STABILITY OPERATIONS
U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

FM 31–23, 8 December 1967, is changed as follows:

Page 33, paragraph 43. In line 3 “rapid and aggressive” is changed to read “rapidly and aggressively”.

Page 48, paragraph 67. In line 1 “Overseas” is changed to “Foreign”. In line 2 “(OIDP)” is changed to read “(FIDP)”.

Page 49, paragraph 67a. In lines 1 and 2 “Based upon guidance contained in the OIDP” is changed to read “When directed”.

Page 116, paragraph 156e. In line 19 “and biological” is changed to read “and defensive biological”.

Page 21. Section VI is changed to Section VII and the following new Section VI is added:

Section VI. URBAN ORGANIZATION

25.1 General
This section describes the urban organization of the subversive insurgent. It discusses the party and its use of front groups; intelligence operations; the use of terrorists and their development into city based guerrillas; and the personnel, logistics, and training support provided by the insurgent organization.

25.2 Party
The party organization in urban areas generally will parallel the legitimate governmental structure. The status of the urban organization will vary depending upon the size, location, and relative importance of the area to the party. This status can vary from that of a party chapter in a relatively small market town containing no significant national government organizations to a status equal to that of an interprovincial committee in a large industrial and commercial city which is the capital city of the government. The urban area simultaneously can be the location of local party organizations and the location of a district, provincial, interprovincial, or even the national level, central committee of the party.

25.3 Terrorists
Terrorist activities will include actions to enforce “party” discipline, assassination of officials articulating opposition to the group, sabotage of public facilities, attacks to frighten the population, and attacks against internal security installations. The terrorist attacks and sabotage are designed to discredit the government’s ability to provide public safety and order as well as to destroy government facilities physically. The wide publicity given to guerrilla incidents will also serve the purpose of attracting other dissident or disaffected personnel to the subversive group. Terrorism is usually a function of a special group constituted of a relatively high percentage of party members or candidate members. This “hard core” will permit expansion into urban guerrilla organizations in the later stages of the insurgency if it is not neutralized by internal defense measures.

25.4 Front Groups
Since the urban areas have a higher population density than rural areas, more intense political and social activity takes place which results in the existence of mass civil organizations. The
party will attempt to penetrate and exert influence or outright control of existing organizations. It will also create mass civil organizations which party members will manipulate and control. The party will attempt to create fronts (or coalitions) of the mass civil organizations to serve the interest of the party and gain widespread support in its drive to destroy the government. These organizations include student groups, unions, youth organizations, political parties, professional associations, and possibly religious groups or women's associations. Many of these organizations will have patriotic or democratic names.

25.5 Intelligence

The insurgents will be required to organize a complex structure to collect intelligence and cover its own activities with counter-intelligence and security measures. The party (infrastructure) will organize counterintelligence and security sections which will function separately from the military intelligence effort. This infrastructure will operate the apparatus used to penetrate the government and gather intelligence. The insurgent military organization can be expected to target its collection effort against military and paramilitary forces to determine strengths, locations, capabilities, methods of employment, and the details of the layout and functioning of military posts.

25.6 Support

The urban organization “infrastructure” will perform a wide variety of activities, in addition to its intelligence functions, to provide support for the insurgency.

a. Personnel. The armed forces of the insurgent organization will receive many of its members from urban areas where they are recruited or coerced into service. In addition to members for the armed service, personnel will be recruited for terrorist groups, guerrilla units, and the infrastructure of the base area system.

b. Logistics. The urban area is a vital part of the insurgent base area system. It is a source of many of the services and supplies needed to support the insurgent armed forces engaged in combat. Medical supplies, facilities, and trained medical personnel become critical to the insurgent if and when armed conflict becomes a part of the insurgency. A system is also developed to provide the armed insurgent with food, clothing, ammunition, and weapons. The production, collection, storage, and distribution of supplies is the function of an element of the infrastructure. Money gathering activities must also take place. They will range from “tax” collection to extortion and robbery.

c. Training. Political indoctrination and training takes place within the small cell groups. Selected members of the party may be sent to other countries for military training. Local guerrillas and recruits for the insurgent armed forces will be sent to rural areas for training. In this regard, rural areas adjacent to the urban area, designated as part of the urban based insurgents’ area of operations, may be utilized for training.

25.7 Guerrillas

The urban guerrilla force generally can be expected to be constituted of a relatively high percentage of party members or candidate members. This “hard core” characteristic of the urban guerrilla force will exist whether the “party” is “communist” or a “nationalist” group seeking to overthrow the government. Rural based guerrillas in areas adjacent to the urban area will be controlled by the central committee when both are included in one area of operations. Those based in more distant areas can be directed to participate in coordinated operations through the party apparatus at an appropriate level. See figure 1 on page 17 for a better understanding of this system.

Page 43. Section VI is added as follows:

Section VI. URBAN AREA COORDINATION CENTER

60.1 General

This section contains doctrinal guidance for all Army elements in the establishment, organization, and operations of the urban coordination center. It identifies the differences between a provincial area coordination center and an urban coordination center with particular em-
phasis on police and civil organizations not usually present in rural areas. Urban area characteristics require a more complex organization than rural areas to plan, coordinate, and direct internal defense and internal development efforts. An urban area may vary from a market town of 20,000 people to a commercial/industrial city with a population of over a million. The physical characteristics of dense population, multistory buildings, subterranean construction, public utilities, and transportation systems require special attention. Police public safety services, social organizations, political factors, economic aspects, and communications systems must be considered.

60.2 Organization

The organization of the Urban Area Coordination Center is similar to the one outlined in paragraph 53. Representatives from local police, firefighting, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation authorities must be included in addition to those outlined in paragraph 53. An operation center with a capability to operate on a 24-hour a day basis must be established. It must be capable of receiving and acting upon information requiring immediate operational action and coordination. A Civilian Advisory Committee as outlined in paragraph 54 also is established. Coordination centers are established for urban areas to perform the same functions for the urban area that district and village coordination centers perform for rural areas. When a province or district area coordination center is present in the urban area, it may be necessary to include the urban resources in the province or district center and utilize it for the additional purpose of planning, coordinating, and directing urban operations. The decision to establish an urban center or use the province or district for this additional purpose should be based upon the authority of the official at the head of the urban area government and the resources available to him. If the urban area is comprised of several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the area coordination center provides the control to insure proper planning and coordination. Urban area coordination centers should be established in autonomous cities and in urban areas not having a higher level coordination center physically present.

60.3 Mission

The mission of the urban area coordination center is to plan, coordinate, and direct the internal defense and internal development activities and to insure an immediate coordinated response to operational requirements.

60.4 Operations

Operations are geared to the level necessary to defeat insurgent capabilities. Emphasis is placed on the selected application of firepower and the use of non-lethal weapons to reduce the possibility of producing casualties in the population.

a. Internal Area. Emphasis must be placed on intelligence and police work to identify and neutralize the insurgent leadership (infrastructure). Plans must be made to counter demonstrations instigated by the insurgent and to provide security for facilities and installations. The insurgent threat may vary from terrorist activities and kidnapping to a capability for an armed attack upon the area. The use of police, military, and paramilitary forces must be carefully coordinated in all operations.

b. Adjacent and Surrounding Areas. Surveillance operations to detect insurgent activities should be utilized on a continuing basis. Maximum use should be made of all available equipment to provide day and night coverage. Visual reconnaissance operations from aircraft by the use of trained observers familiar with the local area may provide targets for immediate tactical operations. Patrol plans must provide for ground coverage of suspected or likely areas of insurgent activities. Internal defense and internal development plans must give a high priority to nearby areas to insure the security of the critical urban areas.

Page 62. Section V is added as follows:
Section V. URBAN CAMPAIGN

96.1 General

a. Urban Operations. This section contains doctrinal guidance for all Army elements in the conduct of urban warfare through all phases of insurgency, provides doctrinal guidance upon which to train, advise, and assist host country forces in the conduct of urban stability operations, and provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and staffs of U.S. Army forces, and for Army advisors to host country military forces in the conduct of urban area operations. This section provides guidance for urban operations versus rural operations with regard to: the characteristics of urban insurgencies and urban insurgent organizations; host country forces for countering urban insurgencies with emphasis on police and other civil organizations and operations; planning considerations impacting on urban operations such as the selective and limited use of firepower to minimize loss of civilian life and facilities; and types of U.S. assistance provided to host country civil and military organizations. Urban area operations may not be specifically designated as a separate campaign; however, they must receive constant attention. Urban operations can take on the appearance of a consolidation campaign. Tactical operations may be required for defense or to re-establish government control.

b. Role of Urban Activities in Insurgencies. Urban areas tend to foster and breed insurgency. The gap between the disadvantaged and the privileged class is readily apparent. Slums, poverty, crime ignorance, official brutality and indifference encourage dissent which is exploited by the insurgent movement. In addition, urban centers with their mass population and concentration of commerce and industry provide excellent cover for insurgent activity.

(1) Early stages. Exploitation of unrest by the insurgent is a traditional and effective tactic which is difficult to detect. In addition to exploiting existing unrest, the insurgent activities include infiltration of government and other organizations, and establishment of intelligence nets, logistical routes and sources, and training of selected groups for limited offensive activities such as terror, assassination, and sabotage.

(2) Later stages. The insurgent may increase his activities to the second phase of insurgency in the rural areas without significant increase of activities in the urban area. Government strength and concentrated security efforts normally require strictly clandestine operations in these areas. While specific operations may be conducted, they usually will be directed toward discrediting the government, hampering its rural operations by requiring larger security forces, and eliminating prime targets or personnel. Open conflict in an urban area may occur when the insurgent needs a significant psychological victory, or when he feels he has the strength to take over the area in the final or third phase.

96.2 Operational Environment

a. Subversion. An urban area presents innumerable problems and situations which require considerable attention by the local government. The introduction of a subversive element intent on destroying the government can greatly multiply the seriousness of these conditions. Security and stability in the urban areas must receive priority in both planning and resources available for IDAD.

b. The Urban Area.

(1) Characteristics. An urban area normally includes:

(a) Large concentrated populations.
(b) Governmental facilities.
(c) Industrial complexes.
(d) Communication terminals.
(e) Transportation terminals.
(f) Storage facilities.
(g) Food markets.
(h) Medical facilities.
(i) Public utilities.
(j) Education centers.
(k) Ethnic, religious, economic, and minority groupings.

Man-made “terrain” (multistory buildings and subterranean facilities).

(m) Police or security forces.

(2) Urban versus rural insurgency. Interdependence of these characteristics is extensive,
and a significant change in one element can influence each of the others. Constant surveillance of all aspects of urban life is essential. Insurgent activities are, therefore, subject to detection and require clandestine operations. In contrast, rural areas and population possess greater independence and a degree of indifference to activities not directly affecting their existence. Government security is limited or nonexistent in rural areas, and insurgent forces enjoy freedom of movement and influence over the rural populations. While the armed insurgent and elements of the insurgent infrastructure are known to operate in rural areas, significant insurgent elements will be operating clandestinely in urban areas.

(3) Indicators for early detection of subversive activities in urban areas. Urban areas require concerted and extensive intelligence and police activities to locate and neutralize clandestine operations. Elimination at the earliest possible time can greatly hamper the insurgent movement and can decrease the possibility of open conflict developing in these critical areas. Careful analysis must be made of unrest or unusual incidents which will forecast the rising level of insurgent activity. Appendix E of FM 30-31 outlines insurgency indicators for urban areas.

c. Host Country Forces. The organization and responsibilities of host country forces is outlined in chapter 9 for all phases of insurgency.

(1) Internal defense forces.

(a) Military forces have the mission of combating armed insurgents. Their employment should be restricted to rural/territorial areas. The security forces are responsible for the conduct of operations in the urban areas.

(b) Military forces are employed in urban areas only when the level of insurgent activities is beyond the control of local security forces. Contingency planning for urban areas must consider in detail duties, command, and coordination requirements. Planning should also include preparations for the withdrawal of military forces at the earliest possible time.

(2) Internal development forces.

(a) Security for urban areas is the responsibility of the civil authorities. All activities must be coordinated and centrally controlled to insure complete intelligence coverage and adequate communication between government agencies. Forces include local and national police, paramilitary forces, and other governmental organizations.

(b) Government development programs designed to win the support of the people by eliminating the root causes of discontent, if vigorously pursued and continuous, will reduce support for the insurgent cause. Necessary population and resources control measures and the all out government attack on the insurgent infrastructure must not unduly alienate the population.

d. Insurgent Forces.

(1) Organization. The organization for insurgent forces operating in urban areas is outlined in chapter 3. Assuming government control over the area, the insurgent organization will be clandestine. Unchallenged, this organization is in an excellent position to supply both information and material to guerrilla forces in the rural areas.

(2) Strategy and tactics in urban settings. Because of the advantages achieved by maintaining a low level of activity, or because of the difficulty of conducting combat operations in secured urban areas, insurgent units will engage in combat only when a psychological victory is needed or when complete victory over government forces is possible. Normally this activity will coincide with attacks by rural guerrilla units as a part of the overall insurgent plan. Harassment actions will be conducted to tie down security forces and to support the rural based finance.

(3) Methods of operation.

(a) An insurgent attack on an urban area may be launched from outside the area, from within the area by infiltrators, or most likely by a combination of the two. If complete takeover is planned, urban based guerrillas will emerge to conduct sabotage, assassinations, or attacks on selected targets.

(b) Insurgents will seek to employ extensive psychological measures to discredit the government's ability to secure the population. In addition, they will attempt to deceive government forces into employing excessive force or attacking targets which can cause excessive damage or civilian casualties.
Vulnerabilities of an insurgent resistance or revolutionary movement in urban setting.

(a) All phases of urban life are under surveillance, and an alert intelligence effort can recognize and monitor any unusual activity. Increased activity can signal government authorities of an impending attack. An unsuccessful urban attack may expose and destroy the usefulness of infrastructure members who have been forced to emerge.

(b) Once an urban attack is launched, measures can be taken by the host country forces to isolate the urban area to cut off reinforcements and supplies. The insurgents then can be defeated in detail by a well planned counteroffensive.

96.3 Planning

Joint planning must be done in accordance with appendix B. In addition, planning for urban areas must emphasize the following aspects:

a. Political Considerations. These include the political effect of insurgent success, provision for the protection of government officials, and foreign personalities. Provision must be made for the protection of individual rights and the expression of legitimate opposition to the government.

b. Sociological Consideration. The government should attempt to alleviate the sociological effect on the populace of a protracted conflict. This involves planning for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of damaged homes and buildings and measures for addressing the legitimate aspirations of the people including minority groups.

c. Psychological Considerations. Planning in this area is concerned with the government effort to develop in its people a sense of nationhood and to provide them with national goals and purpose. Urban centers provide excellent showcases for demonstrating the government's achievements in meeting the populace's legitimate aspirations. In periods of conflict, extreme care must be exercised by government forces to avoid excessive civilian casualties and property damage. Necessary population and resource control measures must be explained via the mass media to avoid alienation of the city dwellers.

Responsibility for urban conflict must be fixed firmly on the insurgents.

d. Economic Considerations. Government planning must insure that urban economic resources are effectively controlled to deny their support of the insurgent movement. Every effort must be made to secure the private sector of the economy and to maximize its support of the development program.

e. Police Operational Consideration. This consideration must be exploited to the fullest without alienating the population. Plans for reinforcement and for combat type activities must be addressed. Organization of police resources must provide rapid and complete coordination through the urban coordination center.

f. Military Operational Considerations. These must provide for rapid deployment, minimum use of force and firepower, and withdrawal at the earliest possible time.

96.4 U.S. Army Advisory Assistance

a. General.

(1) Roles of U.S. government agencies in contingency planning for internal defense and development. Although a number of U.S. Army advisory personnel may be present in an urban area, the major burden for IDAD advisory efforts fall on civilian advisory organizations such as USAID, USIA, and others. Army advisors may have the additional mission of supporting other U.S. efforts and, because of their training and experience, contribute to all phases of IDAS efforts.

(2) The U.S. Army relationships with other U.S. agencies. Responsibilities for operations in support of other U.S. agencies are outlined in (C) FM 100–20. Efforts are required on the local level to insure thorough understanding and coordination between all elements of the Country Team in supporting national goals.

(3) U.S. Army relationship with host country forces. The advisor's relationship with host country forces remains that of advice and assistance. Where a concentration of advisors are present, as may be the case in an urban area, those individuals not involved in their advisory role, will organize to improve their self-defense and installation security capabilities. This or-
ganization of U.S. personnel must be integrated into the overall plan and coordination center to insure complete control and coordinated effort in support of the host country plan.

b. Organization.

(1) MAAG/Missions/MAC. Organizations will remain essentially the same; however, augmentation and/or MTT's may be required to meet additional requirements caused by the presence of a large population, congestion, and influx of security and combat forces.

(2) Special Action Force. Consideration must be given to the employment of first tier backup forces. Special Action Force elements, particularly Military Police, psychological operation teams, civil affairs, intelligence and engineer teams present a responsive and useful resource which can be called in to assist in operations in urban areas. Proper planning and thorough briefing are essential to the successful employment of Special Action Forces.

c. Legal Aspects

(1) Applicable laws. The three legal systems which apply generally to stability operations—U.S. law, host country law, and international law—remain applicable in the urban environment. Particularly important are the provisions of the UCMJ and the laws of land warfare which are set forth in FM 27-10. In urban areas, special attention must be paid to compliance with the legal prohibition against the bombardment of undefended areas and against the indiscriminate use of firepower in populated areas.

(2) Authority for presence of U.S. forces. U.S. advisors and support elements are introduced into the host country at the invitation of the established government. A MAAG, Mission, or status of forces agreement normally prescribes their rights and duties relative to the government and people of the host country.

(3) Status of U.S. forces. The basic agreement which authorizes the introduction of the U.S. military personnel governs the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction over them, their procurement of supplies and services within the host country, and similar matters related to their individual and collective status in the host country. The status of advisors and support personnel in an urban environment is essentially the same as pertains in a rural area.

(4) Legal status of insurgents. Insurgents normally are viewed as ordinary criminals by the established government. However, they are entitled, as a minimum, to the protections (human treatment) accorded by Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. That provision encourages the liberal extension of the other protections provided by the Convention by means of special agreements between the parties to the conflict. U.S. military personnel should endeavor to induce the host country forces to comply at least with the provisions of Article 3 and to accord greater humanitarianism protections. For additional information on legal protection for participants in internal defense operations and insurgency, see FM 100–20.

d. Mission.

(1) Advisors' role. The primary role of the advisor remains unchanged in an urban environment. He may assist civil authorities in preparation of contingency plans for employment of military forces. He may assist in the training of civil security forces in combat type operations and intelligence. He also assists in the formation of the urban coordination centers.

(2) Concept of Employment. The senior military advisor in an urban area will insure that both host country and U.S. military organizations work with the urban coordination center. Should U.S. Combat Support or Combat Service Support forces be employed in the urban area, the Senior U.S. Advisor will exercise operational control over these elements.

96.5 Intelligence

a. Requirements.

(1) Establishment of a data base. The Intelligence Data Base for a large urban area requires input from all governmental agencies (e.g., public works, transportation, military, education) to augment police efforts to insure adequate coverage. Detailed city plans, critical facilities, subterranean construction, essential utilities, and police precinct organization form the data base for urban operations. Dossier files should include both friendly and insurgent personalities.

(2) Essential elements of information. Once the data base is established, continuous
updating is required. Changes in activity, such as crime rate, strikes, hoarding, and movement must be monitored and compared with indications outlined in FM 30-31. Military advisors must provide assistance to civilian agency planners to insure accurate and complete intelligence efforts on military aspects of the insurgency.

b. Organization.

(1) Host country intelligence organizations. Existing intelligence organizations may be improved and expanded; however, new organizations should be developed only if necessary. The host country organization will likely be best suited for the country and attempts to reorganize these organizations may disrupt the effectiveness of the host country efforts. US advisory efforts in intelligence are outlined in FM 30-31.

(2) U.S. intelligence organizations. U.S. intelligence efforts should be applied only when the host country organizations are incapable of adequately performing the missions. All intelligence efforts must be coordinated and tied into the combined intelligence center. Only minimum essential unilateral efforts should be conducted. Detailed organization and procedures are outlined in FM 30-31.

(3) Combined intelligence center. A combined intelligence center is an integral part of the urban coordination center. All reports must be processed through this central facility to insure timely analysis and rapid dissemination.

c. Operations.

(1) Intelligence collection efforts. Collection efforts are primarily a police function advised by U.S. civilian agencies. Military support is provided by the host country Military Police advised by the U.S. Military Police advisors. Military Police advisors may be required to support the civilian advisory effort. See FM 30-31 and (S) FM 30-31A.

(2) Counterintelligence. Urban areas require increased emphasis on counterintelligence operations. Host country resources and capabilities must be developed both in their military and civilian forces. U.S. intelligence efforts may complement host country forces but lack the indigenous and cultural background to operate successfully in a foreign environment. Planning, training, and “sophisticated” assistance are needed to improve host country intelligence efforts.

(3) Security. Security for critical facilities, personnel, and key utilities must receive priority consideration by intelligence and security forces. These will be prime targets for clandestine attack in the early stages of an insurgent attack on the urban area. Sporadic attacks will occur to disrupt host country operation and to tie down security and military forces needed in other areas.

96.6 Operations

a. Host Country Government Civil Organizations. The primary responsibility for IDAID operations in urban areas falls on the civilian advisors supported by military advisors. The military effort should be directed to defense of the area from attack and contingency plans for supporting civilian forces. Military forces can establish a cordon to isolate the area and can provide forces or fire support to eliminate pockets of insurgent forces.

(1) National, local, and military police operations. Police or security units form the primary force to counter the insurgent threat in urban areas. Through police intelligence efforts and police operation, the insurgent infrastructure must be neutralized to minimize the possibility of armed conflict erupting in the area.

(2) Advice and support for government civil organizations. Civil organizations receive advice and support from civilian agencies of the U.S. government. Military advisors may provide support when required (FM 100-20).

b. Host Country Military Forces.

(1) Military forces must maintain pressure on the insurgent forces in the field. Draining military combat forces to provide security for urban areas allows the insurgent to take the initiative in the rural area. If armed conflict does break out in urban areas, military forces should conduct operations on the periphery of the urban center to relieve security forces for duty within the built-up area. Military forces can isolate the area, conduct populace and resources control, and can destroy insurgent forces attempting to withdraw. If military forces are employed in the built-up area, they
should come under the control of the urban coordination center senior official.

(2) The employment of U.S. combat forces in a friendly host country urban area should be avoided when possible. Insurgent forces can achieve a psychological victory by drawing in U.S. forces. The latter are vulnerable to the charge that as foreign soldiers they operate without constraints causing needless civilian casualties and property damage.

c. Phases of Operation

(1) Preparation (intelligence and data base, populace and resources control). Planning and intelligence are essential elements to decrease the possibility of armed conflict erupting in urban areas. These elements, properly applied, can minimize damage and destruction should the insurgent succeed in penetrating outer defensive positions. Action, not reaction, must be stressed in advising host country authorities.

(2) Offensive (neutralize insurgent). A continuous and aggressive attack must be directed against the urban insurgents. Failure to neutralize infrastructure can only improve the armed insurgent chances of success.

(3) Development (initiation of programs). Intensive development programs, psychological operations, and community relations activities are essential to insure a cohesive and pro-government effort against the insurgent force. The population, and ultimately the government, are the targets of the insurgent. Failure to secure the targets, not only militarily, but psychologically and politically can result in insurgent victory.

(4) Defensive (train civil and paramilitary forces). Training of paramilitary, police, and civil authorities so that they can maintain stability is essential. Civil defense training to permit rapid recovery from temporary setbacks is essential.

(5) Completion (return control to civil agencies). Security efforts and control must return to civil forces as soon as feasible after military forces are introduced.

d. U.S. Support for Operations.

(1) Advice and assistance. In response to requests by the host country, the U.S. can provide advice and assistance for both military and civil organizations. The military advisor is a part of the Country Team and provides support and planning under the defense portion of the IDAD effort. The military advisor will assist local officials in planning for defense of urban areas.

(2) Fire support. Fire support can be provided by U.S. Army Combat Support units to support operations in urban areas with both artillery and attack helicopter. All supporting fires must be coordinated through the urban coordination center. Advisors must stress the use of minimum essential destructive fire support.

(3) Intelligence support. U.S. advice and support for intelligence efforts can be provided to train and augment host country efforts. The employment of sophisticated techniques and equipment may be required in developing nations which lack these capabilities.

96.7 Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

a. Concepts of Operations

(1) Concepts of psychological operations in urban areas.

(a) Dissatisfaction by a significant portion of the population with the prevailing political, social, and economic conditions is normally expressed via the ballot box in a democratic society. When this avenue for the redress of grievances is limited or nonexistent as is often true in many underdeveloped areas of the world, it leads to public protest and demonstrations, especially in urban areas, which quickly escalate to rioting and violence or to the development of a subversive insurgent movement. Although a reform orientated government may be determined to modify and ultimately eliminate the root causes of insurgency through the development and modernization of the nation and its society, it finds itself on the defensive and forced to compete with the insurgents for the support of the urban as well as the rural populace. Psychological operations, therefore, play a vital role in the support of stability operations designed to create an environment of security and confidence in the government which will permit orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals. The military cannot
make a lasting contribution to preventing or defeating insurgency unless the people are persuaded that their government is taking every reasonable step to meet their just aspirations. Psychological operations directed at urban centers take on added significance since they normally contain the major opinion makers in the country—news editors, commentators, radio and TV personalities, directors of institutions and organizations, and educators whose support for the government's nation-building programs must be solicited.

(b) A sincere nation-building effort by the government designed to eliminate the sources of discontent coupled with an appropriate psychological campaign to alienate the insurgent from the populace and to give the nation a sense of unity and common purpose that will justify necessary control measures are prerequisites for effectively combating an insurgent movement.

(c) In addition to enhancing the government's image and winning popular support for the overall nation-building program, psychological operations support military actions directed at the armed insurgent. Military operations must be in consonance with the nation's overall psychological operations program. All military and non-military actions are evaluated in terms of psychological impact. This may require sacrificing short-range tactical advantages in order to preserve long-range PSYOP objectives which support national goals. The insurgent cognizant of the psychological impact resulting from mass destruction and heavy civilian casualties often seeks combat in built up areas. In such a situation, psychological factors may rule out the use of massive retaliatory fire power to dislodge the enemy.

(2) PSYOP support of host country internal defense and development. PSYOP in support of stability operations must recognize the factors which are unique in urban insurgencies as opposed to rural insurgencies without loosing sight of the unified effort to counter insurgency nation-wide.

(3) PSYOP support of military operations. Basic U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine, organization, and operational concepts expressed in FM 33–1 and FM 33–5 are applicable to all forms of insurgency though the approach, emphasis, and techniques may vary in adapting to a rural or urban insurgent environment.

(4) PSYOP resources. Resources must be directed toward full support of the national plan. Operators must address the overall program and orient all resources toward meeting the program's objectives.

b. U.S. Assistance.

(1) MAAG, or mission responsibility for PSYOP. During an active conflict in an urban area, increased aid in the form of equipment is essential. U.S. resources must be requested from other areas and emergency plans developed to support host country efforts.

(2) U.S. Information Agency (USIA) role in PSYOP. It is anticipated that USIA will insure the continuing operation of its information and news media. Material may be made available to the host nation in an emergency.

c. PSYOP Contribution to Populace and Resources Control. A major activity of PSYOP in urban centers is to clarify the need for government population and resource control measures and thereby achieve the willing cooperation of the population. In a major insurgent attack on an urban area PSYOP resources are available to the government for preventing panic, directing the movement of civilians, and controlling refugees.

96.8 Civil Affairs (CA) in Urban Insurgency

a. Intelligence.

(1) Civil affairs intelligence requirements. The successful conduct of civil affairs requires accurate, complete, and timely intelligence on the political, economic, and sociological conditions in the area of present or potential operations. This intelligence enables the civil affairs advisor or commander and his staff to estimate in advance of operations the influence of civil affairs on the accomplishment of the mission or on the contemplated course of action of the command (host country or US). There is a continuous requirement to up-to-date intelligence and contingency planning.

(2) Civil affairs support for intelligence. The nature of civil affairs assignments and the necessity for civil affairs personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civil-
ian population places civil affairs personnel in a favorable position to collect information of vital importance to other staff sections and agencies. This paragraph stresses the civil affairs contribution to intelligence collection within an urban area.

b. Civil Affairs Operations.

(1) Employment of civil affairs units. Civil affairs operations are outlined in chapter 8. Urban area combat operations require special attention in civil affairs planning due to the large population, possible mass casualties, and dependence on public utilities. Civil defense plans must be developed and included in the IDAD plans. Civil defense operations must be coordinated through the Urban Coordination Center. Maximum use must be made of civil affairs units to minimize suffering and to prevent interference by the population with military operations.

(2) Civil affairs operations in populace and resources control. In urban areas, civil affairs efforts can assist security forces by an effective control system to restrict and/or monitor traffic into and out of the area. Efforts must be increased during combat operations to aid in the elimination of insurgent forces, to cut off their supplies, and to prevent their escape.

c. CA functional Operations. Once armed hostilities have ceased within an urban area it is paramount that the host government, local, and national, restore a sense of order and stability as quickly as possible. The U.S., as a participant or advisor, must assist in the rapid restoration of a viable government and economy. U.S. assistance may be provided in the following areas:

(1) Restoration of utilities.
(2) Emergency clearance of debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail centers and shelters.
(3) Rescue, evacuation, and hospitalization.
(4) Recovery and disposition of the dead.
(5) Issue of food, essential supplies, and materiel.
(6) Emergency provision of prepared food and facilities for food preparation.
(7) Damage assessment.
(8) Handling of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:
To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12–11 requirements for US Army Counter-insurgency Forces.
# STABILITY OPERATIONS
## U. S. ARMY DOCTRINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PARAGRAPHS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES</td>
<td>4, 5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. The Host Country</td>
<td>6, 7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Economic, Social, and Political Factors</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY</td>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Types of Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Communist Phases of Insurgency</td>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. The Party Core</td>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. The Mass Organization</td>
<td>22, 23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V. The Military Forces</td>
<td>24, 25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI. Legal Status of Insurgencies and Insurgents</td>
<td>26, 27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>U. S./HC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY</td>
<td>28-30</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Internal Defense</td>
<td>31-34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Internal Development</td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. U. S. Foreign Assistance</td>
<td>40-45</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE</td>
<td>46-48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. National Internal Defense Coordination Center</td>
<td>49, 50</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Area Coordination Center</td>
<td>51-54</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Regional Area Coordination Center</td>
<td>55, 56</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V. Provincial Area Coordination Center</td>
<td>57-60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PLANNING GUIDANCE</td>
<td>61-67</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Internal Defense Planning</td>
<td>68-71</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Internal Development Planning</td>
<td>72-77</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS</td>
<td>78, 79</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Consolidation Campaign</td>
<td>80-86</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Strike Campaign</td>
<td>87-91</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Remote Area Campaign</td>
<td>92-96</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>OPERATIONS</td>
<td>97, 98</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I. Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Advisory Assistance</td>
<td>99-104</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Civil Affairs Operations</td>
<td>105-111</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Psychological Operations</td>
<td>112-118</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V. Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>119-124</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI. Populace and Resources Control Operations</td>
<td>125-132</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VII. Tactical Operations</td>
<td>133-140</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope
   a. This manual provides information and guidance to commanders, staffs, and advisors concerning operational aspects of internal defense and internal development by host country (HC) and U. S. forces. It prescribes general doctrine for the roles, missions, and employment of U. S. Army forces in stability operations within the overall interdepartmental internal defense and internal development effort. This manual is based upon the broad, general guidance found in FM 100–20.
   
   b. This manual contains doctrinal guidance applicable to the army components of MAAG, Missions, and Military Assistance Commands upon which to plan and execute stability operations. It should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques, and procedures for field operations.
   
   c. This manual applies to army force employment in—
      (1) Chemical, biological, and radiological environments.
      (2) Limited war.
      (3) Cold war, to include stability operations.

2. Recommended Changes
   Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations for the improvement of its contents. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be addressed to the Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved army doctrine may send an information copy through command channels to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.

3. Definitions
   See glossary for terminology related to internal defense and internal development.
CHAPTER 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4. General
This chapter provides guidance concerning the characteristics of developing countries and the problems inherent to transitional societies. It describes those environmental factors which must be considered in internal defense and internal development operations and the effect of these factors on U. S./HC and insurgent forces.

5. The Dynamics of Developing Nations
a. A developing nation is one which has advanced beyond a traditional society and is striving toward an advanced economy and an efficient, popularly supported government. In achieving these goals, a nation must overcome those features characterizing a traditional society such as a static economy, limited technology, immobile social structure, and rule by custom and traditional law. The social, political, and economic transformation involved in this transitional process often creates an atmosphere of national tension and disorder.

b. Each developing nation is unique. Each has its own history, culture, preferences, and goals which are blended in a combination resulting in problems different from those existing in any other nation. For example, many of the African states and former Asian colonies have gained their independence only recently; others, as in Latin America, have been independent for a century or more. The aggregate problems of these developing nations provide a new dimension to the cold war which complicates, intensifies, and often affects decisively the problems confronting all nations.

Section II. THE HOST COUNTRY

6. The Problems of Transitional Societies
a. Impatience for Progress. Little economic progress is possible without the establishment of a stable and effective government which inspires confidence in the future. Construction is necessary to provide the means of transportation, rapid communication, and industrial power which will insure that products can be moved easily and economically to markets. These early steps toward modernization are essential to progress, but do not always result in immediate benefits to the people. The “revolution of rising expectations” resulting from the knowledge and ideas spread by mass media may cause the people to be impatient for immediate, tangible evidence of progress. Popular leaders seeking to gain additional recognition as spokesmen for the people intensify this impatience by demanding early government action. Under pressure from the people, the government may make concessions and divert resources to satisfy demands. Since these diversions may postpone the orderly achievement of the long-range goal, they should be limited to those requirements which satisfy popular demands.

b. Hesitations to Leave the Past. New ideas may not be accepted easily by most members of the government or the population. The reluctance to leave the past will be based initially upon an attachment to and confidence in traditional methods, coupled with a lack of knowledge and appreciation of the benefits of modernization. This attitude may impede
ternal development programs and tend to sustain the customs and traditions of the past.

(1) The intelligentsia will disagree on the types of programs which should be initiated and on how much change is desirable; additionally, disagreement may extend to political considerations. The type government (Communist, democratic, or autocratic) necessary to accomplish these programs may be argued. In addition, the intelligentsia will differ as to the extent of development that should be undertaken, particularly where development may affect adversely their own position and vested interest in the society.

(2) Finally, the government will be caught in the stress of these diverging desires. In many cases, it will have achieved power under the value scale of old traditions and, as the government is pressured for progressive change, its political fabric may be altered to the extent that political leaders may be forced to undermine their own base of power.

c. Population Support. Only limited internal development is possible in an atmosphere of violence and insurrection. Although the people may lack political maturity or a knowledge of their own best interests and how to make their desires known, they possess a great deal of political power. Political forces in opposition to the government may discover the means of mobilizing the attitudes and opinions of various segments of the population and be able to pressure the government into meeting some of their demands.

d. Dissident Factions. When the government is intolerant of opposition, dissident factions will be forced either to forego any activity or to adopt covert means. On the other hand, if the government is tolerant of disagreement with its policies and provides legal means for a loyal opposition, the probability of dissident factions resorting to force is reduced. The government must establish the limits of its prerogatives and authority to encourage a loyal opposition without establishing a base for general political instability. Although it usually is not possible to insure that all dissident groups fall into the category of loyal opposition, a system to accommodate such opposition must be established in order to reduce possible discontent which otherwise may manifest itself in an insurgency.

e. Minority Groups. As the government pursues the task of progressive reform, it must insure assimilation of minority groups into the national structure and create within these groups a sense of national identity and responsibility. Minority groups which differ in race and language, or, are located in remote areas will be more difficult to assimilate than those which live in close proximity to the predominant group. If progressive programs do not bring hope and the promise of a better life to the minorities, they will lack faith in the government, and may provide an exploitable base for the insurgent movement.

f. The Military. Military groups possess considerable political and social influence, and have a capability to play significant roles in the political, social, and economic development of the country. The amount of success that the military achieves will vary with the efficiency of the government; the existence and intensity of insurgency; the presence or absence of an external threat; and the strength, efficiency, disposition, and leadership of the armed forces.

(1) The military often plays a political role, particularly when it is entrusted with the enforcement of law and order. Since it controls the power to dominate most other agencies of government, the military is likely to develop a political position of its own to perpetuate its strength and prerogatives. In this respect, the military may block, permit, or promote some of the activities of the civil government. Military involvement in politics may be beneficial when it provides the stability, which may be lacking under civil government, for political, social, and economic improvement; however, care must be taken to insure that it does not inhibit the political develop-
ment of the government or the people.

(2) The military often is the first to be exposed to “Western” or modern ideas and concepts. This exposure frequently may cause it to be among the earliest segments of society seeking progressive reforms and the military may provide one of the few channels for upward social movement. Recruits with little or no previous formal education may leave the service as literate citizens possessing skills which will be useful in overcoming traditional ways and in spreading new ideas.

(3) The military is a repository of many skills such as electronics, engineering, medicine, meteorology, management, ship-building, communications, and firefighting. The military assists in internal development through the application of these skills.

7. The Tasks of the Government

The tasks of the government are numerous and closely interrelated. These tasks generally include the following:

a. Providing a program of internal development.

b. Winning the support and confidence of the people for the government.

c. Assimilating dissident factions without undermining the government’s capability for action.

d. Maintaining internal security with minimum disruption of internal development.

e. Establishing an effective government.

Section III. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL FACTORS

8. Economic Factors

a. Nations or regions with low levels of real income and capital per individual generally are referred to as developing. Using this standard, the term “developing” would apply to all the nations of Asia (excluding Japan); the Middle East (except certain of the oil-rich kingdoms); Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa); Latin America (with Argentina sometimes omitted); and parts of Eastern and Southern Europe. These developing regions encompass approximately three-fourths of the population of the world.

b. The economies of the developing countries may have many common characteristics—

(1) There is a lack of large-scale application of modern science and technology to agriculture and industry;

(2) Markets are relatively narrow;

(3) Transportation and communication facilities are inadequate; and

(4) Contribution of modern manufacturing industry to the gross national income is comparatively small.

c. Despite the technical backwardness which developing countries share in common, prominent differences exist between them. The dissimilarities in terms of primary economic activities are immediately apparent. For example, among nomadic peoples, such as the Ogaden Somalis, the economy centers upon animal husbandry; in parts of Africa, activities such as hunting and fishing are crucial factors in the economies of some cultural groups; in most of Southeast Asia and Latin America, farming is the predominant means of livelihood. Moreover, the economies of these countries contrast strikingly in terms of rate of development. There are differences in the rate of growth of both total real income and income per individual, in the accumulation of capital, and in the application of modern techniques to agriculture and industry. To complicate further the economic differences of the developing countries, there are glaring variances in wealth, economic progress, and technical developments within each country.

d. Some of the gravest problems currently facing the developing countries arise not only from economic stagnation but also from rapid and uneven rates of economic development. A significant socio-economic effect of rapid development has been that the changes in economic
activities and relationships have outpaced the emergence of a suitable value system to replace the partially discredited traditional discipline. In times of crisis, the individual may find himself in an alienated position in which, lacking culturally established channels to express his resentment, rebellion appears the only alternative.

e. Uneven rate of economic development has produced even more noticeable contrasts within developing countries. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and levels of technological achievement exist alongside regions with economies which are barely subsistent. To a great extent, the uneven rate of development is a result of the archaic transportation and communication facilities, which hinders satisfactory economic and cultural relationships between proximate geographical regions.

f. The vast range of economic diversity existing within and between developing countries precludes the development of an overall plan which embraces the whole spectrum of human economic activity and the resulting sociopolitical effects. Consequently, primary attention must be focused on those economic activities and problems of development which are most widespread throughout the underdeveloped world. On this basis, the state of development of agriculture and human resources and their roles in economic growth will receive extensive consideration in conceptual planning. Secondly, factors pertinent to the internal security or insurgency problem arising from the more common economic vulnerabilities will be considered. These factors include such effects as economic stagnation and growing poverty, rapid economic progress and the breakdown of the traditional structure, and foreign economic domination.

9. Social Factors

a. After determining the economic factors in a survey of the human environment the social, psychological, and cultural elements must be considered. The complex interaction among these three elements causes difficulty in setting up a plan which will identify the various units or groups in the social structure and indicate the complexity of the culture (e.g., languages, dialects, idea systems, and activities) and the social forces within the environment.

b. In their attempt to modernize, developing countries face the problem of integrating many diverse elements. It is dangerous to ignore the force resulting from the tenacity with which the loyalties and sense of identity of the people remain bound with ties of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition. With the onset of the modernizing process, these people are asked to give up much of their traditional identification and to become absorbed into a culturally integrated mass. This demand reaccentuates the reality and security of traditional loyalties, even though the population is made aware of the possibilities for social reform and material progress. Thus, a conflict ensues as the population is torn between desire for "progress" and fear of the accompanying social change. Because the modernizing process and the accompanying disruption of the traditional social order largely is irreversible, the longstanding loyalties of a people assume increasing importance in understanding the psychological gap which often develops between these people and their government.

c. The part of a history which is meaningful to a tradition-conscious people is that part which underscores and supports their feeling of uniqueness; more often than not, this history is in the nature of conflict with alien groups. Events which should be considered significant are those that have resulted in latent antagonisms and hatreds which are exploitable by a subversive element.

d. An observable phenomenon in the modernization process of a country is the breakdown of the traditional social structure and social mores of a people—an inevitable by-product, perhaps, of increasing physical mobility. The extent to which this occurs varies from one situation to another. In many urban areas in Latin America, the breakdown is rapid and total; this is in contrast to some African situations where tribes attempt to
transplant certain institutions to the urban areas which safeguard traditional social mores and ties. The variability of this phenomenon depends upon the strength of family and ethnic ties, the degree of social and cultural integration of a people, and the strength of local leadership.

e. An assessment of a people’s standard of living, together with the degree of their contact with other cultures and involvement in a money economy, will provide insight into the relative degree of socio-economic discontent which exists in a community. Further, the key role which education plays in the modernizing process is widely recognized, both as an incentive for social change and as an instrument in developing a loyalty to the nation. On the other hand, the recent introduction of government sponsored and supervised educational systems in many countries provides a potential, and in some cases actual, conflict with those groups (missionary, church, and others) previously responsible for support and supervision of the schools.

f. There is no one set of observable phenomena to be probed as far as the attitudes and behavioral responses of a people are concerned. The following are some of the indicators to look for in the human environment, with emphasis upon the “world view” of the group under survey. Examples of indicator questions are—

(1) What strong taboos and beliefs, both religious and nonreligious, have a definite influence among these people?

(2) What contact occurs with other cultures?
   (a) Is this of an economic, cultural, or other nature?
   (b) Is there a minority group living in this area such as a trading class which is ethnically or racially distinct?

(3) Are there taboos or strong traditions against marrying outside of the clan or ethnic unit?

(4) What evidences are there of in-group antagonism such as feuding between families and clans?

(5) What are the attitudes toward social mobility? For example, is there a strong desire evidenced for children to improve themselves through education?

(6) What are the attitudes toward and contact with the government? Is there tangible evidence of the government’s interest in these people such as road building and vaccination?
   (a) Is there a feeling among the group that the government is, or is not, interested in them?
   (b) Is there evidence that people feel the government is trying to “buy” their loyalty through gifts such as roads or bridges?

g. Terms such as “parochialism,” “tribalism,” or “communalism” all refer to the same condition—that of cultural complexity and ethnic multiplicity. Communalism in India takes the form of religious cleavages; in Nigeria, it takes the form of tribal divisions; and in Malaya, communalism refers to racial contrasts. Since few developing countries are completely free of this problem, an attempt must be made to isolate the actual or potential “units of cleavage” which are to be found in the country under survey. Generally, the vulnerabilities which develop from population cleavages arise from suspicion, rivalry, and antagonism on an intergroup level. The usual picture in the developing countries is one of a large gap between the masses and key groups which is emphasized by the wide disparity in their living standards.

h. A result of the growing expectations of radically improved standards is the drift of unabsorbable numbers of rural people into the metropolitan areas expecting to find jobs and easy affluence, only to be disillusioned by lack of employment and poor living conditions. The accompanying breakdown of protective traditional and family ties as a result of physical estrangement and contact with other cultures accentuates the miserable living conditions of the urban masses.

i. The major social significance of organizations and associations which are formed in a
modernizing society is that they replace traditional organizations for an urban mass that has severed its ties to the family in the rural society. These organizations provide an outlet for expression of social discontent and the leadership very quickly becomes vocal on a political level.

10. Political Factors

a. Regardless of its stage of development, each country has a political culture which reflects the society's concepts of authority and purpose and its basic political beliefs. This political culture properly can be called the "real" constitution. This "real" constitution should be distinguished from the formal written document which has been declared the supreme law of the land. Often this written document reflects an attempt to absorb alien political experiences, practices, and ideals which have little applicability in the society; however, the written constitution must be analyzed to determine the aspirations of its framers and the gap between those aspirations and reality.

b. The theoretical organization of government as expressed in the constitution may serve to highlight those factors which the authors considered to be the major problems of the nation. For example, a constitution could indicate that regionalism, cultural diversity, or geographical fragmentation were of concern. On the other hand, a constitution might indicate that centralized control was either undesirable or impossible at the time the constitution was created.

c. In transitional or developing nations, the theoretical organization of government under the constitution may reflect the incorporation of alien ideals and the idealized expression of HC aspirations and objectives. Furthermore, constitutions do not always enjoy the same status and function in these societies as in our own. Such instruments may lack effectiveness as precepts for government if based on social and political concepts that are foreign to the political culture of the people to whom they are applied. In order to determine the true distribution of power, it is necessary to make objective observations and evaluations concerning the actual organization and operations of the government. Further, a critical evaluation of the actual practices is essential to avoid unwarranted application of our own political and cultural values to a foreign system with its own distinct values.

d. Observation and evaluation of the executive, legislative, judicial, and electoral functions are necessary to the study of any political structure. Such observation and evaluation should provide the information necessary to determine whether a government actually exists and whether that government is adequate or inadequate to satisfy the actual requirements of a nation in the present international environment.

e. Where socio-political development has resulted in the emergence of new states and new socio-political orders, the regional or provincial government may have been destroyed or, in fact, never have existed; however, in rural or agrarian nations, leadership and government at the local level will tend to be well defined and traditional in orientation. A major problem for national governments in developing countries is the strengthening of the middle class structure to bridge the gap between the upper and lower classes, thus enabling proper representation and interpretation of national policy at the local level.

f. Administrative and civil service systems generally reflect the cultural heritage and political experience of the nation. In the older developing countries, the bureaucracy tends to be tightly stratified along traditional class and educational lines which limits the development of a technically competent administration. In an unstable political situation where leadership is in a state of flux, there is likely to be social disorganization resulting in a continuous turnover in the bureaucratic hierarchy which will further prevent the development of a stable and responsible civil service.

g. A political party serves as an institution for developing leaders to represent various segments of the "popular" will and as a tool through which those leaders can guide the population into common thought and action. Since "popular" means little more than the
membership of the party, it is necessary to
determine the actual power position of political
parties in relation to the population as a whole.
The political party system will vary with the
nation. A new nation often has an official party
which does not permit opposition, the purpose
being to protect the thin fabric of the new
political society from the many divergent in-
terests which remain within it. The older
nations often will evidence a two-party system
ostensibly divided along liberal and conserva-
tive lines; however, in most cases, these parties
represent members of the same class—the
elite.

h. Within every country there are associa-
tional groups, consciously organized, which lie
outside the formal structure of government but
which include political functions among their
stated objectives. These groups serve to articu-
late demands in society, seek support for these
demands among other power groups, and at-
ttempt to transform these demands into public
policy. Often in developing nations, these
groups exercise functions which in Western
societies might best be performed by political
parties. In addition, within each nation there
are groups which are not formally organized
and which are latent and potential rather than
actually functioning political groups. These
groups usually reflect interests based on class,
ethnic kinship, religion, or regional factors.

i. Each country has formally constituted
organizations which exercise accepted roles in
both the social and the political system. The
political functions of these institutions may
differ radically from their established or ob-
vious roles in society. These groups may com-
prise actual elements of the government or
elements of the social structure. These groups
may presuppose a strength of organization and
political influence which cannot be ignored by
a government, although they might be some-
what limited in their ability to influence
governmental policy decisions.
CHAPTER 3

SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY

Section I. TYPES OF REVOLUTION

11. General

This chapter delineates those characteristics of subversive insurgency which distinguish it from other types of revolution. It describes the evolutionary nature of subversive insurgency as set forth in Communist doctrine and portrays the organizational structure which the party strives to establish in an insurgency movement.

12. Distinctive Characteristics

In order that insurgency may be viewed in perspective, other forms of revolutionary activity must be noted. A revolution in which a small group of men within the government or its armed forces seizes control of government generally is viewed as a coup d'état. The use of open, organized, and armed resistance in which the inhabitants of an area seek to obtain autonomy or independence but make no attempt to alter or overthrow the central government, is a rebellion. The initial stage of a revolution which is still localized and limited to seeking modifications of government policy and does not yet pose a serious threat to state or government in power normally is referred to as an insurrection. The attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population of a country into forcible overthrowing its existing government is called subversive insurgency.

13. Revolution From the Top and From the Bottom

a. To distinguish between the two principal types of revolution, coup d'état and subversive insurgency, the illegal acquisition of governmental power may be considered to be of two types: revolution from the top, and revolution from the bottom. In a revolution from the top (coup d'état) a small group tries to obtain control of or neutralize the armed forces and other government agencies, usually with little or no violence and rarely seeking popular support until after the coup has been initiated or has succeeded. The instigators of the coup, normally men in top echelons of government or the armed forces, seize the instruments of power such as mass-communications media, military materiel, transportation facilities and power stations, and, finally, the symbols of power such as administrative and legislative buildings in the capital city. On the other hand, revolution from the bottom (subversive insurgency) involves more violent seizure of power and largely is the result of social disorganization and unrest. A mass movement, encouraged or directed by a hard insurgent core, develops slowly in a long evolutionary process until armed fighting occurs through a precipitant event. Since mobilization, organization, and manipulation of a sizeable segment of the population are prerequisites for successful revolution from the bottom, it is known as subversive insurgency. The Communists refer to such revolutions as “wars of national liberation.”

b. Although this manual deals primarily with subversive insurgency, those involved in preventing or defeating it must be alert to the possibility that there may be a mixture of two or more forms of revolution. Such was the case in Russia wherein a movement from below was combined with a Communist coup at the top.
Section II. COMMUNIST PHASES OF INSURGENCY

14. Doctrinal Requirements

a. The principal components of Communist insurgent doctrine were developed primarily by two men—Nicolai Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. They provided the doctrinal base and, more significantly, the order of priority for those activities which must follow in organizationally and politically escalating internal attack. To succeed in protracted revolutionary war, one must have—

(1) Disciplined organization of professionals;

(2) Concept of strategy which permits opportunism and varies tactics according to the social classes to which appeals are directed during any particular phase of operations;

(3) Techniques through which the party can assert its control over any extra-party organization; and

(4) Military doctrine built around the political impact of tactical operations.

The first two of these requirements were developed by Lenin; the fourth by Mao. Each of them contributed to the development of the third—the control aspect.

b. According to both Lenin and Mao, insurgent forces will be weak in the early stages of a revolution and, therefore, unable to engage in open warfare. Time in which to develop strength is one of the essentials for a successful insurgent campaign, and planning envisages a period of years to reach the stage where insurgent forces, formed into standard combat units, are able to engage in conventional-type warfare. The protracted nature of the insurgent campaign thus is one of its outstanding characteristics.

c. Mao’s doctrine on protracted war in its militarization phase has been used by Communist insurgent leaders in developing specific doctrine which provides that protracted military war has three stages—

(1) Passive stage (strategic defense stage).

(2) Active stage (or strategic stalemate stage).

(3) Counteroffensive stage.

A brief synopsis of these stages is presented to depict the general characteristics inherent in each.

15. The Passive Stage (Strategic Defense Stage)

a. The passive stage is that initial period of the conflict during which insurgent elements must be on the defensive to insure completion of the necessary political and military preparations for the succeeding phases. This stage is the most difficult and protracted of the three stages of the insurgent campaign. During the passive stage, specific conditions must exist and specific objectives should be achieved before the insurgency can enter successfully the active stage. These conditions are as follows:

(1) The Communist party must be strong in selected base areas.

(2) A popular cause or reasons for the revolution must exist or have been created.

(3) Class warfare must be at an advanced stage. This will be linked with (2) above.

(4) A population base must have been created to provide manpower, materiel, and political support for insurgent forces.

b. To achieve the above objectives, party doctrine stresses both constructive and destructive measures. These include—

(1) The expansion of the active party organization and the creation of a covert Communist-controlled Revolutionary Committee System at all organizational levels of the legal administration.

(2) The penetration of government offices, other political parties, trade unions, and movements with the purpose of obtaining intelligence, fostering popular support, or insuring the elimination of political rivals.

(3) The creation of military forces for the purpose of organizing and controlling mass civil organizations;
carrying out intimidation measures, terrorism, and sabotage; and engaging in minor military operations, e.g., "hit-and-run" ambushes, attacks on isolated posts, and similar actions.

(4) The promulgation of propaganda for both internal and external consumption to obtain material and psychological support for the revolutionary forces and demoralize legal government supporters.

(5) The identification of the aspirations of the masses with Communist aims.

c. A study of the above objectives and the measures necessary to achieve them will show that none are likely to be attained within a short space of time; hence, the prolonged duration of the passive stage. No Communist insurgency contemplates anything other than eventual complete success, which means in effect that all potential dangers to the party have to be eliminated; thus, time is no object.

16. The Active Stage (Strategic Stalemate Stage)

a. The active stage is initiated for the purpose of extending political control and increasing military action in armed resistance against government forces. The principal goal during the active stage is to further the Communist cause and standing in the country and, through this, to make possible the rapid buildup of military capabilities. This goal is achieved through the accomplishment of specific political and military objectives. Although, in practice, Communist political and military activity is integrated, the objectives of each are cited separately for clarity. Political objectives in the active stage are—

(1) Extension of the political control and influence over the masses and establishment of Communist government and administration in "liberated" areas.

(2) Further demoralization of the legal government and its organs and supporters, and the penetration and subversion of police, military, and paramilitary forces.

(3) Conversion or elimination of neutral or opposition groups.

b. The measures employed in the early passive stage will be continued and amplified to include—

(1) The creation or re-establishment of bases.

(2) The employment of insurgent forces in such activities as farming, fishing, and lumbering in order to win population support.

(3) Intimidation through the use of systematic terror, selective sabotage, and guerrilla action.

(4) Demoralization through the negation of government successes, political or military; exaggeration of government failures; creation of doubt concerning the justice and efficiency of government countermeasures; and attacks on the character, good faith, and morals of government leaders at all levels.

c. Military objectives during the active stage are—

(1) Tying down the maximum number of government troops in static defense tasks and destroying lines of communication, supplies, and other government resources.

(2) Expanding existing base areas and "liberating" new territory.

(3) Forming cadres for recruitment to communist military forces through intimidation, persuasion, and terror, continued control of the masses, and liquidation of opposition elements.

d. Military measures employed during the active stage will include ambushes against military and police convoys and columns, attacks on pro-government villages and hamlets, and sabotage against all forms of communication. Increased Communist influence and military strength will enlarge the number of insurgent dominated villages. Government reaction will be to attack these with consequent loss of men and equipment. Villages captured by government forces will require dispersal of HC military personnel and equipment in order to prevent recapture by insurgents. Should HC
forces succeed in defending villages they have captured, ambushes will be organized to cut off government supplies and reinforcements and prevent the withdrawal of troops. Insurgent doctrine requires the reoccupation of such villages after they have been vacated by government troops. It also requires that village systems organized for defense include provision for concealment and evacuation.

e. "Preparation of the battlefield," or of those areas where insurgent regular forces are contemplated for deployment against government troops in future conventional battles, is supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist party at national level during the active stage. Preparation of such areas will include—

(1) The acquisition and storage of arms, ammunition, combat materiel, and food.
(2) Conduct of intelligence surveys of government force capabilities.
(3) Establishment of local population controls.

17. The Counter-Offensive Stage

This is the final stage in the insurgency process and is initiated when the Communists believe they have gained sufficient military strength and population support to meet and defeat the government forces in decisive combat. It is difficult to define the end of the active stage and the beginning of the counter-offensive. The active stage insures that the conditions for decisive battle in strategically selected areas are all in favor of the insurgents, and the concentration of their forces must be handled in such a manner that the outcome cannot be in doubt once these battles begin. Terrain itself will continue to be of little strategic importance to the Communists and will be used primarily to gain tactical advantage over government forces. On the other hand, terrain temporarily occupied must be of sufficient tactical or strategic importance to the government to compel the commitment of principal government forces. When the counter-offensive stage is ready to begin, the following conditions should have been met—

a. The government will have reached a stage at which it can react only in the manner desired by the Communist insurgent forces.

b. The concentration of government forces in the battle areas will be such that their destruction will insure the collapse of the entire military control of the country.

c. Government forces outside the battle areas will be absorbed completely in controlling the areas in which they are stationed.

d. Civil administration will have collapsed or will collapse as soon as military control is removed.

e. Insurgent forces will be strong enough to overwhelm their enemy in the battle areas and sufficient forces will be available to conduct subsidiary operations.

f. The intelligence organization of the government will be ineffective and will receive only the information fed to it by the insurgents. The Communist intelligence organization will be so efficient that no move or decision will be made by the government without insurgent forces being quickly aware of it.

g. The bulk of the population will be politically immobilized and completely obedient to the insurgent forces.

h. Plans will be available to prevent government reserves from influencing directly the outcome of the battle.

Section III. THE PARTY CORE

18. General

a. At the heart of every Communist-dominated insurgency may be found a tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing governmental structure in the country. In most instances, this organization will consist of committees at the village, district, provincial, interprovincial, and national levels; however, intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure if the leadership believes that it can supervise and coordinate adequately the activities of subordinate committees from national level.
This chart portrays the interlocking structure which enables the Communist party (CP) to control an insurgent organization.

**Figure 1. Type Communist insurgent organization.**
b. The overall Communist insurgent organization is composed of three major elements—

(1) Party core.
(2) Mass civil organizations.
(3) Military forces.

These elements are interlocked organizationally to insure at all times that the party exercises complete control over their activities. Figure 1 depicts an optimum type Communist insurgent structure. While the exact organizational relationship of its elements may vary in detail from one insurgency to another, all will employ the "interlocking directorate" arrangement which insures absolute control by the party over the entire organization. FM 30–31 contains detailed information on the Communist insurgent organization.

19. The Party Cellular Organization

a. At the base of the party structure exists the "cell." The cellular structure of any Communist party, legal, or illegal, is its most critical characteristic, and communism as a way of life and organizational development is not possible in the absence of the cell. A Communist party member normally belongs to two or more cells; his party cell (in which the fundamental dynamics of communism are to be found) and one or more functional cells which exist in his place of daily employment such as the party committee, school, or factory. While both party and functional cells are separate and distinct elements, they may appear to overlap, since the same cell members often will work together in daily employment as well as participate together in strictly party activities.

b. Party Groups normally are created to control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Under this arrangement, the cell captain is responsible to the First Secretary of his respective Party Group which also consists of an Assistant Secretary and an Executive Committee. Party Groups, in turn, are responsible to yet another higher office which exists at each echelon of the party hierarchy. This office is known as the Interparty Committee and is the supreme Communist organ at its particular level of organization, responsible only to its counterpart office at the next higher echelon. Like the Party Group, it also is composed of a First Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and an Executive Committee. The chain-of-command within the overall party structure is from the Central Committee of the Communist party at national level down through each of the Interparty Committees at interprovincial, provincial, and district levels.

20. The Party Committee System

a. Although all authority within a Communist insurgent movement stems from the hard core cellular party organization, functional committees, composed of both party and non-party members, are required to carry out the party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the Party Executive Committee, commonly referred to during an insurgency as the Party Revolutionary Committee. Like the party's cellular organization, these committees normally exist at national, interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Below district level, clusters of cells perform their daily functional tasks under the direction of local village committees. At national level, control is exercised by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

b. At each hierarchical level of operation, the hard core party cellular organization and its counterpart Revolutionary Committee exist side-by-side in interlocking fashion. All party members in a given branch or section of the Revolutionary Committee concurrently will be members of a cell in the party organization. Since the allegiance of the party member is to his cell, Party Group, and Interparty Committee, this last body exercises authority over its counterpart Revolutionary Committee.

21. The Party Youth Organization

a. The Party Youth Organization is the third parallel structure within the Party Core control apparatus and is an indispensable affiliate of any Communist party. The Youth Organization is a "half-way" house into which likely future party members may be drawn in their early youth before they reach the required age for candidate membership in the party proper. This age varies from 18 to 26 years.

b. Party Youth members may engage in
most of the activities conducted by actual party members in an insurgency. This organization is considered a training school to prepare Communist youth for the assumption of inner-party responsibilities. Party Youth members are employed to the maximum extent possible in a manner similar to their seniors in order that they may acquire experience in the multiple phases of party work. This will make it possible for them to enter the hard core of the organization when they are of eligible age.

Section IV. THE MASS ORGANIZATION

22. General

a. Communists have never aimed at the conversion of great masses of people to communism. Their entire concept is that of a small party which is compact, mobile, disciplined, and dedicated. It is the task of this small group to utilize scientifically the social forces which move and direct the masses of the people so that the Communist party may exercise power over them and forcibly impose the Communist program. The Communist aim, therefore, is to recruit into the service of the party great numbers of individuals, most of whom are unaware that they are serving the Communist cause.

b. In revolutionary context, Communists consider that three separate organizational elements constitute the Mass Civil Organization. These are—

(1) Popular Organizations.
(2) Special Interest Groups.
(3) Village Militia (popular guerrilla) Units.

Popular Organizations are the most significant of the mass organizations in that they are organized on a nation-wide scale with committees at the national, interprovincial, and district levels with basic units in the village and hamlets. These organizations seek to appeal to a broad segment of the population, particularly workers, farmers, women, and youths. Special Interest Groups are narrower in scope than Popular Organizations and include those groups whose focal concerns and activities are oriented on special issues. Examples of Special Interest Groups are medical associations, sporting clubs, and teachers' groups. Literally, any organization expressly created to further the special interests of a parochial group falls in this category. The Village Militia also is considered an element of the Mass Civil Organization although it often is construed as a part-time and inferior arm of the military. The more correct perspective, however, is to view the militia elements as elite formations among the multiple mass organizations.

23. The Village Militia

a. Three distinct paramilitary elements appear to exist in the Village Militia—Self Defense Force, Combat Guerrilla Unit (Liberation Troops), and Secret Guerrilla Unit. The elements are employed as follows:

(1) The Self Defense Force normally is organized, trained, and employed for the defense of villages and other insurgent facilities, whereas the guerrilla force constitutes the local instrument to inflict damage on the enemy and to gain and maintain population control.

(2) The Combat Guerrilla Unit of the Village Militia is employed by the party in the support of regular military forces or is used independently to conduct small operations.

(3) The Secret Guerrilla Unit is used primarily to enforce the will of the party in a given area, and is composed to a large degree of party members.

b. Although young men are sometimes coerced into service, the individual enrolled in a village guerrilla unit normally is a volunteer. In most small villages, the identity of the members of the Village Militia undoubtedly is known to most of the inhabitants, but fear of brutal reprisal keeps them quiet. Consequently, the village guerrilla is not readily identifiable to government forces. He operates in or close
to his home village, sometimes in conjunction with regional and main force units. By day, he works at his normal job; at night, or during emergencies, he is available for assignment by his party superiors. The insurgent leadership prefers at least five to ten guerrillas in each village. In those villages under insurgent control, a full squad of 10 to 17 personnel or a platoon of from three to four such squads is normal. A type insurgent village guerrilla platoon is shown at figure 2.

---

**Figure 2. Type insurgent village guerrilla platoon.**

---

**Section V. THE MILITARY FORCES**

24. General

a. According to Communist doctrine, the military forces are but one of several instruments through which the party seeks to consummate its power. Actually, of the three principal organizational elements of the Communist insurgent organization (Party Core, Mass Civil Organization, and Military Forces), the military forces are considered the lowest in organizational importance. Communist planning provides for military reverses and the possible necessity for retrenchment, restructuring, or even the temporary disbanding of its military forces should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based realistically upon the assumption that as long as the Party Core and the Mass Civil Organization remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished; however, without the party nucleus and mass civil base, the movement cannot succeed.

b. Communist insurgent military forces fall into two classes—Main Forces, and Regional Forces. These two elements are distinguished from the Village Militia which, although paramilitary, does not fall within the military chain of command. The Main Force normally is a body of well trained soldiers, many of whom may have been infiltrated into the country from the outside. It is a highly motivated, elite fighting group, many of its personnel being full or candidate members of the Commu-
nist party. Although deployable where needed, the Main Force usually is controlled at inter-provincial level. The Regional Force is made up predominantly of indigenous personnel recruited directly from the Mass Civil Organization or promoted from the ranks of the Village Militia. Units of this type operate in specified areas of no more than provincial size.

25. Command and Control

a. Totally distinct but parallel channels of both military command and party control exist within the staff divisions, sections, and operational units of Regular Forces. Military command stems from the commander, and, in a traditional manner, flows to the commanders of subordinate elements. Party control is exercised through the Interparty Committee, special Interparty Committees of the military, and those Party Groups and cells which are imbedded in the military structure.

b. The seemingly sharp compartmentation of command and control functions is smoothed over by the interlocking structure of the entire Communist insurgent organization in which key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in several of these bodies. For example, the Military Affairs Committee, whose leadership is represented on both the Current Affairs Committee and the Party (cellular) Committee, will bring together a select body of individuals who are—

(1) Party-oriented.

(2) Aware of the realities of the military operational situation.

(3) Cognizant of the overall current insurgent effort and the problems confronting it.

Section VI. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENCIES AND INSURGENTS

26. General

a. An insurgency may be distinguished from a belligerency primarily by the different nature of the conflict involved. An insurgency is an "armed conflict not of an international character" that occurs in the territory of a particular state between the duly constituted government and revolutionaries who, for political reasons, have banded together and attempt to displace the established government in whole or in part by force. An insurgent movement becomes a belligerency when the insurgents are accorded belligerent status. This status may be accorded when—

(1) The guerrilla-type action typical of an insurgency escalates into a general state of hostilities.

(2) The insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the territory of the state concerned.

(3) The insurgents possess a government capable of administering such territory.

(4) The revolutionaries or insurgents conduct the armed conflict under a responsible authority and observe the customary rules of land warfare. This requirement usually is considered to be met when the insurgents bear their arms openly, are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance, and obey the rules of land warfare.

b. It is considered permissible under international law for another state to provide assistance to an established government threatened by an insurgent movement; however, as a general rule, it is not permissible for another state to provide assistance to the insurgents. If such assistance is provided, the states concerned may consider themselves to be engaged in an international armed conflict which may be either limited or general in nature. While insurgents who rise against a legally constituted government are not entitled to belligerent status, this historically has been of little concern to insurgent forces and has had little effect on their operations.

27. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GC), guerrillas who meet the criteria for and are accorded belligerent status must be accorded prisoner-of-war status.

b. Insurgents usually cannot meet the criteria for belligerents and are considered outlaws by the established government. Historically, the condition called insurgency has few international legal consequences because, prior to 1949, there was little that could be ascribed to a "status of insurgency" in international law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 gave cognizance to an "armed conflict not of an international character" which essentially is the condition of insurgency. The Conventions furnish protection to captives of these conflicts by prohibiting—

1. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.
2. Taking of hostages.
3. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
4. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

c. The threatened government has the authority and responsibility for promulgating and enforcing policies relating to the treatment of insurgent prisoners. Even if supporting Allied forces elect to treat captured insurgents as prisoners-of-war while in their custody, such prisoners must eventually be turned over to the government for prosecution under existing law. In this respect, it is important that the HC abide by certain minimum standards such as those cited in the preceding paragraph. A U. S. commander may not turn over prisoners-of-war captured during a belligerency to a nation that is not a signatory to the GC; however, a U. S. commander may turn over insurgents captured during an armed conflict not of an international character to a HC that is not a signatory to the GC. Care must be exercised to insure that the status afforded captured insurgents does not imply recognition of the insurgency as a legal movement under international law. It is important to note that Article 3, GC, specifically states that providing the minimum protections referred to in b above shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
CHAPTER 4
U. S./HC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Section I. INTRODUCTION

28. Purpose and Scope
This chapter presents an overall picture of internal defense and internal development from the HC national viewpoint. Key considerations affecting national strategy and planning and their relationship to the operational programs of internal defense and internal development are discussed. U. S. strategy and policy in the attainment of internal defense and internal development also are summarized.

29. National Objectives
The objectives of governments combatting insurgency may vary greatly, change with time, and be altered as insurgent strength changes and as the probable cost of success fluctuates. The primary objective of these governments, however, normally will be the attainment of internal security which will permit economic, political, and social growth.

30. National Strategy
National internal defense and internal development strategy entails the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, sociological, psychological, and military resources of a nation in order to secure national objectives. In the past, the strategy to defeat insurgencies has been viewed mainly, if not entirely, as a counterguerrilla problem and has been handled largely by military and police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of internal development, the prevention of subversive insurgency includes measures for internal political, economic, and social development. Military support of internal development programs is a major preventive measure. A nation or region afflicted with subversive insurgency cannot be brought under effective government control until it has been purged of insurgent organizations and activities and the causes of insurgency removed. Should the insurgent movement be supported by a sponsoring power or powers, measures must be taken to control the flow of personnel and materiel support across land and water frontiers. Basically, national strategy of internal defense and internal development will be directed toward two main considerations—the insurgent and the population.

a. The Insurgent.
(1) Elimination or neutralization of the insurgent leadership and infrastructure is of major consideration in the development of national strategy. Examination of Communist organization reveals that a small, hard core leadership faction exists at the heart of every insurgent movement. Although this faction usually is well concealed, it must be sought out and destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective. The elimination of this hard core will contribute materially to the disintegration of the entire insurgent organization. All component parts of the insurgent organization are interlocked; thus, removal of party leadership elements will result in fragmentation of the insurgent structure, elimination of centralized direction and control, disunity, and the eventual destruction of the insurgent machine.

(2) The defeat of insurgent tactical forces is also of prime consideration in the formulation of national strategy. Pressure must be maintained on in-
surgent forces through tactical operations for the purpose of inflicting casualties, destroying supplies and equipment, and lowering morale. Tactical operations must be aimed at fragmenting large insurgent forces into smaller units thus enabling the HC military forces to deploy smaller-sized units and cover a larger area. Concurrent with tactical operations, strategy must provide for programs aimed at defeating the insurgent and rehabilitating him into a loyal citizen. Such programs offer an alternative to the insurgent which permits him to surrender without fear of extreme punishment and tends to weaken his resolution to continue fighting under adverse circumstances.

(3) National strategy must finally provide for separating the insurgent from the population, thereby depriving him of a source of personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. Populace and resources control operations, to include frontier denial, must be initiated and adequate police and paramilitary forces created to enforce control measures.

b. The Population.

(1) Gaining the support of the population is of paramount importance in the formulation of national strategy. It is not enough merely to deprive the insurgent of population support through control measures. Since populace and resources control operations tend to be restrictive and repressive in nature, they must be offset by vital and dynamic programs aimed at winning the active support of the people. One of the first considerations of national strategy must be the protection of the populace from insurgent ravages and reprisals. Regardless of other measures taken to improve conditions and otherwise gain population support, unless the people know they will be protected from insurgent coercion and acts of terror, their response to other government overtures will be minimal; therefore, basic strategy must provide for the establishment of relatively secure and stable environmental areas within the country in which internal development and other measures aimed at gaining population support can be conducted effectively.

(2) Removing the conditions which are exploited by the insurgents to foster an insurgency must be a part of the national strategy. The military can contribute materially to the overall strategy of winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but their efforts must be accompanied by attendant economic, social, and political changes. The deep, underlying resentments and desires of the population, both majority and minority groups, must be analyzed carefully before strategic measures are decided upon. Within resources and capabilities normally available, it will be virtually impossible to satisfy the desires of all; therefore, the designation of priorities, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks require consideration of numerous factors. These factors must be appraised realistically in the light of their short and long-range impact on the population and the benefits which will accrue to the government.

(3) The employment of psychological operations (PSYOP) in government programs aimed at eliminating the insurgent menace and winning the support of the population is of paramount importance to success. The government must achieve a psychological victory over the insurgents, convincing them that their defeat is inevitable. Insurgents must be convinced of the wisdom of surrendering to a clement government while leniency is still available. Likewise, psychological programs must assure the
population of the intent of their government to provide for their protection and to accomplish in good faith those popular changes which have been announced. Each government success must be exploited psychologically to generate a spirit of confidence and optimism among the people.

Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE

31. General

Internal defense is intended to create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can assure national growth through controlled social, economic, and political change. Both internal defense and internal development must be coordinated and mutually supporting at all levels. Together, they constitute the overall strategy for preventing or defeating subversive insurgency.

32. Objectives

Internal defense embraces the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The objective of internal defense is internal security or a state of law and order within the nation. The emphasis placed on internal defense will necessarily vary according to the intensity of insurgent tactical operations and the degree of influence and control exercised over the population by the insurgents.

a. Phase I Insurgency.

(1) Intelligence operations are of critical importance in the early phase of insurgency. These operations should be designed to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and its leadership and to develop an intelligence data base. Analysis of this data base may enable a more accurate determination to be made of the degree of insurgent control in various areas of the country. This determination allows the government to formulate internal defense and internal development programs based upon logical assumptions regarding insurgent activities.

(2) Populace and resources control operations receive emphasis to separate the population from the insurgents and thus deprive the insurgents of personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. These operations also serve to protect the population from insurgent control and domination. Populace and resources control measures should be only as restrictive as absolutely necessary to achieve objectives, since repressive actions tend to spread popular discontent and further insurgent aims.

(3) Action is taken to reduce the insurgent threat by exposing, discrediting, and destroying the insurgent infrastructure. Every effort is made to reduce the insurgent threat while a large amount of national resources can be applied to internal development projects aimed at gaining population support. As an insurgency escalates, more and more of these resources must be diverted to defense programs with resultant decrease in the amount of support which can be provided popular programs.

(4) Maximum effort must be made to establish psychological rapport with the people and to inflict maximum psychological damage upon the insurgents. Insurgent objectives and methods must be discredited and subversive propaganda effectively countered. The efforts of the government on behalf of the people must be widely publicized as well as what is expected of responsible citizens in assisting in establishing a stable national environment.

b. Phase II Insurgency.

(1) The advent of Phase II insurgency requires a change of emphasis in
internal defense. Internal defense measures, particularly populace and resources control operations and the employment of military forces in support of internal development, must be reoriented toward internal defense operations—action directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. To the extent possible, internal defense forces will continue to assist in internal development projects aimed at gaining and maintaining the good will of the population. Priorities of effort must be established within geographical areas critical to the government. In those areas selected, the population must be assured that internal defense and internal development measures, once initiated, will not be abandoned.

(2) During Phase II, the government is faced with tactical assault as well as continued subversion. The adoption of an internal defense plan oriented toward effective, comprehensive internal security is required. When adequately trained civilians are not available, military personnel may be employed in civilian functions. The police must be expanded and reorganized to meet effectively increased security requirements. Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to augment the police or the armed forces. The armed forces are increased in size and reorganized to perform their roles in internal defense and to prepare for possible escalation of the insurgency or external attack.

(3) Intelligence and populace and resources control operations initiated in Phase I are continued and extended to meet the insurgent tactical threat. Intelligence operations are directed toward the collection and processing of information relating to insurgent tactical forces, leaders, and plans as well as other essential order of battle information. Populace and resources control operations are expanded to prevent or sever relationships between the population and the insurgents and to reduce to a minimum the internal and external support available to insurgent forces. Frontier denial operations and lines of communication (LOC) security are stressed.

(4) The presence of insurgent tactical forces will require HC tactical operations which may have to be conducted at the expense of internal development programs. This reduction of internal development programs may serve to alienate the population. PSYOP must explain the reason for this reduction in internal development, placing the blame on the insurgent.

(a) If the government concentrates exclusively on the insurgent tactical forces, the insurgent infrastructure will be relatively free to grow and to increase its influence over the population. Overemphasis of effort toward either threat tends to create an imbalance in the government effort and presents areas of relative weakness which the insurgent may exploit.

(b) The people are the key to the struggle and represent the prime target of every insurgent activity; therefore, they must be protected and their support won for the government.

(c) The government must determine the amount of effort which may be devoted to internal development and the amount which must be applied to internal defense.

C. Phase III Insurgency. In a Phase III insurgency, the government may face an immediate danger of military defeat. Though other insurgent activities continue, the imminent danger of military defeat must be averted if the government is to survive. During this
phase, the combat requirements of the military take priority and other activities continue only after military defense has been assured.

(1) In addition to defeating the military threat, government operations are continually aimed toward the ultimate objective of winning popular support for the government through internal development of the nation. The requirement to direct more and more resources to support the achievement of internal defense will reduce the amount of resources which can be allocated to internal development.

(2) Internal defense measures become more comprehensive and are administered more strictly. Armed forces are expanded and reorganized to permit larger-sized unit operations and to increase the firepower, mobility, and support needed to cope with the increased insurgent tactical threat.

33. Populace and Resources Control

When nations become targets of subversive insurgency, the internal security objective, though retaining its identity, becomes part of the overall internal defense strategy. In advanced forms of insurgency, armed and paramilitary forces may be required to reinforce and integrate their efforts with police and other internal security forces, or may even assume overall responsibility for the internal security mission.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Although populace and resources control normally is provided by the police and paramilitary forces, the armed forces augment the police where needed. All forces conducting populace and resources control operations are expanded as necessary and steps are taken to insure coordination of effort among them.

(1) The police must be organized, trained, and equipped to control and reduce insurgent activity. This involves the use of repressive measures which aim at the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure and the use of protective actions which isolate the insurgents from loyal and neutral citizens. The government may possess or organize and train paramilitary units to assist its police efforts or to provide increased potential for later use. Armed forces may be trained, equipped, and organized to participate in populace and resources control operations. The armed forces must be able to assist as required in the containment and reduction of the insurgent threat, and must be prepared to overcome the threat if it should escalate to Phase II or Phase III.

(2) If a neighboring country is suspected of sponsoring or supporting the insurgent movement, strong frontier denial efforts may be required. If the insurgency is concentrated in areas near an international border, the neighboring country may be requested to engage in active operations against insurgent supply and training facilities located on its side of the border and against infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across the international border.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The efforts of all organizations participating in populace and resources control operations are coordinated to support the extension of operations in government-controlled, contested, and insurgent-controlled areas. The training of personnel and units continues, and operational experience concerning effectiveness of various procedures and organizations is reflected in training or organizational modifications.

(1) The police carry out the primary role in the establishment of populace and resources control operations within communities. The police force at every level should be increased to deal with the mounting threat in areas in which government control is being extended. The integration and interdependence of populace and resources control operations and tactical operations is a prerequisite to success. The police may make increasingly frequent re-
quests for armed and paramilitary force support. This applies in the extension of government-controlled areas and in operations conducted in contested and insurgent-controlled areas.

(2) Efforts to close the borders of the nation may be initiated or extended during Phase II insurgency.

c. Phase III Insurgency. The police continue their populace and resources control operations; however, they may rely heavily upon armed forces and paramilitary support for relocation of families and resettlement of communities. As contraband lists are increased, rationing initiated, and resources control expanded to cover production, transportation, storage, and utilization of critical materiel, additional military assistance to the police may be necessary. The police contribute to large-scale tactical operations by providing intelligence and counterintelligence assistance, guides, and interrogation and screening teams to accompany and assist the armed and paramilitary forces.

34. Military/Paramilitary

In mounting a campaign against insurgents, the armed and paramilitary forces are mobilized to support the attainment of national internal defense and internal development objectives. In Phases II and III insurgency, more traditional military objectives may develop. Tactical, populace and resources control, civil affairs, advisory assistance, intelligence, and PSYOP constitute the primary military capabilities which may be employed. All of these capabilities may be employed in different degrees, depending on the intensity of the insurgency and the type of operation being conducted.

a. Phase I Insurgency. When government armed forces initially are strong and other conditions permit, they may be assigned missions, to include military civic action projects, which further internal development programs, win allegiance to the government, and establish favorable military-civilian relationships. Advisory assistance to paramilitary and other developing forces will be furnished to develop their capabilities. PSYOP to support civil information efforts will be conducted by military PSYOP resources. Similarly, civil intelligence agencies may be augmented by military intelligence resources, and populace and resources control assistance may be provided civil security and police agencies by military forces. The police and armed forces should develop an airlift capability for liaison, reconnaissance, limited troop and supply movement, and visits by governmental leaders. The U. S. may provide some or all of this air transportation while undertaking to assist in the development of a HC airlift capability. As the armed forces prepare for tactical contingency missions, many long-range tasks may be undertaken. Coordinated training and mobilization programs may be initiated. Personnel may be trained in occupational specialties requiring long periods of instruction, such as fixed and rotary-wing pilots and electronics technicians. Facilities such as airfields, roads, bridges, communications networks, and tactical barriers may be constructed. These construction programs may have the additional value of introducing government control into formerly inaccessible areas. During the latter part of this phase, military forces may be employed in rural or remote areas where the incidents of violence and lawlessness are beyond the capabilities of the police to combat.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The destruction and neutralization of the insurgent tactical force is the primary military objective. Armed forces are used to support the expansion of government-controlled areas and to conduct operations against insurgent tactical forces in contested and insurgent-controlled areas. They also are used to support frontier operations which are a part of the populace and resources control effort. Armed forces engaged in expanding government-controlled areas have a primary responsibility of providing protection for the population against insurgent activities. In contested and insurgent-controlled areas, military forces conduct deep patrols, raids, ambushes, and attacks against targets of opportunity. They collect information, restrict insurgent force freedom of action, destroy in-
surgent tactical forces, and demonstrate a
continuous potential for operations in these
areas. HC normally organize or expand their
paramilitary units during Phase II. These
forces, including both full and part-time
soldiers, usually are equipped with less sophis-
ticated weapons and receive less training than
do the armed forces. Further, the government
may undertake to organize more primitively
equipped irregular forces along tribal, religious,
or ethnic minorities. In addition to providing
a means for the rapid augmentation of the
armed forces, the organization of paramilitary
forces may deny sources of recruits to the insur-
gent organization. In those situations where
forces committed to tactical operations cannot
effectively locate insurgent forces, their efforts
should be directed to the location and destruc-
tion of fixed insurgent bases.

c. Phase III Insurgency. In Phase III insur-
gency, the survival of the government depends
upon its ability to conduct successful tactical
operations. The military capabilities of the
government must remain significantly superior
to those of the insurgent organization. As the
strength of the insurgent military force in-
creases, the government must concentrate its
resources on defeating insurgent tactical forces
or reducing their ability to engage in open
combat. If insurgent forces organize for mobile
warfare, government forces must defeat them,
using appropriately modified operations.

(1) Armed forces continue to be employed
in tactical operations. Large units
conduct operations over wide areas
while smaller units patrol, raid, and
act as reserve forces. Ranger-type
units supported by air and naval
forces conduct deep raids and pro-
tracted, long-range patrols into re-
 mote areas. As insurgent forces hold
ground for longer periods with
stronger units, changes are necessary
in the tactics used by government
military forces. Artillery previously
dispersed to provide both tactical and
territorial coverage must now be used
for massed fires. Land, air, and water
transportation to and within the battle
area is organized and employed
under threat of large caliber and
massive insurgent firepower.

(2) As the insurgent military capability
expands, significant increases in the
capability and size of regional para-
military forces normally will be de-
sirable because of the need to operate
over larger areas. Paramilitary forces
should not be left unsupported in
those geographical areas temporarily
abandoned by government armed
forces. Where continued presence in
an abandoned area might result in
their annihilation by insurgents, para-
military forces should be transferred
as a unit or their personnel absorbed
into the armed forces. Where possible,
paramilitary forces should be retained
and expanded during Phase III, since
they can perform functions otherwise
requiring more highly trained and ex-
tensively equipped armed forces or
police units.

(3) The government should initiate, or
extend, and support programs to re-
cruit paramilitary or irregular forces
from tribal and other minority groups.
These forces can be used for opera-
tions against insurgent base areas and
infiltration routes, for border control
or harassment, or to support tactical
operations performed by other forces.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

35. General

Internal development promotes advances in
the economic, sociological, and political fields.
These advances will not necessarily be balanced
since advances in one field may force im-
balances in others. The concept of development
calls for a maximum effort with priority to
internal security and law and order, the shield
which protects and allows development. The end objective is improvement of individual attitudes, status, and standards of living. The intensity of the insurgency and resources available will dictate priorities and intermediate objectives. Active insurgency requires immediate and large-scale action; latent or incipient insurgency permits more detailed planning, but quick corrective actions will achieve greater success with fewer resources.

36. Objective

Although the basic objective of internal development is to contribute to internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency, its immediate practical goal is gaining population support. Economic, political, and social development programs are aimed at establishing rapport between the government and the people which will result in support of the government to the detriment of the insurgent movement. In most developing nations, internal development cannot take place effectively without the assistance of internal defense forces. The military has the capability to augment civilian agencies with critical skills and the manpower necessary to engage in large projects. Further, the military has the responsibility for providing a secure atmosphere, free from insurgent domination and terrorism, in which internal development programs may be conducted. Through carefully planned and implemented internal development programs, properly publicized, the people can be convinced that their interests are being addressed by the government, thus depriving the insurgency of a base for popular support.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Internal development offers the best promise of eventual, long-term peace in a nation, but its short-term impact may involve an increase of internal pressures. Progress in one field may affect progress in others; therefore, a requirement exists for an overall, integrated program of political, economic, and social action. Failure to initiate positive action in this phase may result in escalation of the insurgency.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The need for resources and personnel to combat the insurgent threat normally will require a reduction in internal development operations. The threat will require that development programs at all levels be reoriented to support internal defense operations. Internal development should be given priority in government-controlled areas and be maintained to the maximum extent in the remaining areas. Political development increases because of the effort to extend governmental presence where it may not have existed previously. Economic development may be reduced because of the requirement to provide resources for internal defense and because of the difficulty of expansion into areas where security cannot be assured. The necessity to deal with the problems of displaced persons, relocated communities, militant factions, and former insurgents will add to the social development problem.

c. Phase III Insurgency. As resources are committed to the defeat of the insurgent tactical threat, development of political, economic, and social programs necessarily will become militarily or emergency-oriented. Some important internal development actions can be completed, although many of these will be a fallout of the overall operation and would not be required except for the insurgent threat. On the other hand, the eventual impact on the internal development program must be considered in the planning for all military operations.

37. Economic Development

The government must create an environment which will encourage economic growth, attract foreign capital, and enable the establishment of a stable currency.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Economic development requires basic efforts in many related fields. Appropriate skills and experience must be acquired; a modern fiscal and monetary system must be established; agriculture must be expanded to create a degree of self-sufficiency and freedom, particularly from the one-crop economies; and the preconditions for economic growth must be achieved (e.g., the establishment of power and communications systems, transportation networks, a workable credit and marketing system, and other elements of the economic infrastructure).
b. Phase II Insurgency. In economic development, emphasis is shifted to projects which support the internal defense effort, including those which are involved directly in achieving internal security and those which demonstrate government concern and ability to benefit the people. For example, transportation facilities constructed to support troop movement should be located, where possible, to contribute to the support and development of the economy. There should be a shift toward short or mid-range economic development projects which are immediately apparent and beneficial to the people. Some long-range projects should be continued in government-controlled areas. When government-controlled areas are being extended, emphasis should be on projects which will satisfy the people's immediate needs, be completed in a relatively short time, show tangible results, teach the people "self-help" techniques, and be maintained with locally available resources. Continuous study is required in order to ascertain which short-range projects can be extended to mid or long-range undertakings, thereby enhancing the government's image in the eyes of the people. Military civic action projects should be undertaken wherever armed forces or paramilitary units are stationed.

c. Phase III Insurgency. Short and mid-range economic development projects are continued whenever and wherever possible. Long-range projects are continued in government-controlled areas. The scope of such projects may be curtailed to divert resources to short-range projects in areas where a critical need exists.

38. Political Development

Training and education perhaps are the most significant aspects of a remedial political development program in that they provide a continual flow of knowledgeable people into various branches of the public administration system. Success of an internal development program depends on the effectiveness of the public administration system which develops plans and provides leadership at all levels; therefore, continuous attention should be paid to the selection and training of those personnel who are qualified for civil service.

a. Phase I Insurgency. At all levels of government, administrative responsibilities must be delineated and procedures established to provide for proper coordination of all programs prior to initiation. The lines of authority and coordination (from the national level, through the regional level, to the local level) must be clearly established so that national programs can be carried out properly and efficiently at the local levels, while the reactions, attitudes, and demands of the people can be ascertained quickly at the national level. Concurrently, the judicial system must be improved and modified to support new economic, social, and political developments, to accommodate changing social values, and to cope with the insurgent threat. A general rule cannot be established pinpointing the time at which the population should begin to participate in the governmental process, but procedures which permit the people to bring their problems to the government should be established as early as possible.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The requirements for improved government organization to deal with the insurgency, to extend government presence downward, and to determine and redress the grievances of the people contribute directly to internal defense and internal development. Increasing government activities, particularly where the expansion of government-controlled areas is concerned, will bring the government into closer contact with the people and provide an opportunity to foster a sense of national unity. Each governmental agency must demonstrate sympathy and respect for the individual.

c. Phase III Insurgency. Under the threat of increased insurgent action, simplified, clear lines of authority should be developed within the governmental structure to facilitate military action and clearly delineate areas of responsibility. Governmental control is extended primarily through the expansion of government-controlled areas. More military headquarters with liaison officers at corresponding governmental levels will be necessary; more military training, advisory or assistance teams, and military personnel to perform normal civilian functions also will be required. Provin-
cial or district governmental leaders may be military personnel or may be assisted by military deputies and staffs which operate in concert with civilian governmental officials.

39. Social Development

Major areas of social development that require attention are health, education, urbanization, population, leadership, status, citizen groups, land reforms, and housing. The main objectives of social development are to improve health standards, to increase the range and quality of human skills, and to instill a personal sense of participation in a larger local and national effort.

- **Phase I Insurgency.** Once the progress of social development has begun, an action in one area affects actions in other areas and the cycle continues, thereby establishing its own momentum and acceleration. In this process, it is difficult to determine which social changes were required to permit progress and which ones were the result of progress. The conflicts and stresses between traditional and modern ways offer possibilities of new grievances which could increase the strength of the insurgent movement. The social development problem involves changing the basic attitudes and values of the people to conform to those required in a new nation.

- **Phases II and III Insurgency.** In addition to the social problems which are part of the internal development process, problems evolving from disruption of the social system due to threats of violence must be dealt with. The added disruption of the social organization due to insurgency is not entirely negative, since it provides an initial shock which tends to displace fundamental traditional relationships. Disruption may permit the reordering of the social structure with relatively less resistance. The government must provide practical programs for dealing with displaced persons, the relocation of communities, and the demands of militant factions or antagonistic minorities. In addition, it must rehabilitate former insurgents or insurgent supporters who have come under government control.

**Section IV. U. S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE**

40. General

This section outlines U. S. economic and military foreign assistance strategy and policy in attaining internal defense and internal development objectives.

41. Concepts

U. S. military and supporting economic assistance are used to prevent or defeat immediate internal or external threats to the national security and independence of friendly nations. In nations lacking effective administrative services and political stability, U. S. foreign assistance may help establish these assets for internal development. In other nations, U. S. capital and technical assistance may be used to facilitate existing national internal development programs.

42. Coordination of Foreign Assistance

U. S. foreign economic and military assistance programs are mutually supporting and are coordinated with the assistance programs of other Free World nations. U. S. programs are administered by the Country Team which is the senior, in-country, U. S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission—usually an ambassador—and composed of the senior member of each represented U. S. department or agency.

- **U. S. Interdepartmental Coordination.** Coordination between U. S. economic and military assistance programs is particularly significant in those nations in which large military assistance programs may create problems of resource allocation. Coordination by the Country Team to minimize possible conflicts is particularly important at the HC national level where it is accomplished by interdepartmental analysis of the specific needs of internal defense and internal development programs. U. S. foreign assistance coordination takes into consideration the comparative costs and benefits of alternate combinations of the
two types of assistance in order to maximize the total contribution toward HC national security, to include internal defense and internal development objectives. Improved military capabilities contribute indirectly to national security through increased economic productivity and investment. Conversely, economic, political, and social development often increase the effectiveness of internal defense programs.

b. International Coordination. The U. S. views its foreign assistance program as a component part of Free World assistance rather than as an isolated effort. The general objective of coordination is to promote the most effective use of those resources available from all assisting nations. Coordination is required to insure compatible approaches to assistance and to facilitate an effective division of responsibility among assisting nations in order to satisfy specific requirements and avoid duplication of effort.

c. Coordination With the HC. At the HC national level, the U. S. Ambassador or the principal U. S. diplomatic officer is responsible for insuring that all U. S. military, economic, social, and political assistance programs in the country are integrated and coordinated. Although not in the line of military command, the ambassador works closely with the commander of the U. S. MAAG, Mission, or unified or specified command to insure full coordination.

(1) The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is employed in foreign nations to provide economic assistance. The activities of USAID are coordinated closely with those of the U. S. Information Service (USIS) and MAAG. Normally, the USAID representatives in the HC are responsible for the coordination of all economic development assistance, social and political, and for advising and otherwise assisting the HC government in all national development functions. Additionally, USAID representatives are charged with overall responsibility for aiding and advising in developing the national police and other law enforcement agencies. In this capacity, they may require assistance from U. S. military forces, especially when HC police forces have paramilitary characteristics. Coordination with USAID should be accomplished for the care of refugees, aid to damaged villages, and provision of food supplies when shortages result from tactical operations. Maximum use should be made of HC military and civilian leadership, with U. S. representatives providing advice, assistance, and support.

(2) The U. S. Information Agency (USIA), referred to in-country as the U. S. Information Service (USIS), operates in foreign nations in support of U. S. foreign policy objectives. In U. S. Missions abroad, the Agency is the principal U. S. advisor and coordinator of psychological programs, to include communication with foreign mass audiences and selected target groups. USIS supports the internal defense and internal development effort by furnishing equipment and technical assistance to the HC to carry out its internal defense and internal development information program.

(3) Military assistance is coordinated at the national level by MAAG/Mission staffs operating with HC counterparts and at lower unit levels by advisory teams operating with subordinate HC armed forces and paramilitary units.

43. U. S. Strategy

U. S. foreign military assistance programs are designed to make the HC response to the internal defense threat as rapid and aggressive as possible. Parallel internal development assistance is directed at eliminating the conditions contributing to the insurgency and promoting the general welfare of the population.

a. A total program is required for prevent-
ing and defeating subversive insurgency. Success depends on accurate, carefully evaluated information and a unified concept of operations tailored to the situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

b. The U. S. should induce HC government leaders to take the required remedial action before a crisis limits the alternatives and necessitates the use of force. The U. S. Country Team is designated as the primary organization for assessing developments within a nation to permit the U. S. Government to determine its best courses of action.

44. **National Development Assistance**

Foreign economic assistance is the primary means through which the U. S. directs its resources to support HC national development. While the nature of this portion of foreign assistance is primarily economic, it also is designed to support HC social and political internal development objectives. In addition, private enterprises and charitable organizations may play a significant role in the development process.

a. **Objectives.** The immediate objective of U. S. foreign assistance is to help developing nations reach the point at which their own increased human and material resources are adequate to sustain development. U. S. foreign assistance is intended to help them preserve their political independence and achieve economic self-support as rapidly as possible.

b. **Concept.** Foreign economic assistance programs are classified according to the nature of U. S. objectives and the extent of U. S. participation. In those nations where active insurgency exists, it is necessary that the U. S. help establish internal security before turning to long-term economic and social development. The general objective of assistance in these circumstances is to establish degrees of security within which economic, political, and social development can thrive. A mixture of military and supporting economic assistance usually is provided in the early stages of this sequence and, as the environment improves, a gradual shift in emphasis is made toward economic development.

45. **U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Assistance**

When the overall internal defense of the HC is threatened by subversive insurgency, the introduction of U. S. Army forces may be appropriate, and military assistance may be increased or established. The primary method used by the U. S. in rendering direct military assistance to the HC is the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

a. **Objectives.** Military assistance is used to increase collective security among friendly nations in order to develop their capability to defend themselves against internal and external aggression. It also is used to assist HC forces in undertaking military civic action to promote economic, social, and political development.

b. **Coordination.** The MAP is administered directly by the Department of Defense; however, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 charges the Secretary of State with the responsibility for the supervision and general direction of the entire foreign assistance program, including military assistance. This responsibility has been delegated by the Secretary of State to the Administrator of USAID in his capacity as Coordinator of Foreign Assistance.

c. **Concept.** The U. S. Government furnishes military assistance to friendly nations or international organizations in order to promote world peace and strengthen the security of the U. S. Assistance may be provided by loan, grant, sale, lease, exchange, or other means. MAP furnishes the materiel support required to resist external aggression, maintain internal security, and participate in collective security arrangements. It also furnishes training and operational assistance and advice and guidance in the use and maintenance of materiel. MAP also may provide limited equipment to be utilized in civic action programs. Except in urgent cases, MAP discourages the buildup of forces beyond the level which the HC would be capable of supporting after U. S. participation ends.
Figure 3. Military Assistance Program, Executive Branch organization.
CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

46. Purpose
This chapter provides an organizational concept for planning and conducting internal defense and internal development operations. It presents a type national organization and describes the responsibilities and functions of each of its elements at various governmental levels.

47. Organizational Objective
The objective of organizing a nation for internal defense and internal development is to enable efficient planning and conduct of operations. The organization must coordinate the efforts of existing government agencies in internal defense and internal development matters and yet permit them to carry on their normal routine functions.

48. Organizational Concepts
While national organizational structures vary from nation to nation, a means of centralized direction and control and decentralized operations must be established. This may be accomplished by forming a National Internal Defense Coordination Center (NIDCC). Below national level, control and direction is vested in a series of subordinate Area Coordination Centers. This concept admittedly involves numerous agencies and hundreds of individuals and requires an extensive security program to minimize chances for penetration by the insurgents.

Section II. NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER (NIDCC)

49. General
The NIDCC is the highest-level organization concerned with planning and coordinating operations. Responsible to the Chief Executive, the NIDCC is headed by a Director who supervises the activities of the major staff offices represented in the NIDCC. These staff offices are responsible for formulating national plans in their respective specialized fields. After appropriate coordination with other staff offices, these plans are disseminated to subordinate Area Coordination Centers to be used as a basis for their planning and conduct of operations. Depending upon U. S./HC agreements, U. S. advisors may be assigned to various posts within the NIDCC and subordinate Area Coordination Centers. The extent and means of imparting advice will depend on the U. S./HC agreements and, most importantly, the personalities involved and type of U. S. personnel assigned or functioning as advisors in these critical posts.

50. Organization
The major offices found in the NIDCC normally correspond to those branches and agencies of the national government which are concerned with internal defense and internal development. In most instances, these offices are extensions of existing government branches and agencies and concentrate their attention upon internal defense and internal development problems.

a. Planning Office. Responsible for internal
Figure 4. Type National Internal Defense Coordination Center.
defense and internal development planning and establishing long-range objectives and priorities.

b. Economic, Social, Psychological, and Political Affairs Offices. These separate offices develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national internal defense and internal development plan. These offices constitute elements representing their parent national-level branches or agencies.

c. Populace and Resources Control Office. Develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on the operations of all forces in the security field. Its primary staffing represents those branches of government concerned with law enforcement and justice.

d. Intelligence Office. Develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence as it relates to national security. It also coordinates intelligence activities; correlates, evaluates, and interprets intelligence relating to national security; disseminates intelligence; and exercises staff supervision over the national intelligence agency.

e. Military Affairs Office. Develops and coordinates broad, general plans for the mobilization and allocation of armed and paramilitary forces. It defines service roles, assigns tasks, establishes priorities, allocates resources, and insures coordination of all military activities in stability operations.

Section III. AREA COORDINATION CENTER

51. General

Below the national-level NIDCC, Area Coordination Centers responsible to the area commander (military or civilian) are established as combined civil/military headquarters at regional, provincial, district, and local levels. These Centers have the responsibility for planning, coordinating, and exercising operational control over all military forces and official civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. U. S./HC policy and agreements will determine command relationships between combined forces. The Area Coordination Center does not replace unit tactical operations centers (TOC), nor does it replace the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

52. Mission

Area Coordination Centers perform a two-fold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all internal defense and internal development efforts and they insure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

53. Organization

The Area Coordination Center is headed by the senior government official who supervises and coordinates the activities of a staff which is responsible for formulating internal defense and internal development plans and operations within their separate areas of interest. These staffs normally are composed of selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the Area Coordination Center’s area of responsibility. The Area Coordination Center should include members from the —

a. Senior area military command.

b. Senior police agency.

c. Local and national intelligence organizations.

d. Public information and PSYOP agencies.

e. Paramilitary forces.

f. Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of internal defense and internal development activities.

g. U. S. military/civilian organizations, if provided for under U. S./HC agreements.

54. Civilian Advisory Committees

Committees composed of both government officials and leading private citizens should be formed to assist the Area Coordination Center in evaluating the success of its various activi-
ities and to elicit population support. These committees evaluate the results of various actions affecting the civil population and provide a communication link with the people, thus providing feedback upon which to base future operations.

a. The organization of a civilian committee will vary depending on local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. The appointed chairman ordinarily will be a leader in the community or area. General membership normally should include—

1. Local police chief.
2. Superintendent of schools or school principal.
3. Priest(s), ministers, or other leaders of religious faiths.
4. Health director.
5. Judge and/or other judiciary representatives.
7. Editors of local news media.
8. Business and commercial leaders.
9. Other influential persons.

b. The civilian committee normally will meet on call of the committee chairman. Some representatives possibly may hold dual membership positions in both the Area Coordination Center and the civilian committee.

Section IV. REGIONAL AREA COORDINATION CENTER

55. General
Civilian governmental structures normally do not exist at the regional level; however, it may be feasible to establish regional Area Coordination Centers to facilitate span of control. If formed, these Centers normally would coordinate the activities of military and civilian organizations operating in the area and assume operational control of large-scale operations which cross established jurisdictional boundaries. They are structured to meet the requirements posed by the threat within a region.

56. Functions
At the regional level, the Area Coordination Center generally will perform planning, coordination, and supervisory functions similar to those performed by the NIDCC. In addition, it may serve as the regional area operations center to provide command and control of large-scale interprovincial operations. Chapter 9 contains a detailed discussion of regional force organization and operations.

Section V. PROVINCIAL AREA COORDINATION CENTER

57. General
The first and primary political subdivision of the nation having a fully developed administrative apparatus normally is the province or state. Provincial governments usually are well established and have exercised governmental functions over the area prior to the onset of insurgency. The province normally is the level of administration closest to the people which has the capability to administer the full range of internal defense and internal development programs. The economic, social, psychological, political, and military aspects of internal defense and internal development are focused at this level. In order to exploit this potential, provincial Area Coordination Centers should be established.

58. Organization
The provincial Area Coordination Center is a combined civil/military headquarters and operations center which plans, coordinates, and conducts provincial internal defense and internal development operations. The provincial Area Coordination Center normally is headed by the senior government official who
Figure 5. Type provincial (state) Area Coordination Center.
supervises and coordinates the activities of a permanent military and civilian staff. Staff members are the appointed representatives of the major branches and agencies of the provincial government and military and police organizations. The actual composition of the provincial Area Coordination Center will be determined by the local situation and available resources, but should contain the necessary organization for the control of all assigned and attached internal defense and internal development forces and elements. The provincial Area Coordination Center does not replace unit tactical operations centers nor does it replace the normal provincial government administrative organization. Figure 5 depicts the organization of a type provincial Area Coordination Center and the relationships between it and various provincial governmental offices.

59. Mission

The principal missions of the provincial Area Coordination Center are to provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of internal defense and internal development efforts in the province and to insure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. The provincial Area Coordination Center, through the civilian committee, insures that communication is maintained with the people and that the people participate in programs designed to improve their economic, social, and political well-being.

60. Operations

a. Provincial Area Coordination Center operations are conducted on a continuing basis. During normal day-to-day operations, the various elements of the provincial Area Coordination Center coordinate actions with their parent counterpart governmental branches or agencies which support the provincial Area Coordination Center according to their capabilities.

b. Suggested major elements responsible for the preparation of appropriate portions of operational plans are as follows:

1. Personnel. Composed of representatives of the military draft board and other governmental offices dealing with manpower and personnel allocations and utilization.

2. Intelligence. Composed of representatives of national and provincial intelligence organizations—military and civilian—operating in the province.

3. Operations. Composed of military and civilian personnel who are qualified to coordinate the operational activities of the other provincial Area Coordination Center elements. Within the operations element is located the fire support coordination group, composed of representatives from ground, air, and naval forces, which coordinates all fires within the province.

4. Armed/paramilitary. Composed of representatives of the armed and paramilitary forces assigned or attached to the province. Although these forces maintain and operate their own TOC, the provincial Area Coordination Center provides centralized planning, coordination, and control.

5. Logistics. Composed of representatives of both civilian and military logistical agencies and units which provide food, materiel, equipment, transportation, storage, and distribution in support of internal defense and internal development.

6. Internal development. Composed of representatives of major economic, political, and social organizations and teams operating in the province.

7. Security. Composed of national and provincial police and representatives of police and paramilitary forces in the province.

8. Information. Composed of representatives of military and civilian PSYOP/information organizations in the province.

9. U. S. (advisory) team. Composed of representatives of U. S. civilian and
military advisory organizations functioning in the province. One U. S. representative should be charged with the responsibility for coordinating the programs of all members of the team.
CHAPTER 6
PLANNING GUIDANCE

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

61. Purpose and Scope
This chapter contains information on planning and organizational procedures. It is designed to assist U. S. military personnel in the development and execution of plans associated with internal defense and internal development operations. It provides an insight into the planning and organizational requirements for the effective use of HC, U. S., and other Free World resources. It also discusses the planning concepts, objectives, operations, and U. S. assistance required to mold HC internal defense and internal development plans into an integrated program designed to eliminate those conditions contributing to insurgency and to defeat insurgent organizations. For additional details concerning internal defense and internal development plans and programs, see FM 31–73, FM 41–10, FM 100–5, FM 100–10, FM 100–15, and FM 100–20.

62. Planning Policy
a. The policy of the U. S. is to support sound plans developed by the HC rather than to force U. S.-prepared plans on another government. In some nations where there is a severe shortage of qualified professional personnel, the U. S. may have to provide specialized assistance to the HC in the preparation of an internal defense and internal development plan.

b. As members of the Country Team, military personnel may participate in planning, reviewing, and evaluating HC internal defense and internal development plans and programs. This may involve projects designed to improve military/civil relationships.

c. Military planning assistance usually is accomplished under the MAP which is administered by the MAAG/Mission or Military Assistance Command stationed in the HC. MAAG Headquarters and each lower advisory echelon must understand the provisions of higher-level plans when preparing and executing their assistance missions.

63. Planning Objectives
The primary objective of planning in insurgency situations is to insure that internal defense and internal development plans are molded into a unified strategy tailored to attain national objectives. Some of the more significant planning tasks include—
a. Developing appropriate objectives.
b. Examining the structure of government and governmental agencies to insure coordination of national objectives and production of internal defense and internal development plans and activities.
c. Understanding the attitudes and intentions of HC key political figures.
d. Providing necessary monetary appropriations to support procurement and operational costs.
e. Legislating necessary conscription laws to insure adequate personnel for the support of operations.
f. Providing the legal structure and legislating suitable laws to prosecute offenders against internal security.

64. Planning Concepts
An internal defense and internal development plan is prepared at national level which sets forth HC objectives and broad, general guidance concerning priorities of effort, budget
limitations, resource allocation, and other similar factors. The national plan should be sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to enable its use as a basis for planning at subnational levels. The national internal defense and internal development plan is supported by detailed annexes prepared by various departments and agencies of government whose resources and functional capabilities can be utilized in the implementation of the master plan. These annexes are, in essence, plans which set forth specific departmental responsi-

Figure 6. Type stability operations plan.
bilities, resources, and the manner in which these resources will be employed in accomplishing coordinated internal defense and internal development programs. Based on the national plan, regions and provinces develop similar plans for operations in their areas.

65. Planning Organization

The composition of the planning organization will vary with the degree of mobilization required. In latent insurgency situations, planning may take place within existing governmental agencies. In more advanced phases of insurgency, planning normally will overextend the capabilities of individual government agencies and a special planning and coordination group, such as the NIDCC, will be required. Planning and directing operations will take place within this structure; however, government agencies remain involved in providing personnel resources and assistance. The internal defense and internal development coordinating group is not intended to replace or perform the functions of government agencies; rather it provides a focal point for coordinating and applying the skills and resources of these organizations. See chapter 5 for a discussion of a suggested internal defense planning and coordinating organization.

66. The Military Plan

The military plan (stability operations plan) annex to the national internal defense and internal development plan will be prepared by the HC defense establishment. It will constitute a realistic and detailed blueprint of the resources, capabilities, and employment of the armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces in support of the total internal defense and internal development effort. The stability operations plan also may include police resources and employment since, during an insurgency, the police often perform paramilitary functions. The following discussion is based on figure 6 which depicts the components of a type stability operations plan. (See app B for an example of a type stability operations plan.)

a. The stability operations plan should encompass the totality of resources and effort to be expended. Of vital importance, all functional elements of the plan, which may be represented as appendices, should be closely coordinated so that proper and judicious use will be made of available personnel and materiel resources. Failure to coordinate all aspects of the plan may result in an idealistic rather than realistic blueprint of the government's military capabilities. As reflected in figure 6, the stability operations plan should include the following functional appendixes:

1) Advisory assistance. Contributes to the stability operations plan by insuring that an adequate advisory program exists which will insure effective planning, organization, operations, training, and equipping of HC military forces to conduct internal defense and internal development operations. This appendix considers individual, military training team, and larger unit training cadres as well as U.S. and other Allied combat support and combat service support assistance which must be provided to increase the capabilities of HC forces to operate efficiently and to perform their missions in the given operational environment.

2) Civil affairs. Includes those major phases of activity which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and the people. The civil affairs appendix contributes to the stability operations plan by developing programs designed to organize and motivate the civil population to assist in governmental internal defense and internal development projects. Specifically, this appendix establishes civil affairs requirements in support of the stability operations plan and designates those personnel and materiel resources necessary to fulfill these requirements.

3) PSYOP. Prescribes those military PSYOP resources and measures necessary to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of
friendly, neutral, and hostile groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national internal defense and internal development objectives. Based upon these objectives, the PSYOP appendix categorizes target audiences, prescribes themes, and establishes criteria for the evaluation of effectiveness of PSYOP measures employed. It also specifies concepts of operations and provides operational guidance for PSYOP personnel.

(4) **Intelligence.** Supports those internal defense and internal development objectives and programs contained in the stability operations plan by insuring general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and insurgent forces. The intelligence appendix denotes those intelligence assets and measures necessary to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population. It further prescribes those counterintelligence activities necessary to reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Intelligence support of specific programs, such as PSYOP and civil affairs, also may be included.

(5) **Population and resources control.** Prescribes proper employment of available resources and measures necessary to preserve or re-establish a state of law and order in which other stability operations programs can be conducted effectively. The populace and resources control appendix includes detailed backup in support of the stability operations plan on such activities as protecting LOC, severing relationships between the insurgent and population, amnesty and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and border denial.

(6) **Tactical operations.** Includes all aspects of mobilizing, equipping, training, and directing armed and paramilitary forces in tactical operations. The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. This mission must be accomplished within a broader framework embracing both internal defense and internal development; therefore, this appendix considers the impact of tactical operations on other military and civilian non-tactical operations being conducted to achieve national objectives.

b. Stability operations plans at all levels should—

(1) State objectives clearly.

(2) Be based on a careful assessment of available personnel and materiel resources.

(3) Present an analysis of those social, cultural, political, and psychological forces stimulating or obstructing the attainment of military objectives.

(4) Project targets, trends, and relationships to other factors of internal defense and internal development.

(5) Evaluate alternate courses of action and the impact of each on other interrelated economic, political, military, and social factors.

c. The area assessment guide is a means of updating area and background studies and presenting those aspects of greatest pertinence to stability operations planning. Once the area assessment is completed, it should be followed by an estimate of the internal defense and internal development situation which evaluates insurgent and government capabilities and develops courses of action. A type national internal defense and internal development estimate of the situation format is shown in appendix C.

67. U. S. Planning Assistance

U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy (OIDP) is the primary document upon which U. S. Country Team planning is based. It includes both internal defense and internal development aspects of U. S. assistance.
a. Based upon guidance contained in the OIDP, an internal defense plan is prepared by the Country Team. This U. S. plan is the basis for programs developed by all U. S. departments and agencies in the country and provides a framework within which to assess programs suggested by the HC.

b. Based on long-range forecasts by U. S. national departments and agencies, the internal defense plan—

1. Insures continuous attention by the Country Team to the HC situation.
2. Enhances the Country Team's ability to forecast dangerous trends.
3. Facilitates planning and program coordination.

Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE PLANNING

68. General

Internal defense planning is based on knowledge of the threat, operational environment, and national objectives, organization, requirements, and other plans. Planning at all levels involves more detail, greater scope, and closer coordination between the civil/military community than is required during limited and general war. Plans must provide for the employment of available support from the armed forces and other organizations. Assistance from Free World nations may be required to mobilize internal defense forces; therefore, plans must permit efficient integration of external assistance.

69. Objective

The objective of internal defense planning is to provide for the efficient employment of military resources to support both internal defense and internal development programs. The national plan provides long-range guidance, whereas lower-level plans provide short-range and more detailed implementing guidance.

70. Concept

During Phase I, internal defense planning accentuates the employment of military resources in support of internal development programs through military civic action, advisory assistance, and PSYOP. Standard operating procedures should be formulated for as many types of military activities as possible. During Phases II and III, internal defense planning is expanded to meet the insurgent tactical threat. The internal defense plan must—

a. Be responsive to nationally established priorities of resource utilization and must be closely coordinated with the internal development plan.

b. Anticipate insurgent activities and prepare to meet them offensively rather than reacting to insurgent operations.

c. Provide an organizational structure which will facilitate coordination and implementation of all plans.

d. Refrain from establishing fixed time schedules. Military forces do not control the operational environment as they do in limited and general war; therefore, fixed time schedules are virtually impossible to maintain.

71. Operations

The following are some planning aspects which should be recognized:

a. Planning for internal defense operations will be far more detailed and comprehensive than that required in limited and general war.

1. Planning should include provision for clear division of responsibility and precise lines of authority.

2. Tasks should be assigned based on unit capabilities and limitations.

3. When areas of responsibility are assigned to a unit, the extent of responsibility must be clearly defined.

b. Planning objectives are not limited to terrain or enemy forces, but include people.

c. Combat power must be applied selectively and its effects modified to preclude harming the population. In many instances, commanders may have to choose between a course of action which will assure entrance into a given area with minimum troop losses and a course of
action which will require the selective application of combat power so as to preclude harming the population.

d. In addition to tactical operations, internal defense planning provides guidance for the conduct of advisory assistance, civil affairs, intelligence, PSYOP, and populace and resources control operations.

e. Regional and provincial plans coordinate activities in detailed, comprehensive orders, insuring that lower unit commanders are furnished adequate operational guidance as to the requirements within their specific operational areas.

f. Planning must give close attention to political, economic, social, psychological, and military situations. Estimates are based on the analysis of the area of operations, the mission, and information previously outlined.

g. All plans must be coordinated closely between U. S. and HC military and civilian agencies. Planning staffs must anticipate greater difficulties in gaining approval for unit plans and adequate time must be provided to process these plans at higher, lower, and adjacent levels.

h. During latent and incipient insurgency, when few or no tactical operational requirements exist, HC combat support and combat service support forces, such as engineers, should be activated early to carry out non-tactical internal development missions.

i. During all phases of insurgency, the ratio of combat service support elements to combat forces will be significantly higher than in limited and general war.

j. National and regional-level plans for military operations should consider the roles and capabilities of the provincial paramilitary forces.

(1) Provincial-level planning considers all aspects of provincial activities. Contingency planning for tactical operations is based on strike missions; however, this planning also must include advisory assistance, civil affairs, intelligence, psychological, and populace and resources control operations.

(2) Supply procedures and other administrative and logistical support activities should be planned for both routine and emergency operations.

(3) Regional-level planning should provide for the contingency that provincial efforts may require military forces in excess of those available at provincial level. The designation of special units to be attached to the provincial government may suffice; however, the NIDCC may establish an Area Coordination Center designed to coordinate internal defense and internal development operations within the region.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

72. General

Internal development planning outlines specific programs to be undertaken by a government to improve economic, social, and political conditions. It also outlines the objectives to be attained and the policies and strategies to be used in accomplishing the stated objectives. Subordinate agencies must provide input to, and base their planning on, national plans.

73. Objectives

HC objectives of internal development planning include—

a. Defining internal development objectives, purposes, and tasks and establishing priorities.

b. Determining actual and potential economic, social, and political resources.

c. Selecting means to mobilize resources for the attainment of objectives.

d. Formulating and publishing components of the plan.

e. Providing a basis for the allocation of scarce resources.

f. Assuring that the operations of different government departments and private groups are coordinated and consistent with each other.
74. Concepts

National internal development planning may be originated by the NIDCC to assist in the attainment of political, sociological, and economic objectives through effective use of available resources.

a. Fundamental characteristics of internal development planning include the clarification of a nation's objectives and an assessment of its willingness to make sacrifices for future growth. In order to be fully effective, planning should stimulate private contributions to the development process.

b. It should assure that private business receives an appropriately large share of scarce resources in order that it may make its proper contribution to the expansion of the economy.

75. Organization

In planning and executing a development program, governments may have to create, supervise, and operate activities and organizations contributing to the political, social, civil, psychological, and economic development of the country, such as—

a. Political.
   (1) Discussion groups.
   (2) Voting apparatus.
   (3) Drafting of a constitution.
   (4) Establishment of political parties.
   (5) Enactment of laws that support national objectives.
   (6) Broadening the bases of political power through education, health, skills, group leadership, self-confidence, and initiative.

b. Social and civil.
   (1) Public health programs.
   (2) Public education programs and facilities.
   (3) Specialized training programs.
   (4) News media.
   (5) Civil service system.
   (6) Civic organizations.
   (7) Crime prevention programs.
   (8) Agricultural extension programs.

c. Psychological.
   (1) Information programs.

76. Operations

Factors pertinent to HC internal development planning include—

a. Recognizing the proper relationship between official and private organizations.

b. Planning for the participation of nongovernmental personnel, organizations, and groups.

c. Ascertaining the impact of internal defense activities on internal development.

d. Coordinating internal defense and internal development plans.

e. Phasing the internal development effort to insure coordinated action and availability of personnel and materiel resources. For example, recruiting and training of personnel must precede initiation of work.

77. National Development Planning Assistance

USAID responds to requests for assistance in planning economic, social, and political development.

a. HC governments are encouraged to make and finance their own contracts for planning advisory services, since they are more likely to accept advice from a group which is employed by and responsible to the government. Even where the contract is financed by USAID funds, planning advisors are responsible directly to the HC.

(2) Pictorial campaigns.
(3) Motion picture service.
(4) Raffles and contests as a means of assembling the population for orientation.

d. Economic.
   (1) National development bank.
   (2) Industrial development company.
   (3) Housing authority.
   (4) Water resources authority.
   (5) Port authority.
   (6) Land development authority.
   (7) Electric power corporation.
   (8) Transportation authority.
   (9) Food distribution authority.
   (10) Medical authority.
b. USAID policy is to encourage governments to formulate and improve internal development plans and the administrative machinery for their initiation. U. S. assistance is related to the OIDP and support of HC objectives and priorities is in this context.
CHAPTER 7
NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

78. General
This chapter provides guidance concerning the primary campaigns conducted to attain internal defense and internal development objectives.

79. Concepts
Three major types of campaigns are conducted to accomplish national programs of internal defense and internal development. Each campaign requires a mixture of both internal defense and internal development resources. Planning of these mutually supporting campaigns is conducted at national level and their implementation normally is accomplished at province and district level. These major campaigns, described in this chapter, are—

a. The Consolidation Campaign. Conducted to establish or re-establish HC control of populations and areas in order that the full range of internal development activities may be pursued within a relatively secure environment. Consolidation campaigns often have been referred to as "clear and hold," "strategic hamlet," "pacification," "rural reconstruction," and "revolutionary development" operations.

b. The Strike Campaign. Conducted to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces and characterized by offensive tactical operations.

c. The Remote Area Campaign. Essentially a consolidation campaign conducted in remote areas to establish islands of resistance in insurgent-dominated areas.

Section II. Consolidation Campaign

80. General
Operations to support the national consolidation campaign are organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the provincial level, this campaign integrates the internal defense and internal development programs which are designed to remove the causes of insurgency and to destroy the insurgent movement. The consolidation campaign is conducted to restore HC governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the normal economic, political, and social activities of the population may be pursued and improved.

81. Concepts
The consolidation campaign may be conducted in all phases of insurgency, although it is more assured of success if mounted during Phase I or II. The concepts described herein are based on the presence of a relatively major insurgent threat, to include the presence of insurgent tactical forces, and must be adjusted to lesser threat situations.

a. National Concept. Operations conducted as part of the consolidation campaign should expand outwardly from such areas as urban industrial complexes or communications centers in which the government is in full control. The government must have a secure base and must place first priority on the denial of this base to the insurgent. Government-controlled areas, normally rich in resources and densely populated, generally have adequate transportation and communications routes. Extension of
operations into contested and insurgent-dominated areas, with priority to population centers, resource locations, installation sites, and routes of communication, facilitates the spread of government influence into surrounding areas.

b. Provincial Concept. Consolidation operations normally are a provincial-level function supported by national, regional, provincial, and other resources.

(1) Consolidation operations may be conducted simultaneously in provinces where remote area and strike operations are being conducted. Both remote area and strike operations support the consolidation campaign by harassing and interdicting insurgent forces and areas. Expansion of consolidated areas decreases the contested zones in which strike operations will be conducted.

(2) Control is established initially by clearing insurgent tactical forces from various subareas, which subsequently will be expanded and linked together. Authorities should extend consolidated areas only to the limits of combined civil/military capabilities. Once an area has been cleared, sufficient tactical defense capabilities and internal security must be established and maintained to defend and secure the area. *Every effort should be made to prevent controlled areas from reverting to insurgent domination.* During all stages, populace and resources control operations, such as the screening of civilians, are conducted to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating newly consolidated areas.

(3) Consolidation operations are characterized by the execution of four generally overlapping stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion. The sequence of events in establishing government-controlled areas involves the accomplishment of many concurrent actions based upon local considerations.

82. Preparation Stage

The preparation stage is a planning, training, organizing, and equipping period during which all participating civil and military forces prepare for operations. During this stage, integration of effort is required between civilian and military planners.

a. Concept. The preparation stage envisages the planning for efficient mobilization of available personnel and materiel resources. Successful planning and execution requires continuous coordination among the participating military and civilian agencies at all levels. Policies relating to national objectives may be directed to regional and provincial government officials. These policies become the basis upon which plans are developed for the accomplishment of the assigned consolidation mission.

(1) District, village, and hamlet planning is conducted within the degree of capability which exists at these levels. Initial detailed requirements may be developed and forwarded by the district chief to the province governor for incorporation into the province consolidation operations plan.

(2) Province consolidation operations plans are developed based upon the internal defense and internal development situation, objective areas designated in national plans, civilian and military resources available, and estimated capability to achieve the objectives. Plans include requirements and means by which operations will be accomplished. The province plan is forwarded to the region for approval and an information copy is sent to the NIDCC.

(3) The NIDCC coordinates all national-level internal defense and internal development activities, reviews region or province plans, establishes priorities for their implementation, and allocates resources.

b. Organization. Organizations participating in consolidation operations are combined into a province task force (TF) which, in turn, is subdivided into district, village, and hamlet...
TF. All TF are interdepartmental and consist of civilian and military operational elements structured to assume political, economic, social, psychological, populace and resources control, intelligence, and tactical responsibilities in the designated area of operations. All elements of the provincial TF normally are controlled by the province governor who exercises operational control through senior officials of each element. Subordinate district, village, and hamlet TF usually are controlled by leaders within the political structure who also exercise operational control over designated military elements. When possible, boundaries and phase lines are established to include entire political subdivisions. Communications are planned to provide an interlocking, integrated network used by police, armed forces, paramilitary, intelligence, and internal development organizations.

c. Operations. Consolidation operations involve the implementation of integrated activities of the armed, paramilitary, and police forces and the economic, social, political, psychological, and civic action cadres. When civilian facilities or organizations are ineffective, the armed forces may provide these until civilian development programs have taken effect.

(1) Internal defense. Planning insures that adequate personnel and materiel for tactical, populace and resources control, and intelligence operations are available at the beginning of the consolidation operation or are programmed to become available as required. Forces allocated should be superior to the insurgent force threat in the operational area. Force requirements include armed and paramilitary forces to engage insurgent tactical forces and police and intelligence forces to maintain law and order, control populace and materiel resources, and locate, identify, and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure. Plans must establish effective command and control measures to insure that force capabilities are applied effectively and are coordinated through the provincial Area Coordination Center.

(2) Internal development. Planning insures that sufficient personnel and materiel resources are available or are programmed to provide adequate support for each stage of the consolidation operation. Force requirements include sufficient political advisors, social workers, economic advisors and operators, and PSYOP/information personnel to attain internal development objectives.

(3) Training. All internal defense and internal development forces required to conduct consolidation operations should be trained prior to actual operations. Training and indoctrination of armed, paramilitary, and police forces, and intelligence, political, economic, civil administration, and PSYOP cadres should be conducted on a team basis. Interdepartmental TF elements organized to meet the requirements of the hamlets, villages, and districts should be trained together in a central government training facility and their training should include information concerning the specific populations with which they will be working.

(4) Combat service support. Combat service support provides support for both the internal defense and the internal development aspects of the campaign. In some nations, military combat service support systems and resources may provide personnel, administrative, logistical, and civil affairs support; however, this support normally is furnished by a combination of civilian and military organizations. Some combat service support considerations peculiar to consolidation operations are—

(a) Effort should be made to provide adequate resources to provincial agencies before operations are undertaken.
(b) Proper funding procedures should be established to provide for unanticipated expenditures. For example, if, during the initial stages of a consolidation operation, hamlets are found to be inaccessible to trucks, then ox carts, pack animals, and porters may have to be hired. Compensation should be made for losses of personal property, and proper PSYOP support should be employed to avoid confusion and loss of faith in the government.

83. Offensive Stage

The initial requirement is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. Once this is accomplished, adequate government forces should remain in the area to provide protection to the population.

a. Concept. The offensive stage entails moving the civil/military TF into the operational area; destroying, dispersing, and clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; locating, identifying, and destroying or neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure; and installing an efficient HC governmental administration.

b. Organization. TF are structured to conduct offensive tactical operations with command and control exercised through the military chain of command. TF headquarters move directly to the district headquarters location and subordinate TF headquarters move to their assigned villages or hamlets. Intelligence and police forces may accompany the tactical elements.

c. Operations. Forces must be prepared to react to unexpected levels of violence from either the insurgent force or the population; however, to protect the population, only the degree of combat power necessary to accomplish the mission should be employed. In addition to clearing the area of tactical forces, continuing effort must be made to neutralize the insurgent infrastructure which has the capability of replacing insurgent forces from the population.

(1) Tactical operations. Offensive combat patrolling, saturation patrolling, and small-unit actions are used to disrupt insurgent operations and to gain information. If insurgent units are large and well trained, strike operations conducted by large forces may be required to destroy them. Ambushes, raids, and other techniques are employed in conjunction with saturation patrolling and large strike operations.

(2) Populace and resources control operations. Curfews, spot checks, searches, a system of information reporting, and other similar measures are initiated. The police and other security organizations institute surveillance and populace and materiel control measures to deprive the insurgent of population support. In addition, they identify and neutralize the infrastructure in order to provide the basis for effective internal defense in the development stage. PSYOP personnel assist in making populace and resources control measures more acceptable to the population.

(3) Intelligence. An intelligence program is established by intelligence agencies and police forces. Interrogation, loyalty screening, and cataloging of information are undertaken to assist in identifying and attacking the insurgent infrastructure.

84. Development Stage

The development stage is characterized by the cessation of territorial expansion initiated in the offensive stage. The objective of the development stage is to establish TF firmly in their respective areas to permit the introduction and establishment of internal defense and internal development organizations and operations. The primary task is to provide adequate defense for population centers and other vital areas and installations against insurgent tactical, propaganda, and intelligence operations.

a. Concept. The development stage entails
defending the area against insurgent attack to permit civilian and other governmental agencies to conduct internal development and security programs. It may involve training local irregular and paramilitary forces to assume the defensive and security missions of the regular armed forces. Tactical operations are conducted to deny insurgents access to support and to provide a secure base from which the campaign can be extended into other areas. Offensive tactical operations are required to eliminate insurgent tactical forces; however, defense of areas such as population centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, and LOC also are important and necessary. PSYOP are continued to gain and hold population support.

b. Organization. TF structuring remains essentially the same as for the offensive stage except that internal development, security, and combat service support elements join the tactical elements which are tailored for aggressive defense of the area.

c. Operations. In the development stage, operational emphasis shifts from military internal defense to civilian internal development. In essence, the armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect the enclaves established during the offensive stage. This permits other TF elements—primarily the political, economic, social, and psychological action cadres—to conduct their activities effectively.

(1) Internal defense. In the development stage, tactical operations, to include saturation patrolling and defense of the area, are the primary mission of designated armed or paramilitary forces. During this stage, advisory assistance is continued in training paramilitary and irregular forces to participate in area internal defense and internal development programs.

(a) Tactical operations. Saturation patrolling, extended in range and scope, is conducted over the entire area to be controlled. Efforts are made to seek out the insurgent and block approaches into the controlled area. Follow-up offensive operations of the strike variety are mounted only after the necessary intelligence organization has been established and is providing timely and accurate information.

(b) Populace and resources control operations. Police cadres organize, plan, and operate forces to maintain an adequate, effective state of law and order. They also control the movement of personnel and materiel and secure materiel items during production.

(2) Internal development. As the area is defended and secured, governmental and private agencies insure that necessary resources are introduced to conduct internal development activities. This includes political administrators who assume the responsibilities of government. Surveys are conducted with assistance from the local population to determine locally available resources and current requirements.

(a) Economic, social, and political development is undertaken by the armed forces, paramilitary, and civil agencies. These include short and mid-range self-help projects which involve the training of local personnel in skills suitable for the continued economic, social, and political growth of the area. Loyal village and hamlet governmental leaders and administrators are selected and trained. When the situation permits, local personnel may be recruited and trained for local defense or service in the armed forces.

(b) Psychological/information activities are continued to motivate and condition the population to support both internal defense and internal development efforts. Internal development activities and supporting military civic action are used to
demonstrate government concern for the population and to solicit its participation in reconstruction programs and in defense against insurgent attack.

85. Completion Stage

The completion stage represents establishment of an environment which will enable peaceful development. This is necessarily a gradual process. Although it cannot be identified precisely, completion, as a deliberate operational stage, eventually comes to an end. Completion stage operations are conducted to permit the population to pursue normal activities and to attain economic, social, and political objectives within a peaceful environment.

a. Concept. The completion stage entails acceleration of internal development programs and is marked by the capability of the local population to insure defense against both internal and external insurgent attack. Concentrated effort is made to return local governmental control to the people at a rate commensurate with their ability to conduct normal governmental functions.

b. Organization. TF organization undergoes a greater modification in the completion stage than in any other stage.

(1) Structuring. District and hamlet TF may begin to lose armed forces and certain internal development cadre elements. Only when the entire province has been consolidated will provincial TF undergo the same changes. Elements released from districts, villages, and hamlets are consolidated within the provincial TF for employment in other districts.

(2) Command and control. Province, district, and other leaders begin to relinquish centralized control over lower-level internal defense and internal development activities and allow more freedom of action to subordinate elements. As the threat is reduced, province governors allow district directors to administer their districts.

c. Operations. As local administrators gain experience, outside cadres which have performed these functions may be released for other assignments. As the local police become more efficient, they may be reduced or moved to other areas. If a local paramilitary force has been recruited and trained and has achieved a sufficient measure of confidence and ability, some of its elements may be withdrawn and reassigned. Prior to the reduction of security forces or their transfer from a given area, permanent government control must be established. Before initiating the extension of government-controlled areas, the government must insure that it has adequate resources to carry out its program. Requests for protection and assistance may be received from hamlets and villages outside the area. Such requests should not be honored until the government is prepared fully for the extension of consolidation operations into these new areas; however, strike operations may be mounted to relieve the pressure on these hamlets and villages and to reassure the people that the government is interested in their welfare.

(1) Internal defense. Redeployment must not take place until local paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces are capable of maintaining tactical defense and security. A local reserve force should be established and provincial reserves provided if they are needed. Regional armed forces provide an additional reserve capability which can be used in responding to insurgent attacks.

(2) Internal development. Economic, social, political, and psychological development activities should be conducted within a political framework acceptable to the population.

86. U. S. Assistance

U. S. and Allied economic and military assistance may include funds, materiel, and advisors. Permanent U. S. advisory efforts, to include those of the U. S. Department of State, USAID, USIS, and the military, may extend from national down to local level. U. S.
advisors with internal development agencies and HC armed, paramilitary, police, and other forces assist in planning and conducting the various aspects of the campaign. In concept, the advisory effort at each level is organized similarly to the U. S. Country Team at national level. In this respect, it is desirable that one U. S. representative be charged with coordination responsibility for the programs of all U. S. advisors at his level. FM 31–73 contains further details on advisory assistance.

Section III. STRIKE CAMPAIGN

87. General

The strike campaign consists of a series of combat operations; therefore, other internal defense activities are minimized during an actual strike. The strike campaign is conducted against insurgent tactical forces and bases outside of provincial areas of control. Strike operations are conducted either in zones under insurgent control or in contested zones. FM 31–16 contains additional guidance on strike operations.

88. Concepts

Strike operations are conducted in remote or contested areas by armed forces and are coordinated through appropriate Area Coordination Centers in the strike area. Since the main objective of a strike is either destruction or harassment, strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

89. Organization

Forces assigned strike missions should be relieved of area responsibilities well in advance of the operation. Preferably, such forces are controlled at the national or regional level and are assigned no permanent area responsibilities. Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient TF which are capable of operating for given periods of time in areas remote from home bases. The strike force normally is assigned a specific area in which to conduct operations. In addition to combat forces, TF may contain intelligence, police, and other military and civilian elements.

90. Operations

Once insurgent forces or bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. The insurgents' ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly and with respect to avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance operations sight relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained until strike forces can be deployed to destroy them. Due to the necessity to react in a timely manner to intelligence concerning insurgent forces, thorough analysis of all factors affecting the situation is rare in strike operations. When an area is suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, reconnaissance should be conducted, followed by an attack or raid.

a. Type strike operations include encirclement, pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack. Combat support and combat service support of strike operations are planned to insure responsiveness to the operations plan. Operations outside of the support range of fixed combat service support installations may require that these elements be attached or assigned directly from field depots and tactical bases. The coordination of these activities is accomplished between the TF commander and the appropriate headquarters.

b. Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional intelligence may be followed immediately by a coordinated attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize thorough reconnoitering of an area and is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small unit operations. If a sizeable insurgent force is located, friendly units maintain contact until strike
forces can be deployed to assist in the destruction of the insurgent force.

c. Since strikes are conducted in insecure areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal after mission accomplishment.

Section IV. REMOTE AREA CAMPAIGN

92. General
The remote area campaign is undertaken in contested areas to establish HC strongholds or in areas under partial insurgent control. These areas usually are populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area campaigns may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population within which insurgent forces have established training bases, rest areas, weapons factories, farms, or major infiltration routes. Remote area operations normally are conducted by specially trained and selected units. The material contained herein should be used in conjunction with FM 30–31, FM 31–16, FM 31–20, FM 31–20A, FM 31–21, FM 31–21A, FM 31–73, and FM 41–10.

93. Concepts
The remote area campaign is conducted to establish islands of resistance in insurgent-infested areas. These islands of resistance serve as HC operational bases to support strike and consolidation operations. Success of a given remote area operation is more assured if there is a segment of the resident population willing to support the remote area program. Operations can best be undertaken in areas under insurgent control if the remote area force contains personnel indigenous to the operational area who can influence the local population. Initially, additional combat and combat support forces may be required to assist the remote area force in establishing secure operational bases.

94. Organization
a. Remote Area Tactical Forces. The remote area tactical force should be composed mainly of personnel indigenous to the operational area. The type of tactical force employed (armed, paramilitary, or irregular) will depend on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political climate, and the logistical support available. The size and composition of the force depends on the degree of area control exercised by the insurgents and the potential for recruiting and developing an adequate local force. When the tactical force is recruited from local inhabitants, local leaders must be used even though their military capabilities may be limited. By using local leaders, more positive control is assured and training, indoctrination, and incorporation of the local force into the HC governmental structure is enhanced.

b. HC Forces. Few nations have or will have military units which are capable of conducting a remote area campaign. A nation with the requirement to conduct a remote area campaign has the following alternatives:

(1) It may employ existing armed forces or paramilitary organizations and rely on U. S. military assistance to provide the skills and capabilities lacking in its own forces.

(2) It may organize units similar to the U. S. Army Special Forces to conduct remote area operations; however, considerable time must be allowed to organize, train, and deploy such a force.

(3) If the HC has an immediate need to conduct a remote area campaign and has inadequate resources, it may provide those personnel necessary for government administration and request that U. S. military forces be used in operational and training roles.

(4) The HC may desire that the U.S. conduct a unilateral remote area cam-
campaign to provide a “bridge” between the HC government and various tribal, religious, racial, or political minorities.

95. Operations

Remote area operations generally are of long duration and encompass the functional areas of advisory assistance and tactical, civil affairs, PSYOP, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations.

a. Planning. Consideration must be given to geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other fields which may enhance or hinder success of remote area operations.

(1) Important political considerations are the motivations, ambitions, and influence of the existing leadership. A complete understanding of the theoretical and actual power structure of the operational area is necessary since actual control may rest with non-governmental religious, tribal, or other groups.

(2) Important sociological considerations are population size and distribution, basic racial stock, minority groups, social structure, religion, and culture, all of which may be either a source of trouble or assistance.

b. Stages. Remote area operations include a preparation stage followed by the operational stages of offense, development, and completion. All operations are long-term and continuous in nature, and are directed at defeating the insurgent movement through the destruction or neutralization of its infrastructure and tactical organizations.

(1) The preparation stage entails delineation of the area of operations; collection and assessment of data and information of the operational area; an estimate of resource requirements; and, finally, preparation of the operations plan.

(2) The offensive stage entails moving the remote area force into the operational area; establishing a secure base from which to launch operations; destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure; and establishing or re-establishing HC government.

(3) The development stage entails the conduct of aggressive defense operations, primarily by saturation patrolling. In this stage, short-term military civic action programs are continued and serve as the medium through which long-term internal development programs are initiated. Advisory assistance in training paramilitary or irregular forces for populace and resources control, intelligence, and PSYOP is initiated. Advisory assistance in civilian activities and the extension of U. S.-sponsored internal development programs may be required in such areas as health, welfare, and education.

(4) The completion stage entails continuing development stage activities, transferring operational control to appropriate civil agencies, and initiating new remote area operations in adjacent areas.

c. Tactical Operations. Tactical operations consist primarily of raids, ambushes, and combat patrols which are conducted to interdict and harass insurgent forces, training areas, and logistical installations. These operations deny the insurgents free movement within the operational area and access to local support. Reconnaissance patrols may provide intelligence as a basis for initiating tactical operations. FM 31–16 contains a detailed discussion of tactical operations.

d. Intelligence Operations—Both Covert and Overt. Intelligence operations provide specific and general knowledge of the area of operation, the general population, and the insurgents.

e. Civil Affairs Operations. Military civic action is the medium through which HC and U.S. internal development programs are initiated in remote areas. A successful military civic action program produces intelligence, personnel re-
sources, and psychological support for the remote area force.

f. PSYOP. PSYOP are directed at the civilian population, the remote area tactical force, and the insurgent. In most remote areas where minority groups are present, PSYOP themes must be tailored to specific target audiences.


g. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Populace and resources control operations normally are conducted by civil agencies; however, in the remote area operational environment, these civil agencies may be nonexistent, insurgent-dominated, or otherwise ineffective. This may require that the remote area force conduct its own populace and resources control operations or augment, control, and advise local forces. The remote area force must be fully capable of conducting populace and resources control operations and organizing and training local security forces. The attitude and cooperation of the population normally determine the extent of populace and resources control imposed; however, care must be taken not to alienate the population by establishing excessively rigid measures. To insure understanding by the population, populace and resources control programs must be supported by PSYOP.

h. Advisory Assistance. The remote area force usually is supported by a program other than the MAP; however, U. S. advisory assistance forces may be required to extend MAP activities into the operational area. One example would be the organization, equipping, training, and advising of paramilitary units to assume the defense of the operational area as part of development stage activities. FM 31–21A contains additional discussion of advisory assistance efforts in remote area operations.

96. U. S. Assistance

Remote area operations are particularly suited for U. S. Army Special Forces units which are trained, equipped, and organized to conduct them. U. S. MAP and USAID economic assistance programs may support the remote area campaign by furnishing advisory assistance, weapons, communications equipment, clothing, and other military materiel. In addition, they may provide seed, fertilizer, civic development construction materials, and other economic support necessary for internal development.
CHAPTER 8
OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

97. Purpose and Scope

This chapter delineates the six major operational roles which military forces may employ to accomplish their stability operations missions. The objectives, concepts, and modes of performing these roles are explained. Further, the interrelationship of these roles and the manner in which they support national campaigns are clarified.

98. Stability Operations Roles

Military forces accomplish stability operations missions through the conduct of advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. These operations may be conducted by the military alone or in coordination with other governmental agencies in support of internal defense and internal development programs. Through these operational roles, the full capabilities of military forces can be coordinated and directed toward the attainment of internal security objectives.

Section II. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

99. General

U. S./HC and Allied advisory assistance includes furnishing advice on military organization, training, operations, doctrine, and material. In addition, U. S. advisory assistance may include providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support for HC military forces.

100. Objective

The objective of advisory assistance is to increase the capabilities of HC organizations to operate efficiently and to perform their missions in the given operational environment. Accomplishment of the advisory assistance objective will insure effective planning, organization, operations, training, and equipping of forces to conduct stability operations.

101. Concepts

Organizations and individuals possessing higher skill and material resource levels assist in imparting their knowledge to less developed organizations and individuals through advisory assistance. Although advisory assistance continues throughout all phases of insurgency, it is most important during Phase I. Some organizations perform advisory assistance as a primary mission, whereas other units may conduct it as a secondary or ancillary role. In the latter instance, advisory assistance requirements may necessitate temporarily downgrading the primary mission in order to train, organize, and equip other forces. When the U. S. provides combat support and combat service support units to the HC, U. S. advisors normally will exercise operational control over these forces.

102. Organization

All organizations must be prepared to provide temporary or long-term advisory assistance to those with less developed capabilities. The provision of advisory assistance cadres to
major organizations is coordinated at the national level by the NIDCC and at subnational levels by the Area Coordination Center. The conduct of advisory assistance may involve the tailoring of mobile training teams to accomplish specific missions. If required, training centers may be established. On-the-job training may be conducted by units having specialized equipment for other units which are projected to receive this equipment in the near future.

103. Operations

Advisory assistance supports both internal defense and internal development. Specifically, advisory assistance operations—

a. Insure that plans are properly prepared, coordinated, published, and disseminated. They also insure that plans are feasible and support national objectives.

b. Help establish effective training programs and assist in the organization and conduct of training.

c. Assist in the organizing and equipping of newly activated units.

d. May include providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support units which are supporting HC forces.

104. U. S. Advisory Assistance

U. S. advisory assistance is provided primarily through DOD, USAID, and USIS. Assistance also may be provided by other official and nonofficial organizations. Within DOD, the principal agency charged with providing advisory assistance is the MAAG, Mission, or Military Assistance Command. The military advisory organization performs the following tasks:

a. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising armed and paramilitary forces in the conduct of stability operations.

b. Training and advising HC armed forces on new equipment provided by MAP.

c. In coordination with USAID, organizing, equipping, training, and advising HC police organizations.

d. In coordination with USIS, advising HC armed and paramilitary forces and governmental agencies in PSYOP/information activities.

e. Providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support forces operating in conjunction with HC forces.

f. Monitoring the utilization, maintenance, and operation of MAP-provided equipment and supplies.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

105. General

a. Civil affairs is a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. Civil affairs includes any activity of command which embraces the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly or occupied country or area. Civil affairs operations may involve the performance of specified functions or the exercise of certain authority by military forces which normally is the responsibility of the local government.

b. The scope of civil affairs operations will vary with the type of local government, status of forces agreements, degree of authority accorded, and influence of the economic, social, and political background of both the country and the population. When U. S. forces are committed to stability operations, their mission is political as well as military. All of their actions will have civil-military implications, and they will be engaged in civil affairs activities whether designated as such or not. The scope of civil affairs can be divided into seven major activities.

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

(2) Support for the functions of government for a civilian population.

(3) Community relations of the military forces.

(4) Military civic action as part of stability operations.
(5) Military participation in populace and resources control programs.
(6) Military support of civil defense.
(7) PSYOP.

106. Objectives

The objectives of civil affairs operations are to organize and motivate the civil population to assist the government and military forces by eliminating or reducing political, economic, and sociological problems.

107. Concepts

a. In Phase I insurgency, civil affairs efforts are devoted primarily to providing staff assistance in planning, organizing, and training military forces in civil affairs aspects of internal defense. In addition, civil affairs units and staff elements may assist HC military and civilian agencies in internal development activities, mainly through military civic action.

b. In Phases II and III, civil affairs efforts may be concentrated on providing normal civil affairs staff and operational assistance to military forces conducting strike, remote area, and consolidation operations. Representatives of military units also may be assigned to civil governmental agencies to coordinate civil affairs activities.

c. Civil affairs liaison should be established between all U. S. and HC military forces and government agencies. This may be accomplished through a system specifically designed for this purpose or through the civil affairs staff elements of existing U. S. units or advisory teams.

109. Operations

a. Civil affairs operations may range from the informal day-to-day community relations activities performed by individuals to the planned and organized operations of units. Civil affairs operations should be based upon good relationships with the population. Civil affairs operations conducted to compensate for lack of troop discipline, discourtesy, or dishonesty in dealings with the people will attain minimal results. On the other hand, where sound rapport has been established between U. S./HC forces and the population, properly administered civil affairs operations may be expected to contribute materially to the attainment of internal defense and internal development objectives.

b. Planning for civil affairs operations is comparable to other planning conducted for internal defense and internal development. Policies and objectives must be defined clearly to insure adequate guidelines for those responsible for developing overall internal defense and internal development plans. Civil affairs planning must consider political as well as military aspects and provide for possible future modifications. Planning for civil affairs should consider the following:

(1) Military civic action operations to be conducted by HC military forces and U. S. support required.
(2) U. S./HC civil affairs mobile training team requirements and resources.
(3) Civil affairs personnel and units required to support U. S. and HC agencies at subnational levels.
(4) Civil affairs training program requirements for U. S./HC and Allied forces.
(5) HC civil affairs requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country where needed.
c. Combined U. S./HC planning at national level should integrate civil affairs requirements into the overall internal defense and internal development plan and provide adequate guidance for similar planning at subnational levels.

d. Certain civil affairs responsibilities assigned to a tactical commander may include functions beyond his capability and will require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or units. (See FM 41–10 for a detailed discussion of civil affairs organizational capabilities.) Examples of tasks which may require specialized civil affairs assistance are:

1. Increasing the efficiency of the local administration.
2. Expediting payment of legitimate claims.
3. Developing the efficiency of the civil police organization and enhancing its image with the population.
4. Improving local health through public health measures.
5. Initiating or improving public welfare activities.
7. Establishing school systems, procuring teachers, and initiating training programs.
8. Organizing and modernizing public facilities.

e. Military civic action will be the most prevalent civil affairs function performed by military forces in stability operations. This function involves the participation by military or paramilitary forces, using their military skills, equipment, and resources, in economic and sociological projects that are useful to the population at all levels. These projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation, which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the HC government with the population.

1. “Do-goodism” for do-goodism’s sake seldom is beneficial, often is costly, and in many instances may provoke alienation of the population rather than win its support; therefore, when planning military civic action projects, the following criteria should be considered: (A military civic action worksheet, such as shown in fig. 7, will prove of assistance in formulating civic action projects.)

(a) Degree of need expressed by the people.
(b) Extent of benefit to the majority of the people.
(c) Ability of the people to help themselves in the project.
(d) Pride and morale resulting from completion of the project.
(e) Speed of completion to provide immediate impact in the minds of the people.
(f) Degree to which these projects support internal defense and internal development plans and programs.
(g) Extent of improvement of the government image in the target area.

2. The degree of emphasis placed on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgency. During Phase I, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socio-economic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, a significant allocation of military resources may be devoted to civic action projects which provide both long- and short-range benefits. An example is the training of conscripts in skills which have both military and civilian application in order that these personnel may make meaningful contributions to their communities after release from military service. Remote areas, inhabited by ethnic and other minority groups susceptible to subversion, should be given civic action priority. During Phases II and III, military civic action will be concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects should produce noticeable improvements
**PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CRITERIA</strong></th>
<th><strong>DESIRABILITY</strong></th>
<th><strong>FEASIBILITY</strong></th>
<th><strong>JUSTIFICATION</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>Will the population support it?</td>
<td>Does it conform to local customs?</td>
<td>Does it support overall internal defense and internal development plans and programs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC WORKS</td>
<td>Will the military support it?</td>
<td>Are all necessary skills available?</td>
<td>Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>Will other agencies support it?</td>
<td>Are labor, materials, and equipment available?</td>
<td>Will it avoid serious impairment of primary military mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will the government support it?</td>
<td>Can it be supported by current programmed funds?</td>
<td>Does it avoid duplication with efforts of other agencies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can it be started immediately?</td>
<td>Complete by indicating yes or no response with detailed explanatory notes attached.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it have immediate impact?</td>
<td>Close association with civil affairs functional teams.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it benefit a majority of the people?</td>
<td><strong>Other functional areas as required.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it have a favorable psychological effect?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is it amendable to publicity exploitation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it improve the government image?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it improve civil-military relations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it lend itself to self-help?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will it contribute to the stabilization of society?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Type military civic action worksheet.
within a comparatively short period. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities placed on defense programs may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to sick and wounded civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter to displaced persons.

110. Interaction With Other Military Roles

Civil affairs operations impact upon and interact with other major military roles. When planning and conducting civil affairs operations, the following interrelationships must be considered:

a. Advisory Assistance. Military forces should be advised and trained in their responsibilities and capabilities in the field of civil affairs, particularly military civic action. In addition to the constructive role which the military forces play in internal development, advisory assistance also should stress proper conduct of military personnel in their relationships with the civilian population.

b. PSYOP. Civil affairs must be supported by PSYOP to insure that projects under consideration will have the desired effect upon the population. To avoid misunderstanding, confusion, and possible discontent, civil affairs programs should be preceded and accompanied by PSYOP to inform the population of what is being accomplished in their behalf and why. PSYOP follow-up should be conducted to provide feedback on the eventual impact of civil affairs projects.

c. Intelligence Operations. Civil affairs must be based to a large extent upon information concerning the population and insurgent activities in the area. Intelligence operations can assist in providing this information. Civil affairs personnel and units, in turn, can provide intelligence information gained from on-the-ground observation while conducting civil affairs projects.

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Populace and resources control operations should be conducted in conjunction with civic action projects. Populace and resources control operations must insure that personnel and resources are protected from insurgent actions and that maximum benefits accrue to the civilian population. They also should insure that the completed civic action projects are used for the purposes intended and not exploited to the detriment of the people.

e. Tactical Operations. During Phases II and III of an insurgency, tactical operations must insure that civil affairs operations are conducted in a relatively secure environment. Prior to the initiation of civil affairs activities, tactical operations should attempt to reduce the insurgent military capability to jeopardize the successful accomplishment of civil affairs activities. During the conduct of civil affairs operations—particularly civic action—tactical operations protect participating personnel and organizations from insurgent attack and harassment.

111. U. S. Assistance

a. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contains the basic authority for U. S. armed forces to provide assistance and to engage in military civic action. Responsibility for carrying out nonmilitary U. S. foreign assistance is vested in USAID which also has the responsibility for the central direction and coordination of military and economic assistance programs. The objectives of such assistance are to increase the capabilities of foreign governments and reduce their dependence upon the U. S.

b. Military aid to foreign governments usually is furnished under the provisions of the MAP which provides for both materiel and training support. U. S. military policy encourages the use of armed and paramilitary forces in developing countries on projects helpful to economic and social development, provided such activities do not detract from capabilities to perform primary military missions. The MAAG is the U. S. military organization normally charged with the responsibility for administering the MAP and insuring that HC
military forces realize the importance of good civil/military relationships.

c. The MAAG or the Military Mission operates within the framework of the U. S. Country Team which coordinates U. S. interests with those of the HC government. MAAG responsibilities and functions are detailed in paragraph 148. Military assistance programming, funding, and technical assistance require a coordinated Country Team effort. At this level, decisions are reached as to which portion of available U. S. funds for HC development should come from USAID and which should come from MAP; which U. S. department or agency should be assigned responsibility for specific projects; and how U. S. personnel and resources should be allocated.

d. While some military civic actions may entail a major outlay of personnel and materiel resources, U. S. military policy emphasizes advice and guidance at the local level to include the initiation of self-help programs which can be accomplished with available local resources.

Section IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

112. General
Both the HC government and insurgent forces need the support of the population to accomplish their respective programs; therefore, attaining population support represents a major struggle between these forces. PSYOP are an integral part of all internal defense and internal development activities and are tailored to meet specific requirements of each area and operation. Military and nonmilitary actions must be prejudged in terms of potential psychological impact. This often may require that short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed in order to preserve long-range psychological objectives. FM 33–1, FM 33–5, FM 100–5, and FM 100–20 contain further guidance on PSYOP.

113. Objectives
PSYOP are designed to support the achievement of national objectives and are directed toward specific target groups. The main target groups and associated PSYOP objectives are discussed below.

a. Insurgents. PSYOP objectives are to create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, sabotage, and defection within insurgent forces. Emphasis should be placed on national programs designed to win the insurgent over to the side of the government and rehabilitate him into a loyal citizen.

b. Civilian Population. PSYOP objectives are to gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HC government and its internal defense and internal development objectives.

c. HC and Allied Stability Operations Forces. PSYOP objectives are essentially the same as for the civilian population, and thus contribute to building and maintaining the morale of these forces.

d. Foreign Groups. PSYOP objective is to gain support for HC efforts, thus denying this foreign support to the insurgent.

114. Concepts
The national PSYOP program, containing national objectives, guidance, and desired approaches, is prepared and directed by the NIDCC. Military organizations and civilian agencies at all levels develop PSYOP within the parameters established by the national PSYOP plan. The plan is interpreted at the various military and political levels in terms of local requirements and is coordinated through appropriate Area Coordination Centers. The U. S. and HC PSYOP efforts are mutually supporting and promote the attainment of population support for the HC government rather than for the U. S. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all psychological activities are executed vigorously within clearly established channels, and PSYOP planners develop a limited number of appropriate themes which can be disseminated by unsophisticated means. These themes, using words familiar to
the target audiences, should be clear, easily understood, and repeated frequently.

115. Organization

Units are organized and trained to emphasize psychological activities at all levels.

a. National Level. Both military and civilian PSYOP organizations exist at national level and, through the NIDCC, are responsible for—

(1) Planning the national PSYOP program.
(2) Organizing, training, and allocating HC PSYOP units and resources.
(3) Conducting strategic PSYOP.
(4) Developing criteria of program effectiveness.
(5) Monitoring all types of propaganda.

b. Regional, Provincial, and District Levels. The regional Area Coordination Center translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for subordinate provincial and district Area Coordination Centers, military commanders, and civilian agencies. The provincial Area Coordination Center provides direction to provincial paramilitary forces, military forces, civilian agencies, and PSYOP teams which may be attached to the province. Since paramilitary organizations normally do not have organic PSYOP teams, PSYOP support is provided by civilian or armed forces organizations. Both military and civilian PSYOP personnel are responsible for—

(1) Advising the commander on the psychological implications of nonmilitary and military courses of action under consideration.
(2) Explaining and emphasizing the importance of the PSYOP program to U. S. advisory personnel and HC counterparts.
(3) Participating in the Area Coordination Center.
(4) Interpreting national PSYOP policies and guidelines.
(5) Establishing and executing a local PSYOP program.
(6) Using PSYOP to support all other internal defense and internal development operations.

(7) Requesting outside PSYOP support as required.
(8) Coordinating with HC or U. S. military units operating in political subdivisions to insure that their PSYOP is aligned properly with the area PSYOP programs.
(9) Indoctrinating military and civilian government personnel in the proper standards of conduct and behavior toward the population.
(10) Notifying adjacent, higher, and lower headquarters of PSYOP opportunities.
(11) Expediting the flow of PSYOP intelligence.

c. Military. PSYOP staff elements and military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national programs and directives developed by the NIDCC. Staff elements are responsible for planning and coordinating PSYOP. They frequently are supported by military PSYOP units whose operations range from national strategic PSYOP to local tactical PSYOP and consolidation PSYOP. PSYOP units are organizationally tailored to meet mission requirements and should possess the capability to employ radio, loudspeaker, printing, motion picture, and other photographic equipment necessary in conducting PSYOP.

d. Facilities and Equipment. Facilities and equipment required for PSYOP vary depending on the area and scope of operations. All equipment capable of delivering a message or producing tangible items for distribution to the target audience is considered applicable to PSYOP.

(1) At the national level, relatively permanent structures are used to house radio and TV broadcasting equipment, heavy printing presses, photographic facilities, supplies, and operating personnel. These facilities often provide backup support for mobile PSYOP teams operating at lower echelons.
(2) At lower military and political levels, PSYOP capabilities often parallel those at national level, but equipment and facilities usually are less sophisti-
cated, fewer in number, and frequently mobile.

116. Operations

Operations range from strategic PSYOP at national level to consolidation and tactical PSYOP at the regional, provincial, district, and village levels. At the national level, operations exploit the broad aspects of internal defense and internal development programs, are general in scope, and deal primarily with national policy and programs. Tactical and consolidation PSYOP are responsive to local intelligence and address more specific target audiences. In nations containing large minority groups, PSYOP employ those languages and dialects deemed necessary. Military PSYOP and civilian information services planning must be closely coordinated and supervised at all levels to insure effectiveness and credibility.

a. Command Responsibility. Since military forces are representatives of the government and, in many cases, a major factor in the formation of attitudes, opinions, and behavior toward the government, commanders must constantly be aware of the psychological impact of operations conducted in their areas of responsibility. Every military operation has some degree of psychological impact upon the population, and the success of an operation often may depend upon the commander's awareness of both the military and political situation.

b. Basic Considerations. The armed forces of many HC will not be organized or trained to conduct PSYOP effectively. When this is the case, U. S. forces may be required to conduct PSYOP training for HC military and paramilitary forces.

c. Planning. The basic requisites for PSYOP planners are—

(1) An intimate knowledge of the background and history of the HC and its population, and the insurgent's organization and motivations.

(2) A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses which characterize ideological and political opponents.

(3) A continuing awareness of the morale patterns of friendly, neutral, and insurgent elements.

(4) An assurance that PSYOP plans support national objectives.

(5) A knowledge of all means of communication available to carry out PSYOP.

(6) The ability to categorize accurately the population into various types of audiences for the purpose of devising appropriate themes tailored to the susceptibility of specific groups.

(7) The availability of continuous, timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence.

d. Supported Campaigns. PSYOP themes must be tailored to support the type of campaign being conducted.

(1) In support of the consolidation campaign, PSYOP themes should stress the degree of security that is being afforded the population and the internal development benefits that can accrue with popular support.

(2) In support of the strike campaign, PSYOP themes should explain the purpose of the operation and stress that every effort is being made to provide for the safety of the civilian population. The decision to employ PSYOP prior to the actual conduct of military operations is weighed carefully against compromising surprise and security.

(3) In support of the remote area campaign, PSYOP themes are tailored to maintain the morale of remote area forces and to solicit the support of the population.

117. Interaction With Other Military Roles

PSYOP support and interact with other military operational roles as follows:

a. Advisory Assistance. MAAG and Mission advisors assist in establishing PSYOP capabilities within HC forces. PSYOP units and mobile training teams also may be employed. The PSYOP advisory effort includes—

(1) Assisting in organizing and equipping HC PSYOP units.
(2) Establishing HC PSYOP schools.
(3) Augmenting the capabilities of USIS and other U. S. civil agencies.
(4) Assisting in the preparation of propaganda and PSYOP media materials, dissemination of PSYOP media, and conduct of PSYOP.
(5) Assisting in the development and conduct of a national PSYOP program.
(6) Evaluating in-country PSYOP resources and developing new requirements and contingency plans.
(7) Assisting in establishing PSYOP training programs.
(8) Fulfilling approved HC PSYOP requirements.

b. Civil Affairs Operations. The success of civil affairs operations will, in large measure, depend upon the degree of support, coordination, and integration achieved with the PSYOP effort. The basic PSYOP approach is to prepare the population to accept and understand the value of proposed civil affairs projects. To project a favorable image of the national government, PSYOP support in this field must be directed toward the population. Particular emphasis should be placed on the beneficial aspects of civic action projects conducted at province, district, and village levels. For these operations, the following should be considered:

(1) Selecting those civil affairs projects which can best be supported by PSYOP in order to achieve desired results. For best PSYOP impact, long-range activities are subdivided into limited short-range objectives which are within the capabilities of the participating units.
(2) Arranging cross-visits of influential and respected persons between villages to provide eyewitness accounts of civil affairs operations.
(3) Using personalities who are known and respected to give speeches extolling the progress and virtues of civil affairs operations. Tapes of these speeches should be prepared for dissemination.
(4) Preparing motion pictures which portray military and civilian cooperation and stress civil affairs progress.
(5) Examining each civil affairs and PSYOP plan in light of local customs, religions, and taboos.
(6) Preparing PSYOP contingency plans to minimize adverse effects of removing troops from a partially completed project should this become a necessity.

c. Intelligence Operations. Intelligence is vital to a sound PSYOP program since population attitude and behavior, ranging from passiveness to hostility, must be reshaped into genuine acceptance of the HC effort. In supporting intelligence operations, the PSYOP objective is to convince the entire population that providing intelligence information to the government forces is to their benefit. PSYOP uses all means of communication to inform the people that—

(1) Strangers, suspicious persons, and unusual activities must be reported. Methods of reporting also should be explained.
(2) Rewards are available for specific types of information, to include information leading to the apprehension of insurgents and capture of their equipment and weapons. (Such rewards must, in fact, exist.)

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Actions resulting from populace and resources control operations often are unpopular because of restrictions imposed upon the population. PSYOP explains the need for these operations and the positive gains accruing to the individual from them. PSYOP support of populace and resources control operations—

(1) Makes the imposition of controls more acceptable to the population by relating their necessity to safety and well-being.
(2) Emphasizes that controls are imposed on the population solely because of insurgent activities and that controls will be reduced or lifted when insurgent activity in their area is reduced.
(3) Points out that food controls give the population an excuse to reduce or
eliminate the need to provide the insurgen ts with food.

(4) Educates the population concerning the importance of self-defense programs.

(5) Informs the population of the importance of protecting raw materials, factories, and crops against sabotage, pilferage, and waste.

(6) Informs the people that the insurgent cannot survive without population support, and that denial of this support will hasten the reduction of controls.

(7) Promotes the cooperation of the population in areas under consolidation and gains support for local programs and national objectives.

(8) Exploits the successes of military, paramilitary, police, and other security forces while protecting the population.

(9) Emphasizes the HC ability to protect the population in consolidated areas from violence, lawlessness, insurgent propaganda, and sabotage (providing the HC is able to do so).

(10) Educates the population to help destroy the insurgent infrastructure by reporting known insurgents and their activities to proper authority.

e. Tactical Operations. The ultimate PSYOP goals in support of tactical operations are to convince the armed insurgents to cease resistance and to persuade the population not to support the insurgent movement. Some means of obtaining these goals are—

(1) Educating and indoctrinating military and paramilitary forces on the importance of proper conduct and behavior toward the population.

(2) Informing the population of the purpose and nature of past and future tactical operations (security permitting).

(3) Informing the population where to receive medical aid and other assistance.

(4) Stressing the insurgents' responsibility for the destruction of life and property.

(5) Employing divisive propaganda themes which attempt to subvert insurgent leadership, create disunity and confusion, and lower troop morale in areas under insurgent control.

(6) Publicizing amnesty programs.

(7) Utilizing leaflets and air or ground loudspeaker surrender appeals against known or suspected enemy locations. This may be particularly effective if defectors are used to deliver loudspeaker messages.

(8) Indoctrinating troops with the need to honor surrender appeals.

118. U. S. Assistance

Support and advice to the HC government normally is conducted through the establishment of a Country Team subcommittee for PSYOP. Usually chaired by the USIS public affairs officer (PAO), this subcommittee is composed of representatives from each of the other U. S. departments and agencies on the Country Team. The subcommittee formulates the U. S. PSYOP program in-country and provides guidance for both military and civilian U. S. advisors and organizations. When PSYOP requirements exceed the capabilities and resources of USIS, augmentation may be required from U. S. Army PSYOP organizations. Normally, this assistance is provided by military advisors using MAP equipment with the objective of developing a PSYOP capability within the HC.

Section V. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

119. General

The collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of a nation or areas of operations susceptible to insurgency are vital to successful internal defense and internal development operations.
Of particular importance are those aspects of intelligence activities which are devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and protecting the HC against espionage, subversion, and sabotage. See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A for detailed guidance on internal defense and internal development intelligence operations.

a. To a large extent, internal defense and internal development operations are dependent upon intelligence and counterintelligence due to the fact that subversive insurgency relies on the population for success. The population is both a target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistical support; therefore, the people must be considered as a fourth major consideration of intelligence in addition to the three traditional considerations of enemy, weather, and terrain.

b. The interlocking nature of the insurgent infrastructure presents a complex and difficult target for intelligence operations. The party control apparatus normally will have been engaged for years in the subversion of the population and is securely imbedded and secreted within the mass civil organization. A thorough understanding of the insurgent infrastructure and the environmental situation is essential for intelligence planning and operations at all levels.

c. Intelligence operations in support of internal defense and internal development must be oriented toward the collection, processing, and dissemination of information concerning insurgent activities and insurgent/civil relationships. Specifically, major intelligence targets are—

(1) The infrastructure;
(2) Insurgent military forces; and
(3) The civilian population.

Both covert and overt measures must be employed in attacking these intelligence targets.

d. Counterintelligence operations must protect U. S./HC information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and facilities and materiel against sabotage. The insurgent is dependent upon espionage, subversion, and sabotage for success, and counterintelligence operations must reduce these activities to a minimum, employing both active and passive measures.

120. Objectives

Intelligence operations must support overall internal defense and internal development planning and operations by providing general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and the insurgent forces. In broad terms, intelligence objectives are to—

(1) Determine the indicators of portending insurgency;
(2) Obtain information concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population; and
(3) Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

121. Concepts

Insurgents employ a full range of measures to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. During Phase I, subversion is the primary measure by which the groundwork is laid for the more advanced stages of insurgency. This subversion is designed to alienate the population from the government and win the support of the people for the insurgency movement. During Phase II, guerrilla warfare erodes the strength and morale of government forces while, concurrently, insurgent strength and population support are increased. During Phase III, when sufficient military strength and population support have been gained, insurgents initiate a war of movement to defeat the government forces in decisive combat. Subversion precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire process, just as guerrilla warfare, once introduced, continues to support the war of movement.

a. As early as possible in Phase I, intelligence operations should attempt to establish evidence of subversion and whether this subversion is related to an insurgency movement so that the movement can be attacked and destroyed. This will involve operations directed against the Communist party infrastructure which consists of the hard core cellular party apparatus, its Revolutionary Committees, and its Party.
Youth Organization. Also considered as part of the infrastructure are those ostensibly legitimate civilian organizations which are insurgent-penetrated and controlled, popular front organizations, and covert village militia (guerrilla) forces. Counterintelligence operations include formulating and conducting security training programs and carrying out security measures necessary to protect U. S./HC information, personnel, facilities, and materiel against insurgent intelligence operations. These intelligence and counterintelligence measures continue throughout all phases of insurgency.

b. During Phase II, intelligence and counterintelligence operations initiated in Phase I continue and are expanded to include insurgent regional military forces. Regional forces receive their direction and are controlled by the hard core insurgent apparatus through a complex, interlocking organizational structure; therefore, personnel engaged in intelligence planning must be concerned primarily with identification and destruction or neutralization of the overall insurgent organization, rather than with piecemeal attacks on its organizational components.

c. During Phase III, intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be expanded to include insurgent main military forces. Since the mission of Main Force units is to engage government forces in a war of movement, intelligence and counterintelligence operations against insurgent Main Forces will approximate those conducted in limited and general war environments.

122. Organization

A unified, centralized intelligence system is essential to the effective conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. The tempo of intelligence must be maintained at the highest level of capability and intelligence operations must employ effectively both intelligence and counterintelligence measures. At national level, the intelligence system must provide for the following responsibilities and prerogatives: operate freely throughout the nation; maintain a central registry of intelligence information; maintain a centralized system of source control; coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence activities; collect, process, and disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information for the benefit of all authorized users; prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates; and coordinate those intelligence and counterintelligence operations mutually conducted with personnel of friendly foreign nations. Below national level, central points should be established at each level of government where the U. S. and HC intelligence efforts can be coordinated.

123. Operations

A thorough understanding of the societal environment is an essential element in the conduct of intelligence operations. Internal and external forces supporting or subverting a society must be understood in order to conduct effective intelligence operations. The basic intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from strategic intelligence reports and studies augmented by available current intelligence information of the area. These form the basis for preparation of the estimate of the situation and subsequent plans. The essential elements for processing this information are contained in FM 30–5 and FM 30–31.

a. The planning for production of intelligence is a continuous process at all levels, since the attack of specific targets may be initiated at any level. There are two significant areas attending intelligence collection planning. The first is strategic intelligence which may expose actual or potential insurgency problems and usually is derived from political, economic, and socio-cultural developments. The second encompasses such intelligence functions as combat intelligence and security. Planning in both areas is important in Phase I, and collection plans must insure that orders or requests for information to collection agencies are clear and concise.

b. Initial intelligence functions which must be accomplished to support current activities and to prepare for possible future operations are—
(1) Preparation of detailed studies regarding the terrain, weather, and population groups (to include ethnic, religious, and tribal minorities).

(2) Preparation of strength and vulnerability analyses of the U.S., HC, and the insurgent.

(3) Preparation, production, and distribution of nation-wide terrain maps and, where appropriate, aerial photographs.

c. The objective of intelligence production is to provide accurate and timely intelligence which satisfies military and civil requirements at each operational echelon. There must be a steady flow of intelligence information to and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S./HC and Allied headquarters and agencies. This necessitates frequent interdepartmental coordination between military and civil police and intelligence organizations. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format, scope, or standard of detail is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must contemplate production in several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities is a matter requiring careful analysis.

d. Timely dissemination of intelligence is perhaps the most critical aspect of the intelligence process. The frequent need for immediate reaction on vital intelligence information dictates the establishment of systems for quick processing and transmission of this data to military and police units at all levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should be established when facilities and resources permit.

e. Military security applies to military information, personnel, facilities, and materiel. Classified information must be protected by all available means and entrusted only to appropriately cleared personnel who require such knowledge or possession. Even after individuals have been investigated and cleared, commanders and intelligence personnel must continue to exercise close supervision and observation over the activities and behavior of individuals who, for one reason or another, may be subjected to insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure. Each unit must prepare and maintain standing operating procedures which prescribe the security discipline, measures, and modes of conduct to be observed.

124. U.S. Assistance

See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A.

Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS

125. General

Populace and resources control operations are necessary to control the populace and its materiel resources and to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against the HC. This section provides general guidance on various activities which comprise populace and resources control operations and establishes a basis upon which to develop tactics and techniques.

a. Objective. The objective of populace and resources control operations is to assist in preserving or re-establishing a state of law and order within a nation or area. Component tasks include: protecting LOC and hamlets from insurgent attack; safeguarding materiel and personnel; strengthening or establishing national authority over the population; severing relationships between the insurgent and the population; detecting and neutralizing insurgent organizations and activities; and preventing civilian interference with internal defense and internal development operations.

b. Concept. Police, intelligence, and other security agencies normally are established to maintain law and order in a peacetime environment. Their organizations are tailored to perform such tasks as protecting the population from common criminals and law-breakers and enforcing the established system of controls necessary to maintain reasonable order. In an active insurgency, security organizations have far more to contend with than the routine preservation of law and order. They are con-
fronted with a well organized insurgent machine which is adept at the disruption of a society through subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Coping with this problem normally is beyond the capabilities of peacetime security forces, and they must be expanded and reinforced by military and paramilitary forces.

(1) During Phase I, insurgents seek to gain control of the populace through a combination of persuasion, terror, and civil disturbance. In many cases, the government of a developing nation learns too late that it actually does not control its more remote areas. For this reason, insurgent activities and influence in these areas may expand rapidly, creating political vacuums which insurgents then attempt to fill. Early deployment of security forces to remote areas should take place in order to establish or re-establish a climate of law and order in which government administration and other development activities can be conducted. During Phase I, urban populace and resources control operations also may be expanded to deny insurgents materiel support from these areas. The number of insurgent elements in any area is based upon population density. Party cells normally are established in various blocks, districts, and regions throughout a city, as well as in such organizational elements as labor unions, youth groups, and social organizations, to conduct espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

(2) In Phases II and III, populace and resources control operations must be expanded to cope with increased societal disruption and the deterioration of law and order. In these phases, the insurgents possess a capability to conduct combat operations which necessitates the commitment of larger security forces to village and hamlet defense duties in order to permit the conduct of offensive operations by government armed forces.

c. Organization. Forces conducting populace and resources control operations should be organized, equipped, and trained to insure unity of command and to permit their operational employment with other forces. National agencies determine those populace and resources control requirements within their respective areas of responsibility and present them to the NIDCC. The NIDCC, assisted by these national agencies, prepares the overall national plan to insure interprovincial coordination of such operations as railway and frontier security and the protection of communications lines which cross provincial boundaries. Subnational Area Coordination Centers prepare their populace and resources control plans based on instructions and guidance provided by the NIDCC.

d. Operations. Populace and resources control measures must be limited to those which are absolutely essential and, once established, they must be enforced justly and firmly. Populace and resources control measures must conform to legal codes. In addition to prescribing possession of certain items, requiring permits for possession or movement of others, and regulating population movements, clear laws must be enacted governing authorized methods of enforcement and disposition of contraband. Populace and resources control operations must be closely supervised to prevent alienation of the population since populace and resources control operations lend themselves readily to graft and extortion. Equal emphasis should be placed on both in-country controls and control of imports. Populace and resources control operations are designed primarily to survey and control population and resources movement. These operations include, but are not limited to— (See FM 31–73 for a detailed discussion of the activities involved in these operations.)

(1) Employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage.

(2) Controlling movement of both personnel and materiel.
(3) Establishing check points and roadblocks.
(4) Establishing curfews and blackouts.
(5) Screening and documenting the population.
(6) Conducting cordon and search operations.
(7) Establishing rationing and price controls.
(8) Controlling refugees and displaced persons.
(9) Protecting resource storage areas from insurgent attack.

126. Law Enforcement

Law enforcement is primarily a police operation to protect the persons and property of the population against criminal acts, including those perpetrated by insurgent elements. Enforcement laws must be enacted temporarily authorizing governmental security and defense forces greater powers than ordinary. Procedural protections, such as search and seizure laws, often must be diminished to permit effective law enforcement measures against organized, mobile insurgents. PSYOP measures should be taken to inform the population of such changes in the law and to turn resentment of these changes and the resulting inconvenience against the insurgents. Emphasis should be placed on the strictly temporary nature of such legislation and its basic purpose, which is to protect the bulk of the population against the insurgents. Additional legal machinery, such as courts of limited jurisdiction to try particular classes of offenses, may be required to process the increased flow of prosecutions. In any case, early attention must be given to the capability of the court system to process cases quickly and fairly. Long periods of pretrial confinement tend to turn even the most loyal citizens against the government.

127. Defended Hamlets

Hamlets are organized, equipped, trained, and supported to provide their inhabitants with a self-defense capability.

a. Objectives. Specific objectives of defended hamlets are to provide security and defense for the population, sever relationships between the population and the insurgents, and facilitate internal development operations.

b. Concept. As far as possible, existing hamlets are converted into defended hamlets to enable the inhabitants to continue their normal pursuits. Converting existing sites more readily facilitates internal development, since people are more willing to defend their traditional homes and land; however, for tactical and other reasons, new hamlets may have to be established. New hamlets should be sited in areas easily defended and where the inhabitants can pursue their normal modes of livelihood. Defended hamlets should have a capability to ward off attack by small insurgent guerrilla units and to withstand assault by insurgent Regional or Main Force units long enough to permit reinforcement.

c. Organization. Hamlets which comprise a village are organized to be mutually supporting and provide defense in depth throughout the village complex.

(1) Hamlet defenders are recruited from the inhabitants and are formed into irregular forces.

(2) Both the complexity of hamlet defensive works and the size defense force needed are based primarily upon the insurgent threat and the terrain. Maximum use is made of local materials and personnel to construct defensive works.

(3) Organization of hamlet defense includes a security system that will provide continuous all-around protection. In order to organize the system in depth, various techniques are described in the four major zones below:

(a) Interior zone—area within the perimeter. Within the installation, underground or covered shelters are constructed. Covered routes are dug to defensive firing positions. The installation is divided into areas of security responsibility or compartmentalized.
(b) Perimeter zone—area immediately outside the installation. The perimeter should contain barriers, weapons positions, guard towers, and numerous obstacles. Maximum use is made of local materiel. Sentinels are essential and dogs are useful.

(c) Restricted zone—area outside of the perimeter zone. This area extends out to effective range of small arms fire; is cleared to provide good fields of fire and observation; is clearly marked to protect innocent wanderers; and contains numerous artificial obstacles and early warning devices. Traffic is checked and suspicious traffic rerouted. Emplaced explosives are kept under surveillance to prevent their use by the insurgent.

(d) Secure zone—area outside the restricted zone. This area extends out several kilometers or miles. In this zone, patrolling occurs and observation and listening posts are established. Local civilians are recruited into an early warning net.

(4) Measures to provide additional security include: curfews, blackouts, changing sentinel routes and times of relief, relocation of crew-served weapons, alert drills and rehearsals, and preplanned reaction capabilities.

d. Operations. The participation by all members of the hamlet in providing their own defense is accomplished by the integration of military, political, economic, and sociological activities into one operation.

(1) Prior to undertaking a defended hamlet program, the following questions should be resolved:

(a) Does the situation warrant the establishment of defended hamlets?

(b) Is the development of defended hamlets within the capability of the government?

(c) Does the terrain or area favor the establishment of defended hamlets?

(d) How will the inhabitants react to the establishment of defended hamlets? If reaction is unfavorable, how can this be changed?

(e) Will the advantages accrued by the establishment of defended hamlets outweigh the disadvantages?

(2) Plans to establish a defended hamlet should include—

(a) Priorities for development of complexes.

(b) Locations of defended hamlets.

(c) Methods by which the population can be motivated to enter the program voluntarily.

(d) Allocation of fortification materiel.

(e) Allocation of engineer assistance.

(f) Programs for training hamlet defense forces.

(g) Organization of the hamlet administrative system to include appointment and delineation of duties of hamlet chiefs, councils, committees, and others.

(h) Internal development activities.

(3) Resettlement of some families may be required to make the hamlet more compact and easily defended. When possible, resettlement should be made to sites within easy reach of the inhabitants' original agricultural plots or work areas.

(a) A house site for each family is designated.

(b) Advance warning of movement is given each household if feasible.

(c) Free transportation and sufficient time are provided to move families, animals, possessions, and salvageable building materials.

(d) Building materials are made available at the new site.

(e) Each family is given a subsidy to purchase needed materials and is compensated for losses and damage incurred during movement.
(f) Emergency food stocks are made available at the new site.

(g) Markets and shops are established.

(h) Temporary shelters are made available for resettled families.

(i) Forces participating in resettlement programs are especially considerate to resettled families.

(4) The concept of defended hamlet security also involves mobile defense. See FM 31-16 for guidance concerning the conduct of hamlet complex defense.

128. Frontier Operations

U. S. and HC armed forces may be required to conduct frontier operations independently or to reinforce other security forces normally charged with this mission.

a. Objectives. The objective of frontier operations is to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across land, sea, and air frontiers. Tasks which may be performed in attaining this objective include—

(1) Customs inspections.

(2) Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

(3) Smuggling control.

(4) Passport control.

(5) Refugee control.

(6) Population relocation.

(7) Communications jamming.

(8) Interdiction operations.

(9) Military civic action.

(10) PSYOP.

(11) Transfrontier pursuit.

(12) Surface and air defense.

b. Concept. In Phase I insurgency, frontier operations normally are handled by police, customs, and other security forces. In Phases II and III, combat requirements incident to frontier operations may necessitate assistance from the armed and paramilitary forces.

(1) The physical sealing of a frontier may be infeasible since such an operation could entail the commitment of forces and materiel which are excessive in the light of overall national requirements.

(2) Since it may not be possible to place forces at all possible crossings or entry sites, priorities must be established. Natural barriers are strengthened and patrolled or guarded and, where appropriate, tactical barriers are constructed.

c. Organization. National frontier forces may be comprised of border police and guards. Frontier forces also may include provincial paramilitary forces and the armed forces of regional commands which have responsibility for portions of the international frontier.

(1) Direction and control. Frontier operations are planned, directed, and supervised from the national level. Provincial governors and armed force area commanders may be delegated authority for the conduct of frontier operations.

(a) Specific frontier commands may be organized to provide unity of command.

(b) Along the coastal frontiers, the navy conducts operations which are coordinated within the Area Coordination Center in coastal provinces.

(c) Naval support may be needed along land frontiers consisting of extensive waterways. Under such circumstances, the establishment of primary interests and responsibilities must be coordinated closely at national and lower level armed forces headquarters.

(d) Frontier units normally operate under direct control of appropriate armed force area commanders. Since they operate within the provinces, units maintain close liaison with the provincial Area Coordination Center and with national and provincial internal security and intelligence officials in their areas of operation.
(e) Frontier operations require an extensive communications and warning system.

(2) Structuring. Frontier TF are tailored units designed to meet requirements in the area to which they are assigned. They should contain sufficient combat support and combat service support units to permit independent operations for an indefinite period.

d. Operations. When physical sealing of a land frontier is not feasible, restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones should be established. Regardless of which method is used, continuous patrol activity, detailed surveillance, and a system for command and control must be established.

(1) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is conducted to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and sites; frequency and volume of traffic; type of transportation; terrain conditions; and probable locations of sanctuaries. Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline; coordinated offshore patrols; static observation posts along the shoreline; and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft.

(2) Restricted zone. An area of predetermined width contiguous to the border is declared a restricted zone, and personnel residing within this zone are relocated. Appropriate proclamations are made to the effect that all individuals or groups encountered in the zone are considered to be insurgent force elements.

(a) Within the limits of practicality, restricted zones are cleared of vegetation and other obstacles which limit observation, using defoliants where appropriate.

(b) Restricted zones are controlled by the use of ground and aerial observers, electronic sensory devices, ground surveillance radars, listening posts, and patrols.

(3) Friendly population buffer. The civilian population living within the area of operations is limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. This can be accomplished by relocating persons of doubtful loyalty. This concept provides a good potential for the establishment of informant nets and the employment of loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for use in border-crossing activities.

(4) Military operations. Border units establish operational bases at battalion and company levels to direct frontier operations. Supplemental signal, engineer, and fire support normally will be required.

(a) Naval patrols interdict, inspect, and, if required, detain ships and other watercraft plying coastal waterways. They enforce populace and resources control measures established by law to prevent sea infiltration and exfiltration.

(b) Air force support is facilitated by the air force plans officer attached to TF headquarters. Air force liaison officers are furnished from the armed forces headquarters to border TF headquarters and tactical air control parties are attached to the combat elements of border TF.

129. Lines of Communication Security

Open and secure lines of communication (LOC) are vital to the survival of a nation and are priority targets for insurgent forces. LOC include highways, rail lines, intercoastal and inland waterways, transmission lines, and pipelines.

a. Objective. The objective of LOC security is to obtain the secure and uninterrupted flow of government and civilian traffic, communications, and materiel.

b. Concept. Basic operations to secure LOC
consist of detailed surveillance, security of key installations, escort of convoys and trains, and the establishment of priorities for the protection of key or primary LOC.

c. Organization. Forces employed for LOC security may include armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces; police; and intelligence agencies. Forces are organized to guard bridges and tunnels and to provide convoy security elements. Army, navy, and air force aircraft are employed to provide convoy escort and conduct surveillance and route reconnaissance. Convoy and train movements must be well coordinated with all agencies involved through the various provincial, regional, and district Area Coordination Centers. Specialized forces for LOC security, although national in organization, should be under the operational control of the Area Coordination Center in the province in which they are operating.

d. Operations. Effective LOC security requires careful planning, detailed training, and rapid response to insurgent attacks.

(1) Highway security. The objective of highway security is to protect individuals, traffic, and convoys, and to secure roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other installations from destruction and sabotage. Since avoidance of insurgent attack is not always possible, methods such as the following must be employed to minimize the effects of attack:

(a) Taking counterintelligence measures to prevent insurgents from gaining information concerning convoy movements and defensive measures to be employed.

(b) Clearing roadides of concealing growth, using defoliants where appropriate.

(c) Using air cover to prevent or minimize the effect of ambushes.

(d) Using troop units to provide armed convoy escorts and to conduct route or area ground reconnaissance.

(e) Establishing communications links between convoy commanders, convoy elements, and supporting forces.

(2) Railway security. Since railway tracks, bridges, defiles, tunnels, and workshops are difficult to protect, they are particularly attractive targets for insurgent attack. Although some degree of railway security may be provided by area and regional armed forces as well as province and district forces, special railway security forces normally are organized and charged with the primary mission of rail security.

(a) Organization. Railway security forces may include provincial paramilitary forces, national and local police, railway company employees, armed forces, and intelligence agencies.

1. National-level agencies provide centralized planning and guidance for railway affairs, to include coordinating railway security operations. A policy-making body for rail security should be established within the NIDCC composed of representatives from the various governmental departments. This policy body should be duplicated at regional armed forces areas and provincial levels to develop and coordinate local railway security measures.

2. Military railway security forces are specifically trained in rail line, train, and escort security duties. The military railway security forces escort trains and provide weapons crews and armed guards for terminals and key way stations. The military coordinates with railway operating personnel in maintaining communications; movement and security of the train; reconnaissance and aerial surveillance; and the defense of primary installations along the route.
3. Regional armed forces conduct tactical operations, patrolling activities, and ground and aerial surveillance along rail lines.

4. Provinces may provide additional security forces for checkpoints, bridge and tunnel security, and reinforcement of attacked trains.

(b) Active measures. Even when friendly forces dominate an area, there is always a possibility of deliberate sabotage and overt attacks against railway lines.

1. Rail line patrols are conducted by trackwalkers, local armed forces, and paramilitary combat and reconnaissance patrols, supplemented by air observation and photo reconnaissance teams. In addition, military rail security forces may conduct periodic day and night patrols along selected portions of the line on an unscheduled basis.

2. The military rail security force normally does not guard installations; therefore, bridges, stations, workshops, defiles, and tunnels may have to be guarded by the armed forces. Bridges should be defended against insurgent swimmers attempting to emplace demolition charges.

3. Aircraft are employed for track patrolling, escort of selected trains, and close air support of beleaguered trains.

4. Countermeasures against electrically-detonated mines may include mine detectors, trackwalkers, pilot-cars with sensory equipment, and mine pre-exploder and neutralizer devices. Countermeasures against armed attack or ambush of trains include the use of heavily armed and armored cars, counter-ambush barrage weapons, and smoke, riot control agents, and flame dispensers.

5. Parallel and access roads should be developed and maintained to facilitate ground reconnaissance and the reinforcement of beleaguered trains and key installations.

(c) Communications. Good communications are necessary for the timely provision of assistance to a beleaguered train or installation.

1. Radio communications are established to cover the entire line and to net with the military rail security force headquarters, armed forces regional commands, direct air support centers, and provincial headquarters.

2. Direct air-ground communications systems must be provided on trains to enable security forces to contact and direct the fires of the close air support aircraft.

(d) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essentially the same as for highway security.

3) Inland waterway security. Naval, marine, police, and aviation forces conduct security operations along inland waterways. In addition, armed and paramilitary forces assigned to provinces containing water LOG may participate in inland waterway security.

(a) Organization. Inland waterway security forces may include national-level governmental agencies, armed, paramilitary, and police forces, and irregular forces.

1. A planning board should be organized in the NIDCC to plan and coordinate the operations of the various forces charged with inland waterway security.

2. The navy normally is given the primary responsibility for securing inland waterways.

3. The army may provide assault
forces for operations along inland waterways and furnish guards for important canal intersections, bridges, dams, and locks.

4. Aviation resources may conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and close air support.

5. Provincial paramilitary and police forces may provide canal patrols, installation security forces, and checkpoint personnel.

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essentially the same as for highway security.

(c) Active measures. Operations along inland waterways are similar in many respects to those along highways and railways.

1. Navy patrols and river TF ply the main waterways maintaining checkpoints and conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Armed and paramilitary forces conduct patrols and operations along the banks of main canals and waterways.

2. Curfew is imposed during hours of darkness; this facilitates the detection of clandestine or illegal traffic by the use of night aerial radar, ground surveillance radar, and infrared surveillance devices.

3. In those regions where inland waterways provide the principal mode of travel, hamlets often are established on the banks of canals. If defended, these hamlets provide an excellent means of securing many miles of inland waterways.

(d) Communications. Communications measures to support waterway security are essentially the same as for highway security.

(4) Transmission line security. Transmission line traffic consists of electrical power, communications, and liquids. These lines often traverse rough and relatively inaccessible terrain and are difficult to secure. Primarily, transmission line security consists of guarding important installations, such as power plants, dams, transfer stations, and pumping stations; conducting patrols and surveillance along the line; and repairing portions of the line which may become damaged.

(a) Organization. Organization for transmission line security is similar to that provided for the security of other LOC. National-level planning and coordination boards or agencies are formed to provide high-level guidance and allocation of resources. Planning is accomplished at NIDCC and the various Area Coordination Centers along the route of the line. Armed forces provide security elements for certain key installations and for repair and construction crews. Aircraft conduct surveillance along the route. Provincial paramilitary and police forces patrol and reinforce the defense of key installations.

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures for security of transmission lines are essentially the same as those provided for highway security.

(c) Active measures. Transmission line security should be incorporated into the defense plans of contiguous areas. The strategic and tactical value of the transmission lines should not be publicized; however, public announcement of insurgent damage to those transmission lines which provide power, communications, water, and fuel to the population can be of psychological value in discrediting insurgent action against public property.

1. Transmission lines should be routed along less direct routes, such as secured highways, rail lines, and waterways. Some lines
may be routed from plants or main transmission stations to the sea, and thence as underwater cable to the terminal station.

2. Unprotected minefields should not be used to secure towers and other installations since the mines may fall into insurgent hands.

3. Technical devices should be installed to indicate the exact location and time of the damage or failure of the line.

4. PSYOP are useful in playing down the military value of transmission lines and in emphasizing the humanitarian requirements for their continuous operation.

(d) Communications. Communications requirements for transmission line security are essentially the same as for highway security.

130. Disarming the Population

It is customary in many developing nations for mature males to be armed even though bearing arms may be illegal. Disarmament, therefore, is important to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of insurgents or other dissident groups which may attempt to assume power and thus threaten the legally constituted government.

a. Objectives. The objective of disarmament operations is to account for and control all weapons to prevent their use by insurgents and other dissident groups.

b. Concept. Disarming the population may be initiated during hostilities as a vital step in the restoration of internal security.

(1) Law-abiding elements of the population who voluntarily surrender their arms are guaranteed protection by those forces charged with the restoration and maintenance of internal security. The effectiveness of disarmament measures depends to a large extent on the size of the population, the extent of territory, and the number of troops available; however, if executed properly, a large portion of the population may be disarmed voluntarily. Others must be disarmed by the military or police, using measures designed to locate and confiscate arms possessed clandestinely. Although complete disarmament will be difficult, the enforcement of ordinances restricting the possession of arms will result in the possession of arms only by insurgent forces, outlaws, and a limited number of inhabitants attempting to evade this ordinance. The success of disarmament operations, particularly those based on voluntary surrender of arms, will tend to be in direct proportion to the degree of security which can be afforded by the government.

(2) Upon cessation of hostilities, one of the initial steps is disarming insurgent forces and friendly paramilitary and irregular forces. For maximum effectiveness, this action must be timely and the full cooperation of government leaders and the population must be secured through proper psychological conditioning. To secure this cooperation, the government must have the confidence of the population and must be able to insure adherence by all parties to disarmament laws. This involves providing security for those who have depended upon their weapons for self-protection.

c. Organization. Civil police authorities, armed forces, intelligence agencies, and other security forces may be employed to collect firearms, ammunition, and explosives.

(1) Civil authorities. The use of civil officials has many advantages over the employment of the armed forces in disarming the population. It is the most normal means of accomplishing the desired objective and is less likely to engender antagonism or create friction. It gives peaceful law-abiding citizens the opportunity to surrender their weapons without being sub-
jected to what might be considered the indignity of personally surrendering to military authorities.

(a) The success attained through the employment of civil authorities in disarmament depends upon the spirit and conscientiousness with which they operate.

(b) The national police may assist in the collection and confiscation of firearms by using their knowledge of the nation and their familiarity with the habits of the people. If it appears that civil officials have exhausted their capabilities to collect arms, governmental authorities may issue orders to the effect that, after a given date, the armed forces and intelligence agencies will be responsible for collecting arms and gathering evidence for conviction of persons involved in violating disarmament laws.

(2) Intelligence agencies. Disarmament action taken by intelligence agencies generally involves comparatively large quantities of illegal firearms and ammunition held by individuals and groups who are intentionally trying to avoid detection. Special operations may be employed for several years following the cessation of insurgency to trace imports of arms and ammunition. Governmental permits and correspondence, customs files, and other records assist in identifying the receipt and disposition of these munitions.

d. Operations. Prior to issuing orders or decrees for the disarmament of the population, an estimate of the situation should be made to analyze all features of the undertaking.

(1) The analysis should include the following:

(a) Determining type of PSYOP/information programs to be conducted in support of the disarmament program.

(b) Determining those measures required to enforce the arms control law.

(c) Designating the civil and military authorities responsible for issuing disarmament orders or decrees.

(d) Designating those forces responsible for enforcing disarmament laws.

(e) Determining methods of promulgating orders or decrees.

(f) Designating and preparing depots, buildings, and bunkers for the storage of collected arms, ammunition, and explosives.

(g) Disposing of collected munitions.

(h) Accounting for collected munitions.

(i) Designating types and classes of munitions to be collected.

(j) Designating those agencies (civil and military) responsible for securing and transporting collected munitions.

(k) Preparing instructions for agencies charged with the execution of orders and decrees.

(l) Preparing instructions for the manufacture and importation of munitions.

(m) Preparing instructions for the sale and distribution of munitions.

(n) Establishing time limits for compliance with orders or decrees and the penalties to be imposed for violations or infractions.

(2) A feature of the disarmament program which may cause difficulty and misunderstanding is the question of retaining machetes, knives, stilettos, and similar instruments. The populace should not be deprived of implements on which they depend for their livelihood. Sufficient time should be allowed for all elements of the population to surrender their arms.

(3) Prior to actual disarmament, laws must be enacted and published for-
bidding the general public to possess firearms, ammunition, weapons, and explosives except by specific authority. Wide publicity must be given these laws and related administrative regulations.

(a) At the cessation of hostilities, governmental or arbitral forces institute measures to secure the area and to achieve the cooperation of the opposition leadership to prevent the caching or illegal sale of weapons.

(b) Personnel must be designated to receive, protect, and maintain the materiel surrendered. An accurate accounting system should be devised to keep complete records of materiel received, and instructions issued designating the agencies which are authorized to accept the materiel and give receipts. A receipt must be furnished for each weapon received except those which are confiscated as contraband. If reissue to governmental agencies is contemplated or if return of weapons to the populace will not take place within a reasonable time, compensation should be made to the owners rather than issuance of receipts.

(c) Classification should be made as to the manner in which arms are collected: materiel voluntarily surrendered for which a receipt has been issued; materiel confiscated; or materiel otherwise received. The custody of materiel implies responsibility to guard and preserve it for eventual return to the rightful owners. Serviceable materiel may be of a type, caliber, and condition suitable for re-issue to HC troops, local police, special agents, or others requiring arms. Unserviceable materiel or that which is hazardous to store is disposed of as directed. Whenever materiel is disposed of in any manner, permanent records should be made of the action. In general, records are made and subscribed to by witnesses whenever materiel is destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Permanently confiscated materiel should be stored separately from the materiel which the government holds temporarily in custody.

(d) Designated authorities determine who shall be empowered to issue arms permits and to whom they may be issued. The process must be coordinated to prevent conflicts or overlapping authority. Certain civil officials, such as provincial governors, judges, and others carrying out security functions, may be authorized to carry arms. Certain permits issued are honored throughout the nation; others are valid only in specified areas.

(e) Planning should include measures to discourage illegal production or procurement of firearms from either within or outside the nation. If national laws prohibiting possession of arms are inadequate, measures should be taken to improve them. If there are remote areas in which law enforcement is difficult, certain concessions may be necessary in order that inhabitants in these areas may protect themselves against lawless elements.

131. Protection of Voters and Polls

During active insurgency, the use of military and police forces to protect voters, polls, and electoral records may be necessary to insure a valid election. These forces are employed to prevent violence to personnel conducting the election, destruction or seizure of ballots and electoral records, and for general protection of the population moving to and from polling stations. Whenever practical, forces required to guarantee an impartial election should be provided by the HC. To avoid the charge that
the election has been unduly influenced, the use of HC and foreign armed forces at or near the polls should be limited to those needed to insure security.

132. U. S. Assistance

To the maximum extent possible, populace and resources control operations should be performed by HC agencies.

a. U. S. force participation in populace and resources control operations may range from minor operational support to extensive operations in U. S. base areas; however, any populace and resources control operation conducted by U. S. forces will be coordinated in appropriate Area Coordination Centers. Normally, U. S. forces function as a reserve to be deployed only in cases of emergency to assist the HC police and armed forces in populace and resources control operations.

(1) Adherence by U. S. personnel to local laws, customs, and regulations is essential to insure that U. S. forces do not hamper HC populace and resources control operations and that the U. S. maintains the respect and confidence of the population.

(2) U. S. civil affairs elements plan and provide staff supervision for those aspects of populace and resources control programs conducted by U. S. forces and agencies.

b. USAID and MAP assistance is provided to train, equip, and advise HC populace and resources control forces. In addition, USAID and MAP may support specific operations. For example, MAP support is provided to defended hamlets in the form of construction materials, weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment. USAID assists by providing livestock, seeds, fertilizers, farm equipment, wells, pumps, and other items. In some areas, radios and mobile movie units are provided and schools and public health facilities are constructed.

Section VII. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

133. General

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all those employed in internal defense. They are the primary operations used to conduct the strike campaign and are employed to support consolidation and remote area campaigns. This section provides guidance on the objectives, organization, and doctrine used in conducting tactical operations. References which provide further guidance on tactical operations include FM 31-16, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

134. Objective

The objective of tactical operations is to destroy insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Tactical operations are coordinated with civilian agencies through the Area Coordination Center.

135. Concepts

Tactical operations are rarely conducted as independent sporadic actions aimed solely at the elimination of insurgent tactical forces and bases. They usually are conducted as part of a larger campaign involving the employment of other internal defense and internal development forces in the attainment of broader objectives.

a. Phase I Insurgency. In Phase I, insurgent activities range from threats of violence to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. These activities normally are countered by civil security and counterintelligence forces. Armed and paramilitary forces engage in training for contingency tactical operations or are employed in military civic action. They may be deployed in show-of-force operations in rural areas where insurgent activities are acute.

b. Phases II and III Insurgency. When the subversive insurgency movement has gained sufficient strength and population support, guerrilla warfare is initiated (Phase II) and,
as insurgent capabilities develop further, insurgent tactical forces may mount mobile warfare (Phase III). Subversion, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare may be conducted simultaneously or in any combinations in various geographical areas. Regardless of the purpose and method of employment of U. S. and HC tactical forces, they must be prepared to accommodate concurrently all forms of insurgent activity.

136. Organization

Armed and paramilitary forces are organized primarily to conduct tactical operations; however, civil security forces such as the police may be assigned certain limited combat missions. Tactical operations must be coordinated by Area Coordination Centers, where intelligence, psychological, and other activities required to support tactical operations are integrated. Organizational emphasis for tactical operations is placed on firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate intelligence, signal, transportation, and other combat support and combat service support elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration should be given to providing the tactical force with capabilities for dealing with the civilian population by attaching or assigning civil affairs and PSYOP personnel or units.

137. Operations

a. Tactical Operations. Tactical operations against guerrillas include the use of saturation patrolling to locate and fix insurgent forces and conducting offensive operations to destroy them. Saturation patrolling entails the deployment of patrols over a selected area of operations so that insurgents cannot move without detection. Patrolling is conducted by squad and platoon-size forces which maintain contact with insurgent forces sighted until larger units can be deployed to destroy them. The following tactics are most frequently employed:

1. Conducting saturation patrolling by foot, track, wheel, air, and water mobile units on a 24-hour schedule. Patrols visit villages and hamlets, establish mobile checkpoints on routes of communication, and preserve law and order outside of hamlet boundaries.
2. Organizing ambushes in depth and width which are backed up by adequate reserves.
3. Conducting raids against hamlets and areas known or suspected of harboring insurgent personnel and/or materiel.
4. Maintaining reserves to permit deployment of forces to meet offensive or defensive operational requirements.
5. Manning of outposts and other installations with minimum essential forces, relying upon artillery, close air support, and mobile reserves to relieve beleaguered posts.
6. Making maximum use of police patrols to maintain security.
7. Employing fire support for both territorial defense and support of tactical forces.
8. Immediately attacking insurgent guerrilla forces which have been detected and isolated.

b. Mobile Warfare. The tactics outlined above must be modified significantly to meet a mobile warfare threat. Mobile warfare cannot be considered as positional or guerrilla warfare. While the same objectives are sought, larger reserves are maintained, the size of operating units is increased, artillery fires are massed, and larger security and defense detachments are required. In mobile warfare, utilization of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are used to seize and hold the initiative, not terrain; therefore, commanders must not expect tactics such as envelopment, penetration, or turning movement to produce the same effects on insurgent forces as they would if terrain were the key consideration. Caches, safe areas, and population support may be dispersed so strategically that insurgent tactical units are not dependent on critical logistical bases which they must protect, and they may
maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver.

c. *Principles of Operation.* Continuous pressure against insurgent forces must be maintained and commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider them destroyed merely because opposition has ceased. If contact with the insurgent force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to re-establish it. Long periods of inactivity permit insurgent forces to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations. The following are some salient principles which govern tactical operations.

(1) Commanders must orient their efforts on the destruction or neutralization of the insurgent force rather than on the seizure of terrain.

(2) Front and rear lines normally do not exist; therefore, units always must remain vigilant and ready for any contingency which might arise.

(3) Tactical areas assigned to military commanders should not be defined by straight, linear boundaries, but should encompass complete political subdivisions to facilitate coordination with civil agencies.

(4) When possible, defensive tasks should be performed by paramilitary and irregular forces to permit armed forces units to concentrate on offensive operations.

(5) Purely defensive measures allow the insurgent force to become stronger; therefore, continuous pressure, regardless of weather conditions, must be exerted to prevent the insurgent from resting, obtaining supplies, and conducting offensive operations.

(6) Informant nets should be established within the population.

(7) Small detachments should not be deployed in defensive operations without adequate fire support and available reinforcements.

(8) Large forces should not be dispatched to destroy or attack insurgent units unless the insurgents have been found and fixed.

(9) Large military forces should not be garrisoned in the hope that the physical presence of troops will deter insurgent operations.

d. *Offensive Operations.* The purpose of offensive operations is the destruction or neutralization of insurgent tactical forces and base areas.

(1) Harassment tactics prevent the insurgent from resting, reorganizing, and massing personnel and supplies for large-scale attacks; aid friendly forces in gaining intelligence of the area of operations; and cause the insurgent to expend his limited resources. Harassment tactics also may be conducted as an economy of force measure in low priority areas to deny the insurgent absolute freedom of operations.

(2) Once an insurgent force has been located, it is eliminated by combat power applied through strike operations. Encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing insurgent forces and for achieving decisive results.

e. *Defensive Operations.* Defensive operations normally are conducted as coordinated military and civilian programs. Defensive operations are employed to—

(1) Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action.

(2) Deny the insurgent entry into an area.

(3) Destroy or trap the insurgent force.

(4) Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.

(5) Economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere.

f. *Retrograde Movements.* Except in Phase III, insurgent forces seldom will be able physically to push government tactical forces from an area; however, it may be desirable for economy of force or other reasons to retire and
retrograde movements must be planned for this eventuality.

g. Bases of Operation. Bases are secure localities from which operations are projected and supported. Bases may be permanent or semipermanent installations containing essential command, control, communications, combat support, and combat service support elements and attachments. FM 31–16 contains details of base establishment and defense.

138. Combat Support

a. Artillery. Artillery provides fire support for both assault and territorial defense elements. Tactics and techniques applicable to limited and general war employment require some modification in an insurgency environment, but the basic tenets of artillery employment remain valid.

(1) Planning must include the fire support of paramilitary, irregular, and police forces. Planning is centralized and detailed for consolidation operations, while planning for strike operations may be decentralized to provide for flexibility.

(2) Consideration must be given to the restrained application of fire because of hamlet activities and movements of civilians within the area of operations.

(3) Artillery target acquisition agencies should be employed to assist in locating insurgent forces. For detailed discussion of fire support planning and coordination principles and procedures, refer to FM 6–20–1, FM 6–20–2, and FM 31–16.

b. Engineers. Tactical operations require increased engineer support because of poorly developed road nets, insufficient key installations, and the inadequate capability of bridges and culverts. For a discussion of the capabilities and organization of engineer units, teams, and detachments, see FM 5–1, FM 5–135, FM 5–136, FM 5–142, and FM 31–16.

(1) When conducting tactical operations in remote areas, direct support is desirable since it allows flexibility in meeting engineer support requirements throughout the operational area.

(2) The full capabilities of engineer units cannot be realized if a large portion of their troops must be employed in providing their own security in the operational area; therefore, they normally are provided site security.

c. Communications. Units must be provided multichannel facilities which permit connection with civil and military communications systems. Vulnerable forward area signal centers should be located where they can be provided local security.

(1) Portable radio sets, in addition to short-range transceivers, will be required. A requirement may exist to provide squads and platoons with company-level radios and companies with battalion-level radios.

(2) Augmentation may be required for the purpose of constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining civilian communications facilities.

d. Tactical Air Support. Preplanned and immediate close air support, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift are requested through army and air force channels as discussed in the FM 7-series, FM 61–100, and FM 100–27.

e. Aerial Fire Support. Highly accurate, discriminatory, and responsive firepower is provided by organic or supporting army armed helicopters to complement tactical air support. Procedures for employing, requesting, and controlling armed helicopters is discussed in FM 1–100, FM 1–110, FM 57–35, and FM 61–100.

139. Combat Service Support

a. Supply. Effective supply is essential to the support of tactical operations; however, until valid experience data can be accumulated, consumption factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and basis of issue must be adjusted to fit the operational area. Similar factors must
be developed for Allied military and civil forces that may be supported in whole or in part from U.S. resources. The possible need for special items must be taken into account early.

(1) It may be necessary to establish and maintain stockage levels of supply at echelons below those where such stockage normally is maintained.

(2) Troops may be provided supplies through unit distribution, supply point distribution, or a combination of the two. When the terrain affords a high degree of mobility and when the command has adequate transportation, unit distribution may be preferable. When the terrain or feasible use of ground transport limits movement, distribution through supply points supported by airlift operations may be desirable or essential.

(3) Local procurement is used when practicable to reduce transportation requirements; however, the overall impact on the economy of the HC must be a major consideration.

(4) Army forces must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to support civic action programs, to include aid to isolated population centers, groups relocated or concentrated for security reasons, and civilian victims of attack. Such supply normally is limited to subsistence but may include such other survival necessities as medical supplies, clothing, construction materials, and fuel.

(5) Supervision must be exercised over the distribution of civilian supplies which could be used by hostile forces. Although local civilians are employed in these functions to the greatest extent possible, in some situations the military must assume this responsibility.

(6) Security of supply installations is vital. Supplies are conserved for consumption by friendly forces and are denied to hostile forces. Supply personnel should be prepared to cope with insurgent attack and guard against contamination, pilferage, and robbery. Supply installations are prime targets and precautions must be taken for their security.

b. Maintenance. The nature of operations may preclude elaborate maintenance support; therefore, both a high level of preventive maintenance and responsive support from direct support units are stressed.

(1) Direct support repair teams may accompany combat and combat support units to provide on-the-spot minor repairs and limited direct exchange. Mobile maintenance teams assist using units in preparing for operations and in rapid recovery after completed operations. In operations where maintenance elements cannot accompany combat units, direct exchange of such unserviceable items as weapons and radios must be provided for in selected forward stockage.

(2) Time is needed before and after each mission to perform repairs and obtain replacement items.

(3) Direct support elements must provide rapid maintenance support at each security post and combat base. Although emphasis is on repair by replacement (direct exchange), efforts are made to repair items without performing complete overhaul or rebuild. Stockage of float items is planned to insure that only fast-moving, high-mortality, combat essential items are stocked.

(4) When items cannot be repaired at direct support echelon, they should be evacuated or otherwise disposed of. In no case, however, should equipment that can be used or cannibalized be permitted to fall into insurgent hands.

c. Transportation. Internal defense and internal development operations need a reliable transportation system that is responsive to
requirements of tactics and logistics, capable of operating over varied and difficult terrain, and of using various modes of transport. Control of transportation should pass to the appropriate commander during operations and revert to the parent transportation unit upon completion of the mission.

(1) Minimum essential items needed to support operations, that cannot be man-packed by soldiers or carried by organic vehicles because of terrain conditions, must be transported by such other modes of transportation as bicycles; porters; pack animals; rafts, sampans, or other watercraft; and aircraft. Such modes of transportation should be planned well in advance and standing operating procedures and control organizations developed to supervise their use.

(2) Modes of transportation should not be restricted to the most convenient, for to do so may be detrimental to the overall mission. The use of surface transportation enables internal defense and internal development forces to gain intelligence information, to expand or retain control of areas, to gain access to remote areas, to establish emergency routes, to gain flexibility in movement, and to provide a show of force to both the insurgents and the friendly population.

(3) All modes of transportation are subject to ambush, attack, sabotage, capture, and destruction. Efforts must be made to keep knowledge of movements limited to a need-to-know.

(a) In transporting cargo, special consideration should be given to the type cargo to be moved. Certain items of great value to insurgents require greater security. Such security may require the use of priority air transportation. Some cargo may require special handling.

(b) Because of their speed, relative security from ground attack, lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions, and adaptability to small unit movement, aircraft often are the most effective means of supply or troop movement. Both army aviation and aviation of other services may be used. Terrain, the tactical situation, and availability of airstrips normally require resupply by airdrop as well as by air landing.

(c) En route security is provided for surface movements. Appropriate measures include intensive driver training, the armoring and arming of vehicles, and the use of armed escorts including armed helicopters.

d. Medical Service. Poor health and sanitation conditions may be anticipated in many areas. Such conditions may include inadequate water supply and sewage disposal facilities, insufficient housing, and lack of good sanitation control and medical care facilities. Any or all of the following measures may be adopted, as appropriate and feasible:

(1) Provision of medical treatment and patient holding capabilities at lower echelons of medical service than is normal, such as at area control bases and security detachments. Patients to be evacuated by ground transport are held until movement by means of a secure convoy is arranged.

(2) Provision of sufficient air or ground means to move medical units or elements.

(3) Maximum use of air evacuation means.

(4) Provision of small medical elements to furnish unit-level medical support to tactical units on long-range missions.

(5) Assignment to mobile units of specially trained medical personnel, capable of operating medical treatment facilities for short periods of time with a minimum of immediate supervision.

(6) Formation of non-U. S. litter bearer teams to accompany combat units...
where terrain or other obstacles preclude transportation or evacuation of patients by other means.

(7) Strict supervision of sanitation, maintenance of individual medical equipment, and advanced or special first aid training throughout the command.

(8) Greater emphasis on basic combat training of medical service personnel; arming of medical service personnel, as required; and use of armored carriers for ground evacuation.

(9) Use of Allied medical resources and capabilities whenever they are available.

e. Military Police. Military police functions and responsibilities in internal defense and internal development operations differ from those in conventional operations in that military police may become directly involved with civil controls and enforcement of emergency regulations. Military police place special emphasis on circulation control, security, riot control, prisoner handling, resources control, intelligence, and other specialized techniques for control of civilians. Military police can provide plans, advice, training, and supervision to civil police personnel in populace and resources control measures, technical police operations, and investigations.

f. Labor. The movement, maintenance, and storage of supplies require large amounts of labor. The need for local labor is particularly acute in internal defense and internal development operations where no logistic base has been established and where there is a need to build up storage sites, airfields, depots, and transfer facilities; however, in internal defense and internal development, additional personnel security precautions must be taken.

140. U. S. Assistance

U. S. advisory, combat support, and combat service support forces may be introduced in Phase I in training, advisory, and support roles. During Phases II and III, U. S. combat forces may be committed to assist HC forces in conducting tactical operations.

a. Planning. Deployment plans normally will consider the following:

(1) Mission—consolidation, strike, remote area, or other.

(2) Training, organizing, and equipping of forces.

(3) Points of entry, to include tactical bases.

(4) Status-of-forces agreements.

(5) Liaison between U. S. advisors, MAAG, Missions, and unified commands and joint TF, HC organizations, and Allied forces.

(6) Base development.

(7) Command relationships.

b. Points of Entry. Points of entry are those secure harbors, installations, or air bases where U. S. troops are introduced into the HC. Facilities must be established at points of entry to permit coordinated, secure deployment. They are established in areas from which forces can initiate and sustain operations.

(1) Opposition. Although the HC forces may be in control of the point of entry, U. S. forces must be prepared to meet opposition at the outset.

(2) Tactical deployment. Initially, U. S. forces may be concentrated in the general point of entry area. U. S. forces may subsequently be deployed to battalion or brigade areas should escalation of the insurgency appear probable.

(3) Relationship with HC forces. Liaison between U. S. and HC armed and paramilitary forces should be established in preparatory operations. As soon as practicable after forces arrive at points of entry, Area Coordination Centers should be established or liaison elements sent to existing Area Coordination Centers. The initial concern of these Centers should be the coordinated defense of the points
of entry. U. S. force commanders, in coordination with HC officials, should begin screening and recruiting indigenous personnel for duty as guides, interpreters, porters, and laborers.

(4) **Local security.** U. S. forces are responsible for their own local security, regardless of the assumed responsibility of this function by the HC.

(5) **Operations.** While processing at points of entry, U. S. forces may initiate limited civil affairs, intelligence, advisory assistance, populace and resources control, psychological, and tactical operations.
CHAPTER 9

FORCES

Section I. HOST COUNTRY FORCES

141. General

a. HC forces which normally are employed in preserving or re-establishing internal security may be categorized as follows:
   (1) Security forces.
   (2) Armed forces.
   (3) Paramilitary forces.
   (4) Irregular forces.

b. In addition to their primary internal defense mission, these forces also may contribute to internal development through the application of their special skills and resources.

142. Security Forces

Security forces include such organizations as police, national intelligence and security agencies, border guard, customs and census agencies, and special investigative organizations such as internal revenue and treasury services.

a. Mission. The mission of security forces is to maintain a state of law and order by effectively coping with violence, subversion, and lawlessness within a nation.

b. Concept. During peacetime, most nations depend primarily on the police to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities. During an insurgency, the problem of maintaining security becomes much greater and the police may find themselves unable to cope with the situation without assistance.

   (1) Phase I insurgency. Police units, particularly at the lower levels of government, normally are augmented and fully integrated into the internal defense system to counter insurgent activities. They attempt to penetrate the insurgent movement, prevent insurgent support across international borders, and deny insurgents internal support. To accomplish these tasks, the police may require assistance from the armed forces.

   (2) Phase II insurgency. Security organizations normally must be enlarged, and all or part of the security tasks may be accomplished by police organizations augmented by paramilitary forces; however, normal police responsibility for frontier operations may be transferred to the armed forces.

   (3) Phase III insurgency. Security forces, particularly the police, may be curtailed territorially and their employment confined largely to consolidated areas. Territorial and border control may become part of territorial defense, a primary responsibility of the armed forces.

c. Organization. The HC police force may consist of national, municipal, and rural police. Special police may be mobilized and trained for tasks such as guarding factories, plantations, mines, railroads, and other facilities. In addition, combat police may be organized to man outposts, secure ports and airstrips, and conduct limited tactical operations such as patrols, raids, ambushes, and searches.

   (1) National police normally are comprised of both uniformed and civilian-clothed personnel who enforce...
populace and resources control measures. They may be organized along military lines and their authority may transcend political boundaries. Early action should be taken to enable national police to move without political boundary restrictions. Inability to cross political boundaries could cause failure of national police missions. A type national police system is shown at figure 8. National police missions may include—

(a) Securing national government installations and LOC.
(b) Assisting provincial police in the execution of populace and resources control operations.
(c) Gathering intelligence information.

(2) In some nations, rural police may be organized to perform law enforcement functions under the control of a political subdivision such as a province or district.

(3) Municipal police maintain or re-establish security in urban areas. They normally are under control of the city authorities and their jurisdiction usually extends only to the city boundaries.

d. Operations. The operations of security forces include the full range of police and intelligence activities necessary to preserve law and order within a nation. These operations range from combatting common crime to riot control and countering subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

143. Armed Forces

In this manual, armed forces are the regular and reserve units of the standing military establishment, to include army, navy, air force, marine corps, and coast guard.

a. Mission. The primary mission of armed forces in internal defense and internal development is to seek out and destroy insurgent combat forces. Armed forces also provide support to other governmental agencies through populace and resources control, psychological, intelligence, civil affairs, and advisory assistance operations.

b. Concept. In addition to defending the nation against internal and external attack, the flexible organization, multiple skills, and varied resources of the armed forces are required to support internal economic, social, and political growth.

(1) Phase I insurgency. The armed forces may engage in—

(a) Training for internal defense operations.
(b) Establishing military representation in Area Coordination Centers.
(c) Expanding intelligence operations.
(d) Developing and refining internal defense contingency plans.
(e) Conducting drills and parades as a part of a systematic plan of show-of-force PSYOP.
(f) Assisting in the training of paramilitary forces.
(g) Conducting military civic action.
(h) Conducting PSYOP.

(2) Phase II insurgency. The dispatch of armed TF from the regional commands to insurgent-infested provinces may mark the beginning of Phase II activity. In addition to those activities performed in Phase I, TF may support provincial police and paramilitary forces in conducting populace and resources control operations. In provinces which are re-establishing provincial authority through the consolidation campaign, TF may be employed to conduct the offensive and development phases of campaign operations. In provinces containing insurgent-dominated areas which are not programmed for early consolidation, armed forces may conduct strike operations against insurgent forces and bases.

(3) Phase III insurgency. The threat is so critical that provincial forces will be engaged primarily in defending
Figure 8. Type national police system.
critical population centers and key installations. The major effort of armed forces in this phase will be devoted to tactical operations against insurgent combat forces.

c. Organization. At national level, the structure of the military establishment should enable joint centralized command and control over subordinate armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces. In most cases, the national armed forces staff structure for internal and external defense will remain the same. Below national level, HC leaders should be encouraged to structure their military organizations and control apparatus after those which have proven successful in past insurgencies. This requires the formation of regional and provincial commands. Regional commands provide TF for operations conducted in those areas in which operations regularly overlap provincial boundaries. Provincial commands conduct the full range of stability operations within their areas of jurisdiction, except those reserved by regional commands.

(1) Regional forces. Regional commands are established to facilitate span of control, provide a centralized source of training and logistical support for subordinate forces, and conduct special operations. The following are functions normally performed by regional commands.

(a) Providing direction and control over regional forces.

(b) Reinforcing provincial tactical forces.

(c) Providing combat support and combat service support to provincial forces.

(d) Conducting strike operations.

(e) Establishing TF to conduct special missions which are beyond the capabilities of provinces.

(f) Providing centralized training facilities for both armed and paramilitary forces.

(g) Equipping provincial paramilitary forces.

(h) Conducting special operations which overlap provincial boundaries. Examples of such operations are border control and protecting interprovincial LOC.

1. Administration and logistical support of these special operations normally is provided by regional commands.

2. Operational command over forces engaged in special operations is exercised by regional commands except when these forces are attached to a province for operations.

(2) Provincial forces. Provincial forces have responsibility for the overall internal defense of a province except for those areas designated by regional commands. Armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces operate under the centralized direction of provincial commands. In addition to their primary combat role, all provincial forces contribute to the overall internal defense and internal development of the province through the application of their special skills and resources.

d. Operations. The operations of HC forces are oriented primarily toward carrying out their strategic, tactical, training, and administrative missions. In an internal defense and internal development environment, the operations of HC forces are expanded to include activities designed to strengthen the government politically, economically, and socially and make more viable its national life.

(1) Advisory assistance. A mission of the armed forces is to assist provincial and other commanders in training armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces. This may be accomplished through the establishment of training centers which provide basic individual training, advanced individual training, for selected personnel, and unit training for provincial and district forces. Armed forces instructors or units may be detached from appro-
Figure 9. Type regional armed forces organization.
appropriate command headquarters to assist in the training mission.

(2) **Civil affairs (military civic action).** Armed forces are operationally trained and equipped to conduct many military civic action projects which come within the purview of internal development. Among these are flood control; bridge, road, and airfield fortifications; and warehouse construction. These projects have both military and civil application. Consistent with tactical requirements, armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces may be employed in civic action projects coordinated by the NIDCC or the appropriate Area Coordination Center.

(3) **PSYOP.** Armed forces PSYOP support both military and civilian psychological development programs. When armed forces units are committed on a relatively long-term basis, such as during a provincial consolidation operation, they should be provided with an organic PSYOP capability.

(4) **Intelligence.** Armed forces intelligence operations support both internal defense and internal development programs. These operations are designed to collect information which will assist in the establishment of a data base in the areas of political, economic, sociological, geographic, insurgent military, and insurgent infrastructure intelligence. Intelligence information collected and collated at all levels should be channeled to a central body having responsibility for producing a composite intelligence picture for the country as a whole. This body normally will be the intelligence branch of the NIDCC, organized specifically to direct and coordinate the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information. Intelligence operations of Area Coordination Centers at major subnational level are performed by intelligence branches with format and function similar to that of the NIDCC. See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A for information pertaining to intelligence operations in the internal defense and internal development environment.

(5) **Populace and resources control.** Populace and resources control measures usually are established by civil authority and armed forces participation in these operations should be in accordance with prescribed laws and regulations. The responsibility for populace and resources control normally is vested in the national and local police and in paramilitary forces organized for this express purpose. The role of the armed forces in populace and resources control operations within urban areas normally is a supporting one. In rural and border areas, the armed forces must be prepared to conduct the full range of populace and resources control operations. These operations are coordinated by the NIDCC and the appropriate Area Coordination Center.

(6) **Tactical operations.** Armed forces seek out and neutralize or destroy insurgent tactical forces.

(a) The army performs the primary mission of seeking out and destroying insurgent land tactical formations, provides units to serve under regional and provincial commands, and provides training, combat support, and combat service support to other forces, as required.

(b) The air force provides air defense (in coordination with the army) and close air support to army, navy, marine, police, paramilitary, and irregular force operations; air reconnaissance; and troop and cargo lift.
Commanders report directly to paramilitary leaders at district Area Coordination Centers or district paramilitary headquarters.

Village paramilitary forces provide secure bases from which other paramilitary and armed forces units may operate against insurgent forces and installations. The organization and employment of paramilitary forces at this level provides for local defense and enables the population to participate directly in the internal defense and internal development effort.

c. Organization. The organization of paramilitary forces will vary with mission and level of employment. In those cases where paramilitary forces assume the major responsibility for internal defense, their organization will be large. When these forces are used primarily to reinforce existing police or armed forces, their organization may be relatively small. Normally, paramilitary forces are organizationally tailored for the specific operation they will be conducting.

(1) Provincial paramilitary unit organization should provide for mobile forces which are immediately deployable for strike operations. These mobile forces should be capable of sustained operations of up to three days without resupply.

(2) District paramilitary forces normally are organized from locally recruited personnel and may be deployed anywhere within the district. They should have an organizational capability for deploying small forces for patrols and similar missions and should be self-sufficient for periods of up to three days without resupply.

(3) Village paramilitary units are organized essentially for defensive operations. They usually perform static guard duties and assist the local civil police in the preservation of law and order. Their offensive tactical capabilities are limited to patrol ac-
tivities within and immediately outside village perimeters.

\textit{d. Operations}. The operational roles and responsibilities of paramilitary forces are basically the same as those of the armed forces. Paramilitary force training programs should stress basic military skills and those tactics and techniques most applicable to the particular mission of the force and its area of operations.

(1) \textit{Advisory assistance}. Although their state of training is lower than that of the armed forces, paramilitary forces have the capability to render advisory assistance to less proficient paramilitary and irregular forces.

(2) \textit{Civil affairs}. Paramilitary forces often are in contact with the population in the same area over long periods and are excellently suited to conduct military civic action operations. For large-scale projects, they will require augmentation from civilian agencies or the armed forces.

(3) \textit{PSYOP}. Below regional level, paramilitary forces normally operate in close association with the civilian population. In order to facilitate
establishing rapport with the populace and to gain its support for the government, paramilitary forces should be provided a PSYOP capability.

(4) Intelligence. Intelligence operations conducted by paramilitary forces normally involve the collection of information for which there may be a tactical response.

(5) Populace and resources control. The primary mission of district and village paramilitary forces is conducting populace and resources control operations. These operations, normally in support of the police, include—

(a) Securing villages and hamlets.
(b) Securing vital installations, LOC, and communications centers.
(c) Protecting persons working or residing outside of hamlets and villages.
(d) Enforcing populace and resources control measures.

(6) Tactical operations. At provincial level, paramilitary forces engage in strike and other tactical operations in much the same manner as the armed forces. At district and village level, paramilitary forces primarily are employed in tactical defense.

145. Irregular Forces

In this manual, irregular forces are considered to be any individual or group not part of the armed or paramilitary forces which are armed for the purpose of defense. Examples of groups which may constitute irregular forces are political parties, trade unions, fraternal organizations, and isolated ethnic minority groups.

a. Mission. The primary mission of irregular forces is the defense of their own villages or hamlets. They also may conduct psychological, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations and perform limited civic action.

b. Concept. Irregular forces usually are volunteer groups organized and trained to provide local defense and security for their own villages or hamlets. Tribal groups may be organized as irregular forces and trained for limited tactical operations, such as patrolling, trail watching, border surveillance, and, to a lesser extent, ambush and raiding insurgent forces and bases. Other irregular organizations, such as female auxiliaries and youth organizations, may perform specific tasks such as political education, economic improvement, and civic development.

c. Organization. Irregular forces are not standardized and their structures generally parallel those of the multiple groups from which they are formed. In view of the many types of organizations represented in irregular forces and the varied capabilities which they possess, the training, assignment, and supervision of these forces must be centralized to prevent confusion, duplication of effort, and their possible misuse.

(1) Irregular force organizations vary, depending on requirements and level of development. Should the force become company or battalion-size, it normally assumes all of the aspects of a paramilitary force and may be employed, equipped, and organized as such. Whenever feasible, former military, paramilitary, and police personnel should be utilized to form cadres for these units.

(2) Irregular forces are commanded and controlled at the lowest levels. When situated in remote areas, hamlet, tribal, or village chiefs normally command these forces. Broad, general missions are assigned by HC authorities and operations are coordinated within the district or provincial Area Coordination Center. Higher-level armed or paramilitary force commanders may provide limited combat support and combat service support to irregular forces.

d. Operations. The operational capabilities of irregular forces approximate on a reduced
scale those of paramilitary forces at district level. In conducting their operations, irregular forces must be particularly security conscious. Since many of these forces are organized around societal groups which have been targets for insurgent penetration, they are particularly susceptible to subversion and espionage by secret agents within their ranks. On the other hand, since members of irregular forces usually are more closely united through common group interests, they can more effectively detect and prevent subversion and espionage than can armed or paramilitary forces. For the same reason, they are in an excellent position to collect information regarding local insurgent activities.

Section II. U. S. FORCES

146. General

This section furnishes guidance concerning the employment of U. S. forces in a developing nation faced with preventing or defeating insurgency. It presents doctrine and detailed guidance on missions, concepts, organization, and operations of U. S. forces found in—

a. FM 100–10, Combat Service Support.

b. FM 100–20, Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations.

c. FM 100–15, Field Service Regulations—Larger Units.


e. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action, Armed Forces.

f. AR 1–75, Administrative Support of MAAG, JMAG, and Similar Activities.

147. Legal Aspects

a. U. S. forces engaged in stability operations are subject to international law, U. S. law, and, except as otherwise specifically agreed, local law. Personal attitudes and action for U. S. military personnel are contained in the "Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States" (AR 350–30 and Pamphlet 21–71).

b. U. S. military personnel should have a full understanding of their status in the HC. This may be established by agreements between the U. S. and the HC which spell out their status. These agreements may provide for full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity from local law. In the absence of an agreement, military personnel are subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the degree of immunity afforded them, U.S. military personnel are expected to observe local law.

148. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

The term MAAG is used in this FM to mean the U. S. military agency present in a HC which is responsible for MAP administration. Normally, this is a MAAG; however, it may be a Military Mission, a Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, or a Military Attache.

a. Mission. The overall mission of the MAAG is to administer U.S. military assistance planning and programming in the HC and to support military requirements of the Country Team. It also makes recommendations to the commander of the unified command concerned. MAAG organizations vary according to existing HC requirements.

(1) Logistical MAAG. Logistical MAAG missions are—

(a) Programming of MAP equipment, supplies, services, and training.

(b) Advising and monitoring the utilization, maintenance, and operation of equipment and supplies.

(2) Training MAAG. Training MAAG missions are—

(a) Advising and assisting in the development of training programs.

(b) Advising and assisting HC field units.
(c) Instructing HC staff personnel in organization, operations, and training.

(d) Administering the Military Assistance Training Program.

(3) Military Assistance Commands. When U. S. foreign assistance includes sizeable U. S. combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, a Military Assistance Command may be established which normally assumes the functions of the MAAG.

b. Concept. The MAAG is a joint service group normally under the military command of the commander of a unified command who represents the Secretary of Defense. The Chief, MAAG, normally is the senior military representative on the US Country Team and is responsible for insuring that the military aspects of the U.S. internal defense and internal development effort are coordinated with other U. S. departmental representatives in the HC.

c. Organization. A MAAG normally is divided into army, navy, and air force sections, each of which is responsible for the accomplishment of its service portion of MAAG activities. In a large MAAG, there may be joint, general, and special staffs. If the MAAG has a training mission, it will have an advisory group responsible for advising HC counterparts on operational and training matters. A type Training MAAG organization is depicted at figure 11.

(1) Command. The Chief, MAAG supervises the military aspects of the MAP in the HC and advises and assists the HC armed forces in tactical, technical, organizational, administrative, logistical, and training matters. In addition, he exercises operational command over all U. S. armed services personnel of the MAAG.

(2) Advisory chain. The MAAG advisory chain parallels the organization of the HC forces in order to facilitate the advisory effort; however, it is not a part of the HC chain of command.

When U. S. representation in both the internal defense and internal development fields is performed by both U. S. civilian and military advisors, a single advisor should be designated as the senior interdepartmental representative.

(3) Personnel status. The status of MAAG personnel varies according to the provisions of applicable Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements and Status of Forces Agreements.

d. Operations. The Chief, MAAG, is guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, applicable DOD directives and instructions, and such other directives as may be issued periodically by appropriate authority.

(1) Strategic operations. Complex military problems can arise in nations in which an insurgency is developing, and the MAAG must be prepared to provide solutions. For example, it may be necessary to reorient the HC military effort from external defense to internal defense against insurgency. Insurgency requires the development of extensive HC counterintelligence and security systems. MAAG may not have the personnel qualified to assist the HC in these fields and must be augmented by the necessary specialists.

(2) Tactical operations. U. S. combat service support, combat support, and combat units may be introduced to assist HC military forces in coping with an insurgency. MAAG normally will assume operational control over these U. S. forces.

(3) Advisory operations. Advising is construed to mean advising, assisting, and influencing one's counterpart in performing his duties more effectively. Although advisors are not considered instructors in the formal sense of the word, they must realize that teaching is one aspect of their duties. Thus, the principles of in-
Figure 11. Type Training MAAG organization.
149. Mobile Training Teams

Mobile training teams (MTT) may be attached to MAAG to assist developing nations in building modern, efficient armed and paramilitary forces.

a. Mission. Each MTT is organized to present instruction in a special occupational field such as intelligence, PSYOP, engineering, and civil affairs. MTT are used primarily to instruct HC military personnel who, in turn, will teach their countrymen. The following are normal tasks performed by MTT:

(1) Giving on-the-ground instruction in the maintenance and operations of specialized and complicated equipment.

(2) Assisting in the establishment and revitalization of operations, maintenance, supply, training, and personnel, and other management systems.

(3) Recommending military or civilian civic action projects.

b. Concept. Temporary military advisory requirements may be handled by MTT provided by the unified commander from his own resources or from CONUS. MTT are dispatched to reinforce temporarily the capabilities of MAAG. If long-term assistance is required, the MAAG organization should be modified to provide permanent assistance personnel of the type needed.

c. Organization. MTT strengths usually vary from one to five personnel, but may consist of more. Such teams may be joint in nature and composed of representatives of two or more services. The size and composition of MTT are determined by the operational environment and mission to be accomplished. At theater level, the area-oriented, partially language-qualified, immediately deployable resources of the U. S. Army Special Action Force (SAF) are the primary source for MTT. (See para 154 for further discussion of SAF.)

Section III. U. S. ARMY FORCES

150. General

This section summarizes the missions, concepts, organizations, and operational capabilities of U. S. Army forces in order to provide an overall picture of U. S. Army capabilities for stability operations. It presents doctrine concerning the missions, organizations, and operations of specially trained U. S. Army internal defense assistance forces, larger units, and branch organizations.

a. Mission. The in-country mission of U. S. Army forces is to assist the HC in attaining its internal defense and internal development objectives. This mission includes the following significant tasks:

(1) Supporting U. S. civil governmental agencies which are assisting the HC.

(2) Assisting HC armed and paramilitary forces through the MAP.

(3) Providing U. S. Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

b. Concept. Many nations subjected to subversive insurgency depend on the U. S. for military assistance in those areas involving advanced technology. In view of the length of time required to train and equip HC forces, it may be necessary to introduce selected U. S. Army units to assist HC forces in combat support and combat service support missions. Integrating HC personnel into these combat support and combat service support units will hasten the attainment of HC self-sufficiency and also may help to negate insurgent propaganda. When insurgency is latent or incipient, U. S. Army resources may be employed to assist HC forces in providing a stable environment for attaining internal development objectives. If the insurgents resort to tactical
operations or related forms of violence, U. S. Army participation may be expanded to include combat, combat support, and combat service support. When an insurgency reaches the stage where the HC forces cannot contain or defeat the insurgent forces, major U. S. Army tactical forces may be deployed at the request of the HC government. Provision must be made for advanced logistical planning and support. At the earliest possible time, logistical planning must begin for the support of U. S. forces.

(1) Concurrent with the planning for the deployment of any U. S. forces (advisory personnel, special action forces, or tactical units), planning for the logistical support of these forces must be conducted.

(2) Prior to, or concurrent with, the deployment of combat forces, logistical units, particularly supply and service units, should be deployed to establish a logistical base. This early deployment is required to provide continuous logistical support when long shipping times and unimproved HC facilities are major considerations.

c. Organization. U. S. Country Teams coordinate U. S. activities in support of the U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy. Army elements of MAAG contain only the personnel and equipment essential to conduct routine operations. Unusual requirements must be met from outside resources.

d. Operations. Capabilities which all branches of the U. S. Army can bring to bear on the internal defense problem generally parallel those of HC armed forces. These capabilities include advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. In some cases, these operations will be conducted simultaneously. Combat support and combat service support units must be introduced early to provide for orderly support to combat forces.

151. Theater Army Forces

All forces assigned to theater army components of unified commands are considered potential stability operations forces. Within subordinate unified commands established primarily for stability operations, the army component may assume tasks of the type and magnitude normally assigned to a theater army.

a. Mission. The stability operations mission of theater army is to provide assistance, through the unified command, to the requesting HC in order to prevent or defeat insurgency.

b. Concept. Theater army organizations and units have a collective capability for performing in-country surveys; planning, training, advising, and supervising internal defense and internal development programs; providing combat service support and combat support; and deploying combat forces to cope with conditions of deteriorating internal defense. While the SAF is not expected to provide the total quantities of advisors, MTT, and support or combat units required by any one nation or region, they should be capable of providing the initial increments of qualified army advisory elements required.

c. Organization. The theater army is organized and possesses the capability to meet any contingencies which might arise in stability operations. This includes the capability of assisting governments which are threatened by subversive insurgency. Personnel and units may be drawn from any segment of the theater army; however, elements assigned stability operations as their primary mission (specially trained and designated forces) should be linguistically, culturally, and professionally qualified to advise their HC counterparts.

d. Command and Control. The unified command exercises operational command over in-country MAAG and other military advisory activities.

(1) Theater army responsibilities are concerned primarily with providing and supporting army elements involved in military advisory activities.

(2) Theater army forces with a primary stability operations mission should not be assigned to army commands below theater level for training, ad-
ministration, or other nonoperational purposes.

(3) The following considerations will affect theater army planning for stability operations:

(a) Civil affairs resources will be required at lower echelons than in limited and general war.

(b) Engineer requirements will be much greater due to the developing status of HC.

(c) Military police will be needed in significantly greater numbers because of increased security requirements.

(d) Intelligence resources, distributed to much lower echelons, will be required in greater numbers because of the primacy of intelligence in operations against subversive insurgency.

(e) PSYOP resources will be required to assist HC armed and paramilitary forces and, through USIS, HC civilian information and PSYOP agencies. These resources will be required at much lower echelons than is normal in limited and general war.

(f) Army aviation requirements to support all phases of internal defense and internal development operations will be greatly increased in nations where an adequate surface transportation system does not exist or when insurgents control surface transportation routes.

(g) Supply, maintenance, and medical resources will be required in greater numbers for support of both U. S. and HC efforts in stability operations.

152. Larger Units

The requirement for field army, corps, and division-size units must be determined on the basis of the threat posed by the insurgents and the capabilities of the HC to meet this threat. The headquarters element of these larger units may be required for purposes of command and control of U. S. forces deployed over wide areas or engaged in combined or joint operations. The staffs of these larger units may be used in advising HC counterparts.

a. Field Army. A force as large as a field army normally will not be deployed in stability operations; however, the field army may be required to train, equip, and dispatch elements for these operations.

(1) The mission of the field army includes three related tasks—

(a) Reinforcing MAAG or Missions in Phase I insurgency operations by providing specialists, MTT, and other support.

(b) Providing advisors and instructors and combat support and combat service support units to the MAAG in Phase II insurgency operations.

(c) Providing combat, combat support,
and combat service support units to operate with HC forces in Phases II or III insurgency operations.

(2) Operations of the field army normally will involve—

(a) Assisting the HC in preparing comprehensive national internal defense plans.

(b) In coordination with MAAG and other agencies, training and equipping police, paramilitary forces, and civilian agencies.

(c) Training HC army personnel in advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

b. Independent Corps. The independent corps, organized with infantry and airmobile divisions, is well suited for internal defense operations. It is provided a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to furnish functionalized combat service support (see FM 54–4). The COSCOM contains sufficient field army-type service support units to make the corps administratively and logistically self-sufficient.

(1) The Corps may command and control subordinate US or combined forces conducting strike, remote area, and consolidation operations. It may be assigned area responsibilities, replacing HC forces normally assigned this mission.

(2) An independent corps may provide forces to unified commands to support internal defense requirements or it may be committed as a unit to operate as part of a Military Assistance Command. When deployed as a unit, the corps may require augmentation in such specialties as civil affairs and PSYOP.

(3) When structured for stability operations, artillery and chemical elements are increased and air defense elements may be reduced.

c. Divisions. The division, with suitable augmentation of its organic units, is well suited for stability operations.

(1) The division is capable of furnishing assistance ranging from MTT to brigade-size backup forces. In the more advanced stages of insurgency, the entire division may participate in stability operations through advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

(2) The division TOE should be analyzed to ensure that only appropriate personnel and equipment are deployed. A requirement normally will exist for increased aviation, PSYOP, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, signal, medical, engineer, and other combat support and combat service support forces.

153. Brigades

Area-oriented and partially language-qualified brigades selected to operate in specific regions can provide specially trained units and MTT to MAAG. Backup brigades may reinforce MAAG or other organizations engaged in stability operations. These brigades provide a pool of specially-trained infantry, artillery, and armor MTT, and engineer, PSYOP, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, military police, and other support units of varying sizes and capabilities. These forces have a capability for training, advising, and operationally supporting HC civil, armed, and paramilitary forces. For additional doctrine on brigades committed to stability operations, see FM 31–16 and FM 31–22.

154. Special Action Forces (SAF)

The SAF is a specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the CINC of unified commands for the support of stability operations.

a. Mission. The mission of SAF is to provide training, advisory support, and operational assistance to HC forces engaged in internal defense and internal development operations.
b. Concept. Within the SAF, most of the capabilities of the army as a whole are represented on a small scale in a form specifically designed for stability operations. Elements of SAF are deployed as MTT or as an advisory/training TF to meet the requirements of MAAG, Missions, or Military Assistance Commands. The characteristics of SAF are—

(1) It is maintained in a state of operational readiness.
(2) Its members are prepared from the standpoint of training and psychology to work in remote areas with foreign personnel, including primitive groups, under conditions of relative hardship and danger.
(3) It provides a pool of resources from which training assistance and operating teams and forces can be deployed to meet the widely varying requirements of internal defense and internal development operations.
(4) It represents a regional repository of experience in internal defense and internal development operations.

c. Organization. A SAF consists of a special forces group and selected detachments which may include civil affairs, PSYOP, engineer, medical, intelligence, military police, and Army Security Agency detachments. It is a composite organization composed of elements organized under approved TOE. Each SAF is tailored to the requirements of the theater to which it is assigned.

d. Operations. The SAF is assigned to theater army under the operational control of the overseas unified command. Whether operating as a separate organization or as the major element of the SAF, the special forces group trains its detachments to meet theater requirements. Prior to deployment, SAF detachments remain under the command and operational control of the commander of the special forces group to which they are attached. When SAF elements are deployed to a HC, they normally function under the operational control of the MAAG. (See FM 31–22 for a detailed discussion of SAF.)

155. Army Combat Forces

All U. S. Army combat units are potential stability operations forces and receive training for this mission. In addition to their primary tactical roles, all U. S. combat forces possess a capability to engage in advisory assistance and to conduct or support civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations. This paragraph contains doctrine for the employment of U. S. Army combat forces in stability operations. Consult appropriate field manuals for specific branch-oriented stability operations doctrine and techniques.

a. Infantry. U. S. Army infantry stability operations missions include closing with and destroying insurgent tactical forces and defending installations and base complexes. When engaged in stability operations, basic infantry tactics must be modified to accommodate local economic, social, psychological, and political considerations. Further, modification of existing infantry unit TOE also may be required to facilitate mission accomplishment. For further information, see FM 7–20, FM 7–30, FM 31–16, and FM 57–35.

(1) Personnel trained in civil affairs and PSYOP work are required on brigade and battalion staffs.
(2) Infantry communications requirements are much greater for stability operations than for limited or general war operations.
(3) Infantry scout dog platoons may be required for patrols, tactical operations, and the security of base areas.
(4) Stability operations intelligence requirements may require greater use of saturation and long-range patrols and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

b. Armor. Flexibility of organization and equipment enables armor units (tank, armored cavalry, or air cavalry) to be mission-tailored for employment in any operational environment. In stability operations, maximum aggressive use of armor units in suitable areas will deny these areas to the insurgents and re-
lease larger infantry forces for employment in terrain which is restrictive to armor. In Phase I insurgency situations, MTT may assist MAAG advisors in developing HC armor capabilities. In Phases II and III, U. S. armor units may operationally support HC armed forces. Armor units may be most profitably employed in raid, border control, pursuit, and counterattack operations. These operations involve the employment of forces which must have greater mobility, firepower, and staying power than that possessed by the insurgents. Separate armored brigades, organized and equipped for the operational environment, are particularly useful due to their self-contained combat support and combat service support capabilities. The armored cavalry squadron and regiment with their organic air cavalry elements, flexibility, combined arms, and extensive communications also are extremely effective. Armor organization staffs may require augmentation by civil affairs and PSYOP personnel. For further information, see FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-36, and FM 17-95.

c. Artillery. Artillery missions in stability operations are the same as in limited and general war—providing close and continuous fire support to other ground forces and providing depth to combat and corollary operations. The mere presence of artillery discourages movement in restricted areas. In Phase I insurgency situations, MTT may assist MAAG advisors in developing HC artillery capabilities. During Phases II and III, MTT and fire support units may operationally assist HC forces. The following considerations govern the use of artillery in stability operations. For further information, see FM 6-20-1 and FM 6-140.

(1) Selection of targets must always consider the psychological impact upon the civilian population.

(2) Aerial and airmobile artillery, searchlight units, and countermortar and ground surveillance radars are most commonly employed.

(3) Requirements to provide simultaneous territorial fire support may necessitate reorganizing artillery battalions to increase the number of firing batteries.

(4) Artillery units are highly susceptible to attacks and ambushes; therefore, they should be collocated with other combat arms forces and be prepared to deliver direct fire in position defense. In the event it is not possible to collocate artillery with other combat forces, additional security forces may be required.

(5) Maintenance, supply, and other logistical activities may be difficult to conduct and methods must be devised to provide this support when artillery units are deployed or when insurgents control surface transportation routes.

156. U. S. Army Combat Support and Service Support Forces

All U. S. combat support and service support units are potential stability operations forces and are trained for this mission. Employment usually will be based upon the requirements for special skills contained in these support forces and may differ considerably from traditional missions. Normally, employment will involve assisting U. S./HC civil and military forces in advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. During Phase I insurgency, U. S. combat support and service support advisory personnel, MTT, and units usually will be employed in training and advising HC counterparts. During Phases II and III, this advisory assistance may be expanded to provide operational support to U. S./HC internal defense and internal development forces. In this operational environment, the political, economic, social, and psychological impact upon the population of all support forces activities must be considered.

a. Engineer. U. S. Army engineer units possess a wide range of capabilities to provide advisory assistance and unit support to U. S./HC military and civilian internal defense and internal development forces. U. S. engineer advisors, MTT, or units may be employed to
support operations in a HC during all levels of insurgency. They may be deployed separately or with a U. S. TF for the accomplishment of specific projects; however, when possible these projects should be carried out jointly with HC armed, paramilitary, and civil organizations. Improvisations and the use of field expedients will be the rule rather than the exception. Since engineer forces normally will operate in small teams dispersed over wide areas, defense against insurgent attack is a major consideration. Insecure routes of surface transportation will impose obstacles to the administration and logistical support of dispersed engineer unit bases. For further information, see FM 5–1.

b. Signal Corps. U. S. Army signal corps organizations possess capabilities to plan, construct, maintain, and instruct in the use of communications systems necessary for a nation’s civil and military development. As with engineer and medical units, signal corps operations basically are constructive in nature and provide services useful to both civil and military forces. In Phase I insurgency situations, signal corps units, MTT, or individuals may be deployed to assist in developing HC military and civil communications capabilities. In Phases II and III, U. S. Army Signal Corps units may be committed to provide support for HC combat forces. Signal communications requirements are greater in stability operations than in limited and general war because of the lack of installed communications in typical developing nations; rugged terrain and poorly developed surface communications; insurgent activities; and widely dispersed operations. For further information, see FM 1–100, FM 1–105, and FM 1–110.

d. Military Intelligence. Military intelligence units support U. S./HC internal defense and internal development operations by maintaining a detailed intelligence data base, collecting and producing current intelligence, and assisting in establishing and maintaining security. The documentary data base is essential for long and short-range contingency planning and for the training of personnel and units. It contains detailed intelligence on six broad areas: political, economic, sociological, geographic, insurgent military, and insurgent infrastructure. Current intelligence includes that information required for timely and accurate monitoring of insurgent activities and is essential for the refinement of contingency plans, reorientation of training, and the conduct of stability operations. Security involves those counterintelligence functions designed to detect and neutralize insurgent espionage, sabotage, and subversion. U. S. military intelligence advisors, MTT, and units have a capability to advise and assist HC counterparts, conduct unilateral operations, or participate in joint or combined intelligence operations. Experience indicates that stability operations require a larger number of operational intelligence and counterintelligence personnel than is required for lim-
ized and general war. For further information, see FM 30–5, FM 30–16, FM 30–31, and FM 30–31A.

e. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR). Chemical personnel and units support U. S./HC internal defense and internal development operations by providing advice and support in defoliation and crop destruction operations, and the use of riot control agents and flame. They provide guidance in the use of chemical agents in tactical operations and in defense against enemy use of chemical and biological agents. Further, chemical units can advise and provide teams for insect control and shower points. During Phase I insurgency, U. S. Army chemical personnel and units may be deployed to provide advisory assistance to HC forces. During Phases II and III, chemical officers and units may provide advice and support to U. S./HC combat, combat support, and combat service support elements in chemical and biological operations. For further information, see FM 3–10, FM 3–50, FM 20–33, and TC 3–16.

f. Military Police. U. S. Army military police units may assist HC security forces in both tactical and nontactical operations. Normal police operations include riot control, area control, public relations, police information, physical security, and general investigations. In an insurgency, these operations may be expanded to include populace relocation, screening, identification, and registration; enforcement of curfews; operation of patrols and checkpoints; and investigation of crime. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations also are a major responsibility of the police. In coordination with HC intelligence organizations, the police participate in operations against the insurgent infrastructure and in detecting and neutralizing other individuals and groups whose goals and activities are inimical to the government. U. S. Army military police assistance to HC forces includes propaganda research, analysis, intelligence content development, news collection, broadcast monitoring, and the skills and equipment required for mass communications. Radio, press, and audiovisual teams are available to advise, train, and operationally support HC forces. Types of operations which U. S. Army PSYOP teams have a capability to conduct include providing timely and appropriate propaganda to demoralize insurgent forces; disseminating information, directives, and appeals to the population; and creating diversions from tactical operations. The activities of U. S. Army PSYOP teams normally are coordinated with USIS. For further information, see FM 33–1 and FM 33–5.

g. PSYOP. The range of support which U. S. Army PSYOP units are capable of furnishing
transportation including trucks, buses, watercraft, porter units, and pack animals. Aircraft normally will provide the most secure means of transporting men and materiel and regulatory and air route traffic systems must be organized. U. S. transportation units have the capability to provide air transport units, truck companies, boat and amphibian companies, terminal support units, and maintenance units in support of HC forces. Should U. S. combat forces be committed, U. S. transportation organizations may become the nucleus of a transportation command. For further information, see FM 55-11, FM 55-35, FM 55-46, and FM 55-58.

j. Finance. The primary mission of U. S. Army finance units is to insure the prompt and accurate payment of U. S. troops. They also control, disburse, and supervise the use of funds for military construction and recommend measures to prevent the introduction of massive dollar resources from disrupting the HC economy. Through advisory assistance and military civic action, finance personnel may assist HC forces in instituting proper financial accounting procedures and other systems of monetary control to support the attainment of national internal defense and internal development objectives.

k. Adjutant General. U. S. Army adjutant general units provide U. S. Army elements and forces normal adjutant general support in administration and personnel services. In addition, adjutant general responsibilities encompass welfare and morale services which include casualty reporting, decorations and awards, personal affairs counseling, postal services, and special services. They also assist HC forces in attaining stability operations objectives by providing advisory assistance in normal adjutant general matters. In the internal defense and internal development operational environment, wide dispersal of U. S. troops may necessitate augmentation of adjutant general TOE resources in order to accomplish the many and varied services which must be performed. Army adjutant general responsibilities, outlined in FM 101-5, can be easily tailored to support the operations of independent corps, divisions, brigades, and special action forces.

l. Chaplain. U. S. Army chaplains are deployed as individuals to perform their religious missions in support of both U. S. and HC personnel. In internal defense and internal development, they may be considered as teachers, counselors, administrators, psychological operators, and liaison officers between U. S. and HC forces. Chaplains provide the soldier a spiritual sense of obligation to duty and the courage to fight for the defense and freedom of his nation. They assist in developing tolerance and faith and in uniting religious factions, cults, and denominations into unified forces in support of peace and national unity. They teach and inform, as well as learn from chaplains of other faiths and, in so doing, create bonds of friendship and mutual understanding.

m. Judge Advocate. U. S. Army judge advocates provide legal advice to both U. S. and HC forces. Judge advocates assist U. S. forces and personnel by providing legal assistance and rendering legal opinions on personnel actions, procurement activities, and civil-military jurisdiction. Judge advocates assist in the administration of military justice and in providing a claims service. Judge advocates assist HC forces by providing advice and training on legal procedures, claims, and military justice. Judge advocates also may assist in developing status of forces agreements and a code of military justice for HC armed forces.

n. Supply and Service. U. S. Army supply and service personnel and quartermaster elements of supply and service, air delivery, and petroleum supply units handle all classes of supplies except Class V, which may be handled by a separate ammunition service brigade or similar organization. Supply and service organizations provide laundry, bath, clothing exchange, and graves registration services to supported units. Although HC forces normally receive support under the MAP and operate their own logistics systems, in stability operations it may be necessary for U. S. Army supply and service elements to operate supply
points and depots and otherwise support HC forces. Wide dispersal of tactical forces in stability operations normally will necessitate augmentation of supply and service TOE personnel and resources. For further information, see FM 29–3, FM 29–10, FM 29–45, and FM 100–10.

o. Ordnance. The reorganization of the support structure for the field army has, for the most part, eliminated units that carried the ordnance designation. In their place, direct and general support maintenance battalions have been provided. These units provide maintenance support on a functionalized basis for a wide variety of equipment. They are composed of ordnance personnel and elements, as well as personnel and elements for the repair of other commodities of equipment, as required (e.g., chemical, engineer, signal, aircraft, quartermaster). Units still retaining the ordnance designation include ammunition service units, missile maintenance units, and the ordnance tire repair company. Maintenance support units should be concentrated in secure bases at lower levels than in limited or general war to permit mission accomplishment in an operational environment where wear and tear on vehicles and other items of equipment is excessive. Failure of the HC to stress maintenance support and preventive maintenance will increase dependence on teams of U. S. maintenance personnel for advice and assistance. Since vehicles and other equipment found in the HC are of varied manufacture and foreign origin, U. S. maintenance personnel may require additional knowledge which would not be required in limited or general war. For further information, see FM 9–6, FM 29–22, and FM 55–45.

p. Medical Service. Medical service has proven to be one of the most effective U. S. Army resources for gaining population support. The high health hazards prevalent in most developing nations and the general lack of HC medical personnel and facilities place a high premium upon U. S. medical services. Because medical resources are scarce and the need for them critical, medical systems must be established to provide for the concurrent conduct and support of both tactical and military civic action operations. U. S. Army medical service personnel and units must be prepared to assist HC forces in developing their capabilities in this field. For further information, see FM 8–10, and FM 8–15. Medical services which may be provided are—

1. Establishing outpatient clinics operated by HC personnel with scheduled visits by a U. S. Army medical officer.
2. Furnishing medical supplies and establishing HC medical supply distribution systems.
3. Using aircraft for evacuation of emergency cases, especially those resulting from insurgency action.
4. Advising and assisting on sanitation matters.
5. Providing emergency dental service.
6. Providing veterinary assistance and advice.

q. Women’s Army Corps. Women’s Army Corps (WAC) personnel are trained in varied military occupational specialties and are capable of replacing men in many administrative, medical, and technical duties. U. S. WAC personnel provide U. S. Army elements and forces normal WAC support in administrative and technical services. They also may assist the HC by providing advisory assistance to HC armed forces women’s service organizations.
# APPENDIX A

## REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR 1–75</td>
<td>Administrative Support of MAAG, JUSMAG, and Similar Activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 10–17</td>
<td>U. S. Army Intelligence Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) AR 10–122</td>
<td>United States Army Security Agency (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) AR 105–87</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 320–5</td>
<td>Dictionary of United States Army Terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 320–50</td>
<td>Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 345–5</td>
<td>Personnel Management; Personnel Records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 380–200</td>
<td>Armed Forces Censorship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 381–115</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) AR 381–205</td>
<td>Procedures Facilitating Intelligence Exploitation of Captured Enemy Personnel (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) AR 515–1</td>
<td>Army Cold War Activities (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 551–50</td>
<td>Foreign Nationals, Training of Foreign Personnel by the United States Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 633–50</td>
<td>Prisoners of War; Administration, Employment, and Compensation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 633–51</td>
<td>Civilian Internees Administration, Employment, and Compensation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 735–35</td>
<td>Supply Procedures for TOE Units and TDA Units or Activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 750–8</td>
<td>Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMMI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 1–5</td>
<td>Aviation Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 1–15</td>
<td>Divisional Aviation Battalion and Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 1–100</td>
<td>Army Aviation Utilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 1–105</td>
<td>Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 1–110</td>
<td>Armed Helicopter Employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3–10</td>
<td>Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) FM 3–10A</td>
<td>Employment of Biological Agents (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) FM 3–10B</td>
<td>Employment of Chemical Agents (U).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3–50</td>
<td>Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3–85</td>
<td>Chemical Service Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–1</td>
<td>Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–15</td>
<td>Field Fortifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–25</td>
<td>Explosives and Demolitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–31</td>
<td>Boobytraps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–135</td>
<td>Engineer Battalion, Armored, Infantry and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–136</td>
<td>Engineer Battalion, Airborne Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5–142</td>
<td>Nondivisional Engineer Combat Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 5-162</td>
<td>Engineer Construction and Construction-Support Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-20-1</td>
<td>Field Artillery Tactics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-20-2</td>
<td>Field Artillery Techniques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-121</td>
<td>Field Artillery Target Acquisition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-140</td>
<td>Field Artillery Cannon, Battalions and Batteries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-161</td>
<td>Radar Set AN/MPQ-4A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 6-162</td>
<td>Radar Set AN/TPS-25A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-11</td>
<td>Rifle Company—Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-15</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon and Squads—Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-20</td>
<td>Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 7-30</td>
<td>Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-5</td>
<td>Medical Service Units, Theater of Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-10</td>
<td>Medical Service, Theater of Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-15</td>
<td>Division Medical Service, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-16</td>
<td>Medical Service Field Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-35</td>
<td>Transportation of the Sick and Wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 8-55</td>
<td>Army Medical Service Planning Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 9-6</td>
<td>Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 9-30</td>
<td>Maintenance Battalion: Division Support Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 10-8</td>
<td>Air Delivery of Supplies and Equipment in the Field Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 10-50</td>
<td>Supply and Transport Battalion, Division Support Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 11-50</td>
<td>Signal Battalion, Armored Infantry, and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 11-57</td>
<td>Signal Battalion, Airborne Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 12-2</td>
<td>Adjutant General Operations in the Field Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 12-11</td>
<td>Administration Company, Airborne, Armored, Infantry and Mechanized Divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 12-50</td>
<td>The Marching Band.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 16-5</td>
<td>The Chaplain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 17-1</td>
<td>Armor Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 17-15</td>
<td>Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 17-36</td>
<td>Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 17-95</td>
<td>The Armored Cavalry Regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-1</td>
<td>Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-2</td>
<td>Military Police Support in the Field Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-3</td>
<td>Military Police Support in the Communication Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-5</td>
<td>The Military Policeman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-15</td>
<td>Civil Disturbances and Disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 19-40</td>
<td>Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 20-32</td>
<td>Landmine Warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 20-33</td>
<td>Combat Flame Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 20-60</td>
<td>Battlefield Illumination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 21-5</td>
<td>Military Training Management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 21-6</td>
<td>Techniques of Military Instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 21-10</td>
<td>Military Sanitation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First Aid for Soldiers.

Foot Marches.

Physical Training.

Map Reading.

Military Symbols.

Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense.

Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare.

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR), and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises.

Ranger Training and Ranger Operations.

Visual Signals.

Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.

Survival, Evasion and Escape.

Joint World-Wide Evasion and Escape (U).

Military Leadership.

Technique of Fire of the Rifle Squad and Tactical Application.

Antipersonnel Mines M18A1 and M18 (Claymore).

Tactical Communication Doctrine.

Field Radio Techniques.

Field Wire and Field Cable Techniques.

The Law of Land Warfare.

Direct Support Supply and Service in the Field Army.

Supply Management in the Field Army.

Maintenance Operations in the Field Army.

General Support Supply and Service in the Field Army.

Combat Intelligence.

Terrain Intelligence.

Intelligence Interrogation (U).

Technical Intelligence.

Counterintelligence Operations, Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army (U).

Intelligence Collection Operations, Intelligence Corps, USA (U).

Armed Forces Censorship.

Stability Operations, Intelligence (U) (to be published).

Stability Operations, Intelligence Collection (U) (to be published).

Barriers and Denial Operations.

Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force).

Battle Group Landing Team (Amphibious).

Counterguerrilla Operations.

Infantry Long-Range Patrol Company.

Special Forces Operational Techniques.

Special Forces Techniques (U).

Special Forces Operations.

Special Forces Operations (U).

Desert Operations.

Jungle Training and Operations.

Tactical Cover and Deception (U).

Combat in Fortified and Built-Up Areas.

River-Crossing Operations.

Basic Cold Weather Manual.
FM 31–72 Mountain Operations.
(CM) FM 32–5 Communications Security (U).
(S) FM 32–10 United States Army Security Agency in Support of a Field Army (U).
FM 41–5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs.
FM 41–10 Civil Affairs Operations.
(S) FM 44–1A U. S. Army Air Defense Employment (U).
FM 54–1 The Logistical Command.
FM 54–2 The Division Support Command.
FM 54–3 Field Army Support Command.
FM 54–4 The Support Brigade.
FM 55–6 Transportation Services in Theaters of Operations.
FM 55–15 Transportation Reference Data.
FM 55–21 Transportation Railway Supervisory Units.
FM 55–35 Motor Transportation Operations and Motor Transport Units.
FM 55–45 Aircraft Maintenance Services and Units in the Field Army.
FM 55–46 Army Aviation Transport Services and Units in the Field Army.
FM 55–58 Transportation Boat Operations.
FM 57–10 Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations.
FM 57–35 Airmobile Operations.
FM 57–38 Pathfinder Operations.
FM 61–100 The Division.
(S) FM 100–1 Doctrinal Guidance (U).
FM 100–5 Field Service Regulations—Operations.
FM 100–10 Combat Service Support.
FM 100–15 Field Service Regulations—Larger Units.
(C) FM 100–20 Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations (U).
FM 100–25 Tactical Air Support of Land Forces (to be published).
FM 101–5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure.
FM 101–10–1 Staff Officers' Field Manual—Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data—Unclassified Data.
FM 101–31–1 Staff Officers' Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment.
TC 3–16 Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, and Herbicides in Counterguerrilla Operations.
TC 101–2 Tactical Operations Centers.
TM 5–258 Pile Construction.
TM 5–280 Foreign Mine Warfare Equipment.
TM 5–332 Pits and Quarries.
TM 5–337 Paving and Surfacing Operations.
TM 5–342 Logging and Sawmill Operations.
TM 5–370 Railroad Construction.
TM 5–634 Refuse Collection and Disposal: Repairs and Utilities.
TM 5–700 Field Water Supply.
TM 5–728 Engineer Foundry Practices.
Concrete and Masonry.

Electric Power Generation in the Field.

Land Mines.

Demolition Materials.

Driver Selection and Training (Wheeled Vehicles).

Army Equipment Record Procedures.

Air Movement of Troops and Equipment.

Psychological Operations Organization.

HHC Civil Affairs Brigade (when published).

Civil Affairs Organization.

The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.

Individual Training in Collecting and Reporting Military Information.

Treaties Governing Land Warfare.

Combat Development ABA Armies's Operational Concept 1966-70 (U).

Index of Army Films, Transparencies, GTA Charts, and Recordings.

Military Publications Indexes.

Preventive Maintenance Guide for Commanders.


APPENDIX B

FORMAT FOR TYPE U. S. /HC STABILITY OPERATIONS PLAN

(CLASSIFICATION)

COPY NO
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
DATE TIME GROUP


References: A listing of policy regulations, concepts, decrees, and other pertinent plans, maps, and charts which relate to stability operations.

1. SITUATION
   
   a. General. State plan objective and scope, policy statements, and considerations affecting formulation of the plan.
   
   b. Directive. Provide a resume of data contained in the U.S./HC internal defense and internal development plan which are pertinent to the plan.
   
   c. Insurgent forces. State here all information of insurgent military forces and infrastructure which may directly affect stability operations planning. Such information as unit identification, organizational concepts, major activities, outside support, leadership, morale, and political ideologies should be included.
   
   d. Friendly forces.
      
      (1) Military. State here information of U.S., HC, and Allied military forces (armed, paramilitary, and irregular) which may directly affect the U.S./HC internal defense and internal development plan. Such information as major units and their deployment, strengths and vulnerabilities, and evaluation of capabilities to perform stability operations missions should be included.
      
      (2) Civil. State here all information of U.S., HC, and Allied official civilian departments and agencies which may play an active role in internal defense and internal development as they affect stability operations. Such information as agency designation, mission and responsibilities, location, and present and future potential in supporting stability operations should be included.

   (CLASSIFICATION)
(CLASSIFICATION)

(3) Public and private. State here all information of U.S., HC, and Allied public and private organizations willing and capable of providing assistance in both the internal defense and internal development aspects of stability operations. Religious organizations, professional societies, industrial firms, and women's and youth groups are examples. Such information as size of membership, influence exerted in community, resources, and capabilities should be included.

e. Operational factors.

(1) Weather and terrain. State major characteristics and significance.

(2) Population. State here information of population groups which may directly affect stability operations. Such information as loyalty to the government, susceptibility to insurgent domination, attitudes, and desires (group objectives) should be included.

2. MISSION

A clear, concise statement of tasks to be accomplished to include who, what, when, where, and why.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation; overall objectives and phasing; new national policy; judicial matters; establishment of the main programs to include relationships; use of foreign assistance; orientation of forces; initiation and disposition of area studies and field surveys; establishment of procedures for planning groups; channels of communication and liaison; considerations affecting intelligence and psychological/information programs; monitoring agencies and procedures.

b. Army. Main missions and priorities.

c. Air Force. Main missions and priorities.

d. Navy. Main missions and priorities.

e. Paramilitary forces. Main missions and priorities.

f. Irregular forces. Main missions and priorities.

g. Police. Main missions and priorities.

h. Official civil agencies. Main missions and priorities.

i. Other assets and capabilities. Main missions and priorities.

j. Coordinating instructions.

(CLASSIFICATION)
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   Major matters affecting the outcome of the stability operations pro-

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   Direction; command relationships; coordination of communications
   capabilities.
   a. Command.
   b. Signal.

Appendixes:
   1. Advisory Assistance (omitted)
   2. Civil Affairs
   3. PSYOP
   4. Intelligence (omitted)
   5. Populace and Resources Control
   6. Tactical Operations

(Note. For further guidance on operational plans, see FM 101–5.)
Appendix 2 (Civil Affairs) to Stability Operations Plan

Organization: If the civil affairs organization is too cumbersome to be listed in body of the stability operations plan, list it here.

1. SITUATION

See basic stability operations plan. Include information which is pertinent to civil affairs operations.

2. MISSION

Write here a clear and concise statement of the mission and objectives to be accomplished by civil affairs operations in order to give maximum support to the accomplishment of the overall objectives of the stability operations plan.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. In this subparagraph, give the concept of the civil affairs operations to be conducted. This includes the development and phasing of the following:

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

(2) Support for the functions of government for the civilian population.

(3) Community relations of the military forces.

(4) Military civic action.

(5) Military participation in populace and resources control.

(6) Military support of civil defense.

(7) PSYOP of a consolidation nature.

b. Phase I.

(1) Tasks.

(2) Concept. This paragraph will contain a specific statement of concept to include priorities of forces and operations; organization, training, and indoctrination of forces; and goals or objectives to be accomplished.

c. Phase II. Cite information as contained in paragraph 3b, above,
for this and subsequent phases. Provide a separate phase for each civil affairs activity applicable in paragraph 3a.

d. Coordinating instructions.
   (1) In the absence of specific policy, principles for the conduct of civil affairs operations set forth in FM 31-22, FM 31-73, FM 41-5 FM 41-10, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20 may be employed initially to plan for the conduct of civil affairs operations and activities.
   (2) Coordination of civil affairs operations is developed among U.S./HC and Allied civilian and military organizations at the adjacent and next higher level. Report locations and primary points of contact of all coordination.
   (3) Commanders exercising authority for advice or assistance for civil affairs matters will establish and maintain checklists dealing with matters of policy to insure compliance.
   (4) Normal command channels will be utilized on all civil affairs matters which affect policy, tactical operations, or security of troops.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. National internal defense and internal development plan.

b. Civilian relief.
   (1) Cite information pertaining to allowances and amounts of supplies to be carried by each type of unit. (Normally of Class I and II variety.)
   (2) Medical supply and assistance allocations per unit.
   (3) Civilian agencies, with advice from civil affair organizations, will distribute relief supplies.

c. Governmental.
   (1) Governmental affairs. Commanders and advisors will utilize, insofar as possible, local governmental agencies and functionaries. Politically compromised or insurgent appointed officials will be reported, subverted, or removed.
   (2) Public order and safety. Commanders and advisors will utilize, consistent with security limitations, existing public safety organizations in coordination with recognized civil and military authorities.

d. Economic.
   (1) Commerce and industry. Encourage local production of items essential to prevent disease and unrest, and other production for military use dependent upon the availability of raw materials and labor.

   (CLASSIFICATION)
(2) Food and agriculture. Provide maximum practical military assistance to agricultural production with control and supervision through HC civil officials. Utilization of food production and processing facilities, including local procurement of food supplies for military use, will be avoided when such use or procurement depletes or reduces local supplies and capabilities to the extent that U. S. support becomes necessary.

(3) Price control and rationing. Observe price control and rationing systems in effect. If not in effect, fair price lists should be established.

(4) Property protection.
   (a) Identification and determination of ownership of property will be accomplished in accordance with HC statutes.
   (b) Military use of public or private property will be coordinated with local civil authorities.
   (c) Procedures to prevent removal or destruction of public and private property will be instituted.

(5) Finance. Commanders and advisors will develop policies and establish safeguards in conjunction with HC civil authorities, to prevent acquisition of public funds by hostile forces and protect value of currency by preventing unauthorized practices.

(6) Civilian supply.
   (a) Set forth in this paragraph the extent to which U. S./HC supplies may be made available for civilian use during mobile or fluid tactical situations; i.e., limited to supplies necessary for prevention and mitigation of disease, starvation, and unrest.
   (b) Policy and coordination requirements for assisting civil authorities in controlling local organizations administering and distributing relief supplies.
   (c) Provision for administration and control of relief contributions and personnel from other than local sources in accordance with national policy.

(7) Labor. Commanders will respect local laws and regulations; coordinate labor requirements with local authorities; and encourage establishment of labor and wage control boards or committees.

e. Sociological.

(1) Public health. Commanders and senior advisors will take steps necessary to protect the health of military forces; prevent

(CLASSIFICATION)
suffering and distress; and assist civil authorities in public health matters.

(2) Public welfare. Control and supervision of local welfare agencies will be coordinated with civil authorities. Insure coordination of civic action projects performed or assisted by armed forces.

(3) Public education. Establishment or re-establishment of schools will be supported by military forces. Encourage or conduct civic action projects which improve facilities and administration of education.

(4) Public works and utilities.
   (a) Statement of policy concerning extent of use by armed forces.
   (b) Facilities utilized for military operations will be improved, repaired, or constructed. Insure maintenance after facilities are turned over to HC personnel.
   (c) Rehabilitation or repairs during strike operations will be limited to that necessary to prevent disease or unrest.

(5) Public transportation.
   (a) Maximum military assistance will be afforded in rehabilitation and implementation of public transportation facilities essential for military purposes.
   (b) Military utilization will be established, where appropriate, by agreement.
   (c) Military transportation will be provided for augmentation as available and commensurate with the tactical situation.

(6) Public communications.
   (a) Strike operations will be given priority use of communications.
   (b) Communications controls will be coordinated with HC authorities for security and safety precautions.

(7) Displaced persons, evacuees, and refugees.
   (a) To maximum extent possible, control, processing, and handling of DP, refugees, and evacuees will be accomplished by HC personnel.
   (b) As a minimum, standards for processing these personnel will be those required to prevent disease and unrest.
   (c) Efforts of charity, nonprofit, and volunteer organizations will be coordinated with military efforts.

(8) Civil information. Civil affairs organizations will coordinate public information activities in conjunction with U.S./HC
and Allied military PSYOP, utilizing civilian facilities and civil officials.

(9) Arts, monuments, and archives.
   (a) Maximum protection will be given to arts, monuments, and archives consistent with the military mission.
   (b) Care and preservation is a HC responsibility but commanders may assist where possible.
   (c) Commanders and senior advisors will enforce measures safeguarding cultural centers or objects.

(10) Cultural relations.
   (a) Maximum respect for customs, traditions, and desires of the civilian population will be shown, consistent with military operations.
   (b) Use of temples, churches, and religious institutions for military purposes is prohibited.
   (c) Matters pertinent to religious welfare of civilian communities will be coordinated with chaplains.

f. Miscellaneous. Cite information as to any special instructions or procedures not covered above.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Concise instructions relating to each of the following, when not otherwise covered.

a. Command posts. Location of command posts.

b. Signal communication.
   (1) General.
      (a) Responsibility for establishing signal circuits.
      (b) Authorization for direct communication.
   (2) Radio.
      (a) Radio nets.
      (b) Limitations on radio communications.

c. Reports. Instructions for submission of periodic civil affairs reports and summaries.

TABS: (omitted)

A. Intelligence
B. PSYOP
C. Amnesty and Rehabilitation

(CLASSIFICATION)
(CLASSIFICATION)

D. Resettlement Program
E. Legislative Support (Governmental)
F. Food Administration Program
G. Logistics
Appendix 3 (PSYOP) to Stability Operations Plan

References:

Organization: If the PSYOP organization is too cumbersome to be listed in the body of the plan, list it here.

1. SITUATION
   Information of the general overall situation that will help subordinates understand the current situation.
   
   a. Insurgent forces. Include the military, sociological, political, and economic background information required for PSYOP; basic ideological strengths and weaknesses; psychological factors favorable or unfavorable to the accomplishment of the mission; target audiences and vulnerabilities.
   
   b. Friendly forces. PSYOP means other than those available within the command or on call from other military commands. This includes appropriate nonmilitary informational agencies within the area of responsibility. It also includes PSYOP which may affect the operations of the issuing command.
   
   c. Attachments and detachments. List here the PSYOP units attached from the issuing unit together with the times they are effective.

2. MISSION
   Write here a clear and concise statement of the mission and objectives to be accomplished by PSYOP in order to give maximum support to the accomplishment of the overall mission of the command. (The objectives and rationale may be lengthy and placed in an appendix.)

3. EXECUTION
   
   a. Concept of operation. In this subparagraph give the concept of the PSYOP. This includes the development and phasing of the operation.
   
   b. In separate lettered subparagraphs give the specific duties of each subordinate unit charged with the accomplishment of a PSYOP objective.
   
   c. In the last subparagraph of paragraph 3, give the details of (CLASSIFICATION)
coordination and control measures applicable to two or more units of the command which are necessary for coordination or general conduct of operations and particular policy guidance on the subject. Included in this subparagraph would be themes to be avoided and themes to be stressed, and specific items which the commander desired to emphasize. Normally, references are made to the tasks concerning guidance and themes.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
Instructions concerning administrative matters, including logistical arrangements for the conduct of operations. Any requirements for special reports are included here.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

b. Signal. Usually, reference is made to the current Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) in effect, and any special instructions relating to signal communications are included in this subparagraph; such as frequency allocation for radio broadcasting operations or for tactical communications.

TABS: (omitted)
A. Target Audiences
B. Themes
C. Operational Guidance for PSYOP Personnel
D. Evaluation of Effectiveness

(ClassIFICATION)
Appendix 5 (Populace and Resources Control) to Stability Operations Plan

References:

Organization: State here those police and other organizations whose primary mission is populace and resources control.

1. SITUATION
   a. General. Outline the general situation from the national and community standpoints to include significant characteristics of the population directly contributing to the internal security problem (making references to intelligence estimates and other documents as necessary). Analyze the resources and materiel situation confronting the population and the insurgent. State present government policy and efforts in the field of internal security and results of these efforts to include emergency legislation or decrees already enacted or potential for such legislative support.
   b. Insurgent forces. Outline the general insurgent situation to include organization, type of warfare, political orientation, outside support, operations, leadership, and similar matters. Include a detailed summary of the nature and functions of the insurgent apparatus within the nation to include a delineation of specific targets if possible. Summarize in detail the nature and functions of the supporting linkage between the population and the insurgent to include a delineation of targets. Refer to intelligence estimates and other documents as necessary.
   c. Friendly forces. List information concerning all major elements (to include armed force, police, paramilitary, and civilian) concerned with security. Make reference to other plans (military campaign, intelligence, PYSOP, and civil affairs) to include objectives and phasing of each. Refer to estimates, studies, and other documentation as required.

2. MISSION
   Write here a clear, concise statement of the populace and resources control mission and objectives.

3. EXECUTION
   a. State here the concept for execution of the populace and resources control program. Concept should be comprehensive to include

   (CLASSIFICATION)
priorities and areas; timing; phasing and scope of operations; and organization, training, and indoctrination of forces to be used in the program. Statement of forces should include primary forces (police) and secondary forces (paramilitary) to be used and to what extent armed forces will participate in the program. Concept should contain a statement concerning integration of this program with the overall internal defense and internal development program. Intelligence and PSYOP programs will be emphasized to include the phasing-in of these programs with other aspects of security, special systems of operations (amnesty and rehabilitation, resettlement, and village defense) to include significance of the overall program.

b. Phase I.

(1) Tasks.

(2) Concept. This will be a specific statement of concept to include priorities of forces and operations; organization, training, and indoctrination of forces; and goals or objectives to be accomplished.

c. Phase II. Cite information as contained in paragraph 3b, above, for this and subsequent phases. Provide a separate phase for each populace and resources control program as suggested in example below:

Phase I: Preparatory actions.
Phase II: Initiation of control actions.
Phase III: Intensification of controls.
Phase IV: Relinquishment of controls.

d. Coordinating instructions. This will consist of instructions applicable to two or more phases of the plan or multiple elements of the force involved. Reference will be made to coordination with other internal defense and internal development programs.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

This will consist of brief, broad statements of logistic information or instructions applicable to the populace and resources control program. This may be issued separately or reference made to other logistic documents as necessary. Some suggested subparagraphs under this heading are:

a. Supply and maintenance of forces involved.

b. Support of civil agencies within the population.

c. Support of specified major projects within the program (e.g., food control, resettlement, village defense).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. State generally the command arrangement for the entire program and any special portion thereof. Indicate legal/legislative basis for command authority where necessary. State establishment and use of Area Coordination Centers and civil/military committees.

b. Signal. Plan of communications with special reference to integration of all (armed forces, paramilitary, police, and civil) communications means. Include time zones to be used and liaison instructions as appropriate.

TABS: (omitted)

A. Intelligence
B. PSYOP
C. Amnesty and Rehabilitation System
D. Resettlement Program
E. Village Defense Program
F. Paramilitary
G. Legislative Support
H. Border Denial
I. Food Control Program
J. Logistics
K. Communications
L. Lines of Communication Security
M. Customs and Imports Control Program
Appendix 6 (Tactical Operations Plan) to the Stability Operations Plan

References:

Organization: List all armed, paramilitary, and other forces which are designated as internal defense forces. Organizations and strengths should be shown if necessary. Civil and other police support contributing directly to the effort should be made a part of this listing.

1. SITUATION
   a. Insurgent forces. Outline the general insurgency situation to include organizations, type of warfare, political orientation, leadership, outside support, operations, and other matters. Include a detailed summary of the tactical elements of the insurgency as to reinforcements, support, efficiency, and other information. Make reference to intelligence estimates, studies, and other relevant materials.
   b. Friendly forces. List information concerning all major force elements to include aid from other nations which contribute directly to the effort. Make reference to other plans (advisory assistance, populace and resources control, intelligence, PSYOP, and civil affairs) to include objectives and major phasing of each. Refer to estimates, studies, and other relevant documents as necessary. Indicate legal basis of authority such as martial law.
   c. Assumptions. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole with emphasis on direct relationships (and/or overlapping) with the internal defense program, and those particularly applicable to the national internal defense plan.

2. MISSION
   State the mission clearly and concisely.

3. EXECUTION
   a. State the broad concept for employment of the force as a whole. Concept will be comprehensive and will include priorities (with regard to forces and areas of operations); timing; phasing; and scope of operations, to include organization, training, and employment of forces for the conduct of the consolidation, strike, and remote area campaigns.
b. Phase I.

(1) Tasks.

(2) Concept. This will be comprehensive and will include priorities (with regard to forces and operations); timing; phasing; and scope of operations to include organization, training, and employment of forces; scheme of maneuver; and civic action programs.

(3) Forces required:
   (a) Army.
   (b) Navy.
   (c) Air force.
   (d) Other.

c. Phase II. Cite information as stated in paragraph b, above, for this and subsequent phases. Where applicable, include the following steps in each campaign as suggested below:

(1) Preparatory actions.
(2) Initiation of counteraction.
(3) Assumption of the offensive.
(4) Destruction of the insurgent.
(5) Reconstruction.

d. Coordinating instructions. This will consist of instructions applying to two or more elements of the plan or multiple elements of the overall internal defense force.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Brief, broad statements of logistic information or instructions applicable to each campaign will be provided under the following subparagraphs as appropriate. Include logistics requirements for civic action programs.

a. Supply aspects.

b. Maintenance and modification.

c. Medical service.

d. Transportation.

e. Base development.

f. Personnel.

g. Allied military assistance.

h. Administrative management.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. State generally the command arrangement for each separate campaign or portions thereof. Indicate any shifts in command contemplated during campaigns to include time of expected shift.

b. Signal. Plan of communications. Refer to standard plan or other communications documents as necessary. Include time zones to be used and liaison instructions as appropriate.

TABS: (omitted)
A. Consolidation Campaign
B. Strike Campaign
C. Remote Area Campaign

(CLASSIFICATION)
APPENDIX C

FORMAT FOR TYPE NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE
AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

(CLASSIFICATION)

COPY NO. ________________
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
DATE TIME GROUP

Internal Defense and Internal Development Estimate of the Situation

References: Maps, charts, and relevant documents.

1. MISSION
   (Example) Counter and neutralize latent/incipient/active insurgency
   in the nation, establishing effective internal defense.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations affecting possible courses of action. Determine and
      analyze those factors which will influence the choice of action as
      well as those which will affect the capabilities of the insurgent.
      Consider each of the following factors involved and include under
      each a statement of each fact or assumption and a deduction of
      its probable influence on insurgent or friendly actions.

      (1) Characteristics of the area of operation. Significant data on
      the Area Assessment to include:

      (a) Geography. General nature of the terrain under consideration
      as an area of operations for insurgent and internal defense
      forces to include terrain barriers, degree of assessibility of
      various sectors, possible safe areas and sanctuaries, critical
      border areas, routes of supply and reinforcement; cover and
      concealment; obstacles to movement; effect of terrain on
      employment of artillery; air support; chemical and biological
      weapons; effects of terrain on radiating devices (communications
      and surveillance devices), and determination of key
      terrain features.

      (b) Climate. Key aspects with regard to present or potential in-
      ternal development programs and internal defense tactical
      operations.

      (CLASSIFICATION)
(CLASSIFICATION)

(c) Economy. Critical aspects from an insurgency point of view to include:
1. Agriculture.
2. Raw material base.
3. Commerce and industry.
4. Finance.
5. Transportation and telecommunications.
7. Capital.

(d) Sociology. Critical aspects from an insurgency and government point of view to include:
1. Government policy.
2. Existing and programmed sociological development measures.
3. Priorities with regard to:
   a. Food supply.
   b. Education.
   c. Health and sanitation.
   d. Social welfare.

(e) Politics.
1. Existing and programmed political development measures.
2. Existing or potential political support for government programs.
3. Priorities with regard to:
   a. Public political allegiance and good will.
   b. Political system to include electoral procedures.
   c. International problems and foreign relations.
   d. Intelligence, security, and information.
   e. Public administration.

(2) Insurgency situation. National analysis of latent, incipient, or active insurgency generally follows standard intelligence procedure; however, special care is taken in identifying the movement to isolate the elements of the movement from one another and the general body of the population. Particular attention is directed to the nature and extent of support of the insurgency from sources outside the nation. Typical factors in the analysis of an insurgency are:

(a) Disposition.
(b) Composition.
   1. Identification.
   2. Leadership and political motivation.

(CLASSIFICATION)
External guidance and other external support.
Support by the population (including attitude).
Armament and other equipment and supplies.

(c) Strength.
1. Locally available.
2. Reinforcements.

(d) Recent and present significant activities.
1. Intelligence.
2. Tactical operations.
4. PSYOP.

(e) Peculiarities and weaknesses.
1. Personnel.
   a. Morale, training, and combat efficiency.
   b. Legal status.
2. Intelligence.
   Methods of operation of nontactical insurgent elements.
4. Logistics.
5. Civil affairs.
6. Personalities.

Own situation. The analysis of government capabilities should be as complete and thorough as possible. In making such an analysis, full advantage should be taken of advice and guidance of personnel familiar with the situation, government, and military and key civilian members of the population. Operations require mobilization of all possible assets which conceivably could have a useful role in the effort to include civilian as well as military organizations and groups of a commercial, trade, welfare, or social nature.

(a) Government armed forces, national police, and paramilitary forces available:
1. Armed forces: strength; organization; disposition, command structure; doctrine; defenses; tactics; personnel; reserve and mobilization systems; training; logistics; intelligence; PSYOP; morale; key personalities; history of recent combat actions; significant traditions; major strengths and weaknesses; and overall evaluation for operations.
2. National police: constabulary, gendarmerie, and other police forces (same as above for military forces plus effectiveness of police and population control systems).
3. Paramilitary forces.

(b) Other government organizations and capabilities (communications, transport, etc.) available: qualitative aspects and effectiveness for internal defense and internal development operations.

(c) Nongovernmental organizations and capabilities (communications, transport, etc.) available: organizations, strength, disposition, composition, recent activities, and potential for use in operations, such as youth groups, labor, and labor-management groups.

(4) Relative power. Indicate the general overall comparison of government capabilities with those of the insurgent, together with an evaluation of significant strengths and vulnerabilities of the insurgents.

b. Insurgent capabilities. State the insurgent capabilities which can affect the accomplishment of the mission. These capabilities include various types of subversion, agitation, and PSYOP; infiltration of mass organizations; psychological exploitation of political/social/economic conditions; espionage; assassination; sabotage; and conduct of military operations. An enumeration of capabilities, probable courses of action, and vulnerabilities should be included.

c. Own courses of action. State all courses of action which may be taken to defeat the insurgent movement. Courses of action are formulated considering the major campaigns of internal defense and internal development.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
Determine the probable effect of each insurgent capability on the success of each course of action. Strengths and weaknesses of courses of action emerge during this analysis.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action with respect to the governing factors. Decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. DECISION
Translate the selected course of action into a formal, concise statement of the program to be adopted.
GLOSSARY

TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO STABILITY OPERATIONS

**Area coordination center**—A composite area headquarters at various political/military levels in which internal defense and development operations are planned, coordinated, and directed. Its members include the leaders of local military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their United States counterparts.

**Area oriented**—A term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipping are based upon projected operational deployment to a specific geographical area.

**Armed Forces**—All of the military forces of a nation or group of nations.

**Asset (Intelligence)**—Any resource—person, group relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role.

**Civic action**—The participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.

**Civil affairs**—Questions relating to relations in war time between the commander of an armed force and the civilian populations and governments in areas where the force is employed, and which are settled on the basis of a mutual (agreement), official or otherwise. Civil affairs include those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include: a. Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; b. Military government. The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.

**Civil disturbances**—Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.

**Consolidation psychological operations**—A psychological operation conducted toward populations in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.

**Counterespionage**—A category of counterintelligence, the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

**Countersabotage**—Action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating and manipulating, neutralizing...
or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

Countersubversion—That part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

Economic action—The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the warmaking potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power.

Economic mobilization—The process of preparing for and carrying out such changes in the organization and functioning of the national economy as are necessary to provide for the most effective use of resources in a national emergency.

Economic warfare—Intensified government direction of economic means to affect foreign economies.

Escapee—Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in freeing himself.

Espionage—The clandestine or covert use of agent personnel and/or equipment in order to obtain information.

Evader—Any person who is isolated in hostile areas and succeeds in eluding capture. Not to be confused with escapee or liberated personnel.

Exfiltration—The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.

Guerrilla warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory, by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

Host country—A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation or international agreement. Particularly refers to nation receiving assistance relevant to its national security.

Infiltration—The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided.

Insurgency—A condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and is not recognized as belligerency. This definition is used in conjunction with the condition of insurgent war. Within the present context, subversive insurgency is Communist led and inspired. Subversive insurgency may be classified in three general phases according to levels of intensity.

(1) Phase I. This phase is the latent or incipient subversive activity during which subversive incidents occur with frequency in an organized pattern; however, it involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

(2) Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support and can initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

(3) Phase III. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

Insurgent war—A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such
wars are distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control.

**Intelligence**—The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations.

**Internal attack**—The full range of measures taken by organized insurgents to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government.

**Internal defense**—The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

**Internal defense assistance operation**—Any operation undertaken by the military, paramilitary, police or other security agencies of an outside power to strengthen the host government politically, economically, psycho-socially or militarily.

**Internal defense operation**—Any operation conducted by host country or its allies—security establishment, military, paramilitary, police or security organization—directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary or outside supporting power.

**Internal development**—The strengthening of the roots, functions and capabilities of government and the viability of its national life toward the end of internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency.

**Internal development assistance operation**—Any organized actions undertaken by government or nongovernment agencies of an outside power to support host government internal development efforts.

**Internal development operation**—Any direct operation undertaken by host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially or militarily, or make more viable its national life.

**Internal security**—The state of law and order within a nation as determined by the government's capability to cope with violence, subversion, and lawlessness and the prevailing public confidence in that capability.

**Irregular forces**—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

**Military civic action**—Civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation or on behalf of host Government civil authorities, agencies or groups.

**Mobile warfare**—Warfare of movement in which the opposing sides seek to seize and hold the initiative by use of maneuver, organization of fire and utilization of terrain. Also called war of movement.

**National internal defense coordination center**—The national level civil/military composite headquarters in which internal defense and internal development programs are planned, coordinated, and directed. See also Area Coordination Center.

**Operational intelligence**—Intelligence required for planning and executing all types of operations.

**Paramilitary forces**—Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission.

**Penetration operation (Intelligence)**—The use of agents or technical monitoring devices in a target organization or installation for the purpose of gaining access to the secrets or of influencing and controlling its activities.

**Physical security**—That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material and documents, and to safeguard them
against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft.

**Political warfare**—Intensified use of political means to achieve national objectives.

**Populace and resources control**—Actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.

**Propaganda**—Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group, in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

**Psychological operations**—The planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

**Receiving state**—A nation, party to an international agreement, which pursuant thereto accepts within its territory the presence of military personnel of another nation party to the agreement. See also Host Country.

**Stability operations**—That type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved.

**Subversion**—Action, principally clandestine or covert, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of a regime.

**Subversive political action**—A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed as to affect the decisions and actions of another government.

**Surveillance**—The systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes. See also Air Surveillance, Sea Surveillance.

**Unconventional warfare**—Includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

**Unconventional warfare forces**—U.S. forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index Term</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC (see Area Coordination Center)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjudant general</td>
<td>156k</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative support</td>
<td>143c, 151d, 110, 110, 156k, q</td>
<td>117, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory assistance (see also Military Assistance Advisory Group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP support</td>
<td>42, 45, 62c, 96, 111b, 132b, 148</td>
<td>32, 34, 45, 61, 68, 88, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capabilities</td>
<td>34, 150d, 28, 110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>95, 98, 103, 143a, 144d, 148d</td>
<td>61, 63, 64, 98, 104, 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>66a, 103a, 84c, 102, 110a, 143d, 148a</td>
<td>47, 64, 57, 63, 68, 100, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>86, 91, 99, 104, 111, 140</td>
<td>58, 60, 63, 68, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial (see also Air)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>155c</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire support</td>
<td>138e</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographs</td>
<td>123b</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance and surveillance</td>
<td>129d, 155c, 156c</td>
<td>82, 113, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>37a, 109e, 127d</td>
<td>30, 66, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air (see also Aerial)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>143d, 152b, 100, 112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation</td>
<td>139d, 156p, 93, 118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lift</td>
<td>34a, 139a, c, 143d</td>
<td>28, 91, 92, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>129c, d; 156a</td>
<td>82, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>128d, 143d</td>
<td>80, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmobile:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>155c</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>152b, c</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>155c</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country employment</td>
<td>34b, 83c, 95c, 137a, 142c, 145b</td>
<td>28, 56, 61, 89, 97, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent employment</td>
<td>16d, 139c, 155c</td>
<td>15, 92, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection</td>
<td>130c, d</td>
<td>85, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service brigade</td>
<td>156a</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service units</td>
<td>156o</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
<td>130d</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty program</td>
<td></td>
<td>117e, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment guide</td>
<td>66c</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>51, 128c</td>
<td>39, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government controlled</td>
<td>81c, 84c, 85c, 88, 53, 57, 85c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>71a, 89, 152b</td>
<td>49, 89, 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Coordination Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian advisory committee</td>
<td>54, 59</td>
<td>39, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>48, 140b</td>
<td>37, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>71f, 82c, 88, 98, 114, 129c, 132a, 134, 136, 89, 100</td>
<td>50, 55, 59, 63, 69, 80, 82, 89, 100, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>115b</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>49, 125c</td>
<td>37, 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>57-60, 82c, 115b</td>
<td>40, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>55, 56, 71f</td>
<td>40, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>115b, 115b</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor employment</td>
<td>155b</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>139c, 151d, 92, 110, 156c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG element</td>
<td>148c</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Agency</td>
<td>153, 154c</td>
<td>112, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>34c, 137a, 138a, 152b, 155c, 156c</td>
<td>29, 89, 91, 92, 112, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA (see Army Security Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers</td>
<td>34a, 128b</td>
<td>28, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control (see also Populace and resources control)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO 7189A</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border operations</td>
<td>128b, d; 142b, 143d, 145b</td>
<td>80, 81, 97, 100, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>152c, 153</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns (see Consolidation campaign, Remote area campaign, and Strike campaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry (see Armor employment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain service</td>
<td>156d</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR)</td>
<td>156e</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs (see also Military civic action):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capability</td>
<td>34, 150d, 152c, 153, 155</td>
<td>28, 110, 112, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>66a, 82c, 84c, 105, 111, 117b, 140b, 143a, 144a, 155</td>
<td>47, 55, 57, 64, 72, 94, 98, 100, 103, 104, 113, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>108, 152b, 153, 154c, 155a, b</td>
<td>65, 112, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>109b, e; 149a, 152a</td>
<td>65, 66, 109, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worksheet (fig. 7)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian advisory committee</td>
<td>54, 59</td>
<td>39, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian population:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes and values</td>
<td>9f, 37b, 39e, 94a, 95g, 117e, d, e</td>
<td>9, 31, 32, 60, 62, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls (see Populace and resources control)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent control</td>
<td>17, 119a, 121</td>
<td>16, 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in government</td>
<td>38a, 85a</td>
<td>31, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>32b, 34b, 83c, 84, 110d, 116d, 117d, 125b, 126, 127</td>
<td>25, 28, 56, 68, 71, 72, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>95f, 110b, 113b, 114, 116, 117b, 12d, 144d</td>
<td>62, 68, 69, 71, 72, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>6c, 30b, 32c, 38b, 84, 85c, 109e, 112, 113b, 114, 116d, 117d, e</td>
<td>6, 24, 26, 31, 56, 58, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast guard</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal defense</td>
<td>128c, 143d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat forces (see also specific type forces)</td>
<td>140, 148a, d; 150a, 151b, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat power</td>
<td>71c, 83c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat service support (see also specific type):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and personnel</td>
<td>156k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>156f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
<td>156h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>156j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>139f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>156m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>139b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical service</td>
<td>139d, 156p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military police</td>
<td>139e, 156f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance</td>
<td>156o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>71h, i; 82c, 90a, 140, 143c, d; 150d, 151e, 152b, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>139a, 156a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>139e, 156f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>91, 99, 101, 103d, 104e, 140, 150a, b; 152a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat support (see also specific type):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>138a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>138e, 156c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>156e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>138e, 156b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>138b, 156a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>156d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>71h, 90a, 93, 138, 143c, d; 150d, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>91, 99, 101, 103d, 104e, 140, 148a, 150a, b; 152a, c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>82c, 95b, 128d, 143c, 144b, 145e, 148c, 151d, 152b, 154d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>155b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>155a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>123d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>82b, 128d, 152c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 31-23</td>
<td>Paragraph Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>116c 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems</td>
<td>128c, 129d, 80, 82, 138c, 156b 91, 115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Communist (see also Insurgent):**
- **Cell:** 19a, b; 20a, 121a 18, 74
- **Central Committee:** 16c, 19b 16, 18
- **Committee system:** 20 18
- **Control apparatus:** 119b 74
- **Executive Committee:** 20a 18
- **Insurgency doctrine:** 14 14
- **Interparty Committee:** 19b, 25a 18, 21
- **Military Affairs Committee:** 26b 21
- **Military forces (see Insurgent forces):**
  - **Party:** 15, 24a, 14, 20, 121a 174
  - **Party core:** 18b, 20b, 24a, 30a 33 18, 20 23
  - **Party Group:** 19b, 20b, 25a 18, 21
  - **Popular organizations:** 22 19
  - **Revolutionary Committee:** 15b, 20a, b; 14, 18, 121a 74
  - **Special interest groups:** 22 19
- **Village Militia:** 22-24, 121a 19, 74
- **Youth:** 21, 121a 18, 74

**Consolidation:**
- **Campaign:** 79a, 80-85, 53, 55, 116d, 133, 71, 88, 143b 98
- **Operations:** 81, 82a, c; 53, 54, 83-86, 92, 55, 56, 107b, 140a 60, 65, 66d, 94
- **Contested areas:** 81a, b; 87, 53, 54, 88, 92 59, 60
- **Contraband:** 33c, 125d 28, 77
- **Controlled areas (see specific type):**
  - **Convoy:** 129b, c, d; 81, 82, 139d 93
  - **Corps:** 162 111
  - **Corps Support Command (COSCOM):** 152b 112
  - **Counterintelligence (see also Intelligence):**
    - **Concepts:** 121 74
    - **Operations:** 119, 129d, 73, 82, 142b, 97, 115, 166d, f 116
- **Organization:** 122, 148d 75, 107
- **Coup d'état:** 12, 13a, b 13
- **Curfew:** 83c, 125d, 56, 77, 127c, 129d 78, 82
- **Customs:** 128a, b; 80, 88, 132a, 142 97
- **Defended hamlets:** 127 78
- **Definitions (see Glossary):**
  - **Defoliants:** 128d, 129d, 81, 82, 156e 116
  - **Department of Defense:** 104 64
- **Deployment:**
  - **Forces:** 150b 109
  - **Planning:** 140 94
- **Depots:** 139f 94
- **Destruction operations:** 88, 90b, 59, 61, 95b, 134, 88, 89 937a, b 90
- **Developing nations:** 5, 8-10 5, 7
- **Disarming the population:** 130 85
- **Division:** 152c 112

**Economic:**
- **Development:** 37 30
- **Factors in developing nations:** 5a, 6a, 8 5, 7
- **Objectives:** 36 30
- **Organization:** 50b, 57, 39, 40, 82b 54
- **Planning:** 72-74, 77 50, 51
- **U. S. assistance:** 40-44, 96, 32, 62, 111b 68

**Elections:** 131 87

**Engineer:**
- **Stability operations requirements:** 151d, 152c 110, 112
- **Support to tactical operations:** 138b 91
- **Units:** 156a 114
- **Environmental factors:** 4 5
- **Espionage:** 119, 120, 73, 74, 125b, 156d 76, 115
- **Estimates:**
  - **Intelligence:** 122 75
  - **Of the situation:** 66c, 123, 48, 75, 130d 86, 143
- **Planning:** 71 49

**Ethnic groups (see Minority groups):**
- **Field army:** 152 111
- **Finance service:** 109d, 156j 66, 117
- **Foreign support:** 42, 49, 113d, 131 69, 87

**Frontier operations (see Border control):**
- **Hamlet (see Defended hamlets):**
- **Harassing operations:** 88, 95c, 59, 61, 137d 90
- **Health and sanitation:** 109d e; 66, 93, 139d, 156p 118
- **Highway security:** 129d 82
### Host country armed forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>U. S. assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33, 34, 80-85</td>
<td>27, 28,</td>
<td></td>
<td>50d, 82b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90, 95, 109, 128, 129d</td>
<td>80, 82,</td>
<td></td>
<td>84e, 122,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131, 135a, b, 137, 143</td>
<td>87, 88,</td>
<td></td>
<td>136, 139e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32b, 60b, 80-86, 94, 108, 115b, 129c, 136, 143c</td>
<td>25, 42, 80, 60, 58, 69, 71, 76, 82, 89, 100</td>
<td></td>
<td>50d, 60b, 66a, 71d, j, 123, 151d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>86, 91, 96, 104, 111, 132, 140, 148-154</td>
<td>98, 104</td>
<td>124, 149a, 150d, 152a, 110, 111, 155, 156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Insurgent (see also Communist):

- **Controlled areas**
  - 33b, 34b, 97, 98, 100

### Irregular forces:

- **Employment**
  - 84, 87, 88, 90, 95, 127d, 129d, 143d

### Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population control</th>
<th>Intelligence (see also Counter-intelligence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23a, 32a, b, 119a, 121, 125b, 135b</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23a, 32a, b; 83a, 90, 95d, 98, 110c, 116, 117c, 119-123, 129d, 130c, 137d, 142d, 143d</td>
<td>84, 87, 88, 90, 95, 127d, 129d, 143d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Internal defense and internal development (see also Stability operations):

- **Objectives and strategy**
  - 28-39

- **Organization**
  - 50, 51

- **Planning**
  - 61-77

### Law and order (see Security)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judge advocate</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Legal service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156m</td>
<td>139f</td>
<td>156m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lines of communication security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lines of communication security</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>MAAG (see Military Assistance Advisory Group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32b, 125a, 129d</td>
<td>60b, 139c</td>
<td>139b, 149a, 151d, 155c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25, 76</td>
<td>81, 97</td>
<td>92, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Limited and general war

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limited and general war</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68, 70d, 81, 94</td>
<td>26, 27, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49, 50, 75, 91</td>
<td>21, 106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legal status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Legal service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>138a</td>
<td>156m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110, 113</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151d</td>
<td>114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155c, c, d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legal service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal service</th>
<th>Legal status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71a, i, 121c</td>
<td>26, 27, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75, 91</td>
<td>21, 106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Maintenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>Lines of communication security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156a, 156b, 156c, 156d</td>
<td>32b, 125a, 129d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115, 116</td>
<td>25, 76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Line of communication security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of communication security</th>
<th>Logistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32b, 125a, 129d</td>
<td>60b, 139c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25, 76</td>
<td>81, 97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics</th>
<th>MAAG (see Military Assistance Advisory Group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>143c, 148a</td>
<td>139b, 149a, 151d, 155c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100, 106</td>
<td>92, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150b, 156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MAAG (see Military Assistance Advisory Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAAG (see Military Assistance Advisory Group)</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139b, 149a, 151d, 155c</td>
<td>156a, 156b, 156c, i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AGO 7189A
### MAP (see Advisory assistance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine forces</td>
<td>143d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>139d, 151d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) (see also Advisory assistance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42c, 111b</td>
<td>33, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148, 149</td>
<td>106, 109, 150c, 151e, 110, 111, 152a, 154d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military civic action (see also Civil affairs):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military capability</td>
<td>108a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>70, 105b, 49, 64, 109b, c; 110, 65, 66, 111d, 117b, 68, 69, 139a, 143b, 72, 91, d; 144d, 98, 100, 145a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military justice

### Military Mission (see Military Assistance Advisory Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military police</td>
<td>139e, 151d, 94, 110, 153, 154c, 112, 113, 156f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Minority groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6c, 9d, g; 6, 8, 9, 34b, 92</td>
<td>28, 60, 94b, 95a, f; 61, 66, 109e, 116, 71, 75, 123b, 145b, 105, c; 154b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mobile training teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102, 109b, 63, 65, 117a, 149, 71, 109, 152a, c; 111, 112, 153, 154b</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mobile warfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>121, 135b, 74, 88, 137b</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Movements (see also specific types)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129c, 139e, d</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### National Internal Defense Coordination Center (NIDCC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48-50</td>
<td>37, 40, 55, 71j, 74, 50, 51, 82a, 102, 54, 63, 69, 114, 115, 70, 77, 82, 125c, 129d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Navy forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128d, 129c, 81, 82, 143d</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Paramilitary forces:

#### Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33, 34, 27, 28, 53</td>
<td>80-85, 59, 61, 65, 87, 88, 99, 76, 80, 95, 109, 82, 88, 89, 125b, 128b, 100, 103, 129d, 135a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32b, 60b, 25, 42, 53, 80-85, 89</td>
<td>59, 60, 65, 94, 108, 70, 80, 82, 115b, 128c, 89, 100, 129c, 136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pipes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129d</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Planning guidance

#### Planning specific type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61-67</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Point of entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140a, b</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Police:

#### Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33, 80-85, 27, 53, 59, 87, 88, 90, 78, 80, 82, 126, 128b, 85, 86, 87</td>
<td>129d, 89, 97, 130b, c, d; 100, 103, 131, 136, 142, 143d, 144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U. S. assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86, 91, 96, 88, 60, 62, 104, 111, 64, 68, 150, 151</td>
<td>109, 110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Populace and resources control:

#### Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30b, 32a, 24, 25, b; 33, 34, 27, 28, 80, 81, 53, 56, 83c, 84c, 57, 62, 95g, 98, 63, 68, 110d, 117d, 72, 76, 125-131, 100, 104, 143d, 144d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50c, 125c, 39, 77, 127c, 128c, 78, 80, 129c, 130c, 82, 85, 142c, 143a, 97, 98, b, c; 144a, 100, 103, b, c</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>82c, App B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (see Civilian population)</td>
<td>132, 150d,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>152a, 155,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological:</td>
<td>115a, 117a,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>30b, 32a,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34, 82c,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83c, 84c,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85c, 85f,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98, 110b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>112-114,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>50b, 57,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75c, 82b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115, 143a,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f; App B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>143d, 144d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>60b, 60a,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70, 71d, f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>j; App B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. assistance</td>
<td>42c, 104d,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>118, 149a,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150d, 151d,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>152a, 155,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public affairs officer (PAO)</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>156a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>128d, 129d,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>138c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>129, 129d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>12, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>90, 90b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>129d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>App A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote area:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>79c, 81b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92-96,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116d, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>79c, 81b,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92-96,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107b, 140a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>127d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrained use of firepower</td>
<td>71c, 83c,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>138a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrograde operation</td>
<td>137f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary development (see Consolidation campaign)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sabotage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113a, 117d</td>
<td>69, 72,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119, 120, 73, 74,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125b, 129d, 76, 82,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156d</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Security:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>33, 85c,</td>
<td>27, 58, 62,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95q, 125b,</td>
<td>76, 78, 82,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126, 129c,</td>
<td>97, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141-144,</td>
<td>156d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Operations

| Defended hamlet               | 127c      | 78 |
| Frontier                      | 128d      | 81 |
| Show of force                 | 135a, 143b| 88, 98 |
| Signal Corps                  | 156b      | 115 |

### Sociological:

| Development                   | 9, 36, 39, | 8, 30, 32, |
|                               | 44, 57, 82c | 34, 40, |
|                               | 84c, 85c, 55, 57, 58, |
|                               | 109       | 65 |
| Planning                      | 50b, 71f, 39, 50, 51, |
|                               | 72-75, 77, | 61 |
|                               | 95a       | |

### Special operations

| Host country forces           | 141-145, 97 |
| Operational roles (see also specific type) | 97-140, 63 |

### Strike:

| Campaign                     | 79b, 81b, 53, 54, 69, |
|                              | 87-91, 71, 88 |
|                              | 116d, 133 |

### Subversion (see also Subversive insurgency)

| Operation                     | 71j, 84c, 50, 57, 58, |
|                              | 85c, 59, 65, 94 |
|                              | 87-92, 107b, 140a |

### Subversive insurgency

| 11-27, 30, 13, 23, 73 |
| 119-121 |

### Surrender appeals

| 117e | 73 |

### Surveillance

| 129d, 128d, 77, 81, |
| 129c, d; 82, 115 |
| 156d |
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for U.S. Army Counter-insurgency Forces.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967—805-649/7189A