MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

July 2015

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Headquarters, Department of the Army
Foreword

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

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Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations

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Preface

ATP 3-11.41 provides commanders, staffs, key agencies, and military members with a key reference for planning and conducting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) consequence management (CM). It provides the tools for CBRN responders to effectively manage the consequences of a CBRN incident. It may also serve as a reference for the development and refining of training and exercises, but shall not supersede Service policy.

The principal audience for this multi-Service publication is for CBRN responders who plan and conduct CBRN CM operations in domestic, foreign, or theater operational environments, to include military installations. Department of Defense (DOD) personnel responding to a CBRN incident may be responsible for CBRN CM and/or crisis planning and may be required to execute plans across the conflict spectrum. This publication provides a reference for planning, resourcing, and executing CBRN CM in support of domestic or foreign agencies responding to a CBRN incident.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international, and host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

This publication uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Service terms and definitions appear in the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any new terms.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-11.41 is the U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School. The preparing agency is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID); Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division (CODDDD); Doctrine Branch with participation of the approving Service commands. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929; by e-mail to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdidoddcbrndoc@mail.mil>; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. Send Army comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to—

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Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
Introduction

This multi-Service publication incorporates the CM guidance and framework identified in JP 3-40 and JP 3-41. The previous multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) also discussed the CBRN aspects of CM as it related to the Federal Response Plan, which was the current guidance at that time. This MTTP provides information on the National Response Framework (NRF), which replaced the National Response Plan (now obsolete) in 2008. The NRF aligns federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. This manual now complies with the NRF, as appropriate.

This publication is designed for use at the tactical level, but has implications at the operational and strategic level for CBRN CM operations supporting strategic objectives. The document will support command and staff planning in preparing for and conducting CBRN CM operations. This manual focuses on DOD support to domestic or foreign CBRN CM operations and a companion reference, TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83 addresses the CBRN defense response on a DOD installation.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a comprehensive approach to all aspects of incident management, regardless of size, complexity, or cause. The guidance for NIMS was published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2004, and the guidance continues to be refined and updated by the NIMS Integration Center. One of the six primary elements of NIMS is the use of a standardized command and management system for incident scene operations, the Incident Command System (ICS); and for supporting operations centers, the Multiagency Coordination System. In addition, NIMS prescribes specific standards regarding all aspects of preparedness, including planning, training, certification, equipment, and information systems. DOD guidance embraces NIMS, and this manual adopts NIMS when applicable.

This manual also incorporates updated information concerning mass casualty decontamination (MCD) operations that was not previously available.

Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are included in the appendixes. This manual incorporates the joint doctrine elements from JP 3-11, JP 3-40, and JP 3-41 for conducting CBRN CM (foreign and domestic), including planning, preparation, response, and recovery considerations. During operations, this publication is subordinate to current joint publications addressing this topic.

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**Note.** Command and control (C2) is a Marine Corps warfighting function. Mission command is a type of C2. By definition, mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission type orders.
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Chapter 1

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Aspects of Consequence Management

Chapter 1 provides background information on CBRN CM, including terms of reference, operational environments, goals, components, the operations process, and operational phases. Chapter 1 is a general overview of the information contained in the remaining chapters and appendixes.

BACKGROUND

1-1. The focus of this manual is the tactical operational CBRN CM activities for deliberate and inadvertent releases of CBRN material.

1-2. Incidents involving CBRN material produce a chaotic and hazardous environment requiring immediate response to minimize pain and suffering, reduce casualties, and restore essential infrastructure. Responders at the local, state, and federal levels may be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the incident, and U.S. DOD forces may be requested to provide additional support through the NRF. The following is a historical example of the type of support that DOD may provide during an incident:

- **Situation.** In the fall of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to U.S. news media personnel and congressional officials. These letters precipitated the first cases of infection related to an intentional release of anthrax in the United States. Outbreaks of the disease were concentrated in six epicenters where individuals were exposed to spores from contaminated letters. The epicenters were Florida; New York; New Jersey; Connecticut; Capitol Hill in Washington, District of Columbia (D.C.); and the Washington, D.C. regional area, which includes Maryland and Virginia.

- **Impact.** The anthrax incidents caused illness in 22 people—11 with the cutaneous (skin) form and 11 with the inhalational (respiratory) form. Five people died from anthrax inhalation. Beyond the epicenters, there was also a psychological impact on the rest of the country, which caused people to be wary of suspicious mail. This wariness triggered additional reports of possible anthrax incidents, which later turned out to be false alarms.

- **Support.** Upon request, DOD provided military response assets to support CM operations on Capitol Hill. Military assets collected suspect samples while operating in Level A protection and conducted technical decontamination of their team and other response workers. Military CBRN responders received the mission to remove contaminated mail from the P Street postal facility in Washington, D.C. (Refer to FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46 for a description of the civilian levels of protection.)

1-3. To synchronize DOD support to CM operations, units must understand the NRF emergency support functions (ESFs). ESFs detail the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of federal agencies for coordinating resources and support during incidents of national significance. The ESFs are defined as—

- ESF 1. Transportation.
- ESF 2. Communications.
- ESF 3. Public works and engineering.
- ESF 4. Firefighting.
- ESF 5. Emergency management.
- ESF 7. Resource support, logistics management, and resource support.
- ESF 8. Public health and medical services.
1-4. This publication provides tactical CM doctrine that incorporates appropriate national and military strategies, policy, joint doctrine (such as JP 3-41), and the NRF (when applicable).

1-5. This chapter provides terms of reference used throughout the manual, a description of the operational environments in which CBRN CM is conducted, and an overview of the factors that govern response support. Chapters 1 through 5 provide the principle-based doctrine, while appendixes A through D provide the supporting TTP that evolve based on capability enhancements and/or lessons learned.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1-6. This section provides key term definitions used throughout this manual. Key term definitions are—

- **Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management** is actions taken to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. (JP 3-41) Figure 1-1 depicts the common hazard groups that may require CM operations.

- **Weapons of mass destruction** are weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 3-40) Other definitions of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be found in Section 2332a, Title 18, U.S. Code (18 USC 2332a), 50 USC 2302, and the NRF.

- **Immediate-response authority** is a federal military commander’s DOD component heads and/or responsible DOD civilian officials authority temporarily to employ resources under their control, subject to any supplement directive provided by higher headquarters and provide those resources to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage from a civil authority under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from higher authority within the United States. Immediate-response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory. (DODD 3025.18)

- **First responders** are firefighters, law enforcement or security personnel, emergency medical technicians, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel who provide initial, immediate response to an all-hazards incident. (DODI 6055.17)

- **Emergency responders** are firefighters, law enforcement, security personnel, emergency medical technicians, emergency management and operations personnel, EOD personnel, physicians, nurses, medical treatment providers at medical treatment facilities (MTFs), disaster preparedness officers, public health officers, bioenvironmental engineers, and mortuary affairs personnel. (DODI 3020.52)

- **Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear responders** are Department of Defense military and civilian personnel who are trained to respond to CBRN incidents and certified to operate safely at appropriate levels according to Section 120, Part 1910, Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR 1910.120) and NFPA 472. (See FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42.) The levels of CBRN responder certification are—
  - Awareness.
  - Operations.
  - Technician.
GOALS

1-7. Goals help focus how DOD conducts CBRN CM. They provide a common understanding of the purpose of CBRN CM.

1-8. The primary goals of CBRN CM are to save lives; prevent injury; provide temporary critical life support; protect critical property, infrastructure, and the environment; restore essential operations; contain the event; and preserve national security. Figure 1-2, page 1-4, illustrates the CBRN CM goals.

1-9. The CBRN defense principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination support these same goals. For example—

- **Saving lives.** Saving lives is the greatest priority during CM operations. This includes immediate life saving measures given by first responders, life-sustaining techniques (emergency decontamination, MCD), and prophylaxis to ensure long-term casualty care, treatment, and safety.

- **Preventing injury.** Protection-related measures help prevent or mitigate exposure to hazards that cause injury or illness. These measures include setting up a security perimeter and establishing hazard control zones.

- **Providing temporary critical life support.** Response-related measures are conducted to assist civil authorities in the provision of medical services to injured personnel.

- **Protecting critical property, infrastructure, and the environment.** The protection of critical property, infrastructure, and the environment occurs through the rapid application of decontamination efforts, early warning, reporting of incidents, and protection of key personnel. Command decisions to shelter in place or evacuate also support the protection of resources.
- **Restoring essential operations.** Following a CBRN event, a likely consequence is the loss of one or more essential services or operations. The rapid restoration of power, water, communication nodes, and transportation routes accompanied by decontamination efforts are vital to continuing critical command missions.

- **Containing the event.** Controlling access to an incident site and conducting proper decontamination procedures limit the spread of contamination. Establishing hazard control zones (cold, warm, and hot) helps to ensure safe work areas for emergency responders and supporting resources.

- **Preserving national security.** CBRN defense principles contribute to the preservation of national security by protecting critical infrastructure within the United States or other locations. When U.S. forces are prepared to respond to an incident, it supports the larger strategic goal of preserving national security. (For installation-specific CBRN defense principles, refer to TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83.)

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![CBRN CM Goals Diagram](image)

**Legend:**

| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear |
| CM  | consequence management                        |

**Figure 1-2. CBRN CM goals**
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-10. CBRN CM operations occur in foreign and domestic settings. DOD must be prepared to conduct CBRN CM operations when called on.

1-11. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. DOD conducts CM operations in three types of operational environments:

- **DSCA during a domestic response.** This response includes assisting federal agencies within the United States, territories, and possessions according to guidance in the NRF. DOD supports operations within its capabilities through liaison with the incident commander (IC).
- **Defense support to a foreign request.** DOD supports the Department of State (DOS) with operations originating from a foreign request. Tasks originate from the HN through the DOS. However, DOD commanders may take appropriate action in life-threatening situations while awaiting DOD or DOS tasking.
- **DOD-led operations.** DOD leads the operational response for an incident involving U.S. forces and allies across the range of military operations. This also includes responding on a DOD installation. (See JP 3-41 for additional information on DOD-led operations.)

1-12. DOD forces tasked to support civil authorities during domestic CM and FCM operations will use the level of protection as determined by the IC. However, in a DOD-led CM response, the senior DOD official will make risk-based decisions, to include decisions on the level of protection.

1-13. A domestic CM response will normally be led by the DHS, and the DOS will normally lead a foreign response. In the first two environments, DOD will normally operate in support of the DHS or the DOS. However, DOD will likely have full control in the third operational environment. In each of the three response elements, DOD retains C2 of all DOD assets.

TASKS

1-14. CBRN CM tasks are conducted during the operations process. A graphical representation of the CBRN CM tasks is shown in figure 1-3, page 1-6. The components are—

- **Assess the situation.** Response units continually collect and analyze information before, during, and after each mission to enable the confirmation, correction, or refutation of existing analyses. Assessment activities provide the ability to predict future requirements to make necessary planning and operational adjustments. Assessment activities include threat, readiness, plans and TTP, detection and analysis, and surveillance. At the tactical level, the response element (a decontamination or survey team) assesses information on the hazard (such as agent flammability, reactivity, explosiveness, and physical properties; protective clothing requirements; weather information; and site drawings).

- **Coordinate operations.** Response units coordinate the full range of activities across the spectrum of the mission. Coordination activities include exercise, warning, and reporting; C2 and synchronization; security and control; forensics; sample collection and packaging; and public and civil affairs activities. At the tactical level, the response element (the CBRN survey team) conducts coordination within the military task force (or with other supporting activities) to coordinate linkup times and locations for staging area operations or operational updates. Responding units report to the incident command post and are assigned tasks according to its level of training and incident requirements.

- **Conduct logistics.** Response units plan and conduct the movement and sustainment of forces for CBRN CM operations. Logistic activities that may be conducted by response elements include pre-positioning materials; transporting casualties, remains, and samples; deploying personnel and material; and maintaining facilities and material.
• **Provide health service support.** Response units provide health service support (HSS) during CBRN CM operations. HSS addresses services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include the management of health services resources (manpower, monies, facilities); preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supplies and equipment and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. The term *force health protection* will be used, according to JP 1-02, when the following definition applies: measures to promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of a Service member to enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards.

• **Decontaminate.** Response units remove contamination from personnel, equipment, and facilities. Decontamination activities include emergency, responder, mass casualty, and patient decontamination.

**Figure 1-3. CBRN CM tasks pillar**

**OPERATIONS PROCESS**

1-15. The operations process consists of four primary activities—plan, prepare, execute, and continually assess. CBRN CM follows this model. Within the CBRN CM process, the execution activity is further expanded into two subordinate activities—response and recovery. This expansion is necessary to address the graduated level of effort from immediate actions to full restoration. (See figure 1-4.) Assessments are continuous throughout preincident and postincident activities. The planning and preparation activities support the NRF prevention efforts, while the response and recovery actions support the NRF mitigation efforts. The chapters and appendixes that follow provide doctrine and supporting TTP for these CBRN CM activities.
PLAN

1-16. Planning involves the assessment of the operational environment and enables commanders to identify minimum standards for training, organizing, equipping, and protecting resources. The response unit planning process determines preparation and facilitates response and recovery operations. Chapter 2 and appendix A discuss the planning process in more detail.

PREPARE

1-17. Preparation implements the approved plan and relevant agreements to increase readiness through training, exercises, and certification. Vulnerability reduction measures are initiated by the response unit to support prevention and mitigation functions. Chapter 3 and appendix B discuss the preparation process in more detail.

RESPOND

1-18. The response process addresses the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response measures initiated by the response unit include those actions taken to save lives, protect property, and establish control. Chapter 4 and appendix C discuss the response process in more detail.
RECOVER

1-19. The response unit initiates the recovery process, focusing on restoring mission capability and essential public and government services interrupted by the incident. The recovery phase also includes completing the mitigation of the immediate hazard. Chapter 5 and appendix D discuss the recovery process in more detail.

JOINT OPERATIONAL PHASES

1-20. During domestic or foreign response operations, response elements follow a multiphase operational approach that is similar to the approach taken for other military deployment operations. The operational phases parallel the operations process as the CBRN CM objectives unfold. This parallel relationship is depicted in figure 1-5.

Figure 1-5. Operational phases

1-21. The operational phases are—

- **Alert, preparation, and situation assessment.** Response elements take actions such as alerting unit personnel, assessing the incident and preparing for deployment. The advanced echelon travels to the incident site.
- **Deployment.** Upon receipt of the appropriate directive, the unit moves to the designated location within the time frame specified.
- **Support to U.S., civil, or HN authorities.** Response elements (remaining under DOD C2) support coordinated actions to accomplish the CM goals.
- **Transition.** This phase outlines the remaining tasks for the response element to complete before redeployment, following coordination between the DOD C2 element and the applicable HN or domestic authority.
- **Redeployment.** The response unit begins redeployment when directed. This phase is complete when the unit has reached its designated home station.
Chapter 2
Planning

Chapter 2 discusses the various assessments used during the planning process. The assessments reviewed include operational environment, capabilities, vulnerability, risk, deliberate site, and HSS.

BACKGROUND

2-1. Planning is an integral part of CBRN CM. A CBRN CM plan is a living document that should be maintained and updated as changes occur.

MISSION

2-2. A response unit begins planning for CBRN CM operations when it receives a mission from headquarters to conduct or support CM operations. (See figure 2-1, page 2-2, for the planning phase relative to the other phases of the CBRN CM process.) A unit may determine if it must be prepared to support or conduct CM operations by analyzing its given mission and conducting a mission-to-task analysis. The mission-to-task analysis may identify one of the unit tasks as “Conduct CBRN CM Operations or Support CBRN CM Operations.”

PLAN

2-3. The supporting response unit plan can be an operation plan (OPLAN) or a contingency plan which can be converted to an operation order (OPORD) to execute or support operations. (Appendix A provides further details on plan development and an example of a plan.)

PLANNING

2-4. Planning involves conducting assessments of the operational environment (including the threat), vulnerabilities, capabilities, and risks. Additionally, war-gaming is conducted for scenarios that address deliberate site assessments for known locations. Response unit planning is conducted like other military mission planning. The unit uses whatever method it normally uses to plan its missions. One such method is the military decisionmaking process. This process consists of—

- Mission receipt.
- Mission analysis.
- Course-of-action development.
- Course-of-action analysis.
- Course-of-action comparison.
- Course-of-action approval.
- Order production.
2-5. There are two levels of planning that occur—

- **Contingency planning.** Contingency planning includes those Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) planning activities that occur in noncrisis situations. The joint planning and execution community uses contingency planning to develop OPLANs for a broad range of contingencies. OPLANs are based on requirements identified in the contingency planning guidance, joint strategic capabilities plan, or other planning directives. Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis action planning.

- **Crisis action planning.** Crisis action planning is a JOPES process involving the time-sensitive development of joint OPLANs and OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist when planning occurs.

**OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT**

2-6. An operational environment assessment provides the response unit commander with information on the threat, the physical environment, and the political environment. Decision support tools may be used in conjunction with this information to assist predictive modeling. Decision support tools may be in the hands of the response unit or obtained by the unit using reachback capabilities or a capability available at the incident site.
**THREAT**

2-7. The threat assessment identifies what the response unit will face during a CM operation. At the tactical level, the threat assessment is provided by the applicable military C2 element. The threat assessment addresses the types of agents and hazards at an incident site and includes occupational and environmental health (OEH) assessments. Additionally, the response unit receives information on potential CBRN storage or production facilities in the vicinity and the methods used to deliver or release CBRN agents or materials. Estimates may be furnished regarding when, where, and how agents or materials may be used. Higher headquarters guidance provides information on previous incidents (past use) and the current threat level as established at the incident site.

2-8. The CBRN response unit (or element) receives situation reports, intelligence summary reports, and spot reports that provide information to update the commander’s situational awareness and common operational picture. Information sharing between civil and military law enforcement agencies provides a means to track local civil threats.

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**PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT**

2-9. The physical environment includes terrain, weather, and characteristics of the geographical area that affect the CM response. Characteristics include critical infrastructure, hazard sites, and zone analysis considerations.

**Critical Infrastructure**

2-10. The response unit reviews the critical infrastructure near the incident site. The presence (or absence) of the following critical infrastructure impacts the operations at an incident site:

- **Telecommunications.** The availability of networks and systems that support the transmission and exchange of electronic communications among and between end users (such as networked computers) directly affects operations (such as technical reachback).
- **Electrical power.** The availability of generation stations and transmission and distribution networks that create and supply electricity to response teams impacts the logistic support required.
- **Chemical, nuclear power, gas, and oil production, storage, and delivery.** The holding, refining, and processing facilities for these fuels and the pipelines, ships, trucks, and rail systems that transport them could be potential targets.
- **Transportation.** The aviation, rail, highway and aquatic vehicles, conduits, and support systems by which hazmat is moved from a point of origin to a destination point could be targets; their availability directly affects logistic support.
- **Water supply systems.** Water sources, reservoirs and holding facilities, aqueducts and other transport systems, filtration and cleaning systems, pipelines, cooling systems, sewage treatment plants, and other delivery mechanisms that provide for domestic and industrial applications (including systems dealing with decontamination) could be targets. The availability of an adequate water supply system affects logistic support and decontamination operations.
- **Emergency services.** Local, state, and federal medical, police, fire, and rescue system capabilities provide resources that military response assets will augment.

**Hazard Sites**

2-11. Known or suspected WMD and toxic industrial material (TIM) production, storage, research, or related facilities must be considered potential sources for CBRN hazard release. This is an especially critical aspect to the targeting process. These facilities must be identified and prioritized on WMD or TIM master site lists and maintained with other target folders.

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*Note.* ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-20.70 provides procedures for conducting a CBRN threat analysis or assessment.
Zone Analysis

2-12. The response unit receives a zone analysis of the vicinity of the CBRN CM incident site. The zoning procedure divides an urban area into zones according to the major categories of building occupancy or function. The zoning information can be presented in the form of an annotated map or color-coded overlay. Typical zones include—

- Residential.
- Commercial.
- Industrial.
- Transportation.
- Storage.
- Military.

Political Environment

2-13. For support of domestic operations, the response unit receives information on agreements (memorandums of understanding and memorandums of agreement) that are in place to support operations. For example, contracted logistic support may be available at the incident site (via a memorandum of agreement) to provide logistic support, or other agreements may be in place to provide other needed capabilities (such as water resupply).

2-14. For support of foreign CBRN CM operations, the response unit is advised of applicable HN agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and other sovereignty issues that may apply.

2-15. Installation 10 USC assets receive tasks to provide support to validated requests for assistance (RFAs). Installation resources capable of providing the necessary response are then sent to a CM incident area to perform the tasks, with operational control normally assigned to the defense coordinating officer or joint task force (JTF) during a CBRN incident. The defense coordinating officer is the DOD on-scene representative who coordinates DSCA requirements for the supporting response units with the IC or designated representative.

2-16. The 32 USC support resources, such as installation-based Army National Guard units, remain under the control of the governor through the adjutant general. However, Army National Guard units assigned to an installation could operate (on or off the installation) within its state of assignment or within another state to support a CBRN CM incident under one of four potential authorities. (See TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83t for additional information.) Potential authorities are—

- Immediate response.
- Interstate compacts.
- State-to-state memorandums of agreements.
- Mobilization under 10 USC.

Capabilities Assessment

2-17. A capabilities assessment is conducted during CBRN CM planning. It provides a candid picture of the DOD ability to conduct CBRN CM.

2-18. The capabilities assessment is a tool used by the commander to gauge the unit ability to conduct or support CBRN CM operations. It involves the continuous assessment of unit plans, organization, manpower, equipment, logistics, training, leadership, and readiness. (See CJCSI 3125.01D for information on response unit CBRN CM capabilities and appendix A for additional information.)

2-19. Before a CBRN CM incident, military organizations and activities identified to conduct, augment, or manage CM operations assess its readiness posture to determine its ability to perform the full range of CM tasks. The commander considers the capabilities required to execute the missions and their ability to integrate CBRN CM tasks.
Representative CM tasks include the following:

- **Provide logistic and engineering support of operations.** This task involves identifying, allocating, and providing the resources necessary for the protection of responders, personnel, victims, critical infrastructure, and equipment.

- **Handle, process, store, and transport contaminated equipment, material, samples, residues, and animal remains.** This task includes gathering samples, adhering to chain-of-evidence procedures, and recovering animal remains. It encompasses preparation for the transport of contaminated materials, samples, residues, equipment, animal remains, and waste.

- **Handle, process, store, and transport contaminated human remains.** This task addresses marking, handling, decontaminating, processing, and temporarily storing contaminated human remains and preparing them for transport.

- **Protect against exposure and effects of chemical agents.** This task includes the application of guidelines for operations within contaminated environments; implementation and maintenance of safety requirements; application and wearing of personal protective equipment (PPE); provision/administration of prophylaxes; marking of contaminated material and hazard locations; enforcement of protective posture protocols; establishment and operation of collective protective systems; implementation of shelter-in-place procedures; issuance of CBRN protective material to affected civilian populations, nonmilitary responders, or non-DOD forces; and implementation of movement controls.

- **Protect against exposure and effects of biological agents.** This task includes the application of guidelines for operations within contaminated or infectious environments; implementation and maintenance of safety requirements; application and wearing of PPE; provision and administration of prophylaxes; marking of contaminated or infectious material and hazard locations; enforcement of protective posture protocols; establishment and operation of collective protective systems; implementation of shelter-in-place procedures; issuance of CBRN protective material to affected civilian populations, nonmilitary responders, or non-DOD forces; and implementation of movement controls. It encompasses the performance and enforcement of prescribed measures for isolation and quarantine.

- **Protect against exposure and effects of nuclear and radiological agents.** This task includes the application of guidelines for operations within contaminated environments; implementation and maintenance of safety requirements; application and wearing of PPE; marking of contaminated material and hazard locations; enforcement of protective posture protocols; establishment and operation of collective protective systems; implementation of shelter-in-place procedures; issuance of CBRN protective material to affected civilian populations, nonmilitary responders, or non-DOD forces; and implementation of movement controls.

- **Provide large-scale medical services.** This task includes collecting and processing laboratory specimens, administering medical prophylaxes and treatment, triaging and resuscitating patients, tracking casualties, and providing in-transit medical care to casualties. It also includes communicating and coordinating medical response with relevant non-DOD agencies, decontaminating casualties, providing medical oversight of responder health and well-being, and ensuring food and water safety.

- **Conduct tactical CM crisis action planning.** This task involves forecasting future resource and operational requirements to support anticipated tasks. It integrates attached forces, DOD and non-DOD; defines responsibilities and roles; identifies areas of interoperability; provides instruction for areas of noninteroperability; and specifies subordinate unit tasks and activities to accomplish the mission. It also includes contingency planning for potential circumstances.

- **Assess the operational environment.** This task addresses the conduct of assessment and characterization of the operational environment, including the integration of information and data to determine the location and source of the primary and secondary hazards associated with the task.

- **Conduct tactical CM C2.** This task encompasses the establishment and operation of a CBRN CM response C2 structure that facilitates CBRN CM operations and activities and is interoperable with participating forces.
Perform incident/hazard risk assessment. This task includes establishing a mutually supporting warning and reporting system for the collection and dissemination of prompt, accurate information to the public, joint forces, HNs, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations and disseminating appropriate intelligence information regarding continuing or potential primary and secondary hazards.

Establish and maintain access/egress controls and hazard zone perimeter. This task addresses implementing measures to contain and control contamination, including marking and identifying hazard areas, maintaining clear access to the incident site, and controlling access to and from hazard areas.

Conduct victim and casualty search, rescue, and extraction. This task includes establishing and operating search and rescue processing centers, applying applicable quarantine and isolation measures, providing support for people with special needs (physical or mental disabilities) who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid, managing and conducting immediate lifesaving measures, evacuating casualties to hot-zone egress points and into a decontamination site, and evacuating noncontaminated victims to appropriate medical and/or mass care facilities.

Establish temporary housing and processing operations and evacuate the affected population. This task addresses the establishment and operation of processing centers to receive and process the affected population, including screening for medical needs, collecting relevant information, and facilitating evacuation.

Conduct decontamination operations. This task includes decontaminating operations for civilian and military personnel, equipment, and assets. It encompasses ambulatory and nonambulatory personnel, including casualties. Decontamination may include a range of activities (removal, sealing, weathering, neutralization, and other means of mitigating or eliminating contamination).

Isolate, quarantine, and manage potentially contaminated or infectious human and animal populations. This task includes screening individuals and animals for exposure patterns and symptoms, establishing isolation and quarantine enforcement requirements, and implementing movement controls from isolation and quarantine areas.

Perform medical surveillance. This task includes screening individuals for symptoms and conducting medical evaluations before and after the incident. It also includes establishing, maintaining, and populating a central medical database to assist health care providers and decisionmakers, integrating surveillance data, and ensuring that information contained in the database is interoperable with relevant interagency and HN entities.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

2-21. A vulnerability assessment is a key part of CBRN CM planning. It allows commanders to take a holistic look at the organization strengths and weaknesses compared to the operational environment and CBRN threat.

2-22. ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-20.70 can be used to assess unit capabilities and readiness. The process examines —

- Unit terrorism CM plans and terrorist incident response measures.
- Military unit or activity capabilities to support its core competencies (emergency operations and response). These include fire or medical capabilities; mass casualty, technical, or emergency decontamination; EOD; hazmat; mass notification; emergency operations center operations; and incident response operations, to include an assessment of training and resources.
- Unit advisory or assistance support.
- The adequacy of deployment procedures to support operations.

2-23. The vulnerability assessment includes the other types of assessments discussed as an overall snapshot of unit ability to support or conduct an operation given the operational environment and the unit capabilities. (See figure 2-2.)
2-24. The vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses in the unit plans. The vulnerability assessment helps develop (or recommends) vulnerability reduction measures to counter these identified weaknesses. Vulnerability reduction measures are discussed in chapter 3.

2-25. Developing a vulnerability assessment plan requires a comparison of the threat with unit vulnerabilities to determine the efforts necessary to safely meet incident requirements. The vulnerability assessment also includes the integration of the commander’s guidance through a composite risk management process to prioritize vulnerability reduction measure implementation. During the planning phase, the vulnerability assessment begins with the identification of the hazards and an analysis of each hazard. During the planning phase, the vulnerability assessment continues by integrating the specific threat assessment with an analysis of specific vulnerabilities and the identification of potential vulnerability reduction measures. The end state during the planning phase is typically an estimate and recommendation to the commander on the priorities for vulnerability reduction.

**RISK ASSESSMENT**

2-26. Commanders conduct risk assessments during CBRN CM planning to quantify the level of risk that may exist in the conduct of CBRN CM.

2-27. The response unit identifies and assesses the risks associated with its assigned missions and makes decisions that balance the costs of those risks with mission benefits. In certain incidents (such as high-radiation hazards), the risk may not be acceptable.

2-28. Commanders must be cognizant of their operational environment. Acceptable risks associated with wartime may not be acceptable when conducting a CM operation. An example can be found in the differences in guidance for radiation exposure for military personnel during war and civilian first responders in a domestic environment. Generally, a higher level of risk is accepted during a wartime situation than would be acceptable under Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for radiation exposures in a domestic environment. It is expected that DOD forces operating in a domestic CM environment will be held to the same standards as their civilian counterparts.
DELIBERATE SITE ASSESSMENT

2-29. A deliberate site assessment allows commanders to better recognize and identify potential CBRN hazards within their area of operations (AO). This allows units to be prepared to execute CBRN CM operations against potential existing sites, if needed.

2-30. Before an incident, a response unit conducts deliberate assessments of sites within its AO that may pose a potential hazard in the future. The following examples are provided for clarification—

- U.S. forces supporting implementation force operations in Tuzla, Bosnia, supported a HN effort to conduct a deliberate site assessment of CBRN hazards at the Sudaso Chemical Factory. This factory, within the U.S. AO, was reported to possess large rail containers filled with chlorine and other hazardous chemicals. The deliberate site assessment hazard analysis indicated that large amounts of chlorine or other hazardous chemicals released into the environment (air and water supply) could seriously affect the local population. Using information gathered by CBRN reconnaissance personnel during these site assessments, the unit was better able to plan for a potential CM response.

- U.S. CBRN military units supporting a DHS national CM exercise in 2004 conducted deliberate site assessments of TIM locations. Using information collected during these site assessments, the units were better able to plan for a potential CM response.

2-31. Units conduct deliberate site assessments as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and prepare potential threat folders for each site assessed. They use these folders to strategize how they would respond if an incident occurred at these sites and to prepare tentative response plans for each incident. Pertinent information collected by the units for each potential threat is maintained in the folder for use in a future response. Information could include floor plans, site maps, ingress and egress routes, potential staging areas, and a determination of prevailing winds to produce downwind hazard predictions. While there is no standard format for these potential threat folders, suggested content is provided in table 2-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-1. Sample potential threat folder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN agent presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Drawings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Photographs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Building plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:  
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

2-32. It is critical to gather as much information and intelligence as possible on the site. It is probable that extensive information will be available on most sites. Background information on the site will be critical for detailed planning. Imagery, maps, and site sketches will assist in the planning. The site assessment identifies sample information (types of CBRN agents or material that may be present, the organization of the facility, and the number of people who typically work at the site).
2-33. CBRN response units identify specified and implied mission tasks. Specified tasks are those directly stated in the mission order that specifically outline what is to be accomplished by the mission. Implied tasks are the necessary tasks that will be executed by the team to accomplish the specified tasks. (See table 2-2.)

Table 2-2. Sample CBRN CM tasks—incident site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBRN tasks</th>
<th>HN tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical interviews</td>
<td>Witness interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual inspections</td>
<td>Meteorological assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downwind plume assessment</td>
<td>Site diagrams, maps, and sketches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area chemical, biological, and radiological search</td>
<td>Determination of exact global positioning system location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil sampling</td>
<td>Area CBRN surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water sampling</td>
<td>Solid sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air sampling</td>
<td>Vegetation sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface sampling</td>
<td>Biological agent detection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with civil or HN authorities</td>
<td>Sample packaging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical-agent detection</td>
<td>Emergency, technical, or mass casualty decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample preservation</td>
<td>Medical treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample chain-of-custody measures</td>
<td>Patient evacuation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
HN host nation

2-34. Using the information collected, the response unit determines what primary missions can be accomplished from within its capabilities. Primary and secondary mission objectives should be clearly outlined.

2-35. Using the essential elements of the information list, the unit generates requests for information. Sample essential elements of information are identified in table 2-3.

Table 2-3. Sample essential elements of information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential elements of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly force dispositions and activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical and biological warfare activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known chemical industry/storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known environmental pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of the facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible landing zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road network around the facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield in the vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil jurisdiction requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical support requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT

2-36. The HSS assessment contains the following tasks:

- Determining operational exposure limits.
- Determining the medical threats.
- Identifying medical countermeasures.
- Determining the health risks/threats in the incident area.
- Identifying the populace at risk in the incident area.
- Identifying local health care facility capabilities.
- Determining DOD augmentation needs.
- Determining the types and numbers of medical units or personnel required to provide support at the incident location.
Chapter 3

Preparation

Chapter 3 provides information on actions taken to prepare units for CBRN CM operations. The activities discussed include vulnerability reduction measures, coordination and reporting, HSS preparation activities, exercises, reassessment of capabilities and identification of remaining vulnerabilities, and national special-security events.

BACKGROUND

3-1. During the preparation phase, response units conduct systematic vulnerability reduction measures. The accomplishment of these measures supports unit readiness to undertake assigned missions. This chapter focuses on means of determining the requirements and developing the capabilities to implement the planning for conducting high-priority vulnerability reduction measures. (See figure 3-1, page 3-2, for the preparation phase in relation to the other phases of the CBRN CM process.)

3-2. Response units undertake concurrent actions to maintain readiness as part of a continuous cyclic process. The concurrent unit vulnerability reduction measures include assessment, planning, training and education, and exercises. (Appendix B provides further detail on vulnerability reduction measures that can assist a unit in preparing for an operation.)

3-3. The response unit also undertakes measures to integrate its preparation activities with other supporting and supported assets. Representative action areas include coordination, logistics, and HSS.

3-4. Exercises serve as a gauge for the commander to reassess capabilities and identify the remaining vulnerabilities that affect mission execution. Exercises provide an opportunity to test plans and make refinements as necessary. The material in this chapter addresses procedures for preparing and sustaining unit CM capabilities.

Note. ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-20.70 provides generic CBRN vulnerability reduction measures that can be adapted when planning and preparing operations.

SUSTAINMENT

3-5. Adequate logistics planning is a key element in operations and requires planning for a continuous resupply of consumable items and personnel.

LOGISTICS

3-6. The response unit possesses an organic logistic capability to support the following basic functions:
   • Sustain the unit ability to conduct operations.
   • Maintain logistic status reports.
   • Coordinate with supporting logistic providers.
   • Procure and store unit equipment according to command guidance.

3-7. A response unit deploys with adequate stocks to sustain operations for a limited duration. To sustain extended operations, a deployed unit receives additional logistic and personnel augmentation.
3-8. The logistic posture for a response unit includes military standard equipment (mission-oriented protective posture [MOPP] gear) or DOD-approved, commercial, off-the-shelf equipment (civilian protective ensembles). During the preparation phase, the response unit identifies the supporting logistic requirements to sustain operations.

*Note.* Throughout the rest of this manual, military standard gear or MOPP gear will be referred to as individual protective equipment and civilian, commercial, off-the-shelf protective ensembles (nonstandard equipment sets) will be referred to as PPE.

3-9. The military standard issue of CBRN detection, protection, and decontamination equipment provides units with the ability to detect and protect against a number of CBRN agents. However, standard issue items, such as the M40A1 mask, are technically noncompliant with OSHA and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health standards and may not be used during nonmilitary operations, such as domestic CM.
3-10. It is important to note that not every unit or installation will possess all capabilities. Standard capabilities can be referenced in the following:

- CBRN detection and protection—FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46.
- CBRN decontamination—FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60.
- CBRN monitoring and surveillance—ATP 3-11.37/MCWP 3-37.4/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP 3-2.44.

3-11. Nonstandard equipment sets provide units with additional capabilities, such as the ability to detect many substances and chemicals that are immediately dangerous to life or health. CBRN CM response forces may be required to maintain PPE sets that provide greater protection than those commonly provided for military protection against chemical and biological warfare. In a domestic CM environment, DOD forces tasked to support civil authorities in downrange operations shall meet the training, equipment, and proficiency standards for such operations as determined by federal law and policy. Standards may be found in 29 CFR 1910.120 and applicable guidance for the interagency board and other federally recognized policy boards or documents. Additionally, equipment that is capable of detecting a greater range of substances is required to identify TIM and organic substances in addition to chemical and biological warfare agents.

3-12. Other logistic considerations include personnel support measures that are needed while deployed to an incident site. These considerations include the following:

- Billeting.
- Rations.
- Transportation support.
- Security.

**PERSONNEL**

3-13. Response unit leaders identify the duties and responsibilities for each position in their unit. Checklists should be prepared to identify the individual and collective tasks that require completion.

3-14. During this preparation phase, leaders are aware of the requirements that each unit member must fulfill (such as periodic medical examinations and scheduled certification training). Personnel shortages are also identified periodically through readiness reporting.

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

3-15. Education and training are important for any operation. However, certain courses are required for personnel conducting CBRN CM incident response.

**EDUCATION**

3-16. Response unit organizations and personnel at all levels must be appropriately educated to provide an effective all-hazards CM capability. CBRN CM operations need to be adequately emphasized in applicable programs of instruction. For those units without experience in civilian exercises on a local, state, regional, or national basis, limited opportunities exist to incorporate lessons learned from these events into institutional education, simulations, and exercises. All personnel should be educated in basic CBRN awareness. Personnel assigned special responsibilities should receive more specific operational instruction. Numerous courses and training opportunities are available from various government and private sources.
3-17. A compendium of these resources is available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Important educational opportunities are available in the following areas:

- **General awareness.**
  - **Protection/antiterrorism.** One component of combating terrorism includes defensive measures against terrorist attacks. All personnel train on the fundamentals necessary to defend against terrorist attacks.
  - **Overview of CBRN counterterrorism operations.** Based on the roles and responsibilities of the audience, this may include the fundamentals of the NRF, the ICS, and Service-specific issues.

- **Specific operational education.**
  - The role of the senior action agency, such as DHS or DOS.
  - Legal authorities, constraints, and limitations.
  - Logistic and support requirements, including fiscal reimbursement issues.
  - C2 structures.

*Note.* The DOD Emergency Preparedness Course is an example of this type of training. This course prepares emergency preparedness liaison officers and staffs to plan and execute joint military operations that support civil authorities responding to domestic emergencies and disasters. The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) offers the course eight times a year at the FEMA Mount Weather Emergency Assistance Center, Berryville, Virginia, and conducts training within the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility (AORs) each year. This training is authorized by DODD 3025.18.

**TRAINING**

3-18. Response units train to perform individual and collective CBRN CM tasks as units and joint forces. Licensing and certification standards vary, based on the geographical location and the equipment available to each unit. Unit leaders ensure that all operators are fully trained to complete their assigned missions.

**Training Tasks**

3-19. Response units conduct training on key universal joint task list (UJTL) and applicable Service-specific training tasks that support preparedness and response and recovery measures. Using the UJTL as a baseline helps to support a common framework for training.

**Training Conditions**

3-20. Response units use a simulated hazardous environment as a condition for selected training events. The degradation experienced by operating in the appropriate protective posture provides a level of realism that improves unit preparedness. This type of training provides unit leadership with an assessment of the effectiveness of vulnerability reduction measures.

**General Training Considerations**

3-21. CBRN awareness training is available for every military member, DOD civilian, contractor, appropriate family member, and local national hired by DOD—regardless of rank. These personnel should be aware of CBRN actions and effects, the need to maintain vigilance for possible CBRN actions, and the methods for employment of CBRN TTP. To ensure an effective CM response, a cross-functional training program should be implemented. Thorough training is required to prepare individuals and response teams to safely and efficiently respond to a terrorist CBRN attack at their required level of proficiency.

**Incident Management System Training**

3-22. There are training courses that personnel should complete before they are qualified to respond to CBRN incidents during domestic CM operations. These courses are listed below.
General Considerations

3-23. Response units must have personnel who are trained to respond to a CBRN attack. Personnel participating in the incident response should be trained to competently perform within the ICS/unified command structure. Incident management system training focuses on domestic CM operations.

Note. Numbered courses (with the prefixes (Independent Study [IS] and ICS) are available from FEMA Emergency Management Institute.

Minimum Requirements

3-24. The following are minimum requirements for personnel who will fulfill an incident management role:

- Response unit entry level responders (including firefighters, security personnel, emergency medical services providers, and other emergency personnel) will require an introduction to the basic components of the ICS entry level courses. This includes IS-700, National Incident Management System (Introduction); IS-800.A, National Response Framework (NRF) (An Introduction); IS-100, Introduction to Incident Command System; and the Tri-Service Emergency Management Program Response Course.
- Response unit first-line supervisors, single-resource leaders, field supervisors, company officers, entry level personnel (trainees) on incident management teams, and other emergency personnel will require a higher level of ICS training (IS-700; ICS-100; and ICS-200, ICS [Incident Command System] for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents).
- Strike team leaders, task force leaders, unit leaders, and emergency operations center staff also require higher-level ICS training (IS-700; IS-800.A; IS-100; ICS-200; and ICS-300, Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents for Operational First Responders).
- Command and general staff, agency administrators, department heads, emergency managers, area commanders, and multiagency coordination system/emergency operations center managers also require higher-level ICS training (IS-700; IS-800; ICS-100; ICS-200; ICS-300; and ICS-400, Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff, Complex Incidents and MACS for Operational First Responders).
- All personnel providing support to civil authorities must complete IS-800 before providing support.

Responder Training

3-25. CBRN responders are DOD military and civilians who are trained and certified to operate safely from the awareness through technician response levels.

General Considerations

3-26. General considerations include the following:

- All local responding personnel must be trained at least to the responder operations level.
- Persons functioning in complex roles (IC, hazmat team leader, technician) must have completed additional training appropriate for the functions to be performed.
- The competency and training requirements for local responders and technical experts are defined in 29 CFR 1910.120, NFPA 472, NFPA 473, and other reference resources.
Specific Requirements

3-27. Personnel who participate, or expect to participate, in emergency response shall complete the following training:

- Responder awareness level training is for personnel who are likely to witness or discover an incident and have been trained to initiate an emergency response sequence. This training should be provided for unit personnel. These personnel would take no further action beyond notifying the authorities of the hazard.

- Responder operations level training is required for personnel who respond to incidents as part of the initial response to protect persons, property, or the environment from the effects of the hazard. This includes security forces, incident response team members, and emergency medical personnel. These personnel are trained to respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to contain the hazard. They are required to receive training equal to responder awareness level training and to demonstrate additional competencies according to service training guidelines.

- Hazmat technician level unit and individual training is provided for personnel who respond to contain the hazard. This training is required for hazmat team members. They are required to receive training equal to responder operations level training and to demonstrate additional competencies according to service training guidelines.

- On-scene incident command level training is needed for unit leaders to assume control of the incident scene. They are required to receive training equal to responder operations level training and to demonstrate additional competencies according to service training guidelines.

Training Evaluations

3-28. The CBRN unit commander can use major training events to provide feedback and assist commanders in assessing the effectiveness of their leader, individual warfighter, unit, and maintenance training programs.

3-29. Evaluations can be internal or external. Internal evaluations are conducted at all levels and are incorporated into all training. External evaluations are usually more formal and are conducted by the next higher headquarters.

3-30. Failure to evaluate each task every time it is executed is a critical weakness in training. The exercise evaluation concept is based on simultaneous training and evaluation. Every training exercise provides the potential for evaluation feedback. The evaluation is a training session. For the program to work, trainers and leaders must continually evaluate training as it is executed. External evaluations are administered at the discretion of the chain of command and are conducted to evaluate the unit ability to perform its critical response missions.

COORDINATING, MONITORING, AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

3-31. Coordinating, monitoring, and reporting are requirements during the preparation phase of CM operations.

COORDINATING

3-32. Coordinating educates all agencies involved about other agencies involved in the operation.

Response Unit Coordination

3-33. One major objective of CBRN CM preparedness efforts is to ensure mission integration and interoperability during responses to emergent crises across functional and organizational lines and between public and private organizations. Each response unit must make certain that its CBRN CM response plan has been coordinated with other applicable response elements; with the response plans of local, state, and federal organizations; and with the plans of any JTFs, coalition forces, or HN.
Focus of Coordination Efforts

3-34. Coordination is conducted within and between military response units and surrounding area resources (civil or HN). Good coordination efforts help to ensure that proper emphasis has been placed on planning (identifying threats, determining vulnerabilities, and identifying required resources), training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, equipment certification, and other preparedness requirements. Coordination efforts focus on identifying the range of deliberate and critical planning tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability of the response unit plans to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from any CBRN incident. Coordination allows the response unit to refine its plan by—

- Identifying assets and resources available.
- Refining how a unit will task-organize with other responders.
- Identifying communications methods and procedures.
- Maintaining a reachback database.
- Developing common operating procedures and details and an understanding of the unit role in the plan. The unit can request, collect, and assess all available local, state, and federal plans and directives, to include mutual aid agreements that involve CBRN preparedness and response. This information can be used to help ensure that the unit needs are met and that an interagency unity of effort is achieved.
- Developing and maintaining a common operational picture of civil and military forces conducting CM operations. This includes AO information, climate, infrastructure, and site assessments.
- Maintaining a responder/emergency operations center/emergency management agency database.
- Maintaining duty rosters and call-up procedures.
- Preparing modeling information for known sensitive sites within its AO.

MONITORING

3-35. Any analysis of a response unit status should include a step-by-step review of command standing operating procedures and associated formal checklists. These emergency response standing operating procedure checklists should be analyzed to ensure that maximum coordination between responding elements is addressed in each standing operating procedure.

REPORTING

3-36. Each response unit periodically reports its operational status to its parent unit, according to Service guidance. Status reporting helps to ensure that applicable incident plans are updated, executable, and relevant.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

3-37. DOD components implement a comprehensive deployment health program during CBRN CM, which helps them effectively anticipate, recognize, evaluate, control, and mitigate health threats encountered during deployments. During the preparation phase, the commander and medical personnel of the responding unit should—

- Ensure that response personnel maintain a high state of predeployment health and medical readiness. This includes ensuring that response personnel complete or confirm the DD Form 2795 (Pre-Deployment Health Assessment), and ensuring that all completed forms are submitted to the Defense Medical Surveillance System, which is maintained by the Army Medical Surveillance Activity, U.S. Army Public Health Command.
- Ensure that response personnel follow the requirements of a respiratory protection program according to guidance from 29 CFR 1910.134.
- Ensure that responding personnel are briefed on deployment health threats and are trained and equipped with necessary countermeasures.
- Ensure that force health protection prescription products (such as nerve agent antidote kits and pyridostigmine tablets) are prescribed, as required.
Ensure that responding medical personnel are trained on the signs, symptoms, medical countermeasures, and treatments of exposure to endemic diseases and environmental, occupational, and CBRN health threats.

Ensure that responding individuals’ immunization, medical, and dental records are updated in a DOD-approved automated health information management system and that custody for these records is established.

Ensure that responding personnel have completed an occupational health baseline examination before responding to an incident.

Train, staff, equip, and provide support to conduct disease outbreak and OEH exposure incident investigations and ensure that reports and documentation of disease outbreaks and OEH and CBRN exposures are reported.

Identify responder health resource requirements in OPLANs and OPORDs.

Ensure that theater health surveillance plans and requirements are identified in each OPLAN.

Train, staff, equip, and provide support to conduct disease outbreak and OEH exposure incident investigations and ensure that reports and documentation of disease outbreaks and OEH and CBRN exposures are reported.

Identify responder health resource requirements in OPLANs and OPORDs.

Ensure that theater health surveillance plans and requirements are identified in each OPLAN.

Train and implement health risk communication plans during all phases of deployment to communicate health threats and countermeasures to deployed personnel.

**RESPONSE EXERCISES**

3-38. Education and training alone are not enough to adequately prepare response units. Realistic exercises are required to ensure that operations can be conducted under CBRN conditions. State and local response plans must be understood by responders. Participation in federal, state, and local exercises increases interoperability and supportability to those plans. Aspects to consider when developing an exercise should include the following:

- **Participants.** Include as many participants as possible from appropriate local, state, federal, and HN CM agencies.

- **Realism.**
  - Ensure that CBRN CM scenarios that units could face based on the current threat assessment are realistic.
  - Provide realistic master events sequence lists that exercise each aspect of CBRN CM collective tasks, and include unexpected challenges (such as disabling key personnel and equipment) to assess the resiliency of the response process.

- **Scheduling.**
  - Align unit exercise and training schedules with the combatant commander, HN, and DOS-related CBRN exercises. HN civilians and units supporting CM operations may require frequent rehearsals and refresher training.
  - Response units should consider aligning its exercise and training schedules with the DHS exercise and training programs for state and local preparedness programs when possible, to include weapons of mass destruction–civil support teams (WMD-CSTs), as appropriate.

- **Leadership exercises.** Tabletop exercises should be used to provide the leadership and staff opportunities to war-game multiple scenarios. Tabletop training exercises are specifically designed for leaders to train in executing critical missions and critical collective tasks.

3-39. Each exercise should be designed to evaluate specific critical missions or tasks within the overall evaluation scenario. The evaluators must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the test in order to implement it correctly. The use of realistic exercises is required to ensure that the installation can conduct operations under CBRN conditions.

3-40. Each evaluator, regardless of position, must have expert knowledge of the capabilities and responsibilities, communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles and should thoroughly understand the mission. Poor evaluator training may result in poor after action or lessons learned information.

*Note.* The Exercise Evaluation Plan prepares an evaluation staff for evaluating a CBRN CM exercise.
CAPABILITIES AND REMAINING VULNERABILITIES

3-41. The response unit CBRN defense vulnerability assessment must be a continuous process. (See figure 3-2.) ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-20.70 provides further guidance on the vulnerability assessment cycle. Following the implementation of a CM plan, the response unit starts scheduling periodic follow-ups to reassess CBRN CM preparation. These periodic follow-ups help ensure that necessary resources remain properly deployed, prepared, and synchronized to successfully execute CBRN CM tasks. However, the timing of these reassessments should not be based strictly on time (such as a calendar year). Other factors (threat changes, unit changes, resource availability) should also be considered. Preincident checks verify that response units have supplies and equipment, such as the required PPE.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3-2. Vulnerability assessment during the preparation phase**

3-42. The measures that comprise protection actions also provide vulnerability assessment feedback. This feedback improves the overall response plan. For example, response personnel may take notice of the shortcomings of HN protective equipment (the protective ponchos issued by some nations may be effective in protecting against a direct-spray hazard, but would provide little protection against regional mustard contamination).
NATIONAL SPECIAL-SECURITY EVENTS

3-43. In preparation for CM operations, DOD response assets may be tasked to support national special-security events. This unique CM operation requires that DOD assets be prepared for possible CM scenarios, for deployment, and for response before an incident occurs. Preparations for national special-security events operations are based on the event supported and the mission the unit is assigned. In many instances, a unit can even be pre-positioned near the site where the CBRN CM operation could occur.

3-44. An important aspect of preparation for CM at a national special-security event is the ability of the unit to directly interface with its counterparts to fully determine its role in the planned response. Unlike other preincident preparation where the exact role of the unit cannot be known until the scope and magnitude of the CBRN incident is determined, the national special-security event involves the preexecution of a response plan to such a degree that many of the responding assets are pre-positioned and prepared to execute their part on very short notice.
Chapter 4
Response

Chapter 4 describes response activities, to include tiered response, immediate-response authority, first response, emergency response, C2, CBRN response, and HSS response activities. The transition to recovery operations is briefly discussed.

BACKGROUND

4-1. CBRN incidents may occur without warning and at a time and location that will produce chaos, confusion, and casualties. In a no-notice incident, local emergency services and, possibly, state and federal agency personnel will be the responders. Notification from local responders to a nearby DOD military command may trigger an immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Notification of an approved RFA triggers the domestic emergency response provided by DOD. DOD personnel support for FCM operations requires approval from the DOS.

4-2. The major functions performed by CBRN CM response units are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining public confidence in the government ability to respond to a CBRN incident. (See figure 4-1, page 4-2, for the response phase relative to the other phases of the CBRN CM response.) Responding forces initiate actions to restore conditions at and near the incident site. Transition and redeployment plans are developed once the role of the DOD force is established and follow-on local, state, and federal assets have been determined.

4-3. Although the DOD primary CM focus is minimizing the effects of CBRN on military operations, it must also be prepared to support the response to a CBRN incident in the homeland and to support allies and partners. To defend against and recover from CBRN use, U.S. armed forces must execute passive defense measures and be prepared to conduct CBRN CM activities. If prevention efforts fail and a CBRN attack cannot be prevented, DOD must be prepared to respond to RFAs; initiate or support ongoing CM efforts; and actively support local, state, and federal or allied and partner authorities.

4-4. The sequence and time of a response to a CBRN incident depends on factors such as the operational environment (domestic CM or FCM), the magnitude of the CBRN incident, and the resources needed to respond. Table 4-1, page 4-2, provides a general flow of events for a CBRN incident response.

INCIDENT RESPONSE OVERVIEW

4-5. Actions taken during an incident response address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response measures include those actions taken to save lives, protect property, and continue essential services and operations.
Table 4-1. Flow of events for a CBRN incident response (notional)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>A CBRN incident occurs that requires a response (explosion, dissemination, appearance of symptoms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate response</td>
<td>A local response team responds to the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate ICS</td>
<td>The response team identifies the need to establish the ICS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish command</td>
<td>The IC assumes command and establishes control at the incident scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure site control access</td>
<td>The IC establishes security of the site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishes a security perimeter around the incident scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assures the safe approach and positioning of emergency response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resources at the incident site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishes a staging area as a method of controlling response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resources at the incident site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish incident command post</td>
<td>The IC establishes an incident command post outside of the present and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>potential hazard zone, but close enough to the incident to maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Location is disseminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Incident reporting continues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-1. Flow of events for a CBRN incident response (notional) (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Identify the hazard/assess the situation (ongoing) | Responders—  
- Evaluate the available information (such as placards and shipping documents).  
- Try to answer questions.  
  - Is there a fire, spill, or plume?  
  - What are the weather conditions?  
  - What is the terrain like?  
  - Who/what is at risk?  
  - What action should be taken?  
  - What can be done immediately (such as evacuate, SIP, or immediate rescue)? |
| Establish hazard control zones | The IC establishes cold, warm, and hot hazard control zones to ensure safe work areas. |
| Task-organize | The IC organizes available response assets under appropriate command authority. |
| Deploy response assets | Responders begin operations based on their assigned mission. |

Legend:  
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  
IC incident commander  
ICS Incident Command System  
SIP shelter in place

**FIRST RESPONSE**

4-6. First response is conducted by local and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency personnel. In its most basic form, first responders are individuals who are likely to witness or discover a hazardous substance release and who have been trained to initiate an emergency response sequence by notifying the proper authorities of the release. In its more advanced form, first responders are personnel who are trained to operations or technician levels.

4-7. Personnel who provide first response support include local and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency personnel who, in the early stages of an incident, are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined in the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*.

**Emergency Response**

4-8. Emergency response occurs when responders from outside the immediate release area deploy to an occurrence that resulted in, or is likely to result in, an uncontrolled release of a hazardous substance. Responses to releases of hazardous substances where there is no potential safety or health hazard are not considered emergency responses.

4-9. Representative functions of emergency response include firefighting, law enforcement, security, medical support, emergency management, EOD, and mortuary affairs.

**RESPONDER**

4-10. CBRN responders are DOD military and civilian personnel who are trained to respond to CBRN incidents and certified to operate safely at the awareness, operations, or technician level according to 29 CFR 1910.120 and NFPA 472.
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONDER (AWARENESS LEVEL)

4-11. CBRN responders at the awareness level are individuals who are likely to witness or discover a CBRN or hazmat release and who have been trained to initiate an emergency response sequence by notifying the proper authorities of the release. They would take no further action beyond notifying the authorities of the release. CBRN responders at the awareness level shall have had sufficient training or experience to demonstrate the following competencies:

- Understand what CBRN or hazardous substances are and the risks associated with them in an incident.
- Understand the potential outcomes associated with an emergency created when hazardous substances are present.
- Recognize the presence of CBRN or hazardous substances in an emergency.
- Identify the CBRN or hazardous substances, if possible.
- Understand the awareness level responder’s role in the employer’s emergency response plan, including site security and control and the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook: A Guidebook for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident.
- Recognize the need for additional resources and make appropriate notifications to the communication center.

OPERATIONS LEVEL

4-12. CBRN responders at the operations level are individuals who respond to releases or potential releases of CBRN or hazmat as part of the initial response to the site for protecting nearby persons, property, or the environment from the effects of the release. They are trained to respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the release. In addition to awareness level training, CBRN responders at the operations level shall have had sufficient training or experience to demonstrate the following competencies:

- Know basic hazard and CBRN risk assessment techniques.
- Know how to select and use proper PPE provided to the operations level responder.
- Understand basic hazardous and CBRN material terms.
- Know how to perform basic control, containment, and confinement operations within the capabilities of the resources and PPE available within the unit.
- Know how to implement basic decontamination procedures.
- Understand the relevant standing operating procedures and termination procedures.

TECHNICIAN LEVEL

4-13. CBRN responders at the technician level are individuals who respond to releases or potential releases for stopping the release. In addition to awareness and operations level training, CBRN responders at the technician level shall have the following competencies:

- Know how to implement emergency response plans.
- Know how to classify, identify, and verify known and unknown materials by using field survey instruments and equipment.
- Be able to function within an assigned role in the ICS.
- Know how to select and use proper specialized CBRN PPE.
- Understand hazard and risk assessment techniques.
- Be able to perform advanced control, containment, and confinement operations within the capabilities of the resources and PPE available in the unit.
- Understand and implement decontamination procedures.
- Understand termination procedures.
- Understand basic CBRN and toxicological terminology and behavior.
RESPONSE ENVIRONMENT

4-14. The response environment includes leads, communication, and response phases.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE

4-15. DOD forces responding in a domestic or FCM response environment act in a supporting role and will not take control from the IC. However, in a DOD-led response environment, the U.S. military will assume the lead role. For example, a geographic combatant commander may develop plans for DOD-led CBRN CM missions within their assigned AOR. If required, the geographic combatant commander may designate and/or establish a CM JTF. The CM JTF would then be tailored to meet the specific requirements of a CBRN CM mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-16. C2 consists of communication during notification, warning and reporting between elements, liaisons, and the immediate-response authority.

Notification

4-17. Notification of a CBRN CM support mission will be processed through normal military channels, and notification of the units tasked to provide support will commence using local standing operating procedures. Generally, a unit may be notified when the installation emergency operations center and command receives an approved RFA and provides a warning order to the units tasked to provide the support.

Warning and Reporting

4-18. Military warning and reporting procedures are still applicable to DOD units while supporting CBRN CM operations. (See FM 3-11.3/MCWP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP(I) 3-2.56 for additional information.) These common reporting procedures provide a means of communicating hazards for the supporting DOD response units. Other reporting requirements may be implemented by the IC during the response operation and should be coordinated through the military liaison to ensure that the supporting military units comply. (See appendix C for additional information.)

Liaison

4-19. The liaison provides information continuity between the supporting military units and the incident command to ensure effective two-way communication. This includes information from the IC for local, state, and federal plans and directives, to include other representative information such as established mutual aid agreements.

Immediate-Response Authority

4-20. Immediate response is any form of immediate action taken in the United States and its territories to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a RFA from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority. (JP 3-28)
4-21. DOD policy for immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property
damage authorizes military commanders or responsible officials of other DOD agencies to respond to civil
authority requests for emergency military support. The policy is based on PL 93-288, commonly known as
The Stafford Act. The Stafford Act gives the commander authority to—

- Support an incident response without formal activation or direction when immediate, serious
  conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters.
- Save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate major property damage under immediate, serious
  conditions where there has not been a Presidential declaration of a catastrophe, a major disaster,
or an emergency.

4-22. While the policy allows for an immediate response, it requires commanders to advise the DOD
Executive Secretary, through command channels and by the most expeditious means available, to seek
approval or additional authorizations as needed. Although an immediate response may be provided on a
reimbursable basis, it will not be delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester
to make a commitment to reimburse DOD. Commanders must exercise extreme caution if electing to deploy
under the auspices of an immediate response. Immediate-response authority is not a basis for using
established mutual aid agreements. While this policy allows for great flexibility, commanders must ensure
that immediate-response deployment authority is used as a last resort.

TIERED RESPONSE

4-23. DOD forces will be employed as part of a flexible tiered response; and military support will be tailored
to support a Tier I, II, or III response. The scope and magnitude of the military response will focus on
providing capabilities that meet the response requirements that are beyond the resources of civil authorities.
(See JP 3-41 for more details.)

Tier I

4-24. Tier I is normally implemented for small-scale, localized CBRN incidents. In a Tier I situation, the
defense coordinating officer can effectively exercise command over the small number of DOD forces
required and still execute their functional responsibilities with respect to processing mission assignments.

Tier II

4-25. Tier II is the normal response posture for CBRN incidents having met the Secretary of Defense criteria
to implement CJCS CONPLAN 0500 (now obsolete) and the need to establish a JTF to respond to the
incident. Specialized units, detachments, teams, supplies, and equipment will likely be required from DOD
in Tier II.

Tier III

4-26. Tier III involves extremely complex CBRN scenarios that affect a wide geographic area or a large
population that threaten national security.

JOINT OPERATIONAL PHASES FOR CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT

4-27. CBRN response is an organized response effort employed to mitigate hazards for an emergency
resulting from a deliberate or unintentional CBRN release. The Joint Director of Military Support, located
within the operations directorate of a joint staff, produces military orders that pertain to domestic
emergencies. The operations directorate of a joint staff forwards the orders to the Secretary of Defense for
approval and then to the appropriate military commander for execution. A six-step process is initiated when
an RFA is received from a lead or other primary agency. The response is generally conducted in the following
sequence:

- **Step 1.** The lead or other primary agency initiates the RFA.
- **Step 2.** The RFA is sent to the DOD Executive Secretary for assessment and processing.
Step 3. The RFA is processed and sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) and the Joint Director of Military Support.

Step 4. The Joint Director of Military Support processes the order.

Step 5. The Secretary of Defense approves the order.

Step 6. The Joint Director of Military Support issues the order to appropriate combatant commanders, Services, and agencies.

**REQUEST FOR SUPPORT**

4-28. When a CBRN incident occurs, the lead agency receives and generates requests for support and DOD may be tasked to provide resources. Although specific unit taskings may occur, the requestor normally asks for a capability to meet an identified shortfall. A representative list of units and/or activities that can support CBRN CM is provided in appendix A.

4-29. Prescripted RFAs may be used by the lead agency to expedite the process for requesting support. Before preparing a prescripted RFA, the preparer considers what federal agency has the unique capability to satisfy the requirement.

4-30. Since prescripting RFAs can assist with time-sensitive response requirements, the preparer should prioritize the capabilities required for the incident. The following factors should be considered when preparing a prescripted RFA:

- Unique capabilities of the supporting agency.
- Lifesaving capabilities of the supporting agency.
- Agency capabilities that can reduce the scope, scale, and/or impact of the incident.

**ALERT**

4-31. Upon notification of a CBRN response mission, tasked military support elements initiate local alert procedures and prepare to deploy to the incident site. Commanders and staff gather the information required to prepare their units to support the response efforts.

**DEPLOY**

4-32. Deploying the needed military support assets at the appropriate time is the key to success. Establishing a base support installation, which may take place during the alert phase or during a transition between these phases, is a key consideration. CBRN response units, with direction from the parent unit and Service, are responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment activities; movement to, and activities at, ports of embarkation; and arrival at ports of debarkation. Deployment ends when the applicable DOD forces are secured in the AO and the military support commander determines that forces are ready to execute the mission. Deployment considerations include—

- Using all transportation modes to deploy supporting CBRN CM response units.
- Phasing the movement of CBRN CM response units so that transportation capabilities are not overwhelmed.
- Prioritizing the movement of CBRN CM response units.
- Immunizing CBRN CM response unit personnel to prevent unnecessary delays in response posture.
- Ensuring that units meet HSS standards established for the operation before deployment into an AO.
- Coordinating with the base support installation for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration operations.

**TRANSITION**

4-33. Transitioning encompasses the remaining tasks that the DOD response elements must complete before redeployment. Transition is discussed further in chapter 5.
REDEPLOYMENT

4-34. Redeploying the supporting military units begins when directed by the commander. Redeployment is discussed further in chapter 5.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE

4-35. The initiation of response operations occurs following a triggering incident. Response measures include the first and emergency response, establishment of the ICS, implementation of requisite control measures, and execution of mission-essential functions that occur in the hazard control zones.

TRIGGERING INCIDENT

4-36. Triggering refers to the initial event or sequence of events that cause response actions to begin. A trigger helps determine when a response to the incident begins. A trigger may prompt an immediate DOD response (conditions permitting) or a delayed response based on DOD approval of a validated RFA. Information from the triggering incident supports the ongoing assessment and influences the follow-on response actions. An effective response will drive a more effective recovery phase, limit the severity of the CBRN event on operations, and reduce the overall number of casualties.

4-37. Detector triggers occur when a detection device signals that a CBRN agent may be present in the environment. Detectors are limited to those CBRN agents they are designed to find. They may not indicate the presence or absence of all CBRN agents due to the sensitivity of the devices and the possibility of false-positive and false-negative readings.

4-38. Weapon triggers refer to an overt attack by a weapons system (such as theater ballistic missiles, submunitions, and artillery that might be armed with a CBRN agent). If intelligence has indicated a CBRN weapons capability, a weapons incident in a high-threat area will likely be initially treated as an unknown agent. The detection of an attack in progress may result from an attack warning, a detector alarm, or an observable weapons incident. During and immediately after an attack, the top priority should be to determine whether it was a CBRN attack. Detection, observation, or other notices of attack before the occurrence of casualties trigger during-attack actions, which are initially focused on immediate actions to preserve human life.

4-39. Medical surveillance may be the first means of detection for a CBRN incident, especially in the case of sentinel casualties discovered following a covert biological attack. A sentinel casualty-triggering incident refers to the medical community detection of a biological agent or infectious disease incident by assessing trends in medical symptoms among personnel or a diagnosis of an index case. Response actions based on a sentinel casualty may begin well into the disease progression cycle. At its highest level, medical surveillance could occur through the theater medical surveillance network, where epidemiology is focused on the theater-wide tracking of medical symptoms.

4-40. Intelligence triggers occur when a commander receives intelligence indicating that a threat possesses an offensive CBRN capability, that there is unusual threat activity consistent with the operational use of a CBRN agent, or that a specific target may be attacked with a CBRN agent. Intelligence warning is the triggering incident that allows a commander the best opportunity to prepare for a response.

FIRST AND EMERGENCY RESPONSES

4-41. Based on the initial and follow-on assessments, the response to a CBRN incident is tailored to the scope and magnitude of the situation and follow-on response assets are requested as required.

4-42. First response is conducted by local police, fire, and emergency personnel who are likely to witness or discover a CBRN release and notify the proper authorities of the release. The first response elements use resources (such as the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook: A Guidebook for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident) to identify the associated hazards and determine hazard control zones. These zones take into consideration the CBRN material, population or area threatened, and weather conditions. Efforts are made by the first response element arriving
at the incident to ensure that no one enters the hazard control zones without authorization from the incident command post.

4-43. Emergency response is conducted by trained responders from outside the immediate release area. CBRN response is conducted by military CBRN responders with specialties in areas such as decontamination, site assessment, response planning, or C2.

FIRST RECEIVERS

4-44. Health care workers at a hospital receiving contaminated victims for treatment are a subset of responders (firefighters, law enforcement, hazmat teams, ambulance service personnel). Most responders typically act at the site of an incident (the location where the primary release occurred). In contrast, inherent to the definition of first receivers is an assumption that the hospital is not itself the primary incident site, but rather is remote from the location where the hazardous substance release occurred. (Refer to OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims From Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances for additional information on first receivers.)

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM INITIATION

4-45. Under circumstances when the ICS will be used, the senior responder at the incident site—who is most experienced for the type of incident—assumes the role of the IC. The IC is responsible for directing, assessing, prioritizing, and controlling resources by virtue of explicit legal, agency, or delegated authority. As the response progresses, the role of the IC may change hands as more qualified responders arrive on the scene or are appointed. Additional information about the functions of the ICS can be found in TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83 and the NIMS. (See figure 4-2 for a graphic representation of the ICS command structure.)
SITE ASSESSMENT

4-46. Although the IC initial site assessment may be complete before military response units arrive at the incident site, assessment is a continual process. Assessment at the incident site considers multiple factors, to include—

- Weather.
- Terrain.
- Infrastructure.
- Agent characteristics (flammability, toxicity, corrosiveness, radioactivity, oxygen levels).
- Response unit capabilities.
- Workload.
- Time.
- Deadlines.

4-47. Representative tasks that support assessment include CBRN detection, identification, and surveillance. The results of detection, identification, and surveillance support identifying the specific hazards and determining the extent or degree of contamination.

4-48. Other assessment support during response operations can be obtained through agencies that provide technical reachback. (See appendix A for a representative list of technical reachback agencies.)

CONTROL MEASURES

4-49. The IC establishes control measures to prevent or reduce the spread of contamination, human injury or death, environmental damage, and property damage from the release or potential release of CBRN or hazmat materials. All control measures are coordinated and controlled through the IC, the focal point for key information (such as the presence of CBRN agents or maximum exposure limits). The IC determines the level of protection that will be worn or available in each of the hazard control zones. Representative control measures include—

- **PPE.** Based on hazardous substances and conditions present, the IC will implement appropriate emergency operations and ensure that the PPE worn is appropriate for the hazards expected to be encountered. For example, responders who are engaged in CBRN defense and emergency response who are exposed to hazardous substances of unknown quantities will wear a positive-pressure, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). They will continue to wear SCBA until the IC or designated safety officer determines that a decreased level of respiratory protection will not result in hazardous exposure.

- **Limited access.** The IC will limit the number of response personnel at the emergency site who enter areas of potential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards. Personnel will be limited to those who are actively performing emergency operations; however, operations in hazardous areas will be performed using the buddy system in groups of two or more.

- **Contamination control.** The IC initiates defensive contamination control operations to limit the spread of contamination. This includes preventing potentially contaminated personnel from leaving the scene without being decontaminated, controlling water runoff, and beginning emergency decontamination.

- **Site security.** The IC ensures that safe site management activities have been instituted. The site is secured by establishing a security perimeter and controlling site access to prevent additional personnel from entering the contaminated area(s) and to prevent media personnel or bystanders from interfering with responders.

- **Decontamination.** The IC directs that the following types of decontamination operations can be conducted in the decontamination corridor:
  - Emergency decontamination.
  - Technical decontamination.
  - MCD.
**Hazard control zones.** The IC identifies and designates hazard control zones, including initial-isolation and protective-action zones (see figure 4-3) and hot, warm, and cold zones (see figure 4-4, page 4-12), which are established to provide areas for functions such as decontamination and support operations. Hazard control zones include—

- **Initial-isolation zone.** The initial-isolation zone is an area surrounding the incident in which persons may be exposed to dangerous (upwind) and life-threatening (downwind) concentrations of material.
- **Protective-action zone.** The protective-action zone is an area downwind from the incident in which persons may become incapacitated and unable to take protective action and/or may incur serious or irreversible health effects.
- **Hot zone.** The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding a hazmat incident, which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from released contamination to personnel outside the zone.
- **Warm zone.** The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold zones where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot-zone support take place. It includes control points for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination.
- **Cold zone.** The cold zone is the area where the command post and support functions that are necessary to control the incident are located.

![Figure 4-3. Initial-isolation and protective-action zones](image)

**ACCESS ROUTES**

4-50. The IC identifies safe approaches along multiple routes, if available, for the movement of response assets to and from the incident site and assembly areas. The routes identified include road, rail, sea, and aerial approaches to the incident site.

**STAGING AREAS**

4-51. The IC designates assembly areas for the staging of follow-on response elements. The initial assembly point is a safe distance from the incident site to prevent interference and to protect personnel.


**HAZARD CONTROL ZONE FUNCTIONS**

4-52. Control zones are established by the IC at an incident site. Control zones are established to ensure the safety of all responders and to control access into and out of a contaminated area. Figure 4-5 depicts hazard control zone functions.
Hot Zone

4-53. The hot zone is the area that the IC judges to be the most affected by the incident and includes any area to which the contaminant has spread or is likely to spread. The hot zone is also the location where contamination reduction begins. Representative functions that can occur within the hot zone include—

- Conducting search and rescue operations.
- Performing mitigation measures.
- Identifying CBRN or other physical obstacles to the entry point.
- Conducting assessment activities (evaluating damage, presence of contamination).
- Performing chemical or radiological monitoring.
- Conducting biological agent sampling.

Warm Zone

4-54. The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold zones where decontamination operations (decontamination corridor) and hot-zone support take place. Representative functions that can occur in the warm zone include—

- Emergency decontamination.
- Technical decontamination.
- MCD.
- Staging of survey teams before entry into the hot zone.
- Equipment decontamination.

Cold Zone

4-55. The cold zone is an area that is readily accessible and provides a clean location for support operations. It must be large enough to accommodate local, state, and federal CBRN response forces, if required. Representative functions that can occur within the cold zone include—

- Incident command operations.
- Support activities such as logistic, sustainment, and security operations.
- Staging area operations.

HAZARD COMMUNICATIONS

4-56. During response operations, units maintain their hazard communications (HAZCOM) program. Representative HAZCOM program execution functions include—

- Sustaining the capability to store and use regulatory reference data and product hazard data.
- Preparing to receive and process CBRN materials information.
- Maintaining access to information on CBRN hazards at the incident site.
- Adhering to safety guidance as contained in applicable OSHA and CFR guidance.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT RESPONSE

4-57. The medical C2 element maintains C2 of deploying DOD medical responders. These C2 functions include—

- Assigning missions and dispatching units/staffs to designated response areas.
- Coordinating DOD medical response activities with the incident command and local, state, federal, or HN response agencies.
- Determining when the response units/staffs are to stand down and turn over their response activities to local, state, federal, HN, or other response agencies.

4-58. Most HSS response activities are continued throughout the recovery phase of CM operations. The HSS response activities of preventive medicine, veterinary services, stress management support for response forces and the local populace, laboratory services, and health service logistics are detailed in appendix C.
Triage, patient decontamination, treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization are addressed in chapter 5 and appendix D.

4-59. Immediate response may be provided by—
- On-scene personnel providing basic first aid.
- Prestaged, specialized DOD assets capable of providing emergency care in the hot zone and patient stabilization in the cold zone until civilian emergency medical services transport is available. Such assets include the chemical-biological incident response force (CBIRF) and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced response force package (CERFP).
- Military installation activities providing immediate support (such as emergency medical services personnel, medical treatment teams, preventive-medicine personnel, veterinary personnel, firefighters, and military police).
- Local police and firefighters; emergency medical services, public health, and public works personnel; and designated medical treatment teams.
- Country teams, HN medical assets, and DOD units and personnel in FCM situations.

4-60. Medical diagnosis is the process of determining the cause of a disease or injury. While some diagnoses are made evident by signs and symptoms, the definitive diagnosis of infection or chemical exposure may require laboratory or radiology studies. These studies may take several days. Empiric treatment must begin before a definitive diagnosis in order to save lives. Medical reachback is a method for the responding HSS elements and organizations to obtain technical, medical consultation and support during CBRN CM response activities. Organizations and activities within DOD and other federal agencies provide these services.

4-61. HSS activities are based on the predeployment health risk assessment of the health threats in the AO and the specific deployment location. Health risk assessments, OEH site assessments, routine and incident-driven monitoring and sampling, and other health surveillance activities should be updated during deployment. If health threats increase or can be anticipated to increase during the deployment, commanders should implement additional HSS to ensure that personnel are adequately monitored and protected.

4-62. During a CBRN CM response, OEH site assessments, site reconnaissance, and food and water vulnerability assessments are conducted to validate actual or potential health threats, evaluate exposure pathways, and determine courses of action and countermeasures to control or reduce the health threats and protect the health of deployed personnel. When conducting CM response, consider the following tasks:
- Ensure that a DOD- or Service-approved, automated health information management system is used to capture OEH monitoring data.
- Ensure that health risk communications (written or oral) are based on health risk assessments and health composite risk management decisions, and update the health risk assessment as new information becomes available.
- Document deployment occupational and environmental exposures or CBRN exposures and related monitoring data, and provide the timely reporting of disease and nonbattle injuries, battle injuries, and other medical information, as required.
- Submit medical information related to CBRN, unanticipated infectious disease, or environmental contamination occurrences to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center. Also, provide copies of operational medical reports, which include descriptions and/or assessments of infectious diseases, environmental findings, and medical capability, to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.

4-63. A respiratory protection program includes the medical screening and surveillance of personnel who are issued respirators (such as SCBA) as an occupational requirement for CBRN operations (such as DSCA). (See 29 CFR 1910.134 for additional information.)
TRANSITION TO RECOVERY OPERATIONS

4-64. A fine, unclear line exists between the end of response operations and the beginning of recovery operations. Often, recovery starts while response operations are still in progress. Recovery operations may begin when military response assets are no longer required or when replacements have arrived to provide relief in place. Chapter 5 discusses recovery operations for CBRN CM operations.

4-65. Additionally, there may be a handover of response authorities and responsibilities when transitioning from response to recovery. For example, a responding fire chief may hand over control of the scene to crime investigators, incident investigation teams, or other officials.
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Chapter 5
Recovery

Chapter 5 provides information on activities conducted during the recovery phase of the operation. Activities discussed include decontamination operations, logistic recovery, HSS recovery, transition, and redeployment.

BACKGROUND

5-1. The recovery phase will begin when the immediate hazards are contained or controlled during the response phase. (See figure 5-1 for the recovery phase relative to the other phases of the CBRN CM process.) CBRN first responders will likely continue support to complete any remaining mitigation of the immediate hazard (such as supporting reconnaissance, decontamination, and assessment and providing advisory assistance). Understanding and defining CBRN CM recovery operations requires a crosswalk between the traditional military term and the NRF definition.

Figure 5-1. CBRN CM process (recover)
5-2. *Recovery and reconstitution* are those actions taken by one nation before, during, and following an attack by an enemy nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the nation economy, provide for the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining forces and supporting activities. (JP 3-35)

5-3. The NRF addresses recovery in terms of the capability necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively. Overall, CBRN recovery operations occur within the context of CM and include those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate the consequences resulting from a CBRN incident.

5-4. The operational duration of the recovery mission for CBRN responders is determined by the requirements established by the appropriate authority (the incident command for domestic operations or the HN and/or DOS for foreign operations). The operational role for CBRN responders changes during the recovery phase. During recovery operations, survey operations may continue in the hot zone while supporting technical decontamination. Additionally, technical advice and assistance and support to other decontamination operations (clearance or terrain decontamination) may occur.

5-5. The CBRN unit commander revises the mission recovery plan before and during the recovery phase and coordinates the plan with civil authorities to help ensure that the transfer of tasks between civil authorities and military support commanders is understood and completed. Top priorities for military commanders are reestablishing mission capability, developing a plan to cover short- and long-term recovery requirements, and returning to normal operations. Special consideration is given to minimizing and mitigating environmental damage. The mission recovery plan may address the following areas:

- Logistical support and resupply.
- Protection.
- Documentation and reporting requirements, to include resource expenditures, losses, and environmental exposure data necessary to estimate personnel exposure (to determine long- and short-term health effects).
- Decontamination of equipment, infrastructure, and terrain. Military forces may be requested to provide transportation for the affected population; assist with decontamination efforts; and assist with segregating/isolating contaminated areas or materials, restoring infrastructure, monitoring operations, and securing the contaminated area.
- HSS activities.
  - Personal protection.
  - Casualty-handling operations.
  - Medical screening and documentation.
  - Critical-incident stress management.
  - Liaison with federal, state, local, and HN officials, as required.

5-6. The operational environment will impact CBRN CM decontamination as follows:

- For support of DHS-led, CBRN CM operations in a domestic setting, DOD response units will likely augment U.S. civilian response elements. Additionally, DOD response units will be subject to OSHA and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency requirements.
- For support of DOS-led, CBRN CM operations in a foreign setting, DOD response units may augment HN response elements, and actions may be bound by existing HN treaty and/or status-of-forces agreements.
- In DOD-led, CBRN CM response operations, recovery measures undertaken will support the commander’s guidance and the overall CBRN CM goals.

5-7. There is no established timetable for recovery operations. During this phase, there will come a time when military assets are replaced or are no longer needed. The transition and order for redeployment may occur when military units receive a new mission, the assigned mission is complete (such as MCD), or civilian authorities take over the mission.

5-8. The CBRN response unit commander facilitates the orderly transition from the assigned recovery mission and conducts the withdrawal of military forces from the incident site. The military support
commander implements the transition plan by transferring CBRN CM tasks to the appropriate civil authorities (DOS, FEMA), commensurate with their ability to continue to conduct operations.

5-9. During transition, nongovernmental organizations and contracted services may augment these civil authorities. Upon completion of the required recovery support, military assets execute transition and redeploy.

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

5-10. Decontamination operations are important during the recovery phase of operations to reduce or eliminate the risk to personnel and to make equipment serviceable. Decontamination procedures will not degrade the performance of personnel or equipment, and it will not harm the environment. It is a step toward restoration.

5-11. By the time the recovery phase has begun, decontamination efforts will have started in order to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit the spread of contamination. Clearance decontamination may have begun on specific mission-essential equipment, materiel, or infrastructure. Clearance decontamination provides decontamination to a level that allows the unrestricted transportation, maintenance, employment, and disposal of equipment. (See FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information.)

PRINCIPLES

5-12. Decontamination is a process that reduces CBRN contamination to levels that minimize the risk of further harm to the victim and cross contamination. To support the goal of decontamination operations to provide effective support for the largest number of personnel, apply the decontamination principles outlined in FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60. Those principles include—

- Speed.
- Need.
- Priority.
- Limited area.

DECONTAMINATION METHODS

5-13. Decontamination methods vary in their effectiveness for removing different substances. The process of selecting a decontamination method begins by identifying the substance quickly in order to define hazard control zones and the most effective method of decontamination. The selection of a decontamination method will rely on multiple sources of data, such as physical indicators, medical symptoms, communication with victims, and detection instrument results. Continue to assess the effectiveness of any decontamination method throughout the decontamination operation. If decontamination does not appear to be effective, select and implement a different method. (See FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information on decontamination methods.) Decontamination is based on one or more of the following methods:

- Physical. Physical methods of decontamination involve physically removing the contaminant from the contaminated person or object and containing the contaminant for disposal. While these methods can reduce the contaminant concentration, the contained contaminant remains chemically unchanged. Examples of physical decontamination methods include absorption, brushing and scraping, isolation and disposal, vacuuming, and washing.

- Chemical. Chemical methods of decontamination are used on equipment, not people, and involve changing the contaminant through some type of chemical reaction in an effort to render the contaminant less harmful. In the case of etiologic contaminants, chemical methods are biologically killing the organism. Examples of chemical methods include adsorption, chemical degradation, disinfection or sterilization, neutralization, and solidification.
• **Weathering.** Weathering involves processes such as evaporation and irradiation to remove or destroy the contaminant. The contaminated item is exposed to natural elements (sun, wind, heat, precipitation) to dilute or destroy the contaminant to create a reduced or negligible hazard. This may be as simple as leaving a vehicle sitting in the hot desert sun to bake off the contaminant. Natural weathering is the simplest and most preferred method of decontamination, particularly for terrain and non-mission-essential buildings and roads.

• **Preventive.** The risk of exposure is reduced and the need for decontamination minimized if contact with a contaminant can be controlled. Work practices that will minimize contact with hazardous substances should be emphasized. Limited-use or disposable protective clothing and equipment should be worn.

**INCIDENT-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS**

5-14. To determine what decontamination practices may be followed, the CBRN responder assesses the characteristics of the incident. Although data may be incomplete, the following factors should be addressed:

- Number of casualties.
- Types of casualties.
- Type of agent.
- Agent properties.
- Type of release.
- Physical environment.
- Available resources.
- Operational desirability of various decontaminants (such as cold weather).
- Victim safety and privacy.

5-15. For hazard-based decontamination during a mass casualty incident, the number of victims may exceed the response capabilities of the CBRN responders. Responders must then prioritize the rescue, treatment, and decontamination process. Suggested prioritization factors include—

- The victim’s report of exposure.
- The physical signs and symptoms of exposure.
- The victim’s distance from the point of release of the agent.
- If the victim has other serious injuries.
- Evidence of agent deposition on clothing or the skin.

**AGENT-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS**

5-16. The type of agent released is a critical factor in determining the decontamination practices to be used. Every situation will have unique challenges, and responders must be flexible enough to adjust to the situation with the resources available.

**Chemical**

5-17. A chemical agent can exist as a liquid, a solid, or a vapor, depending on its physical properties. Liquids and solids are usually the only forms of chemical agents that can be effectively removed from the skin.

5-18. It is generally not possible or necessary to decontaminate the skin after chemical vapor exposure. However, chemical vapors can be trapped in clothing, causing a continuing hazard. Therefore, clothing removal is the first step of decontamination for a victim suspected of being exposed to liquid or vapor chemical agents.

5-19. Self-decontamination or emergency decontamination methods should be initiated immediately for victims suspected of chemical contamination. More complex, field-expedient, and thorough systems might provide more privacy, comfort, and thoroughness in decontamination operations; however, these systems require additional setup time and resources and may not be an initial decontamination option. These systems are typically used to provide additional decontamination for victims that have gone through self-
decontamination or emergency decontamination and as precautionary measures for chemical victims that are not symptomatic and do not have evidence of chemical contamination.

5-20. It may be necessary to use multiple methods of decontamination, depending on the amount of time and equipment required for setup and operation, the number of victims that can be processed, and the thoroughness of the available decontamination methods.

**Biological**

5-21. Biological agents typically have delayed symptoms and lack easily recognizable signatures (color, odor). There will rarely be an on-site incident to respond to when a biological agent is released unless there is a dissemination warning, a claimed or suspected dissemination device found, or a perpetrator caught in the act of disseminating a biological agent.

5-22. Health care facilities are the most likely locations for managing a biological-agent incident. It is there that a biological-agent incident would likely be recognized due to an increasing number of patients presenting similar symptoms.

5-23. Medical treatment is the primary off-scene means of responding to a biological-agent incident. Decontamination using soap and warm-water showers is recommended, especially if patients have not washed themselves thoroughly since the incident. If a biological-agent incident is suspected, care must be taken to protect current hospital patients, staff, and faculty from infection.

5-24. When biological decontamination is performed, thoroughness is more important than speed. Biological agents are not typically a contact hazard, so removing the agents from the skin is not as time-critical as when victims have been exposed to a chemical agent. Immediate disrobing and emergency decontamination are only necessary for victims who have other medical injuries that require immediate treatment.

**Radiological**

5-25. An explosion caused by a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device would have devastating effects. However, nuclear materials are extremely difficult to access, handle, and transport, making this a high-consequence, but unlikely, threat.

5-26. A more likely incident would involve the dispersal of radioactive materials using a radiological dispersal device or dirty bomb. This device typically uses explosives or compressed gas to disperse radioactive materials over an area. A radiological dispersal device would not cause as many casualties as a well-orchestrated chemical or biological release; however, it could cause traumatic injuries, contaminate large areas, and cause significant psychological stress.

5-27. Radiological materials have delayed medical effects and can take on many forms, making them hard to recognize without special markings or the use of detection equipment. Radiation detectors should be used to determine whether high levels of radiological materials are present at an incident.

5-28. If radioactive materials are present, steps should be taken to contain the hazard and minimize additional exposure. The radiological dispersal device should be located and contained. Victims should be moved away from the hazard and directed to an area for decontamination.

5-29. Radiological decontamination minimizes the hazards of skin contamination, reduces the risk of contaminants entering the body, helps contain contamination, and reduces psychological stress. In radiological decontamination, victims should be misted with water before disrobing to reduce the risk of inhaling or ingesting radioactive particles.

5-30. Immediate disrobing and emergency decontamination are necessary only for victims who have other medical conditions that require immediate treatment. However, unlike biological agents, radioactive materials can pose an external hazard (from outside the body) and should be removed from skin and clothing in a timely manner.
DECONTAMINATION CORRIDORS

5-31. Figure 5-2 provides a sample of a decontamination corridor layout (the warm zone is enlarged to provide a detailed view of the corridor). The decontamination corridor is the area, usually located within the warm zone, where decontamination procedures take place. This is a controlled-access area leading from the hot zone (incident site) to the cold zone (support zone) in which decontamination operations for the incident are conducted.

![Figure 5-2. Sample decontamination corridor layout (example)](image)

5-32. The main elements of a decontamination corridor are an entry point and exit point (vapor control line). It is important that the direction of personnel traveling through the decontamination corridor is upwind. The stations between the entry and exit points vary with the type of decontamination corridor used. The TTP for decontamination corridors can be found in appendix D.

PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES

5-33. Personnel decontamination includes emergency decontamination, technical decontamination, MCD, and patient decontamination.

Emergency Decontamination

5-34. Emergency decontamination is a process that removes contamination from personnel in order to save lives, minimizes casualties, and limit the spread of the contamination. It also facilitates rapid medical attention without transferring the contamination to other personnel or equipment.

5-35. Decontaminants used are those that are safe for use on skin and wounds. Emergency decontamination directs mobile victims away from the hazard.

5-36. The process involves removing outer layers of clothing, removing any liquid agent from the skin, showering, checking victims visually, and (time permitting) conducting brief interviews. Figure 5-3 shows a sample emergency decontamination layout.

5-37. Following an incident, the IC may direct that emergency decontamination be the first decontamination measure taken. The rapid setup of emergency decontamination stations should help to minimize the number of casualties. (See appendix D for emergency decontamination procedures.)
5-38. Technical decontamination commonly refers to the deliberate decontamination of responders, response equipment, and evidence. It is conducted during a CBRN CM response where trained responders conduct decontamination operations. The focus of technical decontamination is neutralization of the agent. Terms that are commonly associated with technical decontamination are detailed, thorough, deliberate, definitive, and responder decontamination.

5-39. The incident may be accident-related or terrorist-related and can involve CBRN hazards. Responders may be required to use supplied air respirators and fully encapsulated, splash-resistant, protective suits.

5-40. Technical decontamination requires a step-by-step process, based on the hazards and risks involved, to reduce contamination on responders to a safe level and prevent the transfer of contamination outside the containment area. This consists of checking technical references to determine the hazards (flammability, toxicity), and then evaluating the associated risks (vapor versus liquid, blister versus nerve agents, radiological versus chemical-biological hazards).

5-41. In time sequencing, the establishment of technical decontamination may follow emergency decontamination. However, technical decontamination may also occur concurrent with emergency decontamination. In either case, no responder should be allowed to enter the hot zone until some form of decontamination is established for the responders. (See FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information.) (Figure 5-4, page 5-8, shows a sample technical decontamination layout.)
Mass Casualty Decontamination

5-42. When a CBRN incident results in mass casualties, MCD operations may be required. Because personnel processing through a domestic MCD operation are not likely to have PPE, they require a fast, efficient, and effective decontamination process. In addition to a rapid response, MCD operations require large numbers of response personnel, equipment, and supplies. (See JP 4-06 for information concerning the decontamination of human remains.)

5-43. The operation may be performed by designated deployable units or by members of the affected installation or activity, community, state, or nation. Responders may include firefighters (DOD, local, state, and/or federal), medical personnel, logisticians, engineers, security personnel, HN responders, or nongovernmental organizations.

5-44. Even when expedient decontamination measures (such as fire hoses and nozzles) are employed, the health and safety of the casualties must always be of the utmost concern. Medical personnel monitor the casualties throughout the decontamination process to ensure that the process causes no further injury. Contact information for personnel processing through the decontamination line should be maintained in the event that follow-up action is necessary.

5-45. Upon arrival at the incident site, the designated decontamination unit leader reports to the IC to receive instructions. The decontamination leader coordinates communications and logistic requirements and requests additional resources, as required.
5-46. The leader receives specific guidance and establishes a decontamination site to conduct operations. Responding DOD units/staffs may operate in support of civilian decontamination efforts and provide assets that are not available in the community. The leadership prepares a plan of action and—
- Conducts leader reconnaissance of the designated decontamination site.
- Assigns specific assets to each site designated for setup.
- Updates the response mission statement and tasking based on new information.
- Reconfigures equipment based on the updated mission statement.
- Conducts equipment checks and prepares to deploy to the decontamination site.
- Deploys staff/unit to the decontamination site.
- Sustains the operation and begins to request support through liaisons to the on-scene command or ICS.
- Establishes a plan to control any runoff or waste produced by the decontamination operation.

5-47. Decontamination must be conducted as soon as possible to save lives. First responders/firefighters should use any immediately available resources and start decontamination as soon as possible. Since they may be able to bring large amounts of water, the most expedient approach is to use currently available equipment to provide an emergency low-pressure deluge. Used alone, water provides good decontamination; however, adding soap can improve the removal of the contaminant.

5-48. Diluted sodium hypochlorite (bleach) solutions can aid in the removal of an agent, especially in the nonambulatory decontamination process. A 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution can be used to decontaminate the litter, cutting devices, and other nonskin contact areas. A soap and water solution is used on skin contact areas.

5-49. In time sequencing, the establishment of MCD will likely follow the setup of emergency and technical decontamination. Emergency decontamination should be completed by the time that MCD is established. However, technical decontamination in support of responders should still be in operation. (See appendix D for detailed information on MCD procedures.) (Figure 5-5, page 5-10, shows a sample casualty decontamination layout.)

**Patient Decontamination**

5-50. Patient decontamination is similar to MCD; however, it commonly refers to the decontamination operations that occur at the patient decontamination site near the MTF. This type of operation is primarily conducted to protect the MTF from contamination. Patient decontamination follows all of the guidelines of MCD, but it may be a smaller operation that handles the persons who did not go through the MCD site and are presenting themselves to the MTF for medical treatment.

5-51. Patient decontamination is performed to ensure that patients are not admitted to the MTF until they are contamination free. (See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 for patient decontamination procedures.)

**FACILITY, TERRAIN, AND EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES**

5-52. CBRN CM decontamination operations may involve facility, terrain, or equipment contamination. Doctrine guidance is found in FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60. Based on the highly specialized and technical nature of these decontamination requirements, DOD will likely support other U.S. government technical response assets.

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

5-53. HSS recovery operations are continuous activities conducted during the response phase of operations. During recovery operations, HSS units/staffs begin phasing down operations and turning over their responsibilities to local, state, federal, or HN medical responders.
Triage

5-54. Triage is the process of evaluating patients to place them in medical treatment categories that determine the order in which they are treated. HSS personnel triage casualties at the treatment/decontamination receiving area to determine if they require decontamination before treatment or if they have life-threatening injuries that require immediate lifesaving procedures. The ability to triage and treat victims before decontamination may be limited because medical treatment personnel are in protective clothing. Treatment before decontamination consists mainly of stabilizing and lifesaving measures.

Receiving and Decontamination

5-55. A casualty receiving and decontamination station should be established at the supporting MTF to ensure that all casualties entering the MTF have been decontaminated. Some casualties may self-evacuate to the MTF, thus bypassing the MCD lanes. Others may still have contamination on themselves or have become recontaminated during the medical evacuation/transport process. Support decontamination personnel and medical staff are required at this location. (See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 for TTP on establishing an MTF casualty receiving and decontamination station.) (See patient decontamination in appendix D for additional information.)
**Casualty Treatment**

5-56. Initial treatment is provided by first responders (firefighters, emergency medical services personnel) or by a treatment team (triage, emergency medical treatment, patient decontamination, evacuation personnel). The level of treatment depends on the type of contamination, available decontamination assets, the number of casualties, the types of available medical supplies, the number of available treatment personnel, the availability of PPE for treatment personnel, and the space allocated for the treatment site. Responders remove the casualties from the contaminated area as quickly as possible, conduct decontamination, and provide available antidotes and rapid emergency medical treatment procedures.

**Medical Evacuation**

5-57. Responders must rapidly remove casualties from the contaminated area to reduce agent effects. However, medical evacuation platforms may quickly become overwhelmed during the response to a CBRN incident. As a result, medical personnel must consider nontraditional modes of transportation, especially when unprotected casualties are involved. The use of vehicles (school buses, flatbed trucks, pickups) may be needed to efficiently move the patients to a decontamination and treatment area; however, care must be exercised to contain the spread of contamination. (See ATP 4-25.13, ATP 4-02.2; and FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 for additional information.)

**Hospitalization**

5-58. Hospitalization may be provided by service institutional MTFs (U.S. Army Medical Department activities and medical centers; USAF hospitals; and USN clinics, aid stations, and hospitals); operational medical treatment units (deployable medical units); or local, state, federal, or HN facilities. Unique planning considerations for hospitalization during CBRN CM are decontamination capabilities, specialty supplies and equipment, and medical reachback capabilities for special medical conditions. Regardless of the type of MTF providing support, HSS personnel must provide—

- A patient-receiving site adjacent to the facility with triage and decontamination areas.
- Facility security to prevent contaminated individuals from entering the facility before decontamination.
- Supplies and equipment for management and care of CBRN patients.

**National Disaster Medical System**

5-59. Several DOD MTFs are designated as federal coordinating centers in support of the National Disaster Medical System and must develop memorandums of understanding with the National Disaster Medical System. In the event of a national disaster (such as a CBRN incident), the federal coordinating centers coordinate with local, state, federal, and National Disaster Medical System staffs on the management of disaster victims. This coordination includes patient movement and definitive patient care functions. (See DODD 6000.12E and the *Federal Coordinating Center Guide* for the responsibilities of federal coordinating centers and DOD MTFs in the planning, exercise, and operation of a local plan to receive and provide definitive care to casualties evacuated to the area as part of the National Disaster Medical System.)

**Logistic Recovery Operations**

5-60. Logistic planning must consider CBRN CM recovery and restoration actions. (Recovery operations are addressed in appendix D.) Further restoration may require the remediation of the actual site, and support during this phase of CBRN CM requires detailed assistance that will likely be provided by other federal response assets (such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) or the HN.

5-61. The restoration of a CBRN CM site places a logistic burden on all levels of response. A site may require a large amount of time and resources before it can be used again, if at all. An example of the length of time a CBRN CM action could take is the cleanup of the Hart Senate Building and the Brentwood Mail Facility following the deliberate release of anthrax. The cleanup took months, and large amounts of technical and logistic support were required. Military resources may continue supporting recovery operations (such as clearance, facility, or terrain decontamination).
5-62. Decontamination of human remains to support mortuary affairs may be required. (See JP 4-06 for further guidance.)

5-63. As the recovery phase progresses, the CBRN CM response assets begin to look ahead and prepare for eventual redeployment. Representative issues that may occur include the following:

- Identifying equipment or supplies that may have to be left at the incident site because of contamination.
- Confirming load-planning configurations.
- Verifying the status of supply requisitions and ship-to addresses.
- Checking on the status of equipment awaiting repair.
- Updating records on the use of resources.

TRANSITION OPERATIONS

5-64. Transition involves the transfer of responsibilities and functions to other organizations. Termination or transition occurs when the mission has been accomplished or when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

5-65. DOD typically disengages from operations when the designated authorities no longer require DOD support. This is generally when the immediate danger from the CBRN incident is eliminated, the capabilities to save lives are in place, and critical services are restored. DOD assets generally do not remain to conduct site recovery operations.

5-66. If DOD forces are transitioning functions between units, the transition requirements follow standard military handover procedures. If transition involves the transfer of DOD force functions or areas to civil authorities or to local or HN agencies, the transition will reflect operational procedures and existing agreements established by the IC. A key factor is the transfer of any logs kept during the CM operation. Logs provide the element assuming responsibilities with a detailed picture of the events and actions that have occurred. Rosters of affected personnel and responding personnel will be transferred with the logs, when appropriate.

5-67. A transition plan helps the staff identify transition issues in relation to the desired or projected end state. It is especially important to identify the parties or agencies that will accept functional responsibilities from the JTF commander. The transition plan should identify organizations, operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. When implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise—using terminology appropriate to all parties.

5-68. Transitioning may be accomplished by function or specific areas of the incident site. The transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Functions or areas transfer only when a similar capability becomes available or is no longer needed. Procedures for the transfer of equipment or supplies—between DOD units to civil authorities or to local or HN agencies—must be established according to regulation and command guidance.

5-69. Planners identify other key transition factors within functional areas that may include logistics, medical services, communications, security, and technical services. Planners should develop a series of transition criteria to monitor progress. Well-chosen indicators ensure that a consistent method is used to measure progress during the transition.

REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS

5-70. Redeployment begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for military forces diminishes. Redeployment planning and operations follow normal military guidelines and protocols. Careful consideration is given to identifying physical assets that can be safely removed from the incident site and those that should be contained, controlled, and/or left in place. Safety remains the primary concern.

5-71. During redeployment, the after action review process is used to help evaluate mission and task performance. The after action review addresses the following:
• What was the original mission? How was it stated, and how was it interpreted at the various levels of command?
• What should have happened (the mission or plan)?
• What actually happened (a description of events)?
• How did it happen (key facts that led up to the event)?
• Why did it happen (inferences about probable causes)?
• How can performance be improved next time (alternative courses of action)?

5-72. During a response, incoming and outgoing data (questions and responses) should be captured and archived so that personnel reviewing the data at a later date can be confident that it is complete and accurate.

5-73. Following a response mission, the military response assets document lessons learned, identify postoperation follow-up actions, and provide a copy of the after action review to the applicable C2 headquarters. Key areas of documentation include personnel and equipment expenditures or costs, incident event logs, and medical documentation for response personnel.

5-74. The establishment of active lessons learned collection activities within service channels or established command channels will follow individual service or command procedures.

5-75. The documentation of the incident occurs during the postemergency period. Actions that occurred during the notification, response, and recovery phases will be critical to providing answers to questions that will be asked in areas such as fiscal or resource management, medical surveillance, medical treatment, and mortuary affairs.

5-76. Accurate record keeping also facilitates the monitoring of DOD response element personnel for long-term health problems that could be incident-related. The following HSS considerations during redeployment operations should be considered:

• Ensuring that postdeployment health and risk communications debriefings are provided to personnel who have returned or are returning from deployment.
• Conducting long-term medical surveillance to detect latent diseases because exposure to environmental health threats may have acute, chronic, or latent effects.
• Using health surveillance data to document any occurrence of disease or health outcomes due to exposures, conducting epidemiological investigations, determining new prevention strategies and countermeasures for current or future deployments, and developing health risk communication materials.
• Establishing guidance for archiving operational records to investigate deployment health-related questions and concerns.
• Providing face-to-face health assessment with a trained health care provider for redeploying personnel who are required to complete a DD Form 2796 (Post-Deployment Health Assessment [PDHA]). Scheduling medical and dental referrals and follow-up visits for health concerns or issues.
• Ensuring that Reserve Component members receive medical and dental care and disability evaluations according to DODD 1241.01 before the member is released from active duty. Assisting in medical and dental care, plus necessary health monitoring after release from the military if the member will not remain on active duty.
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Appendix A
Planning Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The CBRN CM response unit plan provides the command guidance that the unit will follow during CM response and recovery operations.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT

A-1. Services use various similar processes when developing a plan. Table A-1 is a sample checklist for conducting CBRN CM planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A-1. Sample plan development checklist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Receive the mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct mission analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Analyze higher headquarters order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct threat assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct operational environment assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks (mission-to-task analysis).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct capabilities assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct vulnerability assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Determine constraints.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Identify facts and assumptions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct risk assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Determine the initial commander’s critical information requirement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Determine site survey requirements/conduct surveys (reconnaissance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Write a restated mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct a mission analysis briefing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Approve the restated mission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Develop the initial commander’s intent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Issue the commander’s guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct course-of-action development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct course-of-action analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Obtain course-of-action approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Produce a plan.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

A-2. The development of a comprehensive, integrated, and executable response plan is the responsibility of the commander. Important points to consider when developing a CBRN CM response plan include the following:

- Provide a clear and concise mission statement.
- Convey the commander’s intent.
- Focus on subordinate activities.
- Provide tasks, activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.
- Include annexes/appendixes, if required, in order to expand the information not readily incorporated in earlier text.
- Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.
- Do not inhibit initiative.
A-3. The unit response plan format follows the standard OPLAN and five-paragraph order format, yet it is tailored to meet the unique requirements of CBRN CM operations. The basic steps taken in developing a unit response plan include the following:

- Gather and compile information.
- Produce a summary and basic plan. The plan summary provides the reader with a synopsis of the scope and purpose of the plan. The basic plan provides the groundwork for amplifying sections (annexes/appendixes), and it is produced before its documentation. The basic plan follows the five-paragraph order format and describes the situation, plan for execution, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks, coordinating instructions, administrative and logistics concepts, and C2 concepts.
- Establish a plan of action, determine and assign responsibility for developing annexes and appendixes, and assign task suspense dates for completion. Annexes provide the details not readily incorporated into the basic plan; they are written to increase the clarity and usefulness of the basic plan. Annexes may address task organization, logistics, intelligence, personnel, operations, and a multitude of CBRN CM-specific topics. These are only required if deemed necessary. Each annex relates to a specific aspect of the CBRN CM operations (such as MCD).
- Coordinate development and review of the plan. Each Service has published guidance concerning deliberate planning, organization, and staff coordination (ADRP 5-0, NWP 5-01, AFMAN 10-401, and MCWP 5-1).
- Finalize the plan, and submit it to the commander for review and approval. The finalized plan should be—
  - Consistent with the organization/installation mission and responsibilities.
  - Oriented on a tactical perspective.
  - Adequately detailed to provide specific actions to be taken.
  - Easily understood.
  - Executed quickly and decisively, if required.

A-4. After the commander’s approval, the unit CBRN CM response plan becomes an OPORD.

UNIT OPERATIONS PLANNING

A-5. The OPLAN results in improved understanding of the situation, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and task to subordinates throughout the unit.

A-6. Figure A-1 provides a sample of a unit CBRN CM OPLAN format. As stated above, units have the flexibility to tailor its plans to meet its specific requirement.
OPLAN _____________ (code name).

References:

Time zone used throughout the order.

Task organization:

1. **SITUATION**
   a. **CM Incident**
      (1) Location.
      (2) Name.
      (3) Brief description.
      (4) Victim information.
         (a) Signs, symptoms, and history.
         (b) Number of victims killed, casualties, and potentially affected.
         (c) Location of the point of injury.
         (d) Emergency decontamination (where, when, and method of confirmation of decontamination) or mass casualty decontamination (where, when).
   b. **Environment**
      (1) Weather.
         (a) Present (next 12 hours).
            • Temperature (ambient/wet-dry bulb).
            • Humidity/precipitation.
            • Barometric pressure.
            • Wind speed.
            • Wind direction (from).
            • Cloud cover.
            • Particular light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset; moon phase; and percent of nighttime illumination).
         (b) Effects of present weather on personnel, equipment, incident area, and site.
         (c) Forecast (next 12 to 24 hours).
            • General forecast.
            • High/low temperature.
            • Barometric pressure trends.
            • Particular light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset; moon phase; and percent of nighttime illumination).
         (d) Forecast (24 to 48 hours).
            • General forecast.
            • High/low temperature.
            • Barometric pressure trends.
            • Particular light data (time of day, estimated time of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset; moon phase; and percent of nighttime illumination).
         (e) Effects of weather during the next 12- to 48-hour period on personnel, equipment, incident area, and site.
   (2) **CM Incident area and site**
      (a) Area.
         • Terrain.
         • Population.
         • Avenues of approach.
         • Congested areas and obstacles.
      (b) Detailed description of CM incident site.
      (c) IC-defined exclusion area.
      (d) Key surrounding areas potentially affected by the hazard.

Figure A-1. Sample unit CBRN CM OPLAN format
Appendix A

(classification)

c. Threat. The threat assessment includes actions that occurred at an incident site, the likelihood of possible future adversary courses of action, the possibility of multiple terrorist events being conducted simultaneously, and the potential for the use of secondary improvised explosive devices or chemical devices amid terrorist activities. This section should be discussed in this paragraph.

(1) Perpetrator identification and ideology or goals (if known).
(2) Tentative CBRN identification.
(a) Known agent(s).
(b) Probable agent(s).
(c) Dispersion method.
(d) Plume (hazard modeling).
(3) Secondary devices or additional hazards.

d. Higher/supporting agencies (POC name and contact number). The plan should include the mission, the commander's intent, and the CONOPS for headquarters and two levels up (if available). Subparagraphs identify additional military response elements being deployed to the site. Fragmentary orders can be used to update this information as the situation matures. Any units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the response unit should also be included. In the initial information, the ICS for the AO may be included.

(1) Higher commander's mission.
(2) Higher commander's intent.
(3) Defense coordinating officer.
(4) Other task force resources.
(5) Base support installation POC.
(7) Department of Defense subject matter experts.
(a) Chemical.
(b) Biological.
(c) Radiological.
(d) Nuclear.
(e) Hazard modeling.

e. Incident command (POC name, agency, and contact number or frequency).

(1) Single or unified command.
(2) I/C.
(3) Safety officer.
(4) Information officer.
(5) Liaison officers.
(6) Planning section.
(7) Operations section.
(8) Logistics section.
(9) Financial/administrative section.

f. CM assets available (attachments and detachments). Do not repeat information already listed under task organization or in annex A (Task Organization). Put all the information in the task organization or in annex A and state See Task Organization or See annex A. However, when not in the task organization, list the assets that are attached or detached to the headquarters that issues the order. State when the attachment or the detachment is to be effective if different from when CPORD or OPLAN is effective.

(1) Hazmat.
(2) Decontamination.
(3) Emergency medical services.
(4) Fire services.
(5) Local law enforcement/security.
(6) Local bomb squad.
(7) Federal or military EOD.
(8) Hospitals.
(9) State agencies or units (such as WMD-CSTs).
(10) Federal agencies.
(11) Private voluntary organizations.
(12) Other.

2. MISSION. State the mission derived during the planning process. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement that will also cover on-order missions. The mission statement should be short, concise, and focused on the efforts of the response unit. For example, the order of the CBRN CM unit deploys NLT [time] _______ to (location) _______ to assess a potential hazard, advise the IC on CBRN-related aspects of CM, and facilitate the mobilization of additional assets to assist in CM in order to prevent the loss of life, human suffering, and property damage.

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. Commander's intent. State the commander's intent derived during the planning process. Describe the commander's vision of the operations, describe the purpose, visualize the end state, and illustrate how the operation will facilitate future operations.

(1) Key tasks (IC objectives).
(2) Desired end state.

(classification)

Figure A-1. Sample unit CBRN CM OPLAN format (continued)
b. CONOPS (general). The CONOPS may be a single paragraph, may be divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as a separate annex. The CONOPS is based on the course-of-action statement from the decisionmaking process and, at a minimum, provides sufficient detail to ensure that the commander’s intent and purpose are understood. It should specify the priority of support and the tasks allocated to the response unit. The concept describes—

- The employment of the response unit.
- The identification of any protection issues and whose implementation.
- The integration of other major organizations within the incident response system. These include active and reserve military forces that may be involved in incident mitigation.
- Any other aspects of the operation that the commander considers appropriate to clarify the concept and to ensure a unity of effort. If the integration and coordination are too lengthy for this paragraph, they are addressed in the appropriate annexes.

When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the CONOPS may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Designate phases as Phase followed by the appropriate Roman numeral, for example, Phase I.

Note. Depending on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of a given operation, the following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the CONOPS:

c. Reconnaissance and surveillance. This paragraph should specify the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and describe how it ties in with the basic CONOPS.

d. Operations security. The plan identifies on-scene security requirements.

e. Environmental considerations. The plan should identify whether the incident site falls into a geographic area with unique environmental considerations (local population, industrial base, soil composition).

f. Coordinating instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. The following information should be included:

- Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.
- Commander’s critical information requirements. List PIR, essential elements of friendly information, friendly force information requirements, and risk reduction control measures.

(1) Phase I, Predeployment—continues unit operations end upon alert notification.

(a) Mobilization records.

(b) Daily personnel/logistics status reports.

(2) Phase II, Deployment—begins on receipt of the mission and ends on arrival at the incident site assembly area.

(a) Alert notification/assembly procedures.

(b) Deployment of the response unit.

(c) Warning order/OPORD.

(d) Convoy operations.

(3) Phase III, Response Operations—begins in the assembly area and ends at the completion of IC-assigned tasks.

(a) Perform liaison operations/quartering.

(b) Conduct unit decontamination operations.

(c) Establish and maintain an operations center.

(d) Establish and maintain communications operations.

(e) Provide logistic support operations.

(f) Conduct administrative support operations.

(g) Conduct HSS operations.

(h) Conduct CBRN survey operations.

(i) Conduct radiological survey operations.

(j) Conduct assessments.

(4) Phase IV, Redeployment—begins at the completion of IC-assigned tasks and ends upon return to the unit area.

(5) Phase V, Recovery—begins upon return to the unit area and ends when all sensitive items and equipment are inventoried and secured.

g. Subunit missions (composition and location).

(1) Advanced echelon.

(2) First sortie.

(3) Second sortie.

(4) Command.

(5) Liaison.

(6) Med/der.

(7) Operations center.

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(CLASSIFICATION)

8. Logistics.
11. First hot-zone entry.
   (a) Survey.
   (b) Backup.
   (c) Decontamination line.
12. Second hot-zone entry.
   (a) Survey.
   (b) Backup.
   (c) Decontamination line.

h. Key personnel (name and location).
   (1) Commander.
   (2) Liaison.
   (3) Operations.
   (4) Survey.
   (5) Technical decontamination.

i. Medically disqualified personnel (personnel identified as a risk for dress-out).

j. Detailed instructions (such as security and rules of engagement).

k. Routes to the incident site.
   (1) Primary.
      (a) Route.
      (b) Checkpoints.
      (c) Rally points.
      (d) Forward staging area.
   (2) Alternate.
      (a) Criteria for use.
      (b) Route.
      (c) Checkpoints.
      (d) Rally points.
      (e) Forward staging area.

l. Actions if a break in contact occurs during movement.
   (3) Actions if a breakdown occurs during movement.
   (4) Actions if a loss of communications occurs during movement.

m. Forward staging area.
   (1) Estimated time of arrival at the forward staging area.
      (a) Advanced echelon.
      (b) First sortie.
      (c) Second sortie.
   (2) Actions of the main body in the staging area.

n. Actions at the incident site.
   (1) Estimated time of arrival at the incident site.
      (a) Advanced echelon.
      (b) First sortie.
      (c) Second sortie.
   (2) Site contamination check.
   (3) Plan if the site is contaminated (alternate site).
   (4) IC liaison and site occupation.
   (5) Priorities of work.
   (6) Tentative timeline.
   (7) Sampling plan.
   (8) Priority of decontamination.
   (9) Hasty withdrawal plan.

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Figure A-1. Sample unit CBRN CM OPLAN format (continued)
Planning Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Figure A-1. Sample unit CBRN CM OPLAN (continued)

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(3) Identify where the commander will be located.
   (a) Phase I, unit headquarters.
   (b) Phase II, briefing area/command vehicle.
   (c) Phase III, incident command post/unit TOC.
   (d) Phase IV, command vehicle/unit headquarters.
   (e) Phase V, unit headquarters.

(4) Identify succession of command: commander, deputy commander, operations officer, followed by date of rank.

b. Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs. Identify the specific signal operating instructions in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are submitted. Identify any unique frequency management issues in the AO.

   (1) Communications plan.
   (2) Methods of communication (by priority).
      (a) Voice.
      (b) Data.
   (3) Signals (hand and arm).
   (4) Signals (audible).
   (5) Code words.

   (6) Challenge/password. The challenge/password system will be briefed at the initial team briefing and updated as necessary.

   (7) Recognition signals. Primary recognition signals for day and night will be via frequency modulation radio. The primary recognition signal for night will be the military issue flashlight with red lens (blinking the light on and off three times). The primary recognition signal for day will be personal recognition and an identification card.

   (8) Special instructions. The use of code words will be implemented by the commander or the designated representative. The use of the challenge/password system will be implemented by the commander or the designated representative. Any change in frequencies or radio configuration will be directed and implemented by the communications team through the commander or the designated representative.

   (9) Provide a time check.

6. SAFETY BRIEFING.
   a. Weather.
      (1) Current temperature.
      (2) Cold- and hot-weather hazards. Hydration (rate of consumption).
   b. Lifting.
      (1) Use multiple-person lifts when lifting heavy and/or uneven objects.
      (2) Use proper lifting techniques; use your legs, not your back.
      (3) Use a guide to clear any hazards when moving large or heavy objects.
   c. Communications.
      (1) Avoid marked antenna fields; these areas will have tripping and radio frequency radiation hazards.
      (2) Avoid electrical cables, wires, and grounding rods.
      (3) Follow proper procedures, and wear required personal protection (gloves, goggles, hard hat, and safety boots) for erecting and slowing antennas.
   d. Vehicles.
      (1) Use seatbelt (mandatory).
      (2) Use lights when operating a vehicle.
      (3) Use ground guides when parking, backing up, and moving in heavily populated areas
      (assistant driver’s responsibility).
      (4) Observe posted speed limits and roadway signs.
   e. Unit operations.
      (1) Be situationally aware of all hazards (identify, mitigate, notify, and supervise).
      (2) Be aware of shock hazards; avoid them if possible.
      (3) Follow the proper procedures for the safe operation of equipment.
      (4) Use buddy teams at all times.
      (5) Wear the appropriate IPE/PPE.
      (6) Eat, drink, and rest in designated areas.
   f. Conclusion.
      (1) Safety is everyone’s responsibility.
      (2) Stop unsafe acts.
      (3) Halt potentially unsafe activities or conditions and notify a supervisor.
      (4) Follow policies, procedures, directives, and standards.
      (5) Use common sense at all times.

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Figure A-1. Sample unit CBRN CM OPLAN format (continued)
OPERATION ORDER FORMAT

A-7. Figure A-2, page A-10, provides a sample unit CBRN CM OPORD. Various OPORDs received will have various degrees of detail depending on the time and information available.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSETS

A-8. The following paragraphs identify representative military assets/units with capabilities that could be tasked to support a CBRN CM incident.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

A-9. The USAF CBRN CM assets consist of the radiation assessment team, theater epidemiology team, EOD, and other assets that conduct or support CBRN CM operations.
1. SITUATION.
   a. Incident. The UA built six spray dissemination devices and released sarin (GB) vapors into the ventilation systems of three large commercial office buildings in downtown Birmingham, Alabama. In addition, some of the agent exited through rooftop ventilation stacks, creating a downwind hazard. Sarin is a man-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. Sarin is a clear, colorless, and tasteless liquid that has no odor in its pure form. However, sarin can evaporate into a vapor and spread into the environment.
   b. Victim information. The agent killed 65% of the people in the buildings and killed or injured many of the responders. Injured personnel showed various signs of miosis (constriction of the pupils), headaches, runny nose, salivation, tightness in the chest, nausea, vomiting, godliness, anxiety, muscle twitches, weakness, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and involuntary urination and defecation.
   c. Environment.
      (1) Terrain. Urban environment.
      (2) Weather (next 12 hours).
         a. Temperature. 65°F.
         b. Humidity/precipitation. 64%/10%.
         c. Barometric pressure. 29.82 inches and rising.
         d. Wind speed. 11 miles per hour.
         e. Wind direction. From the southwest.
         f. Cloud cover. 25%.
         g. Pertinent light data. Sunrise at 0652 hours and sunset at 1653 hours.
      (3) Civil considerations. Fatalities and major injuries have occurred due to falling and crushing during the panic on the street and due to vehicle accidents. There is little direct damage due to the attack, except that the building interiors and contents are highly contaminated by agent condensing on the surfaces. The three buildings and their contents will be a total loss due to decontamination measures and/or psychological impacts of future usability. However, airing and washing should decontaminate adjacent structures adequately. Overwhelming demand has disrupted communications (landline telephone and cellular) in the local area. There are large numbers of worried, well personnel overwhelming the medical system. The loss of three fire crews and three emergency medical services crews will affect readiness for other events in the short term.
      (4) Threat. Sarin liquid and vapor contamination within the three buildings and downwind vapor hazard traveling northeast from the incident site for approximately 1,200 meters. The identification of a secondary device has not yet been determined. The UA has not yet been determined.
   d. Supported agencies. The supported agencies are the local and county emergency response assets (fire services, law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies).
   e. Incident command.
      (1) The incident is being managed by a single incident command. Supporting military assets will remain under the command and control of the DOD.
      (2) The IC is the Birmingham Metropolitan Fire Chief. Military supporting units should report to the incident command post upon arrival at the incident area for further instructions.
   f. Response assets. Contact information for the available response assets can be requested at the incident command post. The following assets are available to assist in the response operation.
      (1) Hazmat. Local and county hazmat response teams.
      (2) Decontamination. Local and county hazmat response teams and supporting military chemical decontamination units.
      (3) Emergency medical services. Local and county emergency medical services.
      (4) Fire services. Local and county fire services.
g. Assumptions. Each building is assumed to have an occupancy of 2,000 personnel, and the outdoor population density of the surrounding areas is 3,900 people per square mile. The evacuation and/or sheltering of downwind populations will be required. Tens of thousands of people will require monitoring and decontamination as they are allowed to leave buildings. Hundreds will require hospital treatment. Anything exposed to a high-vapor agent concentration will require decontamination, including bodies. However, the decontamination of some materials may be difficult or impossible. Even if structures and property could be decontaminated, the psychological impact on future usability would be significant.

2. MISSION. The 1007th Regional Readiness Command will deploy chemical decontamination assets to support emergency and MCO operations. All 1007th assets will provide support to the incident command. Decontamination assets will advise the IC on all aspects of the decontamination operation to assist in the evacuation of chemical casualties to emergency medical services/facilities. Decontamination assets will advise the IC on infrastructure contamination containment and/or decontamination aspects once casualties have been evacuated. The 1007th will deploy chemical reconnaissance assets to assist in casualty extraction at the incident site. Chemical reconnaissance assets will advise the IC on all aspects of casualty extraction. The 1007th will deploy area medical support assets, with clinical operational equipment set, to assist with medical treatment of chemical casualties at the incident site. Health service support assets will advise the IC on all aspects of casualty treatment. All 1007th assets will prepare for redeployment and recovery operations upon notification that support is no longer required and higher headquarters has approved redeployment.

3. EXECUTION. The commander’s intent is to prepare supporting units for deployment to the incident site. The supporting units, provide decontamination, casualty evacuation, and medical treatment support operations; prepare for redeployment; redeploy supporting units; and conduct recovery operations without incident.

   a. Concept of operations.

      (1) Key tasks. MCO operations, casualty evacuation operations, and casualty treatment operations.

      (2) Desired end state. All casualties and nonresponders evacuated, while controlling the spread of contamination. Casualty medical treatment provided without incident.

      (3) Concept of operations (general).

         (a) Phase I, Predeployment. Conduct precombat checks and inspections, rehearsal, and safety briefing operations. Deploy the advanced echelon, and establish liaison and communications with the IC.

         (b) Phase II, Deployment. Deploy to the incident area, and report to the local incident command.

         (c) Phase III, Assist. Conduct MCO operations, casualty evacuation operations, and casualty treatment operations. Advise the IC on all aspects of the assigned support missions, as required.

         (d) Phase IV, Sustain. Establish and conduct sustainment operations as required.

         (e) Phase V, Redeployment. Conduct redeployment operations on order.

         (f) Phase VI, Recovery. Achieve 100% accountability of sensitive items, conduct preventive-maintenance checks and services on all deployed equipment, and turn in all items that require repair or replacement.

   b. Coordinating instructions.

      (1) Effective date. This order becomes effective upon receipt.

      (2) Uniform/IP/PE. Individual physical fitness uniform and IP/PE up to Level A will be required.

      (3) Risk reduction control measures. Premedical screening requirements, hydration monitoring, IP/PE, and work-rest cycles will be maintained.

      (4) Tentative timeline. Advanced party will be prepared to depart within 2 hours of receipt of this order, follow-on support assets will be prepared to depart within 6 hours of receipt of this order.

      (5) Environmental considerations. Sarin nerve agent hazards and control of incident casualties off the incident site.

      (6) Rehearsals/inspections. The supporting unit command will ensure that precombat checks and inspections and premission rehearsals are conducted before deployment.

      (7) Safety briefing. A complete safety briefing will be conducted before any element departs to the incident area.

      (8) Civilian resources. Identify civilian jurisdictions and their response resources.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

   a. Materiel. All supporting units will deploy with a minimum of 72 hours of its basic load for all classes of supply. Class V (ammunition) will be distributed according to the established rules of engagement.

   b. Services. Essential services to sustain operations past 72 hours will be coordinated, as required, at the incident site.

   c. Health service support. Medical support for 1007th personnel will be provided internally by the deploying combat support hospital.

   d. Personnel. Administrative requirements will be coordinated through unit administrative personnel, as necessary.

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A-10. The radiation assessment team is a globally responsive, specialty asset team that provides health physics and radiological support in response to radiation incidents and accidents. The team provides field radioanalytical support to the assigned theater medical authority. It measures, analyzes, and interprets environmental and occupational samples for its radioactivity content, providing expert guidance on the type and degree of radiological hazards that face deployed forces.

A-11. The radiation assessment team performs radioanalytical analysis on environmental samples (swipes, soil, water, air, foodstuffs) and occupational samples (the whole body, breath, urine, feces). Analysis results are interpreted for the impact on deployed forces and noncombatants. The information is compiled for use by the medical authority on dose avoidance, reduction, and assessment; risk of communication; and additional requirements for effective CBRN CM.
Theater Epidemiology Team

A-12. The theater epidemiology team provides threat assessments of environmental and occupational factors and evaluates infectious disease risks and disease and nonbattle injury rates from all sources. The team recommends interventions to minimize the degradation of mission staff. These tasks are accomplished as part of the initial site or theater assessment and during ongoing operations and disease and environmental health threat assessments.

A-13. The theater epidemiology team is a light, mobile, multidisciplinary team with limited environmental and occupational sampling equipment. It has a portable, high-end computing capability and uses a communications infrastructure that allows for theater-wide data collection and coordination with the JTF.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

A-14. The EOD forces locate, identify, disarm, neutralize, recover, and dispose of hazardous explosives; chemical, biological, incendiary, and nuclear ordnance; and criminal and terrorist improvised explosive devices. The highly mobile teams can deploy anywhere in the United States within 24 hours.

Other United States Air Force Management Assets

A-15. The USAF maintains unit type codes capable of supporting CM and specific CBRN response capabilities. These unit type codes are available for CM response as tasked by authorities at the installation level, up to and including combatant commands. Civil engineers serve the USAF as the CBRN experts for the Service. As such, their support includes providing technical advice and response team management, conducting CBRN detection planning, establishing a threat detection grid, and performing active and passive CBRN detection via established detection tools and networks. Civil engineer readiness defines the initial contamination footprint to include declaring contamination control areas contamination-free and establishing an initial hazard perimeter. Additionally, civil engineer readiness performs initial CBRN identification as part of initial detection operations and conducts planning, sampling, and analysis to identify CBRN materials in support of operational risk assessment. These experts gather CBRN hazard concentration data and establish a common operational picture while providing CBRN hazard concentration readings from chemicals, leading active and passive monitoring to shape hazard footprints, and conducting hazard monitoring in contamination control areas and contamination control station. They advise decontamination teams on CBRN decontamination after the attack and support hazmat decontamination operations. Civil engineer readiness supports the bioenvironmental engineer in collecting samples from an incident site—including packaging, preserving, and transporting—and supports civil engineer in development of the chemical warfare agent section of the hazardous waste collection and disposal plan. Additionally, professional civil engineer readiness technicians advise commanders on MOPP decisions; plan and execute hazard modeling, plotting, and reporting; and establish a CBRN warning and reporting network. Experts in this specialty provide isolation zones, hazard areas plotting, responder safe routes, protective action zones, and split MOPP zone status and direct CBRN reconnaissance while coordinating with bioenvironmental teams for the appropriate downwind hazard area and evacuation planning.

Unit Type Code 4F9DA, Emergency Managament Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense 1200 Team

A-16. The unit type code 4F9DA, Emergency Management CBRN Defense 1200 team, provides limited response to the full-spectrum of physical threats, to include the CBRN control center and CM supporting activities throughout the full range of military operations to major theater war and response to major incidents and natural disasters. Capabilities and assets include preliminary risk/vulnerability assessments and threat analysis; planning, detection, identification, warning, and reporting; expedient and operational decontamination operations; disaster response equipment; technical data; roll-on/roll-off capability; and pallets.
A-17. The unit type code 4F9DB, Emergency Management CBRN Defense 600 team, provides minimal, full-spectrum threat response, to include CBRN control center and WMD defense supporting activities (ranging from smaller-scale contingency operations to major theater war) and response to major incidents and natural disasters. Capabilities and assets include preliminary risk/vulnerability assessments and threat analysis; planning, detection, identification, warning, and reporting; decontamination; contamination control area; and disaster response equipment; technical data; roll-on/roll-off capability; and pallets.

First Responders

A-18. First responders, as defined by the Air Force Incident Management System, are members of the disaster response force elements that deploy immediately to the disaster scene to provide initial C2, save lives, and suppress and control hazards. Firefighters, law enforcement, security, and key emergency medical personnel provide the initial, immediate response to major accidents, natural disasters, and CBRN incidents. All first responders are emergency responders, but not all emergency responders are first responders.

Emergency Responders

A-19. Emergency responders, as defined by the Air Force Incident Management System, are members of the disaster response force elements that deploy after the first responders to expand C2 and provide additional support. Emergency responders include follow-on firefighters, law enforcement personnel, security personnel, emergency medical technicians, emergency management and operations (civil engineer readiness specialty) personnel, EOD personnel, physicians, nurses, medical treatment providers at MTFs, public health officers, bioenvironmental engineers, mortuary affairs personnel, and other specialized team members.

Headquarters, Air Combat Command

A-20. Headquarters, Air Combat Command, maintains assets and ensures that the Air Combat Command response task force (other than for intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] assets) is equipped and trained for response to radiological incidents and accidents within the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands.

Headquarters, Air Mobility Command

A-21. Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, provides airlift, air refueling, and air mobility support operations in a CBRN threat environment. The Air Mobility Command provides airborne survey platforms for the Department of Energy observation over areas affected by a nuclear-weapon incident. Additionally, the Air Mobility Command serves as the lead major command to decontaminate large-frame aircraft and handle contaminated cargo and it provides resources for CBRN casualty aeromedical evacuation.

Headquarters, Air Force Space Command

A-22. Headquarters, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), maintains, equips, and trains the AFSPC response task force for ICBM radiological incidents or accidents involving USAF-owned ICBM assets. The AFSPC provides response task force response to incidents involving ICBM and other applicable assets.

Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe

A-23. Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, maintains, equips, and trains the U.S. Air Forces in Europe response task force for radiological and other incidents or accidents within the U.S. European Command AOR.

Air National Guard

A-24. The Air National Guard (ANG) assets in the joint task force–civil support (JTF-CS), plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for CBRN incident management operations through the supported combatant command defense coordinating officer. ANG/JTF-CS deploys to the
incident site, establishes C2 of designated DOD forces, and provides military assistance to the primary agency for CBRN events. ANG/JTF-CS must be requested by the primary agency, authorized by the Secretary of Defense, and directed by the U.S. Northern Command to respond. ANG/JTF-CS serves as the U.S. Northern Command primary interface with the environmental radiation ambient monitoring system, the Rapid Response Information System, and the Unified Command Suite during CBRN events.

A-25. The ANG assets in the WMD-CST deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the precise nature of an incident, provide expert medical and technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on military support. Unless federalized, the ANG civil support teams will remain state National Guard assets that can be quickly accessed by proximate governors. The ANG civil support team mission is to assess a suspected WMD attack, advise civilian responders on appropriate actions, and facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces. Each team consists of 22 full-time ANG and Army National Guard personnel. The team is broken down into six smaller teams that have been trained and equipped to provide a technical capability to reach back to other experts who can assist the IC—

- Command.
- Operations.
- Communications.
- Administration and logistics.
- Medical.
- Survey.

A-26. In essence, these scouts are a unique military capability. They can deploy rapidly to a suspected or actual terrorist attack, conduct special reconnaissance to determine the effects of the attack, provide situational understanding to military command channels, provide technical consultation to local authorities on managing the effects of the attack to minimize the impact on the civilian population, and facilitate follow-on military support by performing validated civilian RFAs.

Headquarters, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency

A-27. Headquarters, Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), supports CBRN incidents through the Civil Engineer Readiness Operations Center.

Air Force Weather Agency

A-28. The Air Force Weather Agency ensures that installation weather squadrons can provide weather data for CBRN material dispersion model (including toxic industrial chemical or TIM assessments) and ensures that operational weather squadrons provide the meteorological information necessary to produce chemical downwind messages and effective downwind messages for radiological fallout.

Air Force Bioenvironmental Engineer

A-29. The Air Force bioenvironmental engineer may assume incident command for recovery operations where a health risk assessment is the primary mission and may support incident command throughout a CBRN event. The bioenvironmental engineer—

- Supports civil engineer readiness with active and passive CBRN detection and contamination footprint definition and hazard location when additional manpower or equipment is required or requested.
- Conducts planning, sampling, and analysis operations to identify CBRN materials and pathogens in support of a health risk assessment and health hazard control (but not for risk assessment).
Performs presumptive CBRN agent identification.
- Quantifies CBRN materials, pathogens, and hazardous conditions to support the health risk assessment and health hazard control.
- Conducts active and passive monitoring to determine contamination extent, hazard condition changes, and personnel dose estimates to support the health risk assessment and health hazard control.
- Collects samples from the incident site (including packaging, preserving, and transporting samples with civil engineer readiness assistance) to support the health risk assessment and health hazard control.
- Supports waste disposal through the health risk assessment and health hazard control to maximize force health protection.
- Evaluates and certifies PPE planned for use in hazmat operations.
- Provides a health risk assessment, in collaboration with civil engineer readiness, to support MOPP reduction before providing recommendation to command authority.

Medical Assets

A-30. Additional assets are available from the Air Force medical service through expeditionary unit type codes and home station response teams. Capabilities cover the range of medical services from the smallest (a preventive aerospace medical team consisting of an aerospace medicine physician, a bioenvironmental engineer, a public health officer, and an independent duty medical technician) to the largest (an expeditionary medical support +25 [a modular, scalable, rapid-response medical package with surgical capability and the capacity to care for 25 inpatients]) facilities. In between, are the teams designed to decontaminate patients, collect environmental samples, conduct epidemiology investigations, and dispense pharmaceuticals to the masses.

United States Army

A-31. The USA CBRN CM assets consist of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) Operational Headquarters, Army Service component commands, the medical community, and the Army Reserve Component.

United States Army Chemical Corps

A-32. The U.S. Army Chemical Corps provides CBRN CM capabilities throughout the force with CBRN units from company to brigade levels; staff expertise from company to theater Army levels; specialized staff augmentation elements; and specialized units that include CBRN reconnaissance, decontamination, and technical escort capabilities.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Operational Headquarters

A-33. The CBRNE Operational Headquarters is an organization that is primarily focused on conducting WMD-elimination operations in support of combatant commanders. The 20th Support Command (CBRNE), a FORSCOM unit, is the only existing organization of this type. The 20th Support Command provides support for CM as a force provider of CBRN and EOD assets to support CM operations and provide technical advice and support through technical reachback capabilities to national assets. It also includes small-scale technical teams to conduct sampling, detection, monitoring, and analytical support to the incident command.

Army Service Component Commands

A-34. Army Service component commands support CM assessment, planning, preparation, and execution activities in support of geographic combatant commanders within respective assigned AORs. The U.S. Army North provides a representative illustration of an Army Service component command support to CM in the domestic operational environment as follows:
The purpose of U.S. Army North is to save lives; prevent injury; and provide temporary, critical life support during a CBRN situation within the U.S. Northern Command AO. U.S. Army North is the Army Service Component Command for U.S. Northern Command and provides homeland defense and DSCA, including CBRN CM operations.

U.S. Army North, established in September 2005, is composed of Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian personnel. U.S. Army North is commanded by an Active Army three-star general officer.

U.S. Army North is capable of deploying two operational command posts, each commanded by a two-star general officer, and able to conduct operations as a JTF or joint force land component command and staff with augmentation. The commander exercises operational control of federal DOD resources (not including U.S. Special Forces Command and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) that are committed to providing DSCA, provides liaison officers to appropriate civil agencies, and receives liaison officers from appropriate military commands and agencies.

U.S. Army North maintains defense coordinating officers (with defense coordinating elements in each of the ten FEMA regions) to plan, coordinate, and integrate DSCA with local, state, and federal agencies.

U.S. Army North accomplishes its CBRN CM mission in strict adherence of public law and DOD policies. The deployment of U.S. Army North, at the direction of the U.S. Northern Command commander and on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, occurs only after a governor requests federal assistance from the President and after the President issues a presidential disaster declaration. In any DSCA setting, U.S. Army North remains in support of the lead federal agency throughout the CBRN CM operation.

Area Medical Laboratory

A-35. The area medical laboratory provides confirmatory analysis and long-term CM of CBRN incidents.

A-36. The area medical laboratory, on order, deploys worldwide in tailored teams to conduct health threat detection, confirmation, and medical surveillance for CBRN OEH, endemic diseases, and CM to protect and sustain the health of the force across the full spectrum of military operations.

Medical Chemical-Biological Advisory Team

A-37. The medical chemical-biological advisory team is the primary source of medical information dealing with the management of chemical warfare agent casualties for the federal government. Through the Federal Bureau of Investigation or agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services, the team provides consultation to state, city, or local agencies. As necessary, they supervise the collection of biological samples (body fluids) for subsequent verification of chemical-agent exposure that can be used to facilitate the confirmation, diagnosis, and treatment of casualties.

A-38. The medical chemical-biological advisory team is staffed by technical experts from the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. The medical chemical-biological advisory team provides—

- Input into the development of operating procedures.
- Training in the management of chemical-agent casualties.
- Clinical advice and consultation in matters related to the initial and long-term management of chemical-agent casualties.
- Essential medical information during the recovery phase of the operation for the safe return to normal activities.
- On-site training for medical professionals on the management of chemical-biological casualties.

Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams

A-39. The USAMEDCOM and its subordinate commands organize, man, and equip the special medical augmentation response teams (SMARTs). SMARTs are task-organized as temporary organizations from existing medical activities. These teams provide DSCA during disasters, civil-military operations, and
humanitarian and emergency service incidents occurring in the United States, in U.S. territories and possessions, and outside the continental United States unified command AORs. The following functional SMARTs have been established:

- Emergency medical response.
- CBRN.
- Stress management.
- Medical command, control, communications, and telemedicine.
- Pastoral care.
- Preventive medicine/disease surveillance.
- Burn.
- Veterinary.
- Health systems assessment and assistance.
- Aeromedical isolation.
- Logistics.
- Smallpox emergency response.
- Smallpox specialized treatment.
- Investigational new drug.
- Radiological advisory medical.

A-40. Additional functional teams are being organized and will be manned and equipped in the near future.

United States Army Reserve

A-41. The U.S. Army Reserve maintains multifunctional CBRN companies with a specified domestic reconnaissance/casualty decontamination mission for domestic CM during DSCA operations. These units are designed for overseas deployment, but may also be tasked by the Secretary of Defense to provide domestic CBRN CM support. These units are not designed or intended to replace functions carried out under the ICS or to replace those functions normally performed by the emergency responder community, but they provide additional capability as needed.

A-42. These units are not designed for a rapid response, but can be mobilized and deployed within days. Their support is requested through the implementation of DSCA policies and processes. These units are best employed by pre-positioning them in preparation for high-threat, high-visibility events (such as the Olympic Games).

A-43. Domestic reconnaissance/casualty decontamination designated CBRN companies within the U.S. Army Reserve are equipped with platoon sets of CBRN detection and identification equipment to support CBRN CM assessment activities, with specialized MCD equipment sets to support ambulatory and nonambulatory casualties.

United States Marine Corps

A-45. The USMC CBRN CM assets consists of the CBIRF and the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force

A-46. The CBIRF was created in 1996 to respond to terrorist attacks or other attacks from WMDs. Before unit activation, the federal government did not have a coherent response capability for CBRN incidents that could holistically provide detection, identification, extraction, mass decontamination, and medical triage. This single-source concept was initiated by General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and The Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy, in response to PDD 39.

A-47. The CBIRF is a battalion-size unit of nearly 500 Marines and Sailors with more than four dozen military occupational specialties (MOSs), and it is capable of performing a broad range of CM tasks. Due to the nature of the WMD threat, the CBIRF has to be prepared 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to respond to a sudden attack or incident. The CBIRF maintains a standing, operational, task-organized force, known as
the initial response force. The initial response force is a task-organized, trained, standing reaction force composed of approximately 131 CBIRF personnel. It is manned and equipped to provide the full range of initial response capabilities for contaminated-environment operations, to include—

- C2.
- Agent detection and identification.
- Casualty extraction, extrication, emergency medical care, and stabilization.
- Limited EOD capability.
- Response force and casualty decontamination.
- Internal organic protection.

A-48. This force is logistically self-sustained and prepared to integrate into the civilian incident or unified command system or as part of a DOD JTF. Upon deployment of the first initial-response force, the CBIRF will immediately stand up its second initial-response force. Within 6 hours, this force will be ready to act as a follow-on force for the first initial-response force and/or as an independent response force for another incident.

A-49. The II Marine Expeditionary Forces retain operational control of CBIRF and remain the USMC point of contact for the request for forces process used to request the commitment of CBIRF personnel. Requests for forces flow from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Forces Command. Approved requests for CBIRF participation are assigned by the Joint Forces Command to USMC and II Marine Expeditionary Forces for action and to the CBIRF commander for execution. Additionally, the CBIRF is often tasked to pre-position forces in support of specific national special-security events designated by the U.S. Secret Service. Although it is generally believed that the CBIRF directly supports the JTF National Capital Region, the CBIRF may be (and has been) tasked to support missions within the continental United States, outside the North Central Region, and outside the continental United States.

Mission

A-50. The CBIRF mission statement is as follows: “When directed, forward deploy and/or respond to a credible threat of a CBRN incident in order to assist local, state, or federal agencies and Unified Combat Commanders in the conduct of CM operations. CBIRF accomplishes this mission by providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel.” Additional planning considerations include the following:

- CBIRF, on its own or in conjunction with other DOD assets (such as USMC National Guard WMD-CST, CBRN enhanced response force package, or Coast Guard strike teams), will detect and identify CBRN agents and/or substances, assess the potential effects of the WMD incident, advise local authorities on managing the effects of the attack, and assist with appropriate requests for additional support to minimize the impact on the civilian populace.
- CBIRF has the ability to locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform medical triage and treatment in contaminated environments, and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination to support civil first responders or military authorities. In a general tiered-response scenario, WMD-CST, USMC National Guard CBRN enhanced response force package, and CBIRF capabilities would be complementary and completely interoperable with civilian responders according to the NIMS, using the ICS. Identified in the WMD CM functional needs analysis as a dual-purpose unit because of its worldwide deployment status, CBIRF is also capable of deploying in support of an FCM incident, enabling it to augment a joint force commander, DOS officials, or other U.S. or non-U.S. agencies as directed. To accomplish these tasks, CBIRF personnel receive specialized training in hazmat operations and PPE and additional training in the technical aspects of performing their regular and specialized duties in hazardous environments.

Capabilities

A-51. The CBIRF includes a complete WMD CM response package and remains the only single-source DOD unit capable of providing C2 and supporting elements required for a CBRN CM incident—foreign or domestic. When required, the CBIRF has a second initial-response force that can deploy and operate
independently or it can augment the first initial-response force for sustained operations. Each of the initial-
response forces provides the following capabilities:

- Detection and identification of known chemical warfare agents, many biological agents, and more
  than 200,000 toxic industrial chemicals and TIMs.
- Casualty search and extraction with more than 150 emergency medical technician (basic) trained
  Marines who are able to operate in PPE Levels A through C.
- Personal decontamination and self-contained decontamination for ambulatory and nonambulatory
  casualties.
- Medical care and stabilization with 50 emergency room doctors, nurses, physicians’ assistants,
  and corpsmen—who are able to operate in full PPE.
- Technical rescue, with approximately 35 FEMA urban search and rescue-qualified Marines.
- Ten EOD Marines who are capable of operating in full PPE.

**Marine Air-Ground Task Force**

A-52. MAGTFs require CBRN detection, identification, and protective equipment that exceeds those
required for defense against traditional CBRN threats and allows monitor/survey and reconnaissance
operations in the most hazardous of environments. The MAGTF CBRN CM set is a suite of specialized
CBRN detection, identification, and protective equipment used by MAGTF CBRN defense officers and
specialists with MOS 5702 and MOS 5711 and other trained personnel to support the MAGTF commanders
in CBRN CM and TIM assessment operations.

A-53. The MAGTF CBRN set of equipment will increase the MAGTF commander’s CBRN monitor/survey
and reconnaissance capability by permitting operations into known and unknown environments and
providing an increased CBRN and TIM detection and identification capability.

A-54. The MAGTF CBRN set provides a CBRN detection and force health protection capability to the
MAGTF commander that allows detection, identification, and sampling of CBRN agents and TIMs and
protection for CBRN reconnaissance elements in known and unknown environments. Equipment required
for this capability is a mixture of current organic and commercial, off-the-shelf equipment.

A-55. MAGTF CBRN CM team consists of the following:

- 3 or 4-man reconnaissance teams.
- Hot-zone controller.
- Cold-zone controller.
- On-scene commander.

A-56. Additional support required includes the following:

- Security.
- Decontamination.
- Communications.
- Administrative assistance.
- Medical.
- EOD.

A-57. The MAGTF commander must have the capability to conduct monitor/survey and reconnaissance
operations against potential CBRN and TIM hazards. MAGTF CBRN CM teams are employed in a mature
operational environment to perform reconnaissance of known or unknown CBRN threats at the major
subordinate command level or higher, as determined by the MAGTF commander. These teams may be
employed in general support of other organizations or in direct support of the parent organization. The
employment of equipment will be according to unit standing operating procedures as guided by
29 CFR 1910.120.
UNITED STATES NAVY

A-58. The USN CBRN CM assets consist of forward deployed preventive-medicine units, the Defense Technical Response Group, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Research Laboratory.

Navy Forward-Deployed, Preventive-Medicine Unit

A-59. Through its rapidly deployable CBRN environmental defense response teams, the Navy forward deployed preventive-medicine unit provides the assessment, identification, and mitigation of near- and long-term health effects and the consequences of disease from the public health aspect. Response teams augment the Naval Medical Research Center field laboratory on-site.

Defense Technical Response Group

A-60. The Defense Technical Response Group can provide assistance with nuclear and improvised nuclear device EOD.

Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory

A-61. Naval research laboratory assets are arrayed strategically at continental United States locations. Broad-based, multidisciplinary research is conducted. The Office of Naval Research and Naval research laboratory assets are available to rapidly deploy uniformed experts in microbiology, who are trained in chemical-biological threat agents, to support field investigations.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

A-62. The National Guard Bureau maintains CBRN-capable forces that are under state government control according to 32 USC, but may be federalized to respond to CBRN incidents under 10 USC. These forces include—

- **WMD-CSTs.** The WMD-CSTs consist of Army National Guard and ANG personnel and are designated to provide a specialized capability in response to a CBRN incident, primarily within 32 USC operations status within the United States and its territories, as established by 10 USC. Responding under the authority of the governor, they support civil authorities at a domestic CBRN incident site by identifying CBRN agents, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. The WMD-CSTs may also be federalized and deployed as a part of a federal response to an incident within or outside the WMD-CST assigned state. (See ATP 3-11.46 for additional information.)

- **National Guard response force.** National Guard response forces provide every state with a ready combat arms force that is capable of delivering a company-size security element at the request of the state governor or the President. The National Guard response force may assist local and state law enforcement officials by protecting key sites or facilities, performing traffic control duties, and conducting cold-zone security operations at a CBRN incident site.

- **CERFP.** The CBRN enhanced response force package is a battalion-size task force that is tailored with existing Army National Guard units and is mobilized under 32 USC to provide a regional response in the event of a CBRN incident. The CBRN enhanced response force package follows WMD-CST and National Guard response force capabilities during the immediate and reinforcing response phases of the response spectrum. The CERFP enhanced response force package deploys to CBRN incident sites to conduct DSCA missions and to support the IC. The CBRN enhanced response force package is typically task-organized as a task force that includes a battalion level command and staff for C2, a company-size medical capability for triage and stabilization (such as an ANG medical group), a table of organization and equipment CBRN company to provide casualty decontamination, and a table of organization and equipment engineer company for casualty search and extraction. The CBRN enhanced response force package units maintain additional specialized equipment and receive specialized training to perform safe operations in a CBRN environment.
OTHER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT AGENCIES

A-63. There are other non-Service specific DOD CM support activities that support CBRN CM operations. Some of these activities are listed below.

Joint Task Force–Civil Support

A-64. The purpose of JTF-CS is to save lives; prevent injury; and provide temporary critical life support during a CBRN incident in the United States or its territories and possessions. JTF-CS is the only military organization dedicated solely to planning and integrating DOD forces for CBRN CM support to civil authorities in such a situation.

A-65. The JTF-CS is a standing JTF composed of Active, Reserve, and National Guard military and civilian members of the USA, USN, USAF, USMC, and U.S. Coast Guard and is commanded by a federalized Army National Guard general officer. Established in October 1999, JTF-CS is a subordinate unit of the U.S. Northern Command, a unified combatant command formed in October 2002 to plan, organize, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command provides military assistance to civil authorities, including CM operations.

A-66. The JTF-CS accomplishes its CBRN CM mission in strict adherence with the principles of the Constitution and public law. The deployment of JTF-CS, at the direction of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, occurs only after a governor requests federal assistance from the President and after the President issues a presidential disaster declaration. In any domestic setting, JTF-CS remains in support of the incident command throughout the CBRN CM operation.

Consequence Management Response Force

A-67. The CBRNE consequence management response force is a brigade-size combined arms task force that is tailored as a reinforcing effort for DSCA in response to CBRN incidents, and it operates under Title 10 USC authority and in support of U.S. Northern Command under JTF-CS. A CBRNE consequence management response force constitutes the majority of the JTF-CS task force response requirements and provides force-tailored capabilities (such as casualty decontamination, security operations, medical triage and treatment, aviation, logistics, and transportation).

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

A-68. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency CM advisory team deploys to provide joint technical support to the supported commander. It provides expertise in CBRN response procedures, requirements, resources, C2, health physics, public affairs, legal affairs, and specialized technical information. The CM advisory team coordinates technical information flow by controlling and resourcing requirements passed to the supported tactical operations center. The CM advisory team is able to task-organize and deploy to support commanders in the technical aspects of CBRN accidents or incidents. The incident-tailored force has secure communications, trained technical experts, hazard prediction modeling capability, and rapid reachback capability.

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

A-69. The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute can provide DOD technical support capability for nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents. The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute medical radiobiology advisory team responds as part of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency CM advisory team and is available at all times. The medical radiobiology advisory team can provide on-site training to health professionals on the management of nuclear or radiological casualties. The team provides state-of-the-art expertise and advice to commanders and primary care providers following a nuclear or radiological accident (nuclear weapons, reactor, or radiological material). The medical radiobiology advisory team provides access to biodosimetry and bioassay support to incident responders and local health authorities.

A-70. The medical radiobiology advisory team is a primary source of medical and radiological health information dealing with the management of casualties from nuclear warfare weapons and radiological dispersal device accidents. Senior medical experts provide on-site advice to physicians on—
- Resuscitative techniques for radiation injury and radionuclide contamination therapy.
- The use of investigative chelation therapy for internal contamination by radioactive material.
- Therapeutic drug combinations for acute radiation injury, and infection and protection against late-occurring diseases (such as cancer).
- Radiation injury interventional therapy and dose estimate bioassay.

**Joint Task Force—Consequence Management**

A-71. When directed, a response task force headquarters may be tasked to support the incident command during an incident. The commander may assume operational control of committed DOD elements (less U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), coordinate military support of CM operations, and redeploy units when DOD disengagement criteria are met. The commander establishes a fully functional command post near the incident within 24 hours of notification. The commander exercises operational control of DOD resources committed to providing DSCA, provides liaison officers to appropriate civil agencies, and receives liaison officers from appropriate military commands and agencies. The response team establishes initial liaison with supported civil agencies and coordinates support for follow-on personnel. (See JP 3-41 for additional information.)

**OTHER FEDERAL CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ASSETS**

A-72. The following paragraphs identify representative federal assets that could be tasked to support a CBRN CM incident.

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

A-73. The Metropolitan Medical Response System operates as an organized team of specialists. Team capabilities include agent detection and identification, patient decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law enforcement activities. Twenty-seven teams have been established. As of February 2007, there are 125 Metropolitan Medical Response System cities, 113 of which have attained baseline capabilities.

A-74. The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force provides rapidly deployable technical expertise, specialized equipment, and incident management for lead agency ICs and federal on-scene commanders for oil, hazmat, and WMD incidents.

**HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES**

A-75. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) capabilities are epidemiological surveillance, biological agent identification, and public health consultation and response. The CDC maintains the strategic national stockpile, which can deploy a push pack of critical chemical and biological countermeasures to any point in the United States within 12 hours. In addition, the strategic national stockpile can provide civilian medical resupply through its vendor-managed inventory.

A-76. The Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response national medical response teams are manned by medical personnel. These teams are capable of agent identification, patient decontamination, triage, and medical treatment in support of local health systems. There are three national medical response teams.
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

A-77. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts investigations on incidents involving CBRN material.

**National Domestic Preparedness Office**

A-78. As an office under the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, the National Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates all federal efforts to assist state and local responders with planning, training, equipment, and exercises necessary to respond to a CBRN incident.

A-79. The National Domestic Preparedness Office—
- Supports functional program areas for domestic preparedness. An improved intelligence and information-sharing apparatus underpins the services provided to the federal, state, and local responder community to distribute lessons learned, asset and capabilities information, and general readiness knowledge.
- Coordinates the establishment of training curricula and standards for responder training to ensure consistency, based on training objectives, and to tailor training opportunities to meet the needs of the responder community.
- Facilitates and coordinates the efforts of the U.S. government to provide the responder community with detection, protection, analysis, and decontamination equipment necessary to prepare for, and respond to, an incident involving WMD.
- Seeks to provide state and local governments with the resources and expertise necessary to design, conduct, and evaluate exercise scenarios involving WMD.
- Is responsible for coordinating federal, state, and local WMD preparedness planning and policy.

**Hazardous Materials Response Unit**

A-80. Hazardous materials response units are capable of the specialized sampling, detection, and identification of CBRN agents. They are also equipped with a variety of rescue equipment and PPE Levels A through C.

**Evidence Response Teams**

A-81. The main functions of the evidence response teams are crime scene documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal investigations. Some evidence response teams are hazmat-trained.

**Critical-incident Response Group**

A-82. Critical-incident response groups are specially assembled to conduct tactical and crisis management efforts.

**Intelligence Collection and Analysis**

A-83. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has experts that contribute to and coordinate detailed interagency threat assessment activities.

**ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY**

A-84. The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for removal and disposal efforts during a CBRN incident. They possess special decontamination capability, sample management capability, and laboratory analysis capability to support the CBRN CM mission.

**On-Scene Commanders**

A-85. Under the authority of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Environmental Protection Agency on-scene commanders coordinate all federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an incident.
Emergency Response Team

A-86. The emergency response team provides 24-hour access to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases and provides advice to the on-scene commander in such areas as hazard evaluation, risk assessment, multimedia sampling and analysis, on-site safety, and cleanup techniques. The emergency response team has portable, chemical-agent instrumentation that is capable of detection and identification in the low and subparts per million categories, and has entry level capabilities using PPE Level A through Level C.

Radiological Emergency Response Team

A-87. Radiological emergency response teams provide on-site monitoring and mobile laboratories for the field analysis of samples, expertise in radiation health physics and risk assessment. The radiological emergency response team is accessible 24 hours a day.

TECHNICAL REACHBACK

A-88. Technical reachback provides commanders with added expertise and knowledge when needed during the conduct of CBRN CM.

A-89. Technical reachback is the capability to contact technical subject matter experts when an information requirement exceeds the knowledge base of the responding ICS organization. A common situational awareness among all elements at the incident site, military and civilian, is imperative. Critical command decisions rely on multiple information sources that include technical reachback input. Table A-2, page A-26, provides a representative list of agencies that can provide technical reachback.

A-90. Reachback should be conducted using established protocols. Technical reachback can support the following representative requirements:

- Nonstandard Agent Identification of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warfare Agents and Toxic Industrial Material. Military responders are trained to detect and identify selected military warfare agents. If a TIM is used, or is suspected, ICS personnel should obtain additional technical information. This technical information may include persistency, medical effects, decontamination methods, and/or protection requirements.

- Modeling. During CBRN CM operations, the spread of contamination must be limited. Technical reachback can help support detailed analysis of an area to assist in determining downwind hazards; locating staging areas, operations centers, and decontamination sites; making shelter in place decisions; and conducting an evacuation.

- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Agent Sample Analysis and Evacuation. Sample analysis and evacuation can use technical reachback to obtain critical information for patient treatment. Samples evacuated can also be used as forensic evidence.

- Hazard Prediction. Technical experts can use modeling to provide a better indication of where vapor, liquid, or aerosolized hazards may occur. Preincident planning can identify technical reachback sources that may be used to provide verifiable, validated, and reliable information. The planning and execution process helps determine the operational value of those capabilities. Other planning considerations include the following:
  - Is technical reachback available at the incident site or at a remote site?
  - Do communication requirements include secure or nonsecure capabilities and/or audio or video capabilities?
  - Does fiscal resourcing support technical reachback 24 hours a day, 7 days a week?
Table A-2. Technical reachback contact information

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td><strong>Department of Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute</td>
<td>(301) 295-0316/0530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
<td>(877) 240-1187</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edgewood Chemical-Biological Center</td>
<td>(800) 831-4408</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases</td>
<td>(888) 872-7443</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense</td>
<td>(410) 436-3277</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine</td>
<td>(800) 222-9698</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Homeland Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Response Center, Chemical Terrorism/chemical-biological Hot Line</td>
<td>(800) 424-8802 or (202) 267-2675</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
<td>(800) 621-FEMA (3362)</td>
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<td><strong>Other Federal Agencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
<td>(800) CDC-INFO (232-4636)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Energy, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center</td>
<td>(865) 576-3131</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Response Team</td>
<td>(732) 321-6743</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health</td>
<td>(800)-35-NIOSH (356-4674)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center</td>
<td>(202) 586-8100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State Agencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>State Emergency Management Agencies</td>
<td>(202) 646-2500</td>
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**Legend:**
- B: biological
- C: chemical
- N: nuclear
- R: radiological
- U.S.: United States

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT**

A-91. A sample checklist for an HSS plan in support of a CBRN CM operation is provided in Table A-3.
**Table A-3. Sample health service support plan checklist**

- Establish response capabilities and prepare specific equipment lists. Include incident site EMT medical evacuation, PVNTMED services, veterinary services, behavioral health personnel, C2 staff, health service logistics, hospitalization capabilities, and a medical laboratory to receive samples or specimens, as required.
- Identify the capabilities (to include IPE/PPE requirements) of HSS staffs and organizations to respond to a CBRN CM event.
- Define roles and responsibilities for DOD personnel augmenting local, state, HN, or other medical organizations and facilities.
- Describe the location and responsibilities of medical personnel supporting MCD operations.
- Define requirements to check food and water supplies for contamination.
- Address health hazard vulnerability assessments, medical surveillance, and OEH surveillance activities.
- Address the procedures for the care of animals.
- Provide reachback contact information for USAMEDCOM, USAMRICD, USAMRIID, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, CDC, and USACHPPM for technical guidance and support.
- Establish liaison with local, state, federal, and HN agencies, as required.
- Provide guidance to response units or staffs on their relationships with local, state, federal, and HN agencies as they relate to CBRN CM incident response.
- Outline the procedures for medical response units or staffs to obtain support from the USAMEDCOM SMARTs. Address—
  - Availability of mass prophylaxes.
  - Evacuation and SIP guidance.
  - Prophylaxis and vaccination distribution guidance.
  - Ability to develop surge capacity.
  - Decontamination and evacuation capabilities.
  - Restriction of movement, isolation, and quarantine procedures.
- Establish a staging area for all response units or staffs.
- Provide procedures for alerting response units or staffs, establish medical C2 for the response units or staffs, establish liaison procedures, brief response units or staffs, dispatch response units or staffs, monitor response activities, and request additional support, as required. Address—
  - Debriefing all response personnel.
  - Preparing after action reviews.
  - Replenishing all expended medical equipment and supplies.
  - Rotating dated medications through the supporting MTF to maintain the current stockage and prevent exceeding expiration dates.
  - Releasing units and staffs not involved in the postincident site decontamination operations to begin preparation in the event that another incident occurs.
  - Providing medical advice to the local, municipal, state, federal, and HN agencies and incident site restoration teams and personnel, as required.
  - Providing assignments to designated units or staffs.
  - Receiving response unit or staff duty assignments.
  - Assembling supplies and equipment in functional sets or as directed by the commander or planning staff.
  - Storing supplies and equipment as directed, ensuring that all supplies and equipment are safeguarded and that all antidotes, anticonvulsants, and other medications are properly stored (including at the correct temperatures).
  - Requesting training material and doctrinal publications and guidance on incident response activities and training units and staffs to meet response requirements.
  - Closing all response unit or staff locations.
  - Terminating operations and preparing for the closure of response site activities.
  - Decontaminating response personnel before departing the incident site.
  - Decontaminating nonexpendable material and equipment, placing contaminated expendable items in the designated disposal site, and closing the decontamination site.
- Continue to monitor operations during the postincident site decontamination operations, and provide recommendations on findings during the monitoring process.
Table A-3. Sample health service support plan checklist (continued)

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<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
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<td>individual protective equipment</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>mass casualty decontamination</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>occupational and environmental health</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>personal protective equipment</td>
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<td>SIP</td>
<td>shelter in place</td>
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<td>SMART</td>
<td>special medical augmentation response team</td>
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<td>USACHPPM</td>
<td>United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine</td>
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<td>USAMEDCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Medical Command</td>
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<td>United States Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense</td>
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<td>United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases</td>
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Appendix B

Preparation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Preparation implements the approved plan and relevant agreements to increase readiness through training, exercises, and certification.

VULNERABILITY REDUCTION MEASURES

B-1. A key element of ensuring preparedness is to recognize and eliminate vulnerabilities. Vulnerability reduction measures help units correct weaknesses identified during the vulnerability assessment. Below is a list of training-, logistics-, personnel-, and readiness-focused vulnerability reduction measures that can be used to assist a unit in preparing to conduct or support CBRN CM operations. (Other CBRN-related vulnerability reduction measures can be found in *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Aspect of Command and Control*.)

- Develop common standing operating procedures and TTP with expected supported and supporting elements.
- Task-organize to fill any gaps in duties and responsibilities.
- Train personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used during a CBRN CM operations (such as NIMS or ICS).
- Obtain (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel (such as hazmat technician or incident command training).
- Exercise and refine plans with military and civilian counterparts.
- Obtain the proper equipment to protect against, detect, and decontaminate identified hazards.
- Develop, request, and maintain push packs for follow-on resupply and maintenance of all classes of supplies in support of extended operations.
- Prepare and maintain medical records for all personnel to ensure that proper physicals, immunizations, and qualifications for specific hazardous duties (such as site entry personnel) are up to date.
- Ensure that all communications equipment, communications security, and controlled cryptographic items are serviceable and ready to deploy. This includes determining the compatibility of communications equipment with other expected responders.

B-2. During preparation, unit checklists are revised and updated. Checklists are valuable tools to assist units in responding to incidents. The following checklists provide examples of activities that should be conducted when responding to a CBRN CM support operation. The examples are not all-inclusive for every unit and should be viewed as guidelines to build from for Service-specific requirements. Table B-1, page B-2, contains a representative checklist for a CBRN CM (hazmat) unit. Table B-2, page B-4, contains a representative checklist for a CBRN CM (technical decontamination) unit.
## Table B-1. Sample CBRN CM (hazmat) unit checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preincident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Identify CBRN team members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Maintain a current alert roster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Maintain an alert notification package of specialized equipment for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>team members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that respiratory equipment is maintained and training is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conducted according to AR 11-34 and 29 CFR 1910.134.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that hazmat emergency response meets the requirements of 29 CFR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910.120(q).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the capability exists to conduct atmospheric monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and detection needed to determine the level and extent of chemical,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biological, and radiological contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the decontamination team is fully trained on all PPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worn and trained and certified on all equipment that is being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate contaminated casualty extraction with installation fire and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emergency services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that hazmat training complies with applicable requirements of 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR 1910.120; NFPA 472; and the appropriate federal, state, or HN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulations governing prehospital care providers (emergency medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services operations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide training requirements for installation personnel who handle or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use hazmat, to include DODI 6050.05 requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Develop and maintain proficiency in essential CBRN tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Develop and maintain ICS forms. (Examples of ICS forms can be found in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the NIMS publication.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incident</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish an incident command post to support the ICS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Initiate communications with the emergency operations center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Initiate personal protection and accountability measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Perform positive and negative pressure tests when donning a respirator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to ensure satisfactory fitting and valve function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Determine the wind direction before approaching the scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Locate and assess the incident site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct contaminated casualty extraction in coordination with fire and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emergency services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide triage and emergency medical services, if required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Search for secondary devices in coordination with EOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Detect CBRN hazards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Identify the chemical-biological agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish exposure limits and stay times in the area requiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protective equipment based on agent type; concentration, if known; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambient temperature. Rotate personnel based on exposure levels and stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct a survey to analyze agent transfer and spread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Initiate initial CBRN reports to the IC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Position CBRN detectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Mark contaminated areas to prevent casualties and the spread of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Determine the initial cordon size, based on the type and quantity of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material involved at the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish the contamination control line or hot line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish the entry and exit control points to the contamination control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line upwind of the incident site. Ensure that security is adequate to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent persons from entering at points other than the entry lane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Communicate to the IC through the incident command post that the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incident site perimeter is established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Reassess the cordon size and locations of the entry control point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on weather conditions and recovery operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B-1. Sample CBRN CM (hazmat) unit checklist (continued)

#### Incident (continued)

- ✔ Determine if the incident site should be treated as a crime scene, and coordinate with the security team for jurisdiction and handling of evidence, if required.
- ✔ Maintain continuous communications with the IC, the incident command post, and other responder organizations.
- ✔ Maintain continuous coordination with the MTF, and coordinate the evacuation of casualties to the MTF or nearest hospital for further stabilization.
- ✔ Coordinate administrative and logistical support to sustain operations in a contaminated environment.
- ✔ Establish personnel and equipment decontamination stations, in conjunction with medical personnel.
- ✔ Secure a water source for the decontamination station.
- ✔ Set up wash stations for the decontamination station.
- ✔ Begin decontamination operations. Contain the hazard and decontamination runoff.
- ✔ Evacuate contaminated casualties to the decontamination station.
- ✔ Conduct limited personnel and equipment decontamination to sustain operations and limit the spread of contamination.
- ✔ Collect aerosol, environmental, plant, animal, and medical samples.
- ✔ Prepare and forward samples to the laboratory for further analysis and identification.
- ✔ Assist in hazard prediction for limited early warning.
- ✔ Confirm the results of atmospheric monitoring and detection using an approved and designated laboratory for analysis.
- ✔ Initiate a request to the IC for external augmentation if the CBRN team capabilities are exceeded.
- ✔ Relocate detectors to the predicted agent location, and verify hazard prediction.
- ✔ Record hazmat exposure for each member of the CBRN team.
- ✔ Coordinate with the disaster mortuary operational response team/grave registration for the disposition of human remains.

#### Postincident

- ✔ Provide hazmat support to the incident command post through recovery.
- ✔ Develop and provide input to incident after action reviews.

**Legend:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>incident commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFPA</td>
<td>National Fire Protection Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>personal protective equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B-2. Sample CBRN CM (responder decontamination) unit checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preoperations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish a water supply, if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that a sufficient amount of decontamination solution and supporting equipment is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate decontamination team protective clothing with safety standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that sufficient respiratory protection devices are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the decontamination area is level or sloped toward the entrance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the decontamination area position is based on ground and wind direction/air flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish the decontamination area in the warm zone at the exit from the hot zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate the selection of decontamination methods and procedures with site safety and the IC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Identify the CBRN material hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the decontamination station is well marked and designated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Recheck runoff considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Set up containment basins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish water flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that sufficient disposal containers are available and in place for contaminated material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that spare respiratory protection devices are available for decontamination personnel and entry teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Mix decontamination solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that entry and exit points are well marked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Advise and prepare emergency medical services personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Position decontamination and cleaning equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that the decontamination team is wearing protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Brief the entry team on decontamination procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Enter the decontamination area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drop tools on the dirty side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Confirm that entry personnel are protected and the air supply is adequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prioritize the order of personnel to be decontaminated based on the amount of air supply remaining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove contaminants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Step into the containment basin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examine protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scrub contaminated protective clothing with decontaminant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allow for appropriate contact time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rinse protective clothing with water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct an air cylinder exchange if returning to the hot zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove Level A protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove Level A respiratory protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove Level B respiratory protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove Level B protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Remove personal clothing (if required).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Dry off and redress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Evaluate emergency medical services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate with disaster mortuary operational response team/grave registration for the disposition of human remains.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B-2. Sample CBRN CM (responder decontamination) unit checklist (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postoperations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Isolate and bag disposable materials. Discard them in approved containers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Seal, mark, and isolate all containers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Clean and account for all equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Identify any equipment requiring isolation for further analysis or decontamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Clean decontamination personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Clean all entry personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Contain and dispose of decontamination solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Replenish decontamination supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Terminate decontamination operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
IC incident commander

ORGANIZATION

B-3. A CBRN CM response unit organization provides the commander with the capabilities to execute assigned missions. Mission analysis identifies key mission-essential tasks. (See paragraph B-11 through B-14 for key tasks that CBRN CM response units may have the capability to perform.)

B-4. Changes may require a CBRN unit to reevaluate how it will conduct and support the mission. Unit personnel must have the training and equipment to execute required missions. Units may require new equipment and training to provide new capabilities. Emerging technology is producing new equipment that is being procured to provide response units with enhanced capabilities. Organizational structures are revised to adapt to these new capabilities. New equipment issue is accompanied by training and the supporting TTP.

EQUIPMENT

B-5. CBRN CM response unit equipment will likely include military standard and commercial, off-the-shelf equipment. Unit leaders ensure that—

- Equipment sets are configured to deploy as part of effective unit load plans.
- Unit load plans are configured for road, rail, or aerial deployment.
- Equipment is maintained according to government and/or commercial technical manuals.
- Unit personnel are trained to accomplish operator and organizational maintenance according to preventive-maintenance checks and services checklists.
- Logistic support packages are prepared to provide units with the needed organizational level repair parts and supplies.
- Support agreements are prepared to ensure that logistic support (above organizational level) will provide the needed sustainment during deployment.
- Exercises are integrated to provide mission-related training that includes the use of authorized equipment.
- Safety-related equipment issues are understood by unit leaders and personnel.
- Inventories are maintained and updated.
- Storage guidelines are followed, especially for perishable, limited shelf life items.

B-6. Equipping a unit to conduct or support a CBRN CM operation requires an understanding of the operational environment in which the unit will function. Specialized protective and detection equipment is used when conducting CBRN CM operations. In many cases, the standard sets of equipment used when conducting CBRN CM operations must be approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health for use in a hazardous environment. Response units must not obtain new commercial, off-the-shelf
equipment unless a higher command authority has authorized its procurement. Even with commercial, off-the-shelf equipment, the standardization of issue is still a key guideline that will influence equipment fielding.

TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION

B-7. Table B-3 and table B-4 provide an overview of the training and certification required for CBRN responders and other personnel participating in a CBRN CM operation.

Table B-3. Levels of response capabilities guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Level</th>
<th>Objective Response Capability</th>
<th>Associated Equipment</th>
<th>Supporting Training Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Priority</td>
<td>Operator competency, plus the ability to—</td>
<td>High-level equipment:</td>
<td>Technician/specialist level hazmat (offensive/hot zone) training. Specialist level physician, nurse, and public health training. Emergency assessment and detection training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Technician/Specialist Capability)</td>
<td>• Operate unhindered by equipment shortfalls in a contaminated environment.</td>
<td>• Advanced detection equipment. Computer database references. Computer programming for detection equipment. Responder protected detection equipment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct safe sampling procedures in a contaminated environment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Priority</td>
<td>Basic competency, plus the ability to—</td>
<td>Moderate level equipment:</td>
<td>Operations level training for firefighters and selected security, emergency medical services, public works, physician, nurse, and public health personnel. Technician level training for hazmat teams or personnel who expect to work in the hot zone. CBRN training for installation emergency response trainers and training and installation planners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Operations Capability)</td>
<td>• Operate with hazmat teams (defensive only).</td>
<td>• Level A, B, and C PPE. SCBA. Decontamination. Detection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct initial detection and monitoring (defensive, outside hot or warm zone).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish mass casualty response/treatment systems.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish transport for mass casualties (gross decontamination only).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implement evacuation plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Apply advanced PPE measures (if trained).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct operations in a contaminated environment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Priority</td>
<td>Ability to implement self-protective measures. Ability to protect the general population from further contamination.</td>
<td>PPE, to include equipment, detection, and decontamination capabilities, as appropriate.</td>
<td>Responder Awareness Course. Awareness level training, all disciplines (except firefighters for which the minimum is operations level training). Command and staff workshop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Awareness Capability)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
PPE personal protective equipment
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
### Table B-4. Performance objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency Level</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Technician/ Specialist</th>
<th>IC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Workers for Competency Levels</td>
<td>Facility workers, hospital support, janitors, security guards</td>
<td>Initial, police officers, 911 operators, dispatchers</td>
<td>IRTs, emergency medical services, firefighters, on-scene support personnel</td>
<td>IC, OSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CBRN Incident Areas of Competency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notes (see legend)</th>
<th>CBRN Incident Areas of Competency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Know the potential for terrorist use of CBRN, to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBRN weapons substances identification.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Associated hazards and risks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Likely locations for its use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Potential outcomes of a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Indicators of possible criminal or terrorist activity involving such agents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Behavior of CBRN agents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Know the indicators, signs, and symptoms for exposure to CBRN; and identify the agents, if possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Know questions to ask a caller to elicit critical information regarding a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. Recognize unusual trends, which may indicate a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Understand relevant response plans, SOPs, and your role in them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recognize and communicate the need for additional resources.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes
- **C** - Critical
- **F** - Fundamental
- **M** - Must
- **m** - Minimum
- **G** - Good
- **◊** - Specialty
- **(911 only)** - 911 operators and public safety dispatchers only

---

Sample Workers for Competency Levels:
- **Employees:** Facility workers, hospital support, janitors, security guards
- **Responders:** Initial, police officers, 911 operators, dispatchers
- **IC:** IRT specialists, hazmat team members/technicians, medical personnel

---

CBRN Incident Areas of Competency:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Notes (see legend)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Know the potential for terrorist use of CBRN, to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBRN weapons substances identification.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Associated hazards and risks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Likely locations for its use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Potential outcomes of a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Indicators of possible criminal or terrorist activity involving such agents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>• Behavior of CBRN agents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Know the indicators, signs, and symptoms for exposure to CBRN; and identify the agents, if possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Know questions to ask a caller to elicit critical information regarding a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. Recognize unusual trends, which may indicate a CBRN incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Understand relevant response plans, SOPs, and your role in them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B-4. Performance objectives (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency Level</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Technician/ Specialist</th>
<th>IC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Responders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Make proper notification, and communicate the hazard.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o ● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Understand—</td>
<td>C F m</td>
<td>o ●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBRN agent terms.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBRN toxicology terms.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employ individual protection:</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o ●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use self-protection measures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Properly employ PPE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Select and use proper protective equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a. Know protective measures and how to initiate actions to protect others and safeguard property.</td>
<td>F M</td>
<td>o ●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b. Know evacuation measures for personnel in a downwind hazard area.</td>
<td>F M G</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Know decontamination procedures for self, victims, site, equipment, and mass casualties:</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o Self</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Understand and implement.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a. Know crime scene and evidence preservation.</td>
<td>F M m</td>
<td>o (except 911)</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10b. Know procedures and safety precautions for collecting legal evidence.</td>
<td>F m G</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Know how to access federal and other support infrastructure.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o (911 only)</td>
<td>o ●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Understand the risks of operating in protective clothing.</td>
<td>C F m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>● ● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competency Level</td>
<td>Awareness (Employees, Responders)</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Technician/Specialist</td>
<td>IC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Understand emergency and first aid procedures for exposure to CBRN agents and principles of triage.</td>
<td>F M</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Know how to perform hazard and risk assessment.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td></td>
<td>•</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Understand termination and all-clear procedures.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Understand ICS/IMS. - Function within role. - Implement.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17a. Know how to perform CBRN contamination control and containment operations, including those for fatalities.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17b. Understand procedures and equipment for the safe transport of contaminated items.</td>
<td>F m G</td>
<td></td>
<td>•</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Know the classification, detection, identification, and verification of CBRN materials using field survey instruments and equipment and methods for the collection of solid, liquid, and gas samples.</td>
<td>C F M m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>◊</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Know safe casualty extraction and chemical-biological antidote administration procedures.</td>
<td>F m</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Know patient assessment and EMT procedures.</td>
<td>M m G (medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Be familiar with CBRN-related public health and local emergency medical services issues.</td>
<td>G (medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Know procedures for patient transport.</td>
<td>F G (medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Have the ability to execute CBRN triage and primary care.</td>
<td>G (medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B-4. Performance objectives (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competency Level</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Technician/ Specialist</th>
<th>IC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Responders</td>
<td>(medical only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Know laboratory identification and diagnosis for biological agents.</td>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Have the ability to develop a site safety plan and control plan.</td>
<td>C F</td>
<td>G m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Have the ability to develop a CBRN response plan and conduct of exercise response.</td>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
C 29 CFR 1910.120
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
EMT emergency medical treatment
F NFPA 472 and/or NFPA 473
G focus group workshop
IC incident commander
ICS Incident Command System
IMS Incident Management System
IRT incident response team
M macro objectives developed by a training subgroup of the senior interagency coordinating group
m micro objectives developed by the U.S. Research, Development, and Engineering Command
OSC on-scene commander
PPE personal protective equipment
SOP standing operating procedure
o basic level
◊ specialized level
● advanced level

B-8. CBRN CM response unit personnel are required to meet the capability guidelines and performance objectives outlined in table B-3, page B-6, and table B-4, page B-7. Unit leaders identify those sections within their organizations that require awareness, operations, or technician/specialist level capabilities.

B-9. Assigned missions and associated tasks may require that unit personnel operate within the hot zone. Therefore, the unit leader must ensure that those personnel receive the required technician or specialist training.

B-10. Unit leaders prepare plans that outline the training program for their unit. Plans will likely include provisions for internal training (such as unit sustainment) and external training (such as attendance at training courses provided by other agencies). The unit maintains individual training records to help ensure that training is current.

UNIVERSAL TASKS

B-11. A summary of the DHS all-hazards task list is provided below. As DOD unit responders train to standard on Service-specific tactical CBRN CM tasks, they should understand how those tasks apply to the CM-related DHS tasks.

B-12. The DHS all-hazards universal task list is used for national preparedness. The list is composed of four main tasks: prevent, protect, respond, and recover. Conducting CBRN CM operations falls primarily within
the domains of the last two tasks (respond and recover). DOD participation in CBRN CM operations focuses almost exclusively within the domain of the respond task.

**RESPOND**

B-13. The supporting subtasks are—

- Assess the incident.
  - Investigate the incident.
  - Assess the hazards and consequences.
  - Conduct internal communications.
- Minimize the impact.
  - Manage the incident.
  - Respond to the hazard.
  - Implement protective actions.
  - Conduct search and rescue.
  - Distribute public information.
- Care for the public.
  - Provide medical care.
  - Distribute prophylaxes.
  - Provide mass care.
  - Manage casualties.

**RECOVER**

B-14. These tasks are generally performed by other federal, state and/or local agencies (such as FEMA). The supporting subtasks are—

- Assist the public.
  - Provide long-term care.
  - Provide recovery information.
  - Provide social services.
- Restore the environment.
  - Conduct site cleanup.
  - Dispose of materials.
  - Conduct site remediation.
  - Restore natural resources.
- Restore infrastructure.
  - Reconstitute government services.
  - Rebuild property.
  - Restore lifelines.
  - Restore economic institutions.

**EXERCISES**

B-15. Response units participate in CBRN CM exercises. The exercise design must provide a realistic portrayal of the possible CBRN CM operational environment. The following scenarios provide guidance for responder organizations, and the guidance in these scenarios can be used to support a reference base for exercise design.

B-16. Table 5, page B-12; table 6, page B-13; and table 7, page B-14, are sample exercise scenarios for CBRN CM operations. Each exercise scenario also includes multiple vignettes.
Table B-5. Sample domestic CM scenario

**Scenario: CBRN hazard assessment, MCD—domestic CM environment, and MCD at an incident site—stateside airport.**

A truck containing an unknown powdery substance has exploded outside a major U.S. airport. DHS has requested DOD support. The Secretary of Defense has approved support from the local military base and one of its tenant units.

a. Vignette One. (CBRN Hazard Assessment)
   - **Situation.** The unit stationed at a nearby base has been requested to support the incident command at the local airport following a terrorist attack.
   - **Mission.** The unit will conduct a CBRN hazard assessment of the attack area to help determine the need for follow-on support.
   - **Execution.** Tasks include the following:
     - Plan.
     - Prepare and coordinate.
     - Conduct movement.
     - Execute linkup.
     - Detect.
     - Identify.
     - Mark.
     - Assess.
     - Report.
     - Sample.
     - Evacuate the sample.
     - Decontaminate (technical).
     - Resupply.
     - Recover.
   - **Service Support.** The unit will support the incident command, as required.
   - **Command and Signal.** The unit will remain under military C2. The unit will report the results of its CBRN hazard assessment to the incident commander.

b. Vignette Two. (MCD)
   - **Situation.** The unit stationed at a nearby base has been requested to support the incident command at the local airport following a terrorist attack.
   - **Mission.** The unit will support local and state responders conducting MCD of large numbers of people that were injured during the blast and exposed to the unknown powdery substance.
   - **Execution.** Tasks include the following:
     - Plan.
     - Prepare and coordinate.
     - Conduct movement.
     - Execute linkup.
     - Decontaminate (technical).
     - Set up mass casualty site.
     - Decontaminate (mass casualty).
     - Resupply.
     - Recover.
   - **Service Support.** The unit will support the incident command, as required.
   - **Command and Signal.** The unit will remain under military C2.

**Legend:**
- **C2** command and control
- **CBRN** chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- **CM** consequence management
- **DHS** Department of Homeland Security
- **DOD** Department of Defense
- **MCD** mass casualty decontamination
### Table B-6. Sample foreign CM scenario

**Scenario:** CBRN hazard assessment, FCM environment, Treeland.

U.S. units stationed in Treeland are currently at FPCON Bravo. Treeland is not considered a combat zone, and U.S. forces are conducting operations in other parts of the continent using Treeland as a base of operations for logistics.

a. **Vignette One. (CBRN Hazard Assessment)**
   
   (1) **Situation.** A small, fixed-wing aircraft has been crashed by terrorists into a U.S. military headquarters building in the city of Yew, Treeland. There are reports of casualties downwind from the crash area. It is suspected that a release of some type of hazmat has occurred during the attack.
   
   (2) **Mission.** The unit stationed near the U.S. military headquarters is ordered to conduct a CBRN hazard assessment of the crash site.
   
   (3) **Execution.** Tasks include the following:
      - Plan (TLP).
      - Prepare and coordinate.
      - Conduct movement.
      - Execute linkup.
      - Detect.
      - Identify.
      - Assess.
      - Report.
      - Decontaminate (technical).
      - Recover.
   
   (4) **Service Support.** The unit will support the senior military commander.
   
   (5) **Command and Signal.** The unit will provide recommendations for follow-on support to the theater J-3 within 2 hours of arrival on-site.

b. **Vignette Two. (CBRN Hazard Assessment)**
   
   (1) **Situation.** A truck has been detonated in front of the U.S. embassy in a large city in Treeland. There are large numbers of U.S. and HN casualties near the embassy.
   
   (2) **Mission.** The unit stationed near the U.S. embassy in Treeland is ordered to conduct a CBRN hazard assessment of the embassy area. Close coordination with HN responders is required.
   
   (3) **Execution.** Tasks include the following:
      - Plan (TLP).
      - Prepare and coordinate.
      - Conduct movement.
      - Execute linkup.
      - Detect.
      - Identify.
      - Assess.
      - Report.
      - Decontaminate (technical).
      - Recover.
   
   (4) **Service Support.** The unit will support the senior military commander, HN IC, and DOS.
   
   (5) **Command and Signal.** The unit will provide recommendations for follow-on support to the theater J-3 and DOS within 2 hours of arrival on-site.
Table B-6. Sample foreign CM scenario (continued)

Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
DOS Department of State
FPCON force protection condition
FCM foreign consequence management
HN host nation
IC incident commander
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
TLP troop leading procedures

Table B-7. Sample national special-security event scenario

Scenario: MCD/CBRN hazard assessment, support at a receiving hospital, CBRN hazard assessment—NSSE.

An international sporting event is being hosted by the United States; athletes from around the world are participating. This event has been designated as an NSSE with DOD support authorized in the event of a terrorist attack. Local DOD units are on-call at various venues across the United States.

a. Vignette One. (NSSE, MCD)
   (1) Situation. Numerous car bombs have exploded on the roads leading into the stadium hosting one of the events. These explosions have caused mass casualties in a 10-mile radius around the stadium. Many of the casualties are having trouble breathing, have burning sensations on their skin and in their throats and eyes, and are reporting dizziness and nausea.
   (2) Mission. Three DOD units have been tasked to provide MCD support to hospitals receiving these casualties.
   (3) Execution. Tasks include the following:
      • Plan (TLP).
      • Prepare and coordinate.
      • Conduct movement.
      • Execute linkup.
      • Report.
      • Decontaminate (technical).
      • Set up an MCD site.
      • Decontaminate (mass casualty).
      • Resupply.
      • Recover.
   (4) Service Support. Units will support the incident command, as required.
   (5) Command and Signal. Units will remain under military C2.

b. Vignette Two. (NSSE, CBRN Hazard Assessment)
   (1) Situation. Numerous car bombs have exploded on the roads leading into the stadium hosting one of the events. These explosions have caused mass casualties in a 10-mile radius around the stadium. Many of the casualties are having trouble breathing, have burning sensations on their skin and in their throats and eyes, and are reporting dizziness and nausea.
   (2) Mission. One unit has been ordered to report to the incident commander and conduct a CBRN hazard assessment to determine the CBRN hazard and obtain samples.
Table B-7. Sample national special-security event scenario (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Execution. Tasks include the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Plan (TLP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepare and coordinate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Execute linkup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Detect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assess.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decontaminate (technical).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resupply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recover.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (4) Service Support. The unit will support the incident command, as required. |
| (5) Command and Signal. The unit will remain under military C2. |

Legend:
- C2 command and control
- CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- DOD Department of Defense
- MCD mass casualty decontamination
- NSSE national special-security event
- TLP troop leading procedures

B-17. The Homeland Security Council—in partnership with the DHS and federal, interagency, state, and local homeland security agencies—has developed 15 all-hazards planning scenarios for use in national, federal, state, and local homeland security preparedness activities. The following are three scenario extracts that reflect a CBRN incident:

- **Scenario 1 (see table B-8, page B-16).** Nuclear detonation: 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device. In this scenario, terrorist members of the universal adversary group assemble a gun type nuclear device using highly enriched uranium stolen from a nuclear facility located in the former Soviet Union. (In this context, highly enriched uranium is weapons grade uranium.) The nuclear device components are smuggled into the United States. The 10-kiloton nuclear device is assembled near a major metropolitan center. Using a delivery van, terrorists transport the device to the central business district of a large city and detonate it. Most buildings within 1,000 meters (approximately 3,200 feet) of the detonation are severely damaged. Injuries from flying debris (missiles) may occur out to 6 kilometers (approximately 3.7 miles). An electromagnetic pulse damages many electronic devices within about 5 kilometers (approximately 3 miles). A mushroom cloud rises above the city and begins to drift east-northeast.

- **Scenario 2 (see table B-9, page B-16).** Biological attack: Aerosol anthrax. Anthrax spores dispersed by aerosol delivery results in the inhalation of anthrax, which develops when the bacterial organism, Bacillus anthracis, is inhaled into the lungs. A progressive infection follows. This scenario describes a single aerosol anthrax attack delivered by a truck using a concealed improvised spraying device in one densely populated urban city with a significant commuter workforce. It does not exclude the possibility of multiple attacks in disparate cities or time-phased attacks (such as reload). For federal planning purposes, it will be assumed that the universal adversary will attack five separate metropolitan areas in a sequential manner. Three cities will be attacked initially, followed by two additional cities 2 weeks later.

- **Scenario 3 (see table B-10, page B-16).** Chemical attack: Nerve agent sarin, also known as GB, is a man-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. Sarin is a clear, colorless, and tasteless liquid that has no odor in its pure form; however, sarin can evaporate into a vapor and spread into
the environment. In this scenario, the universal adversary builds six spray dissemination devices and releases sarin vapor into the ventilation systems of three large commercial office buildings in a metropolitan area. The agent kills 95 percent of the people in the buildings and kills or sickens many of the responders. In addition, some of the agent exits through rooftop ventilation stacks, creating a downwind hazard. For the purposes of estimating federal response requirements, each building is assumed to have an occupancy of 2,000 personnel (twenty-story buildings with 100 occupants per floor) and the outdoor/subway population density of the surrounding areas is 3,900 people per square mile (one-tenth of the total population density in the vicinity of Times Square, New York City).

**Table B-8. Scenario 1 data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Casualties</strong></th>
<th>Can vary widely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure Damage</strong></td>
<td>Total within radius of 0.5 to 1.0 mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evacuations/Displaced Persons</strong></td>
<td>450,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Approximately 3,000 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Impact</strong></td>
<td>Hundreds of billions of dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential for Multiple Events</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recovery Timeline</strong></td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B-9. Scenario 2 data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Casualties</strong></th>
<th>13,000 fatalities and injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure Damage</strong></td>
<td>Minimal, other than contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evacuations/Displaced Persons</strong></td>
<td>Possibly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Impact</strong></td>
<td>Billions of dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential for Multiple Events</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recovery Timeline</strong></td>
<td>Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B-10. Scenario 3 data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Casualties</strong></th>
<th>6,000 fatalities (95% of the building occupants); 350 injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure Damage</strong></td>
<td>Minimal, other than contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evacuations/Displaced Persons</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Impact</strong></td>
<td>$300 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential for Multiple Events</strong></td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recovery Timeline</strong></td>
<td>3 to 4 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REHEARSALS**

B-18. As with any military operation, conducting rehearsals can mean the difference between success and failure. Rehearsals allow individuals and units to establish their roles, responsibilities, and duties in any given mission and to visualize how they fit into the larger scheme of operations. They also reveal flaws and weaknesses in a plan so that corrections can be made before execution.
Appendix C

Response Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

An effective response drives more effective restoration operations, limits the severity of the CBRN event on operations, and reduces the overall number of casualties. Notification, warning, and reporting will trigger protective actions to prevent the exposure of resources.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-1. A clearly defined and understood C2 during CBRN CM allows for effective synergistic operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SYNCHRONIZATION

C-2. Effective C2 is essential to maximize the use of available assets in accomplishing CBRN CM missions. C2 relationships may be tailored to a particular situation, whether domestic or foreign. A unity of effort is achieved by focusing on the commander’s intent and maintaining coordination with the IC. An effective C2 system supports the synchronization of military and civilian agency operations to ensure an effective and efficient response to CBRN CM operations.

C-3. As stated in chapter 1, military CM response assets remain under the C2 of the military chain of command. The command post is the field office for on-scene unit emergency operations and requires access to communications, information, and technical and administrative support. The command post should be located so that the incident site is in view; this allows the commander to supervise and control the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Capabilities that should be resident at the command post include—

- Communications.
- Reference material (electronic/hardcopy).
- Situational status.
- Maps.
- General administrative support.

NOTIFICATION

C-4. Requests for DOD CM support originate from civilian authorities (DHS or DOS) in the aftermath of a CBRN incident. When requested through appropriate channels, DOD makes resources available to assist the IC in response to a CBRN incident. Upon appropriate notification, military response assets deploy to support the incident command that is tasked with managing the coordinated federal response to a CBRN incident. The defense coordinating officer is normally delegated operational control of DOD response assets assigned to the operation. Upon activation, the defense coordinating officer provides a response capability, establishes liaison with military response elements, supports crisis management and CM operations associated with the CBRN incident, and conducts requisite predeployment and deployment actions.

C-5. The response unit will likely receive a warning order as preliminary notice of an upcoming deployment to an incident site. At this point, the unit may execute the unit recall procedures, assemble the unit, alert the reachback and integrated logistic support systems, identify the required information, and plan the deployment.

C-6. Following notification, the commander will likely need access to critical incident information to support required planning steps. To support this need, the commander may receive permission to deploy an advanced echelon. Representative advanced echelon functions are shown in table C-1, page C-2.
### Table C-1. Representative advanced echelon functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrive on-scene.</td>
<td>Report to the ICS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Get a SITREP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct the initial assessment.</strong></td>
<td>Obtain ICS data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate a staging area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinate the sector layout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtain IC intentions for response unit employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtain IC strategic goals for the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct site assessment and coordination with responding agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determine whether the site is secured from hostile action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct a hazard analysis and/or prepare the site safety plan.</strong></td>
<td>Obtain the site map (including the hot, warm, and cold zone boundaries).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtain information for the CBRN agent identified or suspected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct coordination.</strong></td>
<td>Verify decontamination setup requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verify the survey site hotline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor the designated response unit AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verify and mark the hot zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in the site layout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guide main body personnel and equipment into the site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Develop a tentative plan, priorities of work, and draft commander’s critical information requirements.</strong></td>
<td>Coordinate with the IC to determine the preferred location to stage survey/medical teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure that the operations officer provides the deputy commander and main body with the commander’s critical information requirements based on the initial assessment and the IC initial brief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- **AO**: area of operations
- **CBRN**: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- **IC**: incident commander
- **ICS**: Incident Command System
- **SITREP**: situation report

C-7. Upon the notification and receipt of a valid deployment order, the response unit deploys to the designated staging area in the AO. Upon arrival, the unit initiates contact with the local IC and/or the supported emergency response organization. Once the response unit notifies the gaining command of their arrival, key site mapping information is used and/or updated to provide a quick orientation. This information may include—

- Hazard control zones (cold, warm, and hot zones and minimum safe distances).
- Site terrain.
- Ingress and egress routes.
- Site accessibility by vehicle and on foot.
- Off-site populations or environments at risk.
- Weather conditions (wind speed and direction, temperature, precipitation, humidity, and forecast).
- Site maps (detailed and to scale).
REPORTING

C-8. The coordination of warning and reporting activities during CBRN CM is essential for maintaining situational awareness. The response unit reports to the C2 element via electronic means and liaison.

C-9. Reporting during an incident or CBRN emergency is an important aspect of the response. The response unit must provide timely and accurate information to effectively support the response operation and the decisionmaking process at all tiers of the response. Sample reports that a unit may provide are summarized in table C-2.

Table C-2. Reporting timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Submission Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment report</td>
<td>NLT __________ after departure and arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>As required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFS</td>
<td>As required by procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>As required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redeployment report</td>
<td>NLT __________ after departure and return to home station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPREP</td>
<td>According to higher-level command guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmission report</td>
<td>According to higher-level command guidance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- NLT = not later than
- OPREP = operational report
- RFI = request for information
- RFS = request for support
- SITREP = situation report

C-10. Reporting timelines and frequency will be according to the timelines specified in applicable OPLANs/OPORDs and the directives published by the IC or staff. During operations, the reporting sequence should be from the unit to the parent headquarters (at the incident site) and to other activities at the incident site (as designated in written or oral instructions to the response unit).

C-11. Reports must be timely and concise and include enough information for addressees to fully understand the situation. Operational reports, deployment reports, situation reports, requests for support, and reports used during redeployments will be submitted according to OPLAN, OPORD, and standing operating procedure requirements.

C-12. The exchange of information from periodic reporting and situation report support—
- Prioritization of CM efforts and associated resource allocations.
- Resolution of issues.
- Identification of resource shortages.
- Implementation of IC decisions.
- Situational awareness.

C-13. Depending on the classification guidelines established, secure communications may also be a requirement. Many of the reports that update the situation will be provided on a near-real-time basis to the various users (military support C2 elements, IC, area command posts). Effective and efficient reports are needed, and timeliness is critical. Most reports are provided on a periodic basis; however, some situation reports may involve high-priority issues and their submission may involve high-priority requirements (such as on-scene emergency management).

C-14. Information requirements may be reported via situation reports or operational reports. Information requirements include the following:
- Identification of CBRN hazards.
- Disposition of CBRN casualties.
- Arrival or departure of CBRN CM units.
Appendix C

- Injuries or incidents involving personnel operating within the hot zone.
- Significant loss or contamination of equipment.
- Additional CBRN hazards identified at the incident site.

LIAISON

C-15. The military response unit conducts liaison and coordination and receives reports to remain updated on key operational, personnel, and logistical information. Subsequent information in this appendix (such as coordination and incident site assessment characterization) provides other key resources for data that can be obtained through the liaison process. The response unit uses this information to support several tasks. These tasks include the following:

- Preparing reports, assessments, vulnerability analyses, and hazard predictions.
- Monitoring the augmentation of civilian and military response elements at the incident site.
- Maintaining unit incident information boards that include event situation, event casualty, damage summary, weather and evacuation status, area closing and shelter facility status, resources status, hospital bed availability, contracts and agreements, and incident logs.
- Collecting, processing, and disseminating information about the incident to other elements.
- Recommending unit employment strategies for their optimum use as a response element.
- Conducting predictive analysis to identify vulnerabilities at the incident site and advising the IC of results.
- Receiving the necessary information on sample analysis and/or identification of unknown substances.
- Using reachback communication links to designated scientists and subject matter experts for advisory, confirmatory, and technical information.
- Monitoring the performance of surveys to complete assessments, as required.
- Advising on protocols regarding military chemical agents, military chemical-agent precursors, known biological agents, unknown biological agents, dispersed radiological material, and TIM.
- Advising the IC on the additional unit capabilities that could help in the mitigation of CBRN effects at the incident site.
- Helping the IC develop RFAs for additional response capabilities, providing information to assets identified to respond, and bridging any civil-military communication gaps or issues.

COORDINATION

C-16. Coordination is accomplished to support internal and external requirements. Coordinating requirements within the internal structure of the response unit is facilitated with standing operating procedures, checklists, and a common understanding of the ICS framework.

C-17. Coordinating external requirements is also facilitated through standing operating procedures, checklists, and a common understanding of the ICS framework. Although every CBRN CM incident will be different, the ICS framework provides a central focal point for coordination measures. For the military response unit, coordination points will be identified in the higher headquarters OPORD. If direct coordination is authorized with the ICS structure (see figure C-1 for the ICS structure and table C-3 for the key external coordination points) especially those pertaining to functions within the hazmat branch, operations section.

Note. A response unit should not go to each activity within the ICS structure to receive information, but should use key coordination focal points. Those key focal points would likely be the ICS liaison officer, the operations section hazmat liaison officer, and/or the planning section.
Table C-3. ICS coordination points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Operations Section</strong></th>
<th><strong>Hazmat Branch</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management, coordination, and control of all on-scene tactical operations</td>
<td>Site safety plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health and safety issues (including work-rest cycles for entry teams)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection guidance on hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health exposure/surveillance guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Hazmat liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination between the hazmat branch and other emergency service units and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazmat information/research team</td>
<td>Technical data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring data, to include the analysis of samples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection and use of personal protective equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Projection of the potential environmental impact of the incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry group team</td>
<td>Decontamination team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of entry operations with decontamination and medical branches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction of rescue operations, as required, within the hot zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offensive and defensive actions to mitigate/control actions at the incident site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate level of decontamination to be provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommended decontamination procedures (to include area setup, methods, procedures, staffing, and personal protective equipment requirements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinated transfer of decontaminated patients requiring medical treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitored effectiveness of decontamination operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of personnel entering and operating within the decontamination area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical team</td>
<td>Planning Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preentry/postentry medical monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection, evaluation, and dissemination of incident information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on the current and forecasted situation, status of resources at the incident site, and provision technical specialists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INCIDENT SITE ASSESSMENT

C-18. The incident site assessment provides the IC with situational awareness of the conditions and hazards that exist at an incident site. The situational awareness is derived from the information received from site characterization. Information is collected during the characterization process to support decision requirements. The reconnaissance and surveillance data, including samples, provide input for the characterization and assessment effort and support the agent identification process. As CBRN hazards are identified, advise and assist actions become more focused on specific measures to help mitigate the CBRN hazard.

CHARACTERIZATION

C-19. The characterization of the incident site starts when the incident is first recognized. Any information gathered, including historical information, will assist in characterizing the incident. The characterization of the site is a continual process as the situation changes while the operation is progressing. The characterization falls into two categories—general and technical. For each category, the goal is to determine who is involved or affected by the incident, what has happened, when it occurred, where the affected area is located, and why the incident occurred, if known. Characterizing the incident site also includes the following evaluations:

- Physical and CBRN hazards associated with the site.
- PPE requirements for personnel entering the warm and hot zones.
- Decontamination requirements.
- Contamination containment requirements.
- Access points and site security.

C-20. See table C-4 for a sample site characterization checklist that should enable the response unit to help gain the needed situational awareness. The response unit should not require all of the information offered in table C-4. The commander will determine what information requirements are important for the mission.

Table C-4. Site characterization checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of CBRN Material</th>
<th>Chemical Issues</th>
<th>Physical Properties</th>
<th>Isolation/evacuation distances</th>
<th>Health impact of CBRN material</th>
<th>Flammability issues</th>
<th>Reactivity issues</th>
<th>Protective clothing required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weather Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| ✓ Wind speed | ✓ Temperature | ✓ Humidity | ✓ Precipitation | ✓ Weather forecast |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decontamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| ✓ Location | ✓ Activity (emergency decontamination) | ✓ Activity (technical decontamination) | ✓ Activity (MCD) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>✓ Number</th>
<th>✓ Types</th>
<th>✓ Exposure identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table C-4. Site characterization checklist (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release</th>
<th>Other Concerns</th>
<th>Support Resources</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>Recon Sector Data</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Was there a release</td>
<td>✓ Has there been a fire</td>
<td>✓ Medical</td>
<td>✓ Technical reachback capabilities</td>
<td>✓ Frequencies</td>
<td>✓ Checklists.</td>
<td>✓ Life support facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ What was released</td>
<td>✓ Is it confined</td>
<td>✓ EOD</td>
<td>✓ Reference library used</td>
<td>✓ Checklists.</td>
<td>✓ Site drawings.</td>
<td>✓ Maintenance and supply support (military).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Duration of release</td>
<td>✓ Potential for further damage or contamination</td>
<td>✓ Technical escort</td>
<td>✓ Expected duration of the incident</td>
<td>✓ Computer database used</td>
<td>✓ Photographs.</td>
<td>✓ Maintenance and supply support (contracted logistic support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Additional facilities at risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Estimated size</td>
<td>✓ Has the release caused contamination</td>
<td>✓ Laboratory</td>
<td>✓ Computer database used</td>
<td>✓ Means available</td>
<td>✓ Personnel debriefs.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Where</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Sample evacuation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Contamination overlay.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- EOD: explosive ordnance disposal
- MCD: mass casualty decontamination
- SIP: shelter in place

**RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE**

C-21. Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations assist in the characterization of the site. An incident site survey can identify the location of contamination and the physical hazards that may hinder the mitigation of the hazards; it provides information to the IC and future entry teams for the prioritization of mitigation efforts. Reconnaissance and surveillance also provide information for possible sampling operations. Reconnaissance is among the most critical tasks for the management of a CBRN incident. Reconnaissance will use data input from sources (such as observable indicators and monitoring and detection equipment). Surveillance (biological and medical) also serves to provide data to support site characterization requirements. The collection of reconnaissance and surveillance data is accomplished on a continuing basis. The reconnaissance and surveillance collection effort is coordinated to preclude wasted effort.

**Reconnaissance**

C-22. Reconnaissance measures include the observation of visible indicators and the use of monitoring instruments. Detailed information on reconnaissance TTP can be found in *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance and Surveillance*. 
C-23. Initial reconnaissance may use the following observable indicators to support incident data collection:

- **Occupancy and location.** The incident site may be located at a CBRN production, storage, or transportation venue.

- **Container/device characteristics.** The size, shape, and construction features are an indicator for the potential recognition of the CBRN material involved. The container (or dissemination device) may be as simply constructed as a plastic container, a sack (nonbulk packaging), an aerosol container, bulk packaging, or a pressurized container.

- **Marking and colors.** A container may have specific markings or colors that provide some indication of the hazard or contents. These indicators may include color codes, container specification numbers, signal words, or the content name and associated hazards.

- **Placards and labels.** The placards and labels affixed to items (freight containers, cargo tanks) serve as indicators to support the identification of the CBRN hazard.

- **Shipping papers and facility documents.** Shipping papers also serve to provide key information about the nature of the material being shipped.

- **Senses.** Senses are certainly not a primary tool; however, data on agent smell, appearance (color), signs, and symptoms can yield observable indicators.

C-24. Monitoring, detection, and sampling are important tools used to—

- Determine the appropriate levels of PPE.
- Determine the size and location of hazard control zones.
- Develop protective action recommendations and corridors.
- Assess the potential health effects of exposure.
- Determine when the incident scene is safe and allow former occupants to return.

C-25. Reconnaissance techniques used within the hot zone will be coordinated with the incident command operations section to ensure that an integrated, synchronized, tactical level strategy is used.

C-26. Specific chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) reconnaissance TTP are outlined in *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance and Surveillance*. Depending on the government and commercial, off-the-shelf monitoring and detection equipment in use, the guidance found in this manual may require adaptation to specific operational situations.

C-27. The response unit (equipped with monitoring equipment) uses a monitoring strategy that considers the following operational challenges:

- Selecting the appropriate monitoring instruments based on the use of a known CBRN/TIM or unknown materials. Identified monitoring equipment should be able to detect the anticipated hazard, measure applicable concentrations, and operate under field conditions at the site.

- Determining whether a hazard is present. The absence of a positive response does not imply that contaminants are not present. Contaminant concentrations affected by wind, temperature, moisture, or interferents could affect monitoring results. Conversely, monitoring teams should never assume that only one hazard is present.

- Establishing action levels based on monitoring results.

C-28. Reconnaissance actions may also provide samples to support the identification process. Military sampling procedures are contained in *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance and Surveillance*. However, military response units should expect to use the sampling techniques that are in place at the incident site. The value of a sample can be lost if consistent sample collection protocols are not used.

**Surveillance**

C-29. Biological and medical surveillance play key roles in support of incident site assessment. Threat assessments will influence the use of samplers and/or detection equipment for biological surveillance. The TTP for biological surveillance are provided in ATP 3-11.37/MCWP 3-37.4/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP 3-2.44. Medical surveillance is conducted on a continuing basis. Medical surveillance results are used to monitor the health status of the CM response force. (See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 for...
information on how DOD preventive-medicine capabilities provide health risk assessment planning, operations, and advice within the ICS.)

Identification

C-30. Supporting military response units use organic government and commercial, off-the-shelf capabilities to identify suspected CBRN contaminants. Various levels of confidence are associated with identification results, depending on the source. For example, biodetectors (such as the handheld assay) provide presumptive identification results. Supporting field and fixed-site laboratories provide definitive and confirmatory identification results that impart a higher level of confidence. The identification process is also used to provide the analysis and identification of samples collected during the reconnaissance process.

C-31. Military response units provide capabilities, including limitations, briefings to its supported activities/units at the incident site. Technical reachback capabilities may also be used to support the identification process.

C-32. Information contributed by the identification process supports incident command advise and assist functions and decisions. Planning ensures the availability of the requisite technical specialists and units for different types of CBRN contamination.

C-33. As required, the response unit may also package CBR samples and transfer the chain of custody to the applicable receiving organization. The identification process directly links to the other military support functions (characterization, advice, assistance) and provides the commander with a full dimensional picture.

Advice

C-34. The response unit may provide an augmentee to the incident command planning and/or operations section to provide advice on the technical aspects of CBRN CM response. For example, during a response, the augmentee may recommend measures, such as the follow-on capabilities (types of units, equipment, supplies) needed to support mitigation measures at an incident site. Postincident, the commander can advise on measures such as the preparation of a transition plan. This plan helps support the disengagement of military units for redeployment to home stations. Other advisory support functions could include interagency operations to provide technical expertise and consultation to the local authority. The augmentee could also recommend decontamination actions for tailoring actions to minimize the impact of the event.

Assistance

C-35. The supporting response unit provides input to the IC on the unit capabilities to support CM incident operations. This assistance may help emergency response officials identify capability gaps and prepare RFAs. The assistance from the response units contributes to the IC common operational picture at the incident site. The response unit can assist in determining how unit capabilities can be tailored to meet new mission requirements. Unanticipated tasks will arise. Military response units provide a versatile and resilient capability to meet new challenges.

Site Safety

C-36. The response unit provides the IC with frequent updates. Tools (such as the site safety plan) are updated periodically to ensure the safety of responders and citizens. Site safety tasks that the military support staff performs include—

- Analyzing the hazards at the incident site and conducting a risk analysis of those hazards.
- Maintaining and updating the site map or sketches.
- Updating the site control zones (hot, warm, and cold).
- Monitoring decontamination area operations.
- Ensuring that site communications diagrams remain updated.
- Updating information on the location of command posts or command centers.
- Maintaining and updating hazard monitoring overlays and results.
INCIDENT SITE FRAMEWORK

C-37. From a tactical perspective, the incident site framework can be grouped into like tasks. These can include (but are not limited to) the following:

- Assuming command and establishing control at the incident site.
- Ensuring the safe approach and positioning of response assets at the incident site.
- Establishing staging areas to control arriving resources.
- Establishing hazard control zones.
- Assessing the need for immediate actions (rescue) and implementing protective actions (evacuate or shelter in place).

COMMAND

C-38. A CBRN CM operation requires central command authority. A central command will—

- Assign command responsibility to one particular individual through a standard identification system.
- Ensure that strong, direct, and visible command is established as soon as possible.
- Establish a management framework that clearly outlines the objectives and functions of the operations.

C-39. As part of the centralized command structure, responsible units are notified of the command structure and the location for the command post. An experienced commander gives up the advantage of a stationary command post only when it is necessary for the IC to personally provide one-on-one direction to emergency response personnel operating in forward positions. In each case, the IC must maintain a command presence. The IC establishes a staging area in an easily accessible location and announces the location for incoming personnel and equipment.

APPROACH AND POSITIONING

C-40. Safe approach and positioning by the responders are critical to managing the overall incident. For example, if responders become contaminated, the action plan shifts from protecting the public to rescuing and decontaminating the responders.

C-41. When possible, responders approach from uphill and upwind. Responders look for physical indicators of contaminant and avoid wet areas, vapor clouds, and spilled material. Conditions can change quickly at an incident site, and the IC does not allow close positioning until a proper assessment has been completed.

STAGING AREAS

C-42. The staging area is the designated location where emergency response resources (equipment and personnel) are assigned until they are needed. Staging is a function of the operations section. The staging officer accounts for all incoming emergency response units, dispatches resources to the emergency scene at the request of the IC, and requests additional emergency resources, as necessary.

C-43. The ideal staging area is close enough to the perimeter to significantly reduce response time, yet far enough away to provide the unit with the mobility required to rapidly respond to an assignment. Staging is effective when the IC anticipates that additional resources may be required and orders them to respond to a predesignated area approximately 3 minutes from the scene.

C-44. Staging areas should be clearly identified with signs, color-coded flags or lights, or other suitable means. The exact location of the staging area will be based on prevailing wind conditions and the nature of the emergency.

C-45. Large CBRN incidents can bring extensive resources to the scene, which may be needed at different times throughout the emergency. If resources will not be required for some time, the IC should consider establishing primary and secondary staging areas.
**ISOLATION AND PERIMETER**

C-46. Isolating the hazard area and establishing a perimeter are two of the first tactical considerations of a CBRN CM operation.

C-47. The first objective of the isolation procedure, after rescue, is to limit the number of civilian and response personnel exposed to the CBRN materials immediately. This begins by identifying and establishing an isolation perimeter. When confronted with an incident inside a structure, the best place to begin is at the points of entry such as the main entrance doors. Once doorways are secured and the entry of unauthorized personnel is denied, response teams can begin to isolate above and below the hazard. Proper protective clothing and equipment must be worn.

C-48. The same concept applies for outdoor situations. Secure the entry points first, and then establish an isolation perimeter around the CBRN hazard. Begin by controlling intersections, on/off ramps, service roads, or any other access to the scene. At this point, a CBRN reconnaissance team can begin an assessment.

C-49. The IC should make perimeter isolation assignments as soon as possible. Security personnel involved in establishing a perimeter must know what the potential hazards and risks appear to be. If there is any possibility that these officers may be exposed to the hazard as the isolation area expands, they must be provided with proper safety equipment and specific directions concerning evacuation.

**PROTECTIVE ACTIONS**

C-50. Initiating protective actions (shelter-in-place, evacuation) is a tactical strategy used by the IC to protect the general population from CBRN material. This tactical strategy is usually implemented after the IC has established an isolation perimeter and defined the hazard control zones for emergency responders.

C-51. This decisionmaking process uses a combination of factors to determine protective actions, including the size and nature of the release, hazards of the materials involved, weather conditions, type of facility, and availability of airtight structures. (See FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP(I) 3-2.46 and TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83 for further guidance on evacuation and shelter in place.)

**HAZARD CONTROL ZONES**

C-52. When the primary isolation perimeter has been secured, the IC can establish hazard control zones. The IC divides the area into three distinctly different zones, beginning at the incident scene and working outward toward the perimeter. Hazard control zones are designated from most to least dangerous as hot, warm, and cold zones.

C-53. The primary purpose of establishing three different hazard control zones within the isolation perimeter is to provide the highest level of control and personnel accountability for response personnel working at the incident scene. Defined zones help ensure that responders do not inadvertently cross into a contaminated area or place themselves in locations that could be quickly threatened by explosions or migrating vapor clouds.

C-54. As a rule, the field command post and support personnel should be located in the cold zone. Emergency operations personnel supporting the CBRN hazmat team should be positioned in the cold and warm zones. The entry team should be located in the hot zone, as necessary.

C-55. Hazard control zones should be physically marked and posted on the IC C2 chart. The hot zone is indicated with color-coded banner tape, traffic cones, or light sticks. In outdoor situations, hazard control zones can be designated by using key geographical reference points (tank dike wall, fence line, street name). Geographic areas should be communicated verbally by radio or in a face-to-face briefing between the IC and sector officers. When the hazard is confined to a building, these zones can be denoted by their location within the structure.

**Hot Zone**

C-56. The hot zone is the area in which hazards present could cause adverse effects on personnel who do not have appropriate levels of personal protection. These personnel should immediately evacuate or shelter in
place, depending on the situation. The initial isolation zone, identified in the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook, is the initial distance that the incident is isolated in order to contain the hazard and protect personnel. The initial isolation zone size is depends on the hazard, weather conditions, and area affected. The protective-action zone, also identified in the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook, is the area in which a downwind hazard may be present depending on the weather conditions and terrain at the incident site. The initial isolation zone and the protective-action zone are encompassed in the hot zone, which provides an additional buffer from the associated hazards before entering the warm zone.

Warm Zone

C-57. The warm zone (sometimes referred to as the decontamination zone) is the area surrounding the hot zone. Contamination reduction and decontamination operations are conducted in this zone to limit the spread of contamination to the cold zone. (See appendix D for information about the warm zone.)

Cold Zone

C-58. The cold zone (also referred to as the support zone) is an area surrounding the warm and hot zones where incident support operations are coordinated. Personnel in the cold zone are not required to wear PPE, but should have it on hand in case of a sudden change in weather conditions.

Decontamination Corridor

C-59. The decontamination corridor is established in the warm zone to provide decontamination support and to control the spread of contamination. Multiple decontamination corridors may be established at an incident site, depending on the situation. The decontamination corridor is established in an uncontaminated area just outside the contaminated hot-zone boundary. Once contaminated personnel have been processed through the decontamination corridor, access to the corridor must be controlled to preclude entry by unprotected personnel. (See chapter 5 and appendix D for additional information.)

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

C-60. Providing HSS during the response phase of a CBRN CM operation encompasses several areas. The checklist in table C-5 provides information to assist HSS response operations.

Table C-5. HSS checklist for response operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide medical support to the populace in a restriction of movement or quarantine status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide EMT, as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide stress management, as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide PVNTMED support, as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide confirmatory sample identification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☑ Provide definitive sample identification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C-5. HSS checklist for response operations (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Reachback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish reachback linkage with U.S. Army Medical Command, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine for technical assistance, as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Direct the medical specialty team response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Use medical surveillance data from the area to aid in the diagnosis and a plan for the population that may be affected by a CBRN incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide C2 for medical response units or staffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide communications guidance for medical response units or staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓Dispatch medical units or staff to designated response areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate Department of Defense response activities with the incident command and local, state, federal, or host nation response agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish alternate treatment locations, as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVNTMED Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct health hazard vulnerability assessments. Update them daily or as often as required to maintain current vulnerability assessment status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Continue medical surveillance activities. Report medical surveillance data, as it develops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor units, staffs, and the local populace that are placed in restriction-of-movement or quarantine status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Maintain occupational and environmental health surveillance activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor water supplies. Conduct water sampling, as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor food service operations. Provide recommendations, as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor shelter in place operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide recommendations of corrective action on health hazards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor food supplies for food safety standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide advice on handling food supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide guidance on the disposition of unsafe food items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide animal care for government-owned animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide guidance on the care and management of domestic animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide animal care for domestic animals, as capabilities permit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide guidance on domestic food crops and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Operational Stress Control/Behavioral Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct stress management support for response forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide stress management guidance for the local populace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct stress management support for the local populace, within staffing capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Service Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide Class VIII support to response units and staffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Maintain connectivity with prime vendors to ensure that essential pharmaceuticals are delivered in a timely manner to maintain the required amounts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide medical equipment repair support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Assist response units and staffs in the acquisition of replacement medical equipment and supplies, as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C-5. HSS checklist for response operations (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Responders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Ensure that personal protective measures are applied at the incident site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide EMT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Assist in casualty rescue operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Request medical assistance, as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- C2  command and control
- CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- EMT  emergency medical treatment
- PVNTMED  preventive medicine
- U.S.  United States

LABORATORY SERVICES

C-61. Medical laboratory services are provided by operational units (such as the USA area medical laboratories; USN laboratories and forward-deployed preventive-medicine units; USAF theater epidemiology teams; or local, state, federal, and HN laboratories). Medical laboratory services within MTFs are able to perform the limited identification of a suspect agent from patient specimens generated within the facility; however, they are not staffed or equipped to perform analysis on specimens collected outside the facility.

C-62. The level of characterization is determined by the capabilities of the supporting laboratory. Operational DOD medical laboratory elements are capable of providing the field confirmatory identification of a suspect agent. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Naval Medical Research Center, and CDC will provide the definitive identification of a suspect biological agent. Supporting medical laboratories must coordinate with local, state, and federal laboratories to ensure that sample data is provided to the appropriate authorities.

C-63. State and HN laboratories may have the capability to provide the confirmatory identification of suspect biological agents. However, coordination must be made with these laboratories to determine their capabilities.

C-64. The CDC established the Laboratory Response Network that can respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, and other public health emergencies. The Laboratory Response Network is a national network of local, state, and federal public health; food testing; veterinary diagnostic; environmental; DOD; and international laboratories that provide the laboratory infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism and other public health emergencies. The laboratories that make up the Laboratory Response Network are affiliated with federal agencies, continental U.S. DOD laboratories, international partners, and state/local public health departments. (See table C-6 for Laboratory Response Network levels and capabilities.)

C-65. National laboratories, including those operated by the CDC, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and Naval Medical Research Center, are responsible for specialized strain characterizations, bioforensics, select agent activity, and the handling of highly infectious biological agents. They provide the definitive characterization of agents.

C-66. Reference laboratories are responsible for the investigation and/or referral of specimens. They consist of public health, military, international, veterinary, agricultural and food, and water testing laboratories. They provide the confirmatory identification of agents.

C-67. Sentinel laboratories play a key role in the early detection of biological agents. Sentinel laboratories provide routine diagnostic services and rule-out and referral steps in the identification process. While these laboratories may not be equipped to perform the same tests as reference laboratories, they can test samples. They provide the presumptive identification of agents.
Table C-6. Laboratory Response Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laboratory</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Characterization Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National laboratories</td>
<td>National laboratories, including those operated by the CDC, USAMRIID, and the NMRC, are responsible for specialized strain characterizations, bioforensics, select agent activity, and the handling of highly infectious biological agents.</td>
<td>Definitive characterization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference laboratories</td>
<td>Reference laboratories are responsible for the investigation and/or referral of specimens. They are made up of public health, military, international, veterinary, agricultural, food, and water testing laboratories.</td>
<td>Confirmatory testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentinel laboratories</td>
<td>Sentinel laboratories play a key role in the early detection of biological agents. Sentinel laboratories provide routine diagnostic services and rule-out and referral steps in the identification process. While these may not be equipped to perform the same tests as reference laboratories, they can test samples.</td>
<td>Recognize, rule-out, and/or refer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

- CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
- NMRC: Naval Medical Research Center
- USAMRIID: United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

**Veterinary Services**

C-68. As the DOD executive agent for veterinary services, the U.S. Army Veterinary Corps provides support to all branches of DOD. Depending on the location of the incident, veterinary services may be provided by deployable and nondeployable veterinary units or personnel. (See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, FM 4-02.18, and ATP 4-02.42 for additional information.) Veterinary services include, but are not limited to—

- Monitoring the security and protection of subsistence in the CBRN environment.
- Inspecting subsistence and providing disposition instructions in the CBRN environment.
- Monitoring the decontamination of CBRN-contaminated subsistence, military working dogs, and the other government-owned animals.
- Treating military working dogs and other government-owned animals that become CBRN casualties.
- Providing consultation and guidance on animal care and food safety to non-DOD responders and local populace on the effects of a CBRN incident.
- Providing assistance to privately owned animals in cases of evacuation.
- Providing food and water laboratory testing capabilities.
- Reporting intelligence data through command channels.

**Health Service Logistics**

C-69. The health service logistics system provides medical supplies and equipment for response to a CBRN incident in the AO or as part of the homeland security response to a domestic or foreign terrorist incident. In joint operations, the combatant commander may designate one service as the single, integrated medical logistics management agency for Services operating within the CBRN CM AO. Single, integrated medical logistics management functions encompass the provision of medical supplies, medical equipment maintenance and repair, blood management, arrangement for contract support, provision of patient movement items, and optical fabrication to all joint forces within the AO, including USN ships for common-use items on an emergency basis. By exercising directive authority over the health service logistics arena for the accomplishment of assigned missions, the combatant commander can centralize control, reduce the
duplication of services, and provide the support in a more economical and efficient manner. For additional information on health service logistics, refer to Service-specific technical reference manuals. (See appendix D for HSS recovery TTP.)

**COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL STRESS/BEHAVIORAL HEALTH**

C-70. CBRN presents multiple challenges to military operations when considering combat operational stress. The perception of a CBRN threat, whether real or not, in a high combat operational stress environment places military members at high risk of suffering combat and operational stress reactions. Therefore, commanders and leaders must take actions to prevent and reduce the potential numbers of combat and operational stress reaction casualties. Working in an actual CBRN environment poses a real and perceived danger to military members conducting military operations. Pseudosymptoms may be experienced by those believing that they have been exposed or are simply overwhelmed by the operational stressors resulting from CBRN use. Whether the threat is real or perceived, when working in an actual CBRN environment, the protective measures alone can be a significant stressor to military members required to use these protective measures. Combat operational stress care in a CBRN environment is the commander’s responsibility. The combat operational stress care service delivery is achieved through the aid of many resources available to the command, to include military behavioral health assets. The key to successful combat operational stress care operations in a CBRN environment is the prevention activities that are conducted before actual CBRN events. These may include—

- Training in MOPP Level 4 to increase personnel confidence in their ability to wear the ensemble.
- Training in the protective mask often. It takes repeated wear and time to acclimate and get over the claustrophobic feeling of wearing the mask.
- Emphasizing the buddy system as a means of keeping watch for each other. Peer support is a key element in reducing combat and operational stress reactions at the unit level.

**PREVENTIVE-MEDICINE SERVICES**

C-71. Preventive-medicine units/personnel provide support and consultation in the areas of disease and nonbattle injury prevention, field sanitation, entomology, sanitary engineering, and epidemiology to minimize the effects of environmental injuries, enteric diseases, vector-borne diseases, and other health threats to personnel. Preventive-medicine services include, but are not limited to—

- Coordinating CBRN-related specimen collections and environmental sampling, monitoring, and evaluation activities with treatment, CBRN, laboratory, and intelligence personnel in the operational environment.
- Monitoring casualties, hospital admissions, and reports of autopsy for signs of chemical and biological warfare.
- Collecting environmental samples and specimens and performing selected analyses or evaluations to assist in the assessment of the health threat.
- Monitoring field sanitation, water treatment and storage, waste disposal, and disease and nonbattle injury control practices and providing advice and training as necessary.
- Investigating and evaluating sanitation, water supplies, waste disposal practices, and other environmental health-related problems and recommending corrective measures as necessary.
- Conducting health surveillance activities in the AO, to include coordinating, compiling, analyzing, and reporting surveillance data to assist in evaluating conditions affecting the health of the supported force.
- Conducting epidemiological investigations.

**LOGISTICS**

C-72. Logistics is an integral part of CBRN CM operations and must be considered during all phases from planning, through response, to recovery.
RESPONSE

C-73. Logistics must be planned and integrated early in a CBRN CM response to be effective. The challenge of logistics is the effective integration of DOD logistics within the services and with sustaining organizations; support agencies; and other local, state, federal, and HN agencies, as required. No matter the size of the CBRN CM operation, some level of logistic support will be required. Table C-7 provides a checklist for logistic support operations during a CBRN CM response.

Table C-7. Logistic support checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Pre-position material at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time and to ensure the timely support of a specific force during the initial phases of an operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate and synchronize supply functions with the supported incident command logistics section.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate support (as required) with commercial vendors or a central government contracting focal point to resupply common commercial, off-the-shelf items (such as bleach) or services (such as oxygen bottle refills).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Control the allocation of high-demand logistics resources, such as CBRN float items (detection and surveillance).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish procedures to monitor and track the issue of supplies to civilian personnel. This process supports maintaining controls for the reimbursement of costs following the mission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Monitor and approve (if required) the stock levels for CBRN supplies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Approve the return of CBRN commercial, off-the-shelf components or systems for repair or replacement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Check on the receipt, storage, and distribution of CBRN supplies. For example, selected items may require temperature controls or require segregated/secure storage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Transportation                                                      |                                                      |
| ✓ Ensure that the required military resources reach the incident site on time and with the needed supplies and equipment. |                                                      |
| ✓ Coordinate the time phasing of military support resources with the supported incident command. |                                                      |
| ✓ Maintain asset visibility on the shipment of repairable material, such as detection and surveillance equipment for repair. |                                                      |
| ✓ Transport samples taken from the incident site.                    |                                                      |

| Maintenance                                                          |                                                      |
| ✓ Coordinate emergency and routine actions to maintain personnel and materiel in a safe and serviceable condition. |                                                      |
| ✓ Coordinate for the replacement or repair of damaged or contaminated mission-essential equipment. |                                                      |

Legend:
- CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

RESPONDER SUPPORT

C-74. The logistics process facilitates obtaining, maintaining, storing, moving, and replenishing resources used in responding to a CBRN incident. For example, transportation support is required to move assets (human and material) in response to a CBRN incident. This includes the ability to protect the transportation means and the operators providing response support. Elements of the sustainment process used to support an incident may include contracting support, negotiated support, military support, and support from other federal agencies.
Contracting Support

C-75. Contracting, purchasing, renting, or leasing supplies or services from nonfederal sources are effective and efficient ways to provide support in a crisis. Included are all classes of supply or maintenance used in a CBRN response situation. During the initial stages of an operation, contracting officers are required to procure supplies and services.

Negotiated Support

C-76. In some cases, civil authorities have enough logistical resources to support themselves and the military units providing assistance. For example, civil authorities may provide housing, food, and fuel to military assets. Such support is negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the civil authorities.

Military Support

C-77. Installations continue habitual relationships with units, but they may also have to support personnel with whom they have no established support relationship. These personnel include civil authorities and elements from other Services. If an installation or other source discussed below cannot provide the required support directly, planners tailor a support force.

Support From Other Federal Agencies

C-78. Federal agencies (such as the General Services Administration) provide support to civil authorities. The General Services Administration provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the federal government. While the General Services Administration can provide an extensive amount of support to DOD, other federal agencies and organizations may also provide assistance, depending on the nature, scope, and duration of the operation.

Miscellaneous Support

C-79. Special-event packages containing items such as decontamination, detection, and medical equipment may be pre-positioned as part of a preparedness program. This equipment can be transported by air and ground on a short notice and is available for use by civilian responders and military support elements.
Appendix D

Recovery Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Recovery procedures gauge the capability to recover from the temporary or permanent loss of critical assets and infrastructure due to a CBRN incident. Staffs establish recovery procedures to ensure the continued ability to perform ongoing and future missions.

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

D-1. The TTP for recovery operations include various supporting decontamination types (emergency, technical, and MCD). Also, HSS, logistics, and transition TTP occur during CBRN CM recovery.

D-2. The decontamination process begins in the warm zone. A controlled-entry point marks the entrance to the decontamination corridor, and a controlled-exit point marks the exit to the vapor control line (the transition point between the warm and cold zones). More than one type of decontamination corridor can be operated in the warm zone based on situational needs. The main decontamination corridors used in CBRN CM response operations are emergency, technical, mass casualty, and patient. A detailed discussion of each decontamination corridor will be provided further in this appendix.

D-3. Chronologically, the emergency decontamination corridor is generally set up by first responders (local hazmat teams) to facilitate immediate response and the decontamination of personnel that were in the hot zone when the incident occurred. Emergency decontamination is conducted by using copious amounts of water to dilute the agent in order to evacuate personnel to medical aid as quickly as possible. Once the technical and/or MCD lanes have been established, the emergency decontamination corridor may no longer be required.

D-4. Technical decontamination is set up next for responders who have specialized PPE that requires a higher percentage of decontamination solution before removal. The technical decontamination corridor is usually set up by the emergency responders. The technical decontamination corridor is located where other evacuees would not confuse it with emergency decontamination or MCD. Entry into the technical decontamination corridor is limited to responders only. Evacuees are directed to the emergency decontamination corridor or MCD corridor.

D-5. The MCD corridor may be the last corridor set up and is normally set up by emergency responders tasked to provide MCD. This is a large-scale decontamination corridor designed to process large numbers of personnel in a short amount of time. In some situations, an MCD corridor may not be required to conduct CBRN CM operations. For example, an incident that involved only first and emergency responders would not necessarily require an MCD corridor. A patient decontamination corridor is similar to the MCD corridor, except that it would normally be established adjacent to an MTF.

EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION

D-6. Emergency decontamination removes contamination from personnel quickly in order to save lives, minimize casualties, and limit the spread of the contamination. It facilitates rapid medical attention without transferring the contamination to other personnel or equipment. The procedures outlined below apply when the type of hazard is unknown. Adjustments to the steps may be made if and when the hazard is known (for example, the material reacts in a caustic manner when it comes in contact with water, the rapidity of hazard effects on the skin dictates the contaminated clothing be removed before people are sprayed down, or the biological and radiological decontamination requirements differ from chemical and TIM situations). Additional modifications regarding the placement of the decontamination corridor may be needed for incidents that occur during cold-weather operations. Figure D-1, page D-2, shows a sample emergency decontamination operation.
Figure D-1. Emergency decontamination operation

**CASUALTY COLLECTION POINT**

D-7. A casualty collection point is established in the hot zone or adjacent to the hot zone. All casualties are moved to the collection point. Medical personnel conduct initial triage at this location. Casualties that require emergency medical treatment are directed or moved to the contaminated emergency medical treatment station for lifesaving procedures. All other casualties are directed to the decontamination lane.

**DECONTAMINANTS**

D-8. Decontaminants used are safe for use on skin and wounds. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 provides information on individual emergency decontamination procedures.

**FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT**

D-9. Firefighting equipment provides an expedient way to perform decontamination on a large amount of contaminated personnel. Resources and layout are described below.

**Resources**

D-10. The employment of resources that can dispense large amounts of water significantly increases the number of personnel that can be decontaminated. Very large volumes of water are needed for these operations, and the control of runoff will be limited. However, the level of contamination will be reduced through the dilution achieved during the process.
Decontamination Corridor

D-11. A decontamination corridor is established using fire hydrants, hoses, and nozzles; pumper trucks; and fire trucks with ladder pipes. In each case, the nozzles should be adjusted to produce a low-pressure fan spray. When possible, two or more systems should be used to increase the volume of the water and spray area to increase the casualty flow rate through the lane. If time permits and equipment is available, a screen should be positioned to create a lane for males and a lane for females and small children. The screen should be of sufficient height and length to provide privacy between the two lanes. Privacy covers may also be positioned to separate the shower areas from the undress and redress areas.

Fire Hydrant, Fire Hoses, and Nozzles

D-12. When setting up fire hydrants, hoses, and nozzles, platform trucks are needed to elevate the hoses and nozzle assemblies above ground level. Adjust the nozzle to a low-pressure spray pattern to allow the casualties to move under the water spray. The nozzle pressure should be between 50 and 80 pounds per square inch (normal household shower pressure). The hose should be positioned in a manner that will not create a tripping hazard for casualties.

Pumper Trucks

D-13. When setting up pumper trucks, the pumper cannon and hoses can be used to establish the water spray areas.

Ladder Pipe Decontamination

D-14. When setting up trucks with ladder pipes, elevate the ladder pipes above ground level to produce a low-pressure spray pattern. The nozzle pressure should be between 50 and 80 pounds per square inch.

TECHNICAL DECONTAMINATION

D-15. Technical decontamination is conducted during a CBRN CM response, where trained responders conduct operations to mitigate the hazards. The incident may be accident- or terrorist-related, and it can involve CBRN hazards, TIM hazards, or a combination. Responders may be required to use supplied air respirators (such as SCBA or rebreathers) and fully encapsulated, splash-resistant protective suits.

D-16. The planning and execution of technical decontamination operations requires the incorporation of different strategies than those used for military-specific operations. Consider the following actions when planning for technical decontamination:

- Direct the decontamination process toward the confinement of the contaminant within the hot zone and the decontamination corridor. Consider the potential effects of the decontamination process on responder personnel when developing the decontamination plan, and establish countermeasures (such as adequate work-rest cycles).
- Determine proper decontamination methods and procedures before an incident as part of the overall preincident planning, hazard assessment, and risk evaluation process. Do not permit entry into the hot zone until the appropriate decontamination methods and procedures have been established.

D-17. Technical decontamination requires a step-by-step process to reduce contamination on responder personnel to a safe level and to prevent the transfer of contamination outside the containment area. The procedures used are based on field analyses of the hazards and risks involved. Field analyses consist of checking detection results and using technical reference sources to determine the general hazards (flammability, toxicity) and then evaluating the relative risks associated with the contaminants (for example, vapor versus liquid, blister versus nerve agents, and radiological versus chemical-biological hazards).

D-18. Technical decontamination can be accomplished in several ways, depending on the hazard. Typically, it consists of a wet decontamination in which the individual is flushed with water to remove or dilute the contaminants. A dry decontamination, such as brushing and scraping, is an appropriate alternative for other contamination removal (physical radioactive-contaminated particles). Other considerations, such as hazard reactivity with water and its solubility, are factors in determining the appropriate decontamination method.
D-19. Technical decontamination may consist of one or more stations, depending on the hazard. The decontamination team must be available to supervise the operation and assist in the processing of personnel. The team is trained to help personnel decontaminate their outer clothing from top to bottom (always moving the contaminants toward the ground).

D-20. Low-pressure water should be used and overspraying or splashing should be kept to a minimum to control the spread of contaminants. The decontamination site should be established in an area where contaminated runoff can be controlled. Figure D-2 shows a sample technical decontamination operation.

\textbf{Note.} The number of stations required for technical decontamination will vary depending on factors such as the type of agent and the weather.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{technical_decontamination_diagram.png}
\caption{Technical decontamination operation}
\end{figure}

D-21. The entry point is clearly designated, and it identifies the beginning of the decontamination corridor. Responders know the location of the technical decontamination corridor before entering the hot zone. The purpose of the entry point is to ensure that personnel leaving the hot zone process through the decontamination corridor, thereby controlling the spread of contamination. At the entry point, two separate lanes are set up—the primary decontamination lane and an emergency decontamination lane. The decontamination corridor has two main contamination control areas—the liquid control area and the vapor control area.

D-22. The primary decontamination lane requires only those stations necessary to accomplish the effective decontamination of response personnel. The basic goal is to eliminate the contaminant in a safe and appropriate manner. Each station should be manned by properly equipped individuals trained to direct and
assist personnel in the decontamination process. An emergency decontamination lane is used when a responder requires immediate evacuation or medical attention. When the emergency lane requires activation, normal decontamination operations stop until the situation is mitigated. Normal operations resume once the victim has been safely processed through the emergency lane of the technical decontamination corridor.

**EQUIPMENT DROP**

D-23. The equipment drop may consist of a tarp or table for the placement of equipment used in the hot zone. The equipment drop serves a dual purpose. It ensures that potentially contaminated equipment stays within the contaminated area, and it allows the equipment to be operationally decontaminated and reused by those reentering the hot zone. This minimizes the amount of equipment brought into the hot zone that requires later decontamination or disposal.

**PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION**

D-24. Removing gross contamination from boots and gloves (the primary places generally contaminated) before starting the decontamination process helps control the spread of contamination. Scrubbing boots and gloves with long-handled brushes that are dipped in buckets or step pans filled with decontaminant is one method used to accomplish gross removal of contaminants.

**MONITORING POINT**

D-25. Personnel should be monitored for any residual contamination once the decontaminant application and rinsing are complete. Monitors (individual chemical-agent monitors, radiac meters, commercial instruments) can be used to perform this function if the hazard is known. When working with an unknown substance or without monitoring devices, the visual observation of obvious signs and symptoms of exposure provide an alternative monitoring method. If the contamination is still present following decontamination (visually observed or detected by monitoring devices), affected personnel should be returned to the beginning of the decontamination lane to repeat the procedure, with specific attention paid to the areas observed or noted by detection devices.

**PROTECTIVE CLOTHING REMOVAL**

D-26. Personnel should be assisted in removing their protective suits before crossing the liquid control line when monitoring indicates that contamination is not present. During removal of the Level B protective suit, an attendant is required to hold the SCBA while the protective suit is removed. The attendant will maintain control of the respirator until it is removed at Station 5. Decontamination team members ensure that they touch only the outside of the suit. Personnel inside the suit assist with the removal, touching only the inside of the suit. Decontamination personnel then contain the suit in a thick plastic bag for further disposition after all personnel are decontaminated.

*Note.* Personal clothing removal, shower, and redress may be unnecessary if contamination did not penetrate the protective clothing. Monitoring equipment should be used to verify if any contamination has penetrated the protective suit.

**CLOTHING/RESPIRATOR REMOVAL**

D-27. Personnel remove the clothing worn under their protective suit and place it in a thick plastic bag for further disposition by the decontamination team. The respirator is removed from their back, if necessary, and the attendant takes control of the backpack. Before removing their facepiece, personnel close their eyes and hold their breath. They will remove and release their facepiece as they cross the contamination control line, and enter the cold zone. The attendant will place the respirator in a thick plastic bag for further disposition.

**SHOWER AND REDRESS**

D-28. When required, personnel will shower and redress before receiving postentry medical evaluation.
**MEDICAL EVALUATION**

D-29. After responders have entered the hot zone, they receive a medical evaluation to assist in identifying health issues that may have occurred during entry operations.

D-30. The decontamination and monitoring processes are unique to each accident/incident. Decontamination techniques may be physical and/or chemical. The decontamination methods selected should be tailored to the hazard, on-scene responders, location, and equipment available. No matter which method is used, the outcome should be the elimination or reduction of contamination to a safe level, while confining the hazard to the hot zone and decontamination corridor.

**MASS CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION**

D-31. MCD consists of the neutralization or removal of CBRN agents and materials from a large amount of contaminated personnel, minimizing further risks to health and facilitating subsequent treatment.

**SITE SETUP**

D-32. Military personnel who are responsible for MCD may provide support to existing civilian-led ambulatory and nonambulatory decontamination lanes. Alternately, military responders conducting MCD may be responsible for establishing the MCD site. In either case, military unit C2 remains in place.

D-33. The military leadership coordinates with the appropriate official (as part of a site survey) to select a site that is upwind and uphill from the contamination sources. The site should have an ample water supply, good drainage, and vehicle access.

D-34. Planning determines where the stations are established to support ambulatory and litter decontamination. The decontamination team leadership lays out the site and—

- Reviews the outline for hot, warm, and cold zones.
- Establishes entry and exit points.
- Establishes liquid and vapor control lines.
- Identifies runoff control procedures.
- Determines the need for protection, when required.

**OPERATIONS**

D-35. The team establishes an MCD site. Resources are assigned to complete each task (by station) for casualty decontamination operations. A C2 element provides supervision at the MCD site. The C2 element maintains communications with operating personnel in the cold, warm, and hot zones. The C2 element prioritizes and provides additional resources (when needed). The procedures outlined below apply when the type of hazard is unknown. Adjustments to the steps may be made if and when the hazard is known (for example, the material reacts in a caustic manner when it comes in contact with water, the rapidity of hazard effects on the skin dictates that contaminated clothing be removed before people are sprayed down, or the biological and radiological decontamination requirements differ from chemical and TIM situations). Additional modifications regarding the placement of the decontamination corridor may be needed for incidents that occur during cold-weather operations. (See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3; the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook; and FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP(I) 3-2.60 for additional information on decontamination procedures.) Figure D-3 shows a sample MCD operation.

*Note.* The number of stations and personnel required for MCD will vary depending on factors such as the number and type of injuries, agent used, and weather. Not all stations described in this section may be required.
Casualty Collection Point

D-36. Tasks at this point include casualty collection, log-in, and preparation for triage. Crowd control may also be required to handle potentially hostile victims. At this station, casualties are received, quickly assessed, and prioritized by medical personnel. Ambulatory casualties are segregated from nonambulatory casualties. Ambulatory casualties are directed to the triage station, and nonambulatory casualties are transported to the triage station by litter bearers. A minimum of two augmentees should be used at this station.

**Note.** When moving casualties, ensure that an appropriate number of personnel are used to prevent further injuries.

D-37. Other tasks accomplished at this point are listed below:

- **Triage.** Tasks at this station require performance by medical personnel. Casualties are triaged and assigned treatment priorities by medical personnel assigned to the casualty collection point.

- **Emergency medical treatment area (such as hemorrhage control).** At least one medical treatment provider is required at this station.

- **Casualty log-in (warm zone).** An MCD attendant logs in casualties and identifies valuables and items that generally cannot be decontaminated. The attendant assigns each casualty a number, prepares a record for each casualty processed, and identifies the casualty’s personal property and entry medical condition, as determined by the triage officer. Official documentation of the care provided is maintained. One person is required for operations at this station.

- **Contaminated-waste holding area.** The hazardous waste site is established during setup and maintained by logistics personnel for the receipt of contaminated waste. The station attendants
deploy contaminated-waste receptacles in the decontamination corridor, prepare and clearly mark the waste collection point, protect the ground with tarps, secure contaminated material in heavy plastic bags, and control contaminated drainage from decontaminated clothing.

- **Personal property receipt.** The login station properly receives and accounts for personal property and determines its decontamination priority. The personal property and equipment decontamination sites are established adjacent to the casualty decontamination lanes. The decontamination of these items may occur as items are received, or they may be held for later processing. One station attendant supports this operation. Personal property is retrieved from individual bags, and neutralizing solution is applied to the items. The station attendant allows ample time for the decontamination solution to function and then forwards the items for a contamination check. The station operator checks for the completeness of decontamination before transfer back to the casualty.

---

**Note.** Wet down hair and clothing with water mist before undressing during biological and radiological incidents.

---

**Mass Casualty Decontamination Procedures**

D-38. These warm zone decontamination operations are subdivided into a series of procedures that generally involve undressing and showering and should remove most of the contamination from casualties. The procedures include the following:

- **Emergency decontamination.** Emergency decontamination procedures (open wounds, burns, wet down) are conducted by medical personnel before casualties process through the MCD corridor.

- **Ambulatory decontamination.**
  - **Clothing and personal items removal.** The operator receives casualties and directs them to remove their clothing. Some casualties may require assistance in clothing removal. The operator should have cutting devices (scissors, safety knife) to aid in clothing removal. Pressure bandages and splints are not removed—clothing is cut around them and any material under the bandage or splint is left in place. One person should be used at the clothing removal station.
  - **Contaminant removal and shower.** The operator receives casualties and leads them to the shower. The operator instructs the casualty on shower procedures for reassurance. The casualty is placed in the center of the shower with hands and arms raised to allow water flow to all parts of the body, medical condition permitting. If sponges are available, have the casualty sponge the skin from head to toe. If casualties cannot raise their arms and hands, the attendant should make efforts to ensure that the water reaches areas covered by the arms. The attendant turns the water on and directs upper nozzles to the head, directs side sprayers to the sheltered portions of the body, and ensures that any bandage/splint is thoroughly soaked. The attendant stops the water flow when the casualty is thoroughly washed, and the attendant directs the casualty to the next station. One person is required at each wash station.
  - **Monitoring point.** Casualties are monitored for the completeness of decontamination, and their status is recorded on a decontamination card. One station attendant is required at this station.
Recovery Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- **Nonambulatory decontamination.**
  - **Clothing and personal items removal.** The operator receives a litter casualty. Using a cutting device, the station operator cuts away the casualty’s clothing. One person per patient is required at each litter stand setup. The operator requests assistance; lifts the casualty, using a four-person lift technique; and transfers the casualty to a clean litter. A litter transfer team carries the litter casualty to the clothing removal station. Casualties are placed headfirst on the roller system and rolled under the shower.

  **Note.** Medical personnel monitor casualties at all stages of the decontamination process—looking for indications of hypothermia, managing bandages and splints, and providing emergency medical treatment, as needed.

  - **Contaminant removal and shower.** The supporting wash team showers the casualty with water from shower nozzles and side sprayers. The casualty is rolled slowly through the shower allowing ample time for complete gross contamination removal. Two station attendants should support this operation.
  - **Monitoring point.** At this station, casualties are monitored for the completeness of decontamination, and their status is recorded on a decontamination card. Three station attendants should be used at this station.
  - **MCD redress area (cold zone).** The casualty is provided a covering (such as a medical gown, sheet, poncho, or disposable wrap) before proceeding to the medical evaluation and clean treatment area.
  - **MCD medical evaluation (cold zone).**
    - **Postdecontamination triage.** At this station, casualties are thoroughly assessed by a medical augmentee, without the limitations imposed by operating in PPE.
    - **Postdecontamination emergency medical treatment.** Operations at this station allow for medical interventions without PPE limitations.
    - **Transportation.** Casualties are consolidated at this point and medically evacuated or transported to a supporting MTF. When medical staff is available, casualties are monitored during the transportation process to ensure that their health status remains stable.

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT**

D-39. HSS recovery operations include, but are not limited to, the areas shown in table D-1, page D-10.

**LOGISTICS**

D-40. Logistics serves to revitalize units that have expended valuable resources during the conduct of CBRN CM. During recovery, units use logistical operations to prepare for future missions.

D-41. Logistic recovery operations following a CBRN CM operation should recover, restore, reoutfit, and sustain the unit in preparation for follow-on missions. Common recovery functions include the following:

- PPE maintenance and resupply.
- Equipment decontamination, maintenance, calibration, and expendables resupply.
- Postincident medical screening.

D-42. The checklist in table D-2, page D-11, is provided to assist in logistic recovery operations after a CBRN CM operation. This checklist should be used as a supplement to unit standing operating procedures.

**TRANSITION OPERATIONS**

D-43. Military response assets will transition to their home station after they are properly relieved from the mission or civilian authorities no longer require their assistance. Proper notification of, and approval by, the unit higher headquarters should initiate the transition operations.
### Table D-1. HSS checklist for recovery operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Triage</strong></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Assume the appropriate PPE/IPE level.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Direct casualties to the contaminated EMT point or to the casualty decontamination lanes, as their triage condition dictates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide triage support in the cold-zone casualty staging area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Sort casualties into the appropriate triage category as their medical status dictates.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide triage support at the casualty collection point.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EMT</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Assume appropriate PPE/IPE level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide EMT procedures in the warm-zone casualty collection point.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide EMT procedures at the cold-zone casualty staging area, as required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Patient Decontamination</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide EMT and medical supervision of patient decontamination procedures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Manage/decontaminate splints and pressure bandages in the patient decontamination area.</td>
<td>(See FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 for details.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Evacuation</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide casualty evacuation to the supporting MTF, within unit evacuation capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide en route EMT augmentation to local casualty evacuation responders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate patient movement.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>✓ Define ground evacuation routes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Determine patient movement staging areas and medical vehicle decontamination plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate with the federal coordinating center DOD coordinator for an appropriate evacuation site.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Hospitalization</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Establish a patient decontamination area and patient receiving area adjacent to the hospital.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Receive casualties from the incident site.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide triage in the patient receiving area. Evaluate patients for decontamination status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide EMT at the casualty receiving area, as required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Conduct patient decontamination procedures, as required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Admit patients into the emergency service area. Provide EMT, as required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Admit patients into the inpatient treatment areas, as their condition dictates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Discharge patients not requiring inpatient care.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate with the federal coordinating center for patient hospitalization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Medical Augmentation</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide medical augmentation to receiving MTFs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide augmentation at the MTF patient receiving and decontamination areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide augmentation in the MTF emergency service area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Provide augmentation in the inpatient treatment areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Coordinate with nonmedical personnel for augmentees to assist with tasks such as litter bearing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Legend:
- **DOD**: Department of Defense
- **EMT**: emergency medical treatment
- **IPE**: individual protective equipment
- **MTF**: medical treatment facility
- **PPE**: personal protective equipment
Table D-2. Personal protective equipment checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPE Item</th>
<th>Recovery Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level A protective suits</td>
<td>✓ Turn un-contaminated suits inside out, place on hanger assemblies, and suspend on racks or heavy-duty hangars for sanitizing. ✓ Apply one ounce of disinfecting solution and 24 ounces of mild, liquid detergent mixed in a gallon of water to the entire interior of the suit. Allow a contact time of 10 minutes. ✓ Rinse the suit thoroughly with water and air-dry. Returned the suit to its original configuration (right side out). ✓ Wash the exterior of the suit, if needed, with a sponge and air-dry. ✓ Inspect each suit thoroughly for serviceability and damage. (The individual performing the inspection records the results of this inspection on a suit inspection log.) ✓ Fold the suit properly and place in its assigned storage bag. ✓ Brush each bag with a stiff-bristle brush to remove any dirt that may have accumulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective boots</td>
<td>✓ Deposit boots in a warm, soapy water solution; soak for 10 minutes; and then rinse thoroughly in warm water. ✓ Remove any soil buildup on the boots with a soft-bristle brush, if needed. ✓ Air-dry boots upside down until thoroughly dry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective gloves</td>
<td>✓ Deposit gloves in a warm, soapy water solution; soak for 10 minutes; and then rinsed thoroughly in warm water. ✓ Air-dry gloves until the inside and outside are thoroughly dry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBA</td>
<td>✓ Wipe case with a clean, wet cloth and air dry. (All SCBA models consist of a cylinder for storing compressed breathing air, a harness and back frame assembly to support the equipment on the body of the wearer, and a facepiece assembly. These items are generally contained in a hardened, plastic case. All other components are addressed separately in the following paragraphs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBA air cylinder</td>
<td>✓ Inspect cylinders visually before use for dents or gouges in the metal or in composite wrapping. ✓ Remove cylinders from service that show damage, and empty compressed air. ✓ Wipe cylinders free of any dirt that may have accumulated during use. ✓ Check hydrostatic test date for validity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBA harness and back frame assembly</td>
<td>✓ Check each harness and back frame assembly visually for worn/frayed straps, aging rubber parts, workable buckles, and any damages that the harness and back frame assembly and/or components may have. ✓ Turn in damaged harness and backpack frame assemblies for repair. ✓ Wipe free any accumulated dirt on the assembly/component by hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCBA facepiece</td>
<td>✓ Remove breathing regulator from the facepiece (required for most SCBA facepieces). ✓ Clean facepieces by immersing in a solution of warm soapy water, followed by rinsing in clear water. Allow a 10-minute contact time before rinsing. ✓ Rinse with drinking water using a spray bottle or gently running water. ✓ Prepare a disinfectant solution to kill germs (two tablespoons of bleach per gallon of water, commercially available disinfectants if the manufacturer recommends, or disinfectant wipes [70% isopropyl alcohol]). ✓ Shake excess water from the facepiece; and if time permits, hang it until dry. (If time does not permit, dry with a clean, lint-free cloth or gently blow-dry with clean, dry breathing air of 30 pounds per square inch or less pressure.) ✓ Reconnect the facepiece and breathing regulator after drying. ✓ Send damaged facepieces to an authorized maintenance facility for repair.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table D-2. Personal protective equipment checklist (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPE Item</th>
<th>Recovery Procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Air-purifying respirators     | ✓ Remove any filters or cartridges. Filters and cartridges should not be washed.  
✓ Discard any filters that are clogged or cartridges that are spent.  
✓ Disassemble valves and other reusable facepiece parts.  
✓ Wash the facepiece and associated parts with a mild detergent and warm water. (Do not use organic solvents. A soft-bristle brush may be used to remove any heavy debris.)  
✓ Rinse the respirator facepiece and parts in clean, warm water.  
✓ Prepare a disinfectant solution to kill germs (two tablespoons of bleach per gallon of water, commercially available disinfectants if the manufacturer recommends, or disinfectant wipes [70% isopropyl alcohol]).  
✓ Immerse the facepiece and parts in the disinfectant solution for 2 minutes; then rinse with clean, warm water and air-dry overnight.  
✓ Reassemble the respirator after drying.  
✓ Keep the respirator and cartridges in a sealed container when not in use; store in a clean, dry, temperate, noncontaminated environment. (It is especially important to keep gas and vapor cartridges in a sealed container so that they do not passively absorb gases and vapors from the storage area, thereby reducing the filter service life. Particulate filters should also be protected from dust and dirt. Each respirator is inspected routinely before and after each use and discarded if found unserviceable, such as exposure to liquid chemical contamination.) |
| Cooling vests                 | ✓ Inspect cooling vests visually for damages and cleanliness.  
✓ Launder and repair any soiled or damaged vests.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Cooling-vest inserts          | ✓ Inspect inserts visually for tears, leaks, or any other type of damage.  
✓ Turn in damaged inserts for disposal.  
✓ Limit maintenance is limited to gently washing undamaged inserts in warm, soapy water, rinsing, and then placing in storage (freezer) for future use.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

Legend:  
PPE personal protective equipment  
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCESA</td>
<td>Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMAN</td>
<td>Air Force manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFMAN(I)</td>
<td>Air Force manual (instruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFPD</td>
<td>Air Force policy directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSPC</td>
<td>Air Force Space Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force technical training publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTTP(I)</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>allied tactical publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATTN</td>
<td>attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBIRF</td>
<td>chemical-biological incident response force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>chemical, biological, and radiological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERFP</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives enhanced response force package</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSN</td>
<td>Defense Switched Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>emergency management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>emergency medical services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>emergency support function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCM</td>
<td>foreign consequence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Sarin, a chemical agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZCOM</td>
<td>hazard communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security presidential directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>incident commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>initial distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEM</td>
<td>installation emergency management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>independent study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-CS</td>
<td>joint task force–civil support</td>
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<td>MACS</td>
<td>multiagency coordination system</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>mass casualty decontamination</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
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<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps warfighting publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPP</td>
<td>mission-oriented protective posture</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<td>MSCOE</td>
<td>Maneuver Support Center of Excellence</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>MTTP</td>
<td>multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
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<td>NFPA</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Response Framework</td>
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<td>OEH</td>
<td>occupational and environmental health</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OSHA</td>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health Administration</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>presidential decision directive</td>
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<td>post-deployment health assessment</td>
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<td>personal protective equipment</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>request for assistance</td>
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<td>SCBA</td>
<td>self-contained breathing apparatus</td>
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<td>SEVANINST</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy instruction</td>
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<td>SMART</td>
<td>special medical augmentation response team</td>
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<td>TIM</td>
<td>toxic industrial material</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>UJTL</td>
<td>universal joint task list</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
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<td>USAMC</td>
<td>United States Army Medical Command</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>VA</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>WMD-CST</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction–civil support team</td>
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