FM 31–16, 24 March 1967, is changed as follows:

Page 3, paragraph 1. The purpose of the manual is changed to read: “This manual provides guidance in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.”

Page 3, paragraph 2c. In line 3, “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 3, paragraph 3. In lines 11 through 20 (last two sentences) are changed to read as follows: “For example, in jungles and mountains, emphasis may be placed on the use of footmobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in level terrain or desert, on the use of vehicle mobility. Airmobility of counterguerrilla units provides a distinct advantage over footmobile guerrilla forces, especially in difficult terrain, and should be exploited for troop lift, resupply, reconnaissance, surveillance, and fire support.”

Page 3. Paragraph 4 is superseded as follows:

4. Changes and Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.

Page 5, paragraph 6. Subparagraphs i and j are added as follows:

i. Throughout this manual, the terms regular armed, paramilitary, and irregular are used to identify the probable force structure used by guerrillas. These terms have been superseded by main, regional, and local force, respectively. For details on the guerrilla’s organization see FM 31–23.

j. Throughout this manual, the terms reserve and reaction force are synonymous; however, in counterguerrilla operations, commanders enjoying a positive mobility differential normally do not retain an uncommitted reserve, but use least engaged units as reaction forces (reserves).

Page 5, paragraph 7. In line 7, “repetition” is changed to read “repetitive.”

Page 7, paragraph 10. Lines 8 through 11, are changed to read “Since the essence of the counterguerrilla campaign is the control of the populace, emphasis must be placed on winning the support of the people by providing security and by conducting civil affairs activities. The situation in”

Page 8, paragraph 10b(3). In lines 4 and 5, “to press an advantage” is deleted.

Page 8, paragraph 11b. In line 1, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “insurgent wars”; and in line 6, “operations” is changed to read “tactics.”

Page 8, paragraph 11c. In lines 2 and 3, “However” is changed to read “However.”

Page 8, paragraph 11c. Lines 5 and 6 are changed to read “the people, civil affairs activities directed towards controlling the people, gaining their support, and increasing their self-sufficiency becomes primary missions of the counterguerrilla forces of the host country and the United States.”

Page 9, paragraph 12. In line 5, the word “stability” is changed to read “internal defense.”

*This change supersedes Change 1, 25 July 1969.
Page 9, paragraph 13b. In lines 2 and 3 "internal defense operations" is changed to read "insurgency situations."

Page 9, paragraph 13c. In line 3, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 9, paragraph 13e. In line 2, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 10, paragraph 17. In lines 5 and 6, "defense is achieved by" is changed to read "defense is achieved is by"; and in line 13, "Counterguerrilla operations" is changed to read "A counterguerrilla operation."

Page 11, paragraph 19b. In line 1, "military" is changed to read "stability"; and in line 3, "development" is changed to read "development."

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(1) is superseded as follows:

(1) Tactical operations directed against guerrilla forces. Tactical operations are conducted in support of either strike or consolidation campaigns. Strike campaigns are primarily offensive operations, characterized by brevity, which are conducted in an assigned area of operations, to find, fix, destroy, and capture the guerrilla. Consolidation campaigns are primarily defensive operations, characterized by long duration, which are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility, to provide a secure area in which positive effort can be devoted to internal defense and development.

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(4) is superseded as follows:

(4) Civil affairs operations. Any project or activity of U.S. forces involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation, unless the activity is being conducted solely or primarily for intelligence purposes. Intelligence operations must, however, be coordinated and conducted so as not to degrade the overall goals of the internal defense and internal development programs, to include especially civil affairs aspects. In counterguerrilla operations, control of the civilian populace and denial of material resources to the guerrilla along with gaining the support, loyalty, and respect of the people are major concerns of the force commander. These civil affairs functions are achieved by the force commander primarily through populace and resources control and military civic action. Military civic action has proven effective in gaining civilian support for military operations and isolating the guerrillas physically and psychologically from the civilian support without which the guerrillas cannot exist. The military civic action program can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skill or knowledge to a civilian (in order to help the civilian solve a problem or better his condition) to the entire unit providing security for crop harvest and aid in projects that contribute to social and economic improvement of the local civil government or population.

Page 12. Paragraph designation "19b(4) (a)" is changed to read "19b(5)."

Page 12. Paragraph 19b(4) (b) is rescinded.

Page 12. Paragraph 19b(6) is added as follows:

(6) Advisory assistance. Advisory assistance programs include assistance of host country military, paramilitary, and police forces by furnishing advice on organization, training, doctrine, operations, and materiel. In addition, it may include providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for host country military forces.

Page 15, paragraph 27. In lines 9 and 10 "terrain to insure" is changed to read "terrain and susceptibility of local vegetation and foliage to available herbicides to insure."

Page 18, paragraph 33. In lines 6 and 7, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 18, paragraph 33a(3). Line 9, the following is added "In this regard, early consideration must be given to an effective herbicide program."

Page 20. Paragraph 34 is superseded as follows:

34. General

This chapter provides general guidance on typical insurgent or resistance organizations and focuses on their military forces as opposed to their cadres and political organizations.
39. Organization

Guerrilla forces may vary from groups of squad and platoon size to units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations including elements for combat, intelligence, counterintelligence, political, and logistic support. Guerrilla forces may be organized in three principal types of forces: main, regional, and local. The distinction between these forces is based on differences in organization, training, weapons, equipment, and mission.

a. Guerrilla main force units normally are employed militarily when there is maximum chance for success. They usually operate for given periods of time in various regions, moving from region to region according to operational requirements and the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations. These main force units possess the best available equipment, weapons (including mortars and artillery), and uniforms, and are used primarily against the counterguerrilla regular armed forces. Guerrilla main force units usually are well organized (into regimental-size units or larger), well trained, and well led. They operate in close conjunction with the paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces. Fillers for the guerrilla regular forces usually are selected from the best of the guerrilla regional force troops. Sponsoring powers may provide elements of their armed forces as advisors or to reinforce guerrilla regular forces.

b. Guerrilla regional force units are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regular forces. They may be organized into platoons, companies, battalions, and at times, regiments (or equivalent organizations). Guerrilla regional forces launch limited attacks, harass installations and troops, and ambush counterguerrilla force reinforcements. Normally they are assigned to a specific area of operation (e.g., state (province) or country (district)) and do not normally move from that area for conduct of operations elsewhere. Fillers for regional forces usually are obtained from guerrilla irregular forces.

c. Guerrilla local forces are auxiliaries responsible for collecting intelligence information, building bases, fortifying villages, acting as scouts or porters for the guerrilla main and regional forces, and providing security for insurgent officials at the local level. Members of local forces receive limited military training but receive extensive political indoctrination. They normally retain their civilian occupations and function as combatants on a part-time basis in delaying and harassing the counterguerrilla force. These limited military activities may include sniping and employment of antipersonnel boobytraps and devices. The local forces normally do not operate in the military chain of command.

d. Sponsoring power resources, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian political, economic, and psychological organizers and advisors may be provided to guerrilla forces to assist in organizational and operational missions and activities.

Page 23, paragraph 40a (2). In line 2, the following is added: “(except as noted below).”

Page 23, paragraph 40a. Subparagraph (9) is added as follows:

(9) To gain a psychological victory or as a diversionary action, the guerrilla will attack a built-up area, even at the risk of annihilation.

Page 25, paragraph 40f. In line 10, after the word “battle” the following sentence is added “Occasionally, guerrilla units may occupy and defend a population center to gain some advantage, usually political.”

Page 26, paragraph 40f (3). In line 7, “regular forces” is changed to read “main force units,” and to the end of the paragraph the following sentence is added “Main force units will frequently defend until dark before attempting to exfiltrate the contact area.”

Page 26, paragraph 40f. Subparagraph (4) is added as follows:

(4) Guerrillas may defend, even at the risk of annihilation, in a built-up or fortified area if they are confident of winning a local or worldwide psychological victory, or causing the diversion of a large counterguerrilla force.

Page 28, paragraph 48. In line 12 the following sentence is added “In any event, the base area complexes will become meaningful targets for attack by U.S. and host country forces.”

Page 29, paragraph 49. In line 4, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “stability operations.”
Page 29, paragraph 50. In lines 4 and 5, “in internal defense and development” is changed to read “during stability operations.”

Page 29, paragraph 51b. In line 10, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs operations.”

Page 29, paragraph 51d. In lines 4 and 5, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “stability operations”; and in lines 15 and 16, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs operations.”

Page 31, paragraph 52. In line 3, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “stability operations.”

Page 31, paragraph 52a. In line 7, “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 31, paragraph 52b. In line 3 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 31, paragraph 52e. Subparagraphs (6) and (7) are superseded as follows:

(6) Integration of Civil Affairs in all aspects of planning to include:

(a) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials.

(b) Incorporating and monitoring civilian assistance in the operational plan by preparing and executing integrated civil affairs plans that embrace military civic action, populace and resources control, and psychological operations.

(7) Organizing and training, through advisory assistance, paramilitary and police forces for local defense, and insuring continuous support for these forces.

Page 32. Paragraph 52f is superseded as follows:

f. Subordinate commanders are allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their assigned missions but should be assigned specific responsibilities and given sufficient guidance to insure a coordinated effort. The nature of guerrilla is such that, on occasion, plans for counterguerrilla operations must be changed instantly to take advantage of opportunities to employ brigade resources against elusive guerrilla forces.

Page 32, paragraph 53. In line 2, “indicate” is changed to read “dictate”; and in line 16, “may” is changed to read “will.”

Page 32, paragraph 53a. In lines 3 and 4, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “internal defense and internal development.”

Page 32, paragraph 53d. In line 3, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “internal defense and internal development.”

Page 34, paragraph 55. In line 2, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “stability operations.”

Page 34, paragraph 55e. In line 1, “Military civic action” is changed to read “Civil affairs operations.”

Page 35, paragraph 56a. In lines 21 and 22, “internal defense and development” is changed to read “stability operations.”

Page 36, paragraph 58a. Line 1, is changed to read “a. Guerilla forces and base areas are the targets, not the”; and in lines 6 and 7, “guerilla rather than” is changed to read “guerilla and his bases rather than”.

Page 36. Paragraph 58e is superseded as follows:

e. Large-scale reconnaissance-in-force operations should be conducted when sufficient counter-guerilla forces are available, if other forms of intelligence operations have failed to provide targets for attack. Reconnaissance-in-force operations can be conducted in all types of tactical operations (para 114).

Page 36. Paragraph 59a is superseded as follows:

a. Once a guerrilla force has been located, appropriate combat power, with emphasis on artillery, tactical air, Army aviation fires, and naval gunfire, is applied in order to destroy it. Normally, such operations require that the brigade force be larger than the guerrilla force; but if the brigade force is numerically inferior the difference in combat power can often be overcome with additional firepower. The encirclement may offer the greatest possibility of fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, provided the following conditions exist:

(1) Reliable intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.

(2) Troops are emplaced rapidly to maximize surprise.

(3) Effective counterintelligence measures and communications security practices insure the security of plans and movements.
(4) Sufficient troops are utilized to achieve an effective encirclement.
(5) Ample time is taken to search adequately the encircled area.
(6) Plans are made to offset the advantages which darkness affords the encircled guerrillas.

Page 37, paragraph 59b(9). In line 1, "and biological" is deleted.

Page 38, paragraph 64. In line 17, the following is added "in this regard, consideration should be given to the employment of riot control munitions details of which are in FM 3-10 and TC 3-16."

Page 38, paragraph 64a(2). In line 7, "their logistical" is changed to read "their total logistical."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(3) (e) is superseded as follows:
(e) Maintenance of highly mobile all-weather, around-the-clock reaction forces to reinforce or relieve engaged units.

Page 38, paragraph 64a(4). In line 2, "strike" is changed to read "tactical."

Page 38, paragraph 64a(5). In lines 3 and 4 "consolidation operations designed to" is changed to read "consolidation campaigns assigned to."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(6) (d) is superseded as follows:
(d) Providing reaction forces.

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(7) is added as follows:

(7) In areas where guerrilla forces have established base areas, the U.S. brigade commander should consider requesting aerial defoliation of these areas in order to improve vertical and horizontal visibility in these areas and to deny the guerrilla the employment of destruction munitions afforded by the dense growth in jungle areas. If this dense growth can be defoliated, the guerrilla will suffer from the elimination of his natural concealment and he may then be pursued by friendly forces and destroyed by aerial and/or ground weapons.

Page 39. Paragraph 65a(5) is added as follows:
(5) Types of vegetation and susceptibility to available herbicides.

Page 40. Paragraph 65c(10) (b) is superseded as follows:
(b) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolition, medicines, CBR protective equipment and other supplies.

Page 40, paragraph 65e. Line 1 is changed to read: e. Civil Affairs Operations.

Page 40. Paragraph 66a is superseded as follows:
a. Tactical operations which may support:
   (1) Strike campaigns.
   (2) Consolidation campaigns.

Page 41. Paragraph 66e is superseded as follows:

Page 41, paragraph 69b. In line 14, a new sentence is added as follows: "Consideration should be given to the integration of indigenous personnel in maneuver units to provide specialized knowledge of the area, the enemy, and the population."

Page 41, paragraph 70a. In lines 10 and 11, "control attached host" is changed to read "control, or coordinate, when authorized by national agreement, combined operations with host."

Page 41. Paragraph 70a(1) title is changed to read Support operations.

Page 42. In figure 6, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc.)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 43. In figure 7, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc.)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 44, paragraph 76b. In line 12, "augmentation to" is changed to read "increased authorization in."

Page 44, paragraph 76c. In line 9, the following sentence is added: "For details on communication security, see FM 32-5."

Page 45, paragraph 76. A new paragraph is added as follows:

j. The capability of the guerrilla to employ electronic countermeasures against friendly communications-electronics equipment must not be discounted. Operators should be trained to expect and to operate in an electronic-countermeasures environment. Proper training in electronic counter-countermeasures, coupled with good signal security practices, will produce the most effective
defense against enemy attempts to degrade friendly use of communications-electronics systems through jamming, imitative deception, and other forms of electronic countermeasures.

**78. Special Forces**

a. U.S. Army Special Forces are trained in both unconventional warfare and stability operations and may be employed under the direction or operational control of a unified command, another U.S. Army unit, a military mission, a MAAG or a MAC. The Special Forces group, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, medical, military police, signal, engineer, and Army Security Agency elements is responsive to the advisory assistance needs of the host country’s armed, paramilitary and irregular forces, as well as to governmental agencies and officials. Close coordination and exchange of information between Special Forces elements and other U.S. forces is essential.

b. Special Forces units, augmented as required, possess the following specific capabilities:

1. See FM 31–21 and FM 31–21A.
2. provide planning, training and operational advice and assistance, including the management or supervision of fiscal and logistical support, as appropriate to:
   a. Host country Special Forces type units operating in areas dominated or controlled by insurgents.
   b. Host country armed paramilitary, or irregular forces engaged in remote area operations.
   c. Selected forces assigned to specialized missions such as raids or long-range patrol operations.
   d. Host country province and district level leaders and to paramilitary or irregular forces under their direction.
3. To provide temporary support in the absence of other U.S. units, to small MAAGs, military groups, or missions in the following:
   a. Advisory assistance to host country armed and paramilitary forces.
   b. Training or training assistance to host country ranger, airborne or Special Forces type units.
4. Provides teams for operations or training assistance in civil affairs activities of host country armed forces which are engaged in internal development programs designed to prevent insurgency.

5. To establish an operational evasion and escape system in hostile areas.

c. Special Forces tables of organization and equipment are designed to satisfy the requirements of unconventional warfare. Prolonged employment in stability operations may require equipment and personnel in addition to that normally authorized.

*Page 45. Paragraph 79 title is changed to read MILITARY DOGHANDLER TEAMS.*

*Page 46. Paragraph 79, line 1, is changed to read “Scout, sentry, and tracker dogs have value in” and subparagraphs c, d, and e, are added as follows:*

**c.** Combat tracker teams (CTT) composed of tracker dogs and visual trackers are provided by increased authorization to TOE of combat brigade elements. These teams are employed in interpreting signs left by the enemy and in tracking him. The primary function of the CTT is to investigate areas of suspected enemy activity, follow retreating enemy groups, and reestablish contact with the enemy. This requires the use of highly developed skills by both the tracker dog and the visual tracker. (See FM 20–20 for tracking techniques.)

1. The tracker dog has an advantage over the visual tracker in that the dog usually can track faster and can track at night. The tracker dog can also follow a track that does not leave a visible sign.

2. A visual tracker is an expert at observing and interpreting the signs that men have left when they pass over terrain and through vegetation. He is able to provide detailed information about persons being tracked. For example, a well-experienced visual tracker is able to tell the sex of the people making the track and the type of weapons that they are carrying, information on the size of the group, direction and speed of movement, morale and condition of the enemy being tracked, and recency of track.

3. When these two capabilities are combined into a working team the result is a valuable reconnaissance capability for maneuvering infantry elements.

**d.** The organization of U.S. Army combat
tracker team elements follows the lines of the combat force it supports. All men in the team are cross-trained in visual tracking to provide the team with extra capabilities. For a CTT to be effective in the operational environment, all members must be highly trained in tracking, fieldcraft, and weaponry. Another factor that contributes to their effectiveness is mobility. All team members are lightly equipped; readily transportable by air, road, or on foot; and able to remain in the field for 48 hours without resupply. When the teams can be resupplied regularly, they can remain in the field for an indefinite period of time, except the tracker dogs, which should be relieved every 48 hours. The same principles of integrated operations as employed with scout dog teams are applicable.

e. Generally speaking, the CTT has three limitations which influence its effectiveness. First, the team is unable to track through heavy jungle at night, although with sufficient moonlight some tracking tasks can be performed through ground cover that consists of grass or low shrubs. Second, visual trackers and dogs often find it difficult to follow a track that has been subjected to heavy tropical rainfall. Third, it is difficult to follow a track that is more than 24 hours old. Subject to these limitations, combat tracker teams can perform a number of missions, including:

1. Follow a retreating enemy and reestablish contact.
2. Follow local enemy to villages or homes.
3. Follow and recover U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.
4. Follow and recover U.S. Army patrols or individuals who are lost or separated from their units.
5. Backtrack captured personnel to determine where they have been and where they hid any supplies or equipment they may have had.

Page 46, paragraph 80. In line 4, the following sentence is added: “(See also FM 32-10.)”

Page 47. Paragraph 88.1 is added as follows:

88.1. Chemical
Missions, concepts, organization, and operations of a chemical nature are discussed in chapter 9 and in the 3-series manuals.

Page 49. Paragraph 94a is superseded as follows:

a. This chapter provides guidance on the missions, concepts and organization of the brigade in conducting counterguerrilla tactical operations. Its scope includes the operational environment, the forces required, and the types of counterguerrilla tactical operations, and the combat support required for each type.

Page 49. In paragraph 94b, “FM 31-50” is added as a reference.

Page 49, paragraph 96a. Line 18 is changed to read: ** and elusiveness, but he may attack, seize, and defend all or portions of built-up areas for no other reason than the psychological impact on the civilians and the military forces. Various forms **

Page 49, paragraph 96b. In lines 8 and 9, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs operations.”

Page 49. Paragraph 96.1 is added as follows:

96.1. Security
a. The commander is responsible for providing continuous, allround security for his unit and other forces as well as installations in the area for which he has been assigned responsibility. He must accomplish appropriate actions to guard against subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and tactical surprise. Security measures insure freedom of maneuver in response to an enemy threat.

b. The commander provides for his security by coordinating all available security elements to:

1. Provide timely and accurate warning of enemy movement into and within the area for which he has been assigned responsibility.
2. Provide time and space for maneuver of his forces in reaction to enemy threats.
3. Orient on installations, lines of communication, and units in his area of responsibility that are known or suspected enemy targets.
4. Provide or coordinate protection of all fire bases, logistical installations, and lines of communication.
5. Insure that reaction forces are provided and fires are coordinated for use in the event of enemy attack or other action.
6. Provide for a counterreconnaissance screen and coordinate counterintelligence activities to insure detection and denial of enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and provide deception for his own operations.
(7) Destroy or neutralize enemy threats by appropriate action to include coordinated attack and application of all available firepower.

Page 50, paragraph 98. In lines 5 and 6, “larger reserves will be maintained” is changed to read “a larger reaction force must be available.”

Page 50, paragraph 98a. In line 7 after the word “force” the following sentence is added: “However, to prevent entire units from becoming immobilized by the fires of guerrilla forces, every effort should be made to gain contact, using minimum forces, followed by maximum employment of maneuver forces and supporting fires to block possible routes of withdrawal or reinforcement and to destroy the enemy force.”

Page 50. Paragraph 98b is superseded as follows:

b. Since terrain, organized fires, and maneuver are used by guerrilla forces to seize and hold the initiative and not terrain for itself, maneuvers such as envelopments, penetrations, and turning movements may not produce the same effects on guerrilla forces as they would on field army-type tactical forces. Caches, and other sources of supplies may be so dispersed that guerrilla units are not dependent on a few critical logistical bases which they must protect. Under these conditions, a turning movement, for example, launched by counterguerrilla forces to cause the guerrilla force to react to protect a base, may produce movements in entirely different directions than those anticipated.


Page 51. Paragraph 99 is redesignated “99a”; and subparagraph b is added as follows:

b. Heavily fortified guerrilla defenses in dense jungle are often so well concealed that their presence is not known until physically encountered at close range. In this situation, use will not have been made of preparatory fires to soften enemy defensive positions. The use of massive supporting fires at this time usually is necessary to defeat the guerrilla and destroy his position without suffering undue friendly casualties. Once such defenses are encountered, the commander may have to adjust his forward disposition while maintaining contact, in order to permit extensive employment of supporting fires. Simultaneously, additional maneuver forces are committed and supporting fires are used to block the enemy’s possible routes of withdrawal. When the preparatory fires have been completed, forces are maneuvered to defeat him in detail.

Page 51, paragraph 100. The following sentence is added after line 16: “This employment of armor is often decisive in engagements with dug-in enemy forces.”

Page 51, paragraph 100a. In line 7, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs operations.”

Page 51, paragraph 101. In line 4, “Attack and pursuit are” is changed to read “Attack, pursuit, and reaction are.”

Page 51, paragraph 101a. In line 6, “mounted” is changed to “mechanized.”

Page 51, paragraph 101b. In line 1, “carriers where possible” is changed to read “carriers and mechanized flamethrowers where possible”; and in line 3, “mobility advantage” is changed to read “mobility and firepower advantage”.

Page 52, paragraph 104. In line 1, “carriers as part of” is changed to read “carriers, and mechanized flamethrowers as part of.”

Page 52, paragraph 105. Line 21, the following sentence is added: Because of its organization and lack of heavy organic weapons, airmobile infantry relies heavily on supporting firepower to overcome a dug-in enemy.

Page 53, paragraph 105c. Line 9, the following sentence is added: Airmobile forces are ideally suited to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations.

Page 53, paragraph 105e. In line 15, the following is added: “* * * airmobile operations and FM 31-50 for airmobile operations in fortified and built-up areas.”

Page 54, paragraph 107. In lines 5 and 6, the text in parentheses is deleted; and in lines 11 and 12, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs operations.”

Page 54, paragraph 109. In line 3, “located” is deleted; and in line 12, “usually entails” is changed to read “may entail.”
Page 55, paragraph 110. In line 2, "either" is changed to read "ideally"; and in lines 3 and 4, "preferably" is deleted.

Page 55, paragraph 111b. In line 6, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction forces)."

Page 57. Paragraph 111g is superseded as follows:

g. Separation of tactical units from parent headquarters is normal in counterguerrilla operations, but they must operate as part of a well-coordinated plan and be prepared to concentrate rapidly. Objectives normally are not oriented on terrain, but rather on destroying guerrilla forces and bases. Once guerrilla forces have been located, priority of all available combat power is given to operations to destroy or incapacitate the guerrilla. Destruction missions normally require a counterguerrilla force larger than the located guerrilla force. Reserves (reaction forces)—normally the main destruction units—immediately apply sufficient combat power to engage and destroy guerrilla forces before the guerrilla forces disperse. The use of airmobile and airborne forces is emphasized for the conduct of strike operations. The use of chemical munitions to disorganize and incapacitate a guerrilla force will enable the counterguerrilla force to attain its objective with minimum firepower and casualties. After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, the area is thoroughly searched for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents.

Page 58. Figure 10 is changed as follows: The night patrol route (dotted black line) indicated as leaving the patrol base from the six o'clock position and returning to the base at the five o'clock position is changed to indicate the reverse, that the patrol leaves from the five o'clock position and returns at the six o'clock position.

Page 58, paragraph 112. Line 6 is changed to read as follows: "capture the guerrillas. When maneuver elements encounter a strongly fortified position in the jungle and are unable to reduce the position by employment of organic weapons and maneuver, the commander may have to reposition his forward elements while still maintaining contact to permit maximum utilization of tactical air and artillery fires. The guerrillas' ability."

Page 59. Paragraph 114 is superseded as follows:

114. Reconnaissance Operations

a. This paragraph provides general guidance on the conduct of reconnaissance operations during counterguerrilla operations.

b. Reconnaissance is the directed effort to collect information of the enemy and the area of operations by ground and air activities. The purpose of reconnaissance is to obtain combat information of the enemy and the area of operations for the production of combat intelligence. The combat intelligence produced is used in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

c. Reconnaissance and security complement each other and cannot be readily separated. Effective ground and air reconnaissance provides a certain amount of security, and a security force provides information of the enemy and the area of operations.

114.1. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance operations vary with the situation and conditions vary with the situation and conditions in the area and with the assigned missions, size, type, and composition of the reconnaissance units. Ground combat reconnaissance operations are performed in conformance with the following five fundamentals.

a. Orient on the Location or Movement of the Intelligence Targets. Units performing reconnaissance must maneuver according to the location or movement of the intelligence target rather than the location or movement of friendly forces. The target may be enemy troops, a terrain feature, or a locality. To perform the operation, commanders of units conducting reconnaissance must be allowed maximum freedom of action.

b. Report All Information Accurately. Reconnaissance is conducted to obtain information to be used in the production of combat intelligence. To be of value to the commander, this information must be timely and accurate. All members of units conducting reconnaissance missions must report all positive and negative information rapidly and accurately to the next higher headquarters. When considered in conjunction with information from other sources, information that is unimportant to
one level of command may be extremely valuable to the next higher commander. The use of a brief reconnaissance spot report form facilitates the rapid transmission of essential information. A unit performing reconnaissance has not fully accomplished its mission until it has reported all information gathered to the next higher headquarters.

c. Avoid Decisive Engagement. Except in a reconnaissance in force where the mission is to engage the enemy, units performing reconnaissance obtain information by stealth whenever possible, but fight when necessary to gain the desired information. The reconnaissance mission must not be jeopardized by combat with the enemy when combat is not essential to obtain the information desired.

d. Maintain Contact With the Enemy. In the performance of a reconnaissance mission to obtain information of an enemy force, contact with the enemy is gained as soon as possible. Once contact has been made, it is maintained and is not voluntarily broken without authority from higher headquarters. Contact can be maintained by ground and/or air observation.

e. Develop the Situation. When contact with the enemy is made, or an obstacle is encountered, the situation must be developed quickly and a decision made regarding subsequent operations. In the case of enemy contact, the following actions, known as actions on contact, are taken:

(1) Deploy and report. Units move immediately to positions from which they can fire, observe, or be employed against the enemy. The commander immediately reports the enemy contact to higher headquarters in as much detail as possible.

(2) Reconnoiter. The enemy's location, strength, composition, and disposition are determined, with a special effort to determine the flanks of his position. Patrols, whether mounted or dismounted, are supported by fire and by other elements of the unit.

(3) Choose a course of action. After reconnoitering the enemy position to gain as much information as he can, the commander must choose a course of action appropriate to the immediate situation as well as to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. A decision to attack, bypass, or contain the enemy must be made as quickly as the reconnaissance will permit. In counterguerrilla operations, enemy units are rarely bypassed.

(4) Report. After developing the situation, the commander gives a report to his higher headquarters. This report includes the additional enemy information gained by the reconnaissance and the decision as to what course of action the commander plans to follow.

114.2. Types of Reconnaissance Missions

There are three types of reconnaissance missions: route, zone, and area. The type to be employed is determined after considering the information desired, where the information is to be sought, the known enemy situation, terrain, size of the reconnaissance force, and the time available for obtaining the information.

a. Route Reconnaissance.

(1) Route reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain information of the route, obstacles, and enemy along a specific route, and the terrain adjacent to the route which, if occupied by the enemy, would affect movement along the route.

(2) Route reconnaissance may be assigned to obtain information of a specific route or of an enemy force moving generally along a specific route. When intelligence indicates that the enemy is moving on one or more routes, or when terrain features canalize his advance, these routes may be reconnoitered to obtain enemy information. Routes of advance of friendly forces may be reconnoitered when specific information of a route or series of routes is required.

(3) The technique employed and the requirements of a route reconnaissance are less time-consuming and normally can be performed more rapidly than zone or area reconnaissance.

b. Zone Reconnaissance.

(1) Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces in a zone defined by boundaries.

(2) When the enemy's location is in doubt, or when it is desired to locate suitable routes or determine cross-country trafficability in a zone, a zone reconnaissance may be directed. The width of the zone assigned to subordinate units is determined by the pattern of the road net, terrain features, type of information desired, anticipated enemy
action, troops available, weather, visibility, and time available to accomplish the mission.

c. Area Reconnaissance.

(1) Area reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces within a clearly defined area.

(2) The area may be reconnoitered for possible enemy or to determine its suitability as an assembly area or for other uses by friendly forces. The area to be reconnoitered must be clearly delineated. The unit assigned the mission moves directly to the area and conducts the reconnaissance employing the same techniques as in a zone reconnaissance.

114.3. Reconnaissance in Force

a. General. Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation to discover and test the enemy’s positions, locations, and strength, and to gather information. In counterguerrilla operations, its objective is collection of information of the enemy and the destruction of his units and facilities. The commander must be prepared to exploit meeting engagements and meaningful intelligence to achieve tactical success by conducting a coordinated attack to destroy discovered enemy units and facilities, or take additional security measures if required. The committed force may conduct the operation as a unit, or only selected subordinate units may be committed on a limited scale.

b. Basic Considerations.

(1) Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop enemy information more rapidly and in more detail than do other reconnaissance methods; therefore, when firm intelligence is lacking, the principal effort of the committed unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnaissance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory security missions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the commander considers:

(a) His overall mission.
(b) His knowledge of the enemy situation.
(c) The urgency and importance of other information.
(d) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection agencies.

(e) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to a general engagement under favorable conditions.
(f) The continuing requirements for local and area security.
(g) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) and the resources to deliver them quickly to the area to be exploited.
(h) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

(2) The ground maneuver elements conducting the reconnaissance in force should have mobility at least equal to that of the enemy. Reserves (reaction forces) must have a mobility differential or capability that permits them to quickly exploit enemy weaknesses and influence the action.

(3) The size of the subordinate reconnaissance units depends on the mission, the size of the area being investigated, combat power available, the ability to quickly commit reserves (reaction forces), and the enemy’s strength.

c. Area Reconnaissance in Force. An area reconnaissance in force is an offensive action designed to develop enemy information rapidly within a specific area, and it is only conducted when available intelligence is not adequate to support operations with more specific objectives. These operations are not executed without benefit of intelligence about the enemy forces suspected of being within the area of operations. However, these operations are conducted only in the most likely areas in which guerrilla elements or installations should be found based on the best intelligence available. All available intelligence and the judicious estimate of the commander on the probable locations and activities of the enemy are utilized in planning area reconnaissance-in-force operations.

(1) Concept.

(a) In an area reconnaissance in force, commanders—especially small-unit commanders—may have restrictions placed on them to avoid decisive engagement. The ground maneuver element gains contact through aggressive patrolling by small reconnaissance elements, thereby exposing minimum forces to surprise attack or ambush.

(b) The commander exploits contacts gained by the reconnaissance in force by destroying the enemy unit engaged and his facilities when
possible. Those facilities not destroyed by artillery or other fire support means are destroyed during the local exploitation using demolition teams when appropriate. Commanders must be prepared to extract the friendly unit if decisive engagement is unfavorable at that time.

(c) The destruction of large enemy forces, usually employed in prepared fortifications, is accomplished by a coordinated attack of the enemy’s position with appropriate forces supported by all available combat power including artillery, tactical air, naval gunfire, Army aviation fires, and armor. During the conduct of the attack, possible escape routes are put under surveillance or blocked by maneuver elements, artillery fire, naval gunfire, or the use of chemical munitions. The actual attack force which in many cases is smaller than the defending enemy unit, should not execute the ground attack until the enemy unit and his defensive position have been neutralized to the degree possible by the massed firepower. When entering the enemy’s position, the infantry close with the remaining enemy and destroy or capture them, destroy the positions prior to extraction or continuation of the operation when possible. When available, other units conduct pursuit operations and attempt to regain contact if it is lost.

(2) Conduct.

(a) In selecting the area to be reconnoitered in force, the commander directing the operation must consider the size of the assigned area of operations (AO), the terrain and vegetation within the AO, size and location of any known or suspected enemy units within the area, the size of the force available to him to conduct the area reconnaissance in force, and the support available to accomplish the mission, to include fire support and the Army aviation elements available for transportation. There is no specified frontage for a given size force conducting a reconnaissance-in-force mission. After considering all of the above elements, the commander decides how the area will be subdivided to accomplish the mission.

(b) Any number of techniques may be used to reconnoiter an area in force; however, they generally will be variations of one basic concept. To thoroughly reconnoiter an area, it must be saturated with ground elements aggressively patrolling their assigned reconnaissance areas to locate and engage the enemy. In order to accomplish the necessary complete saturation of an area, the area must be subdivided by the controlling headquarters into subordinate unit reconnaissance areas. To the maximum extent possible, the insertion of the individual reconnaissance elements should be as nearly simultaneous as possible in order to achieve maximum surprise and mutual support. However, this saturation of an area of operations may not always be possible to the degree that is desirable. This may be due to the lack of sufficient ground units and support to adequately saturate the designated area of operations. In this situation, a variation of the technique of complete saturation of an area may be used. The number of variations, as to the initial positioning of ground units and the plan for their movement within the area, is usually limited only by the adaptability of the units. Once inserted, the units act independently in their assigned areas of responsibility until an enemy unit is located or its security is threatened. The overall objective is to locate and engage the enemy forces. Once contact has been made, maximum fires are placed on the enemy positions. The controlling headquarters directs adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush positions along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. Where superior forces are encountered, the requirement is to fix the enemy until sufficient combat power can be massed to defeat the guerrillas. Guerrillas characteristically operate in difficult terrain which limits the capability to rapidly move ground units to the decisive point. When this occurs, all available fire support should be used to achieve the necessary massing of combat power.

114.4. Reconnaissance by Fire

a. Reconnaissances by fire is accomplished by firing on likely or suspected enemy positions in an attempt to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or firing. During reconnaissance by fire, positions being reconnoitered must be continuously observed so that any enemy movement or return fire will be definitely located.

b. Reconnaissance by fire is used when time is critical. It is made at the risk of losing surprise, but it tends to lessen the probability of moving into a well-concealed enemy position without being aware of its presence.

c. If the enemy returns the fire, the unit proceeds to develop the situation. If the fire is not
114.5. Reconnaissance by Aircraft

a. Army aircraft extend, supplement, or in some instances replace ground reconnaissance means. Commanders not having organic aircraft should request them to support their reconnaissance efforts.

b. Army aircraft normally are employed in conjunction with, and in close support of, ground reconnaissance forces. Aircraft are used to extend the reconnaissance effort by air observation, air photography, and electronic surveillance.

c. Army aircraft may be used to conduct radiological surveys and to locate routes through or around contaminated areas.

114.6. Coordination and Control During Reconnaissance Operations

a. Reconnaissance must be coordinated at all levels of command. This will insure maximum results from the intelligence effort, prevent duplication of effort, and provide for economical use of reconnaissance forces. Coordination is accomplished primarily by assigning a specific mission to each unit conducting the reconnaissance.

b. The commander conducting the reconnaissance uses radio as the primary means of control. Phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, boundaries, routes, objectives, and time limitations are used by the commander in controlling his unit. Liaison personnel, staff officers, messengers, and aircraft are used to assist in the rapid transmission of reconnaissance instructions and reports.

114.7. Reconnaissance Instructions

Reconnaissance instructions must be complete and must include exactly what combat information is to be obtained, the time by which the information must be reported, where the information is to be sought, and when the mission is to be executed. Essential details may include:

a. Pertinent information of the enemy and friendly troops.

b. Plans of the higher commander.

c. Specific information desired.

d. Zone, area, or route to be reconnoitered.

e. When, where, and how information is to be reported to the higher commander.

f. Time of departure.

g. Appropriate control measures.

h. Action to be taken when mission is completed.

Page 59. Paragraph 115 is superseded as follows:

115. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations is basically the same as in limited and general war operations. Night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are emphasized. Lead elements of advancing units may move by bounds. Where terrain permits, the lead element moves from one favorable position to the next, covered by a strong base of fire in position to engage any resistance encountered. Leading elements of the advancing strike forces gain and maintain contact with the guerrillas. Close-in supporting fires are used in conjunction with the direct fires of elements in contact to destroy the enemy. If the guerrillas withdraw, every effort will be made to retain contact. In many situations, action by committed forces and subordinate elements may develop into a series of meeting engagements. Care must be taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. The infantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and flank patrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing a minimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placed close-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance. When brigades move by ground to the strike area, and on subsequent unit maneuvers, tactical movements must be employed. Habitual use is made of the movement to contact and reconnaissance in force. To prevent ambush of counterguerrilla forces, to gain or reestablish contact, or to develop guerrilla force dispositions, strike operations are best accomplished by airdrop or airmobile assault. Movement by air may enhance surprise and avoids the inherent dangers in ground movement to contact.

Page 61. Paragraph 118 is superseded as follows:

118. Operations in Built-Up Areas

Built-up areas usually are unfavorable for guerrilla force operations. Guerrillas normally will not choose to fight in these areas; however, under-
ground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counter-guerrilla forces to enter the area. They may be reinforced by main force guerrilla units. Non-combatants in the area usually are held as hostages and used as shields by guerrilla forces to deter the application of maximum combat power by counter-guerrilla forces. When an urban area has been seized by insurgent or guerrilla forces, an evaluation has to be made as to whether it is more advantageous, from both a tactical and stability operations perspective, to recapture it with unrestricted force or to recapture it using other techniques. The decision as to the amount of force and the specific techniques to be used to recapture the area is based on analysis of the psychological impact on the enemy, noncombatant civilians, and friendly troops; the safety of civilians and friendly troops; the destruction of buildings; and the military requirements for other impending tactical operations. Riot control munitions can temporarily neutralize such targets so that counter-guerrilla forces can close with and capture the enemy with minimum injury to the noncombatants. Operations to counter these activities will be assisted by civilian police actions. For details of combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 31-50.

Page 63, paragraph 119. In line 7, “Reserves” is changed to read “Reserves (reaction forces).”

Page 63, paragraph 119a. In line 1, “Reserves” is changed to read “Reserves (reaction forces).”

Page 63. Paragraph 119b is superseded as follows:

b. Dispersal of reserves (reaction forces) provides flexibility, and locations that facilitate rapid movement to point of probable employment are occupied. In tactical operations, emphasis is placed on transporting those forces by air. Regardless of how they move, they must be positioned within supporting distances of committed forces.

Page 63. In paragraph 120, lines 5 and 6, the text in parentheses is deleted.

Page 67, paragraph 129h(2) (f). In line 1, “Mobile reserves” is changed to read “Mobile reserves (reaction forces).”

Page 68, paragraph 129i. To line 16 the following is added: “The reserves (reaction forces) must be available around the clock to relieve beleaguered posts. Herbicides may be used to defoliate and/or kill the vegetation along lines of communication for security purposes.”

Page 68, paragraph 130. In lines 4 and 7, “reserve” is changed to read “reserve (reaction force).”

Page 68, paragraph 130a. In line 4, “reserves” is changed to read “reserves (reaction forces).”

Page 68, paragraph 130b. In lines 2 and 7, “reserve” is changed to read “reserve (reaction force).”

Page 69, paragraph 130c. In lines 3, 7, 9, and 12, “reserve” is changed to read “reserve (reaction force).”

Page 69. Existing section IV is renumbered section V, and new section IV is added as follows:

Section IV. URBAN OPERATIONS

130.1. General

a. This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations in conducting counterguerrilla operations in urban areas.

b. Urban operations restore host country governmental control of the populace and resources of the urban area and return the area to the control of host country local police and paramilitary forces when internal security can be maintained and economic, political, social, and civil activities of the population can be pursued and improved. Units committed to urban operations will apply their resources using the following methods:

(1) In the offensive phase, tactical operations are conducted in a manner that minimizes loss of life and destruction of structures and facilities. Some of the methods used are: The rapid containment of the guerrilla; the conduct of psychological operations to separate the guerrilla from the friendly populace and destroy the insurgents' will to fight; show of force; use of chemicals; and the judicious use of fire to limit destruction and loss of life.

(2) In the defensive phase, tactical operations, to include extensive coordinated patrolling by military and police units outside the perimeter of the urban area, are necessary. During this phase,
U.S. units will perform advisory assistance in training host country forces for defensive missions, populace and resources control operations, and intelligence and psychological operations. When guerrilla activity within the area has been neutralized, and host country civilian and governmental agencies have resumed control of the urban area, U.S. units will be free to conduct counter-guerrilla operations in other areas.

130.2. Mission

a. The mission of U.S. infantry-type brigades in counterguerrilla operations in urban areas will include neutralization of the guerrilla threat, or his domination of the area, and return of populace and resources to host country government control. The specific mission will be dictated by the nature of the objective sought; ultimately, it will be based on instructions from higher echelons.

b. Once the counterguerrilla operation is initiated in an urban area, the accomplishment of the mission for that operation remains the U.S. commander’s primary consideration; therefore, any restrictions on the use of his full combat power must be defined clearly and understood by all concerned before the start of the operation.

c. Counterguerrilla operations in an urban area are followed by redeployment of the counterguerrilla force upon return of the area to host country civil control.

Page 69, paragraph 132. Line 9 is changed to read: “in counterguerrilla tactical operations. Field artillery must be capable at all times of extremely rapid and precise massing of all available fires onto a fleeting or well-fortified enemy at close ranges to friendly troops. The”

Page 70, paragraph 132d(1). In lines 16 and 17, “and biological” is deleted.

Page 71, paragraph 132d(5). In line 8, “105-mm howitzer” is changed to read “105-mm and 155-mm howitzer.”

Page 73, paragraph 134b (1). In line 1, “reserve” is changed to read “reserve (reaction force).”

Page 74, paragraph 137a. Subparagraphs (2) and (8) are superseded as follows:

(2) Armed/attack helicopter operations.

(8) Dissemination of chemical munitions.

Page 75, paragraph 137c(1). In lines 1 and 6, “airmobile company (light)” is changed to read “assault helicopter company”; and in line 3, “of combat” is changed to read “of troops, combat.”

Page 75, paragraph 137e (1). Subparagraphs (1.1) and (1.2) are added as follows:

(1.1) The medium helicopter company, when in support of counterguerrilla forces, provides tactical air movement of troops, combat supplies, and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the medium helicopter company include:

(a) Same as (1) (a) above.
(b) Augments other troop lift capability. (Normally not used for initial assault, but provides a capability for rapid troop buildup in an airhead.)

(c) Same as (1)(d) above.

(d) Provides airlift for light artillery units.

(e) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.

(f) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.

(1.2) The heavy helicopter company, when in support of counterguerrilla forces provides tactical air movement of combat supplies and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the heavy helicopter company include the following:

(a) Same as (1)(a) above.

(b) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.

(c) Provides airlift for mobile surgical unit.

(d) Provides airlift for light and medium artillery units.

(e) Provides airlift for heavy equipment to include engineer equipment.

(f) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.

Page 79, paragraph 147b(8). In line 22, the following is added as the next to last sentence: ".. guerrilla communication. Imitative deception against guerrilla communication systems should be considered where such a course of action could achieve decisive results. Well-planned and well-executed deception activities may cause a guerrilla force to divulge information of intelligence value."

Page 88. “Section V. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION” is rescinded.

Page 93. Paragraph 175e is superseded as follows:

e. Reaction forces are vital considerations in planning and coordinating movements. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushes will inevitably produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counterguerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground pursuit. The reaction force is designated to cover the possibility of ambush. Prior to a movement, reaction force commanders and aviators must be briefed on the general area of operations, with emphasis on landing areas and known and suspected guerrilla locations, and on communications, as well as usual preoperations information. Reaction forces are designated in successive areas if the route is of sufficient length to make reaction time of a single reaction force prohibitively long.

Page 100. In Section III title, “WATERBORNE” is changed to read “RIVERINE.”

Page 100, paragraph 186. In line 8 the following is added “See FM 31-75 for detailed discussion of riverine operations and see FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for discussion of amphibious operations.”

Page 100, paragraph 187. In line 11, “military civic action” is changed to read “civil affairs.”

Page 100. Paragraph 188 is superseded as follows:

188. Concept

The brigade may participate in riverine operations along with host country regular armed forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitary forces, and U.S. naval forces.
Page 101, paragraph 190a, lines 3 through 5, delete portion of first sentence beginning with “but should be ... war operations.”

Page 101. In paragraph 190b, line 2, “naval craft” is changed to read “watercraft.”

Page 101. Section IV title is changed to read “CHEMICAL OPERATIONS.”

Page 101. Paragraph 191 is superseded as follows:

191. General
This section provides general guidance on the purposes concepts, organizations, and operations of brigade units employing riot-control munitions in counterguerrilla operations. These munitions are particularly useful where there is difficulty in pinpointing actual guerrilla locations, and where the area coverage provided by riot-control munitions would be greater than that of other available weapon systems. Nonlethal chemical munitions can be effective in areas in which the guerrilla force is intermingled with the local population and the employment of firepower such as artillery and air-delivered ordnance must be avoided. For additional information on CBR munitions, see FM 3–10, 3–12, 3–50, 21–40, and 101–40.

Page 101, paragraph 192b. In line 1, “and biological” is deleted.

Page 101, paragraph 192b (1). In line 2, “deny” is changed to read “restrict use of.”

Page 102, paragraph 192b (5). In line 1, “biological or” is deleted.

Page 102, paragraph 193. In line 4, “The munition is” is changed to read “Some munitions are”

Page 102, paragraph 193a. The first sentence is changed to read:

a. Riot-control agents are used to support operations in which the counterguerrilla forces desire to restrict the use of an area for a short period of time using nonlethal means.

Page 102. Paragraph 193b is rescinded.

Page 102, paragraph 194. The introductory text in lines 1 through 8 is superseded as follows:

Since there may not be sufficient chemical personnel available to meet requirements in counterguerrilla situations, brigade personnel must be able to handle smoke, flame, and nonlethal agents such as riot-control munitions.

Page 102. Paragraph 194a is superseded as follows:

a. Ground Units. Any size ground tactical organization can employ riot-control agents. A platoon, for example, may designate one squad as the riot-control agent squad to provide target coverage. Larger units (company and battalion) may employ the munitions against more extensive targets, particularly in conjunction with air delivery of the agent. The agent may be employed in any desired quantities to gain the desired effects on target.

Page 108. Paragraph 201a is superseded as follows:

a. The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct search operations or to employ search procedures will be a continuous requirement in stability operations. Most search operations will support strike operations or consolidation operations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in populace and resources control operations. A search may be oriented to people, to material, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually will involve both civil police and military personnel.

Page 113, paragraph 204c (3) (c). In lines 1 and 3, “reserves” is changed to read “reserve (reaction force).”

Page 115, paragraph 209a. In lines 2 and 3, “in internal defense operations” is changed to read “during stability operations.”

Page 118, paragraph 212. In line 8, “infantry, airborne” is changed to read “infantry, airmobile infantry, airborne”

Page 120, paragraph 217. In line 9, “affairs” is changed to read “affairs.”

Page 123, paragraph 225k. In line 7 “intelligence channels. In” is changed to read “intelligence channels and the remainder through logistical channels. In”

Page 123. Paragraph 225l is superseded as follows:

1. Destruction of Supplies and Equipment. Destruction of supplies and equipment (less medical) may be accomplished to deny their use to the guerrilla. Under the provisions of Geneva Conventions, medical supplies will not be intentionally destroyed (FM 27–10). For information on which to base destruction plans, see FM 5–25.
Page 141. In numerical sequence, the following references are added:

FM 19-4, Military Police Support, Theater of Operations
FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations.
(Original entry for FM 30-17 is deleted.)
(C) FM 30-17A, Counterintelligence Special Operations (U)
FM 31-23, Stability Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine
(C) FM 32-5, Signal Security (U) (change in title)

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:
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