CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

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Preface

Civil Affairs (CA) forces support missions in every theater, in peace and war, throughout the full range of military operations. They are a combat multiplier for every commander across the domains of conflict. The role of CA forces in support of civil-military operations (CMO) is clarified for the missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations of these forces.

CA forces are only one of the many resources a commander has to help him with the myriad of tasks in this complex and ever-increasing mission. They are an essential element of CMO by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, training in military-to-host nation advisory activities, and civilian professional skills that parallel common government functions.

Although written primarily to assist theater Army, Army corps, and divisions in planning and conducting CA activities, this field manual (FM) has application in joint force operations as well. The commander must always consider the civil aspects within the area of operations (AO).

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army Form 2028 to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-CA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Chapter 1

Introduction to Civil Affairs

Military commanders must consider not only the military forces but also the environment in which those forces operate. One factor of the environment that commanders must consider is the civilian populace and its impact—whether it is supportive, neutral, or hostile to the presence of military forces. A supportive populace can provide material resources that facilitate friendly operations. It can also provide a positive climate for military and diplomatic activities a nation pursues to achieve foreign policy objectives. A hostile populace threatens the immediate operations of deployed friendly forces and can often undermine public support at home for the nation’s policy objectives. Operations that involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives are CMO.

Civil affairs are the designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.
1-2. CA forces support missions across the range of military operations. Although the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) dictates the requirements for CA force structure in support of major theater war (MTW) plans, support to peacetime engagement and emerging operations can only be reached by the proper planning and forecasting of CA force requirements. Early determination of requirements, coupled with properly routed support requests, ensures timely access to CA forces.

Civil Affairs activities are activities performed or supported by Civil Affairs forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of Civil Affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

1-3. CA units were intimately involved in the planning of the transition phase of Operation DESERT STORM to ensure a smooth transition to authority by the legitimate government of Kuwait. Following hostilities, CA units supported and assisted in humanitarian assistance (HA) operations for the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT eventually involved more than 20,000 troops from 6 nations. CA support to theater-level operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM included—

- Coordinating foreign nation support (FNS).
- Managing dislocated civilians (DCs).
- Conducting HA and military civic action (MCA) in support of military operations and U.S. national objectives.

1-4. CA units deployed to Somalia in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Their mission was to coordinate HA, FNS, and MCA. Specifically, CA teams resolved local labor issues and assisted in identifying local sources of supply. These operations helped to promote goodwill and to reduce tension in the capital of Mogadishu.

1-5. Operation SUPPORT HOPE is an excellent example of a joint task force (JTF) established with a CMO mission. Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) CA units, working from numerous civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) established throughout the joint operations area (JOA), coordinated humanitarian relief operations for hundreds of thousands of refugees in Rwanda.

1-6. Operation UPHOLD AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti included humanitarian relief, public safety, and election assistance. When the legally elected government was reestablished, Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) deployed to Haiti to advise and assist various ministries (Health, Justice, and Public Works) in establishing functional programs. CA planners also assisted in coordinating more than $1 billion in funding for public works projects from private sources. Democratic elections were successfully held for the first time following years of military rule.
1-7. Figure 1-1 displays CA mission activities that occur across the full range of military operations. Clear requirements for CA forces exist during each phase of an operation. The complexity and scope of specific activities vary with the type of operation.

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<th>States of the Environment</th>
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| War                       | War                 | Fight to Win       | • Populace and Resource Control  
                          |                     |                    | • Foreign Nation Support  
                          |                     |                    | • Humanitarian Assistance  
                          |                     |                    | • Emergency Services |
| Conflict                  | Military Operations | Deter Aggression and Resolve Conflict | • Humanitarian Assistance  
                          | Other Than War      |                    | • Military Civic Action  
                          | (Stability and Support Operations) |                    | • Emergency Services |  
                          |                     |                    | • Support to Civil Administration |
| Peacetime                 |                     | Promote Peace      | • Humanitarian Assistance  
                          |                     |                    | • Military Civic Action |  
                          |                     |                    | • Support to Civil Administration |

Figure 1-1. CA Mission Activities Across the Range of Military Operations

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN WAR

1-8. When diplomatic means fail to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible. Achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners are implied tasks. Close coordination between the commander in chief’s (CINC’s) staff and the U.S. Embassy country team ensures a smooth transition to war should such an event occur.

1-9. The CMO staff, augmented by CA planning teams, develops a plan that uses CA resources to optimize CMO capabilities. Although each combatant command is apportioned CA forces, only United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has an assigned CA unit. For missions exceeding the capability of this unit, as well as all other operations, the geographic CINCs must
request CA resources through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Once CA forces are allocated, the CINC incorporates them into his campaign plan and executes the plan to a successful conclusion.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

1-10. Stability and support operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. Stability operations enable and enhance world peace and prevent the need to wage a full-scale war. Army involvement in stability operations often results from U.S. support of international mandates, particularly within frameworks established in the United Nations (UN) Charter, Chapter VI (Settlement of Disputes, Articles 33-38) and Chapter VII (Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Articles 39-51). Examples of Army involvement in stability operations include Operations RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT, and UPHOLD AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY. After-action reviews (AARs) of these operations illustrate CA-specific involvement.

*Working from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in downtown Port au Prince, Haiti, a CA team established a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) to process requests for support from numerous civilian relief agencies whose operations had been disrupted by the U.S. military intervention. The HACC provided a single source of information and coordination for relief agencies and ensured the smooth flow of relief supplies to areas of greatest need.*

**AAR, Operation UPHOLD AND MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY**

1-11. Support operations assist civil authorities. When support operations occur in the United States, they generally fall under Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code (USC). Army operations during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew and support to the nation’s counterdrug efforts are examples of support operations.

*In the aftermath of the disaster leveled on southern Florida by Hurricane Andrew, civil affairs teams were deployed to begin assessing the damage. Working in close coordination with local, state, and federal emergency management agencies, the teams established a CMOC. The CMOC provided the critical interface between the Joint Task Force and the numerous government agencies, civilian organizations, and local volunteers.*

**AAR, Hurricane Andrew**

1-12. Stability and support operations are more sensitive to political considerations, and the military is often not the primary player. The CINCs plan and conduct their political and military missions within the limits defined by U.S. and international law, U.S. national policy, and applicable treaties and agreements. Stability and support operations inevitably require RC unit and individual skill sets not found in the AC.
1-13. The geographic CINC provides guidance to make sure CA activities are consistent and continuous. Although the CINC can delegate the authority to conduct CA activities to any commander, he normally retains authority for such activities as national-level liaison and negotiation of international agreements. The joint CMO staff may assist the CINC in—

- Conducting national-level liaison.
- Negotiating international agreements.
- Formulating CMO policy and guidance.
- Determining CA force requirements and objectives.
- Performing CMO analyses.
- Providing technical supervision and staff management over subordinate CA elements.

REGIONAL ORIENTATION

1-14. All CA units are oriented toward a specific region of the world. The Unified Command Plan assigns areas of responsibility (AORs) to geographic and regional CINCs: USPACOM, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and Korea. Orientation helps commanders focus their personnel and training. Examples include language, cultural norms, and operational requirements unique to each theater. Regional orientation begins with formal qualification in a language of the AOR and in regional studies. It is constantly enhanced by repeated deployments to the region.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRUTHS

1-15. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) doctrine holds four basic truths as the foundation of the force. CA forces embrace these truths as timeless values that have not changed since World War II (WWII). These truths capture the essence of the CA soldier recruited, trained, and retained to support commanders and ambassadors around the globe. These truths, as seen from the CA perspective, are as follows:

- **Humans are more important than hardware.** People, not equipment, make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, accomplish the mission with the equipment available. The best equipment in the world cannot compensate for the lack of the right people.

- **Quality is better than quantity.** A small number of people well led, carefully selected, and possessing requisite skills—oftentimes, civilian-acquired—are preferable to a large number of troops, some of whom may not be fully capable.

- **CA cannot be mass-produced.** Developing operational units to the level of proficiency necessary to accomplish difficult, specialized CA missions requires years of training and experience. Integration of mature, competent individuals into fully mission-capable units requires intense
training in CA schools and CA units. Hastening this process only degrades the ultimate capability.

- Competent CA cannot be created after emergencies arise. Creation of competent, fully mission-capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable CA elements on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available CA units in peacetime.

CIVIL AFFAIRS APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1-16. The principles of war are the basis of warfighting doctrine. Although war calls for the direct application of military force, CA commanders must consider all facets of the operational environment. They provide input to the supported unit operation plans (OPLANs) and operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), focusing primarily on the impact of the military operations on the land and the populace. The following paragraphs describe how these basic military principles relate to CA activities.

OBJECTIVE

1-17. Direct every operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. A strategic military objective is subordinate to, and must fulfill, a political objective. Likewise, operational and tactical objectives must fulfill strategic military objectives and thus realize political objectives. Once strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives are specified, CA assets support commanders by—

- Providing information on the political, cultural, and economic situation in the AOR.
- Coordinating FNS.
- Performing government functions when local agencies are unwilling or unable to provide for the needs of their own people.
- Planning for and training foreign nation (FN) personnel who subsequently assume or expand ongoing initiatives.

OFFENSE

1-18. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. CA forces are combat multipliers. They support offensive operations by—

- Augmenting the intelligence cycle through direct involvement with the civilian populace. NOTE: Take care to disassociate CA forces with active intelligence-gathering activities and personnel.
- Minimizing local populace interference with U.S. military operations.
- Coordinating for logistics support to military units using local resources.

MANEUVER

1-19. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Related to mass, maneuver incorporates flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. The local populace can either help or hinder maneuver operations. CA personnel plan and coordinate with local authorities to increase maneuver flexibility. CA units assess the
availability and operability of airport and seaport facilities. CA units also coordinate for the use of indigenous ground transport. They support maneuverability by—

- Reducing civilian interference with military operations.
- Recommending routes that avoid densely populated areas.
- Identifying nonmilitary transportation assets to support military operations.
- Assisting in the development of the Protected Target List, including such items as cultural landmarks, hospitals, and museums.

**MASSED EFFECTS**

1-20. *Mass the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space.* The principle of mass requires the quick assembly of forces and resources at a particular place and time. Surprise is the key to the success of operations depending on massing forces and resources. Concealing concentrations of forces from the local populace can be difficult. CA units can recommend secure areas where population density, local support, logistical support, and transportation routes support the massing forces.

**ECONOMY OF FORCE**

1-21. *Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.* CA units lessen the need to divert combat-ready troops from essential duties by planning for and using local resources to maintain order and provide logistical services.

**SURPRISE**

1-22. *Achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action.* The element of surprise is difficult to achieve in highly populated areas. CA personnel can enhance the effectiveness of sensitive operations by coordinating with local authorities. Feedback from the populace indicates the effectiveness of deception measures. CA activities supported by Psychological Operations (PSYOP) can enhance the element of surprise.

**SECURITY**

1-23. *Never allow the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.* Security includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or an installation to protect itself against acts that may impair its effectiveness. CA operations support security by—

- Providing a conduit for information of intelligence value from the local populace and government human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Screening local populace groups, separating potential terrorists or enemy special operations forces (SOF) from the civilian populace and larger groups, such as DCs (Appendix B).
- Identifying potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the military mission.
UNITY OF COMMAND

1-24. **Achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation.** To achieve unity of effort, CA units must have a clear, concise chain of command that maximizes the effectiveness of their mission. During combined operations with indigenous military forces, CA soldiers must stress the requirement for cooperation between indigenous military and civilian organizations.

SIMPLICITY

1-25. **Prepare uncomplicated concepts and plans and direct concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.** CA relationships are simplified using a single staff focal point. The G5, S5, or joint CMO staff officer can relieve the unit staff of many related functions. CA plans and annexes must be simple and direct. They must also be supportable by the available resources. Early coordination and negotiations with civil authorities can ensure effective, successful operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS IMPERATIVES

1-26. Analyzing traditional military fundamentals in terms of political, information, and economic factors blends the basic principles of war into military imperatives for special operations (SO). They also prescribe key operational requirements for SO in all operational environments. CA activities planned and conducted in compliance with the SO imperatives support the intent of the principles of operations.

UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-27. The operating environment for CA activities goes beyond the military environment and includes civil, political, and informational aspects. Simply knowing facts and figures gathered from an area study is not sufficient. CA personnel must strive to achieve a full-dimensional picture of their operating environment. With this full-dimensional picture, CA personnel can begin to identify and understand the relationships and interaction between variables in the civil environment. From this understanding comes the ability to anticipate not only the impact of specific military actions upon the civil environment, but also the subsequent reactions and potential opportunities to assist the military mission. This imperative also means that CA augmentation teams must understand military doctrine and the standing operating procedures (SOP) of the supported unit. If CA personnel are to facilitate unity of effort, they must understand the unique cultures and procedures of all civilian and military agencies and organizations with whom they may interface.

RECOGNIZE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

1-28. Current military operations run the gamut from peacetime engagement activities to combat and posthostility operations. In many of these operations, military acts may have consequences that are other than military. A multitude of interrelated issues, positions, and interests associated with the agendas of various groups or individuals often exist within the civilian environment. Military involvement or coexistence with the civil environment
can purposely or inadvertently affect these agendas. All military personnel, particularly CA personnel, must be aware of these agendas and be cautious in word, deed, and actions to avoid communicating activities to the civilian community that are not within the parameters of the military mission or U.S. national objectives. Clearly, personnel cannot know all aspects or agendas, but being alert to the political implications of military acts helps in managing the consequences in a timely way.

FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES

1-29. Most CA activities involve the participation of government agencies, as well as policy guidance from those agencies. Interagency involvement is common at the strategic level of conventional combat operations and occurs occasionally at the operational level. During peacetime engagement, peace operations, and humanitarian operations, this involvement can, however, extend to the tactical level. CA personnel can assist units to integrate the military and interagency efforts to achieve a cooperative unity of effort. CA personnel also work with political advisors and military Foreign Area Officers at the strategic and operational levels to translate interagency guidance into unambiguous military tasks.

ENGAGE THE THREAT DISCRIMINATELY

1-30. The U.S. military can bring overwhelming force upon its choice of objectives. To do so without consideration of the political, economic, and social consequences creates the possibility of needless social instability subsequent to the military operation. Such resultant instability may not be supportive of the long-term objectives following the military mission. CA personnel assist units to assess the consequences of too much force and offer nonlethal alternatives to the use of force.

CONSIDER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

1-31. Regardless of the type or length of a military mission, some consequences will occur to the surrounding civilian environment. These consequences may have an impact on the political, economic, or social aspects of the surrounding environment and infrastructure. Not all consequences are significant. Some are, however, and CA personnel must consider the long-term effects and advise unit commanders and staffs of these consequences. This aspect of advising and assisting becomes most important when considering how military objectives transition to nonmilitary objectives and, more important, how the military effort lays the foundation for those subsequent objectives. In so doing, military operations at all levels and their related CA plans, policies, and program guidance remain consistent with the national and theater priorities and the objectives they support.

ENSURE LEGITIMACY AND CREDIBILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

1-32. In modern conflict, legitimacy is a crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition in international law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government and its forces. The people of a nation and the international community determine legitimacy
based on their collective perception of the credibility of the cause and the methods used to achieve results. Because CA personnel focus on the relationship between the civil and military environments, legitimacy and credibility are key issues. Within an AO, respect for the dignity, pride, and culture of the populace are fundamental to maintaining legitimacy and credibility. CA personnel must, therefore, consider the perceptions of the local populace to military events. Neutral or unfriendly civilian populations cannot be physically subdued by the military of a democratic government without risking international and home-country outcries of disdain or, worse, by fomenting an insurgency. Ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of the military operation is key to soliciting and maintaining the support of the population.

ANTICIPATE AND CONTROL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

1-33. Military operations can have a positive or negative effect on individuals and the collective behavior of the civilian populace. Much of the effect may be linked to the perceptions of the civilian populace. Perception often overshadows reality in determining the success or failure of a CA effort. CA personnel must be knowledgeable of PSYOP and public affairs efforts to mitigate negative perceptions. CA personnel must understand these perceptions, as well as the actual realities, and the potential impact of either upon the military operation. They must be aware of the possibility of hostile propaganda and disinformation programs, as well as the misunderstandings and false expectations from poor interpersonal communication, cultural differences, and misinterpreted actions.

APPLY CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY

1-34. Commanders must avoid the attitude that U.S. military forces can and will do all when supporting a foreign government or dealing with nonmilitary groups. Credit for achievements must be shared with, or given to, the supported government to reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of that government. Properly planned and executed U.S.-FN military projects—such as school construction, road building, and well drilling—can have a positive influence on the perception of the local populace toward its government.

DEVELOP MULTIPLE OPTIONS

1-35. Anticipating how various aspects of the civilian environment will interact is a difficult task. Because variables of the environment change, what might have worked one day may not work the next day. Consequently, a CA plan must always have multiple options that can be applied proactively in support of the military mission.

ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT

1-36. The U.S. response to conflict varies with the mission. The resourcing of any particular U.S. support effort may also vary. CA personnel should not recommend or begin programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capacity of the country to maintain without additional U.S. assistance. Such programs can become counterproductive if the population
becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. Learning which programs are sustainable by the country begins with a timely, accurate assessment of the environment in which the project is to be conducted. CA personnel must also assist units to understand other efforts being taken by IOs and NGOs. These organizations remain involved long after redeployment of the U.S. military. Any cooperative civil-military effort with these organizations, therefore, has a higher probability of long-term sustainment, even if the country itself does not have the capacity to maintain the programs.

PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE

1-37. The traditional, conventional, intelligence preparation of the battlespace often omits economic, political, and social factors pertinent to the CA effort at division level and below. Because of the potential political implications of CA efforts, a need for information on national and theater objectives also exist at the tactical level. CA personnel must, therefore, be specific with their information requirements and identify their requirements in priority. They must identify missions as essential or just “nice to have.” Without realistic priorities, the intelligence community can quickly become overwhelmed and disregard CA information requirements.

BALANCE SECURITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION

1-38. Increasing U.S. involvement in stability and support operations confronts the military with operational problems that may have their origins in civil issues. If the military hopes to accomplish its mission, solutions may need to be found within the civilian environment. Some synchronization of civil-military efforts must occur, in turn requiring the sharing of information. To attain consensus and cooperation with civilian organizations existing within or supporting the operational area, CA personnel must balance security and synchronization. Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security may, likewise, cause the mission to fail.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION CRITERIA

1-39. SO mission criteria were developed during Operation DESERT STORM to make sure SOF assets were committed only to missions that supported the theater campaign, that were appropriate and feasible, and that had an expected outcome that justified the risk. The following criteria, as they relate to CA employment, are used to assess proposed CA missions:

- **Is the mission appropriate for CA?** The best use of CA is against key strategic or operational targets that require CA’s unique skills and capabilities. Commanders should not assign CA if targets are not of strategic or operational importance. Commanders should not use CA as a substitute for other forces.

- **Does the mission support the theater geographic combatant commander's campaign plan?** If the mission does not support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) campaign plan, more appropriate missions are probably available for CA.

- **Is the mission operationally feasible?** During the course of action (COA) analysis, the CA commander must realistically evaluate his
force. Planners must understand that CA is not structured for unilateral operations. They should not assign missions that are beyond the scope of CA capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

- **Are the required resources available to conduct the mission?** Almost all CA missions require support from conventional forces. Support involves protecting, integrating, and sustaining employed CA. Support may include airlift, intelligence, communications, and logistics.

- **Does the expected outcome justify the risk?** Some operations that CA can execute make a marginal contribution to the JFC campaign plan and present great risk to personnel and material. Commanders should recognize the high value and limited resources of CA. They must make sure the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and balanced with the risks inherent with the mission. Risk management considers not only the potential loss of CA units and equipment but also the risk of adverse effects on U.S. diplomatic and political interests in a failed mission.
Chapter 2

Civil Affairs Missions

CA forces augment CMO staffs of geographic, theater Army component, and maneuver commanders, down to battalion level. They augment U.S. Embassy country teams, other government agencies, and multinational forces as well. CA forces accomplish the mission by assisting in the planning, coordination, and supervision of CA activities in support of CMO. The specific activities are mission dependent and determined after applying the Special Operations Mission Evaluation Criteria and the Military Decision-Making Process. CA commanders tailor their forces to meet mission requirements, ensuring the proper mix and timely employment of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level forces, as well as functional specialists. Key to this effort is the early deployment of planning teams, without which relevant CA input to OPLANs, functional plans, and CONPLANS cannot be achieved.

CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSION ACTIVITIES

2-1. All CA activities (Figure 2-1) support CMO. They embrace the relationship of military forces with civil authorities, NGOs, IOs, and populations in areas where military forces are present. CA activities may also involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of the civilian government. NOTE: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN modified U.S. CMO concepts and refer to them as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

Figure 2-1. CA Activities in Support of CMO
2-2. CA activities supporting the commander's missions include operations that—

- Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.
- Minimize civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.
- Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, civilian agencies of other governments, and NGOs.
- Exercise military control of the civilian populace in occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
- Provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
- Provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT

2-3. FNS is the identification, coordination, and acquisition of FN resources—such as supplies, materiel, and labor—to support U.S. forces and operations. The preferred means of fulfilling combat service support (CSS) requirements is to get appropriate goods and services locally through FNS.

2-4. In some theaters, specific terms describe categories of FNS. Host nation support (HNS) is support provided by a friendly country for U.S. military operations conducted within its borders, based on mutually concluded agreements. HNS includes the planning, negotiations for, and acquisition of such support. Friendly or allied nation support (FANS) is support within the Pacific theater. CIMIC is support within NATO. FNS may, however, also include support from countries that have no mutual agreements.

ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT ACQUISITION

2-5. In sustained warfare, CSS capabilities seldom meet supply and service requirements. Through an intermediary role, CA personnel identify and help acquire FN goods and services to support U.S. forces and operations while outside the continental United States (OCONUS). FNS helps the commander fulfill his wartime mission. It also promotes trade and employment opportunities for the local populace. Some FNS methods may not be universally applicable. FNS also differs based on the politico-military situation. Factors that influence the politico-military situation include the—

- Type and intensity of the conflict.
- Existence of agreements to provide support.
- FN’s capability and willingness to provide support and its degree of control over the civilian populace.

2-6. When CA personnel and CSS elements deploy early, support procured from FNs shortens the logistics distribution network by minimizing the time between the user’s request to final delivery. Acquisition of FNS requires—

- Logistics planners to identify projected shortfalls.
2-7. Depending on the level of support available, CA responsibilities include identifying resources, assisting other staff agencies with their ad hoc requests (such as S4 and property book), and activating preplanned requests for wartime host nation support (WHNS). NOTE: WHNS is only in Korea.

2-8. In many countries, CA personnel contact businesses and government agencies directly to establish a working relationship to obtain support. In countries with territorial forces structured to support allied troops on their sovereign territory, CA personnel work through the territorial forces. Procurement of goods and services is through—

- Civilian or military agencies in the country that requested U.S. troops.
- Civilian sources in an occupied area (with proper compensation).
- Capture of enemy government-owned materiel.
- A third country that can provide such support more readily than through supply channels back to the continental United States (CONUS).

FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT CONCEPTS

2-9. In the execution of FNS procurement arrangements, a distinction exists between support procured by predeployment agreements and support obtained on an ad hoc arrangement. Most FNS is obtained by agreement, but HNS is usually obtained before forces arrive in theater—for example, when an operation is under NATO, standardization agreements (STANAGs) may exist. (See the bibliography to this publication for recommended readings of STANAGs.)

Host Nation Support

2-10. A host nation (HN) is a nation in which representatives or organizations of another nation are present because of government invitation or international agreement. The term primarily refers to a nation receiving assistance relevant to its national security. The United States views an HN as a friendly nation that has invited U.S. forces to its territory. HNS includes all civil and military support a nation provides to allied forces in their sovereign territories, during peace or war. HNS occurs under agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support according to prescribed conditions. HNS occurs at various levels—from nation to nation, between component commanders, between major commands, and at lower command levels.

2-11. Support arrangements during peace are viable sources of HNS when authorized by formal agreement. Although preferred, a formal agreement is not necessary in obtaining HNS. The United States negotiates bilateral agreements with HNs to procure these services to support stationing and combined exercises during peace and to prepare for CSS in time of conflict.
The HN provides the types and volume of support in accordance with these bilateral agreements and the laws of the HN, based on its capability to provide such support. The United States and the HN agree on reimbursement for support during the negotiation process.

Civil-Military Cooperation

2-12. CIMIC includes all actions and measures taken by UN, NATO, and national commands or headquarters and HN civil authorities during peace, crisis, or conflict. It also includes the relationship between allied forces and the government authorities of the respective nations on whose territory armed forces are stationed and will be employed.

2-13. CIMIC stems from the need to uphold and respect the sovereignty of the NATO nations and from constraints in the forward basing of units from the United States and other countries. CIMIC missions vary according to the location of forces.

2-14. In NATO, logistics remain a national responsibility. During war, the acquisition of HNS under CIMIC consists of two types of support—preplanned and ad hoc. Preplanned HNS is negotiated during peace and culminates in a formal, signed document. It outlines the support agreed to by the HN as “reasonably assured” during war. Ad hoc requests are requests outside the signed agreement. Normally, these requests are presented to the HN during war, but the support cannot be “reasonably assured.”

Friendly and Allied Nation Support

2-15. USPACOM CA assets developed a database system for FANS. The system assesses all types of support potentially available for acquisition by U.S. forces deployed anywhere in USPACOM. The system is transportable and user friendly. FANS can meet joint service requirements as easily as U.S. Army requirements. The successful FANS program integrates all supply and materiel codes used within the supply system. If the user has a valid supply number, he can access the information requested. FANS requires ongoing resource surveys for each country within USPACOM. CA elements provide continuous updates to this database through ongoing infrastructure assessments.

Planning Requirements

2-16. The priority of the warfighting commander is his combat force. Sustaining combat operations on foreign soil generally requires additional resources. To reduce logistics distribution networking and to meet the need for U.S. personnel and materiel better, senior Army commanders must—

- Determine specific combat support (CS), CSS, and rear operations needs that can be met through foreign resources.
- Assess and identify available assets for use during operations.
- Integrate this support into the overall command and control (C2) systems.
- Designate points of contact (POCs) at each required command level to coordinate the acquisition of resources during peace, during mobilization stages (transition to war), and during war.
2-17. For all levels of conflict, the commander’s logistics staff determines any shortfalls in CSS capabilities. The CMO staff analyzes the local environment and recommends suitable FNS functions and tasks for local sources. The CMO estimate in Appendix C provides CMO planners with a comprehensive format for FNS information. In a developed theater, CA may follow regional guidance and established FNS agreements to devise a set of preplanned FNS requests. In such high-troop density environments, CA teams routinely coordinate with proper FN agencies for the acquisition and delivery of supplies. FNS arrangements may range from an absence of any agreement to preplanned requests for specific services and supply quantities. The less developed the agreement, the more CA must assess and identify the resources.

2-18. For contingency operations, the commander has limited previous information to determine suitable and desirable FNS. Because a total lack of usable local resources rarely exists, imaginative use of available FNS assets increases the commander’s logistical support without unduly depriving the local populace. Airlift constraints and the local infrastructure influence the degree of reliance that can be placed on local support. Similarly, if the projection of U.S. force proceeds in stages, the demands on CA support for acquisition of FNS also differ. The role of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs (G5) or the civil-military operations officer (S5) is to identify and coordinate acquisition of support from foreign resources. CA personnel in a friendly country aid the FNS process by providing liaison with local authorities or military forces. In a developed theater, CA provide the single POC between U.S. forces and the foreign source of goods and services or a government representative responsible for such support. In less-developed theaters, CA identify FN resources and act as an intermediary to introduce logistics personnel to providers of goods and services. In areas with no CA presence, CA area studies include an assessment of the availability of personnel and resources to support U.S. operations. Without a bilateral agreement by which an FN provides support to U.S. forces, the area assessment becomes a primary source of information on available foreign support.

2-19. The CMO staff must analyze the overall situation to determine what FNS is appropriate. Before using FNS resources for specific missions, the CMO staff must evaluate or consider the following factors:

- Capability, dependability, and willingness of the nation to provide and sustain identified resource needs.
- Shortfalls in U.S. force structure, as well as areas where the need for CSS units can be reduced using FNS.
- Effect of FNS on the morale of U.S. soldiers and on the psychological condition of the local populace.
- Operations security (OPSEC) and reliability.
- Capability of U.S. forces to accept and manage FNS resources.
- Inherent risk that FNS may be unavailable in the type and quantity needed during war.
2-20. FNS in contingencies requires broad planning. Various situations may arise, and several countries may become involved as coalition partners or as sources of support. Some nations may consider support agreements that are not in their best interests and may, therefore, be incapable of administering those agreements. In such instances, peacetime planning for local resources may still be necessary to accomplish missions assigned to U.S. forces. The risk that FNS will be unavailable is a significant factor in planning for such support.

2-21. Contingency planners identify areas in which conflicts are likely to occur. When the planners have identified those areas and nations, they request CA area studies. Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), USAID, and other agencies can provide studies to analyze a country’s capability to provide FNS as well.

2-22. Contingency plans for countries that have neither FNS plans nor agreements should provide for CA personnel to be among the first to arrive. They must rapidly identify locally available support and then help coordinate and integrate FNS into the logistics plan. Once FNS agreements have been concluded, CA personnel continue to serve as the link between the local activity and the supported units.

SOURCES OF FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT

2-23. After resource shortfalls and requirements are determined, CMO staff officers identify sources that can fill the requirements. FN sources include various government agencies and private citizens in the theater of operations.

Government Agency Support

2-24. Local government agencies build, operate, and maintain facilities and systems that can support U.S. requirements. Examples of such systems include utilities and telephone networks. Police, emergency services, and border patrols may also be available to support U.S. forces.

Civilian Contractors

2-25. Local, national, third-country, or U.S. contractors employing indigenous or third-country personnel may provide supplies and services, such as laundry, bath, transportation, labor, and construction.

Local Civilians

2-26. U.S. manpower needs range from laborers, stevedores, truck drivers, and supply handlers to more highly skilled equipment operators, mechanics, computer operators, and managers. The foreign national labor pool may provide personnel with those skills.

Special U.S. Units

2-27. Special U.S. units consist of HN military personnel and may be assigned to help perform FNS-type functions. They are configured to conserve U.S. manpower by substituting non-U.S. personnel in specified positions of selected units. An example of this configuration is the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program in Korea, which is part of an FNS agreement.
Indigenous Military Units
2-28. During war, indigenous military or paramilitary units may support U.S. needs in traffic control, convoy escort, installation security, cargo and troop transport, and logistics area operations.

Local Facilities
2-29. U.S. forces may use local buildings, airports, seaports, or other facilities to serve as hospitals, headquarters buildings, billets, maintenance shops, or supply facilities. These facilities may be nationalized, come under local government control, or be provided by contractual agreement.

Area Support
2-30. A nation performs specific functions in a designated area or for a particular organization within its boundaries. Some examples are rail operations; convoy scheduling; air traffic control; smoke, decontamination, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance; and harbor pilot services. These services normally operate under government control by authority of national power acts.

EMPLOYMENT AND SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT
2-31. The senior U.S. Army headquarters normally supervises the employment of FNS through its subordinate headquarters. The degree of authority that U.S. forces exercise over FNS depends on the type of FNS, the location, the tactical situation, the political environment, and the provisions of technical agreements. Some local military personnel, rather than civilians, may perform FNS functions because of the proximity of combat operations.

FUNCTIONS INAPPROPRIATE FOR FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT
2-32. Some activities cannot be accomplished through FNS. For security reasons and the need for U.S. national control, only U.S. assets may perform the following services and functions:

- C2 of medical supply, service, maintenance, replacements, and communications.
- Triage of casualties for evacuation.
- Veterinary subsistence inspection.
- Law and order operations over U.S. forces.
- Control and maintenance of U.S. nuclear and chemical ammunition.
- U.S. military prisoner confinement operations.
- Accountability for and security of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) retained in U.S. custody.
- Identification and burial of U.S. dead.
- Repair of U.S. nuclear weapons delivery sites.
- U.S. patient administration.

TRAINING
2-33. U.S. personnel, particularly CA personnel, must have training in FNS procedures. Foreign language expertise for personnel performing FNS may be
a requirement as well. U.S. personnel must also be familiar with status of forces agreements (SOFAs), various other agreements, and command directives on behavior and relationships in the HN. U.S. personnel performing FNS must be aware that their actions can enhance and promote FNS. They should refrain from any behavior that detracts from a positive FN relationship.

**POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL**

2-34. Civilian and military authorities exercise populace and resources control (PRC). Operations in PRC provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace controls include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of PRC measures. Although the services and other government agencies may employ PRC measures, CA personnel are also trained to support these agencies in PRC. Two subdivisions of PRC operations are DC operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

**DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS**

2-35. DC operations are a special category of PRC. Planning and conducting DC operations is the most basic collective task performed by CA personnel. As a CS task, the goal is to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations. The availability of military resources is normally minimal; therefore, additional agencies, such as nonmilitary international aid organizations, may help CA personnel in DC operations. The use of multinational and voluntary organizations lessens the need for military resources.

**Civilians**

2-36. The control of civilians is essential during military operations. Commanders must segregate civilians from EPWs and civilian internees (CIs) to protect them, as required by international law. Uncontrolled masses of people can seriously impair the military mission. According to U.S. policy, the area population, including DCs, is the responsibility of the civilian government of the country in which they are found.

**Legal Obligations**

2-37. All commanders are under the legal obligations imposed by international law, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In accordance with international law, commanders must establish law and order, protect private property within geographic areas of responsibility, and provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians. FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, and the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) can provide additional information.
Categories of Civilians

2-38. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—those who remained in place and those who are dislocated. The first category includes the civilians who are indigenous to the area and the local populace, including civilians from other countries. The civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can take care of themselves, they should continue to remain in place.

2-39. DCs are civilians who left their homes for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. They most likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be native to the area (local populace) or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term that is further subdivided into five categories. These subcategories are defined by legal and political considerations as follows:

- **Displaced person** — A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his country in time of war.
- **Refugee** — A civilian who has left home to seek safety because of real or imagined danger.
- **Evacuee** — A civilian removed from his place of residence by local or national military order.
- ** Stateless person** — A civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish his right to the nationality claimed.
- **War victim** — A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

2-40. The theater commander—in coordination with the DOS, UN, allies, and the HN—defines the subcategories of DCs. Subordinate commanders must make sure civilians within the AO are not erroneously treated as EPWs.

2-41. Military police (MP) units have the responsibility of establishing routes, camps, and services for EPWs and CIs. CIs are individuals who are security risks or who need protection because they committed an offense against the detaining power (for example, insurgents, criminals, and other persons). CA units must coordinate with the MP units to make sure separation of DCs from EPWs and CIs is in accordance with provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

Objectives and Principles of DC Operations

2-42. The primary purpose of DC operations is to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC operations are also designed to—

- Protect civilians from combat operations.
- Prevent and control the outbreak of disease among DCs, which could threaten the health of military forces.
- Relieve, as far as is practicable, human suffering.
- Centralize the masses of DCs.
2-43. Although the G5 or S5 is the primary planner of DC operations, all military planners must consider DC operations in their planning. The following are principles of DC operations:

- The G5 or S5 must assess the needs of DCs to make sure the DCs receive adequate and proper help. The G5 or S5 must also consider the cultural background of the DCs, as well as the cultural background of the country in which they are located.
- All commands and national and international agencies involved in DC operations must have clearly defined responsibilities within a single overall program.
- The planning of DC operations differs with each level of command.
- Coordination should be made with DOS, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), and FN civil and military authorities to determine the appropriate levels and types of aid required and available.
- Outside contributions to meet basic needs should be minimized as the DCs become more self-sufficient. DCs must be encouraged to become as independent as possible.
- The G5 or S5 must constantly review the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and adjust relief activities as necessary. CA personnel must make maximum use of the many U.S., HN, international, and third nation organizations, such as United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and CARE. Their use not only capitalizes on their experience but also reduces requirements placed on U.S. military forces in meeting the commander’s legal obligations.
- Under international law, DCs have the right to freedom of movement, but in the case of mass influx, security considerations and the rights of the local population may require restrictions.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

2-44. The policy of the U.S. Government is to protect U.S. citizens from the risk of death, injury, or capture when the host government is no longer able to provide adequate protection. In addition, the United States attempts to protect and evacuate certain designated aliens. The United States employs military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an FN or an HN to safe areas or to the United States. Such operations are conducted under the direction of the DOS. The DOS may request help in conducting evacuations to—

- Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.

2-45. Evacuation is the order for authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or the appropriate U.S. military commander. Although normally considered in connection with combat,
evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster.

2-46. CA forces—by the nature of their mission—are well suited for planning and coordinating NEOs. Military support of a NEO involves contact with civilians, domestic and foreign. CA activities in support of a NEO include—

- Advising the commander of the CA aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including writing the CA annex to the U.S. Embassy NEO plan and respective theater plans.
- Supporting operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
- Assisting in the identification of U.S. citizens and others to be evacuated.
- Screening and briefing evacuees.
- Performing liaison with the embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area.
- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.
- Assisting in safe haven activities.

AGENCY ROLES

2-47. Support of a NEO involves coordination with government agencies. The roles of these agencies are significant to the overall evacuation effort.

Department of State

2-48. DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. The Chief of Mission (COM), normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS officer-in-charge, has the primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every U.S. Embassy must maintain a NEO plan. DOS in Washington, DC, maintains a copy of these plans. The Washington Liaison Group coordinates evacuation planning between DOS, DOD, and other affected agencies.

Department of Defense

2-49. A request to commit U.S. forces to conduct a NEO is routed from the ambassador or COM to the President. The senior DOS official in country is in charge of the evacuation.

Department of Health and Human Services

2-50. Under emergency conditions, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead federal agency for the reception and onward movement of all U.S. evacuees. Under less-than-emergency conditions or by request of DOS, DHHS provides support for non-DOD evacuees.

NONCOMBATANT STATUS

2-51. DOD defines noncombatants as U.S. citizens who may be ordered by competent authority to evacuate. Noncombatants include—
Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.

- Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- Civilian employees of all agencies of the U.S. Government and their dependents, except as noted in the second bullet of paragraph 2-52.

2-52. Also classified as noncombatants are U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted in evacuation (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority. This classification of noncombatant includes—

- Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
- Civilian employees of U.S. Government agencies and their dependents who, on their own volition, are residents in the concerned country but express the willingness to be evacuated.

2-53. DOS prescribes other classifications of noncombatants, including personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, military dependents, and designated aliens.

ENVIRONMENTS

2-54. NEOs may be ordered for implementation in any of the following environments:

- **Permissive** — NEOs are conducted with the full help and cooperation of the affected nation. Evacuation of noncombatants is mutually beneficial to friends and allies. The political stability of nations granting authority to evacuate noncombatants is secure. An example of a permissive NEO was the evacuation of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines after the eruption of Pinatubo Volcano.

- **Uncertain** — NEOs are conducted where overt or covert opposition to the evacuation exists. The opposition may come from the “host” government, from opposition forces, from outside forces, or from all three. Usually, show of force (military) is sufficient to maintain control of the situation.

- **Hostile** — Operations to prevent or destroy the NEO are occurring or can be expected to occur. Forced entry by military forces into the AO may be required, and as a minimum, combat operations to secure some evacuees can be anticipated. A good example of a hostile evacuation is the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in 1975.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-55. NEOs are a political last step because they send a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel. The U.S. military plays only a supporting role in the implementation of a NEO. Military commanders have primary responsibility for the military involvement of the operation. This involvement could include support during all phases of a NEO. Military planners must, therefore, include elements of intelligence on terrain, weather, hydrography,
designation and number of evacuees, and other facts on the infrastructure of the area, including dissidents. CMO planners should play a major role in the planning process, starting with the preparation or review of existing evacuation plans and continuing through implementation. CA activities can enhance the military efforts in support of a NEO. NEOs resemble DC operations, and the same planning principles apply. The major difference is that in NEOs the DCs are U.S. citizens to be accounted for, protected, and evacuated to CONUS or other designated safe areas.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

2-56. HA encompasses short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. HA is usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat. HA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. This type of assistance must not duplicate other forms of assistance provided by the U.S. Government.

2-57. In foreign HA operations, military forces provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts to progress. As such, HA missions may cover a broad range of taskings. In every case, the specific requirements placed on U.S. forces are situation-dependent. HA has different meanings to different people, based on perspective. HA operations can encompass reactive programs, such as disaster relief, and proactive programs, such as humanitarian and civic assistance (H/CA).

**DISASTER RELIEF**

2-58. Disaster relief operations can be conducted across the entire range of military operations, from domestic natural disasters to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. HA missions in the area of disaster relief include efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, and civil conflicts. Potential roles for U.S. forces include providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, constructing shelters, and responding quickly to relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property.

**REFUGEE ASSISTANCE**

2-59. Refugee assistance operations are specific operations that support the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. (See the Glossary in this manual for official definitions.) The UN definition of people in these two categories is important because of certain legal ramifications and sanctions associated with these designations. The UN coordinates programs for international refugees and displaced people as directed by the secretary general of the UN.

2-60. Refugee assistance operations include—

- Care (food, supplies, medical care, and protection).
- Placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations).
- Administration of camps.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS OF HA OPERATIONS

2-61. The U.S. force commander, in collaboration with other responding organizations, assesses the environment in which U.S. forces will conduct HA operations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest climate for HA operations.

2-62. Once the operational environment is confirmed, the U.S. force commander determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the mission. The operational environment also determines the rules of engagement (ROE) to be used within the AO. For HA, the more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission. Operational environments are categorized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

2-63. The distinction between HA conducted in a permissive environment versus a hostile environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction results in inadequate planning and unrealistic expectations. HA operations in a permissive environment are characterized by—

- Commonality of purpose for all parties.
- A quantifiable problem, often a single, natural disaster.
- Clear objectives, provision of support until normalcy returns.
- HN cooperation.

Permissive Environment

2-64. A permissive environment is normally associated with pure relief operations following a natural disaster or economic collapse, with assistance provided at the request of the host government. A permissive environment is conducive to HA operations. Little or no opposition or resistance to military forces is expected. Nonhostile, anti-U.S. interests may attempt to disrupt U.S. military activities. The physical security environment may be permissive; however, other nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be employed to impair credibility or to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military activities.

Uncertain Environment

2-65. An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which the FN does not have effective control of its territory and population.

Hostile Environment

2-66. A hostile environment includes conditions, circumstances, and influences in the operational environment ranging from civil disorder or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. Forces conducting HA must be prepared for a full range of contingencies. Commanders can employ their forces to safeguard the populace, defend the perimeter, provide escort convoys, screen the local populace, and assist in personnel recovery operations. HA operations in a hostile environment are characterized by—

- Multiple conflicting parties.
• Imminent danger to all parties.
• Relief as a weapon manipulated by combatants for political gain.

2-67. The more hostile the environment, the less predictable the outcome. HA forces must be prepared not only to counter actions by hostile forces attempting to disrupt the HA mission but also to counter actions by a previously friendly populace. Commanders should not depend on their humanitarian mission to shield them from hostile acts. JFCs, in conjunction with higher authorities, must determine the appropriateness of the use of force. The effects of the environment on humanitarian activities are depicted in Figure 2-2. As the environment becomes progressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security increases, while the capability for humanitarian activities, such as food distribution and medical assistance, decreases. For more detail, see FM 100-23-1, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*.

![Figure 2-2. Humanitarian Assistance Environment](image)

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DURING HA OPERATIONS**

2-68. The development of ROE for the forces participating in HA operation is essential to the success of the mission. ROE for HA operations are characterized by restraint. The levels of force, tactics, and weaponry must be evaluated and addressed.

2-69. The sensitive political and international nature of HA operations means that the CINC must coordinate the details of HA ROE with the JFC, which may change as the operation evolves. Under normal circumstances, JCS peacetime ROE apply to all military operations. The CINC, in coordination with the JFC, must request supplemental measures to deal with specifics of the mission. Actual ROE established for each HA mission depend on the individual situation and operational environment.
2-70. For multinational operations, all participating military forces should establish common HA ROE to provide consistency within the force. Individual nations using separate national ROE respond differently to the same situation. The following precepts are essential to the concept of ROE for U.S. military forces:

- The right of self-defense will never be prohibited.
- A unit commander will defend against a hostile act or hostile intent.

2-71. The two elements of self-defense are necessity and proportionality. In necessity, a hostile act must occur or a hostile intent must be apparent. Proportionality—the use of force—must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to ensure the safety of forces.

2-72. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, executes a number of humanitarian and relief programs. Some forms of HA may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities. HA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. HA programs may be in support of MCA projects. CA teams can assume the lead in initiating and coordinating these programs or assume the role of facilitator. The U.S. military and the CA community can play an important role toward enhancing U.S. national security while improving international relations through DOD programs, such as those described in the following paragraphs.

### TITLE 10, CHAPTER 20, USC: HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE

2-73. Title 10, Chapter 20, USC, is the permanent authority for providing HA. In the past, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported to Congress that some HA conducted by the military was outside the authority of the law. As a result, the Stevens Amendment, enacted in 1985, clarified the conduct of HA as incidental to JCS-directed military exercises. Congress lifted some of the restrictions imposed by the Stevens Amendment in 1986. Title 10 now authorizes HA in conjunction with U.S. military operations, whereas the Stevens Amendment is still restricted to JCS-directed exercises.

2-74. The objectives of HA programs are to serve the basic economic and social needs of the people and simultaneously promote support of the civilian leadership. To help achieve these objectives, CMO planners must make sure the nominated programs have a benefit for a wide spectrum of the country in which the activity occurs and are self-sustaining or supportable by HN civilian or military. HA projects can help eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing needed health care; by constructing or repairing schools, clinics, or community buildings; or by building roads that permit farmers to get their products to market.

2-75. The geographic CINCs, with coordination and approval authority vested in the Office of Humanitarian Assistance, administer the Title 10 HA program. HA project nominations originate in several ways. U.S. military engineers or medical and CA personnel can nominate them or the HN via the country team can generate them. Nominations are forwarded to the theater Title 10 HA representative for review and management control. Project nominations are consolidated at the theater level and forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for approval. Title 10 HA projects require formal nomination and approval before implementation. The HN and USAID must review nominated projects. Both must certify that the project complements and does not duplicate other forms of social or economic assistance. See Appendix D for details on relevant Title 10 HA programs.

Civil Affairs liaison teams (CALTs) in Cambodia and Laos, working directly for the respective U.S. Ambassadors, coordinated the HA efforts for the country team. In Cambodia, the CALT gained access to and delivered tons of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) to defecting Khmer Rouge fighters. In Laos, the CALT coordinated numerous medical and engineer civic-action projects to bring much-needed relief to rural areas. This assistance included coordinating Denton Program shipments of U.S. Military Excess Property hospital equipment to free clinics run by NGOs.

AAR, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne)

CHAPTER 20, SECTION 401 (STEVENS AMENDMENT)

2-76. The Stevens Amendment provides specific authority to use operation and maintenance (O&M) funds to conduct H/CA only during overseas exercises directed or coordinated by the JCS. Fuerzas Unidas Panama 90—during which U.S. forces conducted medical civic-action projects using organic medical personnel, equipment, and supplies—is a prime example of an approved JCS exercise that received funding through enactment of the Stevens Amendment.

CHAPTER 20, SECTION 402 (DENTON AMENDMENT)

2-77. The Denton Amendment is the only legal means for U.S. military aircraft to transport private cargo at no cost. This program is under Title 10, USC, Section 402. It authorizes DOD to provide transportation throughout the world, as space is available, of goods and supplies donated by a nongovernment source intended for HA. Specifically excluded are supplies furnished to any group, individual, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activities. The law has been interpreted to apply only to U.S. donors. The USAID Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation administers this program.

CHAPTER 152, SECTION 2547 (THE MCCOLLUM AMENDMENT)

2-78. The McCollum Amendment authorizes the transportation and distribution of humanitarian relief for displaced persons or refugees. Section 2547 of Title 10, USC, and the DOD Appropriation Act give DOD the authority and funding to donate and transport humanitarian relief supplies on a worldwide basis. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, while often formulating its own programs, responds to, and must coordinate with, the DOS to gain its formal tasking for all shipments. Initial inquiries on the applicability of transportation funds should be made to the Office of Humanitarian Assistance. These inquiries include information on—

- Requirements identified by the U.S. COM.
• Damage and disruption suffered by the economy and institutions of the area.
• General welfare of the people.

2-79. The level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation. In no case will the support exceed—
• The FN’s request for help.
• Applicable international treaties and agreements.
• Limitations imposed by the law of land warfare.

TITLE 22, CHAPTER 32, SECTION 2321J (EXCESS PROPERTY PROGRAM)

2-80. Congress gave the SecDef authority to donate nonlethal DOD excess property to foreign governments for humanitarian purposes. This program is basically supply driven—what is in the supply system limits what is donated. All property is initially consigned to the DOS upon arrival. Such items as clothing, tents, medical equipment and supplies, heavy equipment, trucks, and food are available through this program.

DE MINIMUS ACTIVITIES

2-81. De minimus or the “lowest level” funding provides authority to use unit operational monies to support local civic need when operating in the field. De minimus activities have no specific dollar ceiling. A unit doctor, for example, could examine villagers for a few hours or administer several shots and some medicines; however, operations would not include dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations.

COMMANDER’S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

2-82. Regardless of the circumstances under which U.S. forces are employed, international law obligates the commander with respect to civilians, governments, and economics. Agreements or the law of land warfare usually specify the requirements. The Hague Conventions of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other similar documents set forth treaty obligations. FM 27-10 and other service publications explain the commander’s legal obligations.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

2-83. MCA projects are designed to win support of the local population for government objectives and for the military. Properly planned and executed, MCA projects result in popular support for the FN government. MCA employs predominantly indigenous military forces and is planned as short-term projects.

2-84. MCAs are essentially U.S. military-to-FN military projects where U.S. personnel are limited to a training and advisory role. The projects should be useful to the local populace at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, health, and others contributing to economic and social development. Improving the standing of the military with the civilian populace is a positive by-product of MCA. MCA provides commanders greater flexibility compared to Title 10 H/CA. The scope of MCA projects can be expanded to include military and paramilitary forces as
benefactors of U.S. support in foreign countries. U.S. forces may support MCA projects in two general categories, as follows:

- **Mitigating MCA Projects.** Mitigating MCA projects emphasize the short-term benefits to the populace. This type of MCA is associated with emergency aid or assistance following natural disaster or combat. These projects usually involve medical care, food distribution, and basic construction. A single unit can support these projects with its own organic resources.

- **Developmental MCA Projects.** Developmental MCA projects require continuous support from government sources to be effective. Because of their long-term nature, developmental MCA projects involve interagency cooperation and usually exceed the organic capabilities of a single unit. Developmental MCA projects result from a request for assistance from a foreign country. This type of MCA focuses on the infrastructure of a developing nation and is long term. Developmental MCA projects may be supported by Title 10 H/CA funds if the intent of Chapter 20 of USC is not violated. Operational and tactical commanders have the flexibility to use military resources provided to support their mission and training when the MCA project has a direct effect on the military mission. MCA must address the need of the local people while gaining their support. The criteria and COAs must be evaluated for each project.

**LEGAL ISSUES**

2-85. Legal issues surrounding an HA operation are significant and complicated. Appendix D contains USC extracts that may be relevant to HA missions.

**International Agreements**

2-86. The JTF commander must be aware of any existing international agreements that may limit the flexibility of the HA mission. Existing agreements may not be shaped to support HA operations. Such was the case during Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in Kenya and Somalia from August 1992 through February 1993, when third-country staging and forwarding of relief supplies was a major issue. Military HA commanders dealing with HNs and IOs should anticipate the difficulties that international agreements can impose on HA.

**Law of Armed Conflict**

2-87. Normally, the law of armed conflict does not apply to HA operations. It is, however, used in conjunction with the Geneva and Hague Conventions, protocols, and custom laws that may provide the JFC guidance concerning his operations. Guidelines for forces have to be developed from fundamental concepts of international humanitarian law. Mission imperatives and taskings must have a sound legal basis, and commanders must make sure personnel under their control conform to internationally accepted standards of behavior and action.
2-88. The law of armed conflict applies only to combat actions. Specific legal responsibilities associated with armed conflict that also concern HA operations include—

- Care for civilians in an occupied territory.
- Issues concerning civilians and private property.
- Responsibilities concerning criminal acts.

2-89. These specific legal tenets apply only if HA actions progress to open hostilities; however, JTF commanders may use them as a basis for determining what is permissive and appropriate concerning civilians and private property and for handling criminal acts. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, *International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*, provides details on the law of armed conflict.

2-90. Similarly, other legal issues that arise in an HA situation are not governed by other aspects of the law of armed conflict. Somalia, for example, was not an occupied territory under the terms of the Geneva Convention. Commanders should, however, address such issues using international laws, including the law of armed conflict, as a guide whenever possible. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31 and FM 27-10 provide guidance to the JTF commander.

**EMERGENCY SERVICES**

2-91. Emergency services (police, fire, rescue, disaster preparedness) are primarily the responsibility of government agencies. Civil-military issues are reduced when the government can control and care for its people. The effectiveness of emergency service plans and organization has a direct impact on CMO. Support of emergency service agencies may be conducted as MCA. HA in emergency services planning aids military support during disaster relief and can be conducted in CONUS and OCONUS.

**EMERGENCY SERVICES IN CONUS**

2-92. In the United States, emergency services are a government responsibility at all levels. The federal government provides planning advice and coordinates research, equipment, and financial aid. State and local governments determine the allocation of these resources. In the event of an emergency, U.S. forces must be prepared to help civil authorities restore essential services, repair essential facilities, and, if necessary, take such actions as directed to ensure national survival. Federal statutes and military regulations govern conditions for the employment of AC and United States Army Reserve (USAR) military forces. For a detailed discussion, see FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*.

2-93. DOD components develop appropriate contingency plans for major disaster assistance operations and ensure coordination with appropriate federal, state, and local civil authorities and other DOD components. When a disaster is so serious that waiting for instructions from higher authority causes unwarranted delays, a military commander can take actions that may be required and justified to save human life, prevent human suffering, or mitigate major property damage or destruction. The commander must promptly report the action taken to higher authority. He must also request
appropriate guidance if continued support is necessary or beyond his capability to sustain.

2-94. Federal forces (AC and USAR) used in disaster relief are under the command of, and are directly responsible to, their military superiors. Other military participation in disaster relief operations and the use of military resources occur on a minimum-essential basis and end at the earliest practicable time. Commanders ensure that personnel participating in U.S. domestic assistance programs are not in violation of the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act. This act prohibits the use of federal military personnel in enforcing federal, state, or local laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. The act does NOT apply to state National Guard (NG) troops unless they have been federalized.

2-95. Measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival, and the rehabilitation of essential military bases take precedence over military support of local communities. Requests for support for the use of the military are normally accepted only on a mission-type basis. With the exception of support directed in response to a nationally declared emergency (for example, Hurricane Andrew), the decision rests with the military commander as to the necessity, amount, duration, and method of employment of support rendered. USAR units or individual reservists may participate in disaster relief operations under any of the following conditions:

- When ordered to active duty as a result of a Presidential declaration of national emergency in accordance with Title 10, Chapter 39, Section 12301, USC (see Appendix D).
- When ordered to active duty by the Department of the Army (DA) on recommendation of the CONUS Army commander and the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commanding general (CG) as annual training.
- When approved by Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces Command (CINCFORSCOM) and ordered to active duty in a voluntary active duty for training (ADT) status.

2-96. When committing USAR units or individual reservists to disaster relief operations, the following considerations apply:

- Commitment of USAR volunteers must be consistent with Army policy for military assistance.
- Civil authorities have made a firm commitment to repay all ADT costs.
- State and local assets, including the NG, have been committed, or the assistance requested is clearly beyond state and local capabilities.
- Authority to commit USAR volunteers may be delegated no lower than CONUS Army.
- Commitment of volunteers must be coordinated with the proper Corps of Engineer district or division to avoid duplication of effort.

2-97. USAR commanders may approve voluntary USAR participation during imminently serious conditions in a nondrill, nonpay status. USAR members taking part in such support are performing official duty; however, unit commanders will—
- Not order members of the USAR to participate.
- Approve voluntary USAR participation only when time or conditions do not permit seeking guidance from higher headquarters.
- Make sure reasonably available state and local assets are fully committed or the help requested is clearly beyond the ability of the state and local assets.
- Provide support on a minimum-essential basis. NOTE: Support will end when adequate state and local assets become available.

2-98. CA units assisting emergency planning and operations conducted in CONUS involve DOD-sponsored military programs that support the people and the government at any level within the United States and its territories. These programs and operations are classified as domestic support. In all domestic support operations, civil law and Army regulations (ARs) closely regulate the authority and responsibilities of the commander and members of his command.

2-99. Protecting life and property within the territorial jurisdiction of any community is the primary responsibility of state and local government and civil authorities. Generally, federal armed forces may be employed when—
- The situation is beyond the capabilities of state and local officials.
- State and local civil authorities will not take appropriate action.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

2-100. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the executive agency that serves as the single POC within the U.S. Government for emergency management within the United States. The FEMA establishes and maintains a comprehensive, coordinated emergency management capability in the United States. It plans and prepares for, responds and recovers from, and most important, mitigates the effects of emergencies, disasters, and hazards, ranging from safety and protection in the home to nuclear attack. Under Executive Order 12148, 20 July 1979, the President transferred all functions previously assigned to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency within the DOD to the newly created FEMA. The FEMA is the C2 agency for all emergency planning. Within FEMA, the two primary departments that provide civil defense plans and guidance are the Plans and Preparedness Department and the Disaster Response and Recovery Department.

FEMA Plans and Preparedness Department

2-101. The FEMA Plans and Preparedness Department develops and implements overall concepts and policy guidance and directs activities for nationwide plans and preparedness for emergencies during peace and war. It develops guidance for federal emergency plans and state and local response capabilities, including requirements for communications, warning and damage assessment systems, and tests and exercises. The department also develops—
- Plans, systems, and capabilities to protect the U.S. populace, government, and industry.
• Plans, systems, and capabilities for resources management and stabilization of the economy in time of emergency.
• Policy guidance for stockpiling strategic materiel.

**FEMA Disaster Response and Recovery Department**

2-102. The FEMA Disaster Response and Recovery Department provides direction and overall policy coordination for federal disaster assistance programs delegated to the FEMA director. It advises the FEMA director on the mission, organization, and operation of the agency's disaster assistance program and the total federal disaster response and recovery capability. It administers federal disaster assistance and provides overall direction and management of federal response and recovery activities. The department also develops summaries of existing situations to support the director's recommendation to the President on a state governor's request for a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency.

**EMERGENCY SERVICES OCONUS**

2-103. Every FN is responsible for providing emergency services for its citizens. When requirements exceed the capabilities of the FN, however, the nation may request assistance from the United States through the U.S. Embassy.

2-104. DOD components support or participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after DOS determines that foreign disaster relief will be provided to the requesting country. Military commanders at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster may, however, undertake prompt relief operations to preserve lives and prevent injuries when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. Commanders taking such action must immediately report such operations in accordance with the provisions of DOD Directive 5100.46.

2-105. Approval authority for commitment of DOD component resources or services to foreign disaster relief operations rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. The DOD coordinator for foreign disaster relief is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (DASD[H&RA]) (Global Affairs). The joint staff POC for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Program is the Chief of the Logistics Directorate (J4).

2-106. DOD supplies and services are provided for disaster and humanitarian purposes only after approval by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD [ISA]), on behalf of the SecDef. DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which is normally the geographic command from whose theater the foreign disaster or HA request emanates.

2-107. The geographic CINC, when directed, assumes the primary coordinating role for provision of DOD supplies and services. The military departments and joint staff support the designated commander of a unified command as required, primarily by coordinating interdepartmental approval and funding processes as herein described through the DASD(H&RA) (Global Affairs).
2-108. When a foreign disaster or HA request emanates from a country not assigned to a geographic CINC under the Unified Command Plan, the joint staff or J4 assumes the primary coordinating role in conjunction with DASD(H&RA). Requests for DOD assistance come from the DOS or the USAID through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

2-109. USAID, OFDA administers the President's authority to coordinate the provision of assistance in response to disasters, as declared by the ambassador within the country or higher DOS authority. USAID, OFDA has the authority to provide assistance, notwithstanding any other provision of law. This authority allows USAID, OFDA to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of NGOs and other sources of relief. USAID, OFDA is responsible for—

- Organizing and coordinating the total U.S. Government disaster relief response.
- Responding to mission requests for disaster assistance.
- Initiating the necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.
- Coordinating assistance efforts with NGOs.

2-110. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended) is the authority for providing foreign disaster relief to—

- Preserve life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events that cause disasters.
- Preserve life and minimize suffering by responding to natural and man-made disasters.
- Foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness.
- Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate responses to requests for aid.
- Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs.

2-111. USAID, OFDA can coordinate directly with DOD to resolve matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected nation and to arrange DOD transportation. DOD Directive 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID, OFDA. The DASD(H&RA) is the primary POC. When USAID, OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift), USAID, OFDA pays for the services. The CINC should have a coordination linkage with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID, OFDA provides an excellent means for military and civilian operational-level coordination.

2-112. USAID, OFDA has operational links and grants relationships with many NGOs and IOs that have relief programs outside the United States. These include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies, UNICEF, and United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP).
2-113. USAID, OFDA also coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems. USAID, OFDA can deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the AOR to manage the U.S. Government humanitarian relief effort.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

2-114. As mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended), the DART concept was developed by the OFDA as a means of providing rapid-response assistance to international disasters. A DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills who assist U.S. Embassies and USAID missions in managing the U.S. Government response to disasters.

2-115. The activities of a DART vary, depending on the type, size, and complexity of disaster to which it deploys. During disaster response, DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country, NGOs, and IOs, other assisting countries, and U.S. military assets deployed to the disaster.

2-116. During rapid-onset disasters, the focus of a DART is to—

- Coordinate the needs assessment.
- Recommend U.S. Government response actions.
- Manage U.S. Government on-site relief activities, such as search-and-rescue (SAR) and air operations.
- Manage the receipt, distribution, and monitoring of U.S. Government-provided relief supplies.

2-117. During long-term, complex disasters, the focus of a DART is to—

- Gather information on the general disaster situation.
- Monitor the effectiveness of current U.S. Government-funded relief activities.
- Review proposals of relief activities for possible future funding.
- Recommend follow-on strategies and actions to the OFDA in Washington, DC.

2-118. The structure of a DART depends on the type, size, location, and complexity of the disaster and the needs of the USAID or embassy and the affected country. The number of people required to perform the necessary activities to meet the strategic objectives determines the number of individuals assigned to a DART. A DART consists of five functional areas: management, operations, planning, logistics, and administration.

- Management includes the oversight of DART activities, NGOs, IOs, other assisting countries, and the U.S. military. Management also involves the development and implementation of plans to meet strategic objectives.
- Operations include all operational activities carried out by the DART, such as SAR activities, technical support to an affected country, medical and health response, and aerial operations coordination. This function is most active during rapid-onset disasters.
• **Planning** includes collection, evaluation, tracking, and dissemination of information on the disaster. Also included are reviews of activities, recommendations for future actions, and development of the DART's operational (tactical) plan.

• **Logistics** includes providing support to OFDA or DART personnel by managing supplies, equipment, and services and by ordering, receiving, distributing, and tracking people and U.S. Government-provided relief supplies.

• **Administration** includes the management of contracts, the procurement of goods and services required by the OFDA or DART, and the fiscal activities of the team.

2-119. A DART team leader selected by the OFDA organizes and supervises the DART. He receives a delegation of authority from, and works directly for, the OFDA assistant director for disaster response or his designee. The delegation lists the objectives, priorities, constraints, and reporting requirements for the DART.

2-120. Before the DART departs, the DART team leader contacts the USAID or U.S. Embassy (if present in the affected country) to discuss the situation; to review the structure, size, objectives, and capabilities of the DART; and to identify the areas of support needed by the DART. Upon arriving in an affected country, the team leader reports to the senior U.S. official or to appropriate affected country officials to discuss DART objectives and capabilities and to receive additional instructions and authority.

2-121. While in the affected country, the team leader advises the USAID or U.S. Embassy and receives periodic instructions from the agency. The team follows those instructions to the extent that they do not conflict with OFDA policies, authorities, and procedures. Throughout the operation, the team leader maintains a direct line of communication with the OFDA in Washington.

2-122. The USAID or U.S. Embassy and the OFDA in Washington determine the duration of a DART operation after reviewing the disaster situation and the progress in meeting operational objectives. The DART is a highly flexible, mobile organization capable of adjusting its size and mission to satisfy the changing needs of the disaster situation.

2-123. The functional specialty capabilities of the DART are normally tailored to the particular situation. The team assesses the damage to the civil infrastructure, assists in the operation of temporary shelters, and manages a CMOC. CA units also serve as liaison between the military and local relief organizations, NGOs and IOs, and OFDA DART.

**CAPABILITIES OF ARMY ORGANIZATIONS**

2-124. CA teams rely on local resources when conducting emergency service activities. If, however, local resources are unavailable, military resources may be used. Availability of equipment depends on the location, number, and type of military organizations supporting the emergency. Army assets potentially available in time of emergency include—

• Radio equipment.
• Radiation and detection equipment.
• Generators and lighting equipment.
• Vehicles and maintenance and repair tool kits.
• Demolition equipment.
• Water-purification equipment.
• Medical equipment.
• Heaters, stoves, and fire extinguishers.
• Engineer and construction equipment.
• Tentage.

CA SUPPORT TO OCONUS EMERGENCY SERVICES

2-125. CA units are usually attached to the various maneuver commanders assigned to the JTF. When the JTF is employed, CA units establish and maintain relations between the JTF and FN populace and authorities, as well as with NGOs and IOs.

2-126. CA units can provide the JTF with expertise on factors that directly affect military operations in foreign disaster assistance. These factors include—
• FN agencies.
• Ethnic differences and resentments.
• Social structures (family, regional).
• Religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors).
• Political structures (distribution of power).
• Economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth).
• Linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics.
• A cultural history of the area.
• Attitudes toward the U.S. military forces.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

2-127. Using civilian-acquired skills not readily available in the active Army, RC CA forces focus on supporting civil administrations. The tasks they undertake require application of military skills in environments unfamiliar to military personnel. Support to civil administration may include assisting friendly foreign governments or establishing civil administration in occupied territories. This function includes U.S. military commanders exercising certain authority normally associated with governments. Support to civil administration may fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or international law (see FM 27-10), or it may be in unilateral or multilateral support of foreign-policy objectives in the country where troops are deployed.

2-128. The military role in civil administration varies with the mission, as do the extent and character of the executive activities supported. In Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY (1990) and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994–97), CA support eased the establishment or
reorientation of government agencies to facilitate development in support of a
democratic society. In Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
(1991), CA support enabled the Kuwaiti Government-in-exile to plan the
reconstitution of government services upon liberation from Iraqi occupation
and to deliver those services once the government was restored. Despite the
similarity of liberation from foreign occupation in Kuwait and WWII-era
France, the latter did not restore a prewar political structure but rather
facilitated a new one. In post-WWII Germany, Italy, and Japan, CA support
ensured the achievement of political end-state objectives, as well as the
resumption of government services to municipalities, provinces, and,
eventually, the state. In Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD,
and JOINT FORGE (1996–present), support ranged from facilitating the
conduct of free and fair elections, under the auspice of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to resumption of
communications, transportation, and water and sewage services.

2-129. CA functional specialists concentrate on achieving strategic and
operational-level end-state objectives. Often, these objectives have more civil
than military characteristics, with the former usually focusing on the degree
of stability or unrest of the populace. In turn, the availability of food and
water, shelter, means of economic self-sufficiency, transportation, and
communications contributes to civil stability. CA functional specialists are
one of the tools the military can use to harness various resources to achieve
the degree of civil stability that enables a military force to complete its
mission. The functional specialists seek various resources, some military, but
mostly combinations of civil organizations that can fund, plan, and execute
developments that restore a society emerging from conflict or crisis to a
normal state of civil activity. Moreover, functional specialists work with UN
organizations, IOs, and NGOs, as well as other U.S. and foreign government
agencies, financial resources as diverse as the World Bank, and private
philanthropic foundations, to enable U.S. political leadership to determine
when foreign-policy objectives have been met.

CONCEPT OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

2-130. Civil administration support is assistance to stabilize a foreign government.
Three mission activities support civil administration:

- Civil assistance.
- Civil administration in friendly territory.
- Civil administration in occupied territory.

2-131. Civil administration fulfills obligations arising from treaties,
agreements, or international law (see FM 27-10). The military role in civil
administration varies with the mission and the need or degree of support the
allied government requires or the National Command Authorities (NCA)
direct.

2-132. CA units organize for civil administration support missions that
conform to the political, geographic, social, and economic structure of the
area. Task-organized CA teams, of varying sizes and capabilities, enable them
to support—
• Population centers.
• Specific government subdivisions.
• Economic and industrial complexes and regions.

2-133. CA commands and brigades are specifically organized to support civil administration missions. RC CA battalions must be augmented by specialty teams from the command or brigade to accomplish higher level missions. The mission, conditions, and characteristics of the AO determine the CA support structure. CA units organize and employ assets to achieve—
• Flexibility of employment.
• Economy of force of CA personnel and resources.

2-134. Recognizing political implications is essential to effective civil administration. To ensure continuity, CA support to civil administration employs centralized direction and decentralized execution.

CIVIL ASSISTANCE

2-135. CA forces support civil assistance in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters. Based on military necessity, a commander may begin civil assistance within his assigned AOR to—
• Maintain order.
• Provide potential life-sustaining services.
• Control distribution of goods and services.

2-136. Civil assistance differs from the other two activities of civil administration because it is based on the commander’s decision. It provides short-term military support to an established government or populace and does not incur a long-term U.S. commitment. It also provides support at the subnational level to a U.S.-recognized government. CA units support civil assistance by—
• Determining the capabilities of the existing civil administration.
• Developing plans to reinforce or restore civil administration.
• Coordinating civil assistance plans with FN, U.S., and allied agencies.
• Arranging for transfer of authority.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY

2-137. Geographic CINCs support governments of friendly territories. Local authorities may request the U.S. military to perform basic government functions during disasters or war. As situations stabilize, the functions performed by the armed forces return to civilian agencies. The transition normally is gradual and requires detailed, long-range planning. CA staff officers review civil administration guidance provided by higher authority to identify the military implications of support to civil administration. The NCA must direct that CMO conducted in conjunction with this mission support the CINC’s theater engagement plan.

2-138. The damage or disruption to a nation’s government, economy, infrastructure, or social institutions may exceed its ability to deal effectively with the situation. In these cases, the government may request help through
diplomatic channels from the United States. If a military commander receives such a request, he forwards it to the COM.

2-139. The COM communicates the FN's request for civil administration support through appropriate DOS and DOD channels. The theater CINC tasks the Theater Army (TA) commander to provide the CA personnel for the mission. If CA assets are unavailable in theater, the theater CINC requests support from the JCS.

2-140. Based on directions received from the President through the DOS, the COM negotiates a civil administration support agreement with the nation's government. This agreement outlines the nature and extent of the support needed. It defines the limits of authority and liability of U.S. military personnel. It also defines the CA relationships that will exist. The CINC's legal staff coordinates, approves, and reviews this process.

2-141. A formal agreement is desirable before committing U.S. personnel. If, however, the COM and the theater commander believe a commitment is necessary and is in the best interest of the United States, civil administration support missions can begin before setting up a formal agreement. As soon as possible, however, the FN and the United States must have some form of agreement. The agreement must establish the extent, goals, and expected duration of the support mission. The CINC allocates resources based on the—

- Requirements identified by the COM.
- Damage and disruption suffered by the economy and institutions of the area.
- General welfare of the people.
- CA assets available.

2-142. The level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation. In no case will the support exceed—

- The FN's request for help.
- Applicable international treaties and agreements.
- Limitations imposed by the law of land warfare.

2-143. Regardless of the circumstances under which U.S. forces are employed, international law obligates the commander on civilian populations, governments, and economies. Requirements are usually specified in agreements or the law of land warfare. Treaty obligations are set forth in the Hague Conventions of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other documents. FM 27-10; DA Pam 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare; and other service publications explain the commander's legal obligations.

2-144. The nation's people and government must be willing to accept the support. It must complement the experience and expectations of the supported agencies. This support should be temporary, ending as soon as the government can resume normal activity.

2-145. Many NGOs and IOs can provide aid to a devastated nation. The CMO staff or U.S. Government agencies should contact and encourage these agencies to participate. The CMO staff is well suited to provide coordination and liaison in these situations.
2-146. The senior U.S. commander maintains liaison with U.S. diplomatic representatives to ensure maximum efficiency and unification of policy. An executive order covers the scope of authority and provides procedural guidance.

2-147. Equally important are civil-military relationships in peace when commanders have neither authority nor jurisdiction over civilians. At times, the commanders may even share authority over their own installations and personnel with local civil authorities. Trained CMO staff officers and other CA personnel can accomplish efficient liaison and negotiation.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

2-148. Situations occur when military necessity or legitimate directives require the Army to establish a temporary government in an occupied territory. The NCA must direct establishment of civil administration to exercise temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in occupied territory. U.S. forces only assume control prescribed in directives to the U.S. commander.

2-149. Within its capabilities, the occupying power must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory. This type of operation differs from the other two activities of civil administration in that it is imposed by force. The administered territory is under effective U.S. military control. The goal of the U.S. military is to establish a government that supports U.S. objectives and to transfer control to a duly recognized government as quickly as possible. The U.S. military identifies, screens, and trains reliable civilians to ease this transfer. Even with the use of local civilians, the occupying forces retain the power to exercise supreme authority. Granting authority to civilian government officials does not of itself terminate the Army’s responsibility in the occupied territory.

2-150. The goal of U.S. civil administration of an occupied territory is to create an effective civil government. The government should not pose a threat to future peace and stability. CA support to civil administration of an occupied territory should emphasize that—

- The populace receives responsive, effective government services.
- The populace is able to obtain essential goods and services.
- The measures taken enhance the social and economic well-being of the occupied territory.
- The system of control furthers U.S. political objectives.
- Law and order prevail.
- Restoration, rehabilitation, and development occur in the social institutions and economic system of the occupied territory.
- An orderly, efficient transition occurs from civil administration to civil government.
- The country and people are as well off at the end of civil administration as at the onset of occupation.
- The obligations of international law and treaties are met.
• Human rights abuses against collaborators, minority groups, discriminated social classes, or individuals must be prevented.

2-151. The commander of an occupying force has the right within the limits set by international law, U.S. laws, treaties, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to demand and enforce law and order in an occupied area to accomplish his mission and to manage the area properly. In return for such compliance, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, commanders must observe the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed.

2-152. Occupied hostile territory is an area the United States has taken possession of (through force of arms) with the intent to keep it from enemy control. Possession does not require the presence of troops in all areas of the occupied country. The occupying force must, however, be able to deploy quickly to any area within the territory to enforce its authority. The number of troops required to occupy a territory depends on the—

• Degree of resistance to the occupation.
• Size of the area and the nature of the terrain.
• Population density and distribution.
• Level of development in the area.

2-153. The head of an established civil administration system is the civil administrator, often called the military governor. The administrator is a military commander or other designated person who exercises authority over the occupied territory.

2-154. The structure of the civil administration system may develop in one of several ways. The occupying power may—

• Allow the existing government structure to continue under its control and supervision. This arrangement does not mean the occupying power approves of the existing regime or condones its past actions. The arrangement represents the easiest basis for developing a functioning government on short notice because the government is already in place.
• Retain all public officials or, for political or security reasons, replace all or selected personnel with other qualified people. As necessary, the occupying power executes programs that effect political reform, strengthen government agencies and institutions, and develop self-government. In some cases, the occupying power may reorganize, replace, or abolish selected agencies or institutions of the existing government.
• Replace the existing government and build a new structure. This measure is the most drastic COA. The occupying power should, therefore, adopt this COA only if the old regime has completely collapsed or it is so hostile that its continued existence poses an intolerable threat to peace and stability.

2-155. The occupying power must obey the existing laws but, in many cases, may need to change those laws. International law is specific about requirements, and the occupying power must meet these requirements when
changing civil law in an occupied territory. For further information, consult international law specialists and review FM 27-10 and other texts on the law of land warfare.
Chapter 3

Civil Affairs Functions, Capabilities, and Organization

On 17 August 1955, the CA Military Government Branch became the USAR Branch; on 2 October 1959, it became the CA Branch. The major organizational development of the branch traces back to the expansion of the War Department during WWII. At that time, the War and Navy Departments relied primarily upon volunteers from specific civilian careers for consolidation, occupation, and posthostility operations. In exchange for their services, the volunteers received commissions and appropriate military, area, and language training. Today, civilian expertise remains an overriding requirement in choosing personnel for CA assignments. The Army seeks to capitalize on the unique capabilities of citizen-soldiers who offer high levels of civilian experience and military education appropriate to their grades. The experiences, coupled with military operational and planning expertise, result in soldiers who can support contingencies across the range of military operations. CA personnel support commanders in a broad spectrum of missions, from liaison to the assumption of executive, legislative, and judicial processes in occupied areas or nations emerging from conflict.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

3-1. The primary function of all Army CA units is to support CMO. To accomplish this broad mission, Army CA units are organized to support allied forces, the Services, U.S. Government agencies, agencies of other countries, and various IOs. Mission guidance and priorities—including prioritized regional engagement activities and language requirements—from respective unified command CINCs provide regional focus.

AREA EXPERTISE

3-2. Area expertise is a distinguishing characteristic of CA forces. Through continuing education, country studies, and numerous operational and training deployments, CA personnel maintain individual and unit readiness to conduct CA operations in their assigned region. This regional focus, coupled with specific cultural awareness, ensures relevant CA support to theater OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, and CINC initiatives.

CA GENERALISTS

3-3. Most active duty CA staff personnel and personnel assigned to tactical units are CA generalists. When employed, CA generalists support the commander’s immediate needs by planning and coordinating CA activities that support the mission. The ability to negotiate with local civilians and a
thorough knowledge of the military decision-making process are critical skills of the CA generalist. Effective CMO begin with the CA generalist’s estimate of the situation and continue through COA development and mission execution. Area assessments or surveys assist CA functional specialists in completing detailed planning for CMO to be conducted by other forces.

**CA FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISTS**

3-4. RC CA units are organized to provide expertise in 16 functional skills. Although the AC has the capability to execute missions in some of these functional specialty areas, it cannot maintain the high-level skills required for specialized CA activities. CA activities requiring specific civilian skills are, therefore, maintained in the RC. Within each specialty, technically qualified and experienced individuals advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct their civilian counterparts.

3-5. CA functional specialists are generalists with additional areas of expertise, normally acquired through civilian education, training, and experience. They have knowledge of CSS operations and are familiar with the organization and SOP of supported units. CA functional specialists are normally in Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMs), CA brigades, and RC CA battalions. They—

- Are knowledgeable of FN political issues that have an impact on national-level planning.
- Are area-oriented and able to participate in joint deliberate and crisis-action planning.
- Have a thorough understanding of national policies and procedures.
- Possess technical skills as required to operate within the area employed.

**LANGUAGE**

3-6. A theater-oriented language capability enhances the effectiveness of CA personnel. CA organizations attempt to achieve limited basic language skills aligned with their theater CINC’s priority language list. Ideally, CA units recruit individuals with a combination of civilian technical expertise, military education appropriate to their grade, and language skills appropriate to their theater of employment. In practice, however, language skills are very difficult to attain and maintain and thus must be supplemented by interpreters and translators contracted locally.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION**

3-7. CA units support SOF and conventional forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Most of the Army CA force is in the USAR. This force consists of four regionally aligned CACOMs that support one of four unified combatant commands (USPACOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USSOUTHCOM). The CACOMs provide CA support to the respective CINCs, as necessary, by attaching task-organized elements from their headquarters (HQ) or attached CA brigades and battalions.

3-8. To meet the increased need for a rapid deployment CA capability, the Army established an AC, airborne-qualified, CA battalion with a worldwide
mission. Composed of five companies, each aligned with a geographic combatant command; the battalion is capable of rapidly deploying CA forces anywhere in the world. This capability meets initial CA force requirements during contingency operations. Subsequent transition to RC CA forces begins as soon as the forces can be mobilized and deployed to the AO. Because AC and RC CA units are regionally oriented, they have expertise in the cultural and political aspects of countries within a region.

3-9. To meet the stated requirements of the CA unit’s supported HQ and the total needs of the Army, the living table of organization and equipment (LTOE) structure is in effect. This structure enables CA commanders to resource specific CA mission requirements with functional specialty capabilities in their commands. CA elements are thus tailored, prior to employment, with consideration to the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil (METT-TC). Figure 3-1 shows the various levels of command supported by CA units.

![Figure 3-1. Typical Levels of CA Support](image-url)
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND

3-10. The Army inventory has four CACOMs, all in the USAR. Each CACOM (Figure 3-2) aligns with one of four geographic combatant commands—PACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, or SOUTHCOM. The CACOMs are flexible, multipurpose organizations for training, equipping, mobilizing, and deploying task-organized teams, in support of CMO, for the geographic CINC. They accomplish this mission by providing CMO staff augmentation to component and joint theater staffs, as required.

![Figure 3-2. Typical CACOM Structure](image)

CAPABILITIES

3-11. Capabilities of the CACOM are to—

- Train, equip, mobilize, and deploy assigned or attached CA forces.
- Provide predeployment C2 of assigned and attached CA brigades and battalions.
- Establish procedures and processes for cataloging available indigenous resources, facilities, and FNS.
- Establish procedures and processes for minimizing civilian interference with military operations.
- Provide information to the intelligence system.
- Provide information on cultural considerations.
- Assist in formulating the theater policy for civil assistance, civic action, and civil administration activities and missions.
- Provide a Civil Affairs plans, programs, and policy team (CAP3T) as needed.
- Provide a Civil Affairs Planning Team Alpha (CAPT-A) and a Civil Affairs Planning Team Bravo (CAPT-B) to support CMO staffs at unified, subunified, and theater component commands.
- Provide technical expertise in 16 CA functional specialties to plan, coordinate, assess, or conduct CA activities based on mission requirements.
- Provide liaison with government organizations, NGOs, and IOs.
- Establish a CMOC as required.

ORGANIZATION

3-12. A typical CACOM (Figure 3-2, page 3-4) consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), one CA battalion (SO), and one or more CA brigades.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, CACOM

3-13. The HHC, CACOM (Figure 3-3) provides predeployment C2, staff supervision, and mission planning.

![Figure 3-3. Typical HHC, CACOM Structure](image)

Capabilities

3-14. The CACOM HHC provides the organization, command authority, and staff capacity to execute the capabilities of the command.
Organization

3-15. A typical HHC, CACOM (Figure 3-3, page 3-5) consists of three major elements: a company HQ, a command HQ, and attached planning teams (CAPT-Bs and CAPT-As). The company HQ provides the necessary personnel to support the HQ with supplies and arranges for equipment maintenance.

COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

3-16. The command HQ consists of an economics and commerce team and a G1, G2, G3, G4, CAP3T, government team, public facilities team, special functions team, communications section, and linguist team. It provides predeployment C2 of assigned and attached elements.

Command Group

3-17. Responsibilities of personnel within the command group include the following:

- The commander exercises command of the CACOM and all attached or assigned elements. The commander may also act as the geographic combatant CINC’s senior CA advisor, if deployed.
- The deputy commanding officer (DCO) performs the duties assigned by the commander, including directing the day-to-day activities and command of the CACOM in the commander’s absence.
- The command sergeant major (CSM) is the command’s senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) and the primary advisor to the commander and staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel and the NCO corps. The CSM monitors policy implementation and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. The CSM provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Coordinating Staff Group

3-18. Responsibilities of personnel within the coordinating staff group include the following:

- The G1 is the primary staff officer for all personnel service support (PSS) matters and other administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff officer. The specific areas of responsibility are strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities.
- The G2 is the primary staff officer for all aspects of intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support in garrison. The G2 plans, coordinates, approves, and directs all CACOM-level intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. The G2 identifies the need for intelligence support and intelligence automated data processing (ADP) support and assists in planning and coordinating the support. The G2 is responsible for the CACOM’s information security, information systems security, and personnel security. He conducts and coordinates OPSEC and force protection needs.
The G3 is the primary staff officer for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, planning, and operations of the CACOM. The G3 has overall staff responsibility for OPSEC, force development, and modernization.

The G4 is the primary staff officer for all logistic matters. Specific responsibilities include logistics operations, plans, and transportation. The G4 has staff planning and supervision over procurement, contracting, real property control, food service, and clothing exchange.

The communications-electronics (CE) officer is the staff officer responsible for information systems operations and maintenance. The CE officer directly supervises the command communications section to ensure continuous signal support.

The command chaplain is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on moral, ethical, and religious issues affecting the unit mission. The chaplain plans and coordinates comprehensive religious support of all assigned and attached personnel and their families.

The command SJA is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on legal matters. The SJA advises on matters concerning military law, U.S. domestic law, international law, operational law, foreign law, SOFAs, and ROE. He reviews all mission taskings, orders, and briefbacks to ensure compliance with legal statutes.

CA SPECIALTY TEAMS, CACOM

3-19. The CACOM provides four task-organized specialty function teams and a linguist team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) to support commands. The four specialty function teams comprise the technical expertise of all 16 CA functional skills and correspond with those civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO. Each mission may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition. A transition operation, in which the military force is redeploying home while the FN reestablishes civilian services, may place greater importance on economic development and public administration planning, whereas a humanitarian assistance operation may demand DC and emergency service specialties.

GOVERNMENT TEAM, CACOM

3-20. The CACOM government team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) consists of functional specialists in public administration, public education, public safety, international law, and public health. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The team conducts assessments of government resources and systems and determines how these may impact CMO. Team members coordinate with FN administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander’s objectives. The government team provides recommendations, and when appropriate, direction, to maintain, sustain, and improve FN services.
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Figure 3-4. CACOM Specialty Teams
Capabilities

3-21. Capabilities of each functional specialty within the CACOM government team are as follows:

**Public Administration**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
- Coordinate with FN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
- Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.

**Public Education**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and postsecondary educational systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government education systems as part of CMO.

**Public Safety**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.

• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).

• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.

• Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.

• Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

**International Law**

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes, and statutes.

• Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.

• Assist the SJA in educating and training U.S. personnel in the FN legal system, obligations, and consequences.

• Advise and assist the SJA in international law issues.

• Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise local FN judicial agencies.

• Conduct liaison and monitor the local FN judiciary system to deconflict differences in administration of laws, agreements, and policies.

**Public Health**

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.

• Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

• Coordinate the use of FN government and private health resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.

• Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

• Advise and assist FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).

Organization

3-22. See Figure 3-4, page 3-8, for the composition of the CACOM government team.

PUBLIC FACILITIES TEAM, CACOM

3-23. The CACOM public facilities team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) consists of functional specialists in public transportation, public works, and public communications. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of these on CMO. Team members coordinate with FN administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander's objectives. The public facilities team provides recommendations and direction in maintaining, sustaining, and improving FN services.

Capabilities

3-24. Capabilities of each functional specialty within the CACOM public facilities team are as follows:

Public Transportation

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.

• Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.

• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.

• Coordinate the use of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.

• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).

• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.
Public Works and Utilities

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Public Communications

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and systems.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public communications resources to support government administration and CMO.

Organization

3-25. See Figure 3-4, page 3-8, for the composition of the CACOM public facilities team.

ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE TEAM, CACOM

3-26. The CACOM economics and commerce team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) consists of functional specialists in food and agriculture, economic development, and civilian supply. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses
resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of those on CMO. Team members coordinate with FN administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander’s objectives. The economics and commerce team provides recommendations and direction to maintain, sustain, and improve FN services.

Capabilities

3-27. Capabilities of each functional specialty within the CACOM economics and commerce team are as follows:

**Food and Agriculture**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting, distributing, and marketing.
- Coordinate the use of FN government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance, and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).

**Economic Development**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the FN economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
- Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems and treasury operations.
- Advise and assist in price control and rationing programs.
- Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.
- Conduct liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.
- Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.
- Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal policies, and labor).
- Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies. Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor.

**Civilian Supply**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Determine the availability of local supplies.
- Identify private and public property available for military use.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
- Coordinate the use of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
- Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation; storage; distribution, including rationing; and the use of captured and salvaged items).
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
- Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.
Organization

3-28. See Figure 3-4, page 3-8, for the composition of the CACOM economics and commerce team.

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS TEAM, CACOM

3-29. The CACOM special functions team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) consists of functional specialists in emergency services, environmental management, cultural relations, civil information operations, and DC operations. It provides technical expertise, planning assistance, and staff advice to the supported command. The team assesses resources and systems by sector and determines the impact of those systems on CMO. Team members coordinate with FN administrators and representatives of other associated organizations to support the commander’s objectives. The special functions team provides recommendations and direction to maintain, sustain, and improve FN services.

Capabilities

3-30. Capabilities of each functional specialty within the CACOM special functions team are as follows:

Emergency Services

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government emergency services capabilities and resources to respond to the employment of NBC weapons and hazardous material (HazMat) incident.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of emergency service systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing emergency services systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government emergency services systems to support government administration during an NBC or a HazMat incident (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and restoration of other vital services).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government emergency services plans, policies, and procedures.
- Assist in coordinating and employing emergency services resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use (mitigation, detection, warning, response, and recovery).
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. government assistance and resources to support local government emergency service systems as part of CMO.

Environmental Management

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
• Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
• Coordinate FN government and private environmental management resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover environmental activities.
• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).
• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies.
• Advise, assist, and support the coordination of FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

**Cultural Relations**

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on CMO.
• Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the FN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
• Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.
• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.
• Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.
• Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. Government assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

**Civil Information**

• Advise and assist in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support government administration, CMO, and the “single voice” message.
• Advise, assist, develop plans, and provide operational oversight and supervision in the employment of civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, TV, print, and newspaper), both public and private.

• Assist PSYOP forces in planning, developing, and disseminating proclamations, ordinances, and notices.

• Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.

• Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

Dislocated Civilians

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities.

• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs in support of CMO.

• Assist in planning, organizing, and coordinating FN, IO, NGO, U.S. assistance, and resources to support local government care, control, processing, and repatriation of DCs as part of CMO.

Organization

3-31. See Figure 3-4, page 3-8, for the composition of the CACOM special functions team.

LINGUIST TEAM, CACOM

3-32. The CACOM linguist team (Figure 3-4, page 3-8) provides language expertise to supported commands. It also provides language-training management for the CACOM.

Capabilities

3-33. Capabilities of the CACOM linguist team are to—

• Manage the command language program.

• Provide limited translation capability.

• Manage interpreter support.

• Coordinate the production of soldier handbooks for common phrases in target country or region.

Organization

3-34. See Figure 3-4, page 3-8, for the composition of the CACOM linguist team.

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAMS

3-35. The CACOM provides three types of planning teams (Figure 3-5, page 3-18) to augment the CMO staffs of unified, subunified, Service component, and functional commands. The three types of planning teams are the CAP3T, the CAPT-B, and the CAPT-A. The CAP3T is organic to each CACOM and provides the combatant commander with CMO staff
augmentation. Each CACOM also has attached CAPT-As and CAPT-Bs—one CAPT-B for every subunified command or component Service HQ and one CAPT-A for every functional command or corps supported by the CACOM. Consequently, each CACOM has varying numbers of CAPT-Bs and CAPT-As (refer to individual unit MTOE for specific numbers).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Affairs Plans, Program, and Policy Team (CAP3T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong> HHC, CACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Plans Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Policy Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Team Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administration Specialist (2)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Affairs Planning Team-B (CAPT-B)</th>
<th>Civil Affairs Planning Team-A (CAPT-A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong> HHC, CACOM</td>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong> HHC, CACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plans Officer</td>
<td>Plans Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-5. USAR CA Planning Team Composition

**CAP3T**

3-36. The CAP3T (Figure 3-5) provides technical expertise and staff assistance to unified commands in planning, coordinating, and executing CA activities in support of CMO.

**Capabilities**

3-37. Capabilities of the CAP3T are to—

- Provide responsive CMO staff augmentation to unified commands.
- Provide 24-hour CMO staff planning and augmentation to supported commands.
- Plan and coordinate CA activities in support of CMO.
- Advise the unified command on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relevant to the civilian populace and provide coordination and staff assistance as required.
- Produce initial CMO estimate, CA and CMO annex.
- Provide cultural expertise.
- Plan, coordinate, and recommend CA force structure.

**Organization**

3-38. See Figure 3-5, page 3-18, for the composition of the CAP3T.

**CAPT-B**

3-39. The CAPT-B (Figure 3-5, page 3-18) provides CMO planning support to subunified command and service component HQ.

**Capabilities**

3-40. Capabilities of the CAPT-B are to—
- Provide responsive CMO staff augmentation.
- Augment the CMO staff of a theater Service or functional component HQ.
- Establish and operate a CMOC.
- Augment or support a country team.
- Augment or support a CAP3T.
- Plan, coordinate, and direct CA activities in support of CMO.
- Advise the supported command on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relevant to the civilian populace and provide coordination and staff assistance as required.
- Produce initial CMO estimate, CA and CMO annex.
- Provide cultural expertise.
- Plan, coordinate, and recommend CA force structure.

**Organization**

3-41. See Figure 3-5, page 3-18, for the composition of the CAPT-B.

**CAPT-A**

3-42. The CAPT-A (Figure 3-5, page 3-18) provides CMO planning support to functional and corps or JTF-level commands.

**Capabilities**

3-43. Capabilities of the CAPT-A are to—
- Provide responsive CMO staff augmentation of functional commands and corps-level or JTF-level commands.
- Augment and support a country team.
- Conduct transition activities with follow-on USAR CA forces.
- Establish a CMOC.
- Train and prepare other forces to support CMO.
• Advise the supported command on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relevant to the civilian populace and provide coordination and staff assistance as required.
• Produce the initial CMO estimate, CA and CMO annex.
• Conduct the initial area assessment.
• Provide cultural and language expertise.

Organization

3-44. See Figure 3-5, page 3-18, for the composition of the CAPT-A.

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE (USAR)

3-45. All CA brigades in the Army inventory are in the USAR. Each is aligned with a corps or theater Army component. CA brigades support corps, JTF, theater support commands (TSCs), and theater Army area commands (TAACOMs). Each CA brigade (Figure 3-6) provides predeployment C2 of attached battalions and provides staff support to other component Services and joint theater staffs as required. It accomplishes its mission through attachment of subordinate elements to supported commands. It is also the lowest level CA unit with all 16 CA functional specialties.

**Figure 3-6. Civil Affairs Brigade (USAR)**

CAPABILITIES

3-46. Capabilities of the CA brigade (USAR) are to—
• Augment CMO staffs of a TSC, corps, or JTF.
• Establish procedures and processes for FNS.
• Establish procedures and processes for minimizing interference by the civilian populace with military operations.
• Provide information to the intelligence system.
• Act as the focal point (in coordination with PSYOP) for cultural considerations.
• Provide technical expertise in 16 functional specialties to supported commands as needed.
• Provide interface between local civil authorities and U.S. military forces.

ORGANIZATION

3-47. The CA brigade (USAR) (Figure 3-6, page 3-20) consists of an HHC and one or more CA battalions.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, CA BRIGADE

3-48. The HHC, CA brigade (Figure 3-7) provides predeployment C2, staff planning, and staff supervision over brigade operations.

Figure 3-7. Typical HHC, CA Brigade Structure

* CAPT-As and CAPT-Bs are not organic to the brigade TOE and are reflected in the unit MTOE. Specific numbers are determined by theater requirements.
CAPABILITIES

3-49. The HHC, CA brigade provides the organization, command authority, and staff capacity to execute the capabilities of the brigade.

ORGANIZATION

3-50. The HHC, CA brigade (Figure 3-7, page 3-21), has three major elements—the company HQ, the brigade HQ, and attached CA planning teams (CAPT-As and CAPT-Bs). The brigade HQ consists of an economics and commerce team and a G1, G2, G3, G4, public facilities team, special functions team, government team, linguist team, and communications section. The brigade HQ provides C2 of assigned and attached elements. The company HQ provides the necessary personnel to support the HQ with supplies and arrange for equipment maintenance. The brigade staff and specialty function team organizations and responsibilities are identical to a CACOM. (See details under description of the CACOM.)

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE PLANNING TEAMS

3-51. The CA brigade provides two types of planning teams to augment the CMO staffs of subunified, Service component, and functional commands—the CAPT-B and the CAPT-A. Each of these teams has a separate TOE and is assigned to the CA brigade HHC. The basis of allocation is one CAPT-B for every subunified command or component service HQ, and one CAPT-A for every functional command or corps supported by the brigade. Each CA brigade, therefore, has varying numbers of CAPT-Bs and CAPT-As. (Refer to individual unit MTOE for specific numbers.) See Figure 3-5, page 3-18, for composition of the CAPT-B and CAPT-A.

CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE SPECIALTY TEAMS

3-52. The CA brigade has four specialty teams (government, public facilities, economics and commerce, and special functions) and a linguist team (Figure 3-8, page 3-23) organic to the HHC. These teams provide technical expertise and assist the staff in planning, coordinating, and executing CA activities in support of CMO.

CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALIONS

3-53. The Army inventory has 25 CA battalions (24 in the USAR and 1 in the AC). The battalions are organized under three different tables of organization and equipment (TOEs)—AC CA battalion, RC CA battalion, and RC CA battalion (SO). The battalions provide CA generalist and limited functional specialty expertise to supported commands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government Team</strong></th>
<th><strong>Economics and Commerce Team</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Officer</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Education Officer</td>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Officer</td>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Labor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Officer</td>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Finance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer</td>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Administration Officer</td>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Education Officer</td>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Works Officer</td>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law Officer</td>
<td>Assistant Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clinical Nurse</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Officer (Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Maintenance Officer</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Officer (Labor)</td>
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<td>Environmental Science Officer</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Officer (Finance)</td>
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<td>Sanitary Engineer</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Officer (Projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td>Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Facilities Team</strong></td>
<td><strong>Special Functions Team</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Transportation Officer</td>
<td>Emergency Services Officer</td>
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<td>Public Works Officer (Utilities)</td>
<td>Environmental Management Officer</td>
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<td>Public Works Officer (Facilities)</td>
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<td>Public Communications Officer</td>
<td>Civil Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Transportation Officer</td>
<td>Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Works Officer</td>
<td>Assistant Civil Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Linguist Team</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs NCO (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist (4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-8. CA Brigade Specialty Teams**
CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (USAR)

3-54. The mission of the CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 3-9) is to plan and conduct CA activities in support of CMO for division, corps support command (COSCOM), and area support group (ASG), or other HQ (down to brigade level), based on mission requirements.

CAPABILITIES

3-55. Capabilities of the CA battalion (USAR) are to—

- Provide CA units and elements to support the battalion, brigade, division, COSCOM, and ASG CMO staffs.
- Plan, train, and prepare U.S. and FN military forces to execute CA activities in support of CMO.
- Provide cultural expertise to the supported command.
- Plan and coordinate PRC.
- Plan and coordinate MCA.
- Plan and coordinate HA.
- Plan and coordinate emergency services.
- Plan and coordinate FNS.
- Provide support and assistance to interagency, NGO, IO, and FN agencies.
- Coordinate PSYOP activities in relation to the attitudes and behavior of the civilian population.
- Provide functional expertise in public administration, public facilities, public health, civilian supply, and DC operations.
- Task organize to provide two CAPT-Bs and four CAPT-As.
- Plan and coordinate disaster assistance.
ORGANIZATION

3-56. The CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 3-9, page 3-24) has an HHC, a functional specialty company, and three CA companies, each composed of a company HQ (Civil Affairs Team Bravo [CATB]) and four Civil Affairs Teams Alpha (CATAs). The battalion HQ is commonly referred to as the Civil Affairs Team Charlie (CATC).

HHC, CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (USAR)

3-57. The HHC, CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 3-10), consists of a HQ company and a battalion HQ (CATC).

![Figure 3-10. HHC, CA Battalion (USAR)](image_url)

Command Group

3-58. The command group consists of a commander, an executive officer, and a CSM. Responsibilities of personnel within the command group include the following:

- The battalion **commander** exercises command of the battalion and all attached elements.
- The **executive officer** performs duties similar to those of a deputy commander and chief of staff. He directs the battalion staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. He assumes the duties of the commander in his absence.
- The **CSM** is the battalion’s senior NCO. He is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He monitors the implementation of established policies.
and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. He provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Coordinating Staff Group

3-59. The coordinating staff group consists of an adjutant (S1), an operations and training officer/intelligence officer (S3/S2), and a logistics officer (S4). Responsibilities of personnel within the coordinating staff group include the following:

- The S1 is the principal staff officer for all PSS matters and other administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff officer. The specific areas of responsibility are strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities.

- The S3 is the principal staff officer for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, planning, and operations of the battalion. He has overall staff responsibility for communications, OPSEC, force development, and modernization. The S3 also has S2 responsibilities, including all aspects of intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support in garrison. The S3 plans, coordinates, approves, and directs the S2 section in intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. He identifies the need for and assists in planning and coordinating intelligence support and intelligence ADP support. He is responsible for the battalion's information security, information systems security, and personnel security. He conducts and coordinates OPSEC and force protection needs.

- The S4 is the principal staff officer for all logistic matters. Specific responsibilities include logistics operations, plans, maintenance, and transportation. The S4 has staff planning and supervision over procurement, contracting, real property control, food service, force protection, and clothing exchange. He performs additional special staff officer duties as the resource management officer.

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY COMPANY, CA BATTALION (USAR)

3-60. The functional specialty company (Figure 3-11, page 3-27) provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CA activities in support of CMO. Functional specialties include public administration, DCs, civilian supply, public facilities, and public health.
Figure 3-11. Functional Specialty Company, CA Battalion (USAR)

CAPABILITIES

3-61. Capabilities of the specialty teams of the functional specialty company are as follows:

Public Administration Team

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and their impact on CMO.
• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision for rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
• Provide liaison and coordinate with FN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
• Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.
• Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.

Dislocated Civilian Team

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities.
• Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision for the protection, care, control, process, and repatriation of DCs in support of CMO.
• Assist in planning, organizing, and coordinating FN, IO, NGO, U.S. government assistance and resources to support local government care, control, processing, and repatriation of DCs as part of CMO.

Civilian Supply Team

• Advise and assist in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply resource availability and capabilities.
• Develop plans in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
• Coordinate the use of government and commercial supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, CMO, and government administration support.
• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
• Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation, storage, distribution to include rationing, and use of captured and salvaged items).
• Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and using local resources, such as supplies, equipment, and facilities.
• Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. Government assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

Public Works and Utilities Team

• Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial works and utilities capabilities and resources.
• Develop plans for rehabilitating or establishing works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.

• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration, such as electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities.

• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.

• Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Public Health Team

• Advise and assist in identifying and assessing public and private health and sanitation needs, services, capabilities, facilities, personnel, and resources.

• Develop plans for rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.

• Coordinate the use of FN government and private health resources for military use, CMO, and in support of government administration.

• Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration, such as clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, transportation (ambulance), skilled personnel, and education.

• Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.

• Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, U.S. Government assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

• Advise and assist FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. Government agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).

ORGANIZATION

3-62. See Figure 3-11, page 3-27, for the composition of the functional specialty company, CA battalion (USAR).

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY, CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (USAR)

3-63. The CA battalion (USAR) has three CA companies, each with one company HQ (CATB) and four CATAs (Figure 3-12, page 3-30). The CATB provides CMO staff support to brigade-level organizations, and the CATAs provide CMO staff support to battalion-level organizations.

CAPABILITIES

3-64. Capabilities of the CA company of the CA battalion (USAR) are to—

• Plan, coordinate, and conduct CA activities in support of CMO.
Support the civil administration mission.
Provide supported command with advice, coordination, and staff assistance on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relating to the civil populace.
Update CMO estimates, CA and CMO annex.
Update area assessments.
Provide cultural and language expertise.
Provide liaison to interagency, NGO, IO, and FN agencies.
Assist in establishing and operating a CMOC.

ORGANIZATION
3-65. See Figure 3-12 for the composition of the CA company, CA battalion (USAR).

CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM A (CATA), CA COMPANY, CA BATTALION (USAR)
3-66. The CATA (Figure 3-12) provides CMO planning and assessment support to maneuver commanders.

CAPABILITIES
3-67. Capabilities of the CATA are to—
• Provide CMO staff augmentation and CA planning and assessment support to maneuver commanders.
• Maintain direct data and voice communications with conventional and interagency elements with both classified and unclassified connectivity.
• Provide linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to supported commanders.
• Plan and support CMO conducted by military forces.
• Identify and facilitate FNS.
• Conduct liaison with civilian authorities.
• Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
• Conduct area studies and area assessments.

ORGANIZATION

3-68. See Figure 3-12, page 3-30, for the composition of the CATA of a CA company, CA battalion (USAR).

CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (SPECIAL OPERATIONS)

3-69. The Army has three CA battalions (SO) (Figure 3-13), each aligned with a regional theater Special Operations Command (SOC). The primary mission of the CA battalion (SO) is to support the theater SOC by enhancing the ability of the SOC commander to conduct CMO throughout the spectrum of conflict. They provide theater-oriented, language-trained, and culturally aware CA forces to support the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO conducted by SOF during peacetime, stability and support operations, and war. CA battalions are most effective when employed in support of SF units. A versatile organization, the CA battalion (SO) provides CMO staff support to all echelons of SO, as well as task-organized elements to support Special Forces operational detachments (SFODs).
CAPABILITIES

3-70. Capabilities of the CA battalion (SO) are to—

- Train and prepare CA elements and other forces to support CMO.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct CA activities in support of CMO.
- Provide CA support to the following SO missions and collateral activities:
  - Foreign internal defense (FID).
  - Unconventional warfare (UW).
  - HA.
  - Coalition support.
  - Information operations.
  - Security assistance (SA).
  - Countermine activities (CM).
  - Counterdrug (CD).
  - Combat search and rescue (CSAR).
- Prepare CA-related intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), estimates, plans, annexes, and assessments.
- Train SFODAs on CMO.
- Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of H/CA projects.
- Plan and conduct CA activities in support of MCA, HA, Emergency Services, and FNS.
- Operate in austere environments in support of SFODAs.
- Provide cultural and language expertise.
- Rapidly deploy by all means of infiltration.
- Maintain voice and data communications connectivity with supported SOF elements.

ORGANIZATION

3-71. The CA battalion (SO) (Figure 3-13, page 3-31) consists of a battalion HQ detachment (CATC), battalion headquarters support company (HSC), and three CA companies (CATB).

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT (CATC), CA BATTALION (SO)

3-72. The battalion HQ detachment exercises C2 of the battalion and any attachments. Known as the CATC, the battalion HQ detachment (Figure 3-14, page 3-33) has a battalion HQ, primary and special staff sections, and three CAPT-Bs.
CAPABILITIES

3-73. Command and staff responsibilities of the CATC elements are as follows:

Command Group

- The **battalion commander** exercises command of the battalion and all attached elements.
- The **executive officer** performs duties similar to those of a deputy commander and chief of staff. He directs the battalion staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. The executive officer assumes the duties of the commander in his absence.
- The **CSM** is the battalion’s senior NCO. He is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. He monitors the implementation of established policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. The CSM provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Coordinating Staff Group

- The **S1** is the principal staff officer for all PSS matters and other administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff officer. The specific areas of responsibility are strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities.
- The **S2** is responsible for all aspects of intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support in garrison. The S2 plans, coordinates, approves, and directs the S2 section in intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. He identifies the need for and assists in the planning
and coordination of intelligence support and intelligence ADP support. He is responsible for the battalion’s information security, information systems security, and personnel security. He conducts and coordinates OPSEC and force protection needs.

- The **S3** is the principal staff officer for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, planning, and operations of the battalion. The S3 has overall staff responsibility for OPSEC, force development, and modernization.

- The **S4** is the principal staff officer for all logistic matters. Specific responsibilities include logistics operations, plans, and transportation. The S4 has staff planning and supervision over procurement, contracting, real property control, food service, force protection, and clothing exchange. He performs additional special staff officer duties as the resource management officer.

- The battalion **legal officer** (Judge Advocate General) is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on legal matters. He advises on matters involving military law, U.S. domestic law, foreign law, SOFAs, international law, operational law, and ROE. He reviews all mission taskings, plans, and orders to make sure they adequately address legal issues.

- The battalion **engineer** is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on engineer matters. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the engineer aspects of H/CA and MCA missions. He reviews all mission taskings, plans, and orders to make sure they adequately address engineer issues.

- The **signal officer** is the primary staff officer for all signal matters. He plans signal operations, prepares the signal annex to operation orders (OPORDs), and recommends employment of CA battalion signal assets. He is also the battalion information systems management officer with staff responsibility for automation. He is also the battalion communications security (COMSEC) officer and supervises the battalion COMSEC custodian. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training of organic communications personnel.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-74. See Figure 3-14, page 3-33, for the organization of the HQ detachment (CATC), CA battalion (SO).
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY, CA BATTALION (SO)

3-75. The HSC, CA battalion (SO) (Figure 3-15) provides routine administrative and logistics support to the battalion HQ detachment, the company’s organic elements, and the CA companies. The support company commander commands all personnel and elements assigned or attached to the company.

![Figure 3-15. HSC, CA Battalion (SO)](image)

CAPABILITIES

3-76. Capabilities of the battalion HSC, CA battalion (SO) are to—

- Maintain an organic equipment capability to deploy with and support SOF.
- Provide CMO staff support and CA planning and assessment support to SOF commanders.
- Maintain direct voice and data communications with supported SOF elements.
- Provide task-organized signal support to deploying CATAs.

ORGANIZATION

3-77. See Figure 3-15 for the organization of the HSC, CA battalion (SO).

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY, CA BATTALION (SO)

3-78. The CA company, CA battalion (SO) (Figure 3-16, page 3-36) has a company HQ (CATB), six CATAs, and one civic action team (CACT). The company provides peacetime C2 and supervision of company operations and administration. It coordinates and conducts CA activities in support of CMO for SOF elements as directed.
Figure 3-16. Civil Affairs Company, CA Battalion (SO)

CAPABILITIES

3-79. Capabilities of the CA company are to—

- Maintain an organic equipment capability to deploy with and support SOF.
- Provide CMO staff support and CA planning and assessment support to SOF elements.
- Maintain direct voice and data communications with supported SF elements, with both classified and unclassified connectivity.
- Provide regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise to supported SFOD commanders.
- Conduct liaison with civilian authorities.
- Prepare CA annex.
- Establish CMOC, if required.
- Identify CA intelligence requirements.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct H/CA activities.
- Train FN military forces in CMO.
- Coordinate FNS.
- Deploy by all means of infiltration.
- Operate in austere environments in support of SFODs.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-80. See Figure 3-16, page 3-36, for the composition of the CA company, CA battalion (SO).

**CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM A (CATA), CA BATTALION (SO)**

3-81. The CATA (Figure 3-17) enhances and extends the ability of SOF commanders to conduct CMO by providing CMO planning and assessment support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Action Team (CACT)</th>
<th>Company Headquarters (CATB)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CA Battalion (SO)</td>
<td>CA Battalion (SO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physicians Assistant</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>1st Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Movement NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction Engineer</td>
<td>Communications NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Intelligence NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Medical NCO</td>
<td>NBC NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Engineer NCO</td>
<td>Supply NCO</td>
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<td>Animal Care NCO</td>
<td>Operations NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventive Medicine NCO</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
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<td>Dental NCO</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<th>Civil Affairs Planning Team-B (CAPT-B)</th>
<th>Civil Affairs Team-A (CATA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assignment:</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Personnel:</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Team Leader</td>
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<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
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<td>Plans Officer</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
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<td>Team Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-17. CA Team Composition, CA Battalion (SO)**

3-82. Capabilities of the CATA are to—
- Provide CMO staff augmentation and CA planning and assessment support to SOF.
- Maintain direct data and voice communications with SOF and interagency elements with both classified and unclassified connectivity.
- Provide linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to supported commanders.
- Plan and support CMO conducted by military forces.
- Identify and facilitate FNS.
- Conduct liaison with civilian authorities.
- Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
- Conduct area studies and area assessments.
- Deploy by all means of infiltration.
- Operate in austere environments in support of SFODs.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-83. See Figure 3-17, page 3-37, for the composition of the CATA, CA battalion (SO).

**CIVIC ACTION TEAM (CACT), CA BATTALION (SO)**

3-84. The CACT (Figure 3-17, page 3-37) provides limited functional specialty expertise to supported commanders in the conduct of CMO.

**CAPABILITIES**

3-85. Capabilities of the CACT are to—
- Provide medical, dental, veterinarian, and engineer functional expertise to SOF elements.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct area assessments.
- Advise and assist FN agencies on medical, veterinarian, public health, and engineering activities.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct H/CA projects.
- Deploy by all means of infiltration.
- Operate in austere environments in support of SFODs.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-86. See Figure 3-17, page 3-37, for the composition of the CACT, CA battalion (SO).

**CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (AC)**

3-87. The 96th CA Battalion (Airborne [A]) (Figure 3-18, page 3-39) is the only AC CA battalion. The battalion consists of CA generalists with the mission to provide the unified commanders with rapid operational access to CA assets. It provides rapidly deployable, language-trained, theater-oriented CA forces to support the planning and execution of CMO during peacetime, stability and support operations, and war. It is the only CA unit available for immediate deployment. The 96th performs CA generalist tasks across the
range of military operations until RC CA forces can be mobilized and deployed to the theater.

**CAPABILITIES**

3-88. The capabilities of the CA battalion (AC) are to—

- Plan, train, and prepare U.S. and FN military forces to execute CA activities in support of CMO.
- Conduct CA activities in support of SOF and conventional forces.
- Provide cultural and linguistic expertise to the supported command.
- Plan and coordinate PRC.
- Plan and coordinate MCA.
- Plan and coordinate HA.
- Plan and coordinate emergency services.
- Plan and coordinate FNS.
- Provide support and assistance to interagency, NGO, IO, and FN agencies.
- Supplement information operations and PSYOP plans.
- Deploy with classified and unclassified communications capability to access the local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), global phone, and satellite communications (SATCOM).
- Deploy rapidly within 24 to 96 hours by all means of infiltration.
- Operate independently in austere environments, within the constraints of force protection, with minimal support.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-89. The CA battalion (AC) (Figure 3-18) consists of an HHC and five regionally aligned companies, each composed of one company HQ (CATB) and six CATAs. The battalion HQ is commonly referred to as a CATC. The AC battalion can also form two CAPT-Bs from organic HHC assets and five CAPT-As, one each from the respective company HQ. These task-organized
teams provide initial planning capabilities to supported strategic and operational CMO staffs. Figure 3-19 shows the composition of the CA battalion (AC).

![Figure 3-19. Civil Affairs Team Composition, CA Battalion (AC)](image)

**TOE Organization**

**Battalion HQ (CATC)**
- Battalion Commander
- Battalion Executive Officer
- S1
- S2
- S3
- S4
- Communications-Electronics Officer
- Battalion Surgeon
- Battalion Veterinarian
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Command Sergeant Major

**Company HQ (CATB)**
- Company Commander
- Theater Plans Officer
- Theater Liaison Officer
- Operations Officer
- 1st Sergeant
- Movement NCO
- Supply NCO
- Administration Specialist

**CATA**
- Team Leader
- Team Sergeant
- Team Engineer
- Team Medic

**Task-Organized Planning Teams**

**CAPT-B**
- Team Leader
- Operations Officer
- Plans Officer
- Public Health Advisor
- Operations Law Officer
- Logistics Advisor
- Operations NCO
- CATA Augmentation (2)
- Intelligence Analyst

**CAPT-A**
- Team Leader
- Plans Officer
- Operations Officer
- Team NCOIC
- Supply NCO
- Administration Specialist

NOTE: The CAPT-B and CAPT-A are formed from organic personnel.

**HHC, CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (AC)**

3-90. The HHC, CA battalion (AC) (Figure 3-20, page 3-41) has two major elements: a HQ company and a battalion HQ. It also has the capability to form one or more CAPT-Bs. Known as the CATC, the HHC provides C2, staff planning, and supervision of battalion operations and administration.
Figure 3-20. HHC, CA Battalion (AC)

CAPABILITIES

3-91. The HHC, CA battalion (AC) provides the organization, command authority, and staff capacity to train, resource, and deploy CA forces worldwide. The command and staff responsibilities of the battalion HQ elements are as follows:

Command Group

- The **battalion commander** exercises command of the battalion and all attached elements.
- The **executive officer** performs duties similar to those of a deputy commander and chief of staff. He directs the battalion staff and assigns specific responsibilities to prepare plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions. He assumes the duties of the commander in the commander’s absence.
- The **CSM** is the battalion’s senior NCO and is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel and the NCO corps. The CSM monitors the implementation of established policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. The CSM provides counsel and guidance to NCOs and other enlisted personnel.

Coordinating Staff Group

- The **adjutant (S1)** is the principal staff officer for all PSS matters and other administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff officer. The specific areas of responsibility are

---

* Ability to form two CAPT-Bs from organic assets.
strength management, casualty reporting, and morale support activities.

- The **intelligence officer (S2)** is the principal staff officer for all aspects of intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support in garrison. He plans, coordinates, approves, and directs all battalion-level intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination. He identifies the need for, and assists in the planning and coordination of intelligence support and intelligence ADP support. He is responsible for the battalion’s information security, information systems security, and personnel security. He conducts and coordinates OPSEC and force protection needs.

- The **operations and training officer (S3)** is the principal staff officer for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, planning, and operations of the battalion. The S3 has overall staff responsibility for OPSEC, force development, and modernization.

- The **logistics officer (S4)** is the principal staff officer for all logistic matters. Specific responsibilities include logistics operations, plans and transportation. The S4 has staff planning and supervision over procurement, contracting, real property control, food service, force protection, and clothing exchange. He performs additional special staff officer duties as the resource management officer.

- The **CE officer** is the principal advisor for all communications and automation. Specifically, he ensures open, secure communication and data links to forces deployed worldwide. He ensures capabilities for stand-alone peacetime engagement missions and compatibility with any supported unit.

**Special Staff Group**

- The **SJA** is the primary advisor to the commander and his staff on legal matters. He advises on matters concerning military law, U.S. domestic law, international law, operational law, foreign law, SOFAs, and ROE. He reviews all mission taskings, orders, and backbriefs to ensure compliance with legal statutes.

- The **battalion surgeon** is the primary advisor to the commander and staff for all matters concerning medical readiness and public health affecting the battalion and its attached elements. He directly supervises the battalion medical section. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training of organic and attached medical personnel.

- The **battalion veterinarian** is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on all matters of zoonosis, public health, and preventive medicine. He works closely with the battalion surgeon on matters affecting the medical readiness of the battalion and assists in the training of organic and attached medical personnel.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-92. See Figure 3-20, page 3-41, for the organization of the HHC, CA battalion (AC).
CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAM B (CAPT-B), CA BATTALION (AC)

3-93. The CAPT-B (Figure 3-19, page 3-40) provides a rapidly deployable CA planning augmentation capability for theater CINCs and JTFs. It provides operational- and strategic-level initial CA planning capability as well and can support or augment the CAP3T. The CAPT-B provides short-term (30- to 45-day) staff augmentation to JTF and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) or country team.

CAPABILITIES

3-94. Capabilities of the CAPT-B are to—
• Plan, coordinate, and direct CA activities in support of CMO.
• Establish and operate a CMOC.
• Augment and support a country team.
• Provide liaison to interagency, NGO, IO, government, and FN agencies.
• Conduct transition activities with follow-on USAR CA forces.
• Augment and support a CAP3T.
• Train and prepare CA elements and other forces to support CMO.
• Provide supported command with advice, coordination, and staff assistance on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relating to the civil populace.
• Produce initial CMO estimate, CA and CMO annex.
• Provide cultural and language expertise.
• Plan, coordinate, and recommend CA force structure.
• Maintain direct data and voice communications with conventional, SOF, and interagency elements with both classified and unclassified connectivity.

ORGANIZATION

3-95. See Figure 3-19, page 3-40, for the composition of CAPT-B.

CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY, CA BATTALION (AC)

3-96. The mission of the CA company, CA battalion (AC) (Figure 3-21, page 3-44) is to provide rapidly deployable, regionally aligned, CA generalists in support of unified and subunified commands. The company command group ensures that unit missions complement the CINC’s theater engagement plan by directing assets to support priority missions. The company provides C2, staff planning, and supervision of company operations and administration.
Figure 3-21. CA Company, CA Battalion (AC)

CAPABILITIES

3-97. Capabilities of the CA company are to—

• Maintain an organic equipment capability to deploy with and to support rapid-deployment conventional and SO forces.
• Provide the organization, command authority, and staff capacity to execute the capabilities of the company.
• Provide SOF-certified, language-trained, theater-oriented, CA soldiers to supported commands.
• Provide CMO planning expertise to supported commands.
• Provide linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to supported units.
• Deploy rapidly, within 24 to 96 hours, by infiltration.

ORGANIZATION

3-98. See Figure 3-21 for the organization of the CA company, CA battalion (AC).

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS (CATB), CA COMPANY, CA BATTALION (AC)

3-99. The CATB (Figure 3-21) provides CMO planning and assessment support and liaison to maneuver or operational commanders.
CAPABILITIES

3-100. Capabilities of the CATB are to—

- Maintain an organic equipment capability to deploy with and support rapid deployment conventional and SOF.
- Provide liaison with theater CINC/SOC and regionally oriented CACOM.
- Augment battalion, brigade, division, corps, or JTF CMO staffs.
- Task-organize into CAPT-A when required.
- Provide CMO planning and staff augmentation to supported commands.
- Maintain direct data and voice communications with conventional, SOF, and interagency elements with both classified and unclassified connectivity.
- Deploy rapidly by all means of infiltration.

ORGANIZATION

3-101. See Figure 3-21, page 3-44, for the organization of the CATB.

CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM A (CATA), CA COMPANY, CA BATTALION (AC)

3-102. The CATA (Figure 3-21, page 3-44) provides the tactical HQ with a rapidly deployable CA asset capable of conducting staff augmentation, planning, and CMO assessments. The CATA conducts general and limited technical assessments based on military occupational specialty (MOS) skills—operations, intelligence, engineer, and medical. Technical assessments require RC CA assets with functional skills. The general assessment or survey conducted by the CATA allows RC functional specialists to complete detailed planning for CMO that other forces will conduct. The essence of the CATA is the ability to deploy rapidly and to support the commander's immediate needs by facilitating or conducting CA activities that support the tactical mission. The CATA provides short-term CMO direct support (90 days) to maneuver battalions, brigades, and divisions.

3-103. At a minimum, each team member possesses the following skills:

- The team leader supervises and manages the team’s functions. He is command-qualified and branch immaterial. He usually possesses a master’s degree in international relations. In addition, the team leader is a graduate of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC), Psychological Operations Course, and the Regional Studies Course. The team leader possesses a theater-specific language capability as well.

- The team sergeant (MOS 18F) is the senior NCO on the team. He is an SF-qualified Sergeant First Class and a graduate of the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Course and the CAOC. The team sergeant possesses a theater-specific language capability, as well as one of the four specific SF MOS skills (communications, light and heavy weapons, medical, or engineer and demolitions).
• The **team engineer (MOS 18C)** is an SF-qualified Sergeant First Class and graduate of the CAOC. He possesses a theater-specific language capability and can conduct assessments of the HN infrastructure. The team engineer can plan, advise, and assist numerous construction projects to support the CINC’s campaign plan. He has the knowledge to carry out civilian and military logistical plans. He can advise and assist the HN in construction projects that improve its infrastructure.

• The **team medical NCO (MOS 18D)** is an SF-qualified Sergeant First Class and a graduate of the CAOC. He possesses a theater-specific language capability. The team medical NCO can plan and conduct medical assessments and provide routine, emergency, and preventive medical and health care to civilian and military personnel. He possesses the knowledge to carry out limited veterinarian and dental care, as well as environmental health programs.

3-104. All SF NCOs have a minimum of 4 to 5 years experience in a respective SF group where they develop their military skills and gain regional expertise.

**CAPABILITIES**

3-105. Capabilities of the CATA are to—

- Deploy rapidly, within 24 to 48 hours.
- Provide CMO staff augmentation and CA planning and assessment support to maneuver commanders.
- Maintain direct data and voice communications with conventional, SOF, and interagency elements with both classified and unclassified connectivity.
- Provide linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to supported commanders.
- Provide general and limited technical assessments (engineering, medical, intelligence).
- Plan and support CMO conducted by military forces.
- Identify and facilitate FNS.
- Conduct liaison with civilian authorities.
- Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
- Conduct area studies and area assessments.
- Establish and operate a CMOC.

**ORGANIZATION**

3-106. See Figure 3-21, page 3-44, for the organization of the CATA. Also see Figure 3-19, page 3-40, for the composition of the CATA.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING TEAM A (CAPT-A), CA COMPANY, CA BATTALION (AC)**

3-107. The CAPT-A (Figure 3-21, page 3-44) provides short-term (30 to 45 days) staff augmentation to division, brigade, or battalions.
CAPABILITIES

3-108. Capabilities of the CAPT-A are to—

- Augment and support a country team.
- Conduct transition activities with follow-on USAR CA forces.
- Plan, coordinate, and conduct CA activities in support of CMO.
- Train and prepare CA elements and other forces to support CMO.
- Provide supported command with advice, coordination, and staff assistance on the employment of CA capabilities and issues relating to the civil populace.
- Produce initial CMO estimate, CA (CMO) annex.
- Conduct initial area assessment.
- Provide cultural and language expertise.
- Provide liaison to interagency, NGO, IO, and FN agencies.
- Augment and support a CAP3T.

ORGANIZATION

3-109. See Figure 3-21, page 3-44, for the organization of the CAPT-A. Also see Figure 3-19, page 3-40, for the composition of the CAPT-A.
Chapter 4

Command and Control

CA mission capabilities support both broad and specific U.S. foreign policy goals. Because the conduct of CMO entails joint and interagency coordination, commanders and the senior staff must understand the U.S. organization for national security and the prevailing concepts of joint and multinational military operations.

COMBATANT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

4-1. Unified commands have assigned forces of two or more Services and broad, continuing missions. CA support is oriented toward the commanders of those CINCs of geographic commands with specified geographic responsibilities. CINCs report through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the NCA—the President and the SecDef. The CINCs’ mission requires them to initiate, maintain, or improve peacetime relations between the nations in their AOR and the United States. The mission also requires the CINCs to plan for and address conflicts that may threaten U.S. interests in the region. CA forces provide support across the range of military operations and, therefore, are familiar with the geographic CINCs’ concerns in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The Army defines its specific actions in these areas of concern as offense, defense, and stability and support operations. Army commanders at all echelons combine offense, defense, and stability and support simultaneously or sequentially to accomplish assigned missions in war and MOOTW.

4-2. The command authority vested in geographic combatant commanders by statutory law is known as combatant command (COCOM). Unless otherwise directed by the NCA, the CINCs exercise command authority over all military assets placed under their operational control (OPCON). In the exercise of OPCON, the CINC can—

- Determine CA force requirements and operational priorities.
- Prescribe the chain of command for CA forces operating within his AOR.
- Establish and maintain appropriate liaison with U.S. Government agencies and FNs or FN military and civil agencies.

4-3. CA personnel may perform liaison work with the U.S. Government and civilian agencies, such as the USAID and the Department of Justice (DOJ), to provide advice and assistance in any or all of the 16 functional skill areas. Combatant commanders determine C2 requirements of CA personnel and forces supporting allied or multinational commanders within the policy constraints issued by the NCA.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
4-4. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the unified command for SOF. The mission of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), is to prepare assigned forces to conduct SO as required. All CONUS-based SOF are assigned to USSOCOM, which has no geographic AOR. USCINCSOC acts as a supporting CINC by providing mission-ready SOF to the geographic commands or as the supported commander for the conduct of SO. CA units are under the COCOM of USCINCSOC until a change of operational control (CHOP) occurs to one of the geographic CINC's. USSOCOM coordinates with the geographic commands to validate all requests for CA units and individuals during peace and war.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
4-5. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (Figure 4-1, page 4-3) is the Army component of USSOCOM. Its mission is to command and support and to ensure combat readiness of assigned and attached ARSOF. As the Army's senior level command of CA units, USASOC has the responsibility, in conjunction with USCINCSOC, to recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize, and sustain Army CA forces. As a major command (MACOM), USASOC's primary mission is—

- Policy development.
- Long-range planning.
- Programming and budgeting.
- Management and distribution of resources.
- Program performance review and evaluation.

4-6. When directed, USASOC provides CA elements to the geographic CINCs. The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) is a major subordinate command of USASOC and commands the Army's CA and PSYOP units. USACAPOC alerts CA elements for operational missions and validates USAR CA units during mobilization.

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS
4-7. CA operate under various C2 relationships. The requirements of the commander at each echelon of command determine the exact C2 structure. CA operations are inherently joint or multinational. Because CA units are neither organized nor equipped to provide unilateral C2 of attached units, they are normally attached to higher commands.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

4-8. The most common CA mission activities during stability and support operations include HA, MCA, and support to civil administration. These activities often entail close working relationships with nonmilitary individuals and agencies. In many cases, CA teams work for the U.S. Ambassador and his country team. Once deployed and CHOP has passed to the geographic CINC, the CINC normally exercises OPCON through the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group, the Chief of the Security Assistance Office (SAO), or the Defense Attaché Officer (DAO). The immediate commander keeps the U.S. Ambassador informed of plans and activities during the deployment. A thorough knowledge of the country team and the SAO is essential to understanding interagency C2 arrangements in the operational environment.

- **Country Team.** The country team is the executive committee of the Embassy. It consists of senior members of the U.S. Government agencies assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission overseas. By public law, the Ambassador is the Chief of Mission and directs the country team. Members of the country team meet regularly to coordinate U.S. Government political, economic, and military activities in the HN. See Appendix E for more detail on the country team.
• **SAO.** The SAO provides U.S. military advisory assistance to the FN. Certain countries do not have U.S. Embassies; therefore, the organizations within neighboring countries service them. An SAO is not present in all Embassies. DOD tailors each SAO to the needs of the FN. For this reason, no typical or standard SAO exists. The SAO in country may have various names, depending on the number of people it has, the function it performs, or the desires of the FN. Typical SAO designations include Joint Military Advisory Groups, Joint U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission, or Office of Defense Cooperation. The SAO is responsible to three authorities: the country ambassador, the geographic CINC, and the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Ambassador has OPCON of all matters affecting his diplomatic mission, including SA programs.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

4-9. The overseas deployment of CONUS-based CA units involves a CHOP from USSOCOM to the gaining geographic CINC. Transfers of forces between geographic commands occur only by the authority of the NCA. The CHOP of forces for an operational deployment requires a deployment order approved by the NCA. At a predetermined point—for example, upon crossing a specific latitude or longitude—OPCON formally transfers to the gaining CINC.

4-10. The CA requirements for contingency operations normally fall into two categories:

- **Civil Affairs Planning Teams.** CINC and JTF staffs normally require CMO staff planning expertise during the early phases of a contingency. CACOMs support their respective geographic COCOM HQs by providing CAP3Ts to augment the CMO staff. CA brigades support their war-traced component Service commands, subunified commands, or corps by providing CAPT-As and CAPT-Bs to augment the respective CMO staffs of those commands.

- **Civil Affairs Teams.** Maneuver units may also require CA support. In this case, a CATA, CATB, or CATC from war-traced CA battalions may be deployed and attached to maneuver divisions, brigades, and battalions to augment CMO staffs at those respective levels. CA battalions (SO) provide support to the theater SOC by providing planning teams to augment the SOC staff, as well as attaching task-organized elements to Special Forces Group S-5s and operational units, as needed.

4-11. CA personnel assist in the coordination and integration of logistics area operations with civilian police, emergency service agencies, and FN forces to ensure mutual protection and efficient use of resources.

4-12. CA support may be centralized or decentralized. When employed in centralized support, CA personnel fulfill CA needs by responding directly to the commander. In decentralized support, CA teams are attached to major subordinate elements located in the AOR—for example, depots, ports, hospitals, and other facilities.
JOINT TASK FORCES

4-13. The CINC may designate corps and divisions as JTFs. A JTF plans, conducts, and supports military operations on a mission or area basis. It accomplishes a specific mission or campaign of limited duration, but it can exist on a more permanent basis. During war or prolonged conflict, the JTF may control operations in a specific portion of the CINC’s AOR. A JTF may be a new organization but is often formed by augmenting an existing Service HQ with elements from other Services. CA units support JTFs by providing task-organized elements to augment the JTF CMO staff. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, for further guidance on CA support to joint operations.

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

4-14. The Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) is not a CA organization. It is a special purpose task force composed of units from two or more Services, flexible in size and composition, organized to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in a theater of operations or JOA. The JCMOTF may have both conventional and SOF assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (See JP 3-57.) The JCMOTF, if properly chartered and established by the JFC, must meet the criteria as established in JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. A requirement may exist for strong representation of CA-trained personnel. The expertise of CA personnel in dealing with government organizations, IOs, and NGOs greatly enhances the opportunity for success.

4-15. A JCMOTF may be established to—

- Accomplish a specific contingency mission, such as HA or support to civil administration.
- Provide CMO support to U.S. or coalition military forces conducting military operations concurrent with or subsequent to geographic or general conflict.
- Perform other operations as directed by the commander, joint task force (CJTF).

4-16. A JCMOTF could—

- Be organized as either a stand-alone JTF or as a subordinate unit in a JTF.
- Assist other JTF unit commanders, when the amount of CMO to be accomplished exceeds the ability of the commander’s units to accomplish CMO in their AOR.
- Provide—as part of a larger JTF—the CJTF, through a CMOC with a linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the JOA.

4-17. A JCMOTF should not—

- Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.
- Have, when subordinate to a JTF, the primary responsible force for accomplishing all CMO in the JOA.
- Eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO.
• Eliminate the need for all commanders in the JOA to plan and conduct CMO.

4-18. CA planning teams assist the CJTF's CMO staff officer by augmenting the CMO staff cells and the JTF CMOCs.

4-19. A JCMOTF should not be responsible for accomplishing all CMO tasks in the JOA. Service component and other task force commanders are responsible for accomplishing the CMO that they have the capability to accomplish within their AOR. When the need exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF can assist in meeting the shortfall.

4-20. The JCMOTF does not eliminate the need for all units to train on CMO. Such operations can be as complex as disaster assistance operations or as simple as the guard at a checkpoint controlling civilian access into an area or patrol personnel respecting civilian property as they move through a community.

4-21. A review of U.S. military operations shows that the U.S. military has participated in numerous contingencies that have CMO as a mission. Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. military has deployed forces in support of numerous CMO, as shown in Figure 4-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Mission Type</th>
<th>Location and Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROMOTE LIBERTY</td>
<td>PRC, FNS, HA, Support to Civil Administration</td>
<td>Panama, 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM</td>
<td>PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, Support to Civil Administration</td>
<td>Iraq and Kuwait, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK FORCE FREEDOM</td>
<td>HA, MCA, FNS</td>
<td>Kuwait, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVIDE COMFORT</td>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Iraq, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA ANGEL</td>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Bangladesh, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESTORE and CONTINUE HOPE</td>
<td>HA, PRC</td>
<td>Somalia, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT TASK FORCE-BRAVO</td>
<td>HA, PRC, MCA, FNS</td>
<td>Central America, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT HOPE</td>
<td>HA, PRC</td>
<td>Zaire and Rwanda, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD</td>
<td>PRC, HA, FNS, Emergency Services, Support to Civil Administration</td>
<td>Bosnia, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>HA, PRC</td>
<td>Congo and Rwanda, 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-2. CMO Missions

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

4-22. Each CINC has established a theater SOC to exercise OPCON of theater SOF. Some of the SOCs have OPCON of all assigned and attached SOF, while others only have OPCON of SOF excluding CA and PSYOP forces. The SOC responsibility includes integrated SOF mission planning that develops the CINC’s guidance into a blend of SO activities that support the theater campaign plan.
CIVIL AFFAIRS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-23. The organization of a multinational command may retain integrity of the forces, but the HQ of such a command is staffed with personnel from the troop-contributing nations. Consequently, a CMO staff section normally has personnel from several nations. In subordinate echelons, the multinational command commander allows the senior commander of each FN military considerable latitude in conducting CMO in support of the theater campaign plan.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

4-24. In multinational operations, at theater level, senior military leaders develop C2 relationships that respond to the constraints imposed by the nations contributing to the multinational effort. In interagency operations, the country's political leadership often designates a lead agency. Both organizational structures obey the principle of unity of effort as distinct from unity of command. Civilian agencies and organizations that normally do not operate in a hierarchical system may not respond well to the principles of C2. Such structuring often leads to uncooperative working relationships at the expense of the people in need.
Chapter 5

Employment of Civil Affairs Forces

CA forces augment CMO staffs of geographic, theater Army component, and maneuver commanders, down to battalion level, as well as U.S. country teams, other government agencies, and multinational forces. They accomplish this mission by assisting in planning, coordinating, and supervising CA activities in support of CMO. The specific activities are mission dependent and determined after applying the special operations mission evaluation criteria and the military decision-making process. CA commanders tailor their forces to meet mission requirements and to ensure the timely employment of the proper mix of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level forces, as well as functional specialists. Key to this effort is the early deployment of planning teams to provide relevant CA input to OPLANs, functional plans, and CONPLANs.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

5-1. CMO staffs at every level—augmented by periodic and regular deployments of CAP3Ts, CAPT-Bs, and CAPT-As—continually review and, if necessary, update OPLANs and CONPLANs. The organic CMO staffs, augmented by CA planning teams as necessary, maintain situational awareness by participating in their respective supported command and staff updates, as well as relevant crisis-action exercises. When a crisis occurs, the CMO staff requests augmentation by its war-traced CA planning teams to begin developing the CMO estimate and, if needed, a CA annex (Appendix F). An important element of this deliberate or crisis-action planning process focuses on developing a recommended CA task organization, to include identifying needs for functional specialists. The supported commander validates the recommendation and forwards it through the respective CINC to USSOCOM for resourcing. NOTE: Requests for deployment must go through the JCS.

5-2. USASOC receives the USSOCOM-validated mission taskings and validates them again to ensure they meet SOF mission criteria. If validated, the taskings go to USACAPOC, where they are again validated and resourced. USACAPOC assigns the mission planning authority to a regional CACOM or, in the case of missions that require rapid deployment, to the AC CA battalion. AC CA forces task-organize to address specific mission requirements and to deploy to the operational area or directly to the supported unit. This rapid-response capability enhances the supported commander’s efforts to coordinate with government and nongovernment agencies and organizations. This capability ultimately enhances the support and force protection posture of the command.
5-3. Following the rapid deployment of AC CA forces and initial CA assessments, which validate or invalidate the original CMO estimate, a long-term plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills to support the mission. This plan is formulated with significant input from CONUS-based CA functional specialists. (NOTE: Functional specialists should deploy only when a specific need exists for their expertise.) The results of the assessment and recommended task organization flows from the theater commander to USCINCSOC for validation, feasibility assessment, and eventual resourcing. The regionally aligned CACOM normally provides resourcing.

5-4. Concurrently, requests for a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) (if required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the JCS and DOD. When authorized, CA elements are mobilized and deployed. Mission handoff or transition occurs when the RC CA forces arrive. The AC CA forces are redeployed (Figure 5-1) or reassigned in theater, as needed.
ACCESS TO CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

5-5. One of the major obstacles to RC CA employment is timely access. During peacetime operations, proper long-range planning overcomes this obstacle. In contingency operations, however, the authority to deploy RC forces is a lengthy process.

5-6. Missions requiring long-duration, robust CA force packages inevitably require an authority for partial mobilization of the RC under the provisions of a PSRC. Without this authority, RC units must rely on individual volunteers to fill requirements. Although this method is adequate for short-duration missions, it is unsustainable over the long term. Historically, sustainment of long-term missions (more than 1 year), requires CA elements to deploy on 180- to 270-day rotations. Short-term missions (less than 1 year) can be sustained by CA elements on a 90- to 180-day rotation. A temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) can best support these missions.

5-7. The requirement for CA forces begins with the receipt of a mission by the geographic CINC. The CINC staff analyzes the mission and determines the assets needed to support the mission. If mission analysis determines the need for CA forces and the respective CINC does not have organic forces to fill the requirement, the CINC staff forwards to the JCS a request for CA forces. Once validated, the request goes to the USCINCSOC, who, in turn, tasks USASOC to provide forces. USASOC receives task orders (TASKORD) for Army CA support and forwards the orders to USACAPOC. USACAPOC conducts a final mission analysis, validates the mission, and tasks the regional CACOM or the 96th CA battalion to provide the requested support.

5-8. USASOC receives task orders (TASKORD) for Army CA support and forwards the orders to USACAPOC. USACAPOC conducts a final mission analysis, validates the mission, and tasks the regional CACOM or the 96th CA battalion to provide the requested support.

5-9. CA forces (Figure 5-2, page 5-4) are task-organized and deployed based on mission requirements. The difficulty of deploying an entire CA unit has led to deployments under derivative unit identification codes (UICs). Such deployment impacts on the supported unit, as it implies CA forces are attached to the gaining unit and require complete administrative and logistic support.

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

5-10. Selective mobilization is an expansion of active duty forces in response to a domestic crisis. The President, or Congress upon special action, may order expansion of the active duty forces by mobilizing units and individuals of the Reserves to protect life and federal property and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP

5-11. PSRC occurs when the President determines that active duty forces must be augmented for an operational mission. By executive order, the President may augment the active duty forces with up to 200,000 members of the Reserves for up to 270 days. A PSRC does not require a declaration of
national emergency; however, the President must report to Congress within 24 hours on the current situation and anticipated use of the called-up forces.

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

5-12. Partial mobilization requires a Presidential or Congressional declaration of a state of national emergency. A partial mobilization may occur without a PSRC. Under a Presidential declaration of national emergency, members of the Ready Reserve may be mobilized for up to 24 months.

FULL MOBILIZATION

5-13. Full mobilization expands the forces on active duty to meet the requirements of war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security. The President, or Congress upon special action, may mobilize all RC units, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed to support war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the United States.

Figure 5-2. Access to CA
TOTAL MOBILIZATION

5-14. Total mobilization expands the forces on active duty, in consequence of actions by Congress or the President, to organize additional units or personnel and the resources needed for their support to meet the total requirement of war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the United States.

5-15. Other means of bringing RC forces on active duty are—
   - TTAD.
   - Active duty for special work (ADSW).
   - Annual training (AT).
   - Active duty for training (ADT).

5-16. These various categories are explained in detail in Army Regulation 135-210, Order to Active Duty as Individuals for Other Than a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, Partial or Full Mobilization. The categories vary in terms of length and the types of missions they can support. These tours are usually limited to individuals or small groups.

Temporary Tour of Active Duty

5-17. TTAD is voluntary active duty performed by USAR or Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers in support of the Active Army, a unified or specified command, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), or an active force mission of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

5-18. The objective of the TTAD program is to use a soldier’s primary or duty skill to accomplish a specified Active Army, OSD, OJCS, joint project, or essential mission for which no active duty soldier is available. TTADs meet a short-term need of the Active Army for a prescribed period, normally not to exceed 139 days. TTADs may not be used to accomplish Reserve force missions, support, special projects, or staff augmentation.

5-19. TTADs may be used to perform a wartime (support) mission assigned to the RCs under current mobilization and OPLANs. Used only in limited-duration contingency situations, TTADs are still bound by time limits.

Active Duty for Special Work

5-20. ADSW is authorized for temporary projects or missions normally not to exceed 139 days. These missions are in support of ARNG and USAR programs. Duties must exceed the scope of those performed by the Active Army in support of the ARNG and USAR. Duties include, but are not limited to, the operation of training activities, centers, and sites, and short-term mission and administrative support work on a special short-term project or study group vital to the ARNG or the USAR.

Annual Training

5-21. AT usually includes training that cannot be conducted effectively at the home station. Training is in support of USAR missions, projects, or training for nonactivated or mobilized USAR force structure. Soldiers assigned to
troop program units normally serve for 14 days each year. However, they can serve as long as 29 days when participating in an exercise away from home station or for 21 days OCONUS. Soldiers may also perform AT individually or in small groups. During exercises, RC CA personnel frequently support the Active Army by providing cultural and area expertise for the commander. Important relationships between RC CA personnel and AC personnel are developed during this time, which further increases understanding in future missions.

Active Duty for Training

5-22. The primary purpose and content of ADT is training. ADT is authorized for full-time attendance at organized and planned training approved by DA. This type of duty includes such activities as—

- Specialized skills training.
- Refresher and proficiency training.
- Professional development and education programs.

5-23. A soldier normally may not perform more than 179 cumulative days of ADT per fiscal year.

Civil-Military Operations Staff Officer, G5 or S5

5-24. The G5 or S5, the principal staff officer for all CMO matters, conducts the initial assessment that determines CA force augmentation. The war-traced CAPT-A or CAPT-B helps in this process.

5-25. The G5 or S5 enhances the relationship between the military forces and the civilian authorities and personnel in the area of operations to ensure mission success. The G5 or S5 has staff planning and oversight of—

- Attached CA units.
- Area assessments (Appendix G) and area studies.
- Military support to emergency defense and civic-action projects.
- Protection of culturally significant sites.
- HA and disaster relief.
- NEO.
- Emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians.
- Public order and safety applicable to military operations.

5-26. The G5 or S5 is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level but is authorized only at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units and task forces below division level may be authorized an S5.

5-27. The CMO staff officer ensures the effective integration of the “C” (civil considerations) of the METT-TC mission analysis formula into the planning cycle. Like operations and intelligence officers, CMO staff officers focus on the operational area, but like personnel and logistics officers, they must also focus on CS and CSS issues, particularly those regarding FNS and the care of DCs.
5-28. To plan and orchestrate unit operations, in peace or in war, the supported unit’s operations officer must rely heavily upon items from the intelligence officer and the CMO officer, such as—

- Situational and planning maps.
- Overlays (in this instance, overlays of DC movement routes; sources of FNS; national, religious, and cultural monuments; hospitals; and power plants).

5-29. The supported unit’s operations officer plans and integrates the overall operations effort. The unit CMO staff officer plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and issues only through direct coordination with the supported unit’s operations officer.

5-30. The CMO staff officer, like other primary staff officers, is authorized personnel on an MTOE. The CMO staff is augmented by planning teams from regionally aligned AC and USAR CA units. This augmentation gives the unit CMO staff officer enough personnel to accomplish assigned tasks, including the requirement to establish and sustain a staff presence at the main command post (CP), rear CP, and CMOC.

5-31. Mission profile, phase of the operation, and the commander’s preference determine the location of the G5 or S5 in sector; however, the G5 or S5 normally operates from a CMO cell within the main CP. The CMO staff officer may also task-organize his section (Figure 5-3, page 5-8) to support 24-hour operations at the main and rear CPs and at the CMOC, as follows:

- Main CP - A tailored CMO cell to coordinate closely with the plans, current operations, intelligence, and CSS cells to monitor the effects of the operation on the civilian populace; also to plan for emerging operations.
- Rear CP - A tailored CMO cell to monitor the main battle and rear areas; to plan for and coordinate any required FNS, the flow and disposition of DCs, and transition planning. NOTE: Close coordination with the operations and CSS cells is essential for mission success.
- CMOC - The G5 or S5 section to provide the nucleus for a tailored cell that gives the unit commander a 24-hour capability to handle requests for assistance (RFAs) from participating government organizations, IOs, and NGOs.

**ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS SECTION**

5-32. The administrative and logistics section provides general and specific support to the G5, CMO section elements and cells. In addition to the normal operational support required from each staff section, specific support can include—

- Identifying linguistic (interpreter or translator) support resources.
- Collating and maintaining detailed CMO-related data obtained from assessments.
- Recording CMO-related data for historical purposes.
• Providing clerical support for briefings, charts, and other CMO-related documents, as required.
• Coordinating with the logistics staff officer for FNS.

Figure 5-3. CMO Section

OPERATIONS SECTION

5-33. The operations section provides operations-related support to the CMO staff officer. It usually consists of at least three subsections: current operations, plans, and technical support.

5-34. The current operations section—

• Monitors the current civil-military and operational situation.
• Maintains the CMO estimate.
• Prepares either the CMO (Army) or the CA (Joint) annexes to the concept of operations (CONOPS), OPLANs, functional plans, and OPORDs.
• Recommends CA force allocation changes in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGO).
• Develops the CMO periodic report.
• Maintains and updates the many overlays and data used by the operations, intelligence, fire support, and CSS cells. NOTE: The overlays and data depict locations of FN resources, key public facilities, key monuments, and cultural or religious shrines that require protection.
Develops required reports and receives, analyzes, coordinates, disseminates, and monitors CA-related reports from subordinate corps and division units.

Coordinates the validation of and staff coordination for executing support to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs, from CMOC-coordinated RFAs.

Disseminates data and planned activities of the various government organizations, IOs, and NGOs operating within the corps and division AOR or within their area of interest.

5-35. The plans section—

• Works closely with the corps and division plans officer and section.
• Analyzes data and the commander's intent, forecasts requirements, and integrates all CMO into corps and division plans. NOTE: These tasks require the CMO plans officer to operate from the main CP, yet coordinate continually with his counterparts at the rear CP, the CMOC, and the U.S. Embassy, as required.
• Closely monitors progress toward the DOD-defined, CMO-related, desired end state.

5-36. The technical support section—

• Provides, as required, the CA functional experts to provide the CMO staff officer with current, detailed advice on their various areas of expertise.
• May also include contracted civilians whose expertise is beyond the scope of the military force but well within the requirements of the current operation.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CELL (MAIN)

5-37. The CMO staff officer task-organizes his section to provide for two distinct support cells at the main and rear CPs. The main cell provides the direct interface and daily staff coordination with the corps and division primary and special staff officers within the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) and the division tactical operations center (DTOC). The CTOC and DTOC generally have restricted size, space, and mobility requirements. The CMO staff officer, therefore, task-organizes his section to provide for a CMO cell (Figure 5-4, page 5-10) with an immediate operations and plans capability. He may also provide for civil-military representatives to the plans, current operations, intelligence, and CSS cells of the main CP. The requirement to maintain 24-hour capability is inherent.

5-38. After completing his mission analysis, the corps or division commander decides where to place his main cell. In some operations, CMO are central to the corps and division mission; therefore, the CMO staff officer is close to plans, intelligence, and current operations. Higher intensity combat operations may not require the CMO staff officer to be immediately present. The CMO staff officer needs to be located where he can coordinate all CMO and be appropriately responsive to the commander's guidance and the commander's need for staff integration. In carrying out this mission, the CMO cell—
Identifies CA requirements and recommends taskings for attached subordinate units.

Assists the G5 in preparing and maintaining the CA estimate, annex, periodic report, and the numerous overlays and data used by the division or corps.

Coordinates with relevant military and civilian organizations and agencies.

Collects and analyzes CA-related information.

Ensures the implementation of CA doctrine and procedures.

Disseminates, through the G3 or the S3, intelligence gained from CA operations to higher and lateral headquarters.

Maintains current information on assigned and implied missions, situation maps with overlays, the status of CA personnel and DCs, and the availability of basic sustenance items, such as food, shelter, and medical care.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CELL (REAR)

5-39. The CMO staff officer task-organizes his section to provide continuous support to the rear CP. The duties and functions of the rear cell (Figure 5-5, page 5-11) are similar to the duties and functions of the main cell. However, the rear cell focuses on rear operations, FNS issues, transition planning, and CSS issues that do not occur in the main battle area. The rear cell must also maintain a 24-hour capability.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

5-40. In simple terminology, the CMOC is a coordination center. Commanders at every level may establish and tailor a CMOC to help anticipate, facilitate, coordinate, and orchestrate CMO with the civilian populace, government, and economy in areas where military forces and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs are employed. As such, the CMOC may consist of personnel from
any Service having a capability to provide support to the affected civilian populace. Any Army element can execute the operation of the CMOC, and elements of the supporting CA command, brigade, or battalion normally support the CMOC. See Appendix H for a sample CMOC layout.

5-41. The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. Instead, it is an extension of the command that facilitates access to civilian agencies and nonmilitary organizations participating in or having peripheral interest in a particular operation. As an extension or capability of the unit, the CMOC reports and transmits data normally in the form of RFAs from government organizations, IOs, and NGOs, through the CMO officer, to the supported commander.

5-42. The CMOC (Figure 5-6) may include military and civilian representatives from many different agencies. Mission requirements, command directives, operational security, workload, and accessibility to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs have an impact on the actual organization of the CMOC.

Figure 5-5. CMO Cell (Rear)

Figure 5-6. CMOC
REQUIREMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

5-43. The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation varies, based on the mission. CMOCs may be established—

- In operations where the joint force commander’s HQ and the majority of subordinate units are located close to the civilian and HN diplomatic center and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs.
- In operations where the joint force HQ is in one locale and subordinate units are spread throughout the AOR.
- At every level of command, from geographic down to brigade, depending on the geographic area and the tactical control measures.

5-44. More than one CMOC may, therefore, exist in an AOR, all based on METT-TC. Commanders usually establish a CMOC after an initial situation assessment shows the need to coordinate with various agencies and operational security requirements prohibit access to the main HQ.

LOCATION

5-45. The security situation and force protection posture dictate the general location of a CMOC. Normally, the CMOC is in the rear area to prevent nonmilitary traffic in and around the CMOC from interrupting military operations. Also, the rear area is more suitable for transition operations when the CMOC is transferred to UN, foreign military, or nonmilitary agency control. In environments where hostilities are unlikely and the operation is purely civil-military in nature, the CMOC may, however, be near the military force operations center.

MAJOR FUNCTIONS

5-46. The CMOC assists in the coordination of U.S. and multinational forces operations with FN agencies and authorities and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs. The CMOC provides access for government organizations, IOs, and NGOs desiring help and coordination from the military. An extension of the CMO cell provides access and CA-related data and information from and to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs operating away from the military HQ. Major functions of the CMOC include—

- Providing government organizations, IOs, and NGOs with a single point for civilian-related activities and matters. (NOTE: The CMOC is a coordination center for receiving and answering government organization, IO, and NGO requests for military assistance.)
- Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and allied commands, the UN, the HN, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Providing interface with DOS.
- Assisting in the transfer of authority and handoff of operations from U.S. military forces to the DOS, UN, NATO, or FN, or to other nonmilitary agency control.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

5-47. The majority of U.S. Army CA capabilities reside in the USAR. As such, most CA personnel hold civilian jobs and perform their military duties on a part-time basis. As part of their service obligation, Reservists must participate in prescribed training activities. This training focuses on the skills Reservists need when called to active duty. Thousands of reservists normally volunteer for operations when required to assist active-duty forces.

5-48. The successful integration of reservists into the AC force, quickly and effectively, requires an understanding of the similarities and differences of the AC and RC systems. The AC force must constantly review the subtle differences, particularly differences in personnel, finance, logistics, and training.

5-49. The amount of time an RC soldier has to transition from citizen to full-time soldier varies from operation to operation. The normal amount of time is 3 weeks from alert notification to awaiting entrance into the theater of operations from the power projection platform (PPP).

5-50. AC commanders must understand that the transition from Reserve systems in personnel, medical, finance, and logistics management often occurs in an unscheduled, geographically dispersed area. The transition is often without all the support elements of a full-time, operations-oriented military installation and its various facilities and staff. Some of the areas an AC commander and staff must consider are—

- **Personnel Issues.**
  - *Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCOERs), Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs), and Awards.* RC soldiers require profiles not required of AC and NG soldiers. The routing of NCOERs, OERs, awards is also different for RC soldiers. These items go to the Army Personnel Command (ARPERCOM) in Saint Louis, Missouri, rather than the Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in Alexandria, Virginia.
  - *Medical.* RC soldiers complete most of the required medical checks and immunizations before arriving in theater. The exceptions are the immunizations—such as hepatitis and anthrax—and protocols given in series over 2 to 3 weeks.
  - *Finance.* RC soldiers, as part of mobilization, experience major changes to their pay. Although soldiers must participate in SurePay, even before mobilization, the changes to eligibility, rates, allowances, and incentives all at once can lead to major disruptions in the timely disbursement and correctness of pay and allowances. The AC commander’s finance personnel must review and have on hand RC pay regulations.
  - *Media, Community, and Employer Support.* The gaining of community support of the RC soldiers, through the use of the news media and PAO, is a necessary consideration. Use of the hometown news release program is encouraged.
- **Security Clearance.** RC CA soldiers must have a SECRET clearance. If the AC unit requires them to have a higher clearance, the unit must initiate upgrades as soon as possible. When supported by RC soldiers, the AC unit may, however, consider employing the lowest security classification so the RC soldiers may participate fully.

- **Logistics.**
  - **Equipment, Vehicles, and Supplies.** Depending on the priority in equipment issue, RC units may not have the latest or AC-equivalent equipment, as well as individual equipment items.
  - **Licensing.** RC units must know, as early as possible, the special licensing requirements needed to operate equipment in the specific theater. The units should integrate licensing requirements as part of their training.

- **Training.**
  - RC units may require new equipment training, especially in new communication equipment and specific ADP software programs.
  - The sharing of unit SOPs and forms, mission-specific documentation, and unique staff procedures before deployment decreases integration time and leads to mission success.

5-51. For further information, see FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), Volume III, Reserve Component Unit Commander’s Handbook (RCUCH). Also see JP 4-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.

**INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT**

5-52. CA soldiers must not appear to be active intelligence gatherers. They do, however, have unique information requirements (IRs)—items of information on the enemy and his environment that may affect mission accomplishment. Before deploying into any AO—whether by friendly agreement, as part of a liberating force, or in an occupational role—CA units develop specific CA-unique IRs. The necessity to gather information on the target area and its people and on source material and agencies relevant to the operation is essential to mission preparation and execution. The CA functional specialists provide broad guidelines for CA IRs, including—

- Topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain, including landforms, drainage, vegetation, and soils.
- Census, location, ethnic composition, and health factors of the population.
- Attitude of the population, including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.
- Government structure, including forms, personalities, existing laws, and political heritage.
• Educational standards and facilities and important cultural activities and repositories.
• Communications, transportation, utility, power, and natural resources.
• Labor potential, including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.
• Economic development, including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, extent and nature of agricultural production, and accustomed population dietary habits.
• Cores of resistance movements.
• Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.
• Hostile activities, including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

**CA Collection Plan**

5-53. The CA collection plan is predicated on priority intelligence requirements (PIR) — those critical items of information the commander needs at a particular time to reach a logical decision on what COAs to adopt to best accomplish his mission. The collection plan provides a systematic analysis of requirements and identifies the assets or resources for procuring the required information. *(NOTE: Assets are organic to the unit; resources are not.)* Once the staff analyzes the commander’s PIR, the CA G2 or his collection manager prepares the collection plan for integration into the overall OPLAN.

5-54. The CA unit G2 or S2 normally directs and supervises the collection effort. He prepares collection plans, usually with the intelligence officer (S2 or G2) or collection manager of the supported command. In addition, the CA unit G2 or S2 prepares an intelligence collection plan for his own HQ.

5-55. A sound collection plan that effectively uses collection assets results in a large volume of information. The extent to which the CA G2 or S2 processes the information depends on the —

• Size of his staff.
• Proximity and availability of other intelligence-processing agencies.
• Desires of his commander.

5-56. The intelligence officer maintains files, a journal, worksheets, and a situation map with overlays as required by the mission.

**CA Intelligence-Collection Requirements**

5-57. CA intelligence planning identifies the collection assets or resources for collecting intelligence to satisfy CA requirements. The CA G2 or S2 forwards those requirements that organic CA assets cannot answer to the supported command’s G2 or S2. Channeling intelligence requirements through the G2 or S2 ensures that —

• Intelligence requirements are tasked to the proper agencies.
• CA-specific IRs are integrated with other IRs.
• Duplication of effort is minimized.
• Intelligence requirements are coordinated with other sources.
• Intelligence requirements receive proper command emphasis.

5-58. During intelligence planning, the CA staff analyzes PIR and IRs to determine the information needed and the priority of need for each information item. The CA staff also determines—
• Indicators that answer the intelligence requirement.
• Sources and agencies that can best answer each intelligence item.
• The media that can properly disseminate the information.

COMMUNICATIONS

5-59. Civilian agencies normally communicate via handheld Motorola-type radios, commercial telephone (landline, cellular, and global), and the Internet. Military organizations communicate via the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), satellite communications, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), commercial telephone, and automated systems—such as the LAN, WAN, and Internet.

5-60. CA forces coordinate with military and civilian agencies (Figure 5-7). They have a limited organic capability in all forms of communications and, thus, require significant augmentation from their supported command. By TOE, CA units are authorized SINCGARS radios and laptop computers with access to the Internet. Specific requirements beyond these capabilities are determined during mission analysis and forwarded to the supported command as a statement of requirements (SOR).

![Figure 5-7. CA Communications Requirements](image-url)
FORFORCE PROTECTION

5-61. Force protection is a paramount concern of all commanders. Every CINC and major subordinate command has standing force protection rules that must be fully understood and adhered to by all personnel. USASOC has force protection requirements as well. CA forces must incorporate these requirements in their planning to ensure compliance.

5-62. CA forces are most effective working in small units that interact with a wide variety of agencies, civilian and military. This interaction implies a degree of risk higher than the risks encountered by conventional forces. The risks can, however, be mitigated by a thorough analysis of the environment as it relates to mission requirements and by strict adherence to resultant force protection measures. The force protection requirements of the supported command may prove to be less than optimal for the CA team mission. It may, for example, be culturally inappropriate and counterproductive for CA personnel in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. In such cases, the senior CA officer should coordinate with the supported commander to formulate plans that lead to mission success while allowing for cultural sensitivities.

5-63. CA forces, at a minimum, must abide by the guidelines for ROE and force protection. For further information, see Appendix G of USASOC Directive 525-13, Force Protection.

5-64. Deployed commanders and individuals will, within 72 hours of arrival, report to their higher SOF HQ—through administrative channels—on the sufficiency of ROE and force protection measures in the AO, in terms of the following questions:

- **ROE** — Do the ROE of individual or unit self-defense prevent the safeguarding of cryptographic materials and sensitive communications equipment?
- **OPSEC** — Is unclassified information disclosed that could compromise the mission? Is the unit continually evaluating essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) countermeasures for applicability?
- **Physical Security (PHYSEC)** — Is access to unit and individual work and billeting areas controlled? Are other safeguards—such as guards, barriers, or patrols—available, if necessary? Do local PHYSEC measures match the terrorist threat condition (THREATCON)?
- **Personal Security (PERSEC)** — Can the unit or individual vary routines? As far as the mission permits, can individuals blend with the local environment? Do simple ROE exist?
- **Law Enforcement** — Does liaison exist with local law enforcement? Are law enforcement capabilities sufficient to counter the anticipated threat? Are the locations of civilian police, military police, government agencies, the U.S. Embassy, and other safe locations available? Can the unit maintain points of contact with foreign organizations in the deployment area?
- **Antiterrorism** — Is an updated threat briefing available? Does a plan exist for coping with a terrorist attack? Has the plan been rehearsed?
Does an alert system exist? Can the unit reduce signature where possible? Is a means in place to identify the location of all personnel at all times? Is the two-man rule in effect?

5-65. If measures are insufficient, the report must include measures taken locally to remedy the problem and, if external support is required, to solve the problem. Reports must be updated weekly or when the THREATCON changes. For further information, see USASOC Directive 525-13.
Support Provided by Civil Affairs Forces

CA forces enhance the relationship of the military command with the civilian populace. They assist commanders in working with civil authorities and in controlling the populace in the operational area. Normally, treaties or other agreements address relationships with local authorities. In a friendly country or area, U.S. forces coordinate CA activities with local agencies or authorities when possible. In occupied territory, a military commander may exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the local area until a civilian government is established. To gain the cooperation of the populace, CA forces integrate PSYOP resources in civil information operations. These operations can begin before, during, or after military action.

THEATER CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

6-1. The President of the United States, through the SecDef, establishes a theater of operations under a unified or specified command. The JCS provide guidance and directives to the theater commander. All unified commands have CMO staffs to advise and assist the CINC in the execution of his CMO program. They also participate in deliberate and crisis-action planning and, when required, deploy as a member of the Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell (DJFAC). Depending on the theater, the CMO staffs are in the Plans Directorate of a joint staff (J5), Operations Directorate of a joint staff (J3), or the theater SOC. CA planning teams from respective theater-aligned CACOMs augment these staffs.

THEATER ARMY CA PLANNING

6-2. TA CA plans support the CINC’s assigned politico-military objectives that are consistent with international laws, treaties and agreements, and NCA guidance. The plan contains general instructions for relations with national, local, and military authorities. When operations extend into territories of more than one nation, several national plans may exist. Individuals or teams from the theater-aligned CACOM, CA brigade, or CA battalion provide augmentation to the TA CMO staff.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

6-3. CA personnel provide CMO staff augmentation for joint or multinational HQ conducting CMO. U.S. military staff planning and coordination, as well as interagency activities, are the most likely mission support activities CA teams undertake in a joint or multinational environment. Because of the rank and experience of team members, CAP3Ts or CAPTs are best suited for conducting joint or multinational operations.
ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS

6-4. The TA in the communications zone (COMMZ) has two types of support organizations—the TAACOM/TSC and the functional commands. The TAACOM/TSC and its subordinate ASGs are area oriented with geographic responsibilities. The functional commands are mission oriented with no geographic boundary. CA support to TAACOM/TSC is provided by teams from the war-traced CA brigades.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING

6-5. Close coordination is essential between tactical planners and those planning CS and CSS. Because access to critical CS and CSS may decisively influence combat operations, planners must consider all factors impacting on the mission. To provide effective support, CMO planners must understand the mission of the supported force. They must anticipate needs, assess capabilities, and recommend CA activities that result in the most responsive support possible. The priority of CA activities also change with the phases of the operation. A great degree of flexibility and forward thinking are critical in ensuring the relevancy of CA activities to the supported command mission.

AREA SUPPORT GROUPS

6-6. Task-organized teams from war-traced CA battalions support ASGs. CA teams help coordinate and integrate rear battle operations with civilian police, emergency service agencies, and local forces to ensure mutual protection and efficient use of resources.

6-7. CA support may be centralized or decentralized in the ASG. When employed in centralized support, CA teams respond directly to the ASG commander. In decentralized support, CA teams are attached to major subordinate units (MSUs) located within the ASG’s AOR.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

6-8. Although CA forces have participated in all major contingencies, the majority of their operations revolve around the significant CINC-initiated peacetime engagement programs in each theater. Some examples of these programs are—

- African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).
- Joint or combined exchange training (JCET).
- JCS exercises.
- Mobile training teams (MTTs).
- Humanitarian assistance survey teams (HASTs).
- Professional development programs (PDPs).
- MATs.

6-9. These operations can be performed with or in support of a larger mission or exercise, but they frequently are performed unilaterally. In the former case, CA forces rely on their supported unit for logistics and administrative support. In the latter case, CA forces may have to support themselves in austere environments.
CA SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

6-10. Effective CMO require close contact between the U.S. military and the DOS and other U.S. Government agencies. Because DOS formulates and implements foreign policy, it has a vested interest in CA activities. In CMO, the DOS has primary or joint responsibility with DOD for policy. Some examples are plans for handing off CMO to civilian control during the transition process and matters involving PSYOP, public affairs (PA), civil information, or other measures to influence the attitudes of the populace.

CA SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

6-11. The list of IOs and NGOs in an AO may be extensive. Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with the USAID. Commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of IOs and NGOs and, when appropriate, coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. Because many of these organizations may have been established in the AO in advance of the Army's presence, they may be a good source of information and knowledge.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT IN CONFLICT

6-12. CMO occur throughout the battlespace, including close, rear, and deep operations and across all levels of command. Commanders must expect to encounter civilians and have a plan to deal with them in any mission. Rear areas, for example, contain supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources U.S. commanders can use to support military operations. Combat operations in or near these areas can be disrupted by—

- Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians in the battlespace.
- Hostile actions by the populace.
- Failure to cooperate and coordinate with friendly forces.

CLOSE OPERATIONS

6-13. Chaos created by combat restricts CA activities in close operations. In this phase of the operation, controlling DCs and securing FNS are crucial. CA teams support the warfighting commander by—

- Coordinating the use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
- Minimizing local populace interference with U.S. military operations.
- Identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations. NOTE: FNS is normally prearranged through negotiated agreements.
- Providing liaison to local agencies, government organizations, NGOs, IOs, and civilian authorities.
- Advising on cultural and moral considerations.
REAR OPERATIONS

6-14. In rear areas, CA battalions attached to ASGs, COSCOMs, and division support commands provide area support within the AOs of their supported commands. A secure rear area supports expanded CA activities. The CA battalion supports the military mission by—

- Providing liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities. NOTE: CA battalions can conduct CA activities that help civilian authorities organize effective police and emergency services.
- Identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations.
- Coordinating the use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
- Coordinating the efforts of NGOs, IOs, and FN agencies to develop and implement plans for using local resources, as well as coordinating civil information programs.
- Minimizing civilian interference with U.S. military operations by developing populace-control measures, such as civilian evacuation plans that do not interfere with military movement.
- Advising the command on cultural and moral considerations.

DEEP OPERATIONS

6-15. CA teams are rarely deployed in denied or enemy-held areas. Deep combat operations focus on defeating or diminishing the follow-on combat threat. CA teams, however, focus on the area surrounding the battle area. The strategic CA objective is to influence, control, or develop the conditions for conducting future close operations. Through analysis of historical information and the current area assessment, CA functional specialists can—

- Predict movement of civilians and establish procedures and processes to minimize their interference with military operations.
- Estimate the availability of resources.
- Prepare area studies and conduct area assessments of the assigned area, as required, to support the mission.
- Provide information and plans to U.S. and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace in support of U.S. and FN goals.
- Recommend theater policy for H/CA, civil assistance, and civil administration activities and missions.
- Act as the focal point for cultural considerations.
- Act as a link between civil authorities and U.S. or allied military forces at the national level.
- Establish procedures and processes to coordinate FNS.
- Provide technical expertise in all civil functions.
- Provide information to the intelligence system.
• Provide technical advice to subordinate CA elements supporting civil administration of friendly and recovered areas.
• Establish civil administration of occupied territory.

POSTHOSTILITY OPERATIONS

6-16. CA support to the posthostility phase of the operation depends on the condition of the target country at the cessation of the conflict. The CMO staff continually monitors the condition of the FN throughout the operation and recommends functional skills required to support this critical phase. CA activities support conventional forces, SOF, U.S. Government agencies, and the FN civil administration in transitioning the power back to the local government. See Appendix E for specific transition planning and coordination activities.

6-17. Conflict termination marks the start of new challenges for CA forces. These may include encounters with the local populace as it responds to a new or significantly changed government and to a new way of life. Problems may involve the unrealized hopes and aspirations of the local populace, as well as the desires of local leaders to be recognized as the legitimate power.

6-18. Resistance forces, if any, also present unique challenges for the commander. The complete demobilization of the resistance force and the return of those forces to civilian pursuits should be the ultimate goal. Demobilization involves, among other things, the collection of weapons. The demobilization effort may be difficult unless the resistance force receives assurances of transition assistance jobs and proper resettlement. A good example of how CA personnel participated in this effort occurred in Cambodia when CA personnel helped the government repatriate Khmer Rouge defectors. CA personnel coordinated with the FN, IOs, and NGOs to locate jobs and to provide training. Posthostility operations can have a long-term impact on the civilian sector and U.S. national interests and can be the most challenging and most significant part of military operations.

ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CMO

6-19. Numerous NGOs exist in an AO. Many of them offer significant resources and assistance in the conduct of CMO. CA units should, therefore, seek opportunities to train and interact with those NGOs.

6-20. NGOs have inevitably been, and will likely remain, in the AO long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers. These organizations continue to play important roles in providing support to FNs in need. They provide HA to more than 250 million people annually, totaling between $9 and $10 billion each year—more than any single nation or international body, for example, the UN.

6-21. NGOs can respond quickly and effectively to crises, thereby reducing the military resources a commander must devote to the civilian population in the AO. Although differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, the short-term objective is frequently very similar—to reduce the suffering of the people. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity
of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

6-22. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief, to small, newly created organizations dedicated to a particular aspect of a crisis, such as clean water, shelter, and food distribution. The professionalism, capability, resources, and expertise vary greatly from one to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connection between NGOs and the DOD is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. Although the focus remains grassroots and the connections informal, NGOs and the DOD are major participants in the interagency effort. The sheer number of lives they affect and the resources they provide enable the NGO community to wield extensive power within the interagency community. The UN and the U.S. Government often designate individual organizations to perform specific relief functions.

6-23. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable sources of information on local and regional governments and on civilian attitudes toward an operation. Although some organizations seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be a fear of compromising their neutral position with the local populace or be a suspicion that military forces intend to control, influence, or prevent their operations. Staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the FN government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns.

For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses—manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity—that only the military can deploy.

Philip Johnston
President and Chief Executive Officer
CARE

MILITARY SUPPORT OF NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

6-24. The NCA may determine that tasking U.S. military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with NGOs is in the national interest. In such cases, closely coordinating the activities of all participants is mutually beneficial. The goal should be to create a climate of cooperation between NGOs and the military forces. Taskings to support NGOs, such as providing trucks to transport humanitarian supplies, are normally short term. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are the capabilities most
needed by the NGOs. In such missions, the role of the armed forces must be to enable—not to perform—NGO tasks. Consequently, U.S. military assistance is frequently the critical difference that enables the success of an operation.

TRANSITION OPERATIONS PLANNING

6-25. The transition plan for postconflict operations prioritizes and plans for information requirements and required connectivity to support mission activities of the civil administration; CA activities, such as emergency services, HA, and PRC; and unified planning with DOS, NGOs, IOs, and HN officials and agencies. CA personnel are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce postconflict turmoil and stabilize the situation until international relief organizations or FN agencies assume control.

6-26. Postconflict operations require close coordination between CA forces and those conducting CMO to ensure consistent, accurate dissemination of information. Internal information programs aid the transition to redeployment and reconstitution by reducing rumors and uncertainty. Information operations transition planning addresses the smooth retrograde of assets from the theater of operations, while considering the possibility of renewed hostilities. Fixed communications and information infrastructure of the FN should replace tactical and mobile information assets as soon as possible. Part of this stage may include transition of operations to DOS, IOs, NGOs, the FN, or other agencies that represent nonmilitary options to support FN rebuilding. Planning begins at this point for support of the redeployment of friendly forces and continued reconstitution of assets destroyed in the conflict or retained by the FN.

6-27. Commanders continually struggle with the need for timely, accurate information on the AO, the enemy, or even the status of their own forces. They also seek to deny the enemy accurate or timely information on friendly dispositions or to deceive the enemy through misinformation to seize and sustain a comparable information advantage. Developments in information technology are revolutionizing the way nations, organizations, and people interact. For further information on transition activities, see Appendix E.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

6-28. The commander and the PAO are the only official spokespersons for the command. All news media queries should be referred to the PAO. As an official spokesperson, the PAO can make sure the command speaks with one voice and that OPSEC is observed.

6-29. CA, PSYOP, and PA elements use many of the same communications media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and PSYOP personnel address local populations and enemy forces, respectively. PA personnel address national and international news media and U.S. forces.

6-30. Popular U.S. public support contributes to the success of CMO. This support is gained by allowing the news media access to soldiers and to unclassified information. PA personnel escort news media representatives whenever they are in the AO.
6-31. Uncoordinated public support for CMO missions is usually inappropriate, expensive, logistically difficult, time-consuming, and often not useful in humanitarian relief operations. Financial contributions to favorite NGOs are much more desirable and helpful.

6-32. CA and PSYOP personnel provide news and information to the local populace on the effects of combat operations. PA personnel provide U.S. and international news media representatives information on Army operations.

6-33. PA products are a valuable source of news and information to soldiers in the AO. The importance of coordinating CA efforts with PSYOP and PA activities cannot be overstressed. Information released through one of these channels is available to, and has an effect upon, all audiences. If information released to the HN populace by CA and PSYOP personnel conflicts with information released to U.S. soldiers through PA channels, the result may be a loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive accomplishments.

6-34. PA operations include a mix of AC and RC PA assets in HQ elements of TOE units and in TOE PA units. Based on the desires of the commander and staff officers, PA personnel inform U.S. personnel of—

- Essential information.
- Domestic information on home station, family members, and general national and international news, sports, and entertainment.

6-35. PA personnel, like CA personnel, also provide the soldier information on FN geography and culture, changes of command, receipt of new equipment by friendly forces, OPSEC reminders, foreign language phrases, and similar information. This flow of information serves to—

- Maintain the morale, motivation, and competence of the soldier.
- Disrupt the damaging effect of rumors, often caused by conflicting information.
- Assist PSYOP in countering enemy propaganda and disinformation campaigns directed against friendly troops.

6-36. PA support of CMO varies according to the number and composition of PA units available. In general, PA personnel and PA TOE unit capabilities include—

- Providing the resources and manpower necessary to write, edit, and produce fact sheets and field newspapers covering news, sports, and features.
- Providing media escorts, news briefings, and conference support to all command levels.
- Providing print, photo, video, and audio products for PA releases.
- Providing media representatives with print, photo, electronic, or audio and video products not constrained by treaty, policy, law, or OPSEC.
- Accrediting media representatives and coordinating limited logistics support for accredited or registered media representatives in
communications, billeting, dining, and transportation unavailable commercially.

- Acting as a clearinghouse for print, photographic, audio, video, and electronic products generated by PA personnel.
- Providing broadcasts from either fixed or organic mobile facilities.

6-37. The relationship between PA and CA is mutually beneficial. CA personnel and units support PA by—

- Providing information to meet PA requirements.
- Providing feedback on the positive effect PA materials released to the news media have on the local populace.
- Coordinating print and broadcast materials with PA and PSYOP.

NOTE: Radio broadcasts are an open medium listened to by FN civilians and by soldiers.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS

6-38. ARSOF perform various missions and collateral activities (Figure 6-1). ARSOF missions direct the way ARSOF are organized, equipped, and trained, while ARSOF collateral activities are the capabilities these forces can readily perform due to their primary missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Collateral Activities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Unconventional Warfare</td>
<td>• Coalition Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foreign Internal Defense</td>
<td>• Combat Search and Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Psychological Operations</td>
<td>• Counterdrug Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil Affairs</td>
<td>• Countermine Activities</td>
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<td>• Information Operations</td>
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<td>• Direct Action</td>
<td>• Security Assistance</td>
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<td>• Special Reconnaissance</td>
<td>• Special Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Combating Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Counterrproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Figure 6-1. ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities

6-39. Successful CA activities depend on the support of the populace. Most U.S. military operations occur in a low-threat environment with the objective of winning popular support. CA units must, therefore, help other SOF to mobilize this support, keeping in mind the impact of the operation on the civilian populace. CA forces, as part of SOF, must remain politically attuned, regionally oriented, and linguistically capable of supporting SO.

6-40. The theater SOC integrates CA into joint SO activities. Task-organized CA teams (CAPT-Bs) may be attached to the theater SOC for a specific period
of time to provide dedicated planning support. Additionally, the CA battalion (SO) is specially designed, equipped, and trained to support the SO community. For specific capabilities of this battalion, see Chapter 3 of this manual.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

6-41. From the U.S. perspective, the intent of UW is to develop and sustain resistance organizations. In that regard, UW synchronizes the operations of those organizations to further U.S. national security objectives.

CA Role in Unconventional Warfare

6-42. The SF group or battalion S5 exercises staff control over attached CA elements. CA units support SF units in the conduct of UW. They provide advice and assistance relating to social, economic, and political considerations within the joint special operations area (JSOA). Although the nature of UW normally limits the use of supporting CA units outside the JSOA, certain CA personnel may accompany deploying SF units, depending on mission requirements. The most important role of CA in UW is to support a swift transition of power from resistance forces to the legitimate government upon cessation of hostilities.

6-43. CA personnel support SF units with timely advice on the impact of proposed operations on the local populace within the JSOA. They also advise SF units on the development of resistance organizations and the expansion of the JSOA in gaining and keeping popular support. Consequently, CMO planners at the strategic level must have the political knowledge to support the planning and conduct of resistance operations.

6-44. CA teams also advise and assist SO commanders in the operation of DC camps, as needed. These camps can serve as recruiting and training bases for UW operations. The actual operation of these camps, however, is resource intensive and implies a commitment of resources from conventional forces and NGOs.

Planning for the JSOA

6-45. The success of UW operations depends on many factors, primarily the support of the civilian populace. Without active popular support, the UW mission will fail. Planners must, therefore, consider the steps necessary to mobilize the populace to support the resistance. They must also consider the physical and psychological impact of resistance or U.S. unilateral operations on civilians. CA units perform tasks that support this goal by training resistance military and political elements in techniques to motivate and mobilize popular support of the resistance movement. This support must extend through the period in which victory has been achieved and a new government is trying to maintain internal stability.

CA Preparation for SF Operational Detachments

6-46. The supporting CA team advises and assists deploying SFODs in CMO. The element also advises the teams on the political, economic, social, and
cultural factors they must understand before deploying to the JSOA. CA planning and training for UW must consider the following factors:

- The theater CINC’s politico-military mission (for example, to restore the government-in-exile) and its effect on the resistance organization during and after hostilities.
- The strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions of the hostile political organization.
- Hostile countermeasures likely to isolate the resistance organization physically or psychologically from the local populace.
- Resistance activities the hostile political organization can exploit to neutralize U.S. support or to mobilize world opinion against the resistance organization.
- Organization and potential development of the resistance.
- The political, social, economic, and security needs of the various segments of the local populace.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

6-47. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency to higher phases. A national development program can solidify the position of the FN government and improve conditions for the people. CA activities vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of insurgent activity. The economic, social, and political situations also are major influences.

CA Role in Foreign Internal Defense

6-48. CA units conduct CA activities that support the internal development of an FN. CA teams may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies, but they must coordinate with the FN. These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas.

6-49. CA teams provide expertise in HA and PRC and in medical and engineer advisory capabilities. The CA battalion (SO) civic action teams provide additional resources to perform this mission. CA personnel supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid FN military units. CA elements supporting FID—

- Review U.S. SA program goals and FN internal defense and development (IDAD) goals and plan CMO to support the FN plan.
- Plan CMO based on the three phases of insurgency described in FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, and FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*.
- Train FN military to plan, train for, and conduct MCA, PRC, and other CA activities appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
- Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
• Identify specific CMO missions the FN military can and should conduct.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

6-50. PSYOP are operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The intent of PSYOP is to influence target audience behaviors that support U.S. national policy objectives and the geographic CINC’s intentions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP provide the commander the means to employ a nonlethal capability across the range of military operations. For further information, see FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, and JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

CA Support to PSYOP

6-51. CA forces support the theater PSYOP plan by conducting public information activities and providing timely feedback on the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan. These activities are integrated into the battle plans, to include providing for accurate reporting of the operation and combatting distorted or misrepresented information that may be disseminated by an adversary. CA planners can—

• Represent CA concerns in PSYOP activities.
• Coordinate with the psychological operations task force (POTF) to ensure consistency of messages and OPSEC without compromising CA credibility.
• Prepare CMO estimates, assessments, and the annex to the OPLAN or OPORD to identify and integrate CA support.
• Coordinate the use of local resources, facilities, and support—for example, civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance, or medical facilities and miscellaneous services and supplies.
• Provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
• Coordinate civic action projects in support of PSYOP plans.
• Advise on cultural and moral considerations.

During Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and RESTORE DEMOCRACY in 1994, the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) nominated two HA missions to the JTF commander that, in its estimation, would produce positive results with the population of Haiti—restore electricity to the island and remove the trash from the streets of the capital, Port-au-Prince. The collapse of the government had resulted in these services being discontinued, leaving the island in darkness and the streets filled with refuse. CA forces coordinated with Air Force Prime Power Teams and the 20th Engineer Brigade to execute these missions. In less than 30 days, power was restored and the major roads in the capital were free of trash. The success of these missions was highlighted in numerous broadcasts from major U.S.
and international news organizations and showed the people of Haiti that the JTF was there to help them.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

6-52. Commanders and staffs at all levels encounter an expanding information domain termed the global information infrastructure (GII). The GII contains information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military or the NCA but, nevertheless, may directly impact the success or failure of military operations. The media, NGOs, IOs, and selected individuals represent a partial list of GII participants.

6-53. All military operations occur within the GII, both interactive and pervasive in its presence and influence. Current, emerging electronic technologies permit a global audience in near-real-time and without the benefit of filters to be knowledgeable of any aspect of a military operation. With easy access to the global or national information network, the suppression, control, or censorship of the spread of information may be neither feasible nor desirable.

6-54. Adversaries and other non-DOD organizations—including many participants, agencies, and influences outside the traditional view of military conflict—intrude on the military information environment. Adversaries, perhaps supported by nonaligned nations, seek to gain an advantage in the GII by employing battlespace systems and organizations. In addition, the media, think tanks, academic institutions, NGOs, international agencies, and individuals with access to the information highway are all potentially significant participants in the GII. These entities can affect the strategic and operational direction of military operations before they begin. Independent of military control, their impact is always situationally dependent. Their activities may cause an unanticipated or unintentional effect on military operations. Such participants include—

- Government agencies, such as the DOS or the FEMA.
- NGOs.
- International agencies that provide a commercial service, such as the European Space Agency.
- Agencies that coordinate international efforts, such as the ICRC or the World Health Organization.
- Social and cultural elements, including religious movements and their leaders.
- Intelligence and military communications systems of allies, adversaries, and other Services.
- Individuals with the appropriate hardware and software to communicate with a worldwide audience.

6-55. Harnessing the potential of information to transform how the commander operates is critical to success in the future. Technology alone, however, cannot give commanders and staffs automatic battlespace visualization, flawless situational awareness, easily expanded vision,
highly effective information management. In the final analysis, the products of command initiative to harness the potential of information can only support the application of a leader’s judgment, wisdom, experience, and intuition to enhance his battle command.

6-56. Commanders currently synchronize CA activities with command and control warfare (C2W) and PA to gain and maintain information dominance, as well as effective C2. Successful operations require effective C2 to transform military capabilities into applied military power.

6-57. An increase in the amount of information available does not guarantee certainty. In fact, it potentially increases ambiguity. Current staff organizations, procedures, and analytical methods must adjust to master the richer flow, faster pace, and huge volume of information. The challenge is to find better, not just faster, analysis and decision-making procedures.

6-58. In many situations, GII organizations are present in the AOR before conventional forces arrive. They are often well-entrenched, with an established logistical framework and long-standing coordination and liaison arrangements. The media, for example, may initially know the AOR better than the military. As the media cover the buildup, they gain a thorough understanding of the situation, particularly in stability and support operations, and form their own perspectives. The projection of forces into the situation is of national interest, with national and international media watching from the moment forces arrive. CA personnel need to deploy early to support the commander and the force in their interactions with these organizations. CA activities not only reduce the potential distractions to a commander but also educate these organizations and facilitate their efforts to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely information to local officials and agencies, as well as external audiences. Some unique considerations apply to force-projection operations and stability and support operations.

CA Support to Information Operations

6-59. CA support to information operations provides an integral role of interfacing with critical actors and influences in the GII. Whether in stability or support operations or war, conducting military operations, consolidating combat power, and seeking information dominance are improved when leveraging CA support. Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA forces establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations. During Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, for example, CA forces informed the local populace through the news media, public discussion, and PSYOP information products and programs on the reestablishment of the legitimate Haitian Government. These measures created an information exchange that promoted understanding of, confidence in, and positive perception of measures supporting military operations.

6-60. A CMOC can be established to interact with key participants and influences in the GII, such as local authorities, NGOs, and IOs. CA teams support military operations by applying their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and
civil information and by providing information relevant to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).

6-61. Commanders must include CA activities in their planning guidance. CMO planners must consider all available support and information to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. CA forces are well suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support U.S. objectives.

6-62. CA activities, when interrelated with C2W and PA, support the commander’s objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environment—combat or peace. CA activities provide liaison and connectivity with essential participants and influences in the GII and interact with specific elements of C2W. Grouping CA activities, C2W, and PA together as specific information operations provides a framework to promote synergy and to facilitate staff planning and execution. This idea is reinforced by including the CMO and PA staff representatives in the information operations cell or on the information operations battle staff (IOBS) in routine staff coordination. This structure conceptually provides greater integration and synchronization of CA activities and PA with the more traditional warfighting elements of C2W.

**Functional Specialty Support to Information Operations**

6-63. CMO encompass the relationship between military forces and the civil authorities and civilian populace in a friendly or foreign country or area. CA activities support national policy and implement U.S. national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in operational areas. CMO secure local acceptance of and support for U.S. forces. CMO are important in gaining information dominance because of the capability of interfacing with key organizations and individuals in the GII—for example, CA’s traditional relationship with NGOs and IOs, such as the ICRC.

6-64. Commanders fully integrate CMO into all operations and use CMO to influence, coordinate, control, or develop civilian activities and civil organizations. CA activities play a command support role in all operational environments and across the operational continuum. CA activities are most common, however, when supporting the lower end of the range of military operations.

6-65. Many CA activities require specific civilian skills. CA activities most relevant to the GII and supporting information operations are categorized into four major sections:

- **Government team** — Provides liaison to the civilian government.
- **Economics and commerce team** — Monitors government economic and commercial agencies.
- **Public facilities team** — Allocates civilian communications resources for civilian and military use and directs civil communications agencies as required.
• **Special functions team** — Advises, assists, supervises, controls, or operates civil information agencies and provides television, radio, or newspaper services.

6-66. Each CA functional specialty section should consider collection activities, information sources, interrelationships, and coordination and support requirements in its mission analysis.

6-67. The nature of CA activities and the need for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace put them in a favorable position to collect information. CA public information collection activities encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the present or potential AOs. In their daily operations, CA personnel work with people, equipment, and documents that are prime sources of information. Information collected supports the CCIR and is often important to other agencies and to staff sections of other units. This information is particularly important to PSYOP and SF.

6-68. CA units are included in the information collection plan of the supported unit. CA units report information that meets the criteria of the supported unit’s collection plan. Prime sources of information available to CA units include but are not limited to—

- Civilians billeted with, catered to, or associated with enemy personnel.
- DCs and other personnel participating in movement control, relief, or other assistance (normally referred to appropriate intelligence personnel).
- Government documents, libraries, or archives.
- Files of newspapers or periodicals.
- Industrial and commercial records.
- Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest related to transportation, signal, engineer, and medical fields.

6-69. The information collected can supplement the intelligence effort. U.S. forces need timely, accurate information and intelligence to plan missions, to secure the element of surprise, to identify and develop targets, and to protect U.S. interests across the range of military operations. CA activities further provide timely information to the CCIR.

6-70. CA personnel are not, and must not have the appearance of being, intelligence agents. The mission of the unit drives the intelligence cycle. As operational planning begins, so does intelligence planning. Requirements for operational planning are normally for finished intelligence studies, estimates, or briefings. CMO planners prepare their estimates from basic intelligence documents not primarily written for CA use, such as an area study. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and processing of information.

6-71. CA functional specialists may collect information the G2 or J2 turns into intelligence. CA functional specialists, if used correctly, complement the intelligence collection process, especially HUMINT. In some cases, the functional specialists also enhance the capabilities of technical intelligence or...
intelligence on foreign technological development that may have eventual application for military use.

6-72. CA activities require close coordination with military forces and U.S., FN, and nonmilitary agencies that have a vested interest in military operations. CMO planners must consider all available support to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. In most cases, CMO planners directly or indirectly support the agencies assigned by law to carry out national policy. CMO planning is a command responsibility. It must be coordinated, at a minimum, with all other staff planners. To ensure success, coordination and cooperation with the following are vital to the conduct of all operations: other U.S. staffs and units, the FN military, the U.S. Government, foreign governments, international agencies, IOs, and NGOs.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

6-73. Public Law 92-539 assigns primary, concurrent jurisdiction and overall responsibility to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the direction of operations to counter certain criminal acts committed in the United States. Congress identified the need for the Federal government’s involvement in situations that may have international repercussions or in incidents that may impact on U.S. relations. In such cases, the FBI may need specialized military protective-type equipment or weaponry and technical support personnel. By agreement between the DOJ and the DOD, appropriate DOD components respond to all reasonable FBI requests for resources, including materiel, facilities, and personnel. DOD personnel act in a technical advisory but not a law enforcement capacity in combatting acts of terrorism. The SecDef extended the Secretary of the Army’s designation as executive agent for civil disturbance matters to cover the employment of military resources in support of the FBI. For detailed responsibilities of SOF in combatting terrorism, see FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces.

Antiterrorism

6-74. Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of falling victim to a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. These measures vary, based on assessments of the local threat, and include personnel awareness and knowledge of personal protection techniques. They also include crime prevention and physical security programs to “harden” the target, making Army installations and personnel less appealing as terrorist targets.

6-75. CA forces participate in their own antiterrorism programs and support the antiterrorism programs of other units or agencies by planning and conducting CMO as requested.

Counterterrorism

6-76. Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counterterrorism measures include preemption, intervention, or retaliation with specialized forces operating under the direction of the NCA and have the characteristics of strikes or raids. CA forces do not participate in counterterrorism activities.
COUNTERPROLIFERATION

6-77. Counterproliferation involves actions taken to locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe, transport, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In arms control, WMD are weapons capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in a manner that kills or injures a large number of people. WMD may be radiological or NBC. The term WMD excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon.

6-78. Counterproliferation is a special mission, not applicable to most CA forces. CA forces may be capable of responding to “consequence management” requirements involving WMD. CA is particularly well suited to address requirements that focus on regional, cultural, and linguistic capabilities.

CA Support to Consequence Management

6-79. Consequence management operations are closely related to existing doctrine for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The commonalities among all types of technological and natural disasters suggest strongly that many of the same management strategies can apply to all such emergencies. Consequence management is essentially disaster relief in response to an NBC or a WMD event.

6-80. Consequence management is an emerging operation defined as the actions taken to mitigate and recover from the effects of an NBC or a WMD incident. The incidents may be inadvertent or intentional. Consequence management may include providing water, food, mass care, shelter, transportation, communications, SAR, and decontamination. The emphasis is to preserve life and to minimize suffering. Consequence management includes planning actions and preparation to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop the executable plans implemented in response to an incident. The U.S. Government may also provide assistance in restoring essential government services.

6-81. An overarching principle in consequence management operations is that the HN has primary responsibility for responding to the incident. The DOS is the lead U.S. Government agency for OCONUS consequence management operations, and any U.S. Government response to an incident originates at the request of an HN.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39)

6-82. In response to the threat of terrorism, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) in 1996 as a follow-on action to the Federal Response Plan of 1992. The plan is a national-level response plan in which 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross are signatories. PDD-39 defines how the United States deals with terrorist attacks involving WMD, providing guidance to Federal agencies on actions to prevent and protect against WMD attacks (crisis management) and, should those efforts fail, dealing with the effects of the attack (consequence management).

6-83. In 1996, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. This act designates the DOD as the lead agent for the domestic preparedness against WMD destruction. For those events outside the territorial limits of the United States, the DOS is
responsible for negotiating disaster response agreements and for coordinating support requested by foreign nations. The culminating effect of these actions led the Chairman, JCS, to direct each CINC to develop contingency plans to respond to a crisis management or consequence management event.

Preincident Assessment Database

6-84. One of the critical roles CA units perform is to conduct a capability assessment survey of countries within each theater. This preincident assessment survey identifies critical assets within the country that could be used in a consequence management scenario. The information gathered in the assessment is maintained at the Embassy and at each theater HQ and is formatted into a database. The assessment augments the preparation and mitigation of any potential consequence management event.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

6-85. Special reconnaissance (SR) operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to confirm, refute, or obtain by visual observation or other collection methods information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR operations include target acquisition, area assessments, and poststrike reconnaissance. For further information, see FM 100-25. CA forces do not normally participate in SR missions.

DIRECT ACTION

6-86. Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, SOF may—

- Employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics, including close quarters battle.
- Emplace mines and other munitions.
- Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms.
- Provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions.
- Conduct independent sabotage.
- Conduct antiship operations.

6-87. For further information, see FM 100-25. CA forces do not normally participate in direct action missions.

COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

6-88. Collateral activities are applications of ARSOF capabilities in missions other than those directed by Congress. The inherent capabilities of ARSOF mission profiles make ARSOF suitable for employment in a range of collateral activities. These activities are other than primary missions for organizing, training, and equipping such forces. Collateral activities in which
ARSOF may participate include coalition support activities, CSAR, CD activities, HA, CM activities, SA, and special activities.

Coalition Support Activities

6-89. Coalition support by liaison elements improves the interaction of coalition partners and the U.S. military forces, particularly in coalition warfare. Coalition support includes training coalition partners on tactics, techniques, and procedures; providing communications to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure; and establishing liaisons to coordinate for CS and CSS. Liaison elements often give the JFC an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC C2.

6-90. CA forces support coalition warfare by—

- Providing staff augmentation to the coalition CMO staff.
- Establishing coalition CMOCs as required.
- Providing CMO training to coalition partners.
- Assisting in the development of the CA Annex and CMO Estimate to the OPLAN.
- Conducting area assessments.
- Providing functional specialists to transition planning as required.

Combat Search and Rescue

6-91. Personnel recovery (PR) is a term for a broad spectrum of activities that locate, recover, and restore to friendly control selected persons or material isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. PR includes SAR; CSAR; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); evasion and escape (E&E); and the coordination of negotiated and forcible recovery options. These situations may arise from a political change, combat action, chance happening, or mechanical mishap. For further information, see FM 100-25, FM 31-20, or USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery.

6-92. CA soldiers have an inherent role in early PR planning and intelligence analysis. During the SOF mission planning process and the subsequent development of a PR contingency plan, CA soldiers are an essential information source. Specifically, CA input to nominating selected areas for evasion (SAFEs) and directed areas for recovery (DARs) aids SOC planners with pragmatic, timely data.

6-93. CA units maintain valuable tools to assist SOF recovery teams and mechanisms. CA subject matter experts deployed in the target area can assist by elaborating on infrastructure details. Cultural studies highlight the prevailing moods, attitudes, and historical trends of a population. CA units have a wealth of information from lines of communication to population needs in country studies, country surveys, and AARs. Population density studies can, for example, help SOF planners develop a recovery mechanism feasibility study. Additionally, after deployment, CA units produce reports that give factual, timely information to the SOF community via the special
operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS). Details on critical facilities, political parties and factions, social and economic factors, the military, paramilitary, police, and demographics are examples of some of the relevant information available from CA-authored SODARS reports.

6-94. Once SOF soldiers initiate their evasion plan of action (EPA) or a SOF recovery operation, CA units and soldiers help synchronize the recovery plan. CA soldiers have direct access to NGOs and government organizations that may influence the indigenous environment. CA soldiers augment Interagency Working Groups with their ability to coordinate and focus otherwise diverse organizations toward the common PR mission. Should negotiations become necessary, CA teams may provide negotiators with key information through analysis of the situation and the operational environment. As planners identify possible intermediate staging bases (ISBs), CA teams can bring all participants together in the CMOC to centralize resources and to provide the greatest unity of effort toward the PR mission.

6-95. CA planners collaborate with the DOS to develop, review, and recommend actions or initiatives to support current Embassy drawdown plans. These plans prioritize personnel for extraction and identify assembly areas; however, these plans do not address unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) operations requirements beyond the scope of a NEO.

6-96. DOD and DOS are currently working on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for mutual support to PR. The MOA allows the DOS to identify UAR requirements and capabilities necessary in recovering isolated individuals who cannot get to the extraction site. UAR requirements may include SOF recovery teams to assist in the recovery of U.S. citizens, NGOs, and IOs during NEO. CA planners’ knowledge of DOS UAR requirements help ensure NEO adequately address PR contingency issues. All SOF planning agencies should, therefore, consider CA knowledge on current NEO plans to capitalize on a prudent PR design.

6-97. CA soldiers and units assist PR planners by providing factual, timely, and culturally relevant information. CA soldiers have ongoing relationships with NGOs, IOs, and other government agencies that may give negotiators increased advantage should negotiations become necessary. Finally, CA teams synchronize otherwise diverse players in a PR effort using the CMOC to augment existing C2 nodes from CONUS to the ISB. Unity of effort is best achieved using CA soldiers and units early in the PR planning process. Finally, the CA component of a solid PR strategy gives planners increased flexibility should operational and tactical situations change.

**Counterdrug Activities**

6-98. CD activities involve measures taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. The level of violence by the drug infrastructure dictates the increased use of military and paramilitary force in CD operations. A 1981 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (Chapter 18, USC, Section 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in CD activities. The primary SOF role in this interagency activity is to support U.S. and FN CD efforts abroad. CA forces support CD activities by—

- Coordinating FNS for FN forces as well as U.S. forces.
• Coordinating HA projects with the FN, the U.S. forces, and the U.S. country team to develop H/CA “spin off” missions that build a bond between the FN government and the local populace. NOTE: The support could further develop into programs that promote an infrastructure steering people away from drug-related income activities to legal means of making a living. It could possibly integrate functional area expertise—for example agricultural and medical expertise.

• Training FN forces on PRC methods to enhance FN military or police efforts in areas where drugs are produced or processed.

• Training FN CA forces on ways to conduct CMO to enhance mission success. The training includes battle staff training for CMO officers of the FN force on ways to integrate CA activities into the overall mission plan. The training leads to MCA projects that “win the hearts and minds” and do not further isolate the remote villages from the HN government.

• Providing liaison between the local populace and U.S. soldiers and HN ministries.

Along with elements from the 7th SFG(A), CA teams deployed to Ecuador and Columbia to train HN counterdrug forces on PRC, HA, and MCA activities. Specifically, the CA teams trained selected HN officers on battle staff procedures and ways to establish a CMOC to coordinate CMO. The CA teams were instrumental in coordinating the activities of various NGOs, IOs, and U.S. Government agencies to support HN activities in creating a synergy of effort sustainable and relevant to the needs and culture of the two countries.

96th CA Battalion (A) AAR

Humanitarian Assistance

6-99. HA is a group of programs U.S. DOD resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature. HA includes H/CA, foreign disaster relief, NEOs, and support to DCs. Combatants, including members of groups engaged in paramilitary activities, can receive assistance under some HA programs—for example, the DOD nonlethal property program. For further information on HA, see Chapter 2 of this manual.

Countermine Activities

6-100. CA teams support CM as part of a coordinated effort with SF and PSYOP forces to support country team objectives. The effort involves creating and training an FN national demining office (NDO) capable of sustaining, planning, coordinating, executing, and recording demining operations. CA support includes conducting liaison with the FN, UN, other IOs or local NGOs, and commercial contractors to the extent that the activities of those organizations complement the NDO mission. The primary objective of these activities is to establish a self-sustaining NDO operations center with a functional data-collection capability. CA elements supporting humanitarian demining operations (HDO)—
• Assess the capabilities of the potential NDO staff, equipment, and facilities.
• Train and equip the NDO staff in staff coordination and operations procedures.
• Identify the required budget, personnel, and equipment, such as training aids, furniture, computers, and vehicles.
• Identify the required potential resources of additional support—for example, UN, NGOs, contractors, or OSD.
• Conduct the predeployment site survey and confirm the budget.
• Coordinate for the translation of lesson plans, when required.
• Procure necessary equipment and complete contracting requirements.

A CA team from the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Zimbabwe in May 1998 for 7 weeks on a mission to establish, equip, and train an NDO. This mission was conducted in six phases:

Phase 1 - Meet HN participants and the NDO staff and assess the facilities.

Phase 2 - Upgrade facilities (power, lights, structural improvements) and order equipment (furniture, computers, office supplies).

Phase 3 - Conduct initial job-oriented computer training for the NDO staff and conduct classes on demining operations, the orders process, NDO staff operations, data collection and management (minefield data), and property accountability. Completely equip the NDO.

Phase 4 - Lead the staff through an orders process drill, resulting in actual deployment orders for the newly trained demining squadron to deploy and initiate demining operations in the Victoria Falls minefields. Integrate the PSYOP effort in support of the Mine Awareness Section of the NDO so that mine awareness products are completed and available to support the squadron’s initial demining operations.

Phase 5 - Consolidate data for remaining minefields in preparation for future missions. Ensure proper accountability of all donated equipment and provide a stock of office supplies to keep the office operational for many months.

Phase 6 - Conduct mission handoff to the U.S. Embassy staff.

Theater Support Team (TST) 46 returned to Zimbabwe in October 1998 for 2 weeks to assess the progress of the program and to confirm the plan for the follow-on deployment. At this time, they also restocked office supplies. They coordinated with the Department of State and wrote the country plan for the demining project. TST 46 returned in March 1999 for 6 weeks and facilitated the acquisition of more than $700,000 of heavy equipment to be donated to the program. Demining operations continue in Zimbabwe.
Security Assistance

6-101. Narrowly defined, SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services that support national policies and objectives. Considered more properly as a strategic element, SA is a critical tool of U.S. foreign policy. It has application across the range of military operations and is a bridge that links collective security with U.S. friends and allies in times of peace and crisis.

6-102. When the United States provides SA to an FN, a primary concern is the FN’s ability to plan and manage its defense resources by itself. FN military organizations may never develop this ability if they continue to request help in areas where they have already achieved self-sufficiency.

6-103. SA programs are normally conducted by MTTs. These teams consist of subject matter experts who deploy to an FN to provide training and expertise in areas beyond the capability of the target country.

6-104. The main purpose of a CA MTT is to develop FN CMO expertise and training capabilities in a particular CA activity—for example, in 1996 when a CA MTT deployed to Cambodia to train a platoon of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in CMO. The Cambodian Minister of Defense had read about the CA activities in Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD and wanted a similar capability in the RCAF. Upon completing its training, this platoon played a pivotal role in the repatriation of Khmer Rouge defectors by coordinating the delivery of relief supplies to defector camps. This training improves the FN CA capability by educating specialists to train their people further in conducting CMO (train-the-trainer).

6-105. CA MTTs can also provide training in—

- Agriculture.
- Animal husbandry.
- Communications.
- Economics and commerce.
- Education.
- Public health.
- Public information.
- Public safety.
- Public works.
- Sanitation.
- Relief activities.

6-106. For further information on MTTs, see AR 12-1, Security Assistance—Policy, Objectives, and Responsibilities; AR 12-7, Security Assistance Teams; and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Program Handbook.
Special Activities

6-107. Special activities fall under Executive Order 12333 and require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight. ARSOF conduct special activities abroad that support national foreign policy objectives; however, they conduct these activities in such a manner that U.S. Government participation is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, ARSOF may perform any of their primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed on special activities. Such activities are highly compartmentalized and centrally managed and controlled.
Chapter 7

Army Special Operations Forces Logistics Support

The U.S. Army strategy for conducting land warfare has changed from AirLand Operations to force projection. Most ARSOF units are in CONUS and have traditionally operated in a force projection mode. USASOC has aligned its ARSOF sustainment organizations and activities with the U.S. Army’s concept of force projection. During deployment, CA units are attached to Army organizations and receive continuous, responsive sustainment.

**ARSOF LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT**

7-1. The type of operation, deployment sequence, unit basing, and AOR shape the logistics environment for CA forces. A common problem throughout the environment is the integration and distribution of logistics to committed CA forces.

**MAJOR THEATER WAR**

7-2. A robust sustainment system that develops into a mature logistics infrastructure characterizes a protracted MTW. When the theater support system is in place, it meets most ARSOF requirements. CA logistics planners must concentrate on the—

- **Initial entry.** They must determine the type of sustainment required, the number of days of accompanying supplies based on the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), and the CA basing needs.

- **Buildup and integration.** They must coordinate and integrate CA logistics with the theater support system before TPFDL closure and as the system matures. In some cases, the theater logistics infrastructure never achieves full maturity.

- **Redeployment.** As units start the redeployment phase, the Army Services Component Commander (ASCC) ensures the tailoring (FNS or contract) of the remaining support units to meet stay-behind CA support requirements.

**STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

7-3. Each operation is unique and requires mission-specific analysis that develops a tailored sustainment force. Joint, international, and interagency activities add complexity to the sustainment system. CA forces may find themselves conducting operations outside a theater support system because of geographic location. Preparation and submission of an SOR during these types of operations not only enhance the unit requirements determination process, but also add a sanity check to the theater OPLAN.
PREPARATION MODES

7-4. Two methodologies of planning are deliberate planning and crisis-action planning. In deliberate planning, CA units fully identify support requirements for OPLANs and CONPLANs in a bare-based SOR, down to the user level. In this way, the ASCC coordinates how to fulfill requirements from the support structure in the theater Army and prepares a support plan identifying support relationships. In crisis-action planning, the requirements anticipated at the COCOM level dictate the amount of responsiveness and improvisation required to provide reactive, no-notice support and sustainment. Upon notification of mission requirements, CA units submit another SOR modifying logistics requirements differing from the bare-based SOR.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COMMAND

7-5. The theater combatant commander establishes the command relationship involving CA forces. Regardless of SOF command relationships in theater, the relationships do not affect support for CA units. The ASCC has the Title 10 USC responsibility to provide support and sustainment to all ARSOF unless designated otherwise.

7-6. Special operations support command (SOSCOM) HQ provides C2 of its organic elements and, when directed, deploys its CS and CSS battalions in direct support of deployed CA elements.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT

7-7. The special operations theater support element (SOTSE) is a staff planning, coordinating, and facilitating element. It serves as the CA liaison to the ASCC for logistics matters. It coordinates requirements identified by CA elements. The SOTSE also facilitates the interface of CA organizational logistics functions with the services provided by the ASCC. Each ASCC commander has a SOTSE embedded within the staff. As a part of the ASCC staff, the SOTSE ensures that the theater logistics system satisfies validated CA requirements.

7-8. The SOR developed by the CA unit is a critical source of information the ASCC needs in its coordination and facilitation function. CA logistics planners must be proactive and must be included in the mission-planning process. They must anticipate operational unit requirements at all stages of the mission. Ideally, the COCOM J4 uses the ASCC OPLAN to prepare his CONPLAN for inclusion in the mission order. This approach allows theater support elements time to review required support before the CA unit submits its mission-tailored SOR. This review is especially critical in crisis-action planning and short-notice mission changes. The SOR is a living document that requires periodic reevaluation and updating. Again, determination of requirements begins during the deliberate-planning process and is modified with the receipt of the mission. Figure 7-1, page 7-3, depicts the SOR flow. Time and accuracy are critical factors.
7-9. Although deliberate planning is the preferred method, crisis-action planning is within the framework. Anticipating requirements based on emerging operations and using approved OPLANs enhances this process.

**STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FLOW**

7-10. The intent of the SOR process is to make sure each CA unit submits a comprehensive, valid SOR early in the planning cycle. The CA unit coordinates through the USACAPOC operations and logistics staff to provide the USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) an initial list of requirements. USASOC DCSOPS tasks the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to source all requirements.

7-11. The SOR flow is not an exact procedure. More than one level may work the sustainment issues concurrently. CA units develop an SOR for all theater contingency plans. The ASCC staff looks at the key issues and coordinates them.
before receiving the revised SOR. The step-by-step process of the SOR flow from user to provider is as follows:

- When a CA unit receives a mission, it updates the standing SOR developed during the deliberate-planning process. The CA commander uses this SOR to cross-level supplies needed for the assigned mission at the unit level. The SOR identifies and consolidates, in priority, all unit requirements that exceed organic capabilities. The mission unit forwards it to the next higher organization.

- At the next higher level, the SOR starts the process into the operational channels (S3, G3). The operations and logistics sections review the SOR and direct or assist the cross-leveling and transfer of needed items in the most expeditious way possible. This staff level then forwards the SOR to the next higher level for any supplies and services still remaining on the SOR.

- Any supplies and services still unresourced on the SOR are again passed up the chain. This level forwards an SOR requesting only the supplies and services not previously obtained.

- At the next level (USASOC), the requirements that can be obtained within USASOC are coordinated and transferred. USASOC coordinates with HQ DA, Army Materiel Command (subordinate commands), other agencies, and major commands to source all requirements.

- To complete the SOR process, USASOC forwards unsatisfied support requirements to the CINC for validation. *(NOTE: USASOC forwards two copies of the SOR—one for the CINC and the other for the ASCC for information pending validation.)* The CINC tasks the ASCC for the needed supplies and services.

- The theater ASCC then tasks selected units with the sustainment mission. The ASCC publishes a support plan detailing support to the CA unit. If the ASCC cannot provide the service or if a sister Service is better suited to support the CA mission, the theater ASCC returns the SOR to the theater CINC for assistance.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS LOGISTICS SUPPORT**

7-12. Conventional Army organizations and procedures are normally adequate for CA requirements. Standard procedures are in place to handle the few CA-peculiar requirements. The ASCC is responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and follow-on support and sustainment of in-theater Army forces, including ARSOF. The following conditions occur often enough that they must receive special consideration during logistics planning:

- Forward-deployed CA units are usually in isolated, austere locations. In such cases, distribution of the support requirement is the key consideration.

- Although a requirement may exist for some special equipment, most equipment is Army-common and organic units can maintain the equipment.
RESPONSIBILITIES

7-13. Responsibilities for planning and executing theater support do not align with the levels of war or with the HQ normally associated with them.

7-14. The theater CINC tasks missions to CA forces. The theater CINC’s staff works closely with USSOCOM and the theater ASCC to articulate the CA requirements. The theater CINC establishes priorities and allocates the available resources to accomplish each mission. The ASCC develops the theater support plan of theater logistics organizations. The plans include CA.

7-15. CA logisticians coordinate with the ASCC to develop plans and subsequent orders or to implement directives the ASCC issues to support CA forces. The SOTSE keeps SOSCOM informed of the status of ASCC supporting plans.

7-16. CA logistics planners identify the support requirements in the planning phase. The ASCC must also identify the logistics shortfalls for inclusion in the CINC’s risk assessment in his AOR. If the ASCC cannot support the CA forces, the ASCC must raise the shortfall to the supported CINC for resolution.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7-17. Planners must address the following considerations:

- Maximizing the use of existing fixed facilities.
- Limiting CSS requirements to mission essentials.
- Minimizing the handling of supplies.
- Concentrating maintenance on returning major end items to service.
- Relying on air lines of communication for rapid resupply.
- Anticipating high attrition during resupply missions into denied areas.
- Identifying as early as possible those items that require operational floats or other special logistics arrangements.
- Making maximum use of FNS.

7-18. During deliberate planning, the ASCC may use CA elements (either in theater or from USSOCOM) to assist in conducting assessments or site surveys. These missions can also serve ASCC preparations. When feasible, planners integrate these assessments into the theater campaign plan to provide intelligence and operational and logistics information for logistics preparation of the theater.

7-19. The use of assessment teams may not be practical during crisis-action planning. USASOC can deploy advance party personnel to assist the ASCC in receiving CA forces.
Appendix A

International and Nongovernment Organizations

This appendix contains a partial list of IOs and NGOs. The inclusion of the list in this manual does not represent an official endorsement by the U.S. Army, DOD, or any U.S. Government agency.

ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AED)

A-1. The AED meets social, economic, and environmental challenges through education and human resources development. It applies state-of-the-art education, training, research, technology, management, behavioral analysis, and social marketing techniques to solve problems. The AED improves knowledge and skills throughout the world as the most effective means of stimulating growth, reducing poverty, and promoting democratic and humanitarian ideals.

Address: 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009
Telephone: (202) 884-8000, Facsimile (FAX): (202) 884-8400
Web Site: http://www.aed.org/

ACCIÓN INTERNACIONAL

A-2. ACCIÓN International fights poverty through microlending, providing loans and other financial services to poor and low-income people who start their own businesses. An international leader in the field, ACCIÓN is an umbrella organization for a network of microfinance institutions in 13 Latin American countries and 8 U.S. cities.

Address: 120 Beacon Street, Somerville, MA 02143
Telephone: (617) 492-4930, Facsimile (FAX): (617) 876-9509
E-Mail: info@accion.org
Web Site: http://www.accion.org/

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL/VOLUNTEERS IN OVERSEAS COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE (ACDI/VOCA)

A-3. ACDI/VOCA is an international development organization that provides high-quality technical expertise at the request of farmers, agricultural businesses, cooperatives, and private and government agencies abroad.

Address: 50 F Street, NW, Suite 1075, Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 383-4961, Facsimile (FAX): (202) 783-7204
Web Site: http://www.acdivoca.org/
ACTION AGAINST HUNGER (ACTION INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA FAIM [INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST HUNGER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]) (AICF/USA)

A-4. The ultimate objective of all AICF/USA programs is to enable the beneficiaries to regain their autonomy and self-sufficiency. AICF/USA seeks to save lives by combatting hunger, disease, and crises that threaten the lives of men, women, and children in natural or man-made disasters.

Address: 1 Catton Street, London WC1R 4AB, United Kingdom
Telephone: 44 171 831 58 58, FAX: 44 171 831 42 59
Web Site: [http://www.interaction.org/members/aah.html](http://www.interaction.org/members/aah.html)

ACTIONAID

A-5. ActionAid focuses on long-term development, tackling the root causes of poverty and working directly with communities to help them improve the quality of their lives. Projects may help improve access to clean water, sanitation, and health care facilities; develop education for children and adults; improve food supplies; or create ways to generate income.

ACTION INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA FAIM (INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST HUNGER) (AICF)

A-6. AICF promotes development efforts and provides emergency assistance in Africa, Asia, and Central Europe. It focuses its efforts on health, drinking water, and agriculture-based income-generation projects.

Address: 1511 K Street, NW, Suite 1025, Washington, DC 20005

ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY (ADRA)

A-7. ADRA is an independent agency established by the Seventh-Day Adventist church to help in individual and community development and disaster relief. ADRA works in more than 100 countries around the world in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, the South Pacific, and Central and South America.

Address: 12501 Old Columbia Pike, Silver Spring, MD 20904

ADVOCACY INSTITUTE

A-8. Advocacy Institute programs focus on creating policy change by strengthening democratic practices and civil society. Assistance ranges from helping community-based leaders in towns and cities throughout the United States craft effective messages, to working with NGO leaders from around the world to engage in advocacy.

Address: 1707 L Street, NW Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 659-8475, FAX: (202) 659-8484
E-Mail: info@advocacy.org
AFRICA-AMERICA INSTITUTE (AAI)
A-9. The mission of the AAI is to promote African development, primarily through education and training. AAI emphasizes using the long-established skills and resources of educators and facilitators to enhance the growth of trade, investment, and economic development in Africa.

Address: 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 667-5636, FAX: (202) 265-6332

AFRICARE
A-10. Africare helps improve the quality of life in rural Africa in five primary areas: agriculture, water resource development, environmental management, health, and emergency humanitarian aid.

Address: Africare House, 440 R Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001
Web Site: http://www.africare.org/

AGA KHAN FOUNDATION (AKF)
A-11. AKF America promotes social development, primarily in low income countries of Asia and Africa, by funding programs in health, education, and rural development. Grantees and beneficiaries are selected without regard to race, religion, or political persuasion.

Address: 1901 L Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 293-2537, FAX: (202) 785-1752
E-Mail: 71075.1561@compuserve.com

AID TO ARTISANS
A-12. Aid to Artisans offers assistance to artisans world-wide to foster artistic traditions, cultural vitality, and community well-being. Through training and collaboration in product development, production, and marketing, Aid to Artisans provides sustainable economic and social benefits for crafts people in an environmentally sensitive and culturally respectful manner.

Address: 14 Brick Walk Lane, Farmington, CT 06032
Voice Mail: (860) 677-1649, FAX: (860) 676-2170
E-Mail: atausa@aol.com
Web Site: http://www.aid2artisans.org/
AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL ACTION (INTERACTION)
A-13. InterAction works to coordinate and promote the activities of its members with U.S. Government organizations and IOs through consultation, discussion, coordination, planning, and joint action in common areas of concern.

Address: 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20036
Web Site: [http://www.interaction.org/](http://www.interaction.org/)

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (AFSC)
A-14. AFSC is a Quaker organization that includes people of various faiths who are committed to social justice, peace, and humanitarian service. The basis of its work is the belief in the worth of every person and the faith in the power of love to overcome violence and injustice.

Address: 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: (215) 241-7000, FAX: (215) 241-7275
E-Mail: afscinfo@afsc.org
Web Site: [http://www.afsc.org/](http://www.afsc.org/)

AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE (JDC)
A-15. JDC is the overseas arm of the American Jewish community. It sponsors programs of relief, rescue, and reconstruction, fulfilling its commitment to the idea that all Jews are responsible for one another and that “to save one person is to save a world.”

Address: 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
E-Mail: JDC at admin@JDC.org
Web Site: [http://www.jdc.org/](http://www.jdc.org/)

AMERICAN JEWISH WORLD SERVICE (AJWS)
A-16. The Jewish Volunteer Corps (JVC) is a program of the AJWS that sends skilled Jewish men and women to volunteer in the fields of health, economic development, education, and agriculture projects throughout the developing world. AJWS is dedicated to providing nonsectarian HA and emergency relief to disadvantaged people in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine.

Address: 989 Avenue of the Americas, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10018
Telephone: (212) 736-2597
Web Site: [http://www.ajws.org/](http://www.ajws.org/)
AMERICAN NEAR EAST REFUGEE AID (ANERA)
A-17. ANERA seeks to reduce poverty and relieve suffering in the Middle East. ANERA formulates and implements social and economic development projects in cooperation with indigenous institutions. ANERA also provides relief in response to civilian emergencies.

Address: 1522 K Street, NW, Suite 202, Washington, DC 20005
E-Mail: anera@mail.anera.org

AMERICAN ORT
A-18. ORT provides technological education to communities in industrialized countries like Argentina, France, India, Israel, Italy, Morocco, and South Africa. ORT offers instruction in such areas as agriculture, road maintenance, family health care, science, and technology development.

Address: 817 Broadway, New York, NY 10003
Web Site: http://www.aort.org/

AMERICAN RED CROSS
A-19. The American Red Cross provides relief to disaster victims and helps people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. It provides services that are consistent with its Congressional charter and the fundamental principles of the IFRC and Red Crescent Movement, of which it is a part.

Address: 431 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Web Site: http://www.redcross.org/intl/index.html

AMERICAN REFUGEE COMMITTEE (ARC)
A-20. The ARC works for the survival, health, and well-being of refugees, displaced persons, and those at risk. It seeks to enable those people to rebuild productive lives of dignity and purpose, striving always to respect the values of those served.

Address: 2344 Nicollet Avenue South, Suite 350, Minneapolis, MN 55404
Telephone: (612) 872-7060, FAX: (612) 872-4309
E-Mail: pr@archq.org
Web Site: http://www.archq.org/

AMIGOS DE LAS AMÉRICAS
A-21. Amigos de las Américas provides leadership development opportunities for young people; promotes community health in Latin America; and facilitates cross-cultural understanding for the people of the Americas.

Address: 5618 Star Lane, Houston, TX 77057
Telephone: (800) 231-7796, (713) 782-5290, FAX: (713) 782-9267
Web Site: http://www.amigoslink.org/
ANANDA MARGA UNIVERSAL RELIEF TEAM (AMURT)
A-22. AMURT helps to improve the quality of life for the poor and underprivileged people of the world and to assist the victims of natural and man-made disasters. AMURT offers assistance that encourages and enables people to develop themselves, hence harnessing their own resources for securing the basic necessities of life and for gaining greater socioeconomic independence.

Address: 7627 16th Street, NW, PO Box 56466, Washington, DC 20040
Telephone: (202) 829-8676, FAX: (202) 829-0462
E-Mail: amurt-wdc@amps.org

AVSC INTERNATIONAL
A-23. AVSC International works worldwide to improve the lives of individuals by making reproductive health services safe, available, and sustainable. AVSC provides technical assistance, training, and information, with a focus on practical solutions that improve services where resources are scarce. AVSC works in partnership with governments, institutions, and health care professionals to make this right a reality.

Address: 79 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (212) 561-8000, FAX: (212) 779-9489
E-Mail: info@avsc.org
Web Site: http://www.avsc.org/avsc/

BAPTIST WORLD ALLIANCE (BWA)
A-24. The BWA provides fellowship, meets human needs, leads in evangelism, and works for justice. BWA defends the right of every man, woman, and child to exercise their freedom of religion. Baptists, from their earliest history, have suffered, fought for, and defended the religious freedom for all people. The BWA speaks to governments on behalf of Baptists in many parts of the world where individuals continually struggle to worship freely.

Address: 6733 Curran Street, McLean, VA 22101
E-Mail: bwa@bwanet.org
Telephone: (703) 790-8980, FAX: (703) 893-5160
Web Site: http://www.bwanet.org/
BREAD FOR THE WORLD INSTITUTE (BFWI)
A-25. BFWI seeks justice for the world's hungry people by lobbying U.S. decision makers. BFWI members represent more than 40 denominations. Members contact their Congressional representatives on legislation that affects hungry people in the United States and worldwide. Thousands of local churches and community groups support BFWI with letters to Congress and with financial gifts. Some BFWI members meet locally to pray, study, and take action together.

Address: 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1000, Silver Spring, MD 20910
Telephone: (301) 608-2400, (800) 82-BREAD, FAX: (301) 608-2401
Web Site: http://www.bread.org/

BRITISH REFUGEE COUNCIL
A-26. The British Refugee Council gives practical help to asylum seekers and refugees and advances their rights in the United Kingdom and abroad. The Council provides direct help to people seeking asylum in the United Kingdom, helping people at every level—from grassroots work with refugee community organizations to liaison with senior politicians.

Address: 3 Bondway, London SW8 1SJ, United Kingdom
Telephone: 0171 820 3000, FAX: 0171 582 9929
E-Mail: refcounciluk@gn.apc.org
Web Site: http://www.gn.apc.org/brcslproject

BROTHER'S BROTHER FOUNDATION
A-27. Brother's Brother Foundation distributes donated medical, educational, agricultural, and humanitarian response resources to people in need of them internationally.

Address: 1501 Reedsdale Street, Suite 3005, Pittsburgh, PA 15233-2341
Telephone: (412) 321-3160, FAX: (412) 321-3325
E-Mail: BBFound@aol.com
Web Site: http://www.brothersbrother.com/

CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES
A-28. The Canadian Council for Refugees promotes the rights and protection of refugees in Canada and around the world, and encourages the settlement of refugees and immigrants in Canada. Membership consists of organizations involved in the settlement, sponsorship, and protection of refugees and immigrants. The Council serves the networking, information-exchange, and advocacy needs of its membership.

Address: 6839 Drolet #302, Montréal, Québec, Canada H2S 2T1
Telephone: (514) 277-7223, FAX: (514) 277-1447
E-Mail: ccr@web.net
Web Site: http://www.web.net/~ccr/
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (CIDA)
A-29. CIDA provides development assistance programs to support sustainable development to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.

Address: 200 Promenade du Portage, Hull, Québec, Canada K1A 0G4
Telephone: (819) 997-6041, FAX: (819) 953-9453
Web Site: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/

CARE
A-30. CARE helps the poor of the developing world to achieve social and economic well-being. It supports processes that create competence and lead to self-sustainment over time. CARE's task is to reach new standards of excellence in offering disaster relief, technical assistance, training, food, and other material resources and management in combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. It also advocates public policies and programs that support these ends.

Address: Boulevard du Regent 58/10, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
Web Site: http://www.care.org/

CATHOLIC FUND FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT (CAFOD)
A-31. CAFOD promotes human development and social justice in witness to Christian faith and Gospel values. CAFOD raises funds from within the Catholic community and beyond so that it can empower people in need—regardless of their race, gender, religion, or politics—to bring about change through development and relief programs overseas.

Address: Romero Close, Stockwell Road, London, SW9 9TY, United Kingdom
Telephone: 0171 733 7900, FAX: 0171 274 9630
E-Mail: hqcafod@cafod.org.uk
Web Site: http://www.cafod.org.uk/

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AND COOPERATION (CIHC)
A-32. The CIHC focuses on health, human rights, and HA. It offers innovative approaches to foreign policy that may be more effective in many cases than conventional military, economic, and geopolitical solutions. CIHC provides direct health-care in crises. It organizes medical relief and HA through local channels, alone or in cooperation with other international agencies, and sponsors rehabilitation and essential data-retrieval projects.

E-Mail: cihc@usa.healthnet.org
Web Site: http://www.healthnet.org/cihc
CENTER FOR VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION
A-33. The focus of the Center is on the organization and management of voluntary agencies and NGOs and the implications for social and public policy. The Center attempts to develop usable theory by working together with agencies in the resolution of current problems.
Address: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
Telephone: 0171 955 7205/7375, FAX: 0171-955-6039
E-Mail: Cvo@LSE.AC.UK

CENTER OF CONCERN
A-34. The Center of Concern works with international networks promoting social analysis, theological reflection, policy analysis, political advocacy, research and public education on issues of global development, peace, and social justice.
Address: 1225 Otis Street, NE, Washington, DC 20017
Telephone: (202) 635-2757, FAX: (202) 832-9494
E-Mail: coc@coc.org
Web Site: http://www.coc.org/coc

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION ACTIVITIES (CEDPA)
A-35. The CEDPA is a women-focused nonprofit IO founded in 1975. CEDPA seeks to empower women at all levels of society to be full partners in development. Empowerment strategies include building the capacities of development institutions and networks, mobilizing women’s participation at the policy level, linking reproductive health services and women’s empowerment, and making youth an integral part of the development agenda. All CEDPA activities promote gender equity.
Address: 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 667-1142, FAX: (202) 332-4496
Web Site: http://www.cedpa.org/

CHARITIES AID FOUNDATION (CAF)
A-36. CAF provides services to nearly 300,000 private individuals and many of Britain’s largest companies. It processes donations to charities, large and small, and assists them in many other ways. CAF hosts CharityNet, a major Internet site for and about the voluntary sector. CAF commissions and publishes statistics and information for the sector and organizes conferences and seminars.
Address: Kings Hill, West Malling, Kent ME19 4TA, United Kingdom
Telephone: 44 0 1732 520000, FAX: 44 (0)1732 520001
E-Mail: enquiries@caf.charitynet.org
Web Site: http://www.charitynet.org/index.html
CHILD HEALTH FOUNDATION (CHF)
A-37. CHF supports the development of practical, low-cost methods to prevent and treat the most common causes of illness or death for children in all parts of the world. CHF supports clinical research, continuing medical education of health care professionals, and public education and outreach.

Address: 10630 Little Patuxent Parkway, Century Plaza, Suite 325, Columbia, MD 21044

Telephone: (410) 992-5512, (301) 596-4514, FAX: (410) 992-5641

CHILDREACH
A-38. Childreach, the U.S. member of PLAN International, is a global, child-focused development organization that links caring people in the United States with needy children and their families in emerging countries. Overseas programs are implemented by PLAN International and are strengthened by global education in the United States. Childreach seeks a world where all children realize their full potential in societies that respect people's rights and dignity.

Address: 155 Plan Way, Warwick, RI 02886-1099

Telephone: (401) 738-5600, FAX: (401) 738-5608


CHRISTIAN AID
A-39. Christian Aid provides assistance to about 500 evangelistic ministries based in 122 “mission field” countries overseas. Millions of foreign nationals visit the United States and Canada every year. The goal of Christian Aid is to reach those visitors while they are away from home and to lead them to spiritual maturity in Christ.

Address: 3045 Ivy Road, Charlottesville, VA 22903

Telephone: (804) 977-5650

E-Mail: info@christianaid.org.

Web Site: [http://www.christianaid.org/](http://www.christianaid.org/)

CHRISTIAN CHILDREN’S FUND
A-40. The Christian Children’s Fund helps children from every hemisphere to overcome the ravages of war, natural disasters, and disease.

Address: 2821 Emerywood Parkway, Box 26484, Richmond, VA 23261-5066

Telephone: (800) 776-6767

Web Site: [http://www.christianchildrensfund.org/](http://www.christianchildrensfund.org/)
CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE (CRWRC)

A-41. The CRWRC is a relief, development, and educational ministry supported by the Christian Reformed Church in North America. CRWRC supports 30 staff and many programs in North America and more than 30 countries around the world, working with people and their communities to create permanent, positive change in Christ's name.

Telephone: (616) 224-0740 or (800) 552-7972 US; (905) 336-2920 or (800) 730-3490 Canada

Web Site: [http://www.crcna.org/](http://www.crcna.org/)

CHURCH WORLD SERVICE (CWS)

A-42. CWS meets basic needs of people in peril, working for justice and dignity with the poor and vulnerable; promoting peace and understanding among people of different faiths, races, and nations; and affirming the diversity and integrity of God's creation.

Address: 28606 Phillips Street, PO Box 968, Elkhart, IN 46515
Telephone: (800) 297-1516, FAX: (219) 262-0966
Web Site: [http://nccusa.org/cws](http://nccusa.org/cws)

CITIZENS DEMOCRACY CORPS (CDC)

A-43. The CDC supports and develops hundreds of small and medium-sized businesses in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia. The CDC assists in the growth of market economies and a variety of stabilizing, democratic institutions. It provides new market opportunities and jobs for companies and citizens in the region.

Address: 1400 I Street, NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (800) 394-1945, FAX: (202) 872-0923
E-Mail: info@cdc.org.
Web Site: [http://www.cdc.org/](http://www.cdc.org/)

CITIZENS NETWORK FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CNFA)

A-44. CNFA is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to stimulating international economic growth in developing and emerging world markets. CNFA builds partnerships between the public and private sectors to foster sustainable development and to create market-oriented, economically viable enterprises where none or few existed before.

Address: 1111 19th Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 296-3920, FAX: (202) 296-3948
Web Site: [http://www.fb.com/cnfa](http://www.fb.com/cnfa)
COMMUNITY AID ABROAD
A-45. Community Aid Abroad is an independent Australian organization. Secular and voluntary-based, it brings together people from diverse backgrounds, beliefs, and cultures to build a fairer world. Community Aid Abroad merged with the Australian Freedom From Hunger Campaign in 1992. The combined organization is the Australian member of Oxfam International. The organization engages in foreign aid aimed at social justice on a global scale.

Address: 156 George Street, Fitzroy Vic 3065, Australia
Telephone: 61 (0) 3 9289 9444, (800) 034 034
E-Mail: enquire@caa.org.au
Web Site: http://www.caa.org.au/

CONCERN AMERICA
A-46. The main objective of Concern America is to provide training, technical assistance, and material support to community-based programs in developing countries. The programs emphasize training of community members to impart skills and knowledge that remain with the community. A special collaborative arrangement exists with Concern Universal, based in England. Concern America is completely distinct from Concern Worldwide, USA, although both organizations share common roots.

Address: PO Box 1790, 2024 North Broadway Street, Suite 104, Santa Ana, CA 92702-1790
Telephone: (714) 953-8575, FAX: (714) 953-1242
E-Mail: concern-america-inc@charitiesusa.com

CONCERN WORLDWIDE, LIMITED
A-47. Concern Worldwide, Limited, provides humanitarian relief and development assistance to disaster-afflicted people and to the “poorest of the poor”—those whose vulnerability is due to inadequate income, education, and access to power.

Address: Camden Street, Dublin 2, Dublin, Ireland

COUNTERPART
A-48. Counterpart International is a nonprofit, international human-development organization founded in 1965 as the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific. Implementing NGO capacity-building programs, Counterpart has developed replicable models for diverse local environments. Their South Pacific experience has demonstrated that NGO institution-building requires an evolving relationship between the United States and local partners—from mentor, to partner, to resource. Throughout this process, the transfer of knowledge and skills to local partners requires complementary adaptation to cultural attitudes and practices.

Address: 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20036-2561
Telephone: (202) 296-9676, FAX: (202) 296-9679
Web Site: http://www.counterpart.org/
EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ACTION (EHA)

A-49. EHA supports and enables national and international agencies working in the frontline of disasters and emergencies, and in postcrises rehabilitation to apply the best health practices in preparing for, assessing, implementing, and evaluating the impact of humanitarian health assistance. Furthermore, in accordance with the World Health Organization Plan of Action on Violence, EHA strengthens the capacity of countries in safety promotion and injury control. In discharging its mission, EHA is dedicated to the fundamental principles of partnership, collaboration, and coordination.

Address: Avenue Appia 20, CH-1211, Geneva 27, Switzerland
Telephone: (41 22) 791 21 11, FAX: (41 22) 791 07 46 / 791 48 44
E-Mail: eha@who.int
Web Site: [http://www.who.int/eha/about/supdoc.htm](http://www.who.int/eha/about/supdoc.htm)

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HUMANITARIAN OFFICE

A-50. The European Community Humanitarian Office oversees the implementation of European Community humanitarian aid. It deals primarily with general guidelines and coordination issues, as well as any general or specific issues on community aid in the humanitarian field.

E-Mail: echo@echo.cec.be

FAMILY TO FAMILY

A-51. Family to Family helps tear down walls of stereotypes, suspicion, and confusion. Participants “adopt” a family in the former Soviet Bloc and periodically send small care packages of nonperishable foods. Both families exchange letters, build friendships, and learn about each other’s lives and culture.

Address: 325 Queens Avenue, London, Ontario, Canada N6B 1X2 TTY
Voice Mail: (519) 432-2211, FAX: (519) 432-1106
Web Site: [http://info.london.on.ca/children/famtofam/mission.html](http://info.london.on.ca/children/famtofam/mission.html)

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

A-52. The ICRC is an independent, impartial organization that has an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to assist them. The ICRC directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the IFRC and Red Crescent Movement.

Address: 801, Second Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, NY 10017-4706
E-Mail: mail@icrc.delny.org
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES
A-53. The IFRC and Red Crescent Societies is an international humanitarian organization with a unique worldwide network. The IFRC exists to improve the situation of the world’s most vulnerable people. It provides assistance without discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions.

Address: PO Box 372, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland
Telephone: (41 22) 730 42 22, FAX: (41 22) 733 03 95,
Telex: 412 133 FRC CH
E-Mail: secretariat@ifrc.org
Web Site: http://www.ifrc.org/

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS (IMC)
A-54. In war-torn and impoverished regions worldwide, IMC saves lives and relieves suffering while providing the critical knowledge and skills to help people help themselves and to foster self-reliance. Responding rapidly to crisis situations, IMC offers emergency medical and health care assistance to people at highest risk, while training local counterparts to provide these services themselves. By keeping vital health systems going during times of crisis, IMC prevents emergencies from escalating and builds a foundation for future peace and stability.

Address: 11500 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 506,
Los Angeles, CA 90064
Telephone: (310) 826-7800, FAX: (310) 442-6622
Web Site: http://www.imc-la.com/

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)
A-55. The IOM provides technical assistance and advisory services to promote the orderly transfer of refugees, displaced persons, and other individuals compelled to leave their homeland. It also assists nationals who desire to migrate to countries where they may achieve independence through their employment, while advancing the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the receiving countries.

Address: 17 route des Morillons, Case postale 71, CH-1211,
Geneva, Switzerland

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)
A-56. The IRC is committed to freedom, human dignity, and self-reliance in programs for resettlement assistance, global emergency relief, refugee rehabilitation and advocacy, relief, protection, and resettlement services for refugees and victims of oppression or violent conflict.

Address: 122 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10168
IRISH AID
A-57. Irish Aid provides long-term and emergency support to developing countries, working in partnership with governments and communities in the developing world in their attempts to alleviate poverty through helping them meet basic needs and through strengthening their capacity to help themselves. It also has a special focus on the fostering of human rights and democracy.

Address: 76-78 Harcourt Street, Dublin 2, Ireland
Telephone: 01 478 0822, FAX: 01 478 0952
Web Site: http://www.irlgov.ie/

LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF (LWR)
A-58. LWR supports the poor and oppressed of less-developed countries in their efforts to meet basic human needs and to participate with dignity and equity in the life of their communities; and to alleviate human suffering resulting from natural disaster, war, social conflict, or poverty.

Address: 390 Park Avenue S, New York, NY 10016
Web Site: http://www.wcc-coe.org/lwf

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES
A-59. Medecins Sans Frontieres, translated as Doctors Without Borders, offers emergency medical assistance wherever manmade or natural disasters occur, independently of all states, institutions, and political, economic, and religious influences.

Address: 30 Rockefeller Plaza, Suite 5425, New York, NY 10112
Web Site: http://www.msf.org/

MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
A-60. Mennonite Central Committee is involved in food relief, agriculture, health, education, and social services. Volunteers serve in Canada and the United States in programs that assist people with mental illness and disabilities, in job creation, with refugees, in peace-related activities and in the area of crime, including services to offenders and in the area of mediation of offenses.

Address: 21 South 12th Street, PO Box 500, Akron, PA 17501-0500
Telephone: (717) 859-1151
Web Site: http://www.mennonitecc.ca/mcc/index.html
OXFAM AMERICA

A-61. Oxfam America promotes self-reliant efforts that help people supply more of their own food. It also helps poor people gain control over resources and decisions that affect their lives. Oxfam America provides emergency relief and conducts development education programs in the United States.

Address: 26 West Street, Boston, MA 02111

REFUGEE INTERNATIONAL (RI)

A-62. RI provides early warning in crises of mass exodus. The RI also serves as an advocate for refugees. Since 1990, RI has moved from its original focus on Indo-Chinese refugees to refugee crises worldwide.

Address: 21 Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, DC 20036

SAINT DAVID’S RELIEF FOUNDATION

A-63. Saint David’s Relief Foundation provides tangible humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia and assists in reconstruction. The foundation works with the Franciscan Friars of Bosnia and recognized NGOs from other nations, as well as assisting local relief agencies. It is multidenominational and nonpartisan in its relief. The aid is distributed in areas of need without regard to race, ethnic, national, or religious persuasion. The foundation provides evidence to the people of Bosnia that they have not been forgotten or forsaken.

Address: 10382 Miller Road, Dallas, TX 75238

Telephone: (800) 618-9789, FAX: (214) 613-4005

Web Site: [http://www.stdavids.org](http://www.stdavids.org/)

SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (UNITED KINGDOM) (SCF[UK])

A-64. SCF (UK) works to ensure that children are the first to receive relief in time of distress and are protected against every form of exploitation. Emphasis is on early childhood development, primary and nonformal education, and care for children in especially difficult circumstances, but not necessarily only those among the poorest.

Address: 17 Grove Lane, London SE5 8RD, United Kingdom

SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (UNITED STATES) (SCF[US])

A-65. SCF (US) is a relief and development organization dedicated to improving the lives and futures of needy children and their families. It was founded in 1932 to help destitute Appalachian families during the Great Depression. From preventive health care to early childhood education, from relief and rehabilitation to economic development, SCF programs promote self-sufficiency and self-determination so that positive changes become permanent improvements for needy children and their families.

TRÓCAIRE

A-66. Trócaire (from Old Irish word meaning “mercy”) is a Catholic agency for world development. Trócaire focuses on the needs and problems of developing countries and on issues involving justice. The agency has two main aims: to help needy people in developing countries and to make Irish people more aware of those needs and their duty toward them.

Address: 169 Booterstown Avenue, Dublin, Republic of Ireland
E-Mail: nessa@trocaire.ie
Web Site: http://www.trocaire.org/

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

A-67. UNICEF protects children’s rights, helps children meet their basic needs, and expands opportunities for children to reach their full potential. Guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the UNICEF strives to establish children’s rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behavior toward children.

Address: UNICEF House, 3 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 326-7000, Switchboard UNICEF House: 824-6000, FAX: 887-7465, 887-7454
Web Site: http://www.unicef.org/

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

A-68. The functions of emergency relief coordinators are in three core areas: policy development and coordination in support of the Secretary-General in humanitarian issues, advocacy of humanitarian issues with political organs, and coordination of humanitarian emergency response.

Address: Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
Telephone: (41 22) 917.1234, TeleFAX: (41 22) 917.0023
E-Mail: info@dha.unicef.org

WORLD CONCERN

A-69. World Concern works as a funding and resource agency for relief, rehabilitation, and development. It enables aid recipients in developing countries to achieve self-sufficiency and economic independence and to form partnerships between Christian churches in North America and churches in less-developed countries. World Concern works in three regions: Asia (including the former Soviet Union), Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean (Haiti).

Address: 19303 Fremont Avenue, North, Seattle, WA 98133
WORLD VISION RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT (WVRD)
A-70. WVRD fights poverty, hunger, and homelessness through volunteer programs, such as the Student Mentoring Initiative and the Love for Children program.

Address: 919 West Huntington Drive, Monrovia, CA 91016
220 I Street, Washington, DC 20002
Appendix B

Dislocated Civilian Planning

The scope of planning for DCs and actual task implementation differ, depending on the command level. Except as specifically noted, planning considerations discussed in this appendix are applicable to any tactical scenario, including logistics operations for units in the COMMZ.

INTEGRATION OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

B-1. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. At corps level, the commander integrates the theater commander's guidance with the corps' ground tactical plan. The driving force for DC planning must be generated at corps level. At division, COSCOM, and other subordinate command levels, the DC plan must—

• Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.
• Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher HQ.
• Guide the subordinate commands in the handling and routing of DCs.
• Ensure that all concerned parties (including the fire support coordination center and the S3 or G3 air) receive information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration.

B-2. DC plans support the OPLAN. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

• Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
• Minimum standards of care.
• Status and disposition of all DCs.
• Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
• Cultural and dietary considerations.
• Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

HANDLING CONSIDERATIONS

B-3. Care and control of DCs fulfill a double purpose—to ensure DCs receive at least the minimum essentials to subsist (food, water, clothing, and emergency medical aid) and to maximize the mobility of tactical forces and minimize civilian interference with military operations. CA personnel must establish movement control early. Major considerations include stayput policy, DC collection points, and assembly areas (Figure B-1, page B-2).
• **Standfast or stayput policy.** Civilians must remain in the vicinity of their homes and under controlled movement. This policy assumes a capability for policy enforcement, information dissemination, and emergency services. The standfast or stayput policy is not within the authoritative capability of U.S. forces. An HN may have a policy the United States would support, but U.S. forces do not have the authority or the right to enforce the policy.

• **DC collection point.** The purpose of DC collection points is to establish control and direction over the movement of the civilian populace. It is the primary control measure for gaining initial control over DCs. A collection point is temporary for small numbers of DCs until they can return to their homes or move to a safer area. The collection point is as far forward as possible during the flow of battle. Because the DC collection point is temporary, DC screening is quick. The effort may include screening for intelligence information and emergency assistance. Screening must take place to segregate EPWs or allied soldiers from DCs. Local civilians or civilian agencies (police, firemen) under the supervision of tactical or support troops or CA
personnel could operate collection points. MPs become involved in DC operations when refugee congestion along main supply routes threaten the mobility of the maneuver force. They are the first U.S. elements to address DC problems and initiate actions to restore force mobility.

- **Assembly Areas.** An assembly area is a temporary holding area for civilians before they return to their homes or move to a more secure area. Assembly areas are usually in a secure, stable environment and may include schools, churches, hotels, and warehouses. A consideration in selecting a specific area should include the ability to provide overnight accommodations for several days. Here, more detailed screening or segregation of the different categories of DCs takes place. Local civilians may operate an assembly area under the supervision of tactical or support troops or CA personnel.

**DC MOVEMENT**

B-4. Directing and controlling movement are vital when handling masses of DCs. The G5 and HN authorities are responsible for mass DC operations. MP personnel may help direct DCs to alternate routes. If possible, HN assets should be incorporated in the planning and used in implementation. Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

- **Selection of routes.** All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movement, CA personnel must consider the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.

- **Identification of routes.** After designating the movement routes, CA personnel mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. U.S. PSYOP units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark the routes.

- **Control and assembly points.** After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G5 or S5 coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.

- **Emergency rest areas.** CA personnel set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services.

- **Local and national agencies.** Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

**EVACUATION PLANNING**

B-5. Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be considered as a last resort. U.S. doctrine states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, CA
planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include—

- **Transportation.** CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.

- **Security.** CA personnel help the G2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.

- **Documentation.** In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing, as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique, CA personnel may prepare a manifest listing evacuees for movement.

- **Briefing.** Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement schedules.

- **Rations.** For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.

- **Health care.** The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The public health team or surgeon’s staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

- **Return.** Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees’ eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

**FACILITIES**

B-6. When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on a semipermanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units establish camps. HN personnel usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include—

- Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.
- Security.
- Supply.
- Transportation.
• Information dissemination.
• Liaison with other agencies.

CAMP CONTROL

B-7. Control of the people is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations under international law, CA personnel ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA personnel must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp administrators serve as the single point of contact, coordinating all camp matters within the camp and with outside organizations or agencies. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

DC CAMP LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION

B-8. The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control measures. It also lets CA personnel efficiently administer the camp and its population. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials are necessary when camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable—for example, hotels, schools, halls, theaters, vacant warehouses, unused factories, or workers’ camps. CA personnel must avoid those sites in the vicinity of vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution, and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

B-9. The camp’s physical layout is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA personnel must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.

B-10. CA personnel must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the—

• Local climate.
• Anticipated permanency of the camp.
• Number of camps to be constructed.
• Availability of local materials.
• Extent of available military resources and assistance.

B-11. Whenever possible, the DCs themselves or local agencies or government employees should construct the camp. Local sources provide materials
whenever possible in accordance with legal limitations. The supporting command’s logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

ADMINISTRATION OF DC CAMPS

B-12. Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA personnel organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general lawlessness because of their destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by—

- Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.
- Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
- Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.
- Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
- Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
- Quickly establishing contact with agencies for aid and family reunification.

SCREENING

B-13. Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA personnel can perform this function. They must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The insertion or the development of reliable informants is important in all but the most temporary camps. Intelligence collection by CA personnel is under the staff supervision of the G2. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration—for example, policemen, schoolteachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.
MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

B-14. The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

SUPPLY

B-15. The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water, clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and SAOs can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. IOs and voluntary relief groups may also be useful. Consider support from U.S. military stocks only as a last resort, however, and do not rely upon that support.

SECURITY

B-16. The camp security officer, supervised by the public safety team, provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a prison.

TRANSPORTATION

B-17. The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever possible.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

B-18. In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. See, for example, barracks rules (Figure B-2, page B-8). CA civil information teams and area PSYOP units may be able to help.
Barracks Rules

1. **Do not move from assigned barracks without permission.** NOTE: Area teams assign individuals to the designated barracks. Only the U.S. center’s administrative staff can change barracks assignments. Occupants desiring to change barracks must request permission from the area office.

2. **Maintain the sanitary and physical condition of the barracks.** NOTE: Barracks chiefs organize occupants to perform these tasks.

3. **Empty and wash trash cans daily.** NOTE: Put the trash into the trash receptacles (dumpsters) in the barracks area.

4. **Do not bring food or cooking utensils into the barracks. Do not take food from the mess halls (other than baby food and fruit).**

5. **Do not have weapons of any kind in the barracks and in the surrounding camp.**

6. **Do not have pets in the camp.**

7. **Observe barracks lights-out time of 2300. Barracks indoor lights will be turned out at 2300 each night. Do not play radios, record players, or tape recorders after 2300.**

8. **Do not allow children to play on the fire escape.** NOTE: This practice is very dangerous.

9. **Watch children carefully and do not allow them to wander out of the residence areas.**

10. **Do not throw diapers and sanitary napkins into the toilets. Place these items into trash cans.**

11. **Do not allow children to chase or play with wild animals, as these animals may bite and carry diseases.**

12. **Obtain necessary barracks supplies from the barracks chief.**

13. **Do not smoke, use electrical appliances for heating or cooking, or have open fires in the barracks.**

**NOTE:** These barracks rules are similar to the ones used in August 1975 at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. They also parallel the rules posted in support of Panama’s Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.

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**Figure B-2. Sample Barracks Rules**

**LIAISON**

B-19. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. U.S. Government and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and international agencies may help in relief and assistance operations.

**DISPOSITION**

B-20. The final step in DC operations is the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden...
on the military and the civilian economy for their support. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority, under coordination with U.S. forces, national authorities, and international agencies.
Appendix C

Civil-Military Operations Estimate Format

CMO activities support military operations by establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relationships between military forces and the civil authorities and civilian populace. The CMO estimate addresses the critical aspects of CMO. Figure C-1 provides an outline format of the estimate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issuing Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date, Time, and Zone of Signature</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE NUMBER (Include the CMO estimate number.)

REFERENCES: List maps, charts, CMO-related documents, and local command guidance.

1. MISSION. State the mission as determined by the commander.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
   a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer.
      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations. Identify physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.
         (a) Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
         (b) Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care), including civilian capabilities of self-support.
         (c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.
         (d) Number of dislocated civilians in the area.
         (e) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications).
         (f) Status and character of the civil government.
         (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
      (2) Enemy strength and dispositions.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure C-1. CMO Estimate Format
(3) Enemy capabilities. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians.
   (a) Affecting the mission.
   (b) Affecting CMO activities.

b. Tactical Situation. Include information from the commander’s planning guidance and from the operations officer.
   (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
   (2) Possible COAs to accomplish the mission.
   (3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.

c. Personnel Situation. Include information from the personnel officer.
   (1) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that affect the CMO situation.
   (2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CMO.

d. Logistics Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
   (1) Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that affect the CMO situation.
   (2) Projected developments within the logistics field likely to influence CMO.

e. CMO Situation. Discuss the status of the CMO situation. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear with reference to an annex to the estimate.
   (1) Disposition and status of CA elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.
   (2) Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit’s operation pertinent to the CMO mission.
   (3) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
(4) Government functions.
   (a) Legal.
   (b) Public administration.
   (c) Public education.
   (d) Public health.
   (e) Public safety.
(5) Economic functions.
   (a) Civilian supply.
   (b) Economic development.
   (c) Food and agriculture.
(6) Public facilities functions.
   (a) Public communications.
   (b) Transportation.
   (c) Public works and utilities.
(7) Special functions.
   (a) Civil information.
   (b) Cultural relations.
   (c) Dislocated civilians.
   (d) Emergency services.
   (e) Environmental management.

f. Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, give assumptions required to initiate planning or to prepare the estimate. Modify the assumptions as factual data become available.

3. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Analyze all CMO factors indicating problems and deficiencies of each COA.

4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION.
   a. Evaluate CMO deficiencies and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.

CLASSIFICATION
b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical COA under consideration from the CMO standpoint. Eliminate ones that are common to all COAs or ones that are minor. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority is on one major CA activity that most directly relates to the mission—for example, preventing civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

5. CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS.
   a. Indicate whether the stated mission can be supported from the CMO standpoint.
   b. Indicate the COA best supported from the CMO standpoint.
   c. List the primary reasons other COAs are not favored.
   d. List the major CMO problems that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include specific recommendations on the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

(Signature) ___________________________

(Designation of staff officer or originator)

ANNEXES: (As required)
Appendix D

United States Code Relevant to Civil-Military Operations

This appendix contains USC extracts (Figures D-1 through D-5) relevant to CMO. The extracts range from general military law to laws governing the use of RC soldiers during national emergencies.

I. Title 10. Armed Forces.
   A. Subtitle A. General Military Law.
            (1) Section 168. Military-to-military contacts and comparable activities.
               (a) Program Authority. The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-
                   military contacts and comparable activities that are designed to encourage a
                   democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other
                   countries.
               (b) Administration. The Secretary may provide funds appropriated for carrying
                   out subsection (a) to the following officials for use as provided in subsection (c):
                   (1) The commander of a combatant command, upon the request of the
                       commander.
                   (2) An officer designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with
                       respect to an area or areas not under the area of responsibility of a
                       commander of a combatant command.
                   (3) The head of any Department of Defense component.
               (c) Authorized Activities. An official provided funds under subsection (b) may use
                   those funds for the following activities and expenses:
                   (1) The activities of traveling contact teams, including any transportation
                       expense, translation services expense, or administrative expense that is
                       related to such activities.
                   (2) The activities of military liaison teams.
                   (3) Exchanges of civilian or military personnel between the Department of
                       Defense and defense ministries of foreign governments.
                   (4) Exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and
                       units of foreign armed forces.
                   (5) Seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations.
                   (6) Distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations.
                   (7) Personnel expenses for Department of Defense civilian and military
                       personnel to the extent that those expenses relate to participation in an
                       activity described in paragraphs (3) and (4).

Figure D-1. Extract of Title 10, Section 168, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities
(8) Reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any activity referred to in another paragraph of this subsection.

(d) Relationship to Other Funding. Any amount provided during any fiscal year to an official under subsection (b) for an activity or expense referred to in subsection (c) shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for those activities and expenses for that fiscal year.

(e) Limitations.

(1) Funds may not be provided under this section for a fiscal year for any activity for which—

(a) Funding was proposed in the budget submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31; and

(b) Congress did not authorize appropriations.

(2) An activity may not be conducted under this section with a foreign country unless the Secretary of State approves the conduct of such activity in that foreign country.

(3) Funds may not be provided under this section for a fiscal year for any country that is not eligible in that fiscal year for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(4) Except for those activities specifically authorized under subsection (c), funds may not be used under this section for the provision of defense articles or defense services to any country or for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(f) Active Duty End Strengths.

(1) A member of a reserve component referred to in paragraph (2) shall not be counted for purposes of the following personnel strength limitations:

(a) The end strength for active-duty personnel authorized pursuant to section 115(a)(1) of this title for the fiscal year in which the member carries out the activities referred to in paragraph (2).

(b) The authorized daily average for members in pay grades E-8 and E-9 under section 517 of this title for the calendar year in which the member carries out such activities.

(c) The authorized strengths for commissioned officers under section 523 of this title for the fiscal year in which the member carries out such activities.

(2) A member of a reserve component referred to in paragraph (1) is any member on active duty under an order to active duty for 180 days or more who is engaged in activities authorized under this section.

(g) Military-to-Military Contacts Defined. In this section, the term “military-to-military contacts” means contacts between members of the armed forces and members of foreign armed forces through activities described in subsection (c).
b. Chapter 20. Humanitarian and Other Assistance.

(1) **Section 401 (Stevens Amendment).** Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.

(a) 

(1) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the activities will promote—

(a) The security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and

(b) The specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

(2) Humanitarian and civic assistance activities carried out under this section shall complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance which may be provided to the country concerned by any other department or agency of the United States. Such activities shall serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned.

(3) Humanitarian and civic assistance may not be provided under this section (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.

(4) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that no member of the armed forces, while providing assistance under this section that is described in subsection (e)(5)—

(a) Engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a United States military operation); or

(b) Provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the armed forces.

(b) 

(1) Humanitarian and civic assistance may not be provided under this section to any foreign country unless the Secretary of State specifically approves the provision of such assistance.

(2) Any authority provided under any other provision of law to provide assistance that is described in subsection (e)(5) to a foreign country shall be carried out in accordance with, and subject to, the limitations prescribed in this section. Any such provision may be construed as superseding a provision of this section only if, and to the extent that, such provision specifically refers to this section and specifically identifies the provision of this section that is to be considered superseded or otherwise inapplicable under such provision.
(c) Expenses incurred as a direct result of providing humanitarian and civic assistance under this section to a foreign country shall be paid for out of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose.

(2) Expenses covered by paragraph (1) include the following expenses incurred in providing assistance described in subsection (e)(5):

(a) Travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses of Department of Defense personnel providing such assistance.

(b) The cost of any equipment, services, or supplies acquired for the purpose of carrying out or supporting the activities described in subsection (e)(5), including any nonlethal, individual, or small-team landmine clearing equipment or supplies that are to be transferred or otherwise furnished to a foreign country in furtherance of the provision of assistance under this section.

(3) The cost of equipment, services, and supplies provided in any fiscal year under paragraph (2)(b) may not exceed $5,000,000.

(4) Nothing in this section may be interpreted to preclude the incurring of minimal expenditures by the Department of Defense for purposes of humanitarian and civic assistance out of funds other than funds appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1), except that funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance (other than funds appropriated pursuant to such paragraph) may be obligated for humanitarian and civic assistance under this section only for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on National Security and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a report, not later than March 1 of each year, on activities carried out under this section during the preceding fiscal year. The Secretary shall include in each such report—

(1) A list of the countries in which humanitarian and civic assistance activities were carried out during the preceding fiscal year;

(2) The type and description of such activities carried out in each country during the preceding fiscal year; and

(3) The amount expended in carrying out each such activity in each such country during the preceding fiscal year.

(e) In this section, the term “humanitarian and civic assistance” means any of the following:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

(5) Detection and clearance of landmines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of landmines.

Figure D-2. Extract of Title 10, Chapter 20, Humanitarian and Other Assistance (Continued)
(2) **Section 402 (Denton Amendment).** Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may transport to any country, without charge, supplies which have been furnished by a nongovernmental source and which are intended for humanitarian assistance. Such supplies may be transported only on a space available basis.

(b)

(1) The Secretary may not transport supplies under subsection (a) unless the Secretary determines that—

(a) The transportation of such supplies is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition;

(c) There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people for whom they are intended;

(d) The supplies will in fact be used for humanitarian purposes; and

(e) Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution of such supplies in the destination country.

(2) The President shall establish procedures for making the determinations required under paragraph (1). Such procedures shall include inspection of supplies before acceptance for transport.

(3) It shall be the responsibility of the donor to ensure that supplies to be transported under this section are suitable for transport.

(c)

(1) Supplies transported under this section may be distributed by an agency of the United States Government, a foreign government, an international organization, or a private nonprofit relief organization.

(2) Supplies transported under this section may not be distributed, directly or indirectly, to any individual, group, or organization engaged in a military or paramilitary activity.

(d) Not later than July 31 each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on National Security and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a report identifying the origin, contents, destination, and disposition of all supplies transported under this section during the 12-month period ending on the preceding June 30.

(3) **Section 404.** Foreign disaster assistance.

(a) In General. The President may direct the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives.

(b) Forms of Assistance. Assistance provided under this section may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment.

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**Figure D-2. Extract of Title 10, Chapter 20, Humanitarian and Other Assistance (Continued)**
(c) Notification Required. Not later than 48 hours after the commencement of disaster assistance activities to provide assistance under this section, the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing notification of the assistance provided, and proposed to be provided, under this section and a description of so much of the following as is then available:

(1) The manmade or natural disaster for which disaster assistance is necessary.
(2) The threat to human lives presented by the disaster.
(3) The United States military personnel and material resources that are involved or expected to be involved.
(4) The disaster assistance that is being provided or is expected to be provided by other nations or public or private relief organizations.
(5) The anticipated duration of the disaster assistance activities.

(d) Organizing Policies and Programs. Amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs of the Department shall be available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs for disasters occurring outside the United States.


(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds. Funds available to the Department of Defense may not be used to make a financial contribution (directly or through another department or agency of the United States) to the United Nations—
(1) For the costs of a United Nations peacekeeping activity; or
(2) For any United States arrearage to the United Nations.

(b) Application of Prohibition. The prohibition in subsection (a) applies to voluntary contributions, as well as to contributions pursuant to assessment by the United Nations for the United States share of the costs of a peacekeeping activity.

Figure D-2. Extract of Title 10, Chapter 20, Humanitarian and Other Assistance (Continued)

Part IV. Service, Supply, and Procurement.
Chapter 152. Issue of Supplies, Service, and Facilities

(1) Section 2547 (McCollum Amendment). Excess nonlethal supplies: humanitarian relief.

(a) The Secretary of Defense may make available for humanitarian relief purposes any nonlethal excess supplies of the Department of Defense.

(b) Excess supplies made available for humanitarian relief purposes under this section shall be transferred to the Secretary of State, who shall be responsible for the distribution of such supplies.

(c) This section does not constitute authority to conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the Department of Defense, would require a notice to the intelligence committees under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

Figure D-3. Extract of Title 10, Chapter 152, Issue of Supplies, Service, and Facilities
(d) In this section:

(1) The term “nonlethal excess supplies” means property, other than real property, of the Department of Defense—
   (a) That is excess property, as defined in regulations of the Department of Defense; and
   (b) That is not a weapon, ammunition, or other equipment or material that is designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death.

(2) The term “intelligence committees” means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) Section 2551. Humanitarian assistance.

(a) Authorized Assistance. To the extent provided in defense authorization Acts, funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year for humanitarian assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide.

(b) Availability of Funds. To the extent provided in appropriation Acts, funds appropriated for humanitarian assistance for the purposes of this section shall remain available until expended.

(c) Status Reports.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (f) an annual report on the provision of humanitarian assistance pursuant to this section for the prior fiscal year. The report shall be submitted each year at the time of the budget submission by the President for the next fiscal year.

(2) Each report required by paragraph (1) shall cover all provisions of law that authorize appropriations for humanitarian assistance to be available from the Department of Defense for the purposes of this section.

(3) Each report under this subsection shall set forth the following information regarding activities during the previous fiscal year:
   (a) The total amount of funds obligated for humanitarian relief under this section.
   (b) The number of scheduled and completed transportation missions for purposes of providing humanitarian assistance under this section.
   (c) A description of any transfer of excess nonlethal supplies of the Department of Defense made available for humanitarian relief purposes under section 2547 of this title. The description shall include the date of the transfer, the entity to whom the transfer is made, and the quantity of items transferred.
(d) Report Regarding Relief for Unauthorized Countries. In any case in which the Secretary of Defense provides for the transportation of humanitarian relief to a country to which the transportation of humanitarian relief has not been specifically authorized by law, the Secretary shall notify the congressional committees specified in subsection (f) and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Secretary’s intention to provide such transportation. The notification shall be submitted not less than 15 days before the commencement of such transportation.

(e) Definition. In this section, the term “defense authorization Act” means an Act that authorizes appropriations for one or more fiscal years for military activities of the Department of Defense, including authorizations of appropriations for the activities described in paragraph (7) of section 114(a) of this title.

(f) Congressional Committees. The congressional committees referred to in subsections (c)(1) and (d) are the following:

(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) The Committee on National Security and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

II. Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

A. Chapter 32. Foreign Assistance.

1. Section 2321j (Excess Property Program). Authority to transfer excess defense articles.

(a) Authorization. The President is authorized to transfer excess defense articles under this section to countries for which receipt of such articles was justified pursuant to the annual congressional presentation documents for military assistance programs, or for programs under part VIII of subchapter I of this chapter, submitted under section 2394 of this title, or for which receipt of such articles was separately justified to the Congress, for the fiscal year in which the transfer is authorized.

(b) Limitations on transfers.

(1) The President may transfer excess defense articles under this section only if—

(a) Such articles are drawn from existing stocks of the Department of Defense.

(b) Funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment are not expended in connection with the transfer.

(c) The transfer of such articles will not have an adverse impact on the military readiness of the United States.

(d) With respect to a proposed transfer of such articles of a grant basis, such a transfer is preferable to a transfer on a sales basis, after taking into account the potential proceeds from, and likelihood of, such sales, and the comparative foreign policy benefits that may accrue to the United States as the result of a transfer on either a grant or sales basis.
(e) The President determines that the transfer of such articles will not have an
adverse impact on the national technology and industrial base and,
particularly, will not reduce the opportunities of entities in the national
technology and industrial base to sell new or used equipment to the countries
to which such articles are transferred.

(f) The transfer of such articles is consistent with the policy framework for the
Eastern Mediterranean established under section 2373 of this title.

(2) Accordingly, for the four-year period beginning on October 1, 1996, the President
shall ensure that excess defense articles offered to Greece and Turkey under this
section will be made available consistent with the manner in which the President
made available such excess defense articles during the four-year period that
began on October 1, 1992, pursuant to section 573(e) of the Foreign Operations,

(c) Terms of transfers.

(1) No cost to recipient country. Excess defense articles may be transferred under
this section without cost to the recipient country.

(2) Priority. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the delivery of excess
defense articles under this section to member countries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) on the southern and southeastern flank of NATO
and to major non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern flank shall be
given priority to the maximum extent feasible over the delivery of such excess
defense articles to other countries.

(d) Waiver of requirement for reimbursement of Department of Defense expenses
Section 2392(d) of this title shall not apply with respect to transfers of excess defense
articles (including transportation and related costs) under this section.

(e) Transportation and related costs.

(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), funds available to the
Department of Defense may not be expended for crating, packing, handling, and
transportation of excess defense articles transferred under the authority of this
section.

(2) Exception. The President may provide for the transportation of excess defense
articles without charge to a country for the costs of such transportation if—

(g) It is determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.

(b) The recipient is a developing country receiving less than $10,000,000 of
assistance under part V of this subchapter (relating to international military
education and training) or section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program) in the
fiscal year in which the transportation is provided.

(c) The total weight of the transfer does not exceed 25,000 pounds.

(d) Such transportation is accomplished on a space available basis.
(f) Advance notification to Congress for transfer of certain excess defense articles.

(1) In general. The President may not transfer excess defense articles that are significant military equipment (as defined in section 47(9) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(9))) or excess defense articles valued (in terms of original acquisition cost) at $7,000,000 or more, under this section or under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) until 30 days after the date on which the President has provided notice of the proposed transfer to the congressional committees specified in section 2394-1(a) of this title in accordance with procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under that section.

(2) Contents. Such notification shall include—

(a) A statement outlining the purposes for which the article is being provided to the country, including whether such article has been previously provided to such country.

(b) An assessment of the impact of the transfer on the military readiness of the United States.

(c) An assessment of the impact of the transfer on the national technology and industrial base and, particularly, the impact on opportunities of entities in the national technology and industrial base to sell new or used equipment to the countries to which such articles are to be transferred.

(d) A statement describing the current value of such article and the value of such article at acquisition.

(g) Aggregate annual limitation.

(1) In general. The aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred to countries under this section in any fiscal year may not exceed $350,000,000.

(2) Effective date. The limitation contained in paragraph (1) shall apply only with respect to fiscal years beginning after fiscal year 1996.

(h) Congressional presentation documents. Documents described in subsection (a) of this section justifying the transfer of excess defense articles shall include an explanation of the general purposes of providing excess defense articles as well as a table which provides an aggregate annual total of transfers of excess defense articles in the preceding year by country in terms of offers and actual deliveries and in terms of acquisition cost and current value. Such table shall indicate whether such excess defense articles were provided on a grant or sale basis.

(i) Excess Coast Guard property. For purposes of this section, the term “excess defense articles” shall be deemed to include excess property of the Coast Guard, and the term “Department of Defense” shall be deemed, with respect to such excess property, to include the Coast Guard.

Figure D-4. Title 22, Chapter 32, Foreign Assistance (Continued)
Title 10. Armed Forces  
Subtitle E. Reserve Components.  
Part II. Personnel Generally.  
Chapter 39. Active Duty.  
Section 12301. Reserve components generally.

(a) In time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty (other than for training) for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter. However a member on an inactive status list or in a retired status may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection unless the Secretary concerned, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in the case of the Secretary of a military department, determines that there are not enough qualified Reserves in an active status or in the inactive National Guard in the required category who are readily available.

(b) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. However, units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor of the State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia National Guard, the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard).

(c) So far as practicable, during any expansion of the active armed forces that requires that units and members of the reserve components be ordered to active duty (other than for training), members of units organized and trained to serve as units who are ordered to that duty without their consent shall be so ordered with their units. However, members of those units may be reassigned after being ordered to active duty (other than for training).

(d) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may order a member of a reserve component under his jurisdiction to active duty, or retain him on active duty, with the consent of that member. However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.

(e) The period of time allowed between the date when a Reserve ordered to active duty (other than for training) is alerted for that duty and the date when the Reserve is required to enter upon that duty shall be determined by the Secretary concerned based upon military requirements at that time.

(f) The consent of a Governor described in subsections (b) and (d) may not be withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.

Figure D-5. Extract of Title 10, Section 12301, Reserve Components
(g) A member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty without his consent if the Secretary concerned determines that the member is in a captive status. A member ordered to active duty under this section may not be retained on active duty, without his consent, for more than 30 days after his captive status is terminated.

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section. Such regulations shall apply uniformly among the armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretary. A determination for the purposes of this subsection that a member is in a captive status shall be made pursuant to such regulations.

(3) In this section, the term “captive status” means the status of a member of the armed forces who is in a missing status (as defined in section 551(2) of title 37) which occurs as the result of a hostile action and is related to the member’s military status.

Figure D-5. Extract of Title 10, Section 12301, Reserve Components (Continued)
Appendix E

Transition Planning and Coordination Activities

Transferring control of an operation from U.S. military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis, an identifiable end state, and the national political policy all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent, and each one possesses different characteristics and requirements. Nevertheless, this appendix provides general guidelines and recommendations for the transition process. Mission success often hinges on in-depth, proactive transition planning.

E-1. Transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished or when the NCA so directs. Criteria for transition may be based on events, measures of effectiveness (MOE), availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area is an example of an event that might trigger the transition. An appreciable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, and a given decrease in threat activity are examples of statistical criteria that may prompt the end of the involvement of U.S. forces.

E-2. When other organizations (such as the UN, NGOs, and IOs) or the FN have marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, U.S. forces may execute a transition plan.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

E-3. As the redeployment phase for U.S. forces approaches, force protection must remain the number one priority. This phase can often be the most hazardous phase because the focus usually shifts toward leaving as rapidly as possible and away from force protection.

E-4. Transition planning should be an integral part of planning and mission analysis at all levels. Normally accomplished by the future operations cell of the G3 or J3, it should be developed before deployment.

E-5. Areas that impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are—

- Identification of issues.
- Key events (past and present).
- Work required to accomplish the transition.
- Identification of relevant organizations to succeed the military force in delivering civil-sector services.
- A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking control of the operation.
E-6. The following are questions (issues) that can have an impact on transition:

- What is the desired end state?
- Who will determine when the transition begins or when the transition is complete MOE?
- Who will fund the transition?
- What U.S. forces, equipment, supplies, or other resources will remain behind?
- Who will support U.S. forces that remain behind?
- Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?
- Will new ROE be established?
- Will ongoing operations (work with NGOs, IOs, and the FN) be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will HA projects be interrupted?

E-7. Undoubtedly, many other issues will require attention and deliberation. Planning should link the departure of the outgoing force with the anticipated arrival of the force or organization assuming the mission. Keep the plan “unclassified” and avoid using U.S. military acronyms so that civilian or non-U.S. military agencies or organizations do not become confused (if necessary, provide a glossary for essential abbreviations).

E-8. Every staff section has valuable input to the transition plan. Input should never be refused from a staff section solely based on perceived relevance. Nothing is purely routine when dealing with the UN, multinational military forces, or civilian organizations. Staff sections should highlight how they are organized and how they function.

E-9. Each staff section should develop continuity folders to facilitate a smooth transition. Important files are often forgotten in the haste to redeploy. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount. Because funding is always a major concern, records of funding sources used in CA projects, as well as lists of potential projects, are also important.

E-10. The incoming HQ should collocate with the current HQ. Collocating the two helps the new staff assume the responsibilities of the old.

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS**

*Complex humanitarian emergencies lack a mechanism to coordinate, communicate, assess, and evaluate response and outcome for the major participants (NGO, IO, U.S. Government, FN, and military forces). Success in these operations depends on the ability to accomplish agreed upon MOE. These MOE combine security measures used by the military with humanitarian indicators recognized by the relief organizations. MOE have the potential to be a unifying disaster management tool and a partial solution to the communication and coordination problems inherent in these complex emergencies.*

Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 1995
E-11. PDD 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, directs that all political-military implementation plans include demonstrable milestones and MOE. As the mission progresses, it further directs the update of political-military plans to reflect milestones that are (or are not) met to incorporate changes to the situation on the ground.

E-12. Traditional military planning categorizes operations in component phases that include planning, deployment, execution, and redeployment. Emergency assistance is normally addressed in the execution phase of the operation when the military component is decreasing in importance and the transition process is gaining in importance. (See Figure E-1.)

### Traditional Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Execution</th>
<th>Redeployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Complex Humanitarian Emergency Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Execution of Mission</th>
<th>Transition Process</th>
<th>Redeployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure E-1. Emergency Phase Operations in the Execution Phase During Transition**

E-13. MOE development is an interagency process that should begin early in the planning stages of the operation. (See Figure E-2 for a template of the MOE development process.) MOE can be a useful tool in determining when or if the military operation can transition to other authorities.

### Figure E-2. Process for MOE Deployment

- Identify MOE Panel
- Conduct Combined Planning Session
- Propose MOE Categories
- Provide Measurable Criteria, Guidance, and Coordination

E-14. MOE should be—
- Appropriate. MOE should be appropriate to the mission, as follows:
  - Help the decision makers understand the status of the situation in different areas to make better decisions.
Present information to higher authorities.

• Mission-related.
  • The mission must be clearly understood by all participants.
  • MOE must focus on assessing the effectiveness of the mission, not the accomplishment of support tasks.
  • MOE must cover all aspects of the mission and expand as the mission expands.
  • MOE must support decision making.

• Consistently measurable. MOE should be able to assign either:
  • Qualitative values.
  • Qualitative descriptors.

• Cost effective. MOE should be reasonable and not levy too high a burden on limited resources.

• Sensitive. MOE should—
  • Change with progress toward meeting the mission objectives and not be greatly influenced by other factors.
  • Be measured in sufficient detail that changes will be apparent.

• Timely. MOE should be responsive to changes the participants are trying to measure in a timely enough manner for participants to act.

E-15. The international relief community recognizes four categories of MOE that indicate if HA operations are meeting stated goals, as follows:

• Security or level of violence.
  • Number of violent acts against each distribution center.
  • Number of violent acts against convoys along each key line of communications (LOC).
  • Fraction of inventory stolen from distribution centers.
  • Fraction of distribution center security mission assumed by transition agency.
  • Fraction of convoy security mission assumed by transition agency along each key LOC.

• Infrastructure.
  • Fraction of visual flight rule day-capable airfields, by aircraft type.
  • Fraction of all key LOCs that are convoy suitable.
  • Fraction of infrastructure repair efforts met by transition authority.
  • Fraction of potable water sources reestablished.

• Medical.
  • Crude mortality rates.
  • Under-5-years-old crude mortality rate.
  • Cause-specific mortality rates for disease.
• Severe malnutrition measurements.
• Agriculture and economics.
  • Market price of food.
  • Market price of animals.
  • Household surveys.
  • Fraction of land cultivated or leased to raise animals.

E-16. The JFC must establish different MOE for different purposes. Those for resource allocation should be different than for those for transition operations. MOE must reflect more than just the military effort. The mission is to relieve the suffering as soon as possible and to transition to another authority.

TRANSITIONS AND TERMINATION

E-17. The operational environment is a complex one that requires disciplined, versatile Army forces operating in a joint and multinational environment to respond to different situations. These situations include the rapid transition from one kind of operation to another, such as from peace enforcement to peacekeeping and vice versa. In addition, transitions may occur between authorizing entities. Transitions may also occur during conflict termination and involve the transfers of certain responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies, either U.S. Government or non-U.S. Government. These agencies, perhaps with significant U.S. support, will be responsible for achieving political objectives and the strategic end state.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION

E-18. Transition operations should be planned and executed to the same level of detail as any other operational mission, with a heavy focus on logistics planning. The transition plan should be formatted along the same lines as relief in place and deployment and redeployment. In a joint or multinational environment, commanders at all levels must anticipate, coordinate, and plan transition operations to provide a smooth transition to other agencies or forces and to support redeployment operations. Advance elements of the force assuming the mission should strive for self-sufficiency and not assume provisions for life support and other theater-specific logistics will be available.

E-19. Transition plans and checklists are important for operational planners and commanders. Extensive checklists and plans should be developed by the staff for the transition of—
  • A coalition force to the C2 of an Army force.
  • Responsibilities for CSS.
  • Responsibility to a coalition force.
  • An entire theater from U.S. control to UN control.
  • New Army forces replacing forces scheduled to depart.
TRANSITION PLANNING CELL

E-20. Army commanders need to identify a transition planning cell in their respective G2 or S2, G3 or S3, and G5 or S5 operations sections. Transitions are sequels to ongoing operations and should be viewed as future operations. Consequently, the planning cell is most likely that part of the staff that focuses on transitions. Other Services or the joint staff may identify a transition planning cell in future operations. Army commanders must constitute a transition planning cell from available assets within their staffs. Interfacing between the Army transition planning cells and future operations planning cells expedites the process and serves as a forum to resolve issues. Commanders must make sure transition and redeployment planning of forces and equipment begins early.

E-21. If Army forces are entering the theater to assume a mission from another Service, some of the following questions must be answered:

- What equipment or resources will be left behind?
- What will be assumed under a UN or logistics support contract?
- Are sufficient forces and equipment programmed to cover all missions?
- What are the relief-in-place SOPs of the relieving and relieved units?
- When does the transition of command occur?
- What liaison needs to be established?
- How will reconnaissance and surveillance be maintained?
- How will information be exchanged?
- How will fire support remain continuous during the transition?
- How will movement be controlled?
- How and when will responsibility for the area be passed?
- How will communications be maintained with the relieved unit?
- What is the sequence of relief?
- What will be the chain of command?
- Is there a joint HQ?
- Within the joint structure, is there a land component commander?
- With whom must communications be established?
- What FN support is available and who are the points of contact?
- What agreements, understandings, or SOPs have been developed with NGOs, IOs, the FN, and UN forces?
- What are the reporting requirements?
- How does information flow?

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO TRANSITION OPERATIONS

E-22. U.S. military actions accomplish a specific military objective. The actions must, however, always support and defend the Constitution of the United States and its democratic form of government. An important precept of the U.S. Constitution is civilian control of the military. When military
forces are deployed into an operational area, civilians and respective governments in that area often lose their privileges, responsibilities, and basic rights. CMO planners must consider and estimate the impact of the military on the civilian community. Military guidance from higher HQ must clearly define the commander's authority as related to the general ROE and the populace.

OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

E-23. If civil authority is not clearly granted to the military commander, he generally assumes only his military responsibilities. If constraints and restrictions impact on military COAs, the commander exercises more control or modifies the operation. The degree of responsibility for CA activities assumed by the commander is relative to the effort required to disengage and redeploy his forces.

NONMILITARY SUPPORT

E-24. Commanders should plan and coordinate CA activities that maximize nonmilitary support. Employing the nonmilitary resources, in coordination with military operations, minimizes the potential for interference. It also maximizes military resources for the most appropriate purpose. Continuous involvement of U.S. Government and FN officials and agencies expedites transition of civil responsibilities to civil authorities.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER

E-25. As the commander's principal planner for CMO, the CMO staff officer must be involved in transition planning from the beginning and should be a primary player in the transition planning cell. The G5 or Joint CMO officer ensures the following are completely documented for the transition process:

- Ongoing CA activities.
- Coordination with the local government and local populace.
- Interaction with other military forces and all nonmilitary agencies.

E-26. All references should be prepared, if possible, for handoff to the incoming force or agency. These references should include—

- CA workbooks.
- Resource card files.
- CA area studies.
- CMO estimates.
- Copies of CA situation reports.
- Other pertinent information that will aid in the efficiency and effectiveness of the transition process.

NOTE: The actions listed above must occur simultaneously in the CMO main and rear cells.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

E-27. The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between U.S. forces and the
IOs, NGOs, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan to include all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with whom the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process.

OTHER CA TEAMS

E-28. All CA assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in planning and executing transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most complex portion of this process. All teams or sections must develop historical files to aid in the transition process. There is no substitute for detailed staff work and good record keeping.

COORDINATION

E-29. CMO planning is a command responsibility. It must be coordinated, at a minimum, with all other staff planners. All CA activities require close coordination with all or some other military forces, U.S. and foreign government agencies, and NGOs with a vested interest. Coordination is especially pertinent in transition planning and operations. CMO planners consider all available support to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. In most cases, CMO planners directly or indirectly support the agencies assigned by law to carry out national policy. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, provides important information on the interoperability of various organizations in military operations. To ensure success, coordination and cooperation with the following are vital to the conduct of an operation:

- Other U.S. staffs and units (SO and conventional forces).
- FN military.
- Coalition military.
- U.S. Government.
- Foreign governments.
- International agencies.
- NGOs.

U.S. COUNTRY TEAM CONCEPT

E-30. The CMO staff usually coordinates in-country activities through the country team (Figure E-3, Page E-9). The country team concept represents the process of interdepartmental coordination among key members of the U.S. diplomatic mission. In practice, the makeup of the country team varies widely, depending on the—

- Desires of the COM.
- Country situation.
- U.S. departments and agencies represented in country.
- Problems to be considered.
Figure E-3. Sample Country Team Organization

**COUNTRY TEAM**

E-31. The country team coordinates activities to achieve a unified program for the FN and U.S. national interests. Working under the Ambassador’s direction, the country team pools the skills and resources of the participating agencies. This multinational effort helps eliminate problems and realize U.S. national objectives and goals.

**U.S. AMBASSADOR**

E-32. As chairman, the U.S. Ambassador presides over the country team. Team composition is determined by the chairman and may include the—

- Deputy, COM.
- Director, USAID.
- Public affairs officer.
- FBI liaison.
- Intelligence agency liaison.
- Press secretary.
- Department attachés (commerce, labor, and other departments).
- Economics officer.
- Political officer.
- Chief of the SAO.
- Embassy staff personnel, as appropriate.
- Defense attachés.
U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

E-33. Effective CA activities require close contact between the U.S. military, the DOS, and other U.S. Government agencies. Normally, an Executive Order defines agency responsibilities, functions, and interagency relationships. Either the senior DOS representative or the U.S. commander has overall responsibility for U.S. activities in the area.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

E-34. Because the DOS formulates and implements foreign policy, it has a vested interest in CA activities. In the area of CMO, the DOS has primary or joint responsibility with DOD for policy concerning—

- The government in a country where U.S. forces are present.
- The extent to which U.S. forces aid a host government.
- Any matters that may impact on U.S. relations with other nations, particularly allies and neutrals.
- The level at which the economy of a country is influenced by U.S. operations, to include the degree of rehabilitation to be effected with U.S. support.
- Operations where subsistence for local civilians relates to U.S. forces in the area.
- Matters involving PSYOP, PA, CA, civil information, or other measures to influence the attitude of the populace.
- Plans for turning CA activities over to civilian control at the end of hostilities.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

E-35. The United States Information Agency (USIA)—United States Information Service (USIS) overseas—is an independent agency with oversight by the DOS. The USIA helps achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in foreign areas. It advises the President and the various U.S. departments and agencies of the possible impact of policy, programs, and official statements on foreign opinion.

E-36. The USIA is interested in the impact of CMO on the local populace. It aids CA personnel by developing popular support. It detects and counters hostile attempts to distort and frustrate U.S. policies and programs. The USIA supports CA activities through—

- Radio and television broadcasts.
- Personal contacts.
- Demonstrations.
- Motion pictures.
- Book publication and distribution.
- Exhibits.
- English language instruction.
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

E-37. The USAID is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the International Development Cooperation Agency of the DOS. It supervises and directs all developmental assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and similar legislation. The USAID plans and supports programs having long-term goals of improving economic and social conditions. CA elements must coordinate with USAID through the political advisor or SAO. This arrangement ensures a coordinated effort to accomplish U.S. objectives.

E-38. Foreign assistance provided by the USAID may elevate the populace’s esteem for U.S. forces and thus enhance the commander’s efforts. To avoid redundancy, the CMO staff must inform the commander and supporting PSYOP and PA elements on USAID programs.

E-39. The USAID places its emphasis on four major areas:

- **Market forces.** The USAID strives to stimulate market economies in developing nations and to interest U.S. companies in investing in those countries.
- **Policy dialogue.** Governments of many developing countries have policies that hinder economic growth. The USAID emphasizes the importance of policy reform to development progress.
- **Institution building.** Schools, colleges, training organizations, supportive government ministries, and other institutions are all necessary to economic growth of developing nations.
- **Technology transfer.** The transfer of appropriate technology enables countries to develop their own products. Research is a critical part of this process.

E-40. CA activities should not duplicate or negatively impact USAID assistance. CA personnel must coordinate H/CA and MCA projects with USAID efforts to ensure they complement each other. The USAID also provides foreign economic assistance, which fits into two main categories: development assistance (normally loans and grants) and the economic support fund, which is part of the SA program. The goal of development assistance is to improve living standards through financial aid to self-help programs. The economic support fund promotes economic and political stability in areas where the United States has special security interests. Fund resources meet a variety of needs. Examples include balance of payments, infrastructure financing, development programs, and other capital projects.

E-41. The OFDA is an office of the USAID. It coordinates the U.S. Government’s OCONUS response to natural and man-made disasters and focuses primarily on complex international emergencies, such as famines and civil wars. The OFDA provides five life-sustaining interventions: food, medical care, shelter, water, and sanitation. This assistance is provided through—

- Special emergency authorities.
- Grants to NGOs and IOs.
- DARTs.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

E-42. DOD SA programs encompass SAOs that are titled differently in various countries, depending on the scope of their activities and the desires of the FN. When a country team does not have an SAO assigned as a separate entity, the defense attaché assumes the responsibilities for SA. When assigned to an embassy or mission, these personnel work for and report to the Ambassador or COM, not the senior military commander in country.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

E-43. The DOJ has projects and activities ongoing in foreign countries. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are agencies of the DOJ. The DEA conducts CD operations, among other activities. The INS is the lead agency for civilians seeking asylum in the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

E-44. The Department of Transportation (DOT) can, upon request, support specific CA activities. Support that reduces military requirements aids the U.S. military effort. The strategic-level CMO staff must maintain a working knowledge of specific DOT capabilities and operations in its region.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

E-45. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has a direct impact on the population and is a source of detailed area study information. The USDA has projects and activities ongoing in foreign countries. It can provide technical help to CA activities, if requested. Additionally, coordinated CMO and USDA projects can be developed for a given country or region.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

E-46. The Department of Commerce (DOC) has technical expertise in areas of trade, economics, and business regulations. DOC expertise can be used to support CA activities. CMO planners must consider U.S. commerce policies that support interagency cooperation. The long-term effects of CA activities can bring commercial as well as political stability to the area.

NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

E-47. Before deployment, CA personnel must know what agencies and organizations are in their assigned area. These organizations may conduct operations that are humanitarian (short-term) or developmental (long-term) in scope. The sponsoring groups or agencies may be private corporations, foundations, professional associations, or religious groups. With careful and proper coordination, these agencies and organizations can augment or enhance CA activities. In coordinating with NGOs, the CMO staff officer must evaluate NGO goals and objectives and consider their effect on the military mission. NGOs are generally concerned with humanitarian objectives. These objectives create a relationship between the NGO and the local populace and the government. NGOs may support the CMO effort by—

• Conducting welfare and relief programs.
• Volunteering to assist in the establishment and development of educational programs and facilities.
• Teaching and conducting public health enhancement programs.
• Caring for the sick and injured.
• Establishing and maintaining orphanages, sanitariums, or other institutions.
• Advising the local populace on agriculture, industry, and trade developments.
• Establishing and maintaining camps for DCs.
• Developing immigration programs for DCs.
Appendix F

Civil Affairs Annex to an Operation Order

When a CA annex (Figure F-1) to an OPORD is needed, CMO staff personnel (augmented by CA planning teams) develop the annex. In division and below OPORDs, the CA annex is Annex G; in corps and above, it is Annex U.

CLASSIFICATION

ANNEX (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. _____

References: List maps, charts, other relevant documents, and local command guidance.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Identify time zone—for example ZULU.

Task Organization:

1. SITUATION. Include items of information affecting CA support not included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD or any information needing expansion.
   a. Enemy Forces. Address the enemy threat to rear areas, including acts of sabotage, guerrilla activities, threats to civilians in the area, and enemy plans regarding civilians.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Outline CA plans of higher HQ.
      (2) Outline CA plans of higher and adjacent units.
      (3) Identify CA resources supporting the unit.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Identify CA resources attached and detached, including effective times if appropriate.

2. MISSION. Include a clear, concise statement of the CA task—who, what, where, when, and why. Prioritize multiple CA tasks. Include a task and a purpose in all mission statements.

3. EXECUTION. Include the following:
   a. Commander’s CA Intent.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure F-1. Format of CA Annex to an OPORD
CLASSIFICATION

b. Concept of the Operation. Give a brief statement of the CA operation to be carried out, including CA priorities.

c. CA Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Units.

d. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units.
   (2) Reference to supporting appendixes not referenced elsewhere in the annex.
   (3) Additional CA resources available to support the unit.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
   a. Classes of Supplies Affecting CMO.
   b. Supply Distribution Plan for Civilians (If Necessary).
   c. Transportation Assets Available to Conduct CMO.
   d. Combat Health Support. Include all agencies available to support CMO.
   e. Maintenance. Include the location of facilities and the policies regarding the use of those facilities in CMO.
   f. Field Services. Include the location of facilities and the policies regarding the use of those facilities in CMO.
   g. Host Nation. List the types and location of facilities, assets, or support. List procedures for requesting and acquiring support and limitations or restrictions of HN support (may be in a supporting annex or as a tab).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
   a. Command.
      (1) Location of CA command post or CMOC.
      (2) Next higher CA command post or CMOC.
      (3) Designation of alternate CA command post or CMOC.
   b. Signal. Designate CMO reporting requirements for subordinate units.

Acknowledgment Instructions
Last Name of Commander
Authentication Rank
Appendixes:
Distribution:

CLASSIFICATION

Figure F-1. Format of CA Annex to an OPORD (Continued)
Appendix G

Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment Format

The area study is a process common to all ARSOF. Area study files contain information on a designated area. This information supports contingency and SO planning in areas assigned to U.S. forces. SOF personnel obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of need. They update the study as required through an area assessment. An area study has no single format. The information acquired through the area study supports the area assessment. An area assessment begins with receipt of the mission. CA area assessments that support other SOF should supplement, not repeat, information in the basic area study. To ensure coverage of all functional areas, refer to the sample sequence of functions shown in Figure G-1. When a CA area study is prepared separately, the “General” section is used as a basic document.

I. GENERAL.
   A. Geography.
      1. Location and size.
         a. Location in relation to neighboring countries.
         b. Total land area (square miles or kilometers [size in relation to a U.S. state]).
      2. Physical features.
         a. Waterways and ports.
         b. Topography.
         c. Natural resources.
         d. Road and rail nets.
      3. Climate.
         a. Seasonal abnormalities, temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, rainfall, and prevailing winds.
         b. Characteristics and statistics.
      4. Political geography.
         a. Politically organized areas and regions.
         b. Effectiveness of administration of political areas in relation to geographic boundaries.

*Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment*
c. Cities and towns.

d. Boundaries.

e. Sources of raw material.

f. Principles or traditions that command loyal support.

g. State of industrial development.

B. History.

1. Brief history of—
   a. The development of the area.
   b. Influence exerted by major powers in development.
   c. Divisions or partitions resulting from wars and treaties.
   d. Major geographic or political factors to the current status of the area.
   e. Present form of government and previous forms of government.
   f. Extent of political control over other areas.
   g. Degree of control over the population exercised by government.
   h. Susceptibility of existing government toward major powers.
   i. Political organization of the area.

2. Brief coverage of each—
   a. International treaty to which subject area or country is signatory.
   b. Status of forces agreement.
   c. Summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.

C. People.

1. Population.
   a. Numbers.
   b. Distribution and density.
   c. Birth and death rates.
   d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities.
      (1) Name.
      (2) Address.
      (3) Business, profession, or occupation.
(4) Political affiliation.
(5) Education.
(6) Religion.

2. Culture and social structure.
   a. Culture.
      (1) History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
          (a) Events and facts considered most important.
          (b) Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
      (2) Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem.
      (3) Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios of age, sex, and imported or exported labor forces).
      (4) Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions).
      (5) Moral codes.
      (6) Attitudes toward age, sex, race.
      (7) Influences on personality development.
      (8) Individuality.
      (9) Privacy.
      (10) Nature of the people’s perceptions.
      (11) Clothing.
      (12) Fatalism or self-determination.
      (13) Values in economic philosophy (cooperation, competition, respect for personal and private property).
   b. Social structure.
      (1) Status of male and female, by age.
      (2) Humor, entertainment.
      (3) Community participation.
      (4) Exchange of gifts.
      (5) Public displays of emotion.
      (6) Lines of authority.
      (7) Cooperation versus competition, including economics.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
(8) The family.
   (a) Roles and status of family members.
   (b) Nuclear or extended.
   (c) Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members.
   (d) Place in society.
   (e) Inheritance customs.
   (f) Entrance rites and rituals.
   (g) Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.

(9) Dating and marriage.
   (a) Age standards.
   (b) Influence of family and peers.
   (c) Common dating practices, courtship activities.
   (d) Chaperones, group dating.
   (e) Engagement customs.
   (f) Divorce, separation, aloneness.
   (g) Sexual mores.

(10) Greetings.
   (a) Conversation and gestures on meeting.
   (b) Distinctive approaches for greetings.
   (c) Compliments given or received.
   (d) Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people).
   (e) Farewell and leave-taking.
   (f) Use of first name versus titles.
   (g) Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.

(11) Visiting practices.
   (a) Conversations.
      1 Topics.
      2 Appropriate part of visit.
      3 Attitude, rate, pitch, and tone.
   (b) Gifts.
   (c) Compliments on possessions, family, and children.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>Parties and other social events.</td>
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<td>(e)</td>
<td>Business discussions.</td>
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<td>(f)</td>
<td>Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.</td>
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<td>(12)</td>
<td>Eating practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Table manners (before, during, and after the meal).</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>Average diet, meal size, and scheduling.</td>
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<td>(c)</td>
<td>Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.</td>
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<td>(d)</td>
<td>Forbidden foods.</td>
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<td>(e)</td>
<td>Social and other occasions.</td>
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<td>(f)</td>
<td>Unique problems and challenges.</td>
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<td>(13)</td>
<td>Work and recreation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Age, sex, status, and hierarchy.</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>Schedules.</td>
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<td>(c)</td>
<td>Obligations, successes, or failures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>Business codes.</td>
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<td>(e)</td>
<td>Bribes.</td>
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<td>(f)</td>
<td>Family, cultural, and social recreation, vacation, and sports.</td>
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<td>(g)</td>
<td>Individual recreation (age and sex exclusions and variations).</td>
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<td>(h)</td>
<td>Distinctive arts and sciences.</td>
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<td>(i)</td>
<td>Well-known artists, athletes, and others.</td>
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<td>c.</td>
<td>Do's and don'ts (item or area that could embarrass or hurt the commander's mission if handled improperly. Include a quick reference for the commander and a starting point for briefing troops. This section may include items previously mentioned).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Languages.
   a. Map showing distribution.
   b. Minority groups.
   c. Standardization of languages.

4. Religion.
   a. Religious sects (number, key leaders, and geographic locations).
   b. Funeral and burial practices.

*Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)*
c. Religious problems.
d. Eating and dietary habits.
e. Sexual mores, including interrelations and intermarriages with alien personnel.
f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.

D. U.S. Interests.
1. U.S. military units and teams in the area and their activities.
2. U.S. Government organizations in the area and their interests.
4. Legal agreements and treaties.
5. Trade and commercial interests.

E. FN Support.
   a. Space and facilities at echelons above corps.
   b. C2 of other functional areas.
   c. Area security.
   d. Dislocated civilians.
   e. Battlefield circulation control communications.
      (1) Use of communications systems.
      (2) Repair of communications systems.
      (3) Cable construction and repair.
2. Combat service support.
   a. Use of FN transportation and distribution systems, including highways, railways, waterways, ports (public and private).
   b. Use of FN buildings.
   c. Civilian services (laundry, bath, bakery, food, water).
   d. Depot operations and depot maintenance.
   e. Material-handling equipment.
   f. Labor.
      (1) Skilled.
      (2) Manual.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
(3) Agricultural.
(4) Male or female.
(5) Draft exemption for U.S. employees.
(6) Third country (labor necessity, availability, and quantity).
(7) Screened by intelligence.
(8) Linguists and interpreters.
(9) Salary (standard wages).
(10) Workday.

3. Mobility and Survivability.
   a. Repair of railroads, highways, and pipelines.
   b. Obstacle construction.
   c. Contract guard services.
   d. Decontamination.
   e. Port facilities and repair.
   f. Barrier and construction materials.

4. Medical.
   a. Hospitals (facilities and beds).
   b. Medical evacuation.
   c. Medical supplies and equipment.

5. FN POC for U.S. forces and procedures.


II. LEGAL.

A. System of Laws.
   1. Civil and criminal codes.
      a. Origins.
      b. Procedures.
      c. Penalties.
   2. Political crimes.

B. Administration of Justice.
   1. Historical development.
2. Agencies (national and local).
3. Courts and tribunals (types of jurisdiction [including administrative tribunals]).
5. Personnel.
   a. Judiciary.
   b. Prosecutors.
   c. The Bar.
   d. Legal training.
   e. Political controls.

III. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.
   A. General System of Public Administration.
      1. Political traditions.
      2. Political stability.
      4. Constitutional system.
      5. Civil rights and practices.
      6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.
   B. Structure of National Government.
      1. Executive branch.
         a. Organization.
         b. Powers.
         c. Policies.
         d. Administration.
      2. Legislative branch.
         a. Organization.
         b. Powers.
         c. Composition of membership.
         d. Pressure groups.
         a. Organization.
b. Powers.

4. Methods of selection of key officials.

5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
   a. Name.
   b. Address.
   c. Position in government.
   d. Political affiliation.
   e. Education.
   f. Religion.
   g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
   h. Attitude toward the United States.

6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.

C. Structure of Government at Other Levels.
   1. Province or state.
   2. District.
   3. City.
   4. Relations with national government.
   5. Biographical sketches of key officials, potential officials, and other influential persons.
      a. Name.
      b. Address.
      c. Position.
      d. Political affiliation.
      e. Education.
      f. Religion.
      g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
      h. Attitude toward the United States.

D. Armed Forces.
   1. Historical background.
   2. Organization, size, and mission.
      a. Defense establishment.
      b. Army.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
c. Navy.
d. Air Force.
e. Paramilitary forces.
f. Political control and effectiveness.

3. General military policy.

4. International treaties.

5. Foreign influence.

   b. Percentage of total budget.
   c. Military pay.

7. Quality and source of manpower.
   a. Key officers and qualifications.
   b. Recruitment.
   c. Conscription.
   d. Reserves.
   e. Training.
   f. Mobilization plans.

8. Logistics.

9. Weapons and equipment.

10. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia.

11. Loyalty and morale factors.


E. Political Parties.
   1. Strength and capabilities.
   2. Organization.
   4. Biographical sketches of leaders.
   5. Training.
   6. Role in international communist movement.
   7. Relation to domestic government.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
8. Internal party politics.

F. International Affairs.
   1. Agencies.
   2. Foreign relations.
   3. Relations with international organizations.

IV. PUBLIC EDUCATION.
   A. Organization.
      1. National level.
      2. Other levels (province, state, district).
      3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
      4. Philosophy guiding the educational systems.
   B. General Conditions and Problems.
      1. General development of the area’s educational system.
      2. Requirements placed upon individuals.
      3. Significant achievements in recent years.
      4. Educational level of population.
   C. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.
      1. Government agencies and policies.
      2. Educational systems and facilities.
         a. Administration and controls.
         b. Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools.
         c. Secondary schools.
         d. Vocational and special schools.
         e. Higher education.
         f. Teacher education.
         g. Private schools.
         h. Adult education.
      3. Evaluation of educational system.
      4. Private and public organizations.
         a. Influence and pressure groups.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
b. Youth organizations.
c. Religious groups.

D. Influence of Politics on Education.

V. PUBLIC HEALTH.

A. Organization.
   1. National level.
   2. Other levels.
   3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.

B. General Conditions and Problems.

C. Agencies and Institutions.
   1. Hospitals.
      a. Number.
      b. Capacity (number of beds).
      c. Location and condition of facilities.
   2. Other medical facilities.
      a. Public.
      b. Private.

D. Medical Personnel.
   1. Numbers (doctors and nurses).
   2. Location.
   3. Training.
   4. Traditional medical practices (native medicine, theory of disease, and religious beliefs).

E. Medical Equipment and Supplies.
   1. Surgical and dental equipment.
   2. Testing equipment.
   3. Drugs.
      a. Availability.
      b. Shortages.
   4. Other supplies.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
F. Diseases.
   1. Predominant types.
   2. Control programs.

G. Environmental Sanitation.
   1. Regulations governing food and drugs.
   2. Water control and supply.
   3. Disposal of sewage and waste.

H. Public Welfare.
   1. Organization.
      a. National level.
      b. Other levels.
      c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
   2. Major social problems.
      a. Juvenile delinquency.
      b. Alcohol and narcotics abuse.
      c. Unemployment.
      d. Poverty and dependency.
   3. Public assistance.
      a. Basis upon which granted.
      b. Types of relief and medical care provided.
   4. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
      a. Social insurance.
      b. Health insurance.
      c. Accident insurance.
      d. Old age, disability, and survivors' pensions.
      e. Unemployment.
      f. Family assistance.
      g. Other.
   5. Welfare services (government and private).
      a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal).
      b. Emergency and war relief.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
c. Relief and public assistance.
   (1) For mentally and physically handicapped.
   (2) For aged and indigent.

6. Institutions.
   a. Orphanages (number, location, and capacity).
   b. Homes for the aged (number, locations, and capacity).
   c. Mental institutions (number, locations, and capacity).
   d. Physical therapy (number and location).

7. Programs.
   a. Recreational.
   b. Vocational.
   c. Health.
   d. Child care.

8. Welfare personnel.
   a. Professional standards.
   b. Volunteer assistance.
   c. Number available by type of organization.

   a. Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
   b. Laws and regulations.
   c. Organizational structure.


VI. PUBLIC SAFETY.

   A. General Conditions and Problems (Primary consideration in this area is whether the
      existing institutions [police, fire, and penal] may be used to carry out the combat
      commander’s primary mission and to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of
      the local population).

   B. Police System.
      1. Organizations at all levels.
         a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
         b. Organization.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
c. Areas of responsibility and jurisdiction.
d. Chain of command.
e. Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.

2. Equipment.
   a. Arms and special equipment.
   b. Modern crime-fighting equipment.
   c. Traffic control equipment.
   d. Riot control equipment.
   e. Police communications.
   f. Transportation.

3. Personnel.
   a. Strength.
   b. Method of selection.
      (1) Political, racial, and religious requirements.
      (2) Reliability.
      (3) Morale and state of training.
   c. Promotion basis.

4. Functions and authority.
   a. Criminal action.
   b. Civil ordinances.
   c. Disorder and disaster control.

5. Police regulations that differ from U.S. concept of law and order.
   a. General.
   b. Identification system.
   c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews.
   d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.

6. Miscellaneous.
   a. Other methods of enforcing law and order, such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and role of the military.
   b. Psychological effect on the local population.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
C. Penal Institutions.

1. National and local.
   a. Prisons and jails (number, location, and capacity).
   b. Concentration camps and labor camps (number, location, and capacity).

2. Organization.

3. Government agency exercising control.

4. Inmate breakdown.
   b. Criminal.
   c. Juvenile.
   d. Sex.

5. Adequacy (sanitary and health conditions).

6. Treatment of prisoners.

7. Probation.

8. Parole.

D. Fire Protection.

1. Organization (in general, the same as for the police).

2. Equipment.
   a. Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities.
   b. Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.

3. Personnel.
   a. Strength and mode of selection.
   b. Training status and efficiency.
   c. Names and political reliability of key personnel.

4. Miscellaneous.
   a. Particular problems in certain areas, such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure.
   b. Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

VII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

A. General Conditions and Problems.
B. Public Finance.

1. Organization.
   a. National level.
   b. Other levels.
   c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.

2. Policies.
   a. Fiscal and economic policies.
   b. Special conditions and policies.
   c. Accounting systems used.

3. Monetary System.
   a. Currency.
   b. Reserves or backing of currency.
   c. Issuing authorities.
   d. Stability of currency.
   e. Controls.
   f. Exchange rates.
   g. Government authorities.
   h. Other legal instruments of exchange.
   i. Other means of exchange, such as the black market.

4. Budgetary system and current budget.
   a. Current budget.
   b. Budgetary analysis.
   c. Governing authorities and controls.
   d. Analysis of budgetary procedures.
   e. Patterns of expenditure and distribution.

5. Sources of government income.
   a. Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes).
   b. Formulation of tax policies.
   c. Investments.
   d. Other sources of government income.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
   a. Banking institutions (facilities, location, capital, and credit policies).
   b. Investment institutions.
      (1) Stock institutions.
      (2) Controlling authorities and control exercised.
      (3) Miscellaneous investment companies.
   c. Insurance companies (number, size, and location).
   d. Specialized savings institutions.

7. Foreign exchange (balance of trade, controls, and restrictions).

8. Applicable laws and regulations.

C. Economics and Commerce.
   1. Description of economic system.
      a. Private enterprise.
      b. Public enterprise.
      c. Biographical sketches of key officials and business leaders.
   3. Goals and programs.
      a. Short-range.
      b. Intermediate-range.
      c. Long-range.
   4. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.
   5. Resources.
      a. Natural.
      b. Developed.
      c. Human.
      d. Self-sufficiency, dependency, substitution.
   6. Extent of development.
      a. Capabilities of infrastructure.
      b. Capabilities of industry and power.
      c. Capabilities of agriculture.
      d. Capabilities of service sector.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
7. Statistics.
   a. Per capita (income, savings, consumer spending).
   b. Aggregate (gross national product, national income).
   c. Ratios (unemployment, productivity, occupations).
   d. Validity of statistics (when compiled).

8. Internal movement of goods.

   a. Type.
   b. Quantity.
   c. Market.
   d. Influence.

10. Commerce.
    a. Domestic trade.
        (1) Wholesale and retail distribution system.
        (2) Markets and fairs.
        (3) Weights and measures standards.
        (4) Cooperatives and public markets.
    b. Foreign trade.
        (1) Principal items of export and import.
        (2) Tariff system, customs, duties.
        (3) Trade agreements.
        (4) Balance of payments.

11. Industries.
    a. Location of main industrial centers.
    b. Names of important companies.
    c. Labor (skills and distribution).
    d. Power sources and capacities.
    e. Manufacturing industries.
    f. Types (machinery, chemical, textile).
    g. Locations (province, city).
    h. Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).
12. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
   a. Government organization.
   b. Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
   c. Laws governing commerce and industry.
   d. Subsidies and monopolies.

13. Price control and rationing.
   a. Stabilization.
   b. Variation of prices.
   c. Control measures and techniques.
   d. Commodities under price control.
   e. Distribution.
      (1) Essential commodities.
      (2) Imports and exports.
      (3) Ration controls.
      (4) Production and distribution.
      (5) Effect on demands.
      (6) Types and status of markets.
   f. Control systems.
      (1) Price-control program.
      (2) Rationing program.
      (3) Raw materials.
      (4) Financial.
   g. Legislation.
      (1) Price-control legislation and items subject to price control.
      (2) Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.

D. Labor.
   1. Organization.
      a. National level.
      b. Other levels.
      c. Key personnel with biographical sketches.
2. Labor force.
   a. Employment data and trends.
   b. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
   c. Ages and distribution.
   d. Unemployment.
   e. Labor productivity.
3. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
   a. Government labor policy.
      (1) Labor laws and working conditions.
      (2) Role of government.
      (3) Government job placement controls.
      (4) Wages and other incentives.
   b. Labor organizations.
      (1) Organizations (type, size, location, leadership, and political influence).
      (2) Membership.
      (3) Relations with foreign or international labor organizations.
      (4) Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages).
   c. Social insurance.
   d. Labor disputes, including mechanisms for settling.
4. Wages and standards, including hours and working conditions.

VIII. CIVILIAN SUPPLY.

A. General Conditions and Problems (Peculiarities of climate and geography that might influence civilian supply).

B. Storage, Refrigeration, and Processing Facilities.
   1. Storage space, available and required.
      a. Food.
      b. Other supplies.
   2. Refrigeration, available and required.
      a. Food.
      b. Other supplies.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
C. Distribution Channels.
   1. Food.
   2. Clothing.
   3. Essential durables.

D. Dietary and Clothing Requirements and Customs.
   1. Food.
      a. Available.
      b. Required.
   2. Clothing.
      a. Available.
      b. Required.
   3. Customs that might influence civilian supply.

E. Production Excesses and Shortages.

IX. PROPERTY CONTROL.
A. General Conditions and Problems (Brief coverage on classification and administration of property, imposition of controls, and status of property records).

B. Agricultural and Industrial Property.
   1. Type.
   2. Location.
   3. Ownership.
   4. Influence.

C. Property Laws.
   2. Evidence of ownership.
      a. Methods of recording.
      b. Locations of title registers.
      c. Agencies established for registering ownership.
   3. Methods of transfer of ownership.
      a. Confiscations.
      b. Restoration to rightful owner.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
c. Restoration to custodian.

D. Domestic and Foreign Ownership.
      a. Type.
      b. Size.
      c. Location.
   2. Private.
      a. Type.
      b. Size.
      c. Location.

X. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.
   A. General Conditions and Problems.
      1. Importance of agriculture in total economy.
      2. Extent of agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency.
      3. Principal problems.
      4. Attitude of farm population.
   B. Agricultural Geography.
      1. Locations of principal farm areas.
      2. Types of soil.
      3. Influence of climate and topography.
      4. Types of crops.
      5. Farm to market road net.
   C. Agricultural Products and Processing.
      1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, warehousing).
      2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage).
      3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration).
   D. Agricultural Practices.
      1. Extent of mechanization.
      2. Improvement programs.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
3. Conservation programs.
4. Pest and disease control.

E. Land-Holding System and Reform Programs.

F. Fisheries.
   1. Commercial (number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, 
      methods of processing, storage, annual production).
   2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas).
   3. Restocking program.
   4. Problem areas.

G. Forestry.
   1. Reforestation programs.
   2. Importance of forestry to the country.
   3. Forestry service or administration.
   4. Hunting (control, laws, regulations, types of game).
   5. Products and their processing.

H. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.
   2. Private.

I. Food Production.
   1. Type.
   2. Quantity.
   3. Processing.
   4. Location, size, ownership of warehouses.
   5. Types and quantity of food supplies stored.

J. Applicable Laws and Regulations Governing Food and Agriculture.

XI. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS.
   A. General Conditions and Problems.
   B. Postal System.
      1.Extent and frequency of service.
         a. Metropolitan.
b. Rural.

2. Censorship.

3. Private carriers.

4. Parcel post service.

5. Other functions.
   a. Postal savings.
   b. Money order service.
   c. Issuance of licenses.
   d. Tax information service.

C. Telephone.

1. Exchanges and local service.

2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.

3. Priority usage.

4. Censorship.

5. Private systems.


D. Telegraph.

1. Exchanges and local service.

2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.

3. Priority usage.

4. Censorship.

5. Private systems.


E. Radio and Television.

1. Transmitting stations (number, type, and location).

2. Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines.

3. Hours of operation.

4. Censorship.

5. Propaganda usage.


Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
7. Foreign broadcasts.

F. Applicable Laws Governing Communications Systems.

XII. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

A. General Conditions and Problems.
B. Rail Transport.
   1. Railroad by type, gauge, and miles or kilometers.
   2. Type, number, and condition of rolling stock.
   3. Location of switchyards.
   4. Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).
C. Vehicular Transportation.
   1. Road (type, condition, and miles or kilometers).
   2. Street systems and condition.
   3. Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership.
D. Water Transportation.
   1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
   2. Location of all port facilities and services.
   3. Identification of sea routes.
   4. Location and use of inland waterways.
E. Air Transportation.
   1. Location, size, and use of all airfields.
   2. Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.
F. Pipelines.
G. Travel.
   2. Restrictions.
   3. Regulations.
   4. Volume by geographic area of people leaving and entering.
   5. Items of general importance common to all transportation systems.
      a. Ownership.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
b. Regulatory agencies and licenses.

c. Financial structure.

d. Administration.

e. Operation and revenues.

f. Maintenance.

g. Trade associations.

h. Personnel and labor relations.

6. Elements relative to each specific transport system in detail.
   a. Location and mileage.
   b. Condition.
   c. Effect of seasonal variation.
   d. Special traffic hazards and problems.

XIII. PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES.

A. General Conditions and Problems.

B. Public Works.
   1. Public buildings, including hospitals (use, size, and location).
   2. Roads and streets.
   3. Bridges.
   4. Port facilities (harbors).
   5. Airports and railroad terminals.
   7. Dams (flood control).

C. Public Utilities.
   1. Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems.
   2. Water system, including source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership.
   3. Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership).
   4. Sewage-collection systems and disposal plants.
   5. Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal.
   6. Storm drainage systems.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
7. Items of general importance to all public works and utilities.
   a. Ownership.
   b. Regulating and licensing agencies.
   c. Financial structure.
   d. Administration.
   e. Operations and revenues.
   f. Maintenance.
   g. Trade associations.
   h. Personnel and labor relations.

8. Elements relative to each specific public works or utility in detail.
   a. Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids.
   b. Condition.
   c. New construction requirements.
   d. Available resources for construction.
   e. Priority of usage.

XIV. CULTURAL RELATIONS.

   A. General Conditions and Problems.
   B. Cultural Affairs.
      1. Religions in the area.
         b. Organized.
         c. Unorganized (sects).
         d. Relations among religions and religious leaders, indigenous and missionary.
      2. Clergy.
         a. Number, location, and education of clergymen.
         b. Influence of religious leaders.
      3. Religious beliefs.
         a. Major tenets of each religion, including such concepts as—
            (1) Faith.
            (2) Impact of faith on life.
(3) Concept of the hereafter.
(4) Means of salvation.
(5) Rites of cleaning and purification.
(6) Impact of religions on value systems.

b. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.

4. Worship.
a. Forms and significance of worship of each religion.
b. Places of worship.
c. Frequency of worship.

5. Relationship between religion and motivation of indigenous people.

6. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication.

7. Socioeconomic influence of religion.
a. Influence of religions on society.
b. Economic influence of religions.
   (1) Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
   (2) Teachings of religions about private property.

8. Interrelation with government.
a. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
b. Role of religions and religious leaders in armed forces.
c. Political influence of religious leaders.

a. Location, size, and attendance.
b. Influence.
c. Relationship to nonsecular schools.

C. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.
2. Advancements over the past 10 years.
3. Influence of outside countries.
4. Arts.
a. Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts.
b. Population attitude toward art treasures.
c. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.

d. Agencies through which arts are performed.
   (1) Private.
   (2) Government.

5. Advancements in science.

6. Artists’ organizations and government control.

7. Monuments.
   a. Location of historic monuments and sites.
   b. Present significance of historic monuments and sites.

8. Archives.
   a. Location of archives.
   b. Varieties of archives.
      (1) Public archives.
      (2) Semipublic archives.
      (3) Ecclesiastical archives.
      (4) Private or family archives.
   c. Contents or category of archives.
      (1) Historical.
      (2) Current documents.

XV. CIVIL INFORMATION.

A. General Conditions, Problems, and Stage of Development.
   1. Effect of geographic, social, economic, and political factors.
   2. Reading, listening, viewing habits.
   3. Rural-urban differences.
   4. Anticommunist appeal.
   5. International outlook.
   6. Techniques to measure impact.

B. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Publishing Firms.
   1. Name.
   2. Location.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
3. Ownership.
5. Publication.
7. Editorial policies (political persuasion).
8. Procedures.
9. Employees.
10. Equipment.
11. Sources of supply.
12. Revenue.

C. Miscellaneous Means of Communications.
   1. Private printing facilities.
   2. Advertising agencies.
   3. Others.

XVI. DISLOCATED CIVILIANS.

A. Existing DC Population (If Any).
   1. Existing camps.
      b. Responsible agency (national, international).
      c. Population (number, nationality).
   2. Anticipated duration of institutionalization.

B. Potential Population Dislocation.
   1. Volume of dislocation by region.
   2. Direction of major flow.
   3. Troop support required per thousands of population.
   4. U.S. logistical support required (D-day plus 30, 60, 240).
   5. Special problems.

C. Care and Control of DCs.
   1. Government and private agencies involved in displaced persons and refugee activities.
      a. Organization.

*Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)*
b. Scope and powers.
c. Relationships to international organization.
d. Emergency reserve personnel adaptable to displaced persons and refugee activities.

2. Policies and operations of area agencies handling dislocated civilians—by agency (if any).
   a. Policy and procedures concerning—
      (1) Evacuation and control.
      (2) Assembly center (or other grouping) administration.
      (3) Camp or village security.
      (4) Camp physical plant layout.
      (5) Construction, materials, and engineering of physical plants.
      (6) Health and medical care facilities.
      (7) Supplies and food.
      (8) Welfare services.
      (9) Screening and indoctrination.
      (10) Resettlement.
      (11) Resources expenditure (available, used by area agencies, required by U.S. standards).
      (12) Steps needed and resources required to convert existing facilities to U.S. standards for similar use.
   b. Biographical analysis of agency personnel.

XVII. EMERGENCY SERVICES.
   A. General Conditions and Problems.
   B. Civil Defense.
      1. Organization.
         a. Civilian or military jurisdiction.
         b. Organization, rural and urban.
         c. Areas of responsibility of equipment.
      2. Plans.
         a. Status of planning.
Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
(6) Transportation assets (air, ground, water).
(7) Mobile power generation (generators and size).
(8) Labor.
(9) Emergency shelters.
(10) Money.
(11) Water treatment and storage.
(12) Mobile medical units and hospitals.

b. Emergency transportation network analysis.
   (1) Assumptions.
   (2) Roads, railways, airports, and other transportation networks that have sustained damage in previous disasters.

6. In-country POCs, by position and telephone number.
   a. U.S. POCs (Embassy, USAID).
   b. HN POCs (with telephone numbers).

XVIII. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT.

A. General Conditions and Problems.
B. Pollution Control and Environmental Management Organizations.
C. Laws and Regulations.
D. Sources of Pollution.
   1. Air.
   2. Water.
E. Health Hazard.
   1. Immediate and present threats.
   2. Near term.
   3. Mid-term.
   4. Long term.

Figure G-1. Functional Areas in Civil Affairs Area Study and Assessment (Continued)
Appendix H

CMOC Operations

Coordination with various civilian organizations during missions across the full range of military operations has proved to be a necessity. In most cases, these agencies and organizations are in the AO long before the military operation and will most likely remain there long after the military has redeployed. One of the most appropriate means of facilitating this coordination is through the use of a CMOC.

DEFINITION AND ACTIVITIES

H-1. By definition, the CMOC is an operations center formed from CA assets and serves as the primary interface between the U.S. armed forces and the local population, humanitarian organizations, NGOs, IOs, the UN, multinational forces, and other agencies of the U.S. Government. The CMOC may not necessarily be established and run by the military. In such cases, the military plays a supporting role.

H-2. The CMOC is the primary coordination center established and tailored to assist the unit in anticipating, facilitating, and coordinating civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the local civil population, government, and economy in areas where military forces, government organizations, IOs, and NGOs are employed.

H-3. Major activities include—
   • Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and allied commands.
   • Coordinating with NGOs, IOs, FN, and local authorities.
   • Providing interface with U.S. Government organizations.
   • Assisting in transition operations.
   • Monitoring the CMO effort.

CRITERIA

H-4. CMOCs can be established at all levels of command. Consequently, more than one CMOC may be in an AO. The CMOC can also have a variety of names, depending on the level of command or organization and the region of the world that establishes it. Some of the more common names include—
   • Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), CINC.
   • Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), CINC and DOS.
   • Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC Center), NATO and UN.
   • Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), UN.
H-5. Criteria used in the decision to establish a CMOC should address the following questions:

- Is the CMOC justified by mission analysis?
- Is cooperation needed with civilian agencies?
- Are assets available to establish, staff, and operate a CMOC?
- Is the environment secure?
- How does the unit commander want to interface with civilian agencies?

STAFFING

H-6. The staffing of the CMOC depends on the level of command and the situation. A CMOC always has a civilian component and a military component.

H-7. The military component normally consists of representatives from the following staff sections or supporting units:

- S2 or G2.
- S3 or G3.
- Engineer.
- Logistics.
- Legal.
- Transportation (air, naval, ground).
- CA.
- Multinational force representatives.

H-8. The civilian component normally consists of representatives from the following organizations or agencies:

- U.S. Government.
- FN government.
- NGOs.
- IOs.

CAPABILITIES

H-9. Depending on the size and scope of the mission, the CMOC (in support of the JFC)—

- Provides primary support to the CMO staff.
- Develops and maintains annexes, area assessments, and CMO estimates.
- Acts as a clearinghouse for all civilian requests for support to U.S. military and U.S. military requests from civilian organizations.
• Coordinates with outside agencies to prioritize efforts and to reduce or eliminate redundancy.
• Acts as lead organization in transition from “relief to development continuum.”
• Coordinates U.S. Government agencies.
• Convenes mission planning to address complex military missions that support the following NGO requirements:
  ▪ Convoy escort.
  ▪ Management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers.
• Validates RFAs from humanitarian relief agencies.

H-10. One of the most important functions of the CMOC is processing RFAs. The deployment of military forces into an AO implies an inability of an FN to address the situation, whether a man-made or natural disaster. NGOs and IOs in the area have well-established LOCs and support mechanisms that are disrupted by the flow of military forces and materiel into the country. These concerns must be addressed in a timely and efficient manner. The processing of RFAs is an important means to show the relief community that the military is present to assist, not to hinder its ongoing operations. Figure H-1 shows a recommended way to process RFAs.

**Figure H-1. Sample RFA Flow**

**LOCATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CMOC**

H-11. As stated earlier, the CMOC may be established at any level of command. There are also numerous places to locate the CMOC. The CMOC
may be inside or outside the “wire.” During Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the CMOC was inside the wire, mainly for force protection. In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia and during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the CMOC was normally outside the wire.

H-12. If the CMOC is placed inside the wire, some form of coordination center must be established outside the wire. In Haiti, a HACC was established in the USAID compound to allow access by the various civilian relief agencies. Representatives from the CMOC acted as liaisons to the HACC, which allowed information and RFAs to flow between the JTF HQ and the HACC. See Figure H-2.

![Figure H-2. Location of CMOC Inside Wire](image)

H-13. The CMOC may answer directly to the commander, as it did in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during Operation SAFE HARBOR, or it may answer to the CMO staff officer (S5 or G5), as it did in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. In either case, an unobstructed communications link must be established between the CMOC and the command it supports. See Figure H-3, page H-5, for an example of a CMOC in support of Operation SAFE HARBOR.
Figure H-3. CMOC in Support of Operation SAFE HARBOR

ORGANIZATION OF THE CMOC

H-14. The CMOC can be organized in a variety of ways. It must be organized to facilitate a smooth flow of information between all concerned parties, yet not compromise force protection and OPSEC requirements. One technique, used in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, is to have a director, an operations section, an administration and logistics section, and a nonmilitary representative section (Figure H-4, page H-6).

H-15. The operations section is the heart of the CMOC. It can be organized into current operations, future plans, and NGO assistance cells.

- The current operations cell—
  - Plans 24 hours out.
  - Develops situation maps (feeding centers, camps, main supply routes [MSRs]).
  - Develops public information campaigns.
  - Prepares security situation reports.
  - Processes RFAs.
  - Conducts daily meetings.
The future plans cell—
- Develops plans.
- Prioritizes missions.
- Eliminates redundancies.
- Links to U.S. Government agencies.

The NGO assistance cell—
- Maintains a list of NGOs.
- Documents NGO interface.
- Tracks projects.
- Receives RFAs.

H-16. The administration and logistics section coordinates the activities of the CMOC. It consists of an administration and a logistics cell.

- The administration cell—
  - Maintains the access roster.
  - Maintains and communicates meeting schedules.
- Processes required reports.
- Maintains the duty roster.
- The logistics cell—
  - Maintains a resource coordination matrix.
  - Maintains communications.

H-17. Representatives include civilians from—
- FN agencies.
- U.S. Government agencies.
- NGOs.
- Local officials.
- IOs.

LAYOUT CONSIDERATIONS

H-18. The layout of the CMOC (Figure H-5) must be conducive to continuous, productive communications flow. As a minimum, the CMOC should have the following areas:
- Meeting area (determined by officer in charge [OIC]).
- Military work areas (OPSEC, classified).
- Map boards (graphics, overlays) and briefing boards.
- Access points (physical security, force protection).
- Information management and control.

![Figure H-5. Sample CMOC Layout](image-url)
STRUCTURE
H-19. The CMOC is usually established in an existing structure, when available; however, it can easily be established using organic tentage. Normally, at the tactical level, two or three standard integrated command post (SICP) tents or two medium general purpose tents provide adequate space. A standard 3.2-kilowatt generator, wired into the CMOC via commercial electrical cords or a military light set, provides minimal electrical power. The SICP comes with organic neon lights.

FURNITURE
H-20. Tables, desks, and chairs (work stations) should be provided for all participants. The setup also includes a filing capability, as paperwork must be cataloged and filed.

COMMUNICATIONS
H-21. The CMOC must have the ability to communicate to all concerned parties—including higher and subordinate military organizations (secure and nonsecure), IOs, FN agencies, U.S. Government agencies, and NGOs. Common communications assets should include—

- Radios.
- Telephones (military and civilian, landline and cellular).
- Fax machines.
- Local area networks.
- Internet access.
- Copier.

MAP BOARD (SITUATION BOARD)
H-22. Two standard 4-foot by 8-foot sheets of plywood are normally sufficient for use as a map board or situation board (Figure H-6, page H-9). If space is insufficient to display two boards, maps and overlays can be posted on each side of one board—one side for the military and the other side for everyone to see. Critical information should be posted on the board to ensure all parties are receiving the same information. See Figure H-7, page H-9, for examples of CMO-specific graphics.

TRANSPORTATION
H-23. CMOC personnel must have the ability to move around the AO, within force protection constraints. In most cases, sufficient military vehicles are available to meet this requirement. If not, consideration to contract vehicles should be addressed. Sufficient, secure parking areas must also be provided for both civilian and military vehicles.
Figure H-6. Sample Map Board or Situation Board

Figure H-7. Sample HMO-Specific Graphics

Dislocated Civilian Collection Point
Dislocated Civilian Assembly Area
Proposed Dislocated Civilian Assembly Area
Motorized (HMMWV) CA Team (CATA 21, B Company, 96th CA Battalion [A])
Enemy CA Unit
CIV Civilian
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
GLOSSARY

A  airborne
AAI  Africa-America Institute
AAR  after-action review
AC  Active Component
ACDI/VOCA  Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
ACofS  Assistant Chief of Staff
ACRI  African Crisis Response Initiative
ADP  automated data processing
ADRA  Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ADSW  active duty for special work
ADT  active duty for training
AED  Academy for Educational Development
AFSC  American Friends Service Committee
AICF/USA  Action Internationale Contre La Faim (International Action Against Hunger, United States of America)
AJWS  American Jewish World Service
AKF  Aga Khan Foundation
AMURT  Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
ANERA  American Near East Refugee Aid
antiterrorism  Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02)
AO  area of operations
AOR  area of responsibility
AR  Army regulation
ARC  American Refugee Committee
area assessment  The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)
ARNG  Army National Guard
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARPERCOM</td>
<td>Army Personnel Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Services Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD (ISA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>area support group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>annual training</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFWI</td>
<td>Bread for the World Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWA</td>
<td>Baptist World Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2W</td>
<td>command and control warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs - Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 3-57 under revision)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACOM</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACT</td>
<td>civic action team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Charities Aid Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Fund for Overseas Development</td>
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<td>CALT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs liaison team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP3T</td>
<td>Civil Affairs plans, programs, and policy team</td>
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<td>CAPT-A</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Planning Team Alpha</td>
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<td>CAPT-B</td>
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<td>CATC</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team Charlie</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>counterdrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Citizens Democracy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>communications-electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDPA</td>
<td>Centre for Development and Population Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>commanding general</td>
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</table>
CHF  Child Health Foundation
CHOP  change of operational control
CI  civilian internee
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency
CIHC  Center for International Health and Cooperation
CIMIC  civil-military cooperation
CINC  commander in chief
CINCFORSCOM  Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces Command
CIV  civilian

civic action  (See MCA -military civic action.)
civil administration  An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

Civil Affairs activities  Activities performed or supported by Civil Affairs forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of Civil Affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57 under revision)

civil assistance  Military necessity may require a commander to provide life-sustaining services, maintain order, or control distribution of goods and services within his assigned operational area. Civil assistance differs from other forms of civil administration because it is based on the commander’s decision. All other forms of civil administration require NCA approval.

CJCS  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF  commander, joint task force
CM  countermine
CMCC, UN  Civil-military coordination center, UN

CMO  civil-military operations - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of
local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs forces, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs forces and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57 under revision)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNFA</td>
<td>Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>combined command</strong></td>
<td>A unification of two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, for example, combined navies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMZ</td>
<td>communications zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in concept format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSCOM</td>
<td>corps support command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRWRC</td>
<td>Christian Reformed World Relief Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>combat search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>command sergeant major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTOC</td>
<td>corps tactical operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>Church World Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>directed area for recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DASD(H&amp;RA)</strong></td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Dislocated civilian - A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAA</td>
<td>Dislocated civilian assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>Deputy commanding officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAA-assistance</td>
<td>Developmental assistance - Long-range programs to develop the infrastructure of a nation and aid in social and economic progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJFAC</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTOC</td>
<td>Division tactical operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;E</td>
<td>Evasion and escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEFI</td>
<td>Essential elements of friendly information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHA</td>
<td>Emergency Humanitarian Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Evasion plan of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>Enemy prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Emergency rest area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANS</td>
<td>Friendly or allied nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAX</td>
<td>Facsimile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign internal defense - Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Foreign nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNS</td>
<td>Foreign nation support - Identification, negotiation, and procurement of available resources within a foreign nation to support U.S. military missions during wartime, preparation for war, or peacetime. The identification, coordination, and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
acquisition of foreign nation resources, such as supplies, material, and labor, to support U.S. military forces and operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FORMDEPS</td>
<td>FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GII</td>
<td>global information infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAST</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance survey team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HazMat</td>
<td>hazardous material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/CA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance - Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. See also humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDO</td>
<td>humanitarian demining operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>humanitarian daily ration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>headquarters and headquarters company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HMMWV  high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN  host nation - A nation that receives the forces and supplies of allied nations or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.
HNS  host nation support - Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02)
HOC  Humanitarian Operations Center
HQ  headquarters
HSC  headquarters support company
HUMINT  human intelligence
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD  internal defense and development - The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 1-02)
IFRC  International Federation of the Red Cross
IMC  International Medical Corps
information dominance  The degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary. (FM 100-6)
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service
insurgency  (1) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02); (2) A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government that falls short of civil war.
IO  international organization - Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. (JP 1-02)
IOBS  information operations battle staff
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IPB  intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR  information requirement
IRC  International Rescue Committee
ISB  intermediate staging base
| J1 | Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff |
| J2 | Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff |
| J3 | Operations Directorate of a joint staff |
| J4 | Logistics Directorate of a joint staff |
| J5 | Plans Directorate of a joint staff |
| JCET | Joint or combined exchange training |
| JCMOTF | Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JDC | Joint Distribution Committee |
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JOA | Joint Operations Area |
| JP | Joint Publication |
| JPOTF | Joint Psychological Operations Task Force |
| JSCCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSOA | Joint Special Operations Area |
| JSOTF | Joint Special Operations Task Force |
| JTF | **Joint Task Force** - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02) |
| JVC | Jewish Volunteer Corps |
| KATUSA | Korean Augmentation to the United States Army |
| LAN | Local Area Network |
| LOC | Line of Communications |
| LTOE | Living Table of Organization and Equipment |
| LWR | Lutheran World Relief |
| MACOM | Major Command |
| MAT | Ministerial Advisory Team |
| MCA | **Military Civic Action** - The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02) |
| METT-TC | Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil |
military information environment  The environment contained within the GIE, consisting of information systems (INFOSYS) and organizations—friendly and adversary, military and nonmilitary—that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation. (FM 100-6)

MOA  memorandum of agreement
MOE  measures of effectiveness
MOOTW  military operations other than war
MOS  military occupational specialty
MP  military police
MPA  mission planning authority
MSE  mobile subscriber equipment
MSR  main supply route
MSU  major subordinate unit
MTOE  modified table of organization and equipment
MTT  mobile training team - A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The National Command Authorities may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host nation requests. (JP 1-02)

MTW  major theater war
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC  nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA  National Command Authorities - The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JP 1-02)

NCO  noncommissioned officer
NCOER  noncommissioned officer evaluation report
NCOIC  noncommissioned officer in charge
NDO  national demining operations
NEO  noncombatant evacuation operation
NG  National Guard
NGO  nongovernment organization - Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations,
foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

**O&M** operation and maintenance

**OBJ** objective

**OCONUS** outside the continental United States

**OER** officer evaluation report

**OFDA** Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

**OHDACA** Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

**OIC** officer in charge

**OJCS** Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**OPCON** operational control

**OPLAN** operation plan

**OPORD** operation order

**OPSEC** operations security

**ORT** Obshestwo Propostranienia Truda (Russian for “Society for Handicrafts and Agricultural Work”)

**OSCE** Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**OSD** Office of the Secretary of Defense

**PA** public affairs

**PAO** public affairs officer

**PDD** Presidential Decision Directive

**PDP** professional development program

**PERSCOM** Personnel Command

**PERSEC** personnel security

**PHYSEC** physical security

**PIR** priority intelligence requirements

**POC** point of contact

**POTF** psychological operations task force

**PPP** power projection platform

**PR** personnel recovery

**PRC** populace and resources control

**PSRC** Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
**PSS**  personnel service support

**PSYOP**  Psychological Operations - Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02)

**RC**  Reserve Component

**RCAF**  Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

**RCUCH**  Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook

**rear area**  For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions.

**rear battle**  Those actions, including area damage control, taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation) singly or in a combined effort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close battles.

**RFA**  request for assistance

**RI**  Refugees International

**risk management**  The process of examining and evaluating military and/or civilian operations to identify actions that could help commanders eliminate, reduce, or minimize risk while maximizing force protection.

**ROE**  rules of engagement

**RSOI**  reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

**S1**  adjutant

**S2**  intelligence officer

**S3**  operations and training officer

**S4**  logistics officer

**S5**  civil-military operations officer

**SA**  security assistance - Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)
SAFE  **selected area for evasion** - A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. A SAFE area includes contact points and recovery sites. (JP 1-02).

SAO  **security assistance organization** - All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02)

SAR  search and rescue

SATCOM  satellite communications

SCF (UK)  Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom)

SCF (US)  Save the Children Fund (United States)

SecDef  Secretary of Defense

SERE  survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

SF  Special Forces

SFG(A)  Special Forces Group (Airborne)

SFOD  Special Forces operational detachment

SFODA  Special Forces operational detachment A

SICP  standard integrated command post

SINCGARS  Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SJA  Staff Judge Advocate

SO  special operations

SOC  special operations command

SODARS  special operations debrief and retrieval system

SOF  special operations forces

SOFA  status of forces agreement

SOP  standing operating procedure

SOR  statement of requirements

SOSCOM  Special Operations Support Command

SOTSE  Special Operations Theater Support Element

special operations  Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military
operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

**specified command**

A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

**SR**

special reconnaissance

**support to civil administration**

Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to friendly or neutral foreign civilian governments or government agencies.

**TA**

theater Army

**TAACOM**

theater Army area command

**TASKORD**

task order

**terrorism**

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

**threat**

The ability of an enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current or projected mission organization or item of equipment. (TRADOC Reg 381-1)

**THREATCON**

terrorist threat condition

**TOE**

table of organization and equipment

**TPFDL**

time-phased force and deployment list

**TSC**

theater support command

**TST**

Theater Support Team

**TTAD**

temporary tour of active duty

**UAR**

unconventional assisted recovery - (1) Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; authenticate; evader; recovery. (JP 1-02); (2) Recovery operations conducted by diverted unconventional warfare forces or dedicated insertion teams, and recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla
groups or other clandestine organizations, to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return personnel, to include evaders, detainees, and POWs, to friendly control. (DODI 2310.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>unit identification code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>unified command</td>
<td>A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACAPOC</td>
<td>United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAJFKSWCS</td>
<td>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. country team</td>
<td>The senior in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency provided by U.S. forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UW  unconventional warfare - A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (JP 1-02)

WAN  wide area network
WHNS  wartime host nation support
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
WVRD  World Vision Relief and Development
WWII  World War II
WWW  worldwide web
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Air University http://www.au.af.mil/
Alta Vista http://altavista.digital.com/
America's Army http://www4.army.mil/
American Studies Web http://georgetown.edu/crossroads/asw
American Universities http://www.clas.ufl.edu/CLAS/american-universities.html
Armed Forces Staff College http://www.afsc.edu/
Army Research Laboratory Publications http://www.arl.mil/publications.html

*NOTE: The STANAGs listed are available upon request from Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120.
ArmyLink http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/
Association of the United States Army http://www.ausa.org/
Atlantic Monthly http://www2.theAtlantic.com/
Australian Defence Forces Academy http://www.adfa.oz.au/
Auswartiges Amt http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
Bosnia Link http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/
British American Security Information Council (BASIC) http://basicint.org
Cable News Network http://www.cnn.com/
Canadian Department of National Defence http://www.dnd.ca/dnd.htm
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies http://www.ciss.ca/
Canadian War, Peace and Security WWW Server http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/index.html
Carter Center http://www.CarterCenter.org/
CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/home.html
Center for Army Lessons Learned http://call.army.mil/call.html
Center For Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/
Center for International Security and Arms Control http://www.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/
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Defense Link http://www.defenselink.mil
Democracy Net http://www.ned.org/
Department of State http://www.state.gov
EiNet Galaxy http://www.einet.net/
Electronic Headquarters for the Acquisition of War Knowledge (EHAWK)
http://www.e-hawk.com/
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