FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP

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DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY, AND THE AIR FORCE
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FOREWORD

This manual is issued as a general guide for field press censorship personnel to aid them in their training and, in the field, in meeting the censorship problems arising in day to day operations. Based as it is upon experience in World War II and the more recent Korean operations, field press censors will find that the manual provides excellent background material and historical examples for reference and guidance. The manual will likewise be of value to public information personnel with whom field press censorship works in close association in combat areas.

Generally speaking, the principles and examples set forth in this manual apply to field press censorship operations in any combat area. However, it must always be kept in mind that censorship is necessarily flexible in nature; there can be no hard and fast rules or regulations for all situations. Sound judgment must, therefore, always be the basic yardstick of the field press censor.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose
This manual is designed to set forth the general principles of military field press censorship in combat areas. It provides the broad framework within which the precise requirements of field press censorship in a given area should be defined and developed. It furnishes commanders, staff officers, and other personnel with instruction on field press censorship planning and operations.

2. Scope
This manual states the mission, major responsibilities, and functions of field press censorship in combat areas and its relationship to other staff agencies and operations. The procedures and mechanics of the operation are outlined in general terms. There is no attempt to lay down all of the detailed policies and procedures which the field press censor may find to be required in a given situation. Such detailed policies and procedures must vary with changing circumstances in the theater and can be developed realistically only as day to day experience suggests. Field press censors are cautioned, therefore, that in the field they must familiarize themselves with the continuing flow of current press censorship guidances.
3. Censorship and Freedom

a. The United States is served by a free press and its Constitution insures to the people that this freedom will be maintained. It is a fundamental right, as greatly cherished by the citizens of the nation as are freedom of speech and freedom of religion. In protecting these rights, the interests and obligations of members of the armed establishment are identical with those of all other citizens.

b. Censorship of information, whereby the press or radio is denied the right to publish or broadcast news matter which has come into its possession, is an impingement upon freedom of the press or freedom of speech. Within our system, it is strictly an emergency measure, accepted temporarily and reluctantly by the people so that a war effort may be made more effective. The test of whether any information should be published or suppressed by the censor lies in the question: “Will this news aid the enemy in his war against us?” So long as censorship hews to that line, its benefits are obvious, the people will accept it and the press will cooperate with it. But the American press is ever zealous to protect its fundamental freedom and when an excessive or unjustifiable restraint is imposed upon it, the press is quick to carry its case to the people and will get their sympathetic support. The people are naturally mistrustful of censorship in any form as they are of other encroachments upon their basic freedoms. Particularly when censorship is applied by the military, they are suspicious that its authority may be misdirected toward the covering up of blunders, waste, and general incompetence. This has occasionally happened and in every instance it has been an abuse of power.

c. Censorship is therefore always a strain on mutual confidence and good will between the armed establishment and the people. Yet, in combat areas, censorship is essential to the maintenance of security and, reasonably and judiciously applied, does not damage the felicitous nature of this relationship from which so much of our national power derives, but rather serves to strengthen it. This can be easily illustrated. Among troops in an active theater of war there is acute resentment against press freedom itself when they witness the publishing of any information which reason tells them adds to the danger of their situation. Their people at home share this reaction. Censorship serves to remove any basis for criticism or distrust of the press on this score.

d. The American public has a fundamental right to complete information regarding the sufficiency and efficiency of its military forces. Moreover, the military services depend upon and exist only by virtue of the confidence and support of the American public. This confidence and support can be maintained only if the public is informed of military requirements, problems, and progress. The public receives its information concerning the armed forces principally through press, radio, television, and photographic media. The Department of Defense recognizes the right of the public to complete information and the important function of the media in presenting the facts to the public. Its policy is to keep our people fully informed within the limits permitted by security. That policy remains unaltered with the coming of war, though it becomes far more difficult to administer because of the vast increase in the area of acute sensitivity. Much of the burden falls on the field press censor. When in the discharge of his duties he is as helpful as possible in expediting the flow of nonsecurity information to the public through the media which serve it, he is giving maximum service in a position of absolute trust.

e. The situation is, of course, sometimes more complicated than this. Information that may have value to the enemy may be so important to the American people that, on balance, it should be released. Questions of degree arise—if the direct aid to the enemy is slight, but the value of the information to the American public is great, it will
be better that the information be released. For example our Government continued to disseminate crop information during World War II despite the fact that it aided the enemy to know such an essential thing as our food stocks. The information was released because agricultural production would have been handicapped if farmers had to operate in the dark. However, these are considerations of concern to the Government and the high command in the direction of censorship; they do not concern the day to day operations of the field press censor.

4. The Field Press Censor

The field press censor reviews, prior to their dispatch from a zone of active operations, all materials which are to be released to the public. In this labor, his abiding duty is the withholding of all such information as would be of benefit to the enemy cause; his secondary obligation is to do his work promptly, as well as carefully, so that news of operations and of the situation of its armed forces will be speeded to the nation. The responsibility for determining what news is releasable and what other items of information would do violence to security is reposed in the field press censor, as the representative of the commander in this regard. In his review of material, whether passing it or withholding it, he must bring to his work calm and considered reason rather than an overstrained imagination. This calls for balanced judgment in the individual. The more thoroughly the field press censor knows his work and the more surely he conforms to the letter and spirit of the principles and policies published for his guidance, the more certainly will he command the respect and trust of the command and of those whose handiwork he reviews and censors. By that same thoroughness in personal application to the job is won in time the willing cooperation of all concerned, at which stage the task becomes much easier and far more rewarding.

5. Perspective

The field press censor does not gather news. Nor does he serve as a channel for its dissemination. His office is a clearing point, nothing more. His work, by its very nature, interrupts the flow of usable public information to the ultimate consumer while he performs his essential labor of reading it and eliminating any matter which for the time being must not be released. Any process which slows news and tends to give it an appearance of staleness upon publication is an aggravation to professional newsgatherers and an irritation to the public. The average worker in this field is perhaps more sensitive to delays than use of the blue pencil against some part of his material, since, though he lives and works by the clock, he is accustomed to having his copy edited and cut. Therefore, in the field press censor's office, dispatch and accuracy in the doing of work and prompt decisions on the clearing of material will make for good relations and will help to compensate for deletions when they are necessary. Speed of work is but a lubricant serving to minimize the giving of offense to individuals and to ease the frictions which attend any censorship. It is not the field press censor's reason for being. The position exists to prevent any breaching of security and there can be no compromising of the governing requirement. The field press censor does not have a choice between passing doubtful matter to please the press, and killing or retarding it to protect the national safety. When reasonable doubt exists, his decision must be on the side of security. He is a final guardian of official secrets and nothing else in his work lessens this fundamental responsibility.

6. Nature of Censorship

a. In actual practice our free press exercises restraint in the employment of its own freedom, where so doing serves the good of society. For example, many newspapers refrain from publishing the name of any minor who is the innocent victim of a sordid crime. This is a form of self-imposed censorship, done for the public good. However, it is always in the interests of a free society to make information public just as fully as is consonant with public safety and welfare. Censorship in any of its forms has value only when the withholding of particular information is of greater benefit to the common cause than the supplying of it.

b. The field press censor, too, operates within this frame of reference, with the great difference that his sole concern is whether the release of information will be of value to the enemy. Considerations of editorial balance and self-restraint are for the press—not for the field press censor. It is the natural and almost instinctive drive of individuals serving newsgathering agencies to put all emphasis on “getting the story,” often without
proportionate reflection on its possible harmful consequence. Only correspondents who have long served with the armed forces have the background necessary to recognize the security considerations involved in their material. However, the most experienced men—and particularly the ones who are veterans of the armed forces—are often as zealous about keeping their copy free of anything which might endanger the armed establishment as is the censor.

c. The field press censor is a sure safeguard against the exercise of undue license by the correspondent only when, in addition to mastery of the manual techniques of his position, he possesses broad knowledge of the nature of an armed force, its military objectives and its operational problems, particularly in the area of intelligence. Often times the argument for the suppression of information is of such a subtle character that only the individual who is steeped in the fighting problem can appreciate the dangers of the opposite course. On such a decisive enterprise as the Normandy invasion, for example, average common sense would have cautioned against any leak concerning the size and disposition of the buildup, the area to be attacked, the date of the assault, etc. But one World War II problem which was far simpler than that at the same time involved considerations more complex. Throughout operations against the Japanese, correspondents were not permitted to transmit any interviews with enemy personnel, no matter how seemingly innocuous their contents. Reason: the Japanese did not indoctrinate their sailors and soldiers against giving information upon capture. They were expected to fight to the death. Hence the release of any information indicating that the prisoners were talking freely would undoubtedly have persuaded the Japanese authorities to school their troops to give only minimal information if captured and interrogated. Clearance was also refused on captured Japanese diaries. The Japanese were voluminous diary keepers and from the diaries came invaluable intelligence. To have released the story would have prompted an enemy reaction, plugging the source.

d. Conservation of our national strength is the first principle of all when the Nation goes to war. Waste of men, material, and opportunity because of a careless handling of information is therefore an offense against the position and welfare of the nation. But unless censorship is done with a reasoned understanding of the limits within which restraint is exercised, the results are a slowdown of information to the public at a time when a full flow of news is indispensable to public morale. Finally, such a slowdown can promote an impairment of national confidence in the armed establishment or cause a protest which, carried to its extreme, may even sweep away censorship in an hour of crisis. Therefore, the field press censor must be ever the servant of his job. He holds a key position, and the public, not less than the armed forces, is acutely sensitive to what he does. When he is slack about his work, he cannot fail to offend the public and embarrass military high authority, at the very least. When he applies himself to it with diligence, firmness, and steadfast attention to detail, he strengthens the bond between the people and their fighting forces and thereby makes a main contribution to the national effort.

7. Main Principles

Reviewing this discussion of the what and why of field press censorship, it will be seen that there are but two controlling principles:

a. The sole criterion for the killing or temporary withholding of any information in material submitted for review is that it would be of value to the enemy in his prosecution of the war effort.

b. All information which does not come under this specific heading is releasable and the field press censor is enjoined to conduct his work in such manner that publication will be expedited. It is beyond his authority to suppress matter simply because it comes under the heading of “unfavorable publicity.” The press will always find a way to disclose to the public information of a nonsecurity nature which the military tries to suppress. And, when the information is published, the fact that suppression was attempted magnifies the original error out of all proportion.
SECTION III
ORGANIZATION

8. Authority and Control

a. Responsibility for the establishment and operation of field press censorship is that of the theater, force, or area commander. The chief field press censor appointed by the theater commander (AR 360–65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190–11) is responsible to the theater commander for the accomplishment of the field press censorship function.

b. While, at the theater level, the commander may wish the chief field press censor to report to him through his chief of information (or public information officer, if there is no chief of information) and may, therefore, place the chief field press censor under the staff supervision, or under the operational control of the chief of information (or the public information officer, if there is no chief of information), the chief field press censor is appointed by and is responsible to the theater commander and is not simply a member of the theater public information staff. Public information personnel are not responsible for field press censorship. This function is accomplished by personnel of the theater field press censorship organization under the direction of the chief field press censor appointed by the theater commander. While the two functions of public information and field press censorship are accomplished in the same general area and close liaison between the two functions is required, the two functions must not be confused. As a matter of principle, field press censorship is kept entirely separate from other public information functions.

c. Normally field press censorship will be administered and directed by the chief field press censor appointed by the commander through a central organization functioning as a part of the theater commander's headquarters, and each of the services operating in the theater is called upon to provide personnel for field press censorship duty. The field press censors of each service in the theater are under the operational control of the chief field press censor of that service. The latter establishes the censorship policies and guidances with respect to his service which prevail throughout the theater. He also provides for the training of competent personnel in the numbers required by the theater, and he supervises the field press censorship operation throughout the theater as it pertains to his service. Centralized control of field press censorship activities assures that trained personnel can be moved quickly in the numbers required to meet any “news front” encountered. Realistic rotation policies between central and subordinate detachments can be effected with ease and speed. A direct line of authority and responsibility between the central unit and its detachments is necessary for the best results.

d. To provide for the operation of field press censorship at lower echelons, censorship detachments are organized within the parent central field press censorship organization. These detachments are responsible only to the parent press censorship unit for their censorship activities, principles, and practices subject to the determination of the appropriate area commander with respect to the release of information affecting the security of his command. They will normally be attached for administrative requirements, quarters, rations, etc., to the lower command in which physically located. At such lower echelons, field press censorship detachments function under the direction of the chief field press censor and have no connection with the public information officer. They will not perform tasks other than their primary duty except in acute emergency.

e. Field press censorship detachments should, whenever possible, be housed with the public information officers (PIO’s) and correspondents. For the convenience of the correspondents the field press censor should be physically located with the correspondents if the latter are separated from the PIO. The PIO will provide adequate physical facilities for the accomplishment of the censorship mission.
f. Occasionally field press censorship detachments from lower echelons will be confronted with situations which are not covered by field press censorship guidances. If at all possible, they should make the decision required on the new matter, notifying the parent field press censorship unit by the fastest possible means. In turn, the headquarters unit will then notify all other censorship detachments and interested agencies. Normally this will be accompanied by the immediate issuance of a field press censorship guidance.

g. From time to time occasions will arise when copy submitted for censorship to a subordinate field press censorship unit should be referred to the headquarters unit. Such referrals will fall into two categories: (1) copy on a subject which requires referral pursuant to a specific Field Press Censorship Guidance (FPCG); and (2) copy submitted on a subject on which sufficient guidance is not available to the advanced press censor (such as a detailed analysis of a particular item of material). In either case, the censor should advise the correspondent that his copy will have to be referred to the headquarters censorship unit, and will discuss with him the means of transmitting the copy. (Par. 32a, AR 360–65/OPNAV Inst 5530.3/AFR 190–11.)

h. It will be found desirable for the headquarters field press censorship unit to conduct from time to time spot checks on the functioning of censorship in censorship detachments in lower echelons. The purpose is to insure uniform application of censorship practices. Such spot checks are never conducted on “live” copy but involve the periodic review of copies of all material censored by the subordinate detachment during a given period. The headquarters unit will then review and comment upon the deletions, stops, and passes wherever appropriate and necessary.

i. Where telephone or teletype facilities are made available, at the discretion of local commanders, for the transmission of news material from forward units to news representatives at a higher echelon for submission to censorship or for transmission direct to field press censorship, responsibility for maintenance of communications security remains that of the officer responsible for such communications. Usually, the communications facility used will be that located in the office of the forward PIO. While the PIO has no concern with field press censorship, in such case he is responsible for the maintenance of signal security and must exercise caution to see that information of value to the enemy is not transmitted over insecure lines. As the representative of the commander in this regard, the PIO may prescribe whether an item of news material may be transmitted by an insecure line or whether, for security reasons, it must go forward by courier or other secure means. He does not act as a censor. Responsibility for security review of news material where field press censorship is in effect is that of field press censorship—not that of the PIO.

9. Size and Requirements

a. It is impossible to prescribe in advance the precise size and type of organization required to accomplish the field press censorship mission in a particular area, since the size and deployment of the organization depends upon the geographic size of the area, units involved, the amount of news material submitted, and the location of news communication centers. The theater field press censorship organization as a whole must provide personnel to accomplish the following:

(1) The censorship of copy on a 24-hour a day, 7-day a week basis at all press censorship points.

(2) Attendance at press briefings and press tours, and the handling of other special assignments, as required. It will be necessary on frequent occasions, and often on a regular basis, to dispatch censors to locations other than the regular censorship offices to censor movie and radio submissions.

(3) Personal liaison, not only with other military censors in the immediate area, but also with the service field press censorship detachments and the various bases of the command to insure that all field censorship installations are using active, current information for their censorship operations.

(4) Liaison on field press censorship matters with Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense.

b. Because of the pressure of the job and the requirement for mental alertness, the duty hours must not be excessive and adequate opportunity for rest and relaxation must be assured by periodic days off. Sickness and other emergencies
must be anticipated and adequate provision there- for made in advance.

c. A type theater field press censorship organi-
   zation is illustrated in figure 1, AR 360–65/ 
   OPNAV Instr 5330.3/AFR 190–11.

d. Within the theater, the service headquarters 
   field press censorship unit will be required to ac-
   complish the following:

   (1) Provide for the review of all news ma-
       terial of interest to that service submitted 
       for field press censorship at the theater 
       headquarters 7 days a week, 24 hours a 
       day.

   (2) Issue specific press censorship guidances 
       on all subjects of news interest pertaining 
       to that service for the use and control of 
       field press censors of that service at thea-
       ter headquarters, the guidance of censors 
       of that service in subordinate censorship 
       detachments, and the guidance of the Se-
       curity Review Branch, Office of Public 
       Information, Department of Defense.

(3) Maintain direct liaison with subordinate 
    censorship detachments of that service.

(4) Maintain liaison on service field press 
    censorship matters with the service In-
    formation chief and with Security Re-
    view Branch, Office of Public Informa-
    tion, Department of Defense.

(5) Perform special assignments as required, 
    such as regular consultations with intelli-
    gence, operations, and materiel officers to 
    assist in the preparation of guidances, the 
    assignment of field press censors for press 
    briefings, press tours, etc.

(6) Train personnel to establish and man 
    subordinate service field press censorship 
    detachments as required.

(7) Keep records of submissions, censorship 
    action taken, the reproduction and dis-
    tribution of press censorship guidances, 
    and the maintenance of official files and 
    records with respect to field press censor-
    ship action of interest to the particular 
    service.
SECTION IV
ROLE AND FUNCTION

10. General

a. By on-the-job experience, the field press censor comes to realize that he is a referee, required to arbitrate judiciously between two opposing points of view, where there is not infrequently cogent argument and deep conviction on both sides. As the representative of the theater commander he is charged to assist the press by keeping the flow of information from the forces to the home population as complete as possible. But in that same capacity he has the overriding responsibility of protecting the forces against all disclosures which would help the enemy. Though these two objectives are not in fact mutually exclusive but concentric, in the doing of his work it often seems to the field press censor that he is midway between two opposing camps. The natural bent of the press is to make public everything which is “fit to print”. The normal attitude of the military profession is to be excessively cautious about information and to overclassify when in doubt. The field press censor, as the representative of the commander in this regard, is the moderator between these two extremes, protecting the press against undue restraint and guarding the armed establishment against unwise and dangerous disclosures. He could not fill this role unless, in addition to dispassionate judgment, he possesses unique discretionary power, since in the last analysis it is his job to bring reason to bear when others would act unreasonably.

b. The field press censor is the officer who has the responsibility, as the representative of the commander in this regard, for the security review of the news material submitted. He does not impose “stops” on the press simply because some staff section or other element in the command wishes such action taken on a certain piece of information. It must be demonstrated to the field press censor’s satisfaction that the release of the information would promote a tangible danger. If the facts convince him that, notwithstanding the objections raised, military security will not be violated, he clears the information as the representative of the commander in this regard. Further, this relative independence of action cuts both ways. The field press censor does not take someone else’s word for it—for example, the assurances of a staff officer—that a subject should be cleared, if his own reasoning, in the light of all the circumstances, is to the contrary. Nor does he give copy his stamp of approval simply because a correspondent tells him that some high commander has said it should be cleared, even though he has complete confidence in the correspondent and knows he is telling the truth. Many times high authority does not know the reasoning behind a prohibition and may be totally unaware that it exists. Occasionally, a high commander will make a remark in the course of an interview with the press that is definitely against security, not realizing that he has touched a sensitive area. That does not give it a special blessing. The censor still must stop it.

11. Personal Qualities

a. As the arbiter between the positive requirements of the public on the one hand and the negative requirements of military security, the field press censor must deal with forces which on the military side have superior rank and on the press side have tremendous influence. Therefore, extraordinary balance is required of him not only that his judgments be clear but that in the exercise thereof he will display goodwill and will match his own firmness with an equal courtesy and tact. These are among the other qualities which must be brought to his work:

(1) Comprehensive knowledge of the workings of his service, its arms, equipments and customs, its internal policies, and command problems.

(2) That personal confidence which will enable him to make decisions quickly and accurately, accept responsibility for so doing, and then hold the line until reason convinces him that a change is in order.
(3) The ability to read rapidly and to concentrate fully on the meaning of all that he reads.

(4) Absolute loyalty and a careful tongue.

(5) Reflectiveness, so that in the doing of his work, while keeping security uppermost in mind, he will not make senseless decisions out of groundless fears that some security issue is at stake.

b. The field press censor should be a mature officer with broad knowledge of, and interest in, the main problems which attend military operations in war. He should be a student of the military art, for it is only as he combines this type of professional wisdom with an understanding of human nature, that he does his work most efficiently. Good censors are drawn from varying walks of life but the skill is most likely to be found in individuals with experience in fields requiring the critical analysis of information.

12. Relations with the Press

a. In the basic regulations governing field press censorship (AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5350.3/AFR 190-11), there is stressed the “utmost importance” of selecting field press censorship officers “not only on the basis of their experience and background in military security and military affairs, but also upon the basis of an established background of knowledge and understanding of the vital need for getting news to the public and an understanding and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the correspondents.” In other words, unless there is consistent consideration for the dignity of another man’s work, it is impossible to win and hold his respect.

b. Correspondents in the main are reasonable individuals, with more than average intelligence and public spirit. They are impressed by sound reasoning but are impatient with faulty logic. The work normally lends itself to a high degree of personal independence of action, a zealous concern for one’s own right-of-way and belief in a set of disciplines quite opposite from those of the armed establishment. It is a field of intense personal competition which tends to make its members outwardly somewhat more aggressive than members of the other professions. Even so, long experience has proved that field press censorship has no great difficulty if it deals with the press on the basis of mutual respect, establishes sound rules based on true security principles, adheres to these rules firmly and uniformly, and follows operating procedures which provide for rapid, accurate processing of news material.

c. These are among the rules-of-thumb regulating the work of the field press censor:

(1) Every deletion must be supported by a cogent reason formed in the censor’s mind as he makes the cut. An abstruse or half-thought-through objection is not sufficient. The point of objection must be so clear to the censor that he would be prepared to make a rounded defense of his position if called on so to do.

(2) The censor must keep abreast of current guidance and what has been passed for publication by other censors, particularly in his own office. Nothing makes censorship appear more arbitrary and unnecessarily cramping of press freedom than the cutting by one censor of what has been passed by another unless there is a sound basis for the second ruling (see par. 18).

(3) The censor should be informed of major projects and operations within the theater. He will lose the confidence of correspondents if his handling of news material reveals that he is ignorant of what goes on.

(4) The censor should familiarize himself with normal journalistic procedures, transmission channels, and the work routine of the press corps.

(5) When it becomes necessary to make a deletion which seriously changes the sense of the copy or affects its news value, the censor must make sure that the correspondent is advised so that he may rewrite or scrap the story. Otherwise the correspondent has nothing to show for his day’s work and his position is likely to be weakened with the home office.

(6) The censor should never leave a submission on another censor’s desk without making sure he knows about it. News kept in a basket quickly loses its value. The correspondent has a right to rage when delay is due to slipshod handling.
SECTION V
CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES

13. Technical Censorship

a. In addition to safeguarding news of movements, orders, troop locations, etc., within a theater, which could be of advantage to the enemy, the field press censor must prevent any premature disclosure about new weapons and other materiel. In war, new weapons as well as new means of protection are constantly being brought forward, enabling new forms of operation; it is the fact of the enemy's unfamiliarity with them which gives them a special surprise value. The new and novel thing, and the results which come of it, always have prime news value; troops discuss them and correspondents are eager to write about them; but likewise they have extraordinary intelligence value to the enemy. The field press censor, though he is not ordinarily an expert on materiel, must be prepared to rule firmly in this field, withholding the information so long as all of the circumstances indicate the enemy is still off balance because of the innovation, pressing for authority to release it as quickly as the facts show that the enemy has adjusted to its introduction. He must not only pass on technical copy written about the new equipment and its effects, but must also handle photographs of it.

b. Very rarely does he have to pass on blueprints and technical drawings. Most correspondents in an active theater write for a mass audience. They are interested mainly in reporting in simple terms the principle of the innovation, the fact of its arrival in the theater, its employment in combat, and an estimate of its effectiveness. More times than not, the principle of the innovation will have been reported in the continental United States, either by the service concerned, or by the manufacturer, with official consent, prior to the time when it is put to actual use against the enemy. That of itself provides a rule of thumb to the censor. If any piece of materiel has received exhaustive publicity in the American press during its development stage, its surprise value, after it has been committed, is apt to be relatively limited. But if it has been given absolutely secret treatment all along the line, its shock and unbalancing effect will probably endure for a longer period. The greater the secrecy which has attended development of the weapon, the more conservatively should the censor incline in his rulings about the release of information as to its arrival and use.

c. Sometimes field press censors are handed news material so technical in nature that they cannot reasonably be expected to judge it. For example, a technical journal may send a special correspondent to the theater to do one roundup story about a new tank, landing craft, or airplane, building the story with the help of technicians who work with the materiel. When that kind of copy comes to his desk, the alternatives of the censor are: (1) send a field press censor to the sources of the information to learn all that is necessary to review it intelligently; or (2) forward it to the appropriate military department in Washington for review, if it is believed that some of the security and technical aspects of the story are clearly out of the field press censor's range. This last course should not be taken until the submission has been reviewed for all theater security interest.

14. Operational Censorship

a. Operational censorship is the greater portion of the field press censor's work.

(1) Can it be revealed that an attack will be launched toward Objective X tomorrow?
(2) Can it be disclosed by a correspondent that the target for USAF bombing attacks "today" was a named enemy installation, before the fact is announced by the communiqué?
(3) Can it be said that enemy flak over City Z was intense, accurate, effective, doing unexpected damage to the friendly formation?
(4) Can it be cleared that the headquarters of General A, whose name has already been identified in the news with his com-
mand position, is in a white chateau on a wooded hill?
The above are questions of the kind that face the field press censor every day.

b. Here we look but briefly at some of the considerations which press upon the censor as he reasons with himself about the security aspects of copy. All must be answered by asking first—what does this statement tell the enemy?

(1) The answer to question No. 1 is obvious. To say that an attack is coming gives the attack away, enabling the enemy to better prepare himself by redressing toward the line of the threat.

(2) The answer to the second question is not so obvious. While generally, a correspondent’s copy is not limited to information officially issued, in the instance of intended USAF targets, the communiqué is controlling on the correspondent. The communiqué on any USAF raid, lists as specific targets only those that are determined to have actually been struck, as opposed to those that were scheduled to be attacked. This prevents the enemy from knowing precisely whether we have hit a target deliberately, or as a secondary choice. For the same basic security reason the censor should never pass a story which distinguishes a target as “primary” or “secondary”. We should not tell the enemy the specific priorities in our attack patterns, except so far as he may deduce this for himself.

(3) On the flak question, it is always of assistance to the enemy to know when he is getting effectiveness from his defenses, or conversely, to be told that his batteries in a particular place are inaccurate and not to be feared. However, there is no security objection to the word “intense” since the enemy knows better than the attacking force the volume of his own fire.

(4) The answer to the question about describing in general terms the location of a headquarters is conditioned by all of the surrounding circumstances. In Normandy, chateaux were as common as ranches in California. But a “white chateau” on a “wooded hill” could be as specific as a street address if there were only one such chateau along a front.

c. The best possible exercise for the censor, trying to read himself into his job, is to reflect upon as many hypothetical problems of this kind as may be within his imagination. So doing, he will soon find that the fundamental principles and their application take definite form in his mind. We do not tell the enemy anything which would be helpful to him, and which for lack of an assist from our side, he would have to work out for himself at some cost. But in holding to that principle, elementary logic—just plain common sense reasoning—is the ultimate solvent for the censor in his weighing of problems concerning which there are no rules spelled out in detail. He must be ever ready to pit his wits against the unfamiliar or unique situation. For example, on Okinawa an American correspondent talked to two Japanese newspapermen. They were frank and voluble. They told him that much of Japan knew the war was lost, adding that a number of national leaders clandestinely were seeking ways to a negotiated peace. The names of the conspirators were included in the story submitted to Pacific Fleet’s censors. They cleared the copy, minus the names, and the information was sent along top secret to Washington. Reason: If the facts were true (as they proved to be) publication of the names of the group working for peace would have meant their death, and possible prolongation of the war. This is an example of logic again—the process that guides a censor through the greater part of his work.
15. Censorship and Policy

a. The field press censor reviews news material for security only and does not stop or delete news on so-called “policy” grounds. His authority is not used to withhold information from the American public simply because of fears that there will be an adverse reaction to it. One example of “policy” censorship which in the light of reason now seems ill-advised was the deleting during the early days of the North African campaign of all material critical of American dealings with Admiral Darlan. This internal disagreement did not assist the enemy; information about it did not have an obvious vitiating effect on the morale of our forces. The press was certain to react strongly against the embargo; the news would get through finally; it would be made to appear that the services had blocked the information because they were ashamed of what they had done.

b. The word “security” covers a lot of ground. Is it a security matter, or is it policy simply, to look askance at material which says one’s own troops are weak, demoralized, or otherwise ill-suited to their tasks? The answer must depend on the time and situation wholly. When such words are published about troops within a battle zone, it cuts two ways against security; the enemy is given intelligence of great value; the words get back to troops, and if they are not already under par, they will get that way because they have been maligned.

c. News material which, if passed, would have unmistakably a devitalizing consequence to the morale or situation of United States or allied forces (for example, a story which is abusive or slighting of the character of allied troops) must be stopped. On the other hand, discussion of the morale of rear echelon troops, the gripes of mess hall employees, or the hardships of ground crews, etc., will not help the enemy win a battle and in nearly all circumstances should be passed. It is not the field press censor’s job to chop copy either to put a bright face on things or make command look good.

d. Even so, the field press censor must remain sensitive to the interests of troops, and to information which might have an adverse effect upon them, if common sense tells him that it may be magnified out of proportion. For example, it was common practice at United States air bases in Europe during World War II to give bomber crews a shot of whiskey on returning from a mission. There was no security point involved. Yet it was realized that publishing the fact might arouse strong minority objections at home killing the privilege. Field press censors asked correspondents to delete the item. In every instance the correspondents willingly cooperated.

e. As a service officer, the field press censor refers to the PIO any official service release which is questionable from a public relations standpoint. This is not a binding responsibility; it is simply an act of constructive goodwill toward the service, and entails no decision by the field press censor. He simply raises the question when to his eye the point appears important and dubious. For example, an incorrect identification of a VIP or an incorrect statement of his mission could be highly embarrassing to the establishment, and the censor’s eye would be the last to catch it.

16. Censoring for Accuracy

a. The basic rule is that the field press censor does not review copy for accuracy of statement. His “Passed for Publication” stamp is not a guarantee of truth or of fact. Should field press censorship undertake the normal responsibilities of editorship, it would be found very quickly that its principal duties could not be done in the time allowed.

b. On the other hand, being a field press censor does not mean that a man steps out of his character as a gentlemanly individual or his responsibilities as an officer. The average correspondent wants to be right in his facts, and is usually cor-
dially appreciative of the person who saves him from stubbing his toe. This does not refer to the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t," though mistakes in personal and place names are considered important within the profession. Even these things, however, are so much chaff to the censor, and if he becomes overly concerned with them, he cannot concentrate on his work.

c. At the very base of the morale among fighting organizations is the matter of the right unit getting due credit for its achievements in what is put before the country. Newspaper acclaim, radio mention, public acclaim by a VIP—these things count as heavily with troops as payday or the winning of victory itself. Proper acknowledgment and public appreciation are one of the main rewards of the fighting man and his unit, and if the reward is misplaced, they feel unrecognized and hurt. When Ste. Mere Eglise was captured during the Normandy invasion, the wrong division was announced as its captor and the slighted division smarted about it for months. What remained in the minds of the First Marine Division after the Chosin Reservoir operation in North Korea was that the press said the Third Infantry Division had "rescued" them at Chinhungni whereas they had held that base with their rearward battalion and had fought their way to it on the road out. Such mistakes are seriously damaging; they undercut a man's pride in what he is doing. The censor would be less than an officer, less than a responsible person, if he were callous to them.

d. When an inaccuracy is such that it would be of ultimate value to the enemy, the censor deletes it (AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11). Wrong information beamed to troops, saying for example that the United States Army was in possession of a certain town whereas it was still in enemy hands, would come under that heading. Experience has shown that the false statement that troops have taken a town, when in fact they have not, has an adverse effect upon the combat efficiency of the troops. Thus, such a statement is inaccurate in respects detrimental to our forces and of service to the enemy (par. 17c(3), AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11).

e. When a censor detects in a submission inaccuracies on a delicate subject, which neither touches security nor damages the welfare of troops, he takes the matter up direct with the correspondent, giving him the correct information and suggesting the desirability of a change. But he does not alter copy. If the correspondent is obdurate and insists that the copy be passed as written, the field press censor complies. The field press censor in no circumstances corrects (or edits) a correspondent's submission though he knows that the copy is factually wrong. When a security matter is involved, he deletes or withholds. When it is an inaccuracy not bearing on security or the conservation of our military force, he may suggest a change, but he does not insist, or apply his own pencil. These are simple rules, and thoughtfully carried out they will build better working relations with the press.

17. "What the Enemy Can See"

a. Everything that the enemy manifestly can observe and hear from within his own territory comes in time under the heading of releasable information. But in applying this working rule to copy, the field press censor takes due note that the words in time are italicized. He must be certain that the release is not premature; he must not overrate the enemy's capability; he must be guided always by what he knows of the existing situation and by what common sense tells him about the impact of time lag on military operations. He must also keep always in mind the fundamental basis of the rule, "What the enemy can see." The fact that the information is plainly visible to personnel on our side of the line has nothing to do with the case. Censorship is concerned with keeping information from the enemy, not with keeping it from our troops. Thus, in World War II, the fact that First Infantry Division men could be seen on the streets of London was no basis whatsoever for releasing the fact that the Division was in the European theater.

b. There is almost invariably a need for some delay before information which can be readily procured by forces along the enemy front (through the use of patrols, air observation, etc.) can be released for publication. It corresponds to the time lag between what relatively small forces of the enemy are able to see firsthand and the dissemination of the same information to all higher headquarters. That may consume hours, and in many cases, when the communications net of the opposing side has been rent, much of the most vital information never reaches the rear. For example, when the air drop was made against Normandy, many of the sticks of paratroopers were misdropped far outside the designated area. This
unintended wide scattering of the paratroopers led the enemy headquarters astray; they believed that the airborne force was trying to envelop a much wider territory. The misconception endured for approximately 8 hours. In consequence, enemy troops were withheld which might have crushed the airhead had they concentrated against it. Had we taken for granted, following the drop, that the enemy must have discovered the actual target area in which it was intended the drop be made, and so released this information, Normandy could have had a different outcome. The delay in the flow of information from front to rear as the enemy begins to react is frequently the critical period in which tactical surprise is obtained. Premature release, therefore, will compromise the battle at the decisive point.

c. Announcement of troop arrivals in a theater is generally barred for much the same reason. Troop identifications are passed only when proof is clear that the enemy already has the information and is using it. There are occasional exceptions in wartime, such as when the advantage which attends publication of the information, through the stiffening of the morale of an ally, outweighs the value of the intelligence to the enemy. But those are decisions for the high command, not for the field press censor.

d. But under this same heading, there are often more subtle reasons for restraint. Frequently, correspondents have to be deprived of a good story, the elements of which seem known to all forces—including the enemy. From Saipan onward, the Navy's underwater demolition crews routinely explored the waters surrounding the Japanese-held islands a day or two prior to the assault. The enemy saw them at work and sometimes brought them under fire. Why could not stories be passed telling of the heroic work of these men? The facts were that in most cases the enemy commanders were not reporting to their superiors the real nature of the work. Often the crews completed their mission and got back to their ships without interruption. They proceeded from island to island with an astonishingly low casualty rate, and so doing, saved landing crafts from coming to grief on underwater obstructions. We did not wish to give the Japanese higher authority the information which would have prompted the island commanders to take strong counteraction. They would have raised their guard against the men in swim suits and would have read from their arrival the warning that the big attack was coming.

e. There must be even greater restraint on information about installations and forces in the rear area. Here the enemy must rely on air reconnaissance, photo interpretation, and espionage. His information is always fragmentary, and its organization lags far after the march of events. Consequently, whatever pertains to the size of forces, their location and their movement, and the location of depots, marshaling points, air bases, and supply facilities must be considered not releasable for a considerable time, if at all.

18. Prior Publication

a. One rule which is quite generally followed by the field press censor is that once a piece of information has been released to the public, it may be republished no matter that in the first instance it was not properly released. The assumption here is that the enemy has acquired it and that any further attempt to keep it from him would be futile. The assumption is wholly reasonable; the enemy monitors news broadcasts from the United States and its cobelligerents; what they put out to their own people is known just as quickly to the enemy's news, propaganda, and operating agencies. Also, newspapers and other periodicals published in this country or by an ally move quickly into neutral territory from where they are available to the enemy at once. This is a not infertile source of intelligence material and the scanning of the enemy press is a routine part of intelligence procedure.

b. In fact, the whole structure of press censorship, and indeed the justification for it, is based on the proposition that to publish information is to hand it directly to enemy intelligence. Dogmatically to take the position that a published item did not come under the enemy's eye, and that therefore its repetition must be stopped, runs counter to this governing concept. The rule is violated and a stop put on republication only under the following circumstances: (1) The information must be of such an exceptionally serious character that it makes worth running the 1-in-100 chance that the enemy did not see it, or (2) the publication in which the item appeared is of such limited circulation as to make it likely that the item escaped enemy attention. Example: During World War II some of the United States carrier losses in the Pacific were not immediately known to the enemy.
Survivors got back to the United States and went on leave to their home towns; members of the country press sometimes carelessly reported that the home town boy was on such-and-such a ship when it was sunk. That still did not make the story releasable in the theater.

c. Again, in World War II the Japanese Navy's cipher code was broken shortly before the battle of the Coral Sea in the spring of 1942. Keeping this fact from the enemy was of the greatest importance since, so long as he did not learn this and change the code, we could continue to read his messages. A correspondent returned from the Pacific wrote, and his paper published, a story giving in detail the order of battle of the Japanese fleet. While the paper later argued that its correspondent had believed that our reconnaissance had furnished the precise information on the Japanese fleet contained in his story, it appeared likely to our naval authorities at the time that the enemy would realize that these detailed facts could only have been secured through our knowledge of the Japanese code and our consequent ability to read his messages. Still, there was the possibility that the enemy had not grasped the implications of the story; if he had missed the point we did not want to telegraph it to him. Thus, despite much urging upon the ground that the story in question constituted prior publication of which the Japanese must be aware, the fact that we had broken the Japanese naval code was quite rightly not released until after the end of the war. As students of the Pacific War know, the Japanese did not realize that the code had been broken and on other occasions the fact that this knowledge had been kept from them enabled our forces to pull off a coup. Thus, in April 1943, the deciphering of an enemy message made it possible to ambush Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Navy, on a flight over the Solomon Islands.

d. The examples given in b and c above underscore the teaching that the rule of prior publication is not an inflexible commandment, always to be applied without question. The second example, dealing with the breaking of the Japanese code, lays stress also upon the importance, when applying the rule, of considering its fundamental basis and foundation—prior publication of the same fact to which the field press censor is now urged to apply his “Passed for Publication” stamp. The questionable story giving the Japanese fleet’s order of battle did not state as a hard fact that we had cracked the Japanese naval code. In fact, the story said nothing at all about this. There was only the possibility that the enemy would wonder how we knew so much about his dispositions and deduce that we were reading his messages. Thus, in the Japanese code case, the basis for the application of the rule of prior publication simply did not exist. Similarly, prior publication of speculative material on a subject does not constitute prior publication within the meaning of the rule (par. 19e), nor do enemy propaganda assertions of a fact (f below). There must be prior publication of a hard fact before the rule can come into being.

e. Further, the character of the second item which the censor is urged to pass, by reason of prior publication, must be considered. Public information material and psychological warfare news material occupy a special position in this connection. While the fact may previously have appeared in a correspondent’s story, an official statement of the fact will add official corroboration to it and confirm its authenticity. Where the matter is significant, field press censorship may properly therefore hold that the rule of prior publication does not require the censor to pass material to the same effect prepared by members of the establishment.

f. The field press censor does not treat as prior publication of a fact enemy propaganda assertions of the fact. Statements published by the enemy or by neutral sources are never given that dignity. Such statements are a device frequently used by the enemy, occasionally with neutral assistance, in an attempt to pressure our side into releasing fuller information of the same subject.

g. Because publication, in most instances, will constitute release, the field press censor must be aware of all that has been published pertaining to his area of interest. This is a large order, but unless he is familiar with the grist, he is made to look foolish in the eyes of the correspondents when he tries to put a stop on news already in circulation. He keeps himself abreast of what has been published and what has been released for publication by his fellow censors through (1) reviewing the log sheets before beginning each tour of duty, (2) attentive listening to current newscasts and careful reading of all press material dealing with current operations, and (3) daily study of the latest published material in his field of censorship interest.
It is of utmost importance that the field press censorship detachment have the signal equipment enabling it to do this kind of monitoring, and that it be supplied promptly with representative daily newspapers, news weeklies, and technical journals. Without these facilities, the detachment cannot do balanced work.

19. Speculation

a. The main point is that a correspondent is free to reason logically to conclusions of his own from anything which has already appeared in print. The enemy gets all published news material of any consequence and can work through to the same conclusions.

b. Particularly among daily or weekly columnists, and those correspondents who have specialized in military writing, it is normal working procedure to read through the news of current operations, and by selecting events which seem to them to form a significant pattern, forecast plans and the likely course of military developments. It is not the field press censor's job to put a curb on these flights of imagination so long as it is obvious that they are not directly illuminating dangerous ground.

c. We can take this homely example of how the rule is applied in action. Suppose that an article written for a scientific magazine describes the experiments of an inventor who has devised a toy jet engine and aircraft assembly which permits the engine to control the direction of flight. The magazine may reasonably speculate from this that the principle has a military application and that it may be supposed that USAF is looking into it. But likewise, the enemy can speculate to the same end. Though the censor knows that the USAF is working on that very project, and that the project is TOP SECRET, he does not stop the article—unless he detects from the phraseology that the writer in fact knows what USAF is doing and has given his story a speculative slant simply to camouflage an unwarranted revelation. If that deception is obvious to the censor, the enemy also would read between the lines. It is grounds for a stop.

d. Consider another example. Prior to the invasion of Normandy, normal and legitimate speculation about whether there would be a D-day, and at what season, had to be passed. For if such speculation had suddenly been stopped by censorship, the omission from a free press of any subject so completely normal and certain to have a wide reader interest, would have provided an especial alarm to the enemy. On the other hand, if a correspondent had reasoned some days in advance that D-day would occur precisely at the time when it had been scheduled in the order, the submission would have been stopped on the ground that the speculation was “informed”.

e. In weighing material in the light of the rule about prior publication, censors do not recognize as prior publication of a particular fact a speculative story which hints at the existence of the fact. What was passed for one correspondent because he was guessing or advancing an hypothesis, in other words, does not clear the way so that a second correspondent can clear the same set of ideas as a directly-stated truth.

20. Recensorship

a. Once an item has passed through press censorship and is released by it for publication, it is not recensored. Double censorship delays news material, multiplies the opportunities for inconsistency in censorship, and is therefore scrupulously to be avoided.

b. In general, the field press censor relies on established procedures to tell him that an item has already been through censorship. He may also rely, as a general rule, on the word of a reliable, accredited correspondent or agency. For example, a British civilian cable censor in World War II received from the London desk of AP copy slugged “incoming”. The censor rightly assumed from the slug that AP was simply transmitting copy which had come into the United Kingdom from another country; either it had already passed through censorship in that country, or, if it had come from a neutral, then censorship was not required. So the item was passed without recensorship. The censor in this case took his cue from the “incoming” slug, but behind it he had the certification of a dependable agency that the material had not originated in the United Kingdom.

c. Let us suppose that a correspondent got a message in the same manner, coming to him from a colleague in some other country. Again, if that fact is patent in the transaction, the further movement of the same information is not of interest to the censor.
d. These illustrations serve but to emphasize the rule that the censor must be sure that the circumstances warranting the presumption of prior censorship are present. He must not take a correspondent’s word for it that his copy is based on previously censored material as license to pass the material without reading it. In this instance the censor does not have before him an item which has passed censorship but rather an item stated to be based on material which has passed censorship. There is a vast difference. Facts in the rewrite may have been added, or informed speculation may have crept in, to cite only two of many possibilities. Correspondents are just as likely to have faulty memories or be subject to mistaken impressions as any other group of individuals.

e. The censor must be sure that the circumstances and the physical evidence show that there has been compliance with the rules under which he operates. To his eye, the fact that copy bears a dateline does not mean necessarily that it has passed through censorship unless he knows that the channels by which the copy moved to him are controlled by censorship.

f. So in sum, the rule about respecting prior publication and the rule against recensorship are but different expressions of the same idea. The censor doesn’t lock the barn after the horse is gone. If the information has already been published it is out and generally no purpose is served in continuing to delete it from submissions. If the information is contained in a story dealt with by another censorship it is likewise already out, except in the extremely unlikely case where the story has been sent from the first censorship area only to the second point, where it is now under review, and then by a secure means. Transit material involves a third aspect of the same situation. Because of the routing of transmission facilities, news material from a country other than the United States or one of its allies may pass through an area where field press censorship or the press censorship authority of the United States or of an ally is in effect. Such transit material may have originated in a neutral country. If so, it must be assumed that information available to the correspondent and incorporated in the submission is equally available to enemy intelligence in such neutral country and so no purpose would be served by stopping it. Further, in most instances the means of transmission from the neutral country would not be secure and so, even if the information were not readily available to the enemy in the neutral country, its transmission would have made it available to him.

21. Explaining Deletions

a. There is this question: when the field press censor stops material or deletes some part of it, does he explain to the correspondent the reasons for his action? The answer is as follows: yes, normally he gives his reasons. That is only common courtesy. It cements good relations and furthers the education of the press corps. Generally speaking, if the censor cannot explain a cut it should not have been made in the first place. The reasoning here is that in most instances the correspondent already knows the background facts which constitute the basis for the deletion but has failed to reason the matter through. The cut not only is a personal aggravation, impairing his day’s work, but it also gives him the feeling that what was deleted has major importance. It is better to take the mystery out of it where that can be done with relative safety; usually the explanation will dissuade him from future attempts to fight through the same item, possibly at the expense of some other censor.

b. But the censor does not go into explanations when by so doing he would himself commit a greater breach of security. It may happen that a correspondent chances across an informational item, highly classified, which is only a fragment of a larger and much more vital secret. A case in point was the finding of the buzz bomb launching sites along the Channel Coast by the Royal Air Force many months before the first V-1s came in on London, and before Allied air was ready to take effective action against the sites. Had a correspondent obtained a small piece of this story early in the game, it would have been unthinkable that the censor or anyone else would have taken him into his confidence.

c. When the contingencies of an item of information have any such gravity, as in the example cited, field press censorship must roll with the punch, make its ruling without defending or explaining it, and hope for kind thoughts. In such exceptional cases, the senior field press censor should be informed and he should advise the cor-
respondent that the cut is required for security reasons and that security also forbids an explanation of the reasons for the cut.

22. Blanket Stop

There are certain categories of military information which cannot be passed under any circumstances. The correspondent may not discuss them in copy, or even hint at them. One of them is cover planning, which is still TOP SECRET at war's end, the theory being that we may have use for the same ideas again and it is best not to display our bag of tricks to the world. Also, success of antisubmarine warfare depends in great measure on keeping the enemy ignorant of special equipment and methods of operation. During World War II the Secretary of the Navy alone was the releasing or clearing authority on antisubmarine operations. It can be expected that directions to censors in this field will be specific in the event of hostilities, and that little information will be cleared.

23. Right of Clarification

The field press censor is not an editor. He does not correct for beauty of expression or to put a badly-expressed idea in more readable form. But he has a right and duty to insist that any copy crossing his desk be sufficiently clear that he can understand it and relate all parts of it to context. Correspondents sometimes attempt to put double talk in a transcript, having arranged a code at the home office which will enable them to signal a message which would be cut if put in the clear. This conventional trick to beat censorship is nearly always detectable and beatable if the field press censor is awake to any conspicuous ambiguity or outright break in continuity of copy.
SECTION VII
MECHANICS

24. Security Embargoes

a. Frequently news material is submitted which contains information not releasable at the moment for the highest security reasons, but which will be releasable at some specified time or determinable date in the future. In such case the submission is "precensored" as of the future release date and the "Passed for Publication" or "Passed for Publication as Censored" stamp placed on it pending the release date.

b. To exclude the possibility of the release of embargoed copy in advance of the security release time the field press censor simultaneously places across the face of the copy the security embargo stamp—"Not to be Released Before——"—and fills in the release date or prescheduled release time, for example, H-hour plus 4 hours. Whenever the security embargo stamp is used, field press censorship retains the copy until the release time. There are two reasons for this: One, the copy contains classified information in written form which the correspondent should not have in his possession. Two, the correspondent wants his copy to be kept available for immediate transmission upon release. If the correspondent were to hold the copy himself he might be somewhere else at the time the embargo is lifted.

c. The security embargo stamp (as well as the time embargo stamp discussed below) is never used without the correspondent’s knowledge. The correspondent has the right to assume that the censorship of his copy is proceeding without delay and that unless the copy is returned to him it has been transmitted to its destination in a reasonable time. Therefore, whenever field press censorship deliberately delays copy—even in the correspondent’s own interests—the correspondent is immediately advised.

d. In practice, the use of the security embargo enables field press censorship to deal with news material in advance of the release time so that the material may be released immediately upon the lifting of the security ban. It therefore expedites processing. Several examples of its use will demonstrate this point:

1. Several days before D-day in the ETO during World War II, the correspondents who were scheduled to accompany troops in the invasion of Normandy boarded the landing craft with the troops. The stories they wrote while waiting for the invasion were TOP SECRET at the moment they were written, but the correspondents realized—as did the field press censors—that in a matter of several days the bulk of this copy would be releasable. Accordingly, the copy was moved under guard from the landing craft back to censorship headquarters in London where it was precensored (i.e., censored as though the invasion had been announced). Security embargo stamps, and "approved" stamps were placed on the copy, and the copy itself was locked in censorship safes pending D-day announcement. Promptly after the invasion began, all of this copy was released.

2. A hypothetical example concerning several correspondents may be helpful. Suppose a new type combat aircraft has arrived in the theater and suppose that air censorship has decided that when three aircraft have been lost behind enemy lines, the presence of the aircraft in the theater and selected details regarding its armament and performance will be passed for publication. Correspondents writing about the aircraft prior to this date should be told that, while the story cannot be passed at the moment, at some date in the future still undeterminable it will be releasable. They should be given the option of having their copy precensored and held by censorship under security embargo to be released immediately when censorship removes
the stop, or of having the story killed in entirety.

e. When copy is received under such an arrangement it should be kept in chronological order of receipt so that, unless other arrangements are made by the PIO and the correspondents with respect to the release of "flashes" and the like, the first submission filed will be the first to be released.

25. Time Embargoes

a. The time embargo is a different matter. Field press censorship employs time embargoes only in situations where security does not forbid transmission but the material in question may not be published before a specified time. Illustrations of the employment of a time embargo are—

(1) The lifting of the security classification on an item of equipment, coordinated by the appropriate Department, so that correspondents in various locations are treated uniformly.

(2) The clearing of the advance text of a speech or an announcement, where there is no objection to transmission before the speech is delivered or the announcement made, so long as the text is not published prematurely.

b. Whenever a time embargo is in effect, submissions are reviewed, stamped with both the censorship stamp and the time embargo stamp, "Not to be Published Until ______", and returned for transmittal in advance of the time indicated so long as the publication time is transmitted as an integral part of the text of the news material.

26. Press Briefings

a. A representative of field press censorship should attend every formal briefing for correspondents and should be prepared to address the correspondents, following the conclusion of the speaker's remarks, to indicate which of the speaker's comments, if any, are off the record and not to be released. The censor's guidance will be established rules and security stops and basic security principles.

b. Normally, briefing officers, especially combat leaders, will not be familiar with the current press censorship guidances, and the censor will be the only person present adequately informed on such matters. The censor's oral guidance at the briefing is of significant value to the correspondents since it will enable them to confine their stories to releasable information and will eliminate their irritation in having to rewrite them in order to clear censorship.

c. After performing this mission at the briefing, the censor should return immediately to his censorship office to record all nonreleasable items and the gist of the significant releasable statements to serve as guidance for other censors who may be reviewing copy based on the briefing. This guidance should be reproduced as rapidly as possible so as to be available to all censors when the copy begins to flow through censorship channels.

27. Live Broadcasts

a. In general, the best practice for this type of censorship assignment requires that all participants be briefed in advance on the security problems which may be encountered and that the censor assist in working out ways to avoid sensitive subjects. The responsibility for protecting security then is assumed by the participants in the broadcast.

b. Another device is to require the correspondent to interrogate from a prepared script and to rely on the other participants to remain within security limits in composing their answers.

c. At other times circumstances may suggest that the censor should stand by to indicate with prepared signals whether a particular query may or may not be answered. For example, the question might be, "How effective do you find the new enemy ack-ack shells we have heard were used for the first time last week?" The censor would indicate that this question could not be answered and the interviewee could say, "I'm sorry but I cannot reveal that information." In using this form of censorship in connection with live broadcasts, extreme care must be taken by both the censor and the interviewer to prevent asking questions to which a response of "Yes" or "No" would be revealing. For instance, assuming it has been previously announced that the location of the "XXth" group was at "Y-24 base," but later the unit has not been located, the interviewer might say, "Is your group, the XXth group, still based at Y-24?" Either an affirmative or a negative answer would breach security.

28. Press Tours or Facility Visits

a. A field press censor should accompany all organized press tours or facility visits to military installations to advise the correspondents on the
spot with respect to what may be released. This is of the greatest assistance to the correspondents since it gives them guidance with respect to the particular installation and enables them to write their stories within the proper frame. When this is not done their copy is apt to contain matter which must be deleted by field press censorship with consequent delay in the release of the submissions and irritation to correspondents.

b. The practice of sending a field press censor along is also of value to field press censorship in dealing with submissions resulting from the tour. Since the accompanying field press censor then knows exactly what has been shown to the correspondents he is able to formulate adequate censorship guidances for the use of all censors in reviewing the copy flowing from the tour. As in the case of press briefings, the field press censor assigned to such a tour should return to his office immediately following the tour to prepare guidance for the other censors as to what is releasable on the subject matter of the tour.

29. Photographic Censorship

a. The same basic concepts and rules of censorship apply to censoring both still and motion pictures as apply to all other types of submissions. However, there are additional problems. The photo and caption should be reviewed and evaluated together. Material in the photo or caption, though releasable separately, may not be releasable when combined. For example: it might be that unit insignia on a photograph of a plane has been released, and the number of the unit has been released, but the unit insignia and the number of the unit have never been associated. If the caption accompanying a photo of the plane gave the unit designation, a deletion would be required. Generally, under these circumstances, the unreleasable information can be more easily deleted from the caption than from the photograph. Every effort should be made to handle deletions in such a manner as to cause the least inconvenience and loss of news value. On official photography, deletions on captions on record photographs should be made in such a manner that the classified information is retained for record purposes. Complete deletions will be made on copies for release.

b. In reviewing still pictures, it is essential to employ a magnifying glass. Photographs must be carefully scrutinized to insure that unidentified units are not revealed, especially unit insignia or markings on vehicles, shoulder patches, airplanes, buildings, etc. Background may reveal location of bases particularly if the enemy has previously occupied the same base. In that event, almost any background will disclose to him the location of the base.

c. Special attention must be given to any new appurtenance, equipment, or changed configuration in aircraft or weapons. (For example, if an aircraft photo discloses a new gasoline inlet, the photo could easily compromise a planned mission where distances previously were unattainable.) It is essential that field press censors familiarize themselves with photos of all materiel in the theater in their standard form and that deviations from these standards not be released until specifically authorized.

d. The censorship of motion pictures becomes increasingly specialized as facilities for processing are enlarged. In the early stages regular field press censors can handle the material. However, provision should be made for delegating censors to this task on a full-time basis as rapidly as they can be made available and trained. Experience has shown that officers who are slower and more deliberate in judgment, who may have difficulty in the rapid fire review required in dealing with news material moving by electrical transmission, frequently make excellent photographic censors. If the number of censors available permits, a censor should not be required to review film for longer than one and one-half hours at a stretch, since alert perception is required to prevent unreleasable material from slipping by. For the same reason, not more than 4 or 5 hours of movie censorship should be required of a censor in one day.

30. Technique of Photo Censorship

a. In censoring still pictures prints only are stamped and they are stamped on the back. The stamp should be so placed as to overlap parts of both print and caption. Stamped prints should be reassembled face to face and back to back to prevent stamping ink from smearing the prints. Restraint should be used in affixing stamps on photos and in initialing them. Deep impressions readily show through and destroy the quality and usefulness of the print. Caution must be used to prevent photos from being bent or mutilated through careless handling or transmission.

b. Normal censorship supplies should include a magnifying glass, red grease pencil to indicate
deletions to be made by the submitter, and a razor blade to effect deletions in photos going forward by mail. Minor deletions can be made on a photograph going forward by mail by gently scratching out the offending information with the point of a razor blade. For larger deletions the emulsion containing the nonpassable information can be cut out and then separated from the back of the print. Deletions of either type should not be made if the effect of the deletion is to focus attention on some new device or item of equipment which is classified. In such cases the entire picture should be stopped.

32. Service or Business Messages

a. Included in the news material, subject to the jurisdiction of field press censorship, are correspondents' service or business messages. Such messages not infrequently contain source or background information or tips with respect to important news breaks and similar implications and hints. Such material must be reviewed by field press censorship in precisely the same way as other material expressly prepared as news material.

b. Correspondents may not include in personal correspondence any information which may be used as source material or background information for publication. Any personal correspondence containing such source or background information is considered as a service or business communication and must be submitted to field press censorship which will handle it according to its normal procedures. When armed forces censorship is in effect, personal communications of correspondents which are determined by armed forces censors to be service or business messages in accordance with the foregoing criteria will be referred by armed forces censors to field press censorship for disposition.

c. Particular care must be exercised with respect to extemporaneous comments by forward radio reporters to their home offices before going on the air with their scripts. The flat rule is that the radio commentator is permitted to say nothing which is not on his script after passing through the censor's hand. The same rule applies to the telephoning of stories by correspondents. Only that which is on the correspondent's censored script is transmittable, and he must be stopped if he attempts any ad libbing or double talk in getting his message forward.

31. Transmission by Mail

a. News material sent by mail is governed by the same rules of field press censorship as any other copy, with one exception—all materials deleted by field press censorship must be physically removed.

b. One of the largest sources of news material moving by mail is the home town material turned out by PIO's. Frequently, the PIO will develop a standard form for such stories, the only variation being in the soldier's name and rank. In such case field press censorship can arrange with the PIO for the use of a standard precensored form. Thereafter such stories can be transmitted by the PIO direct without the censorship stamp, with a notation included in the mimeographed form that the story has been reviewed and passed by field press censorship.
33. Within Theater Headquarters

a. To prevent premature disclosure of security information and to insure that all proper information will be made releasable at the earliest moment, the theater press censorship must have a close, daily working relationship with all staff agencies. It is particularly important that its liaison with theater intelligence and operations officers be established and kept on a base of cordiality, professional frankness, and mutual confidence. Field press censors cannot do their work unless they remain aware of most of the information which flows into a war room and is passed to the various staff sections—the latest developments in a going operation, what is in planning for the next one, the arrival of new troops, the exploitation of new material, the introduction of new tactics in the fight against the enemy, the disclosures which come from enemy prisoners, and so on. This kind of material does not flow to the field press censor automatically. Under the pressures of war, staff sections normally are too overburdened to take care of all such detail, and besides there is always some time lag in the circulation of official paper. Field press censorship gets much of its useful information through personal digging by its officers; visiting the other man, making friends with him and letting him know the main requirements in one's own work are the essential steps to winning the cooperation of the staff and headquarters.

b. The need that the field press censor keep abreast of all developments on his own side of the fence has already been emphasized. It is not less desirable that he keep informed to the maximum possible on the situation, tactics, and general methods of the enemy, else there is danger that he will pass information which will be a direct gift to the opposing camp. A startling instance of this kind occurred in Korea in January 1951. The Eighth Army had at last solved piece by piece the tactical pattern of the Chinese Communist Army. It was established that the enemy was wasting much of his assault power by putting too many grenadiers and too few riflemen in his waves. On the other hand, his machine guns, used at extremely short range, were having deadly effect. In attacking the ridges, his troops always came up the draws and the gentler slopes; therefore, the steep and rocky escarpments were to be considered reasonably immune to his attack. These, and many similar items, went out in a classified paper to troops. Shortly thereafter, without due consideration, the same information was released to the public. It was a direct invitation to the enemy to modify his tactics, which he quickly did.

c. In its liaison relationship with staff officers, field press censorship seeks the advice and recommendations of interested staff sections with respect to security. It does not ask for decisions as to the releasability or nonreleasability of information. That decision is the responsibility of field press censorship as the representative of the commander in this regard.

d. Field press censors of each of the services should make frequent trips to service installations to acquaint themselves with the latest changes in combat equipment. Through such visits many items requiring security protection can be discovered—items which otherwise might be overlooked in copy or photographic submissions. Getting about also serves to familiarize field press censorship with the equipment and tactics employed in the theater and permits it to make determination in advance on ticklish points. Usually such liaison visits will be followed by the promulgation of specific field press censorship guidance.

e. The relationship between field press censorship in the theater and service PIO's should be hand-in-hand. In many instances, through such cooperation, news which might otherwise be overlooked can be released at the suggestion of field press censorship. On the other hand, PIO's will frequently be able to advise the censors of some new development or planned operation (such as a VIP visit) so that the censor can prepare guidance in advance, thus minimizing the opportunities for a security breach and improving relations with the press.
f. There should also be the closest liaison and cooperation between field press censorship and other censorship installations in the area, such as armed forces censorship, civilian censorship, and allied or neutral countries press censips. In matters of primary importance higher authority should be advised of such liaison, particularly when an allied or neutral government is involved. These same principles apply at lower echelons of field press censorship.

34. Liaison with Other Services

a. The governing regulations (AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11) direct that field press censorship within the theater be operated for the combined services as a single organization with press censorship personnel furnished by the respective services. For success in joint undertakings the closest coordination among the services must be achieved and maintained. The direct relationship of Army and Air Force operations makes it mandatory that news material dealing with most land operations be reviewed from the point of view of both services. Copy which deals with both ground and air operations should normally be reviewed by both Army and Air Force censors. Normally Army censors should not assume the responsibility for passing portions of submissions which make reference to air operations. The same principle applies to relationships with Navy field press censorship and with any allied field press censorship.

b. In clearing technical information the closest possible cooperation is required. Frequently the equipment used by the Air Force will have been developed by the Army or Navy, or either of these services may use Air Force equipment. The regulations governing the release of information established by the developing service will determine the amount of information which can be released on such equipment.

c. Where field press censorship is not conducted as a combined operation it is not less necessary that the closest liaison be maintained with the field press censorship of the other services.

35. Liaison with Higher Authority

a. The review function in the Department of Defense is centralized for the three services in the Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. Officers are assigned from each service to the Security Review Branch where they work closely together to effect uniform release policies. In actual practice the function of review in the United States is not comparable to field press censorship in the theater. Only a very minor proportion of the Department of Defense security review officer's activities is concerned with the examination of press submissions. The bulk of the work of the Department of Defense security review officer is to review the information that the services will issue in formal releases, in answer to press queries, or in requests from manufacturers. The military or manufacturing spokesmen are then required to restrict themselves to the amount of information the security review officers have authorized for release.

b. In developing policies governing the release of information, the Security Review Branch deals direct with the public information and staff agencies of the three services in the development of security review guidance applicable to all three services. The service sections of the Security Review Branch maintain current records of releasable information on virtually all equipment. This information can be readily obtained by theater field press censors and should be procured on a regular basis.

c. One of the most important requirements in field press censorship is that it be consistent and uniform. News material concerning theater operations submitted for review to Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, should receive exactly the same treatment it would receive from theater field press censorship. The reverse is also true. A submission concerning the technical details of a tank or an aircraft operating in the theater should be censored to allow as much but no more information as would be cleared by Security Review Branch in Washington. This ideal is, of course, difficult to achieve in practice. Experience demonstrates, however, that if two fundamental practices are followed faithfully both in the theater and by Security Review Branch and the concerned Department or Departments in Washington most difficulties can be avoided:

1. Press censorship guidances promulgated in the theater and the Public Information Security Guidance Issued by Security Review Branch and the concerned Department(s) in Washington should be detailed and unambiguous, and should be exchanged promptly. They should cover every important subject of possible news
interest so far as is known or can be antici-
pipated. These guidances should be ex-
changed direct by the most expeditious
means where urgency is indicated.

(2) When an important stop is in effect, cor-
respondents both in the United States
and in the theater are interested in its
removal. It is unfair and causes hard
feelings if censorship at either end re-
moves the stop without first advising con-
cerned public information and censorship
offices at the other end that it plans to do
so. Whenever possible, an advance
simultaneous security release time should
be set; and, so far as possible, interested
 correspondents should receive advance
warning of the release time.

d. The main circumstances emphasizing the
need for close press censorship collabora-
tion between Security Review Branch, OPI, and the
public information chief of the concerned Depart-
ment(s) and the theater are as follows:

(1) Where a correspondent who has been in
the theater returns to the United States
to write stories based on information
gathered in the theater, and submits his
copy to Security Review Branch for
 clearance; or where photographic nega-
tives are sent to the United States for
development and are submitted to Secu-
rity Review Branch for clearance. In
both instances Security Review Branch
must have the latest field press censorship
guidances from the theater.

(2) Where Security Review Branch and the
concerned Department(s) have been ap-
plying a stop on news material with
respect to an item of information (usu-
ally materiel) and field press censorship
in the theater, learning that the en-
yemy must be assumed to have knowledge
of the materiel by reason of losses to him,
removes or modifies the stop. In such
cases field press censorship in the theater
should take one of two steps, depending
on the conditions:

(a) If the stop applied by Security Re-
view Branch and the concerned De-
partment(s) is obviously one of consid-
erable importance from the point of
view of its probable news value, the
theater censors should, if possible, ad-
vice Security Review Branch and the
concerned Department(s) by cable
that the stop is being removed—setting
forth the reasons and establishing an
advance release time.

(b) If the stop applied by Security Re-
view Branch and the concerned De-
partment(s) is on a subject of rela-
tively minor news interest, the theater
censors may merely remove the stop
by issuing a press censorship guidance
and transmitting copies to Security
Review Branch and the concerned De-
partment(s) by airmail. Usually in
such cases Security Review Branch and
the concerned Department(s) first be-
come cognizant of the release when
stories on the subject appear with thea-
ter date lines in the United States
papers.

(3) Situations in which Security Review
Branch and the concerned Depart-
ment(s) have been applying a major
stop—with instructions to the theater
that no theater releases will be made with-
out prior Department of Defense per-
mission. Two prime examples of this in
World War II were radar and atomic
warfare. The Office of Public Infor-
mation, Department of Defense, in such
cases, should give the theater advance
warning of the extent of the information
to be released.

(4) Situations in which Security Review
Branch and the concerned Depart-
ment(s) have been applying a stop which
is being observed in two or more theaters,
and the field press censors in one of the
theaters learn that the subject matter of
the stop has been compromised in their
own theater. The Office of Public Infor-
mation, Department of Defense, and the
concerned Department(s), in such cases,
should be called upon to coordinate the
release, if any. Whether they will remove
the stop will depend upon the nature of
the information and circumstances in the
other theater. In World War II, for in-
tance, it was known that the Germans
and Japanese did not always exchange in-
telligence information and that their ex-
change channels were frequently slow.
SECTION IX
PROCEDURE

36. Field Press Censorship Guidances
   a. The Field Press Censorship Guidance (FPCG) is an administrative publication designed to insure uniformity and consistency of censorship throughout the theater or other area of censorship responsibility. Each FPCG establishes and limits the amount of security protection required on a given subject. Whenever possible FPCG's should be issued before copy is submitted on the subjects covered.
   b. Field press censorship guidances will normally require classification. They are not for issuance to correspondents. Where appropriate, correspondents should be advised thereof and briefed thereon so that their work may be facilitated.
   c. FPCG's should be published as often as the need for the promulgation of definite policy arises or is anticipated. Their publication should be centralized in the office of the theater or service chief press censor. Any field censorship detachment may anticipate a need for, and originate, an FPCG but it must be sent to the chief theater and service field press censor for publication.
   d. Normally each FPCG is limited to one subject. For facility in filing, amendment, and rescission they should be numbered consecutively as issued. Each FPCG should deal with a particular subject and should list specifically those items with respect to it which may be passed for publication and those which may not be released.
   e. Dissemination of FPCG's to all PIO units is desirable to facilitate the activities of the PIO's in dealing with correspondents. A limited transmission to intelligence, operations, and other interested staff sections will also be found helpful. Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, should also be furnished copies of each FPCG so that it will be apprised at all times of the rules governing field press censorship in the theater.
   f. From time to time the enduring guidances should be codified in the form of a basic censorship bible or policy book to facilitate the use of the guidances. Like guidelines should be placed together in such a compilation and a table of contents provided.

37. Field Press Censor's Log
   a. Whenever a field press censor handles a submission he should complete a separate log sheet (DD Form 628, Field Press Censorship Log) recording the source of the submission (author and agency); the nature of the submission (e.g., photo, telegram, telephone call, personal query, etc.); the date, hour, and minute he received the copy; a brief description of the subject matter of the submission; the precise action he took, including a statement of the exact words or material deleted; and the date, hour, and minute he completed his censorship action. These are minimum requirements. Frequently the censorship unit requires logging of such additional data as estimated word count and number of words deleted. A DD Form 628 is shown with illustrative entries in figure 3, Appendix VI.
   b. The censor must not be slipshod in the preparation of his log sheets. They must be complete without being too lengthy. They must be neat, legible, and quickly understandable. They should describe any significant content the censor passed, as well as the exact deletions or amendments the censor made. They should give the censor's reasons for any delays in the censorship of the submission beyond the period of time normally required to censor such submissions. They should record anything unusual concerning the action, such as the fact that a correspondent was unusually vigorous in his protests, or that the censor attempted to get the advice of a senior censor but was unable to reach him.
   c. The reason for such care in the preparation of the log should be apparent when its purposes are understood.
      (1) News copy is a perishable commodity—it is a commercial product of financial value
to the author. Time is usually of the essence. Disputes with the censors over delays which the correspondent considers unreasonable or over deletions the correspondent considers to be unintelligent and unwarranted are relatively frequent and sometimes quite heated. The correspondent has a great deal of power and has virtually unrestricted access to all levels of the military. As a result, it often happens that the chief of the field press censorship unit or the senior censor on duty at the time is called upon without notice to explain either to a correspondent or to a superior officer precisely what action his duty censor took and the circumstances and reasons justifying the action. Often such demands are made when the censor who took the action is off duty or on some special duty assignment where he cannot be reached promptly. Field press censorship must be at all times in a position to provide an immediate and detailed answer. The data on the log sheet must provide the full story for the senior censor on duty.

(2) The log sheets prepared by each censor serve to inform the chief of the unit exactly what took place while he was off duty. They should provide him with the means of making a daily check on the work of each of his censors. Not infrequently they result in his cautioning a censor on a censorship point where the censor’s log indicates a lack of perception or lack of basic understanding of some fundamental security principle. It sometimes happens that the senior censor, coming on duty, sees from the log that a duty censor not then on duty has made a serious mistake; or it may be that he has made a reasonable decision, but one which is almost certain to call for an elaborate explanation to the submitting agency. If the former is true, the senior censor may still have time to rectify the error. In the second case, he would be forewarned and given an opportunity to prepare his case.

(3) As a training device the log sheet is unsurpassed. Each censor should be required by inflexible standing operating procedure to read closely every log sheet prepared since his last tour of duty. Over a period of time this usage will tend to make all censors approach the same security point in the same way. Each censor coming on duty gains from his study of the log sheets for the preceding 24 hours all of the experience the other censors had. Each sees continuously how the others approached new security problems and the decisions they made. All censors, particularly new ones, should be instructed to inquire for the reason behind any deletion or any action reflected in the log which is not understood by them. If a censor does not see the reason for a deletion, he will fail to make the same deletion in copy coming to him on the same subject. Once he understands it, he will be alert to detect objectionable material of the same kind.

38. Field Press Censorship Stamps

a. Nine stamps are required efficiently to accomplish the field press censorship mission. Six of these are required to indicate the censorship action taken; the other three are valuable in controlling and facilitating the flow of copy through the censorship office (fig. 2, AR 360–65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190–11). The six basic or “action” censorship stamps are as follows:

1. “Passed for Publication.”
2. “Passed for Publication as Censored.”
6. “Not to be Released.”

The first five stamps should be used with blue ink; the sixth should be used with red ink.

b. Each type of stamp is of a different configuration for ease in handling and ease of recognition by correspondents and transmitting agencies. The “Passed for Publication” stamp is rectangular, the “Passed for Publication as Censored” stamp oval, the “No U. S. Army (Navy, Air Force) Security” stamps round, and the “Not to be Released” stamp triangular with a heavy border for ready recognition.

c. When not in use by authorized personnel field press censorship stamps will be stored in a secure place.
The six basic stamps employed by field press censorship contain the following legends and are used in the following manner:

1. "Passed for Publication" United States Armed Forces Field Press Censors, the date, and the field press censor's number and initials. The purpose of this stamp is obvious. It is used whenever copy is passed without change.

2. "Passed for Publication as Censored" United States Armed Forces Field Press Censors, the date and the censor's number and initials. This stamp is used whenever a submission is passed for transmission with certain of the information therein deleted. The censor should make his deletions clear so as to leave no doubt as to the information which is not approved for release. In the case of mailers, of course, the deletions are physically removed.

3. (4), (5) "No U. S. Army (Navy, Air Force) Security" and censor's initials. These stamps are used on copy referred to a censor for review with respect to material of interest to his service. It does not clear the copy for transmission but indicates that those portions of the copy dealing with Army (Navy, Air Force) matters are releasable. If the copy is altered by the service field press censor he should write in on the stamp "As Censored."

4. "Not to be Released" United States Armed Forces Field Press Censors, the date and censor's number and initials. This stamp, as its title indicates, should be used whenever the entire submission is not releasable or when so many deletions are required as to destroy the value of the submission.

e. The three auxiliary stamps are of importance to the field press censorship operation to insure that security release times are maintained and to assist in connection with time embargoes and for use in connection with photographs. These are:

1. The security embargo stamp, "Not to be Released Before------------," is applied where copy has been precensored but cannot be transmitted before the time and date specified on the stamp. It should be affixed to the copy in addition to the appropriate clearance stamp and governs the handling of that copy until the security release time has passed. It should be used with red ink.

2. The time embargo stamp, "Not to be Published Until------------," is used to indicate that certain material, cleared for transmission, should not be published until a given time. This stamp is used when the release of the copy in advance of the embargoed time has no security implications.

3. The "Photograph Only, Caption Not Submitted" stamp used where photographs are submitted without captions so as to make it clear that only the photograph is dealt with. It is important that photographs and captions be considered together whenever possible. Where this cannot be done and only the photograph is dealt with, this stamp is used to so indicate.

f. Still another stamp, of the greatest importance in providing a record of the flow of copy, is the message center clock. This stamp is used by the censorship logging clerk to place on each piece of copy the hour and minute the submission is received by field press censorship and the hour and minute it is returned by censorship or released for transmission. The message center clock records the length of time required to clear a submission. This record, appearing on the original of the submission and on the file copy retained by censorship, is indispensable when complaints of delay in the censorship of copy are lodged. Normally this stamp is not employed in dealing with photographic submissions.
39. Operations with Allies

a. This manual has discussed the task of the field press censor as if he would always be dealing with United States military forces and United States correspondents only. This is not likely to be his future situation since the United States is now a nation having direct military alliances and possessing allies whose troops will likely serve with American forces in the event of war. Under United States command, there may be troops of various nationalities, each having its own press representation, but still being subject to the field press censorship of the commander. Though that will give rise to some special problems, in his dealing with them, the field press censor adheres to the same personal and professional rules which govern the conduct of his work otherwise. He will be as firm and as courteous in dealing with correspondents of another nationality as with his own people, and he will act always on the assumption that they attach the same importance to the prompt handling and transmission of their work. They, too, will be treated according to the first-come-first-served rule and Americans will be given no preferential treatment in the scheduling of work.

b. Under these conditions, the field press censor may be called on to pass copy written in a foreign language with which he is not familiar in circumstances where no official interpreter is at the service of the censorship office. That was the condition within the Eighth Army during the Korean War. Korean, Turkish, Greek, French, Danish, and Thailand copy all had to be serviced. In that theater, the method used most generally by the censor was to have the correspondent read his copy aloud, in English, and then certify that his submission was as he had read it. Preferably, the correspondent is required to submit his story in sufficient copies so as to provide field press censorship with a file copy in the correspondent's own language, together with an English translation in writing certified by the correspondent as a true and correct translation of the foreign language text. In this way censorship has in its files a record of the correspondent's statement of the English language meaning of his story. Neither of these methods of handling the problem is, however, entirely satisfactory since the translation may slur over shades of meaning contained in the original foreign language version of the story which would not be passed if the same idea had been written in clear English. This hurdle might in some cases be surmounted through the direct assignment of a staff of interpreters to the censorship service. Where possible, field press censors will be recruited from the forces allied with us so that the censorship organization will have in its own ranks personnel with expert knowledge of the allied forces and able to handle the languages involved. Here it is sufficient to note only that in any future emergency, specific rules for the guidance of the field press censor in the processing of foreign language copy can be expected from the chief press censor's office.

c. In most cases where United States forces and Allied forces are employed under a single commander a combined staff will be established with adequate representation from each force. In such case the field press censorship organization required will normally be recruited from each of the services and forces represented and organized as a combined field press censorship group under the direction of the chief field press censor appointed by the commander.

d. An allied problem is that of the handling of reports of the operations of the forces of the commander (including foreign language material) originating or published in liberated or occupied areas. Such material is subject to the field press censorship jurisdiction of the commander (par. 12a (8), AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11). In the event of emergency this would probably be handled as it was in the European Theater in World War II. There this special jurisdiction of the commander over the local press was exercised through liaison field press censors.
These liaison censors, who were members of the theater field press censorship organization especially recruited with the requisite language qualifications, accompanied the armies in the field and were responsible for the security review of reports of the operations of the forces of the commander appearing in the indigenous press and radio as they began to function in the wake of the armies. Just as soon as the governments of the liberated countries were able to set up their own censorships, the liaison field press censors were outposted with such indigenous censorships and accomplished their task of insuring that security with respect to the operations of the forces was maintained through liaison with such indigenous censorships. These liaison censors passed on to the local press censorship appropriate guidance for dealing with reports of the operations, dealt with all questions referred to them by the local censors and monitored the operations of the local censorships so far as they concerned reports of the operations of the forces of the commander.

e. Information officially prepared for dissemination to the civilian population of areas in which a civil affairs or military government condition exits is not normally subject to field press censorship.

40. Violations

In the course of his work, either through his reading of publications circulated in the continental United States, or from a confidential disclosure from a third person, or by some other chance, the field press censor may learn that a correspondent has wilfully violated the instructions and regulations which have been published to safeguard information. Or again, by his vigilance, he may detect and frustrate a deliberate attempt to beat censorship before the offender had done any material damage. In either case, his duty is not to admonish. Nor is it to shut his eyes to the violation because it has already occurred and the hurt cannot be repaired. What is required of him is that he report the violation or attempted violation to his military superior for such further action as the latter deems appropriate.
SECTION XI
CONCLUSION

41. General

a. The basic principles of sound field press censorship have been stated and discussed in previous sections. Examples and illustrations of the application of these principles have been given. On the administrative side, the normal office routine required for the smooth operation of censorship has been detailed. All this is necessarily only a preliminary orientation to the work of field press censorship. The censor will find that, as was emphasized in the foreword, no compilation of rules and regulations can possibly cover all of the situations with which he will be confronted and that a sound, informed judgment must be his main tool. Sureness and confidence will come with actual experience in the handling of news material.

b. The censor must always keep in mind that his is the important job of insuring that information of value to the enemy is deleted from the news which passes through his hands. In the exercise of this function he must be guided by the principle that it is always in the interests of a free society to make information public as fully as is consonant with public welfare and safety. He has the difficult task of maintaining a balance between the dictates of security and the requirement that there be a full and free flow of news. A field press censor should have a deep and abiding belief in the virtues and strengths of a free press, and possess the qualities of a good judge, thus achieving a balance between the conflicting considerations. As was said by a World War I commentator, the field press censor must be firm, absolutely impartial, and he must never on any account or for any reason lose his temper with individuals.
APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

1. Department of Defense
   DD Form 627 ----------------- Field Press Censorship Record of Submissions.
   DD Form 628 ----------------- Field Press Censorship Log.

2. Joint
   AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11 Public Information—Establishment and Conduct of Field
   AR 360-60/OPNAV Instr 5720.6/AFR 190-9 Press Censorship in Combat Areas.
   AR 380-80-1/Navy ONI-CR 50/AFR 205-30 Public Information—Correspondents Accompanying Armed
   SR 320-5-5/OPNAV Instr 3020.1/AFP 5-1-1 Forces of the United States.
   Military Security—Armed Forces Censorship.
   Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.

3. Army
   AR 105-15 ----------------- Communications—Field Signal Communications.
   AR 360-5 ----------------- Public Information.
   AR 380-5 ----------------- Military Security—Safeguarding Military Information.
   AR 380-10 ----------------- Military Security—Laws, Executive Orders, etc., Pertaining to
   SR 10-70-1 ----------------- Organization and Functions of Department of the Army—
   SR 105-15-5 ---------------- Communication—Field Signal Communications—Provision
   SR 110-1-1 ----------------- Index of Army Motion Pictures and Film Strips.
   SR 310-20-3 ---------------- Index of Department of the Army Publications.
   SR 310-20-4 ---------------- Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Regulations, etc.
   SR 310-20-5 ---------------- Index of Administrative Publications.
   SR 320-5-1 ----------------- Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
   SR 320-50-1 ---------------- Authorized Abbreviations.
   SR 360-5-1 ----------------- Public Information—Release of Military Information.
   SR 360-60-1 ---------------- Public Information—Accreditation of Correspondents.
   SR 380-160-2 ---------------- Military Security—Determining Eligibility for Employment in
   Military Training.
   T/O & E 45-510 ---------------- Field Press Censorship Organization.

4. Navy
5. Air Force

AFR 5-3 --------------------- Publications, Subject Index of Administrative Publications.
AFR 30-11 ------------------- Personnel, Casualty Reporting & Notification.
AFR 190-6 ------------------- Public Relations, Air Force Public Information Program.
AFR 190-10 ------------------- Public Relations, Release of Information on Accidents.
AFR 190-12 ------------------- Public Relations, Release of Information on Atomic Energy,
                                 Guided Missiles, and New Weapons.
AFM 1-2 ---------------------- Air Doctrine—USAF Basic Doctrine.
AFM 1-3 ---------------------- Air Doctrine—Theater Air Operations.
AFM 1-4 ---------------------- Air Doctrine—Air Defense Operations.
AFM 1-5 ---------------------- Air Doctrine—Air Operations in Conjunction with Amphibious
                                 Operations.

6. General

1942.
Final Report of G–2–D, General Headquarters, AEF, Volume 13, United States Army in World War,
1917–1919, (Reports of Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services, Part II), page
APPENDIX II

LAYOUT AND OPERATION OF A TYPE THEATER
HEADQUARTERS FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP INSTALLATION

1. Operating Arrangements

a. The main principles governing the doing of the work are kept in mind in the physical organizing of the detachment, so that it will operate with maximum efficiency and economy of effort. A description of the physical layout and operation of a type theater headquarters field press censorship installation therefore emphasizes those conveniences, etc., which by helping "morale" also elevate standards of performance. Speed and accuracy in reading, weighing the meaning and implication of what has been written, and then striking that which endangers the fighting force are the decisive portions of the field press censor's job. Therefore, good lighting arrangements are necessary so that there will be minimum strain on eye and nerve. Also, substitute lighting arrangements for nightwork are a positive requirement in case power fails. In emergency, field press censors carry on by candlelight, if there is nothing better. Any man doing work on manuscript, particularly when it is under steady flow, needs ample elbow room, lest his papers become mixed. To save unnecessary motion and time, all reference sources, such as guidances, should be convenient to the work desks, and their indexing should also have whatever cross-filings are necessary so that there will be no undue delay in checking questionable points in copy.

b. Ideally, the installation is physically integrated with the machinery for the filing and transmission of copy so that as the correspondent files his submission with the PIO copy room or other facility for the reception of copy it flows to the censor and from the latter's desk to the sending apparatus. Adequate space should be provided for—

(1) The logging in of copy. The ideal arrangement is for the field press censorship logging room and logging clerk to be immediately adjacent to the PIO copy room or other facility for the reception of copy so that copy can flow from the copy room to censorship with a minimum of handling. Adjacent rooms, with a connecting window through which submissions are handed by the copy room clerk to the censorship logging clerk, are the best arrangement.

(2) The censorship of written copy. The censorship room or area should be immediately adjacent to the censorship logging clerk so that copy can flow from the logging clerk to the censors with a minimum of handling. The room should be large enough to accommodate a large central table around which the duty censors are grouped, and to provide a separate desk for the continuity officer in charge of the day-to-day operation. The center table should be circular or U-shaped, as in a newspaper city room, with the senior press censor seated inside the opening, available to answer questions from, and give guidance to, the duty censors on all sides. Provisions should be made for a large blackboard upon which flash guidances can be written for all the censors to see.

(3) The censorship of still photographs. (Censorship of motion picture film is necessarily at a studio—normally not at the censorship installation.) Censorship of still photographs produced by Army Pictorial Service, and the like agencies of the other services, is apt to be an outpost operation for the censor. Apart from this, censorship of still photographs should be accomplished at the main censorship installation. If possible, it should be done in the same room as the censorship of written copy.
(4) Personnel charged with the preparation and issuance of guidances.

(5) Files of information with respect to material, guidances previously issued, and information released on particular subjects.

(6) Liaison with correspondents with respect to their submissions. A room should be provided for this, separate from the area where censorship is accomplished.

(7) Censorship files of news material submitted.

(8) Administration and supplies of the censorship installation itself.

(9) The deputy chief field press censor and his operating staff.

A suggested physical layout for a type theater field press censorship installation is illustrated in figure 1. This shows a type operating field press censorship installation at a theater or comparable headquarters. Normally the theater chief field press censor, with the service chief field press censors, will be located at the staff level with the theater chief of information (or public information officer, if there is no chief of information).

2. Logging of Copy

The submission is handed through the window to the censorship logging clerk who logs in the story and stamps the time of submission on it. The story is then taken by the clerk to the censor. After censorship, the story is returned to the censorship record clerk who again time stamps the slip, removes the duplicate copy for the censorship files, notes in his record DD Form 627 (United States Armed Forces Field Press Censorship Record of Submissions) the “time out”, the action taken (passed, passed as censored, stopped), and the name and number of the censor who handled the story. (A DD Form 627 with illustrative entries is shown in figure 2, App. VI.) The copy is then returned or released.

3. The Censorship Room

a. Usually, duty field press censors are grouped around a large table in the center of the room, working together much like men on the “rim” in a metropolitan newspaper. The continuity officer, in immediate charge of the operation, has a desk of his own in a corner of the room.

b. The continuity officer, like the “slot” man on a newspaper, is charged with general overall supervision of the processing of copy and is responsible for all censorship during his tour of duty. The senior press censor, sitting at the center table, is responsible for the general mechanics concerning the flow of copy, dissemination of guidance, and is the first point of referral for duty censors.
Questionable points are put to the senior press censor prior to referral to the continuity officer. The senior press censor checks all censored copy before it is returned to the record clerks, at least sampling as much of the copy as is possible. It is also the responsibility of the senior press censor to bring to the attention of the duty censors any errors in censorship or procedure.

c. Army, Navy, and Air Force censors and photographic censors are present, as required, and submissions pertaining to these departments are referred to them.

d. The chain of referral within the censorship installation is from duty censor to senior press censor to continuity officer to deputy chief press censor. When a censor commences work on a submission, he follows it through to a decision unless clearance requires referral outside of the censorship installation. The DD Form 628 prepared by the censor is shown with illustrative entries in figure 3, Appendix VI.

e. When it is necessary to make extensive deletions in a submission, this is brought to the attention of the senior press censor, who verifies the action recommended. The story is then given to the liaison officer and the reasons for the cuts explained to him, unless the full explanation is such that it would necessitate a major breach of security. If possible, the liaison officer notifies the correspondent prior to the transmission of the story.

f. When it is necessary to stop a submission the duty censor will so notify the senior press censor who will, in turn, check with the continuity officer. If it is agreed that the story must be stopped, the liaison officer will be advised so that he may advise the correspondent, and the logging clerks will also be so advised.

g. The censoring of still photographs is preferably carried on at a separate table in the main censorship room. If the volume of photographic work is extremely heavy this may prove impossible and photographic censorship will necessarily be accomplished in an adjacent room.

4. Guidance Section

The guidance section is primarily responsible for the maintenance of records of unit commander and equipment releases, for the consolidation of guidance coming into the office from other field press censorship units, and for the compilation of guidance resulting from briefings and special conferences. Card indices must be maintained on all units in the theater and all released commanders. Files of data with respect to material must be compiled and kept up to date. A third function of the section of great value to senior commanders and PIO’s is the issuance of a daily “Trend of Copy” report summarizing the important news material passing through the censorship installation and noting significant censorship cuts. (See App. VI, Example 19.) The guidance section is preferably accommodated in a separate room.

5. Liaison Room

a. Adjoining the PIO copy room and the censorship logging room is a room designated as the “liaison room”. Correspondents are invited to come here if they wish to discuss anything with the censor who handled the copy, or to ask advice. Where such a “liaison room” can be provided, it is the only censorship room “in bounds” to correspondents, who are not allowed to trespass in the rooms where censorship is actually conducted. Even where it is not possible to provide a separate room for this purpose, every effort should be made to handle the discussion of cuts and the like as far away as can be from the area where the immediate censorship operation is being conducted. Unless this is done, the other censors, dealing with copy of other correspondents, will be hindered in getting the work out. Further, if the discussion is carried on at or near the censors’ worktable, where the copy of other correspondents is being handled, there is always the possibility that the visiting correspondent may pick up some information, to which he is not entitled, with regard to a competitor’s story which is passing through the censorship procedures.

b. Where an important cut is necessary in a submission, every effort is made to inform the correspondent, or his agency, prior to transmission of his story. Such censored submission is handed to the liaison officer whose duty it is to find the correspondent and to explain the situation and the reason for the cut with the exception previously noted. If the correspondent disagrees with the cut and wishes to support his case, the censor handling the story comes to the liaison room for consultation. If the writer still remains unconvinced or wishes to appeal further the continuity officer is called. Should this fail to placate the writer it is always possible for him to consult the deputy chief
press censor or chief press censor. Such an arrangement is of great benefit. It helps public relations, promotes understanding between correspondents and censors, saves many post-publication post mortems and in many instances prevents “over-cutting” by censors.

c. Duplicates of censored submissions are filed for a period of 24 hours in the liaison room under the head of the submitting agency. This enables the correspondents or censors promptly to obtain the file copy for reference if desired. After the 24 hour period copies are permanently filed in the file room under the name of the correspondent. A complete duplicate file of all stories submitted by any correspondent can thus be obtained immediately either for use by the correspondent or by field press censorship. The correspondents are at all times given free access to file copies of their own stories.

d. An additional function performed by the liaison officer is the briefing of correspondents with respect to significant changes in the current censorship position. Where appropriate, announcements at public information briefings of correspondents or suitable notices posted on correspondents' bulletin boards will be employed to advise correspondents of such changes.

6. Outposts

a. Maximum security and consistency in the operation of field press censorship would be achieved by requiring the submission of all news material to one field press censorship installation. However, this is impracticable and, in the interests of speed of handling and economy of manpower and facilities, censorship outposts must be established at the facilities for the transmission and processing of news material. Thus, in a typical operation, the theater headquarters field press censorship installation described in this appendix might, at theater level, have outposts at the following offices and facilities:

1. Army public information office.
2. Navy public information office.
3. Air Force public information office.
4. Office of theater type service newspaper (Stars and Stripes).
5. Local facilities of Army (Navy, Air Force) pictorial services for processing and exhibiting still and motion picture photographs.
6. Local troop information network station.
7. Local facilities for production and transmission of psychological warfare news material.
8. Office of the indigenous press censorship authority (liaison with respect to news material regarding the operations of the forces of the commander).

b. Field press censorship should be alert to insure that outposts are set up promptly when the volume of news material originating at the proposed location requires them. There must equally be diligent supervision to see that outposts are promptly discontinued if changes in the situation with respect to transmission and processing render the outposts no longer necessary.

c. When field press censorship outposts are established arrangements must be made for keeping outposted censors adequately supplied with current field press censorship guidances so that the work of the outposted censors is kept closely coordinated with that of the principal office. Rapid means of communication should be employed as required. Arranging for one or more of the censors at an outpost to report to the principal installation each day to familiarize himself with the current censorship position and guidances before going on duty at the outpost may be found a useful expedient.
Example 1. Public Information Plan

CLASSIFICATION

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION

PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN “OVERLORD”

1 May 1944

1. OBJECT.

Complete, equitable, and expeditious news, pictorial, and broadcast coverage of Operation “OVERLORD”.

2. DEFINITIONS.

   a. Accommodation, as used in relation to war correspondents, means providing them with food, housing (where possible), conducting officers, transport, adequate communications, and all other facilities necessary for the efficient discharge of their responsibilities.

   b. Accreditation means authoritative sanction for a war correspondent to accompany armed forces on military operations, for the purpose of witnessing actual combat, or obtaining such military information from headquarters staffs as it is deemed expedient to impart, or both, for the information of the public. Accredited war correspondents are subject to military law and regulations, and subject to direction by Naval authority.

   c. A War Correspondent is an employee of a newspaper, magazine, news agency, broadcasting network, photographic agency, or newsreel company assigned to collect news of this campaign for dissemination through the medium of his profession.

   d. Pooling means making available for general publication the product of one or more individual war correspondents.

3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

   a. Supreme Headquarters will be the final authority on all press policy matters affecting Operation OVERLORD in accordance with SHAEF Operational Memorandum No. 24.

   b. Correspondents of all allied nationalities will be accorded full equality as regards communications, transport, etc., and there will be complete impartiality as between the various interests concerned in granting facilities.

   c. Lateral contact between all collateral forces regarding matters contained in this plan is authorized and encouraged, but Supreme Headquarters will be kept informed on all policy discussion between Army Groups, ANXF and AEAF.

   d. Women correspondents are eligible for reaccreditation within the assigned quotas. Their presence in combat zones beyond forward limits in which women service personnel are on duty will be a matter of special facility visits dependent on the decision of the command concerned.

   e. Pool (commercial) still and reel photographers are eligible for reaccreditation to SHAEF and for attachment to any component force, subject to the established policy of the service ministry concerned.

4. ACCREDITATION.

   a. All war correspondents participating in Operation OVERLORD will be accredited by this Headquarters to the Allied Expeditionary Force as a whole.

   b. A prerequisite to eligibility for Supreme Headquarters accreditation will be full accreditation to United States, British, or Canadian Forces.

   c. Reaccreditation will be evidenced by overstamped endorsement on present credentials.
d. Correspondents will be required to serve for a minimum period of 3 months (except in the case of correspondents afloat).

e. All reaccredited war correspondents are eligible to proceed anywhere they wish within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander (see also par. 3d above), but their acceptance at any one time by army group, naval, or air commanders will be dependent on the available accommodation for press, i.e., communications, conducting officers, transport, etc., within that command. Correspondents will not leave the Force to which they are attached without prior permission of the Public Relations Officer immediately concerned, permission of the Public Relations Officer of the Force to which the correspondent wishes to transfer, and reference to SHAEF. In the case of correspondents afloat, Press Liaison Officer ANCF is the Public Relations Officer of the command concerned.

f. Authorization for coverage of OVERLORD on the Continent will be made by "overseas" visa on existing credentials.

g. Regulations will be issued to war correspondents by SHAEF clarifying and adjusting any conflict on basic regulations under which they are now operating.

5. DETAILED BLOCK ALLOTMENTS.

a. The details of the block allotment of war correspondents' vacancies are given in Appendix A (not reproduced here) to this Plan; they are subject to adjustment after the detailed PR plans of Army Groups, AEAF, and ANXF have been worked out.

b. Accreditation, as in Appendix A will commence forthwith. A complete record of each war correspondent so accredited will be maintained at SHAEF. Lists of accredited war correspondents and facsimile visa forms will be furnished G-2 (Intelligence) Division, SHAEF, for distribution to C. I. Staffs and Security Police.

c. The total block number of war correspondents which can be accepted by Army Group, AN XF, and AEAF at each phase of an operation will depend upon the number each command can accommodate. An assessment of these total block numbers is given in column F of Appendix A; as stated above these numbers are subject to adjustment. Subdivision of block numbers between nationalities will be effected by Supreme Headquarters, working on the principle that the majority of correspondents with a force belonging to any one nation shall be the representatives of the press of that nation.

(1) The responsible authorities for the further breakdown of block numbers, i.e., breakdown of the figures given in columns A to E of Appendix A among newspapers, agencies, broadcasting organizations, etc., are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Own National Press, etc.</th>
<th>Press, etc., of other nations (see notes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>S. H. A. E. F.</td>
<td>War Office and C. M. H. Q.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>Adm.</td>
<td>S. H. A. E. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>War Office</td>
<td>S. H. A. E. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A. F.</td>
<td>Air Ministry</td>
<td>S. H. A. E. F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Army</td>
<td>C. M. H. Q.</td>
<td>S. H. A. E. F. and War Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note (i). The Air Ministry will be responsible for the Air accreditation of the Press, etc., of the British Empire, less Canada, and Allies serving with the RAF.

Note (ii) The War Office is responsible for the Press, etc., of the British Empire, less Canada, so far as Army accreditation is concerned.

(2) As far as United States war correspondents are concerned, the specific allocation of individuals into specific available vacancies will be the responsibility of SHA E F. The Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry will arrange for the selection of British war correspondents to fill vacancies, in consultation with the British press organizations concerned. Similarly, Canadian correspondents will be allocated by the Canadian authorities.

6. FACILITIES FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS.

a. All accredited civilian war correspondents will have the assimilated rank of captain, Army, or, in the case of correspondents afloat, lieutenant, Navy.

b. All war correspondents will remain dependent upon the component commands for billeting, rations, transportation, and initially, for communications. Responsibility for arranging such facilities will rest with the respective public relations officers.
c. Special visits by individual newspapermen to the theater of operations may be authorized by Supreme Headquarters (PR Division). Such visits will be cleared in advance with the public relations officers concerned and requests will be handled by the authorities listed in the table shown in paragraph 5 c (1). On arrival in the theater such individuals will be provided with facilities similar to those enjoyed by accredited correspondents, and will be governed by the same restrictions and regulations. In the case of visits to any base or vessel under the command of ANXF, an Admiralty or U.S. N. permit will be required in addition to SHAEF authorization.

d. A complete London Information Service will be provided by this Headquarters for all accredited war correspondents and such others who may be admitted from time to time on the authority of SHAEF. (See paragraph 5 c (1)). This service will consist of a Press Information Room and a reference library. It will be staffed by PR Division personnel on a 24-hour basis.

7. COMMUNIQUES.

The detailed procedure for the preparation of communiques is contained in Annex A (not reproduced here) to this plan, to be issued later.

8. PRESS CENSORSHIP.

The Press Censorship Plan is contained in Annex B to this plan, to be issued later.

9. PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE.

Photographic Plan is contained in Annex C (not reproduced here) to this plan, to be issued later.

10. COMMUNICATIONS.

Press communications will be the responsibility of the Communications Officer, PR Division, SHAEF, working in conjunction with the Communications Officers of the P. & P. W. Sections of Army Groups and the Chief Signal Officers, SHAEF, 21 Army Group, FUSAG, AEAF, and ANXF respectively. A detailed press communications plan will be prepared by him to include the implementing of all types of communication service which will insure the most rapid and equalized flow of press, pictorial, and broadcast material through normal channels to the public.

11. BRIEFING.

At 21 Army Group, FUSAG, AEAF, and ANXF levels, briefing of war correspondents will be the responsibility of the Public Relations Branch with material made available to them by G-2 Intelligence and G-3 Operations. The Public Relations Branch at these levels will also staff and operate a secondary Press Information Room as necessary, which will be available to accredited war correspondents at the proper time. Similar briefing will be available at Army and equivalent Air and Naval levels at frequent intervals, if possible at least once each 24 hours. Briefing will start at a time to be decided by the commanders concerned.

12. POOLING OF PRESS COPY.

a. Planned Pooling. This will only be invoked when restrictions of the operation make it impossible for individual organizations to give complete coverage to the entire scope of the story concerned and will be lifted at the earliest opportunity. When pooling is invoked on a planned basis it will preferably be global. The preparation of the appropriate formulae for their own national Press will be the responsibility of the Service Departments and organizations concerned. It is the responsibility of SHAEF to lay down whether pooling shall be global or national. When national pooling is applied, the method of its application will be the responsibility of the press organizations of the nation concerned. SHAEF has decided that for the first days of OVERLORD (i.e., until SHAEF directs otherwise) pooling shall be global. An inherent characteristic of pooling is that all pooled copy shall be made available after censorship to the press and broadcasting organizations of the United Nations without distinction. For the neutral press and broadcasting media, the M of I may issue selected stories from the pool. Copy will be slugged "by A B War Correspondent, Allied Forces", followed by an appropriate dateline. It is essential that, subject to the above, in all pooling arrangements, there shall be no attempt to impose a time embargo. Global pool-
ing is to be confined to stories collected by correspondents participating in the operations overseas by land, sea, or in the air, while facilities are restricted. All other stories are the property of the organization whose reporters obtained them.

b. Emergency Pooling. Occasions may arise when Army Groups ANCXF or AEAF may consider it necessary to impose pooling on their own authority to cover a particular operation in which they are exclusively concerned. In such a case all responsibility rests with the Group concerned. When circumstances permit, prior concurrence of PR, SHAEF will be obtained. In all cases, where pooling procedure is put into effect, PR Division, SHAEF, will be immediately notified both of the fact and of the subsequent lifting. SHAEF will pass on the information to the Service Departments concerned.

13. ALERTING.

The date on which war correspondents will be mobilized and instructed to join the Forces with which they are to be accommodated will be notified by SHAEF to the component forces, who will issue the necessary instructions for mobilizing correspondents. Army Group, AEAF, and ANXF, will forward their recommendations to SHAEF by 0900 hours on 24 April 1944, as to the date on which they would wish correspondents to be mobilized and report to them for continuous duty.

14. LIFT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PERSONNEL, WAR CORRESPONDENTS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

a. Draft plans for the lift of correspondents, PR personnel, PR transportation, and communications material will be submitted by 0900 hours on 24 April 1944 by Army Groups, AEAF, and ANXF to the Public Relations Division of this Headquarters for coordination.

b. In case of Naval war correspondent lift, correspondents carried afloat will not normally be allowed to go ashore in the combat zone. Exceptionally, they may be permitted to do so, with the permission of SHAEF under the provisions of paragraph 4d above.

CLASSIFICATION

Example 2. Field Press Censorship Annex to Public Information Plan

Annex B to Public Relations Plan OVERLORD dated 1st May 1944

PRESS CENSORSHIP PLAN

OBJECT.

1. The object of this plan is to establish an organization capable of censoring the maximum of material for publication which can reasonably be expected to be produced within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander in Operation OVERLORD.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

2. a. Policy and procedure will apply as set forth in SHAEF’s Operation Memorandum No. 27 (reproduced as Example 5, sec. III, App. IV) which is hereby made a part of this plan.

b. Supreme Headquarters will be the final authority on all Press Censorship policy matters affecting Operation OVERLORD.

c. Censorship personnel will not use any overseas landline for transmission of uncensored press material without the prior authority of the Chief Signal Officer at the point of origin.

PROCEDURE.

3. a. Personnel.

(1) A Combined Field Press Censorship Group will be established at Senate House, Malet Street, LONDON, composed of suitable air, ground, and naval personnel in sufficient number.

(2) Joint Press Censorship units will be formed from personnel of the above organization and will be outposted as required.

(3) The apportioning of personnel to deal with Allied War Correspondents, submissions will take place in accordance with the following phases:

(a) Prior to establishment of 21st Army Group overseas. Censorship will be performed—
CLASSIFICATION

1. In the UNITED KINGDOM. Personnel of Combined Censorship Group, Senate House, LONDON, will censor all press material brought back by courier from overseas, and all copy resulting from SHAEF press facilities or sorties.

2. On Naval craft. Censorship of a limited wordage of naval copy only will be performed on each of two naval craft for which wireless transmission of news has been authorized subject to operational requirements. One naval censor will be allotted to each of these two craft to deal with submissions.

3. In Bridgehead. Joint Press Censorship units will proceed overseas to censor carrier pigeon and/or wireless transmissions from the bridgehead. Each unit will consist of at least one air, one ground, and one naval censor.

(b) 21st Army Group established overseas. Censorship will be performed—
1. In UNITED KINGDOM. As in (a) 1 above.
2. At 21st Army Group Headquarters. Joint Press Censorship Units, as in (a) 3 above, will be absorbed in Combined Censorship Group at 21st Army Group Headquarters, additional personnel being provided from Combined Censorship Group, LONDON. Outposts may be established as required.

(c) 21st Army Group and First U. S. Army Group established overseas. Censorship will be performed—
1. In the UNITED KINGDOM. As in (a) 1 above.
2. At 21st Army Group and First U. S. Army Group Headquarters. Sufficient personnel will be allotted each Army Group Headquarters to provide censorship for both as needed. Outposts may be established as required.

(d) SHAEF established overseas.
1. In the UNITED KINGDOM. Combined Censorship Group at Senate House, LONDON, will be reduced in number to the minimum required for film censorship and liaison.

2. Overseas censorship will be performed at Supreme Headquarters, 21st Army Group, and First US Army Group Headquarters, personnel from the LONDON Group being transferred as needed. Outposts may be established as required.

4. Personnel to deal with Foreign Press material will be apportioned from Combined Censorship Group to Army Group Commanders as required. Upon resumption of Press Censorship by Nationals of the liberated countries in areas under the Commander's control, all press censors relieved from duty will be returned to the SHAEF Combined Censorship Group.

b. Submissions.
(1) All written submissions will be double spaced.
(2) Written material for courier transmission, including scripts of recordings, will be submitted for press censorship at least in triplicate until SHAEF moves overseas. The original will be used for transmission, one copy for file overseas and remaining copy for file in LONDON.
(3) All written material for wireless transmission, broadcast, or carrier pigeon from overseas and naval copy will be submitted for press censorship at least in duplicate.
(4) All still picture material will be submitted for press censorship in the form of two glossy prints with captions. Prints will be 2 1/4” x 2 1/4” or larger. If enlargements are made they will be 4” x 5”.
(5) All motion picture materials will be submitted for press censorship in the form of a viewing print, together with typed dope sheet in duplicate. Whenever practicable the rough dope sheet returned with the undeveloped film will be prepared in duplicate by the submitter, PR passing one copy to press censorship for information.
(6) Photographic censorship will initially be performed in LONDON. No censorship of dope or caption sheets will be performed overseas until facilities have been established for processing of the photographic material overseas. Censors in the field are, however, encouraged to make notations on the rough dope or caption sheets for the information of censors in LONDON.
(7) Recorded material will normally be submitted accompanied by a verbatim script prepared in triplicate.

c. Handling.
(1) Censors will receive submissions via PR channels, log, and deal with them in the order received.
(2) Overseas censors will censor submissions whenever possible, retaining one copy for file.
(3) When overseas censorship is impossible or undesirable, all copies of the submission will be returned to the PRO for courier transmission to Combined Censorship Group, LONDON, at the option of the submitter.

(4) A suitable log note will be made for all submissions before making available, censored or uncensored, to PRO for transmission.

(5) Log description of stopped photographic material will be made with a view to possible release at a later date.

d. Deletions.

(1) Wherever possible, deletions will be made in BLUE pencil and in cases where it is desired to replace over-cut wordage, the censor will underline the words to be reinserted in RED and mark “stet”.

(2) The original (transmission copy) of civilian-enterprise press material originating in the Theater of Operations will when necessary be physically excised as censored before leaving Service channels, whether released overseas or in the UNITED KINGDOM. Material written in the UNITED KINGDOM will not be deemed to originate in the Theater of Operations unless resulting from a SHAEP press facility, including facilities granted accredited correspondents on and after joining component forces for the purpose of proceeding to the Theater of Operations.

(3) Copies retained for Service files will show deletions by pencil marks only.

e. Authorized Markings.

(1) Press material originating overseas and returned to UNITED KINGDOM for censorship will be stamped with SHAEP Field Press Censorship stamp.

(2) Press material censored overseas will bear the stamp of Allied Expeditionary Force Field Press Censorship.

(3) All stamped copy will show the censor's name or initials, and an individual number assigned him for identification purposes.

(4) Copy transmitted from overseas to the UNITED KINGDOM by service wire or wireless facilities should be prefixed “CENSORED BY_________________” (showing the individual’s name).

f. Guidance.

(1) Local advice as to censorship guidance together with requests for censorship rulings will be passed from Field Press Censorship personnel in the field to Press Censorship at Army Group and relayed to SHAEP Headquarters.

(2) Wherever applicable, guidance requests will include a summary of correspondents' copy-trend, setting out points as they arise in the news reported, for which no standing guidance is available.

(3) At Army Group (or, in cases of policy, SHAEP) Headquarters a representative of Press Censorship will coordinate and clear guidance, obtaining concurrences of Intelligence and Operations as necessary.

(4) Guidance originating as above, and any press censorship guidance originating at Headquarters, will be issued to all press censorship personnel concerned, using the quickest authorized channels available.

(5) Operational press censorship guidance will be issued at least twice in every 24 hours to define clearly what communiqué background material is “on the record” and what is “off the record”.

CLASSIFICATION
APPENDIX IV
ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION, AND MEMORANDUMS

Section I. ORDERS

Example 3. Order Establishing Joint Field Press Censorship Group and Appointing Chief Field Press Censor

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 600

5 January 1953

GENERAL ORDERS

NUMBER 3

ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP GROUP (JFPCG) AND APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF FIELD PRESS CENSOR

I. REFERENCE. Army Regulations 360-65, OPNAV Instruction 55303, Air Force Regulation 190-11.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP GROUP. The Joint Field Press Censorship Group (JFPCG), Far East Command, is established effective 1 January 1953, and placed under the operational control of the Public Information Officer, Headquarters, Far East Command.

III. APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF FIELD PRESS CENSOR. Colonel JAMES T. SHERIDAN, A0429294, United States Air Force, this headquarters, is appointed Chief Field Press Censor, Far East Command, and will perform the duties and administer the responsibilities enumerated in paragraph 19 of the above reference, under the operational control of the Public Information Officer, Headquarters, Far East Command.

IV. COMBINED FUNCTION. The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, has concurred in the inclusion of United Nations Command personnel, as required, within the Joint Field Press Censorship Group, and has empowered the Chief Field Press Censor and personnel of the Joint Field Press Censorship Group, within the scope of their respective assigned responsibilities and authority as delineated herein, to act on United Nations Command field press censorship matters.

V. COMPOSITION OF JOINT FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP GROUP. 1. The Joint Field Press Censorship Group will include field press censorship elements of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as indicated:

a. The respective services will each provide a Deputy Chief Field Press Censor, and a Field Press Censorship Detachment composed of a sufficient number of qualified personnel to accomplish the efficient and expeditious censorship of material pertaining to that service.

b. These officers and detachments are designated Deputy Chief Field Press Censor (Army), (Navy), or (Air Force), and Field Press Censorship Detachment (Army), (Navy), or (Air Force), as appropriate.

c. Field press censorship personnel of the respective services of the other nations of the United Nations Command will be made available to the Joint Field Press Censorship Group as required.

2. The duties and responsibilities of the respective Deputy Chief Field Press Censors are those enumerated in paragraph 20 of the above reference.

CLASSIFICATION
VI. GOVERNING DIRECTIVES. Field press censorship in the Far East Command and United Nations Command will be conducted in accordance with the referenced regulations as supplemental or adapted to the needs of this theater by means of directives promulgated by the Chief Field Press Censor, Far East Command, and published by this headquarters.

[AG 000.7 (5 Jan 53) PIO]

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
/s/ H. H. WILD
H. H. WILD
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General

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CLASSIFICATION

Section II. LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

Example 4. Letter of Instructions on Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship

AG000.73 (6 Jan 53) PIO

SUBJECT: Joint Field Press Censorship, Far East Command

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East, APO 343
Commander Naval Forces, Far East, c/o FPO, San Francisco, Cal
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

1. References.
   a. General Orders No. 3, 5 Jan 53, Hq, FEC.
   c. AR 360-60/Navy OPNAV Instr 6530.7/AFR 190-11.
   d. AR 360-60/Navy OPNAV Instr 5720.6/AFR 190-9.
   e. AR 360-5.
   f. AR 380-5.
   g. SR 360-5-1.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this letter is to provide basic policies, procedures and instructions for the operation of the Joint Field Press Censorship Group (JFPCG), Far East Command, comprised of the field press censorship detachments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force specified in paragraph 6e hereof. The Chief Field Press Censor, Headquarters, Far East Command, is Chief, JFPCG, and will exercise operational control over all personnel thereof. Under the operational control of the Public Information Officer, Far East Command, he is responsible for staff coordination and supervision over and implementation of field press censorship in the United Nations and Far East Commands.

3. Definitions.
   a. News Material. All information and material, whether of fact or of opinion and whether visual or auditory, for dissemination to the public including "letters to the editor" and service or business messages between a correspondent and his employer or agency.
   b. Field Press Censorship. The security review of news material as established under the authority of reference 1, above, and of this letter and operated in accordance with the provisions thereof.
4. **Jurisdiction.**
   a. All news material of the following categories originating within the United Nations and Far East Commands is subject to field press censorship:
      1. News material including service or business messages from correspondents accredited to the United Nations and Far East Commands or to any echelon thereof.
      2. News material resulting from facilities granted by Headquarters, United Nations and Far East Commands, or by the Headquarters of any echelons thereof.
      3. News material including "letters to the editor" prepared by persons in, attached to, serving with, or accompanying any of the armed forces of the United Nations and Far East Commands.
      4. Civilian enterprise newspapers, news sheets, news bulletins, and like publications published by civilians primarily in the interest of persons in, attached to, serving with, or accompanying the armed forces of the United Nations and Far East Commands.
      6. Public Information releases, productions, and material of all kinds including official photographic material intended for dissemination to the public.
      7. Psychological Warfare news material. Special cognizance will be taken of the requirements for expeditious review of such material; normally field press censors should be outposted at the point where such material is processed or transmitted; where this is impracticable authority to conduct the field press censorship review of such material may be delegated.
   b. Responsibility for the maintenance of security in connection with service and civilian welfare newspapers, news sheets, news bulletins and like unit and base publications, other than theater type service and civilian welfare newspapers referred to in a(5), above, is that of the officer responsible for the production and issuance thereof. Officers responsible for the preparation and issuance of such material will maintain liaison with field press censorship, as required, to insure conformity with field press censorship regulations, directives, and guidances.
   c. The jurisdiction of field press censorship does not include official military photographic material when in official channels, except that all such material for dissemination to the public will be submitted to field press censorship or Security Review Branch Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, for review prior to the release thereof in accordance with a(6) and (7) above.

5. **Policy.**
   a. Field press censorship will be governed by the principles that the maximum of information will be released to the public with a minimum of time consumed in review, at the same time denying the enemy information which would enable him to prosecute the war more effectively. Following this principle, news material will be released unless it—
      1. Will supply military information of value to the enemy; or
      2. Will have an adverse effect upon the combat efficiency of our forces or those of our allies; or
      3. Is false or inaccurate in respects which are detrimental to our forces or those of our allies and at the same time of service to the enemy.
   b. The basic objectives of field press censors will be—
      2. Speed.
      3. Consistency.
      4. Censorship guidance and assistance to correspondents.

6. **Procedures.**
   a. Field press censorship personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be made available to Joint Field Press Censorship Group by the respective services of the United States and of the other nations represented in the United Nations Command as required. All such personnel will be under the operational control of the Chief Field Press Censor, Far East Command. It is of the utmost importance that officers selected for this duty be chosen, not only on the basis of their experience and background in military security and military
affairs, but also upon the basis of an established background of knowledge and understand-
ing of the vital need for getting news to the public and an understanding and sympathetic
attitude toward the problems of correspondents. Personnel assigned to this duty should be
mature officers with sufficient experience and background to appreciate the significance of
military actions and preferably with experience in fields requiring the critical analysis of
information.

b. The Chief Field Press Censor, Far East Command, will—

(1) Coordinate and supervise the establishment of a field press censorship organi-
zation of sufficient size to effect the review of the maximum amount of news material which
it is anticipated will require review and promulgate the necessary directives, field press cen-
sorship guidances, and administrative memoranda required to govern field press censorship
activity and to maintain a uniform field press censorship policy within the area. Such
directives and guidances will be the sole regulations or directives published by Head-
quarters, Far East Command, governing the release of news material within this theater.
No subordinate commands will issue subsequent regulations at variance with those received
from the Chief Field Press Censor.

(2) Allocate field press censorship detachments as required.

(3) Be responsible for field press censorship in any case where news material
cannot be conveniently dealt with by an outposted field press censorship detachment.

(4) Deal with points of doubt referred by outposted field press censorship detach-
ments for determination.

(5) Make provision for necessary liaison on censorship matters with other agencies
in the military establishment and with civil or military authorities of any allied or neutral
government having jurisdiction over the area involved. In matters of primary importance,
the Department of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, as appropriate, should be made
cognizant of such liaison especially when an allied or neutral government is involved.

c. The respective Services each will provide a Deputy Chief Field Press Censor
and a Field Press Censorship Detachment of sufficient personnel to accomplish the expe-
ditious censorship of news material pertaining to that Service. Normally news material
pertaining to the Army (Navy, Air Force) will be reviewed by a censor of that Service.
These officers and detachments are designated: Deputy Chief Field Press Censor (Army)
and Field Press Censorship Detachment (Army) and similarly for the Navy and Air Force.
They may be abbreviated. Dep Ch Fld Press Censor (A) and Fld Press Censorship (A),
and similarly for the Navy and the Air Force. The Deputy Chief Field Press Censors
(Army) (Navy) (Air Force) will be responsible for—

(1) Supervision of the establishment and operation of field press censorship pert-
aining to his respective Service.

(2) Where appropriate, the command of the field press censorship organization of
his respective Service.

(3) The preparation of such reports on field press censorship operations or on
information gained therefrom as are required by or would be helpful to the Department of
the Army (Navy, Air Force).

(4) Provision necessary for specialized instruction of field press censors of his
Service under his supervision and furnishing them with any information they may require
for the proper performance of their duties.

d. Personnel of the respective Services will remain under the administrative control
of that Service.

e. In addition to censors, officer, warrant officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel
will be assigned by the respective Services to duty with Joint Field Press Censorship Group
and to the detachments of the respective Services as required by the volume of news material
and administrative necessity.


a. Prior to transmittal or publication, news material will be submitted for review
by field press censorship as follows:

(1) News material originating in the Eighth Army—Fifth Air Force zone of re-
sponsibility, except material emanating from the Military Armistice Conference, will be
submitted for review to Korea Section, Joint Field Press Censorship Group, now located
in Seoul.

(2) News material originating from the Military Armistice Conference will be
submitted to the field press censorship installation at the site or to Korea Section, JFPCG.
(3) News material originating in the Korea Communications Zone—Fifth Air Force area of responsibility will be submitted for review to Korea Section, JFPCG, to such other field press censorship installations in Korea as may be established and designated by the Chief Field Press Censor, or to Joint Field Press Censorship Group, Headquarters, Far East Command.

(4) News material of the following categories arising anywhere in the United Nations and Far East Commands other than specified in (1), (2), and (3) above, and which deals with the operations of the forces of the commands will be submitted for review to Joint Field Press Censorship Group, Headquarters, Far East Command:

(a) Concerning military operations of any of the armed forces of the United Nations and Far East Commands.

(b) Concerning the movement of units to and from and within the United Nations and Far East Commands.

(c) Concerning equipment, the presence of which within the United Nations and Far East Commands has not been released.

(5) In situations where the submission of news material to field press censorship is impracticable, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, and Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, may authorize appropriate officers to conduct the security review of such news material prior to its release consistent with appropriate current field press censorship guidance.

b. Correspondents will employ only the following communications facilities and only for the purposes for which they are provided:

(1) Telephone and teletype facilities established at the Correspondents' Billet, Seoul, Korea, and at other locations in Korea expressly for the transmission of news material from Korea to Japan. These facilities will be operated only by military personnel. Transmission of uncensored news material between Korea and Japan, except by secure means authorized for the transmission of classified material, is prohibited.

(2) Telephone, teletype, and ship to shore facilities made available in the discretion of local commanders, through their public information officers or otherwise, for the transmission of news material to field press censorship or, where such news material has undergone final security review by such local commander or his authorized representative, for release. Responsibility for the maintenance of communications security remains that of the officer responsible for such communications.

(3) Communications facilities may be made available to correspondents for routine administrative communications and correspondents may be authorized to personally place administrative telephone calls. Such communications, however, will be held to a minimum, both in number and length, and will be subject to censorship at the discretion of field press censorship. Field press censors are authorized to withdraw the administrative telephone call privilege in the event its exercise interferes with military or news material transmission, or when abuse of the privilege is indicated. Such withdrawals may be individual or collective and for stipulated or indeterminate periods. Strict supervision over the administrative telephone call privilege is vital to the maintenance of security, and officers granting or controlling administrative communications by correspondents will insure that security is not violated.

(4) Postal services of any of the Armed Forces of the United Nations and Far East Commands may be employed to forward uncensored news material to a field press censorship detachment.

(5) Military courier communications facilities may be employed to forward uncensored news material to a field press censorship detachment.

(6) News material which has been censored may be transmitted by any means.

c. (1) News media within the Command having one or more correspondents accredited thereto are authorized to process photographic news material in commercial laboratory facilities of such news media for subsequent submission to censorship. Such authority is subject to termination at the discretion of Chief Field Press Censor if security is compromised or threatened.

(2) Unprocessed photographic material and accompanying captions, destined for the United States, will be forwarded only to the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, Washington 25, D. C., for delivery to the agency concerned after review and will be transmitted either through U. S. Armed Forces channels, or with appropriate security precautions, through civilian facilities. Exceptions to this procedure may be authorized by the Chief Field Press Censor.
CLASSIFICATION

8. Field Press Censorship Stamps. Field press censorship stamps, as illustrated in
reference 1a, will be used exclusively following receipt and distribution. Use of existing
stamps in use by field press censors is authorized until such stamps are replaced. When
field press censorship stamps are not in use by authorized personnel, they will be stored in a
secure manner as determined by the senior field press censor at installation where stored.


a. JFPCG will maintain censorship detachments at Headquarters, Far East Com-
mand, and in the vicinity of Headquarters, Eighth Army and Headquarters, Fifth Air Force,
and will provide such additional detachments as may be required. Press Advisory Division
(FWD), Public Information Office, Headquarters, Far East Command, and Korea detac-
ment, News Security Division, Public Information Office, Headquarters, Far East Air
Forces, located at Headquarters, Eighth Army are redesignated Korea Section, Joint Field
Press Censorship Group, Headquarters, Far East Command. A field press censorship detach-
ment will be established at the Military Armistice Conference site when warranted by the
amount of news material originating at the Military Armistice Conference. Other installa-
tions may be established as determined by the Chief Field Press Censor and will be staffed
by censors of the respective Services as determined by him.

b. Press Advisory Division, Public Information Office, Headquarters, Far East Com-
mand, and News Security Division, Public Information Office, Headquarters, Far East Air
Force, and Press Advisory Division, COMNAVFE, are designated Joint Field Press Censor-
ship Group, Headquarters, Far East Command.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

/S/ H. H. WILD
H. H. WILD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
All Staff Sections
IIQ, FEC

Section III. MEMORANDUMS

Example 5. Operations Memorandum on Field Press Censorship

CLASSIFICATION

OPERATION MEMORANDUM
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

NUMBER 27

PRESS CENSORSHIP

1. OBJECT.
The object of this memorandum is to prescribe the policy and procedure for press
censorship in connection with forthcoming operations.

2. DEFINITIONS. (Note.—To avoid confusion the definitions employed in AR
360-65/OPNAV Instr. 5530.3/AFR 190-11 15 August 1952 have been substituted for those
contained in the original memorandum.)

a. News material means all information and material, whether of fact or of opinion
and whether visual or auditory, for dissemination to the public including "letters to the
editor" and service or business messages between a correspondent and his employer or
agency.

b. Field press censorship means the security review, as established under the author-
ity of AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr 5530.3/AFR 190-11 and of this memorandum and operated
in accordance with the provisions thereof, of news material of the following categories:

(1) News material including service or business messages from correspondents
accredited to the theater, force, or area or to lower echelons thereof.

(2) News material resulting from facilities granted by the theater, force, or other
area commander or by the headquarters of any lower echelon thereof.

(3) News material including “Letters to the Editor“ prepared by persons in,
attached to, serving with, or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States

(4) Civilian enterprise newspapers, news sheets, news bulletins, and like publica-
tions published by civilians in the interests of persons in, attached to, serving with, or accompanying United States Armed Forces.

(5) Theater type service and civilian welfare newspapers.
(6) Public information releases, productions, and material of all kinds including official photographic material for dissemination to the public.
(7) Psychological warfare productions and material; special cognizance will be taken of the requirement for expeditious review of such material; normally, field press censors should be outposted at the points where such material is processed or transmitted; where this is impracticable, authority to conduct the field press censorship review of such material may be delegated with the approval of the theater, force, or other area commander, to specifically designated psychological warfare officers.
(8) Reports of the operations of the forces of the theater, force, or other area commander (including foreign language material) originating or published in liberated or occupied areas.

3. OBJECTIVES. (Note.—To avoid confusion the objectives employed in AR 360-65/OPNAV Instr. 5530.3/AFR 190-11 have been substituted for those contained in the original memorandum.)

a. Field press censorship will be governed by the principle that the maximum of information will be released to the public with a minimum of time consumed in review, at the same time denying the enemy information which would enable him to prosecute the war more effectively. Following this principle, news material will be released unless it—
(1) Will supply military information of value to the enemy; or
(2) Will have an adverse effect upon the combat efficiency of our forces or those of our allies; or
(3) Is false or inaccurate in respects which are detrimental to our forces or those of our allies and of service to the enemy.

It is emphasized that field press censorship is exercised for security only, and that news material will not be deleted or stopped on policy grounds. The field press censor is concerned only with preventing the transmission of information which will aid the enemy. His authority will not be used to prevent the transmission of news upon the ground of anticipated adverse reaction by the American public.

b. The basic objectives of Field Press Censorship organization will be—
(1) Security.
(2) Speed.
(3) Consistency.
(4) Censorship guidance and assistance to war correspondents.

c. Press and Photographic policies are prescribed in SHAEF Operation Memoranda Nos. 24 and 33, respectively.

4. RESPONSIBILITY.

a. The basic press censorship policy prescribed in this memorandum will be amplified as may be necessary by the Supreme Commander. Within this Headquarters, responsibility for recommending and carrying out policy will rest with Chief of the Public Relations Division, acting in consultation with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Chief of Staff, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, and Senior Air Staff Officer, Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

b. Under the general direction of the Supreme Commander, through the Chief of the Public Relations Division, the execution of Field Press Censorship overseas will be the responsibility of Army Group Commanders for the territory under their control undertaken in consultation with the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force and the Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, as necessary.

c. The Public Relations Division at this Headquarters will be responsible for the remainder of Field Press Censorship, including Field Press Censorship in the United Kingdom, and will also be responsible for giving rulings and guidance to authorities responsible for censorship of press material outside the categories mentioned in paragraph 2b.

5. PROCEDURE.

a. In principle, decentralization of press censorship is undesirable from the points of view of both security and of consistency. A certain degree of decentralization may, however, become essential.

b. Field Press Censorship will be carried out by joint press censorship units comprising UNITED STATES, BRITISH, CANADIAN Army, Air and insofar as the situation
renders it necessary, Naval personnel provided by the commanders mentioned in paragraph 4b.

c. The Public Relations Division at this Headquarters will—

(1) Establish a Field Press Censorship organization of a sufficient size to be capable of censoring the maximum amount of material which can reasonably be expected to be produced by the accredited correspondents at any stage of the operations.

(2) Apportion units as required from the Field Press Censorship organization to Army Group Headquarters.

(3) Maintain a uniform press censorship policy by the issue of directives to Joint press censorship units, and, by liaison, through appropriate channels, with Military Postal and Cable Censorship, the Military Censorship of Civilian Communications, United States Office of Censorship, Theatre Censor European Theatre of Operations, United States Army and the Ministry of Information.

(4) Be responsible for field press censorship in any case where press material cannot conveniently be dealt with by a joint censorship unit.

(5) Deal with points of doubt referred by joint press censorship units to this Headquarters for policy decision.

d. Press traffic will not be enciphered/encoded. No transmission of press material by any means liable to interception will be made forward of censorship. As circumstances permit, courier services, including air courier services, will be provided to ensure that press material is brought back for censorship and clearance without delay.

e. Wireless transmission in clear of censored press dispatches shall not begin from the bridgehead or from any vessel until specifically authorized by the Supreme Commander.

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIAL. Psychological Warfare material will normally be dealt with under the procedure outlined above, but where circumstances render it necessary the censorship of Psychological Warfare material may, with the approval of Army Group Commanders or this Headquarters, as the case may be, be delegated to specially designated Psychological Warfare Branch Officers.

7. MATERIAL ORIGINATING IN LIBERATED OR OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.

a. Arrangements will be made at the earliest possible moment for the assumption by nationals of liberated countries of responsibility for press censorship of material originating or published in those countries. Before final agreement on such an arrangement, the proposals will be coordinated with the requirements of Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 and G-3, this Headquarters. Such arrangements will include provision—

(1) that close liaison will be maintained with Joint Field Press Censorship, and

(2) that reports of Allied Expeditionary Force operations will not be published without submission to Joint Field Press Censorship.

b. Responsibility for the execution of press censorship of material originating or published in enemy territory occupied by Allied Expeditionary Force will remain with the authorities mentioned in paragraph 4b unless and until altered by directive from this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. R. BULL,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3A

CLASSIFICATION

Form 1. Letter of Instruction Regarding Guidances

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Station and Headquarters
Place
Date and Time

SUBJECT: Field Press Censorship Guidances.

TO: All Recipients of Field Press Censorship Guidances.

1. Reference is made to Operation Memorandum No. ---- , dated -------------- , authorizing and directing the establishment of Joint Field Press Censorship Group, this headquar-
ters, assigning to the Group responsibility for promulgating guidances for field press censors and public information officers within the theater; and authorizing direct communication on field press censorship matters between Chief, Joint Field Press Censorship Group, and the appropriate agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Department of Defense for that purpose.

2. Enclosed herewith for information and guidance are the initial field press censorship guidances issued by the Chief, Joint Field Press Censorship Group. Additional field press censorship guidances will be issued as the occasion require and new policies are established.

3. All news material will be censored uniformly in accordance with the principles laid down in these guidances as they apply. It is not expected that these guidances will be all inclusive and they are not expected to substitute for basic security principles and sound reasoning. The guidances will be applied to news material of all kinds by trained officer personnel specifically assigned and detailed to field press censorship.

4. Press censorship guidances will be frequently formulated to cover possible eventualities and new developments in tactics, operations, and materiel. It should be understood therefore that the guidances do not necessarily forecast future plans or anticipate developments or state accurately conditions actually prevailing in the theater at any time.

5. Field press censorship guidances will be shown only to authorized military personnel whose duties require their use. They will not be used as source material for public information releases or for discussions with the press. They will, however, be particularly helpful in informing PIO's with respect to what to disclose or not to disclose to correspondents on given subjects.

6. Press censorship guidances will normally be classified. They will be safeguarded accordingly and receipting procedures complied with expeditiously.

Signature.

Example 6. Excerpt From Theater Regulations for Correspondents

REGULATIONS FOR WAR CORRESPONDENTS ACCOMPANYING ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN THE FIELD, 1944

FOREWORD

To Press and Radio representatives accredited to Allied Expeditionary Force:

With regard to publicity, the first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile these sometimes diverse considerations.

I well appreciate that the man in the street is entitled to be informed about his country's forces and of the progress of the war. He is vitally interested, and the fullest and most accurate information, compatible with maintenance of military security, should be made available to him. Only by the willing cooperation of the general public in the war effort can we be victorious.

I am glad to have you with us; I know that we can so cooperate that this particular job will be well done.

/S/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, U. S. Army,
Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX A

1. CENSORSHIP.

(1) Press Copy. All material for publication in the Press including captions for photographs, for newsreel commentaries, and for broadcasting will be submitted for censorship in triplicate, or as required locally. Censorship regulations will be issued by the Supreme Commander, AEF; the senior PR officer will be responsible for all War Correspondents being fully conversant with local censorship regulations as amended from time to time.
(i) Photographs, Films and Sketches. Pictures of all kinds taken or made during the
period of accreditation are subject to censorship. Sketches and undeveloped films and
plates must be handed to a PR officer, who will arrange for their censorship and transmit-
ion. Whenever possible, arrangements will be made for local development of negatives;
but until such arrangements can be made, undeveloped films or plates may be forwarded
direct to the appropriate Service Department in the UK through normal Service channels.

(ii) Private Correspondence. Private and personal correspondence of correspondents
must be submitted for censorship. Correspondents are not permitted to seal and “frank”
their own letters. Private and business communications can be sent from the zone of opera-
tions only through official channels. Further information will be given by the senior PR
officer.

2. SECURITY.

It is impossible to lay down permanent directions on matters to which reference is
forbidden. In certain cases, the position may be affected by local considerations and by
operational developments.

(i) Reference to any of the following cannot normally be made, for security reasons, in
Press reports. The list is to be taken as a guide only, and is not comprehensive:

(a) Composition and location of any units of the Allied Forces.
(b) Details of movements of forces, personnel, or equipment.
(c) Operational orders.
(d) Plans and intended operations.
(e) Casualties.
(f) Organization.
(g) Place names (before reference in communiques or censorship directive).
(h) Camouflage and decoy methods.
(i) Names or numbers of any units of the Allied Forces, unless specifically released.
(j) Speculation upon any of the above.

(ii) Caution should also be exercised in dealing with weapons or equipment of
war, e.g., naval vessels, aircraft, tanks, etc.

(iii) Generally speaking there is no objection to referring to units as “an artillery
unit?”, “a West Country Regiment,” “a Highland Battalion,” “an American Squadron”, etc.

(iv) In describing a defensive position occupied, or being prepared, by Allied troops,
it is essential that such descriptions should not include information of value to the enemy.
To quote some obvious instances, no reference should be made to the nature of antitank or
other obstacles, fortifications, depth of the position, etc. It is permissible to talk in general
terms of trenches, wire, concrete, etc.

(v) Only such details as have already been published or authorized concerning arms
and equipment, etc., of the Allied Forces can be mentioned. No reference can be made to
modifications or improvements to such arms and equipment without authority.

(vi) New types or novel methods of attack or defense should not be referred to until
they have been disclosed officially.

CLASSIFICATION

Example 7. Memorandum Advising Correspondents with Respect to Submis-
sion of Copy

CLASSIFICATION

UNITED STATES ARMY PRESS CENSORS

AND

UNITED STATES NAVY PRESS CENSORS

ROOM 16

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, MALET STREET, W. C. 1.

8th December 1943.

This memorandum is designed to explain the mechanics of press censorship in this
theater to newly arrived correspondents accredited to the U. S. Forces.

1. LOCATION OF PRESS CENSORSHIP OFFICE

The offices of the United States Army and Navy Press Censors, ETOUSA are at Room
16, Ministry of Information, Malet Street, London, W. C. 1. The office is open twenty-four
hours a day.
U. S. NAVY—Euston 4321, Extension 426.

The Chief Press Censor for the Army is Capt. E. F. Nute; for the Navy, Lt. Joseph V. McNamara.


II. PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING COPY

CABLES

Cables may be filed at the offices of any of the companies handling press messages, or at the MOI. If filed with the U. S. Censors they will handle the censoring and forwarding, if desired, or the correspondent can himself file his dispatch after review at the cable desk, MOI, which accepts messages for all companies.

Copy handed in at the MOI must be in duplicate and must, of course, give the addressee, the route by which the message is to be dispatched, and the name, address and telephone number of the sender.

Censorship of cables is handled by the U. S. Censors through liaison with the British Censorship. Most references are handled by telephone, but in some cases it is necessary to teleprint copy from the Cable Office to the Ministry of Information for reference to the U. S. Censors. Where the story is a long one or involves points which are likely to raise censorship questions its handling will be expedited if the filer will file the original of his dispatch with the U. S. Censors at Room 16, MOI and a copy at the Cable Office, indicating on the copy that the original is lodged with the U. S. Censor. The censors will then review the dispatch and telephone the censor on duty at the Cable Office advising him of the action taken. This saves the time consumed in dealing with the dispatch over the telephone or teleprinting it to the MOI.

MAILERS

Mail copy should be delivered to the U. S. Censor, Room 16, MOI together with an addressed envelope, unsealed.

This copy will be reviewed, sealed, and sent forward by the U. S. Censors who will submit anything of British interest to the proper British authorities before forwarding. Copy should indicate the telephone number of the correspondent so the censors can advise him of any cuts made.

Three methods are available for mailing stories to the United States—

(a) U. S. Army Air Transport (urgent material relating wholly or principally to the U. S. Army or Navy).
(b) United States Air Mail or ordinary first-class mail.
(c) V-mail.
(d) British post (air or sea).

All press mail going forward by U. S. Army Air Transport or as U. S. air mail or first-class mail, goes forward to the Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington, D. C. That going by U. S. Army Air Transport is carried to Washington without postage where it is delivered by the Bureau of Public Relations to the office of the sender; such mail going to any destination other than Washington, D. C., must bear proper airmail or first-class postage.

V-mail must bear postage at first-class postage rates. A 3-cent stamp must be affixed to the back of the V-mail blank.

Material sent by British post must, of course, bear the correct postage. It is turned over by the U. S. Censors to the British Postal Section, MOI after review.

PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs are submitted to the Photograph Section, Press Censorship Division, Room 43, MOI which refers those of U. S. interest to the U. S. Censor.

Photographs must be submitted in triplicate.

They may be mailed forward after censoring if the correspondent so desires and an addressed, unsealed envelope with the necessary postage is delivered with them. See MAILERS above.

CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION

FACILITY VISITS

Copy resulting from U. S. facility visits is reviewed in its entirety by the U. S. Censors. The following rules apply:

(i) Mark your copy "U. S. FACILITY—ATTENTION U. S. CENSORS."
(ii) Put the date and your telephone number on the copy.
(iii) Submit in triplicate to Room 16, MOI.
(iv) If it is desired that a cable be dispatched, so state and indicate the route.

Cable copy will be expedited if in addition to the three copies filed at the MOI a fourth copy is filed at the Cable Office with a notation that the original has been submitted to the U. S. Censors, MOI. See CABLES above.

Photographs resulting from facility visits should be sent to Room 43, MOI in triplicate marked "U. S. FACILITY VISIT, ATTENTION U. S. CENSORS."

III. GENERAL

CLEARANCE OF PAPERS ON RETURN

Upon return to the United States all notebooks and papers must be checked. The Travelers and Permit Section, Room 114, Russell Square House, MOI, (Miss Galway, Terminus 3622, Ext. 1685) handles this. Correspondents may deal directly with this Section (which refers items of U. S. interest to the U. S. Censors) or bring their papers to Room 16.

After check, the papers are sealed to pass customs.

PERSONAL MAIL

Correspondents are required to use the Army Post Office for their personal correspondence. Postage must be paid. With reference security requirements in personal correspondence, attention is directed to Circular No. 65, Headquarters, ETOUSA, dated 26 August 1943.

GENERAL

The U. S. Censors are desirous of affording every facility to correspondents and photographers in the handling of their copy. The office is open twenty-four hours a day. Please feel free to call on them for guidance or assistance at any time.

CLASSIFICATION
APPENDIX V
FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP GUIDANCES (FPCG)

Example 8. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—General

CLASSIFICATION
27 June 1944
2000 hours

SHAESF Press Censors Guidance No. 149

CHERBOURG HARBOUR

STOP:
1. Any indication of the rate of opening or clearing of Cherbourg harbour.
2. Any estimates of tonnages we may be able to unload other than speculation based on prewar figures. No official statement is likely to be issued.
3. Any details of damage at particular quays.

PASS:
1. Dock repair parties have gone in.
2. That we may use beaches for unloading.

AUTHORITY:
Lt Col Warden
Naval Advisers—2000 hours

Example 9. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—Naval Bombardment

CLASSIFICATION

ComNavFE Press Censor Guidance Memorandum No. 16.

Subj: Nonvisual and Night Bombardment (aerial and shore).

1. Pass the following:
   a. Mention of radar-controlled naval gunfire and targets hit.
   b. Mention of radar controlled bombing and targets hit.
   c. Stories on ability to bombard land targets with electronically controlled gunfire providing no speculation or definite statements (number of yards, etc.) are made relative to accuracy other than in general terms.
   d. Stories on aircraft-directed naval gunfire providing details of procedures are not outlined.
   e. Stories on aerial bombardment directed by naval vessels provided details of procedures are not given.

2. Do not pass the following:
   a. Type of and characteristics of radars, directors, computers, etc., used in electronically controlled bombardment and aerial bombing.
   b. Mention of maximum or minimum ranges.
   c. Mention of effectiveness of night (or any nonvisual) aerial bombardment at various altitudes.
   d. Stories about procedures used in nonvisual shore and aerial bombardment.
   e. Photographs showing equipment used in aerial bombardment such as radars, etc.
   f. Photographs showing gun-laying or fire-control equipment used in nonvisual shore bombardment.
Example 10. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—Materiel

PRESS CENSORS GUIDANCE NO. 3

Republic F-84 Thunderjet

PASS:

1. That one group of F-84's is in the theater.
2. Armament consists of 6 x .50 caliber machine guns located in wings. Can carry 2 x 1,000 lb. bombs or 32 x 5” HVAR rockets, or 2 Tiny Tims plus 16 rockets.
3. Normally each plane carries 2 x 230 gal. tip tanks, and can carry 2 additional 230-gal. tanks on wing bomb shackles.
4. Performance:
   Range: 850 mi combat radius.
   Speed: 600 mph class.
   Power plant: 1 Allison J-35, 4,000 lbs. takeoff thrust.
6. Dimensions: Span 36’ 5”
   Length 37’ 3”
   Height 12’ 10”
   Weight 16,000 lbs.
7. External and internal photographs, provided no classified information shown.

STOP:

1. Letter designation of models in theater (i.e., F-84A, F-84B, etc.).
2. Number of squadrons, their locations and takeoff points. (To prevent disclosure of bases and precise combat radius.)
3. Any mention of losses or damage without prior approval of FEAF News Security Division.
4. Performance date other than Item 4 above, specifically detailed combat tactics.
5. Duration of flight.

Dwight E. Bonin
Lt. Col., USAF
Chief, News Security Division

See Distribution on PCG No. 1

Example 11. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—Special

SPECIAL PRESS CENSORSHIP GUIDANCE

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DESIGNATE TO KOREA

1. The following special guidance will govern the handling by field press censorship of news material in connection with the projected visit of the President Designate to Korea.
2. A complete blackout will be in effect during the entire period of the President Designate’s visit to Korea. The blackout will begin at a time to be announced and will continue in force until the end of the blackout is officially announced by a communiqué simultaneously in Tokyo and Korea. A memorandum, expressly marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION, has been issued to the press both at Tokyo and at Seoul advising that a blackout will
be placed in effect and outlining the procedures for the handling of copy with respect to the
visit. Mention of these arrangements is not to be passed. Effective immediately and until
the lifting of the blackout censors will therefore:

STOP:

a. Any mention of or information with respect to plans for press coverage of the visit.

b. Any statement that correspondents have been advised that a blackout will be placed
in effect at a time to be announced.

3. DURING THE BLACKOUT PERIOD all news material will be handled by field
press censorship at Seoul as follows:

a. Submissions will be logged carefully in order of precedence of receipt.

b. Submissions will be censored prospectively, i.e., as of the time of the termination
of the blackout. All such submissions will be forwarded to PIO FEC by courier pouch and
will be held by him until the termination of the blackout. Normal security rules will apply
to the censoring of these stories. Since the stories will all be held until the termination of
the blackout the following additional rules will obtain.

PASS:

(1) Precise time and place of the arrival in Korea.

(2) Type of aircraft utilized for trip from United States.

(3) Members of accompanying party.

(4) Locations and organizations visited, subject always to normal censorship rules
with respect to disclosure of headquarters and unit locations and the like.

(5) Mode of travel within the command.

STOP:

(1) Route followed from United States unless officially released.

(2) Time of departure from Korea more precisely than same is stated in official com-
muniqué terminating the blackout.

(3) Route to be followed in returning to United States, unless officially released.

c. No stories dealing with the President Designate, his party, or his visit will be
passed or returned to correspondents for electrical transmission to any point whatsoever.
This includes speculative stories with regard to the visit. It does not, however, include
factual quotation of enemy broadcasts or statements with regard to the visit when these
are attributed to the source and no speculation or interpretation is added, i.e., statements
made by Pyongyang radio with regard to the visit may be passed when attributed to the
source and nothing is added to the enemy statement. Censors are cautioned to examine
carefully this type of story and not pass same unless the correspondent satisfies them the
enemy in fact made the statement or claim.

3. Normal Korea coverage, excluding the President Designate's visit and activities
incident thereto, will be handled in a normal manner and may be transmitted by electrical
means after censorship in accordance with normal rules. However, censors will scrutinize
all routine or regular copy with extreme care to delete any direct or indirect statement,
inference or other disguised indication that the President Designate is in Korea.

4. When the blackout is lifted by release of the official communiqué stories concerning
the visit which have not been forwarded to Tokyo by courier may be processed and trans-
mitted in the normal manner and electrical transmission may be used.

JAMES T. SHERIDAN
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Field Press Censorship Division.

Example 12. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—General

CAUTION TO CENSORS

1. Difficulty and embarrassment have been occasioned in several instances recently by
the passing by censors of submissions in the erroneous belief that they had already been
passed in France.

SHAEF Press Censors Guidance No. 380

25 Aug 44
1600 hours
2. Censors are cautioned that theirs is the responsibility for passing a submission. If a censor is completely satisfied that the material in question has already been passed, he may act upon this premise but, to repeat, the responsibility is his own.

3. Recent instances suggest that censors have been too easily persuaded that material has already been censored. Where the item seems out of the ordinary or well in advance of existing guidance, or there is any slightest doubt, the censor must insist that the fact of prior censorship be demonstrated, and if in doubt, refer to higher authority.

AUTHORITY:
Lt. Col. Merrick

Example 13. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Theater—General

CENSORSHIP DELAY

1. On several occasions recently censorship delays have occurred in this office for which we, as a team, were to blame. The fact that such delays are no one individual's fault is not good enough.

2. When delays occur the cause is almost always reference from one censorship subdepartment to another.

3. NEVER leave a submission on another censor's desk without making sure he knows it. If the submission is urgent, and it usually is, impress this on him. If you can't find him, tell the SPC or the Continuity Officer.

4. If the story is referred to you, either stamp it out or return it to the one who referred it. In no case let it lie around either on your own or anyone else's desk.

5. It is the SPC's specific job to see that copy keeps moving and moving fast. He should be particularly alert with copy referred to us from the DAD, Rm 3 or Rm 4.

6. In connection with the above, i.e., reference to us from the MOI, remember that the MOI buck slip must be marked hold "A" or "B" in the event of our having to check up still further before censoring and the DAD immediately notified that we are holding it. (Hold "A" means a probable delay of one-half to three hours; hold "B" up to 24 hours.)

7. Within the limits of safety, speed must be kept up at all times.

AUTHORITY:
Lt. Col. Merrick

Example 14. Field Press Censorship Guidance—Army Group—Tactical

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
PRESS CENSORSHIP BRANCH
APO 655 US ARMY

PRESS CENSORS GUIDANCE NO. 320
THIRD ARMY SECTOR:

PASS:

1. 76th DIVISION advanced 2 miles to continue mopping up in pocket West of WIESBADEN.

2. 80th DIVISION took estimated 3,000 POWs yesterday.

3. 26th DIVISION advanced 10 miles Northeast to vicinity of BUDINGEN, 13 miles Northeast of HANAU.

4. 11th ARMORED met strong resistance in form of MINES, ROAD BLOCKS, and well defended positions. In vicinity of GELNHAUSEN they encountered 600 infantry and 5 tanks. Others of 11th ARMORED advanced 7 miles Northeast to vicinity of WENINGS, 25 miles Northeast of FRANKFURT.
5. 90th DIVISION advanced 10 miles Northeast to vicinity of ULRICH-STEIN and HERBSTSTEIN, 25 miles East of GIESSEN.

6. Elements of 4th ARMORED advanced 23 miles Northeast to point 4 miles Southeast of HERSFELS, 20 miles Northeast of LAUTERBACH. Other elements advanced 14 miles Northeast to vicinity of HERSFELS.

7. Elements of the 6th ARMORED advanced 30 miles North to point 10 miles South of KASSEL. Other elements of 6th ARMORED advanced 15 miles Northeast to vicinity of KAPPEL, 15 miles South of KASSEL.

8. 80th DIVISION is released in current action.

9. POWs processed last 24 hours—2,967. POWs this operation—20,019. POWs since 1 August—322,879. Estimated 10,000 taken yesterday.

AUTH: Durant TUSA 311205 March.

FIRST ARMY SECTOR:

PASS:

1. The 9th ARMD DIV advanced 28 miles from HOMBERG to the Eder River. Elements crossed the river on BRIDGES CAPTURED INTACT and took BERGHEIM (G 9886). Some resistance was encountered South of FRITZLAR (G 0782) where bridge over the EDER was blown. The advance was continued this morning at 0700 with ARMOR reaching NINZE (G 9593).

2. The 2d DIV continued mopping up in the rear of the advance of the 9th ARMD.

3. The 3d ARMED DIV continued the advance to the vicinity of PADERBORN (B-6047) against scattered resistance. Elements of this division are within 3000 yards of the town.

4. The 104th DIV continued in close support of the 3d ARMED DIV.

5. The 1st DIV secured the high ground and the section of SIEGEN (G-22053) along the Southern BANK of the River.

6. Other INFANTRY elements cleared the area south of the SIEG River between SCHEINSTEIN (G-0152) and ELSERFELD (G-1839). Further East they advanced 4000 yards along the River to DUEZ (G 2954).

7. POWs last 24 hours—1,206. This is exclusive of those taken by the 9th ARMORED DIVISION whose count is not in yet.

AUTH: FUSA 311220 March

JVG 31 March 1945—1600 hours

CLASSIFICATION

Example 15. Distribution Scheme for Field Press Censorship Guidelines

CLASSIFICATION

DISTRIBUTION "B"

American Express Building


Hotel Scribe


Special Delivery Service

35–36. London Deputy;

37–50. FPC, 21 Army Group (Rear) (14);

51–52. FPC, 12th Army Group (Main);

CLASSIFICATION 61
53-54. FPC, Press Camp, 12th Army Group;
55-56. FPC, 3rd U. S. Army;
57-59. FPC, 7th U. S. Army (1 to PRO);
60-66. U. S. Liaison Press Censors (Belgium), Brussels (7);
67. U. S. Army Press Censor, c/o PRO, DBS, Attn: Capt Welel;
68-69. FPC & PRO, Assembly Area Command, APO 752;
70-71. FPC, Radio Luxembourg;
72. FPC, Bremen Port Camp, Attn: Lt Stringer;
73-74. Press Censors, Berlin District Command;
75-76. U. S. Liaison Press Censor, Norway.

Information Control Censors

77. Bamberg, Attn: Lt Theune;
78. Bremen, Attn: Lt Miller;
79-80. Frankfurt and Bad Nauheim, Attn: Capt Volz;
81. Heidelberg, Attn: Lt Wolfe;
82. Kassel, Attn: Lt Jensen;
83. Munich, Attn: Capt Hunte;
84. Stuttgart, Attn: Lt Elbot;
85. Altdorf (Stars & Stripes), Attn: Capt Wood;
86. Pungstadt (Stars & Stripes), Attn: Lt Daly;

USAAF Field Press Censors (Distribution through Air Censors Rm 103)

87. USAAF Censors, Press Camp, Advance Hq, 9th Air Force.

Bomber Packet

88-91. Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington, D. C. (4);
92. Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Command, PR 3;
93. AFHQ, INC Section, Press & Radio Censorship Br., Det "A", APO 794;
94. C. G. S. Ottawa, D. M. I.

Example 16. Guidance for Correspondents in Connection with Facility Visit

Submission of articles
1. Mark your copy (articles, cables, etc.) “U. S. Facility—Attention U. S. Censors.”
2. Put your telephone number on your copy.
3. Then submit it in triplicate to the Press Counter, Ministry of Information, Malet Street, W. C. 1.
4. If you want a cable submission returned to you after censorship, say so on the copy. If you want it dispatched immediately, state by what route.
5. You may, if you like, file one copy at the Cable Office at the same time you file your three copies at the MOI. This, too, must be marked “U. S. Facility.” It will be held by the Censor at the Cable Company until he receives a clearance from the MOI.
6. Send Facility Visit photographs (and sketches) to Room 43, the MOI. They must be in triplicate, captioned and numbered. Mark your packets: “U. S. Facility—Attention, U. S. Censors.”
7. Facility visit films should be discussed with the U. S. Censors.
8. There will be NO embargo time fixed for this sortie.
9. The early filing of material will be appreciated.
A. RESERVATIONS

(1) The location and name of the depot: it must be described only as "Somewhere in England."

(ii) The names of officers above the rank of Lt. Colonel should be referred to the attending censorship officer, unless covered by "B" below.

(iii) In all stories, care should be taken not to compromise the current ruling against revealing the rapid expansion of ground troops in the U.K.

B. RELEASES


(iii) Col. N. A. Ryan, Transportation Corps.

(iv) The names and addresses (home town) and states of officers and enlisted men except as reserved in A (ii) above.

(v) All information contained in PRO information sheet.

Note. Points not covered by the above may be referred to the Commanding Officer or to the United States Army Censorship or Public Relations Officers who will be present.
### Appendix VI

**Field Press Censorship Records and Reports**

Example 17. Field Press Censorship Record of Submissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Correspondent</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Time In</th>
<th>Time Out</th>
<th>Censorship Action</th>
<th>Censor's Name</th>
<th>Censor's Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Pierpoint</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>22:1800</td>
<td>22:1805</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>Bunn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Randolph</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>22:1801</td>
<td>22:1830</td>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Bunn</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Classification**

*Figure 2. DD Form 627 with illustrative entries.*
### Example 18. Field Press Censorship Log

#### CLASSIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES</th>
<th>STATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP LOG</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRESPONDENT</th>
<th>AGENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peterson</td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE OF SUBMISSION (Telephone call, photo, copy)</th>
<th>TIME RECEIVED (hour and date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copy 6th take</td>
<td>1731 22 Jun 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-86 Sorties today</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CENSOR'S ACTION (Note, significant material passed):**

Cuts as follows:

Experienced intense [accurate] flak over Seoul ....... [Saw 3 of a crew of a B-29 bail out OK over P'yongyang at 1135] ....... As I finished my bomb strafing run on Kimpo the [Jagers] from the B-29's were hitting the bridge across the river ......

Passed:

Number of rockets fired (400).

**REMARKS**

Story based on AF handouts and various fighter pilot quotes phoned to AP from Base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME COMPLETED (hour and date)</th>
<th>CENSOR</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1737 22 Jun 51</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.** Field Press Censorship Log (DD Form 628) with illustrative entries.
SUBJECT: Trend of Copy Submitted for 12th Army Group Censorship Between 0800 Hours 15 April and 2400 Hours 22 April 1945.

I. Principal Subjects treated.
   1. LEIPZIG, GERMANY'S FIFTH LARGEST CITY, IS CAPTURED.
   2. THE NOTORIOUS BUCHENWALD CONCENTRATION CAMP.
   3. HITLER'S NATIONAL REDOUT AREA.
   4. EAST-WEST HANDSHAKE.
   5. SPEED OF ALLIED ADVANCE.

II. Trend of Copy passed for Publication.
   1. McDermott (UP). "The great American 'Circus' rolled through this fifth largest German city's streets today while the civilians jammed sidewalks as though watching a parade. The Germans seemed to think the American conquerers of Hitler's supermen were freaks—but these doughboys who fought into this stubbornly defended bastion are heroes. Hundreds of Russians, Poles, British, and Americans treated them as such. They yelled, cheered, and wept with joy at being liberated. Many Germans themselves waved handkerchiefs and smiled at the troops. It wasn't much thrill getting into Leipzig. It lacked the color and glamor of Cologne, Aachen, or Paris. Doughboys said it was just another job which had to be done. I do not know just what time today the city could be called completely cleared. The last Germans had held out in a railroad station, postoffice, and around Napoleon's monument until midmorning. At eleven a.m. Gordon Frazier of Blue Network and I drove past the railroad station and that much bombed building was quiet as a tomb. Down a side street to the south we heard one short burst of small arms fire. Then there was an explosion. We think the doughboys must have liquidated those German guns by tossing grenades. Silence followed. That was probably the last gasp in the German swansong here. The gunfire sounded as if it had come from the rear of Napoleon's statue. To the civilians the American 'Parade' was like a holiday. The stores were all closed. Most of them had the windows boarded. Men, women, and children hollered at the passing columns from sidewalks, windows and buildings overlooking the main streets. There didn't seem to be much animosity. The Germans were just glad the war for them was over. In one little barroom where GIs were congregated sampling liquors, an old red-faced German walked in and demanded a short beer. He insisted on having a beer because 'always got beer here every morning.' Pfc. Aubrey Shelton, 447 East 107th Street, Los Angeles, said, 'We told him 'New Order' had made changes. No beer.' He 'skapooted' hurriedly. At every street corner the people begged for food. We did not have any with us. Pfc. Dan Orouke, 240 Dana Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, tossed a package of K rations into one mob who were Russians and Poles. They fought like dogs for it. The box was ripped to shreds and men and women alike wrestled on the sidewalk for crumbs of crackers. It was a pathetic sight. On all sides were doughboys of the 69th and 2d Divisions. They had linked up in midtown early last night after driving through German lines from both the east and west. Pfc. James Maze, Richmond, Indiana, stroking three grenades which were hanging around his neck said, 'Funny thing. We fought like hell to get in here. Now we find the people glad to see us.' There was no rioting. The liberated peoples appeared still to fear the Germans. They even got off the sidewalk as the German civilians walked some streets. Captain Edward L. Farrel, 155 Hillside Road, Boston, said efforts of the city officials to surrender yesterday were halted by Berlin. The order was to hold the city at all costs. The defense thrown up by the Leipzig garrison in the final hours was little more than a token. It was only the fanatical troops who tried to hold out. The majority gave up without much struggle except in the southern sector of the city where a stiff fight lasted until this morning. Some sections of the city are almost completely wiped out as a result of many months 8th AAF bombings. Most of the downtown buildings are standing however. This city was much luckier than Aachen, Duren, and Cologne which took an awful beating. Leipzig is far from destroyed. It can rebuild and relive. But it is another dead city as far as the Nazis are concerned."
2. Whitehead: (Associated Press) "With FIRST ARMY 19 APRIL". Lampshades, book bindings, and wall ornaments made from the skin of Nazi victims who died in notorious Buchenwald concentration camp have been found near Weimar. "We heard about this when we were in England," said Captain J. Dabney Penick, Montclair, N. J., "but I just couldn't believe it. It was too fantastic and I chalked it up to war propaganda. But I saw them with my own eyes today." Penick and Major M. Goodwin, Atlanta, Ga., found men who had some of these hideous souvenirs. "They were sort of a fad started by the wife of prison commandant," Penick said. There was one piece of skin from a man's chest mounted on a board and covered with cellophane. Some Germans had seen the figure of a nude woman tattooed on a prisoner's chest and a section of skin including the nipples and the tattooing was removed and mounted on a board apparently for a wall decoration, Penick said. "A prisoner told us that the commandant's wife was killed in an air raid with her five children and that everyone got rough treatment after that even more brutal than before"; and he added "death, starvation, brutality, filth, and bestiality of the whole place was on such a huge scale that as you looked at it, you still could hardly believe what you saw."

3. MacGowan: (C. B. N. S.) "With ALLIED forces at NUREMBERG: I have been watching the battle of Hitler's National redoubt begin in earnest and already the gates of his chosen Valhalla are ablaze along the Danube valley. It is the most dramatic phase of the war I have yet witnessed as the French push from one side, the Russians from the other and Americans pushing centrally, demonstrating their eagerness to give the Nazi pagans all the Gotterdammerung they ask."

4. Anderson: (NBC) "The long-awaited EAST-WEST handshake is not far off and, though the Russians still have the ELBE RIVER to cross before giving the ALLIED salute, I wouldn't take any long weekend in Paris if I were covering the First Army. The RUSSIANS are about an hour's drive away in a fast tank and, when last spotted by ALLIED reconnaissance planes, our EASTERN ALLIES were not stopping for any vodka celebration along the way."

5. Gillard (BBC) "For the speed of the ALLIED advance has upset even the plans for the retirement into the fortress and the preparations for the last ditch stand. Even now, the Germans could do much—if only they had time, but time has to bought—bought—bought with men and the signs are that these last new divisions which have arrived on the front are too weak, too few, and too late."

III. Types of Censorship Cuts.

1. Carson: (International News) "Weissenfels, Germany. Twenty German officers in civilians' clothes known to be organizing police, soldiers, and civilians for guerrilla warfare following Reichs overall plan to continue the war on a guerrilla basis after capitulation. Army today began a search for twenty who have orders from Hitler to arm and organize the people in this area to carry on war behind the American lines sniping, sabotaging communications, ambushing supply columns, convoys. Twenty are reported to be in Weissenfels and Naumburg—where more than 100,000 Germans are now crammed in Prisoner of War cages."

2. Carpenter: (London Daily Herald and Boston Globe) "HODGES'S troops have today added power of German propaganda to their day's spoils. This afternoon just outside of Leipzig they overran Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda Headquarters. Like every other Nazi party headquarters it moved out of Berlin to what is now evident was the HARTZ MOUNTAINS redoubt area. In the past few days we stirred out several headquarters including Himmler's. And according to prisoners taken all this Thuringian and Hartz Mountains country was chosen as long ago as last February to safeguard Army and Party headquarters. Goebbels however, like Himmler, was not at home to the visiting troops of the 69th INFANTRY DIVISION who pushed on after reporting that in FREYBURG there was the largest concentration of files and papers ever seen."

3. McDermott: (United Press) "WITH FIRST US ARMY now revealable that a noted German industrialist Peter Speck prominent Nazi party member committed suicide today at his home in Guntheisen 12 miles Northeast of Nordhausen. There are no details available but it is believed likely that Speck might have been classified as a war criminal."

4. McDermott: (United Press) "Rumors are running wild on FIRST US ARMY front that Field Marshall MODEL is on the verge of surrendering the remainder of the troops in the RUHR POCKET. No confirmation. It is known however that MODEL was in the POCKET two days ago. It is possible that he has flown out."
**CLASSIFICATION**

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS REPORT IS STRICTLY FORBIDDEN. ONLY SUCH EXTRACTS AS ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY WILL BE MADE AND MARKED ACCORDINGLY.

For the Chief Press Censor:

/S/ KARL W. BROMEL
Karl W. Bromel
Capt., AUS

**DISTRIBUTION:**

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**CLASSIFICATION**
### Form 2. Censorship Record of Handling of Copy on Facility Visit

**CLASSIFICATION**

**DATE:** 11 January 1944

**FACILITY VISIT TO:** Hainault Transportation Corps Depot

**SECURITY RELEASE TIME:** None

**EMBARGO TIME:** None

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STOP(S)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>More than 200,000 tons of new rolling stock will have been completed when last car rolled onto storage tracks.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELEASES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.B. Cut made despite fact it was included in &quot;memo to press&quot; issued by SOS, PRO</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<td>Specifications for cars and locomotives taken from display cards</td>
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<td>Diesel, electric, and steam locomotives now coming over</td>
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<td>Locomotives not shipped knocked down, but intact</td>
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</tr>
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**CLASSIFICATION**

*Figure 4. Censorship record with illustrative entries showing handling of copy on facility visit.*
Form 3. Censorship Record of Handling of Copy on Air Operation

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<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>29 January 1944</th>
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**Frankfurt, Northern France**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communicate Number</th>
<th>#165 FLASH</th>
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</table>

**Release Number**

| Number | 8300 8302 8295 8296 8297 8298 8299 |

**Target**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heavies at Frankfurt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Component Parts of Target**

| Communications and Industrial Targets at Frankfurt |

**Size of Force**

| More than 800 Bombers |
| More than 1500 U.S. Aircraft |

**Types of Aircraft**

| Forts Libs Marauders |
| 978 447 657 |

**U.S. Losses**

| 0 Medium Bombers 13 AAF Fighters |
| 29 [81] Heavy Bombers |

**Enemy Losses**

| Total: 102 60 by Heavies |
| 42 by Fighters |

**Tonnage of Bombs**

| Over 1800 Tons |

**Stories Filed**

| BBC - NBC - AP - UP - INS - NY Times |
| Herald Tribune - Local Papers |

**Remarks**

1. The heaviest day/night attack to date.
2. Frankfurt 400 miles from England and day's round-trip was 800 miles.
3. Second attack by USAAF on Frankfurt.
4. Today's raid first raid under direct supervision of Bockscar. His presence in this theater released today.
5. Mustangs shot down 5 enemy aircraft.
6. For B-24's it is the eighth time in January that they have attacked military objectives in Northern France, flying over 1500 sorties with loss of three aircraft.
7. Note change in losses on Heavies - See Com. 66.

2 Bombers reported lost returned to base.

**Figure 5. Censorship record with illustrative entries showing handling of copy on air operation.**
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[AG 300.7 (30 Apr 54)]

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