Military Information Support Operations

07 January 2010
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20 December 2011
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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of military information support operations in support of joint, multinational, and interagency activities across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
VADM, USN
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13.2
DATED 7 JANUARY 2010

• Replaced the term psychological operations throughout the publication with military information support operations as appropriate, which more accurately reflects and conveys the nature of planned peacetime or combat operations activities, per Secretary of Defense memo dated 3 December 2010.

• Conducted terminology review to bring definitions into compliance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5705.01, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, Enclosure C, Definition Writing Guide.

• Updated abbreviations and acronyms.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of Military Information Support Operations
• Addresses Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
• Discusses Military Information Support Operations Command and Control
• Explains Military Information Support Operations Planning
• Presents the Joint Military Information Support Operations Process
• Discusses Military Information Support Operations Employment
• Highlights Military Information Support Operations Enablers

Overview

The informational, cultural, social, moral, political, and physical aspects of the operational environment are as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation on adversary military capabilities has been in the past.

Today’s global information environment is complex, rapidly changing, and requires integrated and synchronized application of the instruments of national power to ensure responsiveness to national goals and objectives. In the current operational environment, effective influence is gained by unity of effort in what we say and do, and how well we understand the conditions, target audiences (TAs), and operational environment. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.

The Department of Defense communications strategy and the separate and unique capabilities of military information support operations (MISO), public affairs (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy address a

Military information support operations (MISO) play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns
## Executive Summary

**variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational parameters and policy.**

commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses.

### Legal Framework and Authorities

The employment of MIS units is governed by explicit legal authorities that direct and determine how their capability is utilized. This legal foundation establishes MISO as a communications means and allows their integration with those strategies that apply the instruments of national power. Leaders and planners interpret relevant laws and policies to conduct MISO in any situation or environment, internationally and domestically.

### Levels of War

Joint MISO support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical levels. Although military leadership and local key communicators are examples of TA engaged at the operational and tactical levels that are capable of affecting the accomplishment of a strategic objective.

### The Purpose of MISO

MISO are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve. In conflict, MISO as a force multiplier can degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the local populace’s support for operations.

### Key Considerations for Effective MISO

Key considerations for effective MISO include: early planning and sustained employment; integration of MISO with the communication strategies of the USG and multinational partners; the use of indigenous assets; command emphasis and resourcing; a responsive MISO approval process; and a quantifiable and timely assessment criteria.

### Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

#### Guidance for Combatant Commanders

The *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) provide direction and guidance to combatant commanders (CCDRs) concerning joint operation planning and their respective responsibilities.

#### Roles and Responsibilities

The *Secretary of Defense* (SecDef) provides strategic MISO advice to USG departments and agencies and...
multinational partners and approves all MISO programs submitted as part of a CCDR’s operation plan (OPLAN).

The **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy** approves all MISO programs not submitted as part of a CCDR’s OPLAN.

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities** develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy for MISO activities and reviews, evaluates, coordinates, and oversees MISO plans, programs, and resources to ensure adherence to approved policy and planning guidance.

**General Counsel, DOD,** conducts legal reviews of all proposed MISO plans and programs for consistency with US public law, regulations, and internationally recognized legal standards as applicable.

**CCDRs (to include Commander, United States Special Operations Command [CDRUSSOCOM], when designated the supported commander for MISO)** plan, support, and conduct MISO in support of theater military missions and US national and regional objectives and integrate MISO into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs to ensure appropriate collaboration and deconfliction of information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and civil-military operations.

**CDRUSSOCOM** is the designated joint proponent for MISO, which includes leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the MISO capability across DOD. CDRUSSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed in the JSCP: prepares and provides assigned MIS forces to the other CCDRs and USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef; coordinates and synchronizes transregional MISO when directed by SecDef or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); and coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing sustainment of MIS forces assigned to the other CCDRs for conduct of MISO.

The **Joint Staff** supports transregional MISO programs and activities as well as the programs and plans of geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) with integration and
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coordination of applicable strategic IO capabilities assigned to the Joint Staff under the UCP.

**Military Departments and Services** provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute MISO actions and develop such dedicated MIS forces and equipment as directed by SecDef and CJCS.

**Relationships**

DOD information activities include IO, MISO, PA (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

**MISO and Strategic Communication**

Strategic communication (SC) integrates various instruments of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. MISO are a key capability that supports SC by influencing foreign audiences in support of US objectives.

**MISO and Information Operations**

MISO play a central role in the achievement of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) information objectives through their ability to induce or reinforce adversary attitudes and behavior favorable to these objectives. In order to ensure all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell chief is chosen. This cell chief convenes meetings of the IO cell periodically in order to facilitate the integration of information-related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the MISO representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of MISO with other IO capabilities.

**MISO and Computer Network Operations**

Computer network operations support MIS forces with dissemination assets (including interactive Internet activities) and the capabilities to deny or degrade an adversary’s ability to access, report, process, or disseminate information.

**MISO and Military Deception**

MISO create and reinforce actions that are executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations. Military deception operations that integrate MIS unit’s targeting input provide the JFC with the ability to influence the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions), giving the joint force an advantage.

**MISO and Operations Security**

It is essential that MISO plans and messages are protected prior to execution through the proper use of information
security, information assurance, physical security, and operations security.

**MISO and Electronic Warfare**

Electronic warfare (EW) platforms provide a means of disseminating MISO messages and shaping the information environment through the electronic dissemination of MISO products. EW validates the assessment of MISO effectiveness by providing information on threat responses to broadcasts.

**MISO and Public Affairs**

PA and MISO activities are separate and distinct, but they must support and reinforce each other, which requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally deconfliction. JFCs must ensure that appropriate coordination between MISO and PA activities are consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation, and security.

**Command and Control**

In accordance with SecDef and *Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables*, CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) over all assigned Active Component MIS forces. Designated Reserve Component MIS forces and other MIS functions tasked to the Services remain under the control of the parent Service during training and mobilization. When directed by SecDef, the losing commander transfers MIS forces to the supported geographic or functional combatant commander. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining and losing commanders over those forces must be specified. In most cases, the gaining unit commander will have operational control (OPCON). Commanders centralize operational MISO planning at the combatant command due to its importance to the commander’s strategic concept. When a CCDR establishes a subordinate joint force they include MISO staff positions on the JFC’s staff. The requested MIS force size and planned disposition may exceed the command and control capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases, the CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a joint military information support task force (JMISTF) or military information support task force (MISTF) as a component of the joint force. MIS forces may be organized as large as a JMISTF or as small as a MIS team that provides a planning capability. The JFC may delegate OPCON of all MIS forces.
forces to the JMISTF commander or may exercise OPCON of specified MIS forces through the commander of the units or components to which they are assigned.

**The Joint Military Information Support Task Force**

The JMISTF is responsible for providing MISO support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. The JMISTF is also responsible for deconflicting all MISO that occur under the joint task force and other commands as designated by the establishing authority.

**Organizing Military Information Support Forces**

If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a JMISTF or MISTF. **Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.** Considerations for MISO may dictate that control be at high national levels.

**Planning**

**Joint Operation Planning and Phasing**

*Guidance for Employment of the Force* and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near term—usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). These plans define how a GCC will conduct all DOD activities within their area of responsibility. Joint planning integrates US military actions with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to achieve specified end states. CCDRs translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of security cooperation strategies and implementation plans, and operation and campaign plans. MISO have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster popular support.

**Phasing**

Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.

**Planning Considerations**

To plan for the effective employment of MISO, JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. They must ensure planning is
consistent with IO, PA, and DSPD planning as well as overall USG objectives. In addition, they must ensure all MISO are closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure that consistent themes and messages are communicated to TAs.

**Requesting Forces**

CCDRs clearly articulate MIS requirements in terms of the required capabilities. CCDRs submit requests for MIS forces to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is responsible for validating MIS force requests and will assign the appropriate joint force provider, depending on the activity, type of forces necessary, and availability.

**Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence**

Actions that can be applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives and can be supported by joint MISO include foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control.

**Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies**

In military operations involving the use or threat of force, MISO offer SecDef options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments.

**Major Operations and Campaigns**

CCDR activities executed during the shape phase assist in determining the character of future operations. MISO can be employed to gather information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of multinational forces.

**Interagency and Multinational Coordination**

Coordination of DOD MISO with other USG departments and agencies facilitates the communication of the objectives of each organization and synchronization of effort. The joint interagency coordination group at the combatant command headquarters is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. The Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of International Information Programs engages audiences on issues of foreign policy, society, and values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. In addition to DOS, MISO should be coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of
Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard. When MISO are planned during multinational operations, planners must coordinate with multinational partners to ensure the attainment of US and multinational security objectives.

Support of Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. When MISO occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. MISO are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for MISO.

Joint Military Information Support Operations Process

US MISO are developed and executed through a multiphase approach.

The joint MISO process is a standard framework by which MISO assets and critical enablers plan, execute, and evaluate MISO with proficiency and consistency throughout major campaigns, operations, and peacetime engagements. The joint MISO process consists of seven phases: planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, dissemination; and evaluation. Each of these phases is designed to apply to any type or level of operation. Collectively, the phases address important considerations and include the necessary activities for the proper integration of MISO with the CCDR’s military strategy and mission.

Planning: Phase I

CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting MISO. A MISO program provides the required SecDef guidance for execution. MISO objectives, usually determined by the highest-level MIS authority involved in the operation (e.g., CCDR) provide the framework for developing the MISO plan. The goal of MISO planning is to integrate MISO into the commander’s vision and concept of operations. Staff planners adjust the MISO plan as necessary to support the commander’s objectives.

Target Audience Analysis: Phase II

During this phase of the joint MISO process, foreign groups or individuals are examined carefully and closely for their ability to be influenced. This provides insights on
how best to persuade the TA to change its behavior to one that is more favorable to US interests.

The information learned as a result of TAA is used in the development of products and actions. MIS personnel design a series of products and actions, determine the appropriate mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the intended audience, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, and the resources available to execute them.

The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases are vital for designing the prototypes of MISO products. Evaluating the TA’s understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a MISO product is a key task. Pretesting products also helps establish a foundation for conducting post testing of entire series after dissemination occurs.

A judicious and efficient approval process for MISO series and the management of the series development and approval process are fundamental in providing supporting MISO to emerging, ongoing, and future operations.

MIS units from group to detachment level may deploy with organic production assets or utilize reachback to fixed assets at higher levels. Once production is complete, products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency in accordance with a predetermined timeline. The most appropriate dissemination means are determined through TAA, and intelligence about the operational area. Radio and television broadcasts, the Internet, aerial leaflet drops, and loudspeaker transmissions are some of the means used throughout the world to disseminate MISO messages. Messages also are communicated through planned face-to-face contact with the local populace.

Assessing the effects of MISO product series on TAs relies on MISO impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. MISO assessment criteria are focused on the achievement of supporting MISO objectives by TAs. The results of the evaluation are thus two-fold as they yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting MISO objectives and contribute data that are
relevant for the commander’s overall measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

**Employment**

**Support to Unified Action**
MISO are integrated in joint and multinational military operations as well as actions conducted by other designated governmental agencies. To be effective, MISO must be fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning and decision-making activities. MISO are a key capability in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to maximize the commander’s efforts to shape the operational environment, insert combat forces, neutralize the threat, and secure the region. When authorized, MIS forces may be used domestically under a designated lead federal agency’s or other US civil authority’s public information efforts during domestic emergencies.

**MISO and the Range of Military Operations**
Employing MISO in conjunction with other activities to further national security goals in specific locations may prevent escalation of hostilities, shorten the duration of hostilities, or hasten a return to normalcy.

**Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence**
As an information activity in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, MISO are employed to shape environments and influence relevant audiences to discourage armed conflict. MISO can reduce the need for a lethal response to adversary actions.

**Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations**
During crisis response and limited contingency operations, MISO are executed to mitigate the effects of the crisis and stabilize the operational environment.

**Major Operations and Campaigns**
MISO are planned and integrated throughout all phases of operations or campaigns. During major operations, MISO are integrated with both conventional and special operations (SO) activities.

**MISO and Special Operations Activities**
SO are relevant across the range of military operations and the eleven core activities, including MISO should be integral parts of a theater strategy, OPLAN, or campaign plan. SO usually are most effective when integrated with operations conducted by conventional forces.

**Direct Attack Support**
MISO can be integrated in all direct attack activities, employing within the physical and political risks,
operational techniques, and use of force to achieve specific objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Capabilities</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Reconnaissance Support</strong></td>
<td>MISO can be integrated in the four <em>special reconnaissance</em> (SR) activities by providing an additive capability to special operations forces conducting SR actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unconventional Warfare Support</strong></td>
<td>When conducted independently, the primary focus of <em>unconventional warfare</em> is on political-military and psychological objectives. MIS forces are employed to advise, assist, and train indigenous or surrogate forces in developing and implementing an effective MISO capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance Support</strong></td>
<td>MISO are employed to prepare key audiences for US <em>foreign internal defense and security force assistance</em> operations, and to directly assist the host nation in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security through democratic systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterterrorism Support</strong></td>
<td>MISO are a critical capability in conducting <em>counterterrorism</em> through the application of the direct and indirect approaches in support of DOD’s global operations against terrorist networks. When authorized, MIS forces support national security or disaster relief within US territory to reduce civilian casualties and suffering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</strong></td>
<td>USG strategy to <em>combat weapons of mass destruction</em> (WMD) consists of three pillars: nonproliferation, <em>counterproliferation</em> (CP), and consequence management. MISO can facilitate USG CP informational activities directed at state and non-state actors to prevent and dissuade the production, acquisition, and delivery of WMD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Affairs Operations Support</strong></td>
<td>MISO can be integrated with <em>civil affairs operations</em> activities to increase support for the HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Operations Support</strong></td>
<td>MIS forces can be employed in conjunction with other IO capabilities and provide a critical means of communicating with foreign audiences to inform, direct, and influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interagency Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Military operations are synchronized with operations of other USG departments and agencies as well as with foreign forces, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and regional organizations for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to blend and engage all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
instruments of national power. Interagency and MISO coordination occur at all levels of warfare to ensure synchronization of activities intended to influence TAs.

**Multinational Operations**

MIS units should be integrated into all multinational operations to ensure that MISO are coordinated. MISO must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of an operation. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command structure, peacetime MISO policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. However, US MISO normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.

**Civil Authority Information Support Within the United States and Its Territories**

MIS forces can provide a civil authority information support element within the US and its territories. When authorized for employment in this manner, MIS forces utilize their media development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver public and other critical disaster information to populations in the impacted area. Their role is to assist in dissemination of messages developed by civil authorities.

**Enablers**

**Intelligence Operations**

Ongoing intelligence support is critical to all phases of the MISO process. During phase I (Planning) of the MISO process, planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA in phase II. Phase II (Target Audience Analysis) includes thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and psychological or social conditions that make up the operational environment, and impact the behavior of the audiences within that environment. Intelligence plays a critical role in phase VII (Evaluation) by confirming or denying MISO MOEs. **Development of MISO-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan** with specific collection requirements to exploit all available sources and techniques.

**Threat Identification**

Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of a MISO program is
deemed a threat. The early identification of threats and opportunities increases the potential for successful fulfillment of MISO program goals and objectives.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance**

MISO rely on theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations to provide intelligence products based on a whole of government approach that occurs within the intelligence community. ISR assets also are critical in collecting data to confirm or deny MISO MOEs.

**Communications**

Communications between commands that are planning and executing MISO are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint MISO communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate.

**Logistics**

The execution of the joint MISO process in sustained operations requires critical logistic support. MIS units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, commercial item restock, and dissemination contracting support. Early identification of host nation support is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for MISO.

**Capabilities**

**Service Inherent Capability**

Each Service has the inherent capability to support achievement of US national objectives by using organic assets for production and dissemination of MISO products.

**Studies Programs**

CDRUSSOCOM, as the supporting CCDR, manages the MISO Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and monitors production. Products of the MISO studies program primarily are designed to support the operational requirements of the combatant commands and of US MIS forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., DOS). MISO studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain this type of intelligence information. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess
attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people.

United States Army Assets

Army Service MISO assets provide a vital instrument of engagement across all military phases in support of the full range of military operations and interagency coordination in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during domestic emergencies as well.

United States Army Special Operations Command is the Army component command of United States Special Operations Command. Its mission is to command (if directed), support, and ensure the combat readiness of assigned and attached Army MIS forces for worldwide use.

Army Active Component Military Information Support Group organizes, equips, and collectively trains assigned and attached forces to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world and conduct MISO and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDR and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef.

Reserve Component Military Information Support Groups organize, train, and equip assigned and attached forces to deploy anywhere in the world and conduct MISO and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef.

United States Navy Assets

The US Navy employs a wide range of dissemination assets, product reproduction capabilities, and planning resources that can support joint and Service MISO missions. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint MISO experts to identify maritime audiences, develop themes and products, and plan dissemination. The Navy has ultrahigh frequency, very high frequency, and high frequency broadcast capabilities to deliver MISO messages to afloat and ashore target audiences. Boarding parties can disseminate products to crews of civilian vessels to achieve MISO objectives. Several Navy aircraft support MISO.

United States Air Force Assets

United States Air Force (USAF) MISO is focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the cognitive dimension of the operational environment. USAF MIS forces support JFC objectives
through a variety of operations and activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. Many USAF platforms are used to execute missions in support of JFC MISO objectives. Air Mobility Command IO and MISO planners uniquely postured to observe and support MISO in addition to supporting the operational-level MISO efforts of a single geographic combatant command.

**United States Marine Corps Assets**

The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct MISO at the tactical level via MIS teams using loudspeaker broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication. The Marine Corps expeditionary MIS capability is found within the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the conduct of MISO programs that complement IO with the JMISTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence community, IGOs, NGOs, and others as necessary.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of MISO in support of joint, multinational, and interagency activities across the range of military operations.
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CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

“In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.”

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945

1. General

   a. Today’s global information environment is complex, rapidly changing, and requires integrated and synchronized application of the instruments of national power to ensure responsiveness to national goals and objectives. Key terrain has undergone a fundamental shift from exclusively geographic to now include relevant populations. This has created an increased need for a broad set of capabilities and policy to engage local, regional, and global audiences. The informational, cultural, social, moral, political, and physical aspects of the operational environment are as critical to operational success as the traditional orientation on adversary military capabilities has been in the past. In the current operational environment, effective influence is gained by unity of effort in what we say and do, and how well we understand the conditions, target audiences (TAs), and operational environment.

   b. Within the military and informational instruments of national power, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a key component of a broader United States Government (USG) communications strategy. DOD communications strategy and the separate and unique capabilities of military information support operations (MISO), public affairs (PA) (to include visual information), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) address a variety of communication roles and specific audiences as permitted by operational parameters and policy. DOD informational activities can be used to inform, direct, or persuade. To be effective, all DOD communications efforts must inherently support the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of USG activities.

   See Chapter II, “Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships,” for additional clarification of DOD information activities.

   c. MISO play an important role in DOD communications efforts through the planned use of directed programs specifically designed to support USG and DOD activities and policies. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Military information support (MIS) professionals follow a deliberate process that aligns commander’s objectives with an analysis of the environment; select relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally, and environmentally attuned messages and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means; and produce observable, measurable behavioral responses. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with MISO. Actions of the joint force, such as strikes or shows of force, have psychological impact but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the perceptions
and subsequent behavior of a TA. Regardless of the mission set, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities.

d. MISO contribute to the success of both peacetime engagements and major operations. The combatant commander (CCDR) receives functional and theater strategic planning guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents are derived from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) National Defense Strategy, which interprets the President’s national security policy and strategy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategy.

(1) In peacetime, MISO are planned and integrated to further national defense strategies through the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP). CCDRs incorporate MISO programs and integrate them into the broad range of activities required for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence (i.e., Phase 0). For example, in steady-state geographic combatant command TCPs, MIS units can deploy to support approved counterinsurgency (COIN), demining, or foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs under either a joint force commander (JFC) or US diplomatic control.

(2) MISO reinforce US policies that center on preventing hostilities and advocating peaceful resolutions when possible. MISO are key in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression and to maximize the JFC’s efforts to shape the operational environment. MIS units communicate well-orchestrated and planned information to international audiences to clarify intent, prevent escalation of tension, ease concerns, and mitigate the potential effects and capabilities of adversary information activities.

(3) When diplomatic and other measures fail to deter conflict and lethal capabilities are employed, MISO can assist the JFC by setting conditions for the insertion of combat forces; neutralizing threats; facilitating efforts to contain conflict; stabilizing the operational area; and enhancing efforts to achieve conditions that allow a return to steady-state operations. MISO can inform, direct, educate, and influence targets to increase US combat power and decrease enemy hostile aggression. Proper integration of MISO may reduce operational risk and collateral damage, as well as military and civilian casualties.

(4) MIS forces can also be used to provide civil authority information support (CAIS). CAIS are DOD information activities conducted under a designated lead federal agency or other US civil authority to support dissemination of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies.

2. Legal Framework and Authorities

a. Introduction

(1) The employment of MIS units is governed by explicit legal authorities that direct and determine how their capability is utilized. This legal foundation establishes MISO as a communications means and allows their integration with those strategies that apply the
instruments of national power. Leaders and planners interpret relevant laws and policies to conduct MISO in any situation or environment, internationally and domestically. The outcome is the incorporation of MISO as an integral component of US measures designed to achieve national objectives.

(2) MIS units are employed during military operations as well as operations led by civilian agencies. They can be a vital asset to government departments and agencies in many situations when DOD is not the lead. The legal framework for MISO allows this DOD capability to be integrated with national-level strategies and support other USG departments and agencies.

b. Law

(1) The legal authorities for MISO are established in a number of documents and are in place to enable the proper integration of MISO. The legal framework for MISO applies to:

(a) Establishing the capability.

(b) Authorizing execution.

(c) Approving messages and actions.

(d) Establishing authorities for use of MIS forces in civil support operations (domestic operations) and for use of MISO in sovereign territory, air, seas, and airways.

(2) Although the following list is not all-inclusive, consideration should be given to the following specific legal issues when conducting MISO:

(a) The requirement that US MISO will not target US citizens at any time, in any location globally, or under any circumstances.

(b) Geneva and Hague Conventions. These international conventions preclude the injury of an enemy through “treachery” or “perfidy.” It is also a violation of Geneva Convention III to publish photographic images of enemy prisoners of war.

(c) International agreements with host countries may limit the activities of MIS units (e.g., status-of-forces agreements).

(d) Domestic laws including copyright law and broadcasting law.

c. Policy

(1) Policymakers develop realistic and relevant policies that are within the capabilities of MISO to support. Executive- and agency-level policies reflect the laws and provide the necessary guidance to place MISO into action to achieve objectives. DOD policy, for instance, addresses the intent of the organization, guides decision making, and prompts action to integrate MISO into military operations and other USG strategies.
(2) Military leaders and planners consistently refer to and interpret both broad and specific policies on issues that affect our national security. They study US positions formulated to address a number of issues, such as terrorism, trafficking of illegal drugs, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An in-depth understanding of MISO, and how they are best integrated with other US capabilities, is a prerequisite to determining how MISO contribute to US communication objectives in dealing with these and other global issues.

(3) MISO can assist USG mitigation efforts of issues that arise from unintended consequences.

d. Strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the CCDRs refer to national strategies as they establish guidance that provides the necessary strategic direction for employment of MISO. CCDRs’ analyses of the national strategies’ objectives are a critical step in determining MISO requirements. Understanding other government department and agency approaches in executing national strategies is another important step for decision makers for determining how MISO are to be employed, i.e., MISO contributions to strategic communication (SC) efforts.

3. Levels of War

a. Joint MISO support policy and commanders’ objectives from strategic to tactical levels. The impact of these operations at one level may have significant implications at other levels. Although military leadership and local key communicators are examples of TAs engaged at the operational and tactical levels that are capable of affecting the accomplishment of a strategic objective.

b. MIS forces normally plan and execute operations in support of operational and/or tactical-level headquarters with a defined joint operations area. However, MIS forces may support USG departments and agencies, GCCs, or multinational partners. This is often the case when supporting a broad USG approach designed to achieve strategic objectives. MISO that support strategic objectives are often transregional in character and normally involve detailed coordination with one or more GCCs and interagency partners.

c. Commonly, MISO conducted at the operational level support regional policies and military plans.

d. Typically, tactical MISO are conducted in support of local military or civil authorities. Most commonly, they are designed to create immediate, localized effects, which together, support broader operational objectives.

“To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.”

Flavius Vegetius Renatus
The Military Institutions of the Romans, c. 378 AD
4. Purpose

a. Every activity of the force has potential psychological implications that may be leveraged to influence foreign targets. MISO contribute to the success of wartime strategies and are well-matched for implementation in stable and pre-conflict environments. MISO are applied across the range of military operations and, as a communication capability, constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. MISO are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve. In conflict, MISO as a force multiplier can degrade the enemy’s relative combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the local populace’s support for operations.

b. MISO are integrated with US ambassador and GCC’s theater-wide priorities and objectives to shape the security environment to promote bilateral cooperation, ease tension, and deter aggression. MISO convey the intent of the GCC by supporting public diplomacy efforts, whether to foster relations with other nations or to ensure their collaboration to address shared security concerns.

5. Missions

a. The purpose of joint MIS forces is further clarified by the application of their activities across the range of military operations.

b. Missions performed by joint MIS forces include:

(1) **MISO in Support of Combat Operations.** MISO are planned to influence the perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of adversary, friendly, and neutral audiences and key population groups in support of US combat operations and objectives. Operations supported by joint MIS forces support include the following:

   (a) Offense.

   (b) Defense.

   (c) Stability operations.

(2) **Military Information Support to DOD Information Capabilities in Peacetime.** This support can shape and influence foreign attitudes and behavior in support of US regional objectives, policies, interests, theater military plans, or contingencies. Operations or activities supported by MIS forces may include, but are not limited to:

   (a) FHA/disaster relief.

   (b) Noncombatant evacuation operations.

   (c) Maritime interception operations.
(d) Support to USG country team or host nation (HN) civil programs (e.g., counterdrug, demining, human immunodeficiency virus awareness, security institution building, ethnic tolerance, and reconciliation).

(3) **Defense Support to Civil Authorities.** MIS forces provide support to public information efforts when authorized by SecDef or the President in accordance with Title 10, United States Code (USC). This support is provided during natural disaster relief following domestic incidents. Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05D, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006*, MIS forces do not provide their full capability. MIS forces deliberately exclude their development capability and support dissemination of messages developed by civil authorities. The National Response Framework establishes command relationships and responsibilities of DOD forces in support of domestic operations. Command of federal military and civilian personnel and resources is retained by SecDef when supporting civil authorities.

(4) **Support to Special Operations (SO)** (discussed in Chapter VI, “Employment”).

6. **Key Considerations for Effective Military Information Support Operations**

a. **Early Planning and Sustained Employment**

(1) Military information support should be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effectiveness. This enables the JFC to shape the cognitive dimension of the information environment and set terms of initial and subsequent engagement. Early planning of MISO and employment of MIS forces will maximize the potential to influence foreign audiences within the area of interest.

(2) MISO require sustained application as part of a broader USG communication strategy. Effective MISO are proactive and set conditions for obtaining subsequent phase objectives. MISO are a critical component in all phases and in some phases may be the JFC’s main effort.

b. **Integration of MISO.** MISO must be planned, coordinated, and integrated with the communication strategies of the USG and multinational partners at all levels from strategic to tactical. The synchronization of MISO with all other actions of the US and multinational forces precludes messages or actions at one level from contradicting or weakening the effectiveness at another.

c. **Use of Indigenous Assets.** Planners consider the use of indigenous resources, production assets, key communicators, and dissemination platforms to increase TA receptivity to messages, reduce military footprint, and facilitate credibility of the HN government, allies, and other agencies. While organic MIS assets are essential to the execution of joint force operations, their use may be limited by footprint restrictions or desired to be limited to specific phases of an operation when indigenous assets are disrupted or inappropriate.
d. **Command Emphasis and Resourcing.** Active involvement by the commander will emphasize the importance of MISO. MISO-relevant concerns may be included in commander’s critical information requirements as priority intelligence requirements. Allocation decisions and logistics support of concept of operations (CONOPS) will also reflect the emphasis a commander places on MISO.

e. **Responsive MISO Approval Process.** Once delegated, the MISO approval process belongs to the commander. MISO approval authority should be delegated to the lowest practical level authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A time-sensitive process is crucial to providing responsive MISO.

f. **Assessment**

   (1) Quantifiable and timely assessment criteria to determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are required for every MISO program. The assessment criteria should be established early within each planning phase, evaluated often, and adjusted as necessary throughout the campaign to ensure the joint task force (JTF) objectives are met.

   (2) To create measurable effects in the human environment, commanders need to ensure that the information requirements for MISO and other information support activities are reflected in the collection plan; allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and the codified output of selected staff elements and processes within the joint force battle rhythm.
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CHAPTER II
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

“The psychological warfare has always rested as an uneasy activity in democracies, even in wartime. It is partly to do with the suspicion that using the mind to influence the mind is somehow unacceptable. But is it more unacceptable to shoot someone’s brains out rather than to persuade that brain to drop down their weapon and live?”

Dr. Phillip M. Taylor
Munitions of the Mind, Manchester University Press, 1995

1. General

The UCP and JSCP provide direction and guidance to CCDRs concerning joint operation planning and their respective responsibilities. The roles, responsibilities, and relationships contained in this chapter reflect general guidance derived from a combination of this strategic guidance as well as directives, instructions, joint and Service doctrine, and current practices within the MISO community.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. Secretary of Defense

(1) Participates in the establishment of national security policy and objectives.

(2) Recommends to the President the mobilization of Reserve Component (RC) assets, as necessary.

(3) Provides strategic MISO advice to USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.

(4) Approves all MISO programs submitted as part of a CCDR’s operation plan (OPLAN).

(5) Through an execute order, delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for operational- and tactical-level products during contingency and wartime operations.

b. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])

(1) Approves and oversees all MISO policy and programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]).

(2) Delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for peacetime programs.
(3) Retains approval authority for strategic-level and politically sensitive products during contingency and wartime operations.

(4) Approves all MISO programs not submitted as part of a CCDR’s OPLAN.

For a full description of MISO program and product approval authorities, see CJCSI 3110.05, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))

(1) Ensures appropriate intelligence support and coordination are provided for MISO plans, programs, and activities.

(2) Oversees the integration and support of MISO into information operations (IO) plans, programs, and activities, and capabilities, as appropriate.

(3) Ensures that MISO are supported by other IO capabilities, as appropriate.

d. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

(1) Acts as principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) on MISO matters.

(2) Provides guidance on the planning and conduct of MISO activities and their integration into USG activities during peacetime, and more specific guidance for the planning and conduct of these activities across the range of military operations.

(3) Develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy for MISO activities.

(4) Reviews, evaluates, coordinates, and oversees MISO plans, programs, and resources to ensure adherence to approved policy and planning guidance.

(5) Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates the various policies, processes, and programs of the DOD components that impact on the capability to plan, resource, prepare forces, and execute MISO; initiates and coordinates actions or taskings that enhance the readiness, capabilities, and effective use of MIS forces.

(6) Provides policy guidance and recommendations to consider and incorporate MISO in contingency planning.

(7) Makes recommendations to the USD(P) for all matters concerning the CCDRs’ MISO plans, programs, activities, and requests for deployment of MISO personnel and equipment.
(8) Ascertains where shortfalls in intelligence support to MISO exist and recommends activities to the USD(I) that support the capabilities and plans of DOD components to conduct MISO programs and activities.

(9) Represents the USD(P) and SecDef in interagency deliberations and international negotiations dealing with MISO, as required.

(10) Establishes standing departmental and interagency working groups, as appropriate, to facilitate the conduct of effective MISO activities.

e. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs** reviews MISO plans and programs, and provides recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) on the development of specific MISO programs affecting the GCCs.

f. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs** provides PA guidance for MISO plans and programs.

g. **General Counsel, DOD**, conducts legal reviews of all proposed MISO plans and programs for consistency with US public law, regulations, and internationally recognized legal standards as applicable.

h. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

   (1) Advises the President, SecDef, and National Security Council on all MISO matters.

   (2) Represents SecDef on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization MISO Working Group and in other multinational military forums.

   (3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational MISO plans and US participation in multinational MISO training programs.

   (4) Provides MISO representation to the interagency organizations and their working groups.

   (5) Provides the general policy and establishes production priorities for the MISO Studies Program.

   (6) Provides the guidance for MISO conducted by the CCDRs.

   (7) Prepares strategic plans and issues policy for the use of MISO across the range of military operations.

   (8) Reviews the MISO plans and programs of the CCDRs to ensure they are adequate, feasible, and consistent with USG and DOD policy.

   (9) Provides MISO plans and programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and approval.
(10) Reviews the CCDRs’ peacetime MISO plans and programs.

(11) Establishes, in conjunction with the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) joint doctrine for MISO.

(12) Provides a joint, prioritized statement of military requirements for MISO capabilities to meet the needs of SecDef, the Service Chiefs, CCDRs, and the CJCS.

(13) Provides an integrated statement of joint MISO training requirements and ensures that these requirements are appropriately addressed.

(14) Apportions MIS forces to the combatant commands through the JSCP.

(15) Prepares integrated logistic and mobilization guidance for MISO capabilities.

(16) Provides a unified, prioritized list of MISO intelligence and counterintelligence requirements to meet the needs of the CCDRs, Joint Staff, and Services.

(17) Ensures integration of MISO into the CJCS Exercise Program and Joint Experimentation Program.

(18) Incorporates MISO instruction into joint professional military education programs.

(19) Ensures integration of MISO into military planning.

i. **CCDRs (to include CDRUSSOCOM when designated the supported commander for MISO)** have the following responsibilities:

   (1) Ensure that staffs and organizations within their commands have sufficient representation and working proficiency in the planning and conduct of joint MISO.

   (2) Request liaison officers from other USG departments and agencies when appropriate.

   (3) Working in coordination with the Joint Staff and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), develop plans and programs to support MISO requirements identified by supported CCDRs.

   (4) Develop and submit to the CJCS additional MISO requirements necessary to support CCDR plans and programs.

   (5) When directed by SecDef, accept the attachment of MIS forces and employ those forces as directed.

   (6) Designate specific staff responsibility for maintaining MISO planning capability, coordinating MISO actions, and ensuring that regional plans, activities, and operations support national objectives.
(7) Develop intelligence and counterintelligence requirements necessary to perform MISO analysis, planning, and execution.

(8) Plan, support, and conduct MISO in support of theater military missions and US national and regional objectives.

(9) Coordinate military information support with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions within the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR).

(10) Prepare plans and, upon approval, conduct MISO to support the execution of operations.

(11) Foster cooperative MISO policies among multinational military forces and regional security organizations.

(12) Ensure advance contingency planning for use of non-DOD informational and related capabilities in MISO.

(13) Establish a reporting system to provide relevant information about adversary propaganda, measured impact of MISO, and any anticipated changes to ongoing activities.

(14) Integrate MISO into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs to ensure appropriate collaboration and deconfliction of IO, PA, and civil-military operations (CMO).

(15) Recommend regional-specific MIS forces training requirements to USSOCOM.

j. **Commander, US Special Operations Command,** is the designated joint proponent for MISO, which includes leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the MISO capability across DOD. CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned MIS forces. CDRUSSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed in the JSCP:

(1) Prepares program and budget to fund approved MISO programs for assigned forces. In fulfilling this responsibility, CDRUSSOCOM coordinates with the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and the other CCDRs to ensure that all MISO and support requirements are addressed.

(2) Provides trained and ready MIS forces to support SecDef and the other CCDRs with MISO support.

(3) Performs as joint proponent for development of MISO in joint doctrine; training and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission-essential task lists; and identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience.

(4) Prepares and provides assigned MIS forces to the other CCDRs and USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef.
(5) Supports the IO responsibilities of the geographic and functional combatant commanders, as well as their MISO planning, coordinating, synchronization, and execution efforts.

(6) Develops joint MISO programs of instruction, and when directed, trains DOD and foreign military personnel in MISO techniques and procedures.

(7) Recommends MISO policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required.

(8) Develops and validates priorities for MISO training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the CJCS to support Service, combatant command, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to MISO.

(9) Provides visibility of MISO issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.

(10) Coordinates with the Joint Staff and combatant commands to integrate MISO activities into joint training and experimentation plans and programs.

(11) Develops concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service MISO doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and Service MISO training supports national objectives.

(12) Observes and evaluates MIS forces in exercises to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for MIS forces.

(13) Manages the MISO Studies Program and coordinates MISO input to the Defense Intelligence Production schedule.

(14) Coordinates and synchronizes transregional MISO when directed by SecDef or CJCS.

(15) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing sustainment of MIS forces assigned to the other CCDRs for conduct of MISO.

k. The Joint Staff supports transregional MISO programs and activities as well as the programs and plans of GCCs with integration and coordination of applicable strategic IO capabilities assigned to the Joint Staff under the UCP.

l. Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), supports the deployment of forces, distribution, and dissemination requirements for MISO through USTRANSCOM joint mobility assets.

m. Military Departments and Services

(1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate MISO training and planning skills.
(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute MISO actions and develop such dedicated MIS forces and equipment as directed by SecDef and CJCS.

(3) Develop Service MISO doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to the particular Service.

(4) When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of MIS forces (not assigned to CDRUSSOCOM or under the operational control [OPCON] of a GCC) to support the regional MISO plans, programs, and activities of the combatant commands and other USG departments and agencies.

(5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets that are trained, equipped, and organized to support planning and conduct MISO.

(6) Incorporate MISO instruction into Service training and education programs.

(7) US Army Reserve Command provides RC MIS forces for the Department of the Army to the combatant commands or other USG departments and agencies when directed by SecDef.

(8) **US Army Directorate of Military Information Support Operations and Civil Affairs.** The principal staff directorate that advises the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), on all matters pertaining to MISO. It coordinates with all Army major command staff elements and other special operations forces (SOF) as required to ensure MISO is properly organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to meet USASOC Commander’s Title 10, USC, responsibilities and USSOCOM’s UCP responsibilities. It provides subject matter expertise for coordination with external MISO-related organizations and agency initiatives. It maintains situational awareness on all MISO staff actions and requirements within the command.

For further detail concerning Service MISO capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Capabilities.”

n. **Director, Defense Intelligence Agency**

(1) Establishes and implements a plan to satisfy MISO relevant intelligence requirements.

(2) Assists in the preparation of intelligence and counterintelligence estimates and appraisals of foreign groups designated by USD(P), CJCS, Service Chiefs, CDRUSSOCOM, and other CCDRs.

(3) Provides training for intelligence analysts to ensure a capability to respond to intelligence production requirements in support of MISO programs.

(4) Recommends employment of MIS forces in support of US policy.
(5) Provides indications of potential vulnerability to adversary information or foreign intelligence service activities.

  o. **Director, Defense Information Systems Agency**, provides computer systems support for the transmission of MISO products from the continental United States (CONUS) production facilities to overseas MIS forces.

  p. **Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service**, provides intelligence information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements.

  q. **Joint Force Commanders Serving in Multinational Commands**

    (1) Implement multinational MISO plans to the extent consistent with international law, including the law of armed conflict, and treaty/international agreement obligations in relations with the governments of countries where US forces are assigned.

    (2) Request guidance from SecDef on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

    (3) Coordinate joint MISO planning with appropriate multinational commanders and national forces of HNs.

  r. **Other United States Government Agencies**

    (1) During peacetime, the Department of State (DOS) provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. In peacetime operations or in conflict, the DOS may restrict MISO messages and themes used within specific countries or areas.

    (2) Other government departments and agencies impacted by MISO, including peacetime MISO activities, may provide recommendations to joint planners to ensure consistency of effort.

3. **Relationships**

  a. **General.** There are a variety of functions and capabilities that help a JFC formulate the command’s message and communicate with local, international, and US domestic audiences as part of broader policy and in support of operational objectives. DOD information activities include IO, MISO, PA (to include visual information), and DSPD. See Figure II-1 for additional details concerning DOD information activities.

    (1) PA and MISO are separate and unique activities that are governed by policy and practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. SC integrates various instruments of national power with other activities across the USG to synchronize crucial themes, messages, images, and actions. SC is policy driven and generally conducted under DOS lead. DOD SC activities are designed to support the continuity of DOD strategic- and operational-level messages and activities with overall USG policy and SC themes.
### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PRIMARY TASK</th>
<th>FOCUS OF ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>DESIRED OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Government (USG) Strategic Communication (Department of State Lead)</td>
<td>Coordinate information, themes, plans, programs, and actions that are synchronized with other elements of national power</td>
<td>Understand and engage key audiences</td>
<td>Better enable the USG to engage foreign audiences holistically and with unity of effort</td>
<td>Create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense (DOD) support to Strategic Communication</td>
<td>Use DOD operational and informational activities and strategic communication processes in support of Department of State's broader public diplomacy efforts</td>
<td>Key audiences</td>
<td>Improve the alignment of DOD actions and information with policy objectives</td>
<td>The conduct of military activities and operations in a shaped environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Integrate information operations core, supporting, and related capabilities as part of a military plan</td>
<td>Adversary audiences</td>
<td>Influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.</td>
<td>Optimum application of capability to desired military outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
<td>Influence target audience perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behavior</td>
<td>Approved foreign audiences</td>
<td>Shape, deter, motivate, persuade to act</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes, and behavior conducive to US/multinational partner objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Provide truthful, timely, accurate information about DOD activities (inform)</td>
<td>US, allied, national, international, and internal audiences</td>
<td>Keep the public informed, counter adversary information activities, deter adversary actions, and maintain trust and confidence of US population, and friends and allies</td>
<td>Maintain credibility and legitimacy of US/multinational partner military operations with audience</td>
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</table>

*Figure II-1. Department of Defense Information Activities*
(2) Although each of these activities is distinct, commanders must ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communications strategy. This must be accomplished without blurring traditional lines of separation between PA and MISO and their respective audiences. To this end, it is critical that all DOD military information activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility, veracity, and legitimacy of DOD and USG activities. In very narrow circumstances, MISO may support military deception (MILDEC) operations designed to preserve operational surprise and the safety of friendly forces, but this is done only after the commander and staff carefully weigh the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential short- and long-term loss of credibility with the media or local audiences.

b. Military Information Support Operations and Strategic Communication

(1) SC consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

(2) MISO are a key capability that supports SC by influencing foreign audiences in support of US objectives. Given its focus on foreign TAs, MISO personnel should possess a good understanding of the language and culture of the TA and ensure this knowledge is effectively used in the preparation of MISO products and related activities.

c. Military Information Support Operations and Information Operations

(1) General. MISO play a central role in the achievement of the JFC’s information objectives through their ability to induce or reinforce adversary attitudes and behavior favorable to these objectives. MISO can be particularly useful during pre- and post-combat operations, when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. Because of its wide ranging impact, it is essential MISO be fully coordinated and synchronized with relevant activities and operations. This is normally facilitated through the combatant command IO cell.

(2) IO is the integrated employment during military operations of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. MISO must be coordinated with other information-related capabilities, such as computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), and MILDEC, to ensure deconfliction control measures are in place, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose to achieve the objectives established in planning.

(3) In order to ensure all aspects of IO are properly integrated and synchronized into the combatant command planning process, an IO cell chief is chosen (in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual [CJCSM] 1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force). This cell chief convenes meetings of the IO cell periodically in order to facilitate the integration of information-related capabilities. Within the IO cell, the MISO
representative integrates, coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes the use of MISO with other IO capabilities. Specific examples of this kind of interaction between MISO and the other information-related capabilities follow:

(a) **Military Information Support Operations and Computer Network Operations.** CNO support MIS forces with dissemination assets (including interactive Internet activities) and the capabilities to deny or degrade an adversary’s ability to access, report, process, or disseminate information. These capabilities support MIS by providing access to digital media within the information environment to reach intended targets and denying TA information that does not support objectives.

(b) **Military Information Support Operations and Military Deception.** MIS forces provide the JFC the ability to reduce the allocation of forces and resources required to deceive the adversary and facilitate mission accomplishment. MISO create and reinforce actions that are executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers about US military capabilities, intentions, and operations. MILDEC operations that integrate MIS unit’s targeting input provide the JFC with the ability to influence the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions), giving the joint force an advantage. MISO support to MILDEC operations must be carefully considered by the commander and staff, weighing the likely benefits of a deception operation against a potential short- and long-term loss of credibility with the media and local and regional audiences.

(c) **Military Information Support Operations and Operations Security.** It is essential that MISO plans and messages are protected prior to execution through the proper use of information security, information assurance, physical security, and OPSEC. Additionally, it is essential during the effort to influence foreign audiences that MISO not reveal critical information or indicators of friendly operations to the adversary.

(d) **Military Information Support Operations and Electronic Warfare.** EW platforms provide a means of disseminating MISO messages and shaping the information environment through the electronic dissemination of MISO products. The joint restricted frequency list deconflicts these two capabilities. When appropriate, EW platforms can also provide a means of denying enemy forces the ability to disseminate adversarial information. These platforms can also degrade the adversary’s ability to see, report, and process information by jamming selected frequencies. EW validates the assessment of MISO effectiveness by providing information on threat responses to broadcasts.

*For further guidance concerning IO, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations.*

d. **Military Information Support Operations and Public Affairs**

(1) MISO are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of foreign TAs in a manner favorable to US objectives.

(2) Military PA forces plan, coordinate, and synchronize public information, command information, and community engagement activities and resources to support the commander’s operational objectives. Through timely dissemination of factual information to
international and domestic audiences, PA puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed perceptions about military operations among information consumers, and undermines adversarial information efforts. PA operations and activities shall not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion.

(a) PA and MISO activities are separate and distinct, but they must support and reinforce each other, which requires coordination, synchronization, and occasionally deconfliction. These planning activities are generally accomplished in the IO working group, the IO cell, or other planning groups. In the event that formal planning groups are not established, informal coordination should be accomplished between these two capabilities as well as with other related capabilities. JFCs must ensure that appropriate coordination between MISO and PA activities are consistent with the DOD Principles of Information, policy or statutory limitation, and security.

(b) PA is normally the source for official information for the media. Information disseminated by the joint force regardless of source or method of distribution will reach unintended audiences. Efforts of one capability must not undermine those of another. While PA will have no role in executing MISO, PA can use MISO products to educate the media about MISO missions, as appropriate.
1. General

   a. In accordance with SecDef and *Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables*, CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM over all assigned Active Component (AC) MIS forces. Designated RC MIS forces and other MIS functions tasked to the Services remain under the control of the parent Service during training and mobilization. When directed by SecDef, the losing commander transfers MIS forces to the supported geographic or functional combatant commander. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining and losing commanders over those forces must be specified. In most cases, the gaining unit commander will have OPCON. MISO planning should consider the requirements to delegate directive authority for common support for MIS forces.

   b. Commanders centralize operational MISO planning at the combatant command due to its importance to the commander’s strategic concept. When a CCDR establishes a subordinate joint force they include MISO staff positions on the JFC’s staff. The inclusion of MIS positions on the JFC’s staff ensures nesting of supporting MISO plans with the CCDR’s plan. MIS forces required to execute MISO are requested through SecDef in the same manner that other external forces are requested.

   c. During planning, the CCDRs identify the capabilities required to execute their assigned missions. CCDRs establish subordinate joint forces and designate the required subordinate components. The requested MIS force size and planned disposition may exceed the command and control (C2) capabilities of the joint force components. In these cases, the CCDR may identify the requirement to establish a joint military information support task force (JMISTF) or military information support task force (MISTF) as a component of the joint force. The CCDR may decide to establish the JMISTF or MISTF as a component of an existing joint force component such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or SO task force. MIS forces may be organized as large as a JMISTF or as small as a military information support team that provides a planning capability. Establishing a JMISTF gives the JFC flexibility in arranging the C2 structure of the attached or assigned MIS forces. The JFC may delegate OPCON of all MIS forces to the JMISTF commander or may exercise OPCON of specified MIS forces through the commander of the units or components to which they are assigned.

      (1) The JMISTF is responsible for providing MISO support to joint or multinational operations at the tactical and operational levels. During planning, the JMISTF coordinates with applicable Service, functional components, and staff elements to determine MISO requirements. During execution the JMISTF continues this coordination. The
JMISTF commander may request direct liaison authority to coordinate and synchronize operations with other USG departments or agencies, or multinational officials.

(2) The JMISTF is also responsible for deconflicting all MISO that occur under the JTF and other commands as designated by the establishing authority. Deconfliction is accomplished through the MISO approval process, establishment of direct coordination lines, liaison, and the synchronization conducted by IO staffs. In the absence of a MIS component, the requirement to deconflict MISO is executed in the same manner as all operations are, in the operations staff sections.

(3) Mission requirements will dictate the JMISTF organizational structure and the functions it will perform. It also may be organized as a combined joint military information support task force (CJMISTF) if multinational partners provide psychological operations staff personnel and forces to support operations.

(a) A CJMISTF supports multinational military operations, as well as operations involving intergovernmental and regional organizations.

(b) If US MIS forces are under the OPCON of a US commander, SecDef typically will delegate MISO product and dissemination approval authorities to the supported GCC in the execute order. The GCC may subdelegate MISO product approval authority to a US military officer who is serving as the commander of a multinational operation. If US MIS forces are under the OPCON of a non-US commander for the purposes of developing multinational products only, MISO product approval authority will remain with the GCC, be subdelegated to the senior US military officer or diplomatic official involved in the operation, or be subdelegated to the non-US commander, with SecDef approval.

(c) An order (e.g., execute order, operation order, or fragmentary order) will often provide additional guidance for MISO product approval and dissemination/release procedures. The scope and limits of MISO activities and products will be provided. As an example, the MISO scope (e.g., operational, tactical), means (e.g., satellite, Internet, or leaflets), TA (e.g., adversary leaders, foreign populace), or message content (e.g., humor, specific symbols, detainees’ photos) may be restricted to various levels of command. In all cases, the risk of unintended effects is weighed with ensuring there is a timely approval process/authority for commanders.

d. MISO planners will identify TAs and MISO objectives, themes, activities, and products that support the JFC’s plan. Subordinate commanders will identify requirements for MIS forces to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, MISO staff support may be provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to enhance planning and coordinating capability.

2. Organizing Military Information Support Forces

a. If the JFC determines that MISO planning and execution requires control by a component command with that mission as its sole purpose, then the JFC requests establishment of a JMISTF or MISTF. These may serve as a component or staff element of the JFC or as a subcomponent or staff element under an existing component such as a
JSOTF. **Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.** Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination. Considerations for MISO may dictate that control be at high national levels.

(1) An Army military information support battalion has C2 and product development capability. Production and dissemination capabilities are supported by specialized Army MISO battalions equipped with production and broadcast capabilities, other service assets, third country military assets, or through commercial contract.

(2) Retention of OPCON of the JMISTF by the JFC and integration of its functions optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval process.

(3) Dissemination assets may be attached in CONUS to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements, or deployed with the JMISTF and remain in support of the entire joint force. When attached to a maneuver unit, tactical military information support companies, detachments, or teams are normally placed under the control of the maneuver unit commander.

(4) Factors that will affect the size and composition of the MIS force include, but are not limited to:

(a) Capability required.

(b) Scope and duration of the operation.

(c) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN sensitivities and their impact on other combatant command and supporting component objectives.

*For more information on joint force organizational options, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, or JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

b. If MISO planning and execution requirements can be accomplished by augmenting the JFC’s staff with a tailored MIS element, the joint force MISO officer will ensure continuity of MIS objectives and work through the various staff sections to ensure awareness of MISO capabilities, staff support requirements, and the operational integration of planned MISO activities.

c. When deployed in support of joint force operations, EC-130J COMMANDO SOLO as a rule remains under the OPCON of the commander, JSOTF. Navy MIS dissemination assets include the capability to broadcast on ultrahigh frequency (UHF), very high frequency (VHF), and high frequency (HF); leaflet/handbill reproduction capability; and psychological operations distribution unit (PDU)-5 leaflet canisters with the aircraft to deliver them. Navy assets normally remain under the OPCON of the Navy component commander. The Air Force MIS assets, leaflet canisters MK19 or PDU-5 with the aircraft to deliver them, typically remain under the OPCON of the Air Force component commander. Coordinating authority is granted between the component commanders and the JMISTF commander to facilitate MISO dissemination. United States Air Force (USAF) MIS personnel assigned to an Air Force air and space operations center information operations team (IOT) plan
IV. Psychological Operations

activities intended to produce psychological effects and coordinate those efforts with the JMISTF. For further detail, refer to Appendix A, “Capabilities.”

d. The entire US MISO capability is available for employment by the supported GCC. MIS units apportioned for theater planning purposes are identified in Annex D to the JSCP.

e. Operations may require use of RC MIS forces. Early identification of MISO requirements through the Global Force Management Board is necessary to facilitate RC activation, processing, and training. Required RC MIS forces must be included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), along with AC MIS forces; otherwise, data essential for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will not be available and deployment of forces required for the operations may be delayed.

f. The high demand for MIS forces to support worldwide operations make reachback a critical component for MISO success. Reachback assets must be considered during planning to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility to support future operations. Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability of MISO to support multiple geographic areas with limited assets. The AC MIS media operations center (MOC) located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is capable of providing multimedia reachback support to deployed MIS forces.

For further details concerning JOPES, refer to CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, and CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats.
CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.”

Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense
26 November 2007

1. Joint Operation Planning and Phasing

a. General

(1) GEF and the JSCP set priorities for activities undertaken in the near term—usually the period covered by budget execution (present through two years). The GEF is used mainly by the CCDRs and those who support them to guide the development of campaign and OPLANs. The JSCP specifically tasks CCDRs to develop OPLANs consistent with the GEF. These plans define how GCCs will conduct all DOD activities within their AOR.

(2) Joint planning integrates US military actions with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to achieve specified end states. This chapter focuses on security cooperation and joint operation planning. Joint operation planning includes contingency and crisis action planning and can result in campaign plans, OPLANs, or operation orders depending on the scope and complexity of the situation. Joint operation planning and planning for a campaign are not separate planning types or processes; rather, campaign planning represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. CCDRs translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of security cooperation strategies and implementation plans, and operation and campaign plans. MISO have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster popular support.

For additional guidance on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. Phasing. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Integration of MISO into the joint operation planning process assists in synchronizing planned MISO activities with other joint operations and the activities of the other instruments of national power to create the effects required to achieve objectives and attain the end state.

For additional information on phasing, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
(1) **Shape Phase.** Joint, multinational, and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter adversaries from placing US interests at risk and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. CCDRs are able to take shaping actions before committing forces to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Joint MISO can be key contributors to shaping the international security environment and are routinely employed to shape the operational environment during peacetime. Joint MISO may provide an effective means to deter adversary actions, build international partnerships, and prevent or contain local disruptions. MISO shall be based on the GEF and must be thoroughly integrated and consistent with the GCC’s security cooperation strategy and any other direction provided by the President or SecDef. Peacetime MISO programs are coordinated and integrated with each component and the country team in each country involved. When MIS forces are deployed under a GCC peacetime MISO program, approval authority for products and actions is typically delegated to the chief of mission, who then further delegates the authority to a member of the staff.

(2) **Deter Phase.** The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. The objective is to convince adversaries that planned or potential actions that threaten US vital interests will result in outcomes that are decisively undesirable and cause alternative courses of action (COAs) more favorable to US objectives. During shape and deter phases the GCC expands partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises. **Flexible deterrent options supported by MISO may be initiated in this phase as part of pre-hostility activities.**

(a) MISO can be executed aggressively in support of all the instruments of national power.

(b) MISO are crafted to address unique circumstances with appropriate objectives supported by series (all products and related actions that pertain to a particular audience in support of a single objective).

(3) **Initiative Phase.** During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Increase support for the HN government.

(b) Decrease combat effectiveness of enemy forces.

(c) Create and exploit opportunities.

(d) Provide the capability to communicate US and multinational intent.

(e) Develop the situation by seizing the initiative in the environment, thus forcing the adversary to react without sufficient time to plan.
(f) Influence TAs in the operational area.

(g) Influencing TAs in support of unified actions that establish conditions conducive to political solutions by changing behaviors that will defuse or reduce factional tensions, recognize and preempt inherent dangers, and disrupt illegal activities.

(h) Retain the initiative which requires planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of the long-term mission. Initiative requires delegating decision-making authority to the lowest practical level.

(4) **Dominate Phase.** During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Change behaviors of selected TAs that will generate support for US and multinational operations.

(b) Illustrate the legitimacy and credibility of US and multinational systems and programs.

(c) Lessen external support for an adversary—political, military, economical, and human.

(d) Reduce interference with US and multinational operations.

(e) Reduce casualties and collateral damage and hasten a transition to post-conflict operations.

(5) **Stabilize Phase.** During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Change the perceptions and behavior of selected foreign TAs toward favoring US and multinational objectives.

(b) Support the peacetime elements of US policy.

(c) Support the GCC’s security cooperation strategy.

(d) Support the US country team.

(6) **Enable Civil Authority Phase.** During this phase, MISO objectives may include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Support multinational, other government department and agency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) participants.

(b) Change the behavior of a specific TA that can support the accomplishment of US and local civil authority’s objectives.
Planning for MISO [military information support operations] began immediately after the [Iraqi] invasion of Kuwait [Operation DESERT SHIELD]. A PSYOP [psychological operations] planning group consisting of military and civilian personnel from USCENTCOM [US Central Command], USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command], and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) was formed at USCENTCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, in early August of 1990. This group became the nucleus of the PSYOP command and control element that deployed to Saudi Arabia.

Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations were combined and this combination was key to the success of PSYOP. Leaflets were the most commonly used method of conveying PSYOP messages. Twenty-nine million leaflets consisting of 33 different messages were disseminated in the Kuwait theater of operations. Delivery means consisted of MC-130, HC-130, A-6, F-16, B-52, and artillery.

A building block approach for leaflet operations was used, with the first leaflet themes being ones of peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity of the PSYOP message as events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations (UN) imposed 15 January deadline. After the UN deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began, themes emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion were used. Exploiting the effects of specific munitions leaflets were also used to inform Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. Feedback from interviews with enemy prisoners of war validated the success of leaflet operations.

“Voice of the Gulf” was the Coalition’s radio network that broadcast from ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and surrender.

Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theater. Each tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached. Many of the 66 teams came from the Army Reserve Components. Loudspeaker teams accompanied units into Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of prepared surrender messages. Messages were transmitted in Arabic and were developed by cross-cultural teams. These messages were similar to those on the leaflets being dropped. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to surrender, were warned of impending bombing attacks, and told they would be treated humanely and fairly. Many enemy prisoners of war mentioned hearing the loudspeaker broadcasts in their area and surrendered to the Coalition forces because they feared more bombing.

**SOURCE:** Final Report to Congress

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992*
(c) Support the GCC’s security cooperation strategy.

(d) Support the US country team.

2. Planning Considerations

a. General. To plan for the effective employment of MISO, JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. In addition, MISO planners must possess joint operation planning skills, with knowledge of MISO doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure, and a thorough understanding of the customs, morals, and values of the foreign TA. They must be able to integrate with IO and other related information activities. MISO planners must understand SC as a means to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other instruments of national power. They must ensure planning is consistent with IO, PA, and DSPD planning as well as overall USG objectives. In addition, they must ensure all MISO are closely coordinated and synchronized to ensure that consistent themes and messages are communicated to TAs. Lessons learned in planning include:

   (1) Integrated planning occurs at the onset of the planning stage of operations and continues throughout the remaining stages to mitigate the effects of potentially rapidly changing political and diplomatic circumstances.

   (2) Positive information-related effects increase when MIS forces are integrated with conventional forces. MIS forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to prepare conventional forces for the cultural context of their operations. Conventional forces apply that information which reinforces MISO messages and themes. This result is more profound in prolonged stability operations where there is sufficient time to generate observable effects.

   (3) There is a great need to share information between agencies and with multinational partners to ensure that MISO are part of a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets. The appropriate delegation of MISO approval authority to the lowest practical level enables the timely delivery of MISO products.

b. Requesting Forces. CCDRs clearly articulate MIS requirements in terms of the required capabilities. Concise capability requirements enable force providers to provide the right capability at the right time and place.

   (1) CCDRs submit requests for MIS forces to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is responsible for validating MIS force requests and will assign the appropriate joint force provider, depending on the activity, type of forces necessary, and availability. Army AC MIS units will predominantly support SO missions and contingency operations, and Army RC MIS units will predominantly provide support to conventional forces. However, based on the capability requirement or availability of forces, the exact composition of the force may be a mixture of AC and RC MIS forces from across the services.
(2) Requests for personnel to assist in conducting MISO assessments, planning efforts, or support to exercises will be submitted by CCDRs directly to the Joint Staff for transmission to the appropriate joint force provider. These requests follow the same guidance above.

c. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

(1) To be effective, peacetime MISO are conducted in accordance with appropriate DOD issuances, applicable policy documents, and specific, SecDef-approved MISO programs. MISO conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies require interagency coordination and appropriate authorization at the national, regional, and country team levels as outlined in SecDef-approved program(s). Actions that can be applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives and can be supported by joint MISO include foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control.

(2) Security cooperation strategies and implementation plans integrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Based on guidance from SecDef and CJCS, the CCDRs develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. Generally, the CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies will develop or update security cooperation strategies annually. The Services and DOD agencies will coordinate their strategies with the CCDRs to ensure that they support and complement the CCDRs’ strategies and implementation plans.

(a) Peacetime MISO programs shall be submitted to the Joint Staff for each fiscal year concurrent with the security cooperation strategies. As a minimum, they will contain the CONOPS, objectives, the potential TA list, themes to stress/avoid, product and dissemination approval authorities, means of dissemination, funding sources and requirements, and MOEs. Examples of MISO in peacetime engagement activities include supporting and executing military-to-military programs, support to combating terrorism and counterproliferation (CP) activities, humanitarian demining operations, security force assistance (SFA), and supporting security cooperation objectives.

(b) Peacetime MISO programs must be approved by the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) before execution. As appropriate, MISO activities will be coordinated with interagency organizations to ensure coherency with other USG efforts.

For further details concerning security cooperation planning, refer to the GEF, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

d. Crisis Response and Limited Contingencies. MISO can be a decisive capability in crisis response and limited contingency operations when integrated in military operations. When national strategies are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, to support the other instruments of national power, or to terminate the situation on
Planning

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

“Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs [other government agencies] and cooperate with IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] (e.g., UN [United Nations], NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. These activities generally occur continuously in all GCCs’ [geographic combatant commanders’] AORs [areas of responsibility] regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. They usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of interorganizational partners. Because DOS [Department of State] is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs [joint force commanders] should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent interorganizational partners to share information and facilitate future operations.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

favorable terms. MISO support joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations to include strikes and raids, counterterrorism (CT), FID, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation operations, or other flexible deterrent options as directed. In military operations involving the use or threat of force, MISO offer SecDef options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Examples of MISO activities are shown in Figure IV-1.

e. Major Operations and Campaigns. CCDR activities executed during the shape phase assist in determining the character of future operations. The most comprehensive activity is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence operations, to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential adversaries, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. During the deter phase, MISO provides powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options. MISO can be employed to gather information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. MISO during war are shown in Figure IV-2.

f. Interagency and Multinational Coordination

(1) Coordination of DOD MISO with other USG departments and agencies facilitates the communication of the objectives of each organization and synchronization of effort. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) at the combatant command headquarters is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between
**EXAMPLES OF JOINT MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE</th>
<th>CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS</th>
<th>MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities</td>
<td>Mobilize popular support for US and multinational military operations</td>
<td>Explain US policies, aims, and objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the peacetime elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy</td>
<td>Gain and sustain popular belief in and support for US and multinational political systems (including ideology and infrastructure) and political, social, and economic programs</td>
<td>Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for, or against, a military operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the geographic combatant commander’s security strategy objectives</td>
<td>Attack the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political systems</td>
<td>Influence the development of adversary strategy and tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the objectives of the country team</td>
<td>Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary</td>
<td>Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host nation armed forces and the civilian populace</td>
<td>Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to the friendly powers</td>
<td>Undermine confidence in the adversary leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US, its allies, or the conduct of friendly military operations</td>
<td>Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transition to post-hostilities</td>
<td>Increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support military deception and operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counter hostile information activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-1. Examples of Joint Military Information Support Operations Across the Range of Military Operations**
Convey to the target audience an awareness of US resolve to attain national security objectives

Consider and plan for the early conduct of military information support operations (MISO) and, if required, use of host-nation resources and non-MISO military assets for media production and dissemination; e.g., use of Navy ship printing facilities for production of MISO products

Plan the movement of MISO-specific equipment

Integrate MISO measures into counter command and control plans

Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in developing coordinated MISO programs

Use host-nation and US country teams to gain local support

Deter and discourage would-be aggressors from threatening vital US interests

Include the use of the Military Information Support Operations Automated System

Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when MIS forces and capabilities are provided to multinational commands

Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of MISO products

Coordinate plans with staff elements or agencies involved with public information or information operations

Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and during mission execution

Establish a MISO reporting system to provide relevant information about:

1. Adversary MISO activity
2. The apparent impact of friendly MISO activities
3. Any anticipated changes to ongoing activities

Consider preparation of MISO to counter the effects of adversary propaganda before, during, and after US military combat operations

Synchronize actions and MISO messages

Figure IV-2. Specific Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations
civilian and military operational planners. The JIACG will assist the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying forward to the JTF location or by providing a reachback point of contact at the combatant command location. MISO planners at the JTF level should coordinate with other government departments and agencies through the JIACG or designated centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams. The JIACG does not veto or approve plans but provides inputs and assists with coordination of those plans.

(2) Department of State. DOS’s Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) engages audiences on issues of foreign policy, society, and values to help create an environment receptive to US national interests. IIP contributes to USG SC efforts by interacting with foreign opinion makers and others through a wide range of print and electronic outreach materials published in various languages. IIP also provides information outreach support to US embassies and consulates in more than 140 countries worldwide. The office’s products and services are uniquely designed to support DOS’s initiatives, as well as those of other US foreign policy organizations. It also manages information resource centers overseas and offers reference specialists based in Washington, DC, to answer specialized information queries from abroad.

(3) In addition to DOS, MISO should be coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; International Broadcasting Bureau; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard.

(4) When MISO are planned during multinational operations, planners must coordinate with multinational partners to ensure the attainment of US and multinational security objectives.

For more on interagency and multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, “Employment.” Allied Joint Publication-3.10.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. (The DOD change in terminology from psychological operations to MISO does not affect non-US use of related psychological operations terminology, doctrine, or organizations.)
(3) **Counterinformation.** Competing parties can deny opponents the information they require to formulate decisions. The DOD Information Security Program establishes procedures to protect classified information, and the OPSEC program establishes measures to deny unclassified but sensitive indicators of friendly activities, capabilities, and intentions.

(4) **Intelligence Shaping.** It is possible to convey or deny data to opposing intelligence systems with the objective of causing opposing analysts to derive desired judgments. These judgments interact with the perceptions of opposing planners and decision makers to influence estimates upon which capabilities, intentions, and actions are based.

b. The following guidance is provided for the development of tab D (Military Information Support Operations) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) of plans and orders. Additional information on tab A is provided in Appendix B, “Considerations for Tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations).”

(1) **Research and Analysis.** Research is conducted and requisite information and relevant data are collected and analyzed to plan MISO. The intelligence, information, and data are further assessed to determine competing and complementary US objectives and strategies and the supportability of COAs to achieve these objectives from a MISO standpoint. The planner determines key questions about friendly, neutral, and adversary intentions, capabilities, and activities. The answers to these key questions are termed critical information and are used to develop requirements for intelligence collection and analysis.

(2) **Development.** The perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular targets must be evaluated. Both the sources upon which particular targets rely and the US ability to influence those sources must be determined. Target information interests and activities need to be identified. Information and indicators that should be conveyed and denied to targets to reinforce desired appreciations and preserve essential secrecy must be ascertained. Execution means and methods to convey or deny information and indicators have to be selected. A plan supporting all phases of a CCDR’s campaign should address TAs and include theater and national-level objectives. Planners should identify the assets necessary to execute the plan and list them in OPLAN TPFDDs; otherwise, it may become difficult to obtain these assets in time to execute the plan. Planners should also develop a tracking mechanism to monitor the dissemination of MISO products.

c. **Production Requirements.** The forces, assets, and capabilities needed to produce MISO products must be analyzed and determined during the request for forces (RFF) or request for deployment order (RDO) process. These factors must be compared to the forces assigned or available for planning. Tasks for available MISO resources, including specific requirements, also must be provided on the RFF or RDO for approval to the Joint Staff. Requirements for MISO resources in excess of those available to the combatant command will be forwarded to the Joint Staff.
4. Support of Irregular Warfare

a. General. Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

(1) Some of the operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW are insurgency; COIN; unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; MISO; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries. (Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or other government departments and agencies from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the US and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW.) IW provides a logical, long-term framework for analyzing the irregular threat and is both a form of armed conflict and warfare.

(2) IW is complex and focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory. Ultimately, IW is a political struggle for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The factions involved in the conflict seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters. At the same time, they also seek to strengthen their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population.

(3) When MISO occur in IW, their role usually is much greater than during major operations and campaigns. They impact directly on the operational focus of IW in ways unlike that of combat operations.

b. Approaches. Conducting IW focuses on two approaches—direct and indirect. A JFC will often conduct both approaches simultaneously to defeat our adversaries and those of our partners.

(1) Direct Approach. The direct approach addresses the requirement to pursue adversaries and their infrastructure and resources. Some adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents fighting for a religious or tribal cause, may be so committed that they simply cannot be persuaded or coerced into laying down their arms; these individuals must be either killed or captured.

(2) Indirect Approach. MISO are key supporting operations to each contextual application of indirect approaches to executing IW.

(a) Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying
military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.

(b) Disturb, disrupt, and displace adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.

(c) Empower, enable, and leverage interagency and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them nonmilitarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.

(d) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups to influence adversaries, rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.

(e) Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.

(f) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of MISO, public diplomacy, and PA activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.

c. Military Information Support Operations and IW. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create a fertile field for MISO. Examples of MISO applications to selected activities within IW are:

(1) FID. MISO are used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. MISO also may be used to modify the behavior of selected TAs toward US and multinational capabilities. The main objectives of MISO during FID are to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing support for insurgents.

(2) CT. MISO are an essential part of the capabilities required for CT, in particular in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations (VEOs) operate. CT focuses on populations, and in some operational areas, the information presented can determine which side will gain the favor of public opinion. Terrorist groups have gained sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation partly based on their propaganda focusing on miscues of the friendly forces. In CT operations, TA identification and the use of MISO to influence the TAs’ behavior are important. Within an operational area there may be several TAs and multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The intent of MISO in CT operations is to shape and influence the terrorist network’s informational environment.
(3) **Stability Operations.** Successful execution of stability operations tasks depends on informing the local populace and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. MISO exerts significant influence on foreign TAs.

(4) **COIN Operations.** MISO can influence foreign populations through information to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly joint operations. In addition, MIS units may conduct information activities such as recruit for security forces, legitimize HN governments, and establish and maintain popular support for the HN programs and activities. MISO can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order. MISO can serve as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC’s intent.

(5) **UW.** UW involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional partisanship. These human factors, associated with armed resistance activity, create a situation that MIS units are uniquely suited to engage. MIS units support all phases of UW; therefore, MISO planning is immediately integrated into the planning process.
CHAPTER V
JOINT MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS

“Successful development of the approach requires continuous analysis, learning, dialogue, and collaboration between commander and staff, as well as other subject matter experts.”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning

1. General

a. US MISO are developed and executed through a multiphase approach. The joint MISO process is a standard framework by which MISO assets and critical enablers plan, execute, and evaluate MISO with proficiency and consistency throughout major campaigns, operations, and peacetime engagements. The integration and execution of MISO hinge upon the proper implementation of this process.

b. The joint MISO process consists of seven phases: planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, dissemination; and evaluation. Each of these phases is designed to apply to any type or level of operation. Collectively, the phases address important considerations and include the necessary activities for the proper integration of MISO with the CCDR’s military strategy and mission.

2. Planning: Phase I

a. CCDRs are required to obtain approval prior to conducting MISO. To gain approval, the CCDR submits a proposed MISO program(s) through the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for interagency coordination and SecDef approval. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006, contains a list of MISO programs approved for use by the CCDRs for SecDef-approved missions, operations, and UCP directed activities. Some of these programs include security institution building and operations such as maritime interdiction, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug, and FHA. However, MISO programs can be proposed to meet whatever unique operational need or situation arises for the CCDRs.

b. Peacetime. MISO programs are integrated with the TCP. The TCP reflects national security and defense strategies and planning guidance. MISO programs are devised to support both the GCC’s objectives in the region and the embassies’ country plans. The Joint Staff forwards proposed MISO programs to the Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) for review, interagency coordination, and USD(P) approval. The appropriate combatant command receives the approved MISO program from the Joint Staff to execute. Peacetime MISO planning facilitates the transition to contingency planning by integrating knowledge and experience of the operational area into the joint planning processes.

c. Contingencies and Major Operations. MISO programs are designed to support all phases of a campaign or OPLAN. During contingencies, CCDRs may submit their program
as part of their overall OPLANs. The Joint Staff forwards all OPLANs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. The Office of the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) reviews and staffs the MISO portions of the OPLANs through the interagency coordination process. SecDef approves the program normally as part of the OPLAN. An execute order is sent to the combatant command containing approval for the program, the MISO execution authority, the approval authority for products and actions, and other related guidance. If there is a need to conduct MISO prior to gaining approval for an OPLAN, the CCDR submits a proposed program in accordance with the procedures used during peacetime.

d. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, UCP, GEF, and the JSCP provide guidance to the geographic combatant commands to devise theater strategies. Theater strategies form the basis for employment planning, drive peacetime planning, and provide a point of departure for force projection operations and general war planning. MISO planners on the GCC staff are responsible for devising specific execution strategies and objectives to meet the mission requirements. A program describes these in conjunction with establishing the appropriate authorities and guidelines that reflect precisely national policy objectives and the CCDR’s intent and objectives. In addition to objectives and themes, national policies for execution include the attribution posture the USG takes in acknowledging origination or responsibility for messages and actions. US involvement can be open, partially (technical assistance only) or not acknowledged at all as determined by the CCDR. The attribution posture allows the commander to attribute actions to US, concurring partner nations, or, in the case of sensitive activities, acknowledged as soon as operationally feasible.

e. A MISO program (see Figure V-1) provides the required SecDef guidance for execution. All actions, products, and messages for psychological effect are required to comply with, complement, and adhere to the stated parameters in the approved program. MISO objectives, usually determined by the highest-level MIS authority involved in the operation (e.g., CCDR) provide the framework for developing the MISO plan.

f. The goal of MISO planning is to integrate MISO into the commander’s vision and CONOPS. MISO programs are initiated as a result of the first phase of the MISO process. These programs are developed by the executing element and continue through subsequent phases. Staff planners adjust the MISO plan as necessary to support the commander’s objectives.

g. MISO programs become part of the TCP or OPLAN. Further MISO planning is based on the commander’s objectives and takes into account the key components of an approved MISO program including MISO objectives, potential TAs, themes to stress and themes to avoid, the appropriate attribution status, the necessary dissemination platforms for MISO messages, and the choices of media authorized. Phase I activities are summarized in Figure V-2.
3. Target Audience Analysis: Phase II

a. An approved MISO program contains a list of potential foreign TAs. During this phase, the JMISTF, or other designated MIS element analyzes these foreign groups and individuals by following a model specifically tailored for MISO. Much of the data required to initiate and complete a thorough analysis of potential TAs are obtained through the supported commander’s collection efforts. These requirements are determined early in the planning phase as intelligence organizations and other enablers provide much of the necessary data and information. The data are derived from a multitude of classified and open sources, such as finished intelligence, unit documentation, and special studies, or through technological means and assessments.

b. During this phase of the joint MISO process, foreign groups or individuals are examined carefully and closely for their ability to be influenced. This provides insights on how best to persuade the TA to change its behavior to one that is more favorable to US interests. The results of TAA provide the foundation for the remaining phases of the process, which in turn allows for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the supporting program(s). Analysis does not stop but continues throughout the entire operation, updating information as information is learned, the environment changes, and new TAs are required or selected.
4. Series Development: Phase III

The information learned as a result of TAA is used in the development of products and actions. MIS personnel design a series of products and actions, determine the appropriate mix of media, and develop an execution plan. Each series focuses on a single objective and TA. Series are reviewed for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the intended audience, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, and the resources available to execute them.

5. Product Development and Design: Phase IV

The work completed during the planning, analysis, and series development phases are vital for designing the prototypes of MISO products. There are three categories of MISO products: visual, audio, and audio-visual used to target selected audiences. Fixed and deployable US MISO capabilities, assets belonging to partner nations, and commercial vendors provide the technical expertise and tools to design and create all types of products. The MISO program lists the types of media including the use of electronic messages that are approved for production and dissemination to support the CCDR’s mission. During phase IV, evaluating the TA’s understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a MISO product is a key task. Pretesting products also helps establish a foundation for conducting post testing of entire series after dissemination occurs.
6. Approval: Phase V

A judicious and efficient approval process for MISO series and the management of the series development and approval process are fundamental in providing supporting MISO to emerging, ongoing, and future operations. During phase V, MISO series undergo a formal internal review by MIS personnel. The commander of the MIS unit producing the series is the first official approving authority in the MISO approval process. The potential of the series to achieve the desired outcome and the continuity of messages and media are judged. Once approved by the MISO commander, the series is formally submitted through an established approval process to obtain final approval for production and dissemination. As the series passes through the approval process, action officers responsible for obtaining approval of the series at each echelon maintain visibility of the series until returned to the originating unit. MISO series are approved at the lowest level of command as dictated by SecDef deployment order. Final approval may reside at the CCDR, JFC, JTF, or by maneuver unit commanders to assist in the timely approval and subsequent execution of MISO series.

7. Production, Distribution, and Dissemination: Phase VI

a. MIS units from group to detachment level may deploy with organic production assets or utilize reachback to fixed assets at higher levels. They also have the ability to request other USG resources or locally controlled resources within theater. Once production is complete, products are transferred to the disseminating unit or agency in accordance with a predetermined timeline. Products are distributed via air or ground transport, or transmitted digitally via secure means or through multiple means. Products are distributed using US military or multinational modes of transportation, HN assets or nationalized enterprises, commercial vendors, NGOs, other government departments and agencies, or a combination of these modes.

b. The most appropriate dissemination means are determined through TAA and intelligence about the operational area. Radio and television (TV) broadcasts, the Internet, aerial leaflet drops, and loudspeaker transmissions are some of the means used throughout the world to disseminate MISO messages. Messages also are communicated through planned face-to-face contact with the local populace.

8. Evaluation: Phase VII

a. Assessing the effects of MISO product series on TAs relies on MISO impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. Initial assessment criteria are established in phase I and are refined in phase II. MISO assessment criteria support the commander’s MOEs, and help determine the effectiveness of an operation. MISO assessment criteria are focused on the achievement of supporting MISO objectives by TAs. MISO planners have an established procedure to evaluate the effectiveness of MISO and continuously assess the effectiveness of MISO on achieving the commander’s objectives.

b. The impact of MISO are evaluated within the context of competing information, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that
influence TA behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events have potential to influence a
group’s behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment. Series
evaluation assists in focusing TAA and provides the basis to adjust or maintain series. The
results of the evaluation are thus two-fold as they:

(1) Yield substantive information about the trends toward achieving the supporting
MISO objectives.

(2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander’s overall MOEs.
CHAPTER VI
EMPLOYMENT

“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”

Sir William Francis Butler, 19th Century

1. Support to Unified Action

a. MISO are integrated in joint and multinational military operations as well as actions conducted by other designated governmental departments and agencies. MISO are employed across the range of military operations in both conventional and SO activities. To be effective, MISO must be fully integrated with the supported organization’s planning and decision-making activities.

b. MISO are a key capability in furthering US endeavors to deter aggression, and to maximize the commander’s efforts to shape the operational environment, insert combat forces, neutralize the threat, and secure the region. When MISO are integrated properly, the risk to friendly forces is minimized and collateral damage and expenditures of assets can be significantly reduced. CCDRs also incorporate MISO into activities to support military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. In these efforts, it is common for MISO to be used as a primary means to inform and influence. When authorized, MIS forces may be used domestically under a designated lead federal agency’s or other US civil authority’s public information efforts during domestic emergencies.


a. General. In response to instability or turmoil that jeopardizes US objectives in a region, the joint force can be engaged in multiple operations simultaneously across the range of military operations and during different phases. In these situations, MISO can be employed continuously in either a supported or supporting role. Employing MISO in conjunction with other activities to further national security goals in specific locations may prevent escalation of hostilities, shorten the duration of hostilities, or hasten a return to normalcy.

b. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. As an information activity in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, MISO are employed to shape environments and influence relevant audiences to discourage armed conflict. The goal should be to establish and maintain a concerted and coordinated information effort with multinational partners, thus increasing the capability to successfully influence and inform relevant populations. Enhancing multinational partner information activities can multiply the effectiveness of the indirect approach. MISO can reduce the need for a lethal response to adversary actions.
c. **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** During these operations, MISO are executed to mitigate the effects of the crisis and stabilize the operational environment. They are characterized by time-sensitive planning and rapid deployment in support of USG or multinational operations.

d. **Major Operations and Campaigns.** MISO are planned and integrated throughout all phases of operations or campaigns. During major operations, MISO are integrated with both conventional and SO activities.

### 3. Military Information Support Operations and Special Operations Activities

a. SO are relevant across the range of military operations and the eleven core activities, including MISO should be integral parts of a theater strategy, OPLAN, or campaign plan. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign.

b. SO usually are most effective when integrated with operations conducted by conventional forces. MISO may support the other SO core tasks (see Figure VI-1) in the following ways:

(1) **Direct Action (DA).** DA are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. MISO can be integrated in all DA activities,
employing within the physical and political risks, operational techniques, and use of force to achieve specific objectives. MISO can increase the collection of relevant information used to shape and determine if, when, or DA activities are required. MISO can increase the success of DA strikes and raids by decreasing civilian interference, target resistance, and the need for on-site consequence management through cultural and linguistic expertise in direct (face-to-face) communication. MIS forces collect video, still imagery, and voice data that can be used to counter adversary misinformation and reduce the need for future DA activities by informing audiences of DA success, capabilities, and legitimacy.

(2) **Special Reconnaissance (SR).** SR are actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or a politically sensitive environment to collect or verify defined or time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. MISO can be integrated in the four SR activities by providing an additive capability to SOF conducting SR actions. MISO can facilitate target acquisition through the collection of information on target locations, activities, and potential actions. MISO assessments can be used as rapidly produced time-sensitive intelligence that assist the development or refinement of SR area assessments and support SR actions. In the event of a compromise, MISO can facilitate recovery of personnel and equipment. Upon completion of target or threat assessment, MISO activities should be considered when determining the most effective means of engagement.

(3) **UW.** UW are activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. UW is unique in that it is a special operation that can either be conducted as part of a GCC overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military and psychological objectives. MIS forces are employed to advise, assist, and train indigenous or surrogate forces in developing and implementing an effective MISO capability. When required, MISO are employed to inform, direct, and influence key TAs. The end state is an irregular force capable of conducting information activities to recruit, legitimize, establish, and maintain popular support for the resistance.

*For further guidance concerning DA, SR, and UW, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.*

(4) **FID.** From the SOF perspective, activities that support FID center on enhancing an HN’s ability to appropriately and effectively integrate legitimate security or military forces with other national-level capabilities to eliminate internal threats and prevent the emergence of new threats. The same is true when conducting SFA in support of foreign security forces. MISO are employed to prepare key audiences for US FID/SFA operations and to directly assist the HN in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security through democratic systems. MISO increase HN support for programs that provide positive populace control and protection from adversary activities. MIS forces advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement effective information activities. The end state is the HN ability to conduct information activities in support of achieving and maintaining internal security.

*For further guidance concerning FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.*
(5) **CT.** CT is action taken directly and indirectly against terrorist networks to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Ideological support serves as the center of gravity for violent extremist movements. Global media and mass communication provide terrorists and extremists with a cost-effective capability to recruit, train, plan, legitimize, and resource lethal and nonlethal operations. MISO are a critical capability in conducting CT through the application of the direct and indirect approaches in support of DOD’s global operations against terrorist networks.

(a) The four MISO missions can be integrated in CT activities and provide the following additive capabilities to enable partners to combat VEOs, deter tacit and active support for VEOs, and erode support for extremist ideologies.

(b) MISO inform, direct, and influence targets at all levels of war to increase USG efforts to effectively defeat violent extremism. MISO provide cultural, linguistic, and social expertise required to analyze the human environment influenced by extremist ideology. As a DOD contribution to USG SC, MISO mitigate the effects of VEO information, thus reducing their credibility and access to resources and safe havens.

(c) When authorized, MIS forces support national security or disaster relief within US territory to reduce civilian casualties and suffering.

*For further guidance concerning CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.*

(6) **CP of WMD.** DOD CP policy focuses on preventing the acquisition of WMD and delivery systems, stopping their proliferation and deterring their use. USG strategy to combat WMD consists of three pillars: nonproliferation, CP, and consequence management. MISO can be employed to support all of these USG efforts. MISO can facilitate USG CP informational activities directed at state and non-state actors to prevent and dissuade the production, acquisition, and delivery of WMD. MISO inform audiences about the consequences of using WMD; facilitate the collection of information about activities to develop, acquire, and use WMD, i.e., rewards program; support USG planning of consequence management both domestically and abroad; and provide civil authorities the capability to inform local audiences about the availability of basic needs, shelter, medical services, and requirements.

*For further guidance concerning CP, refer to JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

(7) **Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).** CAO are military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that enhance relationships between military forces and civil authorities through the application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government. MISO can be integrated with CAO activities to increase support for the HN government and reduce support to destabilizing forces. MISO can publicize the existence and successes of CAO to enhance the positive perception of US and HN actions in the AOR and transregionally. MISO inform and direct civilians concerning safety and welfare to reduce civilian casualties, suffering, and interference with military operations.
Regional language and cultural expertise, and specialized communications equipment provide the capability to engage audiences with culturally accepted informative messages.

*For additional information on CAO, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*

(8) **IO.** IO are described as the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities, in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. IO are conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at all levels of war. MIS forces can be employed in conjunction with other IO capabilities and provide a critical means of communicating with foreign audiences to inform, direct, and influence. MIS units provide personnel to conduct IO staff functions to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict information-related capabilities. SO and conventional forces working within the same operational area should synchronize plans and activities to prevent duplication of effort and information inconsistencies, fratricide, inadvertent destruction of intelligence sources, and information inconsistencies.

*For additional information on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.*

4. **Interagency Coordination**

   a. Military operations are synchronized with operations of other USG departments and agencies as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. Success depends on the ability to blend and engage all instruments of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power as well as the efforts of NGOs and IGOs. Successful interagency coordination enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

   b. Interagency and MISO coordination occur at all levels of warfare to ensure synchronization of activities intended to influence TAs. Strategy and policy integration at the national level is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and working groups. CCDRs link national policy to the tactical and operational levels of military operations by using their JIACG, the US country team, and subordinate joint force headquarters as coordinating staff sections. Planners responsible for coordinating multiple USG messages spanning multiple combatant commands are synchronized and deconflicted by coordinating with the appropriate JTF staff elements, such as the JIACG. MISO and IO staff planners arm the JIACG with timely information to assist in the coordination process.

   *For further details concerning interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.*

5. **Multinational Operations**

   a. MIS units should be integrated into all multinational operations to ensure that MISO are coordinated.
b. MISO must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of an operation. MISO provide the commander with a controlled mechanism to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent factions. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, religion, political climate, and military organization can help the multinational force commander to effectively conduct MISO to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces.

c. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command structure, peacetime MISO policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. However, US MISO normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

6. Civil Authority Information Support Within the United States and Its Territories

a. In the same manner that infantry units with a primary mission to find, fix, and kill the enemy can be used to provide humanitarian relief to US citizens following natural disasters or other crises, MIS forces can provide a civil authority information support element (CAISE) within the US and its territories.

b. When authorized for employment in this manner, MIS forces utilize their media development, production, and dissemination capabilities to deliver public and other critical disaster information to populations in the impacted area. Their role is to assist in dissemination of messages developed by civil authorities. Messages typically include such things as the location of relief sites, how to obtain essential services, disease prevention tips, current civil authority instructions, and similar messages. MISO dissemination assets such as radio broadcast systems, print production, and loudspeaker teams also can augment commercial or civil capability shortfalls associated with the contingency.

c. All CAISE efforts should be coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal agency PA efforts.

d. During periods where CAISEs will be needed, such as the annual hurricane season, scheduled national special security events, or times of crisis, CAISEs need to be prepared to deploy to provide support at designated locations.
CHAPTER VII
ENABLERS

“The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.”

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
1847–1934

1. Intelligence Operations

a. Intelligence operations are wide-ranging activities conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose of providing commanders and national-level decision makers with relevant, accurate, and timely intelligence. MISO also have unique intelligence requirements.

b. Ongoing intelligence support is critical to all phases of the MISO process. MISO require detailed analysis of the conditions which exist within the operational environment and detailed demographics on potential TAs. The greatest demand for detailed intelligence support to MISO takes place during phase II (Target Audience Analysis) and phase VII (Evaluation).

c. Phase II (Target Audience Analysis) includes thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and psychological or social conditions that make up the operational environment, and impact the behavior of the audiences within that environment. This information is obtained through integration in the intelligence process, which provides the basis for common intelligence terminology and procedures and consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations. During phase I (Planning) of the MISO process, planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA in phase II.

d. Intelligence plays a critical role in phase VII (Evaluation) by confirming or denying MISO MOEs. These may include both quantitative and qualitative metrics such as changes in TA participation in the political process, increased surrenders or defections, or enhanced civilian cooperation with multinational requests or directives.

e. MISO intelligence requirements include current intelligence, background studies, intelligence estimates, and current cultural information, which may not be available from military intelligence sources. Knowledge such as information on taboos, traditions, venerated figures, myths, and current attitudes can assist in MISO product development as well as developing assessment criteria for MOEs. Each command must evaluate its assigned missions and operational areas and identify specific MISO intelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification will determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations can gather essential information and produce relevant intelligence products. Development of MISO-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific collection requirements to exploit all available sources and
techniques. It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and particular target groups as well as current intelligence on foreign group attitudes, behavior, and capabilities.

f. MIS units and staff elements should communicate mission-specific requirements for raw and finished intelligence products to the intelligence community so time-sensitive requirements are prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner. MIS units and staff elements ensure that information gaps are identified and prioritized as intelligence requirements to drive collection.

g. Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of a MISO program is deemed a threat. The early identification of threats and opportunities increases the potential for successful fulfillment of MISO program goals and objectives. The ISR collection manager, in coordination with the MISO planner, develops an ISR collection plan with specific information requirements pertinent to MISO. Intelligence assets can then be tasked to collect the information for analysis. Generally, regardless of the nature of the operation, there are three recurring threats to the effectiveness of MISO.

(1) **Conflict threats** are those that stem from state and non-state actors using military and economic power to gain control of a region and influence or counter the strategic intent of the US and its multinational partners. MISO planners should identify specific information requirements for which the intelligence collection manager can levy collection requirements, assisting the MISO planner in recognizing the MISO effort to influence the behavior of individuals toward a desired goal.

(2) **Technological threats** are products of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals worldwide who use communications resources. Access to electronic attack and electronic protection assets gives third parties a capability to degrade US MISO efforts. MISO information requirements that fall in the technological environment include those that determine capabilities to broadcast signals that may jam or interfere with US broadcasts, counter or degrade US and multinational MISO messages, and conduct other technical operations. These information requests result in current, general military, target, and scientific and technical intelligence products.

(3) Instability in one country’s economic, religious, cultural, and political structures can threaten regional stability. These changes may be sudden or anticipated, temporary or permanent, and may alter the perceptions held by the country’s populace. This can pose a threat to the success of US MISO if planners do not recognize the potential for these changes in perception. The MISO planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining changes to political, religious, economic, and cultural structures.

h. **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** Theater ISR CONOPS are based on a coherent collection strategy that fully integrates and optimizes the use of all organic, multinational, allied, open source, and requested national ISR assets. MISO rely on theater ISR operations to provide intelligence products based on a whole-of-government approach that occurs within the intelligence community.
(1) ISR assets also are critical in collecting data to confirm or deny MISO MOEs.

(2) Allocation of ISR to collect MOE data takes place during phase VI of the MISO process.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

2. Communications System

a. Communications between commands that are planning and executing MISO are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint MISO communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Theater communications architecture must include plans for integration of MISO support requirements into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a capability to communicate with US national-level agencies, multinational, and HN communications systems.

b. The military information support automated system (MISAS) is hosted on the USASOC SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). MISAS plays an important part in supporting MISO worldwide—for the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the interagency community. Its unique capabilities facilitate the research and analysis that underlie foreign TA analysis, MISO product development, finished MISO intelligence production, special projects, and operational deployments by conventional as well as SOF. Users can draw on a number of different database collections:

1. **DOD Message Traffic Archive.** The archive contains daily defense message system (DMS) messages from different government departments and agencies and military sources, including the DOS, Central Intelligence Agency, and Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center. The system has the capability to do full searches and retrieval from DMS message traffic with a continuous real-time message feed and indexing. This feature allows the immediate retrieval of material for analysis that provides information used to determine behavioral trends in selected target groups over time. The message archives are extensive, covering October 1989 to the present, and readily accessible.

2. **MISO Study Collection.** This collection holds all existing MISO studies and assessments produced by the strategic studies detachments (SSDs). This collection contains the most complete archive of available MISO studies.

3. **Radio and TV Collection.** This collection has statistics on radio and TV facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies, and users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.

4. The MISAS electronically archives studies and also offers analysts access to various classified and unclassified databases. Most of these studies can be obtained through the 4th Military Information Support Group (MISG) (Airborne) home page on the SIPRNET or through the SIPRNET Intellink Web site. MISO relevant intelligence information and products of all types are posted on this site as soon as they are completed. All MISO studies are posted on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Intellink
Web site along with studies that are excluded from the SIPRNET Intellink Web site because of dissemination restrictions or classification constraints. On JWICS, they can be found on the USSOCOM home page under intelligence products. In the unlikely event that an end user does not have access to SIPRNET or JWICS, but requires and knows of a specific study, the MISAS staff can, by exception, forward a copy.

3. Logistics

   a. The execution of the joint MISO process (described in Chapter V, “Joint Military Information Support Operations Process”) in sustained operations requires critical logistic support. The combatant command or appropriate Service component staff must integrate MISO logistic support into planning. MIS units are dependent primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, commercial item restock, and dissemination contracting support. For major operations and contingencies, supported units have the responsibility to fund and acquire the logistic support to develop, produce, disseminate, and assess the effects of multimedia products. Moreover, gaining units facilitate the repair and maintenance of MISO production and dissemination equipment through funding and contracting support. See Figure VII-1 for MISO logistics requirements.

   b. It is critical for the supported unit to understand both common and unique MISO sustainment requirements to insure continuous, responsive, and effective MISO. The gaining unit must identify these items and forecast their procurement and sustainment in advance. In addition, fixed site facilities also may be required during extended operations to house and secure sizeable and highly technical equipment and electronic components used for large-scale production and dissemination of multimedia MISO products.

   c. There are three main categories of MISO support requirements:

   (1) **Service Common.** MIS forces use a broad range of equipment that require service common expendable and major end-item components from across the categories of supply. These assets are generally acquired and sustained through normal supply channels.

   (2) **MISO Unique.** MIS forces use specialized production assets, communications systems, and broadcast platforms. Parts and maintenance for this equipment are coordinated at the theater level and must be programmed during planning.

   (3) **Commercial Contracting.** MISO frequently require the services of private enterprises for a wide range of requirements including the production and dissemination of multimedia products. Professional organizations specializing in research and polling are often contracted to assess TA responses.

   d. The potential for MISO to rely on less sophisticated equipment found in various parts of the world must be considered. Host-nation support (HNS) personnel and organizations may perform many of the support-related functions needed, thus reducing the strain on US logistic systems. **Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether through the host government or commercial entities, must be identified in advance.** Early identification of HNS is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for MISO.
### MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF SUPPLIES OR SERVICES</th>
<th>EXAMPLES (NOT ALL-INCLUSIVE)</th>
<th>SOURCES</th>
<th>WHEN USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Common</td>
<td>Vehicle and generator repair parts; maintenance (above operator level); batteries; petroleum, oil, and lubrication; tactical radios and communications equipment; small arms repair, ammunition; leaflets; rations; potable water; clothing and individual equipment; medical, dental, and mental health; optics and night-vision; vehicle survivability upgrades; engineer and construction supplies; personnel services; access to operational communications system networks (SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network, other); religious services</td>
<td>Supported unit · Service common supply chain</td>
<td>After exhaustion of basic deployment load · Upon formal attachment or designation of other support arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Information Support Operations (MISO)-Unique: Systems, Parts, Maintenance, and Expendable Supplies</td>
<td>· Radio and television broadcast systems · Audio-video production systems · Broadband secure satellite transmission systems · Loudspeaker systems · Print presses, risographs, and high-speed copiers including inks, cleaners, maintenance · Digital media (compact discs, digital video discs, other) · Leaflet boxes and static lines · Specific weight bulk paper for printed products</td>
<td>Coordination through higher MISO component or headquarters including forward/reachback program support agreements · Parent unit (major end items) · Local contract (commercially available expendable supplies and services)</td>
<td>After exhaustion of basic load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Support</td>
<td>· Access controlled workspace for product development, storage of products · Climate-controlled work areas for print presses, production systems · Voltage regulated power source · Classified material destruction (burn or pulverize) · Billeting; morale, welfare, and recreation; all other base services</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>When conducting extended operations in a fixed site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Support</td>
<td>· Local production of unclassified products (print, radio, video, Web, digital, etc.) · Polling to support measure of effectiveness determination · Linguist support · Hiring of local writers, on-air personalities</td>
<td>Supported unit · Higher MISO component or headquarters · Host nation or multinational partners</td>
<td>As soon as operationally required or feasible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure VII-1. Military Information Support Operations Logistics Requirements
e. During multinational operations, US logistic systems, unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANs support MISO integration and execution. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported MISO activities may provide some level of logistic support and should be identified in advance.
APPENDIX A
CAPABILITIES

“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.”

Sun Tsu
The Art of War

1. General

Each Service has the inherent capability to support achievement of US national objectives by using organic assets for production and dissemination of MISO products. Aircraft, ships, units, and military equipment can have deliberate psychological effects on TAs when used in, or as a military information support operation action designed to create a cognitive effect.

2. Studies Programs

a. The SSD of the 4th MISG (Airborne), is an important source of finished MISO analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire MIS force, the combatant commands, and the intelligence community. The CJCS provides general policy guidance and establishes production priorities for the program. CDRUSSOCOM, as the supporting CCDR, manages the MISO Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and monitors production. Products of the MISO studies program primarily are designed to support the operational requirements of the combatant commands and of US MIS forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., DOS). Studies provide CCDRs with MISO perspectives on issues of direct significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational preparations. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a combatant command’s MISO staff officer or intelligence request for information manager, who will enter them in the community online intelligence system for end users and managers system for managing intelligence production requirements.

b. MISO studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain this type of intelligence information. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people.
Appendix A

3. United States Army Assets

a. Army Service MISO assets provide a vital instrument of engagement across all operational phases in support of the full range of military operations and interagency coordination in a foreign setting and under special circumstances during domestic emergencies as well.

b. United States Army Special Operations Command. USASOC is the Army component command of USSOCOM. Its mission is to command (if directed), support, and ensure the combat readiness of assigned and attached Army MIS forces for worldwide use. The USASOC Commander exercises command of CONUS-based AC Army special operations forces (ARSOF) MISO. When directed by CDRUSSOCOM, USASOC provides mission-ready MIS forces to the geographic combatant commands for employment. Specific USASOC functions include:

(1) Assisting in developing and coordinating joint and AC Army MISO requirements, issues, and activities.

(2) Assisting in developing joint and Army MISO doctrine, organization, institution training, materiel, supplies, and services.

(3) Preparing and submitting Army MIS forces program and budget documents.

(4) Prepare and deploy ARSOF MISO for contingency operations, SO missions, as well as missions in a joint environment in peacetime, conflict, and war.

(5) Planning and conducting other training, operations, and support, as directed.

c. Army Active Component Military Information Support Group. The AC MISG organizes, equips, and collectively trains assigned and attached forces to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world and conduct MISO and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency as directed by the President and SecDef.

(1) The AC MISG is capable of conducting the following tasks:

(a) Deploy/redeploy and sustain all assigned and attached forces.

(b) Execute tactical MISO in support of rapid deployment forces, SOF, and other contingencies.

(c) Organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs.

(d) Execute DSPD through MIS teams.

(e) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and dissemination in support of all operations.
(f) Operate CONUS-based multimedia operations center as the digital and analog backbone of the global CT network.

(g) Produce special studies, analyses, and assessments of foreign TAs in support of assigned units or as otherwise directed.

(h) Execute CAIS.

(2) The AC MISG currently contains the following organizations:

(a) **SSD.** The group manages the SSD’s strategic and operational analysis efforts necessary for mission planning. The SSD is organized into regionally focused strategic studies teams comprised of civilian MISO analysts holding advanced degrees and regional expertise. Analysts specialize in target regions and provide MISO-relevant information, strategic analysis, and advice during the planning and execution of missions. The SSD publishes and disseminates MISO studies.

(b) **MIS Battalion.** The battalion is organized, trained, and equipped to provide supported commanders with planning, product development, production, and dissemination from operational to tactical levels. These battalions are regionally oriented and maintain a functional support relationship with their respective GCCs and theater SO commands. The battalions support other regions as directed.

(c) **MIS Battalion—Dissemination.** The battalion provides regional and tactical MIS units with audio, visual, and audiovisual production support; product distribution support; signal support; electronic maintenance support; data archives; and media broadcast capabilities. The battalion provides production support to MIS forces from the MOC location at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and through teams deployed with MIS units around the world. The MOC is the media production and product archives hub for the MISO community and is critical to achieving the commanders’ MISO objectives.

(d) **Tactical MIS Battalion.** The battalion provides tactical-level MISO support to SOF and, when directed, to conventional forces deployed for contingency operations. The battalion’s companies and subordinate detachments and teams are the primary providers of MISO support to deployed forces on the ground.

d. **Reserve Component Military Information Support Group.** The RC MISGs organize, train, and equip assigned and attached forces to deploy anywhere in the world and conduct MISO and other specified communication tasks in any environment in support of CCDRs and the interagency community as directed by the President and SecDef.

(1) The RC MISGs are capable of conducting the following tasks:

(a) Validate, deploy/redeploy, and sustain all assigned and attached forces.

(b) Execute tactical MISO in support of conventional forces.
Appendix A

(c) Organize and execute operational-level task forces in support of JFCs and provide augmentation to GCCs for theater-level MISO support.

(d) Execute multimedia development, production, distribution, and dissemination in support of all operations.

(e) Execute CAIS.

(2) The RC MISGs currently contain the following organizations:

(a) MIS Battalion. The battalion provides support to corps-level units and below, task forces, and SOF. The battalion’s companies are the primary providers of MISO support to conventional forces and enhance the commander’s ability to influence the behavior of TAs within his operational area.

(b) MIS Company—Dissemination. This company provides limited tactical-level dissemination support in the following areas: audio, visual, and audiovisual production; product distribution; electronic maintenance; and media broadcast.

e. Military Information Support Operations Staff Planners. The Army provides the preponderance of MISO planners assigned or attached to the joint force. Responsibilities of MISO staff planners include:

(1) Plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate MISO into operations to create effects required to meet the commander’s intent and support achievement of objectives.

(2) Prepare the MISO portion of OPLANs and orders.

(3) Monitor status of all nonlethal effects, assets, and activities.

(4) Define nonlethal targeting objectives and recommend employment of MISO capabilities to achieve objectives.

(5) Request, receive, and integrate MIS units and capabilities into operations.

(6) Recommend required changes or updates to existing approved programs to provide the capability with required authorities as needed to meet the commander’s intent.

f. 1st Information Operations Command (Land) deploys IO support teams in order to provide IO planning support and vulnerability assessments in support of military forces and provides an IO reachback capability to operational and tactical IO staffs as directed.

g. In addition to dedicated MIS units, conventional Army units can also support MISO. With routine interaction with TAs, they are in an ideal position to support MISO product dissemination and collect limited MOE indicators for transmission to MISO planners.
4. United States Navy Assets

a. The US Navy employs a wide range of dissemination assets, product reproduction capabilities, and planning resources that can support joint and Service MISO missions. Navy ships and shore sites have facilities to print documents, posters, articles, leaflets, and handbills. Most aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious assault ships are capable of high-volume quality printing required to support MISO.

b. Navy afloat and ashore IO cells coordinate with joint MISO experts to identify maritime audiences, develop themes and products, and plan dissemination. Also, within the fleet, capabilities exist for most Asian and European languages.

c. The Navy has UHF, VHF, and HF broadcast capabilities to deliver MISO messages to afloat and ashore TAs. Boarding parties can disseminate products to crews of civilian vessels to achieve MISO objectives.

d. Several Navy aircraft support MISO. F/A-18 HORNET aircraft can drop PDU-5 leaflet canisters to disperse print materials deep inland over hostile territory. The P-3 ORION airframe is certified to drop the PDU-5b. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. Navy C-2A GREYHOUND transport aircraft can disperse a large volume of leaflets by static-line airdrops from the aft cargo ramp. EA-6B PROWLER aircraft (and its successor, the EA-18G GROWLER) can jam adversary broadcasts and also transmit brief .wav files on a wide range of frequencies.

e. The Navy employs the Sound Commander tactical loudspeaker system and conventional loudspeakers for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore audio communications. This includes the delivery of MISO messages.

f. The Navy has two combat camera units: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, Detachment Combat Camera, located in Norfolk, Virginia, and Fleet Combat Camera Group Pacific, located in San Diego, California. These units can produce audiovisual products to support MISO. The ships and aircraft of the fleet can also provide limited audiovisual production capabilities.

g. The Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Norfolk, located at the Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Virginia, provides limited specialized training in planning and executing MISO, and is available to assist fleet units. NIOC San Diego provides similar training to units in the Pacific. NIOC Norfolk maintains a close relationship with the 4th MISG (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for training, equipment employment, product dissemination, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development in the area of Navy MISO.

For additional information see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-53, Navy Psychological Operations.
5. United States Air Force Assets

a. USAF MISO is focused on the employment of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the cognitive dimension of the operational environment. The USAF uses the term “influence operations” to group the activities of MISO, MILDEC, and OPSEC.

b. USAF MIS forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. USAF IOTs are located in joint air operations centers (JAOCs) and assist commanders in the five core capabilities of IO. MISO officers coordinate and liaise between the JAOC and the JTF IO staff to utilize all-source analysis of an adversary’s sociological, cultural, and demographic information to recommend effective MIS strategies. USAF MIS forces fill individual billets on joint manning documents and are capable of providing direct support and general support roles to units conducting MISO.

c. Many USAF platforms are used to execute missions in support of JFC MISO objectives. EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped to broadcast MISO radio and TV products. Transport aircraft perform static line leaflet airdrop missions. USAF fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet canisters.

d. USAF MISO capabilities are growing beyond the traditional dissemination roles of airborne broadcasts and leaflet drops. Behavioral influences analysis (BIA) provides an analytical framework to facilitate understanding and exploitation of the perceptual and behavioral context of the operational environment. BIA directly supports MISO TAA, providing a more robust assessment of TAs.

e. Because of the global nature of USTRANSCOM and its Air Force component, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is in a position to be aware of the synchronized IO efforts across the geographic combatant commands. Thus AMC IO and MISO planners are uniquely postured to observe and support MISO in addition to supporting the operational-level MISO efforts of a single geographic combatant command. Coordination with USTRANSCOM IO planners and the AMC IO team is highly encouraged.

6. United States Marine Corps Assets

a. The Marine Corps has the capability to conduct MISO at the tactical level via MIS teams using loudspeaker broadcasts, print media, and face-to-face communication. The Marine Corps expeditionary MIS capability is found within the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC provides reachback capabilities for forward deployed MIS teams in the form of audience analysis and interdepartmental coordination. While forward deployed, Marine MIS units receive MISO guidance from the MCIOC or an existing JMISTF.

b. The MCIOC coordinates and integrates the conduct of MISO programs that complement IO with the JMISTF, CCDRs, interagency, DOS, intelligence community, IGOs, NGOs, and others as necessary.
APPENDIX B
CONSIDERATIONS FOR
TAB A (MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS) TO
APPENDIX 3 (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. Overview

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of tab A (Military Information Support Operations) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) for plans and orders.

a. Situation

   (1) What is the situation relevant to MISO in the operational area?

   (2) What are the approved MISO programs?

   (3) What are the significant operational environment factors influencing MISO activities?

   (4) What are the competing MISO objectives in the operational area?

   (5) What are the MISO tasks to be accomplished?

b. US (or US and Multinational) Perspective

   (1) How will the MISO tasks be accomplished?

   (2) What resources will be used?

   (3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions?

c. Neutral Perspective (if applicable)

   (1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various circumstances?

   (2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?

   (3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) support mission objectives?

   (4) Which actions and behavior may interfere with mission objectives?

   (5) What resources are available to execute alternative COAs?

   (6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource effectiveness?
(7) What are the characteristics of decision makers and their key advisors, major staff planners, staff sections (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system analysts?

d. **Adversary Perspectives**

(1) **Decision Makers and Staffs**

(a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment?

(b) What resources are available to execute each COA?

(c) Who are the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of resources of COAs pertinent to the task assigned?

(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?

(2) **Intelligence Systems**

(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs?

(b) What are the intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation?

(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of information gathering resources?

(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(e) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(3) **Target Audiences**

(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment?

(b) How susceptible are these groups to MISO?

(c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to task accomplishment?

(d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group?

(e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?
(f) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(4) Command Systems

(a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA?

(b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2 communications net?

(c) What are the MISO targets for jamming or attacking?

(d) When should MISO to demoralize and disorganize opposing command be executed?

(e) When should MISO to reduce opposing operational effectiveness be executed?

(f) When should MISO to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions be executed?

(g) When should MISO to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage be executed?

e. Mission. How will MISO support the maneuver commander’s mission?

f. Execution

(1) Concept of Operations

(a) Overview

1. What is the commander’s intent?

2. What is the overall concept for using MISO in support of task accomplishment?

3. Who will plan and conduct MISO in peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options? Who are the supporting commanders?

4. Who will plan and conduct MISO in support of sustained hostilities? Who are the supporting commanders?

5. Who will plan and conduct joint MISO in support of operational COAs? Who are the supporting commanders?

(b) General Guidance to Units and Forces
1. What are the valid military information themes to promote strategic and theater MISO objectives?

2. What are the valid or invalid military information themes to be discouraged? Include indications of specific foreign TA sensitivities and harm that might occur if foreign TAs accept the themes.

(c) MISO Actions Suitable for Use

1. What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and personnel behavior to promote valid military information themes?

2. What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior?

3. What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of foreign TAs, which will aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with foreign TA members?

(d) Adversary Propaganda Activities

1. What adversary propaganda will be directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area?

2. What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations?

(e) Outline of Each Planned MISO Program

1. What is the foreign TA and set of MISO objectives, overall themes, subgroups to be targeted (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup?

2. What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating MISO materials and for measuring MISO effectiveness?

3. What are the command and staff arrangements? Who are the supporting commanders?

4. What resources are required to plan and conduct MISO actions? Include civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation of detainees for MISO, and MISO resources.

5. What are the logistic requirements? Include production, distribution, and stocking of MISO materials; transport of MISO material and personnel to operational areas and their basing and support while conducting MISO; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous MISO material; and fiscal and personnel matters.
6. What are the requirements for implementing schedules and MISO control sheets?

7. What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for, and conducting MISO and MISO actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive MISO COAs.

(2) Situation Monitoring

(a) How will intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback be provided?

(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations responsive to information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions?

(c) What resources are required? What is their availability?

(3) Control

(a) How will control be affected and implementation centrally coordinated?

(b) What are the coordinating instructions?

(c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action be accomplished?

(d) What is the need for specific MISO?

(e) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, to include US diplomatic missions and US Agency for International Development?

(f) What coordination is required with MILDEC and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action; FHA; CMO; detainees, command, control, and communications; legal; captured US personnel; and operations?

(4) Tasks

(a) What responsibilities must be assigned to implement the concept?

(b) Is designation of an executive agent to coordinate implementation among multiple organizations required?

(c) How will feedback be provided to measure MISO effectiveness?

g. Administration and Logistics
(1) **Logistics**

(a) What is the guidance for stocking MISO and information materials and provisions to disseminating organizations?

(b) What are the provisions for the maintenance of MISO-unique equipment?

(c) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials?

(d) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds?

(e) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel?

(2) **Administration**

(a) What are the requirements for special reports?

(b) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding detainees?

(c) What will be the participation in interrogation of detainees to obtain information essential or peculiar to MISO?

**h. Command and Control**

(1) Refer to appropriate sections of annex K (Communications System) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or annex K, to include the following:

(a) What are the recognition and identification instructions?

(b) What is the electronic policy?

(c) What are the headquarters locations and movements?

(d) What are the code words?

(e) What is the frequency allocation?

2. **Tab A Format**

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO AE 09128
25 May 200X
References: List documents essential to this annex.


c. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006.

d. List plans, estimates, basic MISO studies, special MISO studies, special MISO assessments, and other documents that have a significant bearing on the conduct of MISO.

1. ( ) Situation. Summarize the psychological situation in the operational area, any ongoing MISO programs, and any significant factors influencing MISO activities.

a. ( ) Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and the task to be accomplished.

b. ( ) US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Outline intentions (how the assigned task will be accomplished), capabilities (resources to be used), and activities (current actions and general phasing of future actions).

c. ( ) Neutral Perspective (if applicable). Outline estimated neutral intentions under various circumstances, the resources available to a neutral party, and their activities. Describe neutral actions and/or behavior that would enhance mission accomplishment. Indicate apparent current COAs that might affect mission accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute alternative COAs. (Include the abilities to execute IO strategies.) State objective and subjective factors that could affect decisions and resource effectiveness. Identify staff functions and particularly influential key communicators. Describe the characteristics of decision makers, their key advisors; major staff planners; staff functions, particularly influential communicators; and intelligence system analysts.

d. ( ) Enemy Perspectives

(1) ( ) Decision Maker and Staff. Identify the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of required resources of MISO COA execution pertinent to the task assigned. Outline feasible alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly operational effectiveness. Indicate COAs that might affect friendly task accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute each COA. Describe the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisers, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts).

(2) ( ) Intelligence Systems. Identify intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for detail. Describe objective and subjective factors and the
characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection of information gathering resources.

(3) () Target Audience. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment, and identify their susceptibility to MISO. State group behavior favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Describe the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group and key leaders who can influence or motivate groups to behave in various ways.

(4) () Command Systems. Describe communication and computer systems and command centers used to plan, control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA. Identify the purpose of each communications system and its characteristics. State targets for jamming or attacking. Indicate when to execute operations to demoralize and disorganize opposing command, reduce opposing operational effectiveness, enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions and MISO, and support OPSEC to the maximum advantage.

2. () Mission

3. () Execution

   a. () Concept of Operations

      (1) () Overview. State the commander’s intent. Outline the overall concept for using MISO in support of task accomplishment. Sequentially address MISO in peacetime and in support of deterrence options; MISO in support of sustained hostilities (conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns and operations); and joint tactical MISO in support of operational COAs. State who will plan and conduct each MISO and specify the supported/supporting commands.

      (2) () Provide the following as general guidance to units and forces involved:

         (a) () Valid, approved military information themes to be stressed to achieve strategic and theater MISO objectives.

         (b) () Valid or invalid military information themes and symbols to be avoided to include indications of specific TA cultural sensitivities that might occur if these themes and symbols are accepted by TAs.

         (c) () MISO actions suitable for use:

            1. () Guidance for the conduct of military operations and actions, and personnel behavior, to promote approved military information themes.

            2. () Guidance for avoiding military operations and actions, and personnel behavior, that would result in harmful TA attitudes and behavior.
3. ( ) Description of the cultural and psychological characteristics of TAs to aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with TA members.

(d) ( ) Description of adversary propaganda (including disinformation and misinformation) directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for countering such adversary operations.

(3) ( ) Provide an outline of each planned military information support operation. Indicate for each TA an approved set of supporting MISO objectives and, as applicable, subgroups to be targeted, subgroup characteristics, and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup. As appropriate, refer to intelligence studies, special MISO study, and special MISO assessment for detailed intelligence. State provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating MISO materials and for measuring MISO effectiveness. List resources required for MISO actions (e.g., civil capabilities, indigenous assets, and exploitation of detainees). Indicate requirements for implementing schedules and MISO control sheets.

(4) ( ) In the basic concept description and in each tab describing separate operations, provide OPSEC planning guidance. The guidance should address planning for, preparing for, and conducting MISO and MISO actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s intentions and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive MISO COAs.

b. ( ) Situation Monitoring. Describe how intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback will be provided. State requirements for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of TA actions, attitudes, and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions. Identify resources required and their availability.

c. ( ) Control. Outline how control will be affected and implementation centrally coordinated. State coordinating instructions. Describe accomplishment of implementation planning and supervision of the planned action. Identify the need for specific MISO. Address coordination with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions, US Information Agency, and US Agency for International Development. Also address coordination with MILDEC and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action, humanitarian assistance, PA, CAO, detainee, counterintelligence, communications system, legal, operations, etc.

d. ( ) Tasks. Assign supported/supporting command relationships, to include other USG agencies required to implement the concept. When multiple organizations are involved, designate an executive agent to coordinate implementation. Ensure that tasks clearly fix responsibilities and provide for feedback about MOEs.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to MISO but not covered in the basic plan or another annex thereof. Include data on:
Appendix B

a. ( ) Logistics
   
   (1) ( ) Stocking of MISO, information materials, and supplies to disseminating organizations.
   
   (2) ( ) Provisions for the supply and maintenance of MISO-unique supplies and equipment.
   
   (3) ( ) Provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials.
   
   (4) ( ) Fiscal matters relating to special funds.
   
   (5) ( ) Personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel.

b. ( ) Administration
   
   (1) ( ) Requirements for special reports.

5. ( ) Command and Control. Describe command and staff arrangements for MIS forces supporting the operation and indicate supported/supporting command relationships. Refer to appropriate sections of annex K and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or annex K, including:

   a. ( ) Recognition and identification instructions.
   
   b. ( ) Electronic policy.
   
   c. ( ) Headquarters locations and movements.
   
   d. ( ) Code words.
   
   e. ( ) Frequency allocation, to include potential broadcast frequency ranges and bands (e.g., UHF TV or AM radio).

   f. Communications system support requirements and responsibilities for the JMISTF and MISO liaison officers.

   g. Satellite access, both military and commercial.
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-13.2 is based upon the following primary references:

1. United States Laws
   a. Title 10, USC.
   b. Title 50, USC.

2. Executive Branch Documents
   a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 2007, Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet Activities.
   b. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.
   c. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables.
   h. National Drug Control Strategy.

3. Department of State Publication
   DOS Publication 9434, Treaties in Force.

4. Department of Defense Publications
   b. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Contingencies Short of Declared War.
   c. DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO).
   d. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.
Appendix C

e. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.
f. DODD 5525.1, Status of Forces Policy and Information.
g. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.
h. Department of Defense Instruction 5240.10, Counterintelligence Support to the Combatant Commands and the Defense Agencies.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Manuals

a. CJCSI 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2006.
b. CJCSM 1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force.
c. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.
d. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats.

6. Joint Publications

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
e. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
f. JP 3-05, Special Operations.
g. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.
h. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.
i. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.
j. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.
k. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.
l. JP 3-13, Information Operations.


q. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

r. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.


t. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.

u. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

v. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

w. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

x. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

7. **United States Army Publications**

   a. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*.

   b. FM 3-05, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations*.


   d. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

   e. FM 3-13, *Information Operations*.


8. **United States Marine Corps Publications**


   b. MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.

9. United States Navy Publications
   b. OPNAVINST 3430.26, *Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare Command*.
   c. OPNAVINST 3434.1, *Psychological Operations*.
   d. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3300.1C, *Department of the Navy Law of War Program*.

10. United States Air Force Publications
   b. AFDD 3-05, *Special Operations*.
   c. AFDD 3-13, *Information Operations*.
   d. AFDD 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
   g. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-401, *Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*.
   h. AFI 51-701, *Negotiating, Concluding, Reporting, and Maintaining International Agreements*.

11. Multi-Service Publications
   a. FM 3-05.30/MCWP 3-40.6, *Psychological Operations*.
   c. FM 3-24/-MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the operations directorate of a joint staff.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-13.2, 7 January 2010, Psychological Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD/
   INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD/

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support Division, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC  Active Component
AFDD  Air Force doctrine document
AFI  Air Force instruction
AFPD  Air Force policy directive
AMC  Air Mobility Command
AOR  area of responsibility
ARSOF  Army special operations forces
ASD(SO/LIC&IC)  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
BIA  behavioral influences analysis
C2  command and control
CAIS  civil authority information support
CAISE  civil authority information support element
CAO  civil affairs operations
CCDR  combatant commander
CDRUSSOCOM  Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJMISTF  combined joint military information support task force
CMO  civil-military operations
CNO  computer network operations
COA  course of action
COCOM  combatant command (command authority)
COIN  counterinsurgency
CONOPS  concept of operations
CONUS  continental United States
CP  counterproliferation
CT  counterterrorism
DA  direct action
DMS  defense message system
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense directive
DOS  Department of State
DSPD  defense support to public diplomacy
EW  electronic warfare
FHA  foreign humanitarian assistance
FID  foreign internal defense
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIP</td>
<td>Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOT</td>
<td>information operations team</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAOC</td>
<td>joint air operations center</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMISTF</td>
<td>joint military information support task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCIOC</td>
<td>Marine Corps Information Operations Center</td>
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<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>military information support</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISAS</td>
<td>military information support automated system</td>
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<td>MISG</td>
<td>military information support group</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<td>MISTF</td>
<td>military information support task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>media operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOC</td>
<td>Navy Information Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Navy warfare publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPNAVINST</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations instruction</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>request for deployment order</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>strategic communication</td>
</tr>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>special reconnaissance</td>
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<td>SSD</td>
<td>strategic studies detachment</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>target audience</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>target audience analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<td>TV</td>
<td>television</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEO</td>
<td>violent extremist organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

civil authority information support. Department of Defense information activities conducted under a designated lead federal agency or other United States civil authority to support dissemination of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies. Also called CAIS. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

joint military information support task force. A military information support operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets that assist the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical military information support operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Also called JMISTF. (Approved for replacement of “joint military information support operations task force” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

military information support operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called MISO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

military information support operations assessment team. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

military information support operations impact indicators. An observable event or a discernible subjectively determined behavioral change that represents an effect of a military information support operations activity on the intended foreign target audience at a particular point in time. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

military information support operations support element. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

propaganda. Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**Key Points**
- **Joint Doctrine Publication (JP) 3-13.2** is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications.
- The development process involves multiple steps, including initiation, development, approval, and maintenance.
- Each step is detailed with specific actions and timelines, ensuring a comprehensive approach to doctrine development.

*All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.*