they are equally applicable on land or in littoral areas.** These incidents have the potential for grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations.

j. **Show of Force Operations** are designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve the **appearance of a credible military force** in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national strategic objectives or to underscore US commitment to an alliance or coalition.
SHOW OF FORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Operation Joint Task Force-PHILIPPINES, was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the coastline of the Philippines.

Various Sources

(1) US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. In addition, SecDef orders a show of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests.

(2) Political concerns dominate a show of force operation, and as such, military forces often are under significant legal and political constraints. The military force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises.

k. Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a government through the use of subversion and armed action. It uses a mixture of political, economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve its political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, an interim governing body, or a peace process while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy — the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek either to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country or to break away from state control and form an autonomous area. US forces may provide logistic and training support as it did for the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In certain circumstances the US can provide direct combat support as in providing support to the French Resistance in WWII, the Afghanistan Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban in 2001-2002, or for NATO’s liberation of Kosovo in 1999.

l. Counterinsurgency operations include support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, foreign military financing program, and international military education and training program. Such support also may include FID.
For further guidance on support to counterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

3. Unique Considerations

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center.”

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF, 1994-1996

a. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations and Host Nation Coordination. There is an increased need for the military to work with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities to plan and conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations and activities. Liaison organizations such as a JIACG can help promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency’s capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal — to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission — can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

b. Information Sharing. NGOs and IGOs, by the very nature of what they do, become familiar with the infrastructure in a region and the culture, language, sensitivities, and status of the populace. This information is very valuable to commanders and staffs who may have neither access nor current information. NGOs and IGOs also may need information from commanders and staffs concerning security issues. However, these organizations hold neutrality as a fundamental principle and will resist being used as sources of intelligence and may be hesitant to associate with the military. Careful coordination is necessary to prevent these organizations from feeling like a source of intelligence. They should not perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. Consequently, the JFC should establish mechanisms like a CMOC to coordinate activities and provide a less threatening venue to share information. If the participating IGOs and NGOs perceive that mutual sharing of information aids their work and is not a threat to their neutrality, then they likely will participate.

c. Cultural Awareness. The social, economic, and political environments in which security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN require a firm understanding of the HN’s cultural and political realities. History has shown that cultural awareness cannot be sufficiently developed after a crisis emerges, and must be a continuous, proactive element of theater intelligence and engagement strategies. The capability of the HN government and leadership, as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure, are critical planning factors.
(1) Security cooperation efforts likely will impact countries throughout a region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring states, including hostility toward the United States, may be factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing enemies in the area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance of power. These same nations may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. While such factors will not dictate US policy, they will require careful evaluation and consideration when conducting military operations under those conditions.

(2) The emergence of regional actors may result in an increase in multinational efforts which may be further complicated by increased cultural and language barriers among partners and interoperability of equipment and tactics. Military plans must accurately identify and address interpreter and translator requirements needed to support multinational operations. Further, foreign language skills and foreign area expertise enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of joint operations. Foreign language skills and foreign area expertise are critical to sustaining alliances and coalitions, pursuing security cooperation and deterrence, and conducting multinational operations.
APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

b. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

c. Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to
have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. **Economy of Force**

   a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

   b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. **Maneuver**

   a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

   b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

6. **Unity of Command**

   a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

   b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

7. **Security**

   a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

   b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance
security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. **Surprise**

   a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

   b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. **Simplicity**

   a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

   b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.

**SECTION B. OTHER PRINCIPLES**

10. **Restraint**

    a. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

    b. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state. For example, the exposure of intelligence gathering activities (e.g., interrogation of detainees and prisoners of war) could have significant political and military repercussions and therefore should be conducted with sound judgment. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

    c. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel are properly trained including knowing and understanding ROE and are quickly informed of any changes.
Appendix A

Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. ROE in some operations may be more restrictive and detailed when compared to ROE for large-scale combat in order to address national policy concerns, but should always be consistent with the inherent right of self-defense. ROE should be unclassified, if possible, and widely disseminated. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in joint operations are not needlessly endangered. In multinational operations, use of force may be influenced by coalition or allied force ROE. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE and influence changes as appropriate. Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders must be aware of national restrictions imposed on force participants.

11. Perseverance

a. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

b. Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the national strategic end state. Some joint operations may require years to reach the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

12. Legitimacy

a. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Interested audiences may include the foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces.

c. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.
d. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate. During operations in an area where a legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.
## JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 SERIES HIERARCHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Operations 3-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2 Joint Land Ops 3-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airspace Control 3-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Operations 3-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological &amp; Oceanographic 3-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting 3-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs 3-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainee Operations 3-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO 3-68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Joint Pubs that have completed development or revision

- Countering Air & Missile Threats 3-01
- Antiterrorism 3-07.2
- NBC Defense 3-11
- Multinational Operations 3-16
- Amphib Ops 3-02
- Peace Operations 3-07.3
- Information Operations 3-13
- Air Mobility Ops 3-17
- Detainee Operations 3-63
- Forcible Entry Ops 3-18
- C2 Joint Maritime Ops 3-32
- Interdiction 3-03
- Counterdrug Ops 3-07.4
- EW 3-13.1
- JTF Headquarters 3-33
- Joint Special Operations 3-05
- Fire Support 3-09
- PSYOP 3-13.2
- HLS 3-26
- Jnt Spec Ops Task Frc Ops 3-05.1
- Laser Desig Ops 3-09.1
- OPSEC 3-13.3
- HLD 3-27
- Urban Operations 3-06
- Close Air Support 3-09.3
- Military Deception 3-13.4
- Deployment & Redeployment 3-35
- Foreign Internal Def 3-07.1
- JSA 3-10
- Space Operations 3-14
- Combating WMD 3-40
- Joint Pubs under development
- Barriers & Mines 3-15
- Civil Support 3-28
- Detainee Recovery 3-30
- C2 Joint Air Ops 3-38
- Engineer Doctrine 3-34
- Counterdrug Ops 3-07.4
- HLD 3-27
- Deployment & Redeployment 3-35
- Joint Pubs in revision
- Amphib Ops 3-02
- Interdiction 3-03
- Joint Special Operations 3-05
- Jnt Spec Ops Task Frc Ops 3-05.1
- Urban Operations 3-06
- Foreign Internal Def 3-07.1
Intentionally Blank
The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary references:


7. DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

8. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

9. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

10. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

11. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

12. CJCSI 3113.01, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans.


14. CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

15. CJCSM 3113.01B, Theater Security Cooperation Planning.


17. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

18. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


22. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

23. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
      JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE NUMBER</th>
<th>COPY NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF CHANGE</th>
<th>DATE ENTERED</th>
<th>POSTED BY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Distribution of Printed Publications

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through the Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Individuals and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and combat support agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint test publications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
700 Robbins Avenue
Bldg 1, Customer Service
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)
814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321
Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD)
US Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001
6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
## GLOSSARY
### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>airspace control order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>airspace control plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>airspace control system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOA</td>
<td>amphibious objective area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>area of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BI</td>
<td>battle injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>counterdrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSNORTHCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSPACOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSSOCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRUSSTRATCOM</td>
<td>Commander, United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>combat identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSC</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>computer network attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>computer network defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMZ</td>
<td>communications zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>communications security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOP</td>
<td>continuity of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>contingency planning guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>civil support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUL</td>
<td>common-user logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>defensive counterair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJTFAC</td>
<td>deployable joint task force augmentation cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNBI</td>
<td>disease and nonbattle injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSPD</td>
<td>defense support to public diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>electronic attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>electromagnetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>emergency preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>functional combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDO</td>
<td>flexible deterrent option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFIR</td>
<td>friendly force information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>force health protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOT</td>
<td>forward line of own troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIG</td>
<td>Global Information Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>high-risk personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>homeland security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>information assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>individual protective equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFSOCC</td>
<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSA</td>
<td>joint security area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOA</td>
<td>joint special operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTCB</td>
<td>joint targeting coordination board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUO</td>
<td>joint urban operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNFC</td>
<td>multinational force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>national defense strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETOPS</td>
<td>network operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Term Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSHS</td>
<td>National Strategy for Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>offensive counterair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation ENDURING FREEDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>open-source intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>peace building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>peace enforcement operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>peacemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>rules for the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>strategic communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>space coordinating authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>security cooperation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJFHQ (CE)</td>
<td>standing joint force headquarters (core element)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOT</td>
<td>war on terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

**adversary.** A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**air interdiction.** Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**airspace control authority.** The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

**airspace control in the combat zone.** A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called airspace control; combat airspace control. (JP 1-02)

**air superiority.** That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 1-02)

**alliance.** The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)
**apportionment.** In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

**apportionment (air).** The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (JP 1-02)

**area air defense commander.** Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

**area of interest.** That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

**area of operations.** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

**arms control.** None. (Approval for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**assessment.** 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**assign.** 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To
detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 5-0.)

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 5-0.)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 5-0.)
center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “centers of gravity” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also called CS. (JP 1-02.)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

collection. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)
**Glossary**

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**combat assessment.** The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

**combat identification.** The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Also called CID. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**combating terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. (JP 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**command and control system.** The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned and attached forces pursuant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s critical information requirement.** An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Also called CCIR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “commander’s critical information requirements” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**commander’s estimate of the situation.** A process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate, which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
commander’s intent. A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. (JP 1-02)

communications system. Communications networks and information services that enable joint and multinational warfighting capabilities. (JP 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part of a theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. Also called COMMZ. (JP 1-02)

computer network attack. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Also called CNA. (JP 1-02)

computer network defense. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks. Also called CND. (JP 1-02)

computer network exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Also called CNE. (JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved,
irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (JP 1-02)

**consequence management.** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02)

**continuity of operations.** The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander. Also called COOP. (JP 1-02)

**conventional forces.** 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

**counterair.** A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1-02)

**counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

**counterterrorism.** Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

**coup de main.** An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02)
course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. Also called COA. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 5-0.)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (Approval for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations. Support provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “DOD support to counterdrug operations” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (JP 1-02)

deployable joint task force augmentation cell. A combatant commander asset composed of personnel from the combatant command and components’ staffs. The members are a joint, multidisciplined group of planners and operators who operationally report to the combatant commander’s operations directorate until deployed to a joint task force. Also called DJTFAC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 1-02)

direct liaison authorized. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1-02)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic
warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

**end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**enemy capabilities.** Those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of the friendly mission. The term “capabilities” includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy, such as attack, defense, reinforcement, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. “Enemy capabilities” are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives throughout the range of military operations. (JP 1-02)

**environmental considerations.** The spectrum of environmental media, resources, or programs that may impact on, or are affected by, the planning and execution of military operations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, environmental compliance, pollution prevention, conservation, protection of historical and cultural sites, and protection of flora and fauna. (JP 1-02)

**exclusion zone.** A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (JP 1-02)

**expeditionary force.** An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign country. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**fires.** The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**fire support coordination measure.** A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.
Also called FSCM. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “fire support coordinating measure” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**flexible deterrent option.** A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect. The flexible deterrent option is the means by which the various diplomatic, information, military, and economic deterrent measures available to the President are included in the joint operation planning process. Also called FDO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**force health protection.** Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well being of Service members. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Also called FHP. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 4-02.)

**force projection.** The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the continental United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to the continental United States or home theater. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**force protection.** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

**freedom of navigation operations.** Operations conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air or sea routes. (JP 1-02)

**friendly force information requirement.** Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**full-spectrum superiority.** The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

**geospatial intelligence.** The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Also called GEOINT. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)

**Global Information Grid.** The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. Also called GIG. (JP 1-02)

**health service support.** All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 4-02.)

**homeland defense.** The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**homeland security.** Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. Also called HS. (JP 1-02)
**hostile environment.** Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**information assurance.** Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

**information environment.** The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 1-02)

**information management.** The function of managing an organization’s information resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**information superiority.** The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 1-02)

**integration.**
1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution.
2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.
3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02)

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**interdiction.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional or functional basis, for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

**joint fires.** Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint fire support.** Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

**joint force air component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force land component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02)
**joint force maritime component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

**joint functions.** Related capabilities and activities grouped together to help joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups — command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.** The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. Also called JIPOE. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-01.3.)

**joint interagency coordination group.** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

**joint operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**joint operations area.** An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint security area.** A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to facilitate protection of joint bases that support joint operations. Also called JSA. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations area.** An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Joint Strategic Planning System.** The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (JP 1-02)

**joint urban operations.** All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. Also called JUOs. (JP 1-02)

**line of operations.** 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “lines of operations” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**link.** 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
littoral. The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (JP 1-02)

major operation. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maritime interception operations. Efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods. Also called MIO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

measure. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “measures of effectiveness” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 1-02)

military engagement. Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
military objective. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

military operations other than war. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

military strategy. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

national defense strategy. A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national military strategy. A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national objectives. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national security strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national strategy. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

network operations. Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information Grid. Also called NETOPS. (JP 1-02)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. 2. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or
physical thing. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**noncombatant evacuation operations.** Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

**objective.** 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan, or an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational area.** An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02)

**operational art.** The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational authority.** That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command
over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**operational design.** The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational design element.** A key consideration used in operational design. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational reach.** The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)
peace building. Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Also called PB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

permissive environment. Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

preventive deployment. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peace operations force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-07.3.)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02)

priority intelligence requirement. An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the environment. Also called PIR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “priority intelligence requirements” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**protection.** Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**protection of shipping.** The use of proportionate force by US warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of US flag vessels and aircraft, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended (consistent with international law) to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons. (JP 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

**raid.** An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**reconnaissance.** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02)

**recovery operations.** Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-50.)

**risk management.** The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 1-02)

**sanction enforcement.** Operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “sanction enforcement and maritime interception operations” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

**security cooperation activity.** Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**sequel.** A major operation that follows the current major operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (JP 1-02)

**Service component command.** A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02)

**show of force.** An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (JP 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

**special operations forces.** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

**specified command.** A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)
**stability operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**standard.** None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**standing joint force headquarters.** A staff organization operating under a flag officer providing a combatant commander with a full-time, trained joint command and control element integrated into the combatant commander’s staff whose focus is on contingency and crisis action planning. Also called SJFHQ. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**strategic communication.** Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. Also called SC. (JP 1-02)

**strategic estimate.** The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the President, Secretary of Defense, or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**strategy.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**strategy determination.** A function in which analysis of changing events in the operational environment and the development of a strategy to respond to those events is accomplished. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**strike.** An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**support.** 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

**supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**support to counterinsurgency.** Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

**support to insurgency.** Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**surveillance.** The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)

**sustainment.** The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**synchronization.** 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 1-02)
system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

task. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

terms of reference. 1. A mutual agreement under which a command, element, or unit exercises authority or undertakes specific missions or tasks relative to another command, element, or unit. 2. The directive providing the legitimacy and authority to undertake a mission, task, or endeavor. Also called TORs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater. The geographical area for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Also called
TO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**theater of war.** Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**theater strategy.** Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**uncertain environment.** Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**unified action.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 1.)

**unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)
Assessments/Revision

- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

CJCS Approval

- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

Two Drafts

- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

Program Directive

- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

Project Proposal

- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #5 Assessments/Revision

STEP #4 CJCS Approval

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: