HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 18 October 1967

ADVISOR HANDBOOK FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. Purpose

This manual provides the U. S. Army unit and sector/subsector (province/district) advisor to a host country (HC) a ready reference on doctrine and techniques which are employed most frequently in stability operations.

2. Scope

This manual does not attempt to encompass the entire body of doctrine and techniques which are applicable to internal defense and internal development operations, but rather it is intended to refresh the advisor's memory or refer him to other more detailed information.

a. This manual is not a substitute for field manuals such as FM 21-50, Ranger Training and Ranger Operations; FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling; FM 31-20, Special Forces Operational Techniques; FM 31-30, Jungle Training Operations; FM 33-1, Psychological Operations—U. S. Army Doctrine; and FM 57-35, Airmobile Operations. Specific manuals which should be consulted for more detailed information are FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations; FM 31-23, Stability Operations—U. S. Army Doctrine; FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations; and
FM 100–20, Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Internal Development. Applicable references are listed in appendix A.

b. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, N. C. 28307.

c. The doctrine contained herein applies to nuclear and nonnuclear; chemical, biological, and radiological; and internal defense and internal development operational environments. Doctrinal principles discussed include—

(1) Tactics and techniques which are employed most frequently by HC forces and their advisors where national government directives are translated into plans and operations.

(2) Support provided by U. S. Army and HC combat support and combat service support units; U. S. and HC Air Force and Navy; and the acquisition, coordination, and control of such support.

(3) Internal defense and internal development campaigns and operations, to include consolidation, strike, and remote area operations, and the six primary operational roles performed by armed forces in internal defense and internal development: advisory assistance, tactical, civil affairs, in-
telligence, populace and resources control, and psyc-
chological operations (PSYOP).

(4) Relationships between the U. S. Army
advisor and his counterpart, members of the U. S.
Country Team, and U. S. and other Free World
civil and armed forces operating in the HC.

3. Definitions

The terms listed below are used throughout the
manual. The definitions of these terms are taken
from approved U. S. Army doctrine. For the defini-
tions of other terms, see AR 320-5.

a. Asset (Intelligence). Includes any resource—
person, group, relationship, instrument, installa-
tion, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence
organization for use in an operational or support
role.

b. Espionage. The clandestine or covert use of
agent personnel and/or equipment in order to
obtain information.

c. Insurgency. A condition of revolt against a
government that is less than an organized revolu-
tion and is not recognized as belligerency. This
definition is used in conjunction with the condition
of insurgent war. Within the present context, sub-
versive insurgency is Communist led and inspired.
Subversive insurgency may be classified in three
general phases according to levels of intensity.

(1) Phase I. This phase is the latent or incipi-
ent subversive activity during which subversive
incidents occur with frequency in an organized
pattern; however, it involves no major outbreak of
violence or insurgent activity, which cannot be controlled by the HC.

(2) *Phase II.* This phase is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support and can initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

(3) *Phase III.* The situation moves from phase II to phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

d. *Internal Defense.* The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

e. *Military Civic Action.* Civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups.

f. *Penetration Operation (Intelligence).* The use of agents or technical monitoring devices in a target organization or installation for the purpose of gaining access to the secrets or of influence and controlling its activities.

g. *Stability Operations.* That type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effec-
tively and without which progress cannot be achieved.

h. Unit Advisor. The U. S. Army advisor assigned to HC armed/paramilitary forces is referred to in this manual as the unit advisor. The U. S. Army advisor assigned to HC administrative/political/military subdivisions below national level is referred to in this manual as the sector (province or state) and subsector (district or county) advisor. These personnel advise the HC leaders of the administrative/political/military subdivisions to which assigned. The HC leaders may be military or civilian with the title of governor, chief, leader, or executive.
CHAPTER 2
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section 1. HC FORCES

4. General

The advisor should have a thorough knowledge of the HC’s geography, sociology, economy, and politics which may be obtained in area studies, handbooks, and other similar reference material. He also should be knowledgeable concerning—

a. HC forces and HC administrative and political structures.

b. Insurgent organization and operations.

c. Terrain and its impact on the area of operations.

5. Internal Defense Forces

Internal defense forces are those HC and allied forces conducting operations against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, and outside supporting power. Internal defense forces include regular armed, paramilitary, irregular, police, and other security organizations. In addition to their primary internal defense mission, these forces also may contribute to internal development through the application of their special skills and resources.
6. Internal Development Forces

Governmental and private resources and organizations may be involved in internal development. Primary responsibility normally is assigned civilian agencies, however, military forces may be tasked with this responsibility. Such organizations, functioning under the control of, direction of or in cooperation with the national ministries, operate in the areas of economic, social, and political development.

Section II. INSURGENCY FORCES

7. Insurgent Organization

In a Communist-dominated insurgency, the overall insurgent organization will be composed of three major elements—a party core, a mass civil organization, and military forces. This organizational arrangement also normally will be present in non-Communist inspired subversive insurgencies. These elements are interlocked organizationally to insure party control over their activities at all times. In most instances, this insurgent structure parallels that of the target country government. Operational echelons are established at national, regional, province, district, village, and hamlet levels. Intermediate echelons may be deleted from the structure if the party leadership believes it can control and coordinate adequately the activities of subordinate echelons from national level. Figure 1 depicts a type Communist insurgent structure.
Figure 1. Type Communist insurgent organization.
The insurgent core is composed of the Communist party leadership, executive (revolutionary) committees, and the party youth group. The Communist party, cellularly organized for both security and functional reasons, is the directing force behind the insurgent movement. Responsive only to orders received from higher party channels, it is responsible for the conduct of the insurgent movement at its particular level of operation. The revolutionary committee directs the day-to-day activities of the insurgency and is composed of a number of subcommittees responsible for such activities as communications and liaison, intelligence and security, training and propaganda, military and civilian affairs, and logistics. The party youth organization also exists at each operational level of party organization and its members engage in most of the activities conducted by actual party members. It is considered a school of training and preparation for the assumption of party responsibilities at a later date.

Mass Civil Organization. Three separate elements constitute the mass civil organization. These are—popular organizations, special interest groups, and village militia (popular guerrilla units). Popular organizations are the most significant of the mass organizations in that they are organized on a nation-wide scale with committees at each echelon of party control. These organizations seek to appeal to a broad segment of the population, particularly workers, farmers, women, and youth. Special interest groups are narrower in
scope than popular organizations and include those groups whose interests focus on special issues. Examples of special interest groups are medical associations, sporting clubs, and teachers' organizations. The village militia also is considered an element of the mass civil organization, although it often is construed as a part-time and inferior arm of the military. The more correct perspective is to view militia elements as elite formations within the mass civil organization. During insurgency, civilian organizations falling under Communist control are combined organizationally into a united front, commonly referred to by such terms as "National Liberation Front," "Popular Front," and "People's Front." This mass civil organization serves the party leadership in at least five distinct ways. It provides—

(1) The party with a seemingly legitimate front which represents, by outward appearances, the interests of the population.

(2) A cover which diverts attention from the party and its operations.

(3) A means of diverting the allegiance of the population from the government and mobilizing popular support in behalf of the insurgency movement.

(4) A means of social control.

(5) The apparatus for establishing "shadow" or de facto government, competing with or replacing lawful government.

c. Military Forces. Communist insurgent military forces fall into two classes: main forces and
regional forces. Together, these two elements constitute what may be referred to as the regular forces. The main force normally is a body of well trained soldiers, many of whom have infiltrated into the country from an outside supporting power, and are organized into battalions, regiments, and divisions. It may be considered a highly motivated, elite fighting group with many of its personnel being members or candidate members of the Communist party. Although deployable where needed, the main force usually is controlled at interprovincial level. The regional force, on the other hand, is made up mostly of indigenous personnel, recruited directly from the mass civil organization or promoted from the ranks of the village militia and is organized into platoons, companies, and battalions. Units of this type operate in regions of no more than provincial size. They usually do not cross their provincial or district boundaries to operate in other areas.

d. Village Militia. Although not a part of the military arm of the insurgent movement, the village militia supports military operations. The militia includes all irregular forces; guerrilla, self defense, and secret guerilla units.

(1) Guerrillas are full-time irregulars organized into squads and platoons. Typical guerrilla missions are the harassment of friendly units, tax collection, propaganda lectures, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(2) Self defense forces are part-time guerrillas operating in hamlets or villages located in areas
controlled by the insurgent. These forces operate in their home area, perform their duties on a part-time basis, and rarely exceed squad size. Duties consist of propaganda, construction of fortifications, and defense of home areas.

(3) Secret guerrilla units are clandestine, part-time guerrillas who are used primarily in enforcing the will of the party in a given area and are composed, to a large extent, of party members. Their missions are clandestine and often involve intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.

8. Insurgent Capabilities

Insurgent forces have the capability of infiltrating into the national political, social, and economic structure of the target nation to accomplish espionage, sabotage, subversion, and tactical operations. Insurgents attempt to gain control over and organize the population to assist and support the insurgent movement. As insurgent influence and strength grow, so does their capability for gathering intelligence and conducting raids, ambushes, and major tactical operations. The insurgent movement gains strength through taxation, political warfare, personnel levies, and representation and manipulation of popular support at the hamlet/village level.

9. Methods of Operation

Insurgents exhibit great skill in making the most of their enemy's weaknesses. Emphasis is on speed, security, surprise, and deception.
a. Preparation.

(1) Insurgents attempt to make a detailed estimate of the situation, to include the size, disposition, and direction of movement of their opponent, before engaging him. They prefer to abort an operation rather than to act without proper intelligence and preparation.

(2) Insurgent operations are planned in detail and are based on careful reconnaissance and up-to-date intelligence. Detailed rehearsals, including the use of mock-ups and similar terrain, prepare the troops for the mission.

b. Techniques.

(1) The ambush is a most effective insurgent tactic. Planning for ambush is comprehensive. Rehearsals are conducted and friendly force patterns are studied in detail. "Baited traps" often are used. Advantage is taken of any laxness in security. Favorite tactics include feigning retreat to draw the friendly force into ambush and the ambush of forces moving rapidly and incautiously to the relief of besieged outposts.

(2) Raids are conducted by units from squad to regimental size and are executed most often during the hours of darkness.

(3) Harassment is one of the tenets of guerrilla warfare. Sniper fire is a form of harassment. Diversionary harassing attacks are used to draw friendly forces away from those areas having military and political significance.

(4) Insurgents are experts at infiltration. Particularly effective is their ability to infiltrate friendly
positions during periods of reduced visibility and adverse weather, usually combining the infiltration with a feint or ruse. Insurgents infiltrate the government service or enlist as members of the armed forces to accomplish such objectives as sabotage, assassination, demoralization, and intelligence collection.

(5) Insurgent defensive tactics are centered around ways and means of escaping from ambushes, raids, chance engagements, and surprise attacks. Ambushes designed to delay friendly forces frequently are employed to insure the escape of larger units. Insurgents may evade capture by hiding or by blending with the local population. The insurgent force may disperse in small groups or as individuals, or the force may attempt a breakout of encirclement by attacking in force the weakest area of the encirclement. The insurgent will make use of available sanctuary provided by political boundaries.

Section III. TERRAIN

10. General

The terrain will be "special" only to the advisor. The HC soldier probably has lived and worked in the particular environment all his life.

11. Jungle Operations (FM 31-30)

Jungle varies in locale from mountains to low-lying swampy areas. The following characteristics affect operations:
a. Terrain limits movement, observation, fields of fire, communications, and control.

b. Cover and concealment are excellent.

c. Key terrain, such as trails, navigable rivers, and potable water sources, frequently are objectives. These features often are difficult to identify because of poor maps and limited visibility.

d. Target acquisition capabilities are reduced.

e. Security elements are essential to prevent surprise.

f. Terrain is well suited to the conduct of small unit actions.

g. The employment of heavy infantry and artillery weapons is hampered greatly by their weight and bulk, and by reduced observation and fields of fire, and poor trafficability.

h. Supplies are subject to rapid deterioration and are difficult to move, thereby increasing problems of supply. Airmobile units and air lines of supply facilitate operations.

i. Personal hygiene is of increased importance.

12. Mountain Operations (FM 31–72)

The following characteristics affect operations:

a. Vegetation varies from jungle to bare slopes.

b. Terrain retards and restricts mobility, reduces the effect of firepower, and makes communications difficult.

c. Key terrain features, such as mountain passes, roads, railroads, and heights which dominate lines of communication, frequently are objectives.
d. Helicopters, within altitude capabilities, are valuable for moving personnel and equipment.

e. High-angle fire weapons will have increased importance.

f. Aerial reconnaissance and observation facilitate operations.

13. Inundated Area Operations

Inundated areas vary from continuous inundation to „paddies‟ which are under water during certain seasons. Effects of the tide and direction and speed of the current must be considered, even far inland. The following characteristics affect operations:

a. Fields of fire and communications generally are excellent.

b. Terrain limits foot and motor movement, but is well suited to employment of waterborne and heliborne forces. Consideration should be given to trafficability and maneuverability of waterborne units on waterways.

c. Artillery can be positioned by the use of helicopters and boats.

d. The requirement for tactical air and naval gunfire support is increased.

e. Amphibious tracked vehicles may be used effectively, though careful reconnaissance must be made of sites for entering, leaving, and crossing waterways.

f. Aircraft reconnaissance has increased importance. Hydrographic reconnaissance units should be utilized as necessary.
g. Water routes are a primary means of transportation and communications for both friendly and insurgent forces.

h. The lack of cover and concealment on waterways can be offset by night movement and by traveling close to the stream banks.

i. Units moving by boat can carry more weapons and equipment than foot elements; however, plans must provide for adequate transportation of matériel and security of boats after debarkation.

j. Logistics operations are characterized by the difficulties of resupply and the problems of evacuation. This can be overcome by the use of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for air landings and air drops.

k. Observation from the surface may be poor.
CHAPTER 3

HC CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

14. General

Depending on the intensity of the threat, three primary campaigns will be conducted by a HC to defeat an insurgency: consolidation, strike, and remote area. At provincial level, consolidation, strike, and remote area operations are conducted to support the national-level campaigns.

15. Campaigns

The three primary campaigns are designed to extend internal defense and internal development programs from the national to the local level. Each of these campaigns employs internal defense and internal development elements in varying mixes. They are mutually supporting both at the national level and at lower echelons. See FM 31–23 for detailed discussion.

a. Consolidation Campaign. The consolidation campaign is conducted to restore HC governmental control over the population and the area. It also provides an environment within which the normal activities of the population may be pursued and improved through the implementation of development programs.
b. Strike Campaign. The strike campaign primarily is a combat operation; therefore, internal development activities are minimized during an actual strike. The strike campaign is conducted against major insurgent tactical forces and bases outside of provincial areas of control. Strike operations are conducted either in zones under insurgent control or in contested areas. See FM 31–16 for additional guidance on strike operations.

c. Remote Area Campaign. The remote area campaign is undertaken to establish HC strongholds in contested areas or those under partial insurgent control. These areas usually are populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, they also may include areas devoid of population within which insurgent forces have established training bases, rest areas, weapons factories, or major infiltration routes.

16. Operations

The campaigns discussed above are planned, programmed, and directed at national level; however, the actual conduct of consolidation, strike, and remote area operations are the responsibility of province-level forces. It is possible for all three types of operations to be conducted concurrently within a province just as national-level plans integrate all three campaigns on a nation-wide basis. The advisory effort also should be an integrated effort. One U.S. advisor representative should be charged with the coordination responsibility for the activities of all U.S. advisors at his level.
Section II. CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

17. General

Consolidation operations are organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental, civil-military effort. The concepts described herein are based on the presence of a major insurgent threat, and must be adjusted to accommodate lesser threat situations.

18. Concept

The consolidation operation is a provincial-level function, supported by national and regional resources. The sequence of events in establishing government-controlled areas involves the accomplishment of many concurrent actions. The consolidation operation may be conducted in provinces in which remote area operations and strike operations are being conducted. Its initiation and termination are based upon local considerations.

19. Planning Considerations

Consolidation operations should expand outwardly from a secure base, such as an urban industrial complex in which the population supports the government effort and where government forces are in firm control. Areas or populations which have been subjected to intensive insurgent efforts cannot be won back and retained until—

a. Sufficient military forces are allocated to defeat insurgent tactical forces operating in the area.

b. Sufficient civilian resources are allocated to carry out all necessary populace and resources con-
trol and internal development operations within the area.

c. The insurgent force has been cleared from the area.

d. The insurgent hard-core organization and its support structure has been neutralized or eliminated.

e. A responsive governmental organization has been established which the local population is willing to support.

f. Sufficient tactical defenses and security precautions are established and maintained to defend and secure the area.

20. Execution

The consolidation operation is characterized by execution of four generally overlapping stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion.

a. Preparation Stage. This stage is the planning, training, organizing, and equipping period during which the participating civil and military forces and resources are prepared for operations.

(1) Objective. The objective is to produce a comprehensive, flexible consolidation operations plan which insures the efficient mobilization and employment of available personnel and materiel resources among the participating military and civilian agencies at all levels.

(2) Concept. The consolidation operations plan (app B), to include development of defended hamlets/villages where required, is prepared by
provincial-level planning boards operating in the provincial Area Coordination Center. These Centers prepare their plans along civil guidelines issued by the national authority. Military guidelines are provided by those military authorities responsible for supporting the operation.

(a) Districts, villages, and hamlets conduct planning within their degree of capability. Planning guidance is passed to them from province.

(b) Operations plans are developed, based upon the friendly and the insurgent situation, objective areas designated in the national consolidation campaign plan, civilian and military resources available, and estimated capability to achieve objectives.

(3) Organization. Consolidation operations organizations are formed as a province task force (TF) which may be subdivided into district, village, and hamlet TF. All TF consist of civilian and military elements necessary to perform political, economic, social, psychological, security, intelligence, and tactical operations. Unity of effort and command is essential. The province chief must have authority to control the allotted resources of all agencies and activities operating within his respective area of responsibility. Similarly, advisory efforts within the province are centralized. In those instances where U. S. or allied forces are operating in support of HC forces, an exceptionally high degree of cooperation must exist.

(4) Operations. All armed and paramilitary forces and civilian organizations normally remain
under operational command of their respective area political chiefs; however, in cases where civilian administration is ineffective, the armed forces may provide such administration until civilian programs have taken effect.

b. Offensive Stage. The initial requirement is to clear the area of insurgent tactical forces through the conduct of tactical operations. During operations, armed and paramilitary forces provide defense and security of the area.

(1) Objective. The objective of this stage is to destroy insurgent tactical forces and the insurgent infrastructure.

(2) Concept. The civil-military TF moves into the operational area, destroying insurgent tactical forces; placing political, economic, social, civic, and psychological administrators in the district, village, and hamlet governments; and locating, identifying, and destroying or neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure.

(3) Organization. TF are structured to conduct offensive tactical operations. Intelligence and police forces accompany tactical elements. Command and control is exercised through the TF chain of command.

(4) Operations. The introduction of TF into the operational area is planned so that disruption of civilian activities is minimized.

c. Development Stage.

(1) Objective. The objective of the development stage is to establish TF firmly in their respective areas to permit the establishment of internal
development and police and other security organizations and initiation of operations.

(2) Concept. The development stage entails defending the area against insurgent attack to permit internal development forces to conduct their programs. It may involve training local irregular and paramilitary forces to assume defensive missions and enforce populace and resources control measures.

(3) Organization. TF structuring remains essentially the same as for the offensive stage except that additional internal development, police, and combat service support elements may join the tactical elements.

(4) Operations. Operational emphasis shifts from internal defense to internal development activities. In essence, the armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture. Continued attack is made upon the insurgent infrastructure.

d. Completion Stage. This stage continues indefinitely losing its identity and melting into the course of peacetime activity.

(1) Objectives. Completion stage operations are conducted to permit the population to pursue normal activity and to attain economic, social, political, and psychological objectives within a peaceful environment.

(2) Concept. This stage entails acceleration of internal development programs and is marked by the capability of the local population to become
self-sufficient in its defense and to operate within the policies of the national government.

(3) Organization and operations. As the insurgent threat is reduced, civilian control is increased and military forces are transferred or phased out. Command and control of internal defense and internal development activities in passed to local hamlet, village, and district governments. The phased turnover to local authority is based on the overriding consideration that, once initiated, government control must remain permanently. The insurgent infrastructure must not be allowed to reorganize.

Section III. STRIKE OPERATIONS

21. General

Strike operations are conducted primarily to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces. Where area control by government forces is temporary, strike operations restrict insurgent freedom of action and harass insurgent operations. Local strike operations may be conducted in support of consolidation operations, but generally they are conducted against insurgent tactical forces and their bases.

22. Concept

Strike operations in remote or contested areas are conducted by regional armed forces or by forces assigned to a subordinate armed forces area. Strike operations include reconnaissance in force, raids, and coordinated attacks, or combinations of these,
which are terminated by withdrawal from the area upon mission accomplishment.

23. Planning Considerations

   a. Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient TF capable of operating for given periods of time in areas remote from home bases, and capable of being sustained logistically by air.

   b. Strike forces normally are assigned specific areas in which to conduct strike operations.

   c. Strike force commanders coordinate the employment of all resources available throughout their operational areas through local Area Coordination Centers.

   d. TF include, in addition to armed forces elements, intelligence, police, and other military and/or civilian augmentations.

   e. Command and control within TF is exercised through the military chain of command using tactical communications.

   f. Intensive reconnaissance and reliable intelligence are required to develop the situation.

   g. Strike forces conduct a thorough search of the area and take into custody all suspected insurgents.

   h. Mobile reserves may be required to destroy large insurgent tactical forces contacted by small reconnaissance units.

   i. The elusive nature of insurgent forces normally precludes time-consuming preparation; therefore, contingency plans should be prepared to permit fast reaction and the immediate application of combat power by reserve forces.
j. Priority of combat power is made available to TF committed to strike operations.

k. Civic action should be tailored to existing needs of the population to attain high-impact, short-term results. The nature of strike operations will not permit continuing security of an area; therefore, internal development programs may be self-defeating and render the population a more attractive target for insurgent activity.

24. Execution

Strike operations may take the form of any number or combination of tactical operations. Troops may be introduced into the operational area by ground, airmobile, airborne, riverine, or amphibious operations. Considerations for such operations are noted in paragraphs 80 through 82.

Section IV. REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS

25. General

Remote area operations extend internal defense and internal development programs into remote areas of the HC, and are conducted to prevent exploitation of minority groups and remote area populations by the insurgent. Included tasks are—

a. Neutralizing insurgent forces.

b. Developing a secure environment.

c. Securing willing support and participation in HC internal defense and internal development programs.
26. Concept

Remote area campaigns are conducted to establish islands of resistance in insurgent-dominated areas. These islands of resistance serve as HC operational bases to support strike and consolidation campaigns.

a. To insure successful initiation of a remote area operation—

   (1) A segment of the resident population must be willing to support the remote area force and its programs.

   (2) Other combat and combat support forces should be available to assist the remote area force in establishing a secure base from which to initiate its operations.

b. Psychological, civil affairs, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations are conducted.

c. Remote area operations are conducted in four stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion.

27. Planning Considerations

a. Important political considerations are the motivations, ambitions, and influence of the existing leadership. A complete understanding of the theoretical and actual power structure of the operational area is necessary since actual control may rest with nongovernmental religious, tribal, or other groups.
b. Important sociological considerations include population size and distribution, basic racial stock, minority groups, dissident elements, social structure, religion, and culture.

c. The employment of armed, paramilitary, or irregular forces will depend mainly on the tactical objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political climate, and the logistical system required to support the force.

28. Execution

Remote area operations are long-term and continuous in nature, and are directed at defeating the insurgent movement by the destruction or neutralization of its infrastructure and tactical organizations.

a. The preparation stage entails the delineation of the area of operations; collection and assessment of data and information on the operational area; an estimate of resource requirements; and, finally, preparation of the operations plan.

b. The offensive stage entails moving the remote area force into the operational area; establishing a secure base from which to launch operations; destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure; and establishing or re-establishing HC government.

c. The development stage entails the conduct of aggressive defense operations, primarily by saturation patrolling, to prevent re-entry of significant insurgent tactical forces. In this stage, short-term
military civic action programs are continued and serve as the medium through which long-term internal development programs are initiated.

d. The completion stage entails the continuation of development stage activities and preparation for turnover of the operational area to civilian agencies.
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

29. Purpose and Scope

This chapter provides guidance concerning the six major operational roles which military forces can perform to accomplish their stability operations missions. The objectives, concepts, and modes of performing these roles are explained. Further, clarification is made as to the interrelationship of these roles and the manner in which they support national campaigns.

30. Military Roles

Stability operations are those through which the armed and paramilitary forces, as part of the interdepartmental team, support any or all of the internal defense and internal development campaigns. The primary operational roles through which armed/paramilitary forces support internal defense and internal development campaigns and operations are—

a. Advisory assistance.
b. Tactical operations.
c. Civil affairs operations.
d. Intelligence operations.
e. Populace and resources control.
f. Psychological operations.
Section II. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

31. General

U. S./HC or allied advisory assistance includes furnishing advice on military organization, training, operations, doctrine, and materiel. In addition, U. S. advisory assistance may include providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support for HC military forces.

32. Objective

The objective of advisory assistance is to increase the capabilities of HC organizations to perform their missions and to operate efficiently in the given operational environment.

33. Concept

Organization and individuals possessing higher skill and materiel resources levels assist in imparting their knowledge through advisory assistance efforts. The success of advisory assistance depends to a large extent on effective interaction between U. S. military advisors and their HC counterparts.

34. The Unit Advisor

a. The unit advisor uses his advisory personnel—
   (1) As his staff.
   (2) To advise and assist counterpart personnel in the conduct of the full spectrum of operations.
   (3) To advise and assist counterpart personnel in developing unit combat effectiveness.

b. Unit advisors may assist their counterparts by serving as liaison with U. S. combat support and
Figure 2. Type advisory structure (division).
combat service support forces and U. S. combat forces. Accordingly, they must have a working knowledge of—

(1) The tactical air-ground control system.
(2) Air request nets as integrated with the U. S. and HC Air Force nets.
(3) Capabilities, limitations, and operations of the U. S. and HC Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine units.
(4) Organization and procedures pertaining to combined operations.
(5) MAAG, MAP, and Military Group (MILGP) proficiency level objectives for type unit concerned.

c. A type division advisory structure is shown at figure 2.

35. The Sector/Subsector Advisor

a. Sector Advisor.

(1) Military responsibilities. The sector advisor provides advice to the province chief on matters concerning the employment of the HC military and paramilitary forces under his jurisdiction. Major advisory responsibilities include: area defense, suppression of insurgency, and procurement and employment of U. S. support. As the U. S. military representative, the sector advisor plans for and recommends allocation of resources provided through the MAP and other programs. These resources, as well as those provided by USAID, USIS, and Voluntary Agencies, often are used in support of military civic action. The advisor coordinates the
Figure 3. Type advisory team structure (sector).
military civic action program with other agencies to insure unity of effort and appropriate use of resources. USAID and USIS funding may provide materiel assets while MAP-supported troops and equipment perform the labor. The advisor may find that province forces have the capability to conduct civil affairs and PSYOP, and he should assist his counterpart in planning for the proper employment of these resources. A type sector advisory team structure is shown at figure 3.

(2) Civil responsibilities.

(a) The sector advisor may be the U. S. representative and may be required to advise on civil matters. Close and continuous supervision of all internal development programs is required. The province chief is provided with an administrative staff to assist in carrying out his duties. The advisor may encounter a staff similar to the one depicted at figure 4. It is essential that he be familiar with the responsibilities, functions, and personnel of the administrative staff. The administrative staff is a source of information for the advisor.

(b) As assistance to the HC is increased, other advisors may be introduced into the area. The sector advisor can expect to find representatives from USAID, USIS, and U. S. Voluntary Agencies. Third country nationals, representatives of private corporations, and voluntary organizations may be involved in such tasks as medical care, industrial and agricultural development, and similar endeavors. There is a positive requirement for effective coordination, and military advisors may find it
Figure 4. Type HC province administrative organization.
necessary to coordinate all activities. Interagency agreements should be established as soon as possible.

(c) At the province level, the advisor can expect to find certain technical agencies and services which are extensions of national ministries. Figure 5 depicts type service agencies normally available at province level. Their activities and efforts should be integrated into the overall plan. This requires that the sector advisor maintain close coordination with the USAID representative who normally has responsibility for advising these agencies.

b. Subsector Advisor.

(1) Military responsibilities. The military duties of the subsector advisor are similar to those of the sector advisor. At subsector level, he advises the district chief on the employment of military and paramilitary forces assigned to the subsector. Coordination of all military, civilian, and other U. S. Government Agencies civic action assets assumes increased importance. The realization of internal defense and internal development goals will depend largely on the subsection advisor’s capabilities. Figure 6 depicts a type advisory structure which may exist in a subsector. This organization will vary depending on local requirements. Some considerations influencing the composition of the team include population, economic development, insurgent activity, host government presence and capabilities, and security.
Technical Agencies/Services also Report to National Ministries

**Figure 5.** Type HC technical services/agencies.
Figure 6. Type advisory structure, MAAG, Military Assistance Command, MILGP—subsector.
Figure 7. Type HC district administrative organization.
(2) Civil responsibilities. The subsector advisor may become involved in many projects normally assigned civilian agencies. These will involve civil activities and, therefore, subsector advisory responsibilities are comparable to those listed for the sector advisor. A type HC district administrative organization is shown at figure 7.

36. Funding

The success of internal defense and internal development efforts by a HC and its advisors often is based upon adequate financing and rapid and effective distribution of funds to the lowest level. Advisors should know how to obtain and understand the use of funds available to support activities in their areas of responsibility.

a. HC Funding.

(1) Defense budget. This budget provides funds to support the defense establishment. Items normally supported include troop payment (armed and paramilitary forces), military construction (training centers, dependent housing), training and logistical support (POL, spare parts), and other similar activities.

(2) Ministerial services budget. This budget provides funds to support the various technical ministries from national to local level. The budget provides for pay and allowances of civil servants, and funds for public works (highways, railroads, road and bridge construction and repair), education, social welfare, health, amnesty programs, agriculture, and other similar services.
(3) **Provincial budget.** This budget provides funds to support local (province) operations. The budget provides for pay and allowances (provincial council, local administrative labor, teachers), and funds for self-help projects, public works (those of a purely local nature not included in the national budget), school construction, and other similar services.

(4) **Special budget.** This budget may be utilized in the event insurgency efforts interfere with normal tax collection efforts or when special requirements exist. This budget may be administered nationally or locally. The budget provides funds for refugee relief, pay and allowances for specialized personnel (cadre), resettlement, land reform, and certain other contingency expenses.

b. **U. S. Funding.**

(1) **USIS funds.** USIS may provide funds to assist in the local procurement of leaflets and posters, to purchase equipment (musical instruments, photographic supplies) for HC information agencies, and to support other HC information efforts such as newspapers and radio broadcasts.

(2) **USAID funds.** USAID may provide funds to the military advisor to assist in the implementation of high-impact civic action efforts such as schools, medical assistance, irrigation projects, and wells. Normally, such funds will be made available when local resources are depleted or HC budgets are inadequate.
37. Command and Control

At all levels of government, internal defense and internal development operations planning and direction should be accomplished through Area Coordination Centers. Below the national level, Area Coordination Centers responsible to the area commander or chief are established as combined civil/military headquarters. U.S./HC policy and agreements will determine command relationships between combined forces. The Area Coordination Center does not replace unit tactical operations centers nor does it replace the normal governmental administrative organization of the area.

a. The Area Coordination Center should be composed of elements of—

(1) All HC forces and agencies in the area.
(2) Assigned U. S. military and civilian advisory personnel.
(3) Representatives of U. S. and other Free World forces operating in the area.

b. The chief of the Area Coordination Center will be the political area chief, who generally delegates normal day-to-day coordination to his deputy.

c. A civil-military advisory committee composed of leading citizens, representing economic and social groups, assists the political area chief by providing communication between the Area Coordination Center and the local population.

d. A type provincial Area Coordination Center is shown at figure 8. See FM 31–23 for additional information.
(1) All directorates are manned on a combined host country, U.S., and/or allied military civil basis when U.S. forces are operational in the province (state).

(2) Regular armed force (host country and U.S.) and paramilitary force commanders act in support of directorates to province (state) and lower-echelon chiefs.

(3) ACC does not replace province (state) governments.

(4) Actual composition of ACC will be determined by local resources, but as a minimum, ACC should contain elements for control of tactical ground forces, fire support, air support, and intelligence.

(5) Province deputy insures coordination of entire civil/military effort and supervises the ACC to accomplish this mission.

Figure 8. Type provincial Area Coordination Center.
38. Training

a. Training may not be popular, and the advisor may have to insist upon the development of sound training programs. He must establish training objectives and he should stimulate their accomplishment. Priority of effort should be extended in those areas which will contribute to improved training standards and combat effectiveness. His counterpart should understand that the training mission can be accomplished only if the following basic objectives are achieved:

(1) Military discipline.
(2) Health, strength, and endurance.
(3) Technical proficiency.
(4) Teamwork.
(5) Tactical proficiency.

b. Units once trained must continue operational readiness training. The advisor should—

(1) Encourage counterpart to program time for operational readiness training in such subjects as—

   (a) Leadership.
   (b) Marksmanship.
   (c) Small unit exercises.
   (d) Maintenance.
   (e) Troop information.
   (f) Critiques of past operations.
   (g) Rehearsals for future operations.

(2) Establish training centers to fulfill the requirements for continuous training by rotating all
units through these centers in short cycles. See appendix C for type training schedules.

3. Employ mobile training teams (MTT) when new weapons or tactics are introduced. Where the state of unit training is poor, initiate basic training. Encourage exchange training between U. S. and HC.

4. Concentrate on training unit leaders to train their units. It may be necessary to conduct separate officer and NCO schools and classes to prepare them better to train and lead their units.

5. Estimate the training requirements by observing the unit in combat operations and during training.

6. Encourage counterpart to support the scheduling of all of his units into major training centers for training and refitting. If the situation requires, MTT may be sent to train units on site.

7. Assist counterpart in establishing training programs and policies for his units. See FM 21–5, FM 31–16, and FM 31–23 for type training programs and policy.

8. Guard against the tendency of the counterpart to withdraw units from scheduled training cycles for less necessary assignments. This disrupts the effectiveness of the training effort. Emphasize the need for continuous training. Encourage counterpart to make maximum use of training opportunities.

9. Provide military and technical training to paramilitary, police, and other civilian forces. The
advisor will have to coordinate training operations with other U. S. advisors who function in the fields of PSYOP, agricultural improvement, medical service, and populace and resources control.

(10) Advise counterpart to request resources and to approve requests to use the scarce training resources which he controls.

(11) Instill in the counterpart the desire to use training ammunition, films, and aids.

(12) Show HC units how to construct and use field expedient training facilities.

(13) Encourage counterpart and his staff to visit and actively supervise unit training.

(14) Encourage counterpart to allocate a significant amount of time and effort to intelligence training.

c. Techniques used to enhance training of HC forces include—

(1) Use of appropriate methods for evaluating training.

(2) Demonstration of artillery capabilities by a MTT and on-the-job training of combat leaders in observed fire procedures.

(3) Use of timely post exercise critiques.

(4) Construction of an insurgent village, including caches and boobytraps for use in training.

(5) Use of reaction ranges, close combat ranges, and infiltration courses to inject realism into training.

(6) Inclusion of previously taught subjects for reemphasis.
39. Advisor Tips and Techniques

a. Policy.

(1) U. S. policy states that it is the advisor’s obligation to support the established HC government.

(2) HC national policy, economy, customs, and education often dictate procedures which may be considered inefficient and uneconomical. Avoid an arbitrary attitude toward these procedures. Understand them before recommending changes.

b. Command Relationships.

(1) The advisor must adhere to U. S. guidance transmitted through the advisory system. The advisory chain of command should be utilized to obtain and disseminate guidance and assistance.

(2) The advisor should be aware of activities of other U. S. Government and civilian agencies so that U. S. support represents an integrated effort.

(3) Advice should be rendered orally; then, if not accepted, it should be reported in writing through advisory channels. The counterpart may be prevented from heeding advice by U. S. or HC policy conflict at higher levels. If higher echelons are aware of the problem, they can take appropriate action to align policy.

(4) Proper channels should be stressed at all echelons. Keep the counterpart informed of advice given to his subordinates, and keep subordinate advisory personnel informed.

(5) Officials should be persuaded to pass information up, down, and laterally.
(6) The counterpart senior in grade to the advisor should be treated accordingly.

(7) The counterpart should be advised not to substitute the U. S. advisory chain of command for his own, and he should not direct U. S. advisory personnel to order HC units to take action. Such action must be initiated as advice, thence as orders by the counterpart through his chain of command.

c. Environment.

(1) The HC government may have been in existence only a short time; consequently, the administrative machinery may still be developing. Be aware of such situations and do not be overly critical.

(2) The advisor should have a knowledge of socio-political and military organizations and interrelationships to include personalities, political movements, forces involved, and social drives. He must impress upon his counterpart that an integrated effort is required to defeat the insurgency.

(3) The advisor should have a full understanding of his status in the HC. This may be established by agreements between the U. S. and the HC which spell out his status. These agreements may provide for full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity. In the absence of an agreement, the advisor is subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the diplomatic immunity afforded him, he is expected to observe local law.
d. Counterpart Relationship.

(1) The advisor does not command his counterpart’s organization.

(2) He should study his counterpart’s personality and background, and exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships.

(3) The advisor should make “on-the-spot” recommendations to his counterpart, when appropriate.

(4) The advisor may represent his counterpart in disputes with U. S. agencies; however, this representation should be based on sound judgment and not blind support.

(5) The advisor must not present too many subjects at once or prolong unnecessarily the discussion of any one subject. Suggestions and recommendations must be within the counterpart’s capability to carry them out. Avoid harassment.

(6) The advisor should not accept “yes” at its face value; “yes” may mean only that the person understands what has been said (it also may be used to cover a failure to understand), not that the counterpart “buys” the recommendation.

(7) The advisor should present recommendations carefully, in detail, and supported adequately with an explanation of advantages inherent to the proposal. Recommendations which require immediate decisions should be avoided, except when the situation dictates. Counterparts should be allowed to exercise their prerogatives; one of their fears is that they may appear overly dependent upon ad-
visors. The advisor should choose appropriate times and places to offer advice.

(8) The advisor should not convey the impression that everything is all wrong. A careless word or action on the part of the advisor can impair the advisory effort. If there is criticism, it should be couched tactfully, but the advisor must not be reluctant to criticize when criticism is in order. Failure to do so may leave the counterpart with the impression that the advisor does not know or care. Appropriate, timely, and tactful criticism can engender respect. If it is necessary to make a recommendation which might imply criticism of HC policy, advisors should do so in private.

(9) The advisor should ask the counterpart's advice; he has many good ideas. The advisor who tries to oversell himself may arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Do not make promises which cannot or should not be fulfilled.

(10) A subject should be discussed until it is known that the counterpart understands.

(11) Frequent inspections should be encouraged. It may be necessary to convince the counterpart of the value of frequent inspections to determine actual conditions.

(12) Initiative and inventiveness should be encouraged. The counterpart may follow orders to the letter and, even if a modified course of action subsequently appears to be more appropriate, he may not deviate (or request permission to deviate) from his original instructions. The advisor should encourage his counterpart to request changes in
orders when the need is obvious. Encourage him to be receptive to such requests from his subordinates.

(13) A project should not be rejected because the advisor will not be in-country long enough to complete it. Major events and projects should be documented and transferred to successors. Briefings, end-of-tour reports, and other instructions will assist in providing a smooth transition and continuity of effort.

(14) Maintain a filing and suspense system. Secure classified documents.

(15) Definitive goals and objectives should be developed as part of the overall advisory program. Systematic evaluation insures continuity of advisory effort.

(16) The advisor should keep abreast of activities and in close contact with civilian political leaders, military commanders, and staff officers.

(17) The advisor should participate actively in military, social, and athletic functions. If unable to accept a social invitation, regrets should be expressed in accordance with the local custom. Invite counterparts to appropriate social functions.

(18) A sense of identity with the counterpart’s unit or area should be developed. Spend maximum time at the scene of activity. Attempt to learn the language and volunteer to teach English.

(19) Subordinate advisors should lay the groundwork at their levels for new ideas.

(20) The consequences of mistreating suspects or prisoners should be stressed. Captured insurgents
and other persons taken into custody should be treated humanely. The minimum requirements for humane treatment are specified in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and include: Care for sick and wounded; prohibiting violence such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity such as humiliation and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. Insurgent subversive elements are subject to laws concerning subversion and lawlessness. Advisors must not become involved in atrocities. They should explain to their counterparts that they must report any atrocities of which they have knowledge. Captured insurgents should be interrogated immediately at the lowest level for tactical information. The loss of a prisoner, whatever the justification, is a loss of a valuable intelligence source (FM 30–15, FM 30–17, and FM 30–31).

Section III. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

40. General

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme measures of all those encompassed in internal defense activities. This section provides guidance for offensive and defensive operations, to include tactical operations conducted within the framework of consolidation operations, strike operations, and remote area operations.
41. Objective

The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Tactical operations are coordinated with civilian agencies through the Area Coordination Center.

42. Concept

a. Phase I (Latent and Incipient) Insurgency. During phase I, military and paramilitary forces should place emphasis on military civic action, training and orientation for tactical operations, and certain aspects of populace and resources control, in coordination with police agencies.

b. Phases II and III Insurgency. During these phases of insurgency, defensive and offensive tactical operations will be conducted concurrently.

43. Planning

Tactical operations plans are based on the threat, environment, objectives, policy, strategy, organization, and requirements, with the objective of providing a basis for the efficient employment of military resources.

a. Operational plans should reflect the fact that military resources support all internal defense and internal development efforts. Operational plans must be responsive to nationally established priorities, and must be coordinated with internal defense and internal development plans of other units and agencies.
b. Some aspects of planning include—

(1) Selective application of combat power to reduce to a minimum population casualties.

(2) Coordination of regional and provisional plans and dissemination of information to subordinate units. Time must be provided to process plans at all levels.

(3) Detailed estimates of the situation.

(4) Consideration of the role and capabilities of paramilitary forces. Planning at all levels should incorporate the employment of paramilitary units. Advisors to tactical units must coordinate this planning with sector and subsector advisors.

c. The estimate of the situation includes—

(1) **Weather and terrain.**

(a) Trafficability of terrain, road net, and waterways for operations.

(b) Suitability of terrain for insurgent bases.

(c) Effects of weather.

(2) **Population.**

(a) Elements likely to engage in or support insurgent activities.

(b) Elements likely to support HC, U. S., and allied forces.

(c) Relative susceptibility to insurgent and government PSYOP.

(d) Basic or potential causes of unrest.

(3) **Insurgent.**

(a) National and regional origins.

(b) Organization.

(c) Strength, morale, and status of training.
(d) Leaders and their personalities.
(e) Relations with the population.
(f) Effectiveness of communications.
(g) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.
(h) Tactics.
(i) Resources.
   1. Availability of food and water.
   2. Availability of arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medical items, and other supplies.
   3. Adequacy of lines of communication.
(j) Vulnerabilities.
   1. Susceptibility of logistic system to interdiction.
   2. Susceptibility to air strikes and artillery fire.
   3. Dependence on the population for support.
   4. Susceptibility to PSYOP.
(4) U. S., HC, and allied.
   (a) Forces available for internal defense operations.
      1. U. S., HC, and allied armed forces.
      2. Paramilitary units.
      3. Civil police and irregular units.
      4. Friendly guerrilla forces.
      5. U. S. and HC civil agencies.
      6. Other forces available within area.
   (b) Vulnerabilities.
   (c) Resources.
44. Operations

a. Offensive Considerations. These include—

(1) Saturation patrolling, around-the-clock inspections of towns and hamlets, establishing mobile check points on routes of communication, and preserving law and order outside of hamlet boundaries.

(2) Organizing area ambushes in depth and width in which primary elements trigger the ambush supported by secondary forces covering likely routes of withdrawal.

(3) Continuing raids against suspected hamlets, areas, and outlying facilities known or suspected of harboring insurgent personnel and materiel.

(4) Minimizing defensive commitments to permit maximum offensive employment of forces, while maintaining a reserve force capable of destroying insurgent forces contacted.

(5) Moving supplies along surface lines of communication accompanied by effective guard units and supported by air and artillery to preclude or lessen the effect of insurgent ambush.

(6) Insuring maximum area coverage by fire support weapons.

(7) Insuring immediate destruction of insurgent forces which have been detected and isolated.

(a) When an insurgent force has been located, every attempt to encircle the force should be made. If encirclement is not feasible, all likely avenues of withdrawal should be blocked.
(b) When contact is made with an insurgent force, its probable reaction will be to inflict maximum casualties on the attacking force and then execute a rapid withdrawal. Forces operating against insurgents should be particularly adept in countering ambushes and in conducting pursuit.

1. The unit which makes the initial contact with the insurgent force may require rapid reinforcement to maintain pressure against the force, envelop it, and destroy it. Reserve forces should be given the highest priority for use of available transport to insure their rapid delivery to the battle area. Night infiltration to blocking positions will enhance the overall encircling operation.

2. The pursuit force is organized into two elements: the direct pressure force and the encircling force (includes blocking force). The direct pressure force pursues the insurgent and maintains constant offensive pressure. The encircling force, employing superior mobility, conducts envelopments to destroy the insurgent force.

(8) Night operations should be conducted to facilitate surprise, minimize the effect of insurgent fire, and deny the insurgent supremacy of the darkness.

(9) Continuous pressure must be maintained. Insurgent forces should not be considered destroyed merely because opposition has ceased.

(10) Forces should maintain offensive pressure during all weather conditions, allowing the insurgent force no rest.
b. Defensive Considerations. While continuous emphasis must be placed on offensive operations, establishment of sound defensive policies is essential. Execution of the defense must be flexible to provide rapid reaction.

(1) The best defense is offensive action. A series of outposts and ambush sites should be established in depth at dusk or shortly after dark. Outposts and saturation patrolling should be employed during daylight hours.

(2) Defensive positions must provide all-around protection, to include the capability for rapidly massing fires on any location outside or within the perimeter. A countermortar plan must be developed, and firing units capable of supporting this plan should be assigned specific areas of fire.

(3) Barbed wire barriers (concertina, single and double apron fence, tanglefoot) should be constructed outside and within the perimeter of fixed and semi-fixed installations, as well as sensitive locations inside the perimeter, and should be covered by observed fire. Although a good barrier plan is essential, local security should not depend on physical barriers alone.

(4) Trenches should be dug in a zig-zag pattern between bunkers. Grenade sumps are required in trenches. For fixed and semi-fixed installations, provision should be made within the installation for living quarters and bunkers to accommodate dependents who customarily accompany troops to operating areas.
(5) Bunkers are vulnerable to infiltration attack, and should be located at a distance behind the inner barrier wire necessary to reduce damage by insurgent demolition teams. They should have overhead cover and be camouflaged.

(6) Mines, flame devices, and trip flares are effective in the barrier plan.

(7) A well coordinated illumination plan must be developed.

(8) Guard and reserve forces should be placed within the perimeter to combat infiltration. Reserves should be organized to prevent or repel insurgent penetration.

(9) Multiple means of communication should be established between bunkers and local security posts.

(10) Movement inside the perimeter should be held to a minimum after dark. If firing of weapons or explosion of grenades occurs, all personnel not in protective positions should “freeze” in a firing position. Anyone running or moving about should be considered an insurgent. Signals and distinctive markings should be used to identify friendly forces. After firing ceases, a sweep inside the perimeter should be conducted.

(11) Key personnel, weapons, and equipment should be dispersed to avoid excessive losses. Automatic and crew-served weapons should be moved frequently to alternate positions, especially after dark.

(12) The chain of command within all units must be well defined to preclude confusion.
(13) Emergency plans to restore communications and provide medical aid to insure uninterrupted defense of the area must be developed and rehearsed.

(14) Civilian workers should be searched upon their entrance and departure from the installation. Access of civilians should be kept to an absolute minimum. Areas where personnel were working should be cleared and marker signs which may have been emplaced to pinpoint bunkers, automatic weapons sites, or other sensitive fixtures should be obliterated.

(15) Hasty defensive perimeters established during the conduct of other operations require consideration of the following:

(a) Emplace the ambush force while moving into the area. Ambush patrols and early warning devices should be used to cover avenues of approach into the perimeter.

(b) Stop before dark to set up camp for the night. Delivery of “overnight” boxes” of flares, mines, night vision devices, and other equipment should be accomplished before dark. Defensive fires should be planned for and, if possible, registered. Another technique is to move after dark to a previously reconnoitered position 300 to 500 meters away from the originally occupied site.

(c) Insure that designated guards are alert and outposts are placed during rest stops. Make provisions for marking defensive perimeters to insure positive identification of the perimeter by close air support.
(d) At dawn, consider saturating the perimeter and treetops with a high volume of small arms fire to discourage snipers and the possibility of attack. This technique will disclose friendly dispositions and should be used under selective circumstances.

(16) Insurgents normally make every effort to remove all casualties, weapons, and documents from the battlefield. Use automatic weapons fire and illumination to prevent insurgents from “policing” the battlefield as they withdraw. Casualties left behind may be boobytrapped; hence extreme caution should be exercised when searching or moving them.

(17) Trip flares and boobytraps should be removed at first light if the unit is planning to leave the area.

(18) Automatic weapon positions should not be disclosed by firing when harassed by sniper fire.

(19) Local security should be increased on nights of limited visibility and during periods of heavy rain. The number of ambushes on likely routes of insurgent movement should be increased.

(20) On nights of limited visibility, increase mortar and artillery fires on likely assembly areas, attack positions, assault positions, and observation posts. On nights of good visibility, increase fires in the vicinity of suspected way stations, staging areas, caches, and base areas.

(21) Defense may have to be oriented to support a community or installation rather than upon the most favorable terrain.
(22) Surveillance and security measures must be coordinated. The provisions for perimeter defense discussed in FM 7–11 are particularly applicable in the defense of communities or installations.

(23) Standing operating procedures should detail how neighboring communities mutually assist one another in defense.

(24) Planning for security of column movement must consider—

(a) *Mounted.*

1. Column cover.
2. Fire support. Coordination of air and ground fire support along the route.
3. Counterambush SOP.
4. Security elements positioned along the route.
5. Security elements (armor, armored cavalry, armored infantry) moving with the column.
6. Reserve forces to support the column, on call.
7. Automatic weapons and other fire support means located within the column.
8. Continuous communications.

(b) *Dismounted.*

1. Air cover
2. Flank security.
3. Artillery registration restrictions.
4. Extended formations allow part of the column to maneuver against an ambush force.

(c. *Retrograde Movements.* If, for economy of force or other reasons, it is desirable to retire, then
retrograde movements must be planned and executed concurrently with other tactical operations.

d. Bases. Bases provide secure localities from which operations are projected and supported. They should include morale, rest, and rehabilitation facilities.

(1) Forces assigned strike missions may establish bases in or near major cities and towns.

(2) Patrol bases may be established from which patrolling, reconnaissance, raids, and strike operations are conducted.

(3) Forces assigned base defense missions should be employed in consolidation operations which assist in the defense and security of the base.

e. Inadvisable Practices. The following practices should be avoided:

(1) Excessive assignment of small (battalion and lower) units to essentially defensive tasks.

(2) Dispatch of large-size (regiment and division) units to destroy small insurgent forces.

(3) Employment of large military forces in static defense missions.

45. Advisor Considerations (Tactical Operations)

a. Orient on the insurgent—not terrain.

b. Maintain the offensive, regardless of the weather.

c. Establish priorities of effort.

d. Operate in the insurgent environment.

e. Emphasize secrecy and surprise. Plans should provide for—

(1) Effective and secure communications.
(2) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier.

(3) Variation of methods and the use of unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing patterns.

f. Assign areas of responsibility to commanders.

g. Emphasize that command and staff action should include—

(1) Centralized planning of small-scale decentralized tactical operations.

(2) Integrated planning, to include military civic action, PSYOP, and populace and resources control operations.

(3) Unity of command.

(4) Training programs designed to—

(a) Develop the offensive spirit, physical stamina, and a desire to seek out and destroy the insurgent.

(b) Train paramilitary forces for security operations.

(5) Planning for employment of reserve forces.

(6) Planning and executing the intelligence collection effort by:

(a) Coordinating the activities of all intelligence nets and resources.

(b) Creating informer nets in the local population.

(c) Thorough interrogating of prisoners and suspects.

(d) Detailed planning and coordinating of activities in the Area Coordination Center.
(7) Providing for the rapid collection and dissemination of all available information and intelligence so that forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving insurgent.

(8) Detailed integration of combat support and combat service support into all tactical planning.

(9) Judicious application of firepower in view of the minimum destruction concept to minimize alienation of the population.

(10) Consideration of the use of all means of mobility, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and porters.

(11) Communications requirements, to include:

\(a\) Requirements for AM, FM, and SSB.

\(b\) Air to ground; FM, UHF, VHF, or SSB for—

1. Command and control.
2. Close air support.
3. Aerial fire support.
4. Aerial observed artillery.
5. Radio relay.
6. Medical evacuation.

\(c\) Fire support plans.

\(d\) Emergency nets in various regions.

(12) Insure that adequate resupply is palletized for ease and speed of delivery to forward units during tactical operations.

(13) Insure that attached nonorganic forces are supported adequately.
46. General

a. Civil affairs operations are a responsibility of advisors at all echelons. These operations include any activities which embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and the people in a friendly or occupied country or area.

b. Military civic action will be the most prevalent civil affairs function performed by military forces in internal defense and internal development environments. This function involves the participation by military or paramilitary forces, using their military skills, equipment, and resources, in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the population at all levels.

47. Objectives

a. The objectives of civil affairs operations are to organize and motivate the civil population to assist the government and military forces by eliminating or reducing political, economic, and sociological problems.

b. The specific objective of military civic action is to create a favorable environment in which to support current or anticipated operations and to gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their local and national government by assisting communities in conducting health, welfare, and public works projects; improving living conditions; alleviating suffering; and improving the economic base of the nation and the standing of the HC and allied forces with the population.
48. Concepts

a. All projects should be conducted within the framework of a coordinated plan and in accordance with guidelines issued through command and advisory channels. Projects should include some commitment or require some effort on the part of the population. The following criteria should be applied to military civic action projects under consideration:

(1) Degree of need expressed by the people.
(2) Extent of benefit to the majority of the people.
(3) Ability of the people to help themselves in the project.
(4) Pride and morale resulting from completion of the project.
(5) Degree to which projects support internal defense and internal development plans and programs.
(6) Availability of local resources and capabilities for perpetuation of continuing projects.

b. The degree of emphasis placed on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgency. During phase I, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socio-economic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, a significant allocation of military resources may be devoted to projects which provide both long and short-range benefits. During phase II, military civic action will be oriented on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects should produce noticeable improvements with-
in a comparatively short period. In the advanced stages of phase III insurgency, priorities placed on tactical operations may limit military civic action to short-range, high-impact projects, such as providing medical aid to sick and wounded civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter to displaced persons.

49. Military Resources

a. All military units possess the resources and capability to conduct civil affairs operations, particularly military civic action. The advisor should assess the capabilities of the unit to which assigned and be prepared to propose civil affairs projects, as required, as part of the unit's overall mission. Prior to implementation of projects, coordination with other appropriate U. S. and HC agencies, such as USAID, is important to avoid duplication of effort and to insure that adequate resources and technical assistance are available. Normally, the coordination point is the Area Coordination Center.

b. In addition to benefiting the community, military civic action also benefits the individual soldier, the military service, and the nation. The soldier becomes aware of his responsibility toward the community and, through this association and the mutual exchange of ideas with civilians, national unity is enhanced. Military conscripts are trained in skills which have both military and civilian application and, after release from military service, these personnel are better prepared to
make meaningful contributions to their communities. Soldiers who possess special talents and have learned trades prior to entering the military service have an opportunity to maintain their proficiency in these skills and, at the same time, assist communities in which such skills are not available; therefore, the advisor should encourage his counterpart to screen military personnel to identify skills in such fields as farming, carpentry, automotive repair, and health and sanitation.

c. The following is a representative list of activities which can be undertaken by units or individuals:

   (1) **Food, agriculture, and natural resources.**
       (a) Insect and rodent control.
       (b) Reclaiming land (clearing areas for farms and markets).
       (c) Grading operations to prevent soil erosion (irrigation, drainage).
       (d) Planting, thinning, and harvesting forests and crops.
       (e) Constructing compost pits.
       (f) Constructing animal pens.

   (2) **Industry and commerce.**
       (a) Assessing and developing sand and gravel resources for road construction and repair.
       (b) Constructing housing and buildings.
       (c) Encouraging establishment of small retail businesses and new products; improving marketing facilities and practices.
       (d) Organizing sawmill operations.

   (3) **Communications.**
(a) Installing, operating, and maintaining telephone, telegraph, and radio systems. Installing loudspeakers for public announcements.

(b) Operating emergency communications centers, especially during disasters.

(c) Constructing postal facilities.

(4) Public utilities.

(a) Producing and distributing power (water wheels, windmills, steam, electricity, gasoline, and animals).

(b) Operating public storage facilities.

(c) Supporting blacksmith facilities.

(d) Organizing and supporting village department of sanitation.

(e) Organizing central public hand tool facility.

(f) Improving flood control facilities.

(5) Transportation.

(a) Constructing, repairing, and improving roads, bridges, railway equipment, wharves, and harbors.

(b) Constructing, repairing, improving, and operating airfields and helicopter landing pads.

(c) Removing people from disaster areas.

(d) Increasing small boat construction.

(e) Stressing transportation safety (directional markers for roads and waterways).

(f) Constructing intermediate pickup shelters.

(6) Health and sanitation.

(a) Improving preventive medicine standards (safe water supply, food decontamination
measures, disposal of human and animal waste, insect and rodent control, and immunization requirements and procedures; elimination of rabid animals and control of disease in domestic animals).

(b) Improving treatment standards (establishing and operating dispensary units, outpatient clinics, and hospitals; and employing roving medical teams and establishing medical evacuation systems). Such activities, when conducted by U. S. units, should be in the context of assistance to HC personnel in developing new or direct supplement to existing HC facilities. The objectives of improving the image of the HC government and/or HC armed forces will not be achieved by sole operation of such facilities by U. S. units.

(c) Improving medical training standards.
   1. Initiating training for all military personnel in sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.
   2. Educating civilians regarding preventive medicine measures.
   3. Encouraging advanced training of medical personnel.

(7) Education.

(a) Providing basic and technical education to military personnel.

(b) Constructing schools (use military facilities until schools are completed).

   1. Providing training instructors for basic and technical schools.
   2. Providing instructional materials (audiovisual equipment, movie halls).
3. Teaching literacy courses (night school programs).

4. Establishing village libraries.

(8) Public administration.
   (a) Providing guidance in police, fire protection, and civil defense.
   (b) Establishing village councils.
   (c) Planning, surveying, and supervising such activities as schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, and medical centers.
   (d) Sponsoring worthy projects, such as children's shelters.

(9) Civil information.
   (a) Organizing hamlet/village meetings.
   (b) Preparing posters, wall newspapers, and radio broadcasts.
   (c) Organizing and indoctrinating key communicators.
   (d) Supervising and publishing local newspapers and newssheets.

50. Other Resources

There are many organizations and extensive resources available to aid developing nations. The advisor should not overlook the aid these organizations are capable of providing. Such agencies include—

a. HC.

(1) Commercial. HC business enterprises may exist which sponsor public relations programs, including environmental improvement activities. Normally, the representative of the U. S. Country
Team or the advisor’s counterpart can furnish information concerning these organizations.

(2) *Nonprofit.* These organizations vary from country to country; e.g., Red Cross, Red Lion, and Rotary International.

b. *U. S.*

(1) *Government.*

(a) USAID.

(b) MAP.

(c) USIS.

(d) Peace Corps.

(e) Regional programs, such as Alliance for Progress.

(2) *Commercial.* Overseas U. S. business enterprises often engage in internal development activities through community relations programs.

(3) *Nonprofit.* There are over 200 agencies of this type. Advisors may contact local USAID representatives who can provide specific information, or secure it from: Technical Assistance Information Clearing House of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 44 East 23rd Street, New York, New York 10010. Examples are—

(a) Missionaries.

(b) Foundations.

(c) Charitable organizations.

51. Interaction With Other Military Functions

Civil affairs operations impact upon and interact with other major military functions. When planning and conducting civil affairs operations, the following should be considered:
a. Advisory Assistance. Advisors should stress proper conduct of military personnel in their relationships with the civilian population.

b. PSYOP. Civic action should be supported by PSYOP to insure that projects under consideration will have the desired effect upon the population. PSYOP followup should be made to provide feedback on the eventual impact of civic action projects.

c. Intelligence Operations. Civic action is based, to a large extent, upon information concerning the activities of the population and insurgents in the area. Intelligence operations can assist in providing this information. Civic action personnel and units, in turn, can provide intelligence information gained from on-the-ground observation while conducting civic action projects.

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. These operations should insure that civic action personnel and resources are protected from insurgent actions and that maximum benefits accrue to the civilian population. Populace and resources control operations also should insure that completed civic action projects are used for the purposes intended and not exploited to the detriment of the people.

e. Tactical Operations. During phases II and III insurgency, tactical operations must insure that civil affairs operations are conducted in a relatively secure environment.

52. U. S. Assistance

Proponency for carrying out nonmilitary U. S.
foreign assistance is vested in USAID which also has the responsibility for the central direction and coordination of military and economic assistance programs. Military aid to foreign governments usually is furnished under the provisions of MAP which provides for both materiel and training support. The MAAG is the U. S. military organization usually charged with the responsibility for administering the MAP and assuring that HC military forces realize the importance of good civil-military relationships.

53. Advisor Considerations (Military Civic Action)

a. General.

(1) Communication. The advisor must get his ideas and intentions across through his counterpart. Programs can be advertised by—

(a) Community meetings.
(b) News media.
(c) Informal lectures.
(d) Demonstrations.

(2) Image. In many areas, relations between villagers and the government have not always been satisfactory. The government should—

(a) Establish rapport with the people.
(b) Speak their dialect.
(c) Understand their culture.
(d) Be sympathetic to their problems.

(3) Demonstration. The villagers should be shown dynamically how a program works.
(4) Participation. The villagers should be encouraged to participate voluntarily in projects in order to—

(a) Instill in them a feeling of ownership and responsibility.

(b) Teach them how the system functions so that they may maintain it.

(5) Traditions. Projects should consider local traditions and customs, but not be stifled by them.

(6) Environment. The environment should be used to advantage.

(7) Timeliness. Major work projects should be initiated during seasonal unemployment, not during planting or harvesting time.

(8) Flexibility. Projects should be altered if unforeseen conditions arise.

(9) Continuity. Confidence must be instilled that the government intends to see the project through. Material support and guidance should be continuous.

(10) Maintenance. The people should be left with the means and know-how to maintain the project. Repair parts should be available after the departure of government teams.

b. Population Factors. Factors inherent in local culture can affect the project. These should be recognized and turned to advantage.

(1) Motivation.

(a) The project should be something that the people themselves want.

(b) Benefits must be readily apparent.
(c) The people may accept a program because they wish to emulate more successful members of the community.

(d) Groups may strive to improve their status in relation to other groups, clubs, communities or families.

(e) A project should provide immediate benefits to the majority of the population.

(f) A project may be accepted or rejected because it is impressive or because it is suspect and fearsome.

(2) Traditional culture. Some cultural traditions are resistant to change and may work against the project. Some factors and countermeasures are—

(a) Social structure.

1. Role of the individual. Individuals influence a proposed improvement. For instance, although women are not traditionally included in village institutions, a cooperative endeavor without them may fail because they feel that their interests are being ignored.

2. Kinship. It may be possible to form an institution, such as a cooperative, around a family group.

3. Ethnic group. Ethnic minorities may have separate cultures and traditions and consequently require special attention if they are to be integrated into a regional effort. It may be advisable to assign tasks and functions within the project according to the existing social structure.

4. Political group. It may be necessary to work through the existing political structure. The
authority of the legally constituted government must not be undercut; however, the advisor must take into account traditional and respected leaders who may not be government appointees.

5. *Vested interests.* Individuals will react favorably or unfavorably depending on whether the project will benefit or hinder their situation.

6. *Religious fraternity.* The advisor should consider the ramifications of soliciting aid from local religious orders or individuals.

(b) *Economic pattern.* Projects should be planned according to the capability and availability of local labor.

(c) *Beliefs.* Religious and supernatural beliefs exert powerful influences and must be taken into account.

(d) *Recreation pattern.* Projects must not interfere with cherished local pastimes.

(e) *Consumption pattern.* Products must fit reasonably into the local consumption pattern.

(f) *Value system.* Projects must not transgress traditional beliefs.

c. *Monitorship.* Official progress checks should be made. A responsible HC official should be designated to assume responsibility. Neither the advisor nor his counterpart should defer all projects until the arrival of specialized aid. Progress should be analyzed in the light of such factors as—

1. Budget limitations.
2. Time schedules.
3. Project complexity.
4. Resources available.
54. Outline for Military Civic Action Area Analysis

The advisor should obtain information concerning—

a. Community.
   (1) Road networks.
   (2) Location of religious institutions, schools, community hall, market place, and other community activities.
   (3) Distances to adjacent communities.
   (4) The political, economic, and religious centers of the community, and factors which give the community its identification.
   (5) The socio-economic relationship of the community with adjoining communities.
   (6) The weather and terrain affecting the location and life of the community.
   (7) Areas where new housing and suburban centers, such as markets, may be sited as an aid to planned community development.

b. History (as it affects the present situation).
   (1) Natural crises in the history of the community.
   (2) Conflicts and cooperation in the community.
   (3) Immigration and emigration.
   (4) Leaders and famous citizens.

c. Population.
   (1) Census.
   (2) Occupations.
   (3) Minority groups.

d. Communication.
(1) Transportation (roads, water, rail, and air).
(2) Communications (telephone, radio, and telegraph).
(3) Printed material (newspapers and posters).
(4) Postal facilities.
(5) Connections with other communities.
(6) Degree of self-sufficiency or isolation.

e. Community Integration. The identity of influential groups and individuals which are not a part of the local government. What effects do these have on the community; what is the attitude of the local government toward these groups and individuals?

f. Economic Situation.
(1) Natural resources.
(2) Industries.
(3) Agriculture (crops and products, markets, ownership, and tenancy). Who are the landlords? Are they in the community or absentees?
(4) Local merchants and their influence on the community.
(5) Teachers, doctors, ministers, and other professional personnel.
(6) Credit associations and the dependency of the community upon them.
(7) Economic status of the people (debt, savings, and taxes).

g. Religious Situation.
(1) Number, make-up, and attitude of each sect.
(2) Buildings and equipment.
(3) Church schools.
(4) Clash or cooperation with other groups.

h. Educational Organizations.
   (1) Schools (number, size, territory served, buildings, equipment, and libraries).
   (2) History (how, when, and by whom constructed).
   (3) School activities and relation to community.

i. Voluntary Organizations.
   (1) Number, types, composition of membership, equipment, activities, and their relation to other phases of community life.
   (2) Farmers’ co-ops and organizations.
   (3) Other occupational groups.

j. Recreational Facilities.
   (1) Organizations (community buildings, clubs, teams, ballfields, and courts).
   (2) Traditional forms of and local attitudes toward recreational needs.

k. Health.
   (1) Physicians, health workers, and nurses.
   (2) Public and private health organizations, national and international (hospitals, dispensaries).
   (3) Health status of the people. Prevalence, incidence, and types of diseases.

l. Political Situation.
   (1) Political structure and government.
   (2) Dominant personalities.

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m. Leadership.

(1) Dominant leaders and control factions.
(2) Type of leadership (democratic or autocratic).
(3) Development of new leaders.
(4) Attitude of people toward new leaders.

n. Status of Law and Order.

(1) Organization and capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
(2) Police techniques.
(3) Crime rate.
(4) Unusual enforcement problems.
(5) Effectiveness of police forces.
(6) Coordination and liaison between police agencies of different political subdivisions.
(7) Positive attitude of population toward police forces.
(8) Effectiveness of police intelligence.

Section V. INTELLIGENCE

55. General

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations. Basic U. S. Army intelligence doctrine for stability operations intelligence is contained in FM 30–5, as well as FM 30–31, and FM 30–31A.
56. Objectives

Intelligence is used to determine the causes of popular discontent, to gain information on the insurgent, including the amount of influence he exerts and the substance of his overt nonviolent attacks against the government, and to obtain information about the weather, terrain, and the HC population. While intelligence efforts are directed primarily toward the obvious area of direct insurgency activity, efforts also should include areas in which insurgent actions may appear indirectly, such as economic interference, civil disturbances, or outright violence. The objective of the advisor is to instill in his counterpart an awareness of—

a. The importance of intelligence and counterintelligence.

b. The application of these functions in an insurgency situation.

57. Concept

It is essential that intelligence capabilities be established with a view to enhancing the capability of the HC military and paramilitary forces to produce the required intelligence. Emphasis should be placed on the establishment of an integrated, coordinated, and efficient intelligence system. Central points should be established at each level of government where the intelligence effort can be coordinated. These central points may be the intelligence element of Area Coordination Centers.

a. During phase I insurgency, the military expands and improves its intelligence organizations
and supports police intelligence operations. The coordinated intelligence effort is designed to provide information on the insurgent infrastructure. Concurrently, counterintelligence measures will be initiated or strengthened to enhance security.

(1) The insurgent infrastructure is attacked best through the people by agents and informants. Analyses of operations determine insurgent patterns. Sensitive operations are utilized as a means of locating and penetrating the insurgent movement to identify its leadership, structure, objectives, and programs. The sensitive intelligence effort must be directed and coordinated by a central source control agency which adds source data for all collection organizations. The identities of agents and sources must be protected from hostile elements.

(2) Counterintelligence operations include defensive and offensive activities conducted to protect government forces from insurgent agents. Defensive operations involve such activities as personnel security (background) investigations, investigations of suspect persons, security surveys and inspections, technical inspections, and security training and discipline. Offensive measures involve such activities as counterespionage, countersubversion, and countersabotage, and are aimed at eliminating the infrastructure at the lower levels.

(3) The primary effort in phase I is to determine which intelligence programs to undertake. Careful and systematic gathering of data concerning the population is necessary.
(4) Accurate and current information concerning the topography, vegetation, and meteorological data is gathered.

b. During phase II, intelligence specialties include—

(1) Counterintelligence.
(2) Overt and covert collection.
(3) Order of battle (to include the insurgent infrastructure).
(4) Aerial surveillance/imagery.
(5) Communications and electronic intelligence.
(6) Target, terrain, and weather intelligence.

c. During tactical operations, the individual soldier can be the most important single means of intelligence collection. Training the soldier in what to look for and how to report is essential. His training should stress establishing rapport with the civilian community, thereby gaining its confidence and respect.

d. During phase III, the presence of larger insurgent forces and the type of operations conducted by them increase the requirement for combat intelligence. HC intelligence agencies should intensify their operations to cope with the stronger insurgent movement. HC sensitive intelligence activities become oriented to the consolidated areas.

58. Organization

The organization and operation of the Area Coordination Center and its intelligence components must provide for—
a. Coordination of information and intelligence.

b. A focal point for coordination, processing, and dissemination of information and intelligence between military-civil agencies within the area.

c. Collection activities based on general and specific essential elements of information (EEI).

59. Planning

The intelligence collection plan and the counterintelligence measures worksheet (FM 30-5) provide the management tools by which intelligence and supporting resources are applied. It provides for systematic collection, integration of resources, and extension of the collection effort down to the lowest level. Counterintelligence factors are taken into consideration in overall intelligence planning to insure security.

a. Phase I. Intelligence attempts to detect evidence of subversive activity within the government and society. The initial manifestation of insurgency may be masked by ever-increasing bandit incidents. Counterintelligence is a necessary preventive measure. During this phase, the counterintelligence planning effort is directed primarily toward the detection and identification of subversive activity. Appropriate actions to secure information, personnel, and facilities are planned based on the identified threat.

b. Phase II. The beginning of guerrilla operations in this phase creates the requirement for combat intelligence. Intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination must be accomplished in detail.
Planning must consider that many overt collection and surveillance means will not fulfill this requirement; therefore, increased emphasis is placed on clandestine collection. An increased counterintelligence effort is required for security, and special operations such as the penetration of the insurgent intelligence structure and the recruitment and defection of their personnel.

c. Phase III. Intelligence planning in this phase dictates a continuing intelligence effort, generally of the nature employed in conventional warfare. The insurgent will continue espionage, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities in addition to the initiation of a war of movement; hence, the effort must be directed toward providing commensurate intelligence.

60. Operations

Operational planning must provide for the rapid conversion of raw information into finished intelligence. The element of time is critical and intelligence must be produced, disseminated, and acted upon expeditiously. A major problem encountered in internal defense and internal development operations is the transmission of information from the source to the processor and thence to the user. Solution of this problem will continually tax the ingenuity of all personnel concerned.

a. The production of intelligence involves recording, evaluation, and interpretation. From the time it is collected, intelligence information must be recorded clearly and accurately. Intelligence
records and reports must satisfy the six basic interrogatives: who, what, when, where, why, and how. The evaluation of intelligence information must determine the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source or agency, and its accuracy. Finally, interpretation involves—

(1) Analysis (sifting and sorting evaluated information to isolate significant elements).

(2) Integration (combining significant elements with other known information to form a logical picture, or hypothesis, of insurgent activities or the influence of the characteristics of the area of operations on the mission).

(3) Deduction (developing meaning from the hypotheses considered valid as a result of integration).

b. Dissemination and effective application requires that the intelligence product reach the user in the proper form and in sufficient time. This may require forwarding raw information or partially produced intelligence to higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting units in order to exploit a rapidly changing situation. Intelligence involving a combat response should be forwarded, consistent with security requirements, in the most expeditious manner. Combat intelligence should be used in conjunction with the analysis of the area of operations and the intelligence estimate.

c. Factors which limit the efficiency of intelligence agencies are—

(1) Insurgent penetration of the HC governmental structure.
(2) Political factionalism in the HC.
(3) Authority excessively centralized.
(4) Agent, source, or population fear of reprisal by the insurgents.
(5) Language difficulties.
(6) Lack of a national registry or census data.
(7) Lack of adequate funds, materiel, and trained personnel.
(8) Lack of a centralized source control program.
(9) Lack of reliable communications.

d. Collection agencies (individuals or organizations) must operate with greater flexibility because of the greater numbers and types of sources available. This, in turn, requires greater coordination and exchange of operational intelligence.

(1) Sources include, but are not limited to—
   (a) Insurgent activity (combat, support, and subversive elements).
   (b) Prisoners, informers, local civilians, displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.
   (c) Captured documents and materiel.
   (d) Insurgent signal communications and other electromagnetic emissions.
   (e) Duds; shell and missile fragments.
   (f) Imagery; maps and weather forecasts.
   (g) Studies and reports.

(2) Examples of collection agencies which may be employed are—
   (a) Patrols.
   (b) Military intelligence and technical intelligence specialists.
(c) Electronic warfare and signal intelligence units.

(d) Aviation units.

(e) PSYOP units.

(f) Police organizations, both military and civilian.

(3) Intelligence may be collected by both overt and covert means.

(a) Overt collection operations include, in addition to collection activities normally assigned to research and other special units, combat surveillance, reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance, and target acquisition.

(b) Covert operations normally are conducted by specially trained intelligence personnel. Often intelligence advisor personnel will work with counterparts and assist in or encourage the establishment of local intelligence collection operations, i.e., informant nets.

e. Continuous surveillance of target areas should be accomplished by the coordinated employment of ground and aerial surveillance, and constant patrolling.

f. Counterintelligence measures, both offensive and defensive, should be carried out to maintain a high degree of security and to deny information to the insurgents.

(1) Defensive measures include—

(a) The preparation and maintenance of security SOP.

(b) Security discipline.
(c) Safeguarding classified information and equipment.

(d) Security of troop movements.

(e) Use of passwords.

(f) Special handling of escapees and evaders.

(g) Control of movement of civilian personnel.

(h) Security screening of civilian labor.

(i) Sea and land frontier patrols.

(k) Security screening and control of frontier crossers.

(l) Censorship.

(m) Compilation and dissemination of counterintelligence target data.

(n) Operations of special interrogation centers for processing captured agents.

(2) Offensive measures include—

(a) Neutralization of insurgent intelligence nets and sabotage organizations.

(b) Monitoring suspect political parties.

(c) Deception and provocation.

g. The collection of order of battle information should begin upon detection of the insurgent movement. Emphasis is placed on locating supplies and caches, resupply points, and methods of resupply. Dossiers should be maintained on insurgent leaders and key personnel.
61. Advisor Intelligence Functions

To attain his objectives, it may be necessary for the advisor to plan and conduct training as well as to—

a. Assist in establishing an operations center within the Area Coordination Center to coordinate the intelligence effort.

b. Maintain liaison with police and intelligence agencies responsible for countersubversion.

c. Provide intelligence support to U. S. advisors working at other levels.

d. Establish secure and reliable communications channels.

e. Prepare daily reports of insurgent activity (include psychological vulnerabilities).

f. Assist counterpart in developing effective techniques and procedures for collection and rapid dissemination of intelligence.

g. Assist counterpart in establishing an adequate security program to safeguard against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

h. Encourage and assist counterpart in establishing and maintaining a source control program.

i. Assist counterpart in obtaining and filling intelligence training quotas for training of selected, qualified personnel.

62. Advisor Considerations (Intelligence and Counterintelligence)

The following provides basic guidance on intelligence and counterintelligence matters:
a. Be familiar with the army study and the most recent area assessment. Compare the two to detect trends or changes.

b. Evaluate—

(1) The G2 (S2) /intelligence section and its operating procedures and effectiveness.
(2) Personalities of counterparts and other persons with whom business is conducted.
(3) The chain of command and communication channels of the HC unit.
(4) Intelligence projects initiated by predecessors.
(5) Intelligence projects which predecessor believed should have been initiated.
(6) Advisor communication channels.
(7) Reference material available.
(8) Other intelligence agencies.

c. Prepare and maintain a list of EEI and insurgent indicators, such as those listed below. Be aware that there may be many more indicators.

(1) Examples of standing EEI to establish if an insurgency exists include determining whether—

(a) Trained subversive insurgent leaders have been discovered.
(b) There is evidence of an underground insurgent organization.
(c) There are efforts to create or increase civil disturbances and dissension.
(d) There is insurgent psychological attack against existing or proposed government policies and programs.
(e) Attempts are being made to provoke the government into harsh measures.

(f) Assassination and kidnappings of local political leaders, doctors, or school teachers are taking place.

(g) Guerrilla actions are occurring.

(h) There is an appreciable decline in school attendance.

(2) Typical indicators which provide a guide to the effectiveness of actions taken include—

(a) Amount of area controlled.

(b) Casualties.

(c) Morale.

(d) Relative defection rates from both government and insurgent forces.

(e) Labor strike frequency (might be used as a measure of civil unrest, since citizens often use strikes as protests against the government).

(f) Standard of living.

(g) Intelligence flow from the civilian population.

(h) Relative military strengths.

(i) Frequency of insurgent assassination.

(j) Tax receipts.

(3) Indicators of insurgent infiltration of village or installation include—

(a) Increase in vendors, workers, and applicants for employment.

(b) Frequent visits of relatives from distant or neighboring communities.

(c) Strangers seeking to join paramilitary forces.
(d) Individuals leaving village on many or regular occasions.

(e) Suspect individuals contacting inhabitants or members of paramilitary forces.

(f) Pilfering.

(4) Indicators of impending attack of village or installation include—

(a) Initiation of propaganda lectures (usually conducted 5–15 km from village or installation).

(b) Probes by insurgent reconnaissance patrols.

(c) Firing on or ambushing local security patrols.

(d) Indication of insurgent force movement or shift of location.

(e) Increasing reconnaissance actions.

(f) Quiet period, threats of attack, and propaganda directed at village.

(g) Kidnapping or murder of officials and civic leaders.

(h) Rumor of an attack.

(5) Indicators of area being used as an infiltration route include—

(a) Crops grown away from immediate vicinity of village: crops grown in areas not under friendly control; food caches or way stations in area.

(b) Trails circumventing population centers: unusual amounts of broken branches and debris; undergrowth beaten down on trails and in fields; signals markers or signs.
(c) Abandoned camp sites.
(d) Adequate water supply. Year-round water supply located near trails or cache sites.
(e) Game animals: adequate to support small groups; small animal traps and snares in use.
(f) New or transient enemy units sighted or reported.
(g) Lack of man traps, foot traps, and spikes along trails.
(h) Lack of insurgent combat action along route.
(i) Smoke from unidentified sources.

(6) Indicators leading to known or suspected sympathizers and groups include—
(a) Apparent freedom of movement of individuals or entire village population.
(b) No security for workers in fields.
(c) No fear of insurgents.
(d) No insurgent action against village or village inhabitants.
(e) Trails leading from village to known or suspected insurgent areas.

(7) Indicators of location of strongholds and rendezvous points include—
(a) Concealment from aerial observation.
(b) Good observation of the surrounding area.
(c) Difficulty of access and ease of defense.
(d) Good routes of withdrawal.
(e) Natural water supply.
(f) Reasonable proximity to settlements and lucrative targets.
d. The counterintelligence advisor should attempt to secure answers to the following questions:

(1) Defensive.

(a) Is intelligence information disseminated on a need-to-know basis?
(b) Are security precautions observed?
(c) Is access to sensitive areas positively controlled?
(d) Are cryptographic systems available and used in transmitting classified information?
(e) Do personnel follow proper communications procedures?
(f) Are personnel with access to classified information properly cleared? How effective is the investigation?
(g) Are security inspections of installations conducted at regular and irregular intervals?
(h) Are periodic security lectures conducted?

(2) Offensive.

(a) Does the counterpart have a covert counterintelligence program?
(b) Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of gaining knowledge of insurgent intelligence, subversion, or sabotage within the area?
(c) What means of communication are employed? Do communications media jeopardize the security of the source?
(d) What is the expected elapsed time from acquisition of information by a source to receipt
of his report. Is source reporting prompt? Does elapsed time allow for reaction by friendly forces?

(e) How is the reliability of a source determined? Is reliability or lack thereof considered in evaluating information?

(f) How do counterparts evaluate the accuracy of information received from the source?

(g) How do counterparts protect operations against—

1. Double agents (agents working for two or more opposing intelligence agencies, only one of which knows of the dual relationship)?

2. Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the same government, which may result in false confirmation of information)?

3. Confusion agents (agents fabricating information to mislead friendly forces)?

e. The advisor should assist his counterpart in—

(1) Developing a local intelligence collection program.

(2) Training intelligence personnel in their respective specialties.

(3) Properly utilizing trained intelligence personnel.

Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

63. General

Populace and resources control operations are necessary to control the populace and its materiel resources or to deny access to those resources
which would further hostile aims and objectives against the HC. Joint and combined operations employing civil police forces and military police and tactical forces will facilitate achieving populace and resources control operations objectives.

64. Objectives

The objectives of populace and resources control operations are to assist in the re-establishment of a state of law and order and sever popular support for the insurgent within the nation. Component tasks include—

a. Protecting lines of communication from interdiction and communities from attack.

b. Preventing insurgent confiscation or smuggling of materiel resources and the recruitment of personnel.

c. Strengthening or establishing national authority over the population and preserving a state of law and order.

d. Isolating the insurgent from the population.

e. Discovering and neutralizing insurgent organizations.

f. Preventing interference of friendly operations by the civilian population.

65. Concept

Police, intelligence, and other security agencies normally are established to maintain law and order in a peacetime environment. Their organizations are tailored to perform such tasks as protecting the population from common criminals and
law-breakers and enforcing the established system of controls necessary to maintain order. In an active insurgency, security organizations have far more to contend with than the routine preservation of law and order. They are confronted with a well organized insurgent apparatus which is adept at the disruption of society through subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Coping with this problem normally is beyond the capabilities of peacetime security forces and they must be expanded and reinforced by military and paramilitary forces.

66. Organization

Forces conducting populace and resources control operations should be organized, equipped, and trained to insure unity of command and the capability of integrating their operations with other forces.

a. Command and control. Operations and programs should be planned, programmed, and monitored at the national level. Execution and direction of populace and resources control operations are the responsibility of the province chief, who may delegate these responsibilities to the provincial police element within the Area Coordination Center.

b. Structuring. Forces employed in populace and resources control operations primarily are police and paramilitary. Armed forces normally are backup or reserve, and a source of trained specialists. Maximum effort should be made to organize, train,
and utilize irregular forces to assist in self-defense
and security.

c. *Joint operations.* Whenever police and mili-
tary forces are involved jointly in the security of
the same area, specific delimitations of responsi-
bility should be established.

**67. Control Measures**

Control measures are limited to those considered
essential and enforceable. Once established, they
must be enforced justly and firmly.

a. Control measures employed by the police con-
sist of roadblocks, patrols, check points, screening
and documenting the population, search and seiz-
ure, cordon and search, surveillance and apprehen-
sion, and border and port control operations.

b. Large-scale population movement is prevented
except for those groups who volunteer to leave in-
surgent-dominated areas, or refugees. Meetings and
gatherings are regulated.

c. PSYOP programs support populace and re-
sources control operations to—

1. Make the imposition of control measures
   more palatable.

2. Create a favorable government image.

3. Counter the efforts of insurgent PSYOP.

4. Blame the insurgents for creating the
   necessity for control operations.

d. Tactical operations may be required to secure
areas, conduct border operations, relieve belea-
guered installations, escort convoys and trains, and
support the defense of key installations. Successful
populace and resources control operations complement tactical operations by depriving the insurgent of sanctuary within the population.

68. Implementation of Populace and Resources Control

Implementation of populace and resources control measures is based upon a consideration of the following factors:

a. Population Surveillance. Population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage includes—

   (1) Overt surveillance, the responsibility of the police patrol division, is conducted with conventional police procedures, using the officer on the beat. Police patrols should—

      (a) Vary routes and movement to avoid establishing predictable patterns.

      (b) Patrol areas adjacent to their beat.

      (c) Coordinate the activities of military and paramilitary forces to avoid duplication of effort and confusion.

      (d) Use sentry dogs.

   (2) Covert surveillance, the responsibility of the intelligence/security division of the police department, should include informant nets and block wardens.

b. Movement Control Measures. Movement control measures include requiring passenger and cargo manifests, fuel rationing, trip tickets, and route clearances. Contraband must be defined clearly to the public. Other control measures include—
(1) Individual travel passes. Passes issued on a one-time basis permitting the traveler to go to a certain point or points and return may be used in conjunction with the movement of specified goods listed on manifests.

(2) Check points. Those locations at which vehicular and pedestrian traffic is checked and searched include—

(a) Fixed check points.

1. Established in open country and on high ground.

2. Established where turn-off space is available to avoid traffic congestion.

3. Established on routes which make it necessary for traffic to pass through the check point.

4. Established at reasonable distances apart to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to the traveler.

(b) Mobile check points.

1. Prevent traffic from evading the fixed check points.

2. Achieve surprise and can be established rapidly.

3. Should be employed whenever resources and the situation permit.

(c) Waterborne check points.

1. Unload randomly selected craft for better inspection of cargoes.

2. Establish fixed check points at major junctions of waterways.
3. Maintain records of the customary routes of registered craft to detect suspicious movements.

(d) Check point considerations.
1. Conduct check point operations at night.
2. Provide for adequate security of personnel at check points.
3. Choose some vehicles at random for a thorough inspection, to include complete unloading, rather than attempting a cursory inspection of all.
4. Have reserve forces readily available.

(3) Manifests. Cargo and personnel manifests often are misinterpreted as a license to transport goods and people without inspection. This is not the case; both personnel and cargo should be carefully checked against the authorized manifest.

(4) Curfew. Curfew is based on analysis of its effects, enforceability, and duration, and of its objectives and intelligence value.

(a) Key objectives of curfew are to—
1. Screen military movements and other activities during critical phases of operations.
2. Prevent movement which might be useful or helpful to the insurgent force.
3. Restrict movement during specific hours.
4. Permit government forces to identify and take action on the assumption that the only persons moving in a designated area during the curfew are insurgents.
5. Disrupt the insurgents’ communications or support systems.

6. Deceive the insurgent.

7. Deter the assembly of crowds.

(b) Curfews usually are imposed during the hours of darkness.

(c) Public announcement of curfews and blackouts should include, as a minimum:

1. Periods of time and areas in which citizens may circulate to take care of their needs.

2. Categories of persons who may be exempt from the restrictions.

3. The hours in which they may circulate to perform their functions.

4. Systems to control the number, identity, and special documentation of persons so exempted.

c. Resources Control Measures. Application of resources control measures without sufficient justification causes more harm than good. Measures to be applied selectively include—

(1) Forbidding civilians to enter limited access areas.

(2) Ordering the surrender of all weapons, radio transmitters, and cameras.

(3) Ordering civilians to report all unexploded bombs, shells, and other explosives.

(4) Controlling all raw material and livestock which could be of value to insurgent forces.

(5) Controlling propaganda sources and distribution.
(6) Establishing price, monetary, and rationing controls.
(7) Controlling medical facilities and drugs.
(8) Conducting denial and destruction operations against insurgent installations, materiel, and crops.

d. Screening and Documenting the Population. Screening and documenting include—
(1) Systematic identification and registration, and issuance of individual identification cards containing—
   (a) Picture of individual and of family groups.
   (b) Personal identification data.
   (c) Fingerprint(s).
   (d) An official stamp.
(2) Issuance of family group census cards, a copy of which is retained at the local police agency.
(3) Frequent use of mobile and fixed check points.
(4) Lamination and embossing of identification and registration documents to prevent alterations.

e. Cordon and Search. Frequently utilized by police or military forces, cordon and search activities are employed in small communities or in sections of a larger community. They may be in reaction to intelligence, or part of a systematic and programmed plan. Cordon and search operations afford an excellent opportunity for PSYOP, medical civic action programs, military civic action project surveys, and short-term civic action programs.
(1) Sufficient forces must be provided to cordon effectively and search target areas, to include areas below surface level.

(2) Cordon and search operations should incorporate an element of surprise, avoiding predictable patterns.

(3) Time must be allocated to conduct thorough search and interrogation of residents.

(4) Operations should be rehearsed.

(5) Unnecessary incidents which may alienate the people should be avoided.

(6) Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows:

   (a) Cordon. Disposition of troops should allow for visual contact between posts and provide for patrolling and immediate deployment of reserve forces. Provisions should be given to sealing the administrative center of the community; occupying all critical facilities; detaining personnel in place; and preserving and securing all records, files, and other archives.

   (b) Search. The system for immediate search and seizure should be documented in SOP and carried out by trained personnel. Search forces should, if possible, include personnel familiar with or native to the area being searched. A search SOP should provide for the following:

      1. Search teams of squad size.
      2. One target assigned per team.
      3. Room searches conducted by individuals or two-man teams.
4. Room-search teams armed with pistols; all other personnel armed with automatic weapons.

5. Pre-search coordination between control personnel and screening team leaders; study of lay-out plans, communications, i.e., radio, whistle, and hand signals; disposition of suspects.

6. On-site security: guard entrances, exits, to include roof, halls, corridors, and tunnels; missions for reserve.

7. Room search: search occupants; immobilize occupants with one team member; search room with other team member; place documents in a numbered envelope and tag individual with a corresponding number.

8. Security duties. Search teams are provided security for screening operations and facilities.

69. Defended Hamlets

Defended hamlets are population centers organized, equipped, trained, and supported to separate the population from the insurgent and to provide protection from insurgent attack, terrorism, and harassment.

a. Objectives. Defended hamlets provide secure bases for internal development. Tasks required to develop defended hamlets include—

(1) Providing organizations and resources for defense.

(2) Establishing defensive measures.

(3) Regrouping scattered rural populations.

(4) Providing combat service support.
(5) Establishing populace and resources control measures.
(6) Establishing effective government.
(7) Preserving a state of law and order.
(8) Securing and defending lines of communication.

b. Concept. So far as possible, develop existing hamlets as defended hamlets, since people are more willing to defend their traditional homes and land. When establishing new hamlets, they should be sited in easily defended areas in which the inhabitants can pursue their normal mode of life.

c. Organization. Hamlets should be mutually supporting, to form organized village complexes.

(1) When defended hamlets are sited, the following factors should be considered.

(a) Adequate water.
(b) Routes of access.
(c) Work and farming areas nearby.
(d) Locations tactically sited.
(e) Advanced planning of hamlet sites should include provisions for houses, gardens, canals, defense roads, shops, schools, churches, medical clinics, playgrounds, and a helipad or landing strip.
(f) Cleared lanes of fire.
(g) Limited entry points.
(h) Sited in areas which can be supported by armed and paramilitary forces.

(2) Armed forces and paramilitary units should assume defense and security roles until hamlet defenders become operational.
(3) Early warning devices, such as trip flares, noisemakers, sentry dogs, and listening posts, should be employed.

(4) Organization of defended hamlets includes—

(a) Establishing of a secure zone around the hamlet in which hamlet defense forces and paramilitary units continually patrol.

(b) Division of the hamlet into areas of responsibility for defense.

(c) Maintenance of a mobile reserve at hamlet level.

(d) Establishment of an intelligence network.

d. Operations. The participation of all members of the hamlet in providing their own defense is accomplished by the integration of military, political, economic, sociological, psychological, and civic activities.

(1) Estimate. A thorough estimate of the situation must be made prior to establishing village complexes. The estimate should answer—

(a) Does the situation warrant the establishment of defended hamlets?

(b) Is the development of defended hamlets within the capability of the government?

(c) Does the terrain or area favor the establishment of defended hamlets?

(d) How will the inhabitants react to the establishment of defended hamlets?
(e) Will the advantages accrued by the establishment of defended hamlets outweigh the disadvantages?

(f) Does the plan include—

1. Priorities for development of complexes?
2. Locations of defended hamlet sites?
3. Methods by which the population can be motivated?
4. Allocation of materials?
5. Assistance in the preparation of defense systems?
6. Programs for training the population?
7. Organization of the hamlet administrative system?
8. Activities to improve the economic situation?
9. Political development activities?

(2) *Resettlement.* In preparing for resettlement—

(a) A house site for each family is designated.

(b) Advance warning of movement is given each household.

(c) Free transportation and sufficient time are provided to move families, animals, possessions, and salvaged building materials.

(d) Building materials are made available.

(e) Each family should be given a dislocation allowance.
Emergency food, blankets and clothing, and medical stocks should be made available at the new site.

Markets and shops are established.

Temporary shelters are made available.

70. Frontier Operations

Frontier operations consist of security measures to control airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, and international air boundaries.

a. Port Security. Ports serve as focal points for travel control. They are insurgent targets and must be protected against sabotage. Port facilities normally are under the control of the civil port authority.

(1) Port security may be provided by harbor or port police, paramilitary forces, and military police. The Area Coordination Center is useful in facilitating coordination and cooperation.

(2) Port security requirements include the following:

(a) Develop a security plan and SOP.
(b) Secure insurgent intelligence targets and neutralize insurgent espionage, sabotage, and subversion elements.
(c) Coordinate counterintelligence activities with other interested agencies.
(d) Conduct counterintelligence surveys and inspections.
(e) Survey adjacent towns or areas.
(f) Monitor security measures.
(g) Investigate port employees in coordination with civil police.
(h) Assist in examining ships.
(i) Maintain a list of known or suspected insurgent agents and collaborators.
(j) Assist in screening ship crews and passengers.
(k) Recommend security measures for fishing or harbor craft control.
(l) Control the import of disease and undesirable chemicals and drugs.

b. Border Security. Border security and control prevents insurgent forces from using adjacent countries as sanctuaries.

(1) Objectives are—
(a) Preventing sabotage and espionage by excluding agents.
(b) Apprehending or neutralizing insurgent couriers.
(c) Neutralizing propaganda and subversion by excluding foreign funds and literature.
(d) Preventing undesirable persons from exfiltrating and infiltrating.

(2) Planning considerations. Border security and control plans should provide for the following:
(a) Limiting road and rail crossing points along the frontier.
(b) Establishing border control posts at crossing points to—
   1. Identify persons attempting to cross.
   2. Enforce restrictions on the movement of goods and currency.
(c) Apprehending persons evading border control regulations.
(d) Controlling persons residing near borders and restricted zones.
(e) Interrogating suspects.
(f) Controlling refugees and displaced persons.
(g) Conducting liaison with border control authorities of neighboring countries.

71. Lines of Communication Security

Lines of communication (LOC) are highways, rail lines, intercoastal and inland waterways, transmission lines, and pipelines. Open and secure LOC are necessary for the survival of a nation. Priorities should be allotted to primary LOC.

a. Objective. The objective is to secure LOC to allow an uninterrupted flow of traffic, communications, and materials.

b. Concept. Basic operations to secure LOC consist of—

(1) Detailed surveillance and intelligence.
(2) Security of key installations.
(3) Escort of convoys and trains.
(4) Selective area security and defense.
(5) Clearing the sides of the right-of-way and flank security.
(6) Aggressive counterambush tactics.

c. Organization. Forces are organized to guard key installations and to provide escort security elements. Aircraft are employed to provide convoy escort and to conduct surveillance and route recon-
naissance. Police intelligence agencies, armed forces ground and air patrols, and civilians provide intelligence on insurgent activities and indications of ambush. LOC security coordination normally takes place in Area Coordination Centers.

d. Operations. Effective security and defense from insurgent attack requires planning, training, and responsive procedures.

(1) Highway security. Highway security protects traffic, the roadway, bridges, and other highway installations, and provides methods for minimizing attack.

(a) Intelligence. A source of intelligence is a loyal population. Maximum counterintelligence precautions should be taken to prevent insurgents from gaining information concerning convoy movements.

(b) Active measures. Air cover prevents or minimizes the effect of ambushes. Troop units positioned along routes conduct route and area reconnaissance.

(c) Communications. The principal means of communications within a convoy is radio. The convoy commander must be able to communicate at all times with various elements of the convoy, and with supporting aircraft, artillery, and local forces.

(2) Railway security. Regional and area commands, agencies, provinces, and districts may provide forces for railway security operations, in addition to national railway security forces which are assigned the primary mission of railway security.
(a) *Organization.* Rail security forces include planning agencies at the national government and railway company level; coordinating agencies such as Area Coordination Centers; and forces such as a Military Rail Security Service, provincial paramilitary forces, national and local police, railway company employees, the armed forces, and intelligence agencies.

(b) *Intelligence.* Intelligence measures to insure the timely detection of insurgent sabotage or ambush may include—

1. Decoy freight and passenger cars, heavily armored and disguised as unprotected trains to lure insurgent attack.

2. Varied train schedules.

3. Military train movement schedules published on a need-to-know basis only.

(c) *Active measures.* These include—

1. Rail line patrols conducted by line-walkers, ground patrols, and aerial reconnaissance flights.

2. Bridges, stations, and other key installations permanently guarded.

3. Adequate communications, coordination, alerts, and rehearsals provided for timely and successful reinforcement or support of ambushed trains.

4. Aircraft employed for patrol, escort of selected trains, and close air support.

5. Countermeasures employed to neutralize mines include trackwalkers, pilot-cars with sen-
sory equipment, and mine pre-exploder or neutral-
ized devices.

(3) Inland waterway security. Security forces
should be equipped with boats capable of negotiat-
ing all inland waterways. Aerial surveillance and
fire support is a major form of inland waterway
security. Military and paramilitary forces assigned
to areas along water LOC participate in inland
waterway security.

(a) Organization. Inland waterway security
forces may comprise national-level governmental
agencies, the armed forces, provincial paramilitary
and police forces, and irregular forces.

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence and counter-
intelligence measures for waterway security are
essentially the same as for highway and rail security.

(c) Active measures. These include—
1. Navy patrols and river TF along main
waterways conducting check point, reconnaissance,
and surveillance patrols.
2. Armed and paramilitary forces conduct-
ing patrols and operations along the banks.
3. Outposts and static check points guard-
ing dams, locks, and bridges.
4. Aircraft equipped with aerial flares or
illumination systems, and armed aircraft, to illumi-
nate and attack illegal traffic.
5. Defended hamlets along the waterways
mutually support one another and secure inland
waterways.
6. Vegetation cleared from points offer-
ing favorable ambush sites.
7. Military and paramilitary forces organizing and coordinating travel by river convoy, thus identifying all non-convoy traffic as possible insurgent.

(d) Communications. Communications measures to support waterway security are essentially the same as for highway security.

(4) Transmission line security. Transmission lines include power, telephone and telegraph lines, pipelines, and aqueducts. Security consists of guarding such installations as power plants, dams, and pumping stations, conducting patrols and surveillance, and immediately repairing damaged and sabotaged portions of the line.

(a) Organizations, intelligence, and communications for transmission line security are similar to requirements for the security of other LOC.

(b) Measures include—
1. Routing along secure routes.
2. Fault-locating devices to indicate the exact location of damage.
3. Tactical operations and patrolling throughout the area contiguous to the transmission lines.

72. Advisor Considerations (Populace and Resources Control Operations)

Advisors assist counterparts in—

a. Developing appropriate control plans.

b. Developing training programs for populace and resources control operations:
c. Coordinating plans and requests for materiel.

d. Submitting recommendations to improve overall effectiveness of operations.

(1) Preparing to initiate control.
   (a) Select, organize, and train police, paramilitary, and irregular forces.
   (b) Develop PSYOP to support populace and resources control operations.
   (c) Coordinate activities through the Area Coordination Center.
   (d) Establish and refine populace and resources control operations.
   (e) Intensify intelligence activities.
   (f) Establish and refine coordination and communications with other organizations.

(2) Establishing maximum control. Continued insurgent success will dictate the intensification of control measures.
   (a) Establish defended hamlets and relocate population (as a last resort).
   (b) Initiate and publicize amnesty and rehabilitation programs.
   (c) Offer rewards for capture or defection of insurgent cadre.
   (d) Establish martial law.

(3) Relinquishing control. As internal defense succeeds, controls should be lessened in two stages—
   (a) Stage A reduce intensity of controls.
       1. Continue general area controls, but reduce raids, ambushes, and cordon and search.
       2. Pass primary responsibility for control
to police and paramilitary units, phasing out military participation.

3. Continue intelligence activities.
4. Accelerate internal development.
5. Take maximum psychological advantage of reduced controls.

(b) Stage B reduce controls to a minimum.
1. Lessen individual restrictions, but retain block warden systems.
2. Continue controls on resources and population movements.
3. Reduce paramilitary unit operations to a stand-by basis; continue organization and training activities.
4. Continue intelligence and PSYOP.
5. Emphasize internal development and political allegiance.

(e) Provisions for handling, accountability, and disposition of insurgents, sympathizers, suspects, and other violators, as well as confiscated contraband, should include—

(1) Detention and interrogation facilities.
(2) Circumstances of capture recorded for analysis of trends and patterns.
(3) Prisoners referred for prosecution or rehabilitation.
(4) Confiscated materiel documented, safeguarded, and turned over to the appropriate authority.

(f) Amnesty, pardon, rehabilitation, a system of rewards, and re-education are necessary. Reward programs should be initiated and payments should
be provided for information leading to the capture of insurgents, weapons, and equipment. Amnesty and rehabilitation programs should include—

(1) Provision to allow individuals to revert to the support of the government without fear of punishment for previous anti-government acts, wherever possible.

(2) Just and equitable programs to induce disaffection among insurgents and their supporters.

(3) Rehabilitation of former insurgents and their supporters through re-education and constructive, controlled employment.

**Section VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

**73. General**

PSYOP include the planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. PSYOP become increasingly significant during the conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. PSYOP are tailored to meet the requirements of the specific area and operation. Every action, military or civilian, is prejudged in terms of its potential psychological impact and the resultant effect on political objectives. Tactical advantages may be sacrificed to preserve long-range psychological objectives; for example, the discriminate use of firepower to minimize noncombatant casualties.
74. Objectives

PSYOP objectives are designed to support the achievement of national objectives and are directed toward specific target groups, i.e., the insurgent, civilian population, HC military forces, and foreign groups. PSYOP objectives include—

a. Inducing defection and dissatisfaction among insurgents.

b. Eliminating and reducing civilian support of insurgent forces.

c. Gaining, preserving, and strengthening civilian support for the HC government.

d. Building and maintaining the morale of the HC military forces.

e. Influencing foreign groups to support HC efforts and to withhold support from the insurgent movement.

75. Concept

The PSYOP program is coordinated at the national level. The U. S. portion of the program usually is directed by the U. S. Information Service and may include U. S. Army participation. The national program provides operational policies and guidelines which are applied at lower military and civilian echelons to meet local requirements. PSYOP are planned and coordinated within the Area Coordination Center. The U. S. advisor insures that his counterpart requests and is provided PSYOP support through established channels. This support is provided by U. S. or HC military PSYOP
units, or by civilian agencies. In some cases, printed matter may be secured through arrangements with local printers.

a. To achieve maximum effectiveness, the PSYOP program is total and intensive. All psychological activities are developed and vigorously executed under central direction with clearly established channels of command. Continuous coordination is required. A limited number of appropriate themes are developed which can be disseminated by both skilled and unskilled operators. Simple approaches to elementary emotions are endlessly repeated to the target audience.

b. All U. S. and HC programs, both civilian and military, are integrated to insure detailed coordination, economy of force, and unity of effort. The allegiance of the people is directed toward the HC rather than toward U. S. forces.

76. Organization

Capabilities of HC PSYOP units are developed and employed in support of internal defense and internal development operations. Local resources, when properly organized and motivated, usually are more effective than outside resources. When U. S. combat forces are committed to assist HC forces, U. S. PSYOP units are employed, either in support of U. S. forces or integrated with HC PSYOP units.

a. National-Level Efforts. The advisor at this level may be both a U. S. staff officer and an advisor.
In both areas of responsibility, he is concerned with—

(1) Development of a national PSYOP program.

(2) Development of sufficient guidelines for direction at lower echelons, while allowing adequate latitude for local implementation.

(3) Organization, training, and allocation of HC PSYOP units and resources, and integration with U. S. PSYOP assets.

(4) Conduct of strategic PSYOP.

b. Brigade, Division, and Higher-Level PSYOP Efforts. The advisor at these levels is concerned with—

(1) Advising his counterpart on the psychological implications of civilian and military courses of action under consideration.

(2) Interpreting for local use PSYOP guidelines and policies established at higher headquarters.

(3) Developing a PSYOP annex to operations plans and orders, when feasible.

(4) Requesting PSYOP support for planning and conduct of operations. This includes PSYOP units or teams and selection of appropriate media to accomplish the mission.

(5) Coordinating with the PSYOP advisor of the political subdivision in which operations are to be conducted.

(6) Assisting in the indoctrination of troops to insure proper conduct and behavior toward the population.
(7) Notifying adjacent, higher, and lower advisory detachments of PSYOP opportunities.
(8) Expediting the flow of PSYOP intelligence.
(9) Establishing criteria of effectiveness for use within the command.
(10) Monitoring operations to determine PSYOP effectiveness.

c. Regional, Provincial, and District PSYOP Efforts. The advisor at these levels is concerned with—

(1) Advising the counterpart on the psychological implications of civilian and military courses of action under consideration.
(2) Explaining and emphasizing the importance of the PSYOP program to all U. S. advisory personnel and HC counterparts.
(3) Interpreting for local use PSYOP guidelines and policies established at higher headquarters. In the event of conflict in the implementation of policy, the causes of conflict are made known to the appropriate level for resolution.
(4) Establishing and executing a local PSYOP campaign.
(5) Utilizing PSYOP to support all other internal defense and internal development operations conducted within the area.
(6) Requesting PSYOP units and materiel support from HC and U. S. agencies.
(7) Coordinating with U. S. and HC tactical units operating in the area to assist in orienting all PSYOP to local conditions.
Assisting in the indoctrination of HC and U. S. personnel to insure proper conduct and behavior toward the population.

(9) Notifying adjacent, higher, and lower headquarters of PSYOP opportunities.

(10) Expediting the flow of PSYOP intelligence.

(11) Monitoring operations to determine PSYOP effectiveness.

77. Execution

PSYOP varies from advising HC civil and military agencies to participation in the operations discussed below—

a. Intelligence Operations. Intelligence is a prerequisite to a sound PSYOP program. Attitudes and behavior among the population, ranging from passiveness to hostility, is reshaped into acceptance and support of the HC's effort. The PSYOP objective is to convince the target audience that it is beneficial for them to provide intelligence information. The rate of flow of intelligence from the population is an index of PSYOP effectiveness.

(1) All PSYOP media is used to inform the population that—

(a) Information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and insurgent activity must be reported. Methods of reporting are explained.

(b) Rewards are available for specific types of information, to include information leading to the apprehension of insurgents and capture of
their equipment and weapons. Such rewards must, in fact, exist; and must be paid promptly.

(2) PSYOP intelligence requirements include—

(a) Area studies, special studies, and basic intelligence to identify potential target audiences and their attitudes.

(b) Current intelligence to—

1. Select the target audience and identify its strengths and weaknesses.
2. Determine the best psychological objectives, tasks, and supporting themes to exploit the strengths and weaknesses.
3. Choose the media and actions most suitable for delivering messages.
4. Determine the language and dialect to be used.
5. Determine the effectiveness of PSYOP.

(c) Information on which to base counter-propaganda measures.

(3) Intelligence is needed concerning PSYOP conducted by the insurgent force to identify the—

(a) Source.
(b) Content of the propaganda.
(c) Audience toward whom the PSYOP is directed.
(d) Communications media used. Determine why specific media were used to address a particular audience.
(e) Effect of the PSYOP upon the target audience.
b. Tactical Operations. The goals of PSYOP in support of tactical operations are to convince armed insurgents to cease resistance, to prevent civilian interference, and to reduce noncombatant casualties. Means of obtaining these goals are—

(1) Educating and indoctrinating military and paramilitary forces of the importance of proper conduct toward the population while conducting tactical operations.

(2) Informing the population of the purpose and nature of forthcoming tactical operations, when security permits.

(3) Informing the population where to receive medical aid and assistance.

(4) Employing PSYOP themes which hold the insurgent responsible for inconveniences and tragedy resulting from tactical operations.

(5) Provoking outnumbered insurgent forces to fight.

(6) Attempting to divide insurgent forces and lower morale by employing themes which exploit the hopelessness of their situation; for example—

   (a) Remind the insurgent how well-off his superiors are while he goes hungry, lives under intolerable conditions, and is faced by overwhelming military strength and weapons.

   (b) Tell him death is inevitable if he continues to fight.

   (c) Inform the insurgent of recent government victories.

(7) Advising the insurgent of amnesty programs.
(8) Using defectors and captives to deliver loudspeaker messages, emphasizing good treatment afforded those who defect or surrender.

(9) Utilizing leaflets and air or ground loudspeaker surrender appeals against known or suspected enemy locations.

(10) Indoctrinating troops with the need to honor surrender leaflets.

c. Civil Affairs Operations. There are numerous themes which can be used in support of civil affairs programs. The basic approach is to prepare the population to accept and understand the value of proposed projects and to present the military forces in a favorable light. Most PSYOP support in this field should be directed toward military civic action projects at the hamlet, village, district, or provincial level, and assist in the development of a favorable image of the national government at the local level. For these operations, the following should be considered:

(1) Projects should not be undertaken without reasonable PSYOP support. For best PSYOP impact, long-range activities should be subdivided into limited objectives which are within the capabilities of the participating units, and meet the aspirations or desires of the people.

(2) A PSYOP campaign which presents a credible amount of accomplishments throughout a province is almost impossible for the insurgent to counteract. This overall program serves further to offset the occasional military civic action project
which fails. Failures are minimized by appropriate PSYOP contingency planning.

(3) PSYOP personnel arrange cross-visits of key communicators between villages. This provides eye witness accounts to the people of military civic action projects taking place throughout the area.

(4) Personalities who are known and respected are persuaded to give speeches and prepare tapes for dissemination extolling the progress and virtues of military civic action programs.

(5) Motion pictures are made of military civic action progress in communities for presentation elsewhere. Films showing military and civilian cooperation are desirable.

(6) PSYOP personnel examine each plan in light of all established customs and religion.

d. Advisory Assistance. PSYOP supports the advisory assistance effort by assisting the HC to plan, develop, and successfully initiate PSYOP. Additional PSYOP support is rendered by—

(1) Building the advisor's image as an assistant to his counterpart.

(2) Assisting in developing the concept that the advisory effort is temporary and that territorial expansion is not the desire of the U. S.

(3) Providing PSYOP requirements requested by the advisor or his counterpart.

(4) Furnishing booklets of sample leaflets and loudspeaker messages to the advisor for reference.

(5) Developing HC PSYOP units and resources.
e. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Actions resulting from populace and resources control operations often are unpopular because of restrictions imposed upon the local population. PSYOP presents the need for these operations and—

(1) Makes the imposition of controls more palatable to the population by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being.

(2) Emphasizes that controls are imposed on the population solely because of insurgent activities and that, when insurgent activity is reduced, controls will be reduced or lifted.

(3) Educates the population as to the importance of the defended hamlet program.

(4) Informs the population of the importance of protecting raw materials, factories, and crops against sabotage, pilferage, and waste.

(5) Informs the population that, by withholding support, the insurgent is unable to survive; thus hastening the reduction of controls.

(6) Promotes the cooperation of the population in support of local programs and national objectives.

(7) Exploits the successes of military, paramilitary police, and other security forces.

(8) Emphasizes the HC's ability to protect its population from violence, lawlessness, and sabotage.

(9) Exhorts the population to report known insurgents and their activities to the proper authority.
78. Communications Media

PSYOP communications media include—

a. Skits and shows.
b. Radio and TV.
c. Printed matter.
d. Motion pictures.
e. Loudspeakers.
f. Face-to-face persuasion.
CHAPTER 5
SELECTED TACTICAL OPERATIONS

79. General

This chapter provides guidance on the following type operations:

a. Airmobile.
b. Airborne.
c. Riverine.
d. Patrol.
e. Ambush.
f. Counterambush.
g. Village search and seizure.
h. Coastal area.

80. Airmobile Operations

Airmobile operations, properly planned and executed, substantially increase overall tactical capability. The use of helicopters facilitates the achievement of surprise and shock action. They expedite movement of sizeable forces over obstacles and long distances, and speed the massing of forces and delivery of reinforcements.

a. Planning of airmobile operations should be accomplished in detail, when possible. The aviation battalion is a key planning element. SOP facilitate planning. Representatives of the following units should participate in planning:
(1) Maneuver and reserve.
(2) Artillery fire support.
(3) Close air support.
(4) Naval gunfire support.
(5) Aviation.
(6) Intelligence.

b. Timely and detailed intelligence and weather information is required.

c. The use of multiple staging areas, landing zones (LZ), flight patterns, and routes into and out of the area should be considered.

d. The planning of an airmobile assault should consider LZ, alternate LZ, decoy LZ, and pickup zones; a specific objective or series of objectives to be taken; a reserve element; and the coordinated use of fire support elements. The composition of the airmobile assault force is determined by the mission.

e. The organization of an airmobile operation normally involves the following:

(1) A command and control element consisting of the aviation command, the assault force commander, an air liaison officer, and the artillery commander. This element normally will utilize a helicopter command post with special radio equipment (fig. 9).

(2) Utility tactical helicopters to lift the first phase assault forces and medium helicopters to move artillery to operational areas beyond supporting artillery range. Reinforcements will be ferried into the combat areas as rapidly as the turn-around of assault helicopters permits. Loading plans should
provide for tactical unit integrity, yet remain flexible enough to adapt to available transportation.

(3) An escort element composed of strike aircraft and armed helicopters to provide reconnaiss-
sance, protect the flights of troop carriers into the LZ, and provide fire support for ground operations.

(4) Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters. These are backed up by evacuation helicopters at the staging area.

(5) A maintenance aircraft crew to provide on-the-spot repairs for disabled aircraft.

(6) An “on call” fire support element which is composed of observation aircraft with radio relay capability and forward observers or forward air controllers (FAC).

(7) Additional available ground-based fire support and combat maneuver elements.

f. Conduct of an airmobile assault.

(1) The airmobile assault begins with preparation of the LZ by close air support and artillery fires. If surprise is desired, landings may be employed in decoy LZ. Armed helicopters should arrive at the LZ prior to the actual assault to assist the FAC in evaluating the results and in determining if additional strikes are needed. The assaulting infantry is loaded at staging fields or picked up in the battle area from a pickup zone. Troop lift helicopters are vectored to the LZ by command and control aircraft. Armed helicopters and close air support aircraft coordinate strikes on the LZ prior to the assault. Variation in the preparation of selected LZ should be considered. Close air support and artillery fires should be employed only as needed. A small (7-to 10-man), heavily armed LZ reconnaissance team infiltrated by foot or helicopter 1 to 2 hours prior to the actual heliborne
assault may determine if the insurgent is present on or near the LZ. Close air support, artillery, and armed helicopters should be on station in the vicinity of the LZ to support the reconnaissance team if necessary. This method offers two distinct advantages in the event of contact: personnel on the ground are in a position to determine the size of the force and fix it by fire; and they can direct air strikes, artillery fire, or armed helicopter fire. If no contact is made, the LZ may be reconnoitered in safety; the LZ reconnaissance team can function as pathfinder teams; the expenditure of ordnance is avoided; and the operation is not compromised by preparatory fires. At least two advisors equipped with radios should accompany the first serial to insure continuous communication with command and control aircraft, FAC, and armed helicopters. After the troop lift receives the command to proceed to the LZ, the armed ships relay the following information to them:

(a) Final approach landing.
(b) Touchdown point (may be marked with smoke).
(c) Heading and route for departure from the LZ.
(d) Brief summary of condition of LZ, including insurgent and friendly troop situations.
(e) Where suppressive and supporting fires will be delivered.
(f) Direction of attack or movement from LZ.
(2) Crew chiefs indicate the direction of attack to the assault force by hand and arm signals just prior to touchdown.

(3) Armed helicopters provide suppressive fires as the elements of the airmobile force approach the LZ. Artillery fire and air strikes may be made simultaneously around and adjacent to the LZ. Flak suppression strikes may be required during the landing. Close coordination between the airmobile force and supporting air and artillery will allow landing during artillery fire and air strikes.

(4) Timing calls for simultaneous touchdown and takeoff in the LZ of all troop lift helicopters in less than ten seconds. Caution must be exercised in the use of signaling and screening smoke so as not to obscure the pilot's vision or create confusion on the LZ.

(5) Armed helicopters, tactical air, and artillery can be used to support the ground force as the first lift of helicopters departs from the LZ.

(6) Armed helicopters are used for reconnaissance and surveillance during ground operations.

(7) Troops initially employed in securing the LZ are highly vulnerable to attack, especially if the first troop lift is small. The first serial should—

(a) Send out patrols to search the perimeter.

(b) Consolidate the remainder of the airmobile force into a strong point located off the LZ.

(8) The reserve force commander must keep abreast of the operation so that counterattack plans address the situation to which he may be committed. In some situations, it is advisable to have an
airborne reserve force orbiting near the operational area. This force may be used to counterattack, intercept forces fleeing the area, or for targets of opportunity.

(9) Troop withdrawal is completed at the termination of the mission in the following sequence:

(a) Ground unit secures the area.

(b) Armed helicopters assume security of the LZ as the ground unit moves into pickup formation.

(c) Troop lift helicopters deploy to pickup formation prior to reaching the LZ.

(d) Final element withdrawn includes artillery forward observers and FAC.

(10) Coordinated fire support for the withdrawal is furnished by tactical aircraft, artillery, and armed helicopters.

(11) Ambush is a constant threat. The insurgents’ capability to ambush the LZ in force can be decreased by—

(a) Limiting and varying reconnaissance of LZ.

(b) Conducting tactical air strikes on the LZ and approaches to the LZ followed by an artillery preparation.

(c) Utilizing alternate LZ.

(d) Deceiving the insurgent as to the actual location of the LZ by establishing decoy or dummy LZ.

(e) Avoiding the most likely LZ or those used previously.
(f) Committing a maximum number of troops in the LZ in the first serial.

(g) Using available roads as LZ.

g. Airmobile combat patrols (eagle flight) usually range in size from platoon to company. Their employment is characterized by lack of preplanned LZ and the use of limited fire support. The effectiveness of the patrol depends upon its ability to react and maneuver rapidly and to harass and disrupt the activities of insurgent units. Upon contact, the patrol will assess the situation and determine the requirement for commitment of the reserve force. Normally, an aerial force of company strength remains on station to support the airmobile patrol, while a battalion remains on stand-by alert.

h. Advisor checklist—airmobile operations checklist is based on the five paragraph operations order, and contains planning considerations to assist in planning airmobile operations:

1. Situation

   a. Insurgent.
   b. Unit being supported.
   c. Coordinating officers.

      (1) Unit.

         (a) HC.
         (b) U. S. advisor.
         (c) Free World forces.

      (2) Senior advisor.
      (3) Aviation unit.
      (4) Intelligence officer.
(a) HC.
(b) U. S.
(c) Free World forces.
d. Tactical air support.
e. Supporting artillery fires.
f. Copy of unit operations orders and overlays.
g. Effects of weather.

2. Mission

3. Execution
   a. Concept of operation.
   b. Missions.
      (1) Number of troops to be lifted.
      (2) Number of reserve troops to be lifted as required, distance, and the number of LZ.
   c. Maps.
   d. Coordination instructions.
   e. Description of routes, LZ, and times.
   f. Armed aerial escort requirements.

4. Administration and Logistics
   a. Fuel requirements.
   b. Ammunition.
   c. Special equipment.
   d. Medical support.
   e. Rations.
   f. Medical aid stations and evacuation locations.
   g. Observers.
   h. Maintenance support.
   i. Parking and landing areas.
j. Troop safety in and around helicopters.
k. Procedures for evacuating insurgent prisoners.

5. Command and Signal
   a. Pyrotechnics and panels (tactical marking of friendly troops, enemy targets, and tactical landing areas, and direction of attack).
   b. CP location (friendly ground troops).
   c. Command relationships for specific operations.
   d. Channels of advisor communications for specific operations.
   e. Advisor checklist for request of tactical helicopter support for airmobile operations. See appendix E.

81. Airborne Operations

Airborne operations are used to achieve surprise and to introduce troops into areas otherwise inaccessible. Airborne units normally are a part of the strategic reserve and have the capability to deploy rapidly.

a. If an airborne infantry unit is attached to an infantry unit assigned a primary tactical mission, the airborne unit normally will be retained as all or part of the reserve.

   (1) Ground alert of sufficient troop transport aircraft to airlift these forces is maintained 24 hours a day.

   (2) Each airborne rifle company is reinforced with fire support and logistical support necessary to accomplish its mission.
3. One observation aircraft with a pilot and observer or a combat control team is maintained on 24-hour alert by the appropriate level of command.

4. Each airborne unit should maintain a ready status, to include—
   (a) Basic load.
   (b) Prescribed load.
   (c) Fighting load (individual equipment required for combat).
   (d) Existence load (individual equipment required to exist in a particular environment).

b. In cases where DZ are not available, troops may be dropped in shallow inundated areas, or in the jungle. The following measures are taken to insure a satisfactory drop pattern when using small DZ:

1. Aircraft are loaded tactically so platoons and squads land as units.
2. Aircraft formations are employed which will provide a narrow drop pattern and facilitate rapid delivery.

82. Riverine Operations

Riverine operations are conducted to achieve and/or maintain control of a riverine (inundated) area by destroying insurgent forces and restricting or eliminating insurgent activity. Operations are characterized by extensive use of watermobile forces.

a. If river assault groups are assigned to an operation, they may consist of the following craft:
   1. Command Configured LCM.
b. The river assault group advisor should have facilities to communicate with other advisors and aircraft and direct close air support strikes.

c. River assault group capabilities include—
   (1) Patrol and ambush operations.
   (2) Transport of troops, supplies, and equipment.
   (3) Escort of minesweeping craft and naval gunfire support ships.
   (4) Provision of fire support to landing elements.

d. Planning should include—
   (1) Coordination with naval advisors.
   (2) Detailed intelligence.
   (3) Hydrography, including tide, current, and beach gradient.
   (4) Movement time factors.
   (5) Loading, execution, and endurance time factors.

e. Conduct of a riverine assault—
   (1) Riverine assault requires preplanned landing areas, specific objectives, a reserve element, and coordinated fire support elements. The size of the assault group will be determined by the specific mission.
   (2) Riverine assault operations are initiated by reconnoitering landing areas to gain intelligence
on beach gradients, width of river banks, and width and depth of rivers to be traversed.

(3) River assault group units conduct pre-landing naval gunfire coordinated with available artillery and air support.

(4) Infantry is landed and river assault groups conduct fire support to destroy targets and to provide cover for friendly forces.

83. Patrols

Standard patrolling doctrine normally applies to internal defense, but some techniques of application must be oriented to meet the unorthodox activities of the insurgent and the operational environment. Patrolling takes on added significance because of the difficulty in locating and identifying insurgent forces and determining their intentions. Emphasis should be placed on insuring that patrols are well briefed, are carrying only mission-essential equipment, and that personnel are physically fit. Patrol routes must be planned carefully and coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units, to include air and ground fire support elements and reserve forces. (FM 21–50 and FM 21–75.)

a. Patrols can be employed to—

(1) Saturate areas of suspected insurgent activity.

(2) Control critical roads and trails.

(3) Maintain contact between villages and units.

(4) Establish population check points.

(5) Provide security for friendly forces.
(6) Interdict insurgent routes of supply and communication.

(7) Establish ambushes.

(8) Pursue, maintain contact with, and destroy the insurgent.

(9) Provide internal security in rural areas.

(10) Locate insurgent units and base camps.

b. Saturation patrols are conducted by lightly armed, small, fast-moving units, and provide for thorough area coverage. These patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which are changed frequently to avoid establishing patterns. In addition to harassing and often uncovering insurgent tactical forces, this technique provides—

(1) An opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area of operations.

(2) A form of reassurance to the civil population that their protection and security are of major concern to the government.

(3) A means by which information of the insurgent can be obtained.

c. Advisor checklist—patrols.

I. Preparation

a: Make a detailed map study. Know the terrain and route by memory including features which will aid in navigation. Devise a grid for the area of operation to facilitate reporting and coordination between patrols.

b. Consider the use of difficult terrain in planning the route.
c. Plan to use ridge lines or stream lines for movement. Stay off the skyline. Do not stereotype methods of movement.

d. Plan an offset azimuth approach route when applicable.

e. Clean, check, and test-fire all weapons before departure. Carry cleaning equipment.

f. Wear protective clothing.

g. Carry two pairs of binoculars, wire cutters, and dual items of other essential equipment.

h. Have every man carry a canteen, poncho, an extra pair of socks, and a sharp knife.

i. Consider the use of scout dogs, if available.

j. Wear luminous tape on the back of the collar; it aids in control and movement on dark nights.

k. Use friction tape to secure rifle swivels and slings, or remove slings.

l. Be sure to camouflage the back of neck, ears, and hands.

m. Place a clear acetate sheet over luminous tape to make rough strip maps for night patrols.

n. Designate two pacers: average their individual count.

o. Pre-set compasses before departing.

p. Have an aircraft reconnoiter along the route to detect activity, when appropriate.

q. Take assistant patrol leader or element leaders on initial reconnaissance. Arrange for
prior aerial reconnaissance of areas to be traversed.

r. Prearrange and rehearse all signals. Keep signals simple.
s. Plan time to dark-adapt eyes for night patrol.
t. Do not carry marked maps which will aid the insurgent.
u. Conduct rehearsals on terrain similar to the patrol route and objective area. Prearrange procedures for handling and evacuating insurgent prisoners.
v. Inspect and question patrol during rehearsals and before departure.
w. Arrange for alternate communications by way of adjacent units and airborne radio relay.

2. Execution

a. The assistant patrol leader should check and count the patrol through friendly positions.
b. The count should be passed to the leader automatically after each halt and passage of danger areas. In large patrols, use the chain of command to account for men.
c. A code word, other than the assigned challenge and password, should be used forward of friendly positions.
d. Odd-numbered men should observe to the left; even-numbered men to the right.
e. Conduct reconnaissance and provide security before crossing streams, roads, or other danger areas.

3. Miscellaneous

a. Increase night visibility by use of binoculars. Use starlight scope, if available.

b. Pass on simple instructions; allow time for dissemination.

c. Enforce noise discipline.

d. Keep covering force within a supporting distance of reconnaissance element.

e. Bury and camouflage trash.

f. Allow men to sleep on long patrols, but maintain security.

g. Avoid dead foliage which may be old camouflage over a trap.

h. Avoid tied-down brush which may be a firing lane for an ambush site.

i. Avoid moats around villages.

j. Be cautious of unoccupied huts which may have hidden boobytraps.

k. Be cautious of all civilians and of villages where children are unfriendly or not in sight.

l. Coordinate simultaneous patrol activities and maintain contact when in close proximity with other patrols.

m. Cut trails through dense foliage and undergrowth in the jungle. When practicing dispersion in movement under such conditions, lateral contact is very difficult to maintain. Move in multiple columns for added security.
n. Follow proper preventive medicine procedures.

o. Avoid returning over the same route.

84. Ambush

Well-laid ambushes, properly planned and correctly positioned, often fail because of an error of a single individual. Selection of the site is only the first step in the development of a well-organized ambush. Ambush leaders must be provided with the equipment necessary to carry out their mission. Leaders must be capable of calling in fire support, and be proficient in utilizing boobytraps, demolitions, and punji traps (FM 31–16 and FM 31–21).

a. Actions Prior to the Ambush.

(1) Make a detailed reconnaissance to insure that ambush will not interfere with or harm the local population.

(2) Make a detailed map study, including use of aerial photographs.

(3) Conduct a detailed rehearsal. Each member of the ambush party must understand thoroughly his duty.

(4) Arrange for the employment of available supporting fires.

(5) Move to the ambush site by concealed routes to avoid detection. Contact with civilians must be avoided.

(6) Emplace mutually supporting ambushes in conjunction with mines, boobytraps, and punji stakes along likely avenues of escape.
(7) Avoid repeated use of the same ambush site. Using several sites in the same general area insures better coverage and more effective results.

b. Conduct of the Ambush.

(1) Maintain light, noise, and smoking discipline in the ambush site.

(2) Stress the fact that the leader of the ambush is responsible for “springing” the ambush.

(3) Use a definite, clearly recognizable signal to commence firing. Prearrange and rehearse all signals.

(4) Place a heavy and accurate volume of fire in the ambush area, the killing zone, and escape routes.

(5) Fire low to avoid overshooting the target.

(6) Use available supporting fires.

(7) Pursue by fire when the insurgents withdraw.

(8) Quickly exploit and search the immediate area for casualties, weapons, and documents.

c. Night Ambush. Ambush during the hours of darkness is more difficult to control but lack of light adds to the security of the ambush party and the confusion of those being ambushed. Night ambushes are more effective the first night of a specific strike operation than they are on ensuing nights. A small ambush party generally is more practical; however, the size of the party will depend on factors such as the size of the unit to be ambushed and the estimated insurgent strength in the area. Illuminate the ambush site after contact to conduct a thorough search. Employ preplanned artillery
and mortar illumination, hand-held flares, and illumination grenades for this purpose.

d. Special Considerations.

(1) The Claymore (M18A1) antipersonnel mine is a highly effective ambush weapon.

(2) "Stay behind" ambushes can be very successful. Such patrols should be prepared to remain in location for several days.

85. Counterambush

Insurgent tactical forces rely on the ambush as an effective means of interdicting lines of communication, acquiring needed materiel, and gaining local superiority over larger, better equipped government forces. Successful ambushes are costly in lives and equipment, and it is imperative that host country troops be well trained in counterambush techniques.

a. Dismounted Operations.

(1) Security measures—

(a) Always employ front flank and rear security. If operating in jungle terrain insure that these personnel are relieved frequently. If it is impossible to employ flank security, the unit leader must assign specific sectors of surveillance.

(b) Clear all danger areas prior to crossing them. Identify danger areas by map or reconnaissance prior to the unit’s departure.

(c) If artillery support is available and the route can be determined in advance, pre-planned targets should be plotted on likely or suspected ambush positions.
(d) Where surprise or secrecy of movement is not important, use reconnaissance by fire on likely or suspected ambush positions, being careful not to fire on noncombatants.

(e) Formations will depend upon factors such as the mission, enemy, weather, terrain, and visibility, and should be organized to maintain unit integrity. Crew-served weapons should be distributed throughout the column. Assign specific sectors of surveillance to all personnel within the formation to include rear and overhead surveillance.

(f) Insure that leaders continuously observe and evaluate the terrain through which they move so that they will be prepared to take proper action if ambushed.

(2) Actions taken when a portion of the unit is in the killing zone of an ambush—

(a) In a close-type ambush (ambusher within hand grenade range or less) personnel in the killing zone must return fire immediately and assault into the ambush. Elements not in the killing zone should prepare to maneuver against the flank of the ambush.

(b) In a far-type ambush (ambusher not in close) the element in the killing zone immediately returns fire and establishes a base of fire. Personnel not in the killing zone prepare to maneuver against the flank of the ambush.

(3) Actions taken when the entire unit is in the killing zone of an ambush—
(a) In a close-type ambush personnel in the killing zone immediately return fire and assault into the ambush.

(b) In a far-type ambush personnel in the killing zone break out of the killing zone by fire and movement.

b. Convoy Operations.

(1) Long range security measures—

(a) Timely and accurate intelligence reduces the effectiveness of insurgent ambushes. An important source of such intelligence is the loyal population. Information such as where the insurgent force is opening, size of the force, pattern of ambush (V, L, or U type ambush) and weapon capabilities is necessary.

(b) Counterintelligence
   1. Use alternate routes.
   2. Vary time tables.
   3. Change formation and location of principal weapons.
   4. Practice radio and telephone security.

(c) Clear the roadsides of jungle growth.

(2) Organization of the convoy—

(a) Reconnaissance elements should travel ahead of the convoy to discover or trigger potential ambush. Normally, reconnaissance elements will be provided by higher headquarters. If they are not available, a reconnaissance element must be organized from within the convoy.

(b) If artillery support is available, pre-planned fires should be plotted on all likely or suspected ambush sites.
(c) Vehicles in convoys should not be overloaded. If vehicles are loaded to their maximum, troops will be unable to use their weapons effectively.

(d) Selected individuals should be posted as guards. In large vehicles, a man should be posted in each corner with assigned sectors of surveillance and fire. Guards should be armed with automatic weapons and fragmentary and white phosphorus grenades.

(e) Convoys of two or more serials should be commanded from a command and control helicopter. This affords the commander a good means of control and communication, and enables him to react quickly to all contingencies.

(f) Armored escort vehicles, if available, should be placed in various parts of the convoy.

(g) Radio communications should link all command elements of the convoy, reinforcing alert forces, and escort aircraft.

(3) Location and disposition of weapons.

(a) Crew-served weapons should be distributed throughout the convoy to provide fire support for any portion caught in the killing zone.

(b) Crew-served weapons should be emplaced so that they can be removed quickly from the truck.

(c) Men armed with rifle grenades and M-79's should fire them into the ambushing force immediately upon contact.

(4) Preparation of the vehicles. Troops in a vehicle must have all-around visibility, be able to
fire their weapons without hindrance and be able to dismount quickly. Vehicles should be prepared with armor kits or sandbags when possible. Protecting the 2½ ton truck with sandbags consists of placing a single row of sandbags, stacked five high, on each side of the bed of the truck. This single row will provide protection from small arms fire. One single layer of sandbags on the bed and floor of the cab will minimize casualties from mines detonated under the vehicle. Additional preparatory measures include—

(a) Remove tarpaulins and bows.
(b) Remove or place tailgate in a horizontal position.
(c) Place chicken wire over the open windows of cargo carrying vehicles.
(d) Attach a cutting or deflecting bar to the front of vehicles to prevent injury from barrier cables.

(5) New developments—
(a) Gun ports and vision box have been added to the sides and rear of the M-113 personnel carrier. This does not hamper the fording capability.
(b) Claymorette (one ounce charge of C-4 imbedded with steel pellets) can be mounted on each side of a vehicle in banks of 23. It can be fired in series or all at once from a firing panel in the truck. Maximum effective range is 60 meters.
(c) E-8 CS agent launcher (package of 16 tubes of 4 cartridges each) can be fired to maximum of 250 meters. Within one minute after firing
the launcher can effectively produce a CS agent cloud large enough to cover a football field. It can be mounted on a vehicle and fired from the vehicle's electrical system.

(d) Skink (pressurized bottle of liquid white phosphorous) is mounted on side of a vehicle and discharged through a nozzle up to a range of 30 meters. It is especially effective against a close-type ambush and can be used to produce a smoke screen.

(6) Actions against the unexpected encounter—

(a) When ambushed the basic immediate action is to continue moving and halt only when clear or before entering the killing zone. Prepare to counterattack immediately from the flank of your choosing. Drivers should not stop, but should attempt to reach positions clear of fire. Personnel should bring fire to bear on the ambush positions to disrupt and confuse the insurgent force. As vehicles clear the killing zone they should stop and occupants should detruck and take immediate offensive action. Vehicles other than armored escort should not attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush.

(b) Often the insurgent will halt a portion of the convoy in the killing zone with roadblocks or command detonated mines. Drivers in such a situation should take the following action:

1. In a close-type ambush, halt the vehicle. Automatic weapons immediately take the
suspected ambusher under fire. Troops on vehicles will dismount and assault into the ambush.

2. In a far-type ambush, troops do not assault. Instead, they dismount and establish a base of fire, elements short of the killing zone prepare to maneuver against the flank of the ambush.

(c) Occasionally the insurgent will attempt to halt the entire convoy within the killing zone. In such a case, the unit takes the following actions:

1. In a close-type ambush, the unit reacts in the same manner as when a portion is caught in the killing zone.

2. In a far-type ambush the unit reacts the same as when a portion is caught within the killing zone except they use fire and movement to break out of the killing zone.

86. Village Seizure and Search

a. In an insurgent war, the term seizure and search best describes an operation in which a small population group is surrounded, the area seized and then, some specific mission, usually a detailed search, is carried out in conjunction with other activities for the following reasons:

(1) As part of the intelligence effort to gain information which leads to the elimination of more insurgents.

(2) To aid the population and resources control program in making checks on the population, issuing ID cards, and to detect caches of materials.

(3) As part of the psychological operations/civil affairs effort in an attempt to make the people
aware of the government aims and by a variety of means change their orientation from resistance to willing cooperation.

(4) Harass the insurgents. Hamper their capability for the offense by forcing them to be constantly on the alert and in a defensive posture.

b. The three major elements used to accomplish a seizure and search mission are the search element, the security element, and the reserve element.

(1) The reserve element is nothing more than a mobile force within the outlying area with the specific mission of assisting the other two elements should they meet resistance that they cannot handle. In addition, it must be capable of taking the place of either of the other two elements should the need arise.

(2) The security element surrounds the village while the search element moves into the village. Members of the security element primarily orient their weapons toward the populated area; however, by turning about, they can block any insurgents trying to reinforce the village.

(3) The search element is the element which conducts the mission assigned for the operation. It will be organized normally into special teams. Teams which might make up a search element are—

(a) Search teams which actually go into the village and conduct the search for caches of materials and hidden insurgents. They are formed in at least two teams and use the system of one team
searching while one team covers. The number of teams required depends upon the size of the village.

(b) Fire support teams which provide close-in fire support. Since the security element remains undetected, they are of little value as far as close-in fire support is concerned. The fire support teams are armed with crew-served and automatic weapons.

c) Population control teams which control the population in one of several ways.

1. If the inhabitants appear hostile, all persons can be assembled in a central location. This method allows for maximum control over civilians, facilitates search, denies the insurgent the opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for a more thorough search and interrogation. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes association of civilians with their dwellings difficult which encourages looting and, in turn, engenders adverse propaganda.

2. A second method to control the civilians is to restrict them to their homes. This method prohibits movement of civilian personnel, allows immediate association of civilians with their dwellings and discourages looting. The disadvantages are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and permits them to conceal evidence in their homes during the conduct of the search.

3. A third method is to have the head of each household remain in front of his house while all are brought to a central location. During the search, the head of each dwelling accompanies the
search team through his dwelling. Looting is pre-
cluded and the head of the household can discredit
any tale of the search team stealing property. This
method is considered the best method of con-
trolling the population.

(d) The interrogator is a key man of the
interrogation team. Specially trained interrogators
are desirable and the inclusion of a woman in the
interrogation team is valuable. It may be neces-
sary to have an interpreter accompany this team.

(e) The prisoner team has the mission of
evacuating prisoners to higher headquarters for
further interrogation.

(f) The documentation team records the
results of the search and interrogation. During the
operation, they record everything that is found,
said, or done.

(g) The psychological operations/civil af-
fairs team works hand-in-hand with the population
teams. They should have representatives from the
civil authorities (such as the District Chief and his
teams) to assist them in providing items such as
food, soap, blankets, and medical supplies. They
would also be concerned with removing insurgent
propaganda and putting up their own.

(h) In areas where tunnels have been re-
ported, it is imperative that a tunnel reconnais-
sance team be attached. This team should be com-
posed of volunteers trained in this type of an opera-
tion. They should have special equipment such as
flashlights or miner helmets, protective masks, com-
munication with the surface, and small caliber pis-
tols. They should know how to make a sketch of the tunnel system, and they should recover all items of intelligence interest.

c. Prior to conducting the actual operation, a reconnaissance patrol must be sent out to gain information about the village and its inhabitants. Care must be exercised to avoid detection. A portion of the patrol should remain near the village while the rest returns with the information. This is done to detect any changes which may take place prior to the security element going into position. Information of value to a commander is—

1. Size and exact location of the village.
2. Fortifications (mantraps, spiketraps, etc.).
3. Warning systems.
4. Tunnel systems.
5. Where does the insurgent live? Does he live in the jungle at night and inhabit the village during the day, or does he stay in the village night and day? Does he inhabit one hut or is he spread through the village?
6. How many civilians are there in the village?

d. A seizure and search operation can be launched from a clandestine base or it can be a quick thrust from a home base. The security element and the search element can utilize one of two general methods of movement.

1. If aviation support is available, a quick-strike airmobile operation can be employed. An operation of this nature is characterized by speed.
(2) If the elements conduct a dismounted operation, they normally will do so through the use of predesignated infiltration lanes. An operation of this type is characterized by secure and rapid movement.

e. Search teams must be thorough in their search for insurgent personnel, equipment, escape tunnels, caches, and all likely areas. Cattle pens, wells, haystacks, gardens, fence lines, and cemeteries should be investigated. Search teams must be constantly on the alert for boobytraps in such places as rafters, implements, roofs, and rice bags.

f. After the search has been completed, the next task is to search the perimeter and the area between the security element and the village itself. There are two methods which can be used to conduct such a search—

(1) If the security element has not been discovered, then the search element itself may be formed into sections and allotted a portion of the perimeter to search. Should any one of these sections flush an insurgent out of the vegetation or tunnel exit, the security element will be able to kill or capture him.

(2) If the security element has been discovered, then it will conduct the perimeter search. This element would leave security posted to keep the village isolated, while the remainder conduct the search. Such a search could take hours depending upon whether the terrain is open or extremely dense. Regardless of the terrain, the members of
the searching unit should check every bush for caches of material or personnel in hiding.

87. Coastal Area Operations

The fleet commander makes combat ships available for patrols to the various naval zone commanders, who exercise operational control over the ships. As directed by the zone or regional commanders, and depending on the type of ship, weather conditions, logistical support, and the particular needs of the zone, these ships are used for counterinfiltration patrol, naval gunfire support missions, logistic and escort missions, troop transport and beach support operations, search and rescue, and other relief missions.

a. Combat ship types may include—

(1) Patrol Craft Escort (PCE). Weapons include: one 3"/50 Single, two 40mm Single, four 20mm Twin, and two 20mm Single.

(2) Patrol Craft (PC). Weapons include: one 3"/50 Single, one 40mm Single, two 20mm Twin, two 20mm Single, and two .50 caliber Single.

(3) Landing Ship Infantry Large (LSIL). Weapons include: one 3"/50 Single, two .50 caliber Single, two 20mm Single, two 81mm Mortar, and two 60mm Mortar.

(4) Landing Ship Support Large (LSSL). Weapons include: one 3"/50 Single, two 40mm Twin, six 20mm Single, six .50 caliber Single, two 81mm Mortar, and two 60mm Mortar.
(5) Patrol Motor Gunboat (PMG). Weapons include: one 40mm Single, two 20mm Twin, and two .50 caliber Single.

b. Armed logistic ships may be assigned to missions in the various naval zones. They are available for gunfire support missions, as directed by the zone commander, and are armed as follows:

(1) Landing Ship Medium (LSM). Weapons include: one 40mm Twin and four 20mm Twin.

(2) Landing Ship Tank (LST). Weapons include: two 40mm Twin and four 40mm Single.
Section I. COMBAT SUPPORT

88. General

This section is directed toward advisors who require combat support or who advise HC combat support units. Combat support includes—

a. Artillery.
b. Close air support.
c. Aerial fire support.
d. Naval gunfire.
e. Army aviation.
f. Engineer.
g. Naval River Assault Group.
h. Signal.
i. Explosive ordnance disposal.

89. Artillery

a. General. All available artillery must be considered when developing plans for supporting operations and providing fire support for territorial defense. The artillery commander is the principal
advisor to the force commander on all fire support matters. Within the advisory structure, artillery advisors will assist other advisors in fire support matters.

b. Fire Support. Operations requiring fire support include—

(1) Consolidation operations.
(2) Strike operations.
(3) Remote area operations.
(4) Patrols.
(5) Ambush and counterambush operations.
(6) Village or community defense.
(7) Withdrawal operations.
(8) Airborne operations.
(9) Riverine operations.
(10) Amphibious operations.
(11) Airmobile operations.
(12) Convoy operations.

c. Flexibility. Flexibility in structuring artillery organizations for varying task assignments is necessary.

d. Capabilities. Weapons capabilities and characteristics establish parameters for the employment of artillery. Selected weapon capabilities are listed below—
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>WT (Lbs)</th>
<th>Max Range (M)</th>
<th>Max Fire Rate of Rds/Min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M29 81 mortar mm</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M30 4.2 mortar</td>
<td>156.5</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M116 75mm Pack How</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>8,796</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M101A1 105mm How</td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M102 105mm How</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M108 105mm How SP</td>
<td>46,221</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M114A1 155mm How</td>
<td>12,950</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M109 155mm How SP</td>
<td>52,460</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M115 8-inch How</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>1.5 (1st 3 Min)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M110 8-inch SP</td>
<td>58,500</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>1.5 (1st 3 Min)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M107 175mm Gun</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>32,800</td>
<td>1.5 (1st 3 Min)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Planning Factors. Planning factors include—

(1) The fire plan for a hamlet, village, and base camp defense also should include 60mm and 81mm mortars. Direct fire weapons, such as machineguns, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and 57mm, 75mm, and 106mm recoilless rifles, should be employed.

(2) The weight of the 4.2 inch mortar and the 75mm howitzer, as compared to the 105mm or the 155mm howitzer, may be a deciding factor in the selection of artillery for mountain and jungle fire support operations, or for areas with few or no roads. The availability of utility and medium helicopters may determine whether 105mm or 155mm
howitzers can be employed in difficult terrain. Firing positions must be secured from insurgent attack.

(3) Maximum effective range is an important consideration when planning support of patrols, combat operations, and surface convoys where artillery fire support, i.e., within 50 meters, may be required.

f. Operational Techniques.

(1) Provisions are made for maximum area coverage in support of combat operations and territorial defense. In order to provide maximum coverage for territorial defense, section or platoon deployment may be the rule rather than the exception. Additional personnel will have to be trained in fire direction procedures.

(2) To reduce civilian casualties, and for other reasons, it may not be possible to register actual targets and final protective fires; in such cases, registration may be accomplished on actual target areas at night, or by offset and high burst registration.

(3) Artillery must be as mobile as the force it is supporting or be prepositioned to provide the desired support. In addition to normally associated prime movers, many other means of mobility are available.

(a) Utility helicopters can lift supporting weapons up to and including 105mm howitzers. (M-102) the 155mm howitzer can be lifted by the CH 54 “Flying Crane.”

(b) Armored personnel carriers can be used as the firing platform for the 4.2 inch mortar. It
can tow artillery when wheeled prime movers cannot negotiate the terrain. The 75mm howitzer can be transported by this vehicle.

(c) Landing craft can be used to transport artillery up to and including the 105mm howitzer. The muzzle should be loaded first to facilitate unloading.

(d) Under certain conditions, movement by hand may be required.

(4) Fire plans must make effective use of and integrate all fire support weapons.

(5) Detailed procedures for obtaining clearances to fire must be established and disseminated. Free fire zones should be established. When free fire zones cannot be established, a responsive system must be developed to enable artillery to fire on all insurgent targets.

(6) The use of artillery observers is necessary. Concentrations must be fired in, and, at periodic intervals refired, to check validity. Important considerations include—

(a) At least one artillery forward observer for each company-size combat unit.

(b) Aerial observers should be trained in adjustment of artillery fire. Ground and aerial observers should work together.

(c) Individuals in each rifle platoon or patrol should be capable of observing and adjusting artillery fire.

(d) Selected individuals in paramilitary units and irregular forces should be trained in requesting and adjusting artillery fire.
(c) Artillery observers should be able to direct tactical air strikes.

(f) Artillery observers should be among the last to leave LZ in order to direct close-in protective fires.

(g) Fire missions must be conducted using sound-on-sound techniques.

(7) Simplified methods of adjusting artillery are important for territorial defense. One such technique is the "colored quadrant." It is a round board with each quadrant painted a different color; for example, red is the first quadrant (0–90°), white is the second, blue is the third, and yellow is the fourth. The board is mounted and permanently oriented to a north-south line. Defenders of base camps, villages, and hamlets call for fire using a color direction indicator. This technique requires close coordination with artillery units and as many registered targets as possible. More sophisticated methods can be devised as time and training allow. All fire request techniques require reliable and responsive communications.

(8) Harassing fires restrict movement, inflict casualties, and lower insurgent efficiency and morale. Interdiction fires are employed against assembly areas and other areas to be denied to insurgents. H and I fire frequently used at night requires the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition and must be integrated into the overall fire support plan.

(9) Selection and preparation of positions should—
(a) Afford 6400 mil firing capability.
(b) Be selected to facilitate direct fire missions.
(c) Avoid masking fires.
(d) Consider position security.
(e) Consider selection and use of alternate positions.

(10) The advice on coordination of fire support furnished by U. S. and HC units is the responsibility of the senior U. S. artillery advisor. Artillery may support many small unit operations simultaneously with platoons and in rare instances, batteries. Once operations are underway, coordination is conducted at battery or platoon level. Boundaries, no-fire lines, and fire coordination lines should be used to simplify fire support coordination.

(11) Artillery fires may be used to assist patrols and other units in maintaining a fix on their location.

(12) All fire request systems require reliable and responsive communications. Communications include—
(a) Artillery fire and liaison channels.
(b) Command nets.
(c) Airborne or ground radio relay.
(d) Camp, village, and hamlet defense radio channels.
(e) Commercial telephone systems, if available.
(f) Prearranged visual signals.
Problem areas include—

(a) Fire for effect without adjustment on target.

(b) Failure to request and provide forward and/or aerial observers.

(c) Psychological and physical effects of artillery on the population.

(d) Lack of positive identification of targets.

(e) Lack of roads which discourages displacement of artillery.

(f) Lack of proper maintenance including care and storage of ammunition.

(g) Lack of adequate coordination, to include coordination of airspace for aerial operations.

(h) Failure to displace from permanent positions to meet operational requirements.

(i) Failure to use weather data.

Logistics. Standard logistical procedures apply, but delivery and distribution are difficult. Detailed planning is required.

(1) All transportation means should be exploited.

(2) Maintenance must receive emphasis at all levels.

Responsibilities. When advising counterpart in planning operations which include artillery, insure that the following responsibilities are clearly defined:
Artillery Unit

Answers call for fire from ____________________
Establishes liaison with ____________________
Establishes communications with _____________
Has as its zone of fire _______________________
Furnishes forward observers to ______________
Displaces on order of _______________________
Has its fires planned by _____________________
Has road and position secured by ____________

90. Close Air Support

Effective close air support depends on an air-ground operation system designed to permit centralized direction of the assigned forces. For detailed information, see FM 100-25 and FM 100-27.

a. Air Force Tactical Air Control System (TACS) Elements.

(1) The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) is the communication and control center of the tactical air force commander. The tactical air force commander directs the employment of all tactical air force weapons systems and supervises the elements of TACS through the TACC. The TACC and Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) may be collocated to provide a combined coordination and control center.

(2) The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) is collocated with the Corps Tactical Operations Center (CTOC). The DASC is responsible for providing immediate close air support, reconnaissance, and airlift support in response to requirements approved by the army element. The DASC advises
and coordinates with the CTOC on Army-approved requirements for preplanned air strikes, reconnaissance, and airlift support.

(3) Tactical air control parties (TACP) are attached to each battalion and higher-level ground force tactical headquarters. The TACP at separate brigade and division level consists of an air liaison officer (ALO). The TACP at battalion level consists of one forward air controller (FAC). All TACP have communications personnel and equipment. A FAC is attached to each province/district advisory team. This FAC advises the province team on the use of tactical air and controls the air strikes within that province. TACP normally are located with the unit fire support coordination center (FSCC) or tactical operations center (TOC), as appropriate. TACP may be assigned to province and district to support tactical operations conducted by the province chief.

(a) The ALO advises the Army unit commander on all matters pertaining to the capabilities and employment of tactical air.

(b) The FAC, an experienced fighter pilot, directs air strikes. The FAC may direct air strikes from a position among ground forces or while airborne.

b. Requests. Tactical air support requests are of two types: preplanned and immediate.

(1) Preplanned requests for close air support are passed over Army communications means until they reach the senior TOC (TASE). (Field Army is the highest Army command echelon considered
in preplanned air requests.) After final consolidation and approval at the senior TOC (TASE), the final approval Army authority assigns a priority and precedence to the approved requests based upon the allocation of close air support sorties. Army preplanned requests are then submitted through the Army Liaison Element at the TACC to the Air Force component commander for execution. Preplanned air support fires are incorporated into the fire support plan.

(2) Immediate requests for air strikes may originate at any echelon and are forwarded to the battalion CP. The requests are validated at battalion and given to the TACP for submission to the DASC. The TACP at province, brigade and division levels monitor requests and coordinate with the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)/(TOC) at that level. The DASC completes the necessary coordination and, provided no echelon above the battalion disapproves the request, orders the mission. If aircraft are in the vicinity of the target area, response time will be a matter of minutes. If the immediate air strike mission requires scrambling from ground alert, response may take longer.

91. Aerial Fire Support

Armed helicopters provide accurate fire support. They normally are employed to escort transport helicopters and deliver suppressive fires. Other missions include—
a. Armed visual reconnaissance to obtain information and to locate and destroy insurgent targets. Normally a minimum of two armed helicopters are utilized.

b. Convoy escort. Two methods of performing convoy escort are—

(1) An observation aircraft stays with the convoy at all times, while armed helicopters deploy by bounds, always within a few minutes flying time of the convoy. Upon ambush, the observation pilot scrambles the armed ships and directs the strikes on the ambush force.

(2) Armed helicopters fly continuous column cover. This is used when the convoy distance is short or if ambush is likely.

c. Overhead cover for ground operations provides close-in, accurate, discriminating aerial fire support as needed. Armed helicopters fly at an altitude which will afford the best observation. They assist the ground force commander by—

(1) Screening flanks, front, and rear of his troop units.

(2) Advising him of likely insurgent locations so he can reconnoiter by fire with small arms, artillery, or armed helicopters.

(3) Providing radio relay and control.

d. For the proper employment of armed helicopters, the pilot must know—

(1) The location of friendly forces. Identify friendly unit locations by using panels, smoke, or easily identifiable terrain features.
(2) The location of insurgent forces. Identify positions by giving the pilot an azimuth and distance from a known location.

(3) The long axis of the target to take maximum advantage of the armed helicopter weapons "beaten zone."

(4) Friendly force movements, artillery fires, and the presence or absence of tactical air support. This information allows the pilot to plan time over target area and rate of ammunition expenditure.

e. Armed helicopters can be employed successfully at night if the target is illuminated by flares, searchlights, or moonlight.

f. Detailed information on the employment of armed helicopters is contained in FM 1-110.

92. Naval Gunfire Support

Navy ships operating offshore can provide responsive, accurate fire support for ground forces operating within range. This support can be direct or indirect fire. Ammunition available includes high explosives, WP smoke, and illuminating rounds.

a. Any unit may originate a request for naval gunfire support through normal fire support channels to the nearest FSCC where the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) is located. The NGLO will make necessary arrangements for spotters. As an alternate means of contacting the NGLO, a request for naval gunfire support may be submitted to a Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) for relay to the FSCC.
b. Categories of naval gunfire support are—

(1) **Preplanned**. Requests for naval gunfire support by the FSCC/NGLO at least 48 hours prior to the time required.

(2) **Nonscheduled**. Requests for naval gunfire support received by the FSCC/NGLO less than 48 hours prior to the time of fire but not falling under the urgent category.

(3) **Urgent**. Naval gunfire support for immediate support of friendly units under hostile fire or in direct reply to hostile fire.

c. Requests for naval gunfire support must contain the following information:

(1) Type of mission (preplanned, urgent, etc.).

(2) Number of ships required.

(3) Coordinates of ship's station.

(4) Coordinates of target or target area.

(5) Local time ship is to be on station.

(6) Expected duration on station.

(7) Type of target.

(8) Air, Navy Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) unit/U. S. FORCE.

93. **Army Aviation**

Army aviation provides support in command and control, reconnaissance and surveillance, mobility, aerial fire support, and logistics. A detailed discussion of U. S. Army aviation may be found in FM 1-100, FM 1-105, and FM 57-35.

a. Typical missions include—
Airmobile operations.

Command and control (aerial command posts).

Aerial fire support.

Reconnaissance and surveillance (visual, photographic, infrared, radar).

Target acquisition.

Conduct of fire (aerial artillery OP).

Illumination (flare and helicopter illumination systems).

Airmobile combat patrols (eagle flight).

Smoke laying.

PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet dissemination.

Search and rescue.

Liaison and courier service.

Supply and resupply.

Aeromedical and prisoner evacuation.

Wire laying, radio relay, and message drop.

Administrative troop movement.

Dissemination of riot control agents.

Radiological survey.

The advisor should insure that his counterpart has requested HC aviation support whenever possible.

The advisor can get information on unit capabilities and limitations from the U. S. aviation commander or his representatives.

Aircraft capabilities are listed in g below.

Night and conditions of poor visibility do not totally restrict aviation operations.
(3) Limiting factors pertaining to operations conducted in various types of terrain must be considered.

(a) Navigation in many areas is difficult due to lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and the limited number of well-defined reference points, especially in desert, delta, and jungle areas.

(b) Lack of suitable landing areas.

(c) Aircraft require considerable maintenance due to moisture and corrosion, heat, and blowing sand.

(d) High temperature and elevation restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(e) Air turbulence conditions in mountain areas.

(f) Early morning fog and cloud cover conditions prevalent in mountain areas restrict visibility.

d. U. S. Army senior advisor may have operational control of U. S. Army aviation resources within his area of responsibility.

(1) HC aviation is controlled by HC commanders, with the U. S. advisor providing advice on its employment.

(2) Normally, the senior infantry commander will be appointed as the TF commander in airborne operations.

(3) Army aviation, though centrally controlled, should be decentralized to the lowest element having a continuing requirement for aviation support. Priority of aviation support usually is es-
established by local directives, and generally is as follows:

(a) Combat support missions.
(b) Commitment of reserves and supplies.
(c) Aeromedical evacuation.
(d) Liaison, command visits, and administrative flights.
(e) All other combat service support missions.

(4) Aviation companies may be placed in direct support of specific ground forces for specified periods of time to reduce planning and reaction time.

(5) Request channels.

(a) Counterpart channels.
(b) Advisory channels which parallel counterpart channels.

C. Considerations for aviation combat support include—

(1) A rapid means of deploying a reserve force.

(a) Planning factors for staging and deploying in airmobile operations apply to reserve force deployment.

(b) Reserve forces should be collocated with supporting transport helicopters.

(c) Weapons and compatible ammunition should be loaded aboard the same aircraft.

(d) Supplies and equipment should be prestocked and all necessary preplanning accomplished prior to the commitment of the reserve force.
(2) Target acquisition and target marking of hostile targets. Positive identification of hostile targets is of paramount importance. Targets may be marked from fixed and rotary wing aircraft by—

(a) Rockets with smoke.
(b) High explosives.
(c) WP or smoke grenades.
(d) Circling over or making low passes.
(e) Machinegun tracer fire.

(3) Flare or helicopter searchlight illumination. When requesting battlefield illumination, it is important—

(a) That the call sign and frequency of the requesting unit be furnished to the illumination flight.
(b) That an estimation be made of duration of illumination required.

(4) Route reconnaissance, specific search, photographic, visual, and imagery reconnaissance. HC aerial observers normally are provided to the supporting aviation units.

(5) Command and control helicopters to provide the advisor with means for control of air-mobile and ground tactical operations. See figure 9 for an example of a helicopter command post.

(6) Search and rescue operations. Normally associated with the rescue of air crews and recovery of downed aircraft, they also encompass the rescue of other troops and personnel. The advisor should know SOP which pertain to search and rescue, and evasion and escape.
f. Requesting procedures for combat service support missions are similar to those for combat support missions. Specific considerations and capabilities include—

1. The requirement to move high priority supplies: ammunition, medical supplies, and food by air. The aircraft commander determines the maximum payload which can be carried and the advisor should:
   
   (a) Organize loads by size, weight, and priority to facilitate loading and unloading.
   
   (b) Brief personnel as to specific tasks in loading the aircraft as well as applicable safety procedures.
   
   (c) Notify the personnel at destination of the expected arrival time.
   
   (d) Insure that all items required to make a single piece of equipment function are kept together and loaded on the same aircraft.
   
   (e) Coordinate with the flight leader.
   
   (f) Assist in the supervision of the loading.

2. The HC may have an aeromedical evacuation capability in addition to U. S. helicopter ambulance detachments; however, all U. S. Army aviation units can transport or evacuate wounded and injured personnel.

3. Army aircraft may be used to lay wire over difficult and hazardous terrain. The need for armed aerial escort must be considered because of the slow speed of wire-laying aircraft.
(4) Army aircraft may be used as radio relay stations to assist in maintaining contact over great distances.

(5) Administrative or combat service support troop movements should be planned as carefully as combat assault operations. The advisor and counterpart should—

(a) Insist that other means of transportation be considered prior to requesting aviation support.

(b) Inform the aviation unit of the total lift requirement, pickup area, and destination.

(c) Insure that only authorized personnel, supplies, and equipment are moved by army air transportation.

(d) Establish priorities for movement of military and civilian personnel. This may include military dependents and their household items.

g. Planning data for use of army aircraft (see following chart).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th><strong>O-1</strong> Observation “Bird Dog”</th>
<th><strong>OV-1A</strong> Observation “Mohawk”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Height door above ground</td>
<td>In</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usable length cargo compartment</td>
<td>In</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Width of floor</td>
<td>In</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height of cargo compartment</td>
<td>In</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo space</td>
<td>Cu. ft.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door, width by height</td>
<td>In</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External cargo</td>
<td>Lbs.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter and ambulatory</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 + 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal payload when A/C has</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>full fuel.</td>
<td>Lbs.</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal cruise speed</td>
<td>Kts.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>185</td>
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<tr>
<td>Endur. hrs plus min</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 + 00</td>
<td>1 + 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td>115/145</td>
<td>JP-4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-6A</td>
<td>U-1A</td>
<td>UH-1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>&quot;Beaver&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Otter&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Iroquois&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 + 2</td>
<td>4 + 3</td>
<td>3 + 1</td>
<td>6 + 1</td>
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<td>2,570</td>
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<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 + 00</td>
<td>6 + 30</td>
<td>1 + 45</td>
<td>2 + 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10. Climb and glide ratios, light and medium aircraft.
94. Engineer

HC engineer units may support internal development programs. Advisors must consider the equipment available and the state of training of HC engineer units and the limitations imposed by weather, terrain, and road nets. Every advisor must be capable of improvisation in the event that standard equipment is not available. The engineer advisor should encourage his counterpart to use HC resources before requesting assistance from USAID or U. S. military engineer support. TM 5–227 con-
NOTES:
WHEN AVAILABLE FOR DAY OPERATION SUBSTITUTE PANELS FOR LIGHTS.
MINIMUM WIDTH IS 50FT (15M)
RUNWAY SIDE LIGHTS - WHITE
RUNWAY END LIGHTS - RED

NOTES:
WHEN AVAILABLE FOR DAY OPERATION SUBSTITUTE PANELS FOR LIGHTS.
MEDIUM WIDTH IS 100FT (30M)

Figure 12. LZ for medium and light aircraft.
1. An area of 50 meters in diameter cleared to the ground.

2. An area beyond this, surrounding the cleared area, 20 meters wide and cleared to within three feet of the ground.

3. The completed LZ is thus a minimum of 90 meters in diameter.

* Figure 13. LZ for rotary wing aircraft. 
MARKING

1. LZ'S FOR ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT ARE MARKED TO:
   a. INDICATE DIRECTION OF WIND AND/OR REQUIRED DIRECTION OF APPROACH.
   b. DELINEATE THE TOUCHDOWN AREA.
   c. LOCATE PROMINENT OBSTRUCTIONS.

2. EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES OF MARKING ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE USED WITH FIXED WING DZ'S -- LIGHTS OR FLARES AT NIGHT, SMOKE AND PANELS IN DAYLIGHT.

3. AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF MARKING IS THE "T" SYSTEM. THIS USES FOUR MARKER STATIONS.

Figure 14. Marking of LZ for use by rotary wing aircraft.
tains detailed discussions on engineer support for internal defense and internal development.

a. Engineer units—

(1) May be committed as company or smaller-sized forces because of the size and location of projects. When possible, these elements should remain under the operational control of their parent organization so that backup equipment, technical guidance, and logistic support will be available to the committed force.

(2) May improve their capabilities through on-the-job training.

(3) May be capable of supporting paramilitary forces and local villages, to include construction of—

(a) Sanitation facilities.
(b) Housing.
(c) Medical facilities.
(d) Cantonment areas.
(e) Farm-to-market roads.

(4) For a more detailed discussion of type divisional and nondivisional engineer units, see FM 5-135 and 5-142.

b. During the planning stage of a construction project, the engineer advisor should review—

(1) Logistical problems.
(2) The adequacy of the plan.
(3) The proficiency of HC engineer troops, and requirements for further technical training.
(4) The possibility of employing expedient construction techniques and devices.
Kilometers (KM) - Miles (mi)
To convert kilometers to miles:
Multiply the number of kilometers by the factor .62.
Mi = Nr of Km x .62
To convert miles to kilometers:
Multiply the number of miles by the factor 1.6.
Km = Nr of mi x 1.6

Meters (M) - Yards (yds)
To convert meters to yards:
Multiply the number of meters by the factor 1.1
Yds = Nr of M x 1.1.
To convert yards to meters:
Multiply the number of yards by the factor .91.
M = Nr of yds x .91.

Figure 15. Measure conversion factors.
(5) Principles of equipment utilization and capabilities.

(6) Applicability of the records and procedures for recording and reporting work progress.

(7) Security for work parties.

c. The advisor should be knowledgeable in fundamental construction techniques as detailed in TM 5-227 such as—

(1) Rough carpentry.

(2) Expedient construction devices and methods such as—

(a) Fabricating bricks and blocks from local clays.

(b) Constructing drainage facilities.

(c) Constructing buildings using straw roofs, bamboo framework, and adobe siding, without steel nails and drift pins.

(d) Rigging and lashing techniques.

(e) Constructing expedients for jetted or driven wells: filtration gallery; and small water supply reservoirs.

(f) Constructing culverts, fords, submerged bridges, and by-passes over streams and small rivers in such a way that these expedients are less susceptible to insurgent destruction than conventional bridging.

d. Military engineer tasks include construction of—

(1) Field fortifications, with emphasis on protection from direct fire weapons rather than blast from heavy artillery, large explosives, and bombs.
Figure 16. Insulation against extreme heat by earth-covered roof.
Figure 17. Expedient ferry using native boats.
(a) Overhead construction and dispersion should be planned.
(b) Interconnecting trenches around fixed installations are required.
(c) Local resources should be used for revetments.
(d) Prefabricated components of field fortifications should be constructed for ready availability.

(2) Obstacles, with emphasis on antipersonnel obstacles.
(a) Install minefields and barbed wire whenever applicable. Such obstacles should be covered by fire. Unguarded minefields may serve as a source of munitions supply for insurgent forces.
(b) Utilize impenetrable brush and nuisance items such as sharpened stakes, and stump and posthole barrier fields.
(c) Install camouflaged man traps.
(d) Construct watch towers and moats.
(e) Use natural obstacles whenever possible. Too much reliance should not be placed on them.

(3) Boobytraps, with emphasis on their use as warning devices.
(a) They can be installed effectively to kill infiltrators.
(b) Items such as clothing, ammunition, and medical supplies can be boobytrapped.
(c) Antipersonnel mines should be employed in conjunction with defensive systems. Plant, record, mark, and report.
Figure 18. Expedient ferry using brush-filled canvas.
Figure 19. Expedient raft construction.
(d) Warning devices to avoid harm to friendly civilians should be used.

(4) Bridges, ferries, and rafts.

(a) Bridges should be protected against floating mines by upstream floating mine barriers.
Figure 21. Construction details for bamboo mats.

(b) Maximum use should be made of hand labor and such techniques as gin poles, tripods, shears, boom derricks, cableways, expedient pile drivers, and trestles.

(c) Raft construction normally will be improvised locally. Examples are shown in figures 17, 18, and 19.

(5) Routes of communication construction.

(a) Road surfacing expedients such as chespaling mats, bamboo mats, planks, corduroy, and log tread roads should be considered when necessary (figs. 20 and 21).
Figure 22. Log culvert.
Figure 23. Helicopter landing pads.
Figure 24. Elevated helicopter landing pads.
(b) Frequent reconnaissance of the road trace to insure proper shaping and ditching, and the rapid construction of bridges and culverts (fig. 22) should be conducted.

e. Inundated areas present special problems. Roads and bridges usually are of small capacity. Insurgent forces can restrict movement by destroying a few bridges. Travel can be expedited by using shallow-draft boats. Half pontons are suitable for this purpose. These half pontons may be powered by 25hp outboard motors and are capable of carrying 10 to 15 infantrymen in addition to an engineer crew of two.

f. Air delivery of supplies and troops may demand extensive construction and repair of air-landing facilities.

   (1) Suitable LZ must be reconnoitered.

   (2) Landing pads may be constructed on swamp or marsh areas by building platforms of locally available materials (figs. 23 and 24).

95. Naval River Assault Group

River assault group (RAG) can provide troop lift and combat tactical support for operations conducted in areas with extensive waterways.

a. The mobility of the RAG permits swift displacement of fire support weapons along the river axis, thereby providing extensive area coverage and facilitating flanking movements.

b. Additional support capability includes—

   (1) Waterway blockade.
(2) Minesweeping.
(3) Limited gunfire support.
(4) Patrol.

96. Signal

a. General Principles. Responsive, rapid, and reliable signal communications is a prime requisite for maximum efficiency.

b. Advisor Responsibility. The advisor must give appropriate attention to the signal communications capabilities of the HC unit he advises by encouraging the HC unit commander to place emphasis on signal communications training and planning and on the employment, maintenance, and supply of signal communications equipment. The advisor should use the guidance contained in FM 24-1, FM 24-16, FM 24-17, FM 24-18, FM 24-19, and FM 24-20 as a basis for suggestions and recommendations to his counterpart. He should consider the application of such guidance according to the quality and quantity of signal communications resources available to the HC unit. To prepare himself for making recommendations, the advisor should—

(1) Know the unit plans and SOP for all operations.
(2) Know the signal communications means and networks currently in use and available to his counterpart's unit.
(3) Conduct a survey to determine the numbers, types, and serviceability of signal communications equipment.
(4) Survey the availability and effectiveness of signal supply and maintenance facilities.

(5) Determine the state of training of signal communications personnel.

(6) Know local terrain or climatic conditions which may affect signal communications.

c. Standard Signal Communications Requirements. A number of functions must be performed which normally will require signal communications. These functions represent standard requirements and advisors should insure that their counterparts provide adequate means for each.

(1) Internal command control. All commanders must be provided communications means which enable them to exercise control and influence action. When resources are available, advisors should encourage their counterparts to use an airborne command post equipped with a variety of radios.

(2) Operational control. Signal communications must be provided which permit appropriate staff elements to issue orders implementing the commander's operational decisions and to receive information concerning the progress of operations.

(3) Surveillance and intelligence. Signal communications must be provided to permit an effective exchange of information and intelligence. The requirement to convey information rapidly to a level at which it can be acted upon is critical. The requirement for minimum delay coupled with a high traffic load may warrant provision of separate signal communication facilities.
(4) **Fire support control.** Signal communications are required for effective fire support. This includes the capability to initiate, integrate, and coordinate multiple fire requests and to direct and control fires from all available means. Counterparts should be advised of the need for prior planning to insure effective signal communications with the appropriate FSCC, fire direction center, forward observer, and TACP. Direct communication with supporting aircraft may be required. Consideration must be given to—

(a) Coordination of radio frequencies, call signs, and authentication.

(b) Compatibility of radio equipment.

(c) Provision of prearranged visual signals for marking of friendly units and target areas.

(d) When fire support is provided by U. S. or third country units, language and procedure differences must be taken into account. Exchange of translators may be required.

(5) **Administration and logistics.** Signal communication means should be provided to establish administrative and logistic nets, to insure prompt and adequate support of combat operations.

(6) **External command control/coordination.** Signal communication to higher, adjacent, and supporting units should be provided. The advisor should stress to his counterpart that signal communication be accepted as a mutual responsibility and that it is incumbent upon him to make every effort to insure that adequate communications are available. The degree of success realized in any such
combined activity often is dependent upon the effectiveness of the signal communication channels established and maintained for cross-communication. Signal communication plans must include delineation of responsibility; coordination of frequencies, call signs, and authentication; and special communication links manned on both ends by the same unit when noncompatibility of equipment, language differences, and security considerations so dictate. When a regional HC security net is in being, it may be necessary for a HC armed forces unit to enter this net for certain operations. A type HC communications security net is shown at figure 25.

(7) Communication security. Advisors should impress upon their counterparts the need for communication security (COMSEC). In an internal defense environment where the insurgent is dependent upon information of friendly intentions, effective COMSEC becomes increasingly critical. COMSEC can be enhanced at all levels by the use of appropriate operation and numeral codes; authentication; and proper attention to basic COMSEC practices (see FM 32–5 for more detailed discussion).

(a) Cryptosecurity.
1. Use only authorized cryptosystems.
2. Insure strict compliance with the operating instructions for cryptosystems employed.
3. Use cryptosystems designed to provide the degree and term of security required.

(b) Physical security.
Figure 25. Type HC communication security net.
1. Maintain safeguards against capture, theft, or unauthorized observation of messages and COMSEC materiel.

2. Maintain emergency evacuation and destruction plans and review them frequently.

3. Guard against carelessness and laxity by frequent inspections and tests of security measures.

(c) Transmission security.

1. Use radio transmission only when other means of communication are not adequate.

2. Be aware that all means of transmission are subject to interception by unauthorized personnel.


4. Make transmissions brief.

5. Use only prescribed communications operation procedures.

6. Use minimum power required.

(d) Means of Communication. The advisor should be aware that climate and terrain conditions, as well as the tactical situation, may have a serious impact upon communications. The following paragraphs provide guidance to some specific problems which may be encountered.

(I) Wire communication. Wire normally is a more secure means of transmission than radio, and should be employed in preference to radio whenever feasible; however, a number of factors peculiar to the environment will have significant impact on its employment.
(a) The utilization of wire lines entails risks of sabotage and interception by physical or electronic measures. When wire lines are used, they should be routed to facilitate observation and periodic inspection by wire patrols. Advisors should stress the need for transmission security.

(b) The terrain favored by guerrilla elements of an insurgent movement and the need for friendly units to move rapidly will preclude extensive use of wire during tactical operations. Wire should be used to the maximum within secure base camps and for tie-in of perimeter security sites. Wire lines may be employed short distances to combat outposts and listening posts, but should be backed up by radio.

(2) Messenger communications. Motor and foot messengers are highly vulnerable to ambush, sniper fire, emplaced mines, and road-blocking tactics. When foot or motor messengers must be used, it is advisable to employ them in well-armed teams of two or more and to avoid establishing patterns of routes and time of dispatch. When feasible, air messenger should be used.

(3) Radio communication. Radio often will be the only means of communication available. Any impact which tends to downgrade the radio communication capability can be critical and warrants the attention of the advisor. The advisor must identify and recommend ways of eliminating or minimizing radio transmission problems. If the FM radio equipment available is not suitable to the mission, it should be reported by the advisor.
and his counterpart. Solutions should first be sought within the available equipment resources of the HC unit. Some general guidelines for increasing effectiveness of radio communication include—

(a) Antennas should be located in a clear area, preferably high ground, and vegetation should not touch the antenna.

(b) VHF FM radios are line of sight. For transmission between two such sets, there must be an unobstructed path between the stations. Often, by moving one set a short distance or increasing its antenna height, such a path can be obtained.

(c) Directional antennas may provide increased range; however, such antennas must be oriented properly, for they are extremely inefficient except in one direction.

(d) Field expedient semi-fixed type antennas are more efficient than whip antennas and can extend the range and increase the efficiency of VHF FM and HF FM radio sets. A detailed discussion of such antennas is contained in FM 24–18. Figures 26 through 36 depict some basic expedient antennas. When prior need for a specific type antenna can be ascertained, a standard antenna kit should be obtained, if available, since it will yield higher efficiency than the field expedient.

(e) For long-range operation of AM sets, proper frequency assignment and utilization is a critical factor. Usually, two frequencies (one suitable for day and one for night transmission) are a minimum requirement.
When the insurgent force has the capability to jam friendly radio nets, measures should be taken to minimize the effects. As a minimum, alternate frequencies should be provided for all critical nets and SOP should be established which facilitate coordinated switching to alternate frequencies without orders. The insurgent normally exercises his jamming capability during critical phases of an operation.

A number of radio sets require "grounding" for efficient operation. The effectiveness of a ground rod often can be increased by wetting the ground around it. Use of a counterpoise in addition to, or in place of, a ground may be necessary.

Visual and sound communications. An important factor to insure understanding of the meanings assigned to a particular visual or sound signal is the preparation, publication, and distribution of SSI and SOI containing prearranged meanings and codes. Security of visual and sound signals is difficult to maintain and the insurgent can employ them to mislead and confuse friendly troops. An effective system of visual signals is an excellent means for transmitting brief orders and information as well as emergency requests for air and other support. It is insurance against the total loss of communication between units in close proximity or between ground units and aircraft. FM 21-60 covers the general employment of hand signals, flags, pyrotechnics, and panels.

e. Special Communication Techniques. In the internal defense environment, the following func-
tions may generate special signal communication problems.

(1) *Patrolling*. Special signal communications often will be required to permit reliable communication between the patrol and the patrol base. Basically, patrols should be provided radios suitable for transmission over the terrain and distances at which they will be operating. Some additional measures which should be taken as SOP when communication becomes difficult are—

(a) Patrols should, when possible, halt to make communication contacts to take advantage of the added range provided by semi-fixed antennas.

(b) Transmissions should be kept as short as possible and patrols should move immediately after transmission to minimize the possibility of detection.

(c) The parent unit should continuously monitor the patrol radio frequency.

(d) Arrangements should be made for the parent unit to transmit instructions for patrols at prearranged times, even when two-way contact cannot be made.

(e) Airborne radio relays or retransmission stations may be employed.

(f) Patrols should be provided with a visual system of transmitting prearranged messages to aircraft when radio communication is impossible.

(2) *Convoy security*. Advisors should impress upon their counterparts the necessity for responsive and reliable communications during convoy operations.
Figure 26. Improvised center-fed half wave antenna.
Figure 27. End-fed long wire antenna hasty installation (type AT-101/102) for HF sets.
Figure 28. Ground plane omnidirectional RC-292 type for FM sets.
Figure 29. End-fed long wire hasty installation (type AT-984) for FM sets 20-80 MCS.
Figure 30. Ground plane omnidirectional jungle antenna (field expedient).
Figure 31. Balloon-type support for omnidirectional vertical antenna for AM or FM radio sets.
Formula:

\[
\text{Antenna Length in Feet} = \frac{\text{Height Squared} \times \text{Freq in MCS} + \frac{183}{730} \times \text{Freq in MCS}}{}\]

Figure 32. Vertical half rhombic antenna 20-60 MCS.
Figure 33. Yagi antenna twin lead or coax affixed to bamboo to provide higher gain for FM sets.
This antenna is used with AM radios, on C.W. It is placed underground to prevent its destruction by mortar fire.

- **Length**: 2 or 3 wavelengths of operating frequency
- **Depth**: 15 to 30 centimeters (6-12 inches)
- **Range**: 2 to 3 times normal range of set
- **Radiation**: Off end of antenna

**Note**: The end of the antenna must be sealed to prevent a "direct short" to ground.

**Figure 34. Underground long wire antenna.**

(a) Convoy should be equipped with at least one radio set capable of maintaining contact with its base. When possible, more than one set should be provided, and these sets should be dispersed throughout the convoy.

(b) Inter-convoy communications should be
provided and should include visual and sound signaling systems as well as radio nets.

(c) Radio communications must be established with flank security elements and escort aircraft.

Figure 35. Bent bamboo antenna.
(d) Provision should be made to contact FSCC, fire direction centers, and friendly units en route.

f. U. S. Advisor Communications. A U. S. advisor communication system should be established for direct communications within the U. S. advisor organization. Unit advisors often will be issued
Figure 37. Transceiver HT-1A.

manpack FM or AM sets of the same type available to the host unit. These radios should be utilized for intercommunication of unit advisors, to
contact aircraft, and to permit the advisor to monitor the command net of the unit he is advising to keep abreast of the situation. For this reason, advisors who are not proficient in the language of the HC should, when possible, secure the services of qualified interpreters as radio operators.

g. Additional Communication Means. Frequently, U. S. advisors will find that commercial radios, such as those shown at figures 37 and 38, have been made available by USAID to the HC for use by various governmental officials (province, district, village, and hamlet levels) and police forces. Additionally, such radios may be available to U. S. agencies collocated with the advisory team. Advisors should be familiar with the capabilities and operating characteristics of these radios and consider them as an alternate means of communication in their planning.

h. Training. HC communications personnel must be thoroughly trained to achieve and maintain the desired state of proficiency in voice and CW procedures, security measures, tuning, antenna operations, and maintenance. They should be trained to operate more than one type of radio.

i. Maintenance. A periodic inspection by the HC unit commander should be made to determine status of maintenance and supply conditions.

(1) Insure that adequate repair parts are on hand.
(2) Maintain operable test equipment and insure that personnel are familiar with its operation.

Figure 38. Transceiver TR-20.
(3) Insure that follow-up action has been initiated on overdue requisitions.

(4) Place command emphasis on requisitioning, storage, and use of dry batteries.

(5) Insure that an adequate supply of crystals is available for all radio sets which require them.

97. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Live munitions are both a hazard to friendly personnel and a source of explosive supply for insurgents, and unexploded ordnance may have intelligence value. EOD normally should be performed by specially trained personnel. Planning must take into consideration the probable need for EOD service. Units providing such service should be identified and liaison accomplished. Local SOP should provide for reconnaissance, reporting, marking, and security of unexploded ordnance. Prompt reaction is required to minimize danger to friendly personnel and to prevent capture by the insurgent.

Section II. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

98. General

Combat service support may include administrative services, chaplain service, finance, legal service, maintenance, medical service, military police, replacements, supply, transportation, and other logistical services, and the advisor is expected to advise his counterpart concerning them. The U. S. generally provides certain supplies and equipment
through the MAP. USAID funds also may be made available to military forces for civic action. A major portion of combat service support is made up of MAP supplies and equipment. Coordination at all levels is required to insure that military and civil assistance efforts complement one another. Documentation is important to the MAP because the current year's usage is a major part of the basis for the next year's MAP supplies. The advisor should insist that adequate documentation, warehousing, and inventory procedures are used. Excess equipment should be reported for disposition.

99. Advisor Considerations (Combat Service Support)

The HC logistical system may not be patterned after the U. S. Army system, but the advisor should insure that the basic supply and maintenance functions are performed effectively.

a. General Principles.

(1) Plan well in advance to insure receipt of minimum essential supplies (avoid overstocking).

(2) Use air or water transportation only when land transportation is impractical. Local procurement of supplies will reduce transportation requirements.

(3) Emphasize unit distribution wherever possible.

(4) Stock selected, expendable supplies to provide a more responsive supply system. Dispersed stockage will facilitate support of units in remote areas.
(5) Resupply tactical units from nearest operational bases. Prestocked supplies at departure airfields will prove economical. Do not allow counterpart to become overly reliant upon aerial resupply.

(6) Emphasize coordination of supply missions with the requester, supplier, transporter, and user.

(7) Evacuate captured supplies. They can be used to supplement military and civil stocks, except for certain types of medical supplies, such as biologicals and drugs.

(8) When evacuation of captured materiel is not feasible, it must be destroyed, except for medical supplies.

(9) Insist on rigid control of supplies and equipment.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Insure that maintenance practices are taught to selected maintenance personnel.

(2) Stress preventive maintenance.

(3) Use mobile maintenance teams to assist in training user and organizational maintenance personnel and to perform on-site direct support maintenance.

(4) Insure that direct support units provide rapid maintenance support to outlying posts and bases.

(5) Insist on timely maintenance inspection, evacuation, and follow-up measures.

(6) Monitor and control cannibalization of equipment, when authorized.
(7) Integrate maintenance into all training and operations plans.

(8) Impress HC counterparts with the necessity for their personal participation in the maintenance program, with particular emphasis on a continuous program.

(9) Insist on the use of special tools and test equipment provided for maintenance performance.

c. Transportation. Use locally procured transportation best suited to the situation; i.e., rafts, river boats, pack animals, and porters. Under certain circumstances aircraft may be the only effective means of transportation. Driver training schools may be required.

d. Personnel Administration. Advisors should be aware of basic personnel administration procedures applicable to their counterparts' area of responsibility. The advisor should draw his counterpart's attention to the following essentials:

(1) Avoid the temptation to use excessive manpower for nonoperational duties.

(2) Acknowledge heroic and meritorious service promptly and appropriately.

(3) Administer discipline in accordance with proper leadership techniques and exercise adequate corrective measures.

(4) Be alert to all situations which have morale implications, to include—

(a) Leadership techniques.

(b) Pay.

(c) Promotions.

(d) Leave.
(e) Dependent welfare.

(5) Identify and assist in the development of potential leaders.

e. Military Police.

(1) Military police functions and responsibilities become involved directly with civil controls and enforcement of emergency regulations. This is true in cases where small communities have little or no police resources. Military police training should place special emphasis on movement control, physical security, civil disturbances and riot control, prisoner handling, resources control, organization and operation of police intelligence systems, and other specialized police techniques.

(2) Military police can provide plans, advice, training; and supervision to civil police.

f. Medical Service.

(1) A medical service program—

(a) Provides for the health and treatment of military personnel and their dependents.

(b) Relieves suffering from disease and injury and improves the health of the population.

(c) Initiates an acceptable medical system which can be maintained and continued by the HC.

(2) The medical service plan should include, as a minimum—

(a) A preventive medicine program.

(b) Education in hygiene and sanitation.

(c) Training for health workers.

(d) Treatment for patients.

(e) A medical supply system.

(f) A medical evacuation system.
(3) Training programs should—
(a) Be based on the level of medical training required for HC military and civil personnel.
(b) Improve conditions and train more medical workers.
(c) Encourage emergency medical training for all military personnel.
(d) Emphasize the need for advanced medical training for qualified personnel.
(e) Train health workers selected from their own village.
(f) Encourage health and sanitation training of the population by village health workers and mobile medical teams.

(4) Operations.
(a) Aid stations and dispensaries should be located near the center of operational areas with due consideration given to security.
(b) The advisor should be familiar with the HC medical evacuation system and be prepared to recommend medical evacuation plans for civilian personnel. Medical evacuation plans should be coordinated with all concerned agencies.

100. Sanitation and Hygiene

Illness is as much a casualty producer as a bullet. The maintenance of health is the commander’s responsibility and he must enforce the practices of sanitation and hygiene.

a. Diseases acquired through the respiratory tract include the common cold, influenza, smallpox, diphtheria, meningitis, and tuberculosis. One of
the more dangerous is tuberculosis. The best protection against this disease is the maintenance of good living habits; i.e., plenty of rest and good nutrition. Intestinal tuberculosis and tuberculosis of the skin can be acquired by drinking unpasteurized milk or eating dairy foods made from unpasteurized milk.

b. Intestinal diseases include typhoid fever, amebic and bacillary dysentery, cholera, nonspecific diarrhea, food poisoning, and various parasitic infections. These are spread through food and water contaminated with waste from either an infected individual or an asymptomatic carrier. For protection, eat only thoroughly cooked foods; drink only disinfected or boiled water. Salad vegetables should be scaled by immersing them in boiling water for ten seconds or by soaking them in chlorine disinfectant solution for 30 minutes. (One package of "Disinfectant, Chlorine, Food Service" dissolved in ten gallons of water provides a good disinfectant for this purpose.) Amebic cysts, which cause amebic dysentery, and certain liver flukes may be resistant to chlorine. Some flukes are acquired by eating water vegetables such as watercress, water caltrop, and water chestnuts. Avoid these, if possible. Other parasites may be acquired by eating the flesh of raw, smoked, or pickled fish or meat. Eat only fish or meat which has been cooked thoroughly. Most newcomers may develop intestinal upsets and diarrhea after arrival. Should the diarrhea persist for more than several days or if blood or mucus is present, a physician should be consulted.
c. Water can be the vehicle of infection for hepatitis, typhoid fever, cholera, dysentery, and many of the parasites. Water must not be consumed unless boiled or disinfected with chlorine or iodine. Water used to make ice should be treated in the same manner. Calcium hypochlorite, two ampules per 36-gallon Lyster-Bag, provides sufficient Chlorine; or iodine, one tablet per canteen if the water is clear, two if the water is cloudy. Permit the water to stand for 30 minutes before drinking. Water for bathing also should be purified to avoid the disease, leptospirosis. Leptospirosis infection presumably results from organisms penetrating abraded skin or mucus membranes or possibly through swallowing contaminated water.

d. Insect-borne diseases include malaria, dengue fever, encephalitis, scrub typhus, filariasis, and plague. Antimalarial tablets, taken faithfully as prescribed, generally will prevent malaria. Standard U. S. Army insect repellent, mosquito nets, and impregnated clothing are other measures which can be taken to avoid infection of insect-borne diseases.

e. Deep fungus infections can be prevented by proper utilization of protective clothing and by immediate first aid treatment of even the most minor injuries. Superficial infections, such as athlete's foot, can be prevented by faithful cleaning and drying of infected areas; frequent changes of clothing and socks; and the application of foot powder.

f. Venomous snakes, leeches, and predatory animals represent animals of medical importance. It
generally is agreed that use of specific antivenin is the best definitive treatment for snakebite. Leech bites may be prevented by application of repellents to skin and clothing; when they do occur, such bites should be treated as any other minor wound. Rabies can be contracted from infected bats, even though they show no signs of illness. If animals or bats suspected of being rabid are handled by an individual, further inquiry is needed. Rabies can be spread even by contact with the saliva of rabid individuals, animals, or bats. Bites from domestic or predatory animals may indicate that the animal is rabid. All pets and mascots must be vaccinated against rabies. If examination of the animal for rabies cannot be accomplished, treatment against rabies should be started immediately.

g. Sanitation and hygiene practices include—

(1) Persuade the population to keep communities clean.

(2) Destroy homeless pets and dangerous animals (investigate local laws, customs, and effect on population prior to implementation).

(3) Take appropriate action against diseased animals; report them to veterinary personnel.

(4) Boil untreated water for at least ten minutes prior to use.

(5) Recommend the construction of wells, as required. A well should be a minimum of 100 feet from any possible source of contamination. Surface drainage should be away from the well site.

(6) Cook food thoroughly to destroy disease organisms.
(7) Disinfectant fruits and vegetables thoroughly (FM 21–10).

(8) Boil locally procured milk for one minute prior to consumption. Milk should be obtained from animals which have been tested and found to be free of tuberculosis.

(9) Stress individual training concerning oral hygiene.

(10) Make available and demonstrate the use of toothbrushes.

(11) Demonstrate the techniques of massaging gums. A prevalent oral disease originates with gums and contributes to eventual loss of teeth.

(12) Assist in the construction of latrines and encourage their use.

(13) Collect and treat human waste, which is to be used for fertilizer, in a common latrine. Insist that collectors use covered containers.

(14) Remove garbage from living areas at least once daily.

(15) Designate one area for burning and burying of garbage.

(16) Control mosquito breeding. Eliminate standing water by removing temporary water containers; control plants and debris bordering water bodies; and spray all appropriate areas with 0.5 percent residual DDT once daily.

(17) Spray latrine, garbage, and water disposal pits with 0.5 percent residual diazinon biweekly for fly control. Issue fly swatters to the population and encourage their use.
(18) Spray all dwellings with 0.5 percent residual DDT, especially walls and floors, for flea and louse control. Individuals must bathe frequently and apply louse powder.

(19) Establish rodent control with traps and rodenticide bait mixed with cornmeal, ground rice, or cereal.

(20) Organize mass immunization if necessary to suppress epidemics. Normally, large-scale immunization will be directed by the highest echelon of command.
101. General

This chapter contains information on the following:

a. Tunnel destruction and denial.
b. Employment of riot control agents, flame, smoke, and herbicide.
c. Land-clearing techniques.
d. Scout dogs.
e. Mines and boobytraps.
f. Evasion and escape.
g. Survival.

102. Tunnel Destruction and Denial

During the early phases of insurgency, the insurgent element will commence a supply buildup. These supplies must be stored in areas unknown to HC authorities and the general population. Where the terrain permits, tunnels, caves, and underground storage areas are constructed to enable the insurgent to store his supplies and take refuge.

a. Tunnel complexes vary in size and depth. Various configurations are constructed for specific purposes, numbers of personnel to be housed, types of equipment to be stored, types of materiel and equipment used in construction, and the terrain and soil textures in the area.
Figure 39. Typical village with tunnel system.
b. Types of tunnels.

(1) Village tunnels/village connecting tunnels—

(a) May run as far as 1500 meters in length.
(b) Are one to five meters under ground level.
(c) Rarely exceed one meter in diameter.
(d) May have connecting tunnels.
(e) May have cache rooms.
(f) May have underwater escape hatch.
(g) Will have air vents.
(h) Entrances may be disguised as religious shrines, concealed under huts, haystacks, or trap doors which blend with the terrain (figs. 39 and 40). Entrances may be mined or boobytrapped.
Figure 41. Spider trap holes.
Figure 42. Extensively developed, fortified tunnel complex.
(2) Cache tunnels and spider trap holes—
   (a) Generally are located in difficult terrain, well concealed and accessible only by foot. (fig. 41).
   (b) May be guarded.
   (c) May be short and include false connecting tunnels.
   (d) May be built in the side of a hill giving cache rooms greater overburden.

(3) Fortified tunnels—
   (a) Generally are detailed and complex.
   (b) May have connecting tunnels with an excess of one meter overburden.
   (c) May have reinforcing timbers.
   (d) Have firing positions and bunkers located tactically to support one another mutually, and well fortified against small arms and indirect fire.
   (e) May afford minimum protection against heavy artillery and air bombardment.
   (f) Generally will be defended (figs. 42 and 43).

c. Tunnels must be searched for intelligence information. The area around the tunnel complex should be secured and defended during search and destruction operations.

(1) Flush tunnel first.
   (a) Use power-driven blowers to force smoke or CS into tunnels to neutralize insurgents in the tunnels.
Figure 43. Typical bunkers.
(b) Smoke will rise through additional openings, giving estimates as to length, direction, air vents, and exits.

(2) Flush tunnel clear of smoke or CS prior to entering.

(3) Use small, lithe, adventurous individuals to form tunnel search teams.

(4) Use the buddy system for search teams.

(5) Utilize wire communications between search team and surface.

(6) Equip search team with small, preferably .22 caliber pistol, bayonet, protective masks or oxygen equipment, head lamps or flash lights, and possibly offensive hand grenades.

(7) Wear protective masks. If the tunnel has not been flushed clear of smoke or CS, personnel should wear supplied air or oxygen-generating type protective equipment.

(8) Be cautious of boobytraps and insurgents remaining in tunnels.

(9) Chart and map tunnels.

(10) Remove all intelligence information from the tunnel. Supplies and equipment useful to the insurgent should be confiscated or destroyed.

d. Destruction of tunnels may be accomplished by—

(1) Cratering charges.

(2) High explosives (may require large quantities).

(3) Any new innovations designed for the collapse or destruction of tunnels and caves.
e. Tunnel denial may be accomplished by—
   (1) Use of incapacitating chemical agents.
   (2) Flooding with water.

103. Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, and Herbicides

a. General. The employment of riot control agents, flame, smoke, and herbicides is influenced by weather conditions and terrain conditions in the target area. The most important of these conditions are windspeed and direction, and temperature gradient. Other considerations are: air temperature, humidity, precipitation, amount and type of vegetation, terrain contour, and type of soil. FM 3–10 and TM 3–240 discuss the above effects in detail. Defense against chemical, biological, and radiological weapons is discussed in FM 21–40. Employment of riot control agents, flame, smoke, and herbicides in counterguerrilla operations is discussed in TC 3–16.

   (1) Riot control grenades are effective against targets such as huts, foxholes, and bunkers. They also are effective against underground installations which have good ventilation characteristics.

   (2) Riot control dispersers, such as the M106 (Mighty Mite), are extremely effective against large underground installations and tunnel complexes.

   (3) Micropulverized CS can be dispensed effectively in underground installations by placing it on detonating cord which is strung and detonated throughout the network of tunnels by the search team.
(4) CS boobytraps and micropulverized CS sprayed among foliage along trails and around a perimeter cause intruders to reveal their position as they attempt to escape the effects of the agent.

(5) Patrols may use CS to break contact or delay pursuit by insurgent forces.

(6) Riot control agents should be considered for use—

(a) To gain physical control of target area and its population with minimum casualties.

(b) To precede or follow preparatory fires prior to ground attack.

(c) To canalize insurgent forces into killing zones and blocking positions.

(d) To harass and interdict suspected insurgent areas.

(e) To assist in countering ambush and preparing a friendly ambush.

(f) To disrupt or break up insurgent attack against outposts and villages.

(g) To break contact with insurgent forces during retrograde movement.

b. Flame and Incendiary Weapons and Munitions. The use of flame produces casualties, asphyxiation, psychological effects, and incendiary damage. It may be used to destroy captured supplies, equipment, and insurgent base camps. The use of these weapons, portable or mechanized, must be supported by other fires. See FM 20–33 for detailed information on the construction and use of flame field expedients. These expedients may be used to—

(1) Supplement ambush fire plans.
(2) Reinforce the defense when emplaced along likely avenues of approach and natural or artificial obstacles.

(3) Remove vegetation from ranges, building and road construction sites, and fields of fire.

(4) Destroy insurgent food, supplies, and crops.

(5) Attack insurgent fortified positions, tunnels, caves, and buildings.

(6) Illuminate signal arrows for air-ground coordination at night. Cans filled with one part diesel and one part JP-4, arranged to form an arrow and mounted on a revolving platform, may be used to point the direction in which pilots are to attack.

c. Smoke. Smoke may be used for signaling and screening. It provides a means of air-ground coordination for marking targets and LZ and may be used to screen LZ from aimed fire. Smoke aids in tunnel-clearing operations. It can be delivered by fixed and rotary wing aircraft, indirect fire weapons, rifle grenades, smoke generators, and by hand. When utilizing colored smoke as signals in heavy vegetation, avoid the use of green and violet, which are difficult to see. When used as signals, careful coordination with fire supporting elements is imperative to insure friendly troop safety.

d. Herbicides. Herbicides include defoliant agents, used specifically against trees and shrubs and as anti-crop agents. Commercial nontoxic herbicides may be used safely in operations when applied with normal precautions. Military applica-
tions for herbicides are based on the expectation that removal of the foliage and vegetation will improve visibility. Presently, it is not possible to defoliate chemically in less than a day; thus, available herbicides have no value in surprise attacks. Herbicides may be applied by air and ground spray, hand-spraying or scattering, or by direct application to plants and individual spot treatment. Foliage type, density, and growing season determine the time, amount, and method of applying herbicides. Factors to be considered in using herbicides are the psychological effects and accidental damage to crops of friendly families who must be reimbursed for the damage. Herbicides may be used effectively to—

(1) Clear vegetation bordering roads, paths, railways, and waterways, reducing possible sites from which friendly forces may be ambushed.

(2) Destroy insurgent food supply by spraying crops.

(3) Clear vegetation from fields of fire, avenues of approach, and barrier systems in the defensive perimeter.

(4) Clear vegetation surrounding critical installations.

(5) Clear field training areas.

(6) Clear large areas for major construction projects.

104. Land Clearing

In heavy jungle areas, herbicides cannot denude the entire area. Two methods of mechanical clearing may be employed successfully.
a. The Rome Plow Method requires a standard military dozer equipped with a special cutting blade and operator protective cab. The blade is equipped with a horizontal cutting edge and a stringer for splintering the larger trees. Felled materiel is windrowed for destruction or salvage.

b. The King Ranch Method uses two dozers operating, generally in parallel, 100 to 200 feet apart, towing a 600-foot heavy anchor chain between them. A 9-foot or 14-foot diameter steel ball may be placed in the center of the chain for better results in heavily wooded areas. The debris subsequently is salvaged or destroyed, as desired.

105. Scout Dogs

Scout dogs assist in reconnoitering routes and areas for the presence of humans. Skillful use of scout dogs may preclude insurgent ambush.

a. Scout dogs rely on their keen sense of smell to detect scents which come from an upwind direction. When a dog is working in the harness, he will "alert" when he detects a human scent. From the alert indication, the handler shows the direction of the detected person by arm signal to the tactical unit leader. The alerting distance varies according to conditions of wind, weather, terrain, and vegetation. Along jungle trails, the alert often will indicate a quarry along the trail because the slight winds in the jungle allow scents to drift along trails. Under favorable conditions, scout dogs can alert on a noise.
b. Scout dogs can smell out a person or cache in a covered hole in the ground, or a person hiding underwater while breathing through a reed. They can assist sentries when the unit is at a halt.

c. Scout dog platoon leaders require a warning order to prepare for an operation and a briefing on the major facets of the plan. Failure to receive this information will hinder proper selection and preparation of teams.

d. Scout dogs should be used only when benefits may accrue from their use.

e. Benefit from scout dogs is greatest in small unit operations such as patrols.

f. When troops are negotiating trails in jungle or other heavy vegetation, the dog team should be on the trail rather than in a flank security position.

g. On extended operations or in areas where negotiation of the terrain causes considerable physical exertion, dog teams should be used in pairs and alternated in the working position. Dogs must be provided sufficient water, particularly in hot weather, to avoid having the patrol led to a water source rather than to the insurgent.

h. When operating in flooded rice paddies or similar terrain, dogs normally cannot travel without excessive difficulty.

i. The dog's position in relation to the patrol or body of troops must be such that he uses the wind to the best advantage. When advancing with the
wind, a dog should be at the rear where he is of some benefit. In a crosswind, the dog may walk on the upwind flank or at the head of the column. Handlers and advisors with the unit should emphasize these points to the tactical commander. A change in the direction of advance may require repositioning the dog in relation to the unit.

j. When the dog is working at the head of a column, on a flank, or quartering a field while the unit is halted, designated personnel should maintain visual contact with the dog and handler.

k. Maximum benefit can be realized from the use of scout dogs by gearing the rate of advance of the unit to that of the dog.

l. Scout dogs should not be used in the assault.

m. Scout dogs easily learn to travel in helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, but usually require an initial period of familiarization. Familiarization should be accomplished prior to using the dog on an operation.

106. Mines and Boobytraps

Mines and boobytraps, many of which are field expedients, are used cleverly by insurgent forces and may be used with the same results by friendly forces. The following diagrams are some considerations for the employment of mines and boobytraps by insurgent forces, as well as friendly forces. TM 31–200–1 contains additional detailed information on mines and boobytraps.

a. Boobytraps. Grenades, spike traps, poison arrows, and a variety of other means are employed
IN MOST CASES THE GRENADES ARE BURIED (SHALLOW) UNDER THE GATE. A SHORT TRIP WIRE IS ATTACHED TO THE GATE SO THAT WHEN IT IS MOVED EVEN SLIGHTLY, THE GRENADE IS DETONATED. PRESSURE RELEASE FUZES HAVE ALSO BEEN EMPLOYED. IF THERE IS HEAVY GROWTH AROUND THE GATE, THE GRENADES WILL GENERALLY BE HIDDEN IN THE GROWTH.

Figure 44. Grenade at gate.

to harass, slow down, confuse, and kill. The forms of these weapons are limited only by the imagination of the designer (FM 5–31).

(1) Spiked foot and man traps are common types of boobytraps. Spikes may be sharpened bamboo sticks, barbed wood, or metal spikes emplaced in wood, concrete, or metal blocks. Spiked devices

Figure 45. Bamboo arch.

may be placed in holes, on top of the ground, or along routes of movement, and carefully camouflaged to prevent detection.
TWO BAMBOO POLES, 15 FEET HIGH, SPACED 30-40 FEET APART WITH BARBED WIRE SUSPENDED BETWEEN POLES. LOWEST PART OF WIRE IS ABOUT 10 FEET ABOVE GROUND. TWO GRENADES ARE ATTACHED, EVENLY SPACED TO THE WIRE. A TANK OR OTHER VEHICLE, PASSING BETWEEN THE POLES WILL STRIKE THE OVERHEAD WIRE AND DETONATE THE GRENADES. THE GRENADES ARE PLACED AT SUCH A HEIGHT AS TO CAUSE INJURY TO TANK MOUNTED INFANTRY, OR OTHER VEHICULAR MOUNTED PERSONNEL.

Figure 46. Tank boobytrap.

(2) Grenades are commonly used as boobytraps because they are light in weight, easy to carry and conceal, and readily adaptable. They are put in trees, on fences, and along trails with trip wires strung across the pathway. Artillery and mortar shells may be rigged for detonation as boobytraps.

(3) Trip wire devices placed along trails and paths release arrows, bamboo whips, and other swinging, barbed, and club-type objects. Examples of boobytraps are shown in figures 44 through 50.
b. Mines. Antipersonnel and antitank mines may be used extensively. When antitank mines are employed, they normally are placed on roads and trails capable of carrying vehicular traffic. Antipersonnel mines may be employed on defensive terrain so that personnel taking high ground or conducting immediate action drills to ambush are subjected to these mines. Antipersonnel mines are used along trails and to defend entrances to in-
GRENADES HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO LARGE STAKES IN HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES TO PROVIDE BOOBY TRAPS FOR HELICOPTERS.

*Figure 48. Helicopter trap.*

surgent tunnels. Antitank mines are placed in hollowed-out places on bridges or in holes which have been dug in roads. To make the hole difficult
THE MOST COMMON TYPE OF BOOBY TRAP CONSISTS OF A TRIP WIRE STRETCHED ACROSS A TRAIL, ANCHORED TO A SMALL BUSH OR TREE AND TO A FRICTION TYPE FUZE IN THE GRENADE. MOST OTHER BOOBY TRAPS ARE A VARIATION ON THIS BASIC IDEA.

Figure 49. Grenade on trail.

to detect, the insurgent may scatter dirt across the road for several hundred meters or dig dummy holes for deception or for mine employment at a later date. Shoulders along roads often are mined. Tunnels for mine emplacement are dug under the surface of hard-surfaced roads from the sides or shoulders. Examples of mines are shown in figures 51 through 63.

107. Evasion and Escape (E&E)

It is important that the advisor be well trained in the principles of E&E and the Code of Conduct.
THE DAISY CHAIN OF GRENADES IS MADE BY FIRST ATTACHING A GRENADE TO A TREE OR BUSH AND TYING IT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE HANDLE IS FREE TO ACTIVATE IF THE SAFETY PIN (WHICH IS ATTACHED TO A TRIP WIRE) IS PULLED. SUCCESSIVE GRENADE HANDLES ARE HELD UNDER TENSION BY A LINE FROM THE PRECEDING GRENADE. ALL GRENADES BUT THE FIRST ONE HAVE THEIR SAFETY PINS PULLED.

Figure 50. Grenade daisy chain.

a. Insurgents rarely take, keep, and sustain prisoners for any length of time. Occasionally, selected prisoners may be released for propaganda purposes. Normally, an insurgent force cannot allow prisoners to impede their movement, in
This mine is made from a large joint of bamboo. It is cleaned out and filled with plastic explosive or black powder. In addition to the explosive the section is also filled with nuts and bolts, rocks, nails, and scrap metal or whatever material is available. Although usually detonated by a pull friction type fuze, other means can be readily substituted.

Figure 51. Hollow bamboo mine.

which case they are either killed or evacuated to more permanent prison camps. In any case, capture may mean harsh treatment, privation, physical torture, intense interrogation, and inadequate food, water, and medical treatment.
This mine is made from a hollowed out coconut filled with black powder. Using a friction type fuze, this mine is employed in much the same manner as hand grenades. It is usually buried approximately six inches underground and can be covered by rock and brick for missile effect. These mines have been used effectively near gates.

*Figure 52. Coconut-type mine.*
b. Rescue and recovery procedures to assist friendly personnel in evading capture and exfiltrating to friendly areas must be established.

(1) Coordination between local, politically administered E&E nets and military nets insures an integrated system. Often, no system will exist; in
The projectile or round is hung on the limbs of trees over a trail or likely route of approach. An electrical detonator is attached and wires are run to an overwatching insurgent position. When a patrol or other unit comes under the camouflaged round, it is detonated by a battery power source.

Figure 54. Command-detonated overhead mine.
This mine is constructed of cement with an electric firing device and serrations in the center of the case. The end of the mine has a piece of iron attached by four bolts to hold the electric blasting cap. The mine is 8 inches in diameter and 8 inches long. It weighs 13 pounds and contains TNT.

Figure 55. X-Shaped mine.

This mine is constructed of cement with an electric firing device. Usually the mine is fastened to a long pole. A part of the case has a square piece of iron attached by four screws to hold the fuze in place. The mine is 5 inches in diameter and 9 inches long. It weighs 13 pounds and contains TNT.

Figure 56. Turtle-shaped mine.
THIS CYLINDRICAL, HOMEMADE MINE IS CONSTRUCTED OF CAST IRON. THE MINE BODY IS PAINTED GREY AND HAS SERRATIONS FOR FRAGMENTATION EFFECT. WHEN THE WIRE RING IS PULLED OUT, THE FRICTION-TYPE IGNITER IGNITES THE TIME FUZE AND DETONATES THE BLASTING CAP THAT IN TURN DETONATES THE MINE. THE MINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND 6½ INCHES LONG. IT WEIGHS 2 POUNDS AND CONTAINS TNT.

Figure 57. Cylindrical fragmentation mine.

THIS MINE IS CONSTRUCTED OF SHEET METAL. IT IS A MODIFIED GRENADE EQUIPPED WITH ONE IRON (OR TIN) LUG ON ITS BODY. ITS OPERATION IS SIMILAR TO A HOMEMADE GRENADE. WHEN THE SAFETY RING IS PULLED OUT, THE SPRING IS RELEASED AND THE FIRING PIN STRIKES THE PRIMER AND DETONATES THE MINE. THE MINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND 6 INCHES LONG. IT WEIGHS 2 POUNDS.

Figure 58. Antipersonnel mine.
THIS MINE IS CONE SHAPED AND MADE OF SHEET METAL HELD TOGETHER WITH RIVETS. IT IS EQUIPPED WITH TWO PRESSURE-PULL IGNITING DEVICES THAT DETONATE THE MINE IN 9 SECONDS. THE MINE IS 9 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND 8 INCHES HIGH. IT WEIGHS 15 POUNDS. THE IGNITING DEVICE IS LOCALLY MADE. IT CONSISTS OF A CALTEX OIL CAN THAT CONTAINS TWO DETONATORS, PLACED IN PARALLEL LINES IN THE MINE. THE COMPONENTS OF THE MINE ARE TWO PRESSURE-PULL STRINGS, TWO IGNITING DEVICES, TWO IGNITER CHARGES, AND TWO DETONATORS.

Figure 59. Hollow cone mine.
THE HOMEMADE WATER MINE IS CONSTRUCTED IN THE SHAPE OF A SHORT CONE AND FABRICATED FROM SHEET METAL HELD TOGETHER BY RIVETS. IT IS 11 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND 12 INCHES HIGH. IT WEIGHS 27 POUNDS AND CONTAINS TNT. THE MINE IS CONSTRUCTED IN DIFFERENT SIZES AND IS OPERATED BY ELECTRICITY. IT IS EMPLOYED TO ATTACK NAVAL SHIPS AND BOATS.

Figure 60. Water mine.
The locally made water mine is used to attack ships. It is made of sheet iron rolled into a short conical shape and fastened with rivets. It is 17 inches in diameter and 22 inches high. It weighs 80 pounds. The mine is composed of two parts, upper and lower, that are separated by a piece of sheet metal. The upper part contains the firing device and main charge while the lower part is a hollow case designed to stabilize the water mine and keep it buoyant underwater. To stabilize the water mine underwater, attach steel bars or wooden poles around the two handles attached to the outer side. The mine is asphalt coated but does not appear to be watertight.

*Figure 61. Two-part water mine.*
This locally constructed mine is made of separate pieces of sheet metal fastened together with rivets. There are four U-shaped supports placed across the bottom of the mine. The mine is 9 inches wide and 5½ inches high. It weighs 20 pounds and contains 7½ pounds of melinite explosive.

Figure 62. Turtle mine.

such cases, a province/district E&E net should be established.

(2) HC and U. S. forces can provide assistance by—

(a) Securing and identifying evaders and escapees.

(b) Obtaining aids and communications for E&E.

(c) Infiltrating into insurgent-dominated areas to assist escapees and evaders.

(d) Setting up contact areas, removal areas, and pickup points.

(3) Individuals forced down when flying over insurgent-controlled areas must resolve such problems as: should one stay with the aircraft or destroy
THIS MINE IS CONSTRUCTED OF CEMENT AND IS ELECTRICALLY OPERATED. THERE ARE TWO IRON SWIVELS ON THE MINE BODY TO TIE IT TO AN OBJECT. ONE SIDE OF THE HEAD HAS A ROUND IRON PIPE, 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER, AND THE OPPOSITE SIDE HAS A HOLE TO ACCOMMODATE AN ELECTRIC BLASTING CAP. THE MINE IS 12 INCHES LONG, 5 3/4 INCHES WIDE, AND 6 INCHES HIGH. IT WEIGHS 13 POUNDS AND CONTAINS TNT.

Figure 63. Mound-shaped mine.

it and head for likely safe areas? The answer depends upon a quick estimate of the situation and unit SOP.

(4) SOP should provide for guidance on safe areas and subsequent exfiltration routes should a position be overrun and individuals are forced to evade capture.

c. The following is provided to assist in evaluating existing SOP for E&E programs, and to assist in making recommendations.

(1) Be familiar with E&E doctrine contained in FM 21-77 and FM 21-77A.

(2) Establish E&E SOP in conjunction with next higher headquarters.
(3) Brief all personnel on the E&E SOP for the area or the operation.

(4) Evaluate the capability of the military to assist evaders or escapees.

(5) Determine what civilian resources are available in the local area which can be utilized to assist evaders or escapees.

(6) Determine the availability of E&E assets.
   (a) Known and selected friendly villages.
   (b) Pickup points.
   (c) Communications links.
   (d) Identification systems.
   (e) Caches (food, weapons, clothing).

108. Survival

Failure to survive in remote areas usually is the result of ignorance and inexperience rather than the result of actions taken by an insurgent force. The art of survival is difficult at best, even in an area devoid of insurgent forces. Preparation for survival must begin before the actual need arises (FM 21–76).

109. Ammunition Service

Ammunition service to the host country (HC) includes the following:

a. Advising HC forces on the procedures for determining, obtaining, and maintaining basic loads of ammunition.
b. Advising HC forces on the care, handling, use, and storage of ammunition, to include the necessity for ammunition surveillance and expenditure of oldest stocks first.

c. Advising HC forces on the dangers of unexploded ordnance items, and procedures by which explosive ordnance disposal support will be provided.
## APPENDIX A

### REFERENCES

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APPENDIX B

SAMPLE OPERATIONS PLAN, CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

Copy No. __________________
HQ _______________________
Location __________________
Date ______________________
Message Ref No. ___________

OP PLAN ______________

References:

1. SITUATION
   a. General. Give a brief description of the area of operations.
   b. Weather and Terrain. Describe briefly the predominant nature of the terrain and how seasonal weather changes affect operations.
   c. Insurgent.
      (1) List organizations, strengths and locations of units, auxiliaries, and cadre and describe the nature of recent activities.
      (2) State known objectives, capabilities, and intentions and describe major vulnerabilities.
   d. HC.
      (1) Population.

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(a) State the attitudes of population and what influence the insurgent has over them. Describe briefly the effects of current insurgent activity on the people in the area of operations.

(b) State the attitudes and competence of local officials.

(c) Estimate and confirm by area photo coverage the number of families affected by the operation.

(d) Conduct ground reconnaissance, when feasible, of new defended hamlet sites.

(e) State population estimates.

e. Military, Paramilitary, and Police Forces.

(1) List military and paramilitary and other forces which influence the plan.

(2) Give general location, unit size, and current mission of forces in the area, and indicate those which will be available to support the operation.

(3) List units which have been allocated for the operation from outside the area of interest or from general reserve.

(4) List navy, marine, and air force support available for the operation.

f. Civilian Forces.

(1) List those economic, political, psychological, intelligence, civic action cadres, and other representatives of national or provincial agencies now at work within the planned area of operations.
(2) Indicate those cadre who can be made available to extend the civil effort by reorganizing teams now at work.

(3) State what other representatives of national or local agencies have been made available for the operation.

(4) Estimate the number of local civil servants and other assistants available to support the operation.

g. Other Forces. Describe any known national intelligence activities, psychological operations, economic or civic action organizations, or commercial projects in the area of operations, the activities of which should be included within the operation for coordination.

h. Assumptions.

2. MISSION

State specific objectives, purposes, and tasks to develop a certain number of defended hamlets in a given area; defend and secure lines of communications; deny support of the insurgent by establishing strict population and materiel control; defend, secure, and consolidate control of the population following offensive and defensive operations against the insurgent; establish control vital to the extension of military operations in a critical area, etc.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Explain how military and civilian forces and other resources are
to be used to carry out the operation. Include phasing of large operations.
b. Answer questions as to the who, what, when, where, how, and why of the operation.
c. Develop scope of the operation.
d. Develop appropriate EEI.
e. List the most important objectives in order of priority.
f. Operational Tasks.
   (1) General. This paragraph states how specific resources available will be used.
   (2) Military. Outline use of military forces. State specific reconnaissance and support missions required (such as aerial photo coverage and leaflet missions). State:
      (a) Force numbers and types required based on insurgent concentration and other critical factors.
      (b) Steps necessary to obtain firm commitment for use of military forces.
      (c) How long forces are required.
      (d) Requirements for air and naval support.
      (e) When and where forces are required in relation to D-Day.
      (f) Additional training required.
      (g) Recommended adjustments of troop dispositions that might increase the forces available.
(3) Paramilitary. See \(1e\), above.

(4) Police, Auxiliaries, and Hamlet Defenders. See \(1e\), above. In addition, state:

(a) Police auxiliary relationships to youth and other organizations and how many are available.

(b) Training and equipment requirements for police auxiliaries at earliest possible date so that they will be ready to assume defense of their own villages and hamlets.

(c) Requirements for training and equipping the forces to be raised for local security and defense. Estimate when these forces will be prepared to receive equipment and training. Point out any special considerations in their control or use.

(d) Coordination requirements with intelligence agencies for possible assistance in auxiliary training and equipment.

(5) Civilian. See \(1f\), above. State:

(a) Organization of political action cadre.

(b) Requirements for newly trained teams to coincide with phases of operations.

(c) Equipment, other supply requirements for these teams, and state where teams will get supplies and equipment—local budget or come equipped?

(d) Labor requirements to be established to assist teams in economic development and civic action projects such as
forest clearance, foot bridge construction, building of individual houses, moat, parapet, and fences.

(e) How long teams will be required and how long they will remain in each hamlet.

(f) What liaison has been established with HC ministry of civic action to obtain quotas for training or quotas for student output.

(g) The plan for using civilian economic development, PYSOP, political action, and civic action cadre, indicating where they will be used and what tasks they will perform.

(h) Projects assigned to technical personnel or representatives of national, private, and provincial agencies who may not be members of the cadre teams assigned.

(i) Requirements for additional economic development, political action, civic action, or other cadre and state what qualifications they must have and what they are to do.

(j) Steps taken to provide additional cadre and state training requirements.

(k) The need for technical assistance to the cadre teams.

(l) The type of emergency assistance, community or individual, proposed for the people and indicate the magni-
tude and the time over which it will be required.

(m) Measures essential to achieving the objectives of the plan.

(5) PYSOP. Outline proposed PSYOP themes, activities, or techniques applicable. Recommend targets and information activities.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (The contents of this paragraph may be placed in separate annexes or in an Admin Order.)

a. Consolidate logistical and administrative support requirements for the overall plan insofar as these can be computed or estimated. Show basis for calculations. Include such things as materiel for defended hamlets, emergency assistance, special construction, transportation, communications, labor, and medical supplies. Indicate the phasing of supply requirements to prevent unnecessary stockpiling. Include logistical needs of military forces and civilian agencies usually provided routine support through their own channels except as the requirement for coordination exists.

b. Summarize overall cost of the operation.

c. Outline the capability of the civil administrators to support elements of the plan with materiel or funds at their disposal.

d. Requirements for the defense and security of hamlets include:
(1) The materiel needed.
(2) Need for special devices for defense, e.g., defoliants.
(3) The physical layout of proposed defended hamlets with respect to fencing, moats, parapets, guard posts, etc.
(4) Control and turn-in procedures, maintenance procedures, and maintenance training requirements.
(5) Local materiels available (bamboo, etc.) that can be used in lieu of materials that must be requested from military or other agencies.
(6) Detailed emergency assistance needs of the community or individuals because of relocation operations, or other conditions in the area of operations.
(7) The detailed immediate civic needs of each village or hamlet affected.
(8) Phased requirements for food, seed, clothing, shelter, tools, and medical supplies (these supplies to be available in the vicinity of hamlet sites prior to the operation).
(9) Reception plan for people at new sites if relocation is undertaken.
(10) Amounts and types of transportation available for relocation of people and belongings.
(11) Funds available for compensation for individual property damage and injuries. (Insure funding and budgeting for
emergency assistance is complete and available for timely release when needed.)

(12) Community facilities available at sites.

(13) Additional facilities required, such as:

(a) Medical dispensary and technicians, to include maternity clinics and midwives.

(b) Spraying of area and inoculations.

(c) School buildings, teachers, and supplies.

(d) Community houses.

(e) Information Centers: In addition to propaganda, means will be available for news items of general interest.

(f) Wells and Sanitation Facilities. If wells are dug, technical assistance and labor may be required.

(14) Arrangements for clearance title action for plots given the people.

(15) Amounts of land clearance and moats, parapets, roads, etc., construction required. Estimates of bulldozer work must be included in budget because of the requirement to pay for their use.

(16) Required agricultural assistance.

(a) Outline agriculture situation.

(b) State the requirement for farmer access to agricultural credit programs and what special loans will be necessary.

(c) State requirements for crop and livestock disease and rodent control.
(17) Magnitude of economic or technical assistance essential to area rehabilitation and development. Include such items as insect and rodent control, land clearance, fertilizing, road and bridge repair, construction, and drainage.

(18) Miscellaneous requirements such as:
(a) Support required from CARE and other similar agencies.
(b) Support required from other sources not mentioned previously.
(c) Possibilities of support from friendly nations.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Outline procedures for control of resources and direction of effort.

b. Explain peculiarities of the local situation which may affect lines of authority or methods of operation.

c. Enumerate command structures.

d. State coordination made with navy and air force for their support and planning assistance.

e. The following communications channels will be established:

(1) Communications: From field locations to higher headquarters.

(2) Administrative: From local level to national agencies.
(3) Logistics: From field locations to supporting Log Command for requisitioning and receiving MAP and other supplies.

(4) Operational: For requesting emergency assistance in case of attack.

f. Communications. State:

(1) Status of USAID radios.

(2) Requirements for communications between all echelons of civil administration (e.g., hamlet to village to district).

(3) Training requirements for civilian communication personnel.

(4) Requirements for the military communication system to back up civilian systems.
1. General

This appendix contains examples of training programs for province, district, village, and hamlet paramilitary and irregular forces. It is useful as a guide to show the types of subjects and relative time devoted to each during a training program for these types of units.

2. Province/District Paramilitary Forces (12 Wk—602 Hr)

   a. Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Training (364 hr—8 wk).

      (1) General subjects—(160 hr).

      Day          Night
      (a) Care and Cleaning .............. 15
      (b) Inspections .................. 12
      (c) Commander’s Time ............. 13
          (Devoted to correcting training deficiencies and additional troop information and education.)
      (d) Military Courtesy and
          Customs .....................  3
      (e) Psychological Operations ....  8
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(v) Chemical Training ........... 2

(w) Proficiency Testing ........... 2

(x) Troop Information and Education ........... 8

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148 12

(2) Weapons.

(a) Rifle squads (178 hr).

1. Rifle Qualification ........... 57
2. Carbine Qualification ........... 42
3. AR Qualification ........... 48
4. SMG Familiarization ........... 4
5. Pistol Familiarization ........... 4
6. Night Firing ........... 12
7. Quick Reaction Firing ........... 11

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166 12

(b) LMG section (178 hr).

1. LMG Qualification ........... 80
2. Pistol Qualification ........... 13
3. Carbine Qualification ........... 42
4. Rifle Familiarization ........... 10
5. SMG Familiarization ........... 4
6. Night Firing ........... 12
7. Quick Reaction Firing ........... 17

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166 12

(c) Mortar section (178 hr).

1. Mortar Qualification ........... 82
2. Pistol Qualification ........... 13
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<td>4. Rifle Familiarization</td>
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<td>5. SMG Familiarization</td>
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<td>7. Quick Reaction Firing</td>
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(3) Tactics.

(a) Rifle squad (26 hr).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ............. 8 8
2. Ambush ........................................ 4 4
3. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ............. 1 1

(b) Mortar section (26 hr).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ............. 8 8
2. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ............. 6 4

(c) LMG section (26 hr).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ............. 8 8
2. Ambush ........................................ 2
3. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain

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b. Basic Unit Training (238 hr—4 wk).

(1) General subjects (32 hr).

(a) Inspections .......................... 9
(b) Military Civic Action ............... 5
(c) Psychological Operations .......... 2
(d) Care and Cleaning ................. 12
(e) Troop Information and Education .... 4

Total .................................. 32

(2) Tactical training and squad firing (206 hr).

(a) Movement .......................... 16
(b) Occupation and Organization of Bivouac Area .......... 4
(c) Squad Battle Drill .................. 2
(d) Immediate Action Drill: Reaction to Ambushes .......... 4
(e) Technique of Fire and Combat Firing ............... 12
(f) Squad Night Firing ................. 4 12
(g) Squad Defense and Area Security ............... 2 2
(h) Squad Check Points: Population Surveillance Techniques .... 2 4
(i) Squad Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain 6 4
(j) Squad Recon Patrol: Surveillance of Local Area 6 4
(k) Squad Combat Patrol: Seeking Insurgent Contact 6 4
(l) Squad Ambush 6 4
(m) Platoon Battle Drill 2
(n) Platoon Defense: Area, Installation, and Operational Base Security 2 2
(o) Platoon Ambush on Paths and Roadways 2 4
(p) Platoon Attack in Jungle, Swamp, and Mountain 6 4
(q) Platoon Raid of Insurgent Camp 6 4
(r) Platoon Raid and Search of Insurgent Village 6 4
(s) Platoon Assistance of a Friendly Post 6 4
(t) Helicopter Training 2
(u) Close Air Support in Tactical Operations 2
(v) Company in Defense: Area, Installation and Operational Base Security 2 4
(w) Company Attack in Jungle, Swamp, and Mountain 6 4
(x) Company Raid of Insurgent Camp .............................................. 6 4
(y) Company Raid and Search of Insurgent Village ....................... 6 4
(z) Company Assistance of Friendly Post (to Include the Use of Helicopters) ... 6 4

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3. Village Paramilitary or Irregular Force Training Program (6 Wk —360 Hr)

a. General Subjects.
   (1) Organization and Missions .................. 1
   (2) Care and Cleaning .......................... 16
   (3) Drill and Ceremonies ...................... 7
   (4) Psychological Indoctrination ............. 14
   (5) Military Civic Action ....................... 6
   (6) Survival ..................................... 1
   (7) Communications ............................. 6
   (8) Procurement of Information About Local Insurgents .......... 3
   (9) Maintenance and Supply Economy ............. 1
   (10) Hygiene and First Aid ..................... 3
   (11) Hand-to-Hand Combat ...................... 5
   (12) Land Navigation ............................ 8 4
   (13) Expedient Obstacles and Field Fortifications .............. 4
Day Night

(14) Troop Information and Education ........................................ 8
(15) Commander’s Time ............................................. 7

Subtotal Hours—Gen Sub .................................. 89 4

b. Weapons.
(1) Carbine Qualification .................................. 37
(2) Shotgun Qualification ................................. 10
(3) Automatic Rifle Familiarization .................. 10
(4) Individual Night Firing ........................................ 12
(5) Quick Reaction Firing ........................................ 8
(6) Technique of Fire and Combat Firing ................. 12
(7) Squad Night Firing ........................................ 4 12
(8) Hand Grenades, Rifle Grenades, and Pyrotechnics ........ 6
(9) Demolitions, Mines, Boobytraps, and Illuminants .......... 6 4

Subtotal Hours—Weapons ................................ 93 28

c. Tactics.
(1) Individual Daytime Combat Techniques .................. 4
(2) Individual Nighttime Combat Techniques ................. 6
(3) Squad Battle Drill ........................................ 5
(4) Squad Reaction to Ambushes (Immediate Action Drill) .. 5
(5) Squad Ambush ........................................ 6 4
(6) Squad Surveillance of a Local Area (Reconnaissance Patrol) 6 4
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<tr>
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4. Hamlet Irregular Force Training Program (2 Wk—120 Hr)

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<td>(2) Mines, Boobytraps, and Illuminants</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Underground Tunnel Construction and Concealment Within the Hamlet</td>
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<td>Counterattacks of Insurgent Penetration</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Harassment Tactics and Use of Hidden Firing Positions</td>
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Subtotal Hours—Tactics 45 12

Total Hours 118 = 98 + 20
## APPENDIX D

### CONVERSION TABLE—WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

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<tr>
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<td>Temperature (F)</td>
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<td>Temperature (C)</td>
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APPENDIX E

ADVISOR CHECKLIST FOR REQUEST OF TACTICAL HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

(CLASSIFICATION)

TO: Unit/HQ Controlling Tactical Helicopter Support

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT

(In Message or Letter Format)

1. (Tactical controlling headquarters) will conduct (operation NAME), an airmobile operation, (place and date).

2. Request helicopter support (state what, where, when, and for how long) for Operation (code name).

3. Concept of operation (if no overlay is included, written description will be sufficient in detail to reconstruct operation on an overlay).

4. Enemy situation (include date and source of latest available enemy information).

5. Units to be lifted.

6. Number of troops to be lifted to each LZ.

7. Number of troop lifts: desired/acceptable.

8. Pickup zone(s), coordinates; DTA(s); security.

(CLASSIFICATION)
9. LZ name(s); coordinates; DTG(s).
10. Alternate LZ name(s); coordinates; DTG(s).
11. Extraction zone(s); name(s); coordinates; DTG(s).
12. Troops to be returned to (place) after extraction.
13. Mission(s) after lift for:
   a. Troop lift.
   b. Command and control ship.
   c. Light fire team(s).
14. Reconnaissance restrictions.
15. Restrictions imposed by HC Operations SOP.
16. Artillery Support: Coordination has been effected with (artillery unit) located at _________ _______ to provide artillery support for this operation.
17. Air Support:
   a. Type aircraft.
   b. Ordnance Requested.
   c. Corps/Division ALO Request Number.
      (1) LZ Prep.
      (2) Air Cap.
18. Weather delay.
19. Name, callsign, and frequency of Senior Advisor to HC airmobile force commander.
20. Request coordination meeting with helicopter support commander (time and place, normally two days in advance of operation).

(CLASSIFICATION)
## APPENDIX F

### FIRST AID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ailment</th>
<th>Symptoms</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>Pain and tenderness. Partial or complete loss of motion. Deformity. Swelling. Discoloration.</td>
<td>Handle with care; splint before moving. Support the limb on either side until splint is applied. Splints must be long enough to reach beyond joints above and below fracture and must be tied twice above and below break to immobilize limb. Pad all splints. Treat for shock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailment</td>
<td>Symptoms</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burn ..........</td>
<td>First degree: Skin red. No blister.</td>
<td>Carefully remove or cut clothing away from third degree burned area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second degree: Skin blistered.</td>
<td>Do not open blisters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third degree: Skin destroyed and charred.</td>
<td>Cover area with sterile dressing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frostbite</td>
<td>Numbness. Waxy colorless tissue. Stinging pain at onset.</td>
<td>Do not rub, bend, or expose to extreme heat or further cold. Warm area to body temperature by holding close to warm body or exposing to warmth no higher than 95°.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ailment</td>
<td>Symptoms</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snake Bite</td>
<td></td>
<td>If the snake is positively identified as non-poisonous—only wound treatment is required e.g., prevent infection and possibly a booster of Tetanus toxoid, if the snake is positively identified as poisonous or if identification cannot be made the following treatment should be instituted:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Immobilization. Body activity should be kept to a minimum; lie down, remain quiet and avoid food or alcohol. If practical immobilize the affected part in a position below the level of the heart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reassurance. The victim should be reassured that the incidence of death from snakebite is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fear can be fatal even if the bite is from a harmless species.

3. Tourniquet. Apply a loose tourniquet or (constricting band) immediately above (or proximal to) the bite. In applying the band, tighten just enough to make the veins stand out prominently under the skin so that the flow of venous blood is blocked but not arterial blood.

4. Sterilization. Wipe the skin around the bite free of dripped venom. Sterilize the skin with an antiseptic such as tincture of iodine or soap and water. Next sterilize a
sharp knife or razor blade by holding it in a flame or wiping it with alcohol.

5. Incision. Without delay make an x-cut through each fang mark (or in the area of the bite if fang marks are not visible). Make the incision $\frac{1}{4}-\frac{1}{2}$ inch long and $\frac{1}{8}-\frac{1}{4}$ inch deep depending upon the thickness of the skin. Be careful not to cut large blood vessels, tendons or nerves.

6. Suction. Suck the venom out of the incisions just made and continue for 30 minutes. Use a suction cup or the mouth if there are no cuts or sores in the mouth. Even then the risk involved is not great. Release the tourni-
Ailment | Symptoms | Treatment
---|---|---
| quet at the end of 30 minutes when suction is completed.

7. Transportation. If help is available, move the victim to an area where medical aid is available either during the suction procedure or following it. Maintain immobilization while the victim is being transported. If alone remain still until after suction has been completed and most of the venom removed.

8. Supportive measures. Supportive measures such as transfusions, shock preventatives, antibiotics, and tetanus boosters are important measures and often used by medical personnel. The most widely used supportive measure,
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<th>Treatment</th>
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<td>however, especially in severe cases, is that of administering a polyvalent antivenin prepared from the serum of immunized horses. Local freezing has also been used to slow absorption of the venom from the bitten area but its use as a first-aid measure is debatable.</td>
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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