Civil-Military Engagement

October 2013

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Headquarters, Department of the Army
# Civil-Military Engagement

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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.80, *Civil-Military Engagement*, provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of Civil Affairs operations (CAO) in support of interagency efforts of the American Embassies (AMEMBs), United States (U.S.) missions, as well as a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) civil-military operations (CMO) concept. It provides Army Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers with the information necessary for the integration of CA capability in support of shaping, deterrence, and stability tasks illustrated as joint operating concepts. Since civil-military engagement (CME) occurs in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments, numerous joint terms, definitions, and concepts are used in this publication.

ATP 3-57.80 establishes the role of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) CA elements in support of CME with regard to the missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations for these forces. ARSOF CA forces perform CME missions in every theater, primarily during shaping, deterrence, and stability tasks. CA forces conducting CME are a joint force and interagency integrator and enabler. CA forces are only one of the many resources a commander or chief of mission (COM) uses to deal with the complex and ever-changing civil component of the operational environment. CA forces are an essential element in support of the JFC’s CMO concept by virtue of their linguistic orientation, cultural awareness training in military to host nation (HN) advisory activities, and their civilian professional skills that parallel common government functions.

This manual is written primarily to assist ARSOF CA Soldiers who execute CAO in conducting CME (planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing). This ATP is applicable for CA Soldiers supporting the geographic combatant commander (GCC), theater special operations command (TSOC), and theater Army CMO. Commanders must always consider the civil components within the area of operations.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, HN laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*.)

This publication uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions may appear in both the glossary and text. The principal audience for ATP 3-57.80 is the ARSOF CA elements tasked with executing CME; however, this manual can also provide guidance to the leadership of the Army, which includes officers and senior noncommissioned officers who either command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It is also an applicable reference for the civilian leadership of the U.S. interagency. Unless otherwise stated, this publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United States Army Reserve (USAR).

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). The preparing agency is the Doctrine Division, Civil Affairs Branch, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC. Reviewers and users of this ATP should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-CAD (ATP 3-57.80), 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610 or by electronic mail to: AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil.
Introduction

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.80 expands the doctrinal discussion in Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, concerning the role of Civil Affairs (CA) forces conducting civil-military engagement (CME) operations in support of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the geographical combatant command’s objectives to combat terrorism.

CME is a formal program initiated by USSOCOM to address specific shaping operations that support global special operations forces’ contingency plans. CME is a supporting effort to USSOCOM for countering violent extremist organizations. CME requires continuous coordination with the geographic combatant commander’s and theater special operations commands to identify requirements and integrate actions into the theater security cooperation plan.

ATP 3-57.80 consists of five chapters and four appendixes:

Chapter 1 provides the strategic foundation for the execution of CME. Specifically this chapter addresses the United States National Directives and Policies that establish the framework for the conduct of CME in support of USSOCOM operations.

Chapter 2 describes the theater operational framework in which CME is performed by Army CA forces. The discussion provides CA forces examples of types of operations that will be conducted within specific operational environments. In addition, a discussion on the different approaches a joint force commander and the interagency may use to design CME operations.

Chapter 3 discusses the operational environment that CA forces will operate in while conducting CME. A detailed discussion on the development of the commander’s visualization and the common operational picture specifically to CME operations provides CA forces understanding on the processes required to support the commander developing his operational plan.

Chapter 4 discusses the CME program of record. This chapter provides the overview of the program of record and how it relates to CME relationships within internal defense and development operations.

Chapter 5 develops the tools and techniques to conduct CME mission planning and execution. The discussion provides details for leaders to consider while development of plans and execution of CME operations. Further discussion covers types of problem-solving techniques, CME and CA methodology, and inform and influence activities.

Appendix A provides an overview of the Reserve component forces that can support CME operations, with a brief discussion of CA forces available and force locations for support to CME.

Appendix B provides an overview of the appropriate types of funding available to fund programs and projects for CME operations. The discussion covers Title 10, major force program funding available to commanders conducting CME operations.

Appendix C provides an overview of operational funds available to commanders conducting CME operations. The discussion covers operational funds to resource training during predeployment, as well as operational and sustainment during the course of the mission.

Appendix D provides an overview of project management and the requirements to plan, organize, and manage resources to bring about successful completion of specific projects and the transfer of those projects to another entity.

ATP 3-57.80 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
Chapter 1
Introduction to Civil-Military Engagement

This publication illustrates the techniques used by Army special operations forces (ARSOF) Civil Affairs (CA) forces to support the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and geographic combatant commands’ objectives to combat terrorism. USSOCOM and geographic combatant commands work together to support the Department of State (DOS) by enabling unified action partners to combat terrorism. To this end, USSOCOM has implemented the civil-military engagement (CME) program of record.

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

1-1. CME supports operational and strategic levels of conflict. It is important for CA Soldiers conducting CME to understand by what authorities and programs their actions are predicated. This awareness starts by understanding the national strategic objectives provided.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY

1-2. A basic premise of United States (U.S.) foreign policy is that the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions are best preserved and enhanced as part of a community of free, democratic nations who adhere to the principles of a free market and the rule of law within their respective borders and amid the world community. In this regard, the United States strives to encourage other countries to do their part in nurturing and preserving liberty and justice. The objective is to support U.S. interests by means of a common effort. This unified action makes use of all instruments of national power to support a host nation (HN). The diplomatic instrument of national power is often first used to show U.S. support and commitment. The diplomatic instrument leverages the use of security assistance (SA) as an influential tool. The diverse political systems within the world community are important in providing a more stable world community. They must be willing to improve stability within their own borders by promoting democracy development efforts. The public is informed through the informational instrument of power. Information operations (IO) portray the positive efforts and accomplishments of the HN. These operations may also publicize and promote U.S. support to the HN, while simultaneously improving conditions within the supported country. The military instrument of national power is enhanced through military-to-military engagements, burden-sharing arrangements, combined military activities, and support to international activities. The economic instrument has influence across all aspects of the HN’s internal defense. Allied nations require ways and means to improve their economies. HN programs can range from favorable trade arrangements to assistance with military financing.

1-3. Governments that lack the will to address their social, economic, or political problems are unlikely to benefit from outside assistance. However, governments that unleash their human potential and material resources may find that outside help, including U.S. nation assistance (NA), can make a critical difference. Where significant U.S. strategic interests are involved, the United States may provide economic and military assistance to supplement the efforts of such governments.

1-4. The creation of a relatively stable internal environment, one in which economic growth can occur and in which people are able to determine their own form of government, is a primary U.S. objective. Economic assistance supported by the United States through bilateral agreements or supplied by several nations through multilateral agreements may help achieve this objective.
1-5. Although currently obsolete, the National Security Strategy (NSS) Report (February 1995), *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, directed regional commanders and the joint staff to develop a formal peacetime engagement planning process. Through this process, each geographic combatant commander (GCC) developed a regional strategic plan, referred to initially as the theater engagement plan (TEP), which described the security environment, identified engagement objectives, and listed associated activities that supported those objectives. The TEP is now referred to as the theater campaign plan (TCP).

1-6. A specific component of the strategy was peacetime engagement further defined as a broad range of noncombat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include military-to-military contacts, NA, SA, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism (CT), and peacekeeping.

1-7. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) receive formal taskings to develop TCPs through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The guidance outlined in the JSCP includes tasks, objectives, and apportioned resources for planning. Figure 1-1 depicts the national strategic direction and where the CCDRs’ guidance comes from, as well as how the national strategic direction is used by CCDRs and then developed into plans that produce unified action.

![Figure 1-1. National strategic direction](image)

1-8. The current NSS establishes efforts to advance security and prosperity by supporting universal values. The NSS identifies nations that respect human rights and democratic values as those that are more successful and make stronger partners. The NSS further cites comprehensive engagement as a pillar of our effort. Engagement depends upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance. Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments. The United States Government (USG) will continue to foster economic and financial transactions to advance our prosperity.

1-9. The NSS and National Defense Strategy (NDS) are not published on an annual basis. They may cover a period from 3 to 5 years. Between publication dates, the Department of Defense (DOD) publishes a quadrennial defense review (QDR) every 4 years to reinforce or provide interim guidance to the Services and CCDRs. In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense enclosed a statement promoting the concept of conflict prevention and integration of defense assets with civilian agencies (Figure 1-2, page 1-3).
Figure 1-2. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

1-10. The DOD supports U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams in fulfilling their strategic objectives (ends) as outlined in the NSS, NDS, National Military Strategy (NMS), and the most recent QDR. The DOS released Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in 2010, which followed the Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007–2012, which was initially published in 2007. These mutually supporting strategies and reviews are implemented by focusing on the enhancement of defense, diplomacy, and development to support HN capacity building of diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic lines of effort in a unified manner as outlined in the 2010 QDR. The 2010 QDR serves as an operational document that GCCs can use to adjust their efforts in support of U.S. Ambassadors serving within the CCDR’s area of responsibility (AOR).

1-11. NSS and regional TCPs provide CA planners with the global and regional end states. As it pertains to CME, one of the end states is to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities that can lead to exploitation by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) (USSOCOM 7500 series of plans). CME techniques represent the ways in which the USSOCOM 7500 series of plans support the TCP ends with CA forces, which serve as the means. Civil-military support elements (CMSEs) promote the indirect approach to support building partner capacity. CMSEs are the means by which ambassadors and their supporting defense attachés can enhance U.S. access through CME. CMSEs serve as force integrators utilizing the comprehensive and whole-of-government approaches. Their partners may include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), as well as special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces that support GCC TCPs. CMSEs perform civil information management (CIM) functions that develop civil considerations and contribute to the development of the GCC’s and country teams’ common operational picture (COP) and the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).

1-12. CMSEs are capabilities-based forces. They are dedicated to persistent engagement and develop HN systems analysis to assess civil vulnerabilities. CMSEs conduct Civil Affairs operations (CAO) in support of a U.S. country team and, by extension, the HN government by executing the five core CA tasks:

- Nation assistance.
- Populace and resources control.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Civil information management.
- Support to civil administration.

1-13. While all five tasks may not be suited to a particular area or situation, they all are methods that can be used to assist HNs in developing an internal defense and development (IDAD) plan, which can be executed with and through the HN with assistance from the interagency. These five tasks ultimately enhance good governance and promote stability.
Chapter 2
Theater Operational Framework

This chapter describes the theater operational framework in which CME is performed by Army CA forces. This framework is best described using examples provided in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and the specific operational environments illustrated by this publication. Army forces supporting the joint force commander (JFC) and the interagency must fully understand the variations in approach the JFC may use to design operations.

OVERVIEW

2-1. CME occurs in a complex operational environment, and it is critical that CMSEs understand the complex nature of the operational environments in which they will operate. The CME operational environment can be depicted by citing the joint operating concepts that identify future military problems and propose solutions for innovative ways to conduct operations. The joint operating concepts are a visualization of future operations and describe how a commander, using military art and science, might employ capabilities necessary to meet future challenges. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is the overarching concept of the joint operating concept that outlines the different operational environments that JFCs can expect. Within the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, CME is conducted by the military contribution to cooperative security, deterrence, and irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concepts. Some of the joint concepts appear dated and are considered legacy concepts; however, they conceptually allow CME planners to contextualize their operational environment. Operational principles outlined in the military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations joint operating concepts can contribute tremendously to the CMSEs analysis and planning during the conduct of CME. Although CME may contribute to efforts supporting homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, as well as combat operations, it is not generally conducted within these environments. The military contribution to cooperative security and deterrence operations joint operating concepts are distinct but mutually supporting, with the deterrence operations joint operating concepts focused on adversaries, and the military contribution to cooperative security joint operating concepts primarily focused on partners.

2-2. In context with the strategic framework of offense, defense, and stability tasks as outlined in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, and ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, CME is essentially a contributor to stability tasks and should be considered a subtask of NA as described in Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations. CME is a ways to perform CAO that impact strategic objectives in support of stabilization. Objectives are not generally achieved without planning and sequencing operations to meet the desired ends. ADP 3-0 and ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, provide additional information on the operations process. The USSOCOM program of record designs and intends CME to be preventive. While foreign internal defense (FID) represents one of the primary operational activities associated with NA as cited by FM 3-05.2, Foreign Internal Defense, CME more directly supports a broader HN IDAD strategy through its support of American Embassy (AMEMB), country team, and HN governments’ efforts to counter violent extremism and achieve self-sustainable stability. CME is the implementation of CA techniques that support CAO FID measures at the national or subnational level. Figure 2-1, page 2-2, portrays the hierarchical array of diverse joint operating concepts and their alignment with conventional operational phasing as depicted in ADP 3-0.
2-3. Joint operating concepts are not conducted independently from each other. Military operations are carried out with considerable overlap of each joint operating concept. Figure 2-2, page 2-3, depicts how the joint operating concepts may overlap and how CMSE leaders may plan and synchronize aligned activities simultaneously to achieve the desired effects and end states.

DETERRENCE OPERATIONS

2-4. The objective of deterrence operations is to decisively influence the adversary’s decisionmaking process to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests. Influencing the adversary is the ends of operations designed to achieve deterrence.

2-5. An adversary’s deterrence decision process focuses on a perception of three primary elements, which consist of the—

- Benefits of a course of action (COA).
- Costs of a COA.
- Consequences of restraint (for example, costs and benefits of not taking the COA that is to be deterred).

2-6. Joint operations and activities contribute to the ends of deterrence by affecting the adversary’s decision process elements in the following three ways:

- Denying benefits.
- Imposing costs.
- Encouraging adversary restraint.

2-7. The means that operational planners employ in deterrence operations fall into two categories: those that directly and decisively influence an adversary’s decision process, and those that enable such decisive influence.

2-8. Direct means include the following:

- Force projection.
- Active and passive defenses.
- Global strike (nuclear, conventional, and nonlethal).
- Strategic communication.
2-9. Enabling means include the following:
- A global situational understanding.
- Mission command.
- A forward presence.
- Security cooperation and military integration and interoperability.
- Deterrence assessment, metrics, and experimentation.

2-10. CMSEs support the GCC, the theater special operations command (TSOC), and chief of mission (COM) by establishing CIM systems that enhance regional situational understanding, provide forward persistent presence, and provide continuity of security cooperation, integration, interoperability, and assessments.

**ARMY SUPPORT TO SECURITY COOPERATION**

2-11. The Army helps shape the international environment through security cooperation activities that enable our combatant commanders to assure our friends and contain our enemies through military
engagement with our partners, establishing trust, fostering mutual understanding, and helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves. Shaping the international environment diminishes regional tensions, enhances stability, and contributes to the security of the U.S. homeland. Therefore, as a common Army function, security cooperation is vital to American security interests.

2-12. Army forces also support the GCC plans to promote security cooperation within the context of The Military Support to Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept, which defines cooperative security as “the set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur. The military contribution to these efforts focuses on mobilizing cooperation and building relationships to enhance regional security.” The term security cooperation and its definition reflect an expanded view of actions described as shaping. Important objectives of these shaping efforts referred to as security cooperation also include advancing constructive security initiatives and building transnational capacity and capabilities in the region, as well as enabling and improving cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.

2-13. The interagency develops cooperative security through diplomacy well in advance of any crisis-precipitating event. Through cooperative security arrangements, a state of readiness exists to react to crisis instead of reacting immediately prior to the conduct of a significant joint military operation or in response to a developing crisis.

2-14. The CMSE supports the GCC, the TSOC, and the COM to pursue five objectives as a matter of regular active engagement on a range of security initiatives with the ultimate goal of a secure regional environment favorable to the United States and partner interests. The five objectives are to—

- Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region.
- Advance constructive security initiatives to include building transnational and HN capacity and capabilities in the region.
- Prevent the emergence of specific security threats (transnational and HN) in the region.
- Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.
- Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.

2-15. GCCs support cooperative security through theater security cooperation (TSC) as discussed earlier in Chapter 1. The GCCs use numerous defense assets to implement their TCP (the TCP is one plan within the GCCs family of plans). Defense assets can include defense attachés assigned to the AMEMB in specific countries and the security assistance office (SAO) assigned to each AMEMB. The TCP may also include the application of assets for short-duration events that support continuous engagements linked together to produce a continuous presence or persistent presence. An example of a defense source that promotes cooperation and defense interaction and interoperability is a forward-deployed naval asset that may be available to make friendly-port calls. Other assets may be the Marines that accompany naval forces or those Marines prepositioned as theater reserve forces. GCCs may access the continental United States (CONUS)-based forces for short-term exercises as part of their TCP. CONUS-based forces may be Regular Army or Reserve Component forces. Typical Reserve Component forces may include the Army National Guard or United States Army Reserve (see Appendix A).

2-16. CMSEs support cooperative security by merging the GCC, TSOC, and U.S. Ambassador objectives, which are achieved through TSC. CMSEs are able to sift through the myriad of interagency programs and objectives to link those that provide mutual interest and combine resources to achieve synergy.

2-17. CME supports security cooperation. Security cooperation is an indirect support category of FID. FID uses three integrated approaches to shape the operational environment. Those approaches are indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations. Civil-military operations (CMO) are direct support activities when executing FID. Figure 2-3, page 2-5, illustrates other activities associated with the three approaches to FID operations.
In the realm of unified land operations, there are offensive and defensive dimensions to CME. In the context of supporting TSC, CME is offensive in that it seeks to seize the initiative by using indirect approaches to shape the operational environment and maintain or achieve stability. These efforts prevail in the IW joint operating concept. Commanders must design their efforts to use an operational approach that best supports the IW joint operating concept while using variations of the indirect ways established in the support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction and cooperative security joint operating concepts. Figure 2-4 illustrates the unified land operations concept. All Army tasks are designed to support unified land operations in FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List.
OPERATIONAL APPROACH

2-19. The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. It is the commander’s visualization of how the operation should transform current conditions into the desired conditions at the end state—the way the commander wants the operational environment to look at the conclusion of operations. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem facing the JFC. Once the JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach as the operational environment, end state, or problem change (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0).

2-20. Commanders who use the Army design methodology may gain a greater understanding of their operational environments and the problems and visualize an appropriate operational approach. Operational art spans a continuum—from comprehensive strategic direction to concrete tactical actions. Bridging this continuum requires creative vision coupled with broad experience and knowledge. Without operational art, tactical actions devolve into a series of disconnected engagements that do not accomplish the mission or objectives of the joint force. Through operational art, commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations and ultimately into tactical tasks. Commanders then array forces and maneuver them to achieve a desired end state.

2-21. When participating in FID, commanders adopt different combinations of direct and indirect operational approaches:

- The direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. The most prevalent enemy center of gravity is typically its military structure. Centers of gravity are generally well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. In the case of the IW environment, the adversary’s center of gravity is the populace or the perceptions of the populace. This center of gravity is unassailable by traditional military means. Leaders must choose an indirect approach to affect the adversary until the adversary can be separated from the populace.

- The indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying instruments of power against a series of decisive points or in the case of CME civil vulnerabilities, while avoiding enemy strength or direct efforts against the enemy within the populace. As CMSE leaders and country teams frame the problem, they determine the appropriate combination of defeat or stability mechanisms to solve it. This begins a perpetual process that produces an Army design methodology aimed at achieving the desired operational and strategic effects. While conducting stability tasks in the IW, stability, security, transition, and reconstruction or cooperative security joint operating concepts, friendly forces seek primarily to influence governments and the populace while deterring the enemy. This contrasts with conventional warfare when military forces seek simply to defeat enemy forces. Figure 2-5, page 2-7, illustrates the balance between indirect CMO and direct combat operations.

2-22. IW is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. This broad form of conflict has insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), and unconventional warfare (UW) as the principal activities. Irregular forces are normally active in these conflicts. However, conventional forces may also be heavily involved, particularly in counterinsurgencies.

*To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.*

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 400 B.C.
2-23. IW differs from conventional operations in two ways. First, it is warfare among the populace. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power and establishing who wields that power. Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. The effective application of military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert their influence. Secondly, IW differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach. IW avoids direct military confrontations by combining irregular forces and indirect, unconventional methods (such as terrorism employed by the enemy) to subvert and exhaust an opponent. This is often the only practical means for a weaker enemy to engage a powerful military force. IW seeks to defeat an opponent’s will through steady attrition and constant low-level pressure. In some instances, IW targets the populace and avoids conventional forces. This approach either promotes stability or creates instability. It severely challenges civil authority to fulfill its primary responsibility—securing the populace. The approach required to prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular internal threats consists of an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, plans that are executed in concert with partners, and a clear assessment of the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. This approach requires countering adversary actions with, through, and by the HN governing body, which addresses the root cause of conflict by providing security, good governance, and economic development. Operating in the IW environment necessitates a logical sequencing of analysis and planning. Figure 2-6, pages 2-8 and 2-9, illustrates the IW joint operating concept logic used by planners and leaders in the IW operational environment.

2-24. SOF Soldiers conduct most IW operations. Sometimes conventional forces support them; other times SOF operate alone. However, if SOF and HN Soldiers cannot defeat unconventional and irregular internal threats, conventional Army forces may assume the lead role. Some of the relevant operations grouped under IW include the following:

- UW.
- FID.
- Stability tasks.
- COIN.
- Combating terrorism (CbT).
- IO.
- Military Information Support Operations (MISO).
Chapter 2

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

2-25. In terms of IW, UW is an operating technique used to subvert a standing government. The CME concept involves enabling a HN; therefore, CME is not implemented in conjunction with UW.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-26. FID is used to mitigate a partner government’s vulnerability to subversion, insurgency, and lawlessness, and terrorism. CME is best performed in the context of FID, and CbT. These efforts can prevent the emergence of insurgencies and the necessity of COIN operations or serve as a way to approach a COIN strategy. These efforts are mutually supporting. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. FID characteristics—

- May involve all instruments of national power.
- Can occur across the range of military operations.
- Support and influence a HN’s IDAD program.
- Include training, materiel, technical and organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical operations.

2-27. JP 3-05, Special Operations, defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”

2-28. FID involves all instruments of national power, consisting primarily of a series of programs that support HNs operating against or threatened by hostile elements. FID promotes regional stability by helping a HN respond to its people’s needs while maintaining security. Participating Army forces normally advise and assist HN forces while refraining from combat operations.

2-29. FID is a significant mission for selected ARSOF. However, it requires joint planning, preparation, and execution to integrate and focus the efforts of all Services and functional components. The President approves FID missions conducted in support of legitimate HN forces that are limited in scope and duration.

The Irregular Warfare (IW) Problem: Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminal networks, as well as states, present irregular threats that are not readily countered by military means alone. These threats—

- Are enmeshed in the population.
- Extend their reach and impact regionally and globally through use of communications, cyberspace, and technology.
- Compete with a host nation (HN) for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.
- Require long-term efforts to address the causes of violent conflict.

The Approach: To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the joint force must—

- Understand in depth.
- Plan and execute in concert with partners.
- Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem.

This approach requires balance between defeating the threats and enhancing a local partner’s legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the causes of conflict and building the partner’s ability to provide security, good governance, and economic development.

Figure 2-6. Irregular warfare joint operating concept logic
2-30. FID measures respond to emerging internal defense threats. Most FID activities help the HN prevent an insurgency from developing. CME contributes to FID programs by enabling HNs to defend against internal defense threats or VEOs, thus deterring support for VEOs and eroding support for their ideology. If an insurgency already exists or preventive measures fail, FID focuses on using HN security forces and other resources to eliminate, marginalize, or assimilate insurgent elements. The United States provides

**Figure 2-6. Irregular warfare joint operating concept logic (continued)**
military support to HN COIN efforts, recognizing that military power alone cannot achieve lasting success. \(\text{HN and U.S. actions promote a secure environment with programs that eliminate causes of insurgency or internal instability.} \)

Military support to a threatened government balances security with economic development to enhance or reestablish stability. Additional information on FID can be found in FM 3-05.2.

2-31. CMSEs may be involved in helping the HN and interagency develop a unified action plan to implement the three FID integrated approaches to shape the operational environment:

- Indirect support.
- Direct support (not involving combat operations).
- Combat operations.

**INDIRECT SUPPORT**

2-32. Indirect support emphasizes HN self-sufficiency. It builds strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. Examples include SA programs, multinational exercises, and exchange programs. Indirect support reinforces HN legitimacy and primacy in addressing internal problems by keeping U.S. military assistance inconspicuous.

**DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)**

2-33. Direct support uses U.S. forces to assist the HN civilian populace or military forces directly. Direct support includes operational planning assistance, CAO, intelligence and communications sharing, logistics, and training of local military forces in order to build partner capacity.

**COMBAT OPERATIONS**

2-34. CME rarely supports combat operations. In the IW environment, CMSEs rarely get to choose when and where combat may erupt because the CMO objective is prevention and stability not pursuit of adversaries or internal defense threats. Nonetheless, CME mitigates the effects of combat generated from terrorism or CT activity. Direct support may also involve limited combat operations, usually in self-defense.

**STABILITY TASKS**

2-35. Army forces conduct stability tasks to support stability, security, transition, and reconstruction conducted by the USG. JP 3-07, Stability Operations, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations, outline how joint and Army forces integrate to conduct stability tasks. Stability is achieved through the accomplishment of essential stability tasks (FM 3-07). CMSEs apply those lines of effort in the indirect approach and in conjunction with information or strategic communication objectives as discussed in this chapter. CMSEs integrate GCC and TSOC efforts with stability-oriented diplomatic and development efforts established by the AMEMB COM.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY**

2-36. COIN operations are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. In COIN, HN forces and their partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the HN government’s legitimacy and sovereignty.

2-37. Insurgents try to persuade the populace to accept the insurgents’ goals or force political change. When persuasion does not work, insurgents use other methods to achieve their goals. These methods may include intimidation, sabotage and subversion, propaganda, terror, and military pressure. Sometimes insurgents attempt to organize the populace into a mass movement. At a minimum, they aim to make effective HN governance impossible. Some insurgencies are transnational. Other situations involve multiple insurgencies occurring in an area at the same time. COIN becomes more complex in these situations.
2-38. While each insurgency is unique, similarities among them exist. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states with a lack of national cohesion or with weak, inefficient, unstable, or unpopular governments. Internal conflicts may be racial, cultural, religious, or ideological. Additional factors, such as corruption and external agitation, may also fuel an insurgency. Successful insurgencies develop unifying leadership and organization and an attractive vision of the future. Usually only insurgencies that are able to attract widespread, popular support pose a real threat to state authority.

2-39. Most COIN operations occur at the small-unit level—squad, platoon, or company. However, larger operations also occur, and a consistent, long-range plan is essential to defeat an insurgency. Commanders carefully assess the negative effects of violence on the populace. Strict adherence to the rules of engagement is essential. Operations should reflect and promote the HN government’s authority. These efforts undermine insurgent attempts to establish an alternative authority. Strict adherence to the rules of engagement also reduces the tendency of the population to view the units supporting HN COIN as an occupying force.

2-40. Larger units, such as brigades and divisions, provide direction and consistency to Army operations in their areas of operation (AOs). In addition, they may prioritize mass resources and forces to make operations more effective. Brigades and divisions possess the forces and capabilities to support the small units throughout the AO or populations against urban insurgencies. Additional information on COIN can be found in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations; and the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.

COMBATING TERRORISM

2-41. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, says that CbT remains an approach with both defensive and offensive components: antiterrorism (AT) is defensive and CT is offensive. An enemy who cannot defeat conventional Army forces may resort to terrorism. JP 3-07.2 describes terrorism as the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorist acts are generally the result of political, religious, or ideological beliefs. Terrorist attacks can create disproportionate effects on conventional forces, and their effect on societies can be even greater. Terrorist tactics may range from individual assassinations to employing weapons of mass destruction. CME focuses on enabling partners to combat terrorism by building partner capacity to deter and erode support for internal defense threats and VEOs among the populace.

ANTITERRORISM

2-42. JP 3-07.2 defines AT as “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces.” AT is a protection task. All forces should consider AT during all operations. CMSEs take the security measures necessary to accomplish the mission and protect their forces against terrorism. AT assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts, such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage-taking, and hijacking. DOD training of law enforcement personnel is significantly restricted by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act; however, awareness of and liaison with HN and USG law enforcement agencies can only improve those FID programs that involve CT training, exercises, or actions. CMSEs make every reasonable effort to minimize their forces’ vulnerability to violence and hostage-taking. CMSEs develop and execute measures to assist HN security forces to implement AT measures.

2-43. Typical AT actions include—

- Completing unit, installation, and populace threat and vulnerability assessments.
- Providing training to IPI in AT awareness in conjunction with DOS.
- Establishing standard operating procedures that promote AT measures.
- Ensuring that AT measures protect personnel, physical assets, information, the populace, and critical infrastructure.
- Establishing civil-military partnerships that enhance civil defense and HN reactions to natural or man-made disasters.
• Developing terrorist threat and incident response plans that include managing the threat condition system.
• Establishing appropriate policies based on the threat condition system.

COUNTERTERRORISM

2-44. JP 3-05 defines CT as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” CT actions include strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the United States and its territories. Although CT is a specified mission for selected SOF, conventional Army forces may also contribute. Commanders who employ conventional forces against terrorists are conducting offensive operations, not CT operations. CMSEs perform CT by providing indirect or direct support (noncombat operations) to deter, preempt, and prevent terrorism.

2-45. Additional information on CbT can be found in JP 3-07.2 and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. U.S. Ambassadors and country teams use the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism as their operational guide to build CT programs.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

2-46. CME is conducted in the joint interagency environment. JP 3-13, Information Operations, defines IO as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”

2-47. Much like CME, IO are carried out in the joint and interagency environment. Army forces support IO by inform and influence activities (IIA) and cyber electromagnetic activities. In the IW environment, actions are political and not military in nature. During IO in the joint interagency environment, the primary implementers of IO are public affairs (PA) and MISO. In all cases where CME is conducted, the IO lead is the AMEMB PA, which is supported by a task-organized Military Information Support team (MIST). CMSEs are an IO enabler by linking actions with messages.

2-48. CA elements are a supporting effort to IIA. The IIA staff entities and working groups (AMEMB, public affairs officer [PAO], TSOC or GCC PAO, a joint interagency task force [JIATF]) deconflict and synchronize IIA throughout the operations process to achieve unity of effort supporting the joint or Army force. As appropriate, IIA target or protect information, information transfer links, information gathering, information processing nodes, and the decisionmaking process through core, supporting, and related capabilities. CME operates in the net-centric realm. CIM is an information-based process. Based upon CIM products, CMSEs understand the perceptions of the populace and the civil information and media dissemination means, as well as potential exploitable information vulnerabilities.

2-49. The AMEMB PA and MIST establish the themes and messages and guide every action that is planned and executed to meet strategic operational objectives, which are oriented toward stability, diplomacy, and development. By conducting CAO on established stability-oriented lines of effort and linking them to the embassy message, CMSEs indirectly attack a VEO’s process for recruiting, radicalizing the populace, and proliferating their message.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2-50. Military commanders, U.S. COMs, country teams, interagency partners, lead federal agencies, HNs, international partners, and supported friendly nation counterparts use MISO across the range of military operations to support policy initiatives, public diplomacy, and military objectives and to shape the operational environment favorable to U.S. national objectives. MISO create conditions where military operations result in fewer friendly, civilian, and enemy casualties (when desired) and shortened engagements, thereby limiting the negative consequences of collateral damage. Importantly, by influencing and informing, MISO save lives and ultimately reduce suffering, undermine adversary objectives, increase
purpose and potency of U.S. military and interagency operations on the contemporary and future battlefield, and ease the transition to sustainable peace.

2-51. Commanders conduct IIA in all phases of military operations to amplify the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal engagements such as CME. Commanders have developed an appreciation for the physical and psychological effects that military activities have on populations. In the information age, synchronization of word and deed increasingly matter as the media and the Internet carry both across borders and boundaries, and emerging technologies and social media increase access at the individual level to the media. Accordingly, MISO offer commanders, interagency partners, and HN counterparts a means to inform and influence individuals and groups in ways that support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. CMSEs must coordinate all of their activities with MIS units operating in the same AO. MIS units may operate out of selected AMEMBs or attached to special operations units. MIS units are resourced, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct influence activities using means (for example, MISO, military deception, Soldier and leader engagement, other influence activities, and so on) to affect the behavior and decisions of select foreign target audiences or identity groups in ways desired to support both DOD and interagency partner objectives.
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Chapter 3
The Operational Environment

The operational environment is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. These aspects of the operational environment assist the development of the commander’s visualization and form his basis for development of the COP.

OVERVIEW

3-1. The GCC or TSOC identify conditions that cause a country to be considered a priority country (referred to by DOS as a focus country). Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency are the result of specific conditions within a nation. These conditions may stem from the population’s perception (often grounded to some degree in reality) that they are suffering from poverty, unemployment, religious disparity, political issues, crime, or tribal unrest that has been ignored or poorly dealt with by the HN government. These conditions have historically set the stage for lawlessness and insurgency against an established government. This type of internal strife or conflict within a nation’s borders may remain a local problem or expand, allowing an outside source to influence or create opposition toward the legitimate government. In some cases, outside sources may threaten the HN stability by exploiting the conditions within that nation to further their own cause. This outside influence may even establish itself within the HN to promote and support civil unrest. These types of conditions promote insurgencies and their violent methods, like terrorism (FM 3-05.2). A specific country can also be identified as a priority country based upon its strategic importance. In either case, the United States combines the efforts of multiple agencies to apply defense, diplomatic, and development efforts to resolve complex problems.

3-2. These conditions foster the implementation of FID, possibly as an integral component of COIN or CbT. CME is performed in a highly complex operational environment requiring extensive support to civil administration (SCA) and civil functional areas representing a system of systems within a governance structure. Within the scope of the CMSE’s operational environment, it is imperative to identify civil vulnerabilities or the causes of problems. The CMSE does this by extensively analyzing the civil component and identifying the specific needs of the HN to deter and erode support for internal defense threats. The emphasis should be on assisting the HN in addressing the causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to overt threats. CME, as well as all types of FID programs, such as foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and CbT, can prevent, reduce, or stop destabilizing factors that contribute to the beginning or the spread of terrorism, insurgencies, and other internal defense threats. CME applied against an incipient or mature internal defense threat and implemented through the geographic combatant command or TSOC may ultimately lead to stability within that nation or region and effectively reduce threats to the U.S. homeland. By conducting CME in a priority country, the CMSE may help shape conditions if combat operations become necessary. In addition, measures implemented with, through, and by the interagency and HN serve as a deterrent to the insurgency or popular support for other internal defense threats.

3-3. Efforts in support of FID, CbT, and COIN are designed within the operational environment to address the objectives of the NSS. These objectives are overarching and sometimes lofty. They include seemingly unapproachable objectives such as political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

3-4. CA elements usually support FID operations of other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, as well as SOF or conventional forces. When CA elements perform CME, direct use of military force is the
exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting interagency and HN efforts to mitigate problems through developmental assistance.

3-5. The key differentiating factor between FID and other operations is the involvement, engagement, and support of the HN government. When CME is performed in a priority country, the HN is primarily responsible for creating a stable atmosphere through the commitment and use of its internal resources. These internal resources are most commonly applied in conjunction with an IDAD plan. Under certain conditions, U.S. policy supports supplementing local efforts to maintain order and stability. These conditions are as follows:

- The internal disorder is of such a nature as to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests.
- The priority country is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.
- The priority country requests U.S. assistance.

3-6. The USG applies significant resources to build the capacity and capability of allied and friendly nations. There are numerous benefits gleaned by the U.S. military from conducting CME throughout the world. CME—

- Helps to foster and build favorable relationships that promote U.S. interests.
- Leads to the establishment of personal and unit relationships, which promote operational and strategic access.
- Builds the capacity of friendly nations, which ultimately strengthens U.S. security interests and HN governing viability and sovereignty.
- Improves U.S. forces’ regional knowledge of specific areas (environmental, geographical, social, political, economic, cultural, and spiritual), which can be disseminated throughout the force.
- Supports indirect lines of effort directed at CbT.

3-7. The USG’s efforts may directly support a HN IDAD plan or a combination of national or supporting interagency plans used to obtain U.S. national security objectives while supporting the HN internal instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic).

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-8. CME is inherently CAO conducted in support of stability tasks as defined in FM 3-07. When implementing FID, COIN, or CbT operations, nations often look to other nations for assistance in maintaining, establishing, or reestablishing stability. Nations seek assistance to prevent instability or further the professionalism within their military, which can stave off internal threats. The United States has historically promoted democracy and freedom by assisting other nations to seek solutions for improving the stability within their borders. Due to the stability-oriented nature of FID, there is significant relevance to the military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations joint operating concept. As illustrated in the publication, JFCs at all levels strive to support operations along stability-oriented lines of effort. By implementing variations of stability-oriented lines of effort, the JFC’s ultimate aim is to strengthen the HNs internal instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic), which form the FID framework. Figure 3-1, page 3-3, illustrates FID activities used to advance national instruments of power.

3-9. CMSEs must consider all instruments of national power and how those instruments produce the concept of operation for CME, as well as FID. FID fits into this framework as the primary effort under the military instrument of national power. The overarching effort of CME is FID, which supports COIN and CbT. The National Security Council is responsible for providing FID guidance at the strategic level. The DOS is normally designated as the lead agency for the execution of FID programs up to the point that the President authorizes combat operations. Military assistance is often required to provide a secure environment to accomplish the goals of a HN. DOD provides personnel and equipment to help achieve FID objectives.
The Operational Environment

3-10. Supporting FID requirements and the identified needs of a HN is a compilation of strategic guidance such as the NSS, NDS, NMS, joint plans, and GCC’s developed plans and integrated military activities. These plans are based on U.S. policies developed with friends, allies, and HNs. These strategic commitments may lead to enhanced security, greater cooperation, and stronger alliances with the nations involved. Commitments to other nations based on providing more secure environments lead to various programs to help build or enhance the HN IDAD program or provide assistance in other areas. Military involvement in FID activities can range from supporting military civic action (MCA) and conducting FHA to providing training for CbT.

3-11. FID is a powerful tool within the operational concept and within the range of programs using all instruments of national power. Mission success through the interagency effort that supports the HN’s IDAD strategy involves the successful integration of all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments and resources in concert. The drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate, and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population intensify. Without a countervailing force to break this cycle, these developments can eventually destabilize the interlinked political, economic, and social systems that make up the fabric of a society. Within this setting, the joint force must be able to establish a safe, secure environment and simultaneously work with interagency, coalition, multinational, and HN partners to support the establishment of effective governance and civilian control. CMSE planners use mission-dependent variations of the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction major mission elements to help establish lines of effort applied in an IW environment, across an operationally designed campaign plan.

3-12. Figure 3-2, page 3-4, depicts the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction major mission elements. CMSE leaders can use these major mission elements or variations thereof to deter and erode support for VEOs, as well as enable partners to counter VEOs.
3-13. Stability lines of effort help address operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (PMESII-PT), as depicted in ADP 3-0. The stability major mission elements depicted in Figure 3-2 are addressed in a modified campaign construct or CME-modified campaign construct as depicted in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and illustrated in Figures 3-3 and 3-4, pages 3-5 and 3-6.

3-14. Although FID and stability tasks can occur throughout the range of military operations, CME, relative to FID, and stability usually occur within the context of cooperative security, deterrence, and IW joint operating concepts. Planners must coordinate operations with the interagency as necessary to successfully perform CME in these environments.

**RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TYPES OF OPERATIONS**

3-15. The desired strategic end state of FID is a HN that can provide effective governance and stability within its borders, defeat terrorist elements seeking to operate within the region, and possess the requisite conditions to allow long-term economic growth. By using CME, a more narrow focus of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to prevent or counter internal defense threats through an indirect approach aimed at civil vulnerabilities within the operational environment is achieved. CME is employed to enhance HN capabilities at identifying and addressing internal threats or civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the internal defense threats. Ultimately, FID and CME efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment, thus eliminating the need to seize the initiative or dominate the environment within the traditional campaign construct. FID is among the operations within the IW architecture; however, FID may simultaneously be conducted with operations outside of the IW architecture, and it is one of the most
prevailing IW subset operations. FID takes place in an arena that invariably includes NA and may also include greater or lesser degress of operations, such as support to COIN, CT, peace operations, DOD support to counterdrug operations, and FHA. These categories may include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against internal defense threats. FID programs are distinct and vary from country to country in support of a country’s IDAD program.

**Figure 3-3. Traditional campaign construct**

3-16. In light of the complexities of future operational environments, the U.S. military may predominately, if not exclusively, be involved in limited conflicts (albeit accented with some instances of combat operations). Undoubtedly, FID will be intertwined with other operations.

**THE INTERAGENCY**

3-17. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines interagency as “of or pertaining to USG agencies and departments, including the DOD.” The interagency encompasses all the agencies in the executive branch of the USG. Executive branch agencies of government include the—

- Department of State.
- Department of the Treasury.
- Department of Justice.
- Department of Homeland Security.
- Department of Defense.
- Department of Energy.
- Department of Agriculture.
- Department of Commerce.
- Department of Transportation.
- Department of Education.
- Department of the Interior.
- Department of Health and Human Services.

![Figure 3-4. Modified civil-military campaign approach](image)

### Figure 3-4. Modified civil-military campaign approach
3-18. The interagency includes all the subordinate organizations within the agencies (for example, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and so on). Some members of the interagency play a more active role than others in terms of their ability and scope of activity as it applies to diplomacy, defense, and development. It is the network of service providers that perform governance and defense of the United States. To facilitate interagency coordination, USSOCOM has established an interagency task force to help support the nation’s effort to counter VEOs. Figure 3-5, page 3-8, shows the participants in the USSOCOM interagency task force.

3-19. JP 1-02 defines interagency coordination as “within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective.”

3-20. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, is the DOD encyclopedia for civil-military coordination, and it provides an in-depth examination of the interagency, as well as IGOs and NGOs that DOD personnel may work with.

3-21. Within the interagency, all department heads are of equal status (for example, the Secretary of State is not an overseer to the Secretary of Defense or vice versa). However, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, directs that the DOS assume the lead in terms of coordinating the disparate activities of the interagency abroad.

JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUPS
AT THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

3-22. In March 2002, the National Security Council established a limited coordination capability at each GCC. Joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) were originally created to establish direct contact between GCCs and interagency partners, specifically to enhance the CT efforts. Initially the Department of the Treasury, DOS, and the Department of Justice were able to fund positions at each GCC. No two JIACGs are alike. Each GCC organizes and uses its JIACG differently. Generally, leadership of the JIACGs has been driven by the GCCs. The GCCs generally are still focused on CT and counternarcotics (CNs); however, the role of the JIACG is expanding as JIACGs are supported at other unified commands, as well as GCCs. The Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Advanced Research Projects Center, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Missile Defense Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and National Reconnaissance Office have all participated or been directed to participate in various regional JIACGs.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES

3-23. One of DOD’s most important resources is its extensive top-to-bottom guidance and bottom-up planning capability. DOD has a lineage of plans that aid subordinates to operate within the higher command’s intent. In addition, this lineage of defense plans is accompanied by the lineage of diplomacy and development plans that guide the U.S. Ambassador’s and country team’s mission planning. Figure 3-6, page 3-9, illustrates the lineage or families of supporting plans. The CME serves as the nexus of planning for defense, diplomacy, and development in terms of achieving USSOCOM objectives in a given country. This lineage and the diverse family of plans are applied to the whole-of-government efforts to support CME planning and to achieve U.S. strategic objectives by synchronizing the resources of defense (Title 10 funding) and diplomacy and development (Title 22 funding).
INDIRECT AND DIRECT SUPPORT TO FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

3-24. DOD brings a multitude of joint, SOF, and conventional capabilities when supporting the HN’s IDAD programs through FID. DOD conducts activities under a variety of programs established in United States Code (USC) that are regulated under the auspices of both DOD and civilian agencies. Appendix B provides additional information on programs established in USC. All of these programs can be characterized as indirect support, direct support, or combat operations; however, U.S. forces may be simultaneously conducting some degree of all three forms of support at different locations and times in support of FID. The DOS regulates some of the programs discussed in the following paragraphs; these paragraphs discuss programs from the standpoint of tools available to the DOD. These programs should neither be construed as rights of the authority of the U.S. country team nor should they be construed as suggestions that only DOD-executed portions of these programs should contribute to the HN IDAD program.
INDIRECT SUPPORT

3-25. CME is in essence the apportionment of direct support assets to promote indirect support capability. Indirect support efforts emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on
building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The U.S. military contribution to this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and is provided primarily through SA. Indirect support is supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises.

3-26. Security cooperation involves DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. The DOD security cooperation guidance provides goals and activities for specific regions, directs the preparation of TSC strategies and implementation plans by the GCCs, and provides the overarching framework for many FID-related activities. Figure 3-7 illustrates how FID aligns programs and planning into a FID development process for the whole-of-government approach.

**Figure 3-7. Foreign internal defense development process**

**DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)**

3-27. Direct support efforts involve the use of U.S. forces (including CA forces) to provide direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. Direct support efforts differ from SA, which is DOS funded, compared to CME, which is DOD funded through the joint commands. In addition, direct support efforts do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment. When direct support includes training local military forces, it is distinguished from indirect support by the immediacy with which the
HN force uses their training operationally. In such cases, the HN unit may go directly from training to combat or potential combat situations. Typically, such training represents the validation of HN units that are already in a high state of readiness. Direct support efforts are normally conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle them. Assistance usually focuses on CAO and CMO (primarily the provision of services to the IPI [at the local level], communications, intelligence sharing, and logistics support). In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be warranted.

3-28. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, defines CMO as “activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.” CMO not only supports a COIN program but also can enhance all FID programs. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to address causes of instability in a reconstructive manner after conflict or in support of disaster relief, consequence management, civil defense, counterdrug, and AT activities.

3-29. JP 3-57 defines CAO as “actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.” CAO serve as a critical link between U.S. forces providing support in a HN and the HN government, military force, and civilian population. In FID, CA facilitates the integration of U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation. CA tasks that provide integration and support to the HN are FHA and SCA.

3-30. The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in substantial damage to or loss of property. FHA may be implemented in conjunction with NA, which may include humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) or support to MCA. U.S. forces provide FHA that is limited in scope and duration. FHA programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

3-31. HCA is implemented to assist the HN IPI in conjunction with U.S. military operations. CMSEs engage in direct HCA. HCA is integrated into the overall FID program to enhance the stability of the GCC’s AOR, as well as to improve the readiness of U.S. forces deployed in the theater. HCA efforts performed by CMSEs are carefully aimed at mitigating causes of conflict by supporting defeat or stability mechanisms, such as civic action directly affecting civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by internal defense threats.

3-32. MCA is another defeat and stability mechanism supported by CME planners. MCA is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. These activities may involve U.S. supervision and advice, but normally the local military conducts them. MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program or IDAD. MCA assists the local government with developing capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population. MCA also builds or strengthens ties between the HN military and the civilian population. MCA may mitigate and eventually, when coupled with other activities, eliminate ill will and mistrust toward the HN military. CME support to MCA should also be aimed at causes of instability, with the desired effect of deterring or eroding support for internal defense threats.

3-33. U.S. military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats. When organizing, planning, and executing military training support to a FID program, it is essential that the U.S. forces conducting FID operations place emphasis on supporting the IDAD program. This emphasis helps the HN address the causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to threats. Historically, U.S. military involvement in FID has often been focused on COIN. Increasingly, however, U.S. FID programs may also aim at other threats to a HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, corruption, human rights abuses, drug and human
trafficking, and terrorism. Many of these threats are increasingly intertwined. For instance, whereas the typical Communist insurgency disdained illicit drugs (at least officially) modern internal defense threats feel little if any compunction to avoid this or any other criminal endeavor that furthers its aim. Religious extremism increasingly blurs the line between terrorism and insurgency. It is useful, however, to maintain a distinction between that part of FID that is CT and the part that is COIN. For example, it may be highly counterproductive to the MISO effort to characterize insurgents who do not engage in terrorism or who are citizens of the HN as terrorists. U.S. military training, therefore, should focus on the specific internal defense threats present.

3-34. During FID operations, it is imperative to recognize that COIN operations or relevant COIN techniques may represent a large or even a preponderance of FID efforts. The likelihood is high that some sort of ideologically based insurgency remains a perennial FID focus in the future. In addition, insurgents and other internal defense threats may employ the same tactics and techniques against the HN, to include classic insurgency methods or terrorism. In terms of operational focus, it is irrelevant if an internal defense threat is a true insurgent or is, for instance, a narcoterrorist group using political rhetoric to foster recruitment and gain legitimacy. The focus of such FID operations may be a mix of CNs operations and COIN techniques to separate an internal defense threat from their base of support in the populace. Increasingly, internal defense threats of all types attempt to employ religious or political rhetoric to further their standing or promulgate fear in the HN, and sometimes even more importantly, in the United States, and among third parties. Typically, this has been done through the regional and global media. In this case, it is irrelevant if the internal defense threat is actually ideologically based or simply disingenuously using religious or political rhetoric to further their aims. Internal defense threats can, in effect, become legitimate if sufficient media exposure elicits a broad perception of legitimacy or the perception of the internal defense threat achieving the victory. Therefore, a fundamental ethos of COIN remains a constant in FID, namely, denying an internal defense threat popular support through a balance of lethal and nonlethal interdiction, as well as measures directed at garnering the support of the populace for the HN.

3-35. The characterization of an operation, as primarily FID with COIN elements, is the province of the overall military commander and/or the country team. In an operation where there is significant U.S. military support committed for the interdiction of internal defense threats, major U.S. interests are typically of a higher priority with more at stake. As such, the decision to characterize an operation as COIN usually rests at the highest levels of the USG, up to and including the President. FID is a highly complex operation requiring the use of multiple coordination channels. Figure 3-8, page 3-13, depicts the complex coordinating lines used between the country team and other participating entities involved in executing FID programs.

3-36. The CMSE operates inside the country team to leverage the objectives of the DOD and CCDR. JFCs and Soldiers must recognize the potential political implications of inadvertently characterizing internal defense threats as insurgents. Such a categorization limits the means by which threats can be interdicted by the DOD, interagency, HN, and allies. Leveraging the objectives of the DOD and the combatant commander can be a challenge, when at the tactical and operational levels that interdiction is accomplished through COIN techniques. Commanders combine various COIN, CT, CN, and other techniques on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis on one or another subset of IW techniques employed in FID is influenced by the conditions in the HN and the amount of resources available to combat an internal defense threat. Commanders prioritize FID operations based on the threat, which may evolve or devolve quickly. Comprehensive FID plans anticipate this change and respond to it proactively by adjusting the balance of COIN, CT, or other techniques.

3-37. CME can be defensive in nature. By conducting operations with and through the HN, CME serves to strengthen the defensive posture of HN security forces and civil administration in support of a greater IDAD plan. CME builds partner capacity in good governance. CMSEs support the AMEMB internal SAO with direct support (not involving combat operations). These activities can include CAO and CMO, training and exercise coordination, and civil information integration into the JIPOE. Figure 3-9, page 3-14, depicts how these activities support one another.

3-38. In FID, CA facilitates the integration of U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation. JP 3-57 provides additional information on CA support to FID.
3-39. Based on agreements mutually concluded between nations, NA refers to civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war. FHA is conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions; with programs conducted specifically to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Most often, NA is an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission. The two major differences between NA and FHA are short-term versus long-term activities and funding. Funding authorization for both NA and FHA is obtained through Title 10, USC. Figure 3-10, page 3-14, provides a view of the various sections of Title 10, USC, that support NA and FHA.

3-40. In some cases, CMSEs may be able to access other types of funding, such as funding that originates through the DOS. All DOS funding originates from Title 22, USC, which is discussed later in this chapter.
Note: Section 166a, Title 10, USC provides the CCDRs with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct both NA and humanitarian operations and activities. The statute specifically lists HCA as an authorized activity. Under certain conditions, this authority is also used to fund MCA projects.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESOURCES

3-41. DOS conducts foreign policy engagement on behalf of the President. DOS is organized into various liaison groups, directorates, agencies, and bureaus. DOS organizes its bureaus similar to GCCs, with each covering an AOR in terms of diplomatic engagement. Because of the diplomatic division of responsibilities, GCCs are compelled to coordinate with multiple bureaus and AMEMBs. Figure 3-11 depicts the resources of the DOS.

WASHINGTON LIAISON GROUP

3-42. The Washington Liaison Group is an interagency committee or joint monitoring body chaired by the DOS with representation from the DOD. It was established to coordinate the preparation and implementation of plans for evacuation of U.S. citizens abroad during emergencies. This group is chaired by a representative of the DOS. Members of the group include representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other military departments. The DOS invites other USG departments and agencies to participate as appropriate. The Washington Liaison Group is also responsible
for coordinating the planning and implementation of broader DOS and DOD plans, such as the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for acquired immune deficiency syndrome relief.

REGIONAL LIAISON GROUPS

3-43. DOS, which is responsible for formulating foreign policy, is organized with six regional bureaus (African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs) depicted in Figure 3-12, page 3-17. Regional liaison groups are joint monitoring and coordinating bodies established by the DOS. The regional liaison groups are chaired by that agency’s political advisors to the GCCs, with representation from the DOD. Regional liaison groups ensure that embassies (or posts) and GCCs coordinate noncombatant evacuation operations planning. They provide advice and guidance to diplomatic and consulate posts and military commands in their areas by—

- Providing liaison between the Washington Liaison Group and the AMEMB.
- Ensuring coordination exists between the various AMEMBs and military commands.
- Assisting AMEMBs and commands with planning for evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in case of emergency.
- Reviewing emergency action plans and forwarding them to the DOS along with comments and recommendations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S BUREAU OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS

3-44. The Bureau of International Information Programs communicates with foreign populations, including opinion-makers and youth, about U.S. policy, society, and values. The bureau engages foreign populations through speaker programs, print outreach, and the World Wide Web in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Persian, Russian, and Spanish. The bureau also provides policy and technical support for official embassy Web sites. It develops social networking, such as public diplomacy 2.0, which is a DOS outreach tool.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S BUREAU OF CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

3-45. The DOS initiative for stabilizing conflict is the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), which has replaced the previous established office of reconstruction and stabilization. The complex crisis fund operated by USAID, Office for Transition Initiatives, supports the CSO. Though an office of the DOS, it is staffed by interagency partners from the DOS, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of the Treasury.

3-46. In addition to responding to reconstruction and stabilization tasks, the office is further responsible for conflict prevention planning and mitigation for the USG. There are numerous staff elements within the CSO from various functional areas of the DOS. Two of the most relevant to CA are the Civil Response Corps (CRC) and the humanitarian information unit (HIU).

Civilian Response Corps

3-47. The CRC was conceived in NSPD 44 and authorized in fiscal year (FY) 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The CRC is intended to provide the DOS and the CSO a capacity for civilian response operations. The DOS organizes, manages, trains, and deploys the interagency CRC to effectively increase civilian capacity of the USG for responding and providing civilian subject-matter experts across a wide range of functional specialties. The CRC has an “Active” and “Standby” component, with the active members made up of 250 civilian specialists ready to deploy within 48 hours of activation. The DOS has designed a process to identify, recruit, and train CRC individuals.
The mission of the HIU is to serve as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information critical to the USG decisionmakers and partners. HIUs prepare for and respond to humanitarian emergencies worldwide and promote the best practices for humanitarian information management. The HIU accomplishes its mission by performing the following tasks:

- Identifying key sources of geospatial and geo-referenced data best suited to meet the information requirements of HIU consumers.
- Collecting timely, verifiable, and relevant data by using an extensive network of information partnerships.
- Analyzing data by using multiagency expertise and applying proven technologies to determine significant trends and relationships.
- Disseminating information of value to all levels of consumers, from national-level policymakers to operational field managers.
3-49. The HIU is part of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and receives oversight from a USG interagency executive steering committee. Its staff is composed of personnel from the DOS, USAID, DOD, and the National-Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3-50. The USAID is a subagency of the DOS and, as such, is the development implementer within the defense, diplomacy, and development effort. To advance democracy worldwide, the USAID nurtures democratic openings in places that are not free, encourages democratic progress where it is being made, helps restart progress where it has stalled, and contributes to the foundations of democratic order in countries emerging from conflict. Although many countries are in need of assistance, the USAID focuses first on countries of strategic importance to the United States. The USAID also supports countries where commitment to the democratic progress is strong and assistance is most likely to be effective. As regional progress is monitored, the USAID responds swiftly to aid reformers, support democratic transitions, and assist countries in consolidating democracy. The USAID is the USG’s lead agency in providing international development assistance. The USAID focuses on reconstruction and stabilization efforts, as well as other areas of international assistance and development. It is quite familiar to U.S. military personnel and CA Soldiers after years of interaction throughout stability tasks, and it is represented in the CSO as an interagency partner. The USAID often uses partner organizations such as contractors or NGOs as implementing partners. Some USAID activities include—

- Providing assistance in areas of technical assistance and capacity-building, scholarships, food aid and disaster relief, infrastructure construction, small-enterprise loans, budget support, enterprise funds, and credit guarantees.
- Promoting or facilitating reconstruction projects and the necessary financing, which is important for the CA staff involved in the implementation of project management to be aware of, synchronized with, and coordinated through the USAID to the greatest extent. With proper coordination, USAID funding can become an important leveraging tool.
- Implementing certain programs and policies that require autonomy or independence from military operations. Military personnel must be cognizant of and respectful of such operations.

3-51. Figure 3-13, page 3-19, shows how the USAID is organized. The USAID’s regional representation is aligned with the DOS regional bureaus.

AMERICAN EMBASSY, COUNTRY TEAM, AND SUPPORT TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

3-52. The DOS leads implementation of the USG foreign policy. When conducting CME, U.S. CA forces operate closely with the interagency, and integration occurs within AMEMBs abroad.

EMBASSY ORGANIZATION

3-53. The COM is always the Ambassador, if present, and is the ranking U.S. official in the country. He is directly responsible to the President. In the absence of the Ambassador, the deputy COM becomes the chargé d’affaires. The administrative officer is often the third in command in the embassy hierarchy. Figure 3-14, page 3-20, shows the country team concept.

3-54. In a small post with no security officer assigned, the administrative officer assumes the functions of the security officer and has operational control of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment if assigned. The administrative officer is responsible for the embassy communications unit.
3-55. The general services officer has many of the same functions as a J-4 or S-4. The general services officer is normally responsible for all buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance. The chief of the consular section is responsible for many functions relating to U.S. personnel and is an appropriate point of contact for the J-2/S-2 and J-3/S-3. Consular officers are, in general, responsible for the welfare of all U.S. citizens visiting and residing in their country and for knowing their whereabouts and maintaining an estimated count.

**United States Defense Attaché Office and the Security Assistance Organization**

3-56. The United States defense attaché office (USDAO) and the SAO are called by various names, such as the Office of Defense Cooperation, the SAO, and the military group. The name of the office is largely governed by the preference of the HN. The USDAO and the SAO are key military sources of information for interagency coordination in foreign countries. The Chief, SAO, may be the senior military person at the embassy, and he maintains liaison with the HN’s military forces. He is authorized by law to perform specific military functions with the HN military that are barred to all other embassy staff members. The USDAO is an office of Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The U.S. defense attaché heads the defense attaché office in-country and is a member of the country team. The defense attaché is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the mission. The attachés serve as liaisons with their HN counterparts and are valuable sources of information for the COM and CCDR on the military affairs of the HN. The defense attaché may be accredited to more than one country. The Service attachés report to the COM, but they coordinate with and represent their respective military departments. The attachés assist in the FID program by exchanging information with the CCDR’s staff on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions and interagency coordination. Except for the MSG, all military personnel, even those not assigned to the embassy or under direct control of the COM, must coordinate their activities through the defense attaché.
The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the COM. The SAO oversees the provision of U.S. military assistance to the HN. The SAO—which may be comprised of a military assistance advisory group, another military activity, or an SA officer—operates under the direction of the COM but reports administratively to the CCDR and is operationally funded by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the SA program. The SAO also helps the country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is prohibited by law from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (for example, mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, and quality assurance teams). CMSEs may be embedded with the USDAO or SAO while operating in a given country.

The United States defense representative is normally the senior military official assigned to permanent duty at the U.S. mission. The United States defense representative is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country U.S. defense issues and activities that are not under the purview of the parent DOD components. The United States defense representative is also the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the GCC. Under the direction of the COM, the United States defense representative is responsible for coordinating administrative and security matters for all DOD elements assigned to the country, with the exception of those under the control of a CCDR.

The PAO is responsible for media relations and approves all media contacts. The PAO coordinates closely with other entities to ensure compliance with a strategic communications plan.

The DOS appoints a regional security officer (RSO) who is responsible for the security functions of AMEMBs and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO oversees the post security officer and the special security force.
3-61. The post security officer has general security duties at a specific embassy (or consulate). The post security officer is a special staff officer under the control of the administrative officer and exercises operational control over the MSGs assigned to the station. The special security force is comprised of DOS employees who respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the COM, deputy COM, and others as directed by the RSO.

3-62. The political officer is a foreign service officer who reports on political developments, negotiates with the host government, and represents views and policies of the USG to the HN. The political officer maintains regular contact with host government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of the host country, as well as third country diplomats. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.

3-63. The economic officer is a foreign service officer who analyzes and prepares reports, and advises appropriate embassy and DOS personnel on economic matters in the HN. Economic officers negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They also work in close contact with relief organizations.

3-64. The medical officer is the senior medical person who is able to respond to and set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical officer can also advise military forces on health threats and preventive medicine measures necessary before forces enter the country.

3-65. The MSG detachment has, at a minimum, a commander and five watch standers. The mission and duties of the MSG detachment missions include—

- Exercising access control and providing stationary guard coverage of the principal buildings.
- Conducting visual inspections of controlled access areas to detect possible physical or technical penetrations.
- Providing guards to DOS representatives and local protection to the COM’s (chargé d’affaires’) residence.
- Performing other duties required by circumstances requiring immediate action and as directed by the COM (chargé d’affaires) and the RSO or post security officer.
- Protecting the principal buildings as outlined in the mission emergency action plan or as directed by the COM (chargé d’affaires) and the RSO or post security officer.

3-66. The MSG detachment commander is normally a member of the emergency action committee. The emergency action committee is the interface between the DOS and DOD. Its mission is to brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation and protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain designated aliens. The emergency action committee normally consists of representatives of the USG and country team.

COUNTRY TEAM

3-67. The country team is the senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and is composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The unified effort is established to advance the objectives of the AMEMB’s mission performance plan and the National Diplomacy and Development Strategy, as well as the NSS.

The Country Team is not mentioned by name in any legal document and has no legal standing, nor are its composition or functions laid down anywhere in a formal document. It is essentially a creature and a creation of the Ambassador. One definition of the Country Team is: “Whatever group of United States Government officers a particular American ambassador chooses to select to assist him in meeting his responsibilities to coordinate official American activities in his country of assignment.”

Honorable John D. Jernegan
former United States Ambassador to Iraq

3-68. The primary function of the country team is to advise the COM on important developments in the country and help to ensure coordination of all U.S. efforts in that country. The country team is a council of senior officers, normally section heads, working under the COM’s direction to pool their skills and resources in the national interest of the United States. Some members of the country team may in fact be
members of the HN. The country team model makes possible rapid interagency consultations, actions, or recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. The organization of each country team varies, based on the COM’s desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs, and the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. The country team normally consists of the following members:

- Deputy COM.
- Consular officer.
- Chief of station.
- RSO.
- Political counselor.
- Commercial attaché.
- Agricultural attaché.
- Science officer.
- PAO.
- Administrative officer.
- Economics officer.
- Drug enforcement agency attaché.
- Director of the USAID.
- Director of the Peace Corps.
- Defense attaché.
- Chief SAO.

3-69. The President charges the COM with the responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities in the country to which he is accredited. The Secretary of State provides policy guidance to the COM. All military personnel in-country are under direct control of the Ambassador and must coordinate their activities with the COM, normally through the USDAO or SAO.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

3-70. The DOS, within the construct of the FID environment, strives to assist HNs with the implementation of an IDAD strategy. IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Collectively, threats that rise to levels with the potential to topple the HN’s government, economy, or even social structure and subsequently the nation’s internal security can be termed internal defense threats. The United States defines an internal defense threat as any person or organization that interferes with, disrupts, or damages the domestic, lawfully constituted economic, military, informational, or political institutions of a nation through illegal means or methods in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner (for example, criminals, vigilantes, terrorists, insurgents, or separatists). Nations formulate an IDAD strategy to combat and curtail internal defense threats. IDAD focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of the society. The HN has responsibility and control of the IDAD program. Development programs that are carefully planned, implemented, and properly publicized can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to insurgents or other internal defense threats. Security programs provide an atmosphere of peace within which development can take place.

3-71. The IDAD strategy is founded on the assumption that the HN is responsible for the development and execution of its own programs to prevent or defeat internal defense threats. The fundamental thrust of the IDAD strategy is toward preventing the escalation of internal conflict. Anticipating and defeating the threat posed by specific organizations and working to correct conditions that prompt violence are effective means of prevention. If subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, or terrorism occurs, the emphasis is to hold down the level of violence. The population must be mobilized to support and, when necessary, participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, the IDAD plan is an overall HN strategy for the prevention of these activities. If an insurgency or terrorism should develop, the IDAD plan supports implementation of COIN and CT activities.
3-72. FID operations contribute to the overall IDAD strategy of the HN. These operations are based on integrated military and civilian programs. FID operations are typically conducted jointly with or complementary to programs undertaken by the DOS and its agencies, such as the USAID. Because IDAD often puts civilian programs in the lead over military programs, FID operations such as medical civilian assistance programs can sometimes be viewed as cogs in the greater machinery that is the civilian lead effort. FID operations can be woven into the IDAD strategy. FID operations inherently support the HN, not only by enhancing the security but also by complimenting a myriad of civilian programs throughout the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic effort.

3-73. SA is a principal effort in FID performed in IW and deterrence operational environments. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies, as well as those of the military. Effective SA provides defense material, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. The express goal of the USC governing SA is the furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives by enhancing the ability of lesser-developed nations to remain secure from primarily external but also internal threats. Overall, only a portion of the SA effort encompasses FID, but that portion is a large part of the overall FID effort. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended) authorize the SA program. The program is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS.

3-74. The military component of SA, implemented by DOD in accordance with policies established by the DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program, international military education and training, foreign military sales, and peace operations. The DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations, a subset of peace operations, through a peacekeeping operations fund. These components, combined with the economic support fund and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act, are SA tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. DOS funding is governed primarily as Foreign Assistance under Title 22, USC. Development funding is limited to diplomatic and development efforts. Title 22, USC, governs all humanitarian assistance and HCA funding under DOS and USAID and may govern military sales to include DOS-approved training.

3-75. SA may be applied by DOS to assist HN defense efforts. As an informal participant in the SAO, CMSEs must be aware of SA efforts to evaluate measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) as they relate to those SA efforts that address defense vulnerabilities that may affect the populace. Figure 3-15, page 3-24, shows the relationship between SA and FID, and where CME rests within the comparison.

3-76. To implement the embassy’s mission performance plan (sometimes referred to as the mission strategic resource plan) in support of the HN IDAD, the embassy applies Title 22 funding to resource its activity. Title 22 is solely provided to DOS. Much of the funding is reallocated to the USAID to synchronize diplomacy and development efforts. Funds reallocated to the USAID are usually those funds distributed under Subchapter I, Title 22, USC. Generally, some funds are the domain of the AMEMB defense attaché. Funds redistributed for management by the defense attaché are usually allocated under Subchapter II, Title 22, USC.

3-77. Funding available for public diplomacy and development is authorized for expenditure under sections of Subchapter I, Title 22, USC. Appendix B depicts the relevant components of Title 22 funding to CME.
Figure 3-15. Relationship of security assistance and foreign internal defense
Chapter 4  
Civil-Military Engagement Program of Record

This chapter describes the CME concept. It further explains how CME is integrated into the operational environments described in the previous chapters.

OVERVIEW

4-1. The TSOC in support of the GCC plans, coordinates, requests, and manages the CME at the theater level. CME is a subset of NA. CME is synchronized with the GCC’s contingency and theater campaign plans, as well as the DOS mission strategic plan of the AMEMB in the HN where operations are conducted. CME is designed to identify and address critical civil vulnerabilities in undergoverned and ungoverned areas or high-threat environments.

4-2. CME operations are planned, prepared for, executed, and assessed by elements of assigned CA forces in the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). These forces, when deployed, are known as a CMSE. A CMSE is a task-organized CA force that conducts CME in a specified country or region. The CMSE is composed of a persistent-presence element of CA leaders and planners, and a presence-for-purpose element comprised of a CA team that may include enablers (for example, medical, engineer, and so on) who are task-organized for a specific time to execute a coordinated mission.

4-3. CME as a concept is depicted in Figure 4-1, page 4-2. CME is USSOCOM’s conceptual contribution, and it is part of the DOD’s strategy to build partner capacity in a preventive, population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments. The successful execution of CME operations addresses the causes or drivers of instability or popular grievances of the indigenous population that can be exploited by destabilizing elements within the operational environment to include violent extremists.

4-4. CME is designed to be preventive. While FID represents one of the primary operational activities associated with NA, CME supports a broader HN IDAD strategy by directly supporting the unified efforts of the AMEMB, country team, SAO, and HN government to counter violent extremism and to achieve self-sustainable stability.

4-5. CME uses the indirect approach, which focuses on both the adversary’s vulnerabilities and the vulnerabilities of the indigenous civil society. Through the use of targeted assessments and mission variable analysis (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations [METT-TC]), actions are planned and executed in coordination with interagency and HN partners to address these vulnerabilities. The adversary’s weaknesses are exploited, and threats to civil society are addressed, by building the HN’s capability and capacity to eliminate the causes or drivers of instability. The objective of these actions is to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate the vulnerabilities to the indigenous civil society.
4-6. CA core tasks are performed to mutually support security cooperation and FID with CME. CME assists the interagency and HN to address objectives within the areas of CA core tasks. The CA core tasks are all interrelated and mutually supporting within the FID environment. CA core tasks (established in FM 3-57) are depicted in Figure 4-2.

4-7. NA is performed by providing SCA and advising HN efforts on the implementation of populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, and development measures. In addition, CMSEs perform CIM to advance CME and HN IDAD efforts.
4-8. FHA may be performed in conjunction with contingency planning that is manifested after employment of CMSEs. FHA is planned and executed in conjunction with TSOC or GCC shaping and deterrence operations.

4-9. SCA is performed by conducting civil reconnaissance and CIM and then recommending MOEs and MOPs in relation to the IDAD or mission strategic plan. CMSEs also support PRC measures with recommendations for implementation, as well as instruments to enforce policies.

4-10. PRC measures are implemented with, through, and by the interagency and HN in support of the IDAD plan. PRC measures are implemented through HN policies and legislation, which alleviates the impact of civil vulnerabilities. PRC measures are used in support of contingency operations when FHA is necessary, or MCA must be supported in conjunction with consequence management.

4-11. During civil reconnaissance, CIM is performed through passive or active efforts of information collection. Civil reconnaissance may be performed to identify critical nodes and links within the civil domain. In addition, civil reconnaissance is performed to continuously monitor or evaluate MOEs or MOPs. The CIM process promotes greater awareness of population-centric atmospheric analysis and cultural awareness. The incremental building of civil information supports development of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the COP.

4-12. The civil component of the environment is analyzed to determine vulnerabilities that could invite internal threats. Threats are identified within the civil component and addressed in the HN IDAD plan to advance capacity to ward off such threats or close sovereign capability gaps. Civil societies are commonly structured and most easily analyzed along the lines of CA functional areas within which the populace lives and functions. Internal defense threats seek this environment to establish support networks that could manifest into the active or tacit support for their cause. By dissecting the society along the segments aligned with CA functional areas, a given society and operational environment can be effectively analyzed. Figure 4-3 depicts CA functional areas.
CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

4-13. CME implements ARSOF core activities at the operational and tactical levels as a subset of NA. NA is a core task of CAO, and CAO are an ARSOF core activity. CME can mutually support COIN operations, FID, CT, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, IO, and MISO.

4-14. ARSOF core activities include the following:

- Direct action.
- Special reconnaissance.
- UW.
- FID.
- CAO.
- CT.
- MISO.
- COIN.
- Security force assistance.

4-15. ARSOF secondary core activities include the following:

- IO.
- Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4-16. The ARSOF core activity of FID is only one component of a HN’s IDAD plan, programs, and goals. Although always an important (and frequently critical) part of a nation’s IDAD strategy, FID may be one of the smaller programs within the IDAD strategy in terms of funding, focus, facilities, and personnel. The effect of a successful FID program can be inversely proportional to the amount of resources expended on it. Equally true, however, is that an unsuccessful FID program may cause the failure of far larger and more intensive programs implemented through other instruments of national power. In nations in which the military has been the disproportional focus of national resources to the detriment of civilian institutions and development, the FID portion of the IDAD strategy and programs may be deliberately downsized.

4-17. CME is conducted in a FID or FID-like operational environment. CME operations are carried out in support of joint, multinational, and interagency effort. CA units are well-suited to conduct or support FID operations because they possess unique skills, and they are culturally attuned and language-proficient. FID is a legislatively directed activity for ARSOF under the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.
Chapter 5
Mission Planning and Execution

In planning and executing CME, leaders must take into consideration the entire operational environment and its impact on the adversary’s threat characteristics. The DOD officially defines an operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0). The operational environment is the synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the military problem. Today’s adversaries represent thinking, adaptive uncooperative actors that exploit conditions within the operational environment to achieve military or political objectives.

PLANNING

5-1. Within specific countries, conditions exist that represent a threat to stability and national security interests. CME is a combination of techniques that counter adversary actions, threat characteristics, or their techniques. These techniques have been developed and implemented to combat terrorism and promote stability in specified countries. The primary adversary activity that is countering CME is radicalization of the populace, as well as potential operatives. CME uses a whole-of-government approach to create unified actions to build partner capacity. CME analysis addresses causes of instability by planning and executing operations to defeat radicalization, deter support for VEOs, and erode support for their ideology. CME develops plans using an indirect approach for defeating the adversary’s strategy.

MISSION ANALYSIS

5-2. The mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available (includes interagency partners), time available (persistent engagement), and civilian considerations are analyzed in context with the deterrence, IW, and military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations joint operating concept. The most critical skill CMSEs bring to this complex operational environment is the ability to plan operations and support nonlethal campaigns to be carried out with or through other partners (TSOC, GCC, AMEMB, and HN). Complex problems require complex problem-solving methodologies (diplomatic, developmental, or defense plans) that must be leveraged by the application of resources that may or may not be at the direct disposal of the CMSE. Resourcing for tasks is critical for implementation of actions when approval is required from all parties before resources are applied.

PROBLEM SOLVING

5-3. A critical activity for any CME element is supporting SOF core tasks, CA core tasks, and conducting assessments of the civil component within the metrics of CA functional areas. CA functional areas are organized along the lines of civil sectors. CME is the supporting effort to the interagency and HN. The critical contribution of the CMSE to the civil-military team is mission analysis, Army design methodology, and tactical execution to aid in achieving strategic national and military objectives.

5-4. Techniques are developed in conjunction with mission-essential tasks, and CA elements are task-organized to perform CME. The elements analyze the lines of effort they are tasked to achieve, evaluate the inherent risks in the designated operational environment, and determine what tasks must be accomplished (along USSOCOM established lines of effort) to operate effectively in the environment.
Chapter 5

5-5. The operational environment can be hostile in terms of adversarial presence, attitudes of the populace, and competition for finite economic or environmental resources, as well as the physical environment. In assessing the risks inherent in the environment, CMSEs must be able to exert sufficient force necessary to protect its members, yet with situation dominance so that lethal measures are not necessary. The CMSE may constantly find itself at odds to protect its force, yet striving to attain the information needed to bring clarity to ambiguous local attitudes. It must balance these mission requirements while validating relevant information to maintain the JFC’s COP. Resolution of matters via lethal force may inevitably result in protection of the force, yet compromise the CME mission. The goal is to preserve the force while achieving effective CME.

Theater Strategic

5-6. At the strategic level, CMO focus is on larger and long-term global or regional issues such as reconstruction, economic development, and stability. CME leaders will—

- Conduct interagency and ministerial level coordination with civil administration through the country team.
- Identify desired “ends” or lines of effort within the USSOCOM family of plans.
- Support interagency diplomacy and development along lines of effort corresponding to stability tasks and major mission elements.
- Support HN IDAD plan.
- Support the country team.

Operational

5-7. At the operational level, the CMO’s focus is on immediate or near-term issues such as a health service infrastructure; the movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians; a police and security program; the building of a FN’s government legitimacy; the synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders; and the coordination, synchronization, and, where possible, integration of interagency, IGO, and NGO activities with military operations. CME leaders will—

- Support diplomatic and development efforts of the COM.
- Develop operations that support campaign plans, given the theater guidance, which translates theater strategy into operational concepts within resource constraints of the steady-state security environment, and when contemplated objectives exceed the scope of a single operation.
- Synchronize USSOCOM, GCC, and DOS, as well as HN objectives.
- Participate with interagency in Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) analysis.
- Develop a civil reconnaissance plan and contribute to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Conduct mission analysis, link, and nodal analysis and synchronize nonlethal indirect approach.
- Develop episodic branch and sequel mission sets that assess and mitigate civil vulnerabilities within a construct.
- Array, allocate, and group presence-for-purpose missions to achieve the desired end state.
- Perform CIM.
- Integrate civil information with the JIPOE.
- Participate in the joint operation planning process (JOPP) within a joint planning group.
- Synchronize campaign plan and episodic missions with strategic communications effort to deter or erode support for internal defense threats.

Tactical

5-8. Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. presence and operations among locals, while minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. These may include local security operations, processing and
movement of dislocated civilians, project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and
public health and welfare. CME leaders will—

- Conduct civil reconnaissance and key leader engagements to fulfill information requirements
  and build local relationships.
- Establish rapport with key leaders.
- Conduct assessment of the civil component using mission (METT-TC and areas, structures,
capabilities, organizations, people, and events [ASCOPE]) and operational variables
  (PMESII-PT).
- Conduct mission planning troop leading procedures (TLP) for tactical movement.
- Conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to implement episodic development
  objectives that mitigate civil vulnerabilities.
- Develop contingency plans to provide viable COAs to counter possible negative outcomes of
  operational missions.

5-9. The complexity of the CME operational environment is such that CMSEs must be prepared to defend
themselves with lethal force while maintaining a nonthreatening posture. This requires a disciplined state
of constant situational understanding and readiness. CMSEs must be able to move tactically by executing
individual and collective movement techniques in and among the populace. They must sometimes navigate
where a road appears rather subjective even when depicted on a map. CME leaders may have to navigate
among the interagency partners, country team, HN, and international community of partners engaged in
development and diplomacy. As such, they must communicate in terms of ideals, terminology, and
common goal processes normally associated with civilians and military officers of higher grades, titles, and
positions. To this end, CMSEs must have as much familiarity with the interagency community within
which they operate as it does the HN that it strives to enable.

COMPLEX PROBLEMS AND COMPLEX MISSIONS

5-10. Basic problem-solving techniques evolve from the “observe, orient, decide, and act” model. Army
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, describes the
myriad of planning processes used to solve tactical and operational problem sets. A problem exists when an
individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the
context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from
achieving their desired end state. Army problem solving is a systematic way to arrive at the “best” solution
to a problem. It applies at all echelons and includes the steps needed to develop well-reasoned, supportable
solutions. The goal is to prepare an unbiased solution or recommendation for the decisionmaker, based on
the facts. Figure 5-1, page 5-4, shows the seven-step problem-solving model. For CA, especially at the
tactical level, the first step is critical. As simple as that may seem, many planners fail during the first part of
the problem-solving process. Before a problem can be solved, it must be recognized and defined.

5-11. Leaders must identify the problem first and then ask why the situation exists. At the most basic level,
a problem is simply a difference between what is wanted and what is. From a historic perspective, looking
directly at this difference often leads to treating a “symptom” of the problem rather than the problem itself.
For example, the civilian populace needs to have enough to eat, but there is a food shortage. Hunger
becomes the obvious problem. However, simply giving people food does not necessarily solve the
problem. When the food supply has diminished, the populace will still be hungry unless you continue
giving them food. In this case, the real problem is identifying the reason the people are hungry. There may
not be enough food because there is a lack of water for irrigation, a lack of knowledge about agriculture, or
some other cause for the depletion of resources.
5-12. Recognizing and defining the problem is accomplished through framing the environment and the problem. CA planners are able to frame the environment. By framing problems after using the District Stability Framework (DSF) and ICAF, CA planners are able to define problems by their causes. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 provides additional information on understanding and managing complex problems by framing the problem using such tools as PMESII-PT, METT-TC (ASCOPE), and the art of the CA functional specialties.

5-13. Unified land operations demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts problem-solving and planning methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures the thinking of CMSE leaders while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. The Army uses four different but related problem-solving techniques to guide planning activities:

- Army problem-solving technique.
- TLP.
- MDMP.
- JOPP when in a joint arena.

Note: TLP extends the MDMP to the small-unit level. MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical; JOPP is similar but not identical to MDMP.

5-14. CA Soldiers also use the CA methodology to assess, evaluate, and execute CAO. The CMSE leader must possess Army, joint, and interagency operation planning skills, and with this knowledge the application of TLP is greatly enhanced and limited only by the lack of experience and the supported organization’s policies and standard operating procedures. In the whole-of-government and joint environments, CA planners use the JOPP in support of planning. When the CA planner applies TLP, MDMP, and JOPP, it is critical that planners grasp the utility of each, as well as CA doctrine, techniques, and force structure. Soldiers must also have a thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the civil sector within the operational environment.

5-15. CMSEs not only participate in, but also integrate multiple planning processes to conduct complex mission analysis and planning. CMSEs may be required to participate in contingency and crisis action planning using JOPP or participate in a joint planning group within the AMEMB, GCC, or TSOC. While participating in interagency conflict analysis, the CMSE contributes to the ICAF. For conflict analysis at the tactical level or, in some cases, at the operational level, CMSEs may participate with USAID in the DSF to identify subregional conflict dynamics. MDMP is mainly used when conducting local mission planning, with parent units, or internal to the CMSEs. Finally, when the CMSE is conducting tactical movement and civil reconnaissance in support of assessment or evaluation efforts, it will likely use a modified TLP.
5-16. As depicted in Table 5-1, the processes vary. In addition to these processes, CMSE leaders use the CA methodology as outlined in FM 3-57, which is applied by CA Soldiers at all three levels of war. Each level is designed to support the CMSE leaders’ ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations. CA methodology consists of assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition. CA forces know the first five steps together as AD3E. Chapter 4 of FM 3-57 expands the AD3E steps.

Table 5-1. Comparison of the Civil Affairs methodology and the various problem-solving and decisionmaking processes

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<td>Assess</td>
<td>Identify the Problem</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
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<td>Identify Facts and Assumptions</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
<td>Analyze Mission</td>
<td>Issue a Warning Order</td>
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<td>Decide</td>
<td>Generate Alternatives</td>
<td>Course of Action (COA) Development</td>
<td>Develop COAs</td>
<td>Make a Tentative Plan</td>
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<td>Analyze the Alternatives</td>
<td>COA Analysis</td>
<td>Analyze COAs</td>
<td>Start Necessary Movement</td>
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<td>Compare the Alternatives</td>
<td>COA Comparison</td>
<td>Compare COAs</td>
<td>Conduct a Preliminary or Initial Assessment</td>
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<td>Make a Decision</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
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<td>Develop Plan or Order</td>
<td>Produce Orders</td>
<td>Issue the Complete Order</td>
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<td>Develop and Detect</td>
<td>Execute the Decision</td>
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<td>Deliver</td>
<td>Execute the Decision</td>
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<td>Evaluate</td>
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5-17. Based on the enhanced knowledge of the complex operational environment, CMSEs combine the use of various problem-solving models, as well as the CA methodology to develop an operational approach. This operational approach enhances their ability to frame problems by their root cause, thus resulting in a clearer definition of the problem.

5-18. Persistent-presence elements ultimately derive their objectives from the USSOCOM or GCC family of plans, which are directly linked to the NSS, NDS, and NMS as illustrated in Chapter 2. These planning documents produce the defense objectives for a global region and can be used to extrapolate the objectives for specific priority countries. The NSS is synthesized by interagency partners, producing diplomacy and development objectives as depicted in Figure 3-6, page 3-9. The CMSEs employment implies that the country to which they are deploying is a priority country of the GCC. As such, the priority country is identified as one that is at risk or one that assists the GCC in obtaining strategic access, which promotes increased interest in ensuring the stability and development within its borders. Priority countries are engaged as partners in their own development. As such, the country teams apply defense, diplomacy and development measures assisting these nations in their own internal development within their internal instruments of national power as described in ADP 3-0.

5-19. The persistent-presence elements are employed to serve as the integrator of civil and military capability. They extend the reach of the country team to advance defense, diplomacy, and development objectives to ungoverned or undergoverned areas and synchronization of the development of population-centric, civil, and military efforts. CMSEs must therefore consider the objectives of DOS, USAID, international organizations, and the HN when developing its plan to provide SCA or enable the HN.
CIVIL-MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENTS

5-20. CMSEs are the primary means by which CME is carried out. CMSEs are small tactical elements that identify critical vulnerabilities and address strategic- and operational-level objectives in support of GCCs, TSOCs, U.S. Ambassadors, and HNs. The CMSE is a task-organized element from regionally oriented CA elements. Each CMSE consists of a persistent-presence element and presence-for-purpose element. Upon deployment, the CMSE is normally placed under operational control of the TSOC and provides direct support to the AMEMB within the country of employment. The CMSE may provide general support to other SOF organizations present in-country such as a special operations task force (special forces-centric) or a MIST (MISO-centric).

5-21. The persistent-presence element of the CMSE is comprised of between two and six CA leaders/planners that may be deployed for extended periods. This is the base element of the CMSE tasked to—

- Conduct CIM and develop the situation.
- Support IIA.
- Develop a CME plan that supports IDAD’s mission strategic resource plan or the TSOC family of plans and TSOC objectives.
- Develop a concept of operations and implement specific operations that support the campaign objectives.
- Support the interagency and HN synchronization, coordination, and approval of specific concept of operations.
- Conduct a limited civil reconnaissance and area assessment.

5-22. The presence-for-purpose element of the CMSE is comprised of a task-organized element of varying size based on a METT-TC analysis of an approved concept of operation. Presence-for-purpose elements engage in short duration missions designed to accomplish a specific purpose in conjunction with a CME plan. Several presence-for-purpose elements can be linked as coordinated by the persistent-presence element to achieve short-term objectives or contribute to shaping. The composition of a presence-for-purpose element can vary widely based upon the scope of its limited mission. Such elements could be regular Army or Reserve component CA teams conducting limited duration CAO or National Guard military police platoons that assist in police training. The task organization of the element may include additional enabler personnel or functional specialists identified by specific mission analysis. This element of the CMSE is tasked to—

- Support IO.
- Coordinate and integrate with interagencies.
- Conduct civil reconnaissance.
- Execute and evaluate CAO specific tasks.
- Evaluate MOPs and MOEs.
- Inform and influence partners and IPI.
- Enable HN.
- Address or mitigate civil vulnerabilities.

5-23. Essential tasks performed by the combined elements of the CMSE include—

- Conducting civil reconnaissance to extend the reach and awareness of interagency and IPI partners.
- Identifying and prioritizing country-specific centers of gravity and civil vulnerabilities in coordination with the AMEMB, HN IPI, and select IGO/NGO partners.
- Collecting, analyzing, and fusing civil component information to inform the COP of AMEMB, SOF elements, and indigenous or multinational partners.
- Developing country-specific plans, policies, programs, and projects to mitigate exploitable civil vulnerabilities and influence and inform key leaders and the populace.
Facilitating the implementation of DOS, USAID, and indigenous authorities’ country-specific policies, programs, and projects to address civil vulnerabilities and underlying conditions for support to VEOs.

Establishing priorities for CME, focusing on nonlethal targeting, and developing an action plan.

Developing defeat and stability mechanisms in the form of tasks, MOPs, and MOEs, and evaluating the impacts of CME and adjusting action plans as required.

Planning and conducting transition CME operations to the interagency, HN IPI, or other partners.

Identifying resources required to carry out tasks identified to mitigate exploitable civil vulnerabilities with, through, and by HN IPI.

Establishing CME plans and lines of effort supporting interagency and HN plans or GCC and TSOC country plans or as an enduring stand-alone stabilization strategy.

Supporting the COM and GCC contingency and crisis action planning in support of specific plans for noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster preparedness, and disaster assistance.

CIVIL-MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENTS
TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

5-24. While executing CME, CMSEs operating in an IW environment must maintain the highest state of discipline to operate effectively. CMSEs operate independently from the direct oversight of many higher headquarters’ constraints. The IW and FID environment is characterized by peace punctuated by high-risk events, and those events could emanate from a known adversary, the populace at large, or the physical environment. It is easy to become complacent in the IW and FID environment given that internal defense threats are often not readily visible. CMSE personnel are highly trained and self-confident, thus making teams vulnerable to a false sense of security, as they perceive their own dominance of a given situation. CMSE leaders can mitigate these internal vulnerabilities by considering every activity as a combat mission and culminating readiness preparations before tactical movements by relying on basic TLPs. A TLP may need modification to fulfill CME-specific requirements. Although TLP may seem rudimentary, CMSEs may be required to integrate civilians into mission performance activities (for example, instructing civilians to safely enter and exit a helicopter, back-briefing an exfiltration route, or rehearsing actions on an objective or during a key leader engagement). Adhering to TLP ensures that the ad hoc nature of civil-military teaming results in unity of effort at the tactical level.

5-25. TLP are a dynamic process used to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and adequately preparing their unit for an operation. TLP consist of eight nonrigid steps. Although some steps are accomplished independently, the majority of the steps are conducted concurrently, and many of the steps may be continued throughout the entire process.

5-26. TLP are a decisionmaking process for the small-unit level, such as company, team, element, or detachments. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. They are both linked by Army problem-solving, which is explained in ATTP 5-0.1. Essentially, Army commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP, but company-level and smaller units that lack formal staffs use TLP to plan and prepare for small-unit tactical operations. See Table 5-1, page 5-5, for a graphic comparison of the CA methodology between TLP, MDMP, and JOPP.

5-27. TLPs provide small-unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. Figure 5-2, page 5-8, depicts TLP along with key planning tasks. The box on the left side of the box shows the steps of TLP. The box on the right starts with the mission variables representing the initial METT-TC analysis that leaders conduct to develop an initial assessment. The initial assessment occurs in steps 1 and 2 of TLP and is refined in plan development. The box on the right depicts plan development tasks. Plan development occurs in step 3 and is completed in step 6 of TLP. These tasks are similar to the steps of the MDMP (see Table 5-1, page 5-5).
INTERAGENCY PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODOLOGIES

5-28. The interagency often uses planning processes that are different from Army methodologies. CMSEs must be familiar with these processes to understand how they work and how the product of these efforts can be integrated into Army planning processes.

INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

5-29. To prevent or resolve violent conflict abroad and to advance common or strategic goals, the USG uses tools and approaches to assure coordination of U.S. diplomatic, development, and defense efforts supporting local institutions and actors seeking to resolve disputes. The CSO, organized by DOS, uses several tools for establishing an integrated application of a whole-of-government approach to all stages of reconstruction and stabilization efforts. CSO experts work closely with the USAID and experts from the CSO Civil Response Corps who possess an in-depth understanding of conflict. They assist the USG efforts to prevent conflict and advance the strategic goals of the United States and the supported HN. CMSEs may contribute to this expertise if they have developed civil information into actionable objectives. Civil information dominance can lead to the shaping of interagency programs designed to address the causes of conflict. Conflict prevention as an explicit, integrated, and prioritized initiative is new to the way the United States promotes stability, and the CSO is working to leverage these tools and approaches into mitigating ongoing conflict.

5-30. The ICAF is designed to identify drivers of conflict and to ensure that all elements of U.S. national power have a common understanding of the causes of a violent conflict. The ICAF involves all relevant interagency partners to facilitate a deeper understanding of the conflict and stability dynamics in a region or country. Policy makers and planners alike increasingly see application of the ICAF as a critical first step.
in decisionmaking for states affected by or vulnerable to VEOs. DOS regional bureaus, U.S. missions overseas, USAID, and DOD have universally requested CSO’s assistance in applying the ICAF to priority countries.

5-31. The ICAF develops actions to mitigate the drivers of instability or conflict. The CSO applies a specialized planning framework that can be used for both conflict prevention and conflict transformation to integrate assessment and strategic planning across agencies in both Washington and the field. This whole-of-government assessment and planning process ensures that all instruments of national power share a common understanding of an environment and work toward common strategic objectives. As a result, resources are applied more efficiently toward desired outcomes, lessons learned are shared and applied, and assistance is targeted to mitigate drivers of conflict and to build local institutional capacity. Figure 5-3 illustrates the leading factors that cause conflict.

![Figure 5-3. Governing factors of conflict](image)

5-32. The CSO is funded through the complex crisis fund, managed by the USAID, Office for Transitions and Initiatives. Congress created this funding authority to support civilian-led, whole-of-government projects that address causes of instability or escalating violence in countries of critical relevance to U.S. national security or policy interests. In addition to funding the projects, the CSO has supported several embassies and their USAID missions in their design of an integrated approach to addressing the causes of instability. The ICAF consists of two major components: conflict diagnosis and segue planning.

**Conflict Diagnosis**

5-33. Conflict diagnosis delivers a product describing the context, core grievances, sources of resiliencies, drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and the opportunities and threats for increasing or decreasing conflict. The steps to conflict diagnosis are as follows:

- **Step 1.** Establish and evaluate the context of the conflict.
- **Step 2.** Understand core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience.
- **Step 3.** Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.
- **Step 4.** Describe opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.
Segue Planning

5-34. Segue planning is applied during crisis response, contingency planning, or stability tasks when the assessment leads to planning an interagency response. It is used collaboratively to map out existing USG (and international) efforts and programs, and lists them against a prioritized list of vulnerabilities, drivers and mitigating factors identified in the conflict diagnosis. It is not an evaluative tool for the utility of ongoing efforts, but U.S. agencies use the findings as the basis for planning and recommendations for the way ahead. The steps to segue planning are as follows:

- **Step 1.** Specify current USG activities. Identify the impact of these efforts on the drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, and vulnerabilities.
- **Step 2.** Identify and specify current efforts of non-USG actors. Identify the impact of these efforts on the drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, and vulnerabilities.
- **Step 3.** Identify the gaps that are not sufficiently addressed by existing efforts, within the drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, and vulnerabilities.
- **Step 4.** Specify challenges to addressing these gaps. List the stumbling blocks to success.
- **Step 5.** Describe risks associated with failure to address these gaps.
- **Step 6.** Describe opportunities to address gaps.

5-35. Steps 4 and 5 of segue planning represent the application of classic risk assessment methods in addressing challenges to success and identifying potential solutions and risk reduction methods. Step 6 would develop the recommendations to address the opportunities and the vulnerabilities identified in the conflict diagnosis.
5-36. As with many processes, USAID and DOS continue to refine processes and techniques. Although DSF has not been widely embraced outside of the central command’s AOR, coalition and interagency partners measure its efficacy in Afghanistan, where it is being widely used to identify and mitigate causes of instability. Essentially, DSF is the expansion of variables used to measure instability. During CME, rarely would the persistent-engagement element have the assets to analyze the local level to the extent necessary to apply DSF throughout an entire country. Priority districts need to be identified in order to perpetuate DSF within a given country.

5-37. DSF designs activities that specifically address instability at the local level. DSF activities should include criteria that monitor and evaluate the outputs that impact the overall stability of the AO. It is used in the assessment and evaluation phases of CA methodology.

5-38. The DSF supports unity of effort by promoting the establishment of interagency platforms or ad hoc civil-military teams for stability programming. These civil-military teams are a stability-focused, planning and coordination body ideally comprised of interagency civilians, multinational forces, HN IPI, IGOs, and NGOs. Civil-military teams hold regular coordination meetings to identify and address sources of instability within a local operational environment.

5-39. DSF is an iterative four-step process consisting of—

- **Situational Understanding.** DSF requires population-centric and stability-oriented awareness. To assist with gaining situational understanding, the framework consist of these focused steps:
  - Identify stability and instability factors and their relevance to the population using the operational variables of PMESII and the civil considerations of ASCOPE for a local operational environment.
  - Understand the cultural environment by determining cultural-specific dynamics that exist in the local environment. These dynamics may include traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, traditional authorities, limits to the traditional mechanisms, and how antigovernment elements exploit these dynamics.
  - Understand perception dynamics by determining priority issues (grievances) that are affecting the local population. Identify gaps in knowledge about a local operational environment and confirm or deny assumptions using multiple (available) sources and types of perception data.
  - Apply stability and instability dynamics by using gained situational understanding to further refine possible factors of instability, possible factors of stability (resiliencies), and determine what key actors (with the means and motivations to foster stability and instability) are present in the local area.

- **Analysis.** During analysis, the stability working group determines the source of instability within an operational environment and develops an objective statement to address the causes of instability. Stability working groups identify perceptive and systemic causes of the sources of instability, as well as predetermine the impact (also known as measures of effectiveness [MOE]) necessary to mitigate and/or end the systemic causes of instability. These MOEs should—
  - Identify the actual sources of instability for a local operational environment. Stability working groups screen possible factors of instability identified in DSF step one (situational understanding) to determine the actual sources of instability responsible for fostering instability in the area. Sources of instability are defined as local issues that meet the three stability criteria of decreasing support for the HN, increasing support for antigovernment elements, and disrupting the normal functioning of society.
  - Identify the perceived and systemic causes that contribute to the continuation or exploitation of a source of instability.
  - Develop an effect-oriented objective designed to orient stability working groups to the desired end state of diminishing the source of instability.
  - Determine impact indicators and the data sources. The stability working group identifies the impact (effect) required to see change in the environment as a result of diminishing each systemic cause.
Design. All activities identified through the DSF process are designed to target sources of instability by diminishing the systemic causes that contribute to the sources of instability. Activities are filtered against the three stability criteria and refined by applying common sense design principles, which should—

- Ensure sustainability by the local government or institutions.
- Facilitate local ownership.
- Consider the trade-offs between short-term and long-term impacts.
- Leverage/support other government agencies, IGO, NGOs, and HN programs.
- Fit the local political and cultural context.
- Strengthen governmental accountability and transparency.
- Provide flexibility.
- Ensure the ability of all partners to monitor activity completion and output indicators.
- Identify MOPs and data sources to monitor activity completion and output indicators.
- Filter possible activities against the three stability criteria that ask does the activity:
  - Increase support for the HN?
  - Decrease support for antigovernment elements?
  - Increase institutional and societal capacity and capability?
- Screen remaining activities against the seven design principles that ask if the activity:
  - Is sustainable by the local government and/or local institutions?
  - Promotes local ownership by putting local institution in the lead?
  - Fosters long-term versus short-term results?
  - Leverages support from other organizations?
  - Is politically and culturally appropriate?
  - Strengthens accountability and transparency?
  - Is flexible?
- Answer the question in the final step of design: “Do we have the required money, personnel, expertise, and time to realistically conduct the activity?”
- Identify output indicators (MOPs) that allow them to determine whether an activity is being completed as expected and when it is completed.
- Synchronize and prioritize identified activities by establishing a logical sequence for activities, coordination of activities along the lines of operation, and prioritize activities that address multiple causes of instability to maximize impact and minimize effort/cost.

Monitoring and Evaluation. Effective stability programming relies on the ability to understand and measure change in the stability environment with respect to specific sources of instability, as well as overall stability trends. The DSF looks at three different levels of monitoring and evaluation:

- Level 1, activity output, asks stability working groups to do some critical evaluation to determine—have your activities been completed? Are your activities being implemented successfully? Are there external factors affecting the implementation of your activities? Are your indicators measuring the appropriate outputs? If not, should you identify new indicators? Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, do you need new data sources?
- Level 2, impact, asks stability working groups to do some critical evaluation to determine; Are you seeing the intended impact/change in your environment?; Does this change represent progress towards the objective and a diminishment of a root cause?; How are external factors influencing and/or causing the changes you are observing?; Are the activities contributing to the expected impact and the overall objective? If not, consider alternative activities. Are your indicators measuring the impact appropriately? If not, consider adopting new indicators. Are your data sources providing the correct indicator data? If not, consider adopting new data sources and/or new means to collect them.
Level 3, **overall stability**, looks at monitoring and evaluating overall stability effects in a local operational environment to determine if programming against identified sources of instability as a whole is having a stabilizing effect. Measuring the change in overall stability is a key component of the DSF process. By identifying and measuring a common basket of stability-focused indicators, it is possible to track the change in stability for a given district by identifying and measuring locally focused overall stability indicators. The overall stability indicators are not linked to activities but to societal norms and behavioral points in the local environment. When aggregated, the stability indicators can provide a measurement of overall changes in stability over time for a given district.

5-40. The DSF information collected and analyzed can help identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust civil-military programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict in that area. The DSF integrated with military plans is a key element in taking a comprehensive approach of designing programs in unstable environments. This information is integrated into a synchronized CA running estimate. MOPs and MOEs are then identified to support operations. The information gathered from the DSF contributes to the CMSE’s—

- Situation paragraph in the CAO running estimate.
- MOPs in the execution of Annex G, CAO (if published).
- CA or interagency contributions to the JIPOE.
- Creation of a CME plan supporting HN IDAD or interagency development plans.
- Prioritization of humanitarian assistance, civic action, face-to-face engagements, or SCA that supports interagency stabilization efforts or mutually supporting plans.

**MUTUALLY SUPPORTING INTERAGENCY PLANS**

5-41. Identification of mutually supporting plans is critical to the achievement of success using the indirect approach. Identification of mutually supporting plans leads to the synchronization of various resources that different entities possess, and the combination of these resources can accomplish the desired end state. This in turn leads to unity of effort and use of the expertise that dwells within different interagency organizations.

5-42. Among the interagency, DOS is the first among equals and DOS is tasked to be the coordinating entity among the interagency in accordance with NSPD 44. In addition, DOS is usually the arbiter in terms of appropriate SA and security cooperation that may be provided in a country regardless of funding authority.

5-43. AMEMBs develop mission performance plans or mission strategic plans, which are designed to advance the effectiveness of the U.S. mission. In addition, embassy staffs may be participating with HN IPI to advance a HN IDAD plan.

5-44. Generally, USAID produces a country-specific development plan, which is generally addressed in the AMEMB mission performance plans or mission strategic plans by the country team. These plans encourage HNs to develop their own internal development plans.

**COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING**

5-45. CME involves the integration into a civil-military team. In some cases, the integration is comprised of specialists, potentially operating as a country team, JIATF, or JIACG to work with civilian and military agencies of affected HN governments. Team members interact persistently with the HN to provide support, advice, technical assistance, education, and training. Team members do not normally engage in direct activity against an internal threat, insurgency, or VEO. Through the civil-military team, they may help develop an IDAD plan in consultation with or adoption by the HN, and they become a conduit for international community assistance. The most critical skill that the CMSE brings to the civil-military team is planning and execution capability.
### CME in Complex Operations

In early 2009, USAID officials and CA Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion (A) combined efforts to develop situational understanding and continual enhancement of the COP. Their combined efforts were directed at identifying and mitigating key drivers of instability that affected Yemeni governorates, districts, and communities and their population.

The issues creating instability in the Republic of Yemen Government are manifold. The al-Houthi conflict in the north has resulted in six violent, often-protracted, sectarian conflicts within the Republic of Yemen Government. In addition, the Southern Mobility Movement threatens the unity of the country due to the emergence of opposing separatist political parties that if successful, would leave the vast majority of resources being located in the governorates that once constituted Southern Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to grow within undergoverned areas of the country and threatens not only the United States but also increasingly has become a threat to the Republic of Yemen Government.

In early 2010, USAID officials, along with CMSE and MIST personnel, began analyzing the complex nature of the issues plaguing Yemen to identify the causes of conflict and the most-effective means to mitigate these civil vulnerabilities. As a result of that analysis, the civil-military team subsequently formed a weekly interagency coordination meeting intended to synchronize ongoing projects, enhance the COP, and promote unity by leveraging the country team assets, as well as the assets of Special Operations Command-Central (Forward) against the causes of instability. This coordination effort grew to include representatives from nearly every element of the country team, such as the Force Protection Detachment, Public Diplomacy, Political Economic, Political Military, and the defense attaché. The civil-military team developed a common definition of stability for Yemen, identified the key drivers of instability in selected governorates, and agreed on common objectives and effects that could be measured and would likely indicate movement toward a more stable environment. Some of the effects for the targeted governorates included—

- Increased stability within vulnerable areas subject to extremism.
- Increased tribal confidence and trust in the government.
- Increased U.S. influence allowing for effective development.
- Increased support for U.S. activities by the Republic of Yemen Government.
- Improved civil information processes contributing to a better understanding of the COP.
- Increased employment and economic opportunities for underrepresented demographics of Yemenis.
- Increased basic social services for Yemeni people.

These effects were deliberately broad to allow each element of the coordinating body to be included in the nonlethal targeting effort. This procedure afforded divergent entities to transition from individual projects to projects that included as many other participants as possible. A project that once may have included only the CMSE would now be accomplished in partnership with USAID Office of Transition Initiative, the Force Protection Detachment would provide security, and the Public Diplomacy Office would provide reports.

(continued on the next page)
As the ad hoc civil-military team began to synchronize and complement one another’s projects, unity of action developed and common matrices were jointly monitored. USAID contracted with implementing partners to conduct monitoring and evaluation of their contracted activities. As other elements synchronized their projects with the USAID, the effects or indicators of these projects could also be measured and reported. The monitoring and evaluation implementer developed an online project database with geospatial capability so that each element could enter project data into a common database. The database created better visibility among the participants and increased synchronization.

The CME efforts helped to reinforce HN legitimacy and increase the benefit of existing relationships. Although USAID is the primary coordination conduit with the Republic of Yemen Government Ministries, the CMSE has been successful in developing a CA capacity with the HN military. This whole-of-government approach significantly increased the COP for all elements involved by providing a common platform for sharing information. Each element also shared the Yemeni personnel relationships they developed, which improved the effectiveness for each element for common assistance.

STRATEGIC LINES OF EFFORT

5-46. Varying entities such as the TSOC, GCC, and USAID may have diverging interests and objectives. CMSEs integrate and synchronize the divergent interests and objectives within identified strategic lines of effort. Through synchronization and integration, these lines of effort are mutually beneficial and contribute equitably to the interests of all entities.

5-47. The various problem-solving methodologies are advanced and supported by using the CA methodology as established in FM 3-57. CMSEs use the various problem-solving methodologies to—

- Increase their awareness of the operational environment and design the best operations, programs, and projects to advance the commander’s lines of effort.
- Conduct operations at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.
- Assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate (commonly referred to as AD3E).
- Establish a process creating unified action for defense, development, and diplomacy objectives.

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

5-48. CME is conducted in the joint interagency environment. IO is an integral part of conducting CME operations. The ultimate targets of IO are human. Systems, networks, and a myriad of electronics assist the decisionmaking process and aid in the attainment of information superiority, but ultimately, both the cognition and the will of the human mind direct an adversary’s efforts. Cognition can be reduced by degrading or eliminating systems, but the human will remains. An adversary, at least on the localized level, may have a greater will to resist when denied information than when provided with information. Figure 5-5, page 5-16, illustrates how the United States and adversaries engage one another in IO.
Much like CME, IO are carried out in the joint and interagency environment. CME supports effective IO, which are carried out through effective diplomacy and development to shape the opinions of varying population groups through messages and actions:

- **Priority Country.** The fundamental influence aim in CME is to build confidence in the government while diminishing the credibility and influence of VEOs. All physical actions and information messaging should support this aim.

- **Neighboring Countries.** VEOs may depend on safe havens in countries adjacent to the supported nation. Sanctuary may be given willingly or may be beyond control of the neighboring government. Even in nondemocratic nations and ungoverned spaces, there may be requirements to influence the populace in these areas.

- **Diaspora Communities.** Diaspora communities can play a significant role in supporting or opposing insurgencies. Positive influence on the diaspora abroad is a benefit in the priority country. Clean separation of messages to these various populations is rarely possible, and within the information environment, a high degree of coordination is required to tailor and synchronize messages to different audiences without contradiction.

*Note:* Diaspora is any scattering of people with a common origin, background, beliefs, and so forth.

**Figure 5-5. Information operations capabilities**

ADP 3-0 identifies four mission command staff tasks:

- Conduct the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess).
- Conduct knowledge management and information management.
- Conduct IIA.
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities.

In the Army’s construct of four primary staff tasks, the concentration is on all audiences within the information environment—friendly, neutral, adversarial, and enemy—and cyber electromagnetic activities.

CA elements are a supporting effort to IIA. The IIA staff entities and working groups (AMEMB PAO, TSOC or GCC PAO, JIATFs) deconflict and synchronize IIA throughout the operations process to achieve unity of effort supporting the joint or Army force. As appropriate, IIA target or protect information, information-transfer links, information-gathering and information-processing nodes, and the
decisionmaking process through core, supporting, and related capabilities. CME operates in the net-centric realm. CIM is an information-based process. Based upon CIM products, CMSEs understand the perceptions of the populace, civil information, and media dissemination means, as well as potential exploitable information vulnerabilities through CIM.

**INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES**

5-53. Army units support IO at the joint level by conducting IIA. IIA must cascade down from a set of strategic narratives from which all messages and actions should be derived. Messages and actions must address ideological, social, cultural, political, economic, and religious motivations that influence or engender a sense of common interest and identity among the affected population and international stakeholders. Army units should also counter VEO ideology to undermine their motivation and deny them popular tacit and active support. In doing so, the HN should seek to expose the tensions in motivation (between different ideologies or between ideology and self-interest) that exist across the VEO network. Figure 5-6, page 5-18, depicts inform and influence tasks.

5-54. To enhance the legitimacy of the HN, messages aimed at their populace should be closely coordinated with and ideally delivered by their own officials. Themes and messages should be simple and memorable and must resonate with the populace. This requires detailed understanding of the information and operational environment that must be continually updated. Detailed target audience analysis is required for each separate population group, and reliable MOEs must be sought to assess the success of messages and recalibrated, if necessary.

5-55. Messages are delivered partly through various public media but, also more prolifically and often more credibly, through the thousands of daily interactions between the population, the HN government, and its security forces. Every action in the CME operational environment sends a message, which means that words and deeds must be synchronized. Messages must be grounded in truth and reflect the experience of the populace in its interaction with the government.

5-56. CAO supports IIA, which facilitates mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between the civilian populace and the overall force. CA forces must maintain their credibility with the civilian populace and avoid the perception that their operations are directly related to the IIA they support. CAO and CMO can create conditions that contribute to information dominance by enabling HN network capability and facilitating an in-depth understanding of the environment among the interagency and HN.

5-57. CMSEs support or conduct IIA as their preeminent effort within the indirect approach. The CMSE lines of effort (enable, deter, and erode) are all IIA. Enabling HN to counter VEOs is the result of informing the HN civil administration with CIM products and influencing them to organize, resource, and execute to CbT. CMSEs deter active and tacit support for VEOs and erode support for their ideology or beliefs by indirectly informing the populace of political alternatives to VEOs and their ideology and beliefs through the implementation of projects, programs, and operations in the physical dimension. In addition, CMSEs deter active and tacit support for VEOs and erode support for VEO ideology by diverting support toward other causes of mitigating exploitable grievances. IIA requires CA, MISO, and intelligence support for effective targeting and assessment. ARSOF units may generate significant portions of IIA-relevant information requirements. Conversely, the answers to the commander’s IIA-related CCIRs may require tasking the CMSE to fill information gaps and reconnaissance needs among the civil component. CMSEs coordinate closely with the MIST and the AMEMB PAO for target audience analysis information requirements, as well as for conformance to PAO and MISO strategic communication themes.
Inform and Influence Activities

**Components:**
- Public Affairs
- Military Information Support Operations
- Combat Camera
- Soldier and Leader Engagements

**Task:** Conduct inform and influence activities that integrate themes and messages with action to support operations.

**Purpose:** To inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences.

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**Inform**

- **Task:** Conduct inform activities.
- **Purpose:** To educate domestic and friendly foreign audiences so they can make informed judgments about U.S. operations.

**Influence**

- **Task:** Conduct influence activities.
- **Purpose:** To develop relationships with friendly, neutral, and multinational partners to encourage them to support U.S. efforts.
- To influence adversaries and enemies to cease hostile operations or disruptive actions in order to obtain an operational advantage.

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**Figure 5-6. Inform and influence tasks**

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**CIVIL-MILITARY SUPPORT ELEMENT SUPPORT IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

5-58. CMSEs collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information using any medium or form. These processes may be stand-alone processes or subprocesses that, taken together, comprise a larger system or systems and processes. Information-based processes may be found throughout the range of military operations and among the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Information-based processes are included in all systems and components thereof that require facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form to perform designated functions or provide anticipated services. CME can only be successful if CMSE-generated information is proliferated such that interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and HN entities can access and act upon critical information within the dimensions of the information environment.

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**THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

5-59. The information environment is organized into three dimensions:

- Physical dimension.
- Informational dimension.
- Cognitive dimension.
5-60. If CMSE leaders believe that their efforts cannot succeed in influencing a nation, then they will fail. The CMSE must build a plan that convinces the GCC, TSOC, and interagency that it can influence the priority nation and its populace. The CMSE must design campaigns linked by smaller operations to change popular perceptions over time. Figure 5-7 illustrates the information environment.

![Figure 5-7. The information environment](image)

5-61. Popular perceptions are shaped by the cultures, division of subcultures, and countercultures within a society. These perceptions are shaped by the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions (Table 5-2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal demographics</td>
<td>Physical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Physical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal norms, values, and laws</td>
<td>Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal grievances or elements of radicalization</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers of conflict</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Physical Dimension**

5-62. The physical dimension is composed of mission command systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace domains. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. Physical dimension includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure and, consequently, the HN informational instrument of power has traditionally been measured primarily in the physical dimension. The HN must prevail against VEOs when the United States conducts CME. Within the physical dimension, information nodes and infrastructure support CME. The embassy’s
PAO is the information node through which any strategic communication should be conveyed. Within the AMEMB, the TSOC may also be supporting the COM with a MIST. The CMSE and the MIST must coordinate closely to synchronize the words and deeds of the embassies. CMSEs leverage the information within the information dimension and apply physical solutions that enhance information superiority.

**Informational Dimension**

5-63. The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the mission command of modern military forces is communicated and where the commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, the informational dimension must be protected. CMSEs obtain their mission objectives from GCC, TSOC, and interagency guidance. CMSEs strive to enable the HN through support of the HN IDAD plan within the constraints of their mission guidance. Through civil reconnaissance and CIM, CMSEs seek to assess, evaluate, and inform the GCC, TSOC, interagency, and HN on what specific civil vulnerabilities exist that may be exploited by extremists or other internal threats. VEOs use the GIG to perform command and control of its elements and to recruit, train, and sustain its force. The actions that the populace observes of U.S. forces alter their perception in the cognitive dimension. When appropriate, CMSEs may develop or recommend nonlethal solutions in the physical dimension, including electronic warfare and EM activities to counter VEO ideology or their command and control.

**Cognitive Dimension**

5-64. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decisionmaker and the target audience. This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. When conducting CME, it is the most important of the three dimensions. This dimension is also affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other personal motivations. Campaigns can be won or lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors affecting the cognitive dimension include—

- Leadership.
- Morale.
- Unit cohesion.
- Emotion.
- State of mind.
- Level of training.
- Experience.
- Ethnocentrism.
- Situational understanding.
- Public opinion.
- Perceptions.
- Media.
- Public information.
- Rumors.

**Civil-Military Engagement Support to Information Lines of Effort**

5-65. CMSEs support IO by influencing and enabling IPI to internally deter and erode support for VEOs and their ideologies. Enabling the IPI occurs in the physical and informational dimensions. Deterring and eroding occurs in the informational and cognitive dimension with reinforcement from the physical dimension. VEOs exploit civil vulnerabilities when conditions or perceptions are set that motivate even small segments of the populace to use or support violent action to change their conditions.

5-66. Enabling the IPI to counter VEOs occurs in the physical dimension. The IPI is dependent on the infrastructure to develop its own mission command and information dissemination capability. Enabling the HN IPI to affect the information dimension is dependent on the HN’s governing vision for a better future, the ability to secure the populace, and the ability to shape cultural norms, mores, values, and perceptions.
5-67. In keeping with the information objectives to deter and erode active and tacit support for VEOs, CMSEs must identify tasks with MOEs and MOPs that—

- Shape the perceptions and behavior of the populace (including extremists).
- Delegitimize the ideology of extremists.
- Promote changes in extremist organizational leadership.
- Subvert the VEO’s techniques and strategy.

EXPLOITING SOCIETAL FISSURES

5-68. Societies can be divided by cultures, subcultures, and countercultures. Globally, societal differences are distinguished by diverse cultures.

5-69. Subcultures are groups of people within a culture that are different from the larger culture in terms of beliefs, ethnicity, or race. Counterculture is also a subculture, but it is characterized by opposition to the dominant culture. Subcultures change the social dynamic and require CA forces to anticipate the needs of each subculture and identify reactions to CAO. The difference between a subculture and a counterculture is a matter of collective perception. Within cultures and subcultures, the populace can be divided into numerous groups based upon their cognitive perceptions. These groups are called identity groups. Identity groups unite around a collectively held core grievance. A core grievance is the perception by a group in a society that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests, or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions. Examples of identity groups include—

- Government (local, provincial, national).
- Supporters of the government.
- Apathetic masses.
- Criminals.
- Tribal groups.
- The wealthy.
- The poor.
- Religious extremists.
- Political extremists.

5-70. Identification of radicalized identity groups and their core grievances is the first step toward developing campaigns linked by tasks or operations that successively erode and deter support for VEOs. CMSE planners must plan and execute tasks in the physical and informational dimension that shape the popular perceptions (cognitive dimension). CMSE planners, in conjunction with the HN and interagency, identify societal and institutional sources of resilience that help determine how to prioritize CME informational or physical efforts.

5-71. Societal demographics may include—

- Religious communities.
- Ethnically polarized communities (tribe/race).
- Diverse communities.
- Youth bulge.
- Rural/agrarian communities.
- Urban/commercial communities.
- Nomadic communities.
- Economically polarized communities (poor/middle class/wealthy).
- Government.

5-72. Societal norms, mores, and laws influence popular perceptions. Norms, mores, and laws are shaped by family, tradition, religion, or political beliefs and codified standards of conduct. Assessing HN popular perceptions is necessary for successful support in the information environment. CME relies on a thorough understanding of the information environment to prepare the operational environment. The information...
environment includes HN popular perceptions, target audience analysis, and cultural analysis. GCCs and
the interagency require support from the international community, the HN, and NGOs to continually assess
HN popular perceptions. Popular perceptions are monitored and analyzed through civil reconnaissance
such as key leader engagements, polling, and canvassing.

THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS

5-73. VEOs conduct operations in the population-centric operational environment. They seek acceptance
from the populace for their political message. VEOs depend upon their ability to motivate segments of the
populace to conduct violent acts that promote the attention or achievement of their political message. VEOs
use terrorism as a tactic to carry out their operations. There are very few physical rewards in being a
terrorist. The ability for VEOs to sustain their ranks is fundamental to achieving their internal force
generation requirements. Radicalization is a deliberate process that is carried out in the physical,
informational, and cognitive dimensions; it is highly dependent on an individual’s self-actualization and
identification with the ideology of the VEO. VEOs motivate candidates through coercion, seduction,
dereemption, salvation, guilt, or a combination of all of these activities.

5-74. The radicalization process exploits grievances or elements of radicalization that include—
- Governance and justice.
- Economic stability.
- Religious and political ideologies.
- Education and public information.

5-75. Government action or inaction can alter perceptions and expectations of the populace that establish it
as an element of radicalization. Governance can become a primary cause of radicalization when it fails to
perform functions that establish or maintain its own sovereignty or contradict the societal view of mores,
norms, and values. Such actions include alienation of segments of the population through repression,
discrimination, or inequality (political or economic). Government action may inspire radicalization through
a methodical education or indoctrination process.

5-76. Many developing nations are governed by self-selected leaders and their supporters who had the will
to defeat opposition elements through a combination of majority rule and force. These governing bodies
have developed their own authority, perhaps without the support of some segments of the populace. The
U.S. or international community may recognize the sovereignty of these countries in spite of their lack of
internal legitimacy. Inevitably, governments that maintain legitimacy and sovereignty do so through
consent of the populace. The populace consents when most segments of society are incorporated into the
body politic and governing institutions. They maintain legitimacy when they are perceived by the populace
to make policies conducive to the populace without foreign influence or perceived elites. Governments
preserve their legitimacy by enforcing policies that promote justice and economic development for all
segments of society, not necessarily just the majority or affluent. Civil vulnerabilities manifest when justice
and economic systems are not developed or fail to operate in a manner that supports the greater populace to
benefit the elite. Solutions to civil vulnerabilities can be found in promoting representative government,
public safety through the rule of law, and provision of basic human needs.

5-77. Economic deprivation is a significant supporting element of radicalization. In some cases, the lack of
basic human needs (food, water, clothing, shelter, safety) is an economically destabilizing factor that can
be exploited by extremist organizations or other internal threats (criminals or corrupt government officials).
Criminal elements can co-opt ideological causes when doing so promotes their interests and facilitates their
ability to traffic in illicit trade, such as narcotics, weapons, natural resources, or humans. Socioeconomic
stratification can also create vulnerabilities when societal elements perceive that the stratification is a result
of injustice. Economic vulnerabilities can be mitigated by implementing development programs that
provide humanitarian assistance, civil infrastructure, public safety, and security, which in turn promote
economic activity and growth. Promotion of such programs must be performed publically without any U.S.
notoriety. When conducting CME, the populace must see that it is the HN government’s vision (and not
that of the United States) that counters the economic vision provided by extremist ideologies. Social factors
such as urbanization and youth bulge can create economic conditions that leave segments of society
vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Solutions to economic deprivation can be found by establishing programs and projects that promote resource development through economic civil functional areas such as agriculture, manufacturing, natural resources, financial sectors, and land reform.

5-78. Religious and political ideologies are the leading radicalization elements. Both can be separate or integrated in that both inspire actions based upon beliefs. Beliefs are shaped by societal norms, values, and laws, as well as perceived grievances. Religious and political beliefs can be promoted separately or in combination, but they are the galvanizing feature of any radicalization effort in support of extremist ideology. Belief systems or ideologies that diverge from western political, economic, and social values are not by themselves extremist. Ideologically driven individuals and groups use grievances as justification to advance their beliefs in such a way that their political and economic vision to govern society can be carried out. Grievances are civil vulnerabilities that are exacerbated to the point that they motivate followers or segments of the populace to adopt extremist beliefs and advance their beliefs through violent means. VEOs typically promote an ideology opposed to representative government, free speech, and free trade. They use coercion, intimidation, and terror as political tools to promote instability in any type of government and justice system. When governmental and judicial systems are subverted, economic systems also fail. When religion is promoted in conjunction with political ideologies, extremists appeal to the human condition in the present (physical dimension), as well as the “hereafter” (cognitive dimension). When religious and political extremism are combined, the motivating grievances can be resilient. To attack the ideological cause is to also tear at the fabric of societal belief systems. Inevitably, individuals and groups who advance violent extremist ideologies are defeated by destroying their capability but, more importantly, by eliminating their ideological support from the populace.

SHAPING TECHNIQUES

5-79. CMSEs use defeat mechanisms to shape extremist ideologies before extremists can undergo a radicalization process. These defeat mechanisms are by their nature preventive. There are five defeat mechanisms for shaping religious and political extremist ideologies:

- Moderating the ideology.
- Isolating demographically.
- Blocking the message.
- Marginalizing spoilers.
- Disrupting recruitment.

MODERATING THE IDEOLOGY

5-80. To moderate the religious or political violent extremist ideology, members of that specific demographic political or religious identity group or subculture must present alternative views and interpretations from within the same ideology. In other words, clergy members from within the extremist religious/political subculture must become the advocates for moderation. Clergy members or political leaders who support HN government moderation efforts become vulnerable to attack if perceived by VEOs as being effective in their moderating efforts. Moderation from within is the most effective yet least reliable defeat mechanism. VEOs typically target moderating voices as spoilers to their objectives. Moderators are subject to radicalization.

ISOLATING DEMOGRAPHICALLY

5-81. To isolate the spread of a religious or political violent extremist ideology, demographics must support isolation efforts. In societies where differing religious sects exist, alternatives to extremist ideologies can be exploited and the more moderate alternatives can be supported through civic action and IIA, thus enhancing the standing of moderate clergy members. Clergy that do not support moderation are discredited through IIA. Fissures in political factions (nationalist, socialist, Bathist, communist, and so forth) can also be exploited and, likewise, political moderates can be supported through civic action and IIA.
5-82. Where demographic vulnerabilities reveal a diversity of religious or political views, civic action and IIA can support minority subcultures, countercultures, and identity groups that can make their beliefs more widely tolerated and accepted. In addition, religious identity groups expand their belief systems primarily among nonaligned populations, thus isolating extremist ideologies through proliferation of moderate or alternative religious/political competitors.

**Blocking the Message**

5-83. VEOs use physical as well as information infrastructure to advance support for their ideology and command and control capability. Examples of infrastructure could include schools, places of worship, social venues (teahouse), radio stations, television stations, and newspaper and magazine publishers. CMSEs can develop plans that block the extremist message by introducing a competing or alternate view. CMSEs may recommend use of electronic warfare to counter television and radio, or support establishing a newspaper that provides an alternate view. CMSEs can help counter indoctrination at religious schools by supporting new schools with vetted teachers and an approved curriculum. Some extremist venues can be countered by simply rendering them inaccessible or providing a more attractive or pleasant alternative. These techniques to block the message are a product of the nonlethal targeting process.

**Marginalizing Spoilers**

5-84. Spoilers are individuals who may or may not be espousing violent extremist ideology but nonetheless have a stake in continued conflict or at least stability under only their terms. Spoilers can be marginalized through attacking their character or reputation in local media or social venues. When the spoiler maintains a moral advantage, situations can be created that ultimately can be distorted through the media, which then can serve to discredit the spoiler, causing a lack of support. Spoilers can be bribed, deported, coerced, and intimidated so that they conform or face consequences. Marginalizing spoilers is not the activity of the CMSE; however, CMSEs can identify spoilers through civil reconnaissance and CIM.

**Disrupting Recruiting**

5-85. Violent extremists recruit people by isolating them from their communities and the norms, mores, and values that have traditionally dampened violent action. Radicalization manifesting in active support for violent extremism is most likely to occur where extremists can act uncontested, away from mainstream voices and competing ideas. Disrupting recruiting can apply to both the physical dimension (prisons, schools, mosques) and the information dimension (internet, television, radio). Recruiting is paramount for VEOs. To sustain terrorist activity, a VEO requires a constant supply of indoctrinated or radicalized personnel. VEOs use all the cited defeat mechanisms against the IPI to garner support for their activity and ideology. VEOs must incite recruits and apathetic masses. VEOs seek out and attack demographic vulnerabilities such as religious or ethnic identity groups, apathetic masses, or government representatives to marginalize or exploit. VEOs advance their information objectives using any means available to discredit the government and exploit civil vulnerabilities. VEOs use “noncombatant” spoilers/inciters to enable their indoctrination and radicalization process with the objective of producing dedicated religious/political terrorists to support their cause. To combat this process, HN entities must pay close attention to messages being espoused in the mosque, church, or prison, as well as curriculum in schools. When extremist themes and messages are encountered, CMSEs through the HN use indirect defeat mechanisms to disrupt the message (for example, introduce new mullahs, prison guards, or teachers to counter the message or new textbooks from which to teach or a new school from which to educate with a new staff).

**Shaping Political Extremist Ideology**

5-86. Violent extremist political ideology is countered by IIA and is accomplished through nonlethal targeting measures such as key leader engagements, public education, and public information. Through education and public information, an alternative vision of governance can be offered to that espoused by
VEOs. A lack of public education and information programs are the most important supporting radicalization element for both religious and political VEOs. Societal norms, values, and laws are developed over significant expanses of time and are the fabric of a society. These belief systems shape the perception of the populace. The only mechanisms that can change individual beliefs are the cognitive and informational inputs, as well as physical experiences that reinforce those cognitive and informational inputs. When beliefs are shaped only by religious information and are not augmented with alternative ideals, scientific study, and literacy, popular perceptions become narrow in perspective and are vulnerable to radicalization. Norms, values, and laws are taught in the home, in the church or mosque, in the neighborhood, and in school. Norms and mores are reinforced through social interaction and in some cases imposed by law.

5-87. By identifying the core grievances through the participation in the DSF and ICAF process, CMSEs can help shape the ways and means needed for the IPI and the interagency to mitigate drivers of conflict. One such driver could be the core grievances perceived by identity groups that induce conflict.

5-88. To correctly identify core grievances and identity groups and drivers of conflict, an ICAF is dependent upon a comprehensive area study and COP. Within the CIM architecture of the CMSE, information can be found to produce the identity of key actors (possibly spoilers), systems, nodes, and links to complete an analysis and diagnose a conflict. The CIM process and the analytic products it produces greatly enhance the interagency’s ability to address or diagnose conflict and identify civil vulnerabilities.

5-89. VEOs use techniques to sustain, plan, and carry out operations and campaigns to meet operational and strategic objectives. VEO objectives are generally political, not military, and are most commonly achieved in the information and cognitive dimension before they can be achieved in the physical dimension. Within the FID and COIN complex environment, VEOs exploit HN infrastructure in public information and education. VEOs are able to dominate the word-of-mouth dissemination of their ideology. Weak public communication, public information, and public education systems expose civil vulnerabilities that may be exploited for radicalization. Radicalization occurs as a process in the information dimension and cognitive dimension as described in Figure 5-8, page 5-26.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

5-90. Army units do not conduct campaigns. Campaigns are always joint efforts. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve the desired military end state. (The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.) This planning connects the strategic end state to campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. JFCs use campaigns and joint operations to translate their operational-level actions into strategic results. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning).

5-91. GCCs publish theater campaign plans that support strategic and operational planning efforts. A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a supported GCC that accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a theater of war or theater of operations, primarily within the supported GCCs AOR. An operation plan for a theater campaign is the operational extension of a CCDR’s theater strategy, and translates theater strategic concepts into unified action. Adjacent GCCs may conduct supporting operations within the AOR of the supported GCC, or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the supported GCC.
Figure 5-8. Radicalization process

5-92. GCCs publish country plans that support their overall campaign architecture. Subordinate units may publish campaign plans that support the GCCs overall theater strategy, campaign architecture, country plan, or TCP. A subordinate campaign plan describes the actions of a subordinate JFC that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported JFC. The TSOC supports the GCC with special operations, and the TSOC is an inherently joint command that CMSEs support.

INTERAGENCY CAMPAIGN PLANNING

5-93. The first critical planning occurs at the interagency level. The NSS is the baseline document that prescribes the ends for the global operations against terrorist networks and the CbT strategy provides the outline of the ways. Each department or agency has a unique and important role to play and constitutes the means in this complex effort. Likewise, each department has a prescribed set of authorities that need synchronization into a unified common plan as it applies to a given country. The essential requirement is to focus all the national elements of power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—into a cohesive effort that enables our HN partners, as well as promotes our own national security interests.
INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION

5-94. The term “integration” implies a greater degree of cooperation than “coordination.” Truly interagency staffs are required to synchronize efforts and support operational planning on a global, regional, and HN scale. The optimal activity for the regional groups would be regional collaborative planning and implementation of departmental activities to fight terrorism at the regional and subsequently HN level. Integration is effective if all entities embrace a shared approach attained by totally integrating the planning processes within the whole-of-government.

5-95. NDS and NMS incorporate the guidance from the NSS and national CbT strategy. This serves as the essential basis for developing theater campaign plans, TCPs, and the family of supporting plans generated by the GCC, USSOCOM, and supporting TSOCs. CMSEs extract their CME guidance from the TSOC family of plans as depicted in Figure 5-9.

5-96. DOS diplomacy and development strategy incorporate the guidance from the NSS, national homeland defense strategy, and national CbT strategy. These strategies serve as the essential basis for AMEMB, mission strategic plans and USAID development plans. DOS and USAID produce the Foreign Assistance Framework, as depicted in Figure 5-10, page 5-28.

SUPPORTING THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANS

5-97. Complementary and reinforcing theater campaign plans are required to successfully prosecute operations in GCC regional AORs. GCCs control forces to prosecute operations in accordance with the NDS, NMS, NHDS, and NDDS coordinated in a common unified effort. CMSEs and their supporting structure support CME at the GCC level that includes the TSOC as well as the HN. The campaign plan embodies the CCDR’s strategic vision for the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. CMSE planners through the identification of civil vulnerabilities support CCDRs to develop campaigns specifically aimed at eroding and deterring support for or mitigation of VEOs, as well enable the HN government and the IPI to counter these internal defense threats. Campaign planning can encompass both the deliberate and crisis action-planning processes addressed in ADP 5-0 and JP 5-0. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning.
It continues through crisis action planning and may entail unifying both planning processes. CME planners extract the guidance from theater campaign plans (defense) and integrate it with regional development and diplomacy strategies to create unified action.

**Figure 5-10. Foreign assistance framework**

5-98. CME planning uses a campaign design. In the case of CME, major operations include episodic employment of presence-for-purpose elements, exercises, joint combined exchange training, and other short-term operations aimed at achieving long-term objectives. The campaign design can be applied toward the IDAD, DOS mission strategic plan or JFC campaign plan, or a combination of strategies. Inevitably, the CMSE must combine the use of stability and defeat mechanisms to achieve its defined strategy. During stability tasks, the major lines of effort are focused on the populace and are commonly identified as stability tasks and major mission elements as described in Figure 2-2, page 2-3.

5-99. Within stability tasks, these varying lines of effort are all conducted as a means in support of strategic communication effort. The nature of stability tasks varies and, as such, stabilization objectives and the major lines of effort also vary. CMSEs nest the lines of effort established to advance diplomacy, development, and defense objectives and to achieve unified action as described in Figure 5-11, page 5-29.

5-100. To use the indirect approach in addressing these lines of effort, CMSEs conduct civil reconnaissance and analyze the civil component in the course of the METT-TC analysis. CMSEs establish a civil information grid and conduct CIM to facilitate interagency efforts. CMSEs identify critical
vulnerabilities within a link and nodal analysis of the civil component and integrate information into the GCC and ambassador’s COP, as well as contribute to fulfilling the information requirements for JIPOE.

5-101. Persistence presence elements engage the interagency using accepted interagency processes in combination with military planning processes and problem-solving methods. Presence-for-purpose elements conduct tactical actions that address strategic and operational objectives, thus advancing the lines of effort. CMSEs establish an engagement effort addressing critical nodes within HN needs. Figure 5-12, page 5-30, depicts how tactical tasks are aligned in lines of operation to achieve strategic objectives.

**Figure 5-11. Civil-military engagement campaign design**

**CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY**

5-102. CME requires the implementation of conventional policies and theories executed as techniques at the small-unit level. Many CME techniques would be more closely affiliated with practices occurring on CCDR staff or a Joint Force headquarters. The planning techniques required for successful CME support includes strategic thinking, critical thinking, global and cultural acuity, and mediation and negotiation, as well as a firm understanding of interagency partners and HN capabilities. CME is performed by a CMSE in conjunction with interagency partners. CME is performed by civil-military teaming to develop plans, collect information, and implement policies and programs that accomplish national security objectives.
Figure 5-12. Operational campaign design

5-103. The CA methodology found in FM 3-57 is implemented at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CMSEs are required to think and interact with the interagency strategically and act tactically.

5-104. The CA methodology describes how CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach all CAO and CMO. It consists of six steps:

- Assess.
- Decide.
- Develop and detect.
- Deliver.
- Evaluate.
- Transition.
ASSESS

5-105. Assessments are the foundation of any plan. **Assessment is continuously monitoring and evaluating the current situation and the progress of an operation** (ADP 3-0). Assessment is both a continuous activity of the operations process and mission command. CMSEs support U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams by continuously assessing the mission strategic plan, IDAD or development strategy, operational environment, and progress of the operation. Based on their assessment, CMSE leaders recommend adjustments, thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing mutual defense, diplomacy, and development objectives. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of the HN. More specifically, assessment helps the CMSE leader to determine progress toward attaining the desired ends, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities:

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

5-106. CMSEs conduct assessments in the interagency, whole-of-government environment. In addition to assessing and assembling civil information, CMSEs use interagency assessment tools to identify the causes of conflict. The most widely used analysis tools are the ICAF and the DSF. These interagency processes support the country team or JFCs to gain insight into the nature of the conflict.

Monitoring

5-107. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant, specifically information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the U.S. Ambassadors’ intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, and execution or adjustment decisions cannot be made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

5-108. Leader critical information requirements and decision points focus the presence-for-purpose elements monitoring activities and prioritize the CMSE’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning internal defense threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities through implementation of a civil reconnaissance plan. CMSE leaders use all-source reporting to coordinate other assessment-related information requirements. To prevent duplicated collection efforts, information requirements associated with assessing the environment are integrated into both the civil reconnaissance plan and friendly information requirements.

Civil Reconnaissance

5-109. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by CA or other forces, as required. CMSEs focus civil reconnaissance efforts on critical information requirements needed to monitor or evaluate MOPs or MOEs. The presence-for-purpose elements usually carry out specified civil reconnaissance functions. These functions may include direct observation or information collection through face-to-face or key leader engagements. Civil reconnaissance may also include the sponsoring of indirect collections, such as canvassing and polling carried out by third parties. Canvassing and polling by nonaligned entities may often produce a different response than those conducted by the United States, HNs, or NGOs, depending on what participants believe the interviewer wants to hear.
5-110. **Civil Information Management**

CIM is a process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the AMEMB, GCC, TSOC, and country team, as well as IGOs and NGOs, to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO. Persistent-presence elements of the CMSE usually manage the CIM process. The tools and methods for conducting CIM vary and are still developing. Available computer-based software programs—such as Combined Information Data Network Exchange, Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing system, Mapping the Human Terrain, or CA Operating System—may be used to organize and store civil information to support assessment and running estimate processes; however, the CIM process remains consistent. One particularly important database for CMSEs is the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Topographic Engineering Center, has built a geographic information systems database that enhances work efficiencies, information dissemination, and analytical capability. OHASIS allows CMSEs to visualize the impact of historically implemented humanitarian assistance projects on a Web-based map display, automate report generation, and perform analysis for project suitability. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has extended OHASIS to be used to impute all Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) by all GCCs for managing their OHDACA-funded projects. OHASIS provides a mechanism for the USG to share their appropriate releasable DOD humanitarian assistance information to other organizations, to include both governmental organizations and NGOs.

5-111. The operational environment is complex. Planners must possess a holistic view of the environment in the near- and mid-term that comprises the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the training and employment of military forces.

5-112. To enhance collaboration and developing a shared understanding of the operational environment, information is collected and collated in a method that facilitates analysis. ASCOPE (see FM 3-57) assessments can be converted or further analyzed using other tools that more readily portray strategic and operational level analysis, such as the operational variables known as PMESII-PT. Analysis of the operational environment focuses on these eight interrelated variables:

- Political.
- Military.
- Economic.
- Social.
- Information.
- Infrastructure.
- Physical environment.
- Time.

5-113. These operational variables represent a system of systems that represent an ordered society as depicted in Figure 5-13, page 5-33. Within these operational variables, societies’ functional areas (known as CA functional specialty areas) can be further analyzed and civil vulnerabilities revealed. CMSEs gain the requisite comprehensive understanding by assessing the operational environment using mission (METT-TC [ASCOPE]) and operational variables (PMESII-PT), as well as further analysis of societal systems outlined as CA functional specialty areas. CMSEs must identify the friendly and hostile decisionmakers, key leaders and spoilers, their objectives and strategies, and the ways they interact. The conditions of conflict can change, and CMSEs must anticipate these changes in the environment and exploit opportunities. A simple analysis matrix allows CMSEs to consolidate information relevant to developing the commander’s COP (Figure 5-14, page 5-33).

5-114. CAO and CME are carried out in and among the populace. As such, CCIRs and priority intelligence requirements must be adjusted accordingly. Critical and priority information requirements are increasingly important as they pertain to the effects upon the populace as opposed to the effects upon
friendly forces. Civil information must be integrated with other information sources such that it produces a complete COP for a JFC or the country team.

5-115. Information necessary to describe and define the civil situation of an AO is obtained from classified and unclassified sources. At the strategic theater and operational levels, CMO planners organize data collection according to the analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each of the PMESII-PT variables.
Political

5-116. Political data collection—
- Defines the overall political situation in the AOR.
- Identifies the political leadership and type of government.
- Identifies those key aspects of the commander’s operational environment, such as political boundaries and centers of the FN government—strengths, weaknesses, role in society, and so on.
- Includes IGOs present in the AO.
- Identifies political areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Military

5-117. Military data collection—
- Determines the CMO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces available in the AO.
- Determines how the military situation within the AO influences the current mission requirement.
- Determines how the current military situation is affecting stability, government security, and so on.
- Identifies the role of the military in the applicable country.
- Identifies military areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Economic

5-118. Economic data collection—
- States the strengths and weaknesses of the economic systems along with nation’s plans for economic development (for example, efficient management [production, distribution, trade, and consumption] of resources, goods, and services).
- Includes shortages affecting the commander’s ability to use FN supplies or impacting the operation, including the FN’s ability to supply enough foodstuffs to meet the civil populace’s need.
- Identifies the agricultural calendar—harvest, planting, and spraying seasons.
- Identifies the economy fiscal calendar.
- Identifies economic areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (viability of the economic system).

Social

5-119. Social data collection—
- States the current social climate in the AO.
- Identifies key civilian personnel inside and outside the AO and their link to the population. Key is the identification of leaders of the various factions of the population, to include figureheads such as—
  - Clerics.
  - Subject-matter experts associated with the operation of critical civil infrastructure (water production and treatment, communications, electrical generation, transportation, medical, and so on).
- Identifies the role of religion in society—religious and fraternal groups.
- Identifies social areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
- Identifies events that can affect the commander’s mission—significant weather events (floods), elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time).
Information

5-120. Information data collection—

- Describes the status and ability to transmit and receive information within the AO.
- Lists locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies in the AO (IGOs and NGOs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program [United Nations], Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, governing bodies, public health, judicial and law enforcement, and community organizations).
- Identifies information areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Infrastructure

5-121. Infrastructure data collection—

- Describes the civil infrastructure in the AO and concentrates on how the state of the infrastructure assists or hinders the commander’s mission.
- Identifies infrastructure areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
- Identifies condition and location of key structures including—
  - Government facilities.
  - Medical treatment facilities.
  - Cultural sites—monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so on.
  - Facilities with practical applications—detention facilities and warehouses.
  - Power generation and transmission facilities.
  - Transportation grids—port, rail, and aerial facilities.
  - Water purification and sewage treatment plants.
  - Radio and television production and transmission facilities.
  - Agricultural and mining regions and other significant geographic and economic nodes.

Physical Environment

5-122. Physical environment data collection—

- Is analyzed to include its impact on the populace, which may include—
  - Observation and analysis of economic, social, and political centers of gravity.
  - Concealment of activities related to erosion of existing systems.
  - Obstacles (man-made and natural) to movement within economic, social, and political systems.
  - Key or decisive terrain (includes facilities and infrastructure).
  - Avenues of approach (supporting commerce and social diversity).
- Uses ASCOPE to analyze the civil component within METT-TC.

Time

5-123. Time data collection identifies time consideration in terms of significant events that shape the civil component of the operational environment (for example, religious holidays, flood seasons, winter weather, seasonal drought, growing seasons, and harvesting seasons).

Decide

5-124. During decide, CMSEs identify civil centers of gravity that support prioritized lines of effort. CMSEs garner support for activities that produce synergistic unified effort toward prioritized lines of effort. The established lines for CME are—

- Enable partners to combat terrorism.
- Deter support for terrorists.
- Erode support for extremist ideologies.
DEVELOP AND DETECT

5-125. During develop and detect, CMSEs identify the causes of conflict using ICAF and DSF or other means based upon their understanding of the operational environment. By using these tools, CMSEs implement a nonlethal targeting process.

DELIVER

5-126. During deliver, CMSEs identify tasks that are believed to produce the desired effects on the operational environment. These tasks are aligned with the established prioritized lines of effort and are commonly portrayed in an execution matrix to ensure synchronization with the activities of other interagency or IPI entities.

EVALUATE

5-127. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps leaders determine what is working, determine what is not working, and gain insights into how to better accomplish objectives.

5-128. Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs aid in determining progress toward attaining objectives and performing tasks. MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation. FM 3-57 provides additional information regarding evaluating tasks, MOPs, and MOEs.

5-129. A MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.

5-130. Figure 5-15, page 5-37, demonstrates an MOE for the objective Enable HN to Counter VEOs, which may consist of the following:
- Decrease in insurgent activity.
- Increase in population trust of HN security forces.

5-131. A MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). An execution matrix is a common synchronization product that allows CMSE planners to decide, synchronize, and evaluate performance. It helps CMSEs and the interagency determine if they are initiating the right activities and the qualitative level of their activity, project, program, or operation. MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrices. MOPs are also heavily used to evaluate training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?” Figure 5-16, page 5-38, illustrates the variables that must be analyzed to determine the quality or benefit of MOPs, as well as synchronization of efforts.

5-132. All governing bodies have some common operating functions that manifest into directorates, ministries or departments that support governance activities (for example, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Culture, and Commerce). In the FID environment, CMSEs assist the country team and HN in support of an IDAD plan. Governments identify and execute these common operating functions and create ministries and departments to carry out what the governing body acknowledges as the specified tasks of government.
5-133. All governing bodies have some common operating functions that manifest into directorates, ministries or departments that support governance activities (for example, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Culture, and Commerce). In the FID environment, CMSEs assist the country team and HN in support of an IDAD plan. Governments identify and execute these common operating functions and create ministries and departments to carry out what the governing body acknowledges as the specified tasks of government.

5-134. Most governments develop their structure based upon the needs of the populace. For example, in an arid country, there may be a ministry of water; in an oil producing country, there may be a ministry of oil; and in an Islamic country, there may be a ministry of Hajj or ministry of culture. CMSEs identify civil vulnerabilities within a government’s ordered structure that can be exploited by internal defense threats or VEOs. Within IW operational environments, such vulnerabilities exist among the populace, and thus, operations carried out to address these vulnerabilities are sometimes referred to as “population-centric.” It is within these structures that CA functional areas are carried out. The CA functional areas and their subsets are generally recognized as the common baseline of societal and governing functional areas as identified in Chapter 4 and Figure 4-3, page 4-3. When society is analyzed using the CA functional areas, civil vulnerabilities can be identified and action taken through ministries or departments to address the identified vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are generally not addressed in a single short-term operation, project, or program; therefore, campaigns are established to address specific civil vulnerabilities. These campaigns in themselves may be composed of subordinate lines of effort or composed of small operations projects and programs that, when combined, produce the desired effect or end state.

5-135. When lines of effort are established, CMSEs use the CA methodology to assess and detect civil vulnerabilities, as well as to decide and deliver on the appropriate action. MOEs and MOPs are established to determine if the prescribed action produces the desired effect and if the prescribed measures were appropriate to begin with.
For example, if VEOs or other internal defense threats have identified a weak education system as a means by which they can propagate their ideology, the ministry with responsibility for schools and education must identify the vulnerability being exploited by VEOs. Operations, projects, and programs must then be established to counter VEO exploitation. CMSEs can support the HN effort through civil reconnaissance. Such a solution can mitigate VEO exploitation by building government schools where there are none, vetting teachers, establishing a universally accepted curriculum, and monitoring school performance. These measures must be carried out by HN IPI and monitored by NGOs. The CMSE and the country team must ensure efforts are synchronized to meet objectives that erode the active or tacit support for VEO ideologies. It is the HNs objective to have an educated populace to advance its societal economic and political development.

CMSEs use the CA methodology and all available planning techniques to synchronize the actions of the interagency and HN such that vulnerabilities are defined and appropriate activities are initiated to mitigate the vulnerability. A model using the CA methodology is depicted in Figure 5-17, page 5-39.
TRANSITION

5-138. This step is the direct contribution of CA to a sustainable solution and the commander’s ability to meet the desired end state. Planners execute the transition step according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of transition includes successful changeover of authority or relief-in-place and durable, sustainable programs that the follow-on force or organization can manage.

PROJECT AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

5-139. When conducting complex operations and campaigns, CMSEs orchestrate a series of small-scale operations to achieve the end state on specific lines of effort. The specific tasks often manifest into short-term operations, projects, or exercises that are tied to specific funding sources, times, places, and objectives and must be carried out by contracting entities within the IPI. Contracts are established and carried out in accordance with Appendix C of this publication. These specified tasks may be performed by the persistent-presence element or the presence-for-purpose element or may include short-term major exercises and engagements to create a long-term influence effect. Programs and projects inevitably require the expenditure of resources. CMSEs must understand funding sources to facilitate the transfer of funding from one entity to another for the purpose of expediting planned actions and linking projects to resources.

5-140. DOS and USAID would typically categorize long-term efforts as programs and short-term efforts as projects. All projects are typically limited to a specific funding source and limited by location and time. Appendix D provides information on project management.

5-141. CMSEs combine the efforts and resources of DOS, USAID, and other interagency partners, as well as DOD, to develop campaigns that accomplish defense, development, and diplomacy objectives.
when and where these objectives are mutually supporting. Some programs and projects can be the SA activities being carried out by the embassy’s defense attaché and SAO. The difference is the influence brought about by the persistent-presence element to focus those activities on efforts aimed at one of the three identified CME lines of effort.

5-142. CME is carried out by leveraging multiple funding methods applied to advance the CME lines of effort. Civil-military teaming is desirable for planning and synchronization and may facilitate access to additional funding as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and appropriated by the DOS Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act, which can be leveraged by USC Title 10 funds. When transferring funds from one interagency partner to another, a fund transfer process is initiated. Funds transfers usually require a military interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR). See Appendix C of this publication for more information on executing a MIPR.

5-143. The most significant forms of funding are legislatively divided between Title 10 and Title 22. Title 10 funding is allocated by Congress to the DOD and Title 22 funding is allocated to the DOS. Some Title 10 funding requires approval from DOS, when the funding applies to SA. See Appendix B of this publication to see various DOD and DOS funding sources.
Appendix A

Reserve Component Forces

Reserve component forces are an integral part of CME. National Guard and Reserve forces may augment CME operations based on requirements by the GCC when developing civil-military relations. Understanding the capabilities and force structure of these Reserve components is important in the planning and ultimate execution of CME.

NATIONAL GUARD COMPONENT

A-1. The National Guard operates the State Partnership Program. This program enhances the ability of the CCDR to build enduring civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all levels of society.

A-2. The goals of the program reflect an evolving international affairs mission for the National Guard, emphasizing its unique state-federal and civil-military characteristics to interact with both the active and reserve forces of foreign nations (FNs), interagency partners, and international NGOs. Program partners engage in a broad range of security cooperation activities, to include—

- Homeland defense and security.
- Disaster response and mitigation.
- Consequence and crisis management.
- Interagency cooperation.
- Border, port, and aviation security.
- Combat medical, fellowship-style internships.
- Bilateral familiarization events that lead to training and exercise opportunities.

A-3. Activities are coordinated through CCDRs, U.S. Ambassadors, country teams, and other agencies to ensure National Guard cooperation is tailored to meet U.S. and international partner objectives. Established partnerships include those illustrated in Figure A-1, page A-2.

RESERVE COMPONENT

A-4. United States Army Reserve assets include the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), which is organized and aligned by regional affiliation. USACAPOC is organized into four CA commands (CACOMs) that are designed to support specific GCCs. These CACOMs are arrayed geographically and develop a subordinated coordinating relationship with GCCs (Figure A-2, page A-3). The 350th CACOM supports United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM); the 351st CACOM supports the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM); the 353d CACOM supports the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM); and the 352d CACOM supports United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). In addition, USPACOM has a dedicated forward reserve component CA brigade in Hawaii (322d CA Brigade), and USEUCOM has a dedicated forward reserve component CA brigade in Germany (361st CA Brigade).
### Appendix B

**Figure A-1. Global partnerships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Countries/Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USNORTHCOM • United States Northern Command</strong></td>
<td>• Rhode Island/Bahamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USSOUTHCOM • United States Southern Command</strong></td>
<td>• Arkansas/Guatemala • Connecticut/Uruguay • Delaware/Trinidad-Tobago • District of Columbia/Jamaica • Florida/Venezuela • Florida/Guyana • Florida/Regional Security System (East Caribbean Islands) • Kentucky/Ecuador • Louisiana/Belize • Massachusetts/Paraguay • Mississippi/Bolivia • Missouri/Panama • New Hampshire/El Salvador • New Mexico/Costa Rica • Puerto Rico/Honduras • Puerto Rico/Dominican Republic • South Dakota/Suriname • Texas/Chile • West Virginia/Peru • Wisconsin/Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USEUCOM • United States European Command</strong></td>
<td>• Alabama/Romania • California/Ukraine • Colorado/Slovenia • Georgia/Georgia • Illinois/Poland • Indiana/Slovakia • Kansas/Armenia • Maine/Montenegro • Maryland/Estonia • Maryland/Bosnia • Michigan/Latvia • Minnesota/Croatia • New Jersey/New York/Albania • North Carolina/Moldova • Ohio/Hungary • Ohio/Serbia • Oklahoma/Azerbaijan • Pennsylvania/Lithuania • Tennessee/Bulgaria • Texas/Nebraska/Czech Republic • Vermont/Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USAFRICOM • United States Africa Command</strong></td>
<td>• California/Nigeria • New York/South Africa • North Carolina/Botswana • North Dakota/Ghana • Utah/Morocco • Vermont/Senegal • Wyoming/Tunisia • Michigan/Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USCENTCOM • United States Central Command</strong></td>
<td>• Arizona/Kazakhstan • Colorado/Jordan • Louisiana/Uzbekistan • Montana/Kyrgyzstan • Nevada/Turkmenistan • Virginia/Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USPACOM • United States Pacific Command</strong></td>
<td>• Alaska/Mongolia • Guam/Hawaii/Philippines • Hawaii/Indonesia • Washington/Thailand • Oregon/Bangladesh • Idaho/Cambodia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A-2. Current and planned Civil Affairs unit locations

Legend:
CACOM          Civil Affairs Command
USAFRICOM      United States Africa Command
USEUCOM        United States European Command
USCENTCOM      United States Central Command
USPACOM        United States Pacific Command
USOUTHCOM      United States Southern Command

- West Coast units are under 351st CACOM and regionally aligned to USPACOM.
- Units in Central United States are assigned to 350th CACOM and regionally aligned to USOUTHCOM.
- Units in Southeast United States are under 352nd CACOM and regionally aligned with USCENTCOM.
- Units in Northeast are under 353rd CACOM and regionally aligned with USEUCOM and USAFRICOM.
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Appendix B

Civil-Military Engagement
and the Use of Alternative Funding

CMSEs must identify the appropriate funding sources to fund programs and projects for episodic engagement. Inevitably, funding requires the movement of fiscal resources from one account to another. CMSE leaders and planners must be familiar with resourcing, funding, and accounting techniques established by DOD, DA, USASOC, and USSOCOM.

DOD organizes its budget into 11 major force programs (MFPs). MFPs 2, 10, and 11 are the most relevant to CME.

TITLE 10, MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM 2

B-1. MFP 2 provides funding for conventional forces. These program elements fund organizations and associated weapon systems where mission responsibilities are, at any given point in time, limited to one theater of operations. Virtually all activity involving support, sustainment, and operations of conventional forces in any GCC’s AOR is funded with MFP 2. This funding excludes funding that supports SOF. Conventional units (for example, CA [units assigned to United States Army Forces Command or theater armies], engineer, military police, medical) that are resourced to perform short-term presence-for-purpose missions must be funded through the GCC using MFP 2 funding.

TITLE 10, MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM 10

B-2. MFP 10 is comprised of resources in support of international activities, including support to the Military Assistance Program, foreign military sales, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. Some important funding categories to consider in conjunction with MFP 10 and CME are Sections 1206, 1208, and 1209. Because of the nature of MFP 10 funding, Congress strictly regulates the intent and purpose of these resources.

SECTION 1206, SECURITY ASSISTANCE REFORM

B-3. Section 1206 of the NDAA for FY 2006, as amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. DOD values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, DOD has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide CT support. These funds may also be used to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability tasks in which U.S. forces participate. When CMSEs identify civil vulnerabilities that relate to stability lines of effort, they may coordinate with the defense attaché to help shape expenditures that support the CME’s three lines of effort (enable, deter, and erode).

SECTION 1207, GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND

B-4. Section 1207 of the NDAA for FY 2012 (Public Law 112-81) created a new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) as a four-year pilot project to be jointly administered and funded by the DOD and the DOS. The purpose of the fund is to carry out security and counterterrorism training and rule of law programs. (There are also three 1-year transitional authorities for assistance to Africa and Yemen.) The GSCF is placed under the State Department’s budget. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State
make decisions jointly; however, the Secretary of State assumes lead responsibility for the mandated mechanism.

B-5. The GSCF is seen as an important step in improving U.S. efforts to enable foreign military and security forces to better combat terrorism and other threats. It incorporates features of previous legislation and reflects recommendations to address multiple deficiencies in current national security structures and practices. Many hope that it will provide a model for interagency cooperation on security assistance that will overcome the disadvantages of the current system of agency-centric budgets and efforts.

B-6. Assistance may be provided under the GSCF authority for three purposes as detailed below. Assistance “may include the provision of equipment, supplies, and training.” The first two of these purposes—security and counterterrorism training, and coalition support—are nearly identical to those of the train and equip authority provided by Section 1206 of the FY 2006 NDAA, Public Law 109-163, as amended, with two exceptions. For Section 1206 programs, the Secretary of Defense is the lead. In addition, Section 1206 may only be used to assist military forces and maritime security forces, not the full range of security forces permitted by Section 1207.

Note: GSCF funds are available to either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense for such assistance.

Security and Counterterrorism Training

B-7. Section 1207(b)(1)(A) authorizes the use of the GSCF to enhance the capabilities of military forces and other security forces, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces to “conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations.” Recipient countries would be designated by the Secretary of State with the concurrence or approval of the Secretary of Defense. Programs to provide this support would be jointly formulated by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before implementation.

Coalition Support

B-8. Section 1207(b)(1)(B) permits GSCF assistance to national military forces and other specified security forces to enable them to “participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests.” Just as with security and counterterrorism training assistance, recipient countries would be designated by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. These programs are also jointly formulated by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and approved by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, before implementation.

Justice Sector, Rule of Law, and Stabilization Assistance

B-9. Section 1207(b)(2) authorizes using the GSCF to assist the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), and to conduct rule of law programs and stabilization efforts “where the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance.” The Secretary of State also designates recipients of this type of assistance and implements activities with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. However, unlike the preceding types of assistance where the Secretaries of State and Defense would jointly formulate programs, the Secretary of State formulates these programs in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. DOS and DOD staff will determine an appropriate consultation mechanism.
SECTION 1208, AUTHORITY FOR SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM

B-10. Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2005 authorizes DOD to reimburse foreign forces, groups, or individuals supporting or facilitating ongoing CT military operations by U.S. SOF. Section 1208 has established specific funding programs for expenditures. These programs are discussed below.

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

B-11. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) is an important and growing source of funding available to the U.S. military. When the program is enacted by Congress, it appropriates funds for commanders of operational units to meet the emergency humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the local population. CERP activities have included water distribution projects, sanitation services, electricity projects, health care programs, education programs, rule-of-law initiatives, and civic cleanups. Since November 2003, CERP objectives have been continuously authorized. CERP objectives may vary over time. Examples of theater-level objectives for CERP include the following:

- Ensuring urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements are met for the indigenous population.
- Improving local governance capacity by partnering with provincial government agencies in identifying, prioritizing, selecting, and developing projects.
- Ensuring the larger, strategic projects and services are connected to the end user in local communities.
- Creating momentum and conditions for economic recovery and development.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

B-12. DOD, with the concurrence of DOS, is authorized to assist the government of Pakistan in building the capacity of Pakistan’s security forces to conduct COIN operations in support of U.S. efforts in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Coalition Support Fund

B-13. The coalition support fund reimburses cooperating countries for logistics, military, and other expenses incurred while supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other overseas contingency operations. The coalition support fund was originally created to reimburse the governments of Pakistan and Jordan for their support in CT operations.

Defense Coalition Support Fund

B-14. The defense coalition support fund allows DOD to stockpile defense articles, such as helmets, body armor, and night vision devices for potential use by coalition partners, circumventing lengthy procurement time frames. The defense coalition support fund would be funded through the operation and maintenance, defense-wide budget and would become self-financed through sales of the equipment.

Combatant Commander Initiative Fund

B-15. The CCDR initiative fund supports unforeseen contingency requirements critical to the CCDRs’ joint warfighting readiness and national security interests. The initiative fund enables CCDRs to fund short-term, low-cost projects that meet the requirements of unforeseen situations. GCCs have been authorized to expand the CCDR initiative fund to include programs that provide urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
SECTION 1209, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

B-16. Authority for training and equipping Iraq and Afghan security forces comes from the FY 2006 NDAA Section 1209 and FY 2007 NDAA Section 1202. As the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorated, funding for these two “Train and Equip” programs increased dramatically. The appropriations were formalized in FY 2005 as Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and Iraq Security Forces Fund accounts.

SECTION 2557 AND SECTION 2561, OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER ASSISTANCE, AND CIVIC AID

B-17. Congressional authority to conduct humanitarian programs is embedded in the following sections of Title 10, USC: 401, 402, 404, 2557, and 2561. The humanitarian assistance program was established to assure friendly nations and allies of our support and provide basic humanitarian aid and services to populations in need. The military departments and CCDRs seek to help avert political and humanitarian crises, promote democratic development and regional stability, and enable countries to begin to recover from conflicts.

B-18. Humanitarian assistance projects and activities accomplish these objectives in several ways. They support (1) donations of excess nonlethal DOD property and (2) the provision of on-the-ground activities carried out by U.S. military personnel aimed at assuring friendly nations of our support by improving U.S. military presence in countries. Such activities include assessment of needs and rudimentary construction of clinics, schools, and roads, as well as medical, technical, and logistical assistance. In noncrisis peacetime settings, DOD humanitarian assistance programs support CCDRs by providing access to, and fostering goodwill for the U.S. military in selected countries.

TITLE 10, MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM 11

B-19. MFP 11 is funding for SO. USSOCOM uses MFP 11 to train, equip, and sustain SOF during predeployment training and for operational sustainment. Often, sustainment in DOS facilities requires the transfer of DOD funds to the DOS.

TITLE 22, FUNDING AUTHORITY RELATIVE TO CME

B-20. The legal authority for the DOS SA and development assistance missions is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 2151-1, Title 22 USC (22 USC 2151-1). An exception to this authority occurs when Congress enacts DOD appropriations and/or authorizations to conduct foreign assistance.

B-21. Title 22 is solely provided to DOS. Significant amounts of Title 22 funding are reallocated to USAID to synchronize diplomacy and development efforts. Funds reallocated to USAID are usually those funds distributed under Subchapter I of Title 22, USC. Some funds are generally the domain of the AMEMB defense attaché. Some Title 22 funds are reallocated directly to the defense attaché under Subchapter II, Title 22, USC.

B-22. Funding available for public diplomacy and development within a specific country are authorized for expenditure under sections of Subchapter I. Relative sections of Subchapter I are listed below:

SECTION 2151-1, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY

B-23. A principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries to improve the quality of their lives. This policy includes—

- Agriculture development in rural areas.
- Population planning and health programs may include—
  - Assistance for malaria prevention, treatment, control, and elimination.
  - Assistance to combat human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
  - Assistance to combat tuberculosis.
  - Assistance to combat malaria.
Civil-Military Engagement
and the Use of Alternative Funding

- Education and human resources development.
- Development of indigenous energy resources.
- Appropriate technology.
- Transfer of funds.
- Cost-sharing.
- Development and use of cooperatives.
- Integrating women into national economies.
- Human rights and development assistance (human rights and democracy fund).
- Environmental and natural resources (tropical forests).
- Endangered species.
- Sahel development program (planning).
- Development assistance authority (establishment of a program).
- Private and voluntary organizations and cooperatives in overseas development.
- Aid to relatively least-developed countries.
- Project and program evaluations.
- Development and illicit narcotics production may include—
  - Assistance for agricultural and industrial alternatives to narcotics production.
  - Assistance in furtherance of narcotics control objectives of the United States.

SECTION 2152, ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE

B-24. The President is authorized to provide assistance for the rehabilitation of victims of torture, which may include—
- Programs to encourage good governance.
- Assistance to foreign countries to meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.
- Programs to improve building construction and practices in Latin American countries.
- Assistance for orphans and other vulnerable children.
- Assistance to provide safe water and sanitation.

B-25. Funding available for military assistance within a specific country is authorized for expenditure under sections of Subchapter II. Relative sections of Subchapter II include—
- Part II, sections 2311–2322, Military Assistance.
- Part VIII, sections 2349aa–2349aa-10, AT Assistance.
- Part IX, section 2349bb–2349bb-6, Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance.

B-26. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center has produced several publications that can help CA Soldiers manage diverse funding sources for projects. The publications are listed below:
- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 09-16, Field Ordering Officer and Paying Agent.
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Appendix C

Operational Funds

CMSEs seek to resource internally for operations and sustainment. CMSE leaders work through their chain of command to establish an operational fund to resource training during predeployment, as well as operations and sustainment during the course of the mission.

INTERNAL FUNDING

C-1. Funding authority is complex and fluid. There are many different types of funding authorities and laws governing authorized expenditures for each fund. It is essential that commanders match the requirement to the proper funding authority and then determine if funds are available. Commanders must always obtain legal authority to fund a requirement. The absence of a prohibition does not convey authority.

C-2. Prescribing directives include—

- DOD 5500.07-R, Joint Ethics Regulation.
- Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 3, Section 3.104, Procurement Integrity.
- DOD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 5 (Disbursing Policy and Procedures), Volume 10 (Contract Payment Policy and Procedures), and Volume 12 (Special Accounts, Funds and Programs).
- USASOC Policy 48-04, Paying Agency Procedures.
- USASOC Policy 05-06, Use of MFP-11 Funds for De-Minimis Humanitarian Assistance.

C-3. The purpose of a cash operational fund is to provide a means for a unit to purchase mission critical requirements that cannot otherwise be obtained by the unit through the normal military supply system, Government Purchase Card, MIPR, or contract.

C-4. Cash OPFUNDs are intended to pay primarily for the day-to-day operating expenses of USASOC units in the field while supporting OCOs, joint combined exchange training, CMSEs, and limited CONUS purchases on an exception basis. Accordingly, these funds are commonly used for labor and services provided by contractor personnel for expendable supplies, rental or lease charges for equipment and facilities, clothing, fuel, and maintenance, repair, overhaul, and rework of equipment and real property. An operational fund is intended to—

- Purchase consumable/expendable supplies and services required to sustain the unit. Nonexpendable purchases are allowed when authorized in a Common Table of Allowances or Technical Manual. Any item needed to save human lives or to relieve human suffering as long as it is authorized by the approving authority. Ensure requirements are documented on Standard Form (SF) 44, U.S. Government Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher, and obtain a memorandum signed by an O-6 level commander to validate the requirement.
- Be used primarily outside the CONUS. CONUS requirements must be ordered via the military supply system, Government Purchase Card, DA Form 3953, Purchase Request and Commitment, or MIPR.
MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PURCHASE REQUEST PROCESS

C-5. Because of complex funding authorities, CMSEs might be compelled to use interagency funding to help synchronize and implement programs and projects that support the CME effort. For sustainment support, CMSEs may be required to work through their chain of command to transfer funds from DOD to DOS. The process for transferring funds from Army to USAID is illustrated in Figure C-1.

Figure C-1. Fund transfer process

C-6. Cooperation between USAID and the DOD has resulted in a significant number of fund transfers between DOD and USAID, pursuant to interagency agreements as governed by USAID’s Automated Directives System (Chapter 306). These transfers require a rather burdensome set of steps, many of which were designed to ensure that congressional intent with regard to the end use of funds is respected. Caution must be taken in pursuing such transfers. When it is appropriate to do so, the procedure, known as MIPR is completed using DD Form 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request).

C-7. All USAID interdepartmental fund transfers are vetted by the USAID Office of Military Affairs. Office of Military Affairs provides information on this process and shares examples of memoranda and checklists with other interested offices. Interdepartmental funds transferred for the CMSE, from the Army to DOS, are governed by USASOC Regulation 37-3. A MIPR checklist should be used to ensure all items are included in the request. The checklist should consist of the following elements:

- Requesting activity official’s name, rank/grade, title, organization, phone number, email address, signature, and date.
- MIPR details, which may include answers to these questions:
  - What is a brief description of the purpose of MIPR?
  - What is the amount of the MIPR?
  - Is this requirement new? If yes, is it recurring?
Operational Funds

- What is the year, MFP appropriation, and element of resource (for example, FY, MFP-2, O&M or procurement)?

- How will the MIPR be accepted (reimbursable or direct citation)?

- Is the use of interagency support capability in the best interest of the government and required goods, supplies, or services cannot be obtained as conveniently or economically by contracting directly with a private source? If yes, a determination and findings is required and must be attached.

- Is the servicing activity charging a service or overhead fee? If yes, identify fee in both percentage and dollar amount in a separate line on the MIPR.

- Is funding going on contract by a servicing activity outside of DOD (non-DOD entity)? If yes, an Economy Act Determination is required and must be attached.

- Is a support agreement or memorandum of agreement required, per DODI 4000.19? If yes, is one in place?

- Is this for base operations support?

- Are equipment and/or supplies being procured? If yes, has the MSC/MSU S-4 or U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, reviewed the MIPR package? Provide name of reviewer and date of review.

- Do the items listed on the MIPR require property book accountability? If yes, has the MSC/MSU/USASOC property book office reviewed the MIPR package? Provide name of reviewer and date of review.

- MIPR approval which may include—
  - USASOC staff judge advocate (name, concur/nonconcur, comments).
  - USASOC deputy chief of staff acquisition and contracting (name, concur/nonconcur, comments).
  - USASOC command analyst/headquarters execution branch budget analyst (name, concur/nonconcur, comments).

C-8. Upon completion of a deployment, project, or program, the allocated resources for that effort must have all accounts closed out. CMSE leaders must plan for time to close out and clear accounts before redeployment to the home station. There are several steps to closing out accounts:

- Complete all contracted agreements and pay all contracted vendors.

- Account for all expended funds on SF 44 or other receipt deemed acceptable by the fund manager.

- Turn in any excess or residual funds and close account with the fund manager (Embassy Budget Management Office).

- Ensure fund manager MIPRs funds back to originating funding source (GCC if OHDACA funds).

- Ensure fund manager in the specific embassy provides the documentation that funds have been processed.
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Appendix D

Project Management

Project management is the discipline of planning, organizing, and managing resources to bring about the successful completion of a specific project and the ultimate transfer of that project to another entity.

OVERVIEW

D-1. CMSEs plan projects that fulfill intermediate objectives consistent with lines of operation established in the USSOCOM series of plans. Projects are organized successively to produce gradual societal changes that inevitably erode support for VEOs and their ideology, thus enabling HNs to counter VEOs. Projects may vary from physical construction to the rendering of specific services. At some point, resources must be applied to build or pay for specific projects and bring them to fruition. Annex A portrays the range of funding sources that is available to facilitate specific actions necessary to complete a project. In the context of CME, project management is not a new science or discipline but an extension of the problem-solving process. It does, however, possess common characteristics in that projects are usually applied as nonlethal measures, they are conceived as objectives within a greater campaign or operational context, and they must be developed so that they meet or contribute to meeting higher headquarters’ objectives.

D-2. All projects consist of a concept (idea), a plan (organized idea), resources (people, equipment, and money), and evaluation. After completion of the bidding process, it is important that the pay agent commit funding before issuing a start work order and obligating the command to payment. This normally involves project approval, which is where the pay agents can use the mnemonic INVEST-E (Identify-Nest-Validate-Employ-Sustain-Timely-Effects) to recall a sound methodology for evaluating the value of a project or program. The INVEST-E methodology (Figure D-1, page D-2) serves as a tool for commanders and their designated practitioners to properly select projects, thereby increasing the effective use of available funds.

D-3. CMSE leaders in the persistent-presence elements must take an active role in coordinating the application of funding resources for presence-for-purpose elements. The persistent-presence element may be called upon to serve as pay agent, contracting officer representatives and develop estimates on behalf of projects, programs and exercises that are integrated into campaign plans to ensure the success of these efforts. CALL Handbook 10-39 provides additional information regarding contract management.

CONTRACTS

D-4. Regardless of funding source, every expenditure must be accompanied by a contract. All contracts share certain components, which include the following items:

- Statement of work.
- Period of performance.
- Deliverables schedule.
- Applicable performance standards.
- Acceptance criteria.
- Special requirements.
- Payment schedule.
### Identify-Nest-Validate-Employ-Sustain-Timely Effects methodology

| I | Identify correctly the needs of the local populace, particularly those civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by violent extremists organizations (VEOs) or by the host nation (HN) and civil-military support element (CMSE) to erode support for VEOs and their ideology and generating ideas or concepts to defeat adversary objectives. |
| N | Nest within the higher headquarters and local government stability and reconstruction priorities identified by analyzing the product of various interagency conflict assessment framework/tactical conflict assessment planning framework and district stability framework processes used throughout the planning and analysis effort and discussed in Chapter 5. Concepts must follow the general ideas established by higher headquarters as ways to defeat adversary objectives. |
| V | Validate legitimate local power structures to determine that the intended effects in fact will have the desired effect on the populace and their support for the HN. Plans generated and nested with the civil-support element’s higher headquarters must be validated by the HN, the interagency and, ultimately, the populace. |
| E | Employ local labor and supplies by establishing partnerships or contracts with indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) to fulfill activities carried out in the physical dimension. These activities are specified tasks that are best fulfilled by indigenous entities that have the means to carry out the desired activity. Fulfillment of these specified tasks must be carried out by a specific vendor or contractor whose activities are constrained or restrained by a contract. |
| S | Sustain by HN after completion. Any plan must include a transition to the IPI. That transition must include the acceptance of the project from the contractor by the IPI (Not by the CMSE). Each transition is terminated with the close out of the project with the fund manager. |
| T | Timely in both initiation and completion (intended and unintended time variables). |
| E | Effects must be linked to measures of effectiveness and evaluated as a measure of performance to achieve the desired effect (not just project completion). |

**Figure D-1. Identify-Nest-Validate-Employ-Sustain-Timely Effects methodology**

D-5. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, defines the performance work statement as “a statement of work for performance-based acquisitions that describe the results in clear, specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes.”

D-6. Areas that are typically addressed by a statement of work are as follows:

- **Scope of Work.** The scope of work describes the work to be done in detail and specifies the hardware and software involved and the exact nature of the work to be done.
  - Specifications, to include—
    - Location of Work. The location of work describes where the work is to be performed. This includes the location of hardware and software and where people meet to perform the work.
    - Plans. Plans are narratives or illustrations describing the specifications in detail.
  - **Period of Performance.** The period of performance specifies the time allowed for projects, such as the start and finish time, the number of hours that can be billed per week or month, where the work is to be performed, and anything that relates to scheduling.
- **Deliverables Schedule.** The deliverables schedule lists the specific deliverables, describing what is due and when.
Applicable Standards. The applicable standards describe any industry-specific standards that need to be adhered to in fulfilling the contract (roof pitch, walls masonry block, foundation depth, reinforcement, and so forth), which may include—

- Materials (country-specific, based upon available materials).
- Techniques (country-specific, based upon level of training and competency of available contractors).
- Codes (country-specific, based upon indigenous governmental requirements).
- Professional standards (based upon universally accepted construction practices).

Acceptance Criteria or Occupancy/Completion. The acceptance criteria specifies how the buyer or receiver of goods determines if the product or service is acceptable. It outlines the criteria used to state the work is acceptable.

Special Requirements. Special requirements specify any special hardware or software, specialized workforce requirements (such as degrees or certifications for personnel), travel requirements, and other requirements not covered in the contract specifics.

Payment Schedule/Type of Contract. The project acceptance depends on whether or not the budget available is enough to cover the work required. The payment breakdown, whether all up front or in phases, must be negotiated very early in the process, to include the terms or conditions with regard to payment, price, charge, rates, wages, and so on. Payment schedules must be defined with absolutely no or minimal payment up front. A clearly defined schedule of payments ensures the pace of payment is equal to the pace of work completed. Types of contracts include:

- Fixed Fee or Lump Sum. This type of contract is used when applying the maximum amount of competitiveness to the bidding process and the availability of funds could be constrained.
- Unit Price (estimated cost per unit). This type of contract is best used when costs are widely known by all and when the maximum level of competitiveness is being applied to the bidding process.
- Cost-Plus (labor and material equal cost plus profit). This type of contract works best when the availability of funds is not a constraint and when a significant portion of the effort involves developing local contractor capacity. This type of contract is also used when time is of the essence, and the availability and cost of materials is vague.

Miscellaneous. Many items do not form part of the main negotiations but are nonetheless very important to the project. They seem minor but when overlooked or forgotten can pose problems for the project.

Compliance. In the case of Title 10 or Title 22, USC, expenditures and regardless of theater, the subunified command will either publish or delegate publication of the standards requiring compliance to funding sources to a subordinate functional command.

Indemnity. Indemnity is usually provided in contracts to hold harmless specific parties for failures to meet specifications, standards, or other MOPs. In the United States, these clauses are usually an indicator of risk and highlight the need for mitigation of risk, such as insurance. In many countries in crisis, the biggest risk is inaction. On the other hand, haste in developing terms and conditions can lead to inaction or worse, action that produces effects contrary to the intent and best interests of the national effort. Indemnity must be addressed upon acceptance that holds U.S. entities harmless of actions.

CONTRACTOR POOL

D-7. When using CERP, OHDACA, or other project funding, it is imperative to have a fair, open competitive bidding process. The first step is to build a local pool of eligible contractors. Contractor pools are developed to heighten competitiveness and promote free market principles. In many underdeveloped countries, vendors and contractors may not be available to support the desired program, project, or exercise. When competitive contractors are limited, CMSE leaders may need to establish vocational training workshops to enhance the capability and increase the contractor pool.
CONTRACTOR CHARACTERISTICS

D-8. The contractor pool should have several characteristics, which consist of the following:

- **Ethnic or Tribal Diversity.** In many Asian and African societies, tribal social structures impact significantly on political and economic variables. In order to reduce conflict in these areas and obtain wider acceptance of projects and programs from a wider portion of the populace, efforts should be made to develop capacity among all segments of the population regardless of tribe, ethnicity, or religious differences.

- **Contractor Capacity.** Contractor capacity should be assessed as appropriate for inclusion into the contractor pool. Some factors to be assessed include—
  - Training and experience relative to the country where the work is to be completed.
  - Resources needed to carry out the project (for example, human capital, financial, equipment and tools, access to material specified).

- **Contractor Competitiveness.** Diversity and increased capacity improves competitiveness and increased competition in the market removes tribal and ethnic bias.

CONTRACTOR CREDIT WORTHINESS

D-9. Contractors should be assessed for their creditworthiness, which includes—

- **Credit.** Contractors can borrow their own working capital to fund construction until their first payment is due. In many underdeveloped countries, construction financing does not exist. Where local practices permit such financial instruments, contractors should be compelled to use their own construction period financing until the end payment is received.

- **Capital.** The contractor possesses adequate working capital to start work without exposing pay agents to risky start work deposits. Contractors should not require *upfront money* to start work. If necessary, upfront expenditures can be provided to cover materials that are fixed to the site upon delivery (such as, pouring concrete). When the contractor can secure their own working capital, it speaks volumes regarding their credit, collateral, and consistency.

- **Collateral.** The contractor possesses resources that could secure the risk if contractor fails to perform. Contractors can be required to provide an insured bond, which pays in the event a contract is not performed. Risk mitigation instruments do not exist in many underdeveloped countries. Requiring a list of contractor-owned assets along with a pledge to surrender the assets in the event they fail may suffice. Collateral can be eliminated when no “upfront expenditures” are rendered, allowing both the contracting party and the contractor to part without loss.

- **Consistency.** The contractor should be assessed on the consistency of their performance. Contractors should have a solid contracting history with satisfactory performance. This is commonly referred to as a list of references or identification of completed projects.
Glossary

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<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>AMEMB</td>
<td>American Embassy</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>ARNGUS</td>
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<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>CME</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>continental United States</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>District Stability Framework</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
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<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FY</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GIG</td>
<td>Global Information Grid</td>
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<td>Global Security Contingency Fund</td>
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<td>HIU</td>
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<td>HN</td>
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<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>inform and influence activities</td>
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<td>INVEST-E</td>
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<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
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<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>military civic action</td>
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<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations</td>
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<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
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<td>public affairs officer</td>
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<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure—physical environment, and time</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
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<td>quadrennial defense review</td>
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<td>regional security officer</td>
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<td>S-2</td>
<td>battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (Army; Marine Corps)</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
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<td>USDAO</td>
<td>United States defense attaché office</td>
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Glossary

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<tr>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>UW</td>
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<td>VEO</td>
<td>violent extremist organization</td>
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**SECTION II - TERMS**

center of gravity
The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 3-0)

civil administration
An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)

Civil Affairs
Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations
Actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs operations project management
The six step process by which Civil Affairs forces identify, validate, plan, coordinate, facilitate, and monitor both material and nonmaterial Civil Affairs operations projects to achieve a supported commander’s objectives relating to the civil component of the operational environment. (FM 3-57)

civil considerations
The influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (ADP 6-0)

civil information
Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander’s operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. (FM 3-57)
civil information management

Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called CIM. (FM 3-57)

civil-military engagement

A formal program that facilitates the U.S. interagency, host nation indigenous authorities, select intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners, and the private sector to build, replace, repair, and sustain civil capabilities and capacities that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations. Civil-military engagement is a globally synchronized and regionally coordinated program of country-specific and regional actions executed through and with indigenous and U.S. interagency partners to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional population support to violent extremist organizations and their networks. Also called CME. (FM 3-57)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

civil-military support element

A task-organized Civil Affairs force that conducts civil-military engagement in a specified country or region. A civil-military support element is composed of a persistent-presence element of Civil Affairs leaders/planners, and a presence-for-purpose element composed of a Civil Affairs Team(s) that may include enablers (for example, health service support [now referred to as medical], engineer, and so on.) who are task organized for a specific time to execute a coordinated mission. Also called CMSE. (FM 3-57)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by Civil Affairs or by other forces, as required. Also called CR. (FM 3-57)

country team

The senior, in-country US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)
Glossary

foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (JP 3-22)

host nation
A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)

humanitarian and civic assistance
Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. (JP 3-29)

insurgency
The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

interagency
Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

internal defense and development
The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (JP 3-22)

measure of effectiveness
A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance
A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 3-0)

nation assistance
Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called NA. (JP 3-0)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

security assistance
Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA. (JP 3-22)
special operations
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. Also called SO. (JP 3-05)

stability tasks
Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-07)

terrorism
The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2)
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