**ACCEPTABILITY**

Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. JP 1-02

Acceptability is one of the four joint operation plan review criteria. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. They are consistent with the law of war and are militarily and politically supportable.

**Related Terms**

adequacy; compliance with joint doctrine; completeness; feasibility; operation plan

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

**ACCURACY**

Accuracy is one of the seven attributes of intelligence quality. Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as they exist, and estimate future situations and courses of adversary action based on those facts and sound judgment.

It is not enough that intelligence is true; to be accurate it should also describe what is known of the situation. The attributes of complete, timely, and relevant intelligence bear on accuracy. If requirements are not accurately developed, intelligence products will probably be unsuitable for the operation.

Objectivity of intelligence also bears on accuracy. If the intelligence product is skewed by institutional or personal bias in collection, analysis, or dissemination, the resulting erroneous or incomplete portrayals of situations may foster erroneous operational decisions. Although the intelligence presented may be true or accurate in an absolute factual sense, it may fail the accuracy test by the omission of data and perspectives necessary for a complete understanding of the situation.

**Related Terms**

completeness; objectivity; readiness; relevance; timeliness; usability

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0  Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

**ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE**

Direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air defense role, and electronic warfare. JP 1-02
General. Active air defense (see figure below) degrades the effectiveness of enemy air attacks and protects friendly forces. Integrated employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air systems through coordinated detection, identification, assessment, and engagement of enemy forces is necessary to blunt the enemy attack and protect friendly air and surface forces. Airspace control in an active air defense environment can be extremely difficult but is crucial to successful friendly air operations and effective air defense. Positive control or procedural measures must be implemented to ensure that friendly aircraft can safely transit the airspace without inhibiting air defense or other friendly air operations. Regardless of other controls and measures imposed within defended airspace, air defense forces must be able to identify all aircraft in the area readily by electronic, visual, or procedural means. Rapid, reliable, and secure means of identification, implemented within air defense areas, is critical to the survival of friendly aircraft as well as to the effectiveness of air defense.

Methods of Air Defense. Various options for the organization of air defense resources provide effective air defense for the joint force.

Area Defense. A posture designed for the defense of a broad area. There can be specialized applications of area defense when friendly assets to be protected are spread over a large geographical area with defined threat boundaries. An example would be the belt defense used in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Point Defense. A posture designed for the protection of a limited area, normally in defense of the vital elements of a force and of vital installations.

Self-Defense. A posture developed by friendly units to defend themselves against direct attack or threat of attack through the use of organic weapons and electronic warfare.

Maritime Air Defense. Maritime air defense is essentially offensive in nature and may encompass characteristics of all of the other three methods of air defense. Maritime air defense is conducted simultaneously with other naval warfare tasks including antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, etc. Maritime air defense requires the establishment of mutually supporting defense positions to absorb and weaken the enemy attack progressively and is a function of detection range as well as the speed and responsiveness of weapon systems.
Resources. Dedicated air defense assets may be provided by all components and may include or be supported by space assets. Resources of the active air defense system may include the systems described below.

Weapon Systems. All systems have limitations such as reaction time, range, identification capability, and flexibility of operation. Closer examination of individual systems shows that the disadvantages of one are often balanced by the advantages of another; therefore, an effective active air defense requires a mix of weapon types and systems. This balance is required not only between aircraft and surface-to-air weapons but also between the specific types of aircraft, missiles, and antiaircraft artillery.

Surface Air Defense Systems. All air defense agencies and sensors should be integrated to provide an effective surface environment system. This can be accomplished through the use of direct control or procedural control. Efficient, direct control of air defense resources relies on the provision and exchange of essential real-time information. The exchange of real-time information requires the provision of adequate track capacity within systems and the cross-telling of tracks using data processing systems, including space-based assets. Secure, survivable communications systems to connect the control agencies are essential. In addition, the surface environment system itself should be survivable and have redundancy. To provide the spectrum of cover required for air defense operations, a number of complementary systems are necessary. These range from a mix of static and mobile equipment to strategic warning systems. Systems should be netted to enable the gathering and dissemination of information under all operational conditions and to provide mutual support. The surface environment may include early warning and surveillance systems; other netted civil and military sensors; low-level radar systems; mobile radars, including sea-based systems; strategic warning systems; identification systems; early warning systems; communications systems; and data processing facilities.

Related Terms
air defense; airspace control in the combat zone; area air defense commander; joint force air component commander

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-01.2 Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations

ACTIVE DEFENSE (Theater Missile Defense)

General. Active defense applies to operations initiated to protect against a theater missile (TM) attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or destroying TMs in flight. Active defense includes multilayered defense in depth via multiple engagements using air, land, sea, space, and special operations assets. It also includes active electronic warfare (EW) to disrupt remote or onboard guidance systems.

Active defense must consist of defense in depth against all classes of TMs to include ballistic and cruise missiles. When destruction of the TM launch platform prior to launch is not possible or successful, TMs should be engaged by all means available throughout their entire flight profile. Defense in depth provides multiple opportunities to negate the TMs with differing capabilities, increases probability of kill, and prohibits the enemy from being able to counter the defensive system with a single technique. Active defense also include those actions which mitigate the effectiveness of targeting and delivery systems through EW against remote or onboard guidance systems.

Command and Control. The joint force commander (JFC) exercises control of active defense operations by integration of joint theater missile defense (JTMD) systems and forces
into the command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems supporting theater air defense. The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for air defense, to include active defense theater missile defense, to the area air defense commander (AADC). The AADC assists the JFC in determining missions, communications priorities, and rules of engagement (ROE) for active defense forces, based on assessment and prioritization of forces, critical assets, and population centers. Active defense forces are under the operational control of their component commanders, who employ these forces under the weapons control procedures and measures established by the AADC and approved by the JFC.

Effective control of active defense weapon systems requires a capability to provide continuous wide-area surveillance of the AOR, with emphasis on likely missile launch areas. A confirmed launch triggers reactions by a preplanned selection of appropriate defensive systems, in accordance with established ROE. Short missile flight times require that available air-, land-, sea-, and space-based sensor and surveillance assets reports be integrated to provide a complete and current air and space picture. Space-based systems should be responsive to the joint or combined force commander. The C4I systems supporting theater air defense should provide for centralized coordination and decentralized execution of active defense operations.

Planning. Active defense planning begins with intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Upon completing initial analyses, the JFC provides the concept of operation and mission priorities. The commander finalizes decisions on apportionment of JTMD resources after the staff completes its comparison and analyses of the various courses of action and the component commanders have given their input. Intelligence requirements are identified and collection management priorities established for TM detection, acquisition, and identification. Threat priorities and ROE are established for engaging both enemy aircraft and missiles. Forces are designated to protect critical theater assets; e.g., forces, air bases, seaports, population centers, and fleet operating areas.

Execution. Active defense operations should be centrally coordinated and decentrally executed. Based upon unconfirmed launch indicators, United States Space Command may be capable of providing initial warning reports. These reports could be used by the JFC to initiate certain passive defense measures and provide initial cuing to active defense forces.
An enemy launch observed and identified through national, theater, or tactical surveillance systems triggers active defense and attack operations, along with initiating passive defense measures by military units and civilian authorities. (See figure above.)

Area systems, such as some surface-to-air missile systems or interceptors, provide defense in depth by attacking TMs at long ranges. Engaging missiles early in flight permits multiple engagements by the area and point defense systems and minimizes ground damage to friendly forces and infrastructure from missile and warhead debris. Active electronic countermeasures systems also can deceive TM guidance systems late in flight.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5  Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX

Military operations other than war may require units and individuals not found in the active component or may require deployment of more units or individuals possessing a capability than are available in the active component. Examples of these types of units are shown in the figure below. Mobilization of any reserve component units may be difficult if war is not imminent or declared. Consequently, most reserve component participation will be through volunteer support. To take advantage of volunteers, planners should select roles and tasks for reserve forces that can be supported by a rotational force — tour requirements in excess of three weeks will discourage and limit volunteers. If time permits, planners should determine what reserve component capabilities are required, and how long it will take for the units to be trained and ready for deployment. Planners should also review personnel and equipment authorizations for reserve component units to ensure compatibility with active forces. For example, a reserve unit equipped with commercial cargo vehicles would not be able to operate as well in rough terrain as an active unit equipped with tactical vehicles. On the other hand, use of active forces, especially in functional areas heavily reliant on the reserve component, may impact on those forces’ ability to respond to their wartime taskings in the near term because of the time needed to redeploy and repair or replace equipment.

RESERVE UNITS NEEDED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

- Civil Affairs
- Psychological operations
- Airlift
- Medical
- Port security
- Engineers
ADEQUACY

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ADEQUACY

Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned.

JP 1-02

Adequacy is one of the four joint operation plan review criteria. Adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission. Planning assumptions should provide guidelines for the development of the plan to increase the effectiveness of the concept of operations. These assumptions must be reasonable and consistent with strategic guidance.

Related Terms

acceptability; compliance with joint doctrine; feasibility; operation plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON.

JP 1-02

Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in title 10, US Code. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.
Related Terms
combatant command (command authority); command; control; operational control; tactical control

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ADMINISTRATIVE LOADING

A loading system which gives primary consideration to achieving maximum utilization of troop and cargo space without regard to tactical considerations. Equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before they can be used. Also called commercial loading.

Administrative Loading of Ships During Amphibious Operations. Administrative loading is defined as a loading method that gives primary consideration to achieving maximum use of billeting and cargo space without regard to tactical considerations. Equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before they can be used. Administrative loading is not suitable for amphibious assault operations.

Administrative Loading of Airlift Aircraft. Administrative loading gives primary consideration to achieving maximum use of aircraft passenger and cargo capacities, without regard to ground force tactical considerations. Administrative-loaded materiel usually requires unloading and sorting before it is used. Administrative loading maximizes the use of the volumes and weight capacities of airlift aircraft, their allowable cabin load, while combat loading maximizes the combat readiness of the organizations and equipment being moved.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02.2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

ADVANCED OPERATIONS BASE

In special operations, a small temporary base established near or within a joint special operations area to command, control, and/or support training or tactical operations. Facilities are normally austere. The base may be ashore or afloat. If ashore, it may include an airfield or unimproved airstrip, a pier, or an anchorage. An advanced operations base is normally controlled and/or supported by a main operations base or a forward operations base. Also called AOB.

An advanced operations base (AOB) is a small temporary base established near or within a joint special operations area to command, control, and/or support training or tactical operations. Facilities are normally austere. The base may be ashore or afloat. If ashore, it may include an airfield or unimproved airstrip, a pier, or an anchorage. An AOB is normally the location of a special operation force company or smaller element controlled and/or supported by an main operations base or forward operations base (FOB). An AOB is established by an special forces company to extend the command, control, and support
functions of an FOB. For example, an AOB may function as a launch-and-recovery or radio relay site.

Related Terms
forward operations base; main operations base

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

AERIAL DELIVERY

Aerial delivery is one of the two basic methods of airlift delivery, the other being airland delivery. Because each offers a particular set of advantages and disadvantages to airlift users and providers, selecting the best method of delivery for a particular airlift requirement is a key planning decision. (See figure below.) The different methods of airlift delivery form a complementary system that can deliver at least some of a unit’s equipment requirements, and virtually all of its personnel and sustainment materiel requirements at any time under most conditions of terrain and weather.

In the various aerial delivery methods, airlifted personnel and materiel are disembarked or unloaded from aircraft still in flight. Aerial delivery is often militarily advantageous, because it permits sustainment deliveries to units operating away from airfields and landing zones, permits the delivery of combat forces and materiel, concentrated and in mass, in minimum space and time, and some airlift aircraft can accurately airdrop personnel and materiel in conditions of poor visibility that would otherwise preclude airland operations (e.g., using the adverse weather aerial delivery system).

In relation to airland delivery, aerial delivery has several disadvantages. It carries an increased risk of injury to personnel or damage to cargo, requires special training for the riggers, transported personnel, and the aircrews, can limit allowable cabin load utilization substantially because of the special rigging required for airdropped materiel, has ground wind limitations, and if employed by a large formation, represents an operational level risk, because detection and successful attack by the enemy could rob the theater campaign of two critical assets: the airlift force and the unit and/or materiel being carried. Accordingly, the decision to utilize the aerial delivery method is predicated on determining whether a user’s requirements justify the expenditure of scarce and costly airdrop resources.
“Five thousand balloons, capable of raising two men each, could not cost more than five ships of the line; and where is the prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense as that 10,000 men descending from the clouds might not in many places do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought together to repel them.”

Benjamin Franklin Letter to Jan Ingenhousz, 1784

Related Terms
airland delivery; theater airlift

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION

The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation.

Aeromedical evacuation is the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. As shown in the figure below, the worldwide aeromedical evacuation system operates in the continental United States (CONUS), between the theater and CONUS, and within the theater. Tactical aeromedical evacuation from the combat zone (Echelon III) to the communications zone (Echelon IV) is normally a responsibility of the supporting theater Air Force component commander. Patient evacuation from the theater is the responsibility of US Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, who is responsible for establishing, operating, training, and maintaining the common-user aeromedical evacuation system worldwide. This mission is executed by the Air Mobility Command.
Vietnam: From the Field to the Hospital

Field evacuation and hospitalization of wounded in Vietnam was different from any previously carried out in any war. In addition it varied both in time and place within Vietnam. It was characterized by the absence of front lines and the traditional chain of evacuation. In general, the wounded Soldier was apt to receive his wounds while with a small group or unit isolated deep in roadless jungle, and the wounds were more apt to be multiple over all parts of the body than in any previous war. First aid and emergency medical treatment given on the site by company aid men, however, differed little from previous times. Resuscitative equipment and procedures included pressure dressings, tourniquets, and airways. Morphine was available but seldom used, as pain was not usually a problem at this point and aid men were aware of the depressant effects of morphine. In all likelihood, the patient would be evacuated within a relatively few minutes by helicopter, either a medical ambulance craft or a tactical one. The facilities available for resuscitation aboard the helicopter varied depending on whether it was a medical (“dust-off”) helicopter or a combat helicopter. IV fluid, usually Ringer’s Lactate solution, was often available, and trained medical technicians and emergency equipment were also present on dust-off helicopters.

The destinations of the helicopters varied. In some areas patients were taken to aid stations or medical companies. More often the helicopter flew the patients directly to a surgical hospital where they could receive definitive care. Blood and electrolyte solutions were often available at aid stations and medical and clearing companies, as was some surgical capability. Complete surgical facilities, including anesthetists, were available at clearing companies, but definitive surgery was usually not done here. At times battalion surgeons flew forward to a site of combat, bringing blood and other supplies which were given on the spot.

Hospitals fulfilled much the same function for combat wounded, whether they were surgical hospitals, field hospitals, or evacuation hospitals. By and large
they were all “semipermanent,” usually buildings set on a concrete floor, air-conditioned and with all utilities and other equipment of a first-rate hospital in the continental United States.

Resuscitation of a Vietnam war casualty was an extremely rapid and sophisticated procedure. The patient would often be brought to the hospital directly from the battlefield by medical evacuation helicopter, frequently in less than an hour. Usually he received emergency treatment on the battlefield, to include control of hemorrhage, wound dressing, respiratory control, and often the starting of intravenous fluid. At the hospital, he was immediately taken to the resuscitation area where he was surrounded by a large team of highly trained physicians, nurses, and technicians.

The results of this prompt and efficient treatment may perhaps be best illustrated by comparing them with similar statistics from previous wars. In Vietnam, 46,000 of 346,000, or 13 percent, of all wounded American Soldiers died. If 22 percent had died, as was true in Korea, there would have been
77,840 deaths, 31,840 more than actually occurred. In World War II, 28 percent of all wounded American Soldiers died. If the medical treatment of Vietnam had been available during World War II, 117,748 Soldiers would have been saved.


Medical care is furnished during aeromedical evacuation.

Related Terms
echelons of care; evacuation policy; health service support; patient evacuation

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
JP 4-02.2 JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations

AGILITY

Agility is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare. Agility, the ability to move quickly and easily, should characterize our operations. Agility is relative; the aim is to be more agile than the foe. Agility is not primarily concerned with speed itself, but about timeliness: thinking, planning, communicating, and acting faster than the enemy can effectively react. Operating on a more accelerated time scale than the enemy’s can expand our options while denying opponents options that they deem important.

“The true speed of war is...the unremitting energy which wastes no time.”

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
Agility has different perspectives based on the level of war (strategic, operational, or tactical). At each of these levels, operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space must achieve a synchronized timing and rapid tempo that overmatch the opponent.

Strategic agility requires properly focused logistic support and a smoothly functioning defense transportation system. Forward-deployed forces, prepositioning, and the ability to deploy forces rapidly from the United States, and redeploy them as necessary within and between theaters, also enhance strategic agility.

The interaction of air, land, and sea forces contributes powerfully to operational agility, as shown by the example of the Solomon Islands campaigns provided below. The ability to integrate and exploit the various capabilities of a joint force can disorient an enemy who is weak in one or more of the dimensions of warfare, helping to create a mismatch between what the foe anticipates and what actually occurs. This mismatch can lead to shock, panic, and demoralization, especially in the minds of the enemy leadership.

Joint Campaigning in the Solomons, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point in the war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as a sequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations.

Operations began with the August, 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audacious stroke to eliminate the threat posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island to the Allied air and sea lines of communication with Australia. During the next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperate land battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal. During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six grueling surface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that had so punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew a unique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single air command, the “Cactus Air Force.” (CACTUS was the codeword for Guadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “If it had wings it flew; if it flew it fought....”

“For control of a patch of ocean...Marines clung doggedly to an inland ridge, for a ground victory weeks in the future pilots nursed aloft their worn-out aircraft against all odds, and for possession of their landing field warships miles distant pounded at one another in darkness fitfully lit by searchlights, gunfire, and flaming wreckage. No episode in World War II better illustrates than Guadalcanal the interdependence of the Services that is characteristic of “modern war.” Any one of the military arms of land, sea, or sky could have thrown away the issue; none alone could gain it.”

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertook a sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the huge Japanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forces to shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines; land forces once ashore seized and built airfields; from these airfields air forces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further naval advance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into Air Solomons
Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined air organization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.


Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

AIR CORRIDOR

A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces.

JP 1-02

An air corridor is a procedural airspace control measure. It is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly (primarily Army) aircraft and established to prevent friendly forces from firing on friendly aircraft. Air corridor procedures are used to route aviation combat elements between such areas as forward arming and refueling points, holding areas, and battle positions. Altitudes of an air corridor do not exceed the coordinating altitude, if established.

If a coordinating altitude has been established, an air corridor is implemented by the using authority. If a coordinating altitude has not been established, an air corridor is established by the airspace control authority at the request of the appropriate ground commander.

Related Terms
air defense; base defense; coordinating altitude; fighter engagement zone; high altitude missile engagement zone, high-density airspace control zone, joint engagement zone, low-altitude missile engagement zone; positive identification radar advisory zone; restricted operations area; short range air defense engagement zone; weapons engagement zone

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

AIR DEFENSE

All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.

JP 1-02

Integration of Combat Zone Airspace Control and Air Defense Operations. Because these two areas would conflict and interfere with each other if operating independently, prioritization and integration of each mission is essential. Ultimately, the airspace control function must be performed in close conformity with air defense operations. Airspace control procedures will be used to assist in aircraft identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft, and provide safe passage of friendly aircraft.
Air defense units must be free to engage hostile aircraft within prescribed rules of engagement. However, procedures may need to be established within the combat zone airspace control system to allow identification of friendly aircraft, not cause delays in offensive operations, and prevent fratricide. These procedures need to be simple to execute for both aircrews and ground operations personnel and may include visual, electronic, geographic, and/or maneuver means for sorting friend from foe. Air defense operations should not cause delays in air operations by creating an unnecessarily complicated or lengthy air route structure. Likewise, airspace control measures should not unduly restrain surface-to-air weapons systems so as to put them at increased risk of enemy air attack. Characteristics of procedures used to deconflict in time and space, coordinate and integrate the activities of all users of airspace (including fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft) are shown in the figure above.

Air defense systems might be overwhelmed by massed enemy attacks across limited geographic areas along the front. Therefore, highly flexible airspace control procedures need to be devised to anticipate the perceived threat. The procedures should allow coordinated employment of air and land or maritime air defense systems against the threat and use the inherent flexibility of air defense airborne platforms to mass forces to meet the enemy attackers. However, the problem of separating friendly and enemy aircraft during the heat of battle and employing land- or maritime-based air defenses against these enemy elements is a highly complex task.

Related Terms
active air defense; passive air defense

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

AIRDROP

The unloading of personnel or materiel from aircraft in flight.  

General. The airdrop system should be designed to be responsive in supporting requirements. Airdrop resupply is a joint action between the Air Force component and the
component being supported. Supported components are responsible for providing required supplies, rigging them for airdrop, and delivering them to the departure airfield. The supported component is also responsible for loading the supplies onto the airdrop aircraft under supervision of Air Force personnel.

Units requesting airdrop resupply have responsibilities to accomplish both before and after submission of airdrop requests. Before submitting requests, units determine the supplies and equipment needed, location of drop zone, and time and date airdrop is desired.

After airdrop requests are submitted, units prepare and secure the drop zone and control the drop zone in the absence of an Air Force combat control team, recover airdropped supplies and equipment, and recover, retrograde, or destroy airdrop equipment.

**Types of Equipment Airdrop.** (See figure below.)

Free Drop. Free drop is airdrop without a parachute or retarding device in which the load descends at a rate of 130 to 150 feet per second. Energy-dissipating material around the load lessens the shock when the load hits the ground. Items that may be free-dropped include fortification or barrier material, bales of clothing, and meals ready to eat.

High-Velocity Drop. Ring-slot cargo, cargo extraction, and pilot parachutes are used to stabilize loads for high-velocity airdrop. The parachute has enough drag to hold the load upright during the descent at 70 to 90 feet per second. Items to be high-velocity airdropped are placed on energy-dissipating material and rigged in an airdrop container. Such items might include subsistence, fuel products, and ammunition.

Low-Velocity Drop. Cargo parachutes are used for low-velocity airdrop. Items are rigged on an airdrop platform or in an airdrop container. Energy-dissipating material placed beneath the load lessens the shock when the load hits the ground. Cargo parachutes attached to the load reduce the rate of descent to no more than 28 feet per second. Fragile materiel, vehicles, and artillery may be low-velocity airdropped.
AIR EFFORT

A portion of the total joint force air effort is available for joint air operations. The air capabilities/forces made available for joint force air component commander (JFACC) or joint force commander (JFC) (under the JFC staff option) planning and tasking are determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders, and based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

Component commanders make capabilities/forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance. These capabilities/forces are tasked directly by the JFC or by the JFACC based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision.

Only the JFC has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component’s direct support air capabilities/forces. When a component does not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission, the JFACC or JFC will task available joint air capabilities/forces (through the joint air tasking order (ATO)) based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision. An understanding of what defines component direct support air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces is necessary. Component direct support air capabilities/forces are those air capabilities/forces organic to a component that are used by the component to accomplish its assigned mission. When appropriate, they appear on the joint ATO for coordination and deconfliction purposes.

Related Terms

ten related terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

AIRLAND DELIVERY

There are two types of airland operations that provide transportation within a theater or joint operations area. The first is the routine movement of personnel and equipment within the theater during peacetime or contingency operations. The second type is the airlanding of combat forces directly into an objective area as the situation allows.

In the airland delivery method, airlifted personnel and materiel are disembarked, unloaded, or unslung from an aircraft after it has landed or, in the case of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, after it at least has entered a hover. Airland delivery is usually the most efficient delivery method because it allows a greater degree of unit integrity and capability to rapidly employ units after landing; it carries the least risk of injuring personnel and damaging loads; it requires minimal specialized training and equipment for transported personnel; it seldom requires special rigging of materiel; and it permits the maximum utilization of allowable cabin loads by eliminating the volume and weight penalties of preparing loads for airdrop deliveries. Another advantage of the airland delivery method is that it maximizes the opportunity to backhaul or evacuate cargo and personnel.

The principal disadvantages of airland operations are they require airfields or landing zones that are moderately level or unobstructed and may or may not be available or adequate for the
anticipated operation; they may increase mission intervals depending on airfield size, offload equipment availability, and airfield support capability; they require more time for delivery of a given size force than parachute delivery; they normally require airlift mission support such as ground-handling and transportation assets; and they may prolong and intensify the exposure of the aircraft operating at forward fields to ground or air attacks. However, because the operational tactics and rapid offloading techniques of various theater airlift aircraft can minimize these disadvantages, planners should view airland delivery as the option of first choice for most air movements.

**Related Terms**

aerial delivery

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**AIRLIFT COORDINATION CELL**

A cell within the air operations center which plans, coordinates, manages, and executes theater airlift operations in the area of responsibility or joint operations area. Normally consists of an airlift plans branch, an airlift operations branch, and an airlift logistics branch. Also called ALCC.

The exact organization of the airlift coordination cell (ALCC) will be dependent upon the requirements of the joint force commander (JFC) and in the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) (or Air Force component commander’s (AFCC’s)) concept of organizing and operating the joint air operations center (JAOC). Normally, the ALCC will consist of an airlift plans branch, an airlift operations branch, and an airlift support branch. These airlift elements, though consolidated in the ALCC, will coordinate with various air operations center planning and operational elements. The JFACC normally exercises control of the ALCC through the JAOC director. As part of the JAOC director’s staff, the Chief, ALCC, plans, coordinates, and manages the execution of theater airlift operations with assigned forces. The ALCC will coordinate with the air mobility element (AME), (Air Mobility Command’s tanker airlift control center, if no AME is established in theater), the joint movement center, and the director of mobility forces if designated. In those cases where the JFACC is other than Air Force, the JFC should task the AFCC to augment the Chief, ALCC, with knowledgeable personnel to support operations in the JAOC.

**Related Terms**

air mobility element; air operations center; director of mobility forces

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**AIRLIFT MISSION COMMANDER**

A commander designated when airlift aircraft are participating in airlift operations specified in the implementing directive. The airlift mission commander is usually designated by the commander of the deployed airlift unit, but may be selected by the Air Force component commander or joint force air component commander depending on the nature of the mission.
The airlift mission commander establishes control through the combat control team of all air traffic movement (traffic pattern, landing, taxi, parking, and takeoff) at Air Force operated landing zones, and also is responsible for movement control of ground vehicles at these locations and space allocation for operations and living areas.

**Related Terms**

joint force air component commander

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS**

Airlift’s primary mission is to establish air lines of communications (ALOCs) between air terminals, as required for operations. The United States establishes ALOCs by coordinating the operations of three distinct components of airlift forces. Strategic airlift forces (also called intertheater or global airlift forces) primarily provide common-user airlift into theater terminals from outside the theater. Theater airlift forces primarily provide common-user lift between terminals within a theater. Organic airlift forces, drawn mainly from Service elements, are not common-user assets, and primarily provide specialized lift to specific users, usually between terminals within a theater.

**Related Terms**

lines of communications

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**AIR MOBILITY ELEMENT**

The air mobility element is an extension of the Air Mobility Command Tanker Airlift Control Center deployed to a theater when requested by the geographic combatant commander. It coordinates strategic airlift operations with the theater airlift management system and collocates with the air operations center whenever possible. Also called AME.

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-02

The air mobility element (AME) deploys to the theater as an extension of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Tactical Air Command Center, when requested. It coordinates with the theater airlift management system and collocates with the air operations center (or joint or combat air operations center) whenever possible. It provides coordination and interface of the strategic air mobility system (airlift and air refueling) with the theater air logistic system. The AME assists and advises the Director of Mobilization Forces, when established, on matters concerning strategic air mobility assets. AMC retains operational control of the AME and will organize and manage the AME to support the geographic combatant commander’s airlift requirements in consonance with US Transportation Commander’s global requirements. The corporate efforts of the AME, airlift control center, and the Tanker Cell ensure the seamless execution of air mobility operations in support of the theater.

**Related Terms**

Director of Mobility Forces

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-01.1 JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

As part of the overall planning for an operation involving air movement, air movement planning is developed from the objective area back to the existing disposition of forces (backward planning). The sequence is as follows: overall tactical plan; landing plan; air movement plan; and marshalling plan.

The overall tactical plan for an operation is the basis for all other planning. It covers the concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver. It includes a determination of strength and composition of the forces required to accomplish assigned tasks and a supporting logistics plan. Until the overall tactical plan is complete, other planning cannot be finalized.

The air movement plan covers the phase of the air movement operation from the time units begin loading aircraft until they arrive at the objective. The air movement plan lists takeoff time, flight routes, and order of flight and arrival times at drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs). It facilitates timely delivery of units to the objective area in accordance with the landing plan.

Air movement plans are coordinated with elements of plans. The combat control personnel, communications equipment, and navigational aids required for assault, follow-on, resupply, and withdrawal operations are established on the airfield, LZ or DZ.

The air movement table forms the principal part of the air movement plan. It contains the essential elements of the air movement plan, as listed in the figure below.

### ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

1. Departure airfield for each serial.
2. Number of aircraft for each serial.
3. Chalk numbers for each aircraft, serial, and departure airfield.
4. Unit identity of the airlift element.
5. Name and rank of each US Air Force serial commander.
6. Employment method for each aircraft airlanding, personnel drop, heavy equipment drop, container delivery system, and extraction.
7. Ground unit identity.
8. Name and rank of each assault force commander.
9. Load times.
10. Station times.
11. Takeoff times.
12. Designated primary and alternate landing zones or drop zones for each serial.
13. Time over target/arrival for the lead aircraft.
14. Remarks (include special instructions, key equipment, and location of key members of the chain of command).

### Related Terms

landing plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTPP for Theater Airlift Operations
AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

The principal air operations installation from which aircraft and air warning functions of combat air operations are directed, controlled, and executed. It is the senior agency of the Air Force Component Commander from which command and control of air operations are coordinated with other components and Services. Also called AOC.

The air operations center (AOC) is the Air Force component commander’s (AFCC’s) means of turning the joint force commander’s guidance into a component air operations plan. It allocates resources and tasks forces through air tasking orders. In joint operations, the Joint Air Operations Center is collocated with the AOC if the AFCC is the joint force air component commander.

Related Terms
joint air operations center; theater air control system

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE COMBAT ZONE

A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called combat airspace control; airspace control.

General. Using current US national military objectives and assigned missions as a baseline, the joint force commander (JFC) develops area of responsibility/joint operations area (AOR/JOA)-specific concepts for combat zone airspace control operations to aid in accomplishing these objectives. Procedures to implement these concepts must take into consideration the likelihood of multinational warfare. As such, they should consider the need for developing doctrine and procedures to ensure compatibility and interoperability of support systems and methods to handle potential alliances and coalitions. US forces participating in multinational operations also may be subject to command arrangements and authorities established in international agreements.

Combat zone airspace control increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed upon the friendly airspace users. Airspace control includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness; however, the airspace control authority does not have the authority to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations that is vested only in operational commanders. Combat zone airspace control needs to provide a commander the operational flexibility to employ forces effectively in a joint or multinational campaign or operation.

Fundamental Considerations. The basic principles of war and the commander’s concept of operations are the cornerstone of operations. The primary objective of combat zone airspace control is to maximize the effectiveness of combat operations without adding undue restrictions
and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any Service or functional component. Other fundamental considerations are shown in the figure below.

**Basic Principles.** The airspace control system supporting joint force operations must be based on the principle of unity of effort. A coordinated and integrated combat airspace control system is essential to successful operations. A major reason for close coordination between airspace control, air traffic control, and area air defense elements is to reduce the risk of fratricide and balance those risks with the requirements for an effective air defense.

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<tr>
<th>FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE COMBAT ZONE</th>
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<tr>
<td>■ The need for each Service or functional component within the joint force to operate a variety of air vehicles and weapon systems, both high and low speed, rotary- and fixed-wing (manned and unmanned), within the combat zone airspace control area.</td>
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<td>■ The need for each Service or functional component to use the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of risk operationally acceptable to the joint force commander.</td>
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<td>■ The need for airspace control activities to be performed in congruence with air defense operations to integrate and synchronize surface-to-air defense weapons and air defense aircraft for maximum effectiveness.</td>
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<td>■ The need to discriminate quickly and effectively between friendly, neutral, and enemy air operations and vehicles.</td>
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<td>■ The need for the combat zone airspace control system to be responsive to the requirements of the joint force. The airspace control system needs to be capable of supporting high-density traffic and surge operations as may be required by the joint force commander.</td>
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<td>■ The need for close coordination and integration of surface force operations, supporting fires, air operations, air defense operations, special operations, and airspace control activities.</td>
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<td>■ The need to accommodate US, host-nation, and multinational airspace control activities within the joint combat zone.</td>
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<td>■ Recognition of the saturation levels and limitations of airspace control networks.</td>
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<td>■ The need for temporary restrictive airspace control measures on certain areas of airspace to allow subordinate commanders total freedom of operations.</td>
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<td>■ Detailed incorporation of coordinated offensive operations using electronic warfare elements, strike aircraft, and cruise missiles to ensure that defensive elements or procedures of the force do not unacceptably inhibit or degrade offensive capabilities.</td>
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<td>■ The need to ensure that the airspace control network remains survivable and effective.</td>
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<td>■ The need to provide maximum opportunities to employ deception measures.</td>
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<td>■ The need to standardize communications data, format, and language requirements in multinational operations to reduce the possibility for differences in interpretation, translation, and application of airspace control procedures during multinational operations.</td>
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<td>■ The capability to support day or night and all-weather operations.</td>
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Identification requirements for airspace control must be compatible with those for air defense. Combat zone airspace control, air defense, military air traffic control, and supporting command, control, communications, and computers (C4) procedures, equipment, and terminology need to be compatible and mutually supporting and should be interoperable.

Common combat zone airspace control procedures within the joint force AOR/JOA enhance the effectiveness of air operations. These procedures need to allow maximum flexibility through an effective mix of positive and procedural control measures. The control structure needs to permit close coordination between land, maritime, special operations forces, and air operations and allow rapid concentration of combat power in a specific portion of airspace in minimum time. Procedural control needs to be uncomplicated and readily accessible to all aircrews, air traffic controllers, air defense weapons controllers, and airspace controllers.

The airspace control system in the combat zone must have a reliable, jam-resistant, and, where appropriate, secure C4 network. However, care must be exercised to avoid control procedures that rely heavily on voice communications. Emphasis should be placed on simple, flexible air traffic control schemes, and “in the blind” procedures.

Airspace control systems in the combat zone need to be durable and redundant because they are likely to be prime targets for an attacker. The airspace control structure in the combat zone needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and to the evolving operation.

Combat zone airspace control is a compromise between a wide variety of conflicting demands for airspace use. Flexibility and simplicity must be emphasized throughout to maximize the effectiveness of forces operating within the system. Combat zone airspace control needs to be capable of supporting day or night and all-weather operations.

In summary, the combat zone airspace control procedures must prevent mutual interference from all users of the airspace, facilitate air defense identification, and safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the theater of operations. In accomplishing these broad tasks, the basic principles of war and the JFC’s concept of operations remain the cornerstones of operations.

**Organization.** The following descriptions of broad duties are central to effective airspace control in the combat zone. Further, complete understanding of the role of the JFC, the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the component commanders, the airspace control authority (ACA), the area air defense commander (AADC), and fire support coordination agencies and the roles that they play in executing the JFC’s campaign or operation plan is essential.

**Joint Force Commander.** A combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) and a subordinate JFC exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned forces. The JFC normally exercises OPCON over attached forces, unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. The JFC is responsible for employment of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available to accomplish the assigned mission or objective according to guidance provided by the establishing commander. Key to the JFC’s responsibilities is the development of objectives and priorities for the joint force. Objectives and priorities provide the basis for all subordinate and supporting plans, including the airspace control plan. Finally, the JFC provides authoritative direction to subordinate commanders that includes assigning objectives, priorities, and tasks. For air operations, this includes general and specific direction on the objectives and priorities.

**Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The JFC will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s estimate of the situation. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally will include, but are not
limited to, planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking based on the JFC’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. Because of the integrated relationship between airspace control measures and air defense operations, ACA and AADC duties normally should be performed by the same person, who may also be the JFACC. Normally, the JFACC will be the Service component commander who has the preponderance of the air assets to be used and the ability to assume that responsibility.

Component Commanders. The component commander advises the JFC on the employment of component forces and the direction and control of those forces. Each component commander plans and executes a portion of the total air effort and interacts with other components. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each component commander within a joint force is responsible for the following:

• Employs air defense weapon systems in accordance with the principles established in the Joint Pub 3-01 series, Joint Pub 3-04, “Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air),” established rules of engagement, and the area air defense plan.
• Coordinates and deconflicts the employment of assigned and attached forces with other subordinate commands as required by the operational situation. Coordination for combat zone airspace control may be facilitated through collocation of key airspace control, air defense, and fire support coordination agencies.
• Provides airspace control in areas designated by the ACA in accordance with directives and/or procedures in the airspace control plan (ACP). Be prepared to provide airspace control in other areas designated by the ACA when combat or other factors degrade the airspace control system.
• Forwards requests for airspace control measures to the ACA in accordance with the ACP.
• Develops detailed airspace control instructions, plans, and procedures in accordance with guidance in the ACP. These detailed instructions, plans, and procedures need to be coordinated by the ACA to ensure consistency with JFC-approved airspace control guidance and approved in accordance with directives and/or procedures in the ACP.
• Provides necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions in assigned areas of operations and identify these facilities and personnel to the ACA for inclusion in the ACP.

Airspace Control Authority. The JFC designates the ACA. The broad responsibilities of the ACA include coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval of the JFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among units within the AOR/JOA. The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the JFC, provides for integration of the airspace control system with that of the host nation, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. The ACA develops the ACP and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the AOR/JOA. Implementation of the ACP is through the airspace control order (ACO) which must be complied with by all components, as described in Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control For Joint Air Operations.” A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to meet contingency situations that necessitate rapid employment of forces. Finally, centralized direction by the ACA does not imply assumption of operational control or tactical control over any air assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement will be referred to the JFC for resolution.

Area Air Defense Commander. The JFC will normally designate an AADC. The successful conduct of air defense operations requires the integrated operation of all available air defense
systems. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The responsibilities of the AADC are interrelated with those of the ACA. Preferably, one individual will be assigned the responsibilities of the AADC and the ACA. If, however, this is not the case, close coordination between the AADC and ACA is absolutely essential. The AADC develops the area air defense plan and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the AOR/JOA. For a detailed discussion of the AADC, see Joint Pubs in the 3-01 series.

Planning for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. The following broad principles of planning (see figure below) are essential to effective combat zone airspace control:

- Support the Joint Force. The airspace control system in the combat zone must be planned and integrated to meet and complement the JFC’s campaign or operation plan.
- Interoperability. Combat zone airspace control needs to be exercised in both the multi-Service and in the multi-nation environments in peacetime to operate effectively during conflict. Planning for combat zone airspace control must include planning for interoperability of equipment, as well as personnel and terminology.
- Mass and Timing. Planning for combat zone airspace control needs to include the aircraft traffic volume needed for the anticipated offensive operations and the timing constraints placed on those operations. Planning also needs to be fully integrated with the needs of air defense operations to respond quickly and with adequate force to enemy intrusion.
- Unity of Effort. Proper liaison between joint force components should be identified and exercised prior to hostilities. Representatives from different components need to integrate information flow throughout the system and provide expertise to the designated combat zone airspace control authorities.
- Integrated Planning Cycles. The airspace planning cycle should be integrated with the planning cycle for the joint campaign or operation plan. Input from all organizations involved in the conflict must be consolidated, and the final airspace control plan devised and disseminated to users in the ACO. The ACP can be added as an appendix to the operations annex to the joint force operation plan.
- Degraded Operations. Plans should anticipate the effects of electronic warfare and communications degradation on system operations. An effective combat zone airspace control system needs to plan for the full spectrum of communications from no degradation to full degradation. Plans also should consider the effects of weather and darkness.

Integration of Combat Zone Airspace Control and Air Defense Operations. Because these two areas would conflict and interfere with each other if operating independently,
prioritization and integration of each mission is essential. Ultimately, the airspace control function must be performed in close conformity with air defense operations. Airspace control procedures will be used to assist in aircraft identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft, and provide safe passage of friendly aircraft.

Air defense units must be free to engage hostile aircraft within prescribed rules of engagement. However, procedures may need to be established within the combat zone airspace control system to allow identification of friendly aircraft, not cause delays in offensive operations, and prevent fratricide. These procedures need to be simple to execute for both aircrews and ground operations personnel and may include visual, electronic, geographic, and/or maneuver means for sorting friend from foe. Air defense operations should not cause delays in air operations by creating an unnecessarily complicated or lengthy air route structure. Likewise, airspace control measures should not unduly restrain surface-to-air weapons systems so as to put them at increased risk of enemy air attack. Characteristics of procedures used to deconflict in time and space, coordinate and integrate the activities of all users of airspace (including fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft) are shown in the figure below.

Air defense systems might be overwhelmed by massed enemy attacks across limited geographic areas along the front. Therefore, highly flexible airspace control procedures need to be devised to anticipate the perceived threat. The procedures should allow coordinated employment of air and land or maritime air defense systems against the threat and use the inherent flexibility of air defense airborne platforms to mass forces to meet the enemy attackers. However, the problem of separating friendly and enemy aircraft during the heat of battle and employing land- or maritime-based air defenses against these enemy elements is a highly complex task.

**AIRSPACE CONTROL PROCEDURES CHARACTERISTICS**

- Prevent mutual interference
- Prevent fratricide
- Enhance effectiveness in accomplishing the joint force commander’s objectives
- Safely Accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the area of responsibility/joint operations area
- Facilitate air defense identification

**Related Terms**

area air defense commander; joint force air component commander

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
AIR TASKING ORDER

A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. JP 1-02

The joint air tasking cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air missions/sorties and accommodates changing tactical situations or joint force commander (JFC) guidance as well as requests for support from other component commanders. The full joint air tasking order (ATO) cycle from JFC guidance to the start of ATO execution is dependent on the JFC’s procedures, but each ATO period usually covers a 24-hour period. The joint ATO matches specific targets compiled by the joint force air component commander (JFACC)/JFC staff with the capabilities/forces made available to the JFACC for the given joint ATO day.

Related Terms
joint air tasking cycle; joint force air component commander; special instructions

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

ALERT ORDER

1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. JP 1-02

A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ALERT ORDER is a formal, crisis action planning-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to announce the course of action (COA) selected by the National Command Authorities and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER.

Related Terms
course of action; crisis action planning; execution planning

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. JP 1-02

Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

Related Terms

coalition; multinational operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ALLOCATION REQUEST

A message used to provide an estimate of the total air effort, to identify any excess and joint force general support aircraft sorties, and to identify unfulfilled air requirements. This message is used only for preplanned missions and is transmitted on a daily basis, normally 24 hours prior to the start of the next air tasking day. Also called ALLOREQ. JP 1-02
Allocation (Air). Following the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) air apportionment decision, the joint force air component commander/joint force commander (JFACC/JFC) staff translates that decision into total number of sorties by aircraft or weapon type available for each operation/task they support. On the basis of the JFCs air apportionment decision, internal requirements, and air support request messages, each air capable component prepares an allocation request (ALLOREQ) message for transmission to the JFACC/JFC staff (normally not less than 24 hours prior to the air tasking day). ALLOREQ messages report the number of joint air sorties to be flown during the air tasking day by assigned mission and type aircraft; excess sorties not required by the air capable component and available for taskings by the JFACC/JFC staff; and request for additional air support beyond the capability of the air capable component.

Allotment. The joint air operations center (JAOC) reviews each air capable component’s allocation decision/ALLOREQ message and may prepare a sortie allotment (SORTIEALOT) message back to the components as required, in accordance with established operations plans guideline. If SORTIEALOT messages are not used, the JAOC can pass the information normally contained in the SORTIEALOT by other means (e.g., contingency theater automated planning system, through component liaisons). The SORTIEALOT message confirms (and where necessary modifies) the ALLOREQ and provides general guidance for planning joint air operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked.

Information and intelligence from all sources, including counterintelligence, (see figure below) must be evaluated, correlated, and integrated into products that present the most complete, accurate, and objective views possible. Joint operations in particular require complete and composite views of the situation and an adversary’s land, sea, air, and space forces. Having access to and using all sources of information and intelligence is essential to understanding the actual situation. Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete assessments. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will reduce the risks of deception. It will also become the basis for the nomination and development of countermeasures against hostile intelligence and operations.

All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources. All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via Joint Worldwide Intelligence
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management.

The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in joint force commanders (JFCs) receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts in response to preplanned essential elements of information. Automated data processing interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC.

Automated processing and seamless connectivity at all levels allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery and multiple data bases while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.
AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION

A type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him. JP 1-02

**General.** The amphibious demonstration is intended to confuse the defender as to time, place, or strength of the main operation. In the amphibious objective area (AOA), an amphibious demonstration may be conducted in or near the landing area, in conjunction with an amphibious assault. In other cases, a demonstration may be conducted outside the AOA by a separate amphibious task force (ATF) to divert or immobilize enemy strategic reserve forces that could threaten the amphibious assault. The joint force commander (JFC) could, likewise, use the demonstration to divert enemy attention from other friendly nonamphibious operations in the theater of operations.

Effectiveness of a demonstration increases in direct proportion to the degree of realism involved in its execution. It should neither be underplayed nor overplayed. It is crucial that the enemy receive a convincing impression of preparations for a landing. All visible, audible, and electronic aspects of the demonstration must appear to be authentic. A demonstration normally includes the approach of demonstration forces to the demonstration area, at least a part of the ship-to-shore movement, and employment of supporting fires. A brief but intense preliminary bombardment will usually be more effective than deliberate harassing fire over longer periods of time. A communications deception plan should be used. Special operations forces and tactical deception units may be employed.

**Demonstrations Within the Amphibious Objective Area.** An amphibious demonstration may be conducted by a portion of the ATF within the AOA when it is intended to influence enemy action within that area. Its intended purpose may be to cause the enemy to employ its reserves improperly, to disclose weapon positions by inducing it to fire prematurely, to distract its attention, to place an early burden on its command, control, and communications system, to precipitate a general air or naval engagement, and/or to harass it. The decision to conduct such a demonstration is made during planning by the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), following consultation with the commander, landing force, and other major force commanders as appropriate.

**Demonstrations Outside the Amphibious Objective Area.** An amphibious demonstration may be conducted outside the AOA to divert or immobilize enemy strategic reserves or other forces capable of affecting the amphibious operation, to distract hostile attention from such an operation, or to precipitate a general air or naval engagement. Such a demonstration may be executed as a supporting operation by a separate ATF. The time and place of the demonstration is decided by the JFC or higher authority on the basis of the recommendations of CATF.

**Demonstrations in Support of Other Operations.** An amphibious demonstration may be conducted with the intent of supporting other, nonamphibious operations in the theater. A demonstration conducted before, during, or after commencement of another operation may distract the attention of enemy commanders and induce the enemy to divert major resources
from the main area of operations. The decision to conduct such a demonstration is made by
the JFC or higher authority on the basis of the recommendations of CATF and other major
force commanders as appropriate.

Related Terms
amphibious operation; amphibious raid

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in
ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. As an
entity, the amphibious operation includes the following phases: a. planning —
The period extending from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. b.
embarkation — The period during which the forces, with their equipment and
supplies, are embarked in the assigned shipping. c. rehearsal — The period
during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1) testing
adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness
of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and
(3) testing communications. d. movement — The period during which various
components of the amphibious task force move from points of embarkation to
the objective area. e. assault — The period between the arrival of the major
assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the
accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission.

General. Amphibious operations are designed and conducted primarily to prosecute further
combat operations, obtain a site for an advanced naval, land, or air base, deny use of an area
or facilities to the enemy, and fix enemy forces and attention, providing opportunities for
other combat operations.

The essential usefulness of an amphibious operation stems from its mobility and flexibility
(i.e., the ability to concentrate balanced forces and strike with great strength at a selected
point in the hostile defense system). The amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise
and capitalizes on enemy weaknesses by projecting and applying combat power at the most
advantageous location and time. The threat of an amphibious landing can induce enemies to
divert forces, fix defensive positions, divert major resources to coastal defense, or disperse
forces. Such a threat may result in the enemy making expensive and wasteful efforts in
attempting to defend their coastlines.

The salient requirement of an amphibious assault, which is the principal type of amphibious
operation, is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted buildup of sufficient combat power ashore
from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses
forward amphibious task force (ATF) final objectives. This requirement, although similar to
those for an airborne or airmobile assault, dictates the organizational and technical differences
between an amphibious operation and sustained land warfare.

Other difficulties that must be considered and planned for when conducting an amphibious
operation include the following:

- Natural forces such as unfavorable weather, seas, surf, and features of hydrography.
• Technical, operational, and logistic problems associated with loading large numbers of troops, equipment, and supplies onto ships (sometimes at geographically separated embarkation points).
• Moving the landing force (LF) to the landing area.
• Landing the LF in the proper sequence on open beaches or landing zones, often while under fire. The LF is especially vulnerable during the ship-to-shore movement.
• Combatting possible employment of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by the enemy. This requires use of effective countermeasures, both active and passive, during all stages of the operation.
• Ensuring close cooperation and detailed coordination among all participating forces in an amphibious operation. Forces involved must train together, each possessing a clear understanding of mutual obligations and the special capabilities and limitations of every other element of the ATF.

**Command and Organization.** Forces assigned to conduct an amphibious operation are organized as an ATF or, when the criteria for a joint task force (JTF) are met, a joint amphibious task force (JATF). Other forces may be directed to provide support to the ATF.

When the ATF is organized as a joint force, organization and command relationships will be in accordance with the general principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.” When the ATF is not specifically organized as a JTF, i.e., JATF, it is normally a subordinate command of the Navy component of a combatant or subordinate joint force command structure. The criteria for deciding on task force organization are the Service composition of the force and the desires of the joint force commander. In either case, the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) will retain responsibility for, and operational control of, forces assigned to the ATF and JATF.

In accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the composition of the CATF staff will reflect the organizational form of the assigned forces. Relationships of CATF and commander, landing force (CLF) with other commands will be the subject of specific instruction contained in the initiating directive.
The complexity of amphibious operations and the vulnerability of forces engaged in these operations require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational coherence. The difficulties involved in conducting amphibious operations will normally dictate that the combatant commander will participate in planning, theater integration, and support. During embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault, the CATF must exercise clear and unambiguous authority over assigned, attached, and supporting forces. When unforeseen contingencies arise, the combatant commander (and the commanders of participating and supporting forces) must establish and prepare on-call responses in anticipation of ATF and LF needs following the guidelines provided in operational plans and orders. The CATF and CLF should gain and maintain exceptional situational awareness using the best command, control, communications, and intelligence means available and exercise on-scene command and control through streamlined and highly reliable communications.

**Characteristics.** An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. It is directed by the combatant commander, subunified commander, or JTF commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. An amphibious operation requires extensive air participation and is characterized by closely integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different combat functions.

**Types of Amphibious Operations.** The principal type of amphibious operation is the amphibious assault, which is distinguished from other types of amphibious operations in that it involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Other types of amphibious operations that do not involve establishing an LF on a hostile or potentially hostile shore are as follows:

- **Amphibious Withdrawal.** An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
- **Amphibious Demonstration.** An amphibious operation conducted to deceive the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to it.
- **Amphibious Raid.** An amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or a temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Raids are conducted for such purposes as inflicting loss or damage; securing information; creating a diversion; capturing or evacuating individuals and/or materiel; executing deliberate deception operations; and destroying enemy information gathering systems to support operations security.

Not all amphibious operations conducted can be included in the four types. Forces may be called upon to conduct nonconventional amphibious operations that may closely parallel one of the four types (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations may closely parallel an amphibious raid).

**Supporting Operations.** In amphibious operations, supporting operations are those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the ATF. They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the CATF and normally are conducted outside the area for which the CATF is responsible at the time of their execution. Supporting operations conducted in the amphibious objective area (AOA) before or during the amphibious operation will be coordinated with CATF. Examples of supporting operations are as follows:

- Military deception operations conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the ATF mission.
- Isolation of the landing area by the conduct of interdiction operations.
• Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority in the landing area.
• Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations designed to secure information.
• Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy.
• Mine countermeasures operations conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the AOA.
• Special operations, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the AOA, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles.

Preassault operations are not supporting operations. Preassault operations are conducted in the AOA by elements of the ATF before the arrival of the major assault elements.

**Relative Strength Requirements.** To achieve success, an ATF should be assured in the landing area of naval superiority against enemy surface and subsurface forces, air superiority, and a substantial superiority over enemy forces ashore. In the face of compelling necessity, commanders may undertake an amphibious operation on the basis of a reasonable total superiority of force. For example, naval and air superiority may justify a landing even though the ATF does not possess the desired numerical superiority in ground forces, if friendly surface and air units can be used effectively against enemy forces to negate their advantage. In addition to a preponderance of forces within the landing area, an ATF should have reasonable assurance of freedom from effective interference by enemy surface, subsurface, air, or ground forces from outside the landing area, and the ability to provide continuous support for the forces ashore.

**Sequence.** The amphibious assault follows a well defined pattern. This should not create significant difficulties for planners preparing for other types of amphibious operations, because this sequence of events or activities occurs to an equal or lesser degree in each of the other amphibious operations.

The general sequence consists of planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement to the landing area, assault, and accomplishment of the ATF mission. (See figure below.) While planning
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occurs throughout the entire operation, it is normally dominant in the period before embarkation. Successive phases bear the title of the dominant activity taking place within the period covered.

The organization for embarkation needs to provide for maximum flexibility to support alternate plans that may of necessity be adopted. The landing plan and the scheme of maneuver ashore are based on conditions and enemy capabilities existing in the AOA before embarkation of the LF. For instance, a change in conditions of US or enemy forces during the movement phase may cause changes in either plan with no opportunity for reloading the LF. In a situation such as this, the sequence of an amphibious operation changes to embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and assault. The extent to which changes in the landing plan can be accomplished depends on the organization for embarkation.

Planning. The planning phase denotes the period extending from the issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation. Although planning does not cease with the termination of this phase, it is useful to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent phases because of the change that occurs in the relationship between commanders at the time the planning phase terminates and the operational phase begins.

Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping.

Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of testing the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and testing communications.

Movement. The movement phase is the period during which various elements of the ATF move from points of embarkation to the AOA. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the ATF arrive at their assigned positions in the AOA.

Assault. The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the ATF in the landing area and the accomplishment of the ATF mission.

Termination of an Amphibious Operation. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the ATF mission in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the initiating directive.

When the mission is to establish the LF ashore, the following conditions must be met:

- The beachhead is secured.
- Sufficient tactical and supporting forces are established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.
- Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities are established ashore.
- CLF is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.

When CATF and CLF are satisfied that the conditions stated above have been met, CATF will report these facts to the commander designated in the initiating directive. This authority will then terminate the amphibious operation; disestablish the AOA; dissolve the ATF; and provide additional instructions, as required, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces.

Related Terms
forcible entry operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
AMPHIBIOUS RAID

A type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal.  

**General.** Amphibious raids are conducted as independent operations or in support of other operations, such as another landing, land, or naval operation. Depending on the purpose of the raid, they may be conducted by stealth or appropriately supported so that they resemble the early stages of an amphibious assault. Generally, amphibious raids are conducted to accomplish the following:

- Destroy certain targets, particularly those that do not lend themselves to destruction by other means.
- Harass the enemy by attacks on isolated posts, patrols, and headquarters and to capture or neutralize key personnel.
- Attack the enemy rear or flank positions on a seacoast, in support of forces engaged with the enemy.
- Obtain information on hydrography, terrain, enemy dispositions, morale, strength, movements and weapons.
- Create a diversion in connection with strategic or tactical deception operations.
- Evacuate individuals, including agents, or materiel.
- Establish, support, or coordinate unconventional warfare activities.

Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essential to precision and speed in executing a raid. All participating forces must be drilled in every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore, withdrawal, and reembarkation. Rehearsals are more important in preparation for amphibious raids than for other types of amphibious operations. Timing, critically important in all amphibious raids, cannot be accurately estimated or adhered to without adequate rehearsals.

**Planning Considerations.** An amphibious raid is planned and executed in the same general manner as an amphibious assault, except a raid always includes provision for withdrawal of the raid force. The following factors must be considered when planning for an amphibious raid:

- It may be unnecessary for selected beaches or landing zones (LZs) to meet all the requirements of an amphibious assault. In small-scale raids, beaches or LZs are chosen from the point of view of ensuring tactical surprise.
- A raid will be of limited duration of a raid.
- Final deployment of the raiding force may not be required until it reaches its objective ashore.
- Limited objective and short duration of the amphibious raid will usually simplify logistic/combat service support (CSS) requirements.
- Through prearrangement, it may be possible for a small-scale raid to be executed with very limited communications means.

The following basic considerations must be considered when planning a raid:

- Surprise is an essential ingredient in the success of an amphibious raid and offsets the lack of logistic and/or CSS and fire support normally associated with amphibious operations.
Security during the planning and execution of a raid must receive particular attention, to include full exploitation of deceptive measures. Such deceptive measures may take the form of elaborate cover plans or may be confined to simple ruses.

The following factors will influence the choice of landing areas for the raiding force: enemy dispositions; sea approaches; hydrographic and beach characteristics; availability of LZs; and avenues of approach to the objective.

Estimated time that the raiding force will have to be ashore may influence the choice of specific time an operation begins and, consequently, the conditions of visibility under which the raiding force may be landed. It will likewise affect the scope of logistic and/or CSS arrangements that must be made.

Purpose of the raid, including its relation to other concurrent or imminent operations that it may support, will influence the selection of the day the raid is scheduled to commence. In addition, these same factors may affect the availability of shipping, aircraft, and logistic and/or CSS and/or fire support means for the raid.

Planning for the embarkation of forces assigned to participate in an amphibious raid is similar to preparation for the amphibious assault, including consideration of operational security measures.

Fire support planning is similar to that for an amphibious assault, except, where surprise is a major factor, supporting fires usually are withheld and radio silence is maintained until surprise is lost.

Planning for ship-to-shore movement is generally similar to that for an amphibious assault, except that movement may be made entirely by helicopter.

Withdrawal must be planned in detail including provisions as to time and place for reembarkation. If the landing point and withdrawal point are not the same, positive means of location and identification of the latter must be established. Special situations may permit planning for withdrawal of the raiding force directly into friendly territory without reembarkation. Withdrawal by air may be possible when the area of the raid includes a usable airfield or terrain suitable for landing helicopters.

Related Terms

amphibious operation

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines.

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations are conducted to deny effective use of enemy submarines. ASW involves the search for, localization and classification of, and attack on submarines and support assets at sea. The naval battle group antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC) generally exercises tactical control (TACON) of local, direct support ASW assets such as maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, towed array ships, and submarines in integrated direct support. Associated support aircraft, surface forces, and submarines generally do not come under the TACON of the battle group ASWC, but remain under the control of the composite warfare commander. The ASWC needs to effectively integrate all ASW assets (air, surface, and subsurface) to deal with both the tactical threat to the joint force and the strategic threat posed by ballistic missile submarines. An example of a joint maritime operations
Antiterrorism measures are used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT.

JP 1-02

Combatting terrorism involves actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (See figure below.) To meet the terrorist threat, an integrated and comprehensive antiterrorism program must be developed and implemented at every echelon of command. The program is designed to foster a protective posture in peacetime (i.e., units performing normal duties and serving in security assistance organizations, peacekeeping missions, or mobile training teams) that will carry over to a wartime environment.

Antiterrorist measures are intended to identify and reduce the risk of loss or damage of potential targets and to develop procedures to detect and deter planned terrorist actions before they take place, thereby reducing the probability of a terrorist event. The measures also encompass the reactive or tactical stage of an incident, including direct contact with terrorists to end the incident with minimum loss of life and property. The antiterrorism program stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures common to all combatant
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commands and Services. (See figure below.) The program addresses threat analysis; installation or unit criticality and vulnerability assessments; creation of a threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities; operations security; personnel security; physical security; crisis management planning; employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents; continuous training and education of personnel; and public affairs planning.

Related Terms

counterterrorism; force protection; terrorism

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.2  JTTP for Antiterrorism

APPORTIONMENT (AIR)

The determination and assignment of the total expected air effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. Also called air apportionment.

JP 1-02
Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. Air apportionment allows the joint force commander (JFC) to ensure the weight of the joint air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives. Given the many functions that the joint air effort can perform, its area of responsibility/joint operations area-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs pay particular attention to its apportionment. JFCs normally apportion the air effort by priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include, but are not limited to, strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support. After consulting with other component commanders, the joint force air component commander/JFC staff makes the air apportionment recommendation to the JFC.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER

Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. JP 1-02

The joint force commander (JFC) will normally designate an area air defense commander (AADC). The successful conduct of air defense operations requires the integrated operation of all available air defense systems. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The responsibilities of the joint force air component commander (JFACC), airspace control authority (ACA), and AADC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC’s campaign. Designating one component commander as JFACC, AADC, and ACA may simplify coordination required to develop and execute fully integrated joint air operations. If conditions do not permit this assignment, then close coordination between all three positions is essential. The AADC develops the area air defense plan and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the area of responsibility/joint operations area.

Related Terms

air defense; area air defense plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
The area air defense commander develops the area air defense plan and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the area of responsibility/joint operations area. The area air defense plan needs to be written with detailed engagement procedures that are integral to the airspace control plan and operations in the combat zone. Combat zone airspace control and area air defense operations need to plan for operations in a degraded command, control, communications, and computers environment. Detailed engagement procedures and decentralized control procedures (as apply to air defense) are key to operations in a degraded environment. Air defense interface is critical to effective combat zone airspace control. The geographic arrangement of weapons and the location of specific types of air defense operations, as well as specific procedures for identification of aircraft, are important factors to include in the airspace control plan. Other key features to consider are listed in the figure below.
AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN

CONSIDERATIONS

- Procedures that include rules of engagement, disposition of air defense weapon systems such as air defense fighters, air defense artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and air defense command and control operations.

- Air, land, and maritime situations in the area of responsibility / joint operations area such as existing equipment limitations, electronic warfare, and C4 requirements that may adversely affect adherence to the airspace control plan.

- Anticipated restricted areas based on initial deployment of friendly air, land, maritime, and special operations forces and bases.

- Existing air traffic control areas, base defense zones, controlled or uncontrolled airspace, and overflight of neutral nations.

- Mission profiles, combat radii, and IFF or other identification capability of aircraft that will operate in the area of responsibility / joint operations area.

- Enemy air defense weapons capabilities, deployment, and electronic attack and deception capabilities.

- Emergency procedures for aircraft experiencing difficulties (to include IFF problems).

- Procedures for day or night operations and for aircraft experiencing adverse weather.

- Procedures for en route and terminal-area air traffic control procedures for aircraft transitioning to and from the battle area that complement planned combat requirements.

- Procedures to support surge operations requiring high volumes of air traffic.

- Enemy offensive air capabilities. Additionally, the vulnerability of defensive counterair aircraft to enemy surface-to-air missiles and the vulnerability of friendly surface-based air defenses to enemy long-range artillery are important planning and execution considerations.

Related Terms

- area air defense commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects.  

**General.** The improved destructive capabilities of modern weapons systems significantly increase the need for effective damage control. As shown in the figure below, effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets are necessary to conduct area damage control (ADC) and to ensure prevention, containment, and rapid restoration of operations.

**Responsibilities.** Joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure ADC operations in the joint rear area are conducted in accordance with the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) directives and priorities.

Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for ensuring ADC plans in their operational areas are developed, prioritized, coordinated, and executed in accordance with the JFC’s priorities and concept of operations.

Host Nation (HN). The HN, depending on applicable agreements, may have overall responsibility for ADC within their territorial boundaries. In these circumstances, US forces will retain responsibility for ADC within US base perimeters and be prepared to assist the HN within their unit capabilities with ADC operations outside US base perimeters. Assistance should be provided with the concurrence of the appropriate US command authority and should support the JFC’s ADC priorities and concept of operations.
**ADC Planning Requirements.** Effective ADC planning is decentralized and executed at the lowest level. Base and base cluster defense plans should have ADC annexes identifying responsibilities, priorities, requirements, and procedures for conducting ADC operations. These plans will be coordinated and integrated at the component and subordinate command levels to ensure rapid response and efficient utilization of limited ADC assets. Vulnerability analysis is necessary to ensure that units and facilities are not positioned in such a manner that could place units at unnecessary risk; e.g., a hospital unit should not be within the danger zone of an HN ammunition storage site or fuel facility.

Base and base cluster ADC annexes should identify responsibilities and procedures required before, during, and after an incident. Plans should also include responsibilities for all units occupying the base or located in the base cluster that can make contributions to ADC. Examples include, but are not limited to, military and security police, engineers, ordnance, nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination or reconnaissance, smoke, civil affairs, maintenance, health service support, command, control, and communications systems, supply, and transportation.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

### AREA OF INTEREST

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. JP 1-02

Joint force commanders at all levels can designate areas of interest (AIs) to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

**Related Terms**

area of influence

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

### AREA OF OPERATIONS

An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. JP 1-02

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may define areas of operations (AOs) for land and naval forces. (See figure below.) AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full
range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

**Related Terms**
- area of responsibility; joint operations area; joint rear area; joint special operations area.

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY**

1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR.  

**JP 1-02**
An area of responsibility (AOR) is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned AORs. Subordinate joint force commanders are normally assigned joint operations areas. A geographic combatant commander’s AOR is the assigned theater. An example of a geographic combatant commander’s AOR is shown in the figure below.

Related Terms
area of operations; joint operations area; joint rear area; joint special operations area

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

AREA STUDIES

During planning phases, civil affairs (CA) forces receive their intelligence support from the joint force or Service component force to which they are assigned or attached. The basic intelligence document for CA is the area study. Area studies, as detailed as time and source material permit, should be prepared on each country or region in which military operations are contemplated. Area studies should be continually reviewed and revised prior to
commitment of forces. After operations commence, these studies should constitute the basis of the collection of more current and comprehensive data from on-site surveys and assessments by CA personnel.

Examples of the CA-relevant essential elements of information that area studies provide on a given region, country, or operational area include the following:

- the nature of the host nation government, background and attitudes of key members, and degree of assistance that can be expected;
- the nature of the population, including demographics, religion, distribution, and attitudes toward the US and US forces;
- the location and composition of material stockpiles, availability of civilian transportation, and points of contact to access these facilities, goods, and services;
- the structure, orientation, capabilities, and reliability of indigenous public security or safety organizations.

Related Terms

civil affairs

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

The Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO), established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, is responsible for the coordination of the blood programs of the Military Services and the combatant commands. The Armed Services Blood Program provides an orderly system for collection, storage, and distribution of blood products across the range of military operations. (See figure below.) The primary responsibility of the ASBPO is to ensure blood products, in the required types and amounts, reach the theater in a ready-to-use condition.

Each theater has a standard jointly operated blood distribution system. A Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) is established within the joint force surgeon’s office and functions as part of the staff. The JBPO is the single manager for blood products in the combatant command and is responsible for management and coordination of the total joint blood products requirements and capabilities in the theater. Each theater is subdivided and coordinated by an Area Joint Blood Program Office.
ARMS CONTROL

A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment.

JP 1-02

Arms control is a concept that connotes any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistic support arrangements, and any related intelligence gathering mechanism), and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment or employment

Related Terms
health service support; Joint Blood Program Office

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-02  Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
of the armed forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament). Additionally, it may connote those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment.

Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical or conventional); escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material. All of these actions help reduce threats to regional security. Other examples include military support for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament reductions. Finally, the US military’s implementation of the Vienna Document 1992 confidence and security building measures such as unit/formation inspections, exercise notifications/observations, air and ground base visits, and military equipment demonstrations are further examples of arms control.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

The Army system which provides for interface between Army and tactical air support agencies of other Services in the planning, evaluating, processing, and coordinating of air support requirements and operations. It is composed of appropriate staff members, including G-2 air and G-3 air personnel, and necessary communication equipment.

General. The Army air-ground system (AAGS) (see figure below) begins at the field army level, and extends down through all echelons to the maneuver battalion. AAGS coordinates and integrates both Army component aviation support and close air support (CAS) with Army ground maneuver.

Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE). The Army component commander establishes a BCE to interface and provide liaison with the joint force air component commander or Commander, Air Force Forces. It is the senior Army airspace command and control element. The BCE is collocated with the joint air operations center or air operations center. Preplanned requests for CAS are forwarded through Army command channels to the BCE.

Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC). The CTOC synchronizes the entire corps battle, including all planning and authorization for CAS. It is the final approving authority for CAS within the Corps.

Corps Tactical Command Post. The tactical command post primarily concentrates on the conduct of the corps’ current operations. The Corps Tactical Command Post is usually the approving authority for immediate CAS requests or diversions of preplanned missions within the Corps.

Corps Fire Support Element/Air Support Operations Center Interface. The corps fire support element (FSE) provides interface and effects coordination between the corps and the air support operations center (ASOC). The FSE controls all fires, including CAS, within the corps and coordinates the use of airspace with the corps’ Army airspace command and
control element collocated with the FSE. The FSE and ASOC synchronize CAS for the corps. CAS is coordinated through the corps air liaison officer, ASOC, and the corps tactical air control party in conjunction with the Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer (Air). If Navy or Marine Corps CAS is available, the air/naval gunfire liaison company provides the division, brigade, and battalion FSEs with supporting arms liaison.

**Related Terms**

battlefield coordination element; theater air control system

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

### ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Those active and reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. JP 1-02

**General.** Although all Army forces have an inherent capability to support special operations (SO), Army units specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared, trained, and task-organized especially for SO. Core special operations forces (SOF) designated by the Secretary of Defense include active and reserve component special forces (SF), Ranger, and special operations aviation (SOA). In addition, the Secretary of the Army has designated civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) forces as Army special operations
forces (ARSOF). The SF group is a multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments across the range of military operations. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare (UW), SF units are capable of task-organizing their composition to meet more specific requirements.

**Rangers.** Rangers are rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action (DA) operations in coordination with or in support of other SO units of all Services. Also, they can execute DA operations in support of conventional missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms.

**Special Operations Aviation.** SOA units are specialized Army aviation assets dedicated to the conduct of SO. SOA units are organized into both single aircraft type and composite battalions that provide a mix of light and medium lift and limited light attack capabilities.

**Civil Affairs Forces.** CA forces plan and conduct civil-military operations in support of SOF and conventional forces. Army CA units are regionally oriented, language qualified, and have the capability to train, advise, and assist US and indigenous forces in the conduct of foreign internal defense (FID), UW, and humanitarian assistance (HA) or CA missions.

**PSYOP Forces.** Task-organized elements from either strategic or theater PSYOP forces may be provided to support joint or Service SOF and conventional forces. Frequently, this support is imperative during FID, UW, and HA or CA but may be equally applicable during DA, counterdrug, or counterterrorism activities, either as direct support or to provide operational cover.

**Special Mission Units.** The National Command Authorities (NCA) have directed establishment and maintenance of selected units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a range of highly classified and usually compartmented SO missions across the operational continuum. They are under direct supervision of the highest command levels, often the NCA. These units are prepared and trained to execute a variety of covert and/or clandestine SO missions while maintaining absolute minimum individual and organizational visibility during day-to-day operations.

**Special Operations Coordination Elements (SOCCORDs).** SOCCORDs serve as a permanent staff functional cell within Army or Marine Corps component operations. This cell reinforces integration of ARSOF into corps plans and operations. The SOCCORD does not exercise command and control of ARSOF, but compliments existing ARSOF mechanisms.

**SOF Support Units.** The US Army maintains combat support and combat service support elements and units capable of supporting and sustaining SOF.

**Related Terms**

special operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

**ARRANGING OPERATIONS**

**General.** Joint force commanders (JFCs) must determine the best arrangement of major operations. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. As shown in the figure below, commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy
reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space.

The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations. During force projection operations, for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

**Phases.** The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander’s decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase — such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations — indicates a shift in emphasis. Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms.

During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment).
Prehostilities Phase. Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, JFCs tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC’s concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

Lodgement Phase. A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

Decisive Combat and Stabilization Phase. A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the National Command Authorities and the JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy’s ability and will to continue.

Follow-Through Phase. During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current operations during hostilities on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

Posthostilities and Redeployment Phase. During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible to best accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve the crisis. Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining lines of communications, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.

Branches and Sequels. No plan of operations can be projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of the operation. Commanders build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly
relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

Branches. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

Related Terms
operational art; branches and sequels; phases

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE AIRFIELD CONTROL GROUPS

Army arrival/departure airfield control groups (A/DACGs) coordinate and control the movement of Army component personnel and materiel through airlift terminals. Comprised mainly of personnel and resources from the moving units, they are provisional units, task-organized to reflect the type of move and degree of support available at the terminal. The A/DACG is the moving unit’s point of contact with local Air Force base and tanker airlift control element commanders and personnel. When units from more than one component will transit a terminal simultaneously, the joint force commander should direct one component to provide the A/DACG. This will normally be the component with the largest movement requirement, and augmented, as necessary, by the other components. As the theater matures or when airlift mission requirements increase, an air terminal movement control team should be phased in to replace the arrival airfield control group to execute port clearance missions. Normally, this transition occurs when the airfield is designated an aerial port of debarkation for the theater.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

ART OF LOGISTICS

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Commanders may have more combat forces than available logistic resources to move and sustain desired operations. A nation’s capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a major limiting factor in military operations. This may be especially true in future joint operations, when demands for military resources become highly competitive. Operational planners must understand the importance of effective
and integrated logistics and mobilization planning for joint operations at a time when demands on military resources are increasing.

“Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks all the cleverly hidden details of stage management.”

LtCol George C. Thorpe: Pure Logistics 1917

Related Terms
logistics, logistics support, operational reach

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS) supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. Joint operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS — they are the standards against which readiness is measured in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. This senior forum is designed to assess both Unit Readiness, as reported by the Services, and Joint Readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders. The end product of the CRS is senior level consensus on the readiness of the force to successfully execute Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks. Significant shortfalls or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk and may be remedied through operational or programmatic actions. Joint operation plans have a major role in the process to address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.

Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the Nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities.

As the principal military adviser to the National Command Authorities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for recommending national military strategy to attain national security objectives and for assessing the national military capability and readiness to perform the missions identified in the strategy.

Assessments derived through joint operation planning provide insight into the strengths and deficiencies of the Nation’s existing military capabilities. Consequently, they can be an invaluable source of information for force development planning and the development of national military strategy. The greatest use of joint operation planning as a vehicle for assessing capabilities and influencing other defense planning is realized when deliberate planning is accomplished within a disciplined planning cycle that complements the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). These three
DOD planning systems must be integrated within a mutually supporting, complementary process. Joint operation planning conducted in response to the strategic direction provided by the JSPS must produce approved plans within a time frame that permits consideration of the results of that planning in the next succeeding strategy development evolution. Conversely, the JSPS, in conjunction with the PPBS, must provide timely strategic direction that allows the necessary time for the detailed development of adequate and feasible operation plans. A disciplined deliberate planning process, coordinated with PPBS and JSPS and supported by an effective Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, is essential to exploiting the full potential of joint operation planning as a way to assess capabilities and program improvement.

“Again and again we have owed peace to the fact that we were prepared for war.”
Theodore Roosevelt: Lecture at the Naval War College, June 1897

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

ASSIGNED, APPORTIONED, AND ALLOCATED FORCES

General. Joint operation planning uses uniform categories to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations. Availability categories are assigned, apportioned, and allocated.

Assigned. Assigned forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

Apportioned. Apportioned forces and resources are those assumed to be available for deliberate planning as of a specified date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for execution planning.

Allocated. Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the National Command Authorities for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning. In actual implementation, allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred or attached to the receiving combatant commander.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF FORCES

All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. A
force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate. As shown in the figure below, forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

The combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over forces assigned or reassigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Subordinate joint force commanders will exercise operational control (OPCON) over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities
for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of 
OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” and the “Unified Command Plan,” except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility/joint operations area boundaries.

Related Terms
combatant command (command authority); operational control

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Data bases and automated information systems should be used to enhance rather than replace human ingenuity in analyzing and producing intelligence. Intelligence data bases are used by analysts to assess a situation and reach conclusions, often in support of dynamic, near real time events. Data bases consist of information on orders of battle, characteristics of equipment, installations and facilities, and military geography. To be useful, automated systems need to provide data that are current, tailored, or adaptable to the missions, accessible, interconnected, and interoperable. These data bases should be accessible by a joint intelligence workstation.
**BALANCE**

Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. Deception, special operations, manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, direct attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity, interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one enemy force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options. JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decision makers and ongoing operations.

**Related Terms**

**Operational Art**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

**BARRIERS, OBSTACLES, AND MINE WARFARE**

**General.** Employment of barriers, obstacles, and mine warfare can, in concert with other capabilities, enhance a commander’s ability to mass combat power, sustain the force, conduct offensive or defensive operations, achieve surprise, and use key terrain, airfields, or sea routes. A joint force commander must consider both friendly and enemy employment of these capabilities in preparing plans and conducting operations. (See figure below.)

**Advantages.** Barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment can provide the capability to inflict significant equipment and psychological damage and personnel casualties on the enemy, with minimal or no risk to friendly forces; extend, strengthen, and deepen other defensive and offensive measures to support the concept of operations; immobilize the enemy until barriers, obstacles, or minefields can be bypassed, breached, or cleared; exploit geographic features; free forces for other employment; discern enemy intentions — commitment of enemy forces into a minefield is a detectable indication of intent; and create uncertainty for the enemy commander.

**Disadvantages.** The disadvantages of using barriers, obstacles, and minefields are their creation and removal can consume a significant amount of time, materiel, equipment, and transportation and will be manpower intensive and hazardous; they can be bypassed, breached,
or cleared; they can cause casualties to friendly forces and noncombatants, as well as limit friendly mobility; and defensive minefields must be rendered safe following their operational usefulness.

**Levels of Employment.**

Strategic Employment. Before hostilities, barriers, obstacles, and minefields can enhance deterrence without posing an offensive threat. Defensive employment along a hostile land border can demonstrate friendly resolve. Maritime defensive and protective mining can help protect friendly ports and waters. Prehostility employment would be as directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). NCA determination would be based, in part, on the political signals sent and on concurrence by affected friendly nations. Should deterrence fail, offensive maritime mining of enemy ports and waters can constrict enemy seaborne economic war sustainment efforts and reduce enemy ability to safely deploy maritime forces. Similarly, offensive employment of air-delivered scatterable mines can deny or restrict enemy strategic mobility and sustainability efforts.

Operational Employment. Defensive barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment can help protect friendly ports, lines of communications, and key facilities and free combat forces for offensive employment. Offensive employment can protect friendly maneuver while disrupting enemy ability to concentrate or maneuver forces. Barriers and obstacles having operational significance usually differ in scale from those having tactical significance. However, size alone does not make an obstacle operationally significant. At the operational level, their primary use is the restriction of enemy maneuver options or the creation of friendly maneuver options. Mines can also contribute to gaining the air control or air supremacy essential to achieving campaign objectives. Mines can delay efforts to repair damage to air bases caused by immediate effect munitions, thus degrading or denying the base’s capability to launch or recover aircraft. Mines can also restrict the deployment of mobile, surface-based air defenses, as well as surface-to-surface systems, because rapid movement in a mined area...
increases the risk of a mine encounter. Mines can also disrupt logistic sustainment operations being performed in the enemy’s rear area of operations.

Tactical Employment. Employment at the tactical level, such as the creation or countering of barriers, obstacles, or minefields, is normally done to achieve tactical offensive or defensive objectives.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-15 Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare

BASE DEFENSE

The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces. JP 1-02

**General.** The base and base cluster (designated when required) are the fundamental building blocks for planning, coordinating, and executing base defense operations. Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of contributing to the security and defense of the rear area in consonance with legislated Service functions. (See figure below.) The base commander coordinates the forces of the various Service or functional components to best capitalize on their combined capabilities, synergies, and mutual supportiveness, while minimizing the vulnerabilities of each. At the base level, the component in command of a base has overall responsibility for defense of the base; hosted forces from other Service or functional components defend their own facilities and may be tasked to contribute to the overall base defense, commensurate with their capabilities and the circumstances. Medical personnel may only guard their own unit and wounded and sick without jeopardizing their protective status under the Geneva Convention.

**Base Cluster Commanders.** Base cluster commanders (when designated) are responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within their base cluster and integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense plan. Their specific responsibilities for base cluster defense include the following:

- Establish a base cluster operations center (BCOC) from available base or cluster assets to serve as the base cluster’s tactical operations center and focal point for planning, directing, coordinating, integrating, and controlling base cluster defense activities. This tactical operations center usually serves as both the base defense operations center (BDOC) and the BCOC. An alternate BCOC and base cluster commander will be designated and will have the capability to assume BCOC and/or command functions should the primary facility and/or commander be neutralized. The BCOC will establish connectivity with the joint rear tactical operations center through the rear area operations center or rear tactical operations center (RTOC) as required.
- Provide appropriate facilities and housing for necessary liaison personnel from bases within the cluster.

**Base Commanders.** The base commanders are responsible for base defense. The forces of components other than their own, assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense, will be under their operational control. Forces of other Services or functional components assigned or attached to the base for primary purposes other than local base
defense, will support local base defense during an imminent attack or threat of an attack. The base commanders’ specific responsibilities for defense of the bases include the following:

- Establish a BDOC from available base assets to serve as the base’s tactical operations center and focal point for security and defense. The BDOC will assist with the planning, direction, coordination, integration, and control of base defense efforts.
- Establish an alternate BDOC from base resources or, if base assets cannot support this requirement, designating a headquarters element from units dedicated to the base for its local defense. The alternate BDOC may be located on or off base but must be able to provide the necessary command, control, and communications for base defense if the primary BDOC is neutralized.
• Plan for employment of transient forces by ensuring base defense plans include provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base defense forces present at the base during an attack or when the base is threatened with attack. In an emergency, the base commander will be considered an area commander insofar as establishing authority and command relationships for base defense are concerned. All other principles governing support provided by a transient force during an emergency to a commander in whose area of responsibility the transient force is located, and the responsibilities of the commanders concerned, are fully addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

**Individual Component Commanders.** Commanders of tenant forces of each component at a base are responsible for the following:

• Participate in the preparation of base defense plans.
• Provide, staff, and operate base defense facilities in accordance with the base defense plans.
• Conduct individual and unit training of assigned forces, as necessary, to ensure their readiness to perform their assigned tasks in defense of the base.
• Provide appropriate facilities and essential personnel for a BDOC for the base commander and providing liaison and support, as necessary, for the base cluster commander at the BCOC.
• Provide liaison personnel to advise the base commander on matters peculiar to their Service and, if a joint staff is established, to be regular working members of the staff.
• Provide for the internal security of the command.
• Provide housing for the forces under their command.
• Provide command and control (C2) communications systems, to include common-user communications within the command.
• Provide health service support for the forces under their command.

**Determining Service Identity of the Base Commander.** The Service commander of a base is determined by the classification of the base and by the functions assigned to the individual Services. The Service designated with base command responsibilities provides the C2 structure for base defense operations.

**Classification of Bases.** The commander of a combatant command will determine (unless determined by higher authority) and announce the classification of bases in his area in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be a single-Service base or a joint base which may be either one in which one Service has primary interest or one in which two or more Services have coequal interest.

**Base Clusters.** Base clusters can perform a valuable C2 role in security operations and can enhance the support and security of numerous individual bases in an area of operations. Base clusters may be designated when the large number of bases in an area or subarea exceeds the commander’s normal span of control; their designation would lead to improved support and security for bases in a localized area; bases are located in such close geographic proximity as to require deconfliction of their respective defense plans; or when directed by appropriate higher authority.

Large, single-Service bases and joint bases that are geographically isolated may be independent of base clusters.
BASING

Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or continental United States, directly affects operational reach. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapon systems, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput. Nevertheless, for any given operation, there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly affecting the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and as such can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from enemy attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived of in terms of lines of operations.

Related Terms

operational art; reach

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA.

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-02 Doctrine for Joint Operations
Battle damage assessment (BDA) is one of the principal subordinate elements of combat assessment (CA). At the joint force commander (JFC) level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign or operation plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC’s overall concept. The intent is to analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the adversary with sound military judgment to try to determine what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary’s plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign.

BDA is used to update the enemy order of battle. Accurate BDA is critical to determine if the target should be reattacked. BDA should include information relating BDA to a specific target (e.g., target coordinates, target number, mission number, munitions expended, target description); time of attack; damage actually seen (e.g., secondary explosions or fires, enemy casualties, number and type of vehicles/structures damaged or destroyed); and mission accomplishment (desired effects achieved).

**Related Terms**

- combat assessment

**Source Joint Publications**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP 2-0</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations</td>
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### BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION ELEMENT

An Army liaison provided by the Army component commander to the Air Operations Center (AOC) and/or to the component designated by the joint force commander to plan, coordinate, and deconflict air operations. The battlefield coordination element processes Army requests for tactical air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the AOC, and provides the necessary interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data. Also called BCE.

**Related Terms**

- joint air operations center

**Source Joint Publications**

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<tr>
<td>JP 3-56.1</td>
<td>Command and Control for Joint Air Operations</td>
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</table>
**BEACHHEAD**

A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore.

*JP 1-02*

**General.** A beachhead is the physical objective of an amphibious operation. The commander, landing force, determines possible beachheads for each designated landing site and notifies the commander, amphibious task force, of the selections in order that they may be incorporated in the designation of tentative landing areas. A beachhead includes amphibious task force and landing force objectives, as well as one or more landing sites. In some cases, several potential beachheads, with associated landing sites and objectives, may be developed for evaluation.

**Shoreline Configuration.** The configuration of the coastline is an important factor to be considered in the selection of a beachhead. Shorelines have three primary forms: convex, concave, and straight. Combinations of the three types are possible. The significance of each of these in selection of the beachhead is discussed below.

Convex Shoreline. The convex shoreline in the form of large promontories or deltas causes dispersion of hostile defensive forces and prevents effective enfilade fire on the landing beaches. Except for its generally inferior hydrographic characteristics, convex is the most favorable coastal formation from the attacker's point of view.

Concave Shoreline. The concave shoreline, particularly in the form of a bay or reentrant, is unfavorable because it provides opportunity for the convergent massing of enemy fires at any point in the area and permits establishment of an organized system of crossfires that are extremely disadvantageous to the attacker. Conditions such as the existence of sheltered water and favorable landing conditions may dictate the selection of a concave shoreline as a place of landing despite its unfavorable characteristics. In such cases, particular consideration is given to the promontories that form the shoulders on either flank of the landing beach and provide naturally advantageous positions for defensive weapons.

Straight Shoreline. The straight shoreline has no prominent indentations or promontories and is relatively less favorable because it lends itself to enemy enfilade fire. Straight shoreline represents a compromise between the advantages of the convex shoreline and the disadvantages of the concave shoreline.

**Related Terms**

amphibious operation

**Source Joint Publications**

3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations

**BIOLOGICAL AGENT**

A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel.

*JP 1-02*

Threat doctrine considers biological agents as weapons of mass destruction. Such agents, including infectious microorganisms and toxins, are capable of widespread, mass infection or intoxication. These agents, depending on intended use, can cause lethal, disabling,
contagious, or noncontagious type casualties. (See figure above.) These agents could be effectively employed against large rear area objectives or against command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence or other critical targets.

Certain factors may significantly increase the probability of use. Should a potential threat consider that initiating biological warfare was worth the risk, the employment of biological agents may provide a way of causing asymmetry on the battlefield. Further, genetic engineering can selectively improve toxicity, lifespans, or dissemination efficiencies; defeat detection and warning systems; or make verification of use virtually impossible.

The intentional use of these disease-causing organisms (pathogens), toxins, or other agents of biological origin is designed to weaken resistance to attack and reduce the will to wage war. Historically, biological warfare has primarily involved the use of pathogens to sabotage food and water supplies and spread contagious disease among populations. These pathogens have generally fallen into one of the following categories:

- naturally occurring, unmodified infectious agents;
- toxins, venoms, and their biologically active fractions;
- modified infectious agents;
- bioregulators and physiologically active compounds.

Biotechnology is a tool for the production of biological warfare agents. Naturally occurring infectious organisms can be made more virulent, drug resistant, and can be manipulated to render protective vaccines ineffective. Such developments could greatly complicate the ability to detect and identify biological warfare agents and the ability to operate in areas contaminated by these agents. The causative agents for anthrax, tularemia, plague, and cholera, as well as botulinum toxin, staphylococcus, enterotoxin, and mycotoxin, are believed to have been developed as biological warfare agents by potential US adversaries.
**BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**

**Related Terms**

biological warfare; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support to Joint Operations

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**BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**

Definition of “biological warfare” = See biological operation.

**biological operation**

Employment of biological agents to produce casualties in personnel or animals and damage to plants or materiel; or defense against such employment.

*JP 1-02*

**General.** A biological threat is the capability of an enemy to plan and deploy a biological material to produce casualties in humans or animals or damage plants or other material. A biological agent is a microorganism or biological toxin intended to cause disease, injury, or death in people, plants, or animals or deterioration of material. A biological threat is the capability of an enemy to deploy these types of agents.

**Microorganisms.** (See figure below.) Pathogenic microorganisms are infectious agents that cause disease in personnel, animals, or plants by entering the body through the lungs, digestive tract, skin, and mucous membranes of body openings. Once they enter the body, microorganisms multiply, overcoming the body’s natural defenses, and produce disease.

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**Microorganisms**

Pathogenic microorganisms are infectious agents that cause disease by entering the body through the lungs, digestive tract, skin, and mucous membranes of body openings. Once in the body, they multiply, overcoming natural defenses and producing disease.

**Toxins**

Toxins are poisonous substances produced as by-products of microorganisms, plants, and animals. They can be chemically synthesized or artificially produced. Toxins exert lethal or incapacitating effects by interfering with certain cell and tissue functions. Symptoms can be confused with chemical poisoning or infectious disease.

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**BIOLOGICAL THREAT**

The capability of an enemy to plan and deploy a biological material to produce casualties in humans or animals, or damage plants or other material.
Toxins. Toxins are poisonous substances produced as by-products of microorganisms, plants, and animals. Some toxins can be chemically synthesized, and some can be artificially produced with genetic engineering techniques. Toxins exert their lethal or incapacitating effects by interfering with certain cell and tissue functions. The signs and symptoms of toxin poisoning can be confused with both chemical poisoning and infectious diseases.

Enemy Biological Weapons Employment. Delivery systems for biological warfare agents most commonly generate invisible aerosol clouds with particles or droplets that can remain suspended for extensive periods. The major risk is retention of inhaled particles. To a much lesser extent, particles may adhere to an individual or to clothing. Vectors, which are organisms (e.g., insects) that transmit pathogens, may be involved in the spread of a disease. The effective area covered varies with many factors, including wind speed, humidity, and sunlight. In the absence of direct evidence of an attack, the first clue would be mass casualties fitting a clinical pattern compatible with one of the biological agents; however, diagnosis may be difficult because of the possible use of multiple pathogens. Toxins, although nonliving, affect the body in a manner similar to chemical warfare agents. However, toxins are generally much more potent. Mucous membranes, including the eyes, are also vulnerable to many biological warfare agents. Potential targets of biological agents include the following:

- rear area command centers and key facilities;
- troop assembly areas;
- ports of debarkation or supply points, airfields, and industrial centers prior to the outbreak of hostilities;
- naval operations near land;
- forward combat areas and logistical areas;
- any area that presents a likely target for a terrorist or insurgent group.

Related Terms
biological agent; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

BOUNDARY

A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.

JP 1-02

Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define areas of operation for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.
No plan of operations can be projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of the operation. Commanders build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation — victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

BULK PETROLEUM

Bulk petroleum is common to both commercial and military operations. It requires special handling and storage and has a demand significantly larger than other supply classes. For these reasons, any viable support concept must incorporate the principles of standardization, flexibility, and interoperability. (See the figures below.)

The Department of Defense (DOD) components should minimize the number of bulk petroleum products that must be stocked and distributed, plan to use fuels readily available
worldwide, and minimize the military-unique characteristics of DOD fuels. The determination of required fuel is dependent upon the types of equipment deployed and must also take into account the maturity of the theater’s petroleum production and distribution infrastructure.

Military weapon systems and equipment must be capable of using alternate fuels. Military fuels handling equipment and connectors must be interoperable among Services and, where possible, with allies and coalition partners. This interoperability allows timely weapon system support in joint operations without duplication of effort and material. This concept is also extremely important in combined operations where one nation may be designated as lead for petroleum logistics. Consequently, to foster interoperability, DOD fuels handling equipment should be of common or compatible design, material, and size whenever practical.

Bulk petroleum inventory consists of war reserve materiel stocks and primary operating stocks. Both inventories are sized based on a concept of having enough fuel on hand until resupply can be assured. This approach minimizes stock levels while maintaining an acceptable degree of support and sustainability across the range of military operations. Inventory levels are independently determined for each location or, where practical, for a defined area.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-03 Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
C4 ARCHITECTURE

The joint command, control, communications, and computers (C4) architecture provides a framework of functional and technical relationships for achieving compatibility and interoperability of C4 systems. Architectures provide the logical link between operational requirements and C4 systems development. They are based on doctrine defining command relationships and information requirements (what information is exchanged to support the varied functions of operations, intelligence, logistics, and planning). The supporting analyses for architectures document the doctrinal basis for joint interfaces and can recommend or prescribe an equipment solution for each interface. The equipment solution may be met by existing, programmed, or yet to be developed systems.

Related Terms
C4 systems

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

C4I FOR THE WARRIOR

“We have set the course with C4I For The Warrior concept. Many milestones have been achieved. The Global Command and Control System is well underway. We continue to make progress toward a common global vision to provide the Joint Armed Forces with the critical information they need.”

General John M. Shalikashvili 12 June 1994

The Common Global Vision. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior (C4IFTW) (see figure below) sets forth a 21st century vision of a global information infrastructure made up of a web of computer controlled telecommunications grids that transcends industry, media, government, military, and other nongovernment entities. C4IFTW provides a unifying theme, guiding principles, and milestones for achieving global C4I joint interoperability that will allow any warrior to perform any mission — any time, any place; is responsive, reliable, and secure; and is affordable.

The Infosphere Architecture. The C4I For The Warrior vision put the Armed Forces of the United States on a course toward an open systems architecture referred to as the global grid (see second figure below) that will provide virtual connectivity from anywhere to anywhere instantaneously on warrior demand.

The architecture of grid networks can support both vertical and horizontal information flow to joint and multinational forces. Commanders at all levels require a distributed communications grid comprised of links employing any electronic transmission media overlaying an area of responsibility/joint operations area. Nodal points may be terrestrial, airborne, and/or space-based. Nodal points automatically store, relay, and process information. Voice, data, and imagery flows together in digitized form across all communication paths. Automated user terminals from man portable to more stationary types allow personnel to instantly connect in any fashion desired (e.g., electronic mail; instantly reconfigured (virtual) voice radio nets; imagery; connected sensor grids; or extended personal presence by creating synthetic environments such as virtual reality).
The specific paths used to set-up virtual connectivity are controlled by computers. Warriors no longer depend on a single communication link, but have vastly increased reliability and flexibility with access via any of hundreds or thousands of circuits available through the Global Command and Control System and the Department of Defense information infrastructures, host nation, commercial service, or any combination. Virtual connectivity is automatically determined, established, and maintained on warrior demand through the grid network. When no longer needed, the resource is automatically made available providing efficient use of C4 resources.

**The Warrior Vision of the Infosphere.** The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decision makers and warfighters at all levels and with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity. The joint force commander and subordinate leaders gain a coherent understanding of operational situations, regardless of the enemy’s actions or responses, strategically, operationally, or tactically. Commanders see the battlespace together as a team — they perceive and move ideas and knowledge in a timely and coherent fashion. The virtual grid also links sensors to shooters to allow rapid exploitation of opportunity and generate quick, decisive actions.
A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. JP 1-02

Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. Campaigns are conducted in theaters of war and subordinate theaters of operations; they are based on theater strategic estimates and resulting theater strategies. Campaigns of the Armed Forces of the United States are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign. As such, the joint campaign is a powerful concept that requires the fullest understanding by the leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0  Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
        Systems Support to Joint Operations
The joint campaign is planned within the context of the modern theater environment, a complex setting where events, especially in a crisis, can move rapidly. This puts a premium on the ability of joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs and components to conduct campaign planning under severe time constraints and pressures. The joint campaign supports national strategic goals and is heavily influenced by national military strategy. Logistics sets the campaign’s operational limits. The joint campaign is oriented on the enemy’s strategic and operational centers of gravity. The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects “non-linear.” That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. Joint campaigns rest upon certain foundations of the joint operational art. These foundations are the key collective capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States to wage war: warfighting competencies that have particular relevance to the joint campaign and may play key roles in ensuring its success. From these capabilities the JFC chooses and applies those needed to prosecute the campaign.

The joint campaign seeks to secure air and maritime superiority and space control. These are important for the effective projection of power. Furthermore, air and maritime superiority, and the enhanced support to terrestrial forces assured by space control, allow the JFC freedom of action to exploit the power of the joint force. For instance, air and maritime superiority are prerequisites to attaining a mobility differential over the enemy: first and foremost by protecting friendly mobility from the enemy and second by enabling joint interdiction to degrade the enemy’s mobility. The capability of the armed forces for forcible entry is an important weapon in the arsenal of the JFC. Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. Direct attack of the enemy’s strategic centers of gravity (by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities) is an integral part of the joint theater campaign. Special operations afford a flexible and precise tool upon which the joint campaign often relies heavily. The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, operational, and tactical situation which advanced US technologies provide our forces. Sustained action on land, the capability provided by land power to the JFC, is often a key capability of the joint campaign. Finally, leverage among the forces is the centerpiece of joint operational art. Force interactions can be described with respect to friendly forces and to enemy forces. Friendly relationships may be characterized as supported or supporting. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetric, if our force and the enemy force are similar (e.g., land versus land) or asymmetric, if the forces are dissimilar (e.g., air versus sea, sea versus land). In combination, they illustrate the richness of relationships achievable with joint forces and the foundation for synergy that those relationships create.

Campaigns serve as the military focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war. Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the campaign or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including
redeployment). Logistics is critical to phasing. Logistics is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

### Joint Campaigning in the Solomons, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point in the war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as a sequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations.

Operations began with the August, 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audacious stroke to eliminate the threat posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island to the Allied air and sea lines of communications with Australia. During the next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperate land battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal. During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six grueling surface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that had so punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew a unique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single air command, the “Cactus Air Force.” (CACTUS was the codeword for Guadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “If it had wings it flew; if it flew it fought....”

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertook a sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the huge Japanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forces to shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines; land forces once ashore seized and built airfields; from these airfields air forces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further naval advance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into Air Solomons Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined air organization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.


### Related Terms

campaign plan; campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning; operational art

### Source Joint Publications

| JP 1 | Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States |
| JP 0-2 | Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) |
| JP 3-0 | Doctrine for Joint Operations |
| JP 5-0 | Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations |

### CAMPAIGN PLAN

A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)
The joint campaign plan achieves sequenced and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces — orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on the synergistic effect of joint forces. The objective is the employment of overwhelming military force designed to wrest the initiative from opponents and defeat them in detail. A joint force, employed in its full dimensions, allows the commander a wide range of operational and tactical options that pose multiple and complex problems for the enemy. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

Campaign plans are unique, with considerations that set them apart from other plans. These plans synchronize operations by establishing command relationships among subordinate
commands, by describing the concept of operations, by assigning tasks and objectives, and by task-organizing assigned forces. They orient on the enemy’s centers of gravity; achieve simultaneous and synchronized employment of land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly define an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. (See figure above.) Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment.

The joint campaign plan is based on the commander’s concept. The formulation of the commander’s concept is the intellectual core of the campaign plan, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or “end state” (the commander’s intent) and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including required postconflict measures). Accordingly, the campaign plan itself can be brief, though implementing orders will usually be longer.

The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, nongovernmental operations, and even United Nations operations. Theater campaign plans are time-sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending on the mission and forces available.

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.”

Napoleon II, Maxims of War, 1831

Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework or a series of operation plans for phases of campaigns. Subordinate joint force commanders may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, joint task forces can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, theater guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.

Campaign plans are used by national authorities as well as by subordinates. By means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. Submission of a well-conceived campaign plan to the CJCS gives the combatant commander’s estimated time-phased force requirements for consolidation with other combatant command forecasts at the national level. The campaign plan may be used to influence the joint strategic planning process.
CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Related Terms
campaign plan; campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning; operational art

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

Campaign planning, like all joint operation planning, is based on evolving assumptions. It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations. Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.

Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP) processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

Campaign planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Based on strategy adopted during the crisis action planning procedures, combatant commanders design campaigns to accomplish national or multinational strategic military objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. It communicates the commander’s purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations.

Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Campaign plans guide the development of supporting operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. The use of campaign planning is refocused as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decreases. During peacetime deliberate planning, combatant commanders prepare joint OPLANs, including campaign plans, in direct response to taskings in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation
of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the National Command Authorities (NCA) selects the course of action during CAP. Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution. Execution planning conducted is for the actual commitment of forces when conflict is imminent. It is based on the current situation and includes deployment and initial employment of forces. When a crisis situation develops, an assessment is conducted that may result in the issuance of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. Courses of action (COAs) are developed based on an existing OPLAN or operation plan in concept format, if applicable. The combatant commander proposes COAs and makes any recommendations when the Commander’s Estimate is forwarded to the NCA. The NCA select a COA and, when directed, the Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER. The combatant commander now has the essential elements necessary for finalizing the construction of a campaign plan using the approved COA as the centerpiece of the plan.

Related Terms
campaign plan; campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning; operational art

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz briefs William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt, and General MacArthur on Pacific offensive plans, 26 July 1944.
Throughout the Pacific War, Admiral Nimitz used intelligence to determine enemy intentions and arrange his campaigns and operations accordingly. At the Battle of Midway in June 1942, for instance, superb signals intelligence led to one of Nimitz’ greatest victories.
A key concept that integrates intelligence and operations is centers of gravity, a term first applied in the military context by Clausewitz to describe “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” Joint doctrine defines centers of gravity as: “Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” (See figure below.)

Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly important concept. Rather than attack peripheral enemy vulnerabilities, attacking centers of gravity means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow will yield military success. Though providing an essential focus for all efforts, attacking centers of gravity is often not easy. “Peeling the onion,” that is, progressively first defeating enemy measures undertaken to defend centers of gravity, may be required to expose those centers of gravity to attack, both at the strategic and operational levels. Actions to extend offensive efforts throughout the theater, including deep penetrations of enemy territory, can increase the vulnerability of enemy centers of gravity.

This concept of centers of gravity helps joint force commanders focus their intelligence requirements (including the requirement to identify friendly centers of gravity that must be protected from enemy attack). Intelligence should be timely, objective, responsive, complete, accurate, and relevant. It should aid the identification of centers of gravity and suggest how they might most effectively be dealt with. Beyond that, however, intelligence should provide the capability to verify which desired military effects have or have not been achieved and
generally support the commander’s situational awareness in what will often be a dynamic, fast-moving, and confusing (fog of war) situation.

The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

Identification of enemy centers of gravity requires detailed knowledge and understanding of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Joint force commanders and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause centers of gravity to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.

Enemy centers of gravity will frequently be well protected, making direct attack difficult and costly. This situation may require joint operations that result in indirect attacks until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. It is also important to identify friendly centers of gravity so that they can be protected. Long sea and air lines of communications from the continental US or supporting theaters can represent a center of gravity. National will can also be a center of gravity, as it was for the US during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

CENTRALIZED PLANNING

A joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

Related Terms

decentralized execution; unity of effort

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
As shown in the figure below, the National Command Authorities (NCA) exercises authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The first runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, each operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and control, through the individual Chiefs of the Services, of their forces not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

The commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. Combatant commanders prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

The Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. This branch of the chain of command embraces all military forces within the respective Service not specifically assigned to commanders of combatant commands. This branch of the chain of command is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.
“For when the king is on the field nothing is done without him; he in person gives
general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions;
these again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders
of enomities, and these to the enomy. In like manner any more precise instructions
are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost
the whole Lacadaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and the
responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.”

Thucydides Peloponnesian Wars, 422 B.C.

Commanders in the chain of command exercise authority as prescribed by law or a superior
commander, defined as one of the following command relationships, over the military
capability made available to them: COCOM, operational control, tactical control, or a support
relationship. Unless otherwise directed by the NCA, COCOM is reserved for the commanders
of the combatant commands. The majority of forces are apportioned to support the missions
of multiple joint commanders. While COCOM can only reside with one combatant
commander, the responsibilities of the combatant commander to carry out assigned missions
require that they coordinate on a continuous basis with the combatant commander exercising
COCOM over forces planned to support their operational needs.

Related Terms
administrative control, combatant command (command authority), command, control,
operational control, tactical control

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
the Secretary of Defense, so that the Chairman may better incorporate the views of these commanders in advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also communicates, as appropriate, the combatant commanders’ requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD).

The Chairman assists the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions. The Chairman transmits their orders to the combatant commanders as directed by the President and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the combatant commanders by other authority. In addition to other duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman will, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their business as promptly as practicable; and determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be decided.

In performing Chairman functions, duties, and responsibilities including those enumerated above, the Chairman will convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collectively or individually, and of the combatant commanders.

Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman will be responsible for the following:

- Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include a military strategy to support national security objectives within policy and resource level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense (such strategy will include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders), and net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of potential adversaries.
- Perform duties, as assigned by the President, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions.
- Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the combatant commanders.
- Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.
- Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Military Services in accordance with those plans.
- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.
- Provide for the preparation and review of joint operation plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those joint operation plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans. Ascertain the logistic support available to execute the general war and joint operation plans of the combatant commanders. Review and recommend to the Secretary of Defense appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services which, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness.
consistent with approved plans.

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

- Establish and maintain a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the combatant commanders.

- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense concerning the preparation of annual policy guidance to be provided to the heads of DOD components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals of their respective components.

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other DOD components conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders.

- Submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the combatant commanders.

- Recommend a budget proposal for activities of each combatant command. Activities for which funding may be requested in such a proposal include joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations.

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

- Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the armed forces.

- Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

- Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.

- Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

- Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of roles and functions of the Services and changes in the assignment of missions of the combatant commanders as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.

- Prepare integrated plans for military mobilization.

- Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.

- Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing combatant commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.

- Periodically, not less often than every two years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command, and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.

- Oversee the activities of the combatant commands.

- Serve as the spokesman for combatant commanders, especially on the operational
requirements of their commands. In performing this function, the Chairman will confer with and obtain information from the combatant commanders with respect to the requirements of their commands; evaluate and integrate this information; advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of those commands, individually and collectively; and communicate, as appropriate, those requirements to other elements of the Department of Defense.

- Review the plans and programs of combatant commanders to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each combatant command.
- Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by combatant commanders and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.
- Provide guidance and direction to the combatant commanders on aspects of command and control that relate to the conduct of operations.
- Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, Military Services, and Defense agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.
- Participate, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based on US strategic considerations, current national security policy, and strategic plans. These statements of requirements include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases and for equipping and maintaining military forces.
- Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.
- Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in research and engineering matters by preparing statements of broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of an integrated DOD program; statements of overall military requirements; statements of the relative military importance of development activities to meet the needs of the combatant commanders; and recommendations for the assignment of specific new weapons to the armed forces.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.
- Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of security assistance programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces, including recommendations for allied military forces, materiel, and facilities requirements related to US strategic objectives, current national security policy, strategic plans, and the implementation of approved programs; and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, as necessary, for keeping the Military Assistance Program in consonance with agreed strategic concepts.
- Manage for the Secretary of Defense the National Military Command System (NMCS) to meet the needs of the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish operational policies and procedures for all components of the NMCS and ensure their implementation.
- Provide overall supervision of those Defense agencies and DOD field activities assigned to the Chairman by the Secretary of Defense. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of a Defense agency or DOD field activity, for which the Chairman has been assigned overall supervision,
conform with the requirements of the Military Departments and of the combatant commands.

• Periodically, not less often than every two years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat support agencies. Those include the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Central Imagery Office, and any other Defense agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense.

• Provide for the participation of combat support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.

• Develop a uniform readiness reporting system for reporting the readiness of combat support agencies.

• Provide direction and control of the DIA for the purpose of ensuring that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support is available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands.

• Oversee military aspects of activities of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

• Advise the Secretary of Defense on mapping, charting, and geodesy requirements and priorities and provide guidance to the DMA and the combatant commands to serve as the basis for relationships between these organizations.

• Select officers to serve on the Joint Staff. May suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.

• Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.

• Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the establishment and review of joint duty positions, including those designated as critical joint duty positions.

• Advise the Secretary of Defense on establishing career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty and on procedures for overseeing the careers, including promotions and career assignments, of officers with the joint specialty and other officers who serve in joint duty assignments.

• Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review, accreditation, and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.

• Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing guidelines to be furnished to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for ensuring that specified officer promotion boards give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving or have served in joint duty assignments.

• Designate at least one officer currently serving in a joint duty assignment to each officer promotion board that will consider officers who are serving or have served in a joint duty assignment. (The Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement in the case of any selection board of the Marine Corps.)

• Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.

• Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral or initial appointment as general or admiral.

• Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
CHAIRMAN’S READINESS SYSTEM

- Appoint consultants to the Joint Staff from outside the Department of Defense, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
- Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

CHAIRMAN’S READINESS SYSTEM

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS) supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. Joint operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS — they are the standards against which readiness is measured in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. This senior forum is designed to assess both Unit Readiness, as reported by the Services, and Joint Readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders. The end product of the CRS is senior level consensus on the readiness of the force to successfully execute Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks. Significant shortfalls or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk and may be remedied through operational or programmatic actions. Joint operation plans have a major role in the process to address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

CHEMICAL WARFARE

All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. The term “chemical warfare weapons” may be used when it is desired to reflect both lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents of either chemical or biological origin. Also called CW.

The primary uses of chemical warfare (CW) are to achieve surprise and cause mass casualties, particularly against an unprepared adversary. Chemical weapons can be used to hinder the momentum of an opposing force, disrupting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, and degrading combat potential, to include the use of CW agents to restrict the use of terrain, facilities, and equipment.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, originally signed by 65 nations in Paris in January 1993, bans the acquisition, development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons throughout the world. It also provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and production facilities within 10 years after the agreement takes effect. Further, it requires the monitoring of national chemical industries to ensure compliance, through both routine and
so-called challenge inspections. The convention will take effect for the United States in 1995, if ratified.

“This is a complex problem that requires an experienced hand and a determined approach. First, we’ve got to deal with those nations that have used the gas... We must restore the prohibition against the use of those terrible weapons. The barriers against chemical warfare, breached during the Iran-Iraq War, must be repaired and raised even higher.

Second, we’ve got to prevent those nations approaching the threshold from proliferating. That calls for careful intelligence and controls on the technical capabilities that allow production of the weapons...

Third, we’ve got to prevent the most ominous proliferation of all. The eventual combination of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles could put new destructive power in the hands of governments with terrorist records.

At the end of the First World War, the so-called war to end all wars, mankind sought safety in collective security. Part of that security was to outlaw the use of certain weapons — chemical weapons — as a sign of our civilization. Collective security failed eventually under Hitler’s blows. One of the first signs of the breakdown of civilization was the use of gas in Ethiopia.

From that time until our own, despite World War II, and countless conflicts, somehow the ban on the use of chemical weapons remained intact. Yet now, just as we look up, look forward to a new decade and perhaps a whole new era of peace — the alarm bell has sounded. I’ve heard that bell and I know what it means. And if I’m remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons.”

George Bush, Address at the University of Toledo
Toledo, Ohio, October 21, 1988

Related Terms
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations; riot control agent

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

CINC LOGISTIC PROCUREMENT SUPPORT BOARD

Geographic combatant commanders (CINCs) coordinate contracting operations within their commands. This requirement may be met through the CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB), which is a temporary board designed to achieve a properly coordinated acquisition program. The CLPSB is chaired by a Logistics Directorate representative and includes representatives from each of the component commands. CLPSB functions are as follows:

• Coordinates with US Embassies and host countries for acquisition of supplies and services and for operations by contractors performing under US contracts.
• Eliminates duplication by arranging for single-Service contracting assignments for specified supplies and services, when appropriate.
• Provides an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.
• Provides guidance on the consolidation of purchases.
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

- Establishes procedures to coordinate procurement with the supply operations of the commander and area.
- Prescribes payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.
- Promulgates, as necessary, joint classification and compensation guides governing wages, living allowances, and other benefits for Third World country national and indigenous employees, in coordination with appropriate agencies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The commanders of combatant commands (CINC’s) strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called “the concept of operations.” Also called CSC.

The commanders of combatant commands (CINC’s) strategic concept is the final document produced in step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings.

The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, CINC’s Strategic Concept, and CJCS review. (See figure below.) The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step 1. During step 2, alternative courses of action (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff estimates of supportability to be completed in step 3. In step 4, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander’s estimate containing the commander’s decision on the preferred COA. In step 5, the selected COA is then expanded into the CINC’s Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved in step 6, the CINC’s Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

During the CINC’s Strategic Concept step of the concept development phase, the supported commander prepares a Strategic Concept, which is an expansion of the selected COA, as a narrative statement of how to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. The supported commander may convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties.
Related Terms
concept development; deliberate planning; operation plan; operation plan in concept format

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0    Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)
Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the National Command Authorities. Civil affairs support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

Civil administration missions in friendly territory are normally undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of the area concerned. This form of civil administration is also called civil affairs (CA) administration. Depending on mission requirements, the full range of CA functional specialty skills may be required for the activities shown in the figure below.
In a civil administration by an occupying power, also called military government, agreements will contain provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government. Furthermore, the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power will be determined by policy decisions at the highest level and may even involve an international policy making group. Emphasis on CA activities to implement long-range plans increasingly influences or replaces measures intended to satisfy short-range needs. Consistent with established policy, a sound local administration is developed, always subject to the authority of the occupying power. An informed populace is fostered through news media, public discussion, and the formation of acceptable political parties. CA forces are trained to plan and conduct essential CA activities to assist commanders in the most effective policy implementation concerning reorganizing or reconstituting government structures.

Regardless of the program adopted, CA personnel and military commanders should be aware that the manner in which they carry out established policies has a significant bearing on subsequent courses of action designed to achieve US security objectives.

**Related Terms**

civil affairs

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-57    Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

**CIVIL AFFAIRS**

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.  

**General.** Civil affairs (CA) are those interrelated military activities that embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations. CA missions include civil-military operations and civil administration. Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs and synchronize their effects with combat operations to minimize civilian interference with military operations and safeguard noncombatants and their property.

CA is an inherent responsibility of command. CA encompasses the activities that military commanders take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed. Commanders plan and conduct CA activities to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national security interests. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies as part of missions tasked to a JFC. These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to or in the absence of other military actions.

**Authority.** A commander’s authority for undertaking CA activities in support of all military operations can stem from a variety of sources. Factors such as mission, policy determinants,
and the relation of the government of the country concerned to the United States have an influence on civil affairs.

The authority to conduct CA activities or exercise controls in a given area or country may arise as a result of successful military operations, international cooperative agreement, or from an agreement between the United States Government (USG), or military commander, and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be employed.

International law, including the law of armed conflict, affords occupying powers certain rights and responsibilities. These include the authority to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities.

“The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard to divorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we would have hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in all conflicts, we now have a choice... (in civil affairs) have a tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult, potentially intractable situations...”

Ambassador T.R. Pickering (remarks to a NDU conference)

Civil Affairs Activities. Civil affairs activities are inherently civil-military in nature. While they may be integral parts of both military civic action (MCA) and civil-military operations (CMO), they are not synonymous with either. Civil affairs activities in MCA, as part of more comprehensive USG security and economic assistance programs, may originate from a national plan and entail specific projects, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with other USG agencies. The long-range goal of MCA is to nurture national development. Projects include, but are not limited to, those in education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to host nation (HN) economic and social development. The fundamental tenet of any successful civic action program is civilian self-help. Civil affairs assets are trained either to plan MCA programs or to provide professional advice and assistance to the HN military forces or agencies in establishing local expertise and providing skills and materiel assistance not available to the local civilian participants identified to assume the leadership roles for future long-term development.

As part of CMO, civil affairs activities range from advice and assistance to civilian authorities and a population concerning their relationship with military forces to those that promote the welfare, stability, and security of friendly governments and their population. Civil affairs activities assist and coordinate military efforts to strengthen host-government legitimacy and help to prevent or reduce violence by bridging critical gaps between the civil and military sectors. Use of dedicated CA forces, and the conduct of CA activities, will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US objectives.

Civil affairs activities, however, are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. Civil affairs activities may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities. Civil affairs activities are further characterized by the items listed in the figure below.
Principles of CA Activities. Certain general principles apply to all CA activities. They are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance. These principles are described as follows:

Mission. Civil affairs activities are conducted in support of military operations to assist commanders in fulfilling obligations to civilian noncombatants imposed by international law agreements that may be in effect, or to further the national and international policies of the United States.

Command Responsibility. Responsibility for the conduct of CA activities, including civil administration if directed by higher authority, is vested in the senior military commander, guided by directive, national policies, military strategy, applicable treaty or agreement, and international law.

Continuity and Consistency of Policy. Essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive and clear Department of Defense (DOD) CMO policy transmitted through command channels.

Reciprocal Responsibilities. The commander of an occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an operational area to comply with directives necessary for mission accomplishment and proper administration of a given area. In return, the inhabitants
have the right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their property and individual liberties.

Economy of Personnel and Resources. The activities of CA assets should be limited where possible to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.

Humanitarian Considerations. The use of force beyond military necessity is prohibited. Military commanders should plan operations that include the maximum humanitarian assistance and the minimum suffering for noncombatants that abide by, and exceed if possible, rules of engagement, law of land warfare, and the Geneva Conventions.

**Civil Affairs Assets.** Many DOD organizations have inherent capabilities to support CA activities and conduct CMO. Combatant commanders may be supported by any or all of the following military CA assets:

- Active component or Reserve component (RC) CA forces organized, equipped, and trained to carry out missions that specifically include the conduct or support of CA activities (RC CA units constitute the vast majority of these forces).
- Civil affairs personnel assigned or attached to combatant commands.
- Other RC personnel possessing functional specialty skills applicable to CA activities across the range of military operations.

Although not trained in functional civilian specialty skills for CA operations, DOD forces and personnel trained in such military skills as engineer, medical, dental, veterinary, intelligence, military police, communications, logistics, and transportation complement CA assets and provide significant support to CA activities and CMO. Other special operations forces (SOF) elements and personnel with area orientation, cultural awareness, linguistic capability, and experience in military and civilian advisory and assistance activities will ordinarily collaborate in CA activities and, in certain cases, conduct CA activities of more limited scope. The use of a relatively small number of dedicated CA assets can provide commanders an economy of force capability to achieve assigned objectives through direct interface with civil government officials, agencies, and population. (See first figure below.)

**Designation of Civil Affairs Forces as Special Operations Forces.** Per Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, 27 June 1994, “Civil Affairs,” “US Army civil affairs forces are designated ‘special operations forces’ under title 10 United States Code 167 ....” This action does recognize the commonality of CA force preparation with other SOF, provides increased emphasis on Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) oversight and support structure, and integrates CA force initiatives into United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) programs. Designation of CA forces as SOF does not alter relationships or principles of organization and employment regarding CA forces’ support to military operations.

**Assignment of Civil Affairs Forces to USSOCOM.** All US Army CA forces stationed in the continental United States are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to USCINCSOC who has combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. USCINCSOC normally exercises COCOM of assigned CA forces through the United States Army Special Operations Command, a Major Army Command of the Department of the Army. United States Marine Corps CA Groups are organic assets to Marine air-ground task forces.

**Responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command.** USCINCSOC’s responsibilities for the development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint CA are interrelated with those of the Chiefs of the Services. Therefore,
USCINCSOC coordinates with the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the Services to ensure that all CA requirements are addressed. Additionally, USCINCSOC performs the duties described in the figure below.

**Organization for Civil-Military Operations.** A tailored civil-military organizational structure may be established by combatant commanders, JFC, joint force special operations component commander, or Service or functional component commanders to command and control CMO. Regardless of the name given this structure (e.g., Military Support Group in the United States Southern Command - Operation JUST CAUSE, TASK FORCE FREEDOM in USCENTCOM - Operation DESERT STORM, and Military-Civil Relations Task Force in the United States European Command - Operation PROVIDE PROMISE), the concept of CA command and control organizations may be organized in two ways described below, (names are notional and used for ease of description).

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). A JCMOTF is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or joint task force, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. It may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on National Command Authorities (NCA) or theater guidance. In rarer instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability. A JCMOTF may be formed in theater, in continental United States, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations. Joint commanders may organize JCMOTFs to perform some or all of the CMO-relevant functions listed below:

**OBJECTIVES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES**

- Facilitate commanders' mission capability by obtaining civil support and reducing civilian interference with military operations
- Assist commanders' compliance with operational law requirements, insofar as military circumstances permit, by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civilian property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and suffering
- Assist commanders in achieving developmental goals in friendly or foreign countries by assisting or reinforcing the political and socio-economic viability or efficiency of public institutions and services of host forces
- Assist or supervise the stabilization or reestablishment of civil administration, when directed by the National Command Authorities, in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied territory in support of US and multinational objectives
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). A CMOC is the JFC’s nerve center for CMO and coordination with other non-DOD agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel. A CMOC may have functions closely resembling those for a JCMOTF above, but in addition have certain characteristics differing from a JCMOTF, some of which are enumerated as follows: A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. It may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), USG agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

Situations in which establishment of JCMOTFs and CMOCs are considered are highly scenario-dependent. The next two figures below generally depict such arrangements or relationships, but are intended as illustrative examples only.
1. Combatant commander or joint force commander may maintain direct control of JCMOTF for a specific contingency.

2. Scenario dependent. Combatant commander may direct formation of a JCMOTF in support of other commands as necessary.

3. Liaison with other US Government agencies, host-nation forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations as required.
1. Coordination in development of CMOC.
2. Organizations and relationships are scenario dependent.
3. Comprises multinational forces, civilian coordinating agencies, and others as the situation dictates.
4. CMOC is operational control to the JTF if JCMOTF is not established.
CA Planning. Planning for, and coordination of, CA activities facilitates mission accomplishment. Civil affairs planning is based on national policy and reflects a variety of legal obligations such as the provisions of the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

Deployment and Employment Planning. Selection of CA forces in support of an operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or operation order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning, and identifies, resources, and phases CA required forces. General planning considerations are shown in the figure above.

Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf: Planning

One of the functions of civil affairs is to assist in integrating US forces smoothly with the population and forces of the host nation. Deployment of large numbers of US forces to Saudi Arabia meant harmonizing our western culture with the culture of our host. The challenge facing US personnel was to adapt to the customs of Saudi Arabia so conduct created an impression of respect for the Saudis and their culture. A rigorous indoctrination program was undertaken to orient US personnel on the region’s uniqueness and its history, customs, religion, law, and mores.

Civil affairs planners were active in identifying, planning, coordinating, and integrating host-nation support which was crucial to effective military operations. They identified sources of contract labor, services, materials, and supplies. Civil affairs planners assisted the Saudis in civil defense emergency planning. They kept the status of the Saudi civil defense preparedness including dispersal locations, warning systems, shelters, and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense resources for civilians. Prior to offensive operations and at the request of the US embassy, civil affairs officers met with
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

US civilian nationals living and working in Saudi Arabia to assure them of Coalition military capabilities so as to relieve some of their anxiety about being in a war zone.

Source: DOD Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

CA in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Establishing and maintaining military to civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or coalition, host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and PVOs. CA forces can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations to include culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Selection of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned.

Related Terms
civil-military operations; special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT

civil engineering
Those combat support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations. JP 1-02

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for the preparation of joint logistic plans, to include plans for civil engineering support. In this capacity, the Chairman manages the development of operational planning and execution tools, recommends assignment of civil engineering responsibilities to the Military Services, and recommends to the Secretary of Defense appropriate civil engineering guidance for the Military Services. The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and the relative priority of competing civil engineering support requirements of the commanders of a combatant command (CINCs).

The CINCs prepare Civil Engineering Support Plans (CESPs) as an integral part of their joint operation planning process. They develop training and exercise programs to evaluate and improve preparedness for civil engineering missions and are responsible for prioritizing, planning, and coordinating civil engineering support requirements for their area of responsibility.
The Military Services staff, organize, train, and equip civil engineering resources to perform tasks required by their assigned roles and missions. They provide, through Service components, input to each CINC’s CESP development process regarding Service component requirements. (See figure above.)

**Related Terms**

- combat service support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

The term “civil-military operations” (CMO) is a broad, generic term used to denote the decisive and timely application of military capabilities to enhance the relationship between the military and civilian populace in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander’s mission. CMO range from support to combat operations to traditional nonmilitary roles assisting countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability. (See figure below.)

CMO are undertaken to encourage the development of a country’s material and human resources to assist in achieving US and host-government political, economic, and psychological objectives. CMO involve liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, and among US forces and other government agencies as well as nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations. A variety of types of units, including engineer, medical, intelligence, security, special forces, psychological operations, civil affairs (CA), communications, and transportation provide capabilities, in varying degrees, to plan and conduct CMO and achieve political, economic, and psychological objectives. Dedicated CA forces, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host-nation advisory and assistance activities, as well as in civil-oriented functions paralleling governmental functions, can be essential in CMO designed to secure support...
from the civilian population, fulfill essential civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and host-nation counterparts and governments.

As a fundamental precept, CMO should be closely coordinated with the Country Team and other US Government agencies. Most military responses or efforts, especially those in military operations other than war, require the military-civil partnership that successful CMO provide. CMO also may be manifested through activities associated with humanitarian assistance, civil defense, counterdrug operations, and counterterrorism. Normally, CMO does not connote activities pertaining to enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, or other detainees. Successful CMO should use military CA functional specialty skills but do not necessarily require their use. In all cases, actions by the Armed Forces of the United States should support the host or friendly country’s control over CMO programs and enhance popular perceptions of its stability and legitimacy.

Related Terms
civil affairs; special operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is the joint force commander’s nerve center for civil-military operations (CMO) and coordination with other non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State (DOS), US Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel.

A CMOC may have functions closely resembling those of a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), but in addition have certain characteristics differing from a JCMOTF, some of which are enumerated as follows:

• A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. Such operations may result from decisions and direction emanating from authoritative US or multinational policymaking bodies or from United Nations mandates.

• A CMOC may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, US Government agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. However, the CMOC may be in a supporting role in military operations other than war where DOS or other organizations share or unilaterally control the theater.

• A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It should coordinate US or multinational forces’ goals and operations with those of host nations and appropriate relief or service organizations. A CMOC should serve as a vehicle for the exchange of information among participatory commands and to provide international support for assistance to countries in states of socio-economic or political transition.

• A CMOC may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel.
representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

- Overall management of a CMO may be assigned to a multinational force commander, shared by a US and a multinational commander, or shared by a US commander and a civilian agency head. In a US military-managed CMO, the Operations Directorate of a joint staff is normally responsible for the management of, or participation in, the CMO.
- The CMO may be a suborganization of the JCMOTF and the CMO may have suborganizations to accommodate military or geographic requirements.

**Related Terms**
civil affairs; civil-military operations; joint civil-military operations task force

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs
**General.** The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is designed to augment airlift capability with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure during CRAF activation. Although Air Mobility Command (AMC) assumes mission control of CRAF airlift assets during an activation, individual CRAF carriers retain operational control of their own assets. In this way, the military gains the use of civil aircraft and aircrews and access to the civil en route support structure. The CRAF is comprised of three segments shown in the figure below.

**International Segment.** This segment consists of long-range and short-range sections. The long-range section provides the largest capability with passenger and cargo aircraft. Aircraft must be extended-range capable (over water). The short-range section supports near offshore operations with both passenger and cargo aircraft.

**National Segment.** This segment consists of the Domestic Services and Alaska sections. The Domestic Services section provides passenger and cargo aircraft for domestic-only service using regional US air carriers with at least 75 seats (30,000 lbs allowable cabin load) and a cargo capability of at least 32,000 lbs. The Domestic Services section is used in CRAF Stage III (see below) only. The Alaska section provides cargo aircraft support to Alaska in CRAF Stage II and Stage III.

**Aeromedical Segment.** The Aeromedical segment consists of reconfigured Boeing 767 aircraft, which will be used to evacuate critical casualties from the area of responsibility/joint operations area. In addition, these aircraft will be used to move medical supplies and crews to the theater, thus permitting other aircraft to maximize the cargo flow. The Aeromedical segment is used in both CRAF Stage II and CRAF Stage III.

**Activation of Civil Reserve Air Fleet.** There are three stages of CRAF activation designed to meet varying levels of defense airlift needs. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command may activate Stages I and II with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense will issue the order to activate Stage III. The CRAF is activated in order to use commercial airlift assets to augment Department of Defense’s military airlift capability.

- **Stage I - Committed Airlift Expansion.** This stage is activated to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements when AMC’s military airlift capability cannot meet both the deployment and other airlift requirements simultaneously. It is comprised of long-range assets only.
- **Stage II - Defense Airlift Emergency.** This stage is activated to support a defense airlift emergency. It responds to requirements greater than Stage I but is less than full national mobilization. It is comprised of all three segments.
- **Stage III - National Emergency.** This stage is activated to support a declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense.
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments airlift capabilities with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure.

CRAF: A Middle-Aged Success

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a 43-year old program designed to augment the organic capability of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) with civil aircraft, was called into service first time ever on 18 August 1990. On that date, Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command (AMC)) activated the 38 cargo and passenger aircraft of Stage I to meet the initial surge requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Secretary of Defense followed 5 months later, on 16 January 1991, by activating CRAF Stage II, adding more aircraft to meet the pressing sustainment requirements of Operation DESERT STORM.

Established in 1952, CRAF was sized and structured to meet the threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Its purpose was “to augment US military airlift forces with civil air carriers to support emergency airlift requirements.” Under CRAF, US air carriers voluntarily commit cargo and passenger aircraft to support airlift requirements that exceed airlift capabilities. The carriers pledge specific aircraft by tail number to one of three stages of crisis escalation: Stage I — Committed Expansion; Stage II — Defense Airlift Emergency; or Stage III — National Emergency. The CRAF support is also divided into five functional segments: long-range international, short-range international, domestic, Alaskan, and aeromedical. Once activated, the carriers continue to operate the aircraft and provide full support, including fuel, spare parts, and maintenance. AMC, however, assumes mission control. Several carriers also have agreed to serve as senior lodgers during Stage III. In that capacity, they provide expanded ground support services to all aircraft and their crews, using designated commercial airports.

Each stage of CRAF is designed to meet the increased airlift requirements of escalating levels of emergency. The Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM can call up Stage I aircraft on 24-hour notice to meet crisis requirements. The Secretary of Defense can activate Stage II aircraft, also on 24-hour notice,
during an emergency that is less than a full mobilization. The Secretary of Defense also can activate Stage III aircraft, under either of the following conditions: one, the President or Congress declares a Defense-oriented national emergency, or, two, in a situation short of a declared Defense-oriented national emergency. In Stage III, the air carriers have 48 hours to make their aircraft available to the government.

Although principally aimed at augmenting organic airlift capabilities during wartime, the CRAF Program is also used to allocate some of AMC’s peacetime values to carriers that commit aircraft to, for example, the long-range international segment of CRAF, based upon aircraft type (cargo or passenger), payload, block speed, and range, etc. AMC then uses the mobilization values to establish “entitlements,” expressed in annual dollar shares of its cargo or passenger business.

A “joint venture” concept provides another incentive for carriers to join the CRAF Program. Under this concept, carriers are not required to convert the mobilization values associated with their commitment into peacetime business. Instead, they can trade those mobilization values to their joint-venture CRAF partners that want to augment normal commercial business with military The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments airlift capabilities with US civil aircraft, aircrews, and support structure movements. The concept was established to induce carriers, particularly small-package carriers, to join CRAF that may not do so otherwise.

The process for CRAF activation begins when the combatant commanders specify their requirements, expressed in a variety of terms (military units, equipment end items, ammunition, resupply materiel, etc.), and the date they are needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves those requirements, and USTRANSCOM translates the requirements into time-phased deployment data and designates them for movement by either airlift or sealift. USTRANSCOM then provides the airlift deployment data to AMC to develop detailed lift requirements and the flight schedules necessary to meet them. After programming its organic lift capability, AMC determines the civil augmentation necessary, taking into consideration the amount currently available by expanding the scope of on-going contracts (expansion buy). AMC also assesses, as warranted, the CRAF stage that best meets the unsatisfied airlift requirements, notifies the carriers of possible CRAF activations, and either activates CRAF Stage I (with USTRANSCOM approval, sends a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (through USTRANSCOM) requesting declaration of an airlift or national emergency to activate either Stage II or III. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then notifies the Secretary of Defense, who, if he concurs with the CJCS’s position, apprises the Secretary of Transportation of his intent to activate CRAF. Once activated, the Chairman assigns airlift priorities to meet the CINC’s requirements.

Shortly after the President’s decision to launch a military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, US air carriers voluntarily began supporting the airlift requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD through an AMC “expansion buy.” They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990. By the 17th, they had completed in excess of 100 passenger and cargo missions (i.e. international flights) involving more than 30 aircraft. On 18 August 1990, AMC activated the
38 aircraft from 16 carriers in CRAF Stage I. In one month, those aircraft flew 391 missions in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Over the next four months, the number of CRAF missions increased to 1,903.

On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of CRAF Stage II to meet the additional cargo airlift requirements of Operation DESERT STORM. Consequently, by 12 February, the daily CRAF mission capability increased to an average 23.4 missions per day, an 86 percent increase over support for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The CRAF Program is a DOD success story. This program, first originated to satisfy Cold War requirements, has proven its worth through the years in satisfying peacetime airlift requirements that exceeded organic military lift capabilities. Further, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US commercial carriers responded to both the program’s incentives and the Stage I-II activations completing in excess of 4,700 missions to move units, equipment, and resupply materiel. This proved invaluable in providing AMC with the means to satisfy the combatant commander’s surge, sustainment, and redeployment requirements.

Source: Review of Strategic Mobility Programs, Volume 2: Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1991

Related Terms
mobility; mobilization

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-01.1 JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations
JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

CJCS ALERT ORDER

alert order
1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action.

JP 1-02

The focus of the course of action (COA) selection phase of crisis action planning is on the selection of a COA by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs provided in the supported commander’s estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA. The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning be accomplished. Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision.
A CJCS ALERT ORDER is a formal, crisis action planning (CAP)-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER.

The ALERT ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning. An ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility and will normally be issued following receipt of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the ALERT ORDER may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a PLANNING ORDER has been issued.

The specific contents of the ALERT ORDER may vary widely, as with the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPERATION ORDER may be necessary.

If required by circumstances, the ALERT ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations.

Related Terms
CJCS execute order; CJCS planning order; CJCS warning order; course of action; crisis action planning; execution planning

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

execute order
1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. JP 1-02

When the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the supported commander to implement the OPERATION ORDER (OPORD), the Chairman issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier crisis action planning (CAP) orders and instructions. The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and
supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish objectives.

The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement a National Command Authorities (NCA) decision. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued upon decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an EXECUTE ORDER would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an EXECUTE ORDER may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.

When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER, DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, DEPLOYMENT ORDER, or REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. Under these circumstances, the EXECUTE ORDER need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.

In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the EXECUTE ORDER must pass all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, and ALERT ORDER. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the EXECUTE ORDER will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the EXECUTE ORDER will normally be very time-sensitive.

**Related Terms**

CJCS alert order; CJCS planning order; CJCS warning order

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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**CJCS PLANNING ORDER**

planning order

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action.  

In some cases, a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate execution planning activities before a course of action (COA) is formally selected by the National Command Authorities.
(NCA). Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) additional flexibility in directing military activities. The PLANNING ORDER will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Issuance of either the PLANNING ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks the beginning of execution planning.

The PLANNING ORDER may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The PLANNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A PLANNING ORDER is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the crisis action planning (CAP) while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA. A PLANNING ORDER is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate.

At the Joint Staff level, the PLANNING ORDER generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the PLANNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The PLANNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. Normally, the planning order will allocate major combat forces and strategic lift available for planning. Additional information should be issued as soon as possible in message form and reference the initial planning order.

The PLANNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be provided as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

Related Terms
CJCS alert order; CJCS execute order; CJCS warning order

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)
**CJCS WARNING ORDER**

warning order  
1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow.  
2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted.  
3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.  

When a crisis situation develops, an assessment is conducted that may result in the issuance of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. Courses of action (COAs) are developed based on an existing operation plan or operation plan in concept form, if applicable. The combatant commander proposes COAs and makes any recommendations when the Commander’s Estimate is forwarded to the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA select a COA and, when directed, the Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER. The combatant commander now has the essential elements necessary for finalizing the construction of a campaign plan using the approved COA as the centerpiece of the plan.

The WARNING ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III — Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNING ORDER can contain a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. The WARNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required. The WARNING ORDER will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

The WARNING ORDER normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH.

The WARNING ORDER of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the WARNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be provided with essential guidance necessary to permit him to commence crisis planning. The WARNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available.

The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing rules of engagement or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be provided as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

**Related Terms**

CJCS alert order; CJCS execute order; CJCS planning order

**Source Joint Publications**

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CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS.

General. Joint close air support (CAS) is CAS conducted through joint air operations (as described in Joint Pub 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations”) or in the case of rotary-wing aircraft, through the establishment of a command relationship between components.

CAS is a tactical level operation and is planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. CAS planning focuses on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and/or to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. Although CAS is a tactical operation, it is linked to the operational art through the air apportionment process.

CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly combat forces are in close proximity to enemy forces. The word “close” does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor. CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, or delay enemy forces.

At times, CAS is the best force available to mass lethal capability rapidly in order to exploit tactical opportunities or to save friendly lives. Each Service performs CAS within its organic capabilities, organization, and training. As a result, a variety of aircraft are capable of performing CAS. Some, however, are better designed and suited for the CAS mission than others. Regardless of Service, all aircraft capable of performing CAS must be fully integrated into joint operations to give the joint force commander flexibility in force employment.

CAS is provided to ground commanders when the situation requires detailed integration of firepower against enemy forces.
CAS Usage. Maneuver force commanders request CAS to augment organic supporting fires. They can use CAS to attack the enemy in a majority of weather conditions, day or night. Improvements in tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment have improved the ability of aircraft to provide support. The speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets other supporting arms cannot effectively engage because of limiting factors, such as target type, range, terrain, or the ground scheme of maneuver.

CAS provides commanders with uniquely flexible and responsive fire support. Properly employed, commanders focus the firepower of CAS at decisive places and times to achieve their tactical objectives. Using CAS, commanders can take full advantage of battlefield opportunities. The three-dimensional mobility and speed of aircraft provides commanders with a means to strike the enemy swiftly and unexpectedly. The maneuver force commander considers mission and concept of operations, enemy air defenses and the joint force’s ability to counter them, integration with other supporting arms, and types of CAS assets available in planning for CAS.

CAS is integrated with other fire support measures to support maneuver forces. Whether conducting offensive or defensive operations, commanders focus CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlefield. Priority for the assignment of CAS is to support the commander’s intent and concept of operation. Commensurate with other mission requirements, supporting air commanders posture their assets to optimize support to requesting units.

CAS Employment. The organizational structure, missions, and the characteristics of CAS-capable aircraft determine how CAS is employed. In a joint force, the integration of CAS-capable aircraft allows maneuver force commanders to take advantage of the distinctly different, but complementary, capabilities of each platform to support the fire and maneuver of their units. Although fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can both provide CAS, employment considerations differ. Traditional planning and employment methods for fixed-wing CAS may not be best for rotary-wing aircraft.

While attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft capabilities are complementary, neither type can fully replace the air support provided by the other. The range, speed, and ordnance
load of fixed-wing aircraft and the helicopter’s excellent responsiveness and ability to operate in diverse conditions are distinct advantages peculiar to each.

**Conditions for Effective CAS.** (See figure below.)

Air Superiority. Air superiority permits CAS to function more effectively and denies that same advantage to the enemy. It may range from local or temporary air superiority to control of the air over the entire area of responsibility/joint operating area.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). SEAD may be required for CAS aircraft to operate within areas defended by enemy air defense systems. Available means to suppress enemy air defense threats include destructive and disruptive means.

Target Marking. The requesting commander can improve CAS effectiveness by providing timely and accurate target marks. Target marking aids CAS aircrews in building situational awareness, locating, and attacking the proper target.

Favorable Weather. Favorable visibility improves aircrew effectiveness regardless of aircraft type. Adverse weather CAS is available through specially-equipped aircraft and radar beacons; however, radars or radar beacons may not work well in conditions of heavy precipitation. Before CAS missions are executed, minimum weather conditions will be met. The air unit commander determines the minimum weather required for CAS missions.

Prompt Response. To be effective, CAS must provide a timely response to the request. Streamlined request and control procedures improve responsiveness. Prompt response allows a commander to exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. Techniques for improving response time include the use of forward operating bases to decrease the distance to the area of operations;
placing aircrews on ground or airborne alert status; and delegating launch and divert authority to subordinate units.

Aircrew and Terminal Controller Skill. CAS execution is complex. Aircrew and terminal controller skills influence mission success. Maintaining a high degree of skill requires that aircrews and terminal controllers practice frequently. Frequent training is essential to maintain the skill and currency required to successfully accomplish the CAS mission in a joint environment. In addition, training with all maneuver elements is essential.

Appropriate Ordnance. To achieve the desired level of destruction, neutralization, or suppression of enemy CAS targets, it is necessary to tailor the weapons load and arming and fuzing settings for the required results. For example, cluster and general purpose munitions would be effective against troops and vehicles in the open, whereas hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets may require specialized weapons such as laser guided, electro-optical, infrared munitions, or aircraft with special equipment or capabilities. In all cases, the requesting commander needs to know the type of ordnance to be expended (especially cluster munitions).

Communications. CAS requires dependable and interoperable communications between aircrews, air control agencies, terminal controllers, requesting commanders, and fire support agencies.

Command and Control. CAS requires an integrated, flexible command and control structure to process CAS requirements, assign assets, communicate taskings, deconflict fires and routing, coordinate support, establish airspace control measures, and update or warn of threats to CAS assets.

### Close Air Support in World War I

Despite the losses inflicted on attacking aircraft, aerial attack of front-line troops appeared, on the whole, to be quite effective. On November 23, 1917, for example, RFC D.H. 5 fighters (a type used almost exclusively for ground-attack duties) cooperated with advancing British tanks, attacking artillery positions at Bourlon Woods as the tanks advanced. Subsequent analysis concluded that “the aeroplane pilots often made advance possible when the attacking troops would otherwise have been pinned to the ground.” The critical problem affecting the quality of air support in the First World War was, interestingly, one that has appeared continuously since that time as well: communication between the air forces and the land forces. During these early operations, communication was virtually one-way. Infantry would fire flares or smoke signals indicating their position, or lay out panel messages to liaison aircraft requesting artillery support or reporting advances or delays. For their part, pilots and observers would scribble messages and send them overboard (on larger aircraft, crews carried messenger pigeons for the same purpose). Though by 1918 radio communication was beginning to make an appearance in front-line air operations — as evidenced by its employment on German ground-attack aircraft such as the Junker J1 and on Col. William Mitchell’s Spad XVI command airplane — it was still of such an uncertain nature that, by and large, once an airplane had taken off it was out of communication with the ground until it had landed. Thus attack flights — both Allied and German — tended to operate on what would now be termed a “prebriefed” basis: striking targets along the front of the basis of intelligence information available to the pilots before the commencement of the mission. The “on-call” and “divert” CAS operations associated with the Second World War and subsequent conflicts were not a feature of First World War air command and control, though
attack flights often loitered over the front watching for suitable targets of opportunity, as would their successors in the Second World War.


Related Terms

fire support

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

CLOSE SUPPORT

That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

See support.

COALITION

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

"Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations."

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: Principles for Coalition Warfare, Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

Coalition Structure. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991. Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer not to subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many command and control (C2) structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

Parallel Command. Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. (See figure below.) If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control; and nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force. Parallel command is the simplest to
establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure above depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

Lead Nation Command. In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict provides an example of a parallel command structure within which coalition capabilities were unified toward a common goal. Coalition leaders demonstrated flexibility and innovation in devising and working within this ad hoc structure.

*Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center
Combination. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

Coordination and Liaison. Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well.

Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.

The Gulf War, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.
The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases.

**DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP** (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).

**DEFENSE** (with deployment and force buildup continuing).

**OFFENSE**.

**POSTWAR OPERATIONS** (to include redeployment).

**Deployment and Force Buildup.** While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

**Defense.** While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected course of action before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

**Offense.** Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and control (C2). Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces
closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Related Terms
alliance; combined; multinational operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

“Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character.”

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

Collection includes both the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements.

Collection Management Principles
• Joint force collection management must be able to task any joint force collection asset and obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.
• Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element’s responsiveness to the requirements of the joint force.

Collection Guidelines (See figures below.)
• Intelligence Collection Activities. Collection resources supporting military operations should be allocated or tasked to satisfy anticipated and potential operational and tactical intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. Different types of collection capabilities may be needed so information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others in order to subject the full range of enemy activity to observation. The collection system also needs some redundancy so the loss or failure of
one collection asset can be compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint or multinational operations, responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

- **Essential elements of information (EEI) and Intelligence Requirements.** The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for identifying and determining the EEI for the mission. In turn, the Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) is responsible for identifying the intelligence shortfalls, stating them in terms of intelligence requirements, and then tasking collection assets, conducting exploitation/production, and ensuring dissemination. Identification of pre-planned EEI greatly enhances intelligence support to the joint force.

- **Intelligence Requirements.** At each level of command, senior intelligence officers must be aware of their command’s intelligence requirements, as well as those of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The collection or production capabilities of one component of a joint force may be able to satisfy another’s requirements. Acting for the JFC, the J-2 (collection management) can task resources to collect, process, and exploit the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force based on assigned or potential missions.

- **The J-2 Must be Knowledgeable of Available Collection Resources.** A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and leadtime required for...
tasking intelligence collection and production.

- **Coordination of Collection Sources.** Collection operations (including data exchange) of all collection sources should be synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cuing and tipoff among collectors. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis, as appropriate. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.

- **Collection Opportunity and Command and Control Warfare Tradeoffs.** When determining intelligence operations, the JFC’s staff and the components should identify and compare the longer term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence.
The J-2 and J-2 staff should monitor collection results and provide feedback to the JFC to assist in determining when specific targets can be nominated for attack. The J-2, in conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, should nominate a “no strike” target list to the Operations Directorate of a joint staff and keep it updated. The JFC will determine when and if these targets are to be attacked.

- Collection Operations Management (COM) Responsibilities. COM activities are driven by collection requirements. COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and tasking of the broad array of technical sensor operations and human intelligence collection operations and their associated processing and dissemination resources.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE COMBAT

Joint Force Commander’s actions include...

- Preparing the Theater
- Isolating the Enemy
- Movement to Attain Operational Reach
- Special Operations
- Protection of Forces and their Freedom of Action
- Control of Space
- Constant Assessment of Physical Environment
situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

JFCs direct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations by elements of the joint force to further develop the situation and gain information critical to decision making. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the information desired. Armed reconnaissance operations conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real time intelligence. Special operations forces (SOF) can be employed for special reconnaissance or other human intelligence operations.

JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Central Imagery Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Mapping Agency), which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with continental US (CONUS)-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Joint task forces and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime.Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander’s joint mission essential task list.

JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea lines of communications (LOCs). Supporting combatant commanders can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

Isolating the Enemy. With National Command Authorities (NCA) guidance and approval and with national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by psychological operations and by interdicting critical command and control (C2) nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

Movement to Attain Operational Reach. Forces, sometimes limited to forward-presence forces, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location.
JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions.

Special Operations. During prehostilities, SOF can provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access and influence in foreign nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They can also ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring.

Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

Space. Throughout all prebattlre operations, JFCs continue to exploit the advantages that control of space provides. Intelligence and communications systems are maneuvered or activated as necessary to provide JFCs with an accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the commander of a combatant command or from higher authority.

Physical Environment. Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.

Considerations at the Outset of Combat. As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible.

Force Projection. The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated
with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a C2 perspective, echelonnement is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

Operations with allies and coalition members often require a robust liaison and communications capability. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional sufficient communications equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communications.

Dimensional Superiority. JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. World War II’s Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. The Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force.
and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force.

As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity. Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, JFCs will normally task JFACCs, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy’s depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

Special Operations. Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. SOF frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. They are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force. JFCs counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. Operations security (OPSEC) and military deception are key elements of protection.

JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations,” discusses health support for joint operations.

JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among
component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

**Sustained Combat Operations.** JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. As shown below, JFCs conduct sustained operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF. During one major operation, one component or major category of operations, such as air operations, might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function. Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

The Relationship Between Offense and Defense. Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.

Joint operations will normally include elements of both offense and defense. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During initial entry operations, entry forces may be required to defend while force buildup occurs. Even in sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.
The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. Defensive operations, where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

Linear and Nonlinear Operations.

“The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater”

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward line of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Because rear areas are likewise not clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on C4I, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity. JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs’ objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

Maneuver. The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.
There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent’s centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

Maneuver of forces relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the JFC’s campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or weapons of mass destruction. JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign. At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander in Chief, US Central Command’s concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them. Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC’s concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

Forcible Entry. Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give JFCs unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy’s capability to respond.

Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust C4I capabilities to move with forward elements.

OPSEC and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on
forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the Armed Forces of the United States. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

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**Operation JUST CAUSE**

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.
JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on land and naval maneuver. Interdiction. Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; SOF; amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; Electronic warfare (EW) systems; antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort.

Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real and near real time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing air, land, and naval forces as part of the overall amphibious plan.

### Battle of the Bismarck Sea 2-4 March 1943

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level — in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’s Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney’s air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney’s Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways.
to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement” of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.

Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction. As shown in the figure below, synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the
needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater/joint operations area (JOA) air assets. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their areas of operations (AOs) should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater/JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them. JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

Where maneuver is part of the JFC’s concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces making them better targets for interdiction.

Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater/JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater/JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of
the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC’s objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander’s boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort. JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.
Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of close air support (by both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal or disruptive operations such as EW.

Combat Assessment. With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment (CA). CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. BDA is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA.

At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC’s overall concept. The intent is to analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary’s plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

CA is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint force intelligence officer. JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

COMBATANT COMMAND

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

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The Unified Command Plan defines geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Such AORs are referred to as theaters. By establishing geographic combatant commands (theater commands), the National Command Authorities (NCA) decentralize the authority to plan, prepare, and conduct military operations within that theater to the geographic combatant commander, consistent with strategic guidance and direction.
Other combatant commanders are assigned functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, or strategic operations. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographic regions or can provide forces for assignment to other combatant commanders. These combatant commands can also conduct operations while reporting directly to the NCA.

Combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing assigned missions.

Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander. Such an arrangement allows the subordinate commander to control operations while the combatant commander supports the operation with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a two-tiered system, and was successfully employed in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

The two types of combatant commands are unified and specified.

Related Terms
combatant commander; combatant command (command authority); specified command; unified command

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. JP 1-02

Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred.

COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of US Special Operations Command, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority to perform the following:

• Exercise or delegate operational control of assigned or attached forces.
• Exercise directive authority for logistic matters (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).
• Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
• Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas specified in the UCP with other combatant commanders and with other US Government agencies or agencies of countries in the area of responsibility (AOR), as necessary to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.
• Function, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, as the US military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, Department of Defense (DOD) elements, US diplomatic missions, other US agencies, and agencies of countries in the AOR (if assigned). Whenever a combatant commander undertakes exercises, operations, or other activities with the military forces of nations in another combatant commander’s AOR, those exercises, operations, and activities and their attendant command relationships will be as mutually agreed to between the commanders.
• Determine those matters relating to the exercise of COCOM in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the combatant commander.
• Coordinate with subordinate commands and components and approve those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
• Establish personnel policies to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.
• Participate in the development and acquisition of the command’s command, control, communications, and computer systems and direct their operation.
• Submit recommendations through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense concerning the content of guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.
• Participate actively in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Combatant commanders’ comments are critical to ensuring that warfighting and peacetime operational concerns are emphasized in all JSPS and JOPES documents.
• Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as commanders directly subordinate to the combatant commander and to positions on the combatant command staff. Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any subordinate officer assigned to the combatant command.
• Convene general courts-martial in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
• In accordance with laws and national and DOD policies, establish plans, policies, programs, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.
• When directed in the UCP or otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of US elements of a multinational command may exercise COCOM of those US forces assigned to that command.

Directive Authority for Logistic Matters. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. A combatant commander’s directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support; discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:
• Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander’s directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.
• Under crisis action, wartime conditions or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.
• A combatant commander will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command’s area of responsibility that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Chief of the Service fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.
The term “combatant commander” refers to the commander in chief of both geographically and functionally organized combatant commands. The term “geographic combatant commander” refers to a combatant commander with a geographic area of responsibility assigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Functional combatant commanders support geographic combatant commanders or may conduct operations in direct support of the NCA.

Based on guidance and direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting combatant commanders and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy.

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command, with respect to the commands and the forces assigned to that command, are shown in the figure below.

If a combatant commander at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander will promptly inform the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, commanders of the combatant commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows:

- Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority.

- The commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command will communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command.

- Other elements of the DOD will communicate with the commander of a command or force assigned to a commander of a combatant command on any manner for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the commander of the combatant command.

- The commander of a subordinate command or force will advise the commander of the combatant command, if so directed, of all communications to and from other elements of the DOD on any matter for which the commander of the combatant command has not been assigned authority.
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

Related Terms
combatant command; combatant command (command authority)

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

COMBATANT COMMANDER’S LOGISTIC CONCEPT

Although the commanders of Service component commands provide logistic resources, combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that the overall plan for using these resources supports the theater concept of operations.

The Logistic System. A critical element of a theater logistic system is timely integration of intertheater and intratheater transportation of personnel and supplies in the theater.
distribution system. The means to move people and equipment forward and to evacuate them to the rear is fundamental to successful theater operations. The logistic system ranges from continental US (CONUS) or the deployed support base through a theater port of entry and on to the forward areas of the theater. Key elements of the logistic system are illustrated in the first figure below.

Considerations in developing a logistic system are shown in the second figure below and discussed in the text following.

Geography. The planner must examine the impact of topography, climate, and external factors affecting the logistic system, especially the impact on the various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail, roads, pipelines, and airways.

“Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.”

Winston Churchill: *The River War*, vii 1899

Transportation. Many factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements. For example, sealift is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; airlift is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of equipment and supplies when time is critical. On land, rail (for bulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks.

Logistic Capability. The ability of the base infrastructure to receive, warehouse, and issue logistic resources influences the efficiency of the entire logistic system (for example, through the use of specialized container handling equipment). Infrastructure also limits the size of the force that can be supported.

Logistic Enhancements. Plans should include means to reduce the impact of logistic bottlenecks. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking aprons, additional materials handling equipment, and expedient airfield matting. Improved use of commercial International Organization for Standardization

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**KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM**

**LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)**

The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

**THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK**

The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

**UNITS**

Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

**HOST-NATION SUPPORT**

Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.
containers vice breakbulk can aid in port clearance; but planners should realize such a container policy may create problems elsewhere.

Logistic Infrastructure Protection. Provisions must be made for security of the logistic system because it is an integral part of combat power.

Echelon of Support. The logistic system must be responsive to the needs of the most forward combat forces. It must start from CONUS and extend to the forward area of operations, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed.

Assignment of Responsibility. Combatant commanders should assign responsibility for operating the seaports, bases, and airports to the Service components (or host nations), if applicable.

Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support. The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that can be provided by allied nations affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be devoted to initial movement of combat forces or sustainment.

Theater Concept of Logistic Support. The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The combatant commander’s (CINC’s) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with the logistic system framework considerations outlined above may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.
The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCs’ components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications (LOCs) to be developed, as well as wartime host-nation support to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out. Supporting paragraphs should cover any topics the CINC believes are necessary and may include the following:

- Logistic Authority and Control of Logistic Flow. The figure below lists some of the responsibilities assigned by Department of Defense directive or discussed in joint publications.
- Guidance on Harmonization. Multiple Military Services (US and allied nations) may operate simultaneously within the theater and the LOCs approaching the theater. Coordination of functions among all affected commands, nations, and agencies is essential to avoid confusion and unnecessary duplication. The combatant commanders should provide general guidance, by function and area, wherever needed to ensure unity of effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>Airlift Support</td>
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• Logistic Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems. In addition to standard operating procedures for C4 systems, consideration should be given to backup plans or manual procedures in the event of possible C4 system outages or incompatible interfaces during combined operations.

• Intratheater Support. Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

COMBAT ASSESSMENT

The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendation. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The Operations Directorate (J-3) is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force Intelligence directorate (J-2). Also called CA.

With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment (CA). CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. BDA is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA. At the joint force commander (JFC) level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC’s overall concept. The intent is to analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary’s plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

CA is done at all levels in the joint force. JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) will be responsible for coordinating CA, assisted by the joint force Intelligence Directorate. JFCs apportion joint force reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.
That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.  

The joint force commander (JFC) determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC’s objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander’s decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander’s mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission. Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation.

Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander. Commanders, Operations Directorates, J-2s, and intelligence staffs developing strategy and operations and assigning mission responsibilities have the earliest view of intelligence requirements and the intelligence efforts that must commence at the inception of operations and missions. The determination of strategy and operations becomes the beginning point for intelligence needed to attain military objectives. It is at these earliest determinations that senior intelligence staffs must understand the combat intelligence requirements both for their commands and their subordinate commands, identify the commands and forces’ organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls, access theater and/or national systems to cover shortfalls, and ensure intelligence is provided or available to those who need it. This command responsibility also includes planning for logistic support to command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; intelligence personnel; and equipment. Assignment of appropriate movement priority within the time-phased force and deployment list is essential to ensuring that required intelligence support will be available when needed to support joint operations.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR.

Each Service and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is responsible for performing combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of their own operations, consistent
The joint force commander (JFC) may task Service and special operations component members of a joint force to participate in the operation of the joint search and rescue center (JSRC) and provide trained personnel to staff the center. JFCs have primary authority and responsibility for CSAR in support of US forces within their operational areas, including civilian personnel, such as Civil Reserve Air Fleet crew members and deployed technical representatives. When planning and executing this responsibility, JFCs should ensure that appropriate host nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities are taken into consideration.

JFCs normally delegate responsibility to recover personnel to the joint force component commanders. Additionally, the JFC should establish a JSRC to monitor recovery efforts; to plan, coordinate, and execute joint search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations; and to integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape, and recovery operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. Joint SAR and CSAR operations are those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require the efforts of two or more components of the joint force to accomplish the operation. Established subordinate JFCs such as commanders of subordinate unified commands and standing joint task force (JTF) commanders also should establish a standing JSRC (or its functional equivalent). Contingency JTF commanders should establish a JSRC (or its functional equivalent) in the earliest stages of forming the JTF.

In those joint operations in which there is significant involvement by joint force components and their staffs, the JFC normally should establish the JSRC by tasking one of the component commanders to designate their component rescue coordination center to function also as the JSRC. The designated component should possess the necessary forces and capabilities, such as command, control, communications, intelligence, and surveillance, to plan and execute expeditiously joint CSAR operations. The JFC should give the designated component commander the authority and responsibility that the JFC deems necessary for operating the JSRC so as to properly provide joint CSAR capability for the joint force. The designated component commander designates the JSRC Director, who has overall responsibility for operation of the JSRC.

If a joint operation is limited in nature and there is no significant involvement by joint force component forces or their staffs, the JFC may establish a JSRC (or its functional equivalent) as part of the JFC’s staff. In this case, the JFC normally should designate a JSRC Director as the JFC’s representative with overall responsibility for operation of the JSRC.

The health service support (HSS) capabilities of CSAR units vary from component to component, but are generally limited. Certain component CSAR units are dedicated to CSAR operations while others perform CSAR as a secondary mission. Marine Corps aviation units currently do not conduct CSAR, they do, however, possess the capability to conduct tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, which may involve ground units as well. This mission has a different emphasis and application than the traditional CSAR mission.

Joint force CSAR HSS capabilities are limited to recovering or evacuating the sick or injured from low- to medium-threat environments. They provide medically supervised evacuation of the sick and injured from both peacetime and wartime situations. HSS personnel on rescue aircraft are capable of providing emergency medical treatment (EMT) for traumatic injuries as well as continuing treatment of life-threatening injuries or diseases during transportation.
Although CSAR units require HSS similar to other units, supported geographic combatant commanders must establish a flexible HSS system to meet the demands of CSAR operations. A majority of CSAR HSS requirements can be met by the component surgeon; however, several key issues must be emphasized in any joint CSAR HSS plan.

Adequate intelligence for the theater is critical to the success of CSAR operations. Support requirements for CSAR operations are shown in the figure below.

Some CSAR units do not deploy with organic flight surgeon support. Other units require flight surgeon support for technical assistance in the areas of EMT and administration of medication, continuing medical care and education, and CSAR mission support requirements.

**SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR) OPERATIONS**

- Replenishment of used or outdated medical supplies (medication and material).
- Oxygen supplies.
- Medical equipment maintenance.
- Narcotic storage and control.
- Storage of temperature-sensitive medical material.
- Optical fabrication.
- Blood supply, storage, and distribution.

**Related Terms**
evasion and escape; search and rescue

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-50.2 | Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) |
| JP 4-02  | Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations |

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. **JP 1-02**
All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone. Combat service support (CSS) is the essential logistic functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in an area of operations. At the tactical level of war, CSS includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service troops in ensuring the operational and tactical levels of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Operational logistics encompasses those activities at the operational level of war that link strategic objectives to tactical objectives on the battlefield.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations

COMBAT SUSTAINMENT

Combat sustainment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of supplies, materiel, and personnel to reinforce or resupply units already engaged in combat operations. Combat sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and general threat situations allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and configurations of specific loads. Flight schedules and load plans are usually driven by emergency combat requirements, and perhaps the user’s inability to receive and handle large increments of sustainment materiel. Thus, the efficient utilization of allowable cabin loads (ACLs) and support resources is only a secondary consideration. For example, a unit with limited organic transportation and/or storage capabilities might require daily resupply increments, even though the daily loads underutilize the ACLs of the supporting air transports. On the other hand, such circumstances might justify adding vehicles to a unit’s table of organization and equipment if that would allow airlift planners to consolidate several sorties into one. Given the exceptional risks involved for scarce and perhaps irreplaceable theater airlift assets, combat sustainment requests should normally be restricted to absolutely essential requirements. Combat sustainment usually involves individual aircraft or small formations employing combat tactics to deliver loads to terminals in close proximity to the enemy; it may also be conducted as an air flow operation, depending on requirements and threats. Only essential backhaul requirements justify the increased risks for theater airlift assets involved in these operations. Priority consideration should be given to retrograde of critical reparable items from forward areas to rear echelon repair activities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

COMBATTING TERRORISM

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

JP 1-02
Combatting terrorism involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It includes antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). (See figure below.)

Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism. The basics of such programs include training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. The US Government may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries under the provisions of Chapter II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Counterterrorism provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. The Department of Defense provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. Counterterrorism is a principal special operations mission. Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead agency designation according to terrorist incident location and type. DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the United States; DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur within the United States; and DOT is the lead agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the United States. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or responsibilities.

Related Terms
antiterrorism; counterterrorism

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and combat and communications zones (COMMZs), as shown in the figure below. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental US base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander’s area of responsibility. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.
COMBINED

Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.)

An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations is termed a “multinational” operation. An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations in a formal arrangement is termed an “alliance” operation. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations. Military action in a temporary or informal arrangement for common interests is termed a “coalition” operation. Though the description of “multinational” will always apply to such forces and commanders, they can also be described as “allied,” “combined,” “alliance,” or “coalition,” as appropriate.

OVERLORD: A Classic Joint and Combined Operation

Two years of preparation enhanced by the team-building leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower led to unity of effort in the Normandy campaign.

Thanks to unremitting Allied air offensives, by the spring of 1944 air superiority had been achieved throughout the European theater of war. Allied maritime superiority was assured with victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. These preconditions allowed great synergy to emerge from the integration of air, land, sea, and special operations forces in Operation OVERLORD. Combined military deception operations reinforced this synergy by causing the Germans to focus defenses outside the Normandy invasion area.

From mid-April through June 1944 massive air bombardment interdicted railroads and bridges leading to the lodgement area. Special operations forces (US, United Kingdom (UK), Free French, and Belgian) operating with the French Resistance enhanced these operations; during and after D-day, naval gunfire contributed to the interdiction effort as well. During the night of 5 June, tactical airlift forces carried pathfinders and airborne forces to commence the airborne operations. These airborne landings served to confuse the enemy and block key causeways, road junctions, and bridges leading to the amphibious assault area.

Meanwhile, other Allied air forces screened the sea flanks of the English Channel from enemy submarines, and helped suppress the enemy surface naval threat by constant attacks on E-boat installations. On 6 June 1944, naval gunfire support (often directed by fast flying Royal Air Force Spitfires) proved indispensable to destroying German fortifications, troop concentrations, and
land minefields. Simultaneously, underwater demolition teams comprised of Sailors and Army engineers cleared paths through the vast array of German obstacles blocking the seaward approaches. By D+12, over 2,700 ships and 1,000 transport aircraft had landed 692,000 troops, 95,000 vehicles, and 228,000 tons of supplies.

This effective joint and combined operation owed much to unity of command. Eisenhower’s command structure, the beneficiary of Allied experiences in North Africa and the Mediterranean, included a deputy of another Service and nation; subordinate commands for air, land, and naval forces; and (after much dispute) what we would today call operational control over US and UK strategic air forces.

This stood in sharp contrast to the fragmented German command structure. Von Rundstedt did not control naval and air forces in his theater, including paratroop, air defense, and coast artillery units. Nor did he control all land forces (for instance, he was unable to obtain permission on 6 June to counterattack with immediately available armored divisions).

Related Terms
alliance; coalition

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

COMMAND

1. The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.

3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual.

4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position.

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and enemy forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. Joint force commanders (JFCs) influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by assigning missions; designating the priority effort(s); prioritizing and allocating resources; assessing risks to be
taken; deciding when and how to make adjustments; committing reserves; staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors; and guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.

The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

Effective command at varying operational tempos requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to pass critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. Nonetheless, command style is dictated by the commander, not by the supporting communication system.

**Related Terms**
- combatant command; combatant command (command authority); command and control

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. JP 1-02

Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

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Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.
Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

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Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

Related Terms

command; control; command channel; command, control, communications, and computer systems

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
General. Command and control (C2) protection maintains effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. Synchronized command and control warfare (C2W) operations should enable a joint force commander (JFC) to operate “inside” an adversary’s decision cycle by allowing the JFC to process information through the C2 decision cycle faster than an adversary commander. Initiative is fundamental to success in military operations. In C2W, both C2-attack and C2-protect operations contribute to gaining and maintaining military initiative.

Psychological Operation. Psychological operation’s (PSYOP’s) main objective in C2-protect is to counter the adversary’s hostile propaganda against the joint force. Discrediting the source of mass media attacks against the operations of the US/multinational forces is critical to maintaining a favorable world opinion of the operations. Countering adversary propaganda is a coordinated effort requiring centralized planning and synchronized execution at all levels. Other PSYOP activities to support C2-protect operations include:

- Persuading the adversary forces that US high-technology can be used to identify and neutralize their efforts and that their whole military force and its infrastructure will suffer if they persist in antagonizing friendly forces.
- When called upon, PSYOP operations can target individual intelligence and C2 nodes to assist in C2-protect operations.

Military Deception. Military deception can help protect the joint force from adversary C2-attack efforts. Deception that misleads an adversary commander about friendly C2 capabilities and/or limitations contributes to C2-protect. An adversary commander who is deceived about friendly C2 capabilities and limitations may be more likely to misallocate resources in an effort to attack or exploit friendly C2 systems.

Electronic Warfare. Each of the three divisions of electronic warfare (EW) can also make a contribution to friendly C2-protect efforts.

- Electronic warfare support (ES), supported by signals intelligence (SIGINT) data, can be used to monitor for impending adversary attack on friendly C2-nodes. ES, in the form of signal security monitoring, can be used to identify potential sources of information for an adversary to obtain knowledge about friendly C2 systems.
- Electronic attack, whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or directed energy weapons/antiradiation missiles can be used to defend a friendly force from adversary C2-attack.
- Electronic protection should be used in C2-protect to safeguard friendly forces from exploitation by adversary ES/SIGINT operations. Frequency deconfliction through the use of the joint restricted frequency list is also a key to a successful coordinated defense against adversary C2-attack operations.

Intelligence Role. Traditional military defensive means, implemented at the component level, should defend against adversary efforts to employ physical destruction and EW against friendly C2 systems. However, the JFC should take measures to protect friendly C2 systems from adversary PSYOP, operations security (OPSEC), and military deception operations.
Even a technically unsophisticated adversary may use PSYOP, OPSEC, and/or military deception efforts against friendly C2 systems to influence friendly perceptions. Protecting the joint force from adversary OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception is largely dependent on measures taken by the intelligence community supporting the joint force. The JFC has many sources to “sense” the operational area, including information from his own forces on a wide range of activities, such as the status of friendly forces as well as intelligence provided by many sources, from tactical to national. Although there is no way to guarantee that adversary OPSEC, PSYOP, and/or military deception measures do not distort the JFC’s perception of the battlefield, there are certain measures that can be taken within the intelligence community that should complicate the adversary’s efforts to manipulate friendly perceptions. These measures include:

- training intelligence analysts about military deception methods and to consider the possibility of military deception when analyzing collected intelligence information;
- enforcing information security procedures;
- training intelligence analysts to recognize their own cultural biases and to use analytical procedures that should minimize the impact of those biases;
- cooperating with counterintelligence efforts through active coordination with the counterintelligence support officer.

**Related Terms**

command and control warfare

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
In short, the joint force must have information to operate. This information should be relevant, essential, timely, and in a form that warriors quickly understand and can use to act. The C2S system is the JFC’s principal tool used to collect, transport, process, and disseminate this information. The C2S system also supports the implementation of C2W. C4 systems form the information exchange and decision support subsystems of a C2S system. In time of war, C4 systems support a continuous flow of data to provide real time battlespace information anywhere, anytime, on demand. C4 systems also have the broader role of supporting other functions within joint forces and the Department of Defense forming the overall Defense Information Infrastructure.

Related Terms

command and control

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

COMMAND CHANNEL

Joint force commanders are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole. The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

The command channel is the term used to describe the chain of command from commanders to subordinates through which command is exercised. The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS

Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. JP 1-02

General. Command of joint forces in war is an intense and competitive process. The joint force commander (JFC) is not only faced with making tough decisions in complex situations, but must do this in an environment of uncertainty and limited time. Command is as much a problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and complex warfighting tasks. Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems supporting US military
forces must have the capability to rapidly adapt to the warfighters demands; to make available
the information that is important; provide it where needed; and ensure that it gets there in the
right form and in time to be used. The fundamental objective of C4 systems is to get the
critical and relevant information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize on opportunity
and meet the objectives across the range of military operations.

Enduring Elements. Over time, superior command and control (C2) systems have enabled
victorious commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply their forces’ capabilities at the
critical time and place to win. Two characteristics have remained constant: the human element
and the need for relevant, timely, and accurate information. The human element, with its
ability to sort what’s important, absorb the essentials, and react to the information, remains a
constant factor over time.

“War is a process that pits the opposing wills of two commanders against each
other. Great victories of military forces are often attributed to superior firepower,
mobility, or logistics. In actuality, it often is the commander who makes good decisions
and executes these decisions at a superior tempo who leads his forces to victory. Therefore,
victory demands that commanders effectively link decisionmaking to
execution through the concept of command and control. Warfare will continue to
evolve and command and control processes, organization, and supporting systems
will continue to change, but the basic concept of command and control will remain
the key to the decisive application of combat power. More than ever before, a
command and control system is crucial to success and must support shorter decision
cycles and instantaneous flexibility across vast distances of time and space.”

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3, Command and Control

Today, improved technology in mobility, weapons, sensors, and C4 systems continue to
reduce time and space, increase tempo of operations, and generate large amounts of information.
If not managed, this may degrade the reactions of warfighters and ultimately the warfighting
force. It is essential to employ C4 systems that are designed to complement human capabilities
and limitations.

The Role of C4 Systems in C2. C2 must be viewed from a common perspective to
understand the role of C4 systems that support C2. The figure below provides an overview
of the relationship between information and the command and control support (C2S) system.

The C2S system gives the JFC the means to exercise authority and direct assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC uses information to support
decision making and coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the
JFC’s advantage.

Information integrates joint force components, allowing them to function effectively across
vast distances. Therefore, the structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and
processing requirements. The information requirements of the joint force drive the general
architecture and specific configuration of the C2S system.

The C2S system must overlay the joint force to provide the means through which the JFC
and subordinate commanders drive the joint force toward specific mission objectives. The
C2S forces that compose the C2S system (e.g., reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence,
fire support coordination, air control, electronic warfare, C4 systems, sensor management,
signals intelligence, deception, space systems, and others) should be task-organized and arrayed
to collect, transport, process, and protect information as well as deny the enemy the same
capability.
Modern military forces’ growing dependence upon C2 presents vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the capabilities of joint forces. Command and control warfare (C2W) seeks to deny the adversary the ability to command force disposition and employment while protecting the friendly joint force from similar efforts. The objective is to degrade the adversary’s unity of effort and decrease their tempo of operations while simultaneously increasing that of the joint force.

In short, the joint force must have information to operate. This information should be relevant, essential, timely, and in a form that warriors quickly understand and can use to act. The C2S system is the JFC’s principal tool used to collect, transport, process, and disseminate this information. The C2S system also supports the implementation of C2W. C4 systems form the information exchange and decision support subsystems of a C2S system. (See figure below.) In time of war, C4 systems support a continuous flow of data to provide real time battlespace information anywhere, anytime, on demand. C4 systems also have the broader role of supporting other functions within joint forces and the Department of Defense forming the overall Defense Information Infrastructure.

**Functions of C4 Systems.** C4 systems support the following functions:

- **Collect.** Acquiring or gathering and initial filtering of information based on a planned need, determining time sensitivity, and putting the information into a form suitable for transporting.
- **Transport.** Moving or communicating the information to appropriate receptacles for processing.
- **Process.** Storing, recalling, manipulating, filtering and fusing data to produce the minimum essential information in a usable form on which the warfighter can take appropriate actions.
• Disseminate. Distributing processed information, to the appropriate users of the information.
• Protect. Ensuring the secure flow and processing of information and access only by authorized personnel.

**Fundamental Objectives of C4 Systems.** The fundamental objectives are listed in the figure below and are described in the following text:

Produce Unity of Effort. C4 systems should help a military force and its supporting elements to combine the thoughts and impressions of multiple commanders and key warfighters. This allows the views of many experts to be brought to bear on any given task.
Exploit Total Force Capabilities. C4 systems must be planned as extensions of human senses and processes to help people form perceptions, react, and make decisions. This allows people to be effective during high-tempo operations. C4 systems must be immediately responsive, simple, and easily understandable, especially for systems planned for use during situations involving great stress.

Properly Position Critical Information. C4 systems must be able to respond quickly to requests for information and to place and maintain the information where it is needed. This not only reduces critical delays but also reduces the impact on communications networks.

Information Fusion. The ultimate goal of C4 systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

C4 Principles. To ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow and processing of information, joint warfighters must have C4 systems that are interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. (See figure below.)

Interoperable. Joint and Service C4 systems must possess the interoperability necessary to ensure success in joint and combined operations. Interoperability is the condition achieved among C4 systems or items of C4 equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their users. To ensure C4 systems’ interoperability, all aspects of achieving it must be addressed throughout the life cycle of a system.

Flexible. Flexibility is required to meet changing situations and diversified operations with a minimum of disruption or delay. Flexibility can be obtained by system design (standardization), using commercial facilities, mobile or transportable C4 systems, or pre-positioned facilities. Although certain standard C4 systems (e.g., the Global Command and Control System, or the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)) must operate under rather strict standards, systems requirements and designs should consider the planners’ needs to tailor systems to meet strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. Flexible systems will allow planners to more readily integrate all levels of joint and Service C4 systems into plans. The connectivity that can be achieved and maintained from flexible systems is particularly important in providing commanders’ contingency needs. Flexibility is a necessary adjunct to other principles of interoperability, survivability, and compatibility.
Responsive. C4 systems must respond instantaneously to the warriors’ demands for information. To be responsive, systems must be reliable, redundant, and timely. C4 systems must be available when needed and must perform as intended. The reliability of C4 systems is achieved by designing equipment and systems with low failure rates and error correction techniques, standardizing equipment, establishing standardized procedures and supervising their execution, countering computer attacks and electromagnetic jamming and deception, and establishing effective logistic support programs.

Mobile. The horizontal and vertical flow and processing of information must be continuous to support the rapid deployment and employment of joint military forces. Warriors at all levels must have C4 systems that are as mobile as the forces, elements, or organizations they support without degraded information quality or flow. More than ever before, modular design and micro-electronics can make C4 systems lighter, more compact, and more useful to warfighters.

Disciplined. C4 systems and associated resources available to any JFC are limited and must be carefully used to best advantage. Discipline begins with the JFC focusing and balancing the joint force command and control infrastructure based on predetermined needs for critical information (minimum essential information critical to decision making and mission execution). This ensures that limited C4 systems and their associated forces and resources are employed to best advantage.

The JFC and joint staff must ensure that the flow, processing, and quality of information is deliberately controlled. This requires the planned complementary employment of all information related forces and systems. The C2S system must overlay the rest of the joint force to provide the means through which the JFC and subordinate commanders drive the joint force toward specific mission objectives. The C2S forces that comprise the C2S system should be task-organized and arrayed to collect, transport, process, and protect information as well as support C2W operations that deny the enemy the same capability. Control and management of C2S forces is therefore crucial to the JFC’s ability to implement effective C2 within the joint force. The control and management of C4 networks and nodal operations is central to this effort.
The prioritization of information is essential since C4 systems have a finite capacity. Prioritization of specific types of information is the responsibility of the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staff planners that essentially provides a benchmark from which discipline on information flow and processing within C4 networks can be maintained. Prioritization is also essential to sizing C4 network and nodal systems requirements (e.g., the level of C4 assets devoted to intelligence requirements may reduce network responsiveness to other users requiring a decision by the JFC during campaign and operation planning).

Survivable. National policy dictates the survivability of both the national command centers and the C4 systems through which decisions are transmitted to the forces in the field. It is not practical or economically feasible to make all C4 systems or elements of a system equally survivable. The degree of survivability for C4 systems supporting the function of C2 should be commensurate with the survival potential of the associated command centers and weapon systems. C4 systems survivability can be achieved through application of techniques such as dispersal of key facilities, multiplicity of communication modes, hardening (electrical and physical), or a combination of these techniques.

The JFC ensures that both offensive and defensive C2W actions are employed to protect friendly C2. These actions are referred to as C2-protect operations. Since C4 networks and associated nodal systems are crucial to the joint force C2S system, they present a high value target to the enemy and must be protected to maintain the integrity of the joint force C2 infrastructure. C4 systems defense includes measures to ensure the security of information and C4 systems through information protection, intrusion/attack detection and effect isolation, and incident reaction to restore information and system security.

Sustainable. C4 systems must provide continuous support during any type and length of joint operation. This requires the economical design and employment of C4 systems without sacrificing operational capability or survivability. The following are specific examples:

- Consolidation of functionally similar facilities, which are closely located, under one command or Service.
- Integration of special purpose and dedicated networks into the DISN switched systems, provided they can offer equal or better service.
- Careful planning, design, and procurement of facilities and systems.
- Efficient management and operating practices and effective communications discipline.
- Maximum use of the DISN common-user subsystems.
- Judicious use of commercial services.

Other relevant principles. The principles listed above are by no means the complete set of C4 systems principles; other principles or terms have been identified. Subject to the interpretation and discretion of the user, these are either encompassed in those listed above or applied when appropriate. These principles include: integration, maintainability, mobility, modularity, planning, prioritization procedures, readiness, responsibility, responsiveness, simplicity, and supportability.

Related Terms

command and control

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
The US Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. JP 1-02

The commander, amphibious task force (CA TF) exercises authority through the commanders of the task organizations, who exercise authority through their respective chains of command. Within the amphibious objective area (AOA), CA TF is given specific authority, as prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation. The CA TF will exercise the degree of control prescribed in the initiating directive over forces not a part of the amphibious task force (ATF) when such forces are operating within the AOA after the arrival of the advance force or the ATF. When such forces are merely passing through the AOA, control will be exercised only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference and in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)” regarding support by transient forces under emergency conditions.

Subject to the overall authority of CA TF, responsibility for conduct of operations ashore and for security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations ashore is vested in the commander, landing force (CLF). CLF’s authority includes operational control of all forces, including airborne and/or air assault forces, operating ashore within the landing area, or as directed by the commander who issued the initiating directive.

Related Terms
amphibious operation; commander, landing force

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
COMMANDER, LANDING FORCE

The officer designated in the initiating directive for an amphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF. JP 1-02

The commander, landing force (CLF) is either an Army or Marine officer who is in overall charge of the landing forces (which may include aviation units) from the issuance of the initiating directive until the conditions established in that directive have been met and the amphibious operation is terminated. The CLF is a subordinate of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) within the amphibious task force. During the planning phase of the operation, however, the CLF and CATF enjoy coequal status for planning their respective portions of the operation. Planning matters on which the CATF and the CLF and commanders of other forces are unable to agree are referred to their common superior for decision.

Related Terms
amphibious operation; commander, amphibious task force

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

COMMANDER’S CONCEPT

See concept of operations.

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS WARNING ORDER, provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with time-sensitive information for consideration by the National Command Authorities (NCA) in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander’s analysis of the various courses of action (COAs) that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA. (See figure below.) Although the estimative process at the supported commander’s level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

Supporting commanders normally will not submit a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNING ORDER but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the WARNING ORDER. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours. Follow-on information or revisions to the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

The supported commander may submit a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE at the commander’s own discretion, without a CJCS WARNING ORDER, to advise the NCA and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the commander’s evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the area of responsibility. This situation may be handled by a SITUATION REPORT instead of a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

The essential requirement of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the WARNING ORDER will be addressed.

The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

Situation and Courses of Action. This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.
Enemy Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.

Own Courses of Action. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed: combat forces required (e.g., 2 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.); force provider; destination; required delivery dates; coordinated deployment estimate; employment estimate; and strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For the submission to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs if significant in assisting the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision.

Recommended Course of Action. State the supported commander’s recommended COA.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

COMMANDER’S INTENT

The commander’s intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together, with the higher headquarters’ order, the JFC’s intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander’s estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

The JFC’s intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Thus, the commander’s intent provides focus for all subordinate elements. The intent statement is usually written, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be concise and clear. The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC’s order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

Related Terms

dividuals
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command.  JP 1-02

“I was informed that all the causes of delay had been reported through the ‘usual channels,’ but as far as those on the spot were aware nothing very much seems to have happened.  It would seem best therefore to start from the other end of the ‘usual channels’ and sound backwards to find where the delay in dealing with the matter has occurred.”

Winston Churchill: Note for General Ismay, 26 January 1941

Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates and confers authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law.  (See first figure below.)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) are provided staffs to assist them in the decision making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the situation as a whole.  The staff should be composed of the smallest number of qualified personnel who can do the job.

The command channel is the term used to describe the chain of command from commanders to subordinates through which command is exercised. The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. There are various levels of authority used for US military forces, four are command relationships: combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control, and support.  The other authorities are coordinating authority: administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

Unity of command is the interlocking web of responsibility which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally. An overview of command relationships is shown in the second figure below. All Service forces (except as noted in title 10, US Code, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces.
This diagram is only an example; it does not prescribe Joint Force organization. Service components at lower echelons may only contain Service forces.

NOTE:
This diagram is only an example; it does not prescribe Joint Force organization. Service components at lower echelons may only contain Service forces.
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

**COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

**Combatant Command** (command authority) (COCOM)

*(Unique to Combatant Commander)*

- Budget/PPBS Input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relations with DOD Agencies
- Convene courts-martial
- Directive authority for logistics

When **OPCON** is delegated

- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans/requirements for intelligence activity
- Suspend from duty subordinate commanders

When **TACON** is delegated

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

When **SUPPORT** relationship is delegated

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

As shown in the figure below, forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

The combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. Forces are assigned or reassigned when the transfer of forces will be permanent or for an unknown period of time, or when the broadest level of command and control is required or desired. OPCON of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated within the combatant command by the commander in chief of the combatant command or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

The combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over forces attached by the NCA. Forces are attached when the transfer of forces will be temporary. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces will normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands.

In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” and the “Unified Command Plan,” except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned.
ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF FORCES TO A JOINT FORCE

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

- When the transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.

- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs will exercise OPCON or tactical control, as appropriate, over the attached forces.

- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility/joint operations area boundaries.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

**COMMUNICATIONS**

A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another.  

**Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4) Management.**

Joint C4 management indicates the exercise of systems and technical control over assigned communications systems. C4 management allows the planners to maintain an accurate and detailed status of the C4 network down to the modular level. C4 management combines
centralized control with decentralized execution and provides effective and efficient C4 support for the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) informational requirements.

Management Organizations

- C4 Division. The C4 Directorate (J-6) assists the commander in carrying out supervisory responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. The J-6 is responsible to the JFC for fulfilling the staff functions on all C4 matters. This includes the development of C4 architectures and plans, as well as policy and guidance for the integration and installation of operational C4 systems. The J-6 formulates policy and guidance for all communication assets supporting the JFC. The J-6 and his or her staff assist the JFC in publishing C4 plans, annexes, and operating instructions. They review C4 plans prepared by subordinate component commanders, manage the frequency spectrum within the operational area, and coordinate with host-nation authorities.

- Joint Communications Control Center (JCCC). The J-6 establishes a JCCC to manage all communications systems deployed during joint operations and exercises. Components and subordinate joint force commanders establish C4 control centers to serve as their single point of contact and responsibility for joint C4 matters. The JCCC, as an element of the J-6, exercises control over all deployed communications systems. The JCCC serves as the single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint communications network. As discussed in detail in the CJCSM 6231 series, the JCCC performs planning, execution, technical direction, and management functions. The figure below depicts a notional JCCC.

- Services and Component Management. Components and assigned support organizations should designate a single office within their communications staffs to coordinate with the joint force staff J-6. Component C4 organizations should formulate and publish plans, orders, and internal operating instructions for the use of their component C4 systems.
Joint C4 in the Gulf War

The communications network established to support Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was the largest in history. A flexible and responsive command, control, and communications system was installed in record time — and it maintained a phenomenal 98 percent readiness rate. The final architecture provided connectivity with the NCA, US sustaining bases, CENTCOM, other Coalition forces, and subordinate component elements. This was not an easy task.

In addition to equipment differences among various Coalition members, there were differences among US forces. Ultimately, several generations of equipment and many different command and staff elements were melded. At the height of the operation, this hybrid system supported more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Additionally, more than 35,000 frequencies were managed and monitored daily to ensure radio communication nets were free of interference from other users.

On 8 August, in support of the rapid deployment of US forces, CENTCOM deployed the first contingent of communications equipment and personnel to provide crucial links between the in-theater forces and CINCCENT at MacDill AFB. Included in the initial communications package was a super high frequency (SHF) multichannel satellite terminal, several ultra high frequency (UHF) single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) terminals, and associated terminal equipment, to provide secure voice, facsimile and Defense Switched Network (DSN), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), and Worldwide Military Command and Control System connectivity to the initial deployed headquarters elements. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) was among the first of these deployments (The JCSE is responsible to the CJCS for providing tactical communications to JTF headquarters and SOCOM.) At the same time, communications equipment from the XVIII Airborne Corps, I MEF, and the 9th Air Force began arriving and links were established quickly.

The rapidly deployable JCSE provided the primary communications support to CENTCOM and SOCCENT during the initial deployment. JCSE resources included UHF and SHF SATCOM radios, line-of-sight radios, High Frequency (HF) radios, and circuit and message switches. Throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, JCSE communications provided continuous transmission and switching support for CENTCOM headquarters, linking the command with its components and the NCA. The final JCSE resources were deployed in mid-January in response to a requirement to support the CENTCOM Alternate command post, and to provide Ground Mobile Force/Defense Satellite Communications System (GMF/DSCS) satellite support to UK forces.

The Saudi national telephone service augmented early deploying communications packages. There were very limited in-place Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities anywhere in Southwest Asia (SWA) and, although the Saudi telecommunications system is modern and reliable, it has neither the capacity nor the geographical dispersion to support a large military force. Available international telephone access also was only a small part of the total requirement.
Parallel to the rapid buildup of combat forces in SWA was the deployment of organic tactical communications systems from Army, USMC and USAF units to tie components and subordinate commands into a joint voice and message switching network. Because of the high demand for limited airlift resources, initial forces arrived with minimum essential communications capabilities, usually single channel UHF SATCOM and sporadic access to the local commercial telephone system using secure telephone units (STU-III). This level of communications support would have been insufficient to conduct operations had hostilities begun immediately. The network continued to expand, however, as air and surface transports brought more communications equipment into the theater. The arrival of heavy tropospheric scatter and line-of-sight radio equipment (which provided the bulk of the intra-theater connectivity) improved multiple path routing, adding robustness to the joint network.

By November, there was more strategic connectivity (circuits, telephone trunks and radio links) in the AOR than in Europe. By the time Operation DESERT STORM began, networks that included satellite and terrestrial communications links provided 324 DSN voice trunks into US and European DSN switches, along with 3 AUTODIN circuits to CONUS and European AUTODIN switches, supporting 286 communications centers. The Defense Data Network (DDN) was extended to the tactical level, providing high-speed packet switched data communications. At its peak, the joint communications network included 118 GMF satellite terminals, 12 commercial satellite terminals, 61 TRI-TAC voice and 20 TRI-TAC message switches. (This was the first major operational employment of the jointly developed TRI-TAC equipment.)

Army Communications Organizations. The Army communications organizational structure extends from the Service headquarters level down to the Army division and separate combat brigade. At the Department of the Army (DA), the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, and Communications is responsible for the overall planning, programming, and budgeting of Army communications/information systems that support both strategic and tactical requirements worldwide. The responsibility includes those Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities that are assigned to the Army for engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance.

The Army communications organizations are designed around Army strategic missions as assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the DA, and the tactical communications required to support deployed Army forces from the Army level down to the smallest unit. Strategic communications are designed to support the Army mission of operating and maintaining assigned portions of the Defense Information Systems Network worldwide. Additionally, in Europe, the Pacific, and the continental US, the mission is to provide Army forces and other Services with conductivity into the DCS through Army communications systems and voice and message switches. Tactical communications in support of all Army forces are provided by tactical mobile communications units from separate signal bridges that provide communications in support of Army and other non-Army corps units. Support to corps, divisions, and below is provided by organic signal brigades and battalions designed to meet the operational requirements of their units.
United States Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) has the principal responsibility of engineering, installing, operating, and maintaining all Army DCS facilities and the communications for theater army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Subordinate to USAISC are the Army signal commands and brigades that implement DCS and EAC communications missions for their respective areas of operations. USAISC is also responsible for supporting post communications facilities that include local switching and distribution systems. (See figure below.)

From a tactical standpoint, communications units below Army level are organic to the supported command (corps, division, or separate brigade). At most Army corps, a signal brigade composed of several signal battalions supports the corps headquarters and provides communications between the corps and its subordinate commands. Each division and separate combat brigade contains an organic signal battalion or company to provide its communications systems. These units are normally organized to support a Division Main, Tactical Command Post, Division Artillery, or Division Support Command. They use Mobile Subscriber
Equipment to provide communications access nodes that connect the combat brigades across the division. For a separate combat brigade, a signal company or reinforced communications platoon normally will provide the same type of communications support. Responsibility for communications support is from higher echelons to lower organizations.

Other units having large-scale communications systems to support unique operations in a corps or division are the military intelligence brigades (corps level) or Combat Electronic-Warfare Intelligence battalions (division level) and the Air Defense Artillery (brigade and battalion level) that have dedicated communications systems to support their assigned units when dispersed across the battlefield.

**Navy Communications Organizations.** The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), as the Navy’s Chief of the Service, is responsible for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and providing naval forces for assignment to combatant commands, and for administering and supporting these forces. Providing communications support to the forces is the responsibility of several organizations subordinate to the CNO. The first figure below shows the structure of naval communications within the Department of the Navy.

The Directorate of Space and Electronic Warfare (N-6) is the principal Navy staff responsible to the CNO for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). The N-6 is charged with oversight and development of the technological systems and organizational support systems that focus on the command and control of forces by naval commanders. Primary responsibilities include the Naval C4I strategy and developing systems that support C4I For The Warrior and doctrine governing related space, information warfare, and C4I systems.

Subordinate to the N-6 is the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command (NCTC). The NCTC is charged with the administrative and technical oversight of the Navy’s shore-based naval telecommunications facilities — Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS), Naval Computer and Telecommunications Stations, and other computer and telecommunications shore sites. The NCTC has administrative control of all shore-based telecommunications facilities worldwide, oversees the operations of the naval portion of the DCS, and maintains administrative and logistical oversight of the Naval Telecommunications Integration Center and the Naval Electronic Spectrum Center.

A NCTAMS is the transmission and switching hub for routing all fleet-originated traffic into the DCS and for distributing DCS and internal Navy traffic to fleet units. At the tactical unit level, a ship’s communications officer is responsible for all telecommunications activities. At a naval base, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Centers or Detachments furnish base telecommunication and computer services and provide entry into the DCS. The NCTAMS is administratively subordinate to the Commander, NCTC.

**Air Force Communications Organizations.** Air Force Communications Organizations are shown in the second figure below. The Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is organized with a Deputy Chief of Staff for C4 referred to as SC. The SC is responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for architecture and technical policy, joint interoperability matters, future concepts, monitoring programs, and budgets for the Air Force C4 infrastructure.

The Air Force Pentagon Communications Agency (AFPCA) is responsible for supporting Air Force communications in the Pentagon and the Washington, D.C. area. They were reorganized in March, 1995 under the single agency manager for Pentagon Technical Services, but will continue to function as AFPCA. The Air Force Frequency Management Agency is responsible for all matters involving frequency management.

The Air Force C4 Agency is responsible for carrying out policy directed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for C4. As the technical arm of Headquarters US Air Force/SC, it
ensures C4 integration across the Air Force.

The 3 Combat Communications Group (CCG) at Tinker AFB, OK, and the 5 CCG at Warner Robins AFB, GA, are subordinate to the Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, VA. The 1 Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and 644 CCS are subordinate to US Air Forces Europe and Pacific Air Forces, respectively. Additionally, Air National Guard and Air Reserve Forces Combat Communications Squadrons are also employed when required. CCG/CCS missions will be to deploy equipment and personnel to augment initial communications capabilities already in theater. Their assets provide a more robust mixture of Tri-Service Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) and commercial communications equipment than is often found in a theater of operations. Capabilities provide long haul communications capabilities to include ground mobile forces (GMF) satellite, tropospheric and line of sight (LOS) microwave, digital and analog switching, record communications,
and technical control capabilities. Under the Theater Deployable Communications program, older TRI-TAC equipment will be replaced with advanced digital equipment which includes multi-band capable satellite terminals capable of backward compatibility with GMF terminals while also being capable of using commercial satellite bands. In addition to the more robust communications capabilities, the CCGs and CCSs provide deployed Air Traffic Control capabilities to support bare base operations.

**Marine Corps Communications Organizations.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has the primary responsibility for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and providing Marine forces for assignment to combatant commands. The Service administers and supports those forces, including C4, through a senior staff and subordinate commands.

As shown in the first figure below, the CMC’s principal military staff assistant for communications and intelligence functions is the Assistant Chief of Staff for C4I. The C4I Department located at Headquarters, Marine Corps is responsible for all matters regarding these functional areas, to include planning, programming, budgeting, directing, and operations.

In addition to the headquarters staff, two large Marine Corps support commands have communications responsibilities: the Marine Corps Systems Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center located at Quantico, VA. They are responsible for developing C4I-related doctrine, training and education, equipment acquisition strategies, technical development, and hardware and software program oversight.

All US Marine Corps operational forces are organized for combat as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Regardless of size, each MAGTF consists of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element. All have communications requirements and support organizations. The second figure below illustrates the structure of a notional US Marine Corps operational backbone communications structure.

Organic telecommunications and intelligence support to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) headquarters is provided by a Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.
Within SRIGs are a communications battalion, a radio battalion, and other tactical surveillance and intelligence organizations.

The communications battalion, the major communications unit within a MEF, is charged with providing common-user, general service message, and other telecommunications support as required to the MEF headquarters. This includes, but is not limited to, multi-channel satellite, single channel satellite, multi-channel terrestrial, and single channel terrestrial transmissions systems, along with circuit, packet, and message switching services. The communications battalion also provides necessary equipment to interface with the DCS, the Naval Telecommunications System, joint task force (JTF) systems, and multinational military systems as required. The communications battalion may be augmented as directed for joint operations by JTF-provided communications equipment and systems. A communications battalion is located with each MEF — the 7th with III MEF on Okinawa, Japan; the 8th with II MEF at Camp Lejeune, NC; and the 9th with I MEF at Camp Pendleton, CA.
MAGTF Special Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) communications terminal support is provided by dedicated Special Security Communications Teams from the SRIG’s radio battalion. The communications battalion, however, provides most of the trunking and switching support for SCI circuits within the MEF.

Each Marine aircraft wing has an organic communications squadron, each Marine division an organic communications company, and each service support group a communications company. These communications units provide internal communication to their respective organizations; the MEF’s communication battalion provides common-user external communications.

The traditional staff functions of communications-electronics and computer systems have been combined in all Marine tactical organizations from the MEF headquarters to the battalion/squadron level into one principal staff officer titled either the G-6 or S-6, depending on the size of the unit. For example, a MEF has a G-6, while an infantry battalion has an S-6.

Coast Guard Communications Organizations. Although the Coast Guard is attached to the Department of Transportation, it has participated, as an arm of the US Navy, in every national conflict. It routinely participates in various Department of Defense (DOD) activities and in Navy fleet and joint exercises. The Coast Guard is headquartered in Washington,
D.C., and has an Atlantic and Pacific area headquarters, ten district headquarters, ten air stations, and twelve communications and long-range electronic aid to navigation (LORAN) stations that provide C4 support worldwide. The Coast Guard Office of Command, Control, and Communications manages communications organizations that routinely interact with the Services, as do subordinate units engaged directly in operations involving the joint community. The Coast Guard is directly connected with all major DOD common-user systems such as Defense Data Network, Defense Switched Network, and Defense Commercial Telecommunications Network. Additionally, it plays a very active role in the counterdrug community and has C4 access to systems supporting that effort.

In addition to major systems connectivity, the Coast Guard has mobile/transportable systems such as ultra high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT) and LOS radio systems that provide secure and nonsecure connectivity at the operator level. This is important to the day-to-day operations where it and the military community routinely interact. Examples include search and rescue, aids to navigation, and maritime law enforcement. Major missions under the latter category include customs and immigration issues such as those recently experienced with Haitian refugees, and daily operations in the areas of smuggling and narcotics enforcement.

Organizationally, several communications responsibilities exist in the mission area of aids to navigation that are especially important to the Navy and Air Force. These include the long-range electronic aid to navigation known as LORAN-C, Differential Global Positioning System, and OMEGA. In a related mission, the Coast Guard has an important role in Global Positioning System (GPS) management. Specifically, it operates the GPS Information Center that provides civil users of that system with system status and other GPS satellite information. In that regard, it works directly with the US Space Command in the development of the DOD Operational Capability Reporting Management System regarding the interface of the military with the nonmilitary GPS community.

**Special Operations Forces Communications Organizations.** Special operations forces (SOF) have unique missions that include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The execution of these missions often requires communications and intelligence systems support that is distinctly different from that required by conventional forces.

Located at MacDill AFB in Tampa, FL, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the combatant command with oversight of the special operations community. In normal circumstances, the orientation of USSOCOM is support, not operational control. It does so with the help of its four component commands, which similarly have intelligence and communications staffs, but also have units and capabilities that can be tasked to support communications missions.

SOF units require lightweight, highly mobile, and efficient communications that have a low probability of detection and interception. SOF units have organic communications capability to connect tactical headquarters to small deployed elements operating in the field. Communications normally consist of UHF satellite and high frequency (HF) or UHF/very high frequency LOS communications equipment. USSOCOM acquired communications systems under a program called “Crashout,” that provide an initial deployable communications Joint Special Operations Task Force package. These packages include commercial and military transmission, cryptographic, terminal equipment, power generation assets, UHF TACSAT, international maritime commercial satellite, HF radios, secure telephone unit III, and computer terminals.
**Related Terms**

command, control, communications, and computer systems; telecommunications

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-02 Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

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**COMMUNICATIONS ZONE**

Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones (COMMzs), as shown in the figure below. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental US base or perhaps to a

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**COMBAT AND COMMUNICATIONS ZONES**

This example depicts a CINC’s AOR in which a theater of operations has been designated. The combat zone includes that area required for the conduct of combat operations. The COMMZ in this example is contiguous to the combat zone.
supporting combatant commander’s area of responsibility. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate — connected only by thin LOCs — in very fluid, dynamic situations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

COMPATIBILITY

Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference.

JP 1-02

Compatibility is the capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Electromagnetic compatibility, including frequency supportability, must be considered at the earliest conceptual stages and throughout the planning, design, development, testing and evaluation, and operational life of all systems.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0  Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

COMPLIANCE WITH JOINT DOCTRINE

Operation plans will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

COMPONENT COMMANDS

General. The role of component commanders in a joint force merits special attention. Component commanders are first expected to orchestrate the activity of their own forces, branches, and warfare communities — itself a demanding task. In addition, effective component commanders understand how their own pieces fit into the overall design and best support the joint force commander’s plans and goals. Component commanders also should understand how they can support and be supported by their fellow component commanders. Leaders who possess this extra dimension of professionalism have the potential to become great component commanders. At the tactical level, a combat example of this attitude follows:
THE MEDAL OF HONOR IS AWARDED TO LIEUTENANT THOMAS G. KELLY
UNITED STATES NAVY

While serving as Commander River Assault Division 152 on the afternoon of 15 June 1969 during combat operations against enemy aggressor forces in the Republic of Vietnam, Lieutenant Kelley was in charge of a column of eight river assault craft which were extracting one company of United States Army infantry troops on the east bank of the Ong Muong Canal in Kien Hoa Province, when one of the armored troop carriers reported a mechanical failure of a loading ramp. At approximately the same time, Viet Cong forces opened fire from the opposite bank of the canal. After issuing orders for the crippled troop carrier to raise its ramp manually, and for the remaining boats to form a protective cordon around the disabled craft, Lieutenant Kelley, realizing the extreme danger to his column and its inability to clear the ambush site until the crippled unit was repaired, boldly maneuvered the monitor in which he was embarked to the exposed side of the protective cordon in direct line with the enemy’s fire, and ordered the monitor to commence firing. Suddenly, an enemy rocket scored a direct hit on the coxswain’s flat, the shell penetrating the thick armor plate, and the explosion spraying shrapnel in all directions. Sustaining serious head wounds from the blast, which hurled him to the deck of the monitor, Lieutenant Kelley disregarded his severe injuries and attempted to continue directing the other boats. Although unable to move from the deck or to speak clearly into the radio, he succeeded in relaying his commands through one of his men until the enemy attack was silenced and the boats were able to move to an area of safety.

Service Components. All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. The joint force commander (JFC) also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders, or at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single-Service force, or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements or as otherwise directed by the combatant commander.

Responsibilities of the Service component commander include the following:
• Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
• Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
• Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the control of the Service component commander when such subordinate forces are dissolved.
• Other responsibilities as discussed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”
Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.

The relationship between commanders of Service forces is determined by the JFC. In addition to logistic support arrangements, one component may support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships as previously described.

**Functional Components.** JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing functions, or when it is appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated — and synchronize those operations — it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Services.)

**POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE**

- **JOINT FORCE COMMANDER**
  - **ARMY COMPONENT** (ARFOR)
    - **ARMY FORCES**
  - **AIR FORCE COMPONENT** (AFFOR)
    - **AIR FORCE FORCES**
  - **MARINE CORPS COMPONENT** (MARFOR)
  - **NAVY COMPONENT** (NAVFOR)
    - **NAVY FORCES**
  - **JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPS COMPONENT**
    - FORCES/CAPABILITY MADE AVAILABLE
  - **JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT**
    - FORCES/CAPABILITY MADE AVAILABLE
  - **JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT**
    - FORCES/CAPABILITY MADE AVAILABLE
  - **JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT**
    - FORCES/CAPABILITY MADE AVAILABLE

**NOTES:**
1. A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic and training responsibilities), even when operations are conducted through functional components.
2. All Service and functional components are depicted, any mix of the above components can constitute a joint force.
3. There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.
Functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services operate in the same dimension or medium. A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be used when joint staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

The nature of operations, mix of Service forces, and command and control capabilities are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander. Functional component commanders — such as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the JFLCC, the joint force maritime component commander, and the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) — have the responsibilities of both superior and subordinate commanders as described in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability (e.g., a JFSOCC normally has operational control of assigned forces and a JFACC is normally delegated tactical control of the sorties or other military capability made available). JFCs may also establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

**Combination.** Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components will still have special operations forces organized as a functional component. JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s concept of operations. The figure above depicts possible components in a joint force. It is presented as an example only.

**Related Terms**
- functional component command
- Service component command

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
- JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER**

The officer in tactical command is normally the composite warfare commander. However the composite warfare commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to delegate tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; while the officer in tactical command retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations. JP 1-02

The composite warfare commander (CWC) concept allows the officer in tactical command (OTC) to aggressively wage combat operations against air, surface, and subsurface threats
while carrying out the primary mission of his force. (See figure below.) The CWC concept is capable of flexible implementation and application to any naval task force or task group operating at sea. In particular, the concept is applicable to the battle force that consists of two or more carrier battle groups and associated supporting units.

Control by negation may be exercised by a subordinate commander while operating under the CWC concept. Control by negation is a command and control (C2) philosophy in which the subordinate commander has freedom of action to direct and execute those operations necessary to accomplish assigned and implied missions, unless specific actions and operations are overridden by a superior commander.

The OTC usually fulfills responsibilities as the CWC. The OTC-CWC exercises overall responsibility for C2 of the force and is responsible for the accomplishment of the mission and allocation of warfighting assets. Subordinated to the OTC-CWC are four principal warfare commanders: antiair warfare commander (AAWC); strike warfare commander (SWC); antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC); and antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC).

The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating tactical information and, at the discretion of the OTC-CWC, are delegated tactical authority to use assigned forces to respond to threats. Supporting the OTC-CWC and the warfare commanders are the submarine element coordinator, which is a cell of the ASWC staff that, when assigned, is responsible for coordinating the actions of direct support submarines; and the air element coordinator, who is responsible for managing and coordinating the distribution of carrier aircraft and keeping the OTC-CWC and other warfare commanders and coordinators apprised of carrier air operations.

The supporting coordinators differ from the warfare commanders in one very important respect: when authorized by the OTC-CWC, the warfare commanders have tactical control
of assigned resources and may autonomously initiate action. The supporting coordinators execute policy but do not initiate autonomous actions.

In addition to the coordinators discussed above, a specifically identified cell of the OTC-CWC’s staff is the electronic warfare coordinator. This cell plans, and when authorized, implements and executes electronic warfare and command, control, and communications countermeasures policy.

The OTC can implement the CWC procedures outlined in NWP 10-1, “Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual,” to the extent required by the mission and threat. Fundamental provisions associated with implementation of CWC procedures are as follows:

- The OTC is normally the CWC. Designated warfare commanders are responsible to the OTC-CWC for the conduct of antiair warfare (the AAWC), strike warfare (the SWC), antisurface warfare (the ASUWC), and antisubmarine warfare (the ASWC). Other designated subordinates act as coordinators to assist in the management of specified sensors and warfighting assets of the force in support of the warfare commanders and the OTC-CWC.

- A wide range of options are available to the OTC-CWC in delegating authority to the warfare commanders for the conduct of antiair warfare, strike warfare, antisurface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare operations. These options range from full delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending on the threat and the tactical situation. The OTC-CWC of a multicasuer battle force might use every element of the concept, including supporting CWCs, while the OTC-CWC of a small task group might use only a few of the elements; i.e., an AAWC and ASWC. Regardless of the amount of authority delegated, the CWC always retains the option to control by command override.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

**CONCENTRATION**

Concentration of military power is a fundamental consideration. We should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but on the quality of their planning and skillfulness of their employment. Properly trained and motivated forces with superior technology, executing innovative, flexible, and well-coordinated plans, provide a decisive qualitative edge. Careful selection of strategic and operational priorities aids concentration at the decisive point and time. Action to affect the enemy’s dispositions and readiness prior to battle and to prevent enemy reinforcement of the battle by land, sea, or air also promotes concentration. The purpose of these and related measures is to achieve strategic advantage and exploit that advantage to win quickly, with as few casualties as possible.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review. (See figure below.)

The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step one. During step two, alternative courses of action (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff
estimates of supportability to be completed in step three. In step four, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander’s estimate containing the commander’s decision on the preferred COA. The selected COA is then expanded into the CINC’s Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved, the CINC’s Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

**Related Terms**
commander’s estimate; CINC’s strategic estimate; deliberate planning

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff’s (J-2’s) assumptions or intent in regard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. The concept of intelligence operations, which complements the commander’s concept of operations, is contained in the intelligence annex of operation plans. The concept of intelligence operations is designed to give an overall picture of intelligence support for joint operations. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

In developing the concept of intelligence operations for each commander of a combatant command’s operation and concept plans, the combatant command J-2 should address in detail the support desired during the initial stages of a crisis from national, theater, and supporting intelligence organizations. The intelligence annex for these plans should also identify specific criteria to be met before designated intelligence staffs assume responsibility for intelligence support initially provided by other organizations.

**Related Terms**
concept of operations; intelligence

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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**CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT**

A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with logistic system framework considerations may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCs’ components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications to be developed, as well as wartime
host-nation support to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept.

The concept of operations or commander’s concept describes how the joint force commander (JFC) visualizes the operation will unfold based on the selected course of action. (See figure below.) This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the enemy or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the missions assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the mission.

To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign has more than one phase). This designation is as true in the offense as it is in the defense and also applies in operations other than war. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander’s intent.

The joint campaign plan is based on the commander’s concept or concept of operations. The formulation of the commander’s concept is the intellectual core of the campaign plan, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or “end state” (the commander’s intent) and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including required postconflict measures). Accordingly, the campaign plan itself can be brief, though implementing orders will usually be longer.

JFCs are the most vital cog in the campaign planning process — they bring experience, knowledge, and vision. They and their staffs need to develop early in the planning process four parts to their overall commander’s concept:

- the operational concept itself, based on the theater strategy, which is the scheme for the entire operation;
- the logistic concept, which provides a broad picture of how the joint force as a whole will be supported (the operational concept may stretch but not break the logistic concept);
- the deployment concept (sequencing of operational capabilities and logistic support into the objective area).
• and the organizational concept (external and internal command relationships, and, if required, organization for deployment).

Related Terms

course of action

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

CONCEPT PLAN

An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. JP 1-02

Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an operation plan, campaign plan, or operation order. A CONPLAN contains the commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes and appendixes either required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different
circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless specified in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

**CONPLAN With TPFDD.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the warfighting/employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the CINC’s concept of operations. Phasing, centers of gravity, and commander’s intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the national objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of alliances. In this case campaign planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing, however, that the level of detail contained in these plans is dependent upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANs support, a campaign orientation may not be possible in all cases.

**Related Terms**

- joint operation planning; operation plan

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**CONNECTIVITY**

The comprehensive linking of command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems establishes a level of connectivity which enables communication to and from the joint force and its users. To the maximum extent possible, the hardware and software interfaces should be transparent to the system user. The continued flow of information should not depend on action by an intermediate user.

**Related Terms**

- communications

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 6-02 Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

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**CONTINGENCY PLANNING GUIDANCE**

The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the primary source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

**Related Terms**

- joint strategic capabilities plan

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
CONTROL

1. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 2. In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically defined in appropriate regulations.

Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the command and control system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

Related Terms
administrative control; combatant command (command authority); command; command and control system; operational control; tactical control

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

CONTROL AND COORDINATING MEASURES

Joint force commanders employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields.

Related Terms
boundary

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER

A mobile command, control, and communications radar element of the US Air Force theater air control system subordinate to the air operations center. The control and reporting center possesses four Modular Control Equipment operations modules and integrates a comprehensive air picture via multiple data links from air-, sea-, and land-based sensors as well as from its surveillance and control radars. It performs decentralized command and control of joint operations by conducting threat warning, battle management, theater missile defense, weapons control, combat identification, and strategic communications. Also called CRC. JP 1-02

Control and reporting centers are ground-based airspace control/air defense facilities that provide safe passage and radar control and surveillance for close air support aircraft transiting to and from target areas.

Related Terms

theater air control system

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)

COORDINATING ALTITUDE

A procedural airspace control method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan and may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. JP 1-02

A coordinating altitude is a procedural method to separate fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the forward edge of the communications zone to the forward line of troops. The coordinating altitude does not restrict either fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft when operating against or in the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotary-winged aircraft planning extended penetration of this altitude will notify the appropriate airspace control facility. However, approval acknowledgment is not required prior to fixed-wing aircraft operating below the coordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft operating above the coordinating altitude.

- Uses. Coordinating altitude allows procedural separation of aircraft types.
- Considerations. See-and-avoid procedures are used during visual meteorological conditions.
- Point of Contact. The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan, which is approved by the joint force commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
COORDINATING AUTHORITY

A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

Related Terms
administrative control; direct liaison authorized.

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

CORRIDOR SUPPRESSION

Corridor suppression is a type of localized suppression of enemy air defenses. All components may request joint suppression of enemy air defenses support for corridor suppression. The missions shown in the figure below may require corridor suppression.
Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD.

In counterdrug operations, Department of Defense (DOD) supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the US. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to DOD.

- To act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US by emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries, streamlining activities in the transit zone, and re-focusing activities in the US to concentrate on the cocaine threat at critical border locations.
- To integrate the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets of the US that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the US.
- To approve and fund State governors’ plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies.

In addition, the 1993 DOD Authorization Act added the authority for the DOD to detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of certain surface traffic within 25 miles of the US boundary inside the US. Other DOD support to the National Drug Control Strategy includes support to law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments by providing intelligence analysts and logistical support personnel; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; and research and development. An example of DOD support to counterdrug operations was the establishment of Joint Task Force 6, in 1989, to provide counterdrug support along the Southwest border of the US.
Counterintelligence (CI) is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. An overview of the concept of CI is provided in the figure below. CI supports military operations and planning during peacetime operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the Department of Defense (DOD). CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis. As such, CI plays a significant force protection role as well as conducting functions complementing intelligence such as analysis and collection.
Counterterrorism (CT) provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. Normally, CT operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Department of Defense (DOD) provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. CT is a principal special operations mission. Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead agency designation according to terrorist incident location and type. DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the US; DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur within the US; and DOT is the lead agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the US. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or responsibilities.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) in CT. The primary mission SOF in CT is to apply highly specialized capabilities to preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad. Certain SOF are specifically organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform CT as a primary mission. CT missions may also be performed by other SOF or selected conventional Armed Forces of the United States under extremely urgent and in extremis circumstances when principal National Command Authorities-designated SOF are not readily available. If the mission has not been executed by the in extremis force once the designated force arrives on scene, passing mission responsibility must be exercised with care. The in extremis force will have acquired critical and perishable information and will have developed an experience base of great value to the relieving force.

SOF conduct CT operations that include aspects of unconventional warfare, direct action, and special reconnaissance missions to effect: hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materiel from terrorist organizations, and attack on the terrorist infrastructure.

Because of the very low profile of most terrorist organizations, identifying targets for CT missions can be extremely difficult. Although a preemptive strike against terrorists may be preferred, CT missions must often be conducted after the terrorists have initiated a terrorist act.

Additionally, as a subset of foreign internal development, designated SOF units may also train selected host nation forces to perform CT missions. The level of special operations force participation in this program is determined by US and host-nation policy and legal considerations.

Related Terms
antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; terrorism

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-05  Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
JP 3-07  Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War


**General.** The Country Team Concept (seen in the figure below) denotes the process of interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. The Department of State (DOS) developed this concept of embassy management in the early 1950s, although it wasn’t until 1974 that the term Country Team received its first official mention in Public Law 93-475. The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the Country Team are the Defense Attaché and the chief of the Security Assistance Organization (SAO). Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the Country Team.

**The Members of the Country Team.** The following discussion provides an outline of typical Country Team representatives and explains the military elements important to the foreign internal defense mission.

The Ambassador is the personal representative of the President of the United States. Ambassadorial authority extends to all elements of the mission and all official US Government (USG) activities and establishments within the host country. A presidential letter is used to outline the authority granted to the Ambassador to execute his or her duties. Mentioned in this letter, the only exceptions to the Ambassador’s authority over USG activities are the control of military elements under the separate command of a combatant commander or the control of elements of another US Mission or personnel assigned to an international agency. Within this authority, the Ambassador coordinates much of the foreign internal defense (FID) effort in the assigned country. The Ambassador accomplishes this task either through the assigned SAO or through his Country Team. There is a close coordinating relationship between the Ambassador, the represented USG agencies, and the combatant commander.

The US DOS is generally represented on the Country Team by the following positions:

- **The Deputy Chief of Mission** is the second in command, serves as executive officer and chief of staff, and directs the mission in the Ambassador’s absence (then called the Charge D’Affairs).
- **The Political Counselor** directs the political section and is often third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political/military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs.
- **The Commercial Attaché** is trained by the Department of Commerce and promotes US commercial interests.

US Information Agency (USIA) (US Information Service overseas) is represented by the following positions:

- **The Public Affairs Officer** is the ranking USIA officer in country responsible for implementing the US information program throughout the host nation (HN).
- **The Information Officer** is responsible for relations with the press and media.
THE COUNTRY TEAM CONCEPT

AMBASSADOR

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION

POLITICAL COUNSELOR
ECONOMIC COUNSELOR
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNSELOR
DEFENSE ATTACHE
CHIEF, SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION
DIRECTOR PEACE CORPS

DIRECTOR US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CONSULAR OFFICE
DIRECTOR US INFORMATION SERVICES
AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE
OTHER AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES

☐ BECOMES CHARGE D’AFFAIRS WHEN AMBASSADOR IS OUT OF THE COUNTRY OR WHEN AN AMBASSADOR HAS NOT YET BEEN APPOINTED
The Agency for International Development is represented by the in-country director of US Agency for International Development. The director directs the nonmilitary US developmental efforts in the HN.

Other USG departments, agencies, and interests may be represented by the following:
- Treasury Attaché;
- Agricultural Attaché;
- Labor Attaché;
- Civil Air Attaché;
- Science Attaché;
- Drug Enforcement Administration Representative;
- Director of the Peace Corps.

The DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and Country Team can range from as little as an envoy, to a full complement of Service attaches, or a major SAO. In nations with active FID programs, there is likely to be a larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SAO.

The US Defense Representative (USDR) is the representative for the Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador’s liaison for all matters relating to administrative and security coordination for all DOD personnel and organizations in the HN that are not assigned to, attached to, nor under the command of a combatant commander. The USDR is designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with the concurrence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant commander with area responsibility for the country to which the USDR is assigned. The position is advisory only, thus the USDR does not have either command or tasking authority. The USDR will normally be the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and responsibility in the country. The appointment of the Defense Attache (DATT) or the security assistance officer as the USDR does not change either the scope of their primary responsibilities or their accountability to established rating officials.

DATT is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the embassy. The DATT and other Service attaches comprise the Defense Attache Office (USDAO) and serve as valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. USDAOs are operated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist the FID program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions. In many countries, the functions of an SAO are carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the DATT.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07.1 JTCP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA.

**Course of Action (COA) Development.** COA development support includes Joint Operation Planning and Execution System functions that help the supported commander’s staff develop and test alternative COAs based on National Command Authorities/Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the commander of a combatant command’s Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and the commander’s estimate in crisis action planning.

**Detailed Planning.** This function supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:
- Development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment.
- Development of directives, schedules, and orders.
- Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support, and transportation needs.
- Identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or COA.

**Implementation.** This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

**Related Terms**
- CINC’s strategic concept; commander’s estimate; concept of logistics support; concept of operations

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.  

JP 1-02

Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection operations and rapid transition to combat operations. When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to conduct military operations, the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from the continental US or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP.  

JP 1-02

General. A crisis is defined, within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the US, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military
response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished joint operation planning whenever possible. In crisis situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) follows formally established crisis action planning (CAP) procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared joint operation plans or to develop and execute operation orders (OPORDs) where no useful joint operation plan exists for the evolving crisis. A campaign plan may also be developed if warranted by the scope of contemplated operations. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military courses of action (COAs) for consideration by the National Command Authorities (NCA), and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

**CAP versus Deliberate Planning.** CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operation plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for hypothetical crises based on the best available information and using forces and resources available for the planning period. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it unlikely that any joint operation plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds because every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision making and execution planning during a crisis. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Therefore, CAP includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible. A comparison of CAP and deliberate planning procedures is shown in the first figure below.

**The Six CAP Phases.** CAP and its execution are accomplished within a flexible framework of six phases as summarized in the second figure below. These six phases integrate the workings of the NCA and the JPEC into a single unified process that sequentially provides for the identification of a potential requirement for military response; the assessment of the requirement and formulation of strategy; the development of feasible COAs by the supported commander; the selection of a COA by the NCA; and, when directed by the NCA, implementation of the approved COA by the supported commander.

**Situation Development.** During the initial phase of crisis action planning, events that have potential national security implications are detected, reported, and assessed to determine whether a military response may be required. The focus of this phase of crisis action planning is on the combatant commander in whose area the event occurs and who will be responsible for the execution of any military response. The combatant commander may be the first to detect and report the event to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). However, crisis action planning may be initiated by a report to the NMCC from any of the national means used to continuously monitor the worldwide situation. If not included within the initial report, the supported commander prepares and submits an assessment of the event to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The assessment normally includes amplifying information regarding the situation, actions being taken, forces available, expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and major constraints on the employment of forces. If the time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be followed, the commander’s assessment may also include a recommended COA. It then serves as the commander’s estimate normally prepared in a subsequent phase of CAP. The
### Comparing Crisis Action Procedures with Deliberate Planning Procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Available to Plan</th>
<th>Crisis Action Planning</th>
<th>Deliberate Planning</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hours or days</td>
<td>18-24 months</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JPEC Involvement</th>
<th>For security reasons, possibly very limited to close-hold procedures</th>
<th>Participates fully</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>6 Phases from situation development to execution</th>
<th>5 Phases from initiation to supporting plans</th>
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<tr>
<th>Document Assigning Task</th>
<th>Warning order to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with evaluation request message</th>
<th>JSCP to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive</th>
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<tr>
<th>Forces for Planning</th>
<th>Allocated in the Warning, Planning, Alert, or Execute order</th>
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<tr>
<th>Early Planning Guidance to Staff</th>
<th>Warning order from CJCS; CINC’s evaluation request</th>
<th>Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase</th>
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<tr>
<th>Commander’s Estimates</th>
<th>Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS-NCA</th>
<th>Communicates the CINC’s decision to staff and subordinate commanders</th>
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<tr>
<th>Decision of COA</th>
<th>NCA decide COA</th>
<th>CINC decides COA with review by CJCS</th>
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<tr>
<th>Execution Document</th>
<th>Execute order</th>
<th>When operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an Execute order</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Campaign Plan (if reqd) with supporting OPORDs or OPORD with supporting OPORDs</th>
<th>OPLAN or CONPLAN with supporting plan</th>
</tr>
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### SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
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<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
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<tr>
<td>SITUATION DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>CRISIS ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION</td>
<td>EXECUTION PLANNING</td>
<td>EXECUTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### EVENT
- EVENT OCCURS WITH POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
- CINC’S REPORT/ASSESSMENT RECEIVED
- CJCS SENDS WARNING ORDER
- CJCS PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA’S TO NCA
- CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER
- NCA DECIDE TO EXECUTE OPORD

#### ACTION
- MONITOR WORLD SITUATION
- RECOGNIZE PROBLEM
- SUBMIT CINC’S ASSESSMENT
- INCREASE AWARENESS
- INCREASE REPORTING
- JS ASSESS SITUATION
- JS ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION
- NCA-CJCS EVALUATION
- DEVELOP COA’S
- CINC ASSIGNS TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE
- CINC REVIEWS EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE
- CREATE / MODIFY TPFDD
- USTRANSCOM PREPARES DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES
- EVALUATE COA’S
- CJCS ADVICE TO NCA
- CJCS MAY SEND PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN EXECUTION PLANNING BEFORE SELECTION OF COA BY NCA
- CJCS PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA’S TO NCA
- CJCS SUGGESTS ORDER BY AUTHORITY OF SECDEF
- CJCS EXECUTES OPORD
- JPEF REPORTS EXECUTION STATUS
- BEGIN REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

#### OUTCOME
- ASSESS THAT EVENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
- REPORT EVENT TO NCA/CJCS
- NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA
- CINC SENDS COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA
- NCA SELECT COA
- CINC SENDS OPORD
- CRISIS RESOLVED REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. CAP phases are scenario dependent since actual planning time can vary from hours to months. Therefore, phases may be conducted sequentially concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether.

2. The NCA, in coordination with the CJCS, may elect to return to situation monitoring at any point during CAP.
situation development phase ends when the supported commander’s assessment is submitted to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Crisis Assessment.** During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning, the NCA, the Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering, NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the JPEC. The phase begins with the receipt of the supported commander’s report and assessment of the event. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the situation from a military perspective and provides advice to the NCA on possible military options. The NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic, informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility of the CAP provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the pre-crisis situation, or progress to the next phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase ends with a strategic decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the COAs to be developed.

**COA Development.** The COA development phase of crisis action planning implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options. In response to that decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a planning guidance directive to the supported commander directing the preparation of COAs. Normally, the directive will be a CJCS WARNING ORDER, but other CAP-prescribed orders may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis mandate acceleration of the planning. The directive establishes command relationships and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It either identifies forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution, or it requests the supported commander develop these factors. If the NCA direct development of a specific COA, the directive will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. In response to the directive, the supported commander, with the support of subordinate and supporting commanders, develops and analyzes COAs. Joint operation plans are reviewed for applicability and used when needed. Based on the combatant commander’s guidance, supporting commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and component commanders begin time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development. Time permitting, a TPFDD is generated for each COA. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reviews the proposed COAs and prepares deployment estimates. The Services monitor the development of COAs and begin planning for support forces, sustainment, and mobilization. The supported commander analyzes the COAs and submits his recommendations to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supported commander’s estimate describes the selected COAs, summarizes the supported commander’s evaluation of the COAs, and presents recommendations. The COA development phase of CAP ends with the submission of the supported commander’s estimate.

**COA Selection.** The focus of the COA selection phase is on the selection of a COA by the NCA and the initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs provided in the supported commander’s estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA. The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning be accomplished. Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision. A CJCS
ALERT ORDER is a formal, CAP-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER. In some cases, a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate execution planning activities before a course of action is formally selected by the NCA. Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities. The PLANNING ORDER will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Issuance of either the PLANNING ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks the beginning of execution planning.

Execution Planning. An NCA-approved COA is transformed into an OPORD during the execution planning phase of CAP. In this phase, the JPEC performs the detailed planning necessary to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. This should guide the development of the OPORD. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Following CAP procedures and using capabilities provided through Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing operation plan, expanding an existing concept plan (with or without TPFDD), or developing a new plan. Supporting commanders providing augmenting forces identify and task specific units and provide movement requirements. Component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the Services.
USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to support the requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not mean that the supported commander’s TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules developed are the most effective and realistic given the numbers and types of assets and their location in relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. Force preparation action is accomplished throughout the JPEC in accordance with deployment postures directed by the Secretary of Defense, and deployability posture reporting is initiated. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor execution planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander’s OPORD for feasibility and adequacy. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, planning enters its final phase: execution.

**Execution.** The execution phase begins when the NCA decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis. During this phase, a military response is implemented and operations are conducted by the supported commander until the crisis is resolved. When the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the supported commander to implement the OPORD, the Chairman issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier CAP orders and instructions. The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish objectives. The supported commander monitors movements, assesses and reports the achievement of objectives, and continues planning as necessary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful termination of the crisis. USTRANSCOM manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander. The execution phase of crisis action planning continues until the crisis is terminated or the mission is terminated and force redeployment has been completed. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised. If the crisis expands to major conflict or war, crisis action planning will evolve into, and be absorbed within, the larger context of implementation planning for the conduct of the war.

**Related Terms**
deliberate planning; joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

CRISIS ASSESSMENT

During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning (CAP), the National Command Authorities (NCA), the Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering,
NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The phase begins with the receipt of the supported commander’s report and assessment of the event. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the situation from a military perspective and provides advice to the NCA on possible military options. The NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic, informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility of the CAP provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the pre-crisis situation, or progress to the next phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase ends with a strategic decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the courses of action to be developed.

**Related Terms**

**Crisis action planning**

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

**CRISIS RESPONSE**

US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the US to respond rapidly with appropriate military operations other than war (MOOTW) options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be planned and executed under crisis action circumstances.

**Related Terms**

**Military operations other than war**

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07  Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

**CRITICAL ITEM**

An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short supply for an extended period.

JP 1-02

Critical supplies and materiel should be identified early in the planning process. Critical items are supplies vital to the support of operations that are in short supply or are expected to be in short supply. Special handling of requisitions or requests for transportation and critical items may be indicated.

**Related Terms**

**Logistics**

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations

**CULMINATION**

Culmination has both offensive and defensive application. In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds...
that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues
the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective
before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no
longer has the capability to go on the counter-offensive or defend successfully. Success in
the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted
available resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help
commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels,
theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations
over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at
the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before
reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their
concept of operations.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually
disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or
interpretation.

JP 1-02

Current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations across the range of
military operations. It involves the integration of current, all-source intelligence and
information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. It
usually contains predictive judgments on how the situation will develop and what the
implications are for planning and executing military operations.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

In order to accomplish the assigned mission, the joint force commander develops a concept of operation and organizes forces based on that concept. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in the plan, while preserving the responsiveness of individual component capabilities. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat.

Related Terms

centralized planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

DECEPTION

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.  

See military deception.

DECISION CYCLE

The figure below shows the decision cycle. This model is applicable to all command and control (C2) systems — friendly or adversary. This decision model is based upon the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop.

Observation. In the observation portion of the decision cycle, the commander gathers information from the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) apparatus and from status reports of friendly forces. Much of a commander’s RSTA capability and knowledge of the status of friendly forces will come from the control portion of the friendly force C2 system — that is, from subordinate commanders.

Orientation. In the orientation phase of the decision cycle, information about the opposition’s status received in the observation portion of the cycle is converted into intelligence through the commander’s intelligence staff. Based upon this intelligence and knowledge of the status of friendly forces, the commander will make an assessment of the “reality” of the operational area. The “reality” of the operational area is the actual situation in the operational area including, but not limited to, the disposition of forces on both sides, casualties to personnel and equipment suffered by both sides, the weather in the area, and morale on both sides. The commander’s assessment of the “reality” of the operational area is based on the input of the commander’s intelligence system, sensors and lower echelon commanders in the observation portion of the cycle. Since these sources of input are imperfect and subject to manipulation by the opposing side, the commander’s assessment of “reality” will invariably be something other than the actual “reality” of the operational area.
**Decision.** The commander will make military decisions based on the assessment of the “reality” of the operational area. The decisions made by the commander will be communicated to subordinate commanders as orders via various communications methods.

**Action.** Subordinate commanders at all lower echelons, the control portion of the friendly force C2 system, will cause the commander’s decisions to become actions that impact the “reality” of the operational area.

**Continuity of the Cycle.** Since the decision cycle is a continuous process rather than a step-by-step process, all parts of the cycle are active simultaneously. The commander will be gathering information, forming appraisals, and making decisions for future operations at the same time that current orders are being executed as actions by subordinate commands. The same cycle is occurring simultaneously for all opposing sides in an operation. The same cycle is also occurring at all subordinate levels at a scope commensurate with the responsibilities of the commander at that echelon. All of these decision cycles, on all sides and at all levels will impact the “reality” of the theater of operations on a continuous basis.

**Size of the Cycle.** The amount of time taken to observe, orient, decide and act is represented by the length of the arc between portions of the cycle. Consistent with classic military doctrine, the commander that can gather and process information and initiate action to affect the theater of operations quickest will have a decided military advantage. Conceptually, the ability to process information into action via the cycle at a quicker pace than the opposition can be thought of as getting “inside” the adversary’s decision cycle by making the friendly force cycle smaller than the opponent’s.

**Related Terms**

command and control warfare

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
Decision support systems (i.e., reporting, intelligence, and logistics) are included within the umbrella definition of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems. (See figure below.)

**Joint Reporting System Support.** Reporting includes intelligence, situation reports from maneuver forces, and logistic status. The information varies from data required for staff planning, and significant events requiring a commander’s immediate attention. The principal sources of operationally significant information are the C4 systems of the combatant commands, the management and/or information systems of the Services, the support systems of the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, and the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The following are some principles for reporting:

- Commanders provide the organization and procedures so that reports receive command attention when required to support decision making and control of mission execution.
- Reports adhere to standard formats when feasible to facilitate their handling through electronic systems and speed interpretation by people.
- Commanders review reporting requirements for their commands to assure that the content and frequency of reports support assigned missions without needlessly burdening subordinates.

**Intelligence Support.** Intelligence organizations use a variety of sensors and other information sources to collect and analyze data and produce intelligence products. C4 systems support to intelligence is normally limited to providing the communications interface and media required to move intelligence information. C4 systems support does not typically cover the collection and production of intelligence. The basis for system interoperability is the application of standard data elements and structures and information exchange standards applicable to all levels of command and to all Services and supporting agencies. The Services and agencies are responsible for fielding intelligence systems based on these standards. The following are basic intelligence system principles:
• Intelligence requirements must be incorporated in the planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence staffs should coordinate with the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate staff to identify requirements and obtain an assessment of the intelligence communications required to support operations. Intelligence requirements generally exceed communication capabilities, therefore, communications and intelligence communities continue to develop concepts for expanding communication pipelines and imagery compression techniques.
• Each echelon of command receives organic and external intelligence support. Commanders direct requirements for assets through the Intelligence Directorate staff element.
• Defense intelligence organizations and systems operate on a shared information basis. Accordingly, within limits imposed by security, intelligence is distributed up, down, and across echelons.
• The responsibility for the application of intelligence information is shared by intelligence and operations.

**Logistic Support.** Accurate and timely logistic information is required for the management of critical resources. A principle source of operationally significant logistic information is the JRS. Information not routinely supplied through the JRS may be provided in response to specific queries from combatant command systems, Service logistic systems, and the DOD agencies.

**Planning Support.** In addition to conveying force status and intelligence information, C4 systems provide processing capabilities for planning.

**Decision Support.** Operational and tactical decision support systems also include maneuver, fire support and target planning, command and control warfare, air operations, and C4 systems control and management.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0  
Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)  
Systems Support to Joint Operations

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**DECISIVE POINTS**

By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base. They could also include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or a communications node. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity.

There normally will be more decisive points in an operational area than joint force commanders can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Accordingly, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points enable eventual attack of the enemy’s centers of gravity. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

Geographic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. Thus, they maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the initiative. If a
defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker’s momentum and facilitate the
defender’s counterattack.

**Related Terms**
centers of gravity; operational art

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**DECONTAMINATION**

The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it.

**General.** Decontamination is the reduction of the contamination hazard by removal or neutralization of hazardous levels of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination on personnel and materiel. The primary purposes of decontamination are to stop erosion of combat power and reduce casualties that may result from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. Initial decontamination may be performed by base personnel. Detailed decontamination may require requesting assistance from chemical units assigned to support area commanders, in accordance with joint rear area coordinator priorities. Service manuals discuss decontamination in detail. Decontamination sites should be established in the base area and decontamination supplies should be prestaged before an anticipated NBC attack.

**Planning Considerations.** When planning for decontamination these items should be considered:

- Identify hasty and deliberate decontamination sites.
- Designate decontamination teams and ensure that they have the necessary equipment and command and control assets.
- Plan for treatment of contaminated casualties.
- Plan for the marking and reporting of contaminated areas and terrain decontamination.
- Plan for employment of detection alarms.
- Conduct necessary NBC training.
- Plan for disposal of the waste products of decontamination operations.

The management and treatment of contaminated casualties will vary with the tactical situation and the nature of the contaminant. Each medical unit must have a plan that can be put into effect immediately. Decentralization is necessary — casualties must not be forced to wait at a central point for decontamination. All medical units should have comparable sets of medical items and decontamination equipment for treatment of contaminated patients originating in their area. Decontamination of the patients serves two purposes: it prevents the patient’s system from absorbing additional contaminants, and it protects medical personnel treating the patient and other patients from contamination.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-10.1 JTTP for Base Defense
JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Department of Defense long-haul voice, data, and record traffic system which includes the Defense Data Network, Defense Satellite Communications System, and Defense Switched Network. Also called DCS. JP 1-02

The Defense Communications System (DCS) is a composite of specific Department of Defense (DOD) communications systems and networks under the managerial control and operational directions of Defense Information Systems Agency. DCS provides the long-haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications services needed to satisfy command and control requirements of DOD and those civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements.

Related Terms
Defense Data Network; Defense Switched Network

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETWORK

General. The Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) is a composite of certain Department of Defense (DOD) information systems and networks under the management control and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems operational direction of Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). The DISN is a significant effort that has been undertaken by DOD to transform the way information is developed, used, and shared. This includes modifications to the existing Defense Communications System (DCS) to establish a defense information infrastructure, the Corporate Information Management initiative, programs to implement the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, And Intelligence For The Warrior concept, and the integration of advanced technology demonstrations conducted under the global grid initiative. DISN will ultimately subsume or replace most Service- and Agency-unique stovepipe networks and systems.

Objective. The existing DCS provides the long haul, point-to-point, and switched network telecommunications needed to satisfy the command and control (C2) requirements of DOD and civil agencies directly concerned with national security or other critical emergency requirements. DCS facilities are employed in support of C2; operations; intelligence; weather; logistic; and administrative functions. The objective of the DCS is to organize the complex of DOD communications networks, equipment, control centers, and resources to provide an effective, responsive, survivable worldwide communications system. The system provides maximum security consistent with threat, cost effectiveness, and acceptable risk factors and makes use of any DCS circuitry available at a given time for fulfilling the priority needs of the users.

Architecture. The DISN architecture (see figure below) prescribes a global network integrating existing DCS assets; military satellite communications; commercial satellite communications initiatives; leased telecommunications services; as well as the dedicated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the interoperable transport for the end-to-end transfer of information in support of military operations.
Command Relationships. Directors of DISA field organizations and Service component commanders will be responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders, who exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over the Service component operating elements of the DISN. This authority is normally exercised through the Service component commanders.

In accordance with DOD Directive 5105.19, “Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA),” DISA field organizations, under the command of the Director, DISA, exercise operational direction (the authoritative direction necessary to ensure the effective operation of the DISN) over the DISN operating elements.
If a major emergency necessitates the use of all available forces, the combatant commanders have COCOM over the Service component operating elements of the DISN. In exercising this authority, the combatant commanders will be cognizant of DISN support to the National Command Authorities, DOD agencies, and other combatant commanders and will preserve DISN integrity and standards to the maximum possible extent.

Operating elements of the DISN are subject to authoritative direction from different sources. To avoid conflicting direction, the combatant commanders will normally express their DISN operational requirements to the senior DISN field organization serving their areas of responsibility.

Planning DISN and Non-DISN (Tactical) C4 Systems Interfaces. Requirements for interface between the DISN and tactical C4 systems occur at various organizational levels and include DISN switched networks, C2 and support networks, and transmission capabilities ranging from a few circuits to many.

The combatant commanders designate where, when, and how DISN and non-DISN C4 systems interface. In the preparation of plans, commanders should ensure that these points, and those facilities for which interface capability is required, are identified and that operational interface requirements are established. Normally, interface will occur at the headquarters of the commanders of component commands, at the headquarters of other elements directly controlled by the combatant commander, or at designated area communications nodes. Additional interface points may be specified by the CJCS.

When the combatant commander determines that the extension of the DISN is appropriate, the combatant commander may designate certain operational tactical C4 facilities to replace DISN facilities or make other appropriate temporary arrangements until DISN facilities can be provided.

Related Terms
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency has several responsibilities including the following:

• Ensures that expeditious, tailored, all-source intelligence collection, production, and dissemination support is provided to Department of Defense (DOD) entities. This support includes selected intelligence planning, programming, and policy in support of conventional, special, and nuclear operations; collection and collection management support; and analysis for strategic warning, order of battle, threat, scientific and technical, current, estimative, counterintelligence, and target intelligence.

• Establishes standards of capability and interoperability for Joint and Service intelligence activities.

• Responsible for coordinating planning and programming of intelligence resources, including those for selected automated data processing systems, telecommunications, and survivability.

• Reviews proposed DOD intelligence programs to ensure interoperability and satisfaction of requirements.
• Provides DOD management of collection activities (e.g., human, imagery, and measurement and signature intelligence).

• Plans and develops implementing instructions for provision of intelligence support to joint organizations across the range of military operations with emphasis on special operations, crisis response, and war.

• When authorized during crises and wartime, communicates directly with any military intelligence entity for the purpose of assembling, validating, and prioritizing intelligence collection and production requirements; tasking collection assets; processing intelligence and information; disseminating intelligence data; and ensuring that intelligence is also provided through the chain of command.

• Ensures that intelligence entities of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces are fully informed regarding the actual all-source national and Service unique intelligence capabilities to prevent unnecessary duplicative tasking of intelligence resources and to ensure that they are aware of when new capabilities are projected to become available for planning or operational support.

• Identifies critical intelligence needs of departmental and national users that must be satisfied in a timely manner by operational forces.

• Provides intelligence support for joint exercises.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

**DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE**

This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Also called DPG.  

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) furnishes the Secretary of Defense’s programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of department Program Objective Memorandums for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

The action by which a commander assigns part of his or her authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated must be clearly stated. JP 1-02

The delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility is a necessary part of building trust and teamwork. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Military history demonstrates that delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is the essential building block.

“I built trust among my components because I trusted them....If you want true jointness, a CINC should not dabble in the details of component business.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA Commander, US Central Command during Operation DESERT STORM

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

DELIBERATE PLANNING

1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. JP 1-02

Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. It is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense (DOD) planning systems and is performed in accordance with formally established procedures. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that engages the commanders and staffs of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for all contingencies and the transition to and from war. Plans developed during deliberate
planning provide a foundation for and ease the transition to crisis resolution. Work performed during the deliberate planning process allows the JPEC to develop the processes, procedures, and planning expertise that are critically needed during crisis action planning.

“In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future.”

Jomini: Precis de l’ Art de la Guerre, 1838

The process for joint operation planning begins when a requirement is identified and continues until the requirement no longer exists. Deliberate planning is performed in a continuous cycle that complements and supports other DOD planning cycles. A new deliberate plan usually begins with the publication of a change to the JSCP. The deliberate planning cycle usually begins with the publication of a new JSCP. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and established submission dates for joint operation plans (OPLANs). As seen in the first figure below, deliberate planning is accomplished in five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.

**Initiation.** Planning tasks are assigned to supported commanders, forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued during this phase. The JSCP links the Joint Strategic Planning System to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of plan required (i.e., OPLANs, OPLANs in concept format (with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or functional plans) and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A combatant commander may also initiate deliberate planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

**Concept Development.** The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) review. (See second figure below.) The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step one. During step two, alternative course of actions (COAs) are developed and distributed for staff estimates of supportability to be completed in step three. In step four, alternative COAs are war-gamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander’s estimate containing the commander’s decision on the preferred COA. The selected COA is then expanded into the CINC’s Strategic Concept that is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. When approved, the CINC’s Strategic Concept provides the basis for plan development.

**Plan Development.** A CJCS-approved concept of operations is expanded into a complete OPLAN during the plan development phase of deliberate planning. Plan development is accomplished by a designated supported commander, normally a combatant commander, with the assistance of supporting and subordinate commanders. The supported commander guides the plan development process by publishing a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. Eight steps can be identified in the plan development phase as shown in the third figure below. These eight steps provide a logical planning structure within which the forces and resources required to execute the
concept of operations are progressively identified, sequenced, and coupled with transportation capabilities to produce a feasible OPLAN. This phase of deliberate planning is heavily dependent on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) automated data processing to produce the TPFDD.

One of the most time-consuming and intensively managed aspects of plan development is constructing the OPLAN TPFDD. A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN, necessary to complete Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN. (See third figure below.) The supported commander provides TPFDD development guidance and milestones to the JPEC through a TPFDD LOI.

**TPFDD Refinement.** TPFDD development involves the sequential development and refinement of forces, logistics, and transportation data in a process collectively termed TPFDD refinement. A TPFDD normally contains assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces...
with accompanying supplies. As TPFDD refinement progresses, an estimate of resupply and personnel requirements to sustain the force based on consumption factors, computer modeling, and past experience is added. In addition, a fully refined TPFDD must be made transportation feasible. Therefore, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) plays a key role in the refinement process by hosting and coordinating refinement conferences and assessing transportation feasibility.

Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff and other supporting agencies to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP guidance and to assess the adequacy of the combat support and combat service support sourced by the Services. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.
Logistic refinement is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. USTRANSCOM uses computer simulation to determine
transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

Following TPFDD refinement, the supported commander completes the documentation of the plan and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate. The supported CINC then submits the OPLAN with the TPFDD file to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

At the end of the OPLAN development cycle, or biennially during periods of extended maintenance cycles, the Joint Staff will host a sustainability conference to review current LSA issues. The review will convert any operational logistic deficiencies into programming requirements.

**Plan Review.** In the plan review phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies, assesses and validates joint OPLANs prepared by supported commanders using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. It is a formal process that evaluates the entire plan, including TPFDD and other computer-supported data files, to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource capabilities. Upon completion of the review, the supported commander is informed that the plan is approved or disapproved for reasons stated. Plans that contain critical shortfalls that are beyond the supported commander’s ability to resolve will be approved with these short-falls identified. In such cases, the supported commander will be provided with guidance regarding specific actions planned or programmed to redress the shortfalls. Approved plans remain so until superseded or canceled. Upon notification that a plan has been approved, the supported commander incorporates CJCS-directed changes and directs the completion of supporting plans by supporting and subordinate commanders.
Supporting Plans. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting plans to the CJCS-approved OPLAN. These plans focus on the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the concept described in the supported commander’s approved plan. Supporting plans are developed concurrently with operation plans and are required to be submitted to the supported commander within 60 days of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan approval. The plans are developed by component commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, supporting commanders, and other agencies as directed by the supported commander. The review and approval of supporting plans is the responsibility of the commander they support. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be requested to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans on behalf of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should circumstances so warrant. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the subordinate commands that will direct the forces if the plan is executed. It may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within an alliance or treaty framework.

Related Terms
- crisis action planning
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications
- JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

DEMOBILIZATION

The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. JP 1-02

General. Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisis situation or from a wartime military establishment and defense-based economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and reorganizing the reserve component (RC). Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in mobilization, activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each of the others. For this reason, close coordination between resource area proponents is just as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization.

From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process should put the US in a position to respond to future challenges to our national security. Policies would be established to regulate the pace of demobilization and retain the military capability required to ensure postconflict national security commitments during the transition to a peacetime environment. The armed forces would eventually be returned to their precrisis structure by releasing RC units from active duty. The size of the total force, as well as the size of the active component (AC), RC, and civilian components could also be changed as a result of the crisis, but any such force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict would be released to fuel the postconflict national economy.
The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the preceding mobilization. The scope of mobilization can range from relatively brief use of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the original peacetime levels. (See figure below.) Demobilization of volunteers following Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada and the massive demobilization following World War II are examples of the range of the demobilization activities. Demobilization planners and decision makers, therefore, could be challenged anywhere within these extremes. The demobilization guidelines provided below provide guidance for planners throughout this spectrum.

From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the postconflict missions of supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Department of Defense (DOD) policies for the release of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The demobilization personnel management programs of the Military Departments will be challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life and will need to provide transition assistance as members reenter an economy that could be depressed because of economic conditions brought on by the crisis. National Guard and Reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible.

Demobilization Planning Guidelines. Study of the demobilizations following the two World Wars and the Gulf War provide valuable lessons for today’s demobilization planners and have been distilled into the following guidelines for demobilization planning and execution. (See second figure below.)
Mission First. Demobilization plans must support the postconflict mission as it evolves. The supported commander’s immediate postwar priorities should come first. As the transition to a peacetime state proceeds, long-range national security objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the armed forces are prepared for the next crisis.

Begin Planning Early. Ideally, demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilization commences.

Understand Possible Consequences. The proposed demobilization policies should include consideration of the following: joint force readiness; the health of the national economy; morale of and benefits for Service members and DOD civilian employees and their families.

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies. The demobilization policies and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside the DOD. Public information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain public support.

Planning Considerations. Demobilizing the armed forces could be a relatively straightforward return of mobilized RC units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, and a major reorganization of the RC, which might be necessary after a long war. Similarly, demobilization of the defense industry could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis. (See figure below.)

Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization. These include activities for restoring force readiness and controlling the rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels. At the national level, National Command Authorities (NCA) must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and composition of the postconflict force structure and its resource base. These national-level decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the theater and supporting levels. They also guide the postconflict activities of the supported and supporting commanders.
The key to military demobilization is the supported commander. The commander’s mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. Other general planning factors should include the following:

- The situation and requirements in other theaters, the NCA, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should establish a priority of support.
- Future missions in the theater.
- Availability of strategic lift for redeployment.
- Continental US reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel.

**Related Terms**

- mobilization

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
General. The Health Service Support (HSS) dental service is a major contributor to maintaining unit fighting strength. Joint operation planning must include consideration of the various roles of dental services. Historical review indicates that dental problems cause as much as eight percent of a unit’s noncombat casualty losses.

The planning process includes an evaluation of the size and anticipated duration of the operation, along with the levels of dental care, as shown in the figure below, required throughout the operation.

Levels of Dental Care
- Level I — Emergency Dental Care. Austere treatment of dental emergencies that immediately return troops to duty. This minimal level of care does not require dental facilities.
- Level II — Sustaining Dental Care. Expedient dental treatment that intercepts potential emergencies to minimize troop loss to units in combat operations. This level of care is essential to the preservation of fighting strength early in the conflict, which is usually
provided in combat service support areas adjacent to Echelon II medical support. Planners can include dental personnel to augment medical units during periods of mass casualty (MASCALs) reception.

- **Level III — Maintaining Dental Care.** Definitive treatment to prevent and treat dental and oral conditions early enough to preserve satisfactory oral health. This level of care is necessary when planning HSS for lengthy military operations.

- **Level IV — Comprehensive Care.** Treatment to restore an individual to optimal oral health, functions, and esthetics. Comprehensive dental care may be achieved incidental to maintaining, sustaining, and providing emergency care in individuals whose oral condition is healthy enough to be addressed by the levels of care provided. This level of care is usually reserved for HSS plans that anticipate an extensive period of reception and training in theater. The scope of facilities needed to provide this level of detail support can equal that of Echelon III medical facilities.

Deliberate planning for dental services must include the potential for augmenting the medical effort during MASCALs. Joint planning requires a statement specifically excluding dental services, if deemed appropriate. Joint operations of limited size or duration may limit dental services to predeployment screening, which eliminates planning for deployment of dental personnel and equipment.

**Related Terms**

health service support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the US Transportation Command. Deployment planning is planning to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan. It involves planning for the continental United States, intertheater (strategic), and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Strategic deployment planning focuses on the intertheater movement of forces and resources using national, allied and coalition strategic deployment capabilities.

Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and lends itself better to automated data processing support. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment requirements at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate logistic plans.

**Related Terms**

Employment planning; joint operation planning; redeployment planning

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**DETERRENCE**

The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

The political leadership of an opposing nation is the central objective of deterrence, because that is where the ultimate decision to use military force lies. Deterrence of a large-scale attack (either weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or conventional) requires that US forces and command and control systems be viewed by enemy leadership as capable of inflicting such damage upon their military forces and means of support, or upon their country, as to effectively deny them the military option. Deterrence of the employment of enemy WMD, whether it be nuclear, biological, or chemical, requires that the enemy leadership believes the US has both the ability and will to respond promptly and with selective responses that are credible (commensurate with the scale or scope of enemy attacks and the nature of US interests at stake) and militarily effective. Any deterrence assumes an opposing nation’s political leadership will act according to the logic of national self-interest, although this self-interest will be viewed through differing cultural perspectives and the dictates of given situations.

Although nations possessing WMD have largely refrained from using them, their continuing proliferation along with the means to deliver them increases the possibility that someday a nation may, through miscalculation or by deliberate choice, employ those weapons. This assumption does not rule out the possibility that an opponent may be willing to risk destruction or disproportionate losses in following a course of action based on perceived necessity, whether rational or not in a totally objective sense. In such cases, deterrence, even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail.

Deterrence is founded in real force capabilities and the national determination to use those forces if necessary. To have a credible effect on an adversary, US military forces must be capable of achieving US national objectives throughout the range of military operations.
Capabilities must range from nation building or civil-military operations through direct denial of military objectives and conventional defeat of enemy forces to the full-scale destruction of enemy war footing and economic infrastructures, while minimizing the enemy’s ability to retaliate. These capabilities require maintaining a diverse mix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity, sustained, and coordinated air, land, sea, and special operations; survivable and capable nuclear forces; and the command, control, communications, and computer systems required to control these forces. The mix of these forces must be capable of holding at risk those assets most valued by enemy leaders and providing a range of options in response to attack. It is possible, however, that an adversary may misperceive or purposefully ignore a credible threat. Therefore, should deterrence fail, forces of all types (both conventional and nuclear) must be structured, deployed, and ready to provide a variety of options designed to control escalation and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the US and its allies.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-12  
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

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**DIMENSIONAL SUPERIORITY**

Joint force commanders (JFCs) will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. World War II’s Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. The Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the joint force air component commander is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force.

As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  
Doctrine for Joint Operations

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DIRECT ACTION

Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. JP 1-02

In the conduct of direct action (DA) operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace munitions and other devices; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage.

DA operations are normally limited in scope and duration and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. Special operation forces (SOF) may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. DA operations are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results of strategic, operational, or critical tactical significance. They frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and selective strike capabilities of conventional forces. Operations typically involve attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel); interdiction of critical lines of communications or other target systems; location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or materiel; and seizure, destruction, or neutralization of critical facilities in support of conventional forces or in advance of their arrival. (See figure below.)

DA is conducted by individuals and small units from team to multibattalion size. Although normally thought of in terms of ground or maritime close-combat type operations, they also include standoff attacks by weapon systems either delivered or directed by SOF. Close combat tactics and techniques are employed when the target and mission require precise or discriminate application of force beyond the capability of other forces and weapon systems or when the mission requires recovery or capture of personnel or equipment. Standoff attacks are conducted in support of close combat actions or independently when the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat type forces.

The methods for planning and conducting DA may be either deliberate or quick response. Deliberately planned missions are preferred. They capitalize on detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and meticulous rehearsal to enhance the probability of mission accomplishment. A combination of time available, nature of the target, and the operational environment are keys to determining if a mission can be prosecuted effectively. In response to crises, time-sensitive missions are conducted against perishable or fleeting target or to capitalize on narrow windows of enemy vulnerability. Because of limited planning and rehearsal time and usually incomplete intelligence due to significant time constraints, the probability of mission success is generally less than that for deliberate operations.

DA missions to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control persons held captive, isolated, or threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas may be conducted when the priority of the operation is sufficiently high to warrant planning and conducting a special operation. Special operations (SO) recovery missions differ from Service combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations. To respond in minimum time, Service CSAR forces usually rely on dedicated assets and established command and control nets that are often on alert. However,
SOF recovery missions are often characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. They routinely employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

DA missions may be conducted independently or within the context of larger conventional or unconventional operations or campaigns. They are conducted by Army special forces, Ranger, and Special Operations Aviation units; by Navy sea-air-land teams, special boat unit, and submerged delivery vehicle teams; and by Air Force SO gunships, vertical lift and fixed-wing insertion and/or extraction aircraft, and special tactics units.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05  Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

**DIRECT ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY**

As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, joint force commanders will normally task joint force air component commanders, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.
There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy’s depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTICS

“I don’t know what the hell this “logistics” is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.”

Fleet Admiral E.J. King: To a staff officer, 1942

General. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

A combatant commander’s directive authority does not discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support, discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, or disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:

• Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic and administrative authority exercised by the commander of a combatant command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, Department of Defense policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors preclude execution of a combatant commander’s directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the combatant commander, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, will normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the combatant commander, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

• Under crisis action, wartime conditions or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic and administrative authority of combatant commanders enable them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. Joint logistic doctrine and policy developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes wartime logistic support guidance that will assist the combatant commander in conducting successful joint operations.
• A combatant commander will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force beddowns, and other aspects as appropriate) within the command’s area of responsibility that will have significant effects on operational capability or sustainability. When the combatant commander does not concur with a proposed Service logistic program action and coordination between the combatant commander and the Chief of the Service fails to result in an arrangement suitable to all parties, the combatant commander may forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

**Related Terms**

**combatant command (command authority)**

**Source Joint Publications**

**JP 0-2** Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

### DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED

That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH.

**Related Terms**

administrative control; combatant command (command authority); coordinating authority; operational control; tactical control

**Source Joint Publications**

**JP 0-2** Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

### DIRECTOR OF MOBILITY FORCES

A Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) may be established to assist in the coordination of airlift issues in the theater. The DIRMOBFOR will normally be a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility/joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in airlift operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from the theater’s organizations or be nominated from US Transportation Command or US Atlantic Command. When established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues. The DIRMOBFOR exercises coordinating authority between the airlift control center, air mobility element (AME), (or tactical air command center, if no AME is deployed), joint movement center, and the air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of airlift problems. The DIRMOBFOR’s duties and authority will be as directed by the Air Force.
component commander or joint force air component commander to satisfy the objectives of the joint force commander.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

4-01.1  JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations

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**DIRECT SUPPORT**

A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.  

See support.

**DIRECT SUPPORT AIR CAPABILITIES/FORCES**

Only the joint force commander (JFC) has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component’s direct support air capabilities/forces. When a component does not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission, the joint force air component commander or JFC will task available joint air capabilities/forces (through the joint air tasking order (ATO)) based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision. An understanding of what defines component direct support air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces is necessary. Component direct support air capabilities/forces are those air capabilities/forces organic to a component that are used by the component to accomplish its assigned mission. When appropriate, they appear on the joint ATO for coordination and deconfliction purposes.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-56.1  Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

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**DISASTER RELIEF**

A significant number of humanitarian assistance programs involve disaster relief operations. The military can provide assistance to help ease the effects of natural disasters and manmade events. Characteristics of Disaster Relief Assistance are as follows:

- Health service support (HSS) assistance requires rapid assessment of the damage caused by the disaster and a rapid tailoring of an HSS element to meet the needs of the affected populace. The HSS element should have a wide range of specialties available to conduct an accurate assessment.
- Preventive medicine plays a key role in the relief effort since natural disasters can disrupt the ecological balance, causing potential disease outbreaks. Measures to ensure sanitation and disease vector control must be planned for and implemented as soon as possible.
- The treatment rendered may be austere and possibly provided in rudimentary facilities.
- The HSS response must be able to reach the disaster site rapidly, with the right mix of specialties, and be coordinated with concerned agencies. Coordination should be established, as appropriate, with the Director of Military Support; Federal Emergency Management Agency; state and local office of emergency services; emergency medical systems; local US military medical treatment facilities and Department of Veterans Affairs
medical treatment facilities (including their role as coordinators of national disaster medical systems); and the Department of Health and Human Service’s Public Health Service.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

DISCIPLINE

**General.** The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. In addition to the administration and disciplinary authority exercised by subordinate JFCs, a combatant commander may prescribe procedures by which the senior officer of a Service assigned to the headquarters element of a joint organization may exercise administrative and nonjudicial punishment authority over personnel of the same Service assigned to the same joint organization.

Each Service component commander in a combatant command is primarily responsible for the internal administration and discipline of that Service’s component forces, subject to Service regulations and directives established by the combatant commander. The JFC exercises disciplinary authority vested in the JFC by law, Service regulations, and superior authority in the chain of command.

The JFC should normally exercise administrative and disciplinary authority through the Service component commanders to the extent practicable. When this is impracticable, the JFC may establish joint agencies responsible directly to the JFC to advise or make recommendations on matters placed within their jurisdiction or, if necessary, to carry out the directives of a superior authority. A joint military police force is an example of such an agency.

**Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).** The UCMJ provides the basic law for discipline of the armed forces. The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), US (as amended), prescribes the rules and procedures governing military justice. Pursuant to the authority vested in the President under article 22(a), UCMJ, and in Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 201(e)(2)(a) of the MCM, 1984, combatant commanders are given courts-martial jurisdiction over members of any of the armed forces. Pursuant to article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, subordinate JFCs of a detached command or unit have special courts-martial convening authority. Under RCM 201(e)(2)(c), combatant commanders may expressly authorize subordinate JFCs who are authorized to convene special and summary courts-martial to convene such courts-martial for the trial of members of other armed forces.

Rules and regulations implementing the UCMJ and MCM are, for the most part, of single-Service origin. In a joint force, however, the JFC should publish rules and regulations that establish uniform policies applicable to all Services’ personnel within the joint organization where appropriate. For example, joint rules and regulations should normally be published to cover hours and areas authorized for liberty, apprehension of Service personnel, black market and currency control regulations, and other matters that the JFC deems appropriate.

**Establishment of Joint Military Police.** The JFC may establish joint police agencies to ensure consistent enforcement of military discipline within the joint commander’s area of responsibility or joint operations area. Joint police agencies will normally include members of all Services constituting the joint force. Members of the joint police agency will be
authorized to apprehend personnel of any Service anywhere within the JFC’s area of responsibility/joint operations area, with due regard to host-nation law and applicable status-of-forces agreements. Establishing a joint police agency does not relieve the Service component commander of responsibility for enforcing discipline on the military reservation or within the military jurisdiction under the component’s exclusive control. Responsibility for areas of overlapping disciplinary authority will be specified by the JFC.

**Action of Joint Military Police.** An offender apprehended by joint (or other than own Service) military police (or shore patrol) will be turned over promptly to the offender’s commanding officer, or prompt notice of custody will be sent to the offender’s unit or Service authority.

**Trial and Punishment.**

Convening Courts-Martial. General courts-martial may be convened by the commander of a combatant command. An accused may be tried by a court-martial convened by a member of a different Military Service when the court-martial is convened by a JFC who has been specifically empowered by statute, the President, the Secretary of Defense, or a superior commander under the provisions of the RCM, 201(e)(2) of the MCM, to refer such cases for trial by courts-martial.

Nonjudicial Punishment. The JFC may impose nonjudicial punishment upon any military personnel of the command, unless such authority is limited or withheld by a superior commander. The JFC will use the regulations of the offender’s Service when conducting nonjudicial punishment proceedings, including punishment, suspension, mitigation, and filing. Except as noted below, appeals and other actions involving review of nonjudicial punishment imposed by a JFC will follow the appropriate regulations of the offender’s Service. When the combatant commander personally imposes nonjudicial punishment, or is otherwise disqualified from being the appellate authority, appeals will be forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appropriate action by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. Collateral decisions and processing (e.g., personnel and finance actions and unfavorable notations in selection records and personnel files) will be handled in Service channels.

Confinement. Personnel of any Service may be confined in the facilities of any of the Services while awaiting trial or the results of a trial if confinement is otherwise authorized by law.

Execution of Punishment. Execution of any punishment adjudged or imposed within any Service may be carried out by another Service under regulations provided by the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury and damage. JFC use of forces includes the proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war, noncombatants, and civilians. Laws of war are intended to reduce casualties and enhance fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike.

ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the National Command Authorities. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

DISSEMINATION

Dissemination is conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. As shown in the figure below, intelligence is disseminated in many forms, using a variety of means. Dissemination means include personal contact, physical transfer or courier of hard copy textual and graphic materials, digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference, telephones, facsimile transmissions, messages, briefings, remote terminal access to computer data bases, and direct data transfers. In addition, tactical intelligence can be disseminated via intercom, tactical data systems, tactical radio circuits, and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts. Each intelligence dissemination method can be further categorized as secure or nonsecure, over dedicated or common-user communications, and/or raw or finished intelligence. The diversity of forms and dissemination paths reinforces the need for interoperability among command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems.

Joint intelligence dissemination should be consistent with the C4I For The Warrior concept that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior’s requirements for intelligence exchange. This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs to the maximum extent possible if they:
• have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through preplanned essential elements of information (which involves tailoring data bases);
• emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates);
• accommodate warrior pull on demand (allowing automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System).

This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of request for information messages and intelligence reports. Broadcasts such as the tactical information broadcast service and the tactical related applications are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders.

An important consideration in the dissemination process is management of information transmitted over communications systems. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should ensure for provision of critical, time-sensitive intelligence for force protection and operations, using the
“push-pull” system to receive finished intelligence products from higher or adjacent commanders and intelligence producers. JFCs should manage information dissemination in terms of the product, available communications paths through dynamic bandwidth management, and time sensitivity to ensure the joint force receives what is required to support joint operations. Intelligence dissemination should be continuously reviewed throughout the joint operation.

**Related Terms**

intelligence cycle

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
DISTRIBUTION

1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. That functional phase of military logistics that embraces the act of dispensing materiel, facilities, and services. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. JP 1-02

Distribution is a function of visibility, management, and transportation. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for maintaining an effective theater distribution network that is consistent with the Services’ intertheater policy and procedures and for prescribing unique policies and procedures relating to the theater’s distribution network. In general, the commanders of Service component commands will operate their distribution networks in accordance with established Service procedures, using established channels of distribution whenever possible.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. JP 1-02

“At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory....It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.”

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

General George H. Decker, USA

“Doctrine [is] every action that contributes to unity of purpose... it is what warriors believe in and act on.”

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN Fleet Tactics
“Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting...doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.”

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting

Military leaders understand the nature and utility of doctrine. Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander’s obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces.

A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the Armed Forces of the United States through the combined effort of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operations; and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent. This is critical for our present and future effectiveness. Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.

Related Terms

joint doctrine

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Services of the United States

DOMINANT USER

Dominant User Concept. The geographic combatant commander assigns the Service component which is the principle consumer responsibility for providing or coordinating logistic support to the other Services components in the theater or designated area.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

DROP ZONE

A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped.

General. A drop zone (DZ) is a specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped. Although DZ locations are normally on relatively open, flat terrain, they can in fact be situated on almost any site (including water) suited in size and shape for the intact delivery and recovery of the airdropped personnel and materiel. Key circumstances to consider in evaluating the usefulness of a DZ are as follows:
• Enemy threats in relation to the capabilities of available supporting forces to defend the air and ground phases of the airdrop.
• Its tactical advantages (nearness to the tactical objective or receiving unit, size, defense, and other such advantages) in relation to other available DZs.
• The probable tactical effects (delays, disorganization, injuries, and damage) of any hazardous obstacles (ditches, trees, rocks, and other such obstacles) located on it.
• Accessibility of the drop zone to the supported force or the airdrop force.
• Terrain surrounding the DZ that might limit DZ run-in or DZ escape maneuvers. Selecting a DZ thus involves a judicious exercise of the military art, but historical experience suggests that planners of urgent military operations usually find usable DZs near or even adjacent to tactical objectives and receiving units.

**Drop Zone Types.**

Tactical. During exercises and operations, tactical DZs (DZs that have not been formally surveyed) are sometimes selected to support highly mobile ground forces. These DZs are evaluated and approved for use using tactical survey procedures. When using a tactical DZ, the airlift unit assumes responsibility for aircraft safety of flight while the receiving unit assumes responsibility for load condition. The DZ size should be determined by method of delivery, load dispersal statistics, discussion with the receiving unit, and professional judgment. Other considerations are recoverability of air drop equipment and survivability or recoverability of the load. For example, small trees covering the entire DZ might limit the recovery of airdrop parachutes, but still allow complete recovery of the loads. Tactical DZs may be created within the boundaries of an existing surveyed DZ if needed to accomplish a particular mission. In this case, the tactical DZ need not use the existing dimensions or axis of approach as long as minimum DZ requirements are still met.

Area. An area DZ, illustrated in the first figure below, consists of a start point (point A), an end point (point B), and a prearranged flight path (line of flight) over a series of acceptable drop sites between these points.

Circular. A circular DZ, shown in the second figure below, has multiple run-in headings. Its size is governed by mission requirements and usable terrain. The entire DZ box fits inside the circle. Water DZs are normally circular in shape. The PI of a circular DZ is normally at the DZ center.

Random Approach. Random approach DZs are circular, square, or rectangular and large enough to permit multiple run-in headings. Any axis of approach may be used as long as the resulting DZ meets minimum criteria for the load being airdropped. The PI is normally placed at the DZ center.

**Drop Zone Criteria and Considerations.**

Drop Airspeeds. Specific airdrop airspeeds for each type aircraft are published in appropriate Service manuals or technical orders. Except in emergencies, aircraft should not deviate from these established airspeeds. Deceleration to prescribed drop airspeed and attainment of level flight altitude are required to provide a stable platform for the actual airdrop of personnel, supplies, or equipment.

Drop Zone Wind. Drop zone wind information is critical to airdrop accuracy and aircrews must consider wind data from all available sources when determining the computed air release point. In addition to inflight wind data, aircrews are normally provided with drop zone wind information from ground sources (such as combat control teams or drop zone support teams) which includes surface winds and the computed mean effective winds. Additionally, ground sources can relay indications of possible wind shears or local phenomena that could affect wind direction or speed and, ultimately, impact upon airdrop or mission success. Airdrop
operations may not be feasible during conditions of strong or gusty surface winds. The joint force commander (JFC), based on recommendations by the supported commander and the Air Force component commander (AFCC), may accept high risk, cancel, or postpone the operation because of excessive wind velocity on the DZ.

Drop Altitudes. The airborne force commander and airlift mission commander establish minimum altitudes for airdropping personnel and materiel. Minimum altitudes for airdrop operations are based on operational requirements of the personnel and cargo airdrop systems used. In a high-risk, high-threat environment, survivability of airlift aircraft may require dropping parachutists and equipment at the lowest possible altitude. Aircraft performing normal low-altitude, low-velocity airdrop operations should drop above the minimum altitude to increase load survivability.

Drop Zone Size. The JFC determines the general area for the airborne operation. Factors influencing DZ selection are as follows:

- physical characteristics of available DZs and surrounding areas;
- threat assessment;
- method of air delivery;
- number of airdrop loads or personnel;
- length of the desirable dispersion pattern.

Subordinate ground commanders determine specific grid coordinates and grid reference being used and pass these to the AFCC. During exercises and operations, DZ size and selection criteria are the joint responsibility of the AFCC and the supported commander. Following a survey of the DZ, the AFCC determines the probability of success of the airdrop
and provides it to the ground commander. The supported ground commander makes the final decision to accept use of the DZ. For other than Air Force unilateral airdrops, the ground commander may waive normal minimum training DZ sizes on a “by exception” basis. For the most efficient use of the DZ, separate or multiple points of impact should be used for equipment and personnel.

All drop zone criteria and considerations must be within acceptable limits before “green light” on airdrop operations.
If the DZ is too small for the delivery of a full aircraft load of parachutists, the number of parachutists may be reduced, multiple DZs may be used for one aircraft load, or aircraft may employ multiple run-in procedures, commonly referred to as “racetracks.” Use of the latter tactic, however, increases risk to enemy action. Normal minimum training DZ sizes are shown in the first figure below.

The second figure below shows normal minimum training DZ sizes for high-altitude airdrop resupply system and high-velocity or delayed opening/high-altitude container delivery system.

Minimum DZ sizes for special operations forces (SOF) are shown in the third figure below and apply unless precluded by mission requirements. The supported SOF unit assumes responsibility for drop accuracy and safety when it establishes and operates the DZ.

Drop Zone Run-In Heading. On circular or random run-in DZs, the ground force commander must evaluate the risk of run-in headings to troops on the ground from load malfunctions. If a run-in heading would place a malfunctioning load in a troop concentration, consideration must be given to changing either the run-in heading or the troop concentration locus.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALTITUDE (AGL)*</th>
<th>WIDTH (1)</th>
<th>SINGLE</th>
<th>DOUBLE</th>
<th>LENGTH (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 600 ft</td>
<td>400 yd/365</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>400 yd/370 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>450 yd/410 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>500 yd/460 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>550 yd/500 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>9 or more</td>
<td>700 yd/640 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 600 ft</td>
<td>Add 40 yd/35m to DZ width and length for each 100 ft above 600 ft (20 yd/18m added to each side of the DZ).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CDS (C-141)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALTITUDE (AGL)</th>
<th>WIDTH (1)</th>
<th>1 PLATFORM</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 1000 ft</td>
<td>600 yd/550 m</td>
<td>1000 yd/915 m</td>
<td>Add 400 yd/370 m (C-130) or 500 yd/460 m (C-141 or C-5) to trailing edge for each additional platform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1000 ft</td>
<td>Add 30 yd/28 m to width and length for each 100 ft above 1100 ft (add 15 yd/14 m to each side of the DZ).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEAVY EQUIPMENT

1. (a) For day visual formations, increase width by 100 yd/90 m (50 yd/45 m each side).

(b) For station keeping equipment formation, increase width by 400 yd/370 m (200 yd/185 m each side).

(c) Official sunset to sunrise, increase width by 100 yd/90 m for visual drops (50 yd/45 m for each side) or 200 yd/180 m for visual formations (100 yd/90 m each side).

2. Official sunset to sunrise, increase length by 100 yd/90 m for visual drops (50 yd/46 m each end).

*above ground level (AGL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAARS CDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altitude (Feet AGL)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIGH VELOCITY CDS*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Altitude (Feet AGL)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Using 12-foot, 22-foot, or 26-foot ring slot parachutes

AGL - above ground level
## SPECIAL OPERATIONS DROP ZONE SIZE CRITERIA

### MARKED DROP ZONES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Drop</th>
<th>MC-130 (W x L)</th>
<th>AWADS (W x L)</th>
<th>C-130 (W x L)</th>
<th>C-141 (W x L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (computer air release point (CARP))</td>
<td>300 x 300 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>275 x 275 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground marked release system (GMRS)</td>
<td>300 x 300 yd</td>
<td>300 x 300 yd</td>
<td>300 x 300 yd</td>
<td>300 x 300 yd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>275 x 275 m</td>
<td>275 x 275 m</td>
<td>275 x 275 m</td>
<td>275 x 275 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add 75 yd (69 m) to the length for each additional parachutist.

| CDS/CRS (CARP & GMRS) | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 450 x 590 yd  |
|                       | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 410 x 540 m   |

Add 50 yd (45 m) to the DZ length for each additional container.

| HSSLADS/HSK (CARP & GMRS) | 300 x 600 yd  | N/A         | N/A         | N/A         |
|                           | 275 x 550 m   | N/A         | N/A         | N/A         |

| Recovery Kit (CARP & GMRS) | 200 x 200 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | N/A         |
|                           | 180 x 180 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | N/A         |

| Heavy Equipment (CARP & GMRS) | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  |
|                              | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   |

For all except C-141, add 400 yd (366 m) to DZ length for each additional platform. For C-141, add 500 yd (457 m) to DZ length for each additional platform.

### BLIND DROP ZONES (1)

(1) Natural Radar Targets Only or Radar Beacon/Zone Marker on the DZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Drop</th>
<th>MC-130 (W x L)</th>
<th>AWADS (W x L)</th>
<th>C-130 (W x L)</th>
<th>C-141 (W x L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
<td>600 x 600 yd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
<td>550 x 550 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add 75 yd (69 m) to the length for each additional parachutist.

| CDS/container recovery system (CRS) | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 450 x 590 yd  |
|                                     | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 410 x 540 m   |

Add 50 yd (45 m) to the DZ length for each additional container.

| HSSLADS/HSK* | 400 x 600 yd | N/A         | N/A         | N/A         |
|              | 365 x 365 m  | N/A         | N/A         | N/A         |

| Recovery Kit | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | 400 x 400 yd  | N/A         |
|             | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | 365 x 365 m   | N/A         |

| Heavy Equipment | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  | 600 x 1000 yd  |
|                | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   | 550 x 915 m   |

For all except C-141, add 400 yd (366 m) to DZ length for each additional platform. For C-141, add 500 yd (457 m) to DZ length for each additional platform.

1. For all blind drops, add 30 yd (27 m) to each side and 30 yd (27 m) to each end of the DZ for each 100 ft increase in altitude above the minimum drop altitude for the load being dropped.
2. C-141 aircraft require a SKE zone marker for blind drops.
3. When supporting SOF, specially trained theater and intertheater airlift crews may be called upon to conduct air drop operations on a blind drop zone. A blind DZ is one that is unmarked.

*High-speed, Low-Level air drop system/high-speed air drop
Related Terms

aerial operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations
ECHELONS OF CARE

Five echelons of care make up the health service support (HSS) system, extending from the point of wounding, injury, or illness. (See figure below.) Each succeeding echelon possesses the same treatment capabilities as those echelons forward and adds a new treatment capability.

**Echelon I.** Care is rendered at the unit level and includes self aid and buddy aid, examination, and emergency lifesaving measures. These elements of medical management prepare patients for return to duty (RTD) or for transportation to a higher echelon of care. Supporting medical units are responsible for evacuation of patients from medical treatment facilities (MTFs) forward of the supporting medical unit’s position.

**Echelon II.** Care is administered at an HSS organization by a team of physicians or physician assistants, supported by appropriate medical, technical, or nursing staff. As a minimum, this echelon of care includes basic resuscitation and stabilization and may include surgical capability, basic laboratory, limited x-ray, pharmacy, and temporary holding ward facilities. At this echelon, examinations and observations are accomplished more deliberately than at Echelon I.

**Echelon III.** Care administered requires clinical capabilities normally found in a MTF that is typically located in a lower-level enemy threat environment. The MTF is staffed and equipped to provide resuscitation, initial wound surgery, and post operative treatment. This echelon’s care may be the first step toward restoration of functional health, as compared to procedures that stabilize a condition or prolong life. It does not have the crises aspects of initial resuscitative care and can proceed with greater preparation and deliberation.

**Echelon IV.** This echelon of care will provide not only a surgical capability as provided in Echelon III, but also further definitive therapy for patients in the recovery phase who can return to duty within the theater evacuation policy. Definitive care is normally provided by a communications zone Fleet Hospital, General Hospital, or overseas MTF. If rehabilitation
cannot be accomplished within a predetermined holding period, the casualties/patients are evacuated to the zone of Interior, Echelon V.

**Echelon V.** Care is convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and is normally provided by military, Department of Veterans Affairs, or civilian hospitals in the continental US. This phase may include a period of minimal care and increasing physical activity necessary to restore patients to functional health and allow their RTD or useful life.
ECONOMY OF FORCE

The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack — That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes:
   1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and
   2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).

b. electronic protection — That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support — That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronics intelligence (ELINT).

General. Electronic warfare (EW) is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering enemy
ELECTRONIC WARFARE

systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

The three major subdivisions of EW are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support, which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use electronic surveillance in their execution. EW should be employed to attack the enemy according to established principles of warfare. The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign objectives but also the risks of possible enemy responses and other effects on the campaign effort.

The joint force commander (JFC) should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect. This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support.

All three aspects of EW, electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES), contribute to the command and control warfare (C2W) effort. EA is concerned with denying an adversary commander use of the electronic spectrum to effectively command and control operating forces. EP is involved with guaranteeing use of the electronic spectrum for the JFC to command and control friendly forces. ES contributes to the JFC’s accurate estimate of the situation in the operational area.

**EW in command and control (C2)-attack.** Each of the three divisions of EW — ES, EA, and EP — can contribute to C2-attack operations. ES, in the form of combat information, can provide the real time information required to locate and identify C2 nodes and supporting/ supported early warning and offensive systems during C2-attack missions. ES, used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), can provide timely intelligence about an adversary’s C2 capabilities and limitations that can be used to update previously known information about the adversary’s C2 systems. This updated information can be used to plan C2-attack operations and provide battle damage assessment and feedback on the effectiveness of the overall C2W plan.

EA — whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or destruction of C2 nodes with directed-energy (DE) weapons or antiradiation missiles (ARMs) — has a major role to play

The EA-6B provides the JFC with active suppression measures using both destructive and disruptive means.
in almost all C2-attack operations in a combat environment. EP’s role in C2-attack and other operations is to protect the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for use by friendly forces. Coordination of the use of the EM spectrum by friendly forces through the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is a means of preventing fratricide among friendly electronic emissions. Equipment and procedures designed to prevent adversary disruption or exploitation of the EM spectrum are the best means friendly forces have to ensure their own uninterrupted use of the EM spectrum during C2-attack operations.

**EW in C2-protect.** Each of the three divisions of EW can also make a contribution to friendly C2-protect efforts. ES, supported by SIGINT data, can be used to monitor for impending adversary attack on friendly C2 nodes. ES, in the form of Signal Security monitoring, can be used to identify potential sources of information for an adversary to obtain knowledge about friendly C2 systems. EA, whether jamming, electromagnetic deception, or DE weapons/ARMs can be used to defend a friendly force from adversary C2-attack. EP should be used in C2-protect to safeguard friendly forces from exploitation by adversary ES/SIGINT operations. Frequency deconfliction through the use of the JRFL is also a key to a successful coordinated defense against adversary C2-attack operations.

**Related Terms**
command and control warfare; communications intelligence; electronics intelligence; information warfare; signals intelligence; spectrum management

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

Electronic attack, whether in the form of jamming, electromagnetic deception, or destruction of C2 nodes, has a major role to play in almost all C2-attack operations.

**ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC PROCESS**

For each of the functional areas of supply systems, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and miscellaneous services, the geographic combatant commander should consider the four elements of the logistic process: acquisition, distribution, sustainment,
and disposition. At the theater strategic level, specific considerations include: logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations; the procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner; the process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands; and the distribution system necessary to achieve the maximum combat effectiveness. Theater strategic considerations are shown in the figure below.

**SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AT THE THEATER STRATEGIC LEVEL**

- Logistic resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations.
- The procurement process to ensure the availability of logistic resources in a timely manner.
- The process of allocating available logistic resources among subordinate commands.
- The distribution system necessary to achieve maximum combat effectiveness.

At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided. Geographic combatant commanders should understand that these functions will vary in definition and application, and plan accordingly. Efforts should be made to standardize these functions without inhibiting operations. Logistic functions should use existing policies and procedures of the Service components whenever possible. If it is not possible to use existing policies and procedures of the Service components, the geographic combatant commanders must identify and resolve differences with Service commanders early in the planning process to ascertain the degree of uninterrupted logistic support in the theater. These procedures apply across the range of military operations. Ideally, prior deliberate planning and testing of these modifications in joint exercises should be conducted to ensure adequate logistic support for the expected joint operations.

**Related Terms**

levels of logistic support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**EMBARKATION**

The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships and/or aircraft.

**Embarkation Phase.** The embarkation phase of a amphibious operation (PHIBOP) encompasses the orderly assembly of personnel and material and their subsequent loading aboard ships and/or aircraft in a sequence designed to meet the requirements of the landing force (LF) concept of operations ashore.
Developments Affecting Embarkation Planning. Ongoing development and improvement techniques for projection of combat power ashore and the subsequent support of the LF through enhanced mobility systems require continued emphasis on flexible and responsive embarkation planning.

Effects of Improvements in Mobility. New developments, such as vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, over-the-horizon craft, and improved amphibious shipping have, and will continue to have, a pronounced effect on PHIBOPs. (See figure below.) These new developments do not change fundamental embarkation doctrine, but in some instances, new techniques and procedures in planning, organizing, and executing embarkation must be employed.

Greater Dispersion of Shipping. The vulnerability of the amphibious task force (ATF) to attack is decreased by emphasizing speed, surprise, mobility, and dispersion. LF units must be embarked so as to best accomplish the assault while minimizing the effects of possible loss of ships and their embarked units. The concentration of ships in major port areas is reduced by using several separated ports and open beaches for embarkation. Ships, personnel, supplies, and equipment are echeloned into embarkation areas to reduce congestion.

In the objective area, the sea echelon may be employed, which requires ships to disperse and phase into the unloading areas according to prearranged plans or as needed.

Embarkation Execution. Embarkation of the assault echelons (assault echelon and assault follow-on echelon) will be in accordance with the approved operation and embarkation plan and is a mutual responsibility of the commander, amphibious task force, commander, landing force, and external supporting agencies.

Mutual Effort. Embarkation is a joint undertaking by both LF and naval forces. Proper embarkation depends to a large extent on both mutual understanding of objectives and capabilities and full cooperation in planning and execution. Throughout the planning and execution of the PHIBOP, LF officers will be working with their Navy counterparts.

Degree of Flexibility. Ideally, units embarked for combat should be loaded to allow almost unlimited flexibility in landing at the objective area. This desired degree of flexibility can seldom be attained, however. The organization for embarkation of the landing force must be compatible with the plan for the ship-to-shore movement which, in turn, must support the scheme of maneuver ashore. Insofar as possible, each ship of the amphibious task force must be loaded to provide maximum flexibility to meet possible changes in the tactical plan and to facilitate discharge of cargo to meet emergency calls for personnel, equipment, and supplies.
Importance of Proper Embarkation. A characteristic of successful PHIBOPs is the rapid and effective manner in which assault troops establish themselves ashore. The power and size of the LF must be expanded to the maximum extent necessary to carry out its mission in the shortest possible time. This expansion requires a rapid, yet orderly buildup of men and material, which depends in large measure on the manner in which the ships have been loaded. Proper loading increases the inherent flexibility of the ATF and is a key factor in ensuring success. Conversely, improper loading can seriously jeopardize an operation.

Use of Military Sealift Command (MSC) Ships. MSC ships have been and will continue to be used to augment the ATF’s shipping requirements.

Use of Combatant Ships. Throughout US Naval history, troops have been required to embark aboard combatant ships such as destroyers, cruisers, and carriers for rapid movement to an objective area. These situations developed under circumstances of great importance and urgency when time was a cardinal consideration. Accordingly, direct liaison between the embarking unit and the combatant ship should be authorized to ensure mutual understanding and expeditious embarkation.

Embarkation Security. In developing amphibious embarkation and deployment planning, significant consideration must be given to detailed security and counterintelligence (CI) support requirements. CI as a separate and distinct discipline from intelligence can provide in depth information on the enemy’s intelligence collection effort and capability. CI, specifically the Counterintelligence Support Officers (CISOs) of the unified commands and the component CI elements, affords commanders the ability to enhance their force protection efforts from inception of planning to execution of any operation plan. The CISO, guided by command directives in consonance with the joint publication on CI, can provide commanders the advice and assistance necessary to develop detailed and coordinated CI actions in support of security, operations security, force protection, and operational planning.

Related Terms
amphibious operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02.2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation

EMPLOYMENT PLANNING

Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders.

General. Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces within an operational area. Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, devising and selecting courses of action, and positioning forces and resources to create advantages in combat and exploit resulting opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance. Employment planning influences and drives planning in the other mission areas of joint operation planning.

Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning support the concepts and requirements developed through employment planning. Detailed planning for the actual use of forces and materiel within the operational area is normally accomplished as part of joint operation planning by subordinate commanders, such as component and subordinate joint force commanders. However, in the broader context of joint operation planning, each
level of command plans for the employment of its available forces and resources to achieve specified objectives.

**National Level.** At the national level, strategic plans provide for the global and theater employment of national capabilities to achieve national security and military objectives. This planning considers global requirements, national capabilities, and the theater strategies and campaigns of the combatant commanders. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan describes strategic concepts, defines supporting regional objectives, and apportions forces and resources among the combatant commanders to attain prioritized national objectives. National strategic planning for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment is based on the planned employment of forces in the individual theaters.

**Theater Level.** Employment planning at the theater level focuses on organizing and positioning assigned and augmenting forces for the conduct of theater campaigns or major operations to attain strategic and/or theater objectives. The combatant commander’s strategic employment concept defines objectives, organizes forces, arranges and prioritizes operations, assigns tasks, and prioritizes the movement of forces and support to and within the theater. It provides strategic direction to the employment planning of subordinate commands and, when appropriate, supports alliance, coalition or treaty plans for the employment of multinational forces. Theater strategic employment planning provides the foundation for the concept of operations for joint operation plans (OPLANs) prepared by the combatant commander and the framework for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

**Subordinate Level.** Subordinate commands, such as component commands and subordinate joint force commands, normally accomplish the detailed employment planning for the conduct of joint operations to perform missions tasked by the combatant commanders. When part of an alliance or a coalition organization, detailed employment planning is performed within the multinational or bilateral chain of command in support of multinational strategies, campaigns, and missions. Under these circumstances, multinational employment plans become the basis for joint OPLANs prepared within the US chain of command that plan for moving, preparing, and sustaining US forces dedicated to multinational operations.

**Key Planning Concepts.** To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander’s strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander’s theater objectives. These concepts are shown in the figure below. Because of

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**KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS**

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

- **Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.**
- **Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat.**
- **Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.**
- **Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander’s intent for each phase.**
the ambiguous nature of the threat in some plans, all of these concepts may not be applicable. Where possible, they should at least be considered and identified in the plan.

**DESERT STORM Campaign Plan**

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero,” recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior commanders on his campaign plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who were in attendance, commenting “that no other theater commander in history had ever been blessed with such an array of talent,” and describes his battle plan...

“The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word ‘decapitate,’ so I think I’ll use the word ‘attack,’ leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy — not attack, not damage, not surround — I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t want them to exist as a military organization.” For the benefit of the Vietnam vets — practically the whole room — I emphasized that ‘we’re not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine with us. That’s bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.’ If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

‘I’m now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about, in Washington particularly,’ I said, and described the four phases of attack we’d mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive — a fully realized version of the envelopment I’d proposed to (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General) Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms, we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam’s forces were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural barrier once (Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General) Chuck Horner’s air force dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

‘I anticipated,’ I said, ‘a four-pronged ground assault.’ Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of US Marines and a Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam’s forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in (US Marine Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.) Boomer’s...
direction, I said, ‘I'll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.’ I’d reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the US Army’s power punch. Looking at (Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General) Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. ‘I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,’ I said, showing how I wanted Luck’s divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard’s last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to (Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General) Fred Franks. ‘I think it’s pretty obvious what your mission is going to be’, I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, ‘attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard.’ I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn’t resist adding, ‘Once they’re gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn’t going to be anything else out there.’ I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months. ‘Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed — because the enemy is still going to outnumber us — it is going to take, for lack of a better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.’ I pointed again at the map. ‘What I’m saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here and when the Army forces hit the wire over here...we need commanders in the lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they will get through. And that once they’re through they’re not going to stop and discuss it. They are going to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn’t understand it, I would strongly recommend that you consider removing him from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

‘Because, let’s face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of America rests on our shoulders. There isn’t going to be anybody else in this thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what’s going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn’t understand that, get out of the way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be done.”

Source: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre: It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam Books, 1992
What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude — both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. JP 1-02

The desired end state should be clearly described by the National Command Authorities before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state — described by a set of military conditions — when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

Related Terms

termination

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
prisoner of war
A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant’s privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. JP 1-02

civilian internee
1. A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. 2. A term used to refer to persons interned and protected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention). JP 1-02

Support to Department of Defense Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI) Programs. Civil affairs assets may be tasked by commanders to provide technical advice and assistance to security and law enforcement personnel in implementing EPW/CI operations. Such coordination may include, but is not limited to:
• Identification of individuals who are EPW, CI, or otherwise detained by the Armed Forces of the United States.
• Review of EPW/CI plans and operations to ensure detainee understanding of written procedures, rules, and regulations; administrative and security requirements; food services, hygiene, medical, and other provisions; and labor and other program arrangements.
• Assistance in liaison with civil-military authorities of a detaining power with regard to US captured or detained EPW/CI.

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

The success of the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM can be attributed, in part, to the lessons learned in the war in Vietnam. During that conflict, Armed Forces of the United States dealt with the international transfer of US and Allied EPWs to an ally; conducted military liaison with the EPW camp authorities of that ally; coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); determined training requirements for EPW units; and established the need for an enemy prisoner of war information system, centralized management, and accurate accountability. It is also due in great measure to adherence to the
various agreements and conventions dealing with enemy prisoners of war, displaced persons and refugees.

The most important requirements of international law pertaining to persons captured or detained during an armed conflict are detailed in the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. Specific requirements for the humane treatment and full accountability of prisoners of war are found in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC), governs similar treatment and accountability of civilians.

Treatment and accountability of EPWs generated international interest and concern. In addition to other concerns, religious and cultural sensitivities were a factor. All EPWs and displaced civilians captured by Coalition forces during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were eventually turned over to Saudi control to insure that Arab prisoners were treated in accordance with Arab culture and Islamic religious practice.

During Operation DESERT STORM, Coalition forces captured 86,743 EPWs. Approximately 69,822 EPWs and displaced civilians were processed through US operated facilities between January, when the first EPW was captured, and May 1991. (By agreement, the United States also accepted EPWs and displaced civilians from UK and France and transferred them to Saudi Arabian installations.) US forces provided food, shelter, and medical care to both EPWs and more than 1,400 civilian displaced persons or refugees during this period. Eight EPWs died in US custody; all as a result of injuries or sickness contracted prior to capture. Five died from combat injuries, one from malnutrition/dehydration, and two from unknown causes. Three US transferred prisoners died in Saudi camps due to wounds received while interned in the Saudi controlled camps. These deaths were investigated and reported through command channels to the ICRC, as required by GPW.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CUMULATIVE EPW AND DISPLACED CIVILIANS CAPTURED/SURRENDERED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Forces</td>
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<td>Arab Forces</td>
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<td>British Forces</td>
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<td>French Forces</td>
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<td>Total All Forces</td>
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* Displaced Civilians (1,492) are included in the US Forces numbers.

Interrogations of some detainees initially identified as EPWs determined that several were civilians who had not taken part in hostile actions against the Coalition forces. In some cases, they had surrendered to the Coalition to receive food and lodging. Under Article 5 of the GPW, tribunals were conducted to determine whether civilians were entitled to be granted EPW status. For those detainees whose status was questionable, tribunals were conducted to
verify status, based upon the individual’s relationship to the military and participation in the war. A total of 1,196 tribunal hearings were conducted. As a result, 310 persons were granted EPW status; the others were determined to be displaced civilians and were treated as refugees. No civilian was found to have acted as an unlawful combatant.

Centralized EPW management began during Operation DESERT SHIELD and continued throughout Operation DESERT STORM. The US National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC) was fully operational before the ground offensive began, and a new automated program for compiling information on and accounting for captured personnel (as required by the GPW) was fielded in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Trained Reserve Component (RC) EPW units were activated, and camp advisory teams were sent to Saudi Arabia to establish liaison with Saudi units to provide technical assistance, and to maintain accountability for EPWs and displaced civilians transferred to the Saudis.

Source: DOD Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

Related Terms

civil affairs

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS

These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit. Depending on geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications compatibility. An example of sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning in 1993.

Related Terms

maritime intercept operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ENFORCING EXCLUSION ZONES

An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. The measures are usually imposed by the United Nations, or other international bodies of which the US is a member. However, they may also be imposed
Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right according to international law.

International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is “innocent” as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. These norms are developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. An example is the Berlin air corridors that existed from 1948 until 1990, allowing air access to West Berlin. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 are examples of freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

ESTIMATE OF LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY

A logistic sustainability assessment of each operation plan (OPLAN) will be accomplished after completion of all concurrent logistic planning by supporting unified and Service component commanders. Initially, an estimate of logistic feasibility will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commanders of combatant commands (CINCs) as part of the OPLAN summary. The estimate may encompass any appropriate remarks affecting logistic tasks. As a minimum, the estimate will address the pillars of logistic support, that is materiel resources, combat support, combat service support, infrastructure including facilities, and lift. In addition, a statement will be provided to see whether the plan is considered supportable.
Upon completion of all logistic planning a definitive analysis will be made of the OPLAN. A comprehensive analysis of the four pillars of logistic support and their subelements for the duration of the OPLAN will be accomplished. Services will provide critical item sustainability data as requested by the CINCs and outlined in this volume. Reasonably assured wartime host-nation support must be considered in all assessments and documented. Logistic limitations and shortfalls will be documented with accompanying narrative in Appendix 6 to Annex D of the OPLAN. The analysis will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not later than 45 days after unified or specified command review of their component command supporting plans. Thereafter, the update analysis will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the annual plan review or when significant changes occur that influence mission accomplishment.

Related Terms
- deliberate planning
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
- operation plan

Source Joint Publications
CJCSM 3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Estimate Process and Strategy. The term “estimate” implies a one-sided evaluation of a two or more sided issue where many of the pertinent facts are unknown or distorted. The estimate assists in clarifying problems and devising integrated solutions to complex problems, thus reducing surprise and shock. A continuous estimate process provides a framework for disciplined reason even under the most trying circumstances. The estimate is the central focus for strategic, operational, and tactical analysis that needs to be maintained over time and in the face of continuing change. The first questions in any estimate are the following: What is the mission? What is the desired end state? What has changed? What are the resulting possibilities and consequences?

Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates based on their assigned tasks after reviewing the strategic environment, the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and alliance strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop estimates for each theater they support. Operations in one theater often affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater’s strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate.

The estimate process is continuous, with the combatant commander’s staff contributing to the product. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. Where a subordinate commander’s estimate of the situation is typically used for near term decisions and may lead to an operation plan, the combatant commander’s strategic estimate results in operational concepts and courses of action — broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the strategic end state to be achieved.

Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. Combatant commanders’ plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (approved by the National Command Authorities); establish constraints and restraints; and
define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. (See figure below.)

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to flesh out the basic framework for readers of this term.

**Mission.**

Mission Analysis
- Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.
- Determine specified and implied tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

Mission Statement
- Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).
- Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.
Situation Analysis.

Geostrategic Context. Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

Characteristics of the operational area, including: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, mobilization capacity); social conditions; science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

Analysis of the Enemy. Enemy situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate).

- Broad military courses of action (COAs) being taken and available in the future.
- Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).
- Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.
- Possible external military support.
- Center(s) of gravity (strategic and operational).
- Specific operational characteristics: strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors (including basing utilized and available), and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the theater level, commanders will normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and command, control, communications, and computers estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Restrictions. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

Deductions. Deductions from above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

Courses of Action Analysis. COAs development (based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished). Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

- Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.
- Forces required.
- Logistic concept.
- Deployment concept.
- Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
- Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

- Determine the probable effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA.
Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner: by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, counterreaction.

Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; list advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

**Comparison of Own Courses of Action**

- Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
- Compare with respect to governing factors: fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art); other critical factors (for example, political constraints); and mission accomplishment.
- If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

**Decision.** Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.

**Related Terms**

CINC’s strategic estimate

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**EVACUATION POLICY**

Command decision indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and destinations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. JP 1-02

The theater evacuation policy is established by the Secretary of Defense upon the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommendation of the geographic combatant commander. (The policy states, in number of days, the maximum period of noneffectiveness [hospitalization or convalescence] that casualties may be held within the theater for treatment.) The policy does not imply that a casualty must be held in the theater for the entire period for treatment. Casualties who are not expected to return to duty within the number of days expressed in the theater evacuation policy are evacuated as soon as their medical condition permits. Shorter evacuation policies within the theater reduce theater bed requirements and increase the number of beds required elsewhere. Shorter policies also increase evacuation requirements.

The time period stated in the theater evacuation policy starts when a patient is admitted to the first hospital (Echelon III). The total time a patient spends in all medical treatment...
facilities (MTFs) in the theater for a single episode of wounding, injury, or illness should not exceed the number of allowable days of noneffectiveness stated in the theater evacuation policy. This policy is flexible and changes as the tactical situation shifts. This ensures that nonfixed MTFs retain mobility and the capability to accommodate anticipated surges of patients.

**Related Terms**

health service support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

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**EXECUTE ORDER**

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the decision of the National Command Authorities, publishes the EXECUTE ORDER. The EXECUTE ORDER, issued BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, orders the supported commander to execute his operation order. The EXECUTE ORDER is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the EXECUTE ORDER may be the only message provided in a crisis. In such situations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures that the EXECUTE ORDER contains the information normally provided in the WARNING and ALERT ORDERs. Throughout the operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, crisis action planning (CAP) Procedures Phase VI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate the situation and provide the combatant commander guidance on either continuing under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).”

**Related Terms**

alert order; crisis action planning; planning order; warning order

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)
EXECUTION PLANNING

The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. JP 1-02

A National Command Authorities (NCA)-approved course of action (COA) is transformed into an operation order (OPORD) during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning, as shown in the figure below. In this phase, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) performs the detailed planning necessary to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. This should guide the development of the OPORD.

Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Following crisis action planning procedures and using capabilities provided through Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) by modifying an existing operation plan, expanding an existing operation plan in concept format (with or without TPFDD), or developing a new plan. Supporting commanders providing augmenting forces identify and task specific units and provide movement requirements. Component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the Services.

US Transportation Command develops transportation schedules to support the requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not mean that the
supported commander’s TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules developed are the most effective and realistic given the numbers and types of assets and their location in relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. Force preparation action is accomplished throughout the JPEC in accordance with deployment postures directed by the Secretary of Defense, and deployability posture reporting is initiated.

The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor execution planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander’s OPORD for feasibility and adequacy. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, planning enters its final phase: execution.

Related Terms

- crisis action planning
- Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

EXECUTIVE AGENT

A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes.

The Secretary of Defense may designate one of his immediate subordinates, normally the Secretary of a Military Department or a combatant commander, to act as his executive agent for the performance of duties or activities, normally temporary or transitory, which do not warrant assignment of an additional permanent function. The purpose, scope of authority, and duration of such designation is made clear in the establishing directive. Executive agent responsibilities and activities assigned to the Secretary of a Military Department may serve as justification of budgetary requirements but will not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements. Responsibilities of an Executive Agent are as shown in the figure below.
Responsibilities of an Executive Agent

- Implement and comply with the relevant policies and directives of the Secretary of Defense.

- Ensure proper coordination among Military Departments, the combatant commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense agencies and DOD field activities as appropriate for the responsibilities and activities assigned.

- Issue directives to other DOD components and take action on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, to the extent authorized in the directive establishing the executive agent.

- Make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for actions regarding the activity for which designated the executive agent, including the manner and timing for dissolution of these responsibilities and duties.

- Perform such other duties and observe such limitations as may be set forth in the directive establishing the executive agent.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
FACILITIES

A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. JP 1-02

The commander of a combatant command (CINC) is responsible for the coordination of planning, programming, and construction of facilities within the command. Additionally, the CINC should determine the priorities in the programming of facilities necessary to support the mission. Contingency construction project requests in overseas areas require validation by the CINC. The CINC may establish a Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) to assist in managing facilities.

The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) priorities. The JFUB is activated on the order of a joint force commander and chaired by the Logistics Directorate, with members from component commands and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs). The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the tasking of the JCMEB.

Facility requirements are optimized consistent with expected operational requirements, duration of need, and forces to be supported. If facilities must be acquired to support joint operations, the requirements should be satisfied in the following order, consistent with operational imperatives and economic judgment:

- Use existing facilities owned, occupied, or leased by the US in a theater of operations.
- Use US-owned relocatable buildings and facility substitutes prepositioned in the theater of operations.
- Exercise the provisions of host-nation support agreements.
- Acquire existing facilities in the theater of operations from commercial sources.

Navy SEABEEs use contingency construction skills to construct strong back tent villages for Cuban migrants during Operation SEA SIGNAL.
• Use US-owned relocatable buildings and facility substitutes located outside the theater of operations.
• Construct new facilities.

Facility designs are developed using the following principles:
• Maintenance requirements are considered in the design of facilities.
• Facility scopes are based on Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum-275-89.
• Standard facility designs are developed to meet Service doctrinal requirements based on site condition assumptions and structural configurations to sustain anticipated unit equipment. The standard designs should, therefore, be construed as valid for most situations. The designs may be modified based on operational, environmental, unusual site, or unique customer requirements. The availability of relocatable shelters or facility substitutes also may have design implications.

Construction standards, shown in the figure below, determine the types of materials and construction techniques used in constructing facilities in support of contingency operations. Contingency construction standards provide criteria that minimize engineer efforts while providing facilities of a quality consistent with the mission requirements, personnel health and safety, and the expected availability of construction resources. Where mission requirements are similar, facilities should be constructed to the same standards by all Services. Construction requirements may be met by commercial, off-the-shelf building systems that are austere and rapidly erectable, and yet have a life span that exceeds even the temporary standard if that alternative is as cost or operationally effective.

**CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS**

**Initial Standard**
- Characterized by austere facilities requiring minimal engineer effort
- Intended for immediate austere operational use by units upon arrival in theater for a limited time ranging up to 6 months (depending on the specific facility)
- May require replacement by more substantial or durable facilities during the course of operations

**Temporary Standard**
- Characterized by minimum facilities
- Intended to increase efficiency of operations for use extending to 24 months
- Provides for sustained operations
- Replaces initial standard in some cases where mission requirements dictate. Temporary standard construction can be used from the start of an operation if directed by a combatant commander
The figure below provides examples of the types of construction considered under initial and temporary standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>TEMPORARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site preparation</td>
<td>Clearing and grading for facilities sites, including drainage, revetments for petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammo storage and aircraft parking; aggregate for heavily used hardstands; and soil stabilization.</td>
<td>Engineering site preparation, including pavement for vehicle traffic areas and aircraft parking, building foundations, and concrete floor slabs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop housing</td>
<td>Tents (may have wood frames and flooring).</td>
<td>Wood frame structures; relocatable structures; mobile structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Tactical generators; high and low voltage distribution.</td>
<td>Nontactical generators and high or low voltage distribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Water points, wells, and/or other potable water production and pressurized water distribution systems.</td>
<td>Limited distribution to hospitals, dining halls, and other large users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold storage</td>
<td>Portable refrigeration with freezer units for medical, food, and maintenance storage.</td>
<td>Refrigeration installed in temporary structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>Organic equipment, evaporative ponds, pit or burnout latrines, lagoons for hospitals, and sewage lift stations.</td>
<td>Waterborne to austere treatment facility. Priorities are hospitals, dining halls, bath houses, decontamination sites, and other high volume water users.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield pavement</td>
<td>Tactical surfacing, including matting aggregate, soil stabilization, and concrete pads.</td>
<td>Conventional pavement.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel storage</td>
<td>Bladders.</td>
<td>Bladders and steel tanks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The type of airfield surfacing to be used will be based on the expected number and weight of aircraft involved in operations.
FEASIBILITY

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. JP 1-02

Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan. Measures to enhance feasibility include ensuring effective employment schemes, sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining alternatives and reserves.

Related Terms
acceptability; adequacy

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

FIELD SERVICES

Combatant commanders are responsible for the search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within their theaters. The responsibility extends not only to deceased personnel of US forces, but also to allied, third country, and enemy dead. For humanitarian, health, and morale reasons, this responsibility may extend to the local populace. Combatant commanders are responsible for controlling and coordinating mortuary affairs operations within their theaters. This responsibility also pertains to peacetime mass fatality incidents.

Related Terms
mortuary affairs

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT ZONE

See weapon engagement zone. JP 1-02

Fighter engagement zone (FEZ) operations usually take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea) and short-range air defense systems and are an alternative engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. The principle of meeting the massed combat airpower of the enemy with comparable mass to defeat enemy efforts is highly dependent on coordination and flexibility within the airspace control system in the combat zone. Under FEZ operations, surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons unless targets are positively identified as hostile and assigned by higher authority, or unless they are firing in self-defense. FEZ operations offer great ability for the joint force commander to respond immediately with fighter assets to an enemy air offensive regardless of its location. FEZ and missile engagement zone operations present the enemy with the dilemma of defending against two entirely different
weapon systems, greatly decreasing enemy survivability. FEZ operations within the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the ability of surface-based air defense systems to engage the threat.

FEZs normally will be established in those areas where no effective surface-to-air capability is deployed. These operations usually take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and sea), short-range air defense systems, and are an alternative type of engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. FEZ is an air defense control measure.

From an air defense perspective, FEZ normally is used when fighter aircraft have the clear operational advantage over surface-based systems. These advantages could include range, density of fire, rules of engagement, or coordination requirements. From an airspace control perspective, FEZ provides airspace users with location of the engagement zone for fighter aircraft for mission planning purposes.

Coordination and flexibility within the combat airspace control system may be a limiting factor with FEZ. Under FEZ operations, surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons unless targets are positively identified as hostile and assigned by higher authority, or unless they are firing in self defense.

The area air defense commander is the point of contact.

Related Terms

weapon engagement zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

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**FORCE EXTRACTION**

Force extraction theater airlift operations involve the combat air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces. Because the purpose of these movements may range from withdrawal operations to the lateral movement of forces to new operating locations, the relationship of operational and logistic considerations can vary widely. These operations generally are planned to accomplish a movement with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. However, in higher threat situations it may also be necessary to preserve the combat capabilities of departing units for as long as possible at the departure terminal, while building them up as rapidly as possible at the arrival terminal. In such cases, operational requirements may be more important than the efficient use of allowable cabin loads. In the latter stages of a complete extraction of friendly forces from a combat area, planners should provide suitable operational assets to protect both the extracting forces and the airlift forces engaged in their movement. Extractions are logistical backhaul operations. Commanders must evaluate the risk of extracting materiel as compared to the impact of abandonment and replacement.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**FORCE INTERACTION**

Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for joint force commanders (JFCs) to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and
asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible — air attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (the air and special operations forces interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval attacks against troop transports (US attacks against Japanese reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCE MODULE

A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called FM.

Force modules are a planning and execution tool that provides a means of logically grouping records, which facilitates planning, analysis, and monitoring. Force modules may include both forces and sustainment. There are three types of force modules.

Service or Supporting Command Force Module. Built by the Service or supporting command headquarters to represent the notional force structure of a given major unit. The Service Force Module contains combat force(s), combat support, combat service support, and sustainment for a minimum of 30 days. The Service Force Modules contain type units and an estimate of accompanying supplies and non-unit-related sustainment materiel required to support the unit. Current sustainment in Service Force Modules is developed by a combination of hand-generated data and computer-generated data based on Service-developed sustainment factors and will be used to determine gross transportation feasibility. The Service...
Force Module is designed to be a basic building block to aid the planner in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

Operation Plan (OPLAN)-Dependent Force Module. OPLAN-Dependent Force Modules are force modules that have been modified or developed by supported CINC or Service components to respond to a specific planning task, such as flexible deterrent options or OPLAN Force Module Packages.

Force Tracking Force Module. This force module is OPLAN dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force Tracking Force Modules, as a minimum, will consist of major Service combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

**Related Terms**

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

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**FORCE MOVEMENT CONTROL CENTER**

Marine Corps components usually control requests for theater air movements through coordinated actions by the component movement control center, the command element’s force movement control center (FMCC) of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), and the Air Force tactical air control system. The process is initiated when the MAGTF FMCC transmits an airlift request to the joint movement center for validation and the joint air operations center for information. When airlift is approved, the MAGTF logistics movement control center organizes combat service support units to support the move.

**Related Terms**

joint movement center

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**FORCE PLANNING**

Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services.

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: force planning and joint operation planning. (See figure below.)

Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Chiefs of the Services. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operation forces, with the exception of organizing Service components.
FORCE PROJECTION

The National Command Authorities may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from the continental US or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. Joint force commanders (JFCs) sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

Opposed operations require a viable forcible entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. Unopposed operations may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs control
the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations. Logistic capability may be a higher priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection.

The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a command and control (C2) perspective, echelonment is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCE PROTECTION

Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. JP 1-02

In peacetime, geographic combatant commanders establish measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces. In wartime, geographic combatant commanders carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives derived from national and alliance or coalition strategic goals. Force protection responsibilities are
modified as necessary in order to ensure security of assigned forces and to protect US interests in their areas of responsibility.

Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, joint force commanders and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term “information gathering” is used rather than the term “intelligence” because of the sensitivity of the operation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0   Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-10  Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

FORCES AND FUNCTIONS

Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. Typically, joint force commanders (JFCs) structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently in order to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions such as command and control, resupply, and air defense. Attack of an enemy’s functions is normally intended to destroy enemy balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical enemy functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will. The appropriateness of functional attack as the principal design concept frequently is based on time required and available to cripple enemy critical functions as well as the enemy’s current actions and likely response to such attacks.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0   Doctrine for Joint Operations

FORCIBLE ENTRY

Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give joint force commanders (JFCs) unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy’s capability to respond. Forcible entry operations are normally joint
operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Subordinate joint and Service publications provide details on these operations.

Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements. Operations security and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

Special operations forces (SOF) may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the Armed Forces of the United States. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

### Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.
At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOFs to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.

Related Terms

Related Terms

aerial drop; amphibious operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. JP 1-02

Foreign internal defense (FID) programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting host nation (HN) personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support and combat operations as authorized by the National Command Authorities (NCA), to HN forces in executing an IDAD program. FID is a principal special operations mission.

When it is in the interests of US national security, the US may employ all elements of national power to assist a friendly nation in conducting IDAD programs. For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the United States Government (USG) must integrate efforts of multiple government agencies. Ideally the FID program will incorporate all elements in a synergistic manner that supports HN requirements and US national policy and interests in the most advantageous way.

Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations participating with the United States in multinational FID efforts. As is evident in the figure below, the lines of organization and command and control in a FID situation are interwoven and often unclear. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.
Combatant commands with geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID in their regions. Other unified commands play a supporting role to those combatant commanders by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the NCA. The combatant commander has the responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all the military activities in his AOR in support of FID programs. The priority and importance of the FID mission will depend on the individual theater; however, in certain areas FID may represent the combatant commander’s most...
important peacetime mission. Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations as shown in the following examples:

- Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command’s AOR. These plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance.
- Although planning and executing military operations in FID require a coordinated staff and interagency effort, responsibility and accountability remain with the designated planning and operations section.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

The impetus of logistic support is from the continental US into the theater and forward. A system of continuous replenishment may take the form of either automatic (push) replenishment or requisitioning (pull) replenishment. Whenever possible, the push system is preferred to increase scheduled replenishment and reduce requirements on the logistic command, control, communications, and computers system. Ideally, forward commanders should be relieved of logistic support details without impairing control of their organic logistic support capabilities.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period. Support by a main operating base will be required to provide backup support for a forward operating base. Also called FOB.

Forward Operating Bases (FOB). Forward deployment of fixed-wing close air support (CAS) aircraft offers several advantages. Operating from locations close to the battle area can increase loiter time in the objective area, extend effective combat radius, and, perhaps most importantly, make the CAS firepower more responsive to ground commanders by shortening the response time. Preplanned logistic support is vital to ensure sufficient ammunition, fuel, and servicing equipment is in position and ready for use when it is needed.

Supported units should provide a forecast of anticipated CAS targets, so appropriate munitions can be transported to FOBs and prepared for use. Supporting units are responsible for keeping FOBs operational by planning for and carrying out logistical support. FOB logistical support is a function of the number and type of aircraft using the location, operations tempo, quantity and type of munitions being employed, and system-specific support requirements.
Logistics is a very important consideration when more than one component is operating out of a FOB. Direct liaison between all units involved is vital, and can be critical to mission success. Considerations include munitions handling equipment, fuel connections, type and grade of fuel, and weapon arming and fuzing equipment and configurations.

**Air Direct Delivery.** Air direct delivery is a strategic airlift mission which lands at a forward operating base and does not involve a theater airlift transshipment in conjunction with the strategic airlift. Considerations in selecting air direct delivery are shown in the figure below and include:

- ground plan;
- suppression of enemy air defenses;
- proximity and capacity of airfields at destination;
- offload capability at destination airfield to include the need for additional materials handling equipment and logistical personnel;
- the ground force package may be designed for delivery from continental US to forward areas. Light forces have limited organic transportation capability.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-09.3 | JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS) |
| JP 3-17  | JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations |
FORWARD PRESENCE

Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to military operations other than war.

Related Terms
deterrence

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

FRATRICIDE

Joint force commanders (JFCs) make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

Though occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often been the result of confusion on the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of targets, target location errors, target locations incorrectly transmitted or received, and loss of situational awareness by either terminal controllers, close air support (CAS) aircrews, or requestors. The bottom line is that it is critical for all participants in the CAS process to realize that they can contribute to unintentional or inadvertent friendly fire incidents.

All participants in the CAS employment process — maneuver commanders, fire support coordinators, targeteers, terminal controllers, and aircrews — are responsible for the effective and safe execution of CAS. Each participant must make every effort possible to ensure friendly units and enemy forces are correctly identified prior to the release of ordnance. JFCs, components, and units must habitually emphasize joint training that routinely exercises these joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to create a knowledge and understanding of the battlefield in situations in which CAS may be employed.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
FRICTION, CHANGE, AND UNCERTAINTY

Friction, chance, and uncertainty still characterize battle. Their cumulative effect comprises “the fog of war.” We have, for instance, no precisely defined picture of where, when, for how long, or why we may be obliged to use force in the defense of our nation or its friends and allies. We must be prepared for a broad range of possibilities. Modern technology will not eliminate friction, chance, or uncertainty from military undertakings. Indeed, the massive quantity of information available to modern commanders produces its own component of uncertainty. Instead, friction, chance, and uncertainty are an inevitable part of the medium in which we operate. We should prepare mentally, physically, and psychologically to deal with this.

External friction (caused by factors outside our control, such as weather or the enemy) is essentially inescapable, though we can sometimes mitigate its effects. Internal “friction” caused by excessive rivalries may also confront military forces from time to time. The desire to excel and the competition of differing points of views are indispensable to healthy military organizations. However, there is no place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or denigrate fellow members of the joint team; we must harness all our energies for dealing with our enemies. Effective teamwork among the Armed Forces of the United States helps reduce and cope with the various frictions associated with military endeavors.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

FULL EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

Nations should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, determine relevant and attainable objectives, and achieve unified efforts against the adversary. (See figure below.) The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be conceived and exercised well before operations begin. The exchange must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet better understood or changing circumstances. The combatant command Intelligence Directorates should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the Defense Intelligence Agency as soon as possible. Assignment to the joint or multinational task force of personnel familiar with foreign disclosure regulations will facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence.

Sharing intelligence sources and methods, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When, however, intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.
Related Terms

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

**FULL MOBILIZATION**

See mobilization.  

**Full Mobilization Authority.** The President, upon a declaration of national emergency or war by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law, may invoke 10 USC 12301(a) authorizing the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to order to active duty any member of the Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, without their consent, for the duration of the emergency or war plus six months.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
FULL PROCEDURAL CONTROL

A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. JP 1-02

Full procedural control would rely on previously agreed to and promulgated air space control measures such as comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement, low-level transit routes, minimum-risk routes, minimum-risk levels, aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures, and coordinating altitudes. In any case, all missions remain subject to the airspace control order. The figure below summarizes both methods of airspace control.

Related Terms
- comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement
- low level transit routes
- minimum risk routes
- aircraft identification maneuvers
- fire support coordination measures
- coordinating altitudes

FUNCTIONAL

Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable in order to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority. When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the effect desired or service provided. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.
The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be partially or wholly exempt from the command authority of an area commander in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority who establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected area commanders.

Related Terms

functional component command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.

Combatant commanders and commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces have the authority to establish functional component commands to control military operations. Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability made available to them. Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations to perform operational missions that may be of short or extended duration. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments. (See figure below.)

The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces
The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC. The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander normally has operational control of assigned forces and a joint force air component commander is normally delegated tactical control of the sorties or other military capability made available).

The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.

The functional component commander will normally be a Service component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces. When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the assigned forces and the responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders.

When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command in order to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available. Staff billets for the needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified and used when the functional component staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. The number of personnel on this staff should be kept to the minimum and should be consistent with the task performed. The structure of the staff should be flexible enough to expand or contract under changing conditions without a loss in coordination or capability.

Related Terms

Service component command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or continuity of operations) but may be developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations. Functional plans will be written using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System procedures and formats specified for an operation plan in concept format (without time-phased force and deployment data).

**Related Terms**

**FUSION**

1. The process whereby the nuclei of light elements combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element, with the release of tremendous amounts of energy. 2. In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. 

**Intelligence Fusion.** All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

**Information Fusion.** The ultimate goal of command, control, communications, and computers systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

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GENERAL SUPPORT

See support.

GEOGRAPHIC AREA

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The commander of a combatant command established on an area basis is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A joint force commander (JFC) assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Note: Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned areas of responsibility. Subordinate JFCs are normally assigned joint operations areas.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) provides a fused picture of the battlespace within a modern command, control, communications, and computers system capable of meeting warfighter needs into the 21st century. It incorporates the core planning and assessment tools required by the combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders and meets the readiness support requirements of the Services. GCCS is required to move the combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders joint command and control support capability into the modern era of client/server architecture using commercial, open systems standards for both commercial and government off-the-shelf applications. The umbrella standards and unifying approach that GCCS brings to the ongoing Department of Defense command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system migration strategy are essential for the Services and agencies to successfully reduce the large number of systems in use today.

Related Terms

command, control, communications, and computer systems; worldwide military command and control system

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Advances in information technologies and continued reduction in cost of information-related equipment and systems continue to fuel an explosion of networks around the globe that form the infosphere. In reality, the various labels placed on systems and networks are misleading as there are no discrete boundaries in the information environment. All are
inextricably intertwined and this trend will only intensify with the continuous application of rapidly advancing technology.

Viewing this environment as an infosphere reveals its true nature. This worldwide telecommunications web transcends industry, media, and the military and includes both government and nongovernment entities. The infosphere electronically links organizations and individuals around the globe. It is characterized by a merging of civilian and military information networks and technologies. While the benefits received are tremendous, reliance on this technology and infrastructure generates dependence and dependence creates vulnerabilities that have to be accounted for and overcome.

In the post-Cold War era, US military forces are tasked with a wide variety of missions, from disaster relief, to peacekeeping, to fighting a major regional conflict. Declining resources dictate that the US military accomplish this wider variety of roles and missions with a smaller force structure. Historically, the US military has relied on technology as a force multiplier to accomplish assigned missions as efficiently as possible while preserving human life and limiting the destruction of property. One way to accomplish such missions efficiently is to leverage sophisticated information technologies. Today, and in the future, efficient use of information technologies will require the support of the infosphere, including both an evolving national and defense information infrastructure.

Related Terms
command, control, communications, and computers

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0     Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

GLOBAL PATIENT MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS CENTER

The Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) is located at Scott Air Force Base, IL. The GPMRC coordinates aeromedical evacuation worldwide and encompasses those duties formerly associated with the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center. In practice, the GPMRC will coordinate and allocate assets to the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Centers (TPMRCs). It will also collaborate and integrate TPMRC schedules and plans, and communicate lift/bed requirements.

Related Terms
aeromedical evacuation; Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-02     Doctrine of Health Service Support in Joint Operations

GRADUATED RESPONSE

Graduated Response Process. The graduated response (GR) process (see figure below) provides a planning framework for the national direction and control of military and national mobilization activities. Overall responsibility for GR rests with the National Security Council and its interagency structure. Virtually every Federal agency has a role to play in managing a national response to a crisis. National resources in the 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) are focused on defense needs. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during natural disasters under the Federal Response Plan. FEMA coordinates the actions and programs of the other Federal agencies in support of DOD during regional contingencies and mobilization efforts.

**Mobilization Preparedness Activity.** The GR concept comprises three stages of mobilization preparedness activity: planning and preparation, crisis management, and national emergency or war.

Stage III — Planning and Preparation. In Stage III, the US maintains vigilance, observing national and international events for developing threats to national security. Federal departments and agencies develop emergency plans and maintain the capability to carry out the plans within funding limitations. Although essentially a period of peace, it is during this stage that the gradual emergence of a potential new threat would be perceived and actions could be taken to deter the threat.

Stage II — Crisis Management. Stage II activities are designed around options for responding to specific crisis situations as they develop. The DOD and other Federal departments and agencies initiate preparatory actions that are not feasible during Stage III because of resource constraints or the absence of a more specific basis for focused planning and preparation. During this stage, the nation’s civilian leadership may elect not to risk political capital and significant economic disruption; these are characteristic of overt mobilization actions, but leaders may approve limited actions for improving US preparedness. Such actions would be designed to maximize response potential with minimum disruption of the economy. Limited surge of the defense industrial base, a Presidential declaration of national emergency, and a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup could occur as Stage II actions.

Stage I — National Emergency or War. In Stage I, the US begins a mobilization of the economy for a crisis or war. A Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency
should be expected at an early point in Stage I activities. The principal distinguishing feature between Stages I and II is a substantial increase in the magnitude of defense industrial production and other essential national defense activities. Industrial base expansion will be characterized by expanding facilities, building new facilities, and conversion of non-defense producers. Critical resources could be diverted from nonessential production, and significant disruption of the national economy would be a consequence. The increased demand for resources would mandate increased interagency coordination and support of mobilization actions and prioritization of resource shortages.

Successful GR requires effective interagency coordination in each stage to synchronize production capacity, labor force expansion and stabilization, economic and trade policies, energy and transportation allocations, and other actions that prepare the US to respond to hostilities and signal its commitment to national security.

**Related Terms**

mobilization

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services.

The health service support (HSS) mission in joint operations is to minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, and disease on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. This mission is accomplished by a proactive preventive medicine program and a phased health care system (echelons of care) that extends from actions taken at the point of wounding, injury, or illness to evacuation from a theater for treatment at a hospital in the continental United States (CONUS). One measure of this system’s effectiveness is its ability to save life and limb, to reduce the disease and nonbattle injury rate, and to return patients to duty quickly and as far forward in the theater as possible. Another measure is the system’s ability to evacuate patients to the Communications Zone or out of the theater as appropriate, within the operational evacuation policy, with a minimum delay.

Vietnam: From the Field to the Hospital

Field evacuation and hospitalization of wounded in Vietnam was different from any previously carried out in any war. In addition it varied both in time and place within Vietnam. It was characterized by the absence of front lines and the traditional chain of evacuation. In general, the wounded Soldier was apt to receive his wounds while with a small group or unit isolated deep in roadless jungle, and the wounds were more apt to be multiple over all parts of the body than in any previous war. First aid and emergency medical treatment given on the site by company aid men, however, differed little from previous times. Resuscitative equipment and procedures included pressure dressings, tourniquets, and airways. Morphine was available but seldom used, as pain was not usually a problem at this point and aid men were aware of the depressant effects of morphine. In all likelihood, the patient would be evacuated within a relatively few minutes by helicopter, either a medical ambulance craft or a tactical one. The facilities available for resuscitation aboard the helicopter varied depending on whether it was a medical (“dust-off”) helicopter or a combat helicopter. IV fluid, usually Ringer’s Lactate solution, was often available, and trained medical technicians and emergency equipment were also present on dust-off helicopters.

The destinations of the helicopters varied. In some areas patients were taken to aid stations or medical companies. More often the helicopter flew the patients directly to a surgical hospital where they could receive definitive care. Blood and electrolyte solutions were often available at aid stations and medical
and clearing companies, as was some surgical capability. Complete surgical facilities, including anesthetists, were available at clearing companies, but definitive surgery was usually not done here. At times battalion surgeons flew forward to a site of combat, bringing blood and other supplies which were given on the spot.

Hospitals fulfilled much the same function for combat wounded, whether they were surgical hospitals, field hospitals, or evacuation hospitals. By and large they were all “semipermanent,” usually buildings set on a concrete floor, air-conditioned and with all utilities and other equipment of a first-rate hospital in the continental United States.

Resuscitation of a Vietnam war casualty was an extremely rapid and sophisticated procedure. The patient would often be brought to the hospital directly from the battlefield by medical evacuation helicopter, frequently in less than an hour. Usually he received emergency treatment on the battlefield, to include control of hemorrhage, wound dressing, respiratory control, and often the starting of intravenous fluid. At the hospital, he was immediately taken to the resuscitation area where he was surrounded by a large team of highly trained physicians, nurses, and technicians.

The results of this prompt and efficient treatment may perhaps be best illustrated by comparing them with similar statistics from previous wars. In Vietnam, 46,000 of 346,000, or 13 percent, of all wounded American Soldiers died. If 22 percent had died, as was true in Korea, there would have been 77,840 deaths, 31,840 more than actually occurred. In World War II, 28 percent of all wounded American Soldiers died. If the medical treatment of Vietnam had been available during World War II, 117,748 Soldiers would have been saved.


As shown in the figure below, each Service component has an HSS system that encompasses the following six health care principles:

- **Conformity.** Integration and compliance with the commander’s plan are the basic elements of effective HSS. HSS planners can help ensure conformity by taking part in development of the commander’s operation plan.

- **Proximity.** The objective of proximity is to provide HSS to the wounded, injured, or sick as close to combat operations as the tactical situation permits. In many cases, time may be as important a factor as distance. Patients are evacuated to an medical treatment facility (MTF), or the MTF is moved to the area where the patient population is the greatest.

- **Flexibility.** Changes in tactical plans or operations make this HSS principle essential. Units must be prepared to shift HSS resources to meet changing requirements. All HSS units are used within the theater with none held in reserve, so plans for redistribution of HSS resources are required.

- **Mobility.** Using both organic and nonorganic transportation resources, commanders should anticipate requirements for rapid movement of HSS units to support combat forces during operations. This HSS principle is closely aligned to that of proximity.
Continuity. The objective is to provide optimum, uninterrupted care and treatment to the wounded, injured, and sick. Continuity in care and treatment is achieved by moving the patient through a progressive, phased HSS system, which extends from the forward area of the combat zone to an area as far rearward as the patient’s condition requires, possibly to CONUS. Continuity is also achieved by providing continued care during movement.

Coordination. The objective of this principle is to ensure that HSS resources in short supply are efficiently employed and used to effectively support the planned operation. Continuous coordination ensures that MTFs are not placed in areas that interfere with combat operations. Additionally, continuous coordination ensures that the scope and quality of medical treatment and care meet professional standards and policies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02  Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

HIGH-ALTITUDE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

See weapon engagement zone.  

Normally applied to long-range surface-to-air missiles, a high-altitude missile engagement zone (HIMEZ) will limit the volume of airspace within which these weapons may conduct engagements without specific direction of the area air defense commander (AADC). HIMEZ
is an air defense control measure. From an air defense perspective, HIMEZ normally is used when a high-altitude missile system has a clear operational advantage over using aircraft. These advantages could include range, command and control, rules of engagement, or response time. From an airspace control perspective, it provides airspace users with location of the engagement zone of a high-altitude missile system for mission planning purposes. The design of the HIMEZ is contingent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for establishing a HIMEZ is the AADC.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  
Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

---

**HIGH-DENSITY AIRSPACE CONTROL ZONE**

Airspace designated in an airspace control plan or airspace control order, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. A high-density airspace control zone has defined dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to a high-density airspace control zone is normally controlled by the maneuver commander. The maneuver commander can also direct a more restrictive weapons status within the high-density airspace control zone. Also called HIDACZ. JP 1-02

The high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) is an area in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. HIDACZ has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. Access to and air defense weapons status within a high-density airspace control zone is normally approved by the appropriate commander.

HIDACZ allows ground/Marine air-ground task force commanders to restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with ongoing operations. It restricts use of the airspace because of the large volume and density of fires supporting the ground operations within the described geographic area. The volume of air traffic demands careful coordination to limit the potential conflict among aircraft needed for mission essential operations within the HIDACZ and other airspace users. When establishing a HIDACZ, consider the following:

- Minimum risk routes into and out of the HIDACZ and to the target area.
- Air traffic advisory as required. Procedures and systems also must be considered for air traffic control service during instrument meteorological conditions.
- Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the HIDACZ.
- Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders or status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ.
- Location of enemy forces inside of and within close proximity to the HIDACZ.
- HIDACZ is nominated by the ground commander and approved by the airspace control authority.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  
Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
HOST-NATION SUPPORT

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. JP 1-02

Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. Joint force commanders can consider centralizing host-nation support (HNS) functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude HNS arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

Geographic combatant commanders will obtain authority for negotiations with host nations (HNs) through Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State channels. Assistance sought from HNs can include, but is not limited to, petroleum, oils, and lubricants; transportation; telecommunications; civilian labor; rear area protection; facilities; contracting; acquisition of equipment; supplies; services; and health service support. Areas of potential HNS are shown in the figure below.

Geographic combatant commanders must coordinate with the HN for the acquisition and use of facilities and real estate. Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders will ensure use of existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN. Component commanders will inform the combatant commander if an acquisition cross-service agreement (ACSA) exists with the HN. If one does not exist, the commander of a combatant command or subordinate commander can take steps to initiate an ACSA with the HN when having one would be advantageous.

ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FROM HOST NATIONS

Can include, but is not limited to:

- Transportation
- Civilian Labor
- Services
- Rear Area Protection
- Contracting
- Oils
- Acquisition of Equipment
- Telecommunications
- Supplies
- Health Services Support
- Facilities
- Petroleum
- Lubricants
Geographic combatant commanders and component commanders should make every effort to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The most effective negotiations occur when military members show competence in local language and customs.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP 3-0</th>
<th>Doctrine for Joint Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP 4-0</td>
<td>Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**HUMAN INTELLIGENCE**

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. JP 1-02

Intelligence capabilities and skills should be established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines, but is especially true for human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is not surged easily or with certainty. Relatively long leadtimes are required to establish human intelligence resources and systems. If HUMINT access to denied areas is to be available when needed, then the resources should be developed and operated in advance of anticipated operations. Also, language capabilities are an example of skills that should be developed in peacetime to be available for contingencies.

In military operations other than war conducted outside the US, HUMINT may provide the most useful source of information. However, a HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place when US forces arrive; therefore, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in the town square, it cannot gauge motivations or enthusiasm of the crowds. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. HUMINT is required to supplement signals intelligence and overhead imagery which we typically rely upon to produce the most accurate products.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP 2-0</th>
<th>Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>JP 3-07</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP 1-02</th>
<th>Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations</th>
</tr>
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</table>
Humanitarian assistance (HA) operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the US. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides assistance when the relief need is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond. (See figure below.)

The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations. US forces can provide logistics; command, control, communications, and computers; and the planning required to initiate and sustain HA operations.

HA operations may be directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the US, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. Department of State or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international HA operations.

HA operations may cover a broad range of missions. An HA mission could also include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in three basic types of HA operations: those coordinated by the United Nations, those where the US acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the US responds unilaterally.

Examples of HA are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, to provide assistance in the aftermath of devastating natural disasters in Bangladesh.

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**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

To relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions

Limited in scope and duration

Supplements or complements efforts of host nation

May cover a broad range of missions

**TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS**

- Coordinated by the UN
- US acts in concert with other multinational forces
- US responds unilaterally
Operation SEA ANGEL

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature’s favorite targets. Tornadoes, cyclones, and monsoons occur with alarming regularity in this country, which contains the world’s second largest delta region at the confluence of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Magma rivers. While this tremendously fertile region supports over 120 million people, damage from natural disasters is often severe, mainly due to the low terrain, the high density of the population, and a poorly developed infrastructure.

Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between 15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless. Over 1 million cattle (essential for pulling plows and providing transportation) died. Crops on 74,000 acres of land were destroyed; another 300,000 acres of cropland were damaged, and fields were covered with salt water, contaminating the soil and corrupting the drinking water.

Infrastructure destruction was widespread. Bangladesh’s major port, Chittagong, was severely damaged and was nonoperational for several days. Damaged/sunken ships, many of them belonging to the Bangladeshi Navy, blocked the port. Several key bridges, including the main bridge to Chittagong, were washed out or otherwise damaged. Throughout the storm-affected area, sea walls collapsed, jetties disappeared, dirt roads were flooded, buildings were ravaged, and transportation was virtually destroyed.

For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come at a worse time. After years of military rule, Bangladesh had installed its first civilian government, under Prime Minister Zia, less than two months earlier. Therefore, the young, inexperienced government, sensitive to appearing weak or incompetent and struggling domestically to develop bureaucratic cohesion, faced serious problems in reacting to the cyclone.

Strangely, one of the problems was not one of relief supplies availability. Adequate emergency supplies existed either in government storage houses, called “Go Downs,” or stored and owned by nongovernmental organizations (NGO) such as Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Red Crescent. The GOB, however, was hindered by the lack of cooperation from the NGO, which remembered martial law and were wary of the new regime. Further, the bureaucrats that controlled the grain in the “Go Downs” were similarly reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.

Notwithstanding these political hurdles, the most serious problem was one of distribution. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB Operation SEA ANGEL virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force (CJTF) was immediately formed under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commander of...
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa. A US Navy Amphibious Task Force (ATF) returning from the Persian Gulf war was redirected to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh citizen, spotting the ATF approaching from the water, allegedly called them “Angels from the Sea.” Regardless of whether this incident ever occurred, news of it spread and Operation SEA ANGEL had begun.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous GOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joined the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India, Pakistan, and China also provided assistance.

Two days after the President’s order, LtGen. Stackpole arrived with a small CJTF element. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived later that day. The next day five UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters arrived from Hawaii, along with a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit. Other joint assets continued to flow into the area, as required. Fifteen soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion, already deployed to Bangladesh to construct schools, were diverted to Chittagong. The bulk of US forces were from the ATF consisting of the 4,600 Marines of the 5th MEB, 3,000 sailors of Amphibious Group 3, and 28 helicopters. The MEB also brought four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) vehicles, which proved invaluable in delivering aid to isolated islands.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns: First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation was unavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent, and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff; Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearly viewed by the populace as being “in charge”.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

The distribution problem clearly was the most demanding task and it’s accomplishment was most critical to the success of the operation. There were two aspects: first, supplies had to be moved from Dhaka to Chittagong; second, these supplies then had to be moved to the devastated islands. The decision was made to fly supplies by fixed-wing to Chittagong, then via helicopter to the islands. The MC-130 aircraft that brought the special operations forces provided the fixed-wing capability until Air Force C-130s arrived. A JTF augmentation cell (including the five Blackhawk helicopters) was dispatched from Hawaii. The 5th MEB and its helicopters and LCACs arrived three days later.
In the final analysis, Operation SEA ANGEL proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese nongovernmental organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.


Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. JP 1-02

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors. IMINT systems can operate from land, sea, air, and/or space platforms. Imagery equipment is being improved constantly and combinations of sensors are being used to enhance the quality and timeliness of the intelligence product.

An increasing number of countries are starting to use photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition to being a major strategic collection capability, they are becoming an increasingly important operational and tactical capability. The traditional airborne IMINT platforms remain an important capability for those countries without access to satellite imagery.

Related Terms
intelligence; photographic intelligence.

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security

IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

Immediate Close Air Support (CAS) Requests.

Rationale and Methodology. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop once the battle is joined. Requesting commanders use immediate CAS to exploit opportunities or protect the force. (See figure below.) Because immediate requests respond to developments on a dynamic battlefield, they cannot be identified early enough to allow detailed coordination and planning, which may preclude tailored ordnance loads. If on-call CAS is unavailable, the Corps air liaison officer (ALO) advises the Corps G3/G3 Air to divert corps preplanned CAS missions or forward the request to the joint air operations center (JAOC). During the execution phase of the joint air tasking order, the joint force air component commander (JFACC)/joint force commander staff may need to redirect joint air missions to cover immediate requests for high priority CAS. The JFACC may also seek additional support from another component to cover the immediate request. However, diverting aircraft from preplanned scheduled CAS missions is a zero-sum game: preplanned requestors lose the same amount of firepower gained by the immediate requestor.

Channels. As seen in the second figure below, immediate requests are forwarded to the appropriate command post by the most rapid means available. Requests are broadcast directly from the tactical air control party (TACP) to the air support operations center/direct air support center using the applicable component communications nets. The TACP at each intermediate headquarters monitors the request and informs the G3/S3 Air, ALO/area of operation, and fire support coordinator. Based on the commander’s intent, and after considering whether organic assets are available, appropriate, or sufficient to fulfill the request, they approve or deny the request. Silence by intermediate headquarters indicates approval.

Special Operation Forces (SOF) Request Channels. Due to the small size of SOF surface units and the nature of the mission, there is always a danger that a SOF surface unit may be
confronted with a combat situation posing immediate danger to the unit’s very existence. SOF communication capabilities are usually adequate to link directly to component communications nets, who can divert or scramble CAS aircraft as required.

**Immediate Airlift Requests.** When air movement requirements are identified too late for normal air tasking order tasking cycle coordination, they are handled as immediate requests. Immediate requests are usually made to satisfy urgent employment, sustainment, or extraction requirements. Once identified at an appropriate level within a component, they are transmitted
directly to the JAOC, normally by a theater airlift liaison officer, through operational channels. This allows the JAOC to make preparations for the required missions, while the actual request is staffed expeditiously through logistic channels. Because the theater airlift force is normally fully employed, the joint movement center may fill validated immediate requests by redirecting sorties supporting planned requests.

Related Terms

close air support; theater airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

IMPLEMENTATION

Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities.

This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.
INDICATIONS AND WARNING

Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. JP 1-02

Indications and Warning (I&W) includes forewarning of adversary actions or intentions; the imminence of nuclear or nonnuclear attack on the US, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to US activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events. The I&W process anticipates hostile operations and provides sufficient warning to enable US or allied efforts to preempt, counter, or moderate such actions. Warning notification is made to local commanders, US and allied military authorities at all levels, and the National Command Authorities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

INDUSTRIAL BASE

The US industrial base includes domestic commercial production facilities and government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are government operated and some are contractor operated. Foreign producers of essential components and parts must also be included, because foreign producers may be the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique relationship existing between the US and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. The capabilities of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning. The figure below lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand their output.

Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System. Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from offshore sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of necessity, a major industrial mobilization option.
## INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL BASE SOURCES</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC INDUSTRY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Commercial producers of goods and services</td>
<td>Accelerate production from current sources of goods and services.</td>
<td>Military Departments and Defense Logistics Agency contract for accelerated production from current producers of materiel based on planned or actual consumption rates and prioritized requirements of the combatant commanders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand production base capacity</td>
<td>Under provisions of Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), 50 USC app. 2071, obtain priority performance on DOD contracts and orders.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using DPAS authorities and streamlined acquisition procedures, increase industrial capacity for production of materiel and equipment required to sustain the mobilized force:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE</td>
<td>Government-owned / government-operated production facilities</td>
<td>Accelerate production rates or activate standby and laid-away production capacity government-owned / government-operated facilities and government-owned / contractor-operated facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government-owned / contractor-operated production facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN INDUSTRY</td>
<td>Commercial producers of goods and services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seek additional production from foreign suppliers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DPAS  Defense Priorities and Allocation System

**Related Terms**

mobilization

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05  Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

**INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM**

Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes industrial preparedness measures such as modernization, expansion, and preservation of the production facilities and contributory items and services for planning with industry.

JP 1-02
The goal of the Industrial Preparedness Program (IPP) is to provide an industrial base capable of producing critical military items essential to the readiness and sustainment needs of the Armed Forces of the United States across the range of military operations. The Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP) is the deliberate planning tool that provides documented industrial mobilization plans and analytical processes to respond to a crisis or war. The process unifies industrial mobilization planning and analytical efforts by focusing on warfighting requirements and capabilities. The JIMPP is used by the Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies to:

- Estimate the capability of the industrial base to support execution of operation plans developed through deliberate planning or course of actions derived through crisis action planning;
- Establish a baseline national industrial mobilization capability assessment based on the potential military demands identified through the Joint Strategic Planning System;
- Coordinate the industrial mobilization planning of the Services;
- Identify and provide Department of Defense industrial mobilization requirements to the IPP.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

INFORMATION

1. Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. JP 1-02

“One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy’s proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?

“As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility, and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war.”

Jomini, The Art of War, 1838

The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

Information and intelligence from all sources, including counterintelligence, must be evaluated, correlated, and integrated into products that present the most complete, accurate,
and objective views possible. Joint operations in particular require complete and composite views of the situation and an adversary’s land, sea, air, and space forces.

Having access to and using all sources of information and intelligence is essential to understanding the actual situation. Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete assessments. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will reduce the risks of deception. It will also become the basis for the nomination and development of countermeasures against hostile intelligence and operations. All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

**Related Terms**

**combat information**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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**INFORMATION DIFFERENTIAL**

The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, operational and tactical situation which advanced US technologies provide our forces. (See figure below.) Space power is crucial, but does not operate alone, in assisting the joint force to enjoy superiority in command, control, communications, intelligence, navigation, and information processing. Weather, mapping, charting, geodesy, oceanography, and terrain analysis are all areas where the joint force should achieve significant advantages. The use of Allied signals intelligence...
as a key to victory in the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II provides a good example of exploiting such an information differential.

**Related Terms**
command and control warfare; information warfare

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

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The ultimate goal of command, control, communications, and computer systems is to produce a picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing, i.e., reducing information to the minimum essentials and putting it in a form that people can act on. There is no one fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. However, with concise, accurate, timely, and relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight smarter.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

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In military operations other than war involving in-depth coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and most UN operations, the term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” The term “information gathering” is also appropriate in peacekeeping operations because peacekeepers must be overt, neutral, and impartial. Non-military organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. These organizations may perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. NGOs and PVOs, by the very nature of what they do, become familiar with the culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace. This information is very valuable to military commanders as they seek to accomplish missions which focus not on destroying an enemy, but on providing aid and assistance to the populace of a foreign country. By using the term “information gathering,” military forces may be able to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

**Related Terms**
intelligence; military operations other than war

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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The networks that result from open systems architectures are called information grids. They allow the warrior users to gain access, process, and transport information in near real time to anyone else on the network. Information grids refer to computer controlled networks
that provide virtual connectivity on the demand of the networks that provide virtual connectivity
on the demand of the warrior; they support local and area network operations. (See figure
below.) They are also the basic components of larger grid networks that, when interconnected,
support regional, theater, and ultimately a global grid that is also referred to as the infosphere.

Computers control connectivity so quickly that wasteful and inefficient permanent or full
period connectivity is no longer required; an example could be cellular telephone networks
where mobile users maintain continuous virtual connectivity even though they are connected
through numerous links and nodal switching centers as they move during the course of a
single call. This allows a full range of user service to be distributed across vast areas —
hence these distributed grid networks are also extremely redundant; individual users have
hundreds of computer selectable paths available vice one or two, making their service many
times more reliable.

Related Terms
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations
may reduce network responsiveness to other users requiring a decision by the JFC during campaign and operation planning).

**Related Terms**
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

**INFORMATION PROTECTION**

Security of information and command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems involves the procedural and technical protection of information and C4 systems major components (terminal devices, transmission media, switches, and control and management), and is an integral component of the joint force commander’s command and control protection effort. (See figure below.) This is accomplished through application of information protection means including:

- Physical security of C4 system component facilities;
- Personnel security of individuals authorized access to C4 systems;
- Operations security (OPSEC) procedures and techniques protecting operational employment of C4 system components;
- Deception, deceiving the adversary about specific C4 system configuration, operational employment, and degree of component importance to mission accomplishment;

**INFORMATION PROTECTION CAPABILITIES**

- Deceive the adversary about specific C4 system information
- Low intercept/detection probability capabilities and techniques
- Transmission security capabilities to support OPSEC and LPI/LPD
- COMSEC capabilities to protect information during transmission
- Computer security measures to protect information prior to and after transmission
- C4 system design and configurations control to anticipate vulnerabilities
- Emissions control procedures in support of OPSEC and LPI/LPD objectives
- Personnel security of individuals authorized to access C4 systems
- Physical security of C4 system component facilities
- Technological and procedural vulnerability analysis and assessment programs

**OPSEC = operations security**
**COMSEC = communications security**
**C4 = command, control, communications, and computers**
**LPI/LPD = low probability of intercept/detection**
• Low probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD) capabilities and techniques designed to defeat adversary attempts to detect and exploit C4 system transmission media;
• Emissions control procedures designed to support OPSEC and LPI/LPD objectives;
• Transmission security capabilities designed to support OPSEC and LPI/LPD objectives;
• Communications security capabilities to protect information transiting terminal devices and transmission media from adversary exploitation;
• Computer security capabilities to protect information at rest, being processed, and transitioning terminal devices, switches, networks, and control systems from intrusion, damage, and exploitation;
• C4 system design and configuration control (e.g., protected distribution systems, protection from compromising emanation (TEMPEST)) to mitigate the impact of information technology vulnerabilities;
• Identifying technological and procedural vulnerability analysis and assessment programs.

**Related Terms**

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

ACCURACY
Information that conveys the true situation

RELEVANCE
Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand

TIMELINESS
Information that is available in time to make decisions

USABILITY
Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays

COMPLETENESS
All necessary information required by the decision maker

BREVITY
Information that has only the level of detail required

SECURITY
Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required

Related Terms
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.

JP 1-02

Data is gathered in a variety of ways — from sensors (both active and passive), from command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems, and through situation reports from senior, subordinate, or lateral commands. Information needs to be interpreted and correctly applied to be of use and is valuable only insofar as it contributes to knowledge and understanding. Warfighters understand things best in terms of ideas or images; a clear image of their commander’s intent and of the local situation can allow subordinates to seize the
initiative. In this regard, C4 systems play a critical role in the processing, flow, and quality of data to support information requirements throughout the joint force.

**Related Terms**

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0  
Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

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**INFOSPHERE**

**General.** The infosphere refers to the rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. The infosphere provides a worldwide, automated information exchange that supports joint forces, which is secure and transparent to the warrior. This emerging capability is highly flexible to support the rapid task organization and power projection. Information technology and the existence and growth of a global infosphere have irreversibly impacted the fundamental approach to warfare of massing effects rather than forces. This has not only propelled joint forces into the age of information, but also into information-based warfare with precision-guided weapon systems that detect and engage targets based on the electronic transfer of data.

Joint forces must quickly adapt to this increasingly complex and highly uncertain operating environment. For this reason, joint force commanders (JFCs) must be able to conceptually view the total joint force command and control system as a whole to employ it to the best advantage. The JFC can then identify how it should be structured, identify where improvements can be made, and focus and balance limited C4 resources to best advantage to control the flow, the processing, and the quality of information essential to speed joint force decisions and execution. The need for C4 systems that can deploy rapidly to meet crises worldwide has evolved into a demand for joint, interoperable systems.

**The Infosphere Architecture.** The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, And Intelligence For The Warrior vision put the Armed Forces of the United States on a course toward an open systems architecture referred to as the global grid (see figure below) that will provide virtual connectivity from anywhere to anywhere instantaneously on warrior demand. The architecture of grid networks can support both vertical and horizontal information flow to joint and multinational forces. Commanders at all levels require a distributed communications grid comprised of links employing any electronic transmission media overlaying an area of responsibility/joint operations area. Nodal points may be terrestrial, airborne, and/or space-based. Nodal points automatically store, relay, and process information. Voice, data, and imagery flows together in digitized form across all communication paths. Automated user terminals from man portable to more stationary types allow personnel to instantly connect in any fashion desired (e.g., electronic mail; instantly reconfigured (virtual) voice radio nets; imagery; connected sensor grids; or extended personal presence by creating synthetic environments such as virtual reality). The specific paths used to set-up virtual connectivity are controlled by computers.

**The Warrior Vision of the Infosphere.** The bottom line is a shared image of the battlespace between joint decision makers and warfighters at all levels and with instantaneous sensor to shooter connectivity. The JFC and subordinate leaders gain a coherent understanding of operational situations, regardless of the enemy’s actions or responses, strategically,
operationally, or tactically. Commanders see the battlespace together as a team — they perceive and move ideas and knowledge in a timely and coherent fashion. The virtual grid also links sensors to shooters to allow rapid exploitation of opportunity and generate quick, decisive actions.

**Related Terms**

command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0  
Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

**INITIATING DIRECTIVE**

An order to the commander, amphibious task force, to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the unified commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint force commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation.

The initiating directive is an order to commander, amphibious task force (CATF) to conduct an amphibious operation. It is issued by the combatant commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint task force commander delegated overall responsibility.
for the operation. Copies of the initiating directive need to be furnished to all major subordinate
and supporting commanders.

The initiating directive may not be a single comprehensive document. During crisis action
planning, the information contained in the initiating directive may be found in several orders,
such as, the warning order, alert order, planning order, and execute order. The initiating
directive:

• establishes the amphibious task force (ATF);
• assigns a mission;
• provides forces to accomplish the mission;
• assigns assault shipping for both assault echelon and assault follow-on echelon;
• designates CATF, commander, landing force, and other commanders as appropriate;
• positively defines the amphibious operations area in terms of sea, land, and air space.
The size must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of the ATF mission as well as to
provide sufficient area for the conduct of necessary air, land, and sea operations;
• provides code words for the operation name and for other key specifics about the operation;
• sets target dates for execution of the operation;
• provides special instructions on command relationships;
• provides special instructions pertaining to the planning, employment, allocation, and
control of nuclear and chemical munitions;
• includes positive instructions governing the termination of the operation and, if feasible,
command arrangements and disposition of forces to be effective at that time and
information regarding operations to be conducted after termination of the amphibious
operation;
• assigns responsibility and provides necessary coordination instructions for the conduct
of supporting operations;
• provides cryptographic and operations security guidance;
• provides a concept for military deception operations to be conducted in support of the
amphibious operation;
• provides other information considered necessary.

Related Terms

amphibious operation

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

When the US undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are
only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national
power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military. The instruments of national power
may be applied in any combination to achieve national strategic goals in operations other
than war. The manner in which they are employed is determined by the nature of each
situation. For operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support
the diplomatic and work with the economic and informational instruments.

Related Terms

national security strategy

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
INSURGENCY

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.  

Insurgencies attempt to exploit actual or perceived governmental weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order; inability to respond adequately to disasters; overreaction to civil disturbances; or failure to meet economic, political, ethnic, or social expectations.

Organizational structures for US support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, “US Intelligence Activities,” and is subject to approval by the US Congress.

The US military principally trains and advises insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. These actions should be integrated with the programs of the other instruments of national power.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST

A list of a combatant commander’s highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander’s forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the combatant commander’s recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. Also called IPL.

With the exception of United States Special Operation Command’s (USSOCOM’s) special operations-unique requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their Service components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated Priority List. The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the Defense Planning Guidance. The POMs express the Services’ total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders.

Related Terms
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the joint force commander (JFC) launches a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the commander’s estimate of the situation. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) and J-2 staff have pivotal responsibilities in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other J-staffs. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operations security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC’s flexibility by opening additional operational options.

Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC’s guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander’s requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of command to: employ joint force organic intelligence resources; identify and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the joint intelligence center; and apply national intelligence capabilities. (See the figure below.)

ULTRA, Too Much Intelligence?

Frederick the Great instructed his generals over two hundred years ago, “If you know the enemy’s plans beforehand you will always be more than a match for him...” Seldom this century has this maxim proven more true than during the period 1939-1945 with ULTRA, the code name under which highly sensitive intelligence resulting from the solution of high grade codes and cyphers was passed between selected Allied individuals.

A decisive event in breaking the German cyphers and the subsequent evolution of ULTRA occurred when pre-war (1939) Polish intelligence officers, in concert with their government’s attempts at defending against a German attack and therefore contributing to the cause of an Allied victory over Germany, turned over to the French and British duplicates of the German Enigma machine used for encoding messages.

Although the procurement of the German Enigma machine proved to be the most noted event in the development of special intelligence, other factors contributed as well. Material seized from German submarines and weather/supply ships, material taken from Italian submarines and documents captured in the North African desert war proved valuable as did German diplomatic material provided to the OSS by individuals involved in the internal opposition.
to Hitler. In fact, by 1943 British cryptographers had also broken into the German “secret writing machine,” (the geheimschreiter) a different encoding system from Enigma.

The specifics of the evolution of the special intelligence system notwithstanding, the ULTRA network proved highly reliable giving those trusted with the secret a clear view of the enemy’s operations and intentions. Such capability was unprecedented in military history! — but also presented special problems. The historian, John Winton, summarizes this problem aptly:

“When one player consistently knows which cards his opponent holds, how much and how often dare he go on winning before his opponent begins to suspect and changes the cards or the game?”

Such was the dilemma of those read into the ULTRA secret. Consequently, their actions, at least in the early days, were fraught with caution. “Too much success could be dangerous,” Winton’s account surmises, “Too many U-boats sunk, for instance, at their remote refueling rendezvous might arouse the enemy’s suspicions and cause him to change cyphers which had been only broken after much labour over a long period of time. Worse, it might even cause him to doubt the inviolability of the Enigma coding machine.”

But, in spite of numerous events where the Allies felt certain that ULTRA would be compromised, Nazi planners stubbornly refused to doubt the inviolability of Enigma. Indeed, years passed before some German participants learned of the extent the Allies knew of their operations and intentions. Gerhardt Weinberg, in his general history of World War II, cites an international conference on signals intelligence held in the fall of 1978, where a number of participants who had played active roles in these events still found it hard to believe that their machine codes had been read by the Allies. Of course, it is possible that a signals officer within the Reich, in view of the uncanny “luck” the Allies seemed to hold in thwarting some German campaign plans, might have become suspicious of the security of German secrets. However, if true, none was so convinced to compile the evidence and report it. Weinberg, somewhat insightfully, offers this explanation:

“...in the intellectual climate of Nazi Germany, and more particularly in the Byzantine atmosphere of intrigue and jealousy in Hitler’s court, it would have been an exceptionally bold man who went to the Fuhrer’s bunker and, like he who drew aside Paim’s tent curtain at dead of night and told him half Troy was burned, informed Hitler that the Third Reich’s communications system for all three services, world-wide, must now be considered insecure and should be entirely reconstituted, from the basic essential upwards, with fresh codes and procedures...a gross breach of security by the Allies would be needed to convince Hitler and the many intelligence officers whose careers (to say nothing of their lives) depended upon the continuing belief that the Enigma was invulnerable.”

Hence, the ULTRA secret remained so. In fact by the end of the war, the information became so complete and comprehensive — not merely of military significance, but also political and economic — that the enemy could scarcely make a move without the Allies knowing of it and thereby enjoying the
advantage of meeting him at a controlled time and place. Indeed, without Special Intelligence the war most certainly would have been much more costly in terms of lives lost in the defense of freedom.


CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE

KNOW THE ADVERSARY

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

SYNCHRONIZE INTELLIGENCE WITH OPERATIONS

USE THE SAME APPROACH FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AND WAR

J-2 SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET

ENSURE UNITY OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

RECOGNIZE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION

PRIORITIZE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

TIMELINESS

OBJECTIVITY

USABILITY

READINESS

COMPLETENESS

ACCURACY

RELEVANCE
Strategic intelligence is intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Operational intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Tactical intelligence is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. As shown in the figure below, there are seven primary source types: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence.

**INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHOTINT</td>
<td>Photo Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>COMINT</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence</td>
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<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
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<td>FISINT</td>
<td>Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TELINT</td>
<td>Telemetry Intelligence</td>
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<td>RADINT</td>
<td>Radar Intelligence</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACINT</td>
<td>Acoustical Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTINT</td>
<td>Optical Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELECTRO-OPTICAL</td>
<td>Electro-optical Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRINT</td>
<td>Infrared Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>LASINT</td>
<td>Laser Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUCINT</td>
<td>Nuclear Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>RINT</td>
<td>Unintentional Radiation Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>TECHINT</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Denotes primary source type.*

**Related Terms**
all-source intelligence; combat intelligence; imagery intelligence; medical intelligence; scientific and technical intelligence

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
General. The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network. All intelligence made available to the network from any source is stored and communicated as data whether it is a text file, graphics, imagery, or formatted information. The data is stored on a standards compliant file server. The file server is the interface with the communications network.

In keeping with the spirit of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior, the joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The architecture facilitates the capability of the Defense Intelligence community to focus on supporting the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. The joint intelligence architecture is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the globe and to provide the baseline data that JFCs will need to support joint operations. This architecture conceptually describes equipment capabilities, information flow requirements, and responsibilities.

Principles. The Services and Department of Defense agencies responsible for organizing, training, and fielding intelligence systems and personnel must provide the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and subordinate commanders as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support architectures. JFCs should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (personnel, procedures, and C4I), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. Intelligence systems, concepts, products, and language must be sufficiently interoperable for the exchange and use of data in any form and from any source among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces. Interoperability principles are shown in the first figure below.

Formal Joint Intelligence Architecture. The second figure below depicts the joint intelligence architecture as a network of integrated work stations, file servers, and

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**INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE PRINCIPLES**

- C4I Interoperability
- Interoperability of Intelligence Data and Product
- Common Terminology and Symbols
- Standards
- Effective Training and Exercises
- Data Bases
communications links. These three elements must work together, compliant with common standards, to create the interoperable information environment required to support military operations. The network includes direct connectivity by some communications or communications relay link (landline, radio, satellite, and others as appropriate) and broadcast capability to support time-sensitive and “sensor-to-shooter” needs. The information grid concept allows data collected by whatever means to be communicated directly to a user or to a processing site or platform by the most efficient path, then passed on or through to the user as appropriate. A critical aspect of the information grid is its ability to make all intelligence, including direct collector-to-user information, accessible via standardized file servers to standards compliant work stations.

Some collected, unprocessed information can be transferred to a headquarters, regional, or field processing site directly via existing communications links that are outside the joint architecture. Such information is not useful prior to processing (e.g., encrypted information), or requires very high bandwidths that would overwhelm the communications links. In these instances, the information is first processed or selectively captured prior to transferring or making it available over the network (examples are certain raw signals intelligence and some types of imagery or video).

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Understanding Interagency Operations. The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Clausewitz wrote: “The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation, with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the US Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood. Whether military forces are involved in the detention of migrants in Guantanamo Bay, countering the flow of drugs from Latin America, stopping a tyrannical invader in the Middle East, providing humanitarian assistance to a storm-ravaged populace, or making peace on the Horn of Africa, success will depend to a large extent on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of that power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as nongovernmental organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

Synchronizing Interagency Operations. The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military operations other than war, is the broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the US today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of the myriad agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The National Command Authorities decide to employ the Armed Forces of the United States because they have deemed it necessary to use military means to meet national interests. The use of the military element of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Though the Department of Defense (DOD) may have little or no choice regarding the agencies engaged in a particular operation or control over the individual agency agendas, understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment could provide the key to success in joint operations and unified actions.

A Forum of Expertise. Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process,
providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

Gathering the Right Resources. The challenge, not only to the Nation’s leadership but to commanders at all levels, is to recognize what resources may apply to a problem and to bring them to the interagency table. All efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies. An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimately contribute to unity of effort. Pursuit of coordination and cooperation in the interagency process should be viewed as a means, not an end of the process. While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.

The Combatant Commander in Interagency Operations

Today, the combatant commands are operating in regions where some governments cannot control their cities, regions, and principal functions and institutions. As CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appreciation of the threat must consider the consequences of instability. Countering this will require the effective combination of all the elements of national power if we are to overcome the tyranny of transnational threats and internal disorder. Interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision of peacetime engagement. The problem of “who’s in charge?” still vexes interagency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency has not carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. So, then, how will interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism? Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize interagency effort. The executive and legislative branches have not routinely provided interagency leadership with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations. Decentralized operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules and operating areas. Yet, as long as the CINCs are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership - even while in a supporting role.

Source: William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford
Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations

Strategic Direction. Coordinating the activities of the various USG agencies is fundamental to the efficient use of national resources. The US National Security Strategy defines the interaction between the DOD and other organizations in such critical operations as counterterrorism, counterdrug, and humanitarian assistance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff carry out most interagency coordination for the DOD at the strategic level. This coordination sets the stage for directions to commanders at the operational and tactical levels.

Focus of Theater Operations. Every joint force operation involves close coordination with forces and agencies outside the chain of command. The guidance in Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine
for Joint Operations,” for joint force commanders (JFCs) is clear: “… ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and even the United Nations). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs and their staffs. . . .”

**Related Terms**

**lead agency**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I

**INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT**

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD.

**General.** Foreign internal defense (FID) supports host nation (HN) internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. US military support to FID may include training, materiel, advice, or other assistance, including direct support and combat operations as authorized by the National Command Authorities, to HN forces in executing an IDAD program.

Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN’s program of IDAD. These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. Nevertheless, military assistance is often necessary to provide the secure environment for these efforts to become effective. These needs of society remain relevant to threats posed through illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and civil unrest that affect all aspects of a nation’s defense and development.

FID is the participation by the civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. From the US perspective, FID has assumed many forms as support to foreign nations has evolved. In all cases, however, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN’s IDAD strategy designed to protect against these threats.

**The Role of FID in IDAD.** It is important to frame the US FID effort in perspective with the overall span of US doctrine that it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN’s IDAD program. FID is a primary program used in supporting friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities.
US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering these threats or other potential threats. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to a FID program is an essential aspect. This assists the HN to address the root causes of instability in a proactive manner rather than reacting to threats.

US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency. Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US FID programs may aim at other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Focus on the internal development portion of IDAD enables the FID program to address other areas than just counterinsurgency.

US military operations to support a FID program provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to support local forces in executing an IDAD program rather than US forces conducting the IDAD mission for the HN. US FID efforts are always directed at supporting internal HN action programs aimed at bolstering IDAD. The fundamental principle of all FID efforts is that they foster internal solutions and assist IDAD programs for which the supported nation has ultimate responsibility and control.

US military efforts designed to defend nations against external aggression are extended through mutual defense treaties.

The HN IDAD Program. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to effectively interface with the HN IDAD organization.

IDAD Principles. Although IDAD organizations will vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful IDAD program. These principles include unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government. These may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government.

HN Organization for IDAD. Just as the US organizes to support a FID program, so must an HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. The concept generally requires an organization that is geographically organized into national and regional levels, where each level has its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels of those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the concomitant security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

Strategy. The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID defense planners must understand the HN’s IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it.

Concept. The IDAD strategy should integrate military and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Military actions provide a level of internal security that permits and
supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

Often, a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the enemy’s political strength rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political claims and demands of the opposition is severely handicapped. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success but are not sufficient by themselves.

**Functions.** The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. (See figure below.) These functions are: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

**Balanced Development.** Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem.

**Security.** Security includes all activities to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the populace permit development and deny the enemy access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support.

**Neutralization.** Neutralization is a political concept that makes an organized force irrelevant to the political process; is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population; includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization; can involve public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a low-level of unrest with little political violence; can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or can involve combat action when the enemy’s violent activities escalate.

All neutralization efforts must respect the country’s legal system. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the enemy an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying the enemy an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda.

**Mobilization.** Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes
manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and promotes the government’s legitimacy.

**Principles.** Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas, to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any credible threat. Unity of effort means coordinated action and centralized control at all levels.

Maximum Use of Intelligence. Maximum use of intelligence requires that all operations be based on accurate, timely, and confirmed intelligence derived from reliable sources. Successful implementation of operations necessitates an extensive operational security and counterintelligence program to protect US FID operations and to counter and penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be designed so as to assess accurately the opposing force’s capabilities; to
provide timely warning to HN and US FID forces; and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of US FID forces, then US intelligence and counterintelligence elements must be deployed to accomplish these missions. In this event, the HN must develop its internal intelligence and security forces in order to perform these missions effectively. US elements may assist the HN in developing intelligence capability, within the confines of US Government directives, as deemed appropriate by the Country Team, US combatant commander, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Minimum Use of Violence. A threatened government must carefully examine all courses of action in response to the internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of violence to maintain order. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; at other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, discreet use of force is the guideline.

A Responsive Government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources as well as to motivate the people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and follow-up.

Organizational Guidance. This section presents a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to country in order to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies’ normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

National-Level Organization. The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist or other internal threats.

Subnational-Level Organization. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise operational control over all military forces, and control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

ACCs perform a twofold mission, they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

Civilian Advisory Committees. Committees composed of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law, including the law of armed conflict, affords occupying powers certain rights and responsibilities. These include the authority to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities.

Related Terms

law of armed conflict

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

INTEROPERABILITY

1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.

General. Unified action demands maximum interoperability. (See figure below.) The forces, units, and systems of all Services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability, which includes collective effort to develop and use joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; the development and use of joint plans; the conduct of joint training; and a materiel development and fielding process that provides materiel that is fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all Services. A key to successful interoperability is to ensure that planning processes are joint from their inception. Those responsible for systems and programs intended for joint use must establish working groups that fully represent the services and functions that will be affected and interoperability must be considered in all joint program reviews. Combatant commanders will ensure maximum interoperability and identify interoperability issues to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has overall responsibility for the joint interoperability program.

Intelligence interoperability.

C4I Interoperability. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff should ensure command elements’ and supporting organizations’ intelligence systems and communications are compatible for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products. If components’ intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence data, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems also relates to intelligence data processing and related equipment.
Intelligence Product Interoperability. Intelligence organizations producing joint intelligence should ensure that intelligence products are in a form, content, and language usable by all components of the joint force performing similar and related functions.

Common Terminology and Symbols. Intelligence organizations should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols common to all joint force components.

Standards. Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. Standards are sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity of data, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment, and signals that promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products among intelligence organizations and joint force commanders. Standards for interoperability should be developed and incorporated
into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures providing intelligence for joint operations. Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to operations other than war or war.

Effective Training and Exercises. Intelligence interoperability problems reduce the ability of a joint force to attain unity of effort. Thus, an important concept is to use realistic training, exercises, and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence products.

Data Bases. Ability of all echelons of the joint force to access archives and common data bases is key to successful intelligence operations.

**Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Interoperability.** Joint and Service C4 systems must possess the interoperability necessary to ensure success in joint and combined operations. Interoperability is the condition achieved among C4 systems or items of C4 equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and their users. To ensure C4 systems’ interoperability, all aspects of achieving it must be addressed throughout the life cycle of a system.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP 0-2</th>
<th>Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)</th>
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**INTERTHEATER**

Between theaters or between the continental US and theaters. **JP 1-02**

Intertheater or strategic airlift forces, under the combatant command (command authority) of Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, primarily provide common-user airlift into, within, and out of theater bases from outside the theater. As a common-user force, strategic airlift is available to all authorized users including the Military Services, the combatant commands, other Department of Defense components, other US Government agencies, and, if requested by a US agency, foreign governments.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 4-01.1 | JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations |

**IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY**

The capability provided to a theater Combatant Commander to have visibility of units, personnel, and cargo while in transit through the Defense Transportation System. **JP 1-02**

In-transit visibility is the continuous updating of unit identities, mode of transport, and location during movement. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the supported combatant commander track units, personnel, equipment, and materiel during the strategic phases of a deployment. The supported combatant commander also performs this
function within theater. The systems that comprise this interface are Global Transportation Network and Joint Operation Planning and Execution Systems. This will normally require detailed coordination and support from US Transportation Command for the strategic phases of deployment. This interface allows the geographic combatant commander to monitor and change deployment priorities. (See figure below.)

Related Terms

movement control

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

**INTRATHEATER**

*Within a theater.*

**Intratheater Support.** Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).
ISOLATING THE ENEMY

With National Command Authorities (NCA) guidance and approval and with national support, joint force commanders (JFCs) strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

The JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This isolation is accomplished by psychological operations and by interdicting critical command and control nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JOINT

Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. JP 1-02

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders (JFCs) choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is team warfare.

The joint team of the Armed Forces of the United States comprises the members of each Service, active and reserve, and our supporting civilians. Although the Services organize, train, equip, and sustain forces, these forces are employed under JFCs. To help achieve our fullest combat potential, all American military leaders must integrate JFCs concepts and values into the operations of the Armed Forces of the United States. Service skills form the very core of our combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service “cultures,” heroes, and professional standards are indispensable.

We must expand our tradition of joint victories, building on our extensive history of joint and multinational operations from as long ago as the Revolutionary War. Over time, the American experience in war increasingly demanded joint action. Today, we are making joint action practiced and routine. Whether we have years to plan and rehearse, as in the case of the Normandy invasion, months as in Operation DESERT STORM, or only a few days as in Operation URGENT FURY, the Armed Forces of the United States must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams.

Related Terms

joint force, joint force commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JOINT AIRBORNE ADVANCE PARTY

An advance ground party that provides terminal guidance, air traffic control, ground control measures, intelligence gathering, and surface weather observation in the objective area of an airlift operation. It may consist of US Air Force combat control team members and a US Army long-range surveillance team or similar forces. Also called JAAP. JP 1-02

Joint Airborne Advance Party (JAAP) support for airlift operations consists of a US Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) and a US Army Long-Range Surveillance Team (LRST) or the US Marine Corps equivalent. It provides precise terminal instructions and navigational aids to airlift forces so that they land on the assigned airfield or landing zone. The JAAP
provides terminal guidance, air traffic control, ground control measures, intelligence collection, and surface weather observations in the objective area. (See figure below.)

The joint force commander (JFC) normally ensures specific mission tasks are developed for the JAAP during the planning phase of an airborne operation. Prior to employment, the JFC or designated representative ensures the JAAP has adequate time for isolation, joint planning, logistic planning, and mission preparation. During combat, security considerations may prohibit use of a JAAP in advance of the parachute assault by the main force. The decision to use the JAAP rests with the JFC.

When a JAAP is employed in advance of airborne forces, command and control is determined jointly and published in the operation order. Generally, the senior member of the LRST should be responsible for movement and disposition of the teams during infiltration and ground movement. Decisions regarding airfield, landing zone, drop zone, or extraction zone establishment and control are the responsibility of the senior CCT member. The ground force commander determines when initial security missions are completed and directs that follow-on units establish and maintain contact with the CCT. Decisions are passed to the CCT as well as the identity and location of units assuming security responsibilities. The JAAP may be inserted into an objective area by the following:

- Airdrop or airlanding in advance of the airborne forces. If airdropped, insertions are usually made by either high-altitude low-opening or high-altitude high-opening techniques.
- Airdrop or airlanding in the lead serial of an airborne assault.
- Infiltration by land or sea.
These employment methods provide the JFC options to support operations ranging from overt conventional to clandestine unconventional warfare and special operations.

Elements of the JAAP may operate either independently in the objective area or collectively from the same patrol base. They remain in contact with the JFC and airborne mission commander, share joint communications-electronics operating instructions, and conduct a linkup immediately prior to the airborne assault for intelligence or information transfer.

Related Terms

**theater airlift**

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

**JOINT AIR OPERATIONS**

Air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the joint force commander’s operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. JP 1-02

**General.** Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself.

Assigned, attached, and supporting forces may provide direct support to certain components while also providing the JFC an operational level force capability that can be employed separately as part of a broader operation. The JFC integrates the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting forces into unified area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA)-wide joint air operations.

In order to create synergism and avoid duplication of effort, the JFC synchronizes the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting capabilities/forces in time, space, and purpose. The JFC must exploit the unique characteristics of all capabilities/forces to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as possible.

The JFC will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC) to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralized planning) and a responsive and integrated control system (decentralized execution).

In cases where a JFACC is not designated, the JFC may plan, direct, and control joint air operations. If this option is exercised by the JFC, the JFC’s staff will assist to provide direction and coordination of the capabilities/forces assigned to the joint force.

“Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset - its flexibility.”

Field Marshal Montgomery

**Tasking.** The air capabilities/forces made available for JFACC or JFC (under the JFC staff option) planning and tasking are determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders, and based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations. Component commanders make capabilities/forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint
force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance. These capabilities/forces are tasked directly by the JFC or by the JFACC based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision. Only the JFC has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component’s direct support air capabilities/forces. When a component does not have the organic air capabilities/forces to support their assigned mission, the JFACC or JFC will task available joint air capabilities/forces (through the joint air tasking order (ATO)) based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision. An understanding of what defines component direct support air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces is necessary. Component direct support air capabilities/forces are those air capabilities/forces organic to a component that are used by the component to accomplish its assigned mission. When appropriate, they appear on the joint ATO for coordination and deconfliction purposes. Component capabilities/forces not available for joint air tasking must still comply with the airspace control order and special instructions.

**Planning.** Planning for joint air operations begins with understanding the joint force mission. The JFC’s strategic appreciation of the political, economic, military, and social forces affecting the AOR/JOA and articulation of the strategic and operational objectives needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining components’ objectives. The JFACC/JFC staff uses the mission, the JFC strategic appreciation and objectives, and the components’ objectives to devise an air estimate of the situation. This estimate follows a systematic series of steps to formulate a course of action. When the JFACC’s course of action is approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept of the joint air operations — stating “what” will be done. The “how” part is stated in the joint air operations plan and supporting plans. The JFACC’s daily guidance ensures that joint air operations effectively support the joint force objectives while retaining enough flexibility to adjust to the dynamics of the range of military operations. The figure below describes the concept of how joint air operations are developed.

Joint air operations constitute an integral part of the JFC’s operation or campaign plan. The JFACC is normally assigned responsibility for joint air operations planning and develops a joint air operations plan for employing that portion of the air effort made available to the

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**AV-8 Aircraft**
JFACC to accomplish the objectives assigned by the JFC. The joint air operation plan documents the JFACC’s plan for integrating and coordinating joint air operations. The joint air operation plan encompasses operations of capabilities/forces from joint force components. The staff assigned to develop the plan should include representation from all components providing capabilities/forces.

A carefully selected staff of planners and weapon systems experts from each component enables consideration and understanding of all component capabilities/forces.

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**Related Terms**

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

**JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER**

A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander’s operation or campaign objectives. Also called JAOC. JP 1-02
General. The first figure below represents a notional joint force air component commander (JFACC) organization. The JFACC’s operations center will often be designated a joint air operations center (JAOC).

The JFACC’s JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all of the JFACC’s responsibilities. JFACC organizations may differ based on the specific area of responsibility/joint operations area requirements and operations. However, the two organizations or functions that should be common to all JAOCs are Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Planning “future joint air operations” is the responsibility of Combat Plans, which includes the responsibility of drafting the joint air operations plan to support the JFC’s campaign or objectives and building the daily joint air tasking order (ATO). Execution of the daily joint ATO is carried out by Combat Operations. This organization closely follows the action of current joint air operations, shifting missions from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the situation requires.

Each of these JAOC organizations rely on expertise from other component liaisons (e.g., battlefield coordination element (BCE), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Air Force liaison element (AFLE), special operations liaison element (SOLE), air mobility element (AME), strategic liaison team (STRATLAT), space liaison officer (SLO), Marine liaison officer) to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an “up-to-date” picture of the other component operations. (See second figure below.)

Finally, the role of “intelligence” is extremely important and is an integral part of the daily function of Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Intelligence personnel monitor and assess adversary capabilities and intentions and provide assistance in target, weapon, and platform selection, conduct battle damage assessment, as well as, provide an up-to-date picture of the adversary, expected adversary operations, and the status and priority of assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.

Liaisons. Effective liaison between forces is essential for coordinated joint air operations. The joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders will exchange liaison elements to assist and coordinate planning and execution of joint air operations. Liaison elements provide senior level interface for air, land, sea, space, and special operation forces. These elements consist of experienced warfare specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise, coordination capabilities, and the ability to deconflict component operations and joint air operations. A brief summary follows of typical liaison elements.

Battlefield Coordination Element. The Army component commander establishes a BCE to act as the interface between the component commander and the JFACC or the Air Force component commander. The BCE is collocated with the JAOC or the Air Force component air operations center. The BCE processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the JAOC, and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and intelligence data. The BCE expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with elements of the JAOC (e.g., plans, intelligence, operations, fusion, air defense artillery and Army airspace command and control, and airlift).

Special Operations Liaison Element. The joint force special operation component commander (JFSOCC) provides a SOLE to the JFACC/JFC staff or appropriate Service component air command and control facility to coordinate and synchronize special operations forces (SOF) air and surface operations with joint air operations. A major SOLE responsibility is shared asset coordination/deconfliction. The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance, command and control platforms, aerial refueling, as well as deconfliction
of deep operations. The SOLE chief works directly for the JFSOCC and places liaison officers throughout the JAOC staff. Under the direction of the SOLE chief, these liaison officers provide SOF air and ground operations expertise throughout the JAOC. Because the JFSOCC and the JFACC share a common environment, the deep battlefield, SOF aviation
and surface assets must be integrated into joint air operations planning and execution to provide for synergy, integration, coordination, and deconfliction.

The JFSOCC’s Air Force component is known as the Air Force Special Operations Component. When there are joint special operations aviation assets in theater (which may include Army and Navy special operations aviation assets), the JFSOCC normally designates a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The JSOACC normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. Special operations air assets are organic to the JFSOCC. Their tasking is derived from the JFSOCC and will be coordinated with the JFACC/JFC staff and entered into the ATO.

In addition to specific JFSOCC objectives supporting the JFC’s intent, SOF can act as a significant joint force multiplier by contributing to joint air operations. The senior SOF liaison may seek JFSOCC guidance and approval to contribute to joint air operations in four broad areas. First, SOF can act as an economy of force measure, striking targets which allow joint air to strike higher priority targets. Second, SOF may be able to conduct surgical operations beyond the capabilities of joint air capabilities/forces (e.g., against weapons of mass destruction production or storage facilities inaccessible to joint air capabilities/forces due to environmental or dispersal concerns). Third, because of unique training and multiple air/ground combat power delivery capabilities, SOF may combine with joint air operations in a synergistic attack (e.g., terminal guidance operations). Finally, SOF may enhance joint
air operations with still other unique personnel and platform capabilities, such as providing a
tailored joint special operations task force, under the tactical control of the JFACC, to assist
in locating deep targets.

Space Liaison Officer. US Space Command (USSPACECOM) component personnel deploy
to assist the JFACC/JFC staff in requesting and using support from space assets. The senior
SLO also serves as the Senior Space Liaison to the JAOC, providing direct coordination
between the JAOC and USSPACECOM Theater Support Team. Personnel deployed may be
from Air Force Forward Space Support to Theater Teams and/or the Naval Space Support
Team.

Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element. The NALE is responsive to the JAOC on matters
pertaining to Navy and Marine amphibious operations. The NALE processes Navy force
and Marine landing force requests for air support and monitors and interprets the maritime
battle situation for the JAOC. The NALE provides the necessary interface for the exchange
of current operational and intelligence data between components and the JAOC. The NALE
also coordinates maritime requirements for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-
rage requirements and monitors Navy and Marine airspace and air traffic control requirements
and changes. The NALE provides feedback to the JAOC and components on current and
future joint air operations concerning integration of force requirements.

Air Mobility Element. The AME is responsible for the detailed planning and coordinating
for all strategic airlift operations in theater. The AME is part of the theater airlift system and
should be collocated within the JAOC. Should it become necessary to temporarily assign
strategic airlift assets to fulfill the theater airlift mission requirements, then the AME will be
the focal point and tasking authority for these missions. JFCs should rely on their JFACC to
plan and control theater airlift operations. If a JFACC is not designated, the Air Force
Component Commander should plan and control theater airlift. Normally, the planning and
control for theater airlift operations will be conducted by specialized airlift sections embedded
within functional staff sections of the JAOC.

Strategic Liaison Team. The STRATLAT provides a small number of advisors for the JFC
and the JFACC skilled in nuclear planning and coordination. The STRATLAT will be provided
by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) upon JFC request and will report to
and be collocated with the JFC and/or the appropriate component commander(s). When
provided, this team will be subordinate to the JFC. The JFC should rely on this team to assist
in the preparation of nuclear request and execution messages and for the unique targeting and
effects information for nuclear weapons. The STRATLAT will coordinate with the mission
planning facilities of USSTRATCOM to optimize the utilization of nuclear weapons, if
authorized by the National Command Authorities for use.

Air Force Liaison Element. The AFLE provides an interface between the Commander,
Air Force Forces and the JFACC for coordinating and synchronizing Air Force units in
support of joint air operations. Normally, the AFLE is composed of personnel and equipment
for a General Purpose Numbered Air Force’s staff and component organizations. AFLE
manning is based on a cadre concept with personnel selected for their battle management
expertise and a knowledge of command and control concepts and procedures. Additional
personnel augment the cadre who are specialists knowledgeable in the capabilities and tactics
of the aircraft, intelligence, or weapons systems being employed. The AFLE can be tailored
to perform a variety of missions and management functions to match the contingency or
operation.
A joint air tasking cycle is used to provide for the efficient and effective employment of the joint air capabilities/forces made available. The cycle (see figure below) provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air missions/sorties, within the guidance of the joint force commander (JFC). The cycle accommodates changing tactical situations or JFC guidance, as well as requests for support from other component commanders. The joint air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements. Much of the day-to-day joint air tasking cycle is conducted through an interrelated series of information exchanges (through designated component liaison officers and/or messages), which provide a means of requesting and scheduling joint air missions. Note: A timely joint air tasking order (ATO) is critical — other joint force components conduct their planning and operations based on a prompt, executable joint ATO, and are dependent on its information.

There are usually three joint ATOs at any time: (1) the joint ATO in execution (today’s plan), (2) the joint ATO in production (tomorrow’s plan), and (3) the joint ATO in planning.
(the following day’s plan). The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC’s air apportionment process and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions/sorties. The figure below is a notional joint air tasking timeline, which may be modified to fit the particular situation.

The full joint ATO cycle from JFC guidance to the start of joint ATO execution is dependent on the JFC’s procedures. Notionally, this spans a 30-72 hour period. Each actual joint ATO period usually covers a 24-hour period (0600-0600 for illustrative purposes in this document). The precise timeframes for the joint air tasking cycle must be specified in the JFC’s operation plans or the joint force air component commander’s (JFACC’s) joint air operations plan.

The execution phase of the joint air tasking cycle will notionally consist of 24-hour periods with start and end times as specified by joint air operations plans. The joint ATO embodies JFC objectives and intent in a joint air tasking directive. The joint ATO matches specific
targets compiled by the JFACC/JFC staff with the capabilities/forces made available to the JFACC for the given joint ATO day.

Related Terms
air tasking order; combat assessment

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JOINT BASE

For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which operations of two or more of the Armed Forces of the Department of Defense are projected or supported and which is manned by significant elements of two or more Services or in which significant elements of two or more Services are located.

Classification of Bases. The commander of a combatant command will determine (unless determined by higher authority) and announce the classification of bases in his area in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be a single-Service base or a joint base. A joint base may be either one in which one Service has primary interest or one in which two or more Services have coequal interest.

The establishment of a joint base on a shoreline in the joint rear area presents special advantages and challenges to those responsible for the functions inherent in the base’s mission and for its defense. The advantages include the availability of the assets of more than one Service component for use by commanders in fulfilling their responsibilities. The special challenges may include the fact that facilities like ports and harbors are usually located in heavily populated areas. Command arrangements may be complicated by diverse purposes when multiple Service components use the same facilities. For example, the following installations may be in close geographical proximity: a common-user water terminal; support base for a Marine air-ground task force; naval base supporting and sustaining fleet operations and/or naval coastal warfare operations, naval advanced logistic support site, and naval forward logistic site; and Air Force base operating an aerial port of debarkation.

Related Terms
base defense

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Operations
JP 3-10.1 JTTP for Base Defense

JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM OFFICE

Each theater has a standard jointly operated blood distribution system. A joint blood program office (JBPO) is established within the joint force surgeon’s office and functions as part of the staff. The JBPO is the single manager for blood products in the combatant command and is responsible for management and coordination of the total joint blood products requirements and capabilities in the theater. Each theater is subdivided and coordinated by an Area Joint Blood Program Office (AJBPO). Responsibilities of the JBPO and AJBPOs are numerous as follows:

• They will monitor compliance with Department of Defense blood program policies.
• They must coordinate component blood programs.
• They plan and execute blood program exercises.
• The JBPO manages the wartime theater blood distribution system.
• Blood transshipment centers (BTCs), operated by the Air Force, are established in each theater and are located at major airheads. The BTCs serve as the central receiving point of blood products from the continental US for distribution within the theater.
• Each medical treatment facility (MTF) is responsible for locating and notifying its respective AJBPO for coordination of blood requirements and submission of blood reports and requests. MTFs will be notified by the AJBPO which blood supply unit is their supplier of blood and blood products.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

“It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which they directed . . . The proposals or the convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success, as the united judgments and agreed decisions of all the members.”

Ernest J. King: The US Navy at War, 1945

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is unique among all known systems for the strategic direction of a war. It has brought victory where other systems have failed. It has withstood the all important test of war.”

Arleigh Burke: Speech in Minneapolis, 6 October 1956

The term “Joint Chiefs of Staff” refers collectively to:
• the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
• the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
• the Chief of Staff, US Army;
• the Chief of Naval Operations;
• the Chief of Staff, US Air Force;
• The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the Chairman or in addition to the advice provided by the Chairman. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman will present that advice or opinion at the same time that the Chairman’s advice is presented. The Chairman will also, as considered appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.
The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, will provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense requests such advice, or when the Chairman or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes a matter of national security that merits being addressed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

Each Chief of Service has an Operations Deputy and a Deputy Operations Deputy. The Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Operations Deputies, and the Vice Director, Joint Staff, presides over meetings of the Deputy Operations Deputies. The Director and the Operations Deputies, or the Vice Director and the Deputy Operations Deputies, collectively recommend actions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To the extent it does not impair their independence in the performance of duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except the Chairman, will inform their respective Secretary regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting their Military Department.

The duties of the Chiefs of the Services as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over all their other duties. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as the member may consider appropriate.

When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as, and performs the duties of, the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman, in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President will designate another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as, and perform the duties of, the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

An Organizational History

Although the separate military services are almost as old as the nation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff traces its beginnings only to World War II. Soon after American entry into that war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill created the combined Chiefs of Staff to provide strategic direction to the US-British war effort. The President then formed the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as the American representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

From this seemingly simple beginning as counterparts to the British on the combined Chiefs of Staff, the JCS almost immediately assumed the role of corporate leadership of the American military organization. Under the authority and responsibility of the President as Commander in Chief, the JCS undertook the coordination and strategic direction of the Army and Navy.

Initially the American JCS consisted of three men: the Army Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Soon after the JCS assumed direction of the war, the Chief of Staff to The Commander in Chief of the Army...
and Navy, or the chairman of the JCS, was added to serve as “go-between” with the President and the service chiefs. Throughout World War II, the JCS operated without a formal charter on the assumption that such a charter might inhibit the Joint Chiefs from doing what was necessary to win the war. In fact, the JCS owed its World War II existence and powers solely to letters exchanged by the service chiefs of the Army and Navy.

The National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council and created the Air Force as a separate military department, legitimized the Joint Chiefs of Staff by establishing it as a permanent organization within the national defense establishment and by providing it with a joint staff of a hundred officers. This act designated the Joint Chiefs as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and gave them several general responsibilities and prerogatives. The chiefs were directed to prepare joint strategic and logistic plans for the services and were given the authority to assign logistic responsibilities to the services, to establish unified commands, and to formulate training and educational policies for the armed services.

Source: Korb, Lawrence J., The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, 14-17

Related Terms
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

The Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) is a temporary board activated by the commander of a combatant command (CINC) and staffed by personnel from the component commands and Department of Defense agencies or activities in support of the CINCs. The JCMEB:

• establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineering requirements in the theater;
• arbitrates all issues referred by the Joint Facilities Utilization Board and, if directed, assumes responsibility for the preparation of the Civil Engineering Support Plan;
• coordinates its activities with the regional or theater construction managers having responsibility for the assigned area of responsibility. Construction and engineering requirements the JCMEB cannot satisfy from within the joint force resources will be elevated to the next appropriate level for support.

Related Terms

joint facilities utilization board

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
A Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is normally a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a joint special operations task force or joint task force, flexible in size and composition depending on mission circumstances. It may be developed to meet a specific civil-military operation (CMO) contingency mission, supporting humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on National Command Authorities (NCA) or theater guidance. In rarer instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability. A JCMOTF may be formed in theater, in the continental US, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations. Joint commanders may organize JCMOTFs to perform some or all of the following CMO-relevant functions:

- Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Help establish US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater understanding and efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies, Country Team, United Nation agencies, other US government (USG) agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and host-nation military forces and supporting logistics organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Plan and conduct joint and multinational CMO training exercises.
- Allocate resources and sustain and coordinate combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other USG agency, international organization, or host-nation responsibility.
- Assess or identify host-nation civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the commander of combatant command (CINC) or joint force commander (JFC) for transmission to supporting CINCs, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.
- Advise the CINC or JFC on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
1. Combatant commander or joint force commander may maintain direct control of JCMOTF for a specific contingency.

2. Scenario dependent. Combatant commander may direct formation of a JCMOTF in support of other commands as necessary.

3. Liaison with other US Government agencies, host-nation forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations as required.
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT

The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) is a unique communications organization under the operational control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, the JCSE consists of an active duty element of about 500 personnel and two Air National Guard Joint Communications Support Squadrons. JCSE’s primary mission is to provide tactical communications support for two simultaneously deployed joint task forces and two joint special operations task forces. The JCSE possesses a wide range of tactical communications capabilities tailored to meet a variety of contingency missions. The unit is staffed with personnel from all the Services and is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

JOINT DEPLOYABLE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SYSTEM

A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user. Also called JDISS.

As shown in the figure below, the joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) provides the standard workstation server software configuration.

JDISS is the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System reference model. The basic backbone for the dissemination of intelligence to and from deployed JDISS nodes is via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) network, depicted in the figure below. Where JWICS is not required or not available, JDISS has a versatile communications capability that can be connected to whatever circuit is available. The architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and assure that support is maximized for a theater engaged in military operations.
All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS and JDISS. These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in joint force commanders (JFCs) receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts in response to preplanned essential elements of information. Automated data processing interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC. Automated processing and seamless connectivity at all levels allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery and multiple data bases while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.

Related Terms
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System

Source Joint Publications
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
### The Role of Doctrine

“At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory...It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.”


“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

General George H. Decker, USA, speech given at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 December 1960, quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 95.

“Doctrine [is] every action that contributes to unity of purpose... it is what warriors believe in and act on.”


“Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting...doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.”


**General.** Military leaders understand the nature and utility of doctrine. Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander’s obligation to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.

Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the armed forces. A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the Armed Forces of the United States through the combined effort of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. Because we operate and fight jointly, we must all learn and practice joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; feed back to the doctrine process the lessons learned in training, exercises, and operations; and ensure Service doctrine and procedures are consistent. This is critical for our present and future effectiveness. Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.

**Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) Overview.** The purpose of joint doctrine and JTTP is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces. Joint doctrine and JTTP will not contain policy. Policy will be established in other Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents and can only be referenced in joint publications. Only publications approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “joint publications.” Publications involving two or more Services that have not been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine or Army, Navy, and Air Force procedures).

Joint doctrine (or JTTP) applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. Joint doctrine is used to guide the joint employment of joint forces, provide the national position for multinational doctrine consistent with existing security procedures, provide a basis for joint training, provide instructional material for the military education system, and inform US Government agencies concerning the employment of US joint forces.

Joint doctrine is written for those who provide strategic direction to joint forces (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of combatant commands), employ joint forces (combatant commanders, commanders of subunified commands, or commanders of joint task forces (JTFs)), and support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands, subunified commands, JTFs, component commands, Services, and supporting agencies).

Joint doctrine can be developed by the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders, and Directors, Joint Staff directorates. It will be written to reflect extant capabilities. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are written for those who implement joint doctrine such as commanders of joint forces, commanders of subordinate commands, and commanders at echelons where joint forces interact.

In developing joint doctrine and JTTP, extant Service and multinational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures will be considered. Once approved, joint doctrine provides the national position for combined doctrine development consistent with existing security procedures. Service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine.

Related Terms
document; joint publication; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

JOINT ENGAGEMENT ZONE

Joint engagement zone (JEZ) operations involve multiple air defense weapon systems of one or more Service components, simultaneously and in concert, engaging enemy airpower in the same airspace. However, successful JEZ operations depend on correctly identifying friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft. Positive control may ensure that real time engagement taskings are based on comprehensive situational awareness. Under procedural control, all air defense systems must be capable of accurately discerning between enemy, neutral, and friendly air vehicles in a highly complex environment before full joint engagement operations could occur. If these conditions cannot be met, separate zones for missile and fighter engagement should be established. JEZ, without effective command and control, is extremely difficult to implement. In maritime air operations, airspace control will tend toward procedural control, with aircraft bearing the burden of following promulgated procedures to avoid fratricide.
Such an arrangement allows a layered series of engagements by both friendly aircraft and surface missile systems.

**Related Terms**

weapon engagement zone

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  
Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

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The Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES) provides a common automated system for the civil engineer planners at the unified commands and their components to determine the feasibility of the civil engineering force, construction material, and facilities to support operation plans (OPLANs). Further, it is used to:

- Generate time-phased facility requirements based on an OPLAN;
- Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements to in-theater facility assets and host-nation, contract, and troop engineering capability;
- Provide facility feasibility assessment, manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargo requirements for other processes.

The JEPES replaces the Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator as a planning tool to develop data to assist commander of a combatant command (CINC) and Service component staffs in determining their civil engineering support requirements and documenting their Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP). JEPES is a computer model that should be used by CINC planners to estimate theater-level wartime requirements for facilities, construction material, and civil engineering capability in support of deployed US forces. JEPES should be used wherever possible in the planning process in order to provide consistent civil engineering support planning across all combatant commands.

The primary purpose of JEPES is to assist CINC and component planners in determining whether an OPLAN provides sufficient civil engineering capabilities at the correct locations and at the appropriate times to support deployment, mission accomplishment, and sustainment of OPLAN forces. Specifically, the civil engineering and facility requirements generated by JEPES are intended to aid engineer planners in preparing the CESP.

The civil engineering requirements generated by JEPES serve as the starting point for planning specific wartime construction projects. JEPES requirements are, however, based on many assumptions and simplifications of reality.

JEPES provides assistance to planners in determining civil engineering support requirements and shortfalls during operation planning. Planners need not use JEPES if the deviation from CINC and Service standards in JEPES can be justified. Planners must explain in the CESP the method used to determine their civil engineering support requirements and shortfalls if they elect not to use JEPES.

**Related Terms**

civil engineering support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-04  
Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
JOINT FACILITIES UTILIZATION BOARD

A joint board that evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board priorities. JP 1-02

The commander of a combatant command (CINC) is responsible for the coordination of planning, programming, and construction of facilities within the command. Additionally, the CINC should determine the priorities in the programming of facilities necessary to support the mission. Contingency construction project requests in overseas areas require validation by the CINC. The CINC may establish a Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) to assist in managing facilities. The JFUB has many responsibilities including the following:

- The JFUB evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with Joint Civil Military Engineering Board (JCMEB) priorities.
- The JFUB is activated on the order of a joint force commander and chaired by the Logistics Directorate, with members from component commands and any required special activities (e.g., legal and civil affairs).
- The JFUB also provides administrative support and functions as the executive agency for the tasking of the JCMEB.

Related Terms
Joint Civil Military Engineering Board

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

JOINT FORCE

A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. JP 1-02

General. Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. “Joint force” is a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single JFC. Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces.

Authority to Establish. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, combatant commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint task forces can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (See figure below.)
Basis for Establishing Joint Forces. Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis.

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The commander of a combatant command established on an area basis is assigned a geographic area by the establishing authority. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A JFC assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander. Note: Only commanders of combatant commands are assigned area of responsibilities (AORs). Subordinate joint force commanders are normally assigned joint operations areas (JOAs).

- The boundaries defining these AORs are not intended to delineate restrictive geographic AORs. Commanders may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions.
- The Unified Command Plan contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to combatant commanders. It provides that, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two combatant commands, a joint task force will be formed and assigned an appropriate JOA. Command of this joint task force will be determined by the National Command Authorities and forces transferred to the appropriate combatant commander.
- Each area commander will be kept apprised of the presence, mission, movement, and duration of stay of forces within the AOR/JOA other than those assigned to the area command. Also, the area commander will be apprised of the command channels under
which these transient forces will function. The authority directing movement or permanent location of transient forces is responsible for providing this information.

- Forces not assigned to an area commander are often assigned missions that require them to cross AOR/JOA boundaries. In such cases, it is the duty of the joint force area commander to assist the operations of these forces to the extent of existing capabilities and consistent with other assigned missions. Area commanders may be assigned specific responsibilities with respect to installations or activities exempted from their control, such as logistic support or area defense, particularly if enemy forces should traverse the area commander’s AOR/JOA to attack the exempted installation or activity.

- Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are subject to the area commander’s orders in some instances, e.g., for coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces are not part of the area commander’s command, and the area commander is not in their normal chain of command.

Sometimes a joint force based solely on military functions without respect to a specific geographic region is more suitable in order to fix responsibility for certain types of continuing operations (e.g., the unified commands for transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations). The commander of a joint force established on a functional basis is assigned a functional responsibility by the establishing authority.

- When defining functional responsibilities, the focus should be on the effect desired or service provided. The title of the functional responsibility and its delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive.

- The missions or tasks assigned to the commander of a functional command may require that certain installations and activities of that commander be partially or wholly exempt from the command authority of an area commander in whose area they are located or within which they operate. Such exemptions must be specified by the authority who establishes the functional command. Such exemptions do not relieve the commanders of functional commands of the responsibility to coordinate with the affected area commanders.

**Organizing Joint Forces.** A JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. (See figure below.) The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

The composition of the JFC’s staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations.

All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the
Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force even when composed of forces from two or more Military Departments.) When a functional component command employs forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff must be joint, and requires advanced planning for efficient operation. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified, and those individuals should be used when the functional component command is formed for exercises or actual operations.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components will have special operations forces (if assigned) organized as a functional component. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.
The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. JP 1-02

**General.** The joint force commander (JFC) will normally designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFC will base the decision to designate a JFACC on several factors such as the JFC’s overall mission, concept of operations, the missions and tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available, duration and nature of joint air operations desired, and the degree of unity of command and control of joint air operations required. The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations.

The authority and command relationships of the JFACC are established by the JFC. These typically include exercising operational control over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The JFC normally assigns missions and issues mission-type orders to all components. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the JFC’s intent and concept of the operation.

**Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not limited to planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air operations based on the JFC’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. (See figure below.) Specific JFACC responsibilities normally include the following:

- Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives as assigned by the JFC or higher authority.
JFACC RESPONSIBILITIES

• Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives

• Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders

• Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities/forces made available

• Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC

• Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC

• Evaluating the results of joint air operations

• When assigned by the JFC, performing the duties of the airspace control authority and/or performing the duties of the area air defense commander

• Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the JFC

JFC— joint force commander

• Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders, by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.

• Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities/forces made available based on the JFC apportionment.

• Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC, to include making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking of available joint capabilities/forces. If circumstances require the JFACC to change the planned joint air operations during execution, the JFACC will notify the affected component commanders or JFC, as appropriate.

• Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC (e.g., combat search and rescue operations, the joint force special operations component commander, and if designated, the joint special operations air component commander for integration, synchronization, and deconfliction with special operations).

• Evaluating the results of joint air operations and forwarding combat assessments to the JFC to support the overall combat assessment effort.

• Performing the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA), when assigned that responsibility by the JFC.

• Performing the duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), when assigned that responsibility by the JFC.
• Functioning as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort.

• Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force areas of operations (AOs) are designated by the land and naval force commanders.

• These priorities are considered along with the JFC’s area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operation area (JOA)-wide interdiction priorities and reflected in the air apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the AOR/JOA-wide interdiction effort.

• Functioning as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support, air interdiction within the land and naval force AOs, and maritime support.

Airspace Control Considerations and the JFACC/ACA/AADC Relationship. The responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC’s campaign. Designating one component commander as JFACC, AADC, and ACA may simplify coordination required to develop and execute fully integrated joint air operations. If conditions do not permit this assignment, then close coordination between all three positions is essential.

If appointed the AADC, the JFACC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other tactical operations on and over both land and sea. If appointed the ACA, the JFACC is responsible for developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures and for operating the airspace control system in the area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operation area (JOA).

The JFACC Organization. The figure below represents a notional JFACC organization. The JFACC’s operations center will often be designated a joint air operations center (JAOC). The JFACC’s JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed to fulfill all of the JFACC’s responsibilities. JFACC organizations may differ based on the specific AOR/JOA requirements and operations. However, the two organizations or functions that should be common to all JAOCs are Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Planning “future joint air operations” is the responsibility of Combat Plans, which includes the responsibility of drafting the joint air operations plan to support the JFC’s campaign or objectives and building the daily joint air tasking order (ATO). Execution of the daily joint ATO is carried out by Combat Operations. This organization closely follows the action of current joint air operations, shifting missions from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the situation requires.

Each of these JAOC organizations rely on expertise from other component liaisons (e.g., battlefield coordination element (BCE), naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), Air Force liaison element, special operations liaison element (SOLE), air mobility element, strategic liaison team, space liaison officer, Marine liaison officer) to coordinate requests or requirements and maintain an “up-to-date” picture of the other component operations.

Finally, the role of “intelligence” is extremely important and is an integral part of the daily function of Combat Plans and Combat Operations. Intelligence personnel monitor and assess adversary capabilities and intentions and provide assistance in target, weapon, and platform selection, conduct battle damage assessment, as well as, provide an up-to-date picture of the adversary, expected adversary operations, and the status and priority of assigned targets to assist in execution day changes.
NOTIONAL JFACC ORGANIZATION (JAOC)

- JFACC/DEPUTY JFACC
- SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDERS
- SENIOR COMPONENT LIAISONS
- COMMAND SECTION
- PERSONNEL
- INTEL
- OPS
- LOGISTICS
- COMM
- SJA
- COMBAT PLANS
  - AIR STRATEGY
  - ATO PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
- INTEL PLANS
- INTEL OPS
- COMBAT OPERATIONS
  - CURRENT OPERATIONS
  - WEATHER SUPPORT
  - OPERATIONS SUPPORT
  - JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER
- AIRSPACE/COMMAND AND CONTROL
- COMPONENT LIAISONS

LEGEND:
- COORDINATION - if assigned by JFC
- C2
“Once the command of the air is obtained by one of the contending armies, the war must become a conflict between a seeing host and one that is blind.”

H.G. Wells

**Component Liaison.** The components have ready access to the JFACC and staff through the component liaisons. These liaisons work for their respective component commanders and work with the JFACC and staff.

Senior Component Liaisons. Senior component liaisons serve as conduits for direct coordination between the JFACC and their respective component commanders. Senior liaisons possess the credibility and authority to represent their component commander on time-sensitive and critical issues. They must be equipped and authorized to communicate directly with their respective component commander. The senior liaisons have the responsibility of presenting component perspectives and considerations regarding planning and executing joint air operations.

Coordination Elements. Each component normally provides liaison elements (BCE, NALE, SOLE, and others as appropriate) that work within the JAOC. These liaison elements consist of experienced warfare specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. These experts help integrate and coordinate their component’s participation in joint air operations (e.g., special operations force) and coordinate and deconflict component direct support air operations with joint air operations.

**JFACC Staff.** The JFACC’s staff should be organized and manned so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force. This representation will provide the JFACC with the expertise needed to effectively employ the capabilities/forces made available. Functional component staffs require advanced planning for efficient operations. JFACC staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be identified and trained during peacetime and used when JFACC staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations to ensure an effective transition to combat operations. JFACC staffs should include appropriate component representation at all levels.

Functional Area and Mission Experts. Functional area experts (such as intelligence, logistics, airspace, plans, and communications) provide the critical and unique expertise in support, plans, and execution functions, as appropriate for the employment scenario. Mission experts (air-to-air, air-to-ground, reconnaissance, air refueling, and others as appropriate) provide the technical warfighting expertise required to plan and employ capabilities/forces made available by the components. Functional and mission experts from other components representing weapon systems made available by the JFC for joint air tasking will provide manning throughout the JAOC (i.e., combat operations, combat plans) and at all levels of command.

Preparation. For each specific operation, the nucleus of the JFACC staff should be trained in JFACC operations and be representative of the joint force. Staff augmentation with manning as identified above ensures joint representation throughout the JFACC’s staff and JAOC. The JFACC, in coordination with other component commanders, will determine specific manning requirements based on scenario requirements, force list, and personnel availability.

**JFACC Assignments and Transition.** Procedures for joint air operations are designed to exploit the flexibility of air power to achieve joint force objectives while providing support to component operations. Joint air operations scenarios may vary, and each scenario requires extensive planning when transition of JFACC responsibilities is necessary.
In large-scale joint air operations, the assignment of JFACC ashore is normally desirable because of enhanced logistic, communication, and facility capacities on land. The JFACC should be sea-based when any one of the following conditions are present:

- Maritime forces provide the preponderance of air capability.
- Land-based facilities or sufficient infrastructure does not exist.
- A secure land-based area is not available.
- Ground support forces are forced to withdraw.

**JFACC Transition.** Effective joint air operations planning must contain provisions to transition JFACC responsibilities between platforms or between components afloat or ashore.

**Planned Transition.** The JFACC should develop a plan for transition of JFACC duties to another component, if required or considered likely to occur. Planned JFACC transitions are possible as a function of buildup or scale down of joint force operations. When transition of JFACC responsibilities is complete, the component passing responsibilities should continue monitoring joint air planning, tasking, and control circuits, and remain ready to reassume JFACC responsibilities until the gaining component has demonstrated operational capability.

**Unplanned Transition.** During unplanned shifts of JFACC responsibility, as a possible result of battle damage or major command and control equipment failure, a smooth transition is unlikely. Therefore, the JFC should predesignate alternates (both inter- and intra-component) and establish preplanned responses/options to the temporary or permanent loss of JFACC capability. Frequent backup and exchange of data bases is essential to facilitate a rapid resumption of operations should an unplanned transition be required.

**Transition Events.** The following are events that may cause the JFACC responsibilities to shift:

- Coordination requirements related to joint ATO planning and execution exceed the component capability;
- Buildup or relocation of forces shifts preponderance of air assets to another component commander and the JFC decides that the other component is in a better position (location, command and control capability, or other considerations) to accomplish the JFACC responsibilities;
- Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capability to support the current JFACC becomes unresponsive or unreliable;

**Considerations.** The figure below shows considerations to aid in transition planning and decisions.
**JFACC TRANSITION CONSIDERATIONS**

- **Continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction** for joint air operations must be the primary objective of any JFACC transition.

- **All JFACC operations facilities** should possess **appropriate C4I capabilities** to ensure shift of JFACC duties is as transparent to the components as possible (joint ATO dissemination and receipt should be unchanged).

- **Specific procedures** for coordinating and executing planned and unplanned shifts of JFACC should be published in the joint air operations plan.

- The oncoming JFACC must have **adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support, and command and control capability** prior to assuming JFACC responsibilities.

- The oncoming JFACC must have a **current joint ATO, special instructions, ACO, joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), force disposition, adversary situation, and order of battle**.

- The oncoming JFACC must have the **JFC's objectives** to conduct supporting joint air operations.

- The oncoming JFACC must establish timely, reliable, and secure **communications links** with all appropriate coordination cells associated with the JFC mission to facilitate continuous and dynamic exchange of information and joint air support.

- The oncoming JFACC must be completely familiar with the **area air defense and airspace control plans**. If also designated the AADC, the JFACC must be ready to assume the responsibility for air defense operations. When designated the ACA, the JFACC must also be ready to assume that responsibility.

**Related Terms**

Joint force land component commander; joint force maritime component commander; joint force special operations component commander

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
**General.** Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the joint force commander (JFC) with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

JFC is a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified combatant commander, or joint task force commander. A JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. (See figure below.) The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders.

**Organization of Forces.** Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and

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**POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE**

- **JOINT FORCE COMMANDER**
- **ARMY COMPONENT**
- **NAVY COMPONENT**
- **MARINE CORPS COMPONENT**
- **JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPS COMPONENT**
- **JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT**
- **JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT**
- **JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT**

**NOTES:**
1. A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic and training responsibilities), even when operations are conducted through functional components.
2. All Service and functional components are depicted, any mix of the above components can constitute a joint force.
3. There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.
efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces with multinational forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. Complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces.

Service and Functional Component Commands. The composition of the JFC’s staff will reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of total force capabilities and limitations. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components will have special operations forces (if assigned) organized as a functional component. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

Related Terms

Joint Force

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

The Joint Force Commander’s Electronic Warfare Staff (JCEWS) provides electronic warfare (EW) expertise, planning, and coordination for joint activities, including joint suppression of enemy air defenses operations. The JCEWS coordinates with key staff officers, component commands, and other elements as required. The JCEWS is comprised of personnel from each of the components of the joint force. It is headed by the Operations Directorate (J-3) electronic warfare officer and includes a Intelligence Directorate representative to facilitate intelligence updates and a Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate representative to monitor or direct frequency deconfliction.
EW depends on all-source, timely intelligence. Signals intelligence (both communications intelligence-and electronics intelligence-derived intelligence products, particularly data bases) may be especially useful to joint EW planners. Primary intelligence support for EW is from the electronic order of battle (EOB) and signal data bases such as the Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming Data Base. Direct support by national and Service agency analysts is also provided. EW planners on the JCEWS derive EW targeting information from the EOB and use this information to request that other joint organizations allocate joint force resources to execute EW missions against the identified target. The JCEWS may nominate command and control targets to the command and control warfare (C2W) cell for consideration/incorporation into the C2W cell’s master target nomination list, which is submitted into the target nomination process established by the J-3 officer. Other types of EW mission requests should be made by the JCEWS through the Service or functional component commander who controls the assets necessary to execute the mission.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-01.4 | JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) |
| JP 3-13.1 | Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) |

**JOINT FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMANDER**

The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC.

In accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” the joint force commander may choose to organize special operations forces (SOF) for particular operations along joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC), special operations command (SOC), Service component, or functional lines. In certain circumstances, a functional organization may better fit the demands of a specific SOF mission, especially given the limited number of SOF assets. Several different Service elements of the SOF possess similar capabilities. For example, Army special forces, Air Force special tactics team, and Navy sea-air-land team can employ comparable amphibious tactics and airborne infiltration techniques, and the Army and Air Force both operate rotary special operations (SO) aircraft with similar capabilities. Consideration should be given to aligning JFSOCC (SOC or joint special operations task force (JSOTF)) forces executing similar missions under a single, functional (vice necessarily Service) component commander. (See figures below.) Since the JFSOCC may need to conduct a range of discrete operations or support extended SO, he may choose to exercise either centralized or decentralized control of assets. This flexibility would allow the JFSOCC to establish, for example, various aviation
task organizations ranging from a central pool of all air assets to small, tailored aircraft and support packages assigned to a JSOTF or other subordinate SO commands, as appropriate.

A functional joint special operations air component commander provides organization and resource allocation for managing limited aircraft assets of different types and from different Services. JFSOCC requirements for air support flow through a single point of contact so that all requests may be satisfied by the best available air asset. Further, planning, coordination, and deconfliction are centralized. The liaison for this coordination and deconfliction is as important between the JFSOCC and the conventional theater component commands as it is between JFSOCC forces themselves.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

JOINT FORCE SURGEON

A general term applied to an individual appointed by the joint force commander to serve as the theater or joint task force special staff officer responsible for establishing, monitoring, or evaluating joint force health service support. See also health service support. JP 1-02

General. A joint force surgeon (JFS) should be appointed for each combatant command, subunified command, and joint task force. As a specialty advisor, the JFS reports directly to the joint force commander (JFC). The JFS will coordinate health service support (HSS) matters for the JFC. The JFS section should be jointly staffed and should be of sufficient size to effectively facilitate joint coordination of HSS initiatives, regionalization, standardization and interoperability, development of the HSS plan, and review of subordinate plans and operations.

Responsibilities. As depicted in the figure below, JFSs need to assess component command HSS requirements and capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. JFSs should have the responsibility to:

- assist the combatant commander in formulating a recommended patient evacuation policy within the geographic area;
- assist the component commands in identifying HSS requirements of each component and assigning cross-Service support where practical;
- advise the JFC concerning HSS aspects of combat operations, intratheater rest, rotation, and reconstitution policies, preventive medicine, and other medical factors that could affect operations;
- inform the JFC on the status of HSS units, highlighting problems and other areas of interest or concern;
- monitor the status of patient beds, blood products, health service logistics, HSS staffing, and other issues affecting medical readiness;
- inform the JFC concerning the status of HSS and any assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace, US nationals, and enemy prisoners of war;
- advise supporting civil affairs forces on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the joint force operations area;
• coordinate HSS provided to or received from allies or other friendly nations;
• coordinate medical intelligence support for HSS organizations;
• supervise the activities of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center and the Joint Blood Program Office;
• prepare the HSS annex to joint force plans;

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR JOINT HEALTH SUPPORT SERVICES (HSS)

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating and integrating HSS within their theaters.

JOINT FORCE SURGEON (JFS)

The JFS coordinates matters for the JFC

Facilitates:
  Joint coordination of HSS initiatives
  Regionalization
  Standardization and interoperability
  Development of HSS plan
  Review of subordinate plans and operations

Assess component command HSS requirements and capabilities

Provides guidance to enhance effectiveness of HSS

Monitors the status of:
  Patient beds
  Blood products
  Health service logistics
  HSS staffing

Advises the JFC and informs on status of HSS units

Coordinates medical intelligence and support for HSS organizations (including assistance from allies)

Supervises the activities of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center and the Joint Blood Program Center

Prepares the HSS annex to joint force plans

Prepares bed requirement estimates

Liaison must be established between the JFS and each component surgeon

JFC—joint force commander
• prepare bed requirement estimates based on the casualty estimates provided by the appropriate staff and extracted from the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System medical planning module;
• in conjunction with the joint force’s legal office, advise the JFC on HSS aspects of the Geneva Conventions.

Related Terms
health service support

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-02  Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the theater joint intelligence centers, and subordinate joint force joint intelligence centers. This architecture encompasses automated data processing equipment capabilities, communications and information flow requirements, and responsibilities to provide theater and tactical commanders with the full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations.  

“In establishing a JIC at each combatant command, we have improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter while decreasing the resources required to produce such support.”

CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993

General. The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network. All intelligence made available to the network from any source is stored and communicated as data whether it is a text file, graphics, imagery, or formatted information. The data is stored on a standards compliant file server. The file server is the interface with the communications network.

In keeping with the spirit of Command, Control, Communications, Computers And Intelligence (C4I) For The Warrior, the joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure providing global access to an information grid that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The architecture facilitates the capability of the Defense Intelligence community to focus on supporting the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. The joint intelligence architecture is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources from anywhere on the globe and to provide the baseline data that JFCs will need to support joint operations. This architecture conceptually describes equipment capabilities, information flow requirements, and responsibilities.

Principles. The Services and Department of Defense agencies responsible for organizing, training, and fielding intelligence systems and personnel must provide the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and subordinate commanders as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support architectures. JFCs should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (personnel, procedures, and C4I), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. Intelligence systems, concepts, products, and language must be sufficiently interoperable for the exchange
and use of data in any form and from any source among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces. Interoperability principles are shown in the figure above.

**C4I Interoperability.** The Director for Intelligence should ensure command elements’ and supporting organizations’ intelligence systems and communications are compatible for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products. If components’ intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence data, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems also relates to intelligence data processing and related equipment.

**Intelligence Product Interoperability.** Intelligence organizations producing joint intelligence should ensure that intelligence products are in a form, content, and language usable by all components of the joint force performing similar and related functions. For example, if one component requires maps with Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) (which also includes universal transverse mercator) coordinates while another cooperating component uses charts with geographic coordinates, location information should be expressed with both MGRS and geographic coordinates.

**Common Terminology and Symbols.** Intelligence organizations should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols common to all joint force components.

**Standards.** Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. Standards are sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity of data, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment, and signals that promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products among intelligence organizations and JFCs. Standards for interoperability should be developed and incorporated into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures providing intelligence for joint operations. Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to operations other than war or war.

**Effective Training and Exercises.** Intelligence interoperability problems reduce the ability of a joint force to attain unity of effort. Thus, an important concept is to use realistic training, exercises, and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence products.

**Data Bases.** Ability of all echelons of the joint force to access archives and common data bases is key to successful intelligence operations.

**Communications.** To maximize the utility of the architecture, systems must meet standards of connectivity using standard communications protocols and standard encryption devices that must be available at all echelons. The architecture has the flexibility to accommodate,
not to replace, existing indication and warning and direct support systems. It is intended to overlay additional capabilities using existing communications carriers.

The joint intelligence architecture uses the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) as the joint standard and foundation for commonality among support systems. As shown in the figure below, JWICS satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission services for intelligence information. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Each JWICS node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed via allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications. JWICS is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network.

All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS and JDISS. (See figure below.) These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in JFCs receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts in response to preplanned essential elements of information. Automated data processing interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration. Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC. Automated processing and seamless connectivity at all levels allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery.
and multiple databases while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER/JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ELEMENT**

The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. JP 1-02

**General.** Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, “Strengthening Defense Intelligence,” inter alia, established the joint intelligence center (JIC) as the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint warfighting at all levels. The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a one stop shopping center for intelligence support. Although in reality, a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every request for information; it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon. A subordinate joint force is supported by a joint intelligence support element (JISE), a tailored subset of a theater JIC.

All JICs/JISEs provide intelligence support to operational forces and perform common functions. The figure below provides a representative JIC organization wherein all major joint intelligence functional areas and liaison relationships are presented. As shown, the JIC is the principal Intelligence Directorate (J-2) organization supporting joint operations.

The JIC/JISE is, by design, scalable and can expand to meet the needs of the joint force commander (JFC). During noncrisis periods, JIC manning is normally retained at the minimum level required to perform essential functions such as indication and warning, current intelligence, collection management, delegated general military intelligence production, and
support to the commander. As crises develop, JICs at each echelon bring together personnel and equipment needed to manage intelligence support requirements. JISEs are established to meet the particular needs of subordinate joint forces. Collection, production, and dissemination resources are focused on the crisis. Liaison with intelligence production agencies and communications staffs identifies critical shortfalls, and action to correct deficiencies is accomplished. Because the JIC is the focal point for intelligence support to joint operations, augmentation personnel are drawn from many sources, including Reserves, as shown in the figure below.

At the national level, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations. Combatant commands have JICs focused on their geographic or functional responsibilities. A subordinate joint force, when established, also normally forms a JISE as the focus for intelligence in support of the JFC, joint staff, and components.

**Functions.** The JIC/JISE allows for efficient access to the entire Department of Defense intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations. JICs/JISEs perform common functions although the degree to which they engage in specific functions varies according to command missions. The command’s J-2 and JIC/JISE are normally collocated, and it is the prerogative of command to define JIC functions and responsibilities, particularly with respect to the J-2 staff. In many cases, a responsibility may be shared between the J-2 staff and JIC/JISE. For example, the J-2 staff may be responsible for setting forth collection requirements, while the JIC may have the duties of implementing those requirements and managing their fulfillment.

**Related Terms**

- joint intelligence architecture

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Services of the same nation. JP 1-02

Joint logistics is a complex, interdependent concept that can apply leverage (plus or minus) to a combatant commander’s combat power. An understanding of the combatant commander’s concept of operations and early involvement by the logistic staff will ensure that national and theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with logistic capabilities. Logistic planning considerations aid the combatant commander in providing guidance to staff planners and assessing the adequacy and feasibility of campaign and operation plans. Joint doctrine discusses sustainment planning which is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.

Joint theater logistics is applying logistic resources to generate and support theater combat power. The combatant commander’s theater logistic concepts include balancing objectives, scheme of maneuver, and operations timing. It includes the concept of extending operational reach and logistic applications that apply to the theater. Combatant commanders must ensure that their campaign plans fully integrate operational and logistic capabilities. The combatant commanders must maintain an interrelationship between operations and logistics by insisting on close cooperation and early-on understanding of the missions assigned to subordinate commanders. The influence of the combatant commander is essential in bridging any operations-logistic gap.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
the operational control of the JLOTS commander. The composition of the JLOTS operational staff should contain appropriate representation of participating Service components. Each Service’s senior officer or noncommissioned officer within the JLOTS organization should be afforded access to the JLOTS commander, and, via the JLOTS commander, to higher Service component commanders to address Service concerns or unique administrative requirements. In order to conduct effective JLOTS operations when called on to do so, JLOTS training and exercises need to be periodically conducted.

Related Terms

logistics-over-the-shore

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.6 Joint Logistics-Over-The-Shell Operations

JOINT MATERIEL PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATION BOARD

The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board is responsible for:
• modifying and recommending priorities for allocations of materiel assets for the fulfillment of logistic requirements of the theater (both US and allied forces);
• reviewing, acting on, or forwarding requests for modifications in force and activity designators to the Joint Staff;
• reviewing, acting on, or forwarding requests to establish or change the priorities in the master urgency list to the Joint Staff;
• preparing recommendations to the Joint Staff on modifications to priorities and allocations of resources assigned to other combatant commanders.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT

The Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) is prepared by the Chairman in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO). Commanders of geographic combatant commands will establish a JMAO within their commands to provide oversight of mortuary affairs support. During military operations other than war, peacetime mass-fatality, or politically sensitive incidents, the commander determines if, when, and for how long the JMAO will be activated. The JMAO oversight responsibilities include the following:

- providing procedures concerned with search for, recovery and evacuation, tentative identification, and return of remains and personal effects. This includes providing guidance to Service components and to subordinate joint force or single-Service commands on the disposition of remains of those personnel assigned or attached to multinational forces;
- maintaining inventory data on Service component command mortuary affairs equipment and materials;
- coordinating with Service component commands for data on the recovery status of deceased and missing personnel when requested by combatant command casualty reporting agencies;
- coordinating interment, disinterment, and reinterment of remains within the area of responsibility. In wartime, this includes providing a recommendation to the respective geographic combatant commander regarding when remains can no longer be returned to continental US (CONUS);
- coordinating the establishment of suboffices, as required, to supervise mortuary affairs activities on a Service component, subordinate joint force, or geographic basis;

Deceased personnel are quickly evacuated to the Mortuary Affairs Collection Point.
• providing procedural guidance concerning transfer of enemy, enemy and friendly civilian, allied, and allied civilian remains and their personal effects (PE) to the custody of another government, including maintenance of records required by the Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims;
• designating port of embarkation holding facilities and surface and aerial evacuation of remains and PE;
• coordinating with the Chief, JMOA, Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the Armed Forces Medical Examiner to determine the CONUS port-of-entry military mortuary for Service component’s return of remains;
• coordinating the development of the mortuary affairs support plan;
• maintaining a central records point for deceased and PE;
• maintaining liaison with the Joint Public Affairs Office.

The JMAO will continue to function after periods of military operations to oversee Service efforts to resolve the status and effect the evacuation of remains and PE not previously accomplished. The geographic combatant commander determines if the JMAO will continue to function in support of efforts to process remains and PE of non-US military personnel. The JMAO ensures that Service components forward all records to respective Service headquarters. The component’s Service headquarters coordinates transfer of remains and records to parent Service control in CONUS. Parent Service headquarters are responsible for final archiving of records. The JMAO assists Service headquarters in coordinating these actions.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-06 JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations

The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned area of responsibility, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. JP 1-02

The geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing movement control. He may direct subordinate joint force commander and Service components to perform their own movement control. He may establish a theater Joint Transportation Board (JTB) or a Joint Movement Center (JMC), or both. However, to ensure a fully integrated and responsive transportation system, the combatant commander should consider assigning responsibility for theater transportation movement control to a single joint office, the JMC. This JMC must be equipped with sufficient communication and automation capability to ensure adequate interface between strategic and theater transportation systems and the combatant commander’s staff. This organization must be skilled in coordinating and directing theater transportation operations in support of unit movements and/or logistic resupply operations. The combatant commander’s logistics staff would form the nucleus of a movement control organization, but to properly execute a theater movement control mission, an additional predesignated, fully trained joint organization is required. Ideally, such an organization would
be identified as a force deployment option in an operation plan (OPLAN) and be established early in the theater to coordinate arrival, theater expansion, and operations movement planning and execution.

If the geographic combatant commander establishes a JMC, it should coordinate the employment of all means of theater transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations (HNs)) to support the concept of operations. The JMC should also be the single coordinator of strategic movements between the combatant commander and US Transportation Command. In addition, it oversees the execution of theater transportation priorities. The JMC should be responsible for planning movement operations and for monitoring the overall performance of the theater transportation system. The JMC conducts cyclic reviews of apportionment decisions and acts on emergency transportation requests. When there is no theater JTB, the JMC is the primary advisor to the geographic combatant commander in the apportionment process. The JMC identifies the variance between forecasted requirements and current capabilities of all modes to assist in the planning process. It expedites action and coordination for immediate movement requirements to ensure effective and efficient use of transportation resources.

The JMC is organized functionally and designed with a peacetime nucleus. It expands in proportion to the size of the force and the desires of the geographic combatant commander. A fully developed JMC should have an Administrative Section and two divisions such as a Plans and Programs Division and an Operations Division. Advisory members from functional areas that impact movement planning and execution augment the JMC, as needed. The figure below shows a suggested organization.
The geographic combatant commander should first use his own staff and Service component staff personnel resources to form the nucleus of a JMC. The commander should consider including manning to coordinate requirements for contracting with HN authorities for use of available civil transportation and facilities. When expanding a JMC, the geographic combatant commander must consider the structure of his dominant force and component-unique movement control requirements. The combatant commander may also draw on reserve personnel to augment the JMC. Reserve augmentation personnel should participate in exercises to assure they are familiar with the procedures of a joint force headquarters. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure reserve augmentation forces are properly sequenced in either an exercise or actual time-phased force and deployment data. Finally, the combatant commander may coordinate through the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command and the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command on the creation of a JMC force deployment option package that could be easily inserted into an OPLAN. Likewise, if this JMC augmentation package is established, it must be provided the opportunity to train with the combatant commander’s and Service components’ staffs.

**Related Terms**

**movement control**

**Source Joint Publication**

JP 4-01.3  JTTP for Movement Control

**JOINT OPERATION PLANNING**

Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures.

**General.** Joint operation planning is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. At the national level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Chiefs of the Services, is principally responsible for the unified planning to employ the armed forces in support of national security objectives. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of plans (e.g., operation plans and campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation orders) by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military
Departments and Services. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

**Strategic Planning.** At the strategic level, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives. The NCA translates policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater.

**Operational Planning.** Joint operation planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

**Tactical Planning.** At the tactical level of planning, tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles.

**Scope of Joint Operation Planning.** As shown in the figure below, joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

- **Mobilization Planning.** Primarily the responsibility of the Services, mobilization planning is directed toward assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war and for military operations other than war. Mobilization planning includes bringing all or part of the Armed Forces of the United States to the necessary state of readiness to meet the requirements of the specific contingency. Mobilization planning may include planning for the activation of all or part of the Reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

- **Deployment Planning.** Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the United States Transportation Command. Deployment planning is planning to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan. It involves planning for the continental US (CONUS), intertheater (strategic), and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Strategic deployment planning focuses on the intertheater movement of forces and resources using national, allied and coalition strategic deployment capabilities.

- **Employment Planning.** Employment planning prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by the combatant commanders through their component commands. Employment planning provides
the foundation and determines the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

Sustainment Planning. Sustainment planning is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.

Redeployment Planning. Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the CONUS for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces is considered during redeployment planning. The figure below represents the types of joint operation plans and the planning processes.
Related Terms
execution planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. JP 1-02

General. The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by commanders to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish those tasks. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is used to conduct joint planning. JOPES facilitates the building and maintenance of operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (with or without time-phased force and deployment data). It aids in the development of effective options and operation orders through adaptation of OPLANs or plan creation in a no-plan scenario. JOPES provides policies and procedures to ensure effective management of planning operations across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. As part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), JOPES supports the deployment and transportation aspects of joint operation planning and execution. (The Global Command and Control System is replacing the WWMCCS.)
**JOPES Functions.** JOPES contains five basic planning functions — threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation, as shown in the figure below.

Threat Identification and Assessment. This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and then determining threat capabilities and intentions. This function supports all organizational levels during planning and execution. It gives information for strategic planning and resource allocations at the national level, by developing courses of action (COAs) and detailed planning at the operational level, and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution.

Strategy Determination. This function furnishes direction from the national level for developing COAs. It assists the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in formulating appropriate options to counter the threat. Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, clearly defining political and military objectives or end states, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance.

COA Development. COA development support includes JOPES functions that help the supported commander’s staff develop and test alternative COAs based on NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the CINC’s Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and the commander’s estimate in crisis action planning.

Detailed Planning. This function supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:
- Development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment.
- Development of directives, schedules, and orders.
- Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support, and transportation needs.
- Identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or COA.

Implementation. This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events.
as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

**Related Terms**
campaign planning; crisis action planning; deliberate planning; joint operation planning.

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**JOINT OPERATIONS**

A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. JP 1-02

“Joint operations” are military actions conducted by joint forces or Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. The requirement to plan and conduct joint operations demands expanded intellectual horizons and broadened professional knowledge. Leaders who aspire to joint command must not only have mastered the essentials of their own Service capabilities, but also must understand the fundamentals of combat power represented by the other Services. Beyond that, they must have a clear sense of how these capabilities are integrated for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. This individual professional growth, reinforced by military education and varied Service and joint assignments, leads to a refined capability to command joint forces in peace and war.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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**JOINT OPERATIONS AREA**

An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA.

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 1-02

To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas. (See figure below.) The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ a joint operations area (JOA). A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful...
when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

Related Terms
area of responsibility; joint special operations area

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JOINT PETROLEUM OFFICE

The geographic combatant commander has the predominant fuels responsibility within a theater, and this responsibility is discharged by the Joint Petroleum Office (JPO). The JPO works in conjunction with its Service components and the Defense Fuel Supply Center to plan, coordinate, and oversee all phases of bulk petroleum support for US forces employed or planned for possible employment in the theater.

Related Terms
bulk petroleum

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-03 Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC.

**General.** Planning for joint operations is continuous throughout the range of military operations. As such, joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. In all its applications, the basic process remains fundamentally unchanged and provides a consistent and logical approach for integrating the activities of the National Command Authorities (NCA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and all other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in a coherent planning and execution process to attain military objectives.

Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of the entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES encompasses the entire JPEC. JOPES is, first and foremost, policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts. JOPES Automated Data Processing provides computer support, primarily for transportation planning associated with deployment operations.

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning for the mobilization, training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of forces assigned or committed to a theater of war or theater of operations are collectively termed the JPEC. The JPEC consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and their component commands, subunified commands, joint task forces (JTFs) (if established), and Defense agencies. (See figure below.)

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manages the joint operation planning process. In peacetime, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns planning tasks and resources, establishes planning relationships, and approves joint operation plans. In crisis and war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff orchestrates the development of strategic options and courses of action (COAs), resolves conflicts in resources, provides
recommendations and risk assessments to the NCA, conveys NCA decisions to the combatant commanders, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces.

Services. The Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provide interoperable forces for assignment to the combatant commanders and provide for logistic support to the combatant commanders. USSOCOM’s responsibility to equip special operations forces (SOF) is limited to special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services, and Service-common equipment specified in appropriate written agreements. The Services also maintain reserve forces and prepare for the expansion of capabilities in time of war. For joint operation planning, the Services and USSOCOM make recommendations regarding the apportionment of forces and resources to the Joint Staff and, upon approval, identify the specific units and support to be allocated to the combatant commanders’ joint operation plans. The Services prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated.

Combatant Commands. The combatant commanders are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and develop operation plans in the deliberate planning process. This is a continual process. During crises, they expand and refine existing plans or develop new plans, and recommend COAs. When military operations
are required in time of conflict, combatant commanders conduct joint operations. Campaigns are planned and conducted when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle.

**Service Component Commands.** The Service component commands perform joint planning functions both within the chain of command and under the administrative control of the Military Departments. Within the chain of command, the Service component commands recommend the proper force composition and employment of Service forces, provide Service forces and support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level operation plans or operation orders in support of taskings assigned to the combatant commands. Under administrative control, the Service component commands prepare and execute administrative and logistic plans to support operating forces.

**Special Operations Component Commands.** Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (SOCs) as subordinate unified commands to serve as the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) of their unified command. Similarly, subordinate joint force commanders may establish a joint special operations task force commander to serve as the JFSOCC of a subordinate joint force. This individual typically exercises operational control or tactical control over assigned and attached forces in order to enhance unity of effort of special operations throughout the joint force. USSOCOM provides similar support to the theater SOCs that the Services provide to their respective Service component commands within the combatant commands. The JFSOCC reports to the joint force commander and is the principal adviser for special operations within the joint force. The JFSOCC provides recommendations on organization and employment considerations for SOF and, when directed, prepares component-level operation plans.

**Subordinate Joint Commands.** When established, subunified commands and JTFs perform joint planning functions similar to those of the combatant commands for specified missions or designated joint operations areas. Such functions are accomplished under the direction of the authority that established the subordinate command.

**Related Terms**

joint operation planning

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENT**

The Joint Planning Document supports the National Military Strategy by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, joint planning document volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders and Defense agencies, and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

**Related Terms**

defense planning guidance; national military strategy

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
JOINT PUBLICATION

Publication of joint interest prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the Military Departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. It is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JP. JP 1-02

Only publications approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “joint publications.” Publications involving two or more Services that have not been reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be referred to as “multi-Service” and will identify the participating Services (e.g., Army and Air Force doctrine or Army, Navy, and Air Force procedures).

Related Terms

joint doctrine; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

JOINT REAR AREA

A specific land area within a joint force commander’s area of operations designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. JP 1-02

General. A joint rear area (JRA) is a specific land area within a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operational area designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The size of a JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the operational area, logistic support requirements, threat, or scope of the joint operation. A JRA is usually to the rear of the combat zone, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the combat zone. The airspace above the JRA is normally not included in the JRA; airspace is normally considered a combat zone governed by airspace control procedures.

A JRA may be collocated with the communications zone but normally would not include a naval area of operations (AO). Operations in sea areas are considered to be part of a combat zone and will not normally be included in a JRA. When a naval AO and a JRA meet along a coastline, the high water mark will normally designate the boundary between the two. Ports and harbors (but not the built-up areas around them) are normally included in the naval AO.

A JRA in a joint operation may adjoin the rear areas of one or more of the combat forces making up the combat power of the joint force. A JRA can be adapted to any modern environment. In any circumstance, a JRA may be segmented and may contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that may collectively make up a JRA.

Concurrent with the designation of a JRA, the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC is responsible for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA as directed by the JFC. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and ensuring secure and survivable communications with
all forces operating in the JRA. The area air defense commander (AADC) is responsible for the defense of the airspace above the JRA.

**General of the Army William T. Sherman on the Nature of the Rear Area**

“I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but [when observing troops in the rear] I feared that some calamity had happened at the front - the apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete - perfect order, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy’s shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.”

*Source: The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 1885*

**Operations.** Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint force. They are best described as broad functions and include, but are not limited to, the items shown in the figure below.

- **Security.** The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats in order to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the
joint force. Security is the principal concern of this publication. Other functions are discussed as they relate to the security of the JRA. Security includes area damage control.

Communications. A command, control, communications, and computer system should be established throughout the JRA that will provide for interoperable, secure, reliable, and redundant communications.

Intelligence. Effective intelligence support, merged with counterintelligence and law enforcement agency information, is essential to conducting successful security operations in the JRA. Current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates focused on the JRA should incorporate intelligence from all US, multinational, and host nation (HN) sources.

Sustainment. The primary mission of many of the forces in the JRA is to sustain the joint force. All security and counterintelligence activities are focused on providing a secure JRA in which force sustainment can continue. The time support units spend performing security and self defense operations may detract from their ability to meet support requirements.

Area Management. The effective utilization and positioning of military assets in the JRA is critical to successful operations. Both mission support and security should be considered when positioning assets throughout the JRA.

Movements. The planning, routing, scheduling, control, and security of the movement of personnel and materiel in the JRA is vital to the support of the joint force. The JFC normally centralizes transportation movement control at the highest level by designating a joint movement center where it can be exercised to ensure that common-user transportation resources are allocated to support command missions and priorities.

Infrastructure Development. The availability of adequate and secure facilities in the JRA for elements of the joint force is essential. Close coordination with HN forces and governing agencies is required for use of their facilities or for construction of new facilities on their territory as well as forces necessary to establish and maintain security of the facilities. The required level of base development should be established as early as possible in order to prevent overloading of transportation modes with excess construction material.

Host-Nation Support (HNS). A viable and friendly HN can provide invaluable civil and/or military assistance to US forces throughout the range of military operations. This assistance,
backed by mutual agreements between nations, can significantly contribute to support of the joint force and security of the JRA. The completion of a range of HN agreements is required in order to define relationships and roles explicitly in areas of strategic interest to the US. When more than one HN is involved, careful management is required to ensure that specific national restrictions are met. Joint operations areas encompassing more than one HN may require significantly different restrictions and sensitivities for each nation involved. Violations could result in loss of HNS, which could significantly affect US forces’ ability to achieve national objectives. Operations may occur in a foreign nation whose sovereignty remains viable and where HNS agreements are in effect. In such cases, responsibility for selected JRA functions may be passed to the HN. In any case, overall responsibility for JRA operations remains with the JFC.

Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC). Establishing and maintaining security in the JRA, although vital to the survivability and success of the joint force, is nevertheless an economy of force mission. The JFC dedicates assets for force protection operations in proportion to the severity of the threat in order to conserve resources and prevent degradation of support, which is the primary mission of most of the forces in the JRA. In a low-threat environment, where the inherent defensive capabilities of bases and support or HN forces are generally adequate to deter the threat and the focus of most security efforts is on thorough security planning, the JFC may determine that a JRAC working closely with appropriate commanders, staff, and HN commands has sufficient authority to manage the overall security of the JRA.

JRAC Selection Options. The JFC may designate a subordinate commander or a member of the JFC’s staff as the JRAC. The JFC considers mission requirements, force capabilities, the nature of the JRA, and the threat in determining the JRAC.

General JRAC Responsibilities. The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC accomplishes this by coordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure that they maintain the security of their respective AOs in order to facilitate sustainment, HNS, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The JRAC also ensures that commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice area management within their AOs with due consideration of security requirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the JRA. The JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area security requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint rear area.

Security Integration Responsibilities. Although other agencies or components may have primary responsibility for specific JRA functions, the JRAC is responsible for coordinating the security aspects of all functions throughout the JRA. The JRAC’s overall coordination responsibility for security of the JRA does not lessen the responsibility that component elements residing or operating in the JRA have for their own security.

Specific JRAC Responsibilities. Specific responsibilities across the range of military operations include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that the following applies:

- The security posture in the JRA supports the JFC’s concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations.
- The overall JRA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, multinational, and HN commands in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines.
• The chain of command established by the JFC and the degree of authority granted to the JRAC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US personnel and assets in the JRA.
• Sufficient response forces are identified to respond to anticipated threats to the JRA.
• The intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement networks are responsive to the needs of commanders operating in the JRA.
• Objective criteria are developed and disseminated for assessing the criticality and vulnerability of bases in the JRA in order to prioritize security improvements and position reaction forces or area damage control assets.
• Coordination with the AADC has been completed to ensure that air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, multinational, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations.

One of the most important JRAC responsibilities is to ensure an adequate NBC defense.

• Positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.
• Defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and procedures for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, to include NBC warning and reporting procedures.
• Appropriate liaison is established with multinational and HN commands for coordination of security issues.
• All relevant international and domestic (US and HN) legal guidelines impacting on security within the JRA (such as HNS agreements, Law of War guidance, status-of-forces agreements, and rules of engagement) are disseminated to appropriate command levels.
• Civil Affairs and Judge Advocate support are available to assist in resolution of security issues.
• Development and positioning of infrastructure are made with due consideration of security requirements.
• Component commander(s) in the JRA coordinate security at the boundaries of their AOs (if the JRA is divided) to ensure coordinated JRA security efforts.
• Threat estimates to the JRA are developed and disseminated to appropriate commands in a timely manner.
• A tactical combat force, if established by the JFC, is positioned and given the appropriate mission in accordance with JFC directives.
• Any additional security forces (US, multinational, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JRA defense plan.
• Key lines of communications through the JRA are protected to support current and future operations.
• Key movements and sustainment operations have priority for security, mine detection and clearing, and area damage control assets.
• Liaison is established with the naval coastal warfare commander to coordinate security operations. (NOTE: If it is necessary to plan and/or execute an amphibious operation in the JRA, the JRAC also establishes liaison with the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), as required. The JRAC’s authority will not infringe on the authority granted the CATF and CLF.)

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER

A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational SAR center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called JSRC. JP 1-02

Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). (See figure below.) The JSRC is a primary search and rescue (SAR) facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint SAR and combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational SAR center). The JSRC should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. During peacetime, standing JSRCs normally assist in developing integrated evasion and recovery concepts of operations to support operation plans (OPLANs), operation plan in concept format (CONPLANs), and peacetime operations. The standing JSRCs also coordinate training and exercises in order to provide a trained joint staff element for combat operations that is capable and ready to plan, coordinate, and execute joint CSAR missions as tasked by the joint force commander (JFC).

Responsibilities and Functions. Other typical CSAR-related JSRC responsibilities and functions in peacetime and combat are listed below.

Peacetime Operations
• Develop joint force CSAR standing operating procedures (SOPs).
• Develop CSAR communications plans.
• Establish reporting requirements for the JSRC and component rescue coordination centers (RCCs).
• Assist in the development of CSAR appendixes to Annex C (Operations) to OPLANs, CONPLANs, and operation orders (OPORDs). Ensure the CSAR appendixes are linked to related appendixes for casualty affairs, medical, repatriation, and mortuary affairs.
• Coordinate and deconflict component evasion and recovery (E&R) plans and review them for supportability.
• Develop an integrated personnel recovery concept of operations to support peacetime operations.
• Conduct or provide on-the-job training and informal training for JSRC personnel and component RCC augmentation personnel.
• Organize and conduct CSAR mission training exercises for the joint force.
• Coordinate peacetime SAR activities to provide realistic training for the JSRC in operational procedures.
• Develop a plan to transition from peacetime to combat operations.
  • Develop augmentation personnel requirements.
  • Establish additional communications support requirements.
  • Establish dedicated intelligence support requirements, to include joint force joint intelligence center (JIC)/joint intelligence support element support requirements.

Combat Operations
• Develop a joint force CSAR threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis.
• Develop and disseminate special instructions to be included in air tasking orders to specify the primary theater CSAR and recovery guidance, concepts, and specific procedures to be followed by all high-risk combatants.
• Alert appropriate components of the location where isolated personnel are known or believed to be located.
• Coordinate with national, theater JIC, host-nation, and component intelligence resources to gather information relating to the location and status of isolated personnel and the threat that may affect their successful recovery.
• Coordinate with the joint force psychological operations (PSYOP) officer on ways to influence favorably the local population regarding CSAR efforts.
• Coordinate and deconflict mutual CSAR support operations by joint force components and multinational forces.
• Monitor all CSAR incidents prosecuted by component RCCs.
• Maintain a data base and file on each isolated person until recovery is complete. Forward all files and the data base to the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency once the recovery mission is complete and the JFC no longer has a requirement to maintain the files. The files should not be destroyed.

**Other JSRC Responsibilities**

• Coordinates JFC tasking of other component RCCs to execute CSAR missions when notified that a component RCC is unable to do so or requires support.
• Coordinates with component commands for use of nondedicated CSAR resources when appropriate.
• Coordinates for use of special operations forces with the operations directorate or section (J-3) and the joint force special operations component as appropriate.
• Coordinates development of a CSAR task force with component CSAR controllers when appropriate.
• Coordinates with the intelligence directorate or section (J-2) and/or the special operations component to alert E&R nets, where established and activated, to assist isolated personnel.
• Alerts all forces operating in the area of the CSAR incident to report any evidence of isolated personnel.
• Determines if current operations will provide temporary air superiority in the vicinity of the isolated personnel, resulting in collateral support of the CSAR effort.

**Joint Search and Rescue Center Authority.** The JFC should grant authority to the JSRC commensurate with CSAR responsibilities assigned. For example, JFCs may exercise their authority to task component forces committed to conduct joint CSAR operations through the JSRC. If the JFC has tasked a component commander to designate the component RCC to function also as the JSRC, the JFC should give the necessary authority to that component commander, who subsequently may grant the necessary authority to the JSRC director. If the JSRC is serving as part of the JFC staff, the JFC should give the necessary authority to the JSRC director. Following are examples of types of authority the JFC may give to the designated component commander or to the JSRC:

The JFC may grant authority to the designated component commander or to the JSRC to task component commands to support CSAR missions of another component when that component needs assistance or cannot accomplish the mission. The supporting component commanders should take such actions to fulfill the tasking as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. In cases where these supporting component commanders have conflicts with assigned tasks that cannot be resolved, those commanders may address their concerns with the JFC for resolution.

During joint operations, the JSRC is the focal point of all joint CSAR coordination. The JSRC should have authority to conduct joint CSAR coordination to all levels of command.

• Authority to coordinate and deconflict support provided to component CSAR operations.
• Authority to develop and promulgate joint force CSAR SOPs.
• Authority to develop and promulgate joint force CSAR communications plans. These plans are included in SAR appendixes to the operations annexes of OPLANs and OPORDs and should be coordinated with the joint force command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate (J-6) for deconfliction.
• Authority to establish reporting requirements for the JSRC and component RCCs.
• Authority to monitor all CSAR operations prosecuted within the JFC’s area of responsibility/joint operations area.
• Authority to review CSAR and E&R appendixes to component OPLANs, CONPLANs, and OPORDs.
• Authority to establish operational interfaces with other joint force staff sections and elements as considered appropriate and necessary. These interfaces could include but are not limited to J-2, J-3, logistics directorate, strategic plans and policy directorate, J-6, air operations supporting arms, PSYOP, and other sections and elements, as appropriate.
• Authority to establish coordination with CSAR agencies and forces from multinational forces, as appropriate.

**Related Terms**

combat search and rescue

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

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**JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER**

The commander within the joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting such operations with conventional nonspecial operations air activities. The joint special operations air component commander normally will be the commander with the preponderance of assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint special operations aviation assets. The joint special operations air component commander may be directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander or to any nonspecial operations component or joint force commander as directed. Also called JSOACC. JP 1-02

The joint force special operations component commander may choose to organize functional components in lieu of or in combination with Service components. The most common special operations functional organization is the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The JSOACC is the subordinate commander within a special operations command or joint special operations task force responsible for planning and executing joint special air operations and for coordinating and deconflicting those operations with conventional air operations. The JSOACC normally will be the special operations forces aviation commander providing the preponderance of air assets or most capable of controlling special air operations in a specific situation.

**Related Terms**

combat search and rescue; joint force special operations component commander

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AREA

A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA.

A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a joint force commander (JFC) who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

Related Terms
operational area; special operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF.

A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is organized in a manner similar to conventional joint task force (JTF). A JSOTF normally is developed to meet a specific special operations (SO) mission or a campaign of limited duration. It may be formed as a standing organization, depending on National Command Authorities or theater command guidance. For example, a geographic combatant commander could elect to form a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific region of the theater and a JSOTF subordinate to that JTF to plan and execute SO required to support the overall conventional effort. Likewise, a theater special operations command (SOC) could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the area of responsibility assigned by the geographic combatant commander.

A JSOTF is an organization flexible in both size and composition. Its flexibility provides its primary utility. A JSOTF may be small and temporary or larger and more enduring, depending upon the national objective or theater task at hand. It may be specifically established as a joint organization to meet a specific mission or campaign or it may be formed around an
existing Service force structure. In the latter case, an existing theater SOC component might be directed to form the core of a JSOTF when the preponderant force comes from that component. In such an instance, the existing headquarters would be augmented by appropriate forces from other Services and components. (See figure below.)

For example, a theater SOC commander may designate the Army special operations forces (SOF) component as a JSOTF to pursue a foreign internal defense (FID) operation in a given country. In this instance, the Army SOF is the preponderant force, but it may require augmentation in the form of air, maritime, or headquarters staff support to provide military assistance beyond its own capabilities. The FID and/or Security Assistance role presents some unique operational control considerations. Routinely, military personnel conducting such a program are operationally responsible to a military assistance group that reports to the US Ambassador.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Joint Staff.
The Joint Staff is under the exclusive direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff will perform such duties as the Chairman prescribes and will perform such duties under such procedures as the Chairman prescribes to assist the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Joint Staff includes officers selected in proportional numbers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. Selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff is made by the Chairman from a list of officers submitted by the Services. Each officer whose name is submitted must be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that Service. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on such a list. The Chairman may suspend from duty and recommend the reassignment of any officer assigned to the Joint Staff.

The Chairman, after coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, may select a Director, Joint Staff. The Chairman manages the Joint Staff and its Director.

The Joint Staff will not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and will have no executive authority. The Joint Staff is organized and operates along conventional staff lines to support the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities. In addition, the Joint Staff is the focal point for the Chairman to ensure comments and concerns of the combatant commanders are well represented and advocated during all levels of coordination.

“The military staff must be adequately composed: it must contain the best brains in the fields of land, air and sea warfare, propaganda war, technology, economics, politics and also those who know the peoples’ life.”

General Erich von Ludendorff, Total War 1935

Joint Force Commander’s Staff. A joint staff should be established for commands comprised of more than one Service. The staff of the commander of a combatant command,
subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service) must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

A joint force commander (JFC) is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions. A joint staff should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of the members among the Services concerned. In determining the composition of a joint staff, due regard should be given to the composition of the forces and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure the commander’s staff understands the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component part of the force. The number of personnel on a joint staff should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task to be performed. For the staff to function smoothly and properly, the personnel who compose the joint staff should be assigned to it long enough to gain experience and be effective. Each person assigned to serve on a joint staff will be responsible to the JFC and should have thorough knowledge of the JFC’s policies.

The commander of a force for which a joint staff is established should ensure that the recommendations of any member of the staff receive consideration. The degree of authority to act in the name of and for the commander is a matter to be specifically prescribed by the commander. Orders and directives from a higher to a subordinate command should be issued in the name of the commander of the higher command to the commander of the immediate subordinate command and not directly to elements of that subordinate command. Exceptions may sometimes be required under certain emergency or crisis situations. Command and control of nuclear forces is an example of one such exception.

To expedite the execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands, a commander may authorize his staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands concerning the details of plans and directives that have been received or are to be issued. Each staff division must coordinate its actions and planning with the other staff divisions concerned and keep them currently informed of actions taken and the progress achieved. Normally, each of the general joint staff divisions is assigned responsibility for a particular type of problem and subject and for coordinating the work of the special staff divisions and other agencies of the staff that relate to that problem or subject.

Joint staff divisions and special staff sections should be limited to those functions for which the JFC is responsible or that require the commander’s general supervision in the interest of unity of effort. The authority that establishes a joint force should make the provisions for furnishing necessary personnel for the commander’s staff.

**Staff Organization.** The staff organization should generally conform to the principles established in this section.

Principal Staff Officer. The Chief of Staff functions as the principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser to the commander. The Chief of Staff coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. One or more deputies to the Chief of Staff and a secretary of the staff may be provided to assist the Chief of Staff in the performance of assigned duties. A deputy Chief of Staff should normally be from a Service other than that of the Chief of Staff. The secretary of the staff is the executive in the office of the Chief of Staff and is responsible for routing and forwarding correspondence and papers and maintaining office records.
Personal Staff Group of the Commander. The commander’s personal staff perform duties prescribed by the commander and are responsible directly to the commander. This group, normally composed of aides to the commander and staff officers handling special matters over which the commander wishes to exercise close personal control, will usually include a political adviser and a public affairs officer.

Special Staff Group. The special staff group consists of representatives of technical or administrative services and can include representatives from government or nongovernment agencies. The general functions of the special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and recommendations to the commander and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. Because the headquarters of a joint force is concerned primarily with broad operational matters rather than with technical problems associated with administration and support of Service forces, this group should be small to avoid unnecessary duplication of corresponding staff sections or divisions within the Service component headquarters. When a commander’s headquarters is organized without a special staff group, the officers who might otherwise compose the special staff group may be organized as branches of the divisions of the joint staff or as additional joint staff divisions.

Joint Force Staff Divisions. The general or joint staff group is made up of staff divisions corresponding to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems. The head of each staff division may be designated as a Director or as an Assistant Chief of Staff. The Directors or Assistant Chiefs of Staff provide staff supervision for the commander of all activities pertaining to their respective functions. (See figure below.)

- **Manpower and Personnel Division (J-1).** The J-1 is charged with manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command), and enemy prisoners of war. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the division should consider the established policies of the Military Departments.

- **Intelligence Division (J-2).** The primary function of the J-2 is to support the commander and the staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area. Within the scope of the essential elements of information, the Intelligence Division actively participates in joint staff planning and in planning, coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling a concentration of intelligence efforts on the proper enemy items of intelligence interest at the appropriate time. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The J-2 is responsible for the operation of the Joint Intelligence Center for the joint force commander.

- **Operations Division (J-3).** The J-3 assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and follow-through until specific operations are completed. In this capacity the division plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. When the joint staff includes a Plans Division, it also performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities. The J-3 is responsible for the operation of the Joint Operations Center for the joint force commander.
• Logistics Division (J-4). The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. Because many of the problems confronting this division are necessarily of a single-Service nature, the established policies of the Military Departments should be considered. This division is responsible for advising the commander of the logistic support that can be provided for proposed courses of action. In general, this division formulates policies to ensure effective logistic support for all forces in the command and coordinates execution of the commander’s policies and guidance.

• Plans and Policy Division (J-5). The J-5 assists the commander in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint operation plans, and associated estimates of the situation. The Plans and Policy Division may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When the commander does not organize a separate Plans and Policy Division, the planning functions are performed by the Operations Division.

• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Division (J-6). The J-6 assists the commander in all responsibilities for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. This includes development and integration of C4 architectures and plans which support the command’s operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of
interoperable C4 systems to exercise command in the execution of the mission. When a commander does not organize a separate C4 systems division, these functions may be performed by the Operations Division or by a special staff division or section.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
• issuing planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

The JSCP base document provides the following:
• A summary of the current national military strategy for deterrence and war and a statement of general strategic taskings to combatant commanders. The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the combatant commanders in the attainment of national military objectives.
• Planning guidance to the combatant commanders governing the development of plans.
• Planning guidance to the Services and Combat Support Agencies for supporting the combatant commanders in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks.
• A list of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period under various conditions of mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the combatant commanders for planning.
• Service- and force-unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings.
• An intelligence estimate for planning. This estimate is an appraisal of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. It will support activities during the JSCP planning cycle.

Related Terms
joint operation planning; joint strategic planning system

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the armed forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS.

General. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by title 10, US Code, 6 April 1991, and further delineated in Department of Defense (DOD) 5100.1, 25 September 1987. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) memorandum of policy (MOP) 7 to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, provides policy and procedures governing the operation of the JSPS. The purpose and outputs of the JSPS are summarized in the figure below.

The central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is a continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations,
doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR issue papers are presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and solicit the Chairman’s guidance for changing the military strategy if required.

JSPS Products. The four products of the JSPS are as follows:

National Military Strategy. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain national security objectives. The NMS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and to guide the development of the JSCP. Following Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is forwarded to the President. The NMS may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance for use in National Command Authorities (NCA)-directed actions.

The Joint Planning Document. The JPD supports the NMS by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, JPD volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders and Defense agencies, and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA. It is reviewed at least biennially for required changes.

Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on how well the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) conform to established priorities. It also provides assistance to the Secretary in decisions concerning the defense program subsequent to receipt of the POMs. The CPA summarizes the views of the Chairman on the balance and
Joint Strategic Planning System Interactions. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and strategic guidance for use in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to review the national security environment and US national security objectives. Additionally, it provides the means to evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The JSPS is also a formal means by which the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders carry out some of their statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the JSPS process must establish the opportunity for their timely and substantive participation in the development of every JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources allocated, JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate capabilities and to assess the adequacy and risk associated with the programs and budgets of the Military Departments and Defense agencies and, where appropriate, propose changes to those programs and budgets in conformity with strategic priorities.

JSPS Plans and Documents. The JSPS comprises plans and documents that are described in CJCS MOP 7 and will not be superseded by other documents without the express approval of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JSPS-Related Assessments and Guidance. In addition to the JSPS plans and documents included in CJCS MOP 7, assessments are performed and planning guidance is issued to support those plans and documents. The following is a list of assessments and guidance that contain critical JSPS-related information and other key documents.

Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). The JMNA is prepared by the Chairman in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

Logistics Sustainability Analysis (LSA). The LSA of an operation plan will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders’ operational plan. The LSA provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities by: documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic capabilities, identifying logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process. The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with the Services, supporting commanders, and DOD Agencies. The LSA assesses the combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics: material, logistic support forces, infrastructure, and lift. The LSA integrates the assessments of the individual pillars of logistics by optimizing and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainers of logistic support. Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services and DOD Agencies assessment of their ability to support the commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) plan, followed by the CINC’s assessment.
of the inputs along with supported commander’s analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG furnishes the Secretary of Defense’s programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of department POMs for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between JSPS and the PPBS.

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the primary source document for the JSCP.

Related Terms
joint planning document; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; joint strategy review; national military strategy

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT STRATEGY REVIEW

The central process of the Joint Strategic Planning System is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is a continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR issue papers are presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and solicit the Chairman’s guidance for changing the military strategy if required.

Related Terms
Joint Strategic Planning System

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

JOINT SUPPRESSION MEASURES

Joint Suppression Measures. During joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) operations, suppression requirements vary according to mission objectives, system capabilities, and threat complexity. Major employment considerations include overall air defense system architecture, capabilities of system components, geography and terrain, disposition and density of defenses, weather, resupply and repair capabilities, and friendly force organization, training, and equipment. J-SEAD operations can be accomplished through destructive and disruptive means as shown in the figure below. Using sound combinations of the two can maximize their effectiveness.
Destructive Means. Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces. Examples of destructive suppression of enemy air defenses assets are bombs, air and surface-to-surface missiles, air scatterable mines, and artillery.

Disruptive Means. Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay or neutralize enemy air defense systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means may be either active or passive.

- Active Means include electronic attack (antiradiation missiles, directed energy, electromagnetic jamming and electromagnetic deception) expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), tactics such as deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
- Passive Means include emission control, camouflage, infrared shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

Mutual Support. Joint air operations may require support for suppression of enemy air defenses from resources other than aircraft. The joint force commander may direct components to support joint air operations with assets, capabilities, or forces, in addition to the air capabilities/forces provided. The measures a commander may request include the following:
- reconnaissance and target-acquisition support to gain specific coverage in the area of operations.
- electronic warfare to provide close-in jamming and standoff jamming of radar, data links, and voice communication signals.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.4 JTCP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is any activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface based air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) is a broad term that encompasses all SEAD activities provided by components of a joint force in support of one another. As shown in the figure below, J-SEAD operations can fall into three categories: area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA) air defense system suppression, localized suppression, and opportune suppression. AOR/JOA air defense system suppression creates increasingly favorable conditions for friendly operations by disabling enemy air defense systems (or major capabilities of those systems). Localized suppression operations normally have specified time and space limitations because they support specific operations or missions. Opportune suppression includes self-defense and offensive attacks against enemy air defense targets of opportunity.

SEAD and J-SEAD are not ends in and of themselves but, rather, they are a subset of counterair operations which create favorable conditions for all friendly air operations. Therefore, SEAD and J-SEAD need to be an integral part of planning and executing joint air operations. SEAD objectives are specified by the joint force commander, who will consider the unique capabilities of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Each component of a joint force has unique suppression capabilities and responsibilities to support J-SEAD operations. These responsibilities involve numerous command and staff functions in both the planning and the execution phases.

There are three primary objectives for planning J-SEAD in support of air operations. First, accomplish an accurate appraisal of enemy air defenses and their ability to influence the outcome of overall air operations. Second, decide on the scope, magnitude, and duration of SEAD operations necessary to reduce enemy air defense capabilities to acceptable risk levels. Finally, determine the capabilities of available suppression assets, as well as potential competing requirements for these forces.
The Beginnings of SEAD

It is hardly a surprise that since the time soldiers first left the surface of the earth, militarily, opponents have sought ways to bring them back down. There are reports of balloon and anti-balloon artillery in the American Civil War and the Franco Prussian War, and in 1890 the Russians tested a field-gun battery against a balloon moored three kilometers away. The first aircraft downed in combat fell to ground fire in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912; so when World War I began, there were precedents for ground-based air defense.

It is similarly unremarkable, then, that whoever controlled this third dimension above the battlefield would seek to stay there with equal vigor. During WW I, operations to suppress enemy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) were confined to strafing and bombing enemy artillery and machine gun positions. Since that time, the mission of neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading an enemy air defense system in a specific area by physical and/or electronic means has come to be known as suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and has grown tremendously in importance. There are good reasons why. If an air force of 1,000 aircraft flying two sorties per day per aircraft suffered only a 1 percent attrition rate, that air force would fly 45,150 sorties and have only 557 aircraft remaining at the end of 30 days of combat. If the attrition rate jumped to 10 percent, that same air force would fly only 8,320 sorties and have but two aircraft remaining at the end of 30 days!

The advent of radar in the interwar years made ground-based air defenses, as well as fighters, more effective, and its potential was clearly recognized. The Luftwaffe attempted to destroy the British radar chains at the outset of the Battle of Britain to “put Britain’s eyes out” and make the rest of the plan for attaining air superiority over Britain easier. The Allies also understood the importance of the German radars and flew numerous sorties in attempts to destroy them. To this end, the British developed a radar homing device fitted to three Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoons. The “Abdullah” equipment worked as intended, however, the aircraft were unarmed, flew only with escort fighters, and provided no new information because the locations of German fixed radars were already well known.

During the Second World War, German AAA proved to be a formidable and deadly defense against Allied aircraft, both bombers and fighters. Attrition rates due to flak during the late summer, 1944 became so high that Eighth Air Force was forced to form specific procedures to reduce these losses. The Eighth Air Force measures recommended a number of tactics to counter the AAA threat to blind-bombing aircraft. When possible, bomber pilots were not to overfly flak defenses en route to and from their targets. Bombers were also to fly at the highest possible altitude consistent with offensive and defensive considerations (i.e., clouds, formation, target visibility, etc.). They also recommended planning bomber spacing and axes of attack to make the fullest use of Window and Carpet countermeasures.

Window was the code name for chaff, thin strips of aluminum that “plumed” when deployed, reflecting a much larger image to the radar on the ground and adding to the radar operators’ confusion. Laid in trails, the chaff formed a protective screen for bombers flying within 2,000 feet of the stream. Carpet
was a radar jammer which caused interference in the reception of signals by AAA radar. Bombers enjoyed some protection from radar detection when flying, optimally, within one mile of Carpet equipped aircraft. Besides the nonlethal suppression tactics, more direct methods were also used to counter the deadly flak. The first objective of Operation Market Garden, the September 1944 Allied assault to place three divisions behind German lines, was to provide “anti-aircraft neutralization support,” using bomber and fighter aircraft to strike the anti-aircraft installations along the routes to be followed by the troop carrier aircraft and in the areas surrounding the drop and landing zones.

In the Pacific, operations virtually mirrored those in the European theater. As the Japanese increased the numbers and sophistication of their radars, the US increased the numbers of assets assigned to counter them. The US forces employed B-24 and B-29 “ferret” aircraft to locate and jam the Japanese radars. B-25 gunships equipped with radar homing receivers were used in the lethal-suppression role, flying down a radar beam until they located the site visually and attacking it with their nose-mounted cannons.

In the Second World War, ground-based air defenses proved to be a lethal counter to US air power. However, loss rates varied with the mission flown. Aircraft which operated at lower altitudes were much more vulnerable to enemy flak than those that operated at higher altitudes. Destructive defense suppression efforts were only part of the solution to the flak problem. Good tactics and the use of electronic countermeasures were also important means for reducing aircraft loss rates. These conclusions would also be borne out in later wars.


Related Terms

<table>
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<th>Source Joint Publications</th>
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<tr>
<td>JP 3-01.4 JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)</td>
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The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP.

The purpose of joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces. Joint doctrine and JTTP will not contain policy. Policy will be established in other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents and can only be referenced in joint publications.

Joint doctrine (or JTTP) applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.
Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are written for those who implement joint doctrine such as:

- commanders of joint forces;
- commanders of subordinate commands;
- commanders at echelons where joint forces interact.

**Related Terms**

**joint doctrine**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-01 Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and JTTP Development Program

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**JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD**

A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB.

Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on joint force commander’s (JFC’s) apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs task commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function based on the JFC’s concept of operations and the individual’s experience, expertise, and situational awareness appropriate to the situation.

The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational Targeting Coordination Board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board.

JFCs will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess or have access to a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism is also needed to facilitate this process at this level. All components are normally involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.
The Joint Target List

A consolidated list of selected targets considered to have military significance in the joint operations area.

The joint target list (JTL) is normally constructed by the unified command with support from components and with inputs from the Joint Staff and other national agencies. The JTL contains prioritized target categories (command and control, airfields, lines of communications, and others as appropriate), listing specific targets. It also contains a sufficient level of detail to assist complete target identification, location, and assessment. Upon direction of the joint force commander (JFC), the JTL is updated daily or as required via target information report messages from components. Maintenance of the JTL may be conducted by the JFC’s staff or as directed by the JFC (e.g., Joint Targeting Coordination Board). During execution, the JTL continues to serve as an updated reference. Consideration of any requirements imposed by the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement is also essential in targeting development.

Related Terms
- joint targeting coordination board; targeting

Source Joint Publications
- JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
- JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

Joint Task Force

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF.

As shown in the figure below, a joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (A naval force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps forces does not by itself constitute a joint task force.)

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander and assigns the mission and forces. The commander of a JTF exercises operational control over assigned and normally over attached forces. The commander is responsible for making recommendations to the superior commander on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the establishing commander.
JTF commanders are also responsible to the establishing commander for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.

The JTF commander may also be a Service component commander. When this is the case, the commander also has the responsibilities associated with Service component command for the forces belonging to the parent Service.

The commander of a JTF will have a joint staff with appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command.

**Related Terms**

- joint force

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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**JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD**

The Joint Transportation Board (JTB) will establish priorities and allocate common-user transportation resources within the theater. The JTB will process all requests for reapportionment or adjustment of established allocations from the component commanders.

**Related Terms**

- logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS.

As shown in the figure below, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission services for intelligence information. JWICS incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of circuit is available. The architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and assure that support is maximized for a theater engaged in military operations.

All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels will be via JWICS. This system supports the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management. The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a “push-pull” system. A “pull” concept will result in joint force commanders (JFCs) receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The “pull” capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be “pushed” to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Each JWICS node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed via allocation of bandwidth, allowing simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications. JWICS is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network.
Related Terms

Sources Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

**Lines Of Communications.** The lines of communications (LOCs) consist of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

**Theater Transportation Network.** The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

**Units.** Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

**Host-Nation Support.** Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

*Related Terms*

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0  
Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS**

To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander’s strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander’s theater objectives. These concepts are shown in the figure below. Because of the ambiguous nature of the threat in some plans, all of these concepts may not be applicable. Where possible, they should at least be considered and identified in the plan.

**KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS**

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of joint operation planning doctrine:

- **Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.**
- **Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat.**
- **Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.**
- **Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to include the commander’s intent for each phase.**

*Related Terms*

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0  
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
LANDING PLAN

1. In amphibious operations, a collective term referring to all individually prepared naval and landing force documents that, taken together, present in detail all instructions for execution of the ship-to-shore movement. 2. In airlift operations, the sequence, method of delivery, and place of arrival of troops and materiel.

Amphibious Operations. The landing plan is essentially the plan for the ship-to-shore movement of the landing force (LF). It is predicated on the scheme of maneuver ashore and the means available to move the LF ashore.

Planning for the ship-to-shore movement follows a general sequence of development. Detailed planning for the ship-to-shore movement cannot begin until after the concept of operations ashore (including the scheme of maneuver) is formulated and approved. The landing plan must be substantially completed before embarkation planning can begin. The landing plan must be carefully integrated with the plan of supporting fires and must provide for the requisite combat service support of all forces ashore.

Basic Considerations.

Basic Requirements. The basic requirements for maximum support to initial tactical operations ashore are the maintenance of tactical integrity in the LF and achieving the required degree of concentration or dispersion of assault shipping.

- Tactical Integrity. The organization for landing must ensure adequate control upon landing with a rapid achievement of overall tactical control by commanders of each echelon. Maintenance of tactical integrity is accomplished by proper combat loading of assault shipping and by proper assignment of troops to landing ships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters in the landing plan.
- Concentration or Dispersion of Assault Shipping. The required degree of concentration or dispersion of assault shipping is reflected in the organization of sea areas in the objective area, including preparation and implementation of the sea echelon plan.

Availability of Amphibious Shipping and Ship-to-Shore Movement Assets. The type and quantity of available assault shipping and ship-to-shore movement assets will influence every aspect of the planning and execution of an amphibious operation.

Defense of the Amphibious Task Force. The protection of the amphibious task force (ATF) is a matter of mutual concern to and cooperation between the commander of the amphibious task force and the commander of the landing force. Two types of threats must be considered in planning and executing an amphibious operation: threats to the LF and threats to ATF shipping. LF planning must consider the use of LF assets (e.g., aircraft, REDEYE missiles) in the defense of the ATF. Protection comprising both active and passive measures must be provided during all phases of the amphibious operation. Of particular importance during the ship-to-shore movement is the protection acquired through speed of execution and aggressiveness in the conduct of the assault.

- Active Protection. Active protection includes offensive air operations, air defense, antisubmarine and anti-small-boat screens, covering forces, electronic countermeasures, smoke, and naval gunfire.
- Passive Protection. Passive protection places major emphasis on dispersion and mobility. Dispersion is achieved initially through unit separation afforded by the proper embarkation
Mobility. Planning must incorporate sufficient flexibility to respond to changing situations and to exploit weaknesses in enemy defenses when discovered. Alternate plans and plans for employment of reserves contribute to flexibility.

Fire Support. Planning must include the use and coordination of all fire support means.

Speed and Control. The requirement for speed and positive control in executing an amphibious operation must be emphasized in each phase of the operation.

Special Considerations.

Concept of Operations. The LF concept of operations ashore is the principal determinant in development of the landing plan. As the basis for the landing plan, the concept of operations ashore itself is influenced by many factors; e.g., intelligence on enemy dispositions, the combat power available, hydrographic conditions in the landing area, and the beaches and landing zones available. The concept of operations is the basis on which all subsequent, inverse planning for the amphibious operation as a whole is predicated.

Combat Loading. The arrangement of personnel and the stowage of equipment and supplies in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the organization embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at the required time.

Organization for Embarkation. The organization for embarkation must support both the plan for landing and the concept of operations ashore. It must also provide for maximum flexibility to support alternate plans that may be adopted. The landing plan is based on conditions and enemy capabilities known or believed to have existed in the amphibious objective area before embarkation of the assault troops. A change in conditions affecting either friendly or enemy forces during the transit to the objective area may necessitate modifications to the landing plan without the opportunity for reconfiguring the embarkation organization. The extent to which such changes to the landing plan can be accommodated depends on the flexibility within the organization for embarkation.

Air Operations. The force commander’s landing plan links air movement to the overall tactical plan and is the basis for joint development of the air movement plan. To develop the landing plan, planners should have the following information:

- overall commander’s priorities;
- subordinate unit tactical plan;
- subordinate unit landing plan.

The landing plan contains five elements of information: the sequence of delivery (starting with time over target through offload and departure); the method of delivery; the time of delivery; the place of delivery of troops, equipment, and supplies into the objective area; and the assembly plan. (See figure below.)

The nature and location of the airfield, drop zone (DZ), landing zone (LZ), and extraction zone (EZ) are basic considerations in preparing the landing plan. Landing areas should be large enough to accommodate initial forces. The following are desirable characteristics of an airfield, DZ, LZ, or EZ:

- near to or, if the enemy situation permits, directly on top of the objective;
- free of nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination and natural obstacles;
- avoids enemy air defenses and strong ground forces;
- easily identified from the air;
- straight-line, minimum threat approach to the objective area permitting proper aircraft alignment;
• near dominating terrain, good road networks, and terrain favorable for defense against attack;
• sufficient in size for rapid delivery of the force or, if airdropped, to allow delivery in a single pass;
• adequate cover and concealment for troops to assemble and reorganize near the landing area;
• minimum construction required to maintain or upgrade an airfield, LZ, or EZ;
• outside the range of enemy suppressive fires.

Mass aerial delivery of forces requires large, unobstructed drop zone areas from which the forces can effect a rapid assembly and reorganization.
LANDING ZONE

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>JP 3-02.1</td>
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**LANDING ZONE**

Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft.  

**General.** A landing zone (LZ) is any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. In the theater airlift context, LZs are usually less sophisticated than airfields, with facilities meeting only the minimum requirements of anticipated operations by specific aircraft. They may vary from isolated dirt strips with no off-runway aircraft-handling areas to hard surface airfields with limited support infrastructure. The main advantage of LZs is that in most cases it is possible to find or construct one nearer ground combat units than existing airfields. A close-by, but less sophisticated LZ offers fewer delays in providing airland resupply to forward deployed troops.

The parameters for selecting and preparing LZs are many, but they usually include: anticipated capacity requirements; the nearness of the LZ to the user; the operating and defensive requirements of the aircraft expected to transit the field, and; the time and engineering capabilities available and required to open and/or maintain the LZ.

**Locations.** The component commanders and the joint force engineer determine the most suitable LZ locations. The selected sites must meet Air Force operational requirements, ground component requirements, and construction considerations.

**Construction.** If an airfield is to be constructed, the supported component engineer, the joint force commander designated representative, and the Air Force staff engineer must agree on its specific site. The supported component engineer controls the selected site until the designated representative of the airlift mission commander accepts use of the LZ.

Aircraft may have to use LZ facilities before construction is completed. In addition to emergency landing situations, delivery of additional construction equipment, emergency supplies, or reinforcing units may be necessary. Such use should be jointly agreed to by the supported component construction engineer and the designated representative of the airlift mission commander.

When established construction requirements have been met and the airlift mission commander or designated representative accepts the LZ, operational control of the LZ passes to the airlift mission commander. The construction engineer assigns a minimal force to repair and maintain the critical landing surfaces, taxiway, and hardstands. The composition and size of the unit will depend on the threat situation, type and location of the LZ, availability of engineer forces, expected LZ use, and weather.

**Criteria.** Although the senior planning headquarters assigns the general landing area, subordinate units usually designate specific LZs. Desirable characteristics of LZs are ease of identification from the air; a straight, unobstructed, and secure approach for aircraft; and close proximity to ground objectives. LZs to be developed into more sophisticated facilities should have these additional characteristics as shown in the figure below.

LZs should be classified according to the applicable aircraft and airfield criteria furnished by the construction engineer. Essential airland facilities should be identified before the operation begins. Minimum facilities are provided initially to permit early occupancy and
for safe and efficient landing operations. Plans and orders should provide for later improvements to increase the efficiency of operations and safety factors of the facility.

LZ dimensions vary according to the types of aircraft involved. Factors considered include aircraft ground roll, temperature, field elevation, and nature and conditions of the landing surface. Expected maximum takeoff and landing gross weights, obstructions, and terrain on approach and departure should also be considered.

Existing facilities, such as roads and open areas, should be used to reduce the time and effort for new construction. Furthermore, airland facilities should be dispersed to avoid becoming lucrative targets. Host-nation support agencies may be used to identify emergency or contingency runways.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

**LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT**

See law of war. JP 1-02

**The Law of Armed Conflict.** Throughout the history of war, treaties and customs have developed which generally represent the collective views of the belligerents. Their principles protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard fundamental human rights, and facilitate the restoration of peace by limiting the amount of force and the manner in which force is applied. Together, these treaties and customs are known as the law of armed conflict. Neither the law of armed conflict nor national policy sanction devastation as an end in itself. Both
recognize the need for a reasonable connection between the destruction of life and property and the defeat of the enemy’s forces. That having been said, neither the law of armed conflict nor any other customary or conventional international law prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. However, to comply with the law, a particular use of any weapon must satisfy the long-standing targeting rules of military necessity, proportionality, and avoidance of collateral damage and unnecessary suffering. Nuclear weapons are unique in this analysis only in their greater destructive potential (although they also differ from conventional weapons in that they produce radiation and electromagnetic effects and, potentially, radioactive fallout). In some circumstances, the use of a nuclear weapon may therefore be inappropriate. Treaties may impose additional restrictions on nuclear weapons.

Related Terms

law of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-12.1 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations

LAW OF WAR

That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. JP 1-02

Law of War (see figure below). In the event of armed conflict involving US forces, it is US law that the law of war (also called law of armed conflict) and the obligations of the US Government under that law are observed and enforced by the US forces. US commanders will ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) Law of War Program is implemented in accordance with DOD and Service directives and that adequate procedures are in place for the prompt reporting and thorough investigation of any allegations of violations of the law of war by or against US or enemy personnel. Three general categories within the law of war relating most closely to security operations are briefly discussed below. Legal representatives should be consulted concerning implementation of these basic laws.

Treatment of Combatants. During armed conflict, treatment of combatants is governed by the law of war and relevant host nation and domestic laws. Enemy personnel acting in accordance with the law of war will be accorded enemy prisoner of war (EPW) status. All enemy combatants will be accorded the protection of the law of war and will be treated in a manner consistent with EPW status until an Article 5 tribunal makes a determination of the merits of the claim to EPW status.

Treatment of Insurgents. US policy requires and directs humane care and treatment for insurgents held in US military custody during counterinsurgency operations from the moment of capture until release or repatriation. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Treatment of Prisoners. The treatment of EPWs is outlined in the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, which prescribes specific protective measures for EPWs captured during armed conflict.
Leonard’s Treasury andRulers of Egypt andSidon, including Greek translations of the ancient Greek and Egyptian sources. The monumental work of Diodorus (about 110 BC) also provides an account of the Ptolemies. Moreover, the ancient Egyptian and Greek texts of the Bible, as well as the Jewish sources of the Rabbinic literature, many of them composed in the second and first centuries BC, offer valuable insights into the political and social history of the Ptolemies’ Egypt. In the Near East, the works of Josephus, the first-century AD Jewish historian, and the second-century AD Jewish historian, Flavius Josephus, provide rich and detailed information about the Ptolemies’ Egypt and their interactions with the other powers of the Near East and the Mediterranean. The works of Herodotus, the Greek historian of the 5th century BC, and the Egyptian historian Manetho, the priest of Ammon in the 3rd century BC, also offer valuable insights into the political and social history of the Ptolemies’ Egypt.
agencies such as government field offices and local law enforcement agencies. It is important to determine details about the agencies and organizations that have an active role in the issue at hand to ensure that those requiring information receive it and those that have information provide it.

Related Terms

**LEAD NATION COMMAND**

In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic command and control structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

Related Terms

**LEGITIMACY**

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

In military operations other than war (MOOTW), legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the US public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations and humanitarian and civic assistance programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.

Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.

Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

**LEAD NATION COMMAND**

JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
LEVELS OF AUTHORITY

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the responsibility assigned. There are various levels of authority used for US military forces, four are command relationships — combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, and support. The other authorities are coordinating authority, administrative control, and direct liaison authorized.

Related Terms
administrative control; combatant command (command authority); coordinating authority; direct liaison authorized; operational control; support; tactical control

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

LEVELS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply in war and in operations other than war. Logistic support within these levels is demonstrated in the way the Joint Staff, Services, and warfighting commanders handle logistics. The Joint Staff and Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The supported and supporting commanders’ logistic staffs manage both the strategic and operational logistic issues affecting missions assigned to the combatant commanders in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by the National Command Authorities and other such areas as directed by the combatant commander. The Services and the subordinate commanders down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. Within their areas of responsibility, geographic combatant commanders may establish a theater of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operations. The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the continental US base to the combat zone. The figure below shows a broad framework for this organization and the scope of logistic support needed to support a theater. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.
The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels, in general, are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to both war and operations other than war. (See figure below.)

Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing inter-relationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

The Strategic Level. The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing...
armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

The Operational Level. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders
but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art
looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their
efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the
fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space,
and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following
questions:
- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the
  operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of
  actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

The Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to
use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between
small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide
variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A
battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger
forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LEVERAGE

Leverage among the forces is the centerpiece of joint operational art. Force interactions
can be described with respect to friendly forces and to enemy forces. Friendly relationships
may be characterized as supported or supporting. Engagements with the enemy may be
thought of as symmetric, if our force and the enemy force are similar (land versus land, etc.)
or asymmetric, if the forces are dissimilar (air versus sea, sea versus land, etc.). These
interactions will be discussed in turn. In combination they illustrate the richness of relationships
achievable with joint forces and the foundation for synergy that those relationships create.

Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized
as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort).
The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are
discussed extensively in joint doctrine. A principal joint force commander (JFC) responsibility
is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the
provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions.
Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of effort for)
various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same
time. For example, a land component may be supported for a deep maneuver, a joint force air
component commander for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a
maritime component for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations
component for direct action and other missions. The potentially large number of such
relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs but also their components to plan
and execute.
Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action. JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

**Related Terms**

**operational art**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**LIAISON**

That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

JP 1-02

Liaison is an important aspect of joint force command and control. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

Experience shows liaison is a particularly important part of command, control, communications, and computers in a joint force. Recalling Clausewitz’ analogy of a military force as an intricate machine, ample liaison parties, properly manned and equipped, may be viewed as a lubricant that helps keep that machine working smoothly. The Gulf War vividly demonstrated the role of effective liaison in both the joint and multinational contexts.

In the realm of command, ample and effective liaison parties and teams served to keep communications constant and effective. For example, US Marine Forces Central Command had liaison teams with US Air Forces Central Command (CENTAF), including all seven CENTAF airborne command aircraft, US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), US
Naval Forces Central Command, and the major coalition commands. The US Central Command special operations command had numerous liaison teams with coalition military forces, which played major roles in coordinating fire support and other aspects of military operations. ARCENT sent out several very large liaison teams, including teams to both major coalition groups of land forces. This partial listing of liaison activities was in addition to the “normal” liaison extended among and between the armed forces (for example, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company teams, Air Force tactical air control parties, Army ground liaison teams to the Air Force, and Navy liaison to the Air Force). In short, liaison teams played an important and effective role in reducing the frictions associated with a large and complex collection of forces.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS**

“The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater”

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified forward line of own troops. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially lines of communications (LOCs) between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Because rear areas are likewise not clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.
Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of communication (LOCs). Without secure air, sea, space, and land LOCs we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign. LOCs are included in the list of key elements of the logistic system, as seen in the figure below.

**KEY ELEMENTS OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM**

**LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCs)**
The LOCs consists of all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a theater base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

**THEATER TRANSPORTATION NETWORK**
The ports, bases, airports, rail heads, pipeline terminals, and trailer transfer points that serve as the reception and transshipment points for the LOCs.

**UNITS**
Specified units are responsible for operating the seaports, bases, and airports.

**HOST-NATION SUPPORT**
Desired civil and military assistance from allies that includes: en route support, reception, onward movement, and sustainment of deploying US forces.

Related Terms

**Source Joint Publications**

 JP 1  Joint Warfare of the Armed Services of the United States
 JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
LINES OF OPERATIONS

Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. JP 1-02

Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LITTORAL

Depending on the situation, joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations in the littoral to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force.

Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to
achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LODGMENET

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

LOGISTIC CONCEPT

Combatant Commander’s Logistic Concept. Although the commanders of Service component commands provide logistic resources, combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that the overall plan for using these resources supports the theater concept of operations.

The Logistic System. A critical element of a theater logistic system is timely integration of intertheater and intratheater transportation of personnel and supplies in the theater distribution system. The means to move people and equipment forward and to evacuate them to the rear is fundamental to successful theater operations. The logistic system ranges from the continental US (CONUS) or the deployed support base through a theater port of
entry and on to the forward areas of the theater. Key elements of the logistic system are illustrated in the first figure below.

**Considerations in Developing a Logistic System.** (See second figure below.)

Geography. The planner must examine the impact of topography, climate, and external factors affecting the logistic system, especially the impact on the various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail, roads, pipelines, and airways.

> "Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."
> **Winston Churchill: The River War, vii 1899**

Transportation. Many factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements. For example, sealift is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; airlift is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of equipment and supplies when time is critical. On land, rail (for bulk tonnage) and pipeline (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks.

Logistic Capability. The ability of the base infrastructure to receive, warehouse, and issue logistic resources influences the efficiency of the entire logistic system (for example, through the use of specialized container handling equipment). Infrastructure also limits the size of the force that can be supported.

Logistic Enhancements. Plans should include means to reduce the impact of logistic bottlenecks. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking aprons, additional materials handling equipment, and expedient airfield matting. Improved use of commercial International Organization for Standards containers vice breakbulk can aid in port clearance; but planners should realize such a container policy may create problems elsewhere.

Logistic Infrastructure Protection. Provisions must be made for security of the logistic system because it is an integral part of combat power.

Echelon of Support. The logistic system must be responsive to the needs of the most forward combat forces. It must start from CONUS and extend to the forward area of operations, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed.

Assignment of Responsibility. Combatant commanders should assign responsibility for operating the seaports, bases, and airports to the Service components (or host nations, if applicable).

Availability of Wartime Host-Nation Support (HNS). The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that can be provided by allied nations affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be devoted to initial movement of combat forces or sustainment.

**Theater Concept of Logistic Support.** The concept of logistic support should derive from the estimate of logistic supportability of one or more courses of action (COAs). The commander for a combatant command’s (CINC’s) directorate for logistics prepares these estimates for each alternative COA proposed by either the operations or planning directorate. The estimate of logistic supportability for the selected COA along with the logistic system framework considerations outlined above may be refined into the concept of logistic support for an operation or campaign.

The concept of logistic support is the envisioned manner in which the capabilities and resources of the CINCs’ components will be employed to provide supply, maintenance,
transportation, and engineering services. It is the organization of capabilities and resources into an overall theater warfare support concept.

The concept of logistic support should specify how operations will be supported. It should give special attention to the major lines of communications (LOCs) to be developed, as well.
as wartime HNS to be provided by each allied nation. If there is to be a communications zone to support air or land operations or a network of intermediate and advanced bases to support naval operations within a theater, the general organization and functions should be laid out. Supporting paragraphs should cover any topics the CINC believes are necessary and may include the following:

- **Guidance on Harmonization.** Multiple Military Services (US and allied nations) may operate simultaneously within the theater and the LOCs approaching the theater. Coordination of functions among all affected commands, nations, and agencies is essential to avoid confusion and unnecessary duplication. The combatant commanders should provide general guidance, by function and area, wherever needed to ensure unity of effort.

- **Logistic Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.** In addition to standard operating procedures for C4 systems, consideration should be given to backup plans or manual procedures in the event of possible C4 system outages or incompatible interfaces during combined operations.

- **Intratheater Support.** Specific guidance should be provided for employment of all available logistic infrastructure, including allied civilian and military support. In addition, the geographic combatant commander can assign logistic responsibility for the theater to the predominant user of a particular category of support (i.e., intratheater transportation is frequently an Army component responsibility).

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0   
Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**LOGISTIC DISCIPLINE**

Logistic resources are always constrained. At the theater (strategic) level, these limitations are either fiscal constraints or the unavailability of materials, industrial facilities, and skilled labor and long leadtimes for mobilization and deployment, which affect the strategic concentration of forces and supplies within the theater. At the operational and tactical levels, common limitations are attributed to: inadequate transportation means and port capacities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and critical spare parts; the lack of trained logistic personnel; and the failure to plan for adequate, interoperable command, control, communications, and computer systems. Unwise use of logistic resources means combat forces will be deprived of manpower, equipment, supplies, or training, and constitutes a disregard for economy of force.

True economy of supply requires the careful planning and buildup of levels to provide those resources and combat facilities, based on threat distribution and phase duration, that are essential to initiate and sustain combat operations. At the same time, avoid building too large a stockpile. Excess stocks decrease flexibility, drain transportation resources from other priorities, and deny sustainment to other areas. In all cases, the cost of any military operation must be considered; usually the most efficient means consistent with the concept of operations should be chosen.

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0   
Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations
LOGISTIC PLANNING

**General.** As shown in the figure below, operations and logistics are inseparable facets of war. Neither can claim primacy; each is integral to the other. Integration of the operation and logistic planners’ efforts is necessary throughout the planning and execution phases. Although obvious, such integration does not occur automatically. Command interest at all levels is essential.

Sound logistic planning forms the foundation for strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility and mobility. To influence the relative combat power of his force, the commander must have adequate control of the command’s logistic support capability.

The combatant commanders’ campaign and operation plans should have logistic implications coordinated at all levels: international, national, Service and functional component, and supporting command.

**Adaptability.** Plans should make provisions for changes to the concept of operations. These changes could include the need for creation of logistic support sites, additional security forces, more transportation, expanded port capacity, logistics over-the-shore sites, and numerous other increases in logistic overhead. Plans should be written to anticipate changes.

**Benefits of Adequate Logistic Plans.** Proper logistic planning will reduce the need for emergency measures and logistic improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands.

**Equivalence of Deployment and Employment Planning.** Deployment planning is more deliberate and methodical than employment planning and lends itself better to automated data processing support. Logistic planners must avoid focusing solely on the deployment requirements at the expense of sustaining the employment concept of the campaign. Detailed logistic planning for employment is equally important and should neither be neglected nor
delayed until deployment plans are completed. Only by thorough and concurrent consideration of both deployment and employment facets of the campaign or operation will planners be able to construct adequate logistic plans.

**Integration.** Logistic plans should be integrated with a combatant commander’s operation plan annexes and with plans of other commands and organizations within the Department of Defense, as well as external departments and agencies and wartime host-nation support that will be supporting the combatant commanders.

**Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels.** Logistic planning should be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic and Operational Logistic Support Concepts. Combatant commanders’ strategic logistic concept will focus on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operating locations, where operational logistic concepts are employed. With the transportation and distribution systems in mind, planners must determine the basic, but broad, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment requirements of the combatant commanders’ concept of operations.

Tactical Logistic Support Concepts. This planning is done primarily by the Service components. It includes line-item planning and involves the detailed application of the best planning factors available from historical usage data, analysis, or exercise experience. Also, planners determine the size and precise location of logistic facilities and units. Combatant commanders and their staffs should examine the Service components’ methods, assumptions, and factors to determine their validity and to guard against duplication of effort and any tendency to establish unnecessarily high safety margins or standards of living.

> “Mobility is the true test of a supply system.”

*Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart: Thoughts on War, 1944*

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**LOGISTIC REFINEMENT**

Logistic refinement is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. US Transportation Command coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

**Related Terms**

joint operation planning

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. Areas of logistic responsibilities are shown in the figure below.

The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. Commanders may have more combat forces than available logistic resources to move and sustain desired operations. A nation’s capability to deliver logistic resources has historically been a major limiting factor in military operations. This may be especially true in future joint operations, when demands for military resources become highly competitive.

To avoid shortfalls or increased risk in operation plans, logistics must be balanced between the combatant commander’s needs and logistic resource availability. Logistics is also a function of command. To have control over the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, one must also have control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces. COCOM includes directive authority for logistics, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater. COCOM cannot be delegated. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. (Note: A commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) authority is generally confined to the theater, while logistic support beyond the theater is usually a Service’s responsibility. This authority underscores the need for accurate, and well coordinated, prior logistic planning between CINCs, Services, supporting agencies, and allies.)
LOGISTICS AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING OBJECTIVES

AREAS OF LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES

MATERIEL

Design and Development
Acquisition
Storage
Movement
Distribution
Maintenance
Evacuation
Disposition

PERSONNEL

Movement
Evacuation
Hospitalization

SERVICES

Acquisition or Furnishing

FACILITIES

Acquisition or Construction
Maintenance
Operation
Disposition

Related Terms
concept of logistic support; estimate of logistic feasibility; logistic concept; logistic discipline; logistic planning; logistic refinement; logistic support system; theater concept of logistic support

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING OBJECTIVES

Depending on the theater operation and logistic concepts a geographic combatant commander employs in a campaign, logistic factors will almost always affect a theater campaign and exert different constraints. Strategically, logistic capabilities may limit the deployment, concentration, and employment options available to the National Command
Authorities, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or combatant commanders. Operationally, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate of strategic buildup or theater onward movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance.

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**LOGISTICS AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER**

Correlations of combat power between opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive. Logistics plays a significant role, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the leverage potential from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by increasing the endurance of the force. For example, a small investment in forward infrastructure can pay large dividends by reconstituting forces rapidly and returning them to battle in time to influence the outcome. Specifically, forward battle damage repair and maintenance capability, rapid runway repair capability, and forward medical treatment facilities can help in reconstituting forces efficiently.

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**LOGISTICS-OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS**

The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy. Also called LOTS.

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-02  Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) is the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities in either friendly or undefended territory and, in time of war, during phases of theater development. LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed ports not accessible to deep draft shipping, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without the use of LOTS capabilities.

Both Navy and Army may conduct LOTS operations. In an amphibious operation, the Navy may conduct LOTS operations in conjunction with the Marine Corps as a naval operation. During an amphibious operation, the Navy is responsible for the discharge of cargo and supplies to the high water mark, where the landing force assumes the responsibility for acceptance, transfer, and transportation to inland marshalling areas.

An Army LOTS operation may be conducted as part of the base, garrison, or theater development that immediately follows an amphibious operation or as a separate evolution when no amphibious operation precedes it. It is supported and/or coordinated with other Services. During Army LOTS operations, supplies and equipment are moved ashore and transferred to a transportation agency for onward movement.

The scope of the LOTS operation will depend on geographic, tactical, and time considerations. A LOTS operation area is the geographic area required to successfully conduct a LOTS operation.
Commanders of combatant commands (CINC) will usually form command centers and operational planning teams in wartime. The logistic staff members in these groups are usually supported by a Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) or are teamed with representatives from various functional areas: fuels, ammunition, engineering, supply, surface transportation, sealift, airlift, and medical services. The LRC receives reports from Service components and external sources, distills information for presentation to the CINC, and responds to questions. In addition to operating the LRC and providing representation in the command center, the combatant command logistic staff monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities. The status information collected from Service components should support the following questions:

- Are any planned operations in jeopardy because of logistic limitations?
- Are there any types of operations that should not be considered because they could not be supported?

The data reported should be in the form of gross comparisons of current stock and expected consumption and should identify the on-hand percentage of requirements of critical items and munitions. The logistic status information should be converted to output indicators; the types of operations current and incoming assets could support, including factors such as intensity of combat, duration of the operation, and the operational reach that can be attained. In summary, this function involves collecting, consolidating, interpreting, and explaining data regarding current and upcoming logistic status in the theater. It then relates those data to the operations the CINCs are considering.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

The logistics sustainability analysis (LSA) of an operation plan will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders’ operational plan. The LSA provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities by: documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic capabilities, identifying logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process.

The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with the Services, supporting commanders, and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. The LSA assesses the combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics: material, logistic support forces, infrastructure, and lift. The LSA integrates the assessments of the individual pillars of logistics by optimizing and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainers of logistic support. Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services and DOD agencies assessment of their ability to support the combatant
commander’s (CINC’s) plan, followed by the CINC’s assessment of the inputs along with supported commander’s analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces.

Joint doctrine states that there are three levels of war — strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply in war and in operations other than war. Logistic support within these levels is demonstrated in the way the Joint Staff, Services, and warfighting commanders handle logistics. The Joint Staff and Services concentrate on strategic logistic matters. The supported and supporting commanders’ logistic staffs manage both the strategic and operational logistic issues affecting missions assigned to the combatant commanders in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by the National Command Authorities and other such areas as directed by the combatant commander. The Services and the subordinate commanders down to their battlefield logisticians at the unit and ship level, deal with operational and tactical logistic responsibilities, including developing procedures, doctrine, and training for supplying personnel with all necessary materiel to do their jobs. All levels are interrelated, with constraints at any level limiting options of decision makers. Within their areas of responsibility, geographic combatant commanders may establish a theater of war and, if needed, subordinate theaters of operations.

The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the continental US base to the combat zone. The figure below shows a broad framework for this organization and the scope of logistic support needed to support a theater. All levels of logistics involve combat service support and affect the sustainability of forces in the combat zone.
The logistic support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority. Wherever feasible, peacetime chains of command and staffs should be organized during peacetime to avoid reorganization during war. This includes Reserve component forces (US and host-nation) that may be assigned specific theater missions. Commanders must be able to call forward, in a timely manner, those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.

Related Terms

logistic

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

LOW-ALTITUDE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

The low-altitude missile engagement zone (LOMEZ) is a volume of airspace established to control engagements of low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Subject to weapon system capabilities, the LOMEZ normally will extend beyond the forward edge of the battle area. From an airspace control perspective, LOMEZ provides airspace users with location of
the engagement zone of low-altitude missile systems for mission planning purposes. The design of the LOMEZ is contingent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for the LOMEZ is the area air defense commander.

**Related Terms**

weapon engagement zone

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  
Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
**MAIN OPERATIONS BASE**

In special operations, a base established by a joint force special operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical support to special operations activities in designated areas. Also called MOB. JP 1-02

Special operations forces (SOF) component commanders will identify facilities and construction requirements to support their operations. They will submit these requirements through their Service components. Construction in response to time-sensitive missions requires expedient work. Deviations from standards must be approved by the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) and the geographic combatant commander. SOF normally operate from one or more main operations bases (MOBs) and a variable number of forward operations bases and advanced operations bases.

A MOB is a base established by a JFSOCC or a subordinate SOF component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistic support to special operations activities in designated areas. The MOB is normally the location of an Army special operations task force, Air Force special operations component (AFSOC), or naval special warfare task group. The special forces Group calls its MOB the Special Forces operations base. The AFSOC calls its MOB the Air Force special operations base.

**Related Terms**

advanced operations base; forward operations base

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

**MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF ACTION**

Maintaining freedom of action is vitally important. There are many components to securing the freedom to act. Effective diplomatic, economic, military, and informational components of national security strategy are needed to provide the freedom to act at the national level. Adequate logistic support is essential, as is maintaining the operations security of plans and gaining the fullest possible surprise. Having a force structure that provides insurance against unanticipated developments or the underestimation of enemy strengths is important as well.

Several aspects of modern warfare tend to restrict freedom of action. Sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern news reporting, for instance, make the tasks of ensuring operations security and surprise more difficult. But as Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM showed, tight operations security — even at the expense of some staff efficiency — can work to achieve effective surprise. Joint forces should understand these sorts of very demanding security precautions are a likely part of future operations and should accommodate stringent operations security in exercises and training in order to practice staff efficiency and public affairs activities under realistic conditions.

Finally, the role of deception in securing freedom of action should never be underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers since Sun Tzu have stressed the central nature of deception in successful warfare. Deception can provide a highly leveraged means to confuse our enemies.
and cause them to miscalculate our intentions, deploy their forces poorly, and mistakenly estimate our strengths and weaknesses, while helping to preserve our own freedom of action. Deception at the joint force level requires clear themes around which all components can focus their efforts.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

**JP 1**  
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

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**maintenance**

1. All action taken to retain materiel in or to restore it to a specified condition. It includes: inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation.  
2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.  
3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, structure, ground facility, utility system, or other real property) in such condition that it may be continuously utilized, at its original or designed capacity and efficiency, for its intended purpose.  

**salvage**

1. Property that has some value in excess of its basic material content but which is in such condition that it has no reasonable prospect of use for any purpose as a unit and its repair or rehabilitation for use as a unit is clearly impractical.  
2. The saving or rescuing of condemned, discarded, or abandoned property, and of materials contained therein for reuse, refabrication, or scrapping.

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordination of maintenance and salvage within the theater. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use should be established, and inter-Service use of salvage assets should be emphasized. However, Service-peculiar item maintenance support should remain the responsibility of Service component commanders. Maintenance priorities should emphasize mission-essential weapon systems that can be rapidly returned to combat readiness. An effective maintenance program (including preventive maintenance) can minimize retrograde and supply needs for major end-items and enhance battle damage repair efforts.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

**JP 4-0**  
Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and lines of communications (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.

There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent’s centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

Maneuver of forces relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or weapons of mass destruction.

JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, special operations forces may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

• At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.

• At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command’s concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them.
Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC’s concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

**Related Terms**
interdiction; operational art; principles of war

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-0    Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**Manpower**

Manpower resources
**Human resources available to the Services which can be applied against manpower requirements.**

JP 1-02

“People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome of war.”

**General Lo Jui-Ching**
May 1965

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime Active component (AC) military end strength. Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the Reserve component (RC), military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service personnel who volunteer or are drafted. These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. The figure below associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the actions required to initiate a callup. The legal authorities required for the callup of the various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option.

In addition to the callup of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools and conscription, three other actions can be taken to ensure optimum availability and utilization of manpower during mobilization. These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. Stop-loss actions allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be taken by the Military Departments to stabilize AC personnel and ensure the maximum number are available for assignment to theaters of operation or other high-priority duties. These activities may include canceling temporary and permanent change of station travel, changing tour length policies, and curtailling attendance at Service schools. Redistribution actions are also taken within the Military Departments during a crisis to ensure that high-priority units are maintained at the highest level of personnel readiness until an efficient personnel fill and replacement pipeline can be established.

Civilian manpower is an integral part of the Department of Defense Total Force Concept. Future crises across the range of military operations will require careful management of the civilian work force to support military operations in overseas theaters of operations and the continental US.

In theaters, civilians with skills essential to support military missions may remain after other US civilians and their families have been evacuated. The Services and Defense agencies
designate these personnel as emergency-essential and provide necessary training and other support for their crisis and wartime duties to include the intrinsic responsibility of providing protection to US civilians in the area of responsibility consistent with the capabilities and operational mission. Other civilian employees with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with supported military units. The geographic combatant commander determines admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services and agencies implement those requirements for their employees. Some foreign-national civilian employees

### MILITARY MANPOWER MOBILIZATION:

#### SOURCES AND OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF MANPOWER</th>
<th>MOBILIZATION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Emergency (e.g., natural disaster, civil disturbance)</td>
<td>Army National Guard and Air National Guard</td>
<td>Federalize National Guard troops under 10 USC 12406 and 331-333</td>
<td>President publishes proclamation and executive order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any level of emergency (with or without a declared national emergency)</td>
<td>Volunteers from the National Guard and Reserve, Regular and Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service, Volunteer enlistees, Selected Reserve -Units -Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)</td>
<td>Call for volunteers under 10 USC 12301(d), Recall retirees under 10 USC 688(a), Enlist qualified volunteers, Call to active duty up to 200,000 Selected Reservists under 10 USC 12304 (PSRC)</td>
<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments solicit volunteers with needed skills and publish callup orders.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Secretaries of the Military Departments publish callup orders.</td>
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<td>Military Departments accept qualified applicants in accordance with DOD and Service standards and policies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President publishes Executive order. Military Departments publish callup orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NCA requests amendment to the Selective Service Act (50 USC app. 451 et seq.) authorizing conscription.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an Executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call up orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draftees</td>
<td></td>
<td>President must report to the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use of forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NCA requests amendment to the Selective Service Act (50 USC app. 451 et seq.) authorizing conscription.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an Executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call up orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War or National Emergency</td>
<td>Ready Reserve -Units -Individual Ready Reserve -IMAs, Remaining Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, New units and personnel</td>
<td>Call to active duty up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists for up to 24 months under 10 USC 12302(a) (Partial Mobilization), Call to active duty remaining Reserve Component personnel under 10 USC 12301 (Full Mobilization), Add new force structure and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives (Total Mobilization)</td>
<td>Executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call up orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress declaring war or national emergency. Military Departments publish callup orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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(local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host country.

In the US, the Services and Defense agencies reallocate incumbent civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions through detailing, reassignment, and cross training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies activate Recruiting Area Staffing Committees to find joint, local solutions for meeting these requirements.

Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the National Command Authorities for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war. Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for RC volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled retirees were used in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf. Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC) authority makes up to 200,000 Selected Reservists available for up to 270 days. It was also used effectively in the Persian Gulf and during recent operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization.

A Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial mobilization authority makes up to one million Ready Reservists available for up to 24 consecutive months. This partial mobilization authority, also used for the first time in the Persian Gulf crisis, includes members of the individual ready reserve, which is a source of pretrained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PSRC, activations under this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it develops. A congressional declaration of a national emergency or war is required before full mobilization may be ordered. Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. Manpower requirements for force expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a protracted conflict may require legislation authorizing activation of the Selective Service System for the conscription of additional forces.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

**MARITIME ENVIRONMENT**

The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including amphibious objective areas. JP 1-02

**Joint Operations in the Littoral or Maritime Environment.** Depending on the situation, joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations in the littoral to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force.
Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea. Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a joint force air component commander while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC’s concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.

Transferring command and control (C2) from sea to shore requires coordination throughout the joint force in order to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current operations. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until...
the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**MARITIME POWER PROJECTION**

Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. 

Maritime power projection in and from the maritime environment includes a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces and logistic support and to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection is accomplished by amphibious operations; attack against targets ashore; support of sea control operations; and strike warfare.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-04 Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR)

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**MARSHALLING**

1. The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points, complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. 2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement.

“Move upon the enemy in one mass on one line so that when brought to battle you shall outnumber him.”

Napoleon

General. Marshalling is the process of assembling units or moving them to temporary camps near embarkation points to complete preparation for combat or to prepare for loading. It includes the preparations required to plan, document, and load equipment and personnel aboard aircraft.

The marshalling area is usually located near departure camps and airfields to conserve resources and reduce the opportunity for observation. When the number of departure airfields
is limited or when requirements dictate dispersion, loading may be accomplished on a phased schedule.

The Air Force component portion of the marshalling operation is developed during air movement planning and consists of instructions regulating aircraft movement and the aircraft parking plan. These procedures are in the air movement annex to the operation order (OPORD).

Preparations.
Planning. The joint force commander staff coordinates with administrative and logistic agencies for maximum support during marshalling. This support includes transportation, communications, and housekeeping details (campsite construction, operation, and maintenance; messing; and religion, recreation, and other morale services) and permits the unit to concentrate on preparation for the movement. Support may also include local security personnel to supplement normal Air Force security at the departure airfield. For details on air base ground defense.

Logistics. The unit logistics officer prepares the marshalling plan. The plan is an appendix to the service support annex of the OPORD or an annex to the administrative and logistics order of the airlifted force. It should contain procedures for cover and deception. The marshalling plan includes procedures for moving units from marshalling areas through the alert holding and call forward areas to the ready line. Finally, it includes methods for loading troops and equipment into individual aircraft.

Selection of Marshalling Areas and Departure Airfields. The selection of marshalling areas and departure airfields is based on the air movement plan and influenced by several common factors. There is no order of priority among these factors, but any one of them could become the basis for final selection. To avoid concentration of forces, multiple marshalling areas and departure airfields should be selected. Excessive dispersion, however, makes command and control more difficult and may diminish the effectiveness of supporting activities. The factors affecting selection of marshalling areas and departure airfields are illustrated in the figure below.
**Unit Preparation.** For security reasons, marshalling should be accomplished quickly. To prepare for marshalling, deploying units establish liaison with the departure airfield control group (DACG), obtain equipment and supplies as early as possible, and issue prepackaged supplies and equipment to the airborne forces to expedite loading operations. They also perform final preparation of vehicles and equipment, ensure that adequate shoring and dunnage materials are readily available and receive parachutes and other air items and prepare airdrop loads in coordination with the responsible airdrop support unit.

The deploying unit is responsible for preparing and certifying aircraft load plans (appropriate Air Force officials verify and approve load plans), personnel, and equipment manifests (and annotating any hazardous materials by class), and submitting them through the DACG to the supporting airlift elements. En route messing is a deploying unit responsibility.

Unit commanders or team chiefs plan and coordinate the use of available facilities and areas at departure airfields for command post, communications centers, briefing areas, and equipment and supply handling points. Ensure unit equipment, including individual clothing and equipment not required in the objective area, is packed in suitable containers and stored at the rear echelon or installation.

**Dispersal Procedures.** Dispersal techniques should be considered during marshalling. One technique involves moving personnel and equipment to departure airfields where an airlift may be staged. Another technique is to fly airlift aircraft to onload bases where personnel and equipment are located. Personnel and equipment are subsequently airlifted to the originating departure airfields. Any combination of these procedures may be used.

**Responsibilities.** Arrival and departure airfield operations are conducted by Air Force and the deploying component units. The Air Force units, consisting of tanker airlift control element (TALCE), mission support team (MST), and mission support element (MSE) teams, are typically assigned to either composite or provisional organizations tailored to meet the specific task at hand. These teams are responsible for marshalling the deploying unit and associated equipment for airlift. The organization employed depends on the size of the unit being deployed and the number of aircraft involved.

The arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) is the deploying Service component’s counterpart to the TALCE, MST, and MSE. This organization is sized to support the unit being deployed. Specific marshalling responsibilities are outlined in the figure below.
Marshalling Responsibilities

A/DACG
Coordinate with the TALCE, MST, or MSE and deploying unit.
Ensure offload teams and required support teams are available.
Accept responsibility for each planeload at the established release point from the TALCE.
Release each load to the deploying unit. Provide fueling and minor maintenance for deploying unit vehicles.

Deploying Unit
Appoint a plane team or troop commander for each mission aircraft carrying passengers.
Coordinate with the A/DACG.
Complete final preparation of vehicles, equipment, pallets, containers, and required documentation.
Ensure all required shoring and dunnage are on hand.
Assemble personnel and equipment into plane loads according to preplanned load plans.
Provide safety equipment to loading crew members.
Ensure personnel and equipment arrive at the alert holding area according to the established timetable. Correct any load or documentation discrepancies identified by the A/DACG or TALCE.
Assist in loading and unloading aircraft as instructed by the TALCE load team chief.

Departure and Arrival Airfield Installation Commander
Provide a marshalling area.
Provide any logistical or administrative support as identified during the planning process.

Execution. The deploying unit, DACG, and TALCE work together to ensure the unit is ready for air movement as quickly, orderly, and safely as possible. The deploying unit assembles, prepares, and documents its cargo and personnel for air movement. Discrepancies are identified and corrected prior to air movement. There are four separate areas of activity in departure airfield operations. Each activity takes place in a designated area and involves specific tasks. The figure below shows the four separate areas of activity and outlines the major functions of each area.

Deploying unit cargo, vehicles, and equipment to loading sites based on required loading and scheduled station times published in the air movement plan. The deploying unit’s installation major command provides transportation to move personnel and chalk loads to aircraft. Whenever possible, movements are made at night to maximize operations security. Personnel in charge of aircraft chalk loads should receive mission briefings concerning the route to their respective aircraft. Personnel and equipment should arrive at onload airfields in accordance with prescribed times published in the air movement plan. The TALCE controls
**DEPARTURE AIRFIELD OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARSHALLING AREA</th>
<th>ALERT HOLDING AREA</th>
<th>CALL FORWARD AREA</th>
<th>READY LINE / LOADING RAMP AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deploying unit responsibility. Prepare vehicles, equipment cargo and personnel into chalk loads for delivery to the DACG alert holding area for air movement.</td>
<td>Departure airfield control group area of responsibility. The DACG ensures the movement of vehicles, equipment, and cargo from the alert holding area to the call forward area in orderly fashion. The reception of aircraft loads and conducting preinspections are accomplished here.</td>
<td>Dual DACG and TALCE area of responsibility. Joint inspection and discrepancy corrections are conducted in this area. Chalk loads are moved from the call forward area and released into the TALCE at the ready line.</td>
<td>TALCE area of responsibility. Receives control of chalks from the DACG and conducts additional briefings / inspections as required. Responsibility for all air movement operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAJOR FUNCTIONS**

- **DACG**
  - Prepares personnel and cargo manifests
  - Prepares other documentation agreed upon during the joint planning conference
  - Conducts initial inspection of each chalk
  - Releases each chalk to the DACG at the alert holding area

- **TALCE**
  - Conducts joint inspection
  - Conducts final briefing and performs final manifest corrections
  - Compiles statistical data
  - Provides area for correction of discrepancies identified during the joint inspection

**UNITS**

- **MARSHALLING**
  - Establishes aircraft parking plan
  - Receives load at ready line, directs to aircraft and, in conjunction with aircraft load master or load team chief, supervises the supported component while loading and restraining cargo aboard aircraft

**AREAS**

- **Assembling and inspection**
  - Accepts chalk from deploying unit
  - Conducts inspection
  - Establishes traffic flow pattern
  - Establishes communications with deploying units and other functional areas, provides backup communications with TALCE

- **Final briefings**
  - Conducts joint inspection
  - Conducts final briefing and performs final manifest corrections
  - Compiles statistical data
  - Provides area for correction of discrepancies identified during the joint inspection

- **Final manifest corrections**
  - Conducts joint inspection
  - Conducts final briefing and performs final manifest corrections
  - Compiles statistical data
  - Provides area for correction of discrepancies identified during the joint inspection
aerial movement at the departure airfield. Routes to and from loading areas should be clearly marked. Strict control of air and ground traffic is maintained on and across runways and strips.

Preparation of Platform Loads. If airdrop is part of the operation, platform loads are prepared during marshalling. When planning the preparation and marshalling of platform loads, the following factors should be anticipated:

- Additional lead time may be required.
- Skilled rigging supervision is needed.
- Required materials handling equipment.
- Adequate facilities, to include a relatively clean and illuminated rigging area, should be provided if tactically feasible.

Cross-Loading. Whether administrative or combat-loaded, aircraft also may be cross-loaded. Cross-loading distributes supplies among aircraft to ensure that the entire supply of one item is not lost by an abort or loss of one or some other small number of aircraft. Cross-loading does not alter the desirability of keeping ground force crews in the same aircraft as their vehicles, weapon systems, or other crew-served equipment.

Arrival Airfield Operations. Although arrival operations are not part of the marshalling process, they are important in air movement. If not orderly, arrival operations could adversely affect the mission. Arrival operations take place in three main areas — the offloading ramp, holding area, and unit area. Cargo is offloaded from aircraft and shipped to the specified arrival airfield control group (AACG) offloading ramp. The AACG then processes and releases the cargo load to the deployed unit. Finally, the deployed unit is responsible for moving its cargo to the marshalling area, thus concluding air movement operations. This process prevents congestion on the flight line and ensures arrival operations do not interfere with the planned air flow. This process may be modified or streamlined for combat offload operations.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

MASS

1. The concentration of combat power. 2. The military formation in which units are spaced at less than the normal distances and intervals. JP 1-02

The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MASS CASUALTY

Any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or armed attack that exceeds local logistical support capabilities. JP 1-02

Mass casualties (MASCAL) may result from combat operations, and procedures for handling the casualties are required. Particular emphasis is placed on the flexibility of health service support (HSS) units to respond to sudden changes in the casualty situation. Successful management of MASCALs is a complex task where success relies as much on well-practiced logistics and communications as it does on skilled medical treatment. While many medical personnel receive basic exposure to the principles of battlefield triage and emergency management, there is much less familiarity with communications, transportation, evacuation, and supply management in a simulated MASCAL or combat setting. Joint force surgeons must ensure that the MASCAL plan is rehearsed with all components represented. Particular emphasis must be placed on the flexibility of HSS units to respond to changes in the casualty situation.

Enemy employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons produces an unusually large number of casualties and may impair existing provisions for HSS. An NBC weapons attack significantly hinders all operations, including HSS operations.

In an effort to provide adequate HSS in an NBC environment, definitive planning and coordination are mandatory at all command levels. Higher headquarters must distribute timely, well-understood plans and directives to subordinate units.
Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02  Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MASTER AIR ATTACK PLAN

A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. Sometimes referred to as the air employment plan or joint air tasking order shell. Information which may be included: joint force commander guidance, joint force air component commander guidance, support plans, component requests, target update requests, availability of capabilities/forces, target information from target lists, aircraft allocation, etc. Also called MAAP.

JP 1-02

General. During the weaponeering/allocation phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets. The joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), the prioritized listing of potential targets, constructed during the target development phase, provides the basis for weaponeering assessment activities. All approved targets are weaponeered on target worksheets, which detail recommended aimpoints, recommended number/type aircraft and weapons, fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats, and probability of destruction. The final prioritized targets are then included into the master air attack plan (MAAP). The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. The MAAP is a key element of the concept of joint air operations. The development of the MAAP includes the review of joint force commander and joint force air component commander guidance; component direct air support plans and support requests from components; updates to target requests; availability of capabilities/forces; target selection from the JIPTL; and aircraft allocation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1  Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

MASTER MOBILIZATION GUIDE

Basic guidance to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within the Department of Defense (DOD) is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG), which implements DOD responsibilities under the National Security Council national security emergency preparedness policy. The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning. It identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense agencies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05  Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
MATERIEL

All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. JP 1-02

“When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army.”

Napoleon I
Maxims of War

General. The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It includes equipment on hand in units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign commercial sources. These sources and the options and actions for obtaining them are listed in the figure below.

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force, and alleviating shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with emergency priorities. These activities can be undertaken either separately or in combination to equip and sustain the mobilized force.

Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability. Decision options that increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot stocks, accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system, diverting items from foreign military sales and other security assistance programs, accelerating production rates of existing contracts for consumable items like clothing and rations, and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign sources. Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply pipeline. Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these options are exercised by the Military Departments, Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies as they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the combatant commanders. Action to divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant effect on our relations with affected allies and must be taken at the National Command Authorities (NCA) level. However, once diverted and allocated to a Military Department, they are distributed as determined by the owning Military Department.

Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions taken internally by the Military Departments based on operation plan priorities and guided by the Department of Defense policy to equip earlier deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US military claimants, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines priorities among the Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility. The JMPAB is chaired by the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff and includes other Joint Staff directors as well as general or flag
officer representatives from the Military Departments. In coalition warfare, the United States may be responsible for providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies. When shortages occur, priority and allocation decisions for resolving conflicts among allies, or between US claimants and allies, are made by the NCA.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

**MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE**

That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors.

JP 1-02

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) develops and disseminates medical intelligence. The two major intelligence categories of primary use to the health service support (HSS) planner are general military intelligence and medical. For DIA, medical intelligence is
produced by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Ft. Detrick, Maryland. AFMIC currently produces and disseminates finished intelligence products via studies, message traffic, and online electronic systems.

Department of Defense military medical personnel frequently use the term “medical intelligence” incorrectly to mean any medical information of military importance; however, the term “medical intelligence” officially refers to finished intelligence on medical and related matters. By this definition, medical intelligence includes only finished intelligence products produced by an authorized intelligence agency such as AFMIC through the intelligence cycle. Medical intelligence is intended to provide HSS operations and planning staffs with basic guidance for understanding, acquiring, using, and applying intelligence and intelligence systems in the conduct of HSS operations, medical threat analysis and management, threat-based concept development, medical research, and doctrine development. Other sources of medical information may be used in assessing potential threats (e.g., Naval Environmental and preventative medicine units, Defense Pest Management Information Analysis Center, and the World Health Organization).

Accurate and timely intelligence is a critical combat support tool for planning, executing, and sustaining military operations. It is equally important in achieving optimum planning, execution, and sustainment of HSS operations, the medical readiness of the command, and the overall combat readiness of the unit.

Related Terms

- health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02   Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MEDICAL REGULATING

The actions and coordination necessary to arrange for the movement of patients through the echelons of care. This process matches patients with a medical treatment facility which has the necessary health service support capabilities, and it also ensures that bed space is available.   JP 1-02

General. Medical regulating of patients will occur by the same process across the range of military operations. The movement of casualties to or between medical treatment facilities (MTFs) within the combat zone or forward of corps level is a Service component responsibility. If, in the opinion of the attending physician, a casualty cannot be returned to duty within the theater evacuation policy, the originating MTF will request that the patient be regulated to another MTF for more definitive care. Patients may be regulated to destinations within the theater, to another theater, or to the continental US (CONUS). Patient regulating includes accounting for bed availability, medical airlift capability, and patient in-transit visibility (the ability to track an individual patient’s status and location). This will be accomplished through a command and control system known as Transportation Command’s Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

TRAC2ES. TRAC2ES is a multi-nodal system composed of three basic collaborative parts. (See figure below.)

The first of these is the Global Patient Movements Requirements Center (GPMRC) located at Scott Air Force Base, IL. The GPMRC coordinates aeromedical evacuation worldwide and encompasses those duties formerly associated with the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center (AECC). In practice, the GPMRC
The Theater Patient Movement Requirements Centers (TPMRCs) will coordinate and allocate assets to the TPMRCs. It will also collaborate and integrate TPMRC schedules and plans, and communicate lift/bed requirements.

The second integral part of patient regulating is the TPMRC. TPMRCs assume responsibilities formerly performed by the Joint Medical Regulating Office and theater AECCs. Active TPMRCs are located in US European Command and US Pacific Command. Other TPMRCs would be established in US Atlantic Command, US Central Command, US Southern Command, and CONUS as the need arose. The primary role of TPMRCs is to generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute GPMRC-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the MTF (which includes both fixed and deployable, Veterans Administration, Department of Defense, and National Disaster Medical System hospitals).

The last part of the patient regulating process is the respective MTF that receives/sends patients.

**Related Terms**
- health service support; patient evacuation

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

**MEDICAL SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

Special operations forces (SOF) are specially organized, trained, and equipped forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that conduct the following operations: unconventional warfare, strategic reconnaissance, direct action, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, civil affairs, and psychological operations. The nature of special operations requires that units be small, highly skilled, self-contained teams that can be easily inserted and extracted by air, sea, and
land delivery methods. Medical support of special operations units is characterized by an austere structure and a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills.

The special operations medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the team level. To meet the operational requirements of SOF infiltration and exfiltration, characteristics of larger medical elements of Echelons II, III, and IV cannot be applied or incorporated. Medical support provided to the teams in the area of operations is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this area of influence or capability depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover lack of capability or meet requirements for additional medical assets (i.e., medical evacuation). Medical capability that is not part of a Service conventional medical system will be based on a complete mission analysis and a coordinated support plan developed by the medical planner. SOF should be provided all functions of health service support at the point their personnel enter the conventional force medical structure.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MEDICAL THREAT

A collective term used to designate all potential or continuing enemy actions and environmental situations that could possibly adversely affect the combat effectiveness of friendly forces, to include wounding, injuries, or sickness incurred while engaged in a joint operation.

The medical threat is the composite of all ongoing or potential enemy actions and environmental conditions that could reduce the effectiveness of friendly forces. (See figure below.) These actions and conditions include wounds, injuries, or diseases. Information to assess the medical threat caused by enemy actions should be obtained from the Intelligence Directorate and Operations Directorate of a joint staff community.

Infectious diseases which occur naturally are also referred to as endemic disease. Historically, infectious diseases have been responsible for more casualties than battle injuries. Many naturally occurring infectious diseases have short incubation periods. They may cause significant numbers of casualties within the first 48 hours of a deployment or contact. Others with longer incubation periods may not create casualties for several weeks.

Extreme environmental conditions in the form of heat, cold, high humidity, and high altitude can pose significant health hazards to an unacclimated, unprepared, and poorly conditioned military force. Employment of US forces into areas where these conditions exist without adequate opportunity for acclimatization may significantly decrease combat performance.

Conventional warfare munitions include small arms, high velocity weapons, rockets, bombs, artillery, bayonets, and other wounding devices, either individual or crew-served. This threat may be encountered in all geographic areas and can be employed by adversaries across the range of military operations. Research and development in smart munitions and extended range artillery, coupled with more powerful high explosives, will increase the threat from these types of weapons. Area denial munitions are likely to be present and pose a major psychological and physical threat. Wounds from booby traps, mines, and nontraditional weapons can also be encountered.
Biological warfare is the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in humans or animals or cause damage to plants or materiel. The intentional use of these disease-causing organisms (pathogens), toxins, or other agents of biological origin is designed to weaken resistance to attack and reduce the will to wage war.

- Historically, biological warfare has primarily involved the use of pathogens to sabotage food and water supplies and spread contagious disease among populations. These pathogens have generally fallen into one of the following categories: naturally occurring,
unmodified infectious agents; toxins, venoms, and their biologically active fractions; modified infectious agents; bioregulators and physiologically active compounds.

- Biotechnology is a tool for the production of biological warfare agents. Naturally occurring infectious organisms can be made more virulent, drug resistant, and can be manipulated to render protective vaccines ineffective. Such developments could greatly complicate the ability to detect and identify biological warfare agents and the ability to operate in areas contaminated by these agents. The causative agents for anthrax, tularemia, plague, and cholera, as well as botulinum toxin, staphylococcus, enterotoxin, and mycotoxin, are believed to have been developed as biological warfare agents by potential US adversaries.

As a result of confirmed chemical warfare agent use by Iraq against Iranian forces, probable use by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and reported use of chemical agents and toxins in Southeast Asia, there is continuing heightened interest in the use of chemical munitions and delivery methods. Nerve and blister agents appear to be the agents most available in developing countries.

Directed-energy weapons focus radiation on a target to induce electronic, thermal, or structural and human (particularly eye) damage and can cause mission failure. The radiation is composed of three types: radio frequency, laser, and charged particle beam. There have been numerous reports of personnel sustaining eye damage while using optic devices and being exposed to a bright flashing light emanating from warships or other sources. These reports suggest an increasing threat from lasers to both air and ground forces.

Blast effect weapons such as fuel and air explosives represent an emerging medical threat. Gas-filled body organs such as ears, lungs, and digestive tract are the most susceptible to primary blast injury. This emerging threat may result in lower lethality but a greater number of wounded and a significantly increased workload.

Strategic mobility of US forces is a major element of US political and military strategy. Alert forces may be required to operate without rest for extended periods of time during mobilization, staging, airborne transportation, and combat insertion into hostile areas. Modern combat, with its increased lethality, rapid maneuvers, technological skill requirements, exposure to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and day or night all-weather operations, will stress personnel to their endurance limits. Under these conditions, the significance of stress as a major contributor of casualties cannot be overstated.

Flame and incendiary systems include napalm and white phosphorus for aerial delivered bombs. Possible uses of flame and incendiary weapons include the clearing of difficult defensive positions such as caves, bunkers, buildings, and soft shelter or vehicular targets. Flame has also been used quite effectively in previous conflicts in an antitank role.

Until recently, the primary nuclear warfare threat has been from the Soviet Union. However, open-source information suggests that other countries may develop nuclear weapons capability within the next decade. Planners expect a minimum of 10 to 20 percent casualties within a division-size force that has experienced a nuclear strike. This percentage may be a low estimate, since proximity to ground zero is the critical factor in determining weapon effects on the force. In addition to casualties, a nuclear weapon detonation can generate an electromagnetic pulse that will result in catastrophic failure of some electronic equipment components.

**The Threat to Health Support Service (HSS) Personnel and Operations.** Commanders can anticipate increased casualty densities among HSS personnel over those experienced in most previous conflicts. Medical threat elements with the greatest potential for force degradation during combat operations are:
• battle injuries because of artillery, small arms, and fragmentation weapons;
• casualties caused by combat stress;
• NBC and combined casualties;
• premeditated attack upon medical organizations, personnel, or Class VIII supplies;
• the continually increasing range of indirect fire weapons;
• the enhanced wounding capability and destructiveness of munitions and weapon systems;
• the collective effects of conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
• significant increases in casualty densities that cause local or general overloads of the HSS system, resulting in physical and psychological stress;
• infectious diseases and environmental extremes.

Enemy combat operations in friendly rear areas will interdict lines of communications and disrupt necessary logistic activity. This disruption will produce a serious negative effect on the ability of personnel to retrieve and evacuate wounded, injured, and sick personnel and deliver health care. Although enemy combat operations may threaten the HSS combat mission by disrupting HSS operations or threaten the survival of HSS, they are not considered to be medical threats for our purposes.

Prolonged periods of intense, continuous operations will tax HSS personnel to the limit of their psychological and emotional endurance. This stress and fatigue will cause both quantitative and qualitative degradation in the ability of the HSS system to deliver health care at a sustained level. Proper training, such as taking vital signs, or minor surgical procedures of dental personnel to augment medical staff, may provide some temporary relief.

HSS organizations are not expected to be the primary target for biological or chemical attacks; however, logistic base complexes may be prime candidates for such enemy operations. As elements of logistic complexes, medical organizations must anticipate collateral contamination from attacks on adjacent facilities. Forward HSS assets have an even higher probability of being required to operate in or in proximity to areas contaminated by biological and chemical weapons.

The Medical Threat in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The medical threat is traditionally evaluated for its impact on US forces alone. When preparing for and conducting operations during MOOTW, elements of the medical threat to the indigenous population must also be assessed. The impact of the medical threat as a contributing factor to social, political, and economic stability in both peace and other operational environments must be considered. The general environment in which these types of operations are conducted ranges from peaceful, developing countries with no apparent internal or external instabilities to countries with limited resources and a poorly led population assailed by active insurgent movements, diseases, and dependent on humanitarian assistance (HA).

Within the military operations, US efforts may focus on foreign internal defense operations such as security assistance, HA, or host nation (HN) logistic support. These operations are often conducted in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate food distribution, possible lawlessness, and general civil unrest. Significant medical threats are likely to be naturally occurring infectious diseases and environmental extremes.

There are varied scenarios under which US forces could be employed in nation assistance, disaster relief, and HA missions involving Third World countries. In general, areas where assistance teams and units may be employed will likely have a very low standard of living and high levels of endemic infectious diseases. Many of these diseases could be considered exotic to most US HSS personnel. US forces serving in these areas will enter with very little, if any, natural immunity to many endemic diseases. The degree of cultural and social interaction required to support the mission, as well as the sharing of food, quarters, and recreational
facilities with local nationals, will increase exposure of US personnel to diseases endemic to the host country. For the most part, assistance operations will last a relatively extended period of time (past 30 days) and will increase the exposure to and raise the risk from endemic disease.

In these environments, protection afforded to medical treatment facilities and HSS personnel by the Geneva Conventions may not be recognized by insurgent or terrorist forces. HSS activities may be perceived as prime targets by these groups, especially if these facilities are seen as making a major contribution to the HN government. Medical facilities will also be vulnerable to theft and raids on Class VIII supplies by insurgents or terrorists for their own support or to support black market activities.

In some situations, the in-country components of the US logistic system in support of US assistance forces will be austere. Often the HSS structure will require significant reliance on contracting for local food, water, sanitation, public health, localized medical treatment, and health industry resources. There will be increased reliance on tactical medical support and evacuation. Coordination with Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command for intertheater patient evacuation can be greater in these operations than in other war scenarios. US Navy and US Marine Corps transportation assets should be used to support all aspects of HSS in military operations other than war scenarios, based on the availability and location in coastal waters. These circumstances will demand solid HSS planning. This planning must be based on current, accurate medical intelligence and include the total involvement of the Country Team prior to the execution of operations.

**Related Terms**

- health service support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-02  
Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

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**METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL**

Enemy forces will attempt to degrade airspace control capabilities by direct attack and electronic measures directed against control nodes or other specific targets. The methods of airspace control vary throughout the range of military operations from war to military operations other than war that include both combat and noncombat activities. The methods range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets, with any effective combination of positive and procedural control measures between the two extremes.

Airspace control plans (ACP) and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, joint, and national capabilities and requirements. Full positive control would rely on radars, other sensors, identification, friend or foe/selective identification feature, digital data links, and other elements of the air defense network command, control, communications, and computer system to positively identify, track, and direct air assets. Full procedural control would rely on previously agreed to and promulgated airspace control measures such as comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement, low-level transit routes, minimum-risk routes, minimum-risk levels, aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures, and coordinating altitudes. In any case, all missions remain subject to the airspace control order. The figure below summarizes both methods of airspace control. The airspace control structure needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing tactical situations. It is up to the joint force commander, through the ACP, to decide the appropriate method based on the concept of operations.
FULL POSITIVE CONTROL
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIES, TRACKS & DIRECTS AIR ASSETS USING:
- Radars
- Other sensors
- Identification, friend or foe/selective identification system
- Digital data links
- Other elements of the command, control, communications, and computer system

FULL PROCEDURAL CONTROL
RELIES ON PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO & PROMULGATED AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES SUCH AS:
- Comprehensive air defense ID procedures and rules of engagement
- Low level transit routes
- Minimum risk routes
- Aircraft ID maneuvers
- Fire support coordination measures
- Coordinating altitudes

Related Terms
airspace control in the combat zone

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-52  Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) JP 1-02

General. Military civic action (MCA) programs offer the foreign internal defense (FID) planner a civil-military operations opportunity to improve the host nation (HN) infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominately indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population’s basic needs. MCA programs can also be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military; which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool combatant commanders and other joint force commanders should use, whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan.

MCA Examples. US forces may advise or assist the HN military in conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with security assistance (SA) training or as a combatant commander’s separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects are in the areas of construction.

MCA Coordination and Control. Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for humanitarian assistance (HA) and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID programs, however, the Ambassador and Country Team should be aware of all operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply, but, if it is provided through a separate combatant commander’s initiative using operation and maintenance funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the same considerations apply to employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting HA and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs:

- Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged.
- HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission.
• Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally include civil affairs (CA), psychological operations, other special operations forces trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions.

• Coordinate projects with the Country Team. The US Agency for International Development representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

Civil Affairs Activities in MCA. Civil affairs activities in MCA, as part of more comprehensive US Government (USG) security and economic assistance programs, may originate from a national plan and entail specific projects, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with other USG agencies. The long-range goal of MCA is to nurture national development. Projects may be in areas closely paralleling those of the CA functional specialty areas. Projects include, but are not limited to, those in education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to HN economic and social development. The fundamental tenet of any successful civic action program is civilian self-help. Civil affairs assets are trained either to plan MCA programs or to provide professional advice and assistance to the HN military forces or agencies in establishing local expertise and providing skills and materiel assistance not available to the local civilian participants identified to assume the leadership roles for future long-term development. Other US military forces are capable of participating in MCA programs. Within the scope of their organization, funds, mission, and terms of agreements with the HN, these forces can undertake projects of their own or can assist and motivate HN counterparts to develop their own programs and plan projects, procure equipment needed, or train participating personnel. In developing countries, military organizations often possess a large share of skilled and semiskilled manpower, mobility, funds, and technical equipment essential to socio-economic development.

Related Terms
civil affairs; foreign internal defense

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception — Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC) — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities.

General. The role of deception in securing freedom of action should never be underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers since Sun Tzu have stressed the central nature of deception in successful warfare. Deception can provide a highly leveraged means to confuse our enemies and cause them to miscalculate our intentions, deploy their forces poorly, and mistakenly estimate our strengths and weaknesses, while helping to preserve our own freedom of action. Deception at the joint force level requires clear themes around which all components can focus their efforts. (See first figure below.)

Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Principles of Military Deception. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, six principles of military deception provide guidance for the planning and execution of deception operations, they are illustrated in the second figure below.

Focus. The deception must target the adversary decision maker capable of taking the desired action(s). The adversary’s intelligence system is normally not the target. It is only the primary conduit used by deceivers to get selected information to the decision maker.
Objective. The objective of the deception must be to cause an adversary to take (or not to take) specific actions, not just to believe certain things.

Centralized Control. A deception operation must be directed and controlled by a single element. This is required in order to avoid confusion and to ensure that the various elements involved in the deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other operational objectives. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized so long as all participating organizations are adhering to a single plan.

Security. Knowledge of a force’s intent to deceive and the execution of that intent must be denied to adversaries. Successful deception operations require strict security. Need-to-know criteria must be applied to each deception operation and to each aspect of that operation. Along with an active operations security (OPSEC) effort to deny critical information about both actual and deception activities, knowledge of deception plans and orders must be carefully protected.

Timeliness. A deception operation requires careful timing. Sufficient time must be provided for its portrayal; for the adversary’s intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report; for the adversary decision maker to react; and for the friendly intelligence system to detect the action resulting from the adversary decision maker’s decision.

Integration. Each deception must be fully integrated with the basic operation that it is supporting. The development of the deception concept must occur as part of the development of the commander’s concept of operations. Deception planning should occur simultaneously with operational planning.

As part of the command and control warfare (C2W) warfighting strategy, military deception conducted in support of joint operations seeks to influence adversary military commanders and to degrade their command and control (C2) capabilities. When supporting joint operations, military deception is done in conjunction with the overall C2W effort. It reinforces and is reinforced by the execution of other C2W tools.

Deception and Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deception during the planning, execution, and termination phases of every deception operation.
Intelligence and counterintelligence perform the following essential functions for deception planners:

- Identify adversary decision makers and assess the vulnerability of the decision makers to deception.
- Determine the adversary’s perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action.
- Provide estimates of adversary actions under differing scenarios and war games possible outcomes with the deception planner.
- Establish and monitor feedback channels to evaluate success of the deception operation through observation of the adversary’s reaction.
- Identify adversary information gathering capabilities and communication systems to determine the best deception conduits.
- Penetrate adversary OPSEC measures and deceptions in support of C2 protection.
Deception planners must keep intelligence analysts aware of ongoing deception operations. The analysts must look for feedback about the operation and consider the impact, both intended and unintended, of those operations as they seek to identify possible future adversary courses of action.

**Deception and Psychological Operations (PSYOP).** Similar to military deception, military PSYOP is a systematic process of conveying tailored messages to a selected audience. It promotes particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment US efforts to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP normally targets groups while deception targets specific individuals. An individual targeted by deception may also be part of a PSYOP target group.

Groups that might be suitable for targeting by PSYOP in support of deception operations include adversary command groups, planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

Through the skillful use of associated truths, PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce the deception plan. Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discretely convey intended information to selected target audiences through appropriate “key communicator” backchannel networks.

PSYOP actions convey information not only to the intended target audiences but also to foreign intelligence systems. Therefore, PSYOP objectives and actions must be consistent with the other C2W objectives and actions.

Additionally, some deception actions will not only convey information to the deception target but also to the PSYOP audience. This provides the opportunity for mutual support if deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

**Deception and Operations Security.** OPSEC is the process for denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. This unclassified evidence (called OPSEC indicators) is created by friendly detectable actions or is available in open-source information.

OPSEC measures are those actions that organizations take to control their OPSEC indicators. This is done to deny critical information to an adversary. Critical information is that information an adversary requires to counter friendly operations.

OPSEC and deception have much in common. Both require the management of indicators. OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary’s ability to detect or derive useful information from observing friendly activities. Deception seeks to create or increase the likelihood of detection of certain indicators in order to cause an adversary to derive an incorrect conclusion.

Deception can be used to directly support OPSEC. Cover stories provide plausible explanations for activities that cannot be hidden. False vehicle or aircraft markings disguise the deployment of specific forces. Major deception operations create numerous false indicators making it more difficult for adversary intelligence analysts to identify the real indicators that OPSEC is seeking to control.

The OPSEC process supports deception. The OPSEC process identifies the key questions about friendly capabilities and intentions to which adversary commanders need answers to effectively prepare to counteract friendly operations. The process also identifies the critical information that answers many of those questions. Deception planners set out to provide another set of answers to those questions — answers that provide the adversary with plausible information that induces certain desired actions.
An OPSEC analysis of a planned activity or operation will identify potential OPSEC vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities may be useful to deception planners as possible conduits for passing deceptive information to an adversary.

Deception actions often need their own OPSEC protection. The existence of a deception operation, in and of itself, may convey OPSEC indicators that reveal to the opposing commander the actual friendly intentions. An OPSEC analysis of the planned deception is needed to protect against just such an inadvertent or unintentional outcome.

**Deception and Electronic Warfare (EW).** EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary. Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC, supports EW operations by being used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of sensitive EW capabilities. Deception can also be used to support the employment of EW units and systems.

In turn, EW can be used to support deception. Electromagnetic deception is a form of electronic attack and a technical means of deception. EW can be used in support of feints, demonstrations, and displays. The positioning of a majority of a command’s EW systems in a particular area can be used to create an indicator of the command’s intended main effort. The disruption of an adversary’s intelligence and command communications capabilities can facilitate the insertion of deceptive information. EW attacks on intelligence collection and radar systems can be used to shape and control the adversary’s ability to see certain activities.

EW planning should be closely coordinated with deception and intelligence planners to ensure that EW does not disrupt any adversary C2 systems that are being used as deception conduits or that are providing intelligence feedback.

**Deception and Physical Destruction.** The relationship of deception and physical destruction is very similar to that of deception and EW. Deception, used in conjunction with OPSEC, can be used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of physical destruction systems. It can mislead an adversary as to true capabilities and purpose of a weapon system.

Physical destruction can support deception by shaping an adversary’s intelligence collection capability by destroying or nullifying selected intelligence systems or sites. Attacks can be used to mask the main effort from the adversary.

**Deception Terms.** Knowledge of military deception terminology is necessary for understanding the deception planning process.

**Deception Objective.** The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location. Military deception planners must distinguish between the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operational objective and the deception objective. The JFC’s operational objective is what the JFC wants achieve as the result of friendly force operations. The deception objective is the action(s) (or inaction) that the JFC wants the adversary to take.

A deception objective is always stated in terms of specific actions such as “have the adversary move its reserve force from Point A to Point B prior to H-Hour.” A statement such as “have the adversary think that we will make our main attack on its left flank” is not a deception objective. It is a desired perception. Having the adversary decision maker think a certain way is important only as a step toward getting that decision maker to make the decision that will result in the desired action that is the deception objective. Thoughts without action are of little military value.

**Deception Target.** The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. Each situation must be analyzed to identify the adversary commander who has the authority to take the desired action.
example, if the deception objective is to have an enemy reserve division be moved from its current position to a position more favorable to intended friendly operations, then the deception target would be the enemy corps or army commander. Subordinate commanders do not normally have the authority to direct their own positioning. They must be directed to do so by their commanders. The adversary’s intelligence system is normally not the deception target. It is a conduit that is used to get deceptive information to the target.

Desired Perception. The desired perception is what the deception target must believe in order for it to make the decision required to achieve the deception objective. Deception operations seek to identify and then create or reinforce those perceptions that will lead the deception target to make certain decisions.

Determining the desired perception is difficult. It requires understanding the target’s historical, cultural, and personal background. Generally it is much easier, and historically more effective, to reinforce an existing belief than to establish a new one. In addition, the target must believe that it is in its best interest to take the action required by the deception objective.

Deception Story. The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. A deception story identifies those friendly actions, both real and simulated, that when observed by the deception target will lead it to develop the desired perception.

The story normally takes the form of a concept of operation statement: “We will portray that we are preparing to attack the enemy’s left flank in three days with two armored divisions reinforced by a Marine air-ground task force.” The story does not address the means that will be used to portray the outlined actions.

Deception Means. Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. Deception means are used to portray the deception story. They are used to create a complete adversary intelligence picture that supports all aspects of the deception story. Means are tailored to the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities. Whether or not the deception target relies upon any particular intelligence source should be considered when selecting means. If the target is known to trust one intelligence source over all others, then means should be selected to exploit that trust.

There are three categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative. Physical means include displays of troop movements and concentration, feints and demonstrations by maneuver units, false logistic activity, and false headquarters. Technical means include false communications nets, false radar emissions, and the use of smoke and other obscurants. Administrative means include the staged compromise or loss of classified documents.

Deception Courses of Action (COA). Deception COAs are the schemes developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decision making. At a minimum, a deception COA will identify the deception objective, target, desired perception, story, and, in general terms, means. It answers the questions: who, what, where, when, how, and why.

Deception Events. The deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation. For example, a deception means is the passing of false messages over radio nets. A deception event identifies what unit would pass the desired message, when the unit would broadcast the message, and from where. Deception events are developed during the deception planning process.

Deception Action. A deception action is a collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation. A deception action is a combination of related
deception events that are used to portray a main element of a deception story. The four major types of deception actions are feints, demonstrations, displays, and ruses.

**Deception in the Yom Kippur War, 1973**

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

**Related Terms**

command and control warfare; deception

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

**MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. JP 1-02

**General.** Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be
applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war.

War. When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. As the figure below indicates, MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations.

MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies.

However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations or other regional organizations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance (HA). The specific goal of MOOTW may be peaceful settlement, assistance

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<th>Military Operations</th>
<th>General US Goals</th>
<th>Representative Examples</th>
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<td>Fight &amp; Win</td>
<td>Large Scale Combat Operations</td>
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<td>Attack / Defend / Blockade</td>
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<td>Combat</td>
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<td>Show of Force/Raid/Strike</td>
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<td>Peacekeeping/NEO</td>
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<td>Promote Peace &amp; Support US Civil Authorities</td>
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| Noncombat Other Than War | |
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RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for HA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is often in a support role to another agency, such as the Department of State (DOS) in HA operations. However, in certain types of operations DOD is the lead agency, such as in peace enforcement operations (PEO). These operations usually involve interagency coordination and may also involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Finally, although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the US, some types may be conducted within the US in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.

Primacy of Political Objectives. Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.

However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which, over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

Strategic Aspect. MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options. These contributions are shown in the figure below and then discussed.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOOTW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DETERRENCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences</td>
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<td><strong>FORWARD PRESENCE</strong></td>
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<td>Demonstrates commitment, lends credibility to alliances, and enhances regional stability</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CRISIS RESPONSE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Responding rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises</td>
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Deterrence. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the threat of nuclear conflict has diminished, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the US, allies, or other friendly nations — ranging from terrorism to WMD — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Various MOOTW combat options (such as peace enforcement or strikes and raids) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. Other MOOTW (such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

Forward Presence. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to MOOTW.

Crisis Response. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the US to respond rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be planned and executed under crisis action circumstances.

**Range of Military Operations Other Than War.** MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. These operations provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a wide range of possible response options, ranging from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement and strikes and raids.

Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force. In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives — to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace. Such operations involve a risk that US forces could become involved in combat.

Combatant commanders, at the direction of the NCA, may employ US forces to deter an adversary’s action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of strikes, raids, and other contingency operations. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, some foreign internal defense (FID), enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants.

The use of force introduces the fear, physical strain, and uncertainty which are among the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Although there are important political, diplomatic, and
legal differences between war and military operations other than war, there exists a singularly important threshold which may be crossed by use (or threat of use) of military force of any kind. In the range of military operations, this threshold marks the distinction between noncombat and combat operations.

Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include HA, disaster relief, some nation assistance, FID, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Such operations are inherently joint in nature. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

Simultaneous Operations. MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with PEO. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, DOS, and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area.

Duration of Operations. Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state. For example, the US has been a partner with ten other nations in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai since 1982. Short duration operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long term commitment is required to achieve objectives.

Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center."

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

General Principles. MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with applicable law. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The principles of war, though principally associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Strikes and raids, for example, rely on the principles of surprise, offensive, economy of force, and mass to achieve a favorable outcome. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles described in this chapter. MOOTW that require combat operations (such as some forms of peace enforcement, or strikes and
raids) require joint force commanders (JFCs) to fully consider principles of war and principles of MOOTW.

**Principles of Military Operations Other Than War.** Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” delineates six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific. These principles are shown in the figure below and then discussed.

Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. As an example, excessive US casualties incurred during a peacekeeping operation may cause abandonment of the operation.

Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions. The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. JFCs should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully
explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.

Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. However, in MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.

While the chain of command for US military forces remains inviolate (flowing from the NCA through the combatant commander to the subordinate joint force commander), command arrangements among coalition partners may be less well-defined and not include full command authority. Under such circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort. Because MOOTW will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the informal and formal relationships.

Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation: for example, terrorists, or looters after a civil crisis or natural disaster. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. All personnel should stay alert even in a non-hostile operation with little or no perceived risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to plan for and posture the necessary capability to quickly transition to combat should circumstances change.

In addition to the right of self-defense, operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation inherent in many MOOTW, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that operations security be an integral part of the operation. Operations security planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations. The perceived neutrality of these protected elements may be a factor in their security. Protection of an NGO or PVO by US military forces may create the perception that the NGO or PVO is pro-US. Therefore, an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to accept the US military’s protection.

Restraint. Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations,
and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war, consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

Perseverance. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

Legitimacy. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the US public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations and humanitarian
and civic assistance programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported
government.

Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community,
e nsuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions.
It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the
disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is
strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is
assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.

Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the
perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the
government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes,
they consider that government as legitimate.

Related Terms

political objectives in MOOTW

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

MILITARY PLANNING

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: force planning and joint
operation planning. (See figure below.)

Force Planning. Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military
capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under administrative control
that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the
Chiefs of the Services. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for
assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. USSOCOM
has similar responsibility for special operation forces, with the exception of organizing Service
components.

Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning is the focus of this document. It is
directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to
attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is conducted
within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities to the
combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the combatant commanders. At the national level, the Chairman of the Joint...
Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Chiefs of the Services, is principally responsible for the unified planning to employ the armed forces in support of national security objectives. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of plans (e.g., operation plans and campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation orders) by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military Departments and Services. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

**Related Terms**

force planning; joint operation planning

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0       Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also called MSCA. JP 1-02

Military support to civil authorities (MSCA) operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Support to civil authorities can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of riots, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Authority for additional support to law enforcement officials is contained in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,” and permits such support as loan of equipment, use of facilities, training, and transfer of information. Support is constrained in some instances by the Economy Act (31 US Code Section 1535) which may require the requesting agency to provide reimbursement.

Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385 — Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380.

Examples of military support to civil authorities are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew in Florida and Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992. Under DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” the Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for MSCA.

**Related Terms**

military operations other than war

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07       Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

Missile engagement zone (MEZ) operations are ideal for point defense of critical assets, protection of maneuver units in the forward area, and area coverage of rear operations. MEZ operations offer the joint force commander the ability to meet the enemy with a high- and low-altitude, all-weather capability. Advanced surface-to-air missile systems have long-range, high-firepower capability that can engage enemy aircraft beyond the forward line of own troops or disrupt massed enemy air attacks prior to committing fighter assets. Properly employed, MEZ operations are effective across the full range of air defense operations and enemy threats. MEZ operations need to be designed to maximize the full range and capabilities of various systems. Finally, MEZ operations within the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the flexibility and ability of friendly air assets to respond to the changing enemy threat and should not result in attacks on friendly assets.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

MISSION

The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. JP 1-02

The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows. It is the joint force commander’s expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, commanders translate these tasks into missions for their subordinates. Commanders do so by analyzing the mission statement and concept of operations, understanding the intent of senior commanders, assessing the current situation, and organizing all resources available to achieve the desired end. Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MISSION TYPE ORDER

1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. JP 1-02

Joint force commanders issue prioritized mission type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers,
or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority and responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with the superior commander’s intent and concept of operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MOBILITY

A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. JP 1-02

The joint campaign seeks to secure air and maritime superiority and space control. These are important for the effective projection of power. Furthermore, air and maritime superiority, and the enhanced support to terrestrial forces assured by space control, allow the joint force commander freedom of action to exploit the power of the joint force. For instance, air and maritime superiority are prerequisites to attaining a mobility differential over the enemy: first and foremost by protecting friendly mobility from the enemy and second by enabling joint interdiction to degrade the enemy’s mobility.

Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of communications. Without secure air, sea, space, and land lines of communications we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
MOBILIZATION

The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization.

2. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the armed forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

MOBILIZATION is the process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this definition:

- The Military Mobilization Process by which the nation’s armed forces are brought to an increased state of readiness.
- The National Mobilization Process of mobilizing the national economy to meet non-defense needs and sustain the armed forces in war or military operations other than war.

From a national perspective, the importance of a responsive mobilization capability to our national security is implicit in the President’s National Security Strategy and its derivative military strategy. The national process of graduated response (GR) provides the framework for achieving the desired mobilization capability and is a model for coordinating resources and plans for military and national mobilization. GR is the process by which the US responds to early ambiguous or explicit warning of an emerging national security emergency. It includes...
preplanned measures in the areas of force readiness, industrial base preparedness, operational requirements, and sustainability. From a joint operations perspective, mobilization is a function of the joint command and control process, which together with the Department of Defense (DOD) Total Force Policy provides the basis for joint military mobilization planning and execution. This information examines the relationship between mobilization and national security from both perspectives. It concludes with a definition of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security after a crisis or war.

Military forces fulfill their role in maintaining our national security by preparing for and, if necessary, conducting joint operations across the range of military operations. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System defines the functions, planning systems, and information management tools for accomplishing these tasks. Joint operation functions are arrayed in the figure below.

One complete cycle is shown. It is meant to depict an era of relative peace interrupted by a crisis and war requiring the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It shows the major steps in the deliberate planning process that produced the operation plan used as the basis for crisis response. It also depicts a gradual return to a peacetime environment secured by the return to the pre-crisis force structure. The mobilization and demobilization functions have been emphasized to place them in perspective with the other joint operation functions.

The mobilization function includes activation of the Reserve component (RC) and surging and expanding the industrial base. Lessons learned from the war in the Persian Gulf and the emergence of a new national military strategy at the end of the Cold War have led US military planners to a broader understanding of the scope of activities that should be included under the umbrella of the term, mobilization. Planners have also acquired an awareness of the importance of mobilization planning for contingencies requiring less than full mobilization.
Because the most visible mobilization activity is activating members of the RC serving in units or in individual manpower pools, there has been a tendency to focus planning on manpower issues. Mobilization, however, involves much more than expanding and filling the military force with people. The force must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is to achieve and maintain its designed capability. These activities require the support of the DOD civilian work force and contractor support. They also require increased resources in the areas of materiel, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, command and control communications, and host-nation support. Extraordinary actions may be required to ensure continued compliance with, or temporary waivers of, environmental protection laws. Funding and legal authorities are also required to enable mobilization activities. Mobilization, therefore, must include determining and satisfying demands for these resources to support the total force during deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

Mobilization planning complements and supports joint operation planning conducted by the combatant commanders. It is accomplished primarily by the Military Services, United States Special Operations Command, and their major subordinate commands based on guidance received from the Secretary of Defense. It requires development of supporting plans by the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Selective Service System, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, Office of Personnel Management, and other Federal agencies. Just as the Military Services mobilize their reserve organizations and individuals to augment military capability, supporting Federal agencies must oversee mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force. The Joint Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his role as principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities; facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources among the Services, combatant commanders, and Defense agencies; provides input for resolution of claims for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization planning.

Related Terms

MOVEMENT CONTROL

The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. JP 1-02

Movement Control. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling of common-user assets, and maintaining of in-transit visibility to assist commanders and operations staffs in force tracking. It also includes reception and onward movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies over lines of communications in accordance with command directives and responsibilities. Movement control is a system involving the coordination and integration of movement information and programs spanning all levels of operations.

Movement control coordinates transportation resources to enhance combat effectiveness and meet the priorities of the supported combatant commander. Efficient transportation in a
Theater involves establishing effective organization and control procedures. It also involves movement and resource management.

The geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing movement control. These options include directing subordinate joint force commander and Service components to perform their own movement control or creating a fully integrated joint organization. Regardless, the geographic combatant commander should task organize the movement control functions commensurate with the mission, size, and geography of the operational area.

Normally, the geographic combatant commander delegates operational control (OPCON) of the various parts of the transportation system to the most-capable-Service components and monitors the entire operation and retains the authority to set priorities and apportion resources. To exercise this authority, he establishes a Joint Transportation Board, a Joint Movement Center, or both. In addition, he may assign the responsibility to a staff element, normally the command’s senior logistic staff officer.

In relation to movement control, effective resource management requires the establishment and maintenance of a flow of resources through the transportation system that permits efficient utilization of user and transportation resources and capabilities. Maximum throughput at all transportation route segments, ports, and nodes, along with timely deliveries, are key measures of success in this effort. For the mode, terminal, and facility operator functions, resource management pertains to the efficient employment of personnel, materiel, and facilities.

**Principles of Movement Control.** Five movement control principles shown in the figure below form the foundation for management of all transportation operations.

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution. The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the geographic combatant commander control movement planning and resource allocation. Using the most-capable-Service concept, the geographic combatant commander usually delegates OPCON of movements to the Service component that has the required assets or capabilities to fulfill the mission. This delegation of authority achieves two objectives: it satisfies requirements at the lowest level possible, and it frees the geographic combatant commander to focus on theater-wide critical issues.

Fluid and Flexible Movements. The transportation system must provide an uninterrupted flow of supplies. It must also be flexible enough to change with mission modifications. The key to successful execution is the ability to regulate and manage the transportation system.

Regulated Movements. Movement control authorities must regulate moves to prevent terminal congestion and scheduling conflicts between Service components. Proper management of transportation assets and the transportation network is critical. Advances in technology have increased both the capability and requirement to regulate movements. Highly mobile forces, longer distances, increased consumption rates, and shared lines of communications are a few of the new challenges.

Maximized Use of Carrying Capacity. Transportation is a limited asset. As such, planners must understand when to use a specific mode of transport and when to maximize the use of each mode’s unique capabilities. This does not mean simply loading each mode to its capacity. It means the simultaneous, synergistic use of all transportation resources that best meet the combatant commander’s requirements. However, some situations may not allow adherence to this principle. The geographic combatant commander may decide to hold certain transportation modes in reserve. The following considerations apply:

- The expeditious movement of cargo to meet the combatant commander’s requirements may be more important than maximizing carrying capacity.
- Terminal congestion may preclude the use of a given mode.
• Delays during off-loading cause a lost transport capability.
• Stress keeping transport modes loaded and moving.

Forward Support. Forward-oriented transportation support is a combat multiplier; it allows the commander to concentrate all his forces on the enemy.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

JP 1-02

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of – most often to lead – coalition operations.”

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: “Principles for Coalition Warfare”, Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993
**General.** US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition.

An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations.

A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

**Considerations for Multinational Operations.** Considerations are shown in the figure below.

**National Goals.** No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation, therefore, can produce differing perceptions of progress. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

**Unity of Effort.** Motivations of member nations may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, and supported by each member nation. Commanders of multinational forces should carefully consider the types of missions assigned to member forces. Capabilities will often differ substantially between national forces, but sensitivity to and consideration of national honor, pride, and prestige will often be as important to final success as the contributions and capabilities of the national forces themselves. Small decisions, such as which national
forces are involved in the main effort or perhaps play the lead role at the start of an offensive, can have major consequences in multinational operations.

Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is required. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement (ROE), fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

Planning is often complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek to involve all member nations in the decision making process, consistent with the terms established at the founding of the alliance or coalition. Member recommendations should be sought continuously by multinational force commanders, but especially during development of courses of action (COAs) and ROE, assignment of missions to national forces, and establishment of priorities of effort.

JFCs should establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces. A personal, direct relationship can often overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise are essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

Doctrine, Training, and Equipment. Doctrines, operational competence as a result of training and experience, and types and quality of equipment can vary substantially among the military forces of member nations. When the situation permits, JFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces through training assistance and sharing of resources.
consistent with US and alliance or coalition terms of reference, such as the loan of American equipment (for example, radios, vehicles, or weapons).

JFCs implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate matching missions with capabilities. Where member forces have unique or special capabilities, they should be appropriately exploited. Joint and multinational exercises are key components of joint training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. Simulation can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces.

Cultural Differences. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English. Information loss during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage.

Management of Resources. Forces of member nations must be supported either by national assets or through the coalition. Resource contributions will vary between members. Some may contribute logistically, while others contribute military forces. Some may be able to do both. Commanders of multinational forces should seek to ensure that member forces are appropriately supplied and that contributions of member nations are consistent with national capabilities and the terms established at the formation of the alliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCs will rely on national political leadership and representatives from such

A US aircrew member coordinates loading procedures with UN loading crews through an Ethiopian translator during Operation SUPPORT HOPE.
agencies as the Department of State to effect such coordination with the leadership of member nations.

National Communications. JFCs should anticipate that some forces from alliance or coalition member nations will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leadership. This communications capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaderships external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the National Command Authorities, provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain of command for exceptional and emergency situations. The conditions and supporting communications systems for such bypassing should be established by the appropriate military and political leadership early.

**Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations.**

Rules of Engagement. JFCs should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

The Media. Though not directly related to the conduct of operations, JFCs seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations, consistent with requirements for operations security. This task is complicated in a multinational situation where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements. JFCs cannot hope to impose control over such efforts and, instead, should seek to work closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements to develop an open and collegial environment. Simple ground rules should be established by the senior political and military representatives of the alliance or coalition at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.

Local Law Enforcement. US forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations. Where local law enforcement organizations are present and capable, JFCs establish systems and procedures to optimize the contributions of indigent law enforcement personnel in facilitating operations and protecting lives and property in the operational area. Where local law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, JFCs should consider deploying appropriate US forces early in the deployment flow as well as exploiting the capabilities of other member nations.

Command and Control (C2). Successful multinational operations can center on achieving unity of effort from the outset. Participating nations need to provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the
multinational force toward common objectives. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decision making in multinational organizations.

Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the alliance force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances. The figure below provides an example of a command structure within an alliance.

Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many C2 structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with the following:
• Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control.
• Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force.
• Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure below depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

In a lead nation command arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well. Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.

Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition’s concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.

Liaison officers between multinational forces should be operationally proficient, innovative, and tenacious, but at the same time diplomatic and sensitive to the multinational forces with whom they are detailed. They should have the authority to speak for their JFCs or national force commanders.

Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the operation or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the operation. Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Some alliance or coalition member forces may not have the planning and execution
dexterity and flexibility characteristic of US forces. Accordingly, JFCs should ensure that the tempo of planning and execution does not exceed the capabilities of national forces. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate subordinate planning and execution.

To the extent possible, procedures should be standardized within the multinational force, especially if mistakes can result in failed missions or fratricide. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized. Where this is not possible, liaison teams should be tasked to facilitate coordination and deconflict operations. JFCs should fully exploit all capabilities available to them to coordinate operations, including Marine air/naval gunfire liaison companies and/or teams and Air Force tactical air control parties.

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict provides an example of a parallel command structure within which coalition capabilities were unified toward a common goal. Coalition leaders demonstrated flexibility and innovation in devising and working within this ad hoc structure.

*Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center*
Commanders may elect to organize the operational area that supports the command’s organization. For example, when a parallel command structure is employed, there are advantages to assigning areas of operation to national forces. This assignment permits relative autonomy of operations and can significantly deconflict operations. This technique was successfully employed by JTF Bravo during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where American, British, French, and Spanish forces operated in an area approximately 170 by 70 kilometers in size.

Intelligence. The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge. Alliance or coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in sophistication and focus. Members may not have capabilities similar to the US to collect and process intelligence. Nonetheless, each nation’s contributions and capabilities should be appropriately incorporated and exploited. JFCs should rapidly establish a system that optimizes each nation’s contributions and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

JFCs need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so need to be determined during initial coordination and negotiation between senior political and military representatives from member nations.

The National Disclosure Policy provides initial guidance. It promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable.

Logistics. Multinational logistics is a major challenge. Potential problem areas, as shown in the figure below, include differences in logistic doctrine; stockage levels; logistic mobility; interoperability; infrastructure; competition between Services and alliance and/or coalition
CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

Potential Problem Areas Include...

- **Difference in Logistic Doctrine**
- **Stockage Levels**
- **Logistic Mobility**
- **Interoperability**
- **Infrastructure**
- **Competition between Service, Alliances, and/or coalition members for common support**
- **National Resource Limitations**

members for common support; and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in the operational area. JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

Standardization of logistic systems and procedures can ease the logistic challenges. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. Significant logistic operations include acquisition and distribution of food stuffs, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts; transportation; field services; and health service support.

Contracting for various types of support, especially labor, facilities, common supplies, and transportation, is a significant aspect of many military operations. Procurement of materiel and services in the joint force’s operational area is done either through contracting on the open market or when the host nation offers support through specific government agencies. The host nation may also restrict the joint force’s contracting ability as it manages essential services for the host population. Requirements for materiel and services should be consolidated and validated as operationally required by the JFC’s staff. A determination of appropriate source for meeting the requirements should then be conducted (for example, supply system, host-nation support, or contracting). If contracting is deemed appropriate, JFCs should ensure that sufficient, qualified contracting officers are available from the outset to leverage the
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

capabilities available within the operational area. When required, contracting officers should be paired with linguists and should be prepared to operate in currencies or commodities other than US dollars.

Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. JFCs can consider centralizing host-nation support functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude host-nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

If some level of force integration is necessary to conduct operations, planners should determine where the integration of units and headquarters needs to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment. If integration is to occur at an intermediate staging base or port of debarkation, its impact on those bases or ports can be significant and needs to be addressed and accounted for by base and/or port commanders and staffs.

Protection. Protection measures that apply to joint operations are appropriate also for multinational situations. JFCs consider, for example, air defense, defensive counterair, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security measures for the multinational force. These considerations extend to nuclear, biological, and chemical warning and decontamination.

Avoidance of fratricide, especially between member forces, is important because of its potential negative impact on alliance or coalition unity and trust between member forces. JFCs should carefully assess the risks of fratricide between member forces involved in COAs being considered and actively seek to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of operational and technological solutions and expedients.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.  

The National Command Authorities (NCA), consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the armed forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.

The ultimate authority for national defense rests with the President. The President is assisted by the National Security Council (NSC), which is the principal forum for the development of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense is the principal adviser to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense and is a member of the NSC. The President and the Secretary of Defense (or their duly authorized alternates or successors) are the NCA, and they alone are vested with the lawful authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States in the execution of military action, including the movement of forces or the initiation of operations. In peacetime, the Secretary of Defense issues policy guidance for joint operation planning and reviews joint operation plans with the assistance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In crisis and war, the Secretary plays a pivotal role in crisis action planning and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the NCA.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The telecommunications system that results from the technical and operational integration of the separate telecommunications systems of the several executive branch departments and agencies having a significant telecommunications capability. Also called NCS.

The National Communications System (NCS) is an interagency group that coordinates the telecommunications assets of 23 Federal departments and agencies to ensure compatibility and interoperability during emergencies without compromising day-to-day operations. The NCS consists of the telecommunications assets of the entities represented on the NCS Committee of Principals and an administrative structure consisting of the Executive Agent, the NCS Committee of Principals, and the Manager. NCS Committee of Principals consists of representatives from those Federal departments, agencies, or entities designated by the President that lease or own telecommunications facilities or services of significance to national security or emergency preparedness. The NCS includes, to the extent permitted by law, other Executive entities that bear policy, regulatory, or enforcement responsibilities of importance to national security or emergency preparedness telecommunications capabilities.
The purpose of the NCS is to assist the President, National Security Council, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Office of Management and Budget to exercise their wartime and non-wartime emergency functions and their planning and oversight responsibilities; and to coordinate the planning for and provision of national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal government under all circumstances.

The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the NCS. The principal adviser for NCS matters is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency, is the Manager, NCS.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0  Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

NATIONAL GOALS

No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation, therefore, can produce differing perceptions of progress. Joint force commanders should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM

The priority component of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. Also called NMCS.

The National Military Command System (NMCS) is the priority component of Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)/Global Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and the Secretary of Defense can receive warning and intelligence so that accurate and timely decisions can be made, the resources of the Military Departments can be applied, military missions can be assigned, and direction can be communicated to combatant commanders or the commanders of other commands established by the NCA. The NMCS must be capable of providing information so that appropriate and timely responses can be selected, directed, and implemented by the NCA.

Both the communication of warning and intelligence from all sources and the communication of decisions and commands to military forces require that the NMCS be a responsive, reliable,
and survivable system. This capability requires that the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4) systems within WWMCCS be configured and operated for effective support of the NMCS as well as their specific missions. Systems must be compatible and interoperable. C4 systems must provide direct connection or real time relay wherever necessary. Data and message text formats must be standard. All details of system configuration and operation must be as efficient as possible in terms of both effectiveness and use of resources.

An enduring command structure with survivable C4 systems is both required and fundamental to NMCS continuity of operations. The NMCS includes four primary nodes — the National Military Command Center (Site R), United States Strategic Command Center, United States Space Command Center, the National Airborne Operations Center, and such other command centers as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. Support of the NMCS will be the priority function of all primary and alternate command centers.

These centers must be linked by reliable C4 systems, supported by warning and intelligence systems, and continuously staffed and ready for use. Special capabilities must be provided for communication with strategic offensive and defensive forces and for other forces that may be required for quick reaction in crises. In this case, the communications will be designated and operated to ensure minimum elapsed time for the transmission of orders to the operating units of these forces. The NMCS also includes C4 systems connecting its centers with primary and alternate command centers of the headquarters of the combatant commands; service Headquarters of the Military Departments; other designated commands and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies that provide support through the WWMCCS; major or key intelligence direction, analysis, and indication and warning centers; and other functional activities; e.g., counterdrug.

Effective coordination and liaison must be established and maintained with those activities of the US Government outside the DOD that have functions associated with the NMCS; e.g., the White House Situation Room, Department of State Operations Center, Central Intelligence Agency Operations Center, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, United Nations Military Mission, US Coast Guard Operations Center, Federal Aviation Administration Executive Communications Control Center, and such other agencies, activities, or centers as may be designated.
Appropriate military information will be provided to these associated systems through the NMCS, using timely, secure, and reliable communications systems. Conversely, political, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic information input to the NMCS will be provided by these same systems. In addition, the NMCS should provide communications to support representatives of the White House and other Government activities that may use the NMCS in a politico-military situation concerning strategic direction of US military forces.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide for lateral coordination with US Government activities external to the DOD to ensure necessary interchange of data to and from the NMCS.

**Related Terms**

global command and control system

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 6-0  
Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

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**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.  

National military strategy (NMS) is derived from the national security strategy. NMS attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. The NMS and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The NMS provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities.

**Related Terms**

national security strategy; strategy; theater strategy

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  
Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**NATIONAL SECURITY**

A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.  

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-02
Pursuant to the constitutional requirement of the Federal Government to “provide for the common defense,” the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government share responsibility and authority for ensuring national security. Based on the constitutional foundation of checks and balances and civilian control of the military, Congress legislates an overall framework for national security and allocates resources to meet changing defense requirements as identified by the executive branch. Within the executive branch, Federal agencies operate within this overall framework and the resources allocated to provide for the Nation’s present and future security. Using available resources and statutory authorities, the President exercises his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to direct the deployment and employment of the Nation’s Armed Forces.

Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation’s wars. When we fight, we fight to win.

We also have a long history of military support for national goals short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation (such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.

Related Terms
national military strategy; national security strategy

Source Joint Publications
JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Force of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

The National Security Council (NSC) system is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of his statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and presents his views and those of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for military planning and programming.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
We achieve unity of effort first at the national level. The President, assisted by the National Security Council, develops national security strategy (otherwise known as national or grand strategy), employing the political/diplomatic, economic, informational, and military powers of the nation to secure national policy aims and objectives. In support of this national security strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advises the President and Secretary of Defense (the National Command Authorities) concerning the application of military power. The resulting national military strategy provides strategic focus for US military activity. Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals for a projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated. The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus are fundamental prerequisites for unity of effort.

National security strategy is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action.

As the national leadership generates national objectives and a national security strategy to pursue them, the leadership will also devise — or modify — the military instrument of national power as a component of national security strategy. This strategy takes the form of objectives for the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional and geographic orientation. In the event of armed conflict, this strategy will take the form of military objectives for the establishment of military conditions essential to support national security objectives and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to US interests. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.

Related Terms

national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
national resources and military forces and supplies (means). The figure below illustrates national strategic direction.

The National Command Authorities, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure the following:

- Military objectives are defined, understood, and achievable.
- Active Service forces are ready for combat and Reserve component forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.
- Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their armed forces.
- Strategic direction is current and timely.
- Defense and other governmental agencies support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) employment of forces.
- The continental US base and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.
- Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.
- Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the JFC’s concept of operations.
“Our military forces are one team — in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. This is no time for “Fancy Dans” who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team — whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in the line — must be an all-American.”

**General Omar N. Bradley, USA:**
*Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, 19 Oct 1949*

**Related Terms**
- national security strategy, national military strategy

**Source Joint Publications**
- JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**NATION ASSISTANCE**

Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

**General.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than humanitarian assistance (HA)) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the US and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance as shown in the figure below. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan.

**Security Assistance.** Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program, Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act.

**Foreign Internal Defense.** FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.
"The severity of human suffering in Somalia caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Upon seeing the appalling conditions, and realizing they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population, local commanders took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted the commanders’ attention from their primary mission."

Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter, 93-8

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are provided under title 10 US Code section 401. This assistance is provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under HA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and,
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

### Related Terms

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
Coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy and in the United States as part of this Nation’s defense. Also called NCW. JP 1-02

Naval coastal warfare (NCW) forces plan and conduct operations to ensure strategic mobility and provide a safe haven for US and multinational forces in NCW areas, during time of war or other contingency situations, in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) concept of operations. NCW is the responsibility of the JFC. This responsibility is exercised through the Navy component commander (NCC), who will normally assign a naval coastal warfare commander (NCWC) for an appropriate NCW area. The NCWC plans and conducts NCW operations within a defined geographic area, normally designated as the NCW area. NCW encompasses coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security. NCW operations include but are not limited to intelligence gathering; reconnaissance and surveillance; interdiction; security and safety; and supporting operations. These operations may be done independently or in support of other operations.

The NCWC may assign subarea operational commanders as needed for coastal sea control and harbor defense in order to conduct these operations. Supporting functions such as mine countermeasures or search and rescue may be assigned to the NCWC. The conceptual organization is illustrated in the figure below.

Geographic combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders have the responsibility for NCW within their respective area of responsibility/joint operations area. This responsibility is exercised through the NCC. The NCC tasks the NCWC to conduct NCW operations. The NCC will assign supporting forces to the NCWC as required and available. The NCWC may request Coast Guard support before the transfer of the Coast Guard as a Service to the Navy.

The NCWC conducts NCW operations within a designated NCW area. The NCWC may identify one or more coastal sea control commanders (CSCCs), harbor defense commanders, and supporting function commanders, as appropriate.

The NCWC conducts liaison with Service component forces ashore via the joint rear area coordinator or the joint rear area commander, if designated, during joint operations. Close coordination is essential. CSCCs and harbor defense commanders establish corresponding relationships with Service component forces ashore to coordinate security operations.

The NCWC is subject to all agreements between the US and host nation (HN) governments. Close liaison between the NCWC and appropriate HN agencies is necessary in order to operate within that country’s territorial waters and to coordinate support from local, civil, and military authorities.
The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs across the range of military operations. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)-capable nations, including developing nations, may use these weapons to achieve political or military objectives. WMD may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. If used, they pose the problem to US forces of creating an asymmetrical battlefield.

The number of nations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing. Developing nations are receiving these weapons or means to develop them through technological transfer, overt or covert direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups or governments. The potential for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism during
peace to escalation during conflict or war. An NBC-capable nation is defined as one that has the capability to produce or acquire and employ one or more types of WMD to achieve political and military objectives. Inherent in this capability are varying degrees of abilities to conduct research and development, improve technology, stockpile, and effectively prosecute a war in an NBC environment.

Related Terms
nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

NETWORK

The missions of the US military have changed dramatically in the last decades of the twentieth century. The current and future operating environment of joint forces will be increasingly characterized by rapid change. Technological improvements in mobility, directed energy weapons, and sensors will continue to reduce factors of time and space, and demand faster tempos of operation across vast areas. Increasing global population, rapidly expanding world economic markets, and unprecedented advances in information systems technology will continue to perpetuate a global explosion of military and commercial information networks. These ever increasing networks are rapidly creating a global sphere (or infosphere) of information. The infosphere refers to the rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computers systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. The infosphere provides a worldwide, automated information exchange that supports joint forces, which is secure and transparent to the warrior. This emerging capability is highly flexible to support the rapid task organization and power projection. Information technology and the existence and growth of a global infosphere have irreversibly impacted the fundamental approach to warfare of massing effects rather than forces. This has not only propelled joint forces into the age of information, but also into information-based warfare with precision-guided weapon systems that detect and engage targets based on the electronic transfer of data. Joint forces must quickly adapt to this increasingly complex and highly uncertain operating environment.

Related Terms
information grid

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called NEO.

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may
also include selective evacuation of citizens from the host nation as well as citizens from other countries.

NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. This order also directs the Department of Defense to advise and assist the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander.

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty. Evacuation operations may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented political or military relationship with the US, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.

Examples of NEO are EASTERN EXIT, conducted in 1991, when US and foreign national personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and QUICK LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when personnel were evacuated from Zaire.
### Operation EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the US Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu’s international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the US Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a NEO in the midst of the Gulf War.

### Related Terms
- military operations other than war

### Source Joint Publications

- **JP 3-07** Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. JP 1-02

General. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are frequently on scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

These organizations play an important role in providing support to host nations. In fact, NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between $9 and $10 billion each year — more than any single nation or international body (such as the United Nations (UN)). Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

The Role of NGOs. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connectivity between NGOs and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the UN and US government agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

Military and Private Organization Relations. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed public affairs guidance.
“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses — manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity — that only the military can deploy”

Philip Johnston, President & CEO, CARE

“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.”

General George A. Joulwan, USA Commander in Chief, US European Command

Military Support of NGOs. The National Command Authorities may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between NGOs, and the military forces should be the goal. Taskings to support NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the NGOs. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable — not perform — NGO tasks. As later described, US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and NGOs and may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

Related Terms
private voluntary organizations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE OPERATIONS

General. A capability to defend against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack and to survive and sustain combat operations in an NBC environment requires intelligence forewarning and highly trained, properly equipped forces throughout the theater of operations. US forces must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation. At the theater operational level, NBC defense involves protection for forces and the means to remove or cope with operationally significant hazards, conceal intentions in the area of responsibility, and provide adequate health service support to preserve the fighting capability of the forces. Physical and mental demands of military operations can have profound effects on the performance of individual Service members and units. This is particularly true
when the stress of combat is intensified by heat, continuous operations, and NBC protective clothing worn as part of a unit’s mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP).

NBC defense for the theater requires cognizance of the principles of NBC defense — avoidance, protection, and decontamination — coupled with a proactive theater-level program of intelligence, psychological operations, deception, and obscuration. If the enemy uses NBC weapons, an effective NBC defense program gives our forces an advantage in operational tempo. This advantage causes the enemy to cease NBC warfare or continue the conflict on less favorable terms. Nuclear weapons cause casualties through blast, heat, and radiation effects. Biological and chemical weapons cause serious injury or death and restrict the use of terrain or equipment. NBC weapons also degrade force effectiveness by causing military personnel to don cumbersome protective clothing and equipment. To counter these effects, NBC defense, as shown in the figure below, adheres to the three principles: avoidance, protection, and decontamination.

Avoidance. Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense. Passive measures include training, camouflage and concealment (including the use of smoke and obscurants), hardened positions, and dispersion. Active avoidance includes contamination detection, marking, alarms, warning, reporting, and control measures.

Protection. This principle consists of hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming MOPP, physical defense measures, and reacting to attack.

Hardening. Overhead cover, bunkered positions, armored-like sections of ships, or tanks are examples. This measure pertains primarily to nuclear weapons in the NBC defense context.

Protecting Personnel. Ordinary clothing can provide some protection against the thermal effects of a nuclear detonation, but more sophisticated protection is required against biological and chemical weapons. These measures may include medical prophylaxis (pre-treatments) protective masks or protective ensemble, antidote, or other medical treatments.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AVOIDANCE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PROTECTION</strong></td>
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<td><strong>DECONTAMINATION</strong></td>
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<td>Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection</td>
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Nuclear. Other measures to protect personnel from nuclear effects include implementing passive measures, warning others, locating and identifying burst location, and limiting exposure.

Biological and Chemical. Other biological and chemical measures include providing individual and collective protection measures or relocation of personnel to toxic-free areas.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. When considering the use of MOPP, the commander should balance protection with degradation of the forces’ ability to perform their mission. Normally, the joint force commander will leave the decision of MOPP level to the component commander, who usually will decentralize the decision to the various area commanders or captains of their vessels.

Physical Defense Measures. The optimum conditions for the enemy to employ biological aerosols or chemical attacks exist in the late evening or early morning. When threat conditions exist, it is recommended that during the hours of darkness as many personnel as possible remain inside any available fixed or improvised collective protective shelters or wear their protective masks.

**Decontamination.** Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces the possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. The extent of and time required for decontamination depends on the tactical situation, mission, degree of contamination, and other alternatives to decontamination, such as deferring the use of the equipment. Forces should ordinarily decontaminate only that materiel needed for completion of the mission. Depending on agent type and weather conditions, decontamination may not be required because of natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and sunlight). Non-mission essential equipment would have the decontamination deferred, or natural weathering could be used.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

**NUCLEAR RADIATION**

Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapon standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; X-rays for example, are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since they do not originate from atomic nuclei.

Effects of a nuclear detonation are primarily in three areas: thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear radiation. Corollary effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, can break down electronics system protection, disrupt communications, and have significant psychological impacts on friendly forces.

The most wide-spread and longest lasting weapon effect comes from the emission of radioactive products. These appear in two forms: initial and residual radiation. Initial radiation, which is emitted during the first minute after detonation, produces deadly gamma rays and neutrons. Residual radiation is most prevalent in ground bursts where the detonation heaves...
up land, buildings, and other materials that are later dispersed as radioactive fallout. In the case of an air burst, residual radioactive emissions are extremely limited.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-11 | Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense |
OBJECTIVE

The physical object of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature, the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan. JP 1-02

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved). Commanders of combatant commands (CINCs) and joint force commanders (JFCs) reporting directly to the National Command Authorities (NCA) receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCs refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs then translate this guidance and theater strategy into clearly defined and attainable objectives. JFCs then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish these objectives. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

Related Terms
principles of war; target

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OBJECTIVITY

For intelligence to be objective, it should be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or an adversary, institutional position, predetermined objective, operation, or method of operations. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

OFFENSIVE

The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.
**Operational Area**

**Organization of an Operational Area.** To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas (illustrated in the figure below).

Joint Operations Area (JOA). A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.
Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

Joint Rear Area (JRA). The JRA facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

Amphibious Objective Area. The amphibious objective area includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. Refer to Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” for further information and guidance.

Area of Operations (AO). JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

Area of Interest (AI). JFCs at all levels can designate AIs to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL ART

The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. JP 1-02

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. (See figure below.) Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders
understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Related Terms

operational level of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0    Doctrine for Joint Operations
OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. JP 1-02

Operational Control (OPCON) is the command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be delegated or transferred.

OPCON is inherent in combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate joint force commanders. Commanders of subordinate commands and joint task forces will normally be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior commander.

OPCON is the authority to exercise the following:

- Exercise or delegate OPCON and tactical control, establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.
- Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.
- Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
• Organize commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
• Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.
• Assign command functions to subordinate commanders.
• Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of subordinate forces.
• Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.
• Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.
• Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.
• Assign responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders.
• Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such areas of operation for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable.
• Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic areas of operation of subordinate commanders.

The Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between combatant commanders. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating combatant commanders.

Related Terms

combatant command; combatant command (command authority); tactical control

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Related Terms
operational art; strategic level of war; tactical level of war

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL REACH

“Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate control of its logistic support.”

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles: Logistics in the National Defense (1959)

On the first page of “On War,” Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler’s sword; the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to protect each other is the dueler’s shield; and, in its broadest sense, basing is the dueler’s footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or continental US, directly affects operational reach.

Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapon systems, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput. Nevertheless, for any given operation, there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations. (See figure below.)
Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly affecting the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and as such can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from enemy attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived of in terms of lines of operations.

Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space...
and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment. The combatant commander (CINC) may seek to extend operational reach (with associated increase in risk) by deploying forces ahead of supporting combat service support forces. The logistician must then creatively use available assets to provide the minimum level of sustainment to the deployed forces. Operational reach may be improved by establishing advanced bases or depots and by improving the security and efficiency of the lines of communications.

Operational reach is a relative value. It may be improved by denying one or several components of the enemy’s operational reach. The essence of a campaign plan is to accomplish the assigned national strategic objectives with logistics providing the extension of the CINC’s strategic and operational reach into the enemy’s depths while denying operational reach to the enemy.

As CINCs move forces forward, they must gain control of command, control, communications, and computer systems centers, transportation nodes, and prospective base areas. These centers and areas become physical objectives for the combat forces to seize, control, and pass to the logistic system as it moves forward to exploit new gains. The resulting forward momentum of the logistic system results in an extension of the operational reach and endurance of the combat forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 4-0  Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

OPERATION ORDER

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD.

JP 1-02

Operation orders are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to effect the coordinated execution of an operation.

Related Terms

campaign plan; operation plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.

An operation plan (OPLAN) is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an operation order. OPLANs are normally prepared under the following conditions:

- The contingency has a compelling national interest, a specific threat, is critical to national security, and requires detailed prior planning.
- The nature (large scale) of the contingency requires detailed prior planning for complex issues.
- Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness and resolve.
- Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan’s concept of operations.
- Detailed planning is necessary to determine force and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

**Related Terms**

operation order; time-phased force and deployment data

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
OPERATION PLAN IN CONCEPT FORMAT

An operation plan (OPLAN) in concept format (CONPLAN) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or operation order. A CONPLAN contains the commander of a combatant command’s (CINC’s) Strategic Concept, Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes and appendixes either required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless specified in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files are not prepared.

A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the warfighting/employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the CINC’s concept of operations. Phasing, centers of gravity, and commander’s intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the national objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of alliances. In this case campaign planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing, however, that the level of detail contained in these plans is dependent upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANs support, a campaign orientation may not be possible in all cases.

Related Terms
campaign plan; operation plan

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

OPERATIONS SECURITY

A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC.

Operations security (OPSEC) is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to accomplish objectives shown in the figure and text below:

- identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems;
- determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries;
• select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

OPSEC’s most important characteristic is that it is a process. OPSEC is not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation. It is a methodology that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to an adversary.

Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence that is associated with sensitive operations and activities. OPSEC and security programs must be closely coordinated to ensure that all aspects of sensitive operations are protected.

OPSEC acknowledges that commanders must be prepared to assume some degree of risk when choosing whether or not to execute OPSEC measures. OPSEC measures will, in most cases, entail the expenditure of resources. In choosing to execute particular OPSEC measures, commanders must decide that the assumed gain in secrecy outweighs the costs in resources. If commanders decide not to execute certain measures because the costs outweigh the gain, then they are assuming risks. The OPSEC process requires that decision makers directly address how much risk they are willing to assume.

“The general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.”

Sun Tzu

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
PARALLEL CHAINS OF COMMAND

In amphibious operations, a parallel system of command, responding to the interrelationship of Navy, landing force, Air Force, and other major forces assigned, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation. JP 1-02

The interrelationship of naval and landing force (LF) tasks during the planning for and execution of the amphibious operation requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding commanders at all levels of the amphibious task force organization. The following fundamental considerations govern the application of such a system of parallel command:

• The commander, amphibious task force (CATF), a Navy officer, is responsible for the operation and, except during the planning phase, exercises that degree of authority over the entire force as necessary to ensure success of the operation.
• The commander, landing force (CLF) is either an Army or Marine Corps officer who has operational command of the LF (which may include aviation units).
• The CATF and CLF are on a corresponding level of command with regard to their respective components.

Parallel chains of command between the naval force, LF, and, in some cases, Air Force elements of an amphibious task force create special requirements for consultation. No significant decision contemplated by a commander in one chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of command will be made without consultation with the commander concerned.

All necessary orders from one commander affecting personnel under command of a corresponding commander at a parallel level of command are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate counterpart commander. The foregoing will not affect the paramount authority of a commander of a ship or aircraft over persons embarked therein concerning matters affecting safety and good order of his ship or aircraft or authority of a senior officer present to act in an emergency.

Related Terms

amphibious operation

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

PARALLEL COMMAND

Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with: Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control; and Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force.

Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions
are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure below depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

This diagram shows a variation of the parallel combined command structure. A formal, longstanding alliance will normally form a combined command headquarters with a combined staff and a single combined commander. Subordinate national commands, however, maintain national integrity.

**Related Terms**

**lead nation command**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**PATIENT EVACUATION**

Patient evacuation in the combat zone or from Echelon I to Echelon II, from Echelon II to Echelon III, and within Echelon III is normally the responsibility of the component commands and is coordinated by a Theater Patient Movements Requirements Center. These movements can be by surface (land or water), rotary-wing aircraft, or tactical aeromedical aircraft.
Dedicated patient evacuation for Navy hospital ships is provided by Army air ambulance assets. Tactical aeromedical evacuation from the combat zone (Echelon III) to the communications zone (Echelon IV) is normally a responsibility of the supporting Air Force component. Patient evacuation from the theater is the responsibility of US Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, who is responsible for establishing, operating, training, and maintaining the common-user aeromedical evacuation system worldwide. This mission is executed by the Air Mobility Command.

Vietnam: From the Field to the Hospital

Field evacuation and hospitalization of wounded in Vietnam was different from any previously carried out in any war. In addition it varied both in time and place within Vietnam. It was characterized by the absence of front lines and the traditional chain of evacuation. In general, the wounded Soldier was apt to receive his wounds while with a small group or unit isolated deep in roadless jungle, and the wounds were more apt to be multiple over all parts of the body than in any previous war. First aid and emergency medical treatment given on the site by company aid men, however, differed little from previous times. Resuscitative equipment and procedures included pressure dressings, tourniquets, and airways. Morphine was available but seldom used, as pain was not usually a problem at this point and aid men were aware of the depressant effects of morphine. In all likelihood, the patient would be evacuated within a relatively few minutes by helicopter, either a medical ambulance craft or a tactical one. The facilities available for resuscitation aboard the helicopter varied depending on whether it was a medical (“dust-off”) helicopter or a combat helicopter. IV fluid, usually Ringer’s Lactate solution, was often available, and trained medical technicians and emergency equipment were also present on dust-off helicopters.

The destinations of the helicopters varied. In some areas patients were taken to aid stations or medical companies. More often the helicopter flew the patients directly to a surgical hospital where they could receive definitive care. Blood and electrolyte solutions were often available at aid stations and medical and clearing companies, as was some surgical capability. Complete surgical facilities, including anesthetists, were available at clearing companies, but definitive surgery was usually not done here. At times battalion surgeons flew forward to a site of combat, bringing blood and other supplies which were given on the spot.

Hospitals fulfilled much the same function for combat wounded, whether they were surgical hospitals, field hospitals, or evacuation hospitals. By and large they were all “semipermanent,” usually buildings set on a concrete floor, air-conditioned and with all utilities and other equipment of a first-rate hospital in the continental United States.

Resuscitation of a Vietnam war casualty was an extremely rapid and sophisticated procedure. The patient would often be brought to the hospital directly from the battlefield by medical evacuation helicopter, frequently in less than an hour. Usually he received emergency treatment on the battlefield, to include control of hemorrhage, wound dressing, respiratory control, and often the starting of intravenous fluid. At the hospital, he was immediately
taken to the resuscitation area where he was surrounded by a large team of highly trained physicians, nurses, and technicians.

The results of this prompt and efficient treatment may perhaps be best illustrated by comparing them with similar statistics from previous wars. In Vietnam, 46,000 of 346,000 or 13 percent, of all wounded American Soldiers died. If 22 percent had died, as was true in Korea, there would have been 77,840 deaths, 31,840 more than actually occurred. In World War II, 28 percent of all wounded American Soldiers died. If the medical treatment of Vietnam had been available during World War II, 117,748 Soldiers would have been saved.


Timely patient evacuation plays an important role in the design of the treatment sequence from front to rear. When the echelons of health service support become more sophisticated, the means of patient evacuation also become more sophisticated. Patient evacuation involves route planning, movement control, and the locating of evacuation facilities. The evacuation of patients in a theater will primarily be by aircraft when air transportation is available, feasible, and the patient’s condition permits. The joint force surgeon (JFS) must plan the means for treatment, logistics support, and movement of joint force patients that exceed the capability of individual medical treatment facilities (MTFs), just as the individual MTFs and medical units must have established internal operating procedures for these unforeseen surges in patient flow. The JFS must develop and exercise these plans for interorganizational support within the joint force, as well as those medical resources that will come from higher echelons or adjacent forces.

Health service plans must consider the evacuation of patients and casualties who cannot be returned to duty in the combat zone (Echelons I-III) to more capable hospitals in the communication zone or CONUS.
PEACE BUILDING

Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. JP 1-02

Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.

Related Terms
peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Peace enforcement operations (PEO) are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or ceasefire. Unlike peacekeeping operations, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO

**Related Terms**
peace operations; peacekeeping operations

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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**PEACEKEEPING**

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

US doctrine has defined peacekeeping as “Military or para-military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, codified in title 22, US Code, authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and other programs to further US national security interests. (See figure below.)

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**US SUPPORTED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

- **Foreign Assistant Act of 1961**
  - Title 22, US Code
  - Authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further US national security interests

- The United States has supported numerous United Nations and non-United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping efforts with logistical support, financial support, observers, and forces

- The United States is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world
PKOs take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the belligerents, the sponsoring organization, and potential force contributing nations concerning which nations will provide peacekeeping forces as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute. These operations are conducted in accordance with agreements among the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping efforts often involve ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant.

The United Nations (UN) has been the most frequent sponsor of international PKOs. However, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions. Similarly, some nations have negotiated multilateral agreements to create peacekeeping missions independent of any permanent international forum. Although there have been instances of other types of operations — such as the loose coalition of national units known as the Multinational Force in Beirut — these operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN. In some cases, unilateral interventions, such as Indian forces in Sri Lanka, have been termed “peacekeeping,” but fall outside the use of the term as defined by US doctrine.

Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the UN. Although the UN Charter did not address peacekeeping, the UN gradually developed peacekeeping doctrine. The term “peacekeeping force” was used in 1956 when the UN established the UN Emergency Force to supervise the disengagement of forces after the invasion of Egypt, in the Suez War, by Great Britain, France, and Israel.

The US has supported numerous UN and non-UN-sponsored peacekeeping efforts with logistical support, financial support, observers, and forces. The US is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world.

**Related Terms**

peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations

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**PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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**PEACEMAKING**

The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it.

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-02
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance.

**Related Terms**
peace building; peace enforcement; peace operations; peacekeeping

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

**PEACE OPERATIONS**

A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Peace operations (PO) are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of military operations other than war (e.g., humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operation) may complement peace operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

**Related Terms**
peace building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

**PERSEVERANCE**

Perseverance requires the preparation for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some military operations other than war may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

**Related Terms**
military operations other than war

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

**PHASE DURATION**

Phase duration is a useful tool for determining the allocation of resources. Phase duration is the joint force commander’s projection of how long a specific phase of an operation is
expected to last. Two examples of phase duration: the air operation will last a certain number of days (time oriented); or the air operation will last until a certain percentage of enemy ground threat is destroyed (objective oriented). Threat distribution and phase duration help identify where the weight of the campaign will fall during various phases to prevent unnecessary duplication of support to different components.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

PHASES

The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander’s decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase — such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations — indicates a shift in emphasis. World War II’s Operation OVERLORD contained six phases: buildup, rehearsals, embarkation, assault, buildup, and breakout.

Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms. During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment).

Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, joint force commanders (JFCs) tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC’s concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute
greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a 
deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full 
dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive 
action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the National Command 
Authorities and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction 
of the enemy’s ability and will to continue.

During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation 
to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political 
objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat (military 
and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring 
that the results achieved endure. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in 
support of other governmental agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current 
operations during hostilities on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations 
should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for 
operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy 
their forces. JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible to best 
accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve 
the crisis.

Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, 
opening and maintaining lines of communications, establishing intermediate logistic bases to 
support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key 
to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint 
responsibility.

Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this 
point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and 
sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.
The Gulf War, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases:

- DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).
- DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing).
- OFFENSE.
- POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment).

Deployment and Force Buildup. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

Defense. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected COA before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

Offense. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval
forces; logistic infrastructure; and C2. Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a ceasefire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the ceasefire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

PLANNED REQUESTS

When air movement requirements are known or projected in advance, they are handled as planned requests through normal logistic channels. Channel missions and most special assignment airlift missions result from planned requests. In all cases, the joint military
command should task planned requests within the operational lead time established by the Air Force component commander. Lead time is the time required to source, task, and generate actual missions in support of a specific requirement. Lead time varies, depending on the scale of the request, available forces, and the theater air planning process.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Support

PLANNING AND DIRECTION

Planning and direction involve establishing the command relationships between all intelligence elements within the joint force and identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements. This step also includes preparing a collection plan, determining essential elements of information, issuing requests for information collection and production, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

Collection planning is normally conducted through the Collection Requirements Management (CRM) process. CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint and component force commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, CRM tasks requirements to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies. (See figure below.) CRM also monitors the overall satisfaction of these requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.

Planning and direction also includes identifying: intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to the Manpower and Personnel Directorate, key logistical requirements to the Logistics Directorate, lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment list to the Plans Directorate, and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate. This step also includes establishing and coordinating intelligence dissemination procedures.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

ORGANIC

Intelligence assets or capabilities permanently assigned to a particular command.

ATTACHED

Separate units or assets attached to the joint force to support a particular operation or phase of operation.

SUPPORTING

Adjacent or other area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA), theater, other combatant command, or national intelligence assets providing intelligence support to the joint force commander from outside his AOR/JOA.
and systems with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands, and identifying national-level support requirements.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PLANNING ORDER

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action.

The PLANNING ORDER is a message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the supported commander and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The primary purpose of the PLANNING ORDER is to direct that execution planning activities begin before formal selection of a course of action (COA) by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V of crisis action planning to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The PLANNING ORDER is designed to allow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the PLANNING ORDER may be used in lieu of a WARNING ORDER. When used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER will normally not be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Related Terms

alert order; execute order; warning order

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-02

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM

The planning, programming, and budgeting system, (PPBS) is another major national-level system related to the joint operation planning and execution process. The Department of Defense (DOD) military strategy formulation and resource management system develops and integrates defense policy, military strategy, Service programs, and the DOD budget. This system’s ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. The PPBS applies Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) derived national military strategy and recommended forces, and translates
them into budgetary requirements to be presented to Congress. The PPBS encompasses three phases.

Planning. The planning phase of the PPBS articulates the national policy, military strategy, and the force requirements to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding projected budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses the JSPS to develop national military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President’s consideration. Following review by the Secretary of Defense, the President considers the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and makes his strategy and option decisions, which are then incorporated in the development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG is developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, the Services, and others. The final DPG is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Planning Resources Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and publication. The DPG is the link between planning and programming as it articulates national defense strategy and appropriate force structure requirements, together with programming guidance sufficient to accomplish national security objectives to the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for the development of their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

Programming. The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. With the exception of USSOCOM’s special operations-unique requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their Service components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated Priority List. The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services’ total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of approved strategy and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the Chairman’s Program Assessment. In a coordinated effort, program issues are identified by the combatant commanders and DPRB members and are resolved by the DPRB. The results are promulgated in the Secretary’s Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, budget estimates are prepared by each of the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM and submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense budget is reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that it is consistent with fiscal guidance. Changes to the budget are documented in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). During this final phase of budgeting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the Secretary of Defense. Final changes are incorporated with previous PBDs to establish the DOD portion of the President’s budget, which is submitted to Congress for funding. When the President
signs the congressional appropriations act into law, the Services, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget to procure forces and capabilities.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

**POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

**Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).** All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies. However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations or other regional organizations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance.

**Political Considerations.** There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent’s military strength and political policy — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. War is an instrument of policy. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in hostilities, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent’s strategic aim shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

**Related Term**

**Source Joint Publication**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN MOOTW

Political objectives drive military operations other than war (MOOTW) at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which, over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.

Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code, Section 1385)

Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385 — Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members
to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380.

**Related Terms**

**Joint Source Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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**PREHOSTILITIES**

Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, joint force commanders (JFCs) tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC’s concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**PREPARING THE THEATER**

**General.** Actions joint force commanders (JFCs) are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the theater, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations. (See figure below.)

**Preparing the Theater.**

Intelligence. At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process, JFCs then focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable actions within the context of the current situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

JFCs direct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations by elements of the joint force to further develop the situation and gain information critical to decision making. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the information desired. Armed
reconnaissance operations conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real time intelligence. Special operations forces can be employed for special reconnaissance or other human intelligence operations.

JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. Intelligence Directorates should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements. Intelligence operations serve to reduce uncertainty.

Organizing and Training Forces. Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with continental US-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Joint task forces and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander’s joint mission essential task list.

Maintaining Theater Access. JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea lines of communications (LOCs). Supporting combatant commanders
can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

**PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY**

Provision of a public law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 270 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC.

Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the National Command Authorities for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war. Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for Reserve component (RC) volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled retirees were used in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf.

Presidential Selective Reserve Callup authority makes up to 200,000 Selected Reservists available for up to 270 days (10 USC 12304). It was also used effectively in the Persian Gulf and during recent operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05  Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

**PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY**

Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence.

Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a preventive deployment. An example is Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US
Forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the United Nations effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

**Related Terms**

peace operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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**PREVENTIVE MEDICINE**

Preventive medicine personnel must be included early in joint health service support planning. They conduct preliminary investigations for endemic diseases, arthropod and rodent infestations, and water quality. Specific preventive medicine procedures are generally the responsibility of the component commands. However, the geographic combatant commander may exercise directive authority and change component responsibilities based on operational or geographic considerations.

In a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment, preventive medicine services will be in great demand. There is a possibility that many deaths would occur if an effective biological agent attack occurred. Demands for military medical support to both military and civilian populations will probably be intense. Preventive medicine personnel must assist the commander in determining the health hazards associated with nuclear fallout and biological contamination, such as safe food and water sources, and in determining when to use prophylaxis, immunization, and other preventive measures associated with NBC warfare. Preventive medicine personnel must be aware of the NBC threat in the theater and continually update the informational data base on diseases, potential disease vectors, and the susceptibility of troops to these diseases. In NBC conditions, diseases known to exist in the area may be manifested but not transmitted to our forces. The appearance of a disease or vector not known to exist in the theater is an indication that biological warfare agents are being introduced into the area. Following an effective NBC attack, the application of general preventive medicine principles will be important.

**Related Terms**

health service support

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

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**PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE**

Basic Principles of Intelligence. (See figure below.)

**Joint Force Commander (JFC) is Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations.**

The JFC determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC’s objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander’s decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander’s mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission.
Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation. Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander.

**Synchronize Intelligence With Operations.** The commander should require, and the J-2 should ensure, that all intelligence activities, assets, and disciplines are applied in time, space, and purpose to support optimally the JFC’s operation plan. This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide timely, objective, tailored, complete, accurate, and relevant intelligence to achieve assigned operational objectives. This integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the adversary’s centers of gravity. The product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource, including intelligence assets, where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success.
Use the Same Approach for Operations Other Than War and War. Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation throughout the range of military operations. Warfighting intelligence structures of resources, methodologies, and products should be established, viable, exercised, and operational in peacetime to be available in any type of conflict and for any form of operation. Although it is recognized that intelligence organizations, particularly Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and joint intelligence support elements (JISEs), will expand according to need, the concept of dual peacetime and wartime structures does not support the principle of “readiness” for all potential operations. Dual intelligence structures for peace and war require difficult and time-consuming transitions in critical situations.

The J-2 Should Participate From the Outset. The J-2 should participate in decision and planning processes from the initial point when operations are contemplated or directed. Effective intelligence support requires a two-way flow of essential information. The J-2 should be collocated with the JFC and function as a full member of the staff to provide the commander with the best possible view of the situation and adversary and to identify, develop, and disseminate the intelligence needed to support operations. The J-2 should apprise the JFC whether adequate intelligence can be made available for the campaigns, operations, and courses of action being considered.

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

JFCs have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, the J-2 should integrate their efforts with the JIC/JISE. These liaison personnel are normally organized into a national intelligence support team (NIST) and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization. Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities. If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2’s concept of synchronizing all forces’ intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander’s needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.
The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. This includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets. Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC. Support relationships are shown in the figure below.

**Recognize Counterintelligence (CI) as a Source of Information.** CI is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational

### STANDARD SUPPORT MISSIONS

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<tr>
<th><strong>GENERAL</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>An intelligence element in general support will provide support to the joint force as a whole and not to any particular subordinate unit. This element responds to the requirements of the JFC as tasked by the J-2.</td>
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<th><strong>DIRECT</strong></th>
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<td>An intelligence element in the direct support of a specific unit is required to respond to the intelligence requirements of that unit. Direct support elements have a second priority to respond to the needs of the joint force as a whole.</td>
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<td>The capabilities of intelligence units or staff sections are extended by intelligence units reinforcing other intelligence units.</td>
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<th><strong>MUTUAL</strong></th>
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<td>An intelligence element assigned a mutual support mission is required to respond first to the intelligence requirements of the joint force as a whole and then to support the activities of another specified intelligence element as a second priority.</td>
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</table>
planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. CI supports military operations and planning during peacetime operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the Department of Defense (DOD). CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis. As such, CI plays a significant force protection role as well as conducting functions complementing intelligence such as analysis and collection.

Prioritize Component Intelligence Requirements. The joint force J-2 should carefully manage the flow of intelligence to the joint warfighter. Critical, time-sensitive component request for information should be expeditiously answered at the lowest command level possible.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS

General. The principles of logistics (see figure below) complement the principles of war. These principles and considerations serve as a guide to commanders and their staffs for planning and conducting logistic support for joint operations.
Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time. Among the logistic principles, responsiveness is the keystone; all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.

Simplicity. Simplicity is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations. Mission-type orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity. Establishment of priorities and preallocation of supplies and services by the supported unit can simplify logistic support operations.

Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The commander must retain positive command and control over subordinate organizations to maintain flexibility. The principle of flexibility also includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized operations.

Economy. Economy is the provision of support at the least cost. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the commander must continuously consider economy.

Attainability. Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The commander’s logistic staff develops the concept of logistic support, completes the logistic estimate, and initiates resource identification based on supported commander’s requirements, priorities, and apportionment. An operation should not begin until minimum essential levels of support are on hand.

Sustainability. Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander’s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.

Survivability. Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction. Examples of military objectives selected for their effect on logistics and subsequent theater operational capability include industrial centers, airfields, seaports, railheads, supply points and depots, lines of communications, shipping, rail and road bridges, and intersections. Logistic units and installations are also high-value targets that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission. Although the physical environment will most often only degrade logistic capabilities rather than destroy them, it must be considered when planning. Survivability may dictate dispersion and decentralization at the expense of economy. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to survivability. These concepts are related to logistic indicators.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
**General.** Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense for the theater requires cognizance of the principles of NBC defense — avoidance, protection, and decontamination — coupled with a proactive theater-level program of intelligence, psychological operations, deception, and obscuration. (See figure below.) Theater-level intelligence assets gather information on the state of the area of responsibility and enemy capabilities and intentions. Psychological operations support deterrent measures and, in the event of the failure of deterrence, enhance reactive measures as a force multiplier. Deception at the theater level supports large-scale maneuvers. Obscuration increases survivability of large-scale operations and port and airfield operations.

**Avoidance.** Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense. Passive measures include training, camouflage and concealment (including the use of smoke and obscurants), hardened positions, and dispersion. Active avoidance includes contamination detection, marking, alarms, warning, reporting, and control measures.
**Protection.** This principle consists of hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), physical defense measures, and reacting to attack.

Hardening. Overhead cover, bunkered positions, armored-like sections of ships, or tanks are examples. This measure pertains primarily to nuclear weapons in the NBC defense context.

Protecting Personnel. Ordinary clothing can provide some protection against the thermal effects of a nuclear detonation, but more sophisticated protection is required against biological and chemical weapons. These measures may include medical prophylaxis (pre-treatments) protective masks or protective ensemble, antidote, or other medical treatments. Other measures to protect personnel from nuclear effects include implementing passive measures, warning others, locating and identifying burst location, and limiting exposure. Other biological and chemical measures include providing individual and collective protection measures or relocation of personnel to toxic-free areas.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. When considering the use of MOPP, the commander should balance protection with degradation of the forces’ ability to perform their mission. Normally, the joint force commander will leave the decision of MOPP level to the component commander, who usually will decentralize the decision to the various area commanders or captains of their vessels.

Physical Defense Measures. The optimum conditions for the enemy to employ biological aerosols or chemical attacks exist in the late evening or early morning. When threat conditions exist, it is recommended that during the hours of darkness as many personnel as possible remain inside any available fixed or improvised collective protective shelters or wear their protective masks.

After an Attack. Following an attack, personnel should take immediate action to reduce the impact of the attack and restore the fighting power to continue the mission. Different procedures would be prescribed for nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks.

**Decontamination.** Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces the possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. The extent of and time required for decontamination depends on the tactical situation, mission, degree of contamination, and other alternatives to decontamination, such as deferring the use of the equipment. Forces should ordinarily decontaminate only that materiel needed for completion of the mission. Depending on agent type and weather conditions, decontamination may not be required because of natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and sunlight). Non-mission essential equipment would have the decontamination deferred, or natural weathering could be used.

**Related Terms**

NBC defensive operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

**PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

**Principles of War.** The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant. The principles of war currently adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. (See figure below.) The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.
**Objective.** The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

**Offensive.** The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

**Mass.** The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can
enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

**Economy of Force.** The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

**Maneuver.** The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

**Unity of Command.** The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

**Security.** The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

**Surprise.** The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

**Simplicity.** The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

**Related Terms**

**Joint Source Publications**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States</th>
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The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

General. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are frequently on scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. PVOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers. These organizations play an important role in providing support to host nations. In fact, PVOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between $9 and $10 billion each year — more than any single nation or international body (such as the United Nations (UN)). Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of PVOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

The Role of PVOs. PVOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one PVO to another. PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connectivity between PVOs and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, PVOs are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the PVO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the UN and US Government agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

Military and Private Organization Relations. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed public affairs guidance.

“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses – manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity – that only the military can deploy”

Philip Johnston, President & CEO, CARE
“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.”

General George A. Joulwan, USA Commander in Chief, US European Command

**Military Support of PVOs.** The National Command Authorities may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) PVOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between PVOs, and the military forces should be the goal. Taskings to support PVOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the PVOs. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable — not perform — PVO tasks. As later described, US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and PVOs may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

**Related Terms**

nongovernmental organization

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

**PRODUCTION (INTELLIGENCE CYCLE)**

The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle: a. planning and direction — Determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies. b. collection — Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements. c. processing — Conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence. d. production — Conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. e. dissemination — Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form.

**Production.** Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. A term associated with production is “intelligence application.” Intelligence application is the direct
extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near real time reporting. It is focused on and meets specific requirements, normally on demand.

**Production Guidelines.** (See figure below.)

Focus on the Purpose and Use of Intelligence. To better understand the exact needs of the consumer and the best way of answering the requirements, the producer needs to know who will use the intelligence at what level(s) of command, the user’s mission, the general intelligence requirements and responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

Objectivity. Producers must be objective, unbiased, and avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas. When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time or resources are inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the joint force commander (JFC) should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all available pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradicting information and opinion.

Provide Integrated Products. Intelligence analysts at joint intelligence centers and other fusion centers should use information available from multiple sources, integrate it, and provide the decision maker with a clear picture.

Coordinate Production Among Echelons. Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels. These production activities should be directed and coordinated by the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) so they are mutually supporting and nonduplicative.

- Intelligence production for joint operations is accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon. It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces.
- Intelligence produced at higher echelons is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. Subordinate units, in turn, use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy.

**Production Responsibilities.** Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate’s organic production capability. Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide JFCs with required intelligence products and services.

**Production Management.** Production management is a critical element in ensuring effective and efficient military intelligence production in support of joint operations. Within

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**PRODUCTION GUIDELINES**

- **FOCUS ON THE PURPOSE AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE**
- **OBJECTIVITY**
- **PROVIDE INTEGRATED PRODUCTS**
- **COORDINATE PRODUCTION AMONG ECHELONS**
each production agency, production managers receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the producer and schedule, the task, and editing requirements for intelligence products. Automated data processing (ADP) on-line updates are controlled by the production manager. Strict controls should be applied to changing information in ADP systems that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such changes. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (e.g., a data field in a record in an official data base).

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PROTECTION

Protection. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force.

Protection from the Enemy’s Firepower and Maneuver. JFCs counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, lines of communications, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. Operations security and military deception are key elements of protection.

Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance. JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine.

Safety. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

The use of proportionate force by United States warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended (consistent with international law) to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons.

When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. With the consent of the flag state this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high seas. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.

Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against offending bases or facilities. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. Environmental defense operations provide for coordinated Coast Guard/Department of Defense response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. These incidents have the potential for grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations.

Related Terms
military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP.

General. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. When properly employed, PSYOP can lower the morale and reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and could create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks.

**Military PSYOP.** PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders. PSYOP have been used throughout history to influence foreign groups and leaders. Modern PSYOP are enhanced by the expansion of mass communication capabilities. Nations may multiply the effects of their military capabilities by communicating directly to their intended targets promises or threats of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe passage for deserters, invitations to sabotage, support to resistance groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of this communication depends on the perception of the communicator’s credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened actions. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with PSYOP. Actions such as shows-of-force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of the targeted audience. Categories of Military PSYOP are shown in the figure below.

The employment of any element of national power, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension. Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrence. The effectiveness of deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts hinges on US ability to influence the perceptions of others. Military PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment the national effort. PSYOP are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve.
CATEGORIES OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

**Strategic PSYOP -**
International information activities conducted by US Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor or US goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and be supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts.

**Operational PSYOP -**
Conducted prior to, during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of the area commander's campaigns and strategies.

**Tactical PSYOP -**
Conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander during conflict and war to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

**Consolidated PSYOP -**
Conducted in foreign areas that are inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by US forces, or in which US forces are based, to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support US objectives in the area.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-53  Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The US acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. The figure below shows the range of military operations.

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

Combatant commanders, at the direction of the National Command Authorities, may employ US forces to deter an adversary’s action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of raids or strikes. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime interception, and evacuation of noncombatants.
At any point when force or the threat of its use is contemplated, those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing such action should remember Clausewitz’s dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Just as there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and operations other than war, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind or the threat of its use comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operation include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or continental US or a combination of both. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

Operations other than war can involve simultaneous actions within an area of responsibility. These actions may or may not involve the use of force at times; part of the theater could also be in a wartime state. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating and coordinating the effects and activities of forces toward a common purpose that supports attaining theater, national, and multinational strategic objectives.

Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid — such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism — can be an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes, such as the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE) that combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations.

In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  
Doctrine for Joint Operations
### Reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.  

*JP 1-02*

### Surveillance

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.  

*JP 1-02*

### Target Acquisition

The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.  

*JP 1-02*

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**General.** The primary objective of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations is to support military operations across the range of military operations. RSTA operations are performed by forces with a primary RSTA mission and other forces with either a collateral mission or the capability to perform such a mission. Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed, properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user. Also, the information must be appropriately classified to protect the RSTA system and its technology but sanitized to the degree necessary to allow dissemination to the appropriate user level.

**RSTA Mission Areas.** RSTA mission areas are essentially the same for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations and interest. However, the tasking within these mission areas will vary based on the level, focus, need, and forces available. RSTA mission areas include indications and warning (I&W), planning and employment, and assessment.

Indications and Warning. Strategic- and operational-level RSTA operations provide information necessary to assess forces and installations that threaten the United States and its allies. It may be used to enhance an allied nation’s ability to conduct military operations on a global, theater, or regional basis. RSTA missions may require both continuous surveillance and as-required reconnaissance to provide timely I&W of a threat or impending attack. RSTA assets can assist in monitoring or verifying compliance with international agreements, e.g., arms control agreements.

Tactical RSTA operations provide information and intelligence similar to the strategic and operational level necessary to assess force strength and deployment, defensive and offensive capabilities, and other factors that may affect US and/or allied military plans and operations. RSTA missions may require both continuous surveillance and as-required reconnaissance. They can assist in providing I&W of a threat or impending attack in sufficient time for an appropriate response.
Planning and Employment. Strategic RSTA operations may be used to support the planning and conduct of nuclear and nonnuclear operations for all military environments, including the following:

- Monitoring centers of gravity critical to a nation’s warfighting capability.
- Single Integrated Operational Plan/limited attack option data base planning, adaptive planning, Unified Command Plan responsibilities, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan taskings.
- Information on system capabilities, location, and other installations for the National Target Base and other target bases.

Operational RSTA operations provide commanders with current data on areas to include the environment, organizations, infrastructures, and forces necessary for planning theater campaigns and major operations, including contingencies. Additionally, they can provide for adaptive real time planning for current operations. RSTA operational-level support includes the following:

- Monitoring centers of gravity critical to a nation’s warfighting ability and enemy orders of battle against which the joint force commander (JFC) must concentrate his operations.
- Strategic conventional attack data base planning.
- Information on enemy offensive and defensive system capabilities, locations, and other data bases.
- Collection of information on the conduct of combat or support operations across the range of military operations.

Tactical RSTA operations forces and assets can provide the required detailed information (i.e., terrain, enemy disposition, orders of battle, movement, offensive and defensive capabilities) needed to plan and to employ forces successfully. This support includes providing target detection and acquisition, near real time intelligence, that provide opportunities for offensive and defensive actions and help reduce casualties and achieve victory.

Assessment. RSTA operations provide assessment support to all levels of command before, during, and after the conduct of military operations. They can provide an important means for assessing friendly deception efforts. Assessments like battle damage assessment can provide information on the success of military operations and the need for follow-up or new operations. They can assist in determining where and when to employ scarce resources and concentrate efforts. Such assessments will affect the formulation of policy and military plans at all levels of conflict.

Operations Security (OPSEC). Operations security must be used when generating RSTA resources, while sustaining and protecting the forces, and in planning and conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The purpose is to enhance combat effectiveness by gaining and maintaining essential secrecy about friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations. (See figure below.)

RSTA operations and planning must be closely coordinated with primary mission strategies and objectives to ensure activities and communications do not reveal indications of the primary mission that may be exploited by adversaries. Essential secrecy is required about the specific characteristics of sensors and data links, wartime reserve mode designs, deployment intentions, areas under surveillance, when and where reconnaissance will take place, patterns of operations that may imply operational objectives, and processing capabilities.

Military Deception. RSTA operations may be used in four ways to support military deception. The first way tasks RSTA assets to identify and locate appropriate targets for military deception within the enemy command and control structure. The second way involves RSTA operations to monitor enemy actions or inactions relative to deception plans being
implemented by the JFC. Enemy actions may include troop movement in reaction to perceived friendly movement or increased surveillance activity by the enemy in attempts to monitor friendly activities. Third, increased RSTA activity in a specific area away from the main thrust of a planned operation may deceive the enemy into thinking that friendly forces may be preparing an operation into a specific area. Such RSTA activities, along with other military deception inputs, confuse enemy commanders, allowing friendly commanders to exploit the situation. And fourth, RSTA assets may be used to support detection of enemy military deception.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-55  Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations

**RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION**

Those actions taken by one nation prior to, during, and following an attack by an enemy nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the national economy, provide for the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining forces and supporting activities.  

JP 1-02
Following a theater missile attack, units should be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution may include reestablishing or reinforcing command and control; reallocating or replacing communications, personnel, supplies, and equipment; conducting essential training, reestablishing unit cohesion; and repairing battle damage. In some instances of mass devastation, whole unit replacement may be necessary.

Reconstitution actions taken by a commander to restore a unit to a desired level of combat effectiveness include reestablishment of command and control; cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment; and conduct of essential training. Reconstitution sites in the joint rear area may require security augmentation and should be considered in joint rear area coordinator and component command security plans.

On the nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield, organizations may be subject to catastrophic losses. When such losses occur, each affected unit must be brought back to operational effectiveness or replaced. The reconstitution role of Service components is to restore debilitated or destroyed units from available assets. First, there must be an assessment of the criticality of the function. If the function is determined to be critical, it must be resumed. Second, the unit must be assessed for remaining capability in terms of personnel and equipment. Using the surviving assets as a base, component commanders must determine what personnel and equipment each unit will need to return to an acceptable level of effectiveness. Personnel may come from the replacement system, medical channels, or other organizations that perform less critical functions. The required equipment may come from the supply system, maintenance facilities, or other organizations.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-01.5 | Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense |
| JP 3-10  | Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations |
| JP 3-11  | Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense |

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**RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. JP 1-02

Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them, especially when conducting them in denied areas. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. Other recovery operations may be conducted in friendly areas, particularly when the host nation does not have the means to provide technical assistance in conducting the recovery. An example of a recovery operation is Operation FULL ACCOUNTING conducted to account for and recover the remains of US service members lost during the Vietnam War.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 3-07  | Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War |

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RECURRENT OPERATIONS

For scheduling purposes, theater airlift is conducted on either a recurrent or surge basis. Recurrent operations establish a scheduled flow of individual aircraft to make the most of available aircraft and ground support assets. However, such operations require low-threat environments because they often involve aircraft flying predictable schedules and route structures, making them relatively easy to detect and attack. For other than low-threat environments, surge operations maximize the ability of air defense forces to protect airlift assets because they usually reduce movements in time and space, and thereby reduce their vulnerability to detection and attack. Surge operations may disrupt the efficiency of the overall theater airlift system. Aircraft already loaded and serviced may wait unproductively on the ground, for example, until all the aircraft in the surge are ready for the mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-17  JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

REDEPLOYMENT

The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. JP 1-02

Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of financial obligations, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the continental US for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces is considered during redeployment planning.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
Reducing Targeting Effectiveness. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and component commanders are responsible for protecting forces against the effects of missile attack through the following:

Operations Security (OPSEC). The communications security, signature reduction, and security aspects of OPSEC deny enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and identification of friendly targets. Signature reduction measures include camouflage, commonality of vehicle appearance, an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic emissions, and cover and concealment. Local unit security is an important element in denying accurate targeting data to enemy special operations forces or other enemy agents. Frequent movement of units (inside the enemy’s intelligence cycle) is of singular importance.

Deception. Deception misleads enemies by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. This can cause enemies to deplete their tactical missile (TM) resources by attacking false targets through the use of decoys, missing intended targets, and denying them accurate battle damage assessments. Deception influences enemy decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information or by denying the enemy the ability to gain tactical, operational, and strategic information when using reconnaissance and surveillance systems. TM deception is an integral element of the JFC’s overall plan for deception and is included in the JFC’s operation plan. The deception effort should be specifically tailored to counter or exploit the enemy’s collection capability.

Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and contributes to survivability of certain systems by limiting exposure to reconnaissance and targeting.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

Reducing Vulnerability

Hardening. Hardening reduces the effect of attack on systems and facilities (i.e., aircraft, air base support equipment and facilities, nuclear delivery systems, nuclear storage areas, command and control (C2) elements, communications nodes, and theater logistic facilities). Hardening should be accomplished or begun in peacetime. However, political and fiscal constraints may preclude certain prehostility hardening measures, such as construction of fixed fortifications. Protection for mobile ground forces and equipment may be best accomplished by careful site selection, field fortifications, and other field-expedient methods.

Redundancy and Robustness. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical capabilities that are particularly vulnerable to tactical missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Of primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors, and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors. The capabilities provided by these systems can be preserved through redundancy and robustness. That is, by having systems capable of backing up or duplicating the roles of other systems and having many systems with similar or identical capabilities.

Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy
uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed. It forces the enemy to search more locations, which requires more resources and more time.

**Training Civilian Authorities.** Civilian authorities should be trained to organize and instruct their populations on actions to take upon warning of missile attack. This training will facilitate civilian protection efforts and may reduce the political impact of missiles hitting civilian areas and facilities.

**Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.** The elements of passive defense against NBC weapons are contamination avoidance, force protection, and decontamination. These form a hierarchy that protects the force, sustains operational effectiveness, and minimizes casualties. Units employ detection and NBC reconnaissance to avoid contamination, thus minimizing or eliminating NBC casualties, mission performance degradation, and logistical intensive decontamination requirements. If units fail to avoid being attacked or contaminated with NBC weapons, they use individual and collective protection to sustain operations and reduce the impact on NBC weapons on the unit. Individual protection uses physical protection devices, medical immunization and prophylaxis, and NBC casualty medical treatment. Collective protection provides relief from sustained operations in full NBC protective equipment, shelters sensitive equipment not easily decontaminated, and provides clean environments for operations that cannot be performed under NBC-contaminated conditions. Decontamination removes NBC hazards from personnel and equipment. Decontamination also minimizes the hazard and spread of contamination and facilitates the prompt restoration of normal operations.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-01.5   Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

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**REHEARSAL**

Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting themselves to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, joint force commanders should identify key elements for rehearsal.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0   Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**RELEVANCE**

For intelligence to be truly relevant, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being complete, accurate, timely, objective, and usable. Intelligence should be relevant to
determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. It must contribute to the joint
force commander’s (JFC’s) understanding of the adversary and the JFC’s own situation relative
to the adversary. Intelligence must be appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed and
how it will be applied for the operation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

RELIABILITY

Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems must be available when
needed and must perform as intended. The reliability of C4 systems is achieved by designing
equipment and systems with low failure rates and error correction techniques, standardizing
equipment, establishing standardized procedures and supervising their execution, countering
computer attacks and electromagnetic jamming and deception, and establishing effective
logistic support programs.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

RELIigious MINISTRY SUPPORT

The entire spectrum of professional duties to include providing for or facilitating
essential religious needs and practices, pastoral care, family support programs,
religious education, volunteer and community activities, and programs performed
to enhance morale and moral, ethical, and personal well being. Enlisted religious
support personnel assist the chaplain in providing religious ministry support.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-02 Activities.

Religious ministry support activities cover a wide range of professional functions
accomplished across the entire operational continuum. Because there may be no precise
boundary where one condition (peace, conflict, and war) ends and another begins, changes in
religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis
than dramatically altered duties. Chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel support
the accomplishment of operational objectives through one or more of the following activities
discussed and shown in the figure below.

Advising. Chaplains advise the joint force commander (JFC) on matters of religion, morals,
ethics, and morale and provide recommendations as to how the religious ministry support
assets of the command can be most effectively employed. The chaplain advises the JFC on
the role and influence of indigenous religious customs and practices as they affect the
command’s mission accomplishment. Chaplains also provide ethical decision making and
moral leadership recommendations to the commander.

Supporting. Chaplains provide religious worship services, rites, sacraments, ordinances,
and ministrations. The primary focus of this activity is to nurture the living, care for the sick
or wounded, minister to prisoners or prisoners of war, and honor the dead. They accompany
US forces during operations to implement the commander’s religious ministry support plan. In addition, chaplains assist military personnel and family members in dealing with personal concerns such as faith issues, stress, anxiety, redeployment or reunion issues, moral and ethical values, and social concerns. They combine care and pastoral counseling skills to provide spiritual comfort, moral support, and encouragement.

Chaplains help to resolve problems by making appropriate referrals to command channels or social service agencies. They also assist military personnel in requesting emergency leave, compassionate reassignments, and hardship discharges.

Chaplains conduct liaison with, and support humanitarian efforts by working with, humanitarian relief agencies, civil affairs, and public affairs, where appropriate. Their skill and experience in public relations allows them to bring an added dimension and perspective to the command’s total mission.

Coordinating. As staff officers, chaplains coordinate a comprehensive religious ministry support plan that makes worship opportunities and pastoral care available to all members of the command. Chaplains coordinate religious ministry support plans with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters to ensure a balance of faith group coverage throughout the force.
Coordinating instructions should be stated clearly in operating procedures or the religious ministry support annex of operation, contingency, concept summary, and exercise plans. At a minimum, these will supply the following:

Analyzing. In this area, chaplains, as staff officers:
- analyze joint force mission and religious ministry support requirements;
- identify religious, ethical, and moral needs of the command;
- research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to a given area of operations.

Work with civil affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations, customs and practices, doctrines, symbols, and the significance of shrines and holy places. Prepare area assessments and estimates of the local religious situation.

Planning. Chaplains work continuously with staffs and other chaplains at all echelons to determine the best methods of employing religious ministry support assets to accomplish assigned missions, review after-action data from previous operations and apply appropriate lessons learned, and maintain current standing operating procedures.

Writing. Chaplains draft proposed estimates, assessments, agreements, instructions, operation plans, annexes, and other documentation relevant to use of chaplaincy assets and resources.

Training. Chaplains are responsible for professional training and will identify the training needs of subordinate chaplains, enlisted religious support personnel, and lay readers or lay leaders. They provide personnel, materiel, guidance, coordination, and appropriate training activities to ensure readiness and a high level of professional development.

Supervising. As supervisors, chaplains provide coordination and functional guidance to their chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel of the combatant command or subordinate task forces. Supervisory chaplains at all levels manage assets for ministry to ensure that chaplains are trained, equipped, and prepared to perform their duties. Chaplains in supervisory positions coordinate with appropriate staff agencies to ensure that subordinate chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel receive appropriate support, professional guidance, and performance evaluations.

Evaluating. In a system where evaluation and feedback are highly valued, chaplains continually review and analyze religious ministry support to determine its effectiveness in supporting common objectives.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1-05 Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations

**RESOURCE AREAS**

National resources in the 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) are focused on defense needs. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas. Mobilization planners and decision makers should understand that activities occurring in any one area may have an influence on each of the others; (e.g., activating additional manpower creates demands for additional materiel and equipment, transportation, and additional workloads at affected facilities). Depending on the situation, it could also generate requirements for additional industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, communications support, and host-nation support.
Increasing levels of manpower and other resources may also create conflicts with environmental protection statutes, especially at various facilities in the US. Some mobilization actions may be delayed until these conflicts are resolved by either complying with environmental protection standards or by requesting temporary waivers. The appropriate legal authorities and funding would also have to be obtained to enable the callup. Mobilization decisions in each resource area, therefore, should be made with an understanding of the effect the decision could have on other resource areas.

Mobilization planners deal with resource area interactions during deliberate and crisis action planning through staff coordination and the exchange of information among supported and supporting organizations. Thorough coordination and effective communications will ensure that mobilization activities initiated in a resource area can be supported by the other areas.

**Related Terms**

mobilization

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

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Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the rules of engagement (ROE) and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in military operations other than war (MOOTW) are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war, consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

**Related Terms**

military operations other than war

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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The Restricted Operations Area (ROA) is airspace of defined dimensions created in response to specific operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. ROA is also known as a restricted operations zone. An ROA is
an airspace control measure used to separate and identify areas. For example, artillery, mortar, naval gunfire support, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operating areas, aerial refueling, concentrated interdiction areas, areas of search and rescue (SAR), special operations forces operating areas, and areas in which the area air defense commander has declared “weapons free.” ROA’s are commonly used for drop zones, landing zones, SAR areas, UAV launch and recovery sites, UAV mission areas, and special electronics mission aircraft. ROA can adversely affect air defense operations; therefore, air defense missions generally have priority over ROAs. The point of contact for an ROA is the airspace control authority.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-52  Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

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**RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>riot control agent</td>
<td>A substance which produces temporary irritating or disabling physical effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. There is no significant risk of permanent injury, and medical treatment is rarely required.</td>
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**Riot Control Agents (RCAs) and Herbicides Use in Wartime.** The US has renounced first use of herbicides in war except under regulations applicable to domestic use or for control of vegetation within US bases and installations and around their immediate perimeters. The US has renounced the first use of RCAs in war. US forces will only use RCAs in war in defensive modes to save lives as approved by the President. In wartime, use of RCAs outside the war zone is authorized as prescribed for peacetime as described in the paragraphs and figure below.

For RCA and herbicide use, war is any period of armed conflict no matter how it may be characterized, including declared and undeclared war, counterinsurgency, and any other uses of armed forces in engagements between US military forces and foreign military or paramilitary forces. Armed conflict is conflict between states in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims. It also may involve conflict between a state and uniformed or non-uniformed groups within that state, such as organized resistance groups.

Commanders must recognize that, while the US does not consider herbicides and RCAs to be chemical weapons, some other countries do not draw a distinction. Commanders must consider international ramifications and rules of engagement before recommending the use of herbicides or RCAs.

**RCAs and Herbicides Use in Peacetime.** The Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for civil disturbance operations, has promulgated instructions governing the use of RCAs in civil disturbances in the US, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and US possessions and territories. RCAs may be used on US bases, posts, embassy grounds, and installations for protection and security purposes, riot control, installation security, and evacuation of US noncombatants and foreign nationals. The US-controlled portions of foreign installations are considered US installations.

Chemical aerosol-irritant projectors may be used by military law enforcement personnel for the performance of law enforcement activities. They may be used in the following areas:

- on-base and off-base in the US and its territories and possessions;
- on-base overseas;
• off-base overseas in those countries where such use is specifically authorized by the host-country government.

RCAs may be used off-base (world-wide) for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons under the same conditions as those authorized for the use of lethal force. (See DOD Directive 5210.56.) RCAs may be used in training. A review of current treaties and/or status-of-forces agreements between the host country and US forces may be required in determining whether or not training with RCAs is authorized.

Herbicides may be used within US bases, posts, and installations for control of vegetation. Use of herbicides off-base overseas must be in accordance with host-country laws and agreements, US Environmental Protection Agency requirements, or Service regulations, whichever are the most stringent.

**Authority.** Only the President may authorize the following:

- Use of RCAs in war, including defensive military modes. However, advance authority to use RCAs for protection or recovery of nuclear weapons has been delegated to the Secretary of the Defense.
- Wartime use of herbicides, including installation vegetation control.

The Secretary of Defense may authorize the following:

- Use of RCAs or herbicides in peacetime.
- Use of RCAs in wartime for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons.

Combatant commanders and Service component commanders may authorize the following:
The use of RCAs in peacetime on US installations for riot control, installation security, civil disturbance operations, and noncombatant emergency evacuation operations. The US-controlled portions of foreign installations are considered US installations.

- The movement and storage of RCAs and herbicides, as necessary, to support requirements, provided US control is maintained.
- The off-base use of RCAs in peacetime for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons under the same situations as authorized for the use of lethal force.
- The use of herbicides in peacetime within and, when authorized by the host-country government, around US bases for control of vegetation.
- The use of chemical aerosol-irritant projectors by military law enforcement personnel during peacetime for the performance of law enforcement activities on-base and off-base in the US and its territories and possessions; on-base overseas; and off-base overseas in those countries where such use is specifically authorized by the host-country government.
- Authority for use of RCAs in peacetime situations not covered by the above (for example, to save lives in counterterrorist operations) will be addressed in plans and requested by the combatant commanders for Secretary of Defense approval.

Related Terms

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

RISK

Risk is inherent in military operations. In peacetime operations, commanders consider a variety of risks — such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, or risk to the safety of individual joint force members. In combat or potential combat situations, commanders carefully identify conditions that constitute success — both for the envisioned end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. To the extent that these conditions are met, commanders reduce the risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force — by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example. Or they may decide the risk is acceptable. Commanders consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations. As in peacetime operations, commanders consider the risk to joint force members. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to enemy centers of gravity, attacking enemy vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and major operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS

As illustrated in the figure below, the terms “roles, missions, and functions” are often used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. “Roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the US Special Operations Command
ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS

The primary function of the Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role — to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.

**ROLES**

"Roles" are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the USSOCOM were established by Congress in law.

**MISSIONS**

"Missions" are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.

**FUNCTIONS**

"Functions" are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles.

(USSOCOM) were established by Congress in law. “Missions” are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. “Functions” are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles. Simply stated, the primary function of the Services and USSOCOM is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role — to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

**ROUTINE SUSTAINMENT**

Routine sustainment theater airlift operations involve the administrative air movement of materiel and personnel to reinforce or resupply forces already deployed and/or employed in operations. These operations normally deliver the user’s requirements with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. Routine sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and the general air and ground security situation allow some flexibility in the actual delivery times of specific loads. Thus, flight schedules and load plans are usually made to get maximum throughput from available allowable cabin loads and support resources. When practical, routine sustainment should be planned to utilize backhaul capacity. Depending on theater and user priorities, typical backhaul loads might include wounded personnel, other friendly evacuees, enemy prisoners of war, excess or reparable weapons and materiel of moderate to high value, as well as mail.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. JP 1-02

Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force. ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the National Command Authorities. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

Related Terms

law of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
SABOTAGE

An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. JP 1-02

Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy’s infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.

Related Terms

SANITIZE

Revise a report or other document in such a fashion as to prevent identification of sources, or of the actual persons and places with which it is concerned, or of the means by which it was acquired. Usually involves deletion or substitution of names and other key details. JP 1-02

Intelligence should be sanitized when personnel who need it cannot be cleared for knowledge of its sources and methods, cannot meet the security requirements for that category of intelligence material, or the timeliness for application is jeopardized. Security by sanitizing is attained by effectively separating intelligence from its sources and methods.

The policy for sanitizing intelligence must ensure timely access and application to operations. The interpretation of this policy should be accomplished by the joint force commander (JFC) who, with the Director of Intelligence (J-2), has the best appreciation of the criticality, utility, and time sensitivity of the intelligence. Establishment of sanitization policy should be accomplished by the chain of command prior to, or at the outset of, joint operations. This is of particular importance for JFCs who will be operating with multinational forces.

The reasoning used in developing and applying the policies and guidelines for intelligence security and accessibility should include consideration of the value of intended and potential uses of the intelligence, future value of intelligence sources and methods in light of national and theater military strategies and operational objectives, and situations of threat and opportunity.

Where the sources and methods of critical information cannot be protected (i.e., the intelligence cannot be sanitized), the senior commander assigned the military objective or mission and the J-2 should be apprised. When the protection of the information sources and methods is paramount, the commander can then make a reevaluation of objectives in light of the probable outcome of operations without the intelligence.
The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture.

Scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence is intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. It includes S&T characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, subsystems, and associated material; research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. S&T intelligence also addresses overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness and the foreign material program.

Security in the Joint Rear Area (JRA). The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the joint force.

The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for providing sufficient forces to ensure the security of the JRA. All US forces in the JRA have an inherent responsibility to contribute as many forces as possible for base defense and local security for themselves, their facilities, installations, and activities. This must be done without seriously degrading their capabilities to perform their primary mission. Headquarters will frequently be collocated with host nation (HN) counterparts. The security of the area will be enhanced by close cooperation with HN authorities. Additionally, the integration of HN security personnel with US facility and
personnel detachments is invaluable in evaluating and resolving issues and incidents with the local population and with HN authorities.

**Objectives of Security Operations in JRA.** (See figure below.)

Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations. Commanders should take all reasonable measures, including camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and movement to avoid becoming engaged with threat forces that could disrupt forward support of combat forces.

Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). US forces should establish effective C4I for day-to-day operations and for successful security operations. Security forces should protect key C4I facilities to prevent or minimize enemy interference.

Protect Personnel and Facilities. Units should take active and passive measures that protect themselves and high value assets in the JRA.

Protect JRA Lines of Communications (LOCs). Protection of land, water, and air routes within the JRA that connect an operating military force with its theater base of operations is essential to sustaining campaigns. Geographic features may be used, and friendly security forces and uncommitted combat units should be employed to maximize LOCs security. Responsibility for overall protection of JRA LOCs is assigned to the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) with active participation and coordination by the respective component commanders.

Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions. US forces should use all means of intelligence, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, law enforcement agency support, surveillance, and detection to anticipate and locate enemy incursions. Surveillance and warning assets and fighting forces should be linked together as simply, robustly, and reliably as possible. Once located, enemy forces should be contained or defeated quickly.
Plan and Execute Area Damage Control (ADC). Commanders at all levels must prepare plans, establish specific responsibilities, and ensure all available assets are prepared for operations to ensure continuous support and restoration of assets. Comprehensive intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agency information regarding threats to the rear area are key to the prior planning in ADC that will prevent or minimize casualties or physical damage associated with enemy attacks against JRA facilities and personnel.

Assess and Prioritize Bases. The JRAC ensures component commanders, in accordance with JFC priorities and the nature of the threat, assess and prioritize bases for protection and damage repair in order to ensure that operational and logistics planners are able to identify key bases, establish security and ADC requirements for those bases, and position other assets. This process should help to maximize defense force and ADC efforts.

Related Terms

national security; principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

Security assistance (SA) refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program, Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). SA surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. SA surges are military in nature and are focused on providing additional combat systems (weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of SA, to include financial and training support.

SA is a principal instrument in the US foreign internal defense (FID) effort. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies as well as those of the military. By definition, SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives. SA, while integral to our FID program, is also much broader than FID alone. The preponderance of SA (80 to 90 percent), is aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats. This relationship of SA to FID is depicted in the figure below. Note that only a portion of the overall SA effort fits into the FID area, but that it is a large part of the overall FID effort. Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving combat operations) category makes up the preponderance of the remaining military operations.

The SA program is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the AECA of 1976, as amended, and is under the supervision and general direction of the Department of State (DOS). The military component of SA, implemented by the Department
of Defense in accordance with policies established by DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program, International Military Education and Training, foreign military sales, and peacekeeping operations. These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA provide the SA tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. The specific procedures for requesting and approving host nation SA requests and integrating the SA tool into the combatant commanders’ military plans to support a FID program are complex. This area will be examined in more detail later in this publication. The figure below offers a general overview of the SA management process and lists the key military programs.
SEIZING AND MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE

Seizing and maintaining the initiative is an American military tradition. Because the United States of America is not an aggressor nation, we may initially find ourselves forced to fight defensively for a time. However, our actions should be offensive in spirit, exploiting the full leverage of balanced, versatile joint forces to confuse, demoralize, and defeat the enemy. Taking calculated risks to throw an opponent off balance or achieve major military advantage may be required. In any case, retaining the initiative relies on the ability of our military people to think for themselves and execute orders intelligently — the ingenuity that has always been an American trademark.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
commanders, the commander and only that portion of the commander’s assets assigned to a particular commander of combatant command (CINC) are under the command authority of that particular CINC.

**Designation of Service Component Commanders.** With the exception of the commander of a combatant command and members of the command’s joint staff, the senior officer of each Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is designated the commander of the Service component forces, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority. The assignment of any specific individual as a Service component commander of a combatant command is subject to the concurrence of the combatant commander.

**Responsibilities of Service Component Commanders.** Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services’ support function. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. In the event that operational control of Service component forces is delegated by the JFC to a Service component commander of a subordinate joint force command, the authority of the Service component of the superior JFC is described as administrative control that includes responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions. Service component commanders are responsible to the JFC for the following:

- Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commander’s control when such subordinate forces are dissolved.
- Conducting joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service component’s facilities and capabilities are suitable.
- Informing their JFC (and their combatant commander, if affected) of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the combatant commander does not approve the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the combatant commander and the Service component commander, the combatant commander will forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component commanders will implement directives issued by the combatant commander.
- Developing program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. The Service component commander will provide to the combatant commander a copy of the program submission prior to forwarding it to the Service headquarters. The Service component commander will keep the combatant commander informed of the status of combatant commander requirements while Service programs are under development.
- Informing the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning. The Service component commander will inform the combatant commander of such decisions and of program and budget changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the combatant commander
to express his views before final decision. The Service component commander will include in this information Service rationale for nonsupport of the combatant commander’s requirements.

- Providing, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the combatant commander.

**Responsibilities of Subordinate Service Component Commanders.** Service component commanders in joint forces at any level within a combatant command are responsible to the combatant command-level Service component commander for the following:

- internal administration and discipline;
- training in own Service doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques;
- logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority;
- Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with the laws, policies, and directives.

**Communication With a Chief of Service.** Unless otherwise directed by the combatant commander, the Service component commander will communicate through the combatant command on those matters over which the combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) or directive authority. On Service specific matters such as personnel, administration, and unit training, the Service component commander will normally communicate directly with the Chief of the Service, informing the combatant commander as the combatant commander directs.

**Logistic Authority.** The operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the combatant commander. Joint force transportation policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

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**SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT ZONE**

See weapon engagement zone.

**Short Range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ)**

**Description.** Areas of short-range air defense (SHORAD) deployment may fall within a low-altitude missile engagement zone or high-altitude missile engagement zone. It is possible that some areas may be solely defended by SHORAD assets. A SHORADEZ can be established to define the airspace within which these assets will operate. Because centralized control over the SHORAD weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and disseminated so friendly aircraft can avoid them.

**Uses.** SHORADEZ is normally established for the local air defense of high-value assets. From an airspace control perspective, SHORADEZ provides airspace users with the location of the engagement zone of short-range air defense systems for mission planning purposes.

**Considerations.** Centralized control of SHORADEZ may not be possible.

**Point of Contact.** Area air defense commander.
SHOW OF FORCE

Related Terms
air corridor; coordinating altitude; fighter engagement zone; high altitude missile engagement zone; high-density airspace control zone; joint engagement zone; low-altitude missile engagement zone; positive identification radar advisory zone; restricted operations area.

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

SHOW OF FORCE

An operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or national objectives.

Show of force operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. In addition, the National Command Authorities order shows of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests as well as international law.

A show of force involves the appearance of a credible military force to underscore US policy interests or commitment to an alliance or coalition. Political concerns dominate a show of force. Military forces conduct these operations within legal and political constraints. The force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises.

As an example of a show of force, Operation Joint Task Force-Philippines, was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, US Air Force fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the Philippines.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SIMPLICITY

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

Simplicity is one of the principles of war. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize
misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

SIMULTANEOUSITY AND DEPTH

General. The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of deep operations theory. (See figure below.) The intent is to bring force to bear on the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that is within the decision making cycle of the opponent. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist.

Simultaneity. Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and sources of strength.
sources of strength. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.

Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operational plan. Joint force commanders (JFCs) set the conditions for battles within a major operation to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Geographic combatant commanders integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon.

**Depth.** The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Airpower can be projected at greater distances while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Just as with simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs add depth to operations.

The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space (geographically), shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potentials before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

Simultaneity and depth place a premium on situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a clear picture of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of strategic objectives.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  
Doctrine for Joint Operations

### SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as humanitarian assistance in conjunction with peace enforcement operations. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, Department of State, and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area.
SINGLE-SERVICE LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The combatant commanders may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated area. If so, the combatant commander may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user.

Related Terms

SKIP-ECHelon INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support when necessary to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces being constituted, in transit, or engaged. Analyst-to-analyst exchange is a form of skip-echelon support. Intelligence analysts at all levels can contribute important perspectives to other intelligence organizations collecting, processing, and producing intelligence. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations.

Related Terms

SMALL AUSTERE AIRFIELD

A small austere airfield is an unsophisticated airfield, usually with a short runway and limited in one or a combination of the following: taxiway systems, ramp space, security, materials handling equipment, aircraft servicing, maintenance, navigation aids, weather observing sensors, and communications. The greatest disadvantage of airfields is their relatively limited availability, particularly in lesser-developed regions of the world. Many of the available facilities may have limited space as a result of other combat forces beddown. They may be targeted as the focus of enemy forces and are often too far from surface combat units to be efficient destination terminals for combat sustainment operations.

Related Terms

landing zone
SOURCES AND METHODS

Sharing intelligence sources and methods, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When, however, intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

SPAN OF CONTROL

Span of control is the joint force commander’s ability to command and control actions. Span of control is based on the number of subordinates, number of activities, and the area of responsibility/joint operations area. Span of control is related to the duration and scope of joint air operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSIONS

Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs) provide airlift to satisfy unique customer requirements and are funded directly by the requesting organization. These requirements may be due to constraints of time, geographic location, and/or type of cargo that preclude the use of surface transport, established airlift channel service, or other transportation means.

Theater airlift is usually divided between channel and SAAMs. Channel missions provide common-user general airlift service, usually on relatively fixed schedules and route structures, over an extended period of time. However, channel missions can also be event driven, i.e., based on mission requirements to move cargo or personnel outside of the established schedule. SAAMs provide dedicated airlift for specific requirements, usually at times, places, and in load configurations requested by a specific user. SAAM operations may involve any level of activity, from a single aircraft sortie to operations involving large formations or many sorties over extended periods of time.

SAAMs provide service for the exclusive use of an agency to meet special considerations of pickup, delivery, classification, off-route requirements, or other factors that preclude the use of channel airlift. In effect, this is a chartered mission supporting that particular request. Units submit their request through their component validator to the theater validator. If approved, the theater validator forwards the requests to the joint air operations center for tasking.
Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

SPECIAL FORCES

US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF.

General. Although all Army forces have an inherent capability to support special operations (SO), Army units specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared, trained, and task organized especially for SO. Core special operations forces (SOF) designated by the Secretary of Defense include active and reserve component special forces (SF), Ranger, and separate operating agency. In addition, the Secretary of the Army has designated civil affairs and psychological operations forces as Army special operations forces.

Special Forces Group. The SF group is a multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments throughout the operational continuum. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare (UW), SF units are capable of task-organizing their composition to meet more specific requirements.

Organization. SF are organized into groups of three battalions, each with one support and three operational companies. Each company is composed of a headquarters element and six operational detachments of 12 personnel. SF units are regionally oriented to specific areas of the world and possess language training and cultural familiarity.

Missions. The primary missions generally assigned to SF are UW, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action (DA), and counterterrorism (CT). Also, certain SF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CT as a principal mission.

Capabilities. The command, control, and support elements of an SF group can:
- function as the Army component of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or as a JSOTF when augmented by resources from other Services;
- command, control, and support organic and attached elements;
- establish and operate with the group headquarters (HQ) a special forces operations base and up to three forward operations bases by employing its organic battalion HQ (C detachments);
- provide up to three command and control (C2) elements (B detachments) to corps or higher conventional headquarters or to specified operational areas. B detachments can also operate as tactical C2 elements.

The operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) of an SF group can:
- infiltrate or exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea;
- conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with appropriate support or resupply;
- plan and conduct SO unilaterally or as part of a larger force;
SPECIAL FORCES

- develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to a battalion in size.
- organize, train, advise, and assist US, allied, and other friendly military and paramilitary forces or agencies in the conduct of SO, especially in environments requiring language proficiency and area and/or cultural orientation;

Limitations. SF units:
- generally require specialized support from other military Services and nonmilitary agencies for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply;
- are restricted in their ability to conduct sustained combat operations by limited firepower, mobility, organic combat support, and combat service support assets;
- dependent upon the resources of the theater Army component to support and sustain operations;
- endurance and fatigue as influenced by terrain, mode of transport, environment, enemy situation, and weather.

Employment. SF may be employed as individuals, teams, or larger units up to group in size. The principal operating element is the ODA. SF elements are frequently task-organized for specific missions, but are rarely, if ever, employed outside their specific area of orientation.

Rangers. Rangers are rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint DA operations in coordination with or in support of other SO units of all Services. Also, they can execute DA operations in support of conventional missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms.

Organization. Rangers are organized into a regiment of three battalions. Battalions are organized into a headquarters company and three rifle companies, each composed of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.

Mission. When employed in SO, Rangers are primarily tasked to conduct DA and other special light infantry missions. They may conduct these operations independently, in support of conventional forces or other SOF.

Capabilities. The Ranger regiment can:
- deploy quickly to conduct operations on all types of terrain and in all weather conditions;
- establish a credible US military presence in any part of the world to demonstrate US interest or resolve;
- infiltrate and exfiltrate an area of operations and assault an objective by land, sea, and air;
- conduct DA missions consisting of raids, ambushes, and recovery operations.

Related Terms

special operations forces

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05  Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS BASE

A command, control, and support base established and operated by a special forces group or battalion from organic and attached resources. The base commander and his staff coordinate and synchronize the activities of subordinate and forward-deployed forces. A special forces operations base is normally established for an extended period of time to support a series of operations. Also called SFOB. JP 1-02

The special forces operations base (SFOB) is established by a special force group to synchronize the activities of subordinate forward operations bases and/or advanced operations bases. The SFOB normally serves as an Army special operations component or Army special operations task force headquarters directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

After the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) is approved by the joint force air component commander (JFACC) (joint force commander (JFC) under the JFC staff option), detailed preparations continue by Combat Plans section on the joint air tasking order (ATO), special instructions (SPINS), and the airspace control order (ACO) (provided by the airspace control authority (ACA)). JFC and JFACC guidance, target worksheets, the MAAP, and component requirements are used to finalize the ATO/SPINS/ACO. Components may submit critical changes to target requests and asset availability during this final phase of joint ATO development. The ACA and area air defense commander (AADC) instructions must be provided in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and execute all missions tasked in the joint ATO. These directions must enable combat operations without undue restrictions, balancing combat effectiveness with the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace. ACA instructions must provide for quick coordination of task assignment or reassignment. The AADC must direct aircraft identification and engagement procedures and rules of engagement that are appropriate to the nature of the threat. ACA and AADC instructions should also consider the volume of friendly air traffic, friendly air defense requirements, identification, friend or foe technology, weather, and enemy capabilities. ACA and AADC instructions are contained in monthly, weekly, and daily SPINS, and also in the ACO that is updated as frequently as required.

The joint ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The level of detail should be very explicit when forces operate from different bases and multi-component and/or composite missions are tasked. By contrast, less detail is required when missions are tasked to a single component or base.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. JP 1-02

Special operations (SO) are a form of warfare characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons, and forces. (See figure below.)

A mission, under a certain set of environmental constraints, may require the application of SO skills and techniques. Change one or more of those characteristics, and the mission may no longer fit the category of SO. For example, the Grenada operation was designed to rescue a large number of American citizens and publicly demonstrate US resolve. As such, it required a visible, conventional operation on a relatively large scale, with SO in support and targeted at specific objectives. Conversely, had the goals been to recover a small number of detained personnel and to limit US presence, SO might have been selected as the preferred option. SO
are not bound by any specific environment. They are described by the transitory characteristics and the constraints placed upon a given mission.

Employment of conventional forces usually involves movement of large operational units and requires extensive support structures. Such force movement and employment generally are observable and traceable to the US. However, the capabilities of special operations forces (SOF) primarily are a function of individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional, combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and often self-sufficient (for short periods) nature of SOF operational units provide the US with feasible and appropriate military responses that do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of necessarily larger, or more visible, conventional forces.

SOF are not a substitute for strong conventional forces but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces so that they can achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precisely focused use of force.

SOF can be quickly task-organized and rapidly deployed to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) a selective, flexible crisis response capability. Often, SOF may be the force of choice for the NCA to provide a capability that falls between diplomatic initiatives and the overt commitment of conventional force. SOF are designed for specific principal missions. Properly employed, they provide an added dimension for the combatant commander. An imprecise understanding of SOF capabilities or the improper employment or support of SOF at any level of command can result in mission failure, attendant political costs, and possible loss of the entire force.

SOF are usually joint, but they may be conducted as single-Service operations. Even single-Service conduct of SO requires joint support and coordination. The planning process may be staffed jointly, while the execution and command and control (C2) structure may be either joint or single-Service. This publication describes SOF interoperability requirements and provides for employment of SOF in coordination with conventional forces.

Characteristics of Special Operations. SO are marked by certain characteristics that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations.

• They are principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical, and often perishable targets. They offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first mission fail.
• They are often principally politico-military in nature and subject to oversight at the national level. They frequently demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid coordination with other commands, Services, and Government agencies.
• They often require responsive joint ground, air, and maritime operations and the C2 architecture permanently resident in the existing SOF structure.
• They may frequently be covert or clandestine.
• They are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible for either military or political reasons.
• They rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently employ deception to achieve success.
• They are often conducted at great distances from established support bases, requiring sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to
penetrate and recover from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

- They may require patient, long-term commitment in a given operational area to achieve national goals through security assistance and/or nation assistance activities or extended unconventional warfare operations. Often, the training and organization of indigenous forces are required to attain these objectives.
- They frequently require discriminate and precise use of force; a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment; and often rapid development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Department of Defense forces.
- They are primarily conducted by specially recruited, selected, and trained personnel, organized into small units tailored for specific missions or environments. Missions often require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the country where employed.
- They require detailed intelligence, thorough planning, decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed rehearsal.

**Related Terms**

**special operations forces**

**Source Joint Publications**

*JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*

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**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. 

As specified by law in title 10, US Code Section 167, special operations forces (SOF) are units of the armed forces that meet one of the following criteria:

- identified as core forces or as augmenting forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E;
- described in the Terms of Reference and Conceptual Operations Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in effect on April 1, 1986;
- designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

Under certain circumstances, conventional forces may provide the capabilities required to conduct a specific special operation. However, designated SOF are principally structured to be the force of choice under most circumstances. They possess unique capabilities designed to address those missions, regardless of where they are conducted in the operational continuum. (See figure below.)

**US Army.** Active and Reserve component forces include Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, psychological operations and civil affairs units.

**US Navy.** Active and Reserve component forces include sea-air-land team, sea-air-land team delivery vehicles and special boat units.

**US Air Force.** Active and Reserve component forces include:

- fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft and aircrews to conduct infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply; aerial fire support; and aerial refueling;
- composite special tactics teams composed of combat control and pararescue forces, weather, communications, and other combat support units.
The demands of special operations (SO) require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities. Personnel may undergo lengthy selection processes or extensive mission-specific training programs above basic military skill training to achieve entry-level SO skills. Units are small and necessarily maintain high personal and professional levels of maturity and experience, usually in more than one principal field. The complex SO selection and long leadtime objective and subjective maturation process make any rapid replacement of personnel or capabilities very difficult.

SOF are often organized jointly and routinely plan, execute, command, and control operations from a joint perspective. Area orientation is often required and includes the capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the area’s environmental conditions. Detailed area orientation, including mastery of language and culture, requires long-term, dedicated training and may be applicable to air, ground, and maritime SOF units, depending upon mission assignment. To develop and maintain skills, SOF should train and exercise under conditions resembling the operational environment in which they intend to operate.

**Related Terms**

- special forces; special operations

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department.  

A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See figure below.) Although a specified command normally is composed of forces from one Military Department, it may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.

When units of other Military Departments are transferred (assigned or attached) to the commander of a specified command, the purpose and duration of the transfer will normally be indicated. Such transfer, in itself, does not constitute the specified command as a unified command or a joint task force. If the transfer is major and to be of long duration, a unified command normally would be established in lieu of a specified command.

The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command, except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

Related Terms

**SPECIFIED COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS**  
*When Designated*

- **CINC**
- **CO**
- **COM**
- **SINGLE SERVICE FORCE**
- **JOINT TASK FORCES** (Area or Functional)

Optional *

ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY PROVIDING OTHER SERVICE FORCES Specifies Administrative Support For These Forces

**combatant command; unified command**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures, with the objective of enabling electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference.  JP 1-02

The complexity and vast distances involved in joint warfighting makes control and management of the electromagnetic spectrum a crucial factor in the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to influence decisive action. The horizontal flow of information between adjacent subordinate commands is equally critical during mission execution and demands continuous and uninterrupted access to the electromagnetic spectrum to support highly mobile, fast moving operations. The JFC ensures that favorable electromagnetic compatibility exists through the comprehensive management of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Related Terms
electronic warfare

Source Joint Publications
JP 6-0  Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

STAFF CHANNEL

The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

Related Terms
command channel

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2  Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

STANDARDIZATION

The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.

General. The broad objectives of the National Communications System and the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), coupled with the need for tactical command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems to interface with facilities of the DISN, require
that C4 systems be standardized as far as practical. Standardization includes aspects of compatibility, interoperability, and commonality. Plans for standardization must ensure that the essential requirements of all Services and agencies are accommodated. Space, weight, or other limitations may prevent systems used by different Services and agencies from taking the same form. In such cases, the equipment should include the maximum possible number of components common to all Services, and operational characteristics must be coordinated between the Services and agencies concerned.

Objectives. The following are objectives of standardization:

• minimize the addition of buffering, translative, or similar devices for the specific purpose of achieving workable interface connections;
• achieve the maximum economy possible from cross-servicing and cross-procurement;
• permit emergency supply assistance among Services;
• facilitate interoperability of functionally similar joint and Service C4 systems;
• avoid unnecessary duplication in research and development of new technology.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

STRAATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES

The US establishes air lines of communications by coordinating the operations of three distinct components of airlift forces. Strategic airlift forces (also called intertheater or global airlift forces) primarily provide common-user airlift into theater terminals from outside the theater.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

STRAATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES

Strategic defense forces combine the capabilities of air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense for North America. The Commander in Chief, US Space Command, is the coordinating authority for strategic defense, and is the combatant commander responsible for ballistic missile defense of North America, missile warning support to theaters, and space defense missions. The Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command, provides attack assessments of strategic defense.

Strategic defense forces provide direct support to geographic combatant commanders through global surveillance, tactical warning and attack assessment, ballistic missile warning, and by providing a secure mobilization base to support regional conflicts. During wartime, geographic combatant commanders continue to receive missile defense support consistent with both the degree and nature of the threat of attacks against US strategic assets.

Combat operations conducted within a theater may contribute to strategic defense through detection and/or attrition of hostile aerospace forces in the process of attack on the United States. These operations include theater sea control, antisubmarine warfare, counterair, theater ballistic missile defense, or special operations.
STRATEGIC END STATE

The desired end state should be clearly described by the National Command Authorities before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state — described by a set of military conditions — when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

Related Terms
end state

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition.

The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans. JFCs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate
is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy.

In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze courses of action. Items contained in strategic estimate are shown in the figure below.

The result of the estimate is a visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, including opportunities available for exploitation. The estimate includes a visualization of what these states must look like to accomplish the mission and a clear expression of alternatives to achieve that state. Commanders employ the estimate to consider the enemy’s likely intent and courses of action and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision.

The strategic estimate process is continuous and based on direction from national and multinational leadership. Estimates for the current operation can often provide the basis for estimates for future operations.

JFCs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions. Both supported and supporting JFCs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. Combatant commanders who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

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**Related Terms**

*estimate; logistic estimate of the situation*

**Source Joint Publications**

*JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations*
STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. JP 1-02

The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

Related Terms
operational level of war; tactical level of war

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGY

The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. JP 1-02

General. National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). The figure below illustrates national strategic direction.

National Security Strategic Content. The US approaches its global commitments with a strategy founded on deterrence and buttressed by the capability to project power to safeguard its national interests. Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of operations need to be
synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national aims.

**National Military Strategy.** National military strategy is derived from the national security strategy. National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. The national military strategy and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities.

**Related Terms**

military strategy; national strategy

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations
STRATEGY DETERMINATION

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action.

The strategy determination function furnishes direction from the national level for developing courses of action. It assists the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating appropriate options to counter the threat. Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, clearly defining political and military objectives or end states, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

STRIKES AND RAIDS

strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.

raider
An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. An example of a strike is Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983. An example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin.
SUBORDINATE COMMANDER

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SUBORDINATE COMMANDER

In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, all subordinate commanders possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following:

• The accomplishment of missions or tasks assigned by the plans and orders of the superior. Wide latitude is normally given to the subordinate commander to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission; however, this latitude may be limited by coordinating directives issued by the superior commander to ensure effective joint operations. When required by a changing situation, a subordinate commander may depart in some measure from the plan if the action will not jeopardize friendly forces and is in the best interest of better accomplishing the overall objective. Any such departure from the plan by a subordinate commander should, if possible, be coordinated with other concerned commanders prior to departure from the plan. In addition, the departure must be communicated as soon as practicable to the superior.

• Advice to the superior commander regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to the subordinate command, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernment agencies, and other matters of common concern.

• Timely information to the superior commander relating to the subordinate commander’s situation and progress.

Related Terms

superior commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND

A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area.

When authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. (See figure below.) A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned joint operations area or functional area. The commanders of
components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those listed for component commanders within a unified command. The Service component commanders of a subordinate unified command will normally communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified command on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.

Related Terms

joint task force; unified command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUPERIOR COMMANDER

Although specific responsibilities will vary, every superior commander possesses the general responsibilities to provide the following:

- Timely communication of clear-cut missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior’s plan. Tasks must be realistic and leave the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.
- Forces and other means in a timely manner to immediate subordinates for accomplishing assigned tasks. This includes the requisite time to plan and prepare for military action.
- All available information to subordinates that bears on the changing situation including changes in plans, missions and tasks; resources; and friendly, enemy, and environmental situations.
- To delegate authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.
The procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. 

a. producer phase — That phase of military supply which extends from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the military Services. 
b. consumer phase — That phase of military supply which extends from receipt of finished supplies by the Military Services through issue for use or consumption.

A geographic combatant commander’s responsibilities for supply are illustrated in the figure below. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for effectively coordinating supply support between the Service components, establishing supply buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels. When practical to improve economy of effort, common-item support may be assigned to a Service component command, normally the dominant user. Geographic combatant commanders are also responsible for the allocation of critical logistic resources within their theaters. They must ensure that statements of the requirements of assigned forces (including mutual support arrangements and associated inter-Service support agreements) are prepared and submitted in accordance with existing directives of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Chiefs of the Services.

Subject to combatant commanders’ responsibility and authority as outlined above, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces and direct communication with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters, and related requirements, such as the deployment of supplies, materiel, and equipment into
the area of responsibility. Commanders of component commands will keep the geographic combatant commander informed of the status of supply matters affecting readiness of their forces.

Commanders of subordinate commands may be assigned the responsibility for providing supply support to elements or individuals of other Services within the theater or designated area. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for provision of supplies to civilians in occupied areas in accordance with current directives, obligations, and treaties the US recognizes. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for recommending to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the priority of the phased buildup and cutback of supplies, installations, and organizations essential to the mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

SUPPORT

1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle.  Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat.  

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander’s existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

- the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
- the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
- the relative priority of the supporting effort;
- the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;
• the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander’s effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander’s organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command to better characterize the support that should be given. These are shown in the figure below.

**Related Terms**
close support; direct support; general support; inter-Service support; mutual support

**Source Joint Publications**
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. Joint force commanders (JFCs) will often assign one of their components or subordinate joint forces as a supported activity for a certain purpose and time. In fulfilling that responsibility, the supported commanders must coordinate and synchronize the fighting activity of supporting commands in conjunction with their own forces under the overall supervision and authority of the JFC. More than one supported command may be designated simultaneously. For instance, a joint force special operations component may be supported for direct action missions, while a joint force maritime component is supported for sea control. (See figure below.)

Supporting activities can take many forms as air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces support one another. For instance, close support occurs when the supporting force acts against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting attack with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. Examples include air support to land (close air support, tactical airlift); sea support to land (naval gunfire and missile support); and land support for air (suppression of enemy air defenses).
Other forms of support do not require coordination with fire and movement of the supported commander. Some examples are air support to sea (aerial sea mining, air delivery to ships); sea support to land (sea lift); sea support to air (sea delivery of fuel and ammunition); land support to air (seizure and protection of air bases, antiair defense of air bases); land support to sea (seizure or protection of naval bases and choke points); and space support to air, land, and sea (force enhancement).

All these forms of support constitute important ways in which JFCs can obtain leverage from the interaction of their forces. Support relations require careful attention by JFCs, component commanders, and their staffs to integrate and harmonize.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

SUPPORTED COMMANDER

The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) organizes the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant commands. A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting commanders, Services, US Special Operation Command, and agencies are designated as appropriate. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

The supported commander is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans, campaign plans, or operation orders in response to CJCS requirements.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander’s existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the
establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

• the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
• the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
• the relative priority of the supporting effort;
• the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;
• the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander’s effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander’s organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

**Related Terms**

**SUPPORTING COMMANDER**

A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. JP 1-02

Supporting commanders are designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).” Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military courses of action (COAs), as shown in the figure below, and identify the actual units and associated movement data.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.
The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander’s existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

- the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
- the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
- the relative priority of the supporting effort;
- the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;
- the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will
advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander’s effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander’s organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

Related Terms

supported commander; supporting plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0   Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

In amphibious operations, those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the amphibious task force. They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the amphibious task force commander and normally are conducted outside the area for which the amphibious task force commander is responsible at the time of their execution.

In amphibious operations, supporting operations are those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the amphibious task force (ATF). They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and normally are conducted outside the area for which the CATF is responsible at the time of their execution. Supporting operations conducted in the amphibious objective area (AOA) before or during the amphibious operation will be coordinated with the CATF. The CATF exercises authority through the commanders of the task organizations, who exercise authority through their respective chains of command. Examples of supporting operations are as follows, and are depicted in the figure below:

- Military deception operations conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the ATF mission.
- Isolation of the landing area by the conduct of interdiction operations.
- Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority in the landing area.
- Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations designed to secure information.
- Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy.
- Mine countermeasures operations conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the AOA.
- Special operations, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the AOA, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles.

Preassault operations are not supporting operations. Preassault operations are conducted in the AOA by elements of the ATF before the arrival of the major assault elements.
### SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

- **Military deception operations** conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission.
- **Isolation of the landing area** by the conduct of interdiction operations.
- **Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority** in the landing area.
- **Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations** designed to secure information.
- **Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy.**
- **Mine countermeasures operations** conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the amphibious objective area.
- **Special operations**, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the amphibious objective area, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles.

### Related Terms

- **amphibious operations**

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 3-02: Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
**SUPPORTING PLAN**

An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. JP 1-02

Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commanders in support of their deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, component commanders, or other agencies. These commanders or agencies may, in turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the supported plan is implemented. In many cases, however, the political or military situation cannot be clearly forecast, so employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it. In the absence of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions to the contrary, the combatant commanders responsible for the supported plans will review and approve supporting plans.

**Related Terms**

supported commander; supporting commander

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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**SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY**

Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. JP 1-02

An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. An example of support to insurgency was US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion.

**Related Terms**

military operations other than war

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

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**SURPRISE**

The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.
SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander’s attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.

Sustaining operations at the strategic and operational levels underwrites agility, extension of operations, and freedom of action. Strategic and theater logistics and deployment concepts are integral to combat success. These concepts are driven by the plans and orders of joint force commanders and supported by the Services, by other supporting commands, and often by host-nation support from allies and friends. Logistic standardization (to include deployment procedures and equipment interoperability where practical) will also enhance sustainment of joint force operations.

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL ACTIONS

As shown in the figure below, symmetric engagements are battles between similar forces where superior correlation of forces and technological advantage are important to ensure victory and minimize losses. Examples of symmetric conflict are land versus land (Meuse-Argonne in World War I); sea versus sea (the Battle of Jutland in World War I); air versus air (the Battle of Britain in World War II).

Asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat. An example is air versus land (such as the air attack of land targets in the Korean War).
Other examples are air versus sea (air attack of ships as in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in 1943); sea and air versus land and air (strike operations and antiair warfare as in the raid on Libya in 1986); and land versus air and sea (denial of enemy air and naval bases as when Allied ground forces overran German air, missile, and naval bases along the Atlantic coast of Europe in 1944). Special operations may function in all these modes. The concept also extends to space forces (for example, space-based jamming of terrestrial communications or terrestrial attack against an enemy ground space installation).

Joint operations should also shield the joint force against enemy asymmetric action. Protective action and posture, usually including joint offensive action, should be taken to defend our forces from potentially effective asymmetric attack. Antiterrorism is one example of friendly force protection. In another instance, to counter the Iraqi tactical ballistic missile threat during Operation DESERT STORM, the combination of space-based warning,
antitactical missile defenses, friendly force protective measures, and active efforts to destroy SCUD launchers provided a full-dimensional joint shield.

Both types of engagements support the joint campaign. Symmetric actions are often delegated to component commands for planning and execution within the overall framework of the campaign. Asymmetric engagements may require greater supervision by the joint force headquarters and offer tremendous potential efficiencies. The properly functioning joint force is powerful in asymmetric attack, posing threats from a variety of directions with a broad range of weapon systems to stress the enemy’s defenses. The land attack on a submarine pen, the sea-launched cruise missile strike or special operations force raid against a key air defense radar, the air strike against a vital ground transportation node — such asymmetric attacks afford devastating ways to attack or create enemy weaknesses and can avoid casualties and save resources.

Being alert to seizing or creating such opportunities is the business of the joint force as a whole, including not only joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs but their component commanders and staffs. “Cross-talk” and cross-fertilization of ideas often produce cheaper, better, and faster solutions to combat problems.

The key to the most productive integration of these supporting capabilities, and to the joint campaign as a whole, is attitude. In years past, the sea was a barrier to the Soldier and a highway to the Sailor; the different mediums of air, land, sea, and space were alien to one another. To the joint force team, all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation.

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. As Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions.

Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible. There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 1 | Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States |
| JP 3-0 | Doctrine for Joint Operations |
SYNCHRONIZATION

1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. JP 1-02

Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force, and is shown in the figure below. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater/joint operations area (JOA) air assets. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize
requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their area of operations (AOs) should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater/JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions. Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them. JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

Where maneuver is part of the JFC’s concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces making them better targets for interdiction.

Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater/JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater/JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC’s objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful
interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander’s boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The joint force air component commander will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort.

JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

Related Terms

interdiction; maneuver

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0       Doctrine for Joint Operations
Synergy results when the elements of the joint force are so effectively employed that their total military impact exceeds the sum of their individual contributions. Synergy is reinforced when operations are integrated and extended throughout the theater, including rear areas. The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects “non-linear.” That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater. (See figure below.)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war. JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities but also the enemy’s morale and will.
When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetrical, if our force and the enemy force are similar (for example, land versus land) or asymmetric, if forces are dissimilar (for example, air versus sea, sea versus land). As Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions.

It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full dimensional operations against the enemy.

The synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit. JFCs are especially suited to develop and project joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available only within joint forces.

The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. The JFC’s vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the desired end state.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
TACTICAL CONTROL

Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. JP 1-02

Tactical control (TACON) is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in operational control.

TACON provides the authority to give direction for military operations and control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management). TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

TACON is typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.

Related Terms
- combatant command
- combatant command (command authority)
- operational control

Source Joint Publications
- JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

JP 1-02

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.
TACTICAL WARNING

Related Terms
operational level of war; strategic level of war

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

TACTICAL WARNING

1. A warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile act based on an evaluation of information from all available sources. 2. In satellite and missile surveillance, a notification to operational command centers that a specific threat event is occurring. The component elements that describe threat events are: Country of origin — country or countries initiating hostilities. Event type and size — identification of the type of event and determination of the size or number of weapons. Country under attack — determined by observing trajectory of an object and predicting its impact point. Event time — time the hostile event occurred. Also called integrated tactical warning. JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for establishing theater event reporting systems to acquire, process, and disseminate warning information to joint force components and population centers. They are also responsible for implementing tactical event system architectures into local operations and intelligence nets. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Tactical warning triggers passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas of the battlefield or theater are in danger of attack). The geographic combatant commanders’ tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence systems.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL ELEMENT

A mobile command and control organization deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations at fixed, en route, and deployed locations where air mobility operational support is nonexistent or insufficient. The Tanker Airlift Control Element provides on-site management of air mobility airfield operations to include command and control, communications, aerial port services, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and other support functions, as necessary. The Tanker Airlift Control Element is composed of mission support elements from various units and deploys in support of peacetime, contingency, and emergency relief operations on both planned and “no notice” basis. Also called TALCE. JP 1-02

Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) are mobile command and control units deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations. When deployed specifically to support theater air mobility operations, TALCEs should be attached to the command of a geographic combatant commander as an element of the Theater Air Control System. Tanker/Airlift Control
Center decisions to position TALCE assets will be based upon strategic and theater mobility support requirements. It is a theater responsibility to identify requirements for such support.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**TARGET DEVELOPMENT**

The target development portion of the targeting process is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems and their components to determine which elements of the target system(s) military action should, or could, be taken against to achieve the given objectives. All sources of intelligence are reviewed and potential target systems and components are selected for consideration. Potential targeted systems and their components are then analyzed for their military, economic, and political importance; priority of attack; and weapon systems required to determine the required level of disruption, destruction, neutralization, or exploitation.

Targeteers must identify key target systems that are relevant to objectives and guidance and suitable for disruption, degradation, neutralization, or destruction. To accomplish this task, targeteers must understand target system characteristics, target linkage, and interdependence. In addition, targeteers must identify critical nodes, prepare preliminary documentation, validate the target, identify recommended aim points for attack, and develop a potential prioritized target list. This list is then used for weaponeering assessment.

Targeted systems have a number of characteristics. First, a targeted system is oriented toward a goal, objective, or purpose that is achieved through the system’s components. These components are interdependent; a change in one causes a change in one or more of the other components. Second, each targeted system is a component of another more inclusive system.

Target linkage is the connection between targets performing identical, similar, or complementary activities or functions. Target interdependence is the mutual relationships among targets where the activity of one is contingent, influenced, controlled, or determined by another.

Targeted system activities are those actions or functions performed by target system components in pursuit of system goals. This is the area where targeteers should focus their efforts. Once enemy activities that must be modified or defeated have been identified, targeteers can identify key activities of the targeted system or components that should be attacked, degraded, or exploited to produce the desired effect.

Target development focuses on identifying critical nodes within key target systems that will satisfy targeting objectives and conform to joint force commander (JFC) guidance. Critical nodes are points within a targeted system that will produce a cascading destructive, disruptive, or crippling effect on the targeted system.

Preliminary documentation includes identification of prohibited targets, incorporation of targets directed by higher headquarters, verification of targets recommended by components or other agencies, and identification of targets suitable for attack by specialized systems.

Targets are validated by evaluating and approving candidate targets. Certain questions need to be considered during this portion of the target development process: Does the targeting process meet JFC objectives and guidance received? Does the target contribute to the enemy’s capability and will to wage war? Is the target significant, operationally, or politically sensitive?
TARGETING

What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the enemy? Have all applicable laws of armed conflict or rules of engagement been considered?

The end product of the target development process is an unconstrained prioritized list of potential targets. It reflects relative importance of targets to the enemy’s ability to wage war. This list is the basis for the weaponeering assessment phase.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-55 Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Support for Joint Operations

TARGETING

1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander’s mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander’s disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. JP 1-02

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law, the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as rules of engagement approved by the National Command Authorities (NCA) for the particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal experts must consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting decisions.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other dimensions of the joint force.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the advice of subordinate commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to JFCs how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed in terms of percentage of total available resources; by assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation; or as otherwise determined by the JFC.

The targeting process is cyclic. (See figure below.) It begins with guidance and priorities issued by the NCA, JFCs, or headquarters senior to JFCs and continues with identification of requirements by components, the prioritization of these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, the assessment of the effects of those missions by both components and JFCs, and continuing guidance from JFCs on future fires or attack of targets.
Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on JFC’s apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. The NCA or headquarters senior to JFCs may provide guidance, priorities, and targeting support to JFCs. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their area of operations or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and air apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

The JFC may establish and task an organization within the JFC staff to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander (e.g., joint force air component commander (JFACC)). Typically, the JFC organizes a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center to accomplish the broad targeting oversight functions, or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and if required, their subordinate units.

The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews targeting information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB must also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.
The JTCB may assist the JFC in developing or revising the targeting guidance and/or priorities. The JTCB maintains a macro-level view of the area of responsibility/joint operations area and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC’s campaign plan.

The JFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the JFACC/JFC staff and will ensure that this process is a joint effort. The JFACC/JFC staff must possess a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. A targeting mechanism, tasked with detailed planning, weaponeering, and execution, is also required at the component level to facilitate the process.

**Related Terms**

Joint Targeting Coordination Board

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0    Doctrine for Joint Operations  
JP 3-56.1  Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

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**TARGET SYSTEM ANALYSIS**

Target system analysis is a systematic approach to determine enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. It determines what effects will be achieved against target systems and their activities. A target analysis must review the systems and their interactions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the system works and, subsequently, how to attack that system so it becomes inoperable.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures

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**TECHNOLOGY AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER**

In the post-Cold War era, US military forces are tasked with a wide variety of missions, from disaster relief to peacekeeping to fighting a major regional conflict. Historically, the US military has relied on technology as a force multiplier to accomplish assigned missions as efficiently as possible while preserving human life and limiting the destruction of property. The use of sophisticated information technologies as a force multiplier is the latest example of this trend.
The Defense Information Infrastructure links mission support and intelligence infrastructures and puts vital information at DOD user’s work stations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

**TERMINATION**

**General.** Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, National Military Strategy, and posthostility aims — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war. (See figure below.)

**Political Considerations.** There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent’s military strength and political policy — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. War is an instrument of policy. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to
use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in hostilities, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor
concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent’s strategic aim shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

**Military Considerations.** In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political aim and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should include estimates of military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability and estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political aim and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority in the absence of the political authorities.

Another military consideration is the follow up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance and requires early planning and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.

**When to Terminate.** Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the National Command Authorities (NCA) intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in
the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value and interest-based differences.

The underlying causes of a particular war — such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic — must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict. Ideally, national and allied or coalition decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic aims following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces. In some cases, these aims will be military strategic aims that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader aims. World War II and the transition from the end of the war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design. They provide decision makers with critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy’s judgment of cost and risk and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the US fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.

A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of operations other than war occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.

Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge. Working with Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate
transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

**War Termination.** The fundamental differences between a potential nuclear war and previous military conflicts involve the speed, scope, and degree of destruction inherent in nuclear weapons employment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportunities and enduring control over military forces. Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war, how and under what conditions it is brought to a conclusion may be very different from previous wars. Terminating a global war involving the use of large numbers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on both sides and the degradation or destruction of their central means of control could be vastly more difficult than ending a theater or regional nuclear conflict involving the relatively constrained use of a limited number of nuclear weapons. In the latter case, war-termination strategies may more readily lead to a cessation of hostilities, assuming that the belligerents’ interests in war termination are mutual.

**Termination Strategy.** The objective of termination strategy should be to end a conflict at the lowest level of destruction possible, consistent with national objectives. However, there can be no assurances that a conflict involving WMD could be controllable or would be of short duration. Nor are negotiations opportunities and the capacity for enduring control over military forces clear. Therefore, US nuclear forces, supporting command control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems (e.g., sensors, communications, command facilities), and employment planning must provide the capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a conflict of indefinite duration.

Reserve Forces. Adequate nuclear reserve forces reduce opportunities for another nation to dominate or coerce behavior before, during, or after the use of WMD. Such forces provide the US with the capability to continue to deny enemy war aims, influence other nations, and exert leverage for war termination.

**Military Operations Other Than War.** As in war, military operations other than war (MOOTW) operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions depend on the specific operation and may include the items listed in figure below. The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation, and application of this principle of

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**TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS ACTIONS**

May include but are not limited to:

- Transition to civil authority
- Marking and clearing minefields
- Closing financial obligations
- Pre-redeployment activities
- Redeploying forces
MOOTW requires careful planning for this phase. Additionally, proper accountability of funds and equipment facilitates disbursement of funds and reimbursements any outstanding claims.

Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations in either the primary role of fighting the nation’s wars or deploying for subsequent MOOTW. Forces that have been performing noncombat types of MOOTW, such as peacekeeping operations, may be degraded in combat proficiency. If the MOOTW tasks are significantly different from their combat tasks, forces may require proficiency training prior to being deployed as warfighters.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

TERRORISM

The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. JP 1-02

General. Acts of terrorism span the globe and are an inescapable element across the range of military operations. Each joint force commander (JFC) must institute continuous and aggressive programs to combat terrorism in his area of responsibility/joint operations area. These include use of psychological operations support to develop operations that encourage international acceptance of US actions.

Response to Terrorism. Responses to terrorism can occur with either of the two measures summarized in the figure below and discussed in the text following.

Antiterrorism (Defensive Measures). The basis of this program includes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of threat awareness programs, and the implementation of sound defensive programs. The joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) and component commanders ensure that these measures are incorporated into security operations. Counterintelligence serves as the main source for collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorism information for the JRAC.

Counterterrorism (Offensive Measures). The responsive phase of combatting terrorism is based on extensive preparations and planning, as well as response measures that can include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The type forces and command and control structure used depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. The JRAC and area commanders support counterterrorism operations within force capabilities.
The Theater Air Control System (TACS).

Air Operations Center (USAF) (AOC). The AOC serves as the central node of the Air Force command and control system called the TACS. The TACS, which also comprises the Air Force element of the Army/Air Force Air-Ground Operations System, consists of fixed- and mobile-units and facilities that provide the AOC with the information and communications required to monitor the ongoing air operation and control Air Force aircraft in theater air operations. The broad organization and functions of these units and facilities are discussed here in their relationship to theater airlift.

Related Terms
antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; counterterrorism

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

Theater Air Control System

The organization and equipment necessary to plan, direct, and control theater air operations between Services. It is composed of control agencies and communications-electronics facilities which provide the means for centralized control and decentralized execution of missions.

JP 1-02
Control and Reporting Center (CRC). Directly subordinate to the AOC and charged with broad air defense, surveillance, and control functions, the CRC provides the means to flight-follow, direct, and coordinate the support and defense of theater airlift aircraft and formations operating in the area of operations.

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). TACPs consist of Air Force personnel equipped and trained to assist US ground commanders to plan and request tactical air support, including theater airlift.

Wing Operations Center (WOC). As the command and control facility of Air Force wings, WOCs provide control and communications facilities to link wing commanders to the AOC and enable them to command their forces. To facilitate joint operations, Army Ground Liaison Officers or other component representatives may be assigned to a WOC.

Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE). TALCEs are mobile command and control units deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations. When deployed specifically to support theater air mobility operations, TALCEs should be attached to the command of a geographic combatant commander as an element of the TACS. Tanker airlift control center (USAF) (TACC) decisions to position TALCE assets will be based upon strategic and theater mobility support requirements. It is a theater responsibility to identify requirements for such support.

Mission Support Team (MST). Smaller than TALCEs, MSTs perform similar functions at locations where airlift command and control otherwise would not exist.

Combat Control Team (CCT). CCTs are small, task-organized teams of Air Force parachute and combat diver-qualified personnel, trained and equipped to quickly establish and control drop, landing, and extraction zone air traffic in austere or hostile conditions. These teams survey and establish terminal airheads as well as provide guidance to aircraft for airlift operations. They provide command and control and conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and survey assessments of potential airfields or assault zones and perform limited weather observation and removal of obstacles or unexploded ordinance with demolitions.

Theater Airlift Liaison Officers (TALOs). TALOs are rated airlift officers aligned under TACPs supporting the Army at corps, division, and separate brigade or regiment levels. Air Mobility Command (AMC) liaison officers (LNOs) are normally assigned to a Marine expeditionary force. The AMC LNOs perform similar functions as the TALOs, but are not designated as TALOs. TALOs advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airlift, and assist in planning, requesting, and using airlift resources.

Airborne Elements. As airborne command and control nodes of the TACS, the airborne battlefield command and control center and the Airborne Warning and Control System may perform AOC functions in support of theater airlift operations. This may occur either early in a campaign (before the regular AOC is established) or during operations conducted in the presence of enemy air and ground threats.

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). A DIRMOBFOR may be established to assist in the coordination of airlift issues within the theater. The DIRMOBFOR will normally be a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and has an extensive background in airlift operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from the theater’s organizations, or nominated by US Transportation Command, or United States Atlantic Command. When established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent of the joint force air component commander or air force component commander for all airlift issues. The DIRMOBFOR exercises coordinating authority between the airlift control center, air mobility element (AME) (or TACC if no AME is deployed), joint movement center, and the joint air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of any airlift problems.
Theater airlift operations are categorized in different ways for different purposes and are shown in the first figure below.

**Missions.** Theater airlift is usually divided between channel and special assignment airlift missions (SAAMs). Channel missions provide common-user general airlift service, usually on relatively fixed schedules and route structures, over an extended period of time. However, channel missions can also be event driven, i.e., based on mission requirements to move cargo or personnel outside of the established schedule. SAAMs provide dedicated airlift for specific requirements, usually at times, places, and in load configurations requested by a specific user. SAAM operations may involve any level of activity, from a single aircraft sortie to operations involving large formations or many sorties over extended periods of time.

**Scheduling.** For scheduling purposes, theater airlift is conducted on either a recurrent or surge basis. Recurrent operations establish a scheduled flow of individual aircraft to make the most of available aircraft and ground support assets. However, such operations require low-threat environments because they often involve aircraft flying predictable schedules and route structures, making them relatively easy to detect and attack. For other than low-threat environments, surge operations maximize the ability of air defense forces to protect airlift assets because they usually reduce movements in time and space, and thereby reduce their vulnerability to detection and attack. Surge operations may disrupt the efficiency of the overall theater airlift system. Aircraft already loaded and serviced may wait unproductively on the ground, for example, until all the aircraft in the surge are ready for the mission.

**Movement Planning.** For movement planning purposes, theater airlift aircraft are either administrative- or combat-loaded. Administrative-loading gives primary consideration to achieving maximum use of aircraft passenger and cargo capacities, without regard to ground force tactical considerations. Administrative-loaded materiel usually requires unloading and sorting before it is used. Combat-loading arranges personnel and materiel to arrive at their intended destination in an order and condition so that they are ready for immediate use. Administrative-loading maximizes the use of the volumes and weight capacities of airlift aircraft, their allowable cabin load (ACL), while combat-loading maximizes the combat readiness of the organizations and equipment being moved.

**Theater Airlift Missions Basic Tasks.** For operational planning purposes, most theater airlift missions perform one of six basic tasks, as shown in the second figure below and then discussed: deployment, employment, routine sustainment, combat sustainment, redeployment, or force extraction. Each of these tasks is different and has specific applications to distinct
phases of a campaign or operation. This categorization is useful because it relates directly to the problem of maximizing theater airlift support to immediate requirements, while also maximizing its contribution to the long-term requirements of the theater campaign.

Deployment. Deployment theater airlift operations involve the administrative or combat movement of personnel, units, and materiel into or within an area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA) before they engage in operations. Ideally, deployment airlift should operate in a low-threat environment. They can operate in higher threat environments, but their tactics, escort requirements, and objective area support requirements could reduce the throughput of the overall theater airlift system and individual aircraft cargo capacity. Backhaul airlift — the efficient rearward movement of personnel, intelligence materials, mail, reparable items, and other materiel could be an important planning consideration, even at the start of a deployment operation.

Employment. Employment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of units as an integral part of their operations. Usually, employment airlift moves combat-loaded units to maximize their readiness for immediate combat operations. Given the assumption of immediate combat, user requirements should drive scheduling and load planning. However, for large-scale operations or increased threat situations, it may be necessary to
adjust the user’s plans or operations to accommodate the ACL limitations, tactical procedures, and defensive support requirements of the theater airlift force. In most cases, employment airlift could be provided through surge operations, given the requirement to deliver combat-ready units in the minimum time possible. Defensive arrangements for both the forces and airlift assets involved depend on the situation; they could possibly be high at the beginning of an operation and then taper off as the delivered units establish their operational effectiveness. Backhaul airlift is seldom feasible or worth the risk during employment operations, except for the rearward movement of essential items of intelligence, wounded personnel or other friendly evacuees.

Routine Sustainment. Routine sustainment theater airlift operations involve the administrative air movement of materiel and personnel to reinforce or resupply forces already deployed and/or employed in operations. These operations normally deliver the user’s requirements with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. Routine sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and the general air and ground security situation allow some flexibility in the actual delivery times of specific loads. Thus, flight schedules and load plans are usually made to get maximum throughput from available ACLs and support resources. When practical, routine sustainment should be planned to utilize backhaul capacity.
Depending on theater and user priorities, typical backhaul loads might include wounded personnel, other friendly evacuees, enemy prisoners of war, excess or reparable weapons and materiel of moderate to high value, as well as mail.

Combat Sustainment. Combat sustainment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of supplies, materiel, and personnel to reinforce or resupply units already engaged in combat operations. Combat sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and general threat situations allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and configurations of specific loads. Combat sustainment usually involves individual aircraft or small formations employing combat tactics to deliver loads to terminals in close proximity to the enemy; it may also be conducted as an air flow operation, depending on requirements and threats. Only essential backhaul requirements justify the increased risks for theater airlift assets involved in these operations. Priority consideration should be given to retrograde of critical reparable items from forward areas to rear echelon repair activities.

Redeployment. Redeployment theater airlift operations involve the combat or administrative air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from deployed positions within an AOR or JOA. Redeployment operations are conducted to move the maximum force in the minimum time or with the fewest resources possible. They normally require a low-threat situation. If circumstances permit, backhaul should be accomplished with whatever capacity is not used by the primary movement.

Force Extraction. Force extraction theater airlift operations involve the combat air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces. Because the purpose of these movements may range from withdrawal operations to the lateral movement of forces to new operating locations, the relationship of operational and logistic considerations can vary widely. These operations generally are planned to accomplish a movement with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. However, in higher threat situations it may also be necessary to preserve the combat capabilities of departing units for as long as possible at the departure terminal, while building them up as rapidly as possible at the arrival terminal. In such cases, operational requirements may be more important than the efficient use of ACLs. In the latter stages of a complete extraction of friendly forces from a combat area, planners should provide suitable operational assets to protect both the extracting forces and the airlift forces engaged in their movement. Extractions are logistical backhaul operations. Commanders must evaluate the risk of extracting materiel as compared to the impact of abandonment and replacement.

Related Terms

strategic airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

The US establishes air lines of communications by coordinating the operations of three distinct components of airlift forces. Strategic airlift forces (also called intertheater or global airlift forces) primarily provide common-user airlift into theater terminals from outside the theater. Theater airlift forces primarily provide common-user lift between terminals within a theater. Organic airlift forces, drawn mainly from Service elements, are not common-user assets, and primarily provide specialized lift to specific users, usually between terminals within a theater.
In daily operations, airlift forces sometimes operate at bases and carry loads that overlap with the strategic, theater, and organic airlift missions. They may also operate aircraft of the same type or design. These operational and technological overlaps have complicated many past efforts to establish distinct organizational boundaries between airlift forces. However, they also provide an opportunity and an obligation to organize and operate each airlift force in ways that satisfy its primary customers, while also maximizing the effectiveness of the overall theater airlift system.

Theater airlift forces exist to support the plans, operations, and priorities of the geographic combatant commander by operating air transport aircraft and ground support assets for all theater forces. Theater airlift forces have a dual identity; they are both air operating forces and they are an element of the logistic support system. Planning and organization of theater airlift forces should reflect this dual nature.

**Related Terms**

strategic airlift forces

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

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**THEATER AIRLIFT LIAISON OFFICER**

An officer specially trained to implement the theater air control system and to control tactical airlift assets. Theater airlift liaison officers are highly qualified, rated airlift officers, with tactical (airdrop) airlift experience, assigned duties supporting US Army units. Also called TALO.

Theater airlift liaison officers (TALOs) are rated airlift officers aligned under tactical air control parties supporting the Army at corps, division, and separate brigade or regiment levels. Air Mobility Command (AMC) liaison officers (LNOs) are normally assigned to a Marine expeditionary force. The AMC LNOs perform similar functions as the TALOs, but
are not designated as TALOs. TALOs advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airlift, and assist in planning, requesting, and using airlift resources.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

THEATER MISSILE

A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose target is within a given theater of operation. JP 1-02

Potential adversaries possessing theater missiles (TMs) pose a threat to US security interests and forward-deployed forces. The proliferation of TMs and advances in missile and associated technologies, coupled with the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, can provide these adversaries with potentially decisive attack capabilities which can include the use of WMD against critical friendly targets.

TMs may be as much a political weapon as a military weapon. In many cases, their political impact may outweigh their military significance. Commanders must consider the political as well as the military impact of TMs. The precise time, location, and nature of TM employment is uncertain, thus complicating the determination of friendly force composition and method of power projection to overcome specific threats. The nature and extent of US global interests require that theater missile defense (TMD) forces be rapidly deployable or employable from the US, forward bases, and/or ships. Furthermore, the intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition systems, weapon systems, and communication architectures and resources required to conduct TMD operations must be flexible enough to provide timely and accurate support throughout the area of interest. Geographic combatant commanders should plan for TMD operations within the theater in support of contingencies and national military strategy.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), joint force commanders plan for the employment of theater nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command’s capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.
A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the area of responsibility).

Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.
THEATER OF WAR

Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the area of responsibility (AOR)).

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
In time of war, the National Command Authorities or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

Related Terms
area of responsibility; theater of operations

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

The second integral part of patient regulating is the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). TPMRCs assume responsibilities formerly performed by the Joint Medical Regulating Office and theater aeromedical evacuation control centers. Active TPMRCs are located in US European Command and US Pacific Command. Other TPMRCs would be established in US Atlantic Command, US Central Command, US Southern Command, and the continental US as the need arose. The primary role of TPMRCs is to generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute Global Patient Movement
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia

Requirements Center (GPMRC)-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the medical treatment facility (which includes both fixed and deployable, Veterans Administration, Department of Defense, and National Disaster Medical System hospitals).

The TPMRC is under the control of the joint force surgeon and coordinates and controls, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, the movement of patients within and out of the assigned area of responsibility. TPMRCs generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute GPMRC-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the medical treatment facility. The TPMRC should be task-organized to maintain flexibility in response to the tactical situation and mission of the combatant commander.

**Related Terms**

global patient movement requirements center

**Source Joint Publications**

*JP 4-0* Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**THEATER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS**

Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, command and control capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each course of action.

Theater strategic concepts should provide for unity of effort and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts.

Combatant commanders use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage.

Though geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant commanders may differ, there are several common strategic considerations. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider the following:

- Protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.
- Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.
- Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or United Nations circumstances.
- Identification of conflict termination criteria and postconflict objectives and measures.
- Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.
- Support for security assistance or nation assistance.
- Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

*JP 3-0* Doctrine for Joint Operations
**THEATER STRATEGY**

The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater.  

Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused concepts to accomplish specific missions and objectives. The National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan guide the development of this strategy that incorporates peacetime and war objectives and reflects national and Department of Defense policy and guidance. Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. Foreign internal defense is an integral part of this strategy. The determination of the desired end state for the theater is an important element in the strategy process. This determination establishes the theater’s strategic direction on which planners base campaign plans as well as other plans. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. In general, the theater strategy will normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a strategic assessment of the area of responsibility, a threat analysis, the combatant commander’s vision, and a statement of theater missions and objectives.

Theater campaign plans are operational extensions of the theater strategy. They provide the commander’s vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the framework for supporting operation plans.

**Related Terms**

joint strategic capabilities plan; national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

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**THREAT ASSESSMENT**

In antiterrorism, threat assessment brings together the threat analysis and the vulnerability analysis, as depicted in the figure below. The threat assessment concerns people or items essential to the mission or function of the installation, port, base, or unit. It also applies to people or facilities that, by virtue of their symbolic value to a terrorist group (as determined by the threat assessment), are probable targets. The threat assessment is provided by the supporting counterintelligence staff element. Based on the threat assessment, the commander and staff should identify and prioritize critical personnel, facilities, and equipment, and should conduct a vulnerability assessment for each. Assessing the vulnerability of a unit, installation, base, facility, material, or personnel to the terrorist threat helps uncover and isolate security weakness. Steps can then be taken to reduce or eliminate the weakness. Once the vulnerability assessment is completed, steps should be taken (planning, training, and if necessary, design or redesign of construction projects) to correct or reduce these vulnerabilities. The installation commander and staff should review this vulnerability assessment at least annually to ensure that it remains accurate in view of the changing threat, installation makeup, and unit missions.
## THREAT DISTRIBUTION

### THREAT ASSESSMENT

Concerns people or items essential to the mission or function of the installation, port, base, or unit; applies to people or facilities that, by virtue of their symbolic value to a terrorist group, are probable targets.

Based on the threat assessment, the commander and staff should identify and prioritize critical personnel, facilities, and equipment, and should conduct a vulnerability assessment for each.

### VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Assessing the vulnerability of a unit, installation, base, facility, material, or personnel to the terrorist threat helps uncover and isolate security weakness.

Once the vulnerability assessment is completed, steps should be taken to correct or reduce these vulnerabilities.

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**Related Terms**

antiterrorism

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-07.2   JTTP for Antiterrorism

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**THREAT DISTRIBUTION**

Threat distribution and phase duration are useful tools for determining the allocation of resources. Using threat distribution, the joint force commander (JFC) will assign destruction of a portion of the enemy’s total combat capability (i.e., forces, installations, organizations) to Service component commands. An example of threat distribution would be to assign destruction of a certain percentage of enemy mechanized, armor, follow-on forces, and artillery forces during an air operations phase among the Services. The remaining percentage of the threat, increased intentionally to provide a deliberate total overlap, would be distributed among the Services during the ground maneuver operations phases. Phase duration is the JFC’s projection of how long a specific phase of an operation is expected to last. Two examples of phase duration: the air operation will last a certain number of days (time oriented) or the air operation will last until a certain percentage of enemy ground threat is destroyed (objective oriented). Threat distribution and phase duration help identify where the weight of the
The campaign will fall during various phases to prevent unnecessary duplication of support to different components.

**Related Terms**

- phase duration

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 4-0
  - Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

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**TIMELINESS**

Intelligence must be available in time to be effective. Timely intelligence enables the commander to make sound decisions, use the principles of war, and to act decisively. Timeliness is influenced by the intelligence process of developing essential elements of information, identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. The commander must inform the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) of intent and the J-2 must identify intelligence requirements to supporting intelligence organizations in a timely manner.

**Related Terms**

- intelligence

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 2-0
  - Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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**TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA**

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:

- a. In-place units.
- b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.
- c. Routing of forces to be deployed.
- d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.
- e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.
- f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD.

**Related Terms**

- joint operation planning

**Source Joint Publications**

- JP 4-01.3
  - JTTP for Movement Control

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**US Transportation Command** uses TPFDD to analyze the flow of forces and cargo from their points of origin to arrival in theater. They distribute the apportioned strategic transportation resources. During this process, Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command follows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance and coordinates all major decisions with the supported combatant commander.

**Related Terms**

- joint operation planning
TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS

 Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.  

 Time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and determining its appropriateness as a special operations target. Time-sensitivity can be viewed from either a targeting or mission planning perspective or a combination of both, as in the case of personnel recovery missions. 

 A target is time-sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or is highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity. Time-sensitive targets are usually mobile, such as a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, or they may lose their value quickly, such as a bridge being used for an enemy advance or withdrawal.

 Related Terms

targeting

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.5  Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures

TIMING AND TEMPO

 The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. (See figure below.) With proper timing, joint force commanders (JFCs) can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for instance, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than one month.

 The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. This reduced pace may be particularly appropriate when enemy forces enjoy a mobility advantage or when friendly forces are not yet able to conduct decisive operations.

 JFCs may vary the tempo of operations. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities.

 Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that synchronizes the effects of operations so that the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired
time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate effects, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in a synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that effects achieved through combat operations build toward decisive results but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

**TOTAL FORCE**

The total force policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and missions to the Reserve component along with the resources necessary to maintain high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis. As the total force policy matured, military retirees, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support personnel were brought under its umbrella to reflect the
value of their contributions to our military capability. Total force policy focuses awareness and energy on sound, thorough mobilization planning and the development of procedures that are essential to the timely activation of reserve military power. The total force policy was tested by the war in the Persian Gulf, which involved the largest mobilization and deployment of Reserve forces since the Korean War. There was significant reliance on military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support for critical skills and performance of many essential tasks.

Reserve Forces Preparedness — Legacy of the ‘80s

During the 1980s, major improvements were made in Reserve Component (RC) force readiness to perform wartime missions. By the fall of 1990, modernization efforts had given the RC the ability to field approximately 84 percent (in dollar value) of the equipment they required for war. The DOD policy of “first to fight, first to equip” required resourcing both Active and RC units in the sequence in which they were required to perform their wartime missions. Successful recruiting efforts, the assignment to the RC of important peacetime and wartime responsibilities, and substantially improved training opportunities, also contributed significantly to improved RC force readiness.

The increase in RC readiness levels in the 1980s occurred concurrently with the largest ever expansion of the RC peacetime structure. From 1980 to the end of the decade, the number of Selected Reservists increased by 35 percent, growing from approximately 850,000 to more than 1,150,000. This growth did not come at the expense of personnel readiness. On the contrary, throughout the decade, the Services devoted considerable resources to ensure individual proficiency of Selected Reserve members. During this same period, more emphasis was placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the pool of pre-trained individuals.

Individual RC volunteers were integrated into the Active force from the start of the Persian Gulf crisis, even before the involuntary Reserve call-up. By 22 August, more than 10,500 volunteer RC members already were serving on active duty. Their contributions were essential to provide capabilities required from the first days of the crisis — particularly strategic airlift — and to perform missions almost exclusively assigned to Reserve units including, for example, water purification and port security.

Thousands of Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel volunteered within hours of the initial US response to support the time-sensitive movement of US personnel and materiel to the Persian Gulf. ARC volunteers flew 42 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions. They also provided continental United States (CONUS) base maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police support to deploying Air Force units and airlift mission. By 22 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers had moved seven million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater. As of 25 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers began operating Westover AFB, MA as a major eastbound staging operation on a 24-hour basis. Westover continued to operate on a volunteer basis for four months until these same volunteers were mobilized on 3 December.
The Services expand their institutional training bases to train nonprior Service personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure. The training base also provides reclassification and refresher training for pretrained individual manpower who need it. Based on the rate of force expansion and attrition due to casualties, training base output requirements, over time, are determined and compared to available capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations from the Reserve component, by hiring Department of Defense civilian employees, and by contracting for additional instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in the figure below.

### EXPANDING TRAINING BASE CAPACITY: SOURCES AND OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING BASE CAPACITY</th>
<th>TRAINING BASE EXPANSION OPTIONS</th>
<th>ACTIONS REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Level of emergency</td>
<td>Wartime policies and programs of instruction</td>
<td>Implemented wartime training policies and programs</td>
<td>Implement wartime programs of instruction; extend the training day and training week; increase class size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve Component training units</td>
<td>Expand existing training centers and schools</td>
<td>Call up Reserve component training base augmentation units as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New training centers and schools</td>
<td>Add new training centers and schools</td>
<td>Call up remaining Reserve component training base augmentation units; activate new training units, acquire new training facilities and support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

**TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES**

A commander of a combatant command (CINC) has the authority to issue and implement directives to transfer civil engineering functions between or among Service components within the area of responsibility during war or military operations other than war. However, in
peacetime, the CINC must obtain the concurrence of the affected Service or refer the matter through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

A CINC’s directive authority is not intended to abrogate Service responsibility for civil engineering support. Every effort will be made to obtain the Service’s concurrence through coordination with Service component commands or directly to the headquarters of the appropriate Service. Under all conditions, the implementation of such directed transfers, including administrative and procedural aspects, is the responsibility of the Service component commander involved. The CINC retains the responsibility for overseeing and resolving issues.

Related Terms
directive authority for logistics

Source Joint Publications
JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

TRANIENT FORCES

Forces which pass or stage through, or base temporarily within, the area of responsibility or joint operations area of another command but are not under its operational control. JP 1-02

In accordance with the “Forces for Unified Commands” and the “Unified Command Plan,” except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area boundaries.

Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are subject to the area commander’s orders in some instances, e.g., for coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces are not part of the area commander’s command, and the area commander is not in their normal chain of command.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of
communications. Without secure air, sea, space, and land lines of communications we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign.

The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCETRANS) has the mission to provide strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives across the range of military operations. Combatant commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCETRANS who, with the transportation component commands, provides a complete movement system from origin to initial theater destination. This system includes the effective use of military and commercial assets. Finally, USCINCETRANS has the authority to procure commercial transportation services through component commands (within legal constraints) and to activate, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Ready Reserve Force, and Sealift Readiness Program.

Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command transportation facilities and supplies not assigned to the geographic combatant commander are normally exempted from the logistic authority of the geographic combatant commander. Combatant commanders should communicate their requirements and priorities for modification of existing facilities and establishment of new transportation facilities to Service component commanders and USCINCETRANS.

Most airports and seaports located outside the continental US are operated and controlled by host nations but may be augmented by US forces. During wartime, each Service has primary responsibility for loading and unloading its military units. The responsibilities of AMC and individual units moving via AMC or AMC-controlled aircraft are contained in multi-Service publications.

**Related Terms**

logistics

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
TRANSPORTATION REFINEMENT

Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. US Transportation Command uses computer simulation to determine transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

Transportation refinement is conducted by Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting commands. USCINCTRANS will normally host transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of operations plans to ensure they are transportation feasible and consistent with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of US forces and their supplies during peacetime training, conflict, or war, involving both mature and contingency theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. JP 1-02

The employment of military forces and combat power decides the outcome of campaigns and operations. The success of these forces often depends on sound, timely deployment and support. A well-defined, integrated transportation system is a critical part of this support. It provides time and place utility for units and sustainment. Inadequate control of logistic movement results in waste, reduced efficiency, and loss of potential combat power.

The three elements of a transportation system, shown in the figure below, are mode operations (surface, water, air), terminal operations, and movement control. Movement control is the
most critical component of the system. It must coordinate the transportation assets of all modes, terminals, Services, commands, and host nations during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment.

Force deployments occur in five phases. The phases are predeployment, movement to a port of embarkation (POE), strategic movement, in-theater reception at a port of debarkation, and theater onward movement. The figure below shows this process, using the continental US (CONUS) as the origin. In general, predeployment activities are a Service responsibility and movement to a POE within CONUS is shared between the Services and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Commercial movement to a POE within CONUS is arranged by USTRANSCOM’s Military Traffic Management Command. Additionally, USTRANSCOM executes the strategic movement to the theater. The last two phases, in-theater reception and onward movement, are the responsibility of the supported geographic combatant commander.

The transportation system also encompasses patient and enemy prisoners of war evacuations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and force redeployment. Redeployments can take twice as long as deployments, and planners must address them early in an operation. The transportation system must be capable of moving joint forces by multiple modes. It must move forces over long distances and through an array of different types of terminals. It must accomplish all this while adhering to the timetable of the supported joint force commander.

The complexity of the transportation system requires that both the providers and users develop integrated, executable movement plans. An effective interface between the strategic and theater movement systems is crucial. The supported combatant commander and
Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, along with other supporting combatant commanders, are responsible for establishing that interface.

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 4-01.3  JTTP for Movement Control
Friction, chance, and uncertainty still characterize battle. Their cumulative effect comprises “the fog of war.” We have, for instance, no precisely defined picture of where, when, for how long, or why we may be obliged to use force in the defense of our nation or its friends and allies. We must be prepared for a broad range of possibilities. Modern technology will not eliminate friction, chance, or uncertainty from military undertakings. Indeed, the massive quantity of information available to modern commanders produces its own component of uncertainty. Instead, friction, chance, and uncertainty are an inevitable part of the medium in which we operate. We should prepare mentally, physically, and psychologically to deal with this.

### Related Terms

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

### UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.

Unconventional warfare (UW) includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (E&E). (See figure below.) GW consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities. In the latter stages of a successful insurgency, guerrilla forces may directly oppose selected, vulnerable enemy forces while avoiding enemy concentrations of strength.

Subversion is an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. All elements of the resistance organization contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy’s infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.
In UW, the intelligence function must collect, develop, and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the established government or occupying power and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence activities have both offensive and defensive purposes and range well beyond military issues, including social, economic, and political information that may be used to identify threats, operational objectives, and necessary supporting operations.

E&E is an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to:
• move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control;
• avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control;
• once captured, escape. Special operations personnel often will work in concert with the Joint Search and Rescue Center of the joint force commander (JFC) while operating in an E&E network.

UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the US perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving US national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic or operational objectives.

When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:
• Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
• Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
• Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
• Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
• Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.

When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. However, the political and psychological implications remain. UW operations delay and disrupt hostile military activities, interdict lines of communications, deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas, divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle area, and interdict hostile warfighting capabilities. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of air, sea, or ground battles, complement conventional military operations, and provide the JFC with the windows of opportunity needed to seize the initiative through offensive action.

During war, SOF may directly support the resistance movement by infiltrating operational elements into denied or politically sensitive areas. They organize, train, equip, and advise or direct the indigenous resistance organization. In situations short of war, when direct US military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, SOF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.

UW may be conducted by all designated SOF, but it is principally the responsibility of Army special forces. Augmentation other than SOF, will usually be provided as the situation dictates by psychological operations and civil affairs units, as well as other selected conventional combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.

**Related Terms**

**special operations**

**Source Joint Publications**

3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

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**UNIFIED ACTION**

A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

JP 1-02

The term “unified action” is a broad generic term referring to the wide scope of activities (including the synchronization of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. It integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations; in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations (UN) operations, into a unity of effort in the theater or joint operations area. Unified action within the military element of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power as they apply within the theater environment and its unity of effort. (See figure below.)
The concept of unified action highlights the integrated and synchronized activities of military forces and nonmilitary organizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve common objectives, though in common parlance joint operations increasingly has this connotation (the "joint warfare is team warfare" context of Joint Pub 1). Unified actions are planned and conducted by joint force commanders in accordance with guidance and direction received from the National Command Authorities, multinational organizations, and superior commanders.

Success often depends on these unified actions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all combatant commanders are in pivotal positions to ensure unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the National Command Authorities in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or coalition leadership). Combatant commanders should ensure that their unified action synchronizes joint operations and single-Service operations in time, space, and purpose with the actions of supporting combatant commands and other military forces (multinational operations) and non-military organizations (Department of Defense and other federal government agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, private and nongovernment volunteer organizations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and the UN).

Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the joint force commander with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

Related Terms
joint task force; subordinate unified command; unified command

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
General. A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See figure below.) The unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options: subordinate unified command; joint task force; functional component; Service component; single-Service force (normally the commander of a combatant command (CINC) assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service component); or specific operational forces that, because of mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CINC. These options do not in any way limit the commanders’ authority to organize their forces as they see fit. Unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of a unified command will not act as the commander of a subordinate command.

Criteria for Establishing a Unified Command. When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unit of effort.

- A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating a single strategic direction.
- Any combination of the following exists and significant forces of two or more Military Departments are involved: a large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force; a large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein; and necessity for common utilization of limited logistic means.
The commander of a unified command will have a joint staff. Normally, a member of the joint staff will not also function as the commander of a subordinate force. The commander of a unified command has the authority to communicate to the Services his views on the nomination of senior officers serving in the command for immediate follow-on assignment, further joint assignments, and promotional potential.

**Primary Responsibilities of the Commander of a Unified Command.** The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. Combatant command responsibilities include the following:

- Planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the US, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks the combatant commanders to prepare joint operation plans that may be operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans with or without time-phased force and deployment data, or functional plans.
- Maintaining the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.
- Assigning tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions.
- Communication directly with the Chiefs of the Services on single-Service matters as deemed appropriate; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on other matters, including the preparation of strategic, joint operation, and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and any other necessary function of command required to accomplish the mission; the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives; subordinate elements, including the development organizations, of the Defense agency or the Military Department directly supporting the development and acquisition of the combatant commander’s command and control system in coordination with the Director of the Defense agency or Secretary of the Military Department concerned.
- Keeping the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional or geographic area of responsibility, particularly those incidents that could create national or international repercussions.

**Authority of the Commander of a Unified Command in an Emergency.** In the event of a major emergency in the geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) requiring the use of all available forces, the geographic combatant commander may assume temporary operation control (OPCON) of all forces in the assigned AOR, except those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of specific operational missions under joint OPLANs approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would be interfered with by contemplated use of such forces. The commander determines when such an emergency exists and, on assuming temporary OPCON over forces of another command, immediately advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the appropriate operational commanders, and the Chief of the Service of the forces concerned of the nature and estimated duration of employment of such forces.

The authority to assume temporary OPCON of forces in the event of a major emergency will not be delegated. Unusual circumstances in wartime, emergencies, or crises involving military operations other than war (such as a terrorist incident) may require a geographic
combatant commander to directly exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) through a shortened chain of command to forces assigned for the purpose of resolving the crisis. Additionally, the combatant commander can assume COCOM, in the event of war or an emergency that prevents control through normal channels, of security assistance organizations within the commander’s general geographic AOR, or as directed by the National Command Authorities. All commanders bypassed in such exceptional command arrangements will be kept advised of all directives issued to and reports sent from elements under such exceptional command arrangements. Such arrangements will be terminated as soon as practicable, consistent with accomplishment of the mission.

Assumption of Temporary Command. In the temporary absence of a combatant commander from the command, interim command will pass to the deputy commander. If a deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass to the next senior officer present for duty who is eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation.

Related Terms
combatant command; subordinate unified command(s)

Source Joint Publications
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

UNIT INTEGRITY

Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting these to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force is less effective and takes more time to adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but may also have an impact on force protection. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal
structures and have trained and operated together. Additionally, when deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations, commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures. In order to provide joint force commanders with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. Units not accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to normally unrelated units.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

UNITY OF COMMAND

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort, as shown in the figure below, requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. National unified action is influenced by the Constitution, federal law, international law, and the national interest.

Responsibilities for strategic coordination established in law and practice are as follows:

• The President of the US, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort.

• The Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. Unity of effort among the Military Services at the national level is obtained from the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, by the strategic planning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by cross-Service efforts by the Military Departments. The Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of their forces assigned to combatant commanders.
The National Command Authorities (NCA), consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the armed forces through combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services, for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders, and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

In a foreign country, the US Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements in the host nation, except those under the command of a combatant commander.
those under the command of a combatant commander. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with US Ambassadors in their geographic area of responsibility as necessary across the range of military operations.

**Multinational Unity of Effort.** As shown in the figure below, there are some general principles for attaining unity of effort among allied or coalition forces.

Unity of command may not be politically feasible but should be a goal if at all possible. Although important, it is only one of the components of unity of effort, and the others must be attained in any case. First, there must be common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the multinational force and the concept for its attainment. Simplicity of plan and organization is essential.

Coordination policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and intelligence, is required. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

Finally, commanders and their representatives must establish and maintain trust and confidence among the multinational forces. Plain and objective communication, together with common courtesy, is essential.

### PRINCIPLES OF MULTINATIONAL UNITY OF EFFORT

**COMMON UNDERSTANDING**

Among all forces of the overall aim and the concept of its attainment. Simplicity of plan and organization is essential.

**COORDINATED POLICY**

Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to improve interoperability and mutual understanding.

**TRUST AND CONFIDENCE**

Must be established and maintained by commanders and their representatives. Plain and objective communication, together with common courtesy, is essential.

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**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 3-0  
Doctrine for Joint Operations
UNITY OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication. Joint force commanders (JFCs) have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) should integrate their efforts with the joint intelligence center/joint intelligence support element. These liaison personnel are normally organized into a national intelligence support team and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization. Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities. If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2’s concept of synchronizing all forces’ intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander’s needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. As shown in the figure below, this includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets. Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC.
**UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE**

A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. Also called UAV.  

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are operated in the airspace control area by each component of the joint force. The established principles of airspace management used in manned flight operations will normally apply to UAV operations. The UAV is difficult to acquire and does not provide a clear radar signature, presenting a potential hazard to high performance aircraft. Therefore, UAV operations should be coordinated with all appropriate airspace control agencies to provide safe separation of UAVs and manned aircraft and prevent

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
engagement by friendly forces. UAV airspace control considerations are shown in the figure below.

Present reconnaissance assets available to the commander are generally large, costly, and usually manned, or are satellite systems. The unmanned aerial vehicle provides an additional capability to the commander to conduct day or night reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), rapid battle damage assessment (BDA), and battlefield management (within line-of-sight of the ground control station) in high-threat or heavily defended areas where the loss of high-value, manned systems is likely and near real time information is required. Employment of UAVs in Vietnam and Operation DESERT STORM proved the capability of the UAV in a combat environment. UAVs require relatively few maintenance, control, and operating personnel or transportation assets for deployment (versus manned fixed-wing, helicopter, or radio units). Satellite systems are national assets and may not be available, or it may take too long to get the information from these assets to the supported commander. UAVs provide commanders with an enhanced capability to collect, disseminate, and exploit combat intelligence information in near real time.

UAVs are significant force enhancers. When first introduced, the UAVs were referred to as remotely piloted vehicles. With the development of Department of Defense-approved class categories, the name has been changed to UAV.

Future improvements promise mission area growth. The UAV also provides fire support agencies an ability to target and adjust supporting arms at significantly greater distances and at reduced risk when compared to current forward observer, forward air controller, and forward air controller (airborne) procedures. The UAV provides near real time target information and weapon designation capabilities, which can reduce the risk to manned aircraft performing air-to-surface weapon spotting and delivery. UAV assets can be task-organized, and UAV class categories can be selected to achieve maximum flexibility and mission success. Present mission assignments center on the UAV’s ability to perform RSTA and BDA.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
AIRSPACE CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

- UAVs are launched from UAV launch and recovery sites, which may be either airfields, unimproved tactical field locations, or flight decks afloat. They then climb to a transit altitude (normally above the coordinating altitude), fly to the UAV mission area, then return via the UAV transit altitude for recovery.

- UAV operations should be addressed in the air control plan and air control order and adhere to the procedures established by the air control authority. As appropriate, UAV missions should be included in the air tasking order and special instructions.

- Because UAV missions can occur as preplanned or immediate, this information must be disseminated through the airspace control system in a timely manner.

Related Terms

airspace control

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52  Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-55.1  JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

USABILITY

The form in which intelligence is provided to the joint force commander (JFC) should be tailored for particular applications or be suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practicable, intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received. Intelligence production and the tailoring of particular materials for operational and tactical commanders must be done in the perspective of the JFC’s need for timely application. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the command mission and the intelligence purpose in mind. The commander should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant intelligence. Common terminology and multimedia methods must be employed in the communication of intelligence so that it is understandable and useful given the capabilities and time constraints of the commander. Provision of useful intelligence requires producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used, and implies the JFC’s responsibility to communicate his operational intent or situation and any particular requirements of content, form, medium, or presentation.
Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations
Intentionally Blank
VALUES

Our military service is based on values — those standards that American military experience has proven to be the bedrock of combat success. These values are common to all the Services and represent the essence of our professionalism.

First and always is integrity. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the armed forces that whatever the issue at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean and do what we say. This allows us to rely with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. This is an enormous advantage for building effective teams.

Competence is at the center of our relationship with the American people and cements the mutual cohesion between leader and follower. Our fellow citizens expect that we are competent in every aspect of warfare; those we lead into battle deserve no less. Each of the Services has organized, trained, and equipped superbly competent forces whose ability to fight with devastating effectiveness in the air, on land, and at sea is the foundation on which successful joint action rests.

For the dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair. In addition, many serve in assignments requiring an additional competency in joint skills; and all members of the armed forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent required for effective operations. Moreover, those who will lead joint forces must develop skill in orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

Since warfare began, physical courage has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. This publication recounts examples of splendid acts of heroism. Even in warfare featuring advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

Moral courage is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties.

We also must have the courage to wield military power in an unimpeachable moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience. This behavior is integral to our status as American fighting men and women. Acting with conscience reinforces the links among the Services and between the Armed Forces of the United States and the American people, and these linkages are basic sources of our strength.

Lastly, teamwork is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States are the team. Deterring aggression and, if need be, winning our wars are the team’s common goals. Americans culturally respond to and respect teamwork as an important value. This provides the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams. Several elements support effective teamwork.

- Trust and Confidence. Trust — defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another — is one of the most important ingredients in building strong
teams. Trust expands the commander’s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes but is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit: by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together. Trust has often been singled out by key members of the most effective US joint forces as a dominant characteristic of their teams.

- Delegation. The delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility is a necessary part of building trust and teamwork. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Military history demonstrates that delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is the essential building block.

- Cooperation. This aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition. Both are central human characteristics, but the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation with each other to compete with the enemy. Higher echelons should never have to mandate cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members.

In conclusion, military analysts have long pointed out that unit cohesion is a most important cause of excellence in combat. At a higher organizational level, cultivation of the values discussed here helps master the challenges inherent in building joint cohesion from individual Service elements and produces a shared loyalty among the members of a joint team.

**Joint Warfare is Team Warfare**

“When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win. So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time. Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is the best in the world. Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea. Every Marine must hit the beach believing that there are no better infantrymen in the world. But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win. This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.”

General Colin L. Powell

**Related Terms**

**Source Joint Publications**

| JP 1 | Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States |
WAR

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

WARNING ORDER

1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (DOD) 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.  

During Phase III of crisis action planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally publishes the WARNING ORDER, a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The WARNING ORDER establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The WARNING ORDER usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the WARNING ORDER, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. Finally, the WARNING ORDER directs the supported commander to develop courses of action (COAs). If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES automated data processing and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the WARNING ORDER will be used to describe that COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. The WARNING ORDER establishes a deadline for US Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM’s) preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile and for the supported commander’s response — the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. Time permitting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE for analytical purposes.  

In extremely time-sensitive situations, the WARNING ORDER may be issued orally or even omitted. When the WARNING ORDER is omitted, a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER may be issued. When issued in lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the PLANNING or ALERT ORDERS will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information.
WEAPONEERING

Related Terms
alert order; execute order; planning order

Source Joint Publications
JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

WEAPONEERING

The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. JP 1-02

During the weaponeering/allocation phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets. The joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), the prioritized listing of potential targets, constructed during the target development phase, provides the basis for weaponeering assessment activities. All approved targets are weaponeered on target worksheets, which detail recommended aim points, recommended number/type aircraft and weapons, fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats, and probability of destruction. The final prioritized targets are then included into the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP). The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. The MAAP is a key element of the concept of joint air operations. The development of the MAAP includes the review of joint force commander and joint force air component commander guidance; component direct air support plans and support requests from components; updates to target requests; availability of capabilities/forces; target selection from the JIPTL; and aircraft allocation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
WEAPON ENGAGEMENT ZONE

In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system. Also called WEZ.  a. fighter engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. Also called FEZ.  b. high-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called HIMEZ.  c. low-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called LOMEZ.  d. short-range air defense engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with short-range air defense weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone. Also called SHORADEZ.  e. joint engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ.

In air defense, a weapons engagement zone (WEZ) is airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon system. These include fighter engagement zone, high-altitude missile engagement zone, low-altitude missile engagement zone, short-range air defense engagement zone, and joint engagement zone.

WEZ defines air defense areas by weapon system. From an airspace control perspective, WEZ provides airspace users with location of the air defense engagement for mission planning purposes. Design of the WEZ is dependent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for designation of a WEZ is the area air defense commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.

As weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces increases not only in war but also in operations other than war. An enemy’s use of such weapons can quickly change the nature of a campaign, perhaps even affecting the combatant commander’s strategic objectives. The use or the threat of use of these weapons...
can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and courses of action. Thus, planning for the possibility of both friendly and enemy use is important to campaign design.

It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.

The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. Joint force commanders (JFCs) implement defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems.

Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other coalition members, especially those with no or little defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the coalition.

Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent’s capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these weapons. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), JFCs plan for the employment of theater nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command’s capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

If directed to plan for the use of theater nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives. The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using psychological operations (PSYOP) or other means. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and special operations forces.

If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of WMD.

Force protection is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, operations security, dispersion of forces, use of protective clothing, inoculation, and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects. Enhancement of force protection by using all available measures reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with NBC weapons.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0  Doctrine for Joint Operations
Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) is the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support for command and control of US military forces. It supports joint operation planning and implementation. WWMCCS furnishes the multipath channel of secure communications that transmits tactical warning and assessment intelligence to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and direction from the NCA to the combatant commanders. WWMCCS consists of the National Military Command System, the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems of the combatant commanders, the WWMCCS-related management and information systems of the Military Departments, the C4 systems of the Service component commands, and the C4 support systems of Department of Defense agencies. The automated data processing system supports four basic functional areas: resource and unit monitoring, conventional planning and execution, nuclear planning and execution, and tactical warning and attack assessment intelligence.

WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) provides planners with the means to review, update, and transfer data rapidly between WWMCCS locations. It permits real time secure communications. WIN enables commanders and staffs to work critical compartmented plans and operation orders by innate characteristics of user identification and other system safeguards. Within WIN, the telecommunications network permits access to computer resources at separate WWMCCS locations and use of those resources. The WIN file transfer service supports the exchange of large volumes of data such as time-phased force and deployment data files between members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The WIN teleconference enables interconnected members of the JPEC to confer and exchange textual information simultaneously.

**Related Terms**

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

**Source Joint Publications**

JP 5-0  Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations