STABILITY OPERATIONS
US ARMY DOCTRINE

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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# STABILITY OPERATIONS

**US ARMY DOCTRINE**

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*This manual supersedes FM 31-23, 8 December 1967; FM 31-22, 12 November 1963; and (5) FM 31-22A, 22 November 1963.*

TAGO 8166A
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

1–1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides general doctrine for commanders, staffs, and advisors responsible for stability operations within the overall interdepartmental internal defense and internal development (IDAD) effort. It is based upon the broad, general guidance found in FM 100–20.

b. The doctrinal guidance is applicable to an academic environment and to the Army components of MAAG, missions, and military assistance commands for use in planning and executing stability operations. It should be used concurrently with other doctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques, and procedures for field operations.

c. This manual applies to Army force employment in—

   (1) Cold war, to include stability operations.
   (2) Limited war.

1–2. Recommended Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations for improving its contents. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and addressed to the Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Operations Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes that significantly modify approved Army doctrine may send an information copy through command channels to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow up.

1–3. Definitions

a. Stability Operations. Those types of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved.

b. Internal Defense. The full range of measures or organizations of another state are present because of government invitations and/or international agreement.

c. Internal Development. The strengthening of the roots, functions, and capabilities of government and the viability of its national life toward achieving independence, freedom from conditions fostering insurgency, and the pursuit of national goals.

d. Host Country. A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitations and/or international agreement.

1–4. Notice

This revision updates the December 1967 edition of FM 31–23 and incorporates the current pertinent provisions of FM 31–22 and FM 31–22A in order to consolidate the latest US Army doctrine for stability operations. A summary of the major changes follows:

   a. General revision (chap 2).
   b. General revision (chap 3).
   c. General revision (chap 4).
   d. General revision (chap 5).
   e. General revision (chap 6).
   f. New chapter 7, "Training Requirements for US Army Advisors and Operational Forces."
   g. New section on urban operations, new paragraph on border operations and general revision (chap 8).
   h. General revision (chap 9).
CHAPTER 2
THE ENVIRONMENT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

2-1. General
This chapter outlines characteristics of and problems inherent in developing nations. It describes those environmental factors which must be considered in internal defense and development operations and the effect of these factors on US, host country and insurgent forces.

2-2. Characteristics of Developing Nations

a. A developing nation is one which has progressed beyond a traditional society and is experiencing the dynamic process of economic, social, military, and political change. In achieving modernization, a nation must overcome those characteristics of a traditional society such as a static economy, limited technology, and immobile social structure. The economic, social, and political transformation involved in this transitional process, when not properly balanced and integrated, may create an atmosphere of national tension and disorder.

b. Each developing nation is unique. Each has its own history, culture, and goals combined in a way that produces problems different from those in any other nation. The aggregate problems of developing nations provide a new dimension to the world situation—complicating, intensifying, and often decisively affecting the relationships between nations as well as their individual national cohesion.

c. Within any given developing nation, the military may have the capability of influencing the modernization process and often plays a dominant role. The success the military achieves is dependent upon its capabilities, relationship with the government, the government's efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the existence and intensity of insurgency and the presence or absence of an external threat.

2-3. General Problems of Developing Nations

a. Impatience for Progress. Little economic progress is possible without a stable and effective government that inspires confidence in the future. The provision of the means of transportation, improved communication, and some economic activity other than subsistence agriculture is paramount for modernization and progress. The people do not, however, always perceive immediate benefit. The "revolution of rising expectations" fed by the knowledge of how others live and spread by mass media may cause the people to be impatient for immediate, tangible evidence of progress. Leaders seeking to gain recognition as spokesmen for the people frequently intensify this impatience by demanding government action which may or may not be in the nation's best interests. Under pressure from the people, the government may make concessions and divert resources to satisfy demands; however, these diversions may postpone the orderly achievement of the long-range goal.

b. Resistance to Change. New ideas may not be accepted easily by some societies. The resistance to change will be based initially on an attachment to and confidence in traditional methods coupled with a lack of knowledge of and appreciation for the benefits of modernization. This attitude will impede internal development programs and heighten social tension. Fear of failure is also a common cause of resistance to change.

c. Lack of Support. Only limited internal development is possible in an atmosphere of social disorder. Although the people may lack political maturity or a knowledge of their own best interests, they inherently possess the capacity when or ga...
nized to exercise a great deal of political power. Political forces opposing the government may discover the means for mobilizing the attitudes of various segments of the population and be able to pressure the government into meeting some of their demands.

d. Reaction of Dissident Factions. When the government is intolerant of opposition, dissident factions will be forced either to forego any activity or to adopt covert means. On the other hand, if the government tolerates disagreement with its policies and provides legal means for a loyal opposition, the probability of dissident factions resorting to force is reduced. The government must establish the limits of its prerogatives and authority to encourage a loyal opposition without establishing a base for general political instability. Although it usually is not possible to insure that all dissident groups will fall into the category of loyal opposition, a system to accommodate such opposition must be established to reduce the possible discontent that might otherwise manifest itself as an insurgence.

e. Reaction of Minority Groups. As the government pursues the task of progressive reform, it must insure assimilation of minority groups into the national structure and create within these groups a sense of national identity and responsibility. If progressive programs do not bring the minorities hope and the promise of a better life, these groups will lack faith in the government and provide an exploitable base for an insurgent movement.

2-4. Tasks of the Developing Nation's Government

The tasks of the government in response to the problems inherent to development are numerous and closely interrelated. They generally should include:

a. Establishing a viable political system.

b. Providing a dynamic program of internal development.

c. Winning the support and confidence of the people for the government and its programs.

d. Assimilating dissident and minority factions without undermining the government's capability for action.

c. Maintaining internal security as a prerequisite for internal development.

Section II. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL FACTORS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

2-5. Economic Factors

a. The economics of developing nations may have the following common characteristics—

(1) A lack of large-scale application of modern science and technology to agriculture and industry.

(2) Relatively narrow markets.

(3) Inadequate transportation and communication facilities.

(4) Comparatively small contribution by modern manufacturing industries to the gross national income.

(5) Insufficient capital assets and investment programs to favorably influence development of (1) through (4) above.

b. Some of the more serious problems currently facing developing nations arise not only from economic stagnation but also from rapid and uneven rates of economic development. A significant socioeconomic effect of rapid development has been that changes in economic activities and relationships have outpaced the emergence of a suitable value system to replace the partially discredited traditional discipline. In time of crisis the individual may find himself in an alienated position in which, lacking culturally established channels to express his resentment, rebellion appears the only alternative.

c. Uneven rates of economic development have produced even more noticeable contrasts. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and higher levels of technological achievement exist alongside regions with barely subsistent economies. To a great extent, the uneven rate of development is a result of archaic transportation and communication facilities which hinder satisfactory economic and cultural relationships between proximate geographical regions.

d. The vast range of economic diversity within and between developing nations precludes the development of an overall plan that would embrace the whole spectrum of human economic activity and the resulting sociopolitical effects. Consequently, primary attention must be focused on the most widespread economic activities and develop-
ment problems in the underdeveloped world. On this basis, the state of development of agriculture and human resources and their roles in economic growth should receive extensive consideration in planning. Factors pertinent to the internal security or insurgency problem may arise from the more common economic vulnerabilities and should also be considered. These factors include such effects as economic stagnation and growing poverty, rapid economic progress and the breakdown of the traditional structure, and foreign economic domination.

2–6. Social Factors

a. In addition to economic factors, a survey of the human environment must consider the social, psychological, and cultural elements. The complex interaction of these three elements causes difficulty in establishing a plan which will identify the various units or groups in the social structure and indicates the complexity of the culture and the social forces within the environment.

b. In their attempt to modernize, developing nations face the problem of integrating many diverse elements. It is dangerous to ignore the force resulting from the tenacity with which the loyalties and sense of identity of the people remain bound with ties of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition. When modernization begins, these people are asked to give up much of their traditional identification and to become absorbed into a culturally integrated mass. This demand further accentuates the emotional security of traditional loyalties, even though the population is made aware of the possibilities for social reform and material progress. Thus, a conflict ensues as the population is torn between desire for progress and fear of the accompanying social change. Because the modernizing process and the accompanying disruption of the traditional social order are largely irreversible, the long-standing values of a people assume increasing importance in understanding the psychological gap that often develops between the mass of people and their modernizing elite.

c. An observable phenomenon in the modernization process of a country is the rapid change of the traditional social structure and social mores of a people—an inevitable by-product, perhaps, of increasing social mobility. The extent to which this occurs varies from one situation to another. In many urban areas of Latin America, the breakdown is rapid and total. This is in contrast with some African urban areas to which tribes attempt to transplant certain institutions to safeguard traditional social mores and ties. The variability of this phenomenon depends upon the strength of family and ethnic ties, the degree of social and cultural integration of a people, and the strength of local leadership.

d. Unabsorbable numbers of rural people drift into metropolitan areas expecting to find jobs and easy affluence, only to be disillusioned by lack of employment and poor living conditions. When protective traditional and family ties break down as a result of physical estrangement and contact with other cultures, the miserable living conditions of the urban masses are accentuated, and organizations and associations may form in order to provide an outlet for expression of social discontent. Local leadership may then learn to press for solutions in or outside the political structure of the country.

e. An assessment of a people's standard of living in relation to their aspirations, the degree of their contact with other cultures, and their involvement in a money economy may provide insight into the relative degree of socioeconomic discontent existing in a community. Further, the key role that education may play in modernization is widely recognized, both as an instrument for social change and in developing loyalty to the nation.

f. There is no one set of observable phenomena to be probed as far as the attitudes and behavioral responses of a people are concerned. The following are some of the indicators to look for in the human environment, with emphasis upon the overall view of the group under survey. Examples of indicator questions are—

(1) What patterns of interaction do the people follow with each other, government officials, and security forces?

(2) How do the people interact with foreigners? How do they perceive foreigners?

(3) What is the basic social structure of the society? How strong are the family ties?

(4) What type of class system is present and how rigid is it? Does it promote or impede social mobility?

(5) How do the people perceive time? Does their concept of time enhance or hinder progress?

(6) What roles are assumed by the male and female in the society?
(7) What is the attitude of the people toward the government, authority and law?

(8) What ethnic, racial, or religious differences exist in the society? Do these differences affect efforts to develop a spirit of nationalism and unity?

(9) What religious beliefs do the people follow? How do these beliefs influence their attitudes and behavior?

(10) How do the people learn? How do the people perceive education? Is there a strong desire for children to improve themselves through education?

(11) How do the people perceive their environment? Does this perception oppose the exploitation of natural resources?

(2) How does the value system affect the attitude of the people toward modernization? To what extent does technology conflict with existing values?

(13) What is the attitude of the people toward personal and public property?

2-7. Political Factors

a. Regardless of its stage of development, each nation has a political system that reflects the society's concepts of authority and purpose, and its basic political beliefs. It is upon real practices, relationships, and organizations that a political society is founded and from which it functions. This political system can be properly called the "real" constitution. This "real" constitution should be distinguished from the formal written document that has been declared the supreme law of the land. Often this written document is an attempt to absorb alien political experiences, practices, and ideals which have little applicability in the society; however, the written constitution must be analyzed to determine the aspirations of its framers and the gap between those aspirations and reality. Objective observations and evaluations of the actual organization and operations of the government are necessary to determine the true distribution of power. Further, a critical evaluation of the actual practices is essential to avoid unwarranted application of our own political and cultural values to a foreign system with its own distinct values.

b. In every country there are associational groups, consciously organized, which lie outside the formal structure of government but which include political functions among their stated objectives. These groups serve to articulate demands in society, seek support for these demands among other power groups, and attempt to transform them into public policy. Often in developing nations, these groups exercise functions which in Western societies might best be performed by political parties. Each nation also has groups which are not formally organized and which are latent and potential rather than actually functioning political groups. These groups usually reflect interests based on class, ethnic kinship, religion, or regional factors.

c. Administrative and civil service systems generally reflect the cultural heritage and political experience of the nation. In the older developing countries, the bureaucracy tends to be stratified along traditional class and educational lines. This limits the development of a technically competent administration. In an unstable political situation where leadership is in a state of flux, there is likely to be social disorganization and a continuous turnover in the bureaucratic hierarchy that prevents the development of a stable and responsible civil service.
HIGHLIGHTS

a DEVELOPING NATION

- has progressed beyond a traditional society.
- experiences the dynamic process of economic, social and political change.
- is unique. Each has its own HISTORY, CULTURE and GOALS.

a DEVELOPING NATION experiences PROBLEMS

- People impatient for progress
- People resist change
- Demands of pressure groups
- Disruption by dissident factions
- Integration of minority groups

a DEVELOPING NATION must

- establish a viable political system and implement effective internal defense and development programs.

Figure 2-1. Highlights.
CHAPTER 3
INSURGENCY

Section I. TYPES OF REVOLUTION

3-1. General
This chapter identifies the characteristics of insurgency, traces its general development and examines the insurgent's organizational requirements. The Communist organization is the basis for discussion because it has been successful in the past. Non-Communist insurgents could employ similar strategies, since the objective—seizure of political power—is the same regardless of political leanings. The chapter also discusses the legal status of insurgencies and insurgents.

3-2. Distinctive Characteristics
   a. An insurgency involves a violent seizure of power and is largely the result of social disorganization and unrest at bottom echelons of the social strata. A mass movement, encouraged or directed by a hard insurgent core, develops slowly in a long evolutionary process until armed fighting occurs through a precipitant event. Mobilization, organization, and manipulation of a sizeable segment of the population are prerequisites for successful revolution from the bottom.
   b. Although this manual deals primarily with insurgency, those involved in preventing or defeating it must be alert to the possibility that there may be a mixture of two or more forms of revolution, such as a coup d'etat, insurrection or rebellion.

Section II. DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENCY

3-3. General
This manual considers the development of insurgency in three phases—phase I, phase II, and phase III. Assigning phases to the progression of events permits assignment of objectives, allocation of resources, and emphasis on specific functions and activities during given time periods. Since overall strategy depends on a great many variables in any given environment, any concept of phasing must be generalized although it might be said that a given insurgency progressed to phase II or phase III following a specific incident. In reality, the activities in earlier phases generally continue throughout an insurgency, while the emphasis on certain activities may change and intensify the conflict. Recruitment, intelligence gathering, psychological operations, and political activities, for example, are carried on from the beginning of an insurgency to a successful consolidation or a defeat.
   a. Phase I. This phase includes the latent and incipient periods and extends through periods during which organized subversive incidents are frequent, but there are no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority.
   b. Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.
   a. Phase III. The situation moves from phase II to phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government.

3-4. Organizational Requirements
   a. The principal components of insurgent organization were developed primarily by two men—Nikolai Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. They provided the doctrinal base and, more significantly, the order or priority for those activities which must follow in organizationally and politically escalat-
ing an internal attack. Communist doctrine states that to succeed in protracted revolutionary war, there must be—

(1) Disciplined organization of professionals.
(2) Strategy that permits flexibility and varies tactics according to the circumstances during any particular phase of operations.
(3) Techniques through which the party can assert its control over any extra-party organization.
(4) Military doctrine built around the political impact of tactical operations.

b. Conceptually, both Lenin and Mao envisioned a period of years to reach the stage where insurgent forces, formed into regularized combat units, are able to engage in conventional warfare. The extended duration and flexibility of an insurgent campaign is one of its chief characteristics. However, success can come at any stage.

Section III. COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR INSURGENCY

3–5. General

a. At the heart of every Communist-dominated insurgency may be found a tightly disciplined party organization structured to parallel the country's existing government. This organization usually consists of committees at the local, state, interstate, and national levels. However, intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure if the leaders believe they can adequately supervise and coordinate the activities of subordinate committees from the national level.

b. The overall Communist insurgent organization is composed of three major elements—

(1) Party core.
(2) Mass civil organizations.
(3) Military forces.

These elements are interlocked organizationally to insure that the party always exercises complete control over their activities. Figure 3–1 depicts an optimum type of Communist insurgent structure. Although the exact organizational relationship of its elements may vary in detail from one insurgency to another, the interlocking directorate arrangement with its high degree of centralized control will be used in all insurgencies. See FM 30–31 for a detailed explanation concerning Communist insurgent organization, capabilities and vulnerabilities.

c. Command and Control.

(1) Totally distinct but parallel channels of both military command and party control exist within the staff divisions, sections, and operational units of regular forces. Military command stems from the commander and flows in a traditional manner to the commanders of subordinate elements. Party control is exercised through the Interparty Committee, special interparty committees of the military, and party groups and cells imbedded in the military structure.

(2) The seemingly sharp compartmentation of command and control functions is smoothed over by the interlocking structure of the entire Communist insurgent organization in which key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in several bodies. For example, the Military Affairs Committee, whose leadership is represented on both the Current Affairs Committee and the Party (cellular) Committee, will bring together a select body of individuals who are—

(a) Party-oriented.
(b) Aware of the realities of the military operational situation.
(c) Cognizant of the overall current insurgent effort and the problems confronting it.

(3) The seemingly sharp compartmentation of command and control functions is smoothed over by the interlocking structure of the entire Communist insurgent organization in which key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in several bodies. For example, the Military Affairs Committee, whose leadership is represented on both the Current Affairs Committee and the Party (cellular) Committee, will bring together a select body of individuals who are—

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(b) Aware of the realities of the military operational situation.
(c) Cognizant of the overall current insurgent effort and the problems confronting it.

d. General Insurgent Tasks. An insurgent movement will usually be successful if it can accomplish the following functional tasks.

(1) Organize. It should be apparent that insurgencies do not occur spontaneously and that their likelihood of success is in part proportional to their organizational efficiency.

(2) Gain legitimacy. Having no relation to national laws, this function involves the psychological use of the term. Legitimacy being the attitude of the governed toward their governors. That governing agency to which one gives willing compliance is legitimate in that person's eyes.

(3) Secure the support of the forces of authority. The insurgent faces this problem on two occasions. First, he must subvert, defeat or in some way neutralize the forces (police, military, and administrative) supporting incumbent government if he hopes to assume power. Secondly, after assuming power he must insure that the forces of authority support his policies.
This chart portrays the interlocking structure which enables the Communist party (CP) to control an insurgent organization.

*Figure 8-1. Type communist insurgent organization.*
(4) Establish a governing structure. Insurgents gain popular support largely through promises of change. Obviously, depending on the magnitude of change intended, some modification in the existing governmental system will be necessary to carry out the promised improvements.

3-6. Urban Organization

a. This paragraph describes the urban organization of the insurgent. It discusses the party and its use of front groups; intelligence operations; the use of terrorists and their development into city-based guerrillas; and the personnel, logistics, and training support provided by the insurgent organization.

b. Political and social activities are more intense in larger cities where mass civil organizations flourish. The party will attempt to penetrate and influence or control existing organizations. It will also create mass civil organizations that party members will manipulate and control. The party will attempt to create fronts (or coalitions) of the mass civil organizations to serve the party's interest and gain widespread support for its drive to destroy the government. These organizations include student groups, unions, youth organizations, political parties, professional associations, and possibly religious groups or women's associations. Many of them will have patriotic or democratic names.

c. Terrorists activities will include actions to enforce party discipline, assassination of officials voicing opposition to the group, sabotage of public facilities, attacks to frighten the population, and attacks against internal security installations. The terrorist attacks and sabotage are designed to discredit the government's ability to provide public safety and maintain order as much as to destroy government facilities. The wide publicity given to these incidents will attract other dissident or disaffected personnel to the subversive group. Terrorism is usually a function of a special group having a high percentage of party members or candidate members. This hard core will permit expansion of urban guerrilla organization in the later phases of the insurgency unless the revolt is neutralized by internal defense measures.

d. The urban area is a vital part of the insurgent base area system. It is a source of many of the services and supplies, facilities, and trained medical personnel critical to the insurgent if and when armed conflict becomes a part of the insurgency. A system is also developed to provide the armed insurgent with food, clothing, ammunition, and weapons. The production, collection, storage, and distribution of supplies is the function of an insurgent element. These will range from “tax” collection to extortion and robbery.

e. Political indoctrination and training takes place within the small cell groups. Selected members of the party may be sent to other countries for such training. Local guerrillas and recruits for the insurgent armed forces may be sent to rural areas for training.

3-7. Guerrillas

The urban guerrilla force generally can be expected to contain a relatively high percentage of party members or candidate members. Rural-based guerrillas in areas adjacent to the urban area will be controlled by the Provincial Committee when both are in one area of operation. Those based in more distant areas can be directed to participate in coordinated operations through the party apparatus at the appropriate level. Figure 3-1 shows the organization that makes this control possible.

Section IV. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENCIES AND INSURGENTS

3-8. General

a. Insurgency occurs within a particular state when revolutionaries who have banded together for political reasons attempt to displace the established government by force. An insurgency attains belligerent status under international law when—

(1) The guerrilla action typical of an insurgency escalates into a general state of hostilities.

(2) The insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the territory of the state concerned.

(3) The insurgents possess a government capable of administering such territory.

(4) The revolutionaries or insurgents conduct the armed conflict under a responsible authority and observe the customary rules of land warfare. This requirement usually is considered to be met when the insurgents bear their arms.
openly, are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance, and obey the rules of land warfare.

b. It is permissible under international law for another country to assist an established government threatened by an insurgent movement; however, as a general rule, it is not considered permissible for another country to assist the insurgents.

3–9. **Treatment of Prisoners**

a. Under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War guerrillas who meet the criteria for belligerent status and are accorded it must be accorded prisoner-of-war status.

b. Insurgents usually cannot meet the criteria for belligerents. Historically, insurgency has been accorded little international legal status because the condition had no status in international law before 1949. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 gave cognizance to an “armed conflict not of an international character”—essentially, insurgency. The Conventions furnish protection to captives of these conflicts by prohibiting—

1. Violence to life and person; in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.

(2) Taking hostages.

(3) Outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

(4) Passing sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court that affords all the judicial guarantees considered indispensable by civilized peoples.

c. Basic United States policy for the treatment of insurgents held in United States Army custody during internal defense operations requires and directs that they be accorded humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they are detained until they are released or repatriated. The observance of this policy is fully and equally binding upon United States personnel whether they are the capturing troops, custodial personnel, or serve in some other capacity. This policy is equally applicable for the protection of all detained or interned personnel. It is applicable whether they are known to have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or other serious offenses of a war crimes nature. The punishment of such persons is adjudicated and administered only under due process of law and by legally constituted authority. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.
CHAPTER 4
UNITED STATES AND HOST COUNTRY OBJECTIVES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4–1. Purpose and Scope
This chapter presents an overall picture of the key considerations affecting national strategy and policy in support of the attainment of internal defense and development objectives.

4–2. US National Objectives
Creation of a stable international environment, within which political, economic, and social development can occur, is a primary US objective. In order to achieve this objective, the US pursues a foreign security assistance policy that endeavors to assist other countries to maintain their freedom and independence, to deal effectively with their problems of political stability, economic development and social justice, and to contribute to a common defense and world peace. Assistance is predicated upon the requirement that any country whose security is threatened and who requests assistance must assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower needed for its own defense.

4–3. Host Country National Objectives
The objectives of governments combatting insurgency may vary greatly, change with time, and be altered as insurgent strength changes and as the probable cost of success fluctuates. The primary objective of these governments normally will be the attainment of internal security through stability operations programs which will permit economic, political and social growth. When undertaking a stability operations program, conditions that foster an insurgency must be recognized and preventive measures initiated early. Preventive measures include internal development programs and operations that encourage political, economic, and social development. Should preventive measures be applied too late, a nation or region afflicted with insurgency cannot be brought under effective government control until it has been purged of insurgent organizations and the causes of insurgency have been removed. Should the insurgent movement be sponsored or supported by outside powers, measures must be taken to stop the flow of personnel and materiel support across national borders; however, these measures may be difficult and resource consuming.

   a. The Insurgent.
      (1) The host country national strategy must provide for isolating the insurgent from the population, both physically and ideologically; thereby denying him personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. Populace and resources control programs, including border operations, must be initiated to control the population and separate the insurgent from his base of support. Psychological operations must be initiated to win support for these and other national programs that contribute to the defeat of the insurgency.
      (2) The defeat of insurgent tactical forces is also of prime importance in the formulation of national strategy. Pressure on these forces must be maintained through tactical operations to inflict casualties, destroy supplies and equipment, and lower morale. Government tactical forces must be highly mobile and prepared to move quickly to destroy insurgent forces and base areas as these are located. At the same time, strategy must provide for programs urging the insurgent to voluntarily abandon the insurgent movement. Such programs offer the insurgent an alternative that permits him to surrender without fear of punishment and tends to weaken his resolution to continue fighting under adverse circumstances.

   b. The Population.
      (1) Gaining the support of the population is of paramount importance. It is not enough merely to deprive the insurgent of population support through control measures. Since populace and resources control operations tend to be restrictive and repressive, they must be offset by vital and
dynamic programs aimed at winning the active support of the people. One of the first considerations must be the protection of the populace from insurgent ravages and reprisals. Therefore, basic strategy must provide for the establishment of relatively secure and stable environmental areas within the country in which internal development and other measures aimed at gaining population support can be conducted effectively.

(2) Removing the conditions that insurgents exploit to foster an insurgency must be a part of the national strategy. The military can contribute materially to the overall strategy of winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but their efforts must be accompanied by economic, social, and political changes. The deep, underlying resentments leading to frustration, anger and political violence and desires of both majority and minority groups must be analyzed carefully before strategic measures are decided. Limited resources and capabilities often make it impossible to accomplish all objectives at once. Therefore, the designation of priorities, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks require careful consideration. Plans must be appraised realistically in the light of their short and long-range impact on the population and on the benefits which will accrue to the government.

Section II. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE

4-4. General

This section outlines US security assistance strategy to attain internal defense and development objectives. US security assistance programs are categorized as security developmental and humanitarian assistance. US security assistance programs aid in defeating immediate internal or external threats to the national security and independence of friendly nations. In nations lacking effective administrative services and political stability, US developmental assistance can help establish these assets for internal development; while in other nations, it can be used to further existing national internal development programs. Humanitarian assistance is provided on an ad hoc basis for welfare and emergency relief.

4-5. Coordination of Foreign Assistance

a. General. US developmental and security assistance programs are mutually supporting and may be coordinated with the assistance programs of other Free World nations. US programs are administered by the Country Team, the senior in-country US coordinating and supervising body. It is headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission—usually an ambassador—and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency. Funds for these programs are appropriated by the US Congress. The Department of State has ultimate responsibility for their coordination and direction.

b. International Coordination. The US views its security assistance program as a component part of Free World assistance rather than as an isolated effort. The general objective of coordination is to promote the most effective use of resources available from all assisting nations. Coordination is required to insure compatible approaches to assistance and to facilitate an effective division of responsibility.

c. US Interdepartmental Coordination. Coordination between US assistance programs is particularly necessary in nations where these programs create problems of resource allocation. Country Team efforts to minimize possible conflicts are particularly important at the host country national level and consist of interdepartmental analyses of the specific needs of internal defense and development programs. US foreign assistance coordination takes into consideration the comparative costs and benefits of various combinations of the two types of assistance programs to maximize the total contribution toward host country national security. Improved military capabilities contribute indirectly to national security through increased economic productivity and investment.

d. Coordination with the Host Country. At the host country national level, the US ambassador or the principal US diplomatic officer is responsible for insuring that all US military, economic, social, and political assistance programs in the country are coordinated. The senior military representative in the host country is directly responsible to the ambassador for the implementation and coordination of the military assistance program.

e. Host Country National Level. Security assistance is coordinated at the national level by the senior Department of Defense representative and his organization operating with host country military counterparts. It is coordinated at unit levels
by military advisory teams operating with subordinate host country armed forces. For details of the US military organization for security assistance, see chapter 9.

4–6. US Strategy

US military security assistance programs are designed to make the host country response to the internal defense threat as rapid and effective as possible. Parallel international development assistance is directed at eliminating the conditions contributing to the insurgency and promoting the economic and social welfare of the population.

a. A total host country program is needed to prevent and defeat insurgency. Success depends on accurate, carefully evaluated information and on a unified concept of operations tailored to the situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

b. The US should assist host country government leaders to take required remedial action before a crisis limits the alternatives and necessitates the use of force. The US Country Team assesses the situation in a nation to permit the US Government to determine its best courses of action.

4–7. Role of US Military

The US military role in stability operations must be primarily advisory. However, US forces can provide training and encouragement to indigenous personnel. They should perform their mission without becoming involved in political party affiliations, usurping the prerogatives of civilian agencies, or becoming the dominant force in civilian institutions. Viable and lasting institutions can be generated only by the host country government and maintained by the host country populace. Neither the US military nor US civilian personnel can create enduring patterns of cooperation among the host country populace.

Section III. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

4–8. General

Internal defense is intended to create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can assure national growth through controlled social, economic, and political change. Internal defense and development must be coordinated and mutually supporting at all levels.

4–9. Internal Defense

Internal defense embraces the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The objective of internal defense is internal security or a state of law and order within the nation. The emphasis on internal defense will necessarily vary with the intensity of insurgent operations and the degree of the insurgents' influence and control over the population.

4–10. Internal Development

Internal development promotes advances in the economic, social, and political fields. These advances will not necessarily be balanced because advances in one field may force imbalances in others. Although the basic objective of internal development is to contribute to stability operations programs and thus to independence and freedom, its immediate goal is to gain legitimacy. Internal development programs, carefully planned and implemented and properly publicized, can convince the people that the government is promoting their interests and so assist in depriving any insurgency of a base for popular support.

4–11. Internal Defense and Development Strategy

a. Phase I Insurgency.

(1) Intelligence operations are of critical importance in the early phase of insurgency. US Army intelligence operations, combined with those of the host country, should be considered as soon as US military assistance is committed to internal defense. Operations should be designed to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure (its political leadership) and develop an intelligence data base. Analysis of this data base should produce a more accurate determination of the degree of insurgent control in various areas of the country. This determination allows the government to formulate internal defense and development programs based upon logical assumptions regarding insurgent activities.

(2) When nations become targets of insurgency, the internal security objective, though retaining its identity, becomes part of the overall internal defense strategy. During Phase I, the
host country police and paramilitary forces constitute the first line of defense; however, the army augments these forces where needed.

(3) Populace and resources control operations are used to isolate insurgents from the population, thus depriving them of personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. These operations also serve to protect the population from insurgent violence and exploitation. Populace and resources control measures should be only as restrictive as absolutely necessary to achieve objectives. Excessive restriction tends to spread popular discontent and further insurgent aims. Maximum effort must be made to establish psychological rapport with the people and to inflict maximum psychological damage upon the insurgents. Insurgent objectives and methods must be discredited and subversive propaganda effectively countered.

(4) The efforts of the government on behalf of the people must be widely publicized as must the ways in which responsible citizens are expected to assist in establishing a stable national environment.

(5) Economic development requires basic efforts in many related fields. Appropriate skills and experience must be acquired; a modern fiscal and monetary system must be established; agriculture must be expanded to develop a degree of self-sufficiency and freedom, particularly from the one-crop economies. The preconditions for economic growth also must be achieved, which include the establishment of power and communications systems, transportation networks, a workable credit and marketing system, and other elements of the economic infrastructure.

(6) At all levels of government, administrative responsibilities must be delineated and procedures established to provide for proper coordination of all programs before they are initiated. The lines of authority and coordination (from the national level to the local level) must be clearly established so that national programs can be carried out properly and efficiently at local levels and the reactions, attitudes, and demands of the people can be ascertained quickly at the national level. Concurrently, the judicial system must be improved and modified to support new economic, social, and political developments, to accommodate changing social values, and to cope with the insurgent threat. No general rule can pinpoint the time when the people should begin to participate in the governmental process, but procedures permitting them to bring their problems to the government should be established as early as possible.

(7) Once social progress has begun, an action in one area affects actions in other areas. In this process, it is difficult to determine which social changes were required to permit progress and which ones were the result of progress. The conflicts and stresses between traditional and modern ways might lead to new grievances that could increase the strength of the insurgent movement. The social development problem may involve changing the basic attitudes and values of the people.

b. Phase II Insurgency.

(1) The advent of the second phase requires a change of emphasis. Internal defense measures, particularly populace and resources control operations and the employment of military forces in support of internal development, must be reoriented toward internal defense operations. These include actions directed against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, base areas, external support, external sanctuaries, or outside supporting power. As far as possible, internal defense forces will continue to assist in internal development projects to gain and maintain the good will of the population. Priorities of effort must be established within geographical areas critical to the government. In those areas selected, the population must be assured that internal defense and development measures, once initiated, will not be abandoned.

(2) During Phase II, the government is faced with tactical assault and continued subversion. The adoption of an internal defense plan oriented toward effective, comprehensive internal security is required. When adequately trained civilians are not available, military personnel may be employed in civilian functions. The police should be expanded and reorganized to effectively meet increased security requirements. Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to augment the police or the armed forces. The armed forces are increased in size in order to perform their roles in internal defense and to prepare for possible escalation of the insurgency or external attack. Efforts to close national borders may be initiated or extended.

(3) Intelligence and populace and resources control operations initiated in Phase I are continued and extended to meet the insurgent tactical threat. Military intelligence operations are directed toward the collection and processing of information relating to insurgent tactical forces, their leaders and plans, and to other essential order of battle information. Populace and re-
sources control operations are expanded to prevent or sever relationships between the population and the insurgents and to reduce to a minimum the internal and external support available to insurgent forces. Border security operations and lines of communication security are stressed.

(4) The presence of insurgent tactical forces requires host country tactical operations—possibly at the expense of internal development programs. The resulting reduction in internal development programs may alienate the population. PSYOP must explain the reason for this reduction in internal development, placing the blame on the insurgent.

(a) If the government concentrates exclusively on the insurgent tactical forces, the insurgent infrastructure is relatively free to grow and to increase its influence over the population. Overemphasis on either threat tends to create an imbalance in the government effort which exposes areas of relative weakness, which the insurgent may exploit.

(b) The people are the key to the struggle and represent the prime target of every insurgent activity. Therefore, they must be protected and their support won for the government.

(c) The host country must determine the amount of effort that can be devoted to internal development and the amount that can be applied to internal defense.

(5) In economic development, emphasis is shifted to projects which support the internal defense effort, including those involved directly in achieving internal security and those demonstrating the government's concern and ability to benefit the people. For example, transportation facilities constructed to support troop movement should be located where they also contribute to the support and development of the economy. Although some long-range projects should be continued in government-controlled areas, there should be a shift toward short or mid-range economic development projects that are immediately apparent and beneficial to the people. When government-controlled areas are being extended, emphasis should be on projects which will satisfy the people's immediate needs. These projects should be completed in a relatively short time, show tangible results, teach the people self-help techniques, and be maintained with local resources. Continuous study is required to ascertain which short-range projects can be extended to mid or long-range undertakings, thereby enhancing the government's image in the eyes of the people. Military civic action projects should be undertaken wherever armed forces or paramilitary units are stationed if the tactical situation permits.

(6) The requirements for improved government organization to deal with the insurgency, to extend government presence downward, and to determine and redress the grievances of the people contribute directly to internal defense and development. Increasing government activities, particularly where the expansion of government-controlled areas are concerned, will bring the government closer to the people and help to foster a sense of national unity. Each government agency must demonstrate concern and respect for the individual.

(7) In addition to the social problems that are part of the internal development process, problems evolving from disruption of the social system due to threats of violence must be solved. The added disruption of the social organization as a result of insurgency is not entirely negative, since it provides an initial shock which tends to displace fundamental traditional relationships. Disruption may permit the reordering of the social structure with less resistance. The government must provide practical programs for dealing with displaced persons and the demands of militant factions or antagonistic minorities. It must also rehabilitate former insurgents or insurgent supporters who have come under government control.

c. Phase III Insurgency. In a Phase III insurgency, the government may face an immediate danger of military defeat. Though other insurgent activities continue, the imminent danger of military defeat must be averted if the government is to survive. During this phase, the combat requirements of the military take priority and other activities continue only after military defense has been assured.

(1) In addition to defeating the military threat, government operations are continually aimed toward the ultimate objective of winning popular support for the government through internal development of the nation. The need to use more and more resources for internal defense reduces the resources available for internal development.

(2) Internal defense measures become more comprehensive and are administered more strictly. Armed forces are expanded and reorganized to permit larger-sized unit operations and increase the firepower, mobility, and support needed
to cope with the increased insurgent tactical threat.

(3) The police continue their populace and resources control operations; however, they may rely heavily upon military and paramilitary support for relocation of families and resettlement of communities. The police may need additional military assistance when contraband lists are increased, rationing initiated, and resources control expanded to cover production, transportation, storage, and utilization of critical materiel. The police contribute to large-scale tactical operations by providing intelligence and counterintelligence assistance, guides, and interrogation and screening teams to accompany and assist the military and paramilitary forces.

(4) Short and mid-range economic development projects are continued whenever and wherever possible. Long-range projects are continued in government-controlled areas. The scope of such projects may be curtailed to divert resources to short-range projects in areas where a critical need exists.

(5) Under the threat of increased insurgent action, simplified, clear lines of authority should be developed within the governmental structure to facilitate military action and clearly delineate areas of responsibility. Governmental control is extended primarily through the expansion of government-controlled areas. More military headquarters with liaison officers at corresponding governmental levels will be necessary; more military training, advisory or assistance teams, and military personnel to perform normal civilian functions also will be required. Subnational and regional government leaders may be military personnel or may be assisted by military deputies and staffs operating in concert with civilian government officials.
HIGHLIGHTS

Host country MILITARY SUPPORT of internal development programs enhances

- the POSTURE of the government
- and the PREVENTIVE process in combatting insurgency.

Host country NATIONAL STRATEGY must provide for

- IDENTIFYING the INSURGENT
- ISOLATING the INSURGENT from the population
- Gaining the SUPPORT of the POPULATION.

US INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT and SECURITY ASSISTANCE programs are

- MUTUALLY SUPPORTING
- may be COORDINATED with assistance programs of other Free World nations.

THE OBJECTIVE of INTERNAL DEFENSE is to

- achieve INTERNAL SECURITY
- or a state of LAW and ORDER within the nation
- in order that INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT programs can proceed.

THE OBJECTIVE of INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT is to

- create those conditions that enhance SOCIAL, POLITICAL, and ECONOMIC progress.

THE OBJECTIVE of US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE is to

- ASSIST developing nations
- to preserve their POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
- and to achieve ECONOMIC and SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

Figure 4-1. Highlights.
CHAPTER 5
PLANNING GUIDANCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. Purpose and Scope
This chapter contains information on planning procedures. It is designed to assist US military personnel in the development and execution of plans associated with internal defense and internal development operations. It also discusses the planning concepts, objectives and operations that may be required to mold host country internal defense and internal development plans into an integrated program designed to eliminate those conditions contributing to insurgency and to defeat insurgent organizations.

5-2. Planning Concepts
a. A national internal defense and development plan is prepared by the host country government to set forth their objectives and broad, general guidance concerning priorities of effort, budget limitations, resource allocation, and other similar factors. This plan should be detailed and comprehensive enough so that it can be used for planning at regional, state, and local levels. The national plan is supported by detailed annexes prepared by various government departments and agencies whose resources and functional capabilities can be used in implementing the master plan. These annexes discuss specific departmental responsibilities and resources and describe how these resources will be used to carry out coordinated internal defense and internal development programs. Subnational plans are based on the national plan.

b. The national plan is based on an estimate of the internal defense and development situation which evaluates government and opposing force capabilities and develops courses of action. The estimate updates host country and background studies by highlighting the most pertinent elements of internal defense and internal development planning and considers the insurgent threat and the host country situation and considerations.

5-3. Planning Objectives
The primary objective of planning in insurgency situations is to insure that internal defense and development activities are molded into unified strategy tailored to attain national objectives. Some of the more significant planning objectives include—

a. Developing appropriate objectives and establishing priorities.

b. Examining the structure of government and governmental agencies to determine existence of mechanisms to insure coordination of national objectives and production of internal defense and internal development plans and activities.

c. Estimating necessary monetary appropriations for procurement and operations.

d. Examining conscription laws to insure adequate personnel for the operations.

5-4. Planning Organization
The composition of the planning organization will vary with the degree of mobilization required. In latent insurgent situations, planning can be done by existing government agencies. In more advanced phases of insurgency, planning will overextend the capabilities of individual government agencies. A special planning and coordination group, such as a National Internal Defense Coordination Center will provide additional personnel resources and assistance. The internal defense and internal development coordinating group is not intended to replace government agencies or perform their functions, but to provide a focal point for coordinating and applying the skills and resources of the agencies. See chapter 6 for a discussion of a type NIDCC organization.

5-5. The Military Plan
The military plan to the national internal defense and internal development plan will be prepared by
the host country defense establishment. It should be a realistic and detailed blueprint of the resources, capabilities, and employment of the armed, paramilitary, and self-defense forces in support of the total internal defense and internal development effort. The Army's portion of the military plan is referred to here as the stability operations annex (app C). This annex can also include information on police resources and employment since the police often perform paramilitary functions during an insurgency. The following discussion is based on figure 5-1, which depicts the components of a stability operations annex.

a. The stability operations annex should include all the resources and effort to be expended. It is particularly important to coordinate all functional elements of the plan so that available personnel and materiel resources will be used properly. The stability operations annex should have appendixes on the following functions:

(1) Advisory assistance. This appendix considers the individual advisor, mobile training teams, and larger unit advisory teams plus US and other allied combat support and combat service support assistance. This support, if required, will increase the capabilities of host country forces to operate efficiently and to perform their missions in the given operational environment.

(2) Intelligence. This appendix denotes intelligence assets and measures necessary to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population. It also prescribes counterintelligence activities necessary to minimize insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. The intelligence appendix must include intelligence requirement’s and information pertinent to PSYOP, civil affairs communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and support.

(3) Psychological operations. This appendix prescribes the military PSYOP objectives, roles, missions, and the resources required to accomplish these tasks. It categorizes the target audiences and prescribes the themes to—

(a) Gain, preserve and strengthen civilian support for the host government.

(b) Build and maintain the morale, loyalty, and fighting spirit of government forces.

(c) Create dissension, dissatisfaction, and defection among insurgent forces.

This appendix also establishes criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the PSYOP program.

(4) Civil affairs. This appendix considers relationships between the military, civil authorities, and the people. It focuses on programs designed to organize and motivate the people to support the internal defense and internal development projects.

(5) Populace and resources control. This appendix prescribes proper employment of available resources and measures necessary to preserve or reestablish a state of law and order in which other stability operations programs can be conducted effectively. It includes detailed backup in support of stability operations on such activities as protecting LOCs; severing relations between the insurgent and the population; amnesty and rehabilitation; law enforcement; and border operations.

(6) Tactical operations. This appendix considers all aspects of mobilizing, equipping, training, and directing armed and paramilitary forces in tactical operations. The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Since both internal defense and internal de-
development are involved in mission accomplishment, this appendix also considers the impact of tactical operations on other military and civilian nontactical operations being conducted to achieve national objectives.

b. The stability operations annex at all levels should—

1. State objectives clearly.
2. Be based on a careful assessment of available personnel and materiel resources.
3. Analyze social, cultural, political, and psychological forces stimulating or obstructing the attainment of military objectives.
4. Evaluate alternate courses of action and the impact of each on other interrelated economic, political, military, and social factors.

Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE PLANNING

5–7. General

Internal defense planning is based on knowledge of the threat; operational environment; national objectives, organization, requirements; and other plans. Planning at all levels involves more detail, and closer coordination between the civil/military community, than is required during limited and general war. Plans must provide for the employment of available support from the armed forces and other organizations. When assistance from Free World nations is desired to assist mobilization of internal defense forces, plans must permit efficient integration of external assistance.

5–8. Objective

The objective of internal defense planning is to provide for the efficient employment of military resources to support both internal defense and internal development programs. The national plan provides long-range guidance, whereas lower-level plans provide short-range and more detailed implementing guidance.

5–9. Concept

During phase I, internal defense planning accentuates the employment of military resources in support of internal development programs through military civic action, advisory assistance, and PSYOP. Standard operating procedures should be formulated for as many types of military activities as possible. During phases II and III, internal defense planning is expanded to meet the insurgent tactical threat. The internal defense plan must—

a. Be responsive to nationally established priorities of resource utilization and must be closely coordinated with the internal development plan.

b. Anticipate insurgent activities and prepare to meet them offensively.

c. Provide an organizational structure that will facilitate coordination and implementation of all plans.

d. Refrain from establishing fixed time schedules. Since military forces do not control the operational environment to the degree they do in limited and general war, fixed time schedules are virtually impossible to maintain.

5–10. Operations

The following planning aspects should be recognized—

a. Planning for internal defense operations will be far more detailed and comprehensive than for limited and general war.

1. Planning should provide for clear division of responsibility and precise lines of authority.
(2) Tasks should be assigned on the basis of unit capabilities and limitations.

(3) When areas or responsibility are assigned to a unit, the extent of responsibility must be clearly defined.

b. Planning objectives are not limited to terrain or enemy forces, but include people.

c. Combat power must be applied selectively and its effect modified to avoid civilian casualties. In many instances, commanders may have to choose between a course of action that will assure entrance into a given area with minimum troop losses and one that precludes harming the population. The commander must weigh the psychological impact of his military operations.

d. In addition to tactical operations, internal defense planning provides guidance for conducting advisory assistance, civil affairs, intelligence, PSYOP, and populace and resources control operations.

e. Local, state, and regional plans coordinate activities in detailed, comprehensive orders, insuring that subordinate commanders are furnished adequate operational guidance about the requirements within their specific operational areas.

f. Planning must give close attention to political, economic, social, psychological, and military situations. Estimates are based on the analysis of the areas of operations, the mission, and information previously outlined.

g. All plans must be coordinated closely between US and host country military and civilian agencies. Planning staffs must anticipate greater difficulties in gaining approval for unit plans and allow enough time to process these plans at higher, lower, and adjacent levels.

h. During latent and incipient insurgency, when few or no tactical operational requirements exist, host country combat support and combat service support forces (such as engineers and intelligence) should be tasked early to carry out non-tactical internal development missions.

i. All plans for military operations should consider the roles and capabilities of paramilitary forces.

j. Plans for tactical operations are oriented on the enemy and his activities but they also must consider internal defense and development operations.

k. Supply procedures and other administrative and logistical support activities should be planned for both routine and emergency operations.

l. Planning should provide for the contingency that subnational efforts may require military forces in excess of those available. The designation of special units to be attached to subnational levels may suffice.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

5–11. General

Internal development planning outlines specific programs to be undertaken by a government to improve economic, social, and political conditions. It also outlines the objectives to be attained and the policies and strategies to be used in achieving them. Subordinate agencies must provide input to, and base their planning on, national plans.

c. Selecting means to mobilize resources for the attainment of objectives.

d. Providing a basis for the allocation of limited resources.

e. Insuring that the operations of different government departments and private groups are coordinated and consistent with each other.

5–12. Objectives

Host country objectives of internal development planning include—

a. Defining internal development objectives, purposes, and tasks and establishing priorities.

b. Determining actual and potential economic, social, and political resources.

5–4
be fully effective, planning should stimulate private contributions to the development process.

b. Planning should provide for private business to receive an appropriately large share of limited resources so that it can further economic expansion.

5-14. Organization

In planning and executing a development program, governments may have to create, supervise, and operate activities and organizations contributing to the political, social, civil, psychological, and economic development of the country. These may include—

a. Political.
   (1) Discussion groups.
   (2) Voting apparatus.
   (3) Drafting a constitution.
   (4) Establishing political parties.
   (5) Enacting laws that support national objectives.
   (6) Broadening the bases of political power through education, health, skills, group leadership, self-confidence, and initiative.

b. Social and Civil.
   (1) Public health programs.
   (2) Public education programs and facilities.
   (3) Specialized training programs.
   (4) News media.
   (5) Civil service system.
   (6) Civic organizations.
   (7) Crime prevention programs.
   (8) Agricultural extension programs.
   (9) Youth programs.
   (10) Recreational programs.

c. Psychological.
   (1) Information programs.
   (2) Pictorial campaigns.
   (3) Motion picture service.
   (4) Ceremonies and contests to assemble people for orientation.

d. Economic.
   (1) National development bank.
   (2) Industrial development company.
   (3) Housing authority.
   (4) Water resources authority.
   (5) Port authority.
   (6) Land development authority.
   (7) Electric power corporation.
   (8) Transportation authority.
   (9) Food distribution authority.
   (10) Medical authority.

5-15. Operations

Measures important in host country internal development planning include—

a. Recognizing the needs and aspirations of the people and the appropriate government response.

b. Recognizing the proper relationship between official and private organizations.

c. Planning for the participation of nongovernment personnel, organizations, and groups.

d. Ascertaining the impact of internal defense activities on internal development.

e. Coordinating internal defense and internal development plans in an overall nation-building program.

f. Phasing internal development to insure coordinated action and availability of personnel and material. For example, personnel must be recruited and trained before work can begin.
HIGHLIGHTS

A NATIONAL internal defense and internal development PLAN sets forth

- host country objectives
- broad general guidance concerning priorities of
  - effort
  - budget limitations
  - resource allocation

The PLANNING OBJECTIVE in an insurgency environment is to insure that the internal defense and internal development plans are molded into a UNIFIED STRATEGY tailored to attain national objectives.

As members of the country team, military personnel provide input

- PLANNING
- REVIEWING
- EVALUATING host country internal defense and internal development plans and programs.

The STABILITY OPERATIONS annex encompasses

- advisory assistance
- intelligence
- psychological operations
- civil affairs
- populace and resources control
- tactical operations

In INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

- combat power must be applied selectively
- the commander must weigh the psychological impact of military operations.

Figure 5-2. Highlights.
CHAPTER 6
ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6-1. Purpose
This chapter provides an organizational concept for planning and conducting internal defense and internal development operations. It presents a type of host country national organization and describes the responsibilities and functions of each of its elements at various governmental levels. However, the assumption is clearly drawn that any such organization will be built around the existing host country organization and that initiative for such organizations will come from the host country.

6-2. Organizational Objective
The objective of creating a national level organization is to provide centralized direction to the planning and conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. The organization should be so structured and chartered that it has the capability of coordinating the IDAD efforts of existing governmental agencies and yet not interfere with those agencies non-IDAD functions.

6-3. Organizational Concepts
The National Internal Defense Coordination Center (NIDCC) presented here is a type organization designed to provide a framework under which centralized direction and decentralized execution can be established. This concept would have organizational variances from country to country in order to adapt to the particular structure of the host government.

Section II. NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER (NIDCC)

6-4. General
The NIDCC, when formed, would be the highest level organization concerned with planning and coordinating operations. Responsible to the nation's chief executive, the NIDCC is headed by a director who supervises the activities of the major staff offices in the NIDCC. These staff offices are responsible for formulating plans in their respective fields—plans that will become a part of the national plan. After coordination, these plans will be sent to subordinate area coordination centers for use as a basis for their planning and conduct of operations. US advisors may be assigned to various posts in the NIDCC and area coordination centers. The extent of their advice and means of imparting it will depend on the US/host country agreements and, most importantly, on the personalities of the US personnel assigned or functioning as advisors in these critical posts.

6-5. Organization
The major NIDCC offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with internal defense and internal development. In most instances, these offices would be extensions of existing organizations and concentrate on internal defense and internal development problems. Figure 6-1 depicts a type of National Internal Defense Coordination Center.

a. Planning Office. This office is responsible for long-range plans for internal defense and internal development. These plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

b. Economic, Social, Psychological, and Political Affairs Offices. These separate offices—elements representing their parent national-level branches or agencies—develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.
Figure 6.1. Type national internal defense coordination center.
c. **Populace and Resources Control Office.** This office develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on the operations of all forces in the security field. It is staffed mainly by representatives of branches of government concerned with law enforcement and justice.

d. **Intelligence Office.** This office develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security.

e. **Military Affairs Office.** This office develops and coordinates broad, general plans for the mobilization and allocation of armed and paramilitary forces.

### Section III. AREA COORDINATION CENTER

#### 6-6. General

Area coordination center (ACC) responsible to the area commander (military or civilian) are established as combined civil/military headquarters at regional, state, and local levels. These centers are responsible for planning, coordinating, and exercising operational control over all military forces and governmental civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. US/host country policy and agreements will determine command relationships between combined forces. The area coordination center does not replace unit tactical operations centers (TOC) or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

#### 6-7. Mission

Area coordination centers perform a two-fold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all internal defense and internal development efforts and they insure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

#### 6-8. Organization

The area coordination center is headed by the senior government official who supervises and coordinates the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense and internal development plans and operations within their separate areas of interest. These staffs normally are composed of selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's area of responsibility. The area coordination center should include members from the—

a. Senior area military command.

b. Senior police agency.

c. Local and national intelligence organization.

d. Public information and PSYOP agencies.

e. Paramilitary forces.

f. Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of internal defense and internal development activities.

g. US military/civilian organizations if provided for under US/host country agreements.

#### 6-9. State (Provincial Area Coordination Center)

A nation's first political subdivision with a fully developed administrative apparatus usually is the state. Most state governments are well established and have exercised governmental functions over their areas before the onset of insurgency. The state normally is the lowest level of administration capable of administering the full range of internal defense and internal development programs. The economic, social, psychological, political, and military aspects of these programs are focused at this level and state area coordination centers should be established to exploit this potential.

#### 6-10. Urban Area Coordination Center

a. **General.** Urban areas require a more complex organization than rural areas to plan, coordinate, and direct internal defense and internal development efforts. An urban area may vary from a market town of 20,000 people to a commercial/industrial city with a population of more than a million. The dense population, multistory buildings, subterranean construction, public utilities, and transportation systems all require special attention. Police public safety services, social organizations, political factors, economic aspects, and communications systems must be considered.
b. Mission. The mission of the urban area coordination center is to plan, coordinate, and direct internal defense and internal development activities and to insure an immediate coordinated response to operational requirements.

c. Organization. The urban area coordination center is organized very much like the area center described in paragraph 6-8. However, representatives from local police, fire fighting, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation authorities also must be included. An operation center capable of operating 24 hours a day must be established. It must be able to receive and act upon information requiring immediate operational action and coordination. A civilian advisory committee (para 6-9) also is required. Urban coordination centers are established to perform the same functions for urban areas that local coordination centers perform for rural areas. When there is a state or local area coordination center in an urban area, it may be necessary to include the urban resources in that center and to plan, coordinate, and direct urban operations from there. The decision to establish an urban center or use the state or local center for these purposes should be based on the authority of the official at the head of the urban area government and resources available to him. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the area coordination center provides the control to insure proper planning and coordination. Urban area coordination centers should be established in autonomous cities and in urban areas not having a higher level coordination center.

d. Operations. Operations are geared to the level necessary to defeat insurgent activities. Emphasis is placed on the selected application of firepower and the use of nonlethal weapons to reduce the possibility of producing civilian casualties.

(1) Internal area. Emphasis must be placed on intelligence and police work to identify and neutralize the insurgent leadership (infrastructure). Plans must be made to counter demonstrations instigated by the insurgents and to protect facilities and installations. The insurgent threat may vary from terrorist activities and kidnapping to an armed attack on the area. The use of police, military, and paramilitary forces must be carefully coordinated in all operations.

(2) Adjacent and surrounding areas. Surveillance operations to detect insurgent activities should be conducted on a continuing basis. Maximum use should be made of all available equipment to provide day and night coverage. Visual reconnaissance operations from aircraft by trained observers familiar with the local area may provide targets for immediate tactical operations. Patrol plans must provide for ground coverage of suspected or likely areas of insurgent activities. Internal defense and internal development plans must give a high priority to nearby areas to insure the security of the critical urban areas.

6-11. Civilian Advisory Committees

Committees composed of government officials and leading citizens should be formed to help the area coordination center evaluate the success of its activities and to elicit population support. These committees evaluate the results of various actions affecting civilians and provide a communications link with the people, thus providing feedback on which to base future operations.

a. The organization of a civilian committee will vary with local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. The appointed chairman ordinarily will be a leader in the community or the area. General membership should include—

(1) Local police chief.
(2) Superintendent of schools or school principal.
(3) Priests, ministers, or other leaders of religious faiths.
(4) Health director.
(5) Judge or other judiciary representatives.
(6) Labor union officials.
(7) Editors of local news media.
(8) Business and commercial leaders.
(9) Other influential persons.

b. The civilian committee normally will meet on call of the committee chairman. Some representatives may hold positions in both the area coordination center and the civilian committee.
HIGHLIGHTS

Where organized, the NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER (NIDCC) and its subordinate area coordination centers (ACC)

- PLAN
- COORDINATE internal defense and internal development operations.

CIVILIAN ADVISORY COMMITTEES, composed of government officials and leading citizens, should be formed to HELP the area coordination centers

- EVALUATE the SUCCESS of its various ACTIVITIES
- ELICIT POPULAR SUPPORT.

Figure 6-2. Highlights.
CHAPTER 7
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7-1. Purpose and Scope
This chapter contains information on training objectives and requirements for US Army stability operations personnel. It is designed to assist US military personnel in the development of training programs for US and host country forces for participation in internal defense and internal development operations.

7-2. General
a. The nature of stability operations requires a personal orientation and motivation toward assisting the host country and accomplishing the US objectives. US and individual responsibility to a host country government must be understood. Training and educational programs should stress the importance of the individual's actions in influencing indigenous support of US and host country objectives. Tolerance of political, economic, social, religious, and cultural difference is required to insure proper relationships between indigenous and US personnel. Host country goals, status of forces agreements, and rules of engagement must be included in a continuing orientation program.

b. Training of US Army stability operations forces stresses the development of skills, concepts, and procedures that must be taught to host country forces and the learning and teaching techniques required to impart these skills to individuals whose cultural background differs from that of the US soldier. Training emphasis on what and how to teach indigenous forces will vary according to the country's requirements, force composition, and US programs. However, US standards of training for combat, combat support, and combat service support units provide the basic guides for preparing US forces to advise host military authorities in the organization and methods of employment of indigenous forces to combat insurgents. Individual training for US personnel should include development of proficiency in basic MOS skills, area orientation, varying degrees of language skill, and physical conditioning. When feasible, maximum cross-training should be given to members of mobile training teams (MTT) and advisors. Training should emphasize instructor skills to include techniques for teaching by demonstration with minimum use of language (voice) and proper techniques for use of interpreters.

c. Training in the employment of and defense against non-lethal chemical agents must be given all personnel. See FM 3-10 and TC 3-16 for guidance on the employment of nonlethal chemical agents, FM 21-40 for guidance on defense against nonlethal chemical agents, and FM 21-48 for guidance on chemical defense training exercises.

d. Courses of instruction are given by the US Army Institute for Military Assistance, and other governmental agencies to provide selected officers and noncommissioned officers with a working knowledge of stability operations including civic action programs and activities.

Section II. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

7-3. Special Action Forces Training
The commander of the Special Action Force is responsible for the training of all assigned and attached units. Normally, those professional skills contained in the various augmentation detachments are MOS-qualified before detachments are assigned to a SAF. However, the commander must make provisions for service school training of selected personnel in specialized courses such as civil affairs, engineer, medical, military police, psychological operations, and intelligence. Area orientation and language training requirements
for each SAF differ. The base SAF in CONUS, however, can provide limited predeployment training for detachments in consonance with assignment requirements. Training missions in the SAF are assigned consistent with the availability of instructors, training facilities, and the type training required. Training supervision is centralized and accomplished through the normal chain of command.

7-4. Special Forces Training

The highly developed capability of Special Forces to organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces plus their knowledge of guerrilla warfare tactics and techniques makes these forces particularly effective in stability operations. Special Forces predeployment training should also include, as a minimum, area studies, language, stability operations, MOS cross training, and general subject skills. This additional training presumes that Army training program requirements have already been satisfied.

7-5. Augmentation Units Training

Training for augmentation detachments of the SAF should be integrated into the Special Forces group training program for area orientation, language training, common subjects, and field training exercises. Physical conditioning should be stressed in order to develop an ability to function under adverse conditions. Positions requiring professional skills should be filled by personnel who are already trained.

7-6. Brigade-Size Backup Forces Training

a. General. Backup forces, like the SAF's are specifically oriented for deployment to particular areas of the world. Accordingly, each US Army division designated is required to develop training programs for the brigade and its subordinate elements. FM 31-16 provides information and guidance for training the brigade and its subordinate elements in its tactical counterguerrilla role.

b. Training Objectives. The backup forces training objectives are:

1. To be proficient in MOS skills.
2. To be highly proficient in stability operations.
3. To understand the role of backup forces in Army stability operations missions.
4. To be familiar with the designated area.
5. To maintain language skill levels through refresher training.
HIGHLIGHTS

TRAINING of US Army Stability Operations Forces stresses
- the development of SKILLS, CONCEPTS, and PROCEDURES
  that must be taught to host country forces.
- the LEARNING and TEACHING TECHNIQUES required to
  impart these skills to individuals whose cultural background
  differs from that of the US soldier.

TRAINING EMPHASIS on what and how to teach indigenous forces
WILL VARY according to the country’s
- requirements
- force composition
- US programs

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING for US personnel should include development
of proficiency in
- basic MOS skills
- area orientation
- varying degrees of language skill
- physical conditioning

The COMMANDER of the Special Action Force is responsible for the
TRAINING of all
- ASSIGNED
- ATTACHED UNITS

CAPABILITY of SPECIAL FORCES to
- ORGANIZE
- EQUIP
- TRAIN
- DIRECT indigenous forces

TRAINING for augmentation detachments of the SAF should be INTE-
GRATED into the Special Forces group training program for
- area orientation
- language training
- common subjects
- field training exercises

Figure 7–1. Highlights.
CHAPTER 8
OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8-1. Purpose and Scope
This chapter discusses the major operational roles that military forces can perform to accomplish their stability operations missions. The objectives, concepts, and modes of performing these roles are also explained. Information about the operational environment, particularly in respect to other governmental activity, is included for clarity.

8-2. Stability Operations Roles
US military participation primarily consists of training the host country trainers and then providing advice and assistance to the trainers in each of these roles. Military forces accomplish stability operations missions chiefly through civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. These operations can be conducted by the military alone or in coordination with other government agencies in support of internal defense and development programs. US Army elements can be called upon to provide operational support in any of these roles not only when the situation is determined to be critical to US interests.

8-3. Advice and Assistance
Most US advice and assistance is provided to the host country trainers through DOD, USAID, and USIA. Within DOD, the principal action agency is the MAAG, mission or military assistance command, which is responsible for furnishing advice and assistance on military organization, training, operations, intelligence, doctrine, and materiel.

a. The objective of US advice and assistance programs is to increase the capability and efficiency of the host country trainers in the conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. Organization and individuals possessing higher skill and material resource levels assist in imparting their knowledge to less developed organizations and individuals to achieve this objective. Although advice and assistance continue throughout all phases of insurgency, they are most important during phase I.

b. The provision of advisory cadres to major organizations is coordinated at the national level by the NIDCC and at subnational levels by area coordination centers; and if required, training centers can be established. Units having specialized equipment conduct on-the-job training for units that are expected to receive this equipment in the near future.

c. Specific operations are—
   (1) Assist in establishing effective training programs.
   (2) Assist in preparing and coordinating host country plans.
   (3) Assist in organizing and equipping activated units.
   (4) Under certain conditions, provide and control US combat support and combat service support units supporting host country forces.
   (5) Monitor the use, maintenance, and operations of MAP-provided equipment and supplies.

Section II. STABILITY OPERATIONS

8-4. Civil Affairs Operations
   a. Civil affairs operations are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. They include any activity of command concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. In civil affairs operations, military forces perform specified functions or may exercise certain authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.
APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A-1. Army Regulations (AR)

1-75    Administrative Support of MAAG, JUSMAG, and Similar Activities
(Food) 1-78 Internal Coordination Among US Army Agencies Overseas
10-6    Branches of the Army
(C) 10-122 United States Army Security Agency
27-20   Claims
310-25  Dictionary of United States Army Terms
310 50  Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
360-30  Code of Conduct
550-50  Training of Foreign Personnel by the US Army
614-134 Military Assistance Officer Program
795-204 General Policies and Principles For Furnishing Defense Articles and Serv-
ices on a Sale or Loan Basis

A-2. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

27-1    Treaties Governing Land Warfare
310-series Military Publications Indexes

A-3. Department of the Army Training Circulars (TC)

3-16    Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Antiplant Agents and
Personnel Detectors in Counterguerrilla Operations.

A-4. Department of the Army Field Manuals (FM)

1-15    Aviation Battalion, Group, and Brigade
1-100   Army Aviation Utilization
1-105   Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures
3-1     Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Support
3-2     Tactical Employment of Riot Control Agent CS
3-12    Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
3-50    Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations
5-1     Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations
5-135   Engineer Battalion, Armored, Infantry, and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions
5-136   Engineer Battalions, Airborne and Airmobile Divisions.
5-142   Nondivisional Engineer Combat Units.
5-162   Engineer Construction and Construction-Support Units.
6-140   Field Artillery Organization
7-10    The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads
7-20    The Infantry Battalions.
7-30    The Infantry Brigades
8-10    Medical Support, Theater of Operations
8-15    Medical Support in Division, Separate Brigades, and the Armored Cavalry Regiment
8-55    Army Medical Service Planning Guide
9-6     Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations.
10-8    Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment in the Theater of Operations
11-23 US Army Strategic Communications Command (Theater)
11-50 Signal Battalion, Armored Infantry, Infantry, Infantry (Mechanized), and Airmobile Division
11-57 Signal Battalion, Airmobile Division
12-2 Personnel and Administrative Support in Theaters of Operations
14-3 Comptroller Support in Theaters of Operation
16-5 The Chaplain
16-5-1 (Test) Chaplain Support TASTA-70
17-1 Armor Operations
17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units
17-96 The Armored Cavalry Regiment
19-1 Military Police Support, Army Division and Separate Brigades
19-4 Military Police Support, Theater of Operations
19-50 Military Police in Stability Operations
20-32 Landmine Warfare
20-33 Combat Flame Operations
21-40 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense
21-50 Ranger Training and Ranger Operations
21-76 Survival, Evasion and Escape
24-1 Tactical Communications Doctrine
27-4 (Test) Judge Advocate Support in Theaters of Operations
27-10 The Law of Land Warfare
29-3 Direct Support Supply and Service in the Field Army
29-45 General Support Supply and Service in the Field Army
30-5 Combat Intelligence
30-17 Counterintelligence Operations
30-31 Stability Operations-Intelligence
31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations
31-21 Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine
(S)31-21A Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine (U)
31-50 Combat in Fortified and Built-Up Areas
31-55 Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations
31-75 Riverine Operations
31-81 (Test) Base Defense
(C)32-5 Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U)
(S)32-10 USASA in Support of Tactical Operations
(C) 32-20 Electronic Warfare (U)
33-1 Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine
33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures
41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
41-10 Civil Affairs Operation
44-1 US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment
54-1 The Logistical Command
54-2 The Division Support Command and Separate Brigade Support Battalion
54-3 The Field Army Support Command
54-4 The Support Brigade
55-1 Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations
55-8 Transportation Intelligence
55-10 Army Transportation Movements Management
55-15 Transportation Reference Data
55-20 Army Rail Transport Operations
55-30 Army Motor Transport Operations
55-40 Army Combat Service Support Air Transport Operations
55-50-1 (Test) Transportation Amphibian Operations
55-60 Army Terminal Operations
57-35 Airmobile Operations
61-100 The Division
100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field
100-10 Combat Service Support
100-15 Larger Units Theater Army—Corps
100-20 Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
101-10-1 Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical

A–5. Department of the Army Technical Manuals (TM)

5–632 Military Entomology Operational Handbook
5–634 Refuse Collection and Disposal: Repairs and Utilities.
5–700 Field Water Supply.
38–750 The Army Maintenance Management System

A–6. Other References

DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM)
Public Law 87–195, Foreign Assistance Act
Public Law 90–629, Foreign Military Sales Act
PCS Pub 1, Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage. (Short Term JD)
(FOUD) JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
APPENDIX B

FORMAT FOR TYPE US–HOST COUNTRY STABILITY OPERATIONS ANNEX

(CLASSIFICATION)

COPY NO ______ OF ______ COPIES
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
PLACE
DATE TIME GROUP
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER


References: A listing of policy regulations, concepts, decrees, and other pertinent plans, maps, and charts relating to stability operations.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

Task Organization:

1. Situation

   a. General. State plan objective and scope, policy statements, and considerations affecting formulation of the plan.

   b. Directive. Provide a resume of data contained in the US-host country internal defense and development plan that are pertinent to the plan.

   c. Insurgent Forces. Include information about insurgent military forces and infrastructure that may directly affect stability operations planning. Such information as unit identification, organizational concepts, major activities, outside support, leadership, morale, and political ideologies should be included.

   d. Friendly Forces.

      (1) Military. Include information about US, host country, and allied military forces (armed, paramilitary) which may directly affect the US-host country internal defense and development plan. Such information as major units and their stability operations missions should be included.

      (2) Civil. Include information about US, host country, and allied official civilian departments and agencies which may play an active role in internal defense and development as they affect stability operations. Such information as agency designation, mission and responsibilities, location, and present and future potential in supporting stability operations should be included.

      (3) Public and Private. Include data concerning US, host country and allied public and private organizations willing and capable of providing assistance in both the internal defense and development aspects of stability operations. Religious organizations, professional societies, industrial firms, and women’s and youth groups are examples. Such information as size of membership, influence exerted in the community, resources, and capabilities should be included.

(CLASSIFICATION)
e. Operational Factors.
   (1) Weather and terrain. State major characteristics and significance.
   (2) Population. Include data concerning population groups which may
directly affect stability operations. Such information as loyalty to the
government, susceptibility to insurgent domination, attitudes, and desires
(group objectives) should be included.

2. MISSION.
   A clear, concise statement of tasks to be accomplished to include who, what,
when, where, and why.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of operation. Overall objectives and phasing; new national
      policy; judicial matters; establishment of the main programs to include
      relationships; use of foreign assistance; orientation of forces; initiation
      and disposition of area studies and field surveys; establishment of pro-
      cedures for planning groups; channels of communication and liaison; and
      considerations affecting intelligence and psychological/information pro-
      grams, monitoring agencies, and procedures.
   b. Army. Main missions and priorities.
   c. Air Force. Main missions and priorities.
   d. Navy. Main missions and priorities.
   e. Paramilitary Forces. Main missions and priorities.
   f. Police. Main missions and priorities.
   g. Official civil agencies. Main missions and priorities.
   h. Other assets and capabilities. Main missions and priorities.
   i. Coordinating instructions.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   This paragraph contains a statement of the combat service support in-
structions and arrangement.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
   b. Command. This paragraph contains instructions relative to command
and the operation of signal communications. The paragraph may have as
many subparagraphs as are required. Two of the more common subhead-
ings are "Signal" and "Command." Signal instructions may refer to an
annex, but as a minimum, should list the index and the issue number of
the signal operations (SOI) that is in effect and the instructions for con-
trol, coordination, and establishment of priorities in the use of electromag-
netic emissions.
Acknowledgement Instructions.

Signature Commander

AUTHENTICATION (NOTE)

Appendixes
1—Advisory Assistance (omitted)
2—Intelligence (omitted)
3—Psychological Operations (omitted)
4—Civil Affairs (omitted)
5—Populace and Resources Control (omitted)
6—Tactical Operations (omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Same as OPLAN (NOTE)

NOTE: Required only when the annex has a wider distribution than the plan or is being distributed separately.
APPENDIX C
BRANCH AND FUNCTIONAL AREA PRECIS

C-1. Introduction
This appendix summarizes branch and functional area doctrine for stability operations. References indicate the sources of detailed information on each area.

a. The US Army has designated its basic and special branches as arms and services to provide a basis for identifying functions and duties associated with the branches. Foreign military forces differ somewhat from the US Army system; however, the functions and duties ascribed to each of the US Army branches must generally be accommodated in every military system. AR 10-6 provides detailed coverage of the functions of each US Army branch.

b. Combat arms are those branches whose personnel are primarily concerned with fighting. They are Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery.

c. Combat support arms are those branches whose personnel provide operational assistance to the combat arms. They are Corps of Engineers, Military Police Corps, Chemical Corps and Military Intelligence. The first four of these branches are also designated services.

d. The services are those branches whose personnel are primarily concerned with providing combat service support or administrative support to the Army. The services are Adjutant General’s Corps, Corps of Engineers, Finance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Army Medical Department, Chaplains, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Chemical Corps, Military Police Corps, Women’s Army Corps, and Transportation Corps.

e. Some US Army functions—aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs activities, for example—are performed by several branches. This manual addresses these as functional areas and special units—Special Forces and ASA—are addressed as special functional units.

C-2. Combat Arms
In stability operations, Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery are mainly concerned with tactical operations. These branches are charged with seeking out and destroying insurgent armed forces and their base areas and with defending populated areas and critical installations. FM 31-16 provides guidance on tactical operations.

a. Infantry. The Infantry requires increased mobility support for its tactical operations. It is normally assigned responsibility for a tactical area of operations in which it conducts aggressive offensive and defensive operations. Added emphasis is placed on its reconnaissance and security roles. See FM 7-10, 7-20, and 7-30 for detailed doctrine.

b. Armor. The mobility, firepower, shock effect and staying power of armored and air and armored cavalry units are employed in strike operations against enemy forces and base areas. Air cavalry firepower and mobility are used in reconnaissance and security operations, providing a quick strike capability against moving enemy forces. See FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-36, FM 17-37, and FM 17-95 for detailed doctrine.

c. Field Artillery. The Field Artillery can be called upon to dispose units to provide for greater area coverage in the defense of populated areas and forward operational bases. Its target acquisition functions must receive added emphasis and its firepower must be applied in a manner that will reduce the possibility of unnecessary harm and destruction in populated areas. FM 6-140 provide detailed doctrine for Field Artillery Branch.

d. Air Defense Artillery. The air defense artillery provides air defense for key installations. Its automatic weapons units can be deployed in the ground fire role in base defense and convoy security. It can also provide fire support for ground maneuver elements. See FM 44-1, FM 44-2, and FM 44-3 for detailed doctrine.

C-3. Combat Support Arms
In stability operations, the roles of the Corps of Engineers, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps, and Signal Corps differ significantly from their primary function of providing assistance to US Army combat areas. They may be called upon...
to provide assistance to host country forces engaged in tactical operations or to participate in other internal defense and internal development activities.

a. Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers is capable of performing a great many stability operations missions and tasks in addition to providing combat support assistance. Units can be called on to construct military facilities. They are especially well suited to provide advice and assistance for a wide range of military civic action projects and to participate in major internal development projects and to participate in major internal development projects such as road construction or water resources. See FM 5-1, FM 5-135b, FM 5-136, and FM 5-142 for detailed doctrine.

b. Military Intelligence. Military intelligence units participate in a wide range of intelligence and counterintelligence activities with host country intelligence agencies. Early identification and neutralization of the insurgent leadership are emphasized. A military intelligence effort should precede support assistance by other US Army units to provide an intelligence base for their operations. See FM 30-17, FM 30-17A, FM 30-31, and FM 30-31A for detailed guidance.

c. Military Police Corps. Military police participate in joint and combined stability operations. They provide assistance to host country military police, paramilitary police, or civilian police agencies. Populace and resources control and police intelligence are emphasized. FM 19-50 contains detailed guidance.

d. Signal Corps. Signal Corps units can provide communications support to host country military forces and to US advisory organizations. They can also assist in establishing civil communications facilities as part of the internal development effort. See FM 11-23, FM 11-50, and FM 11-57 for detailed doctrine.

C-4. Combat Service Support Arms

The Services provide combat service support and administration in stability operations. Their assigned functions and tasks are adapted to the operational environment. The requirement for security is greatly emphasized and the requirement for mobility and communications is increased significantly. The Corps of Engineers, Military Police Corps, and the Signal Corps have been covered under their combat support role in the preceding paragraph. See FM 100-10 for combat service support doctrine.

a. Adjutant General's Corps. The Adjutant General's Corps role in stability operations is essentially the same as in other types of conflict. Adjustments must be made to provide services for units and small detachments in many locations. See FM 12-2 for doctrine.

b. Chaplains. Chaplains support stability operations by providing understanding of the customs and the people in the host country. They provide liaison and become involved in civil-military relations programs with host country religious groups. They may have to travel frequently to perform religious services for small groups in remote locations. See FM 16-5 for detailed guidance.

c. Chemical Corps. The Chemical Corps provides support in the defense against chemical and biological weapons. They also support nonlethal chemical, flame, and herbicide operations. See FM 3-1, FM 3-2, FM 3-10, FM 3-50, and TC 3-16 for guidance.

d. Finance Corps. The Finance Corps functions in stability operations include measures to reduce the disruption of the host country economy by US Army payroll funds. See FM 14-3 for guidance.

e. Judge Advocate General's Corps. Judge Advocate General's Corps personnel become greatly involved in host country laws and procedures in stability operations. Their legal services are required in a great many matters relating to the US military relationships with the host country. Claims services must be emphasized in the stability operations environment. See FM 27-10 and AR 27-20 for guidance.

f. Army Medical Department. Medical support in stability operations requires increased emphasis on air evacuation of casualties. It is provided to host country military forces. Medical assistance to the civilian population is provided through military civic action projects and internal development public health programs. See FM 8-10, FM 8-15, and FM 8-55 for guidance.

g. Ordnance Corps. Ordnance units can provide ammunition, weapons, and fire control equipment maintenance, and ground mobility materiel maintenance support for host country military forces. See FM 9-6, FM 29-20, and FM 29-24 for guidance.
h. Quartermaster Corps. Quartermaster units can provide logistical support and services for host country military forces. See FM 29-3, FM 29-10, FM 54-1, FM 54-2, and 54-3 for guidance.

i. Transportation Corps. The Transportation Corps can provide mobility to host country military forces. Transportation units have an excellent capability to support military civic action projects and internal development programs. A great many manuals in the 55-series provide guidance for transportation support. See FM 55-15, FM 55-80, and FM 55-40 for general guidance on air and motor vehicle operations.

j. Women's Army Corps. Women's Army Corps personnel can provide advisory assistance to host country women's service organizations. AR 600-3 contains information on the mission and composition of the Women's Army Corps.

C-5. Functional Areas

This paragraph summarizes doctrine on selected functional areas as they apply to stability operations and references sources of detailed information. The functional areas included here require emphasis in stability operations but are not considered under branch functions.

a. Advisory Assistance. US advisory assistance, furnished under various circumstances and operational conditions, varies from provisions of US representatives at the national level only to advisors with armed forces units and political subdivisions. See AR 1-75, AR 550-50, AR 795-204 and FM 31-73 for guidance on advisory assistance.

b. Aviation. Aviation units provide reconnaissance, surveillance, mobility, and firepower in stability operations. Units are called on to support indigenous forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations. See FM 1-100 for general guidance.

c. Base Defense. The threat in the stability operations environment requires preparation of base defense measures against surprise attack. Measures must include defense against infiltrators, armed assault, and attack by long range weapons. See FM 31-31 (Test) for guidance on base defense.

d. Border Security/Anti-Infiltration. Border operations are conducted to deny the insurgent external support and base areas across international boundaries. Mobile forces and sensors are used in conjunction with barriers when it is infeasible to seal border areas. See FM 31-55 for guidance.

e. Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs personnel and units are engaged in a wide variety of activities in stability operations. Civil-military relations, military civic action, populace and resources control, and care of refugees are important areas for civil affairs. Officers trained in a military assistance officer program fill key positions and have staff responsibility for civil affairs operations. See FM 41-10 and FM 101-5 for guidance.

f. Population and Resources Control. Population and resources control measures are necessary to provide security for the population and to deny resources to the insurgent. Host country police normally are responsible for enforcing these measures. Military and paramilitary forces can support police operations. See FM 19-50 and FM 41-10 for guidance.

g. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP are an important component of a broad range of political, economic, social, and military activities in internal defense and internal development. PSYOP personnel and units support all aspects of nation-building programs. Military PSYOP provide the commander with methods he can use to accomplish his mission. All military operations should be evaluated in terms of their impact on national PSYOP objectives to identify PSYOP tasks that will contribute to mission accomplishment. FM 33-5 and FM 33-5 provide guidance for psychological operations.

h. Riverine Operations. Riverine operations are necessary in operational environments where there are water lines of communication. A major consideration is the type of watercraft necessary to provide adequate mobility. Aviation can be used extensively in conjunction with watercraft. See FM 31-76 for guidance on riverine operations.

i. Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation (STANO) locates and identifies enemy activity. They also improve firepower, mobility, and command and control effectiveness when visibility is poor. See FM 31-100 for guidance.

j. Tactical Operations. The principal function of tactical operations is the destruction of enemy forces and base areas. Guidance for tactical operations is found in branch field manuals of each of the combat arms and combat support arms. Additional guidance is found in FM 31-16.
C–6. Special Functional Units

This paragraph summarizes doctrine on special functional units as they apply to stability operations and references sources of detailed information.

a. Army Security Agency. The United States Army Security Agency (USASA) provides support for signal intelligence, jamming, and deception operations and for advice and assistance in signal security practices and electronic counter-countermeasures. Stringent security measures are part of these operations. AR 10–122, FM 32–5 and FM 32–10 provide guidance for USASA operations.

b. Special Forces. The organization, mission, capabilities, and methods of operations of Special Forces are ideally suited for stability operations. To some extent, most of the US Army's stability operations are found in the Special Forces group and related units in the Special Action Force. These units are especially well suited to deploy MTT and operational elements to provide advisory assistance and support to indigenous forces. See 31–20, and FM 31–21 for additional guidance.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

BRUCE PALMER, JR.
General, U. S. Army
Acting Chief of Staff

Official:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12–11 requirements for US Army Counterinsurgency Forces.
b. The scope of civil affairs operations will vary with the type of local government, status of forces agreements, degree of authority accorded, and influence of the economic, social, and political background of the country and people. The major civil affairs actions are—

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
(2) Support of government functions.
(3) Community relations.
(4) Civic action.
(5) Population and resources control.
(6) Civil defense.

c. The overall objective of civil affairs operations is to organize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. The operations are directed at eliminating or reducing political, economic, and sociological problems.

d. All military units have a capability to conduct civil affairs, particularly military civic action. Since this capability may be great or minimal, each military organization must assess its capabilities and be prepared to make civil affairs contributions part of its overall mission. Some combat support and combat service support units, such as engineer and medical, may be assigned a primary role of military civic action and be organized specifically for this mission.

(1) Civil affairs organizations can be established within major commands. Units as small as battalion TF may be assigned civil affairs elements to assist in carrying out plans for which the civil-military operations staff officer has responsibility.

(2) Civil affairs liaison should be established between all US and host country military forces and government agencies. This can be accomplished through a system specifically designed for this purpose or through the civil affairs staff elements of existing US units or advisory teams.

e. Civil affairs operations range from the informal, day-to-day, community relations activities of individuals to the planned and organized operations of units. Civil affairs operations should be based on good relationships with the population. Those conducted to compensate for lack of troop discipline, discourtesy, or dishonesty and dealings with the people will attain minimal results. On the other hand, where sound rapport has been established between US/host country forces and the population, properly administered civil affairs operations can be expected to contribute materially to the attainment of internal defense and internal development objectives.

(1) Planning for civil affairs operations is comparable to other planning for internal defense and internal development. Policies and objectives must be defined clearly to provide adequate guidelines for persons responsible for developing overall internal defense and internal development plans. Civil affairs planning must consider political and military aspects and provide for possible future modifications. Planning for civil affairs should consider the following—

(a) Military civic action operations to be conducted by host country military forces with US support. Figure 8–1 shows a military civic action worksheet.

(b) US/host country civil affairs mobile training team requirements and resources.

(c) Civil affairs personnel and units required to support US and host country agencies at subnational levels.

(d) Civil affairs training program requirements for US/host country and allied forces.

(e) The host country civil affairs requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country where needed.

(2) Civil affairs responsibilities assigned to a tactical commander may include functions beyond his capability and will require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or units. (See FM 41–10 for details about civil affairs organization and capabilities.)

(3) Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgency. During phase I, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socioeconomic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, a significant allocation of military resources may be devoted to civic action projects providing both long-range and short-range benefits. An example is the training of conscripts in skills with both military and civilian application so that these personnel can make useful contributions to their communities after release from military service. Remote areas, inhabited by ethnic and other minority groups susceptible to subversion, should be given civic action priority. During phases II and III, military civic action will be concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects should produce noticeable improvements in a short time. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immuniza-
** Proposed Course of Action **

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** Feasibility **

- Does it conform to local customs?
- Are all necessary skills available?
- Are labor, materials, and equipment available?
- Can it be supported by current programmed funds?

** Justification **

- Does it support overall internal defense and internal development plans and programs?
- Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort?
- Will it avoid serious impairment of primary military mission?
- Does it avoid duplication with efforts of other agencies?

* Close association with civil affairs functional teams

** Other functional areas as required

Figure 8-1. Type military civic action worksheet.
tion programs, and simple irrigation projects. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on defense programs may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to sick and wounded civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter for displaced persons.

8-5. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Both host country government forces and insurgent forces need the support of the people to accomplish their programs. This leads to a major struggle between the government and the insurgent for the people's support. PSYOP are an integral part of all internal defense and internal development activities and are tailored to meet specific requirements of each area and operation. Military and nonmilitary actions must be prejudged in terms of potential psychological impact. This often requires that short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed to preserve long-range psychological objectives. FM 33-1, FM 33-5, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20 contain further guidance on PSYOP.

a. PSYOP are designed to support the achievement of national objectives and are directed toward specific target groups. Target group selection and determination is made based upon the US Information Service Country Program Plan Memorandum (CPPM) as approved by the Embassy Mission Council and the USIA. PSYOP objectives for the main target groups are—

(1) Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. National programs designed to win insurgents over to the government's side are needed.

(2) Civilian population. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the host country government and its internal defense and internal development programs.

(3) Host country and allied stability operations forces. Essentially the same as for civilians, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces.

(4) Neutral Elements. To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside of the host country; and, by revealing its subversive activities, bring international pressure to bear on the external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency.

(5) External hostile powers. To convince the external hostile power supporting the insurgents that its cause will fail.

b. The national PSYOP program, containing national objectives, guidance, and desired approaches, is prepared and coordinated by the NIDCC. Military organizations and civilian agencies at all levels develop PSYOP within the parameters established by the national PSYOP plan. The plan is interpreted at the various military and political levels in terms of local requirements, and is coordinated through appropriate area coordination centers. US and host country PSYOP efforts are mutually supporting and promote the attainment of population support for the host country government rather than for the US. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all psychological activities are executed vigorously within clearly established channels, and PSYOP planners develop a number of appropriate themes that can be disseminated by available means. These themes, using words familiar to the target audiences, should be clear, easily understood, and repeated frequently.

c. Units are organized and trained to emphasize psychological activities at all levels.

(1) National Level. Both military and civilian PSYOP organizations exist at national level. They are responsible for—

(a) Planning the national PSYOP program.

(b) Organizing, training, and allocating host country PSYOP units and resources.

(c) Conducting strategic PSYOP.

(d) Developing criteria of program effectiveness.

(e) Monitoring all types of propaganda.

(2) Subnational and local levels. The subnational area coordination center translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for subordinate area coordination centers, military commanders, and civilian agencies. The local center provides direction to paramilitary forces, military forces, civilian agencies, and PSYOP teams. Since paramilitary organizations normally do not have organic PSYOP teams, PSYOP support is provided by civilian or armed forces organizations.

(3) Military. Civil-military operations staff elements and PSYOP military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national programs and directives developed by the NIDCC. They frequently are supported by military PSYOP units whose operations range from national strategic PSYOP to local tactical PSYOP and consolidation PSYOP. PSYOP units are
tailored to meet mission requirements. They should have and be able to use radio, loudspeaker, printing, audio-visual, and other photographic equipment.

d. Operations range from strategic PSYOP at the national level to consolidation and tactical PSYOP at subnational and local levels. At the national level, operations exploit the broad aspects of internal defense and internal development programs. They are general in scope, and deal primarily with national policy and programs. Tactical and consolidation PSYOP are responsive to local intelligence and address more specific target audiences. In nations with large minority groups, PSYOP employ appropriate languages and dialects. Military PSYOP and civilian information services planning must be closely coordinated and supervised at all levels to insure effectiveness and credibility.

(1) Command responsibility. Military forces are representatives of the government, and in many cases a major factor in the formation of attitudes and behavior toward the government. For this reason, commanders must constantly be aware of the psychological effect of operations conducted in their areas of responsibility. Every military operation has some psychological impact on the population, and the success of an operation often may depend on the commander's awareness of both the military and political situation.

(2) Basic considerations. The armed forces of many host countries will not be organized or trained to conduct PSYOP effectively. When this is the case, US personnel may be required to assist in PSYOP training for host country military and paramilitary forces.

(3) Planning. The basic requisites for an effective PSYOP plan includes—

(a) An intimate knowledge of the background and history of the host country and its population, and the insurgent's organization and motivation.

(b) A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political opponents.

(c) An assurance that PSYOP plans support national objectives.

(d) A knowledge of all means of communication available to carry out PSYOP.

(e) The ability to classify the population by audience type so that themes can be tailored to influence specific groups.

(f) The availability of continuous, timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence.

(4) Supported campaigns. PSYOP themes must be tailored to support the type of national campaign being conducted.

(a) PSYOP themes in support of the consolidation campaign should stress the degree of security that is afforded the population and the benefits that have and can be gained with popular support.

(b) PSYOP themes supporting the strike campaign should explain the purpose of the operation and stress efforts being made to provide for the safety of the civilian population. PSYOP themes directed against the insurgent force should explain and stress the futility of fighting, family ties, and the host country's amnesty programs. The decision to employ PSYOP before the actual conduct of military operations is weighed carefully against compromising surprise and security.

(c) PSYOP themes supporting remote area campaigns are tailored to maintain the morale of remote area forces and to solicit the support of the population.

8–6. Intelligence Operations.

The direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of a nation susceptible to insurgency are essential to successful internal defense and internal development operations. Military intelligence actions, in coordination with other US and host country government agencies, must be started as early as possible during an expected or actual insurgency. Of particular importance are intelligence activities devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and establishing a data base in preparation for whatever roles the military is required to play in defeating the insurgent movement. See FM 19-50, FM 30-16, FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A for detailed guidance on internal defense and internal development intelligence operations.

a. Intelligence operations must support overall internal defense and internal development planning and operations by providing general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and the insurgent forces. In broad terms, intelligence objectives are to—

(1) Determine the Indicators of impending insurgency.

(2) Obtain information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population.
(5) Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

b. Insurgents employ a full range of measures to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. Before and during phase I, subversion is used extensively to lay the groundwork for the more advanced stages of insurgency. This subversion is designed to alienate the population from the government and win the support of the people for the insurgency movement. During phase II, guerilla warfare erodes the strength and morale of government forces while, concurrently, insurgent strength and population support are increased. During phase III, when sufficient military strength and population support have been gained, insurgents initiate a war of movement to defeat the government forces in decisive combat. Subversion precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire process, just as guerilla warfare, once introduced, continues to support the war of movement.

c. Prior to or as early as possible in Phase I, civil and military intelligence operations should attempt to establish evidence of subversion so that the movement can be attacked and destroyed. This involves operations against the political infrastructure which consists of the hard core cellular party apparatus, its revolutionary committees, party youth organizations, farmers associations, and workers and women's organizations. Also considered part of the insurgency are those ostensibly legitimate civilian organizations which are insurgent-penetrated and controlled, popular front organizations, and covert local militia (guerrilla forces). Counterintelligence operations include formulating and conducting security training programs and carrying out security measures necessary to protect US/host country information, personnel, facilities, and material against insurgent intelligence operations. These intelligence and counterintelligence measures continue throughout all phases if the insurgency escalates.

d. A unified, centralized intelligence system is essential to the effective conduct of internal defense and internal development operations.

(1) At national level, the intelligence system must—

(a) Operate freely throughout the nation.
(b) Maintain a central registry of intelligence information.
(c) Maintain a centralized system of source control.

(d) Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

(e) Direct, collect, process, and disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information for the benefit of all authorized users.

(f) Prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates.

(2) Below national level, coordination points should be established at each level of government where the US and host country intelligence efforts can be combined.

c. A thorough understanding of the internal and external forces supporting or subverting a society is essential to effective intelligence operations. Basic intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from strategic intelligence reports and studies augmented by available intelligence information of the area. These are the basis for the estimate of the situation and subsequent plans. These essential elements for processing this information are contained in FM 30-5 and FM 30-81.

(1) Planning for production of intelligence is a continuous process at all levels, since the attack of specific targets can be initiated by any level. There are three significant areas involving intelligence collection planning. The first is strategic intelligence, which may expose actual or potential insurgency problems and usually is derived from political, economic and sociocultural developments. The second encompasses exploiting the weakness inherent in the logistical support system of the insurgent armed elements. The establishment of facilities to provide services and support involves people and a great deal of activity to gather, store, and distribute supplies. Targeting on this system during planning can lead to early detection and identification of significant elements of the insurgent network, such as members of the political infrastructure. The third area encompasses such functions as combat intelligence and security.

(2) Initial intelligence functions that must be accomplished to support current activities and prepare for possible future operations are—

(a) Preparation of detailed studies regarding the terrain, weather, and population groups (including ethnic, religious, and tribal minorities).

(b) Preparation of strength and vulnerability analysis of the US, allied, host country, and the insurgent.

(c) Preparation, production, and distribu-
tion of nationwide terrain maps and aerial photographs.

(3) The objective of intelligence production is to provide accurate and timely intelligence that satisfies military and civil requirements at each operational echelon. There must be a steady flow of intelligence information to and from higher, lower, and adjacent US/host country and allied headquarters and agencies. This necessitates constant interdepartmental coordination between military and civil police and intelligence organizations. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must provide for several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities is a matter requiring careful analysis.

(4) Timely dissemination of intelligence is perhaps the most critical aspect of the intelligence process. The frequent need for immediate reaction on essential information dictates the establishment of systems for quick processing and transmission of this data to military and police units at all levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should be established when facilities and resources permit.

(5) Military security applies to military information, personnel, facilities, and materiel. Classified information must be protected by all available means and entrusted only to appropriately cleared personnel who require such knowledge. Even after individuals have been investigated and cleared, commanders and intelligence personnel must continue to exercise close supervision and observation over the activities and behavior of individuals who, for one reason or another, may be subjected to insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure.

8-7. Populace and Resources Control Operations

Populace and resources control operations are police-type operations directed primarily against the insurgent apparatus by controlling the populace and resources of a nation. When military units are employed they should be in support of the police forces whenever possible and not replace them. If regular units are used, special training must be considered. This section provides general guidance on various populace and resources control activities and establishes a basis upon which to develop tactics and techniques.

a. A populace and resources control program is designed to complement and support the other internal defense and internal development programs. Its objectives are to—

(1) Mobilize the material and human resources on behalf of the government.

(2) Detect and neutralize the insurgent organizations and activities.

(3) Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.

(4) Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the insurgent.

b. Police, intelligence, and other security agencies normally are established to maintain law and order in a peacetime environment. Their organizations are tailored to protect the populace from common criminals and lawbreakers and enforce the established system of control necessary to maintain reasonable order. In an active insurgency, peacetime security organizations have far more to contend with. They are confronted with a well-organized insurgent machine that is adept at the disruption of a society through subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Coping with this problem often is beyond their capabilities and expansion and reinforcement by military and paramilitary forces is required.

(1) During phase I, insurgents seek to gain control of the populace through a combination of persuasion, terror, and civil disturbance. In many cases, the government of a developing nation learns too late that it actually does not control its more remote areas. For this reason, insurgent activities and influence in these areas can expand rapidly, creating political vacuums that insurgents attempt to fill. Security forces should be deployed to remote areas early to establish or reestablish a climate of law and order in which government administration and other development activities can be conducted. During phase I, urban populace and resources control operations also should be expanded to deny insurgents material support from these areas. This is the phase where general surveillance measures and block ward systems are initiated. Intelligence is intensified to continue seeking out and eliminating the infrastructure.

(2) In phases II and III, populace and resources control operations must be expanded to cope with increased societal disruption and the deterioration of law and order. Inadequate early control measures probably account for this in-
crease in conflict. When the need for populace and resources control is first established, a complete and adequate program should be applied immediately. It is best to avoid piecemeal operations that escalate slowly. A carefully designed psychological operations program should be implemented simultaneously with the controls so that the two programs complement each other in attaining their objectives.

c. Indigenous police organizations, if adequately staffed, trained, and equipped, are ideally suited to supervise the implementation of populace and resources programs because they provide an organized control force that is—

(1) Knowledgeable about local conditions.
(2) Accepted by the populace as a government organization with enforcement prerogatives.
(3) Capable of security operations.
(4) Able to gain access to and use recorded factual data.
(5) Capable of controlling transportation arteries.

d. Immediate augmentation of the existing police force should be obtained from other organizations whose duties call for contact with the populace. This may include revenue agents, conservation officials, and customs officials. Paramilitary forces are another source of manpower for these programs. The regular military is normally used as a backup force and as a source of personnel for administrative, intelligence, and psychological operations and other specialties. National agencies determine those populace and resources control requirements within their respective areas of responsibility and present them to the NIDCC. The NIDCC, assisted by these national agencies, prepares the overall national plan to insure coordination of railway and border security operations and the protection of lines of communications. Subnational area coordination centers prepare their populace and resources control plans according to instructions and guidance from the NIDCC.

e. Essential populace and resources control measures that conform to legal codes must be established and enforced—justly and firmly. In addition to laws prescribing possession of certain items, requiring permits for possession or movement of others, and regulating populace movements, clear laws must specify authorized methods of contraband. Since populace and resources control operations lend themselves readily to graft and extortion, they must be closely supervised, but in a way that does not alienate the people. Emphasis should be placed on both in-country controls and control of imports. Populace and resources control operations include, but are not limited to—

(1) Employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage.
(2) Controlling movement of both personnel and materiel.
(3) Establishing checkpoints and roadblocks.
(4) Establishing curfews and blackouts.
(5) Screening and documenting the population.
(6) Conducting cordon and search operations.
(7) Establishing rationing and price controls.
(8) Controlling refugees and displaced persons.
(9) Protecting resource storage areas from insurgent attack.

See FM 19-50 and FM 31-73 for a detailed discussion of the activities involved in these operations.

f. Law enforcement is primarily a police operation to protect the persons and property of the populace against criminal acts, including those perpetrated by insurgent elements. Enforcement laws must be enacted temporarily authorizing government security and defense forces extraordinary powers. Procedural protections, such as search and seizure laws, often must be diminished to permit effective law enforcement measures against organized, mobile insurgents. PSYOP measures should inform the people of such changes in the law and turn their resentment against the insurgents. Emphasis should be placed on the strictly temporary nature of such legislation and its basic purpose, which is to protect the bulk of the populace against the insurgents. Additional legal machinery, such as courts of limited jurisdiction to try particular classes of offenses, may be required to process the increased flow of prosecutions. In any case, early attention must be given to the capability of the court system to process cases quickly and fairly. Long periods of pretrial confinement tend to turn even the most loyal citizens against the government. Military forces will assist civil law enforcement agencies in accordance with host country legal procedures.

g. Border Operations. Armed forces may be charged with the overall mission of border secu-
curity or they may reinforce other security forces charted with this mission.

(1) Objectives. The objective of border operations is to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. Tasks which may be performed in attaining this objective include—

(a) Security of populated areas.
(b) Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
(c) Operation of authorized points of entry.
(d) Refugee control.
(e) Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions.
(f) Psychological operations.
(g) Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.
(h) Attacks against insurgent forces.
(i) Destruction of insurgent base areas.
(j) Barrier and denial operations.

(2) Concept. In phase I insurgency, border operations are normally a function of police, customs and other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly in remote areas. In phases II and III, increased external support for the insurgency may require combat operations in border areas. Close coordination and cooperation are required between the armed forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved in border operations.

(a) The physical sealing of the border may be infeasible since such an operation could require the commitment of more government forces and materiel than overall national requirements permit.

(b) Since it may not be possible to place forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites, priorities must be established. Natural barriers must be used wherever possible. The use of patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas will increase the effectiveness of natural barriers. Herbicides, if approved for the area of operation, may be used to enhance the visibility in vegetated areas.

(c) Barrier and denial operations are established after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, and the location of the infiltrators' probable targets and methods of operation.

(3) Organization. National border forces may be composed of border police and guards. These forces may include paramilitary forces and the armed forces of regional commands with supporting responsibilities or direct responsibility for portions of the international border.

(a) Command and control. Border operations are planned, directed, and supervised from the national level. Authority to conduct these operations may be delegated to subnational and regional area commanders.

(b) Structuring. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in the area to which they are assigned. They should contain sufficient combat support and combat service support units to permit independent operations for an extended period.

(4) Operations. Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones can be established if needed. Either of these operations could require the relocation of many persons and must be carefully planned. Although armed forces may assist, overall responsibility for planning and carrying out a relocation program is normally the responsibility of civil authorities.

(a) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is conducted to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and, probably, the location of base areas and sanctuaries. Aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground reconnaissance patrols are employed to insure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, static observation posts along the shoreline, and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft.

(b) Military operations. Border units establish operational bases at brigade, battalion, and company levels, to direct operations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire support augmentation usually are required.

(c) Restricted zone. A carefully selected area, varied in width, and contiguous to the border is declared a restricted zone. Persons living in this zone are relocated. Announcements state that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone after completion of the relocation program will be considered infiltrators or insurgents.
(d) Friendly population buffer. Civilians living within the area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. Persons of doubtful loyalty are relocated. This concept offers a good potential for establishing informant nets and using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.

h. Disarming the Population. Disarmament may be required to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of insurgents or other dissident groups that might threaten the legally constituted government by attempting to assume power.

(1) Objective. The objective of disarmament operations is to account for and control all weapons.

(2) Concept. Disarming the populace during hostilities is a necessary step in the restoration of internal security.

(a) Law-abiding persons who voluntarily surrender their arms are guaranteed protection by the forces charged with restoring and maintaining internal security. The effectiveness of disarmament measures depends to a large extent on the attitude and size of the population, the incidence of crime and lawlessness, the size of the territory, and the number of troops available. If these measures are carried out properly, a large portion of the populace can be disarmed voluntarily. Others must be disarmed by the military or police, using measures designed to locate and confiscate arms possessed clandestinely. Although complete disarmament will be difficult, the enforcement of restrictive ordnances will reduce those in possession of arms to insurgent forces, outlaws, and a few inhabitants attempting to evade the law. The success of disarmament operations, particularly those based on voluntary surrender of arms, is usually in direct proportion to the degree of security afforded by the government.

(b) Upon cessation of hostilities, one of the first actions is the disarming of insurgent forces and friendly paramilitary and self-defense forces. For maximum effectiveness, this action must be timely and have the full cooperation of government leaders and the populace. To secure the cooperation of the people, the government must win their confidence and insure that all parties concerned will obey the disarmament laws. This necessitates providing security for persons who have depended on their weapons for self-protection.

(3) Organization. Civil police authorities, armed forces, intelligence agencies, and other security forces can be employed to collect firearms, ammunition, and explosives.

(a) Civil authorities. The use of local civil officials rather than armed forces has many advantages in disarming the populace. It is the most normal means and the one least likely to antagonize the people or create friction. It gives peaceful, law-abiding citizens the opportunity to turn in their weapons without being subjected to what might be considered the indignity of personally surrendering to military authorities. The national police can assist in the collection and confiscation of firearms by using their knowledge of the nation and their familiarity with the habits of the people. If it appears that local civil officials have exhausted their ability to collect arms government authorities can issue orders that, after a given date, the armed forces and intelligence agencies will collect arms and gather evidence for the conviction of persons violating disarmament laws.

(b) Intelligence agencies. Disarmament action by intelligence agencies generally involves comparatively large quantities of illegal firearms and ammunition held by individuals and groups who are intentionally trying to avoid detection. Special operations to trace imports of arms and ammunition may continue for years after an insurgency ends. Government permits and correspondence, customs files, and other records assist in identifying the receipt and disposition of these munitions.

(4) Operations. Before orders or decrees to disarm the populace are issued, an estimate of the situation should be made to analyze all features of the undertaking. However, before actual disarmament, the government must enact and publish laws forbidding the general public to possess firearms, ammunition, weapons, and explosives except by specific authority. These laws and related administrative regulations must be given wide publicity.

i. Protection of Voters and Polls. During active insurgency, the use of police forces and military personnel to protect voters, polls, and electoral records is sometimes necessary to insure a valid election. These forces are employed to prevent violence to persons conducting the election, destruction or seizure of ballots and electoral records, and to protect the populace moving to and from polling stations. To avoid charges of undue influence, host country and foreign armed forces
at or near the polls should be limited to those needed to insure security.

8–8. Tactical Operations

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all those employed in internal defense. They are the principal operations in strike campaigns and they support both consolidation and remote area campaigns. This section provides guidance on tactical operations, objectives, organization, and doctrine. For further guidance, see FM 31–16 and FM 100–5.

a. The objective of tactical operations is to destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Tactical operations are coordinated with civilian agencies through the area coordination center.

b. Tactical operations rarely are conducted as independent sporadic actions aimed solely at the elimination of insurgent tactical forces and bases. They usually are part of a larger campaign involving the employment of other internal defense and internal development forces in the attainment of broader objectives.

c. Armed and paramilitary forces are organized primarily to conduct tactical operations; however, civil security forces, such as the police, also may be assigned certain limited combat missions. Tactical operations must be coordinated by area coordination centers, which integrate intelligence, psychological, and other activities required to support tactical operations. Organizational emphasis for tactical operations is placed on firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate combat support and combat service support elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration should be given to providing the tactical force with capabilities for dealing with the civilian population by attaching or assigning civil affairs and PSYOP personnel or units.

d. Tactical operations against guerrillas are primarily offensive operations, characterized by mobility, to find, fix, destroy, or capture the guerrillas. They generally include such offensive tactics as raids, reconnaissance in force, and coordinated attacks, plus harassing, elimination, and reaction-type operations and are categorized as consolidation or strike campaigns.

(1) The consolidation campaign is conducted to restore host country governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the normal economic, political, and social activities of the population can be pursued and improved.

(a) Concepts. The consolidation campaign may be conducted in all phases of insurgency, although it is more assured of success if mounted during phase I or II. The concepts described below are based on a relatively major insurgent threat, including the presence of insurgent tactical forces, and must be adjusted to lesser threat situations.

(b) Operations. Consolidation operations have four overlapping stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion. The sequence of events in establishing government-controlled areas involves the accomplishment of many concurrent actions based on local considerations.

1. The preparation stage is a planning, training, organizing, and equipping period during which all participating civil and military forces prepare for operations. During the preparation stage, planning for efficient mobilization of available personnel and material is envisaged. Successful planning and execution require continuous coordination among the participating military and civilian agencies at all levels. Policies relating to national objectives are published for execution at subnational levels. These policies become the basis upon which plans are developed for the accomplishment of the assigned consolidation mission.

2. The offensive stage entails moving the civil/military TF into the operational area; destroying, dispersing, and clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; locating and destroying elements of the insurgent's supporting base area system; identifying and neutralizing the members of the insurgent's political infrastructure; and installing an efficient host country governmental administration.

3. The development stage is characterized by the cessation of the territorial expansion initiated in the offensive stage. The objective of the development stage is to establish the TF firmly in its respective area to permit the introduction and establishment of internal defense and internal development organizations and operations. The primary task is to defend population centers and other vital areas and installations against insurgent tactical, propaganda, and intelligence operations. The defense of the area against insurgent attack permits civilian and other government agencies to conduct internal development and security programs. It may involve training local self-defense and paramilitary forces.
to assume the defense and security missions of the
regular armed forces. Tactical operations are con-
ducted to destroy insurgents and supporting base
areas that pose a threat to consolidation efforts.
Offensive tactical operations are required to elimi-
nate insurgent tactical forces and their support-
ing base areas; however, defense of population
centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, and
LOC is also important and necessary. PSYOP are
continued to gain and hold population support.

4. Completion stage operations are con-
ducted to permit the population to pursue normal
activities and to attain economic, social, and politi-
cal objectives within a peaceful environment.
Establishing such an environment is necessarily a
gradual process. It entails acceleration of internal
development programs and is marked by the capa-
bility of the local authorities to provide defense
against insurgent attack. Concentrated efforts are
made to return control of the local government to
the people at a rate commensurate with their abil-
ity to conduct normal government functions.

(a) US Assistance. US and allied economic
and military assistance may include funds, mate-
rial, and advisors. US advisory efforts, including
those of the US Department of State, USAID, and
USIS, may extend from national down to local
level. US advisors with internal development
agencies and host country armed, paramilitary,
police, and other forces assist in planning and
conducting the various aspects of the campaign.
In concept, the advisory effort at each level is
organized like the US Country Team at national
level. In this respect, it is desirable that one US
representative be charged with coordination re-
sponsibility for the programs of all US advisors
at his level. FM 31-73 contains further details on
advisory assistance.

(2) The strike campaign consists of a series
of combat operations targeted against insurgent
tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent
controlled zones. Other internal defense activities
may support tactical forces during an actual
strike. FM 31-16 contains additional guidance on
strike operations.

(a) Concepts. Strike operations are con-
ducted in remote or contested areas by armed
forces and are coordinated through appropriate
area coordination centers. Since the main objec-
tive of a strike is destruction of insurgent forces
and base areas, strike forces normally do not re-
main in the area of operations after mission
accomplishment.

(b) Organization. Forces assigned strike
missions should be relieved of area responsibil-
ities well in advance of the operations. Prefera-
bly, such forces are controlled at the national or
regional level and are assigned no permanent area
responsibilities. Strike forces are organized as
self-sufficient TF capable of operating for given
periods of time in areas remote from home bases.
The strike force normally is assigned a specific
area in which to conduct operations. In addition
to combat forces, TF may contain intelligence,
police, paramilitary and civilian elements.

(c) Operations. Once insurgent forces or
bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to
destroy or neutralize them. The insurgent's ability
to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises
in attempting to avoid capture may require thorough
reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects
must be managed firmly but treated fairly and with respect to avoid turning innocent
suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small
units conducting reconnaissance operations detect
relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveil-
ance should be maintained until strike forces can
be deployed to destroy them. Due to the necessity
to react quickly to intelligence about insurgent
forces, a thorough analysis of all factors affecting
the situation is rare in strike operations. When an
area is suspected of harboring insurgent forces or
installations, reconnaissance and surveillance
should be conducted and followed by an attack or
raid.

1. Strike operations include movement
to contact, reconnaissance in force, encirclement,
pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack.
Combat support and combat service support of
strike operations are planned to insure responsi-
viveness to the operations plan. Operations out-
side of the support range of fixed combat service
support installations may require that these ele-
ments be attached or assigned directly from field
depots and tactical bases. The coordination of
these activities is accomplished between the TF
commander and the appropriate headquarters.

2. Reconnaissance to locate and test ins-
urgent dispositions and strengths or to develop
additional intelligence can be followed immedi-
ately by a coordinated attack or raid. Reconnais-
sance should emphasize thorough reconnoitering
of an area and is characterized by continuous,
decentralized, small unit operations.

3. Since strikes are conducted in insecure
areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal
after mission accomplishment.

(d) US assistance. The US may assist the
host country strike campaign through military ad-

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visory programs and commitment of combat, combat support, or combat service support units.

a. Mobile Warfare. Tactics outlined above must be modified greatly to meet a mobile warfare threat. Mobile warfare cannot be considered as positional or guerrilla warfare. Although it seeks the same objectives, larger reserves are maintained, the size of operating units is increased, artillery fires are massed, and larger security and defense detachments are required. In mobile warfare, utilization of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are used to seize and hold the initiative, not terrain. Therefore, commanders must not expect envelopments, penetrations, or turning movements to produce the same effects on insurgent forces as they would if terrain were the key consideration. Caches, safe areas, and population support can be dispersed so strategically that insurgent tactical units are not dependent on a single critical logistical base that they must protect, and they can maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver.

f. Continuous pressure against insurgent forces must be maintained and commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider them destroyed merely because opposition has ceased. If contact with the insurgent force is lost, aggressive pursuit efforts must be made to reestablish contact and destroy the force. Long periods of inactivity permit insurgent forces to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations.

g. The purpose of offensive operations is the destruction or neutralization of insurgent tactical forces and base areas and can be classified as remote area or urban operations.

1. Remote area operations.

(a) General. The remote area operation is undertaken in contested areas to establish host country strongholds. These areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area operations may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population in which insurgent forces have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistical facilities, or command posts. The remote area may be in interior regions of the country or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally are conducted by specially trained and selected units. The material in this section should be used in conjunction with FM 30-31, FM 31-16, FM 31-20, FM 31-21, FM 31-73, and FM 41-10.

(b) Concepts. The remote area operation is conducted to establish islands of strength in insurgent-infested areas. These islands of strength serve as host country operational bases to support strike and consolidation campaigns. Success of a given remote area operation is more assured if a segment of the local population is willing to support the program. Operations can best be undertaken in areas under insurgent control if the remote area force contains indigenous personnel who can influence the local population. Initially, additional combat and combat support forces may be required to assist the remote area force in establishing secure operational bases. A remote area operation may be conducted in areas nearly devoid of any people when the primary objective is the interdiction of infiltration routes across international borders. Maximum use should be made of sensors and other STANO equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes. Firepower and airmobile forces, operating from secure bases must be immediately available to attack located and identified targets.

(c) Organization. The remote area tactical force should be composed mainly of personnel indigenous to the operational area. The type of tactical force employed (armed or paramilitary) will depend on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political climate, and the logistical support available. The size and composition of the force depend on the degree of area control exercised by the insurgents and the potential for recruiting and developing an adequate local force. When the tactical force is recruited from local inhabitants, local leaders must be used even though their military capabilities may be limited. By using local leaders, assisted as necessary by advisors, more positive control is assured and training, indoctrination, and incorporation of the local force into the host country governmental structure is enhanced.

(d) Operations. Remote area operations, generally of long duration, encompass the functional areas of advisory assistance and tactical, civil affairs, PSYOP, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations.

(e) US assistance. Remote area operations are particularly suited for US Army Special Forces units, which are trained, equipped, and organized to conduct them. US MAP and USAID economic assistance programs can support the remote area campaign by furnishing advisory assistance, weapons, communications equipment, clothing, and other military materiel.

2. Urban operations.

(a) General. Operations in an urban envi-
1. The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal weapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when the application of force is necessary. The limitations placed on the use of firepower to minimize the loss of life and destruction of property require detailed planning, coordination, and control.

2. Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. The government must emphasize intelligence and police operations to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and terrorist activities.

3. Urban areas are critical and require a continuing internal defense and internal development effort whether they are part of a specific campaign or not. Military forces participate in internal defense and internal development operations and planning in both urban and rural areas during all phases of insurgency when other national security/law enforcement agencies are not available or adequate.

(b) Concepts. Internal defense and internal development operations in urban areas may be part of a consolidation campaign as outlined in paragraphs 7-3 through 7-9. The urban environment requires a special emphasis because of the large numbers of people and other resources there. Physical characteristics also influence operations. Armed forces are used to reinforce police, paramilitary, and other law enforcement agencies, to establish security, or restore and maintain order. Armed forces also participate in internal defense and internal development operations, which are coordinated in the urban area coordination center. Should the conflict require tactical operations to defeat armed insurgent forces in urban areas, the military forces may be required to perform many governmental functions and provide temporary care for refugees.

(c) Operations.

1. General. Careful planning and coordination are required for operations in urban areas, particularly for operations involving the application of force. Military forces must be able to communicate with police and other agencies involved in the operations. Detailed information must be available on area characteristics and critical installations.

2. Intelligence. Intelligence data on an area of operations must include detailed information about the urban centers. Information needed in all aspects of internal defense and internal development operations is drawn from this data base. Military forces, which may be responsible for tactical operations in an urban area, prepare plans and get ready to implement them should the need arise. Information needed for planning must be gathered if it is not available in the area intelligence files. This information includes detailed city plans, subterranean construction, location and description of all critical installations, and organization and facilities of internal security forces. Information on all internal defense and internal development activities and the insurgent situation must be kept current for operational plans.

3. Populace and resources control. Populace and resources control activities in urban areas are extremely critical to the overall effort to defeat a subversive insurgency before the insurgent can develop a significant capability for armed conflict. Police intelligence operations contribute to populace and resources control and may link criminal acts such as robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion to insurgent psychological or money-gathering activities. Careful surveillance must be maintained over government and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Intelligence operations are targeted on production, collection, and storage activities which may form part of the insurgent's logistical base area system. Psychological operations must support restrictive measures such as rationing, curfews, searches, and setting up checkpoints and restricted areas when these measures are necessary. Military support may be required for populace and resources control operations if insurgent activity surpasses the capability of other resources for countering it.

4. Tactical operations. Tactical operations may be required to defeat an insurgent attack inside or outside an urban area. It is likely that any insurgent attempt to seize and hold the area will involve both methods. When the police and other internal defense forces can cope with the internal attack, military forces can best participate by establishing security around the urban
area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement or support. When military forces are required to reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area, operations are closely controlled and coordinated. Military forces should be withdrawn as soon as local forces can handle the situation.

5. Psychological operations. Psychological operations in urban areas take on added significance because of the mass media available and the size and composition of the target audience. The government must solicit and win the support of the major opinion makers in the area. These include news editors; radio and television personalities; educators; and leaders of organizations whose support of the nation-building effort is essential to success.

(a) A major activity of PSYOP in urban areas is the support of populace and resources control programs.

(b) All PSYOP resources available in the urban area should be considered in planning support of tactical operations. If there is an insurgent attack, PSYOP resources can be used to prevent panic, direct the movement of civilians, and control and care for refugees.

6. Civil Affairs. Civil affairs operations in urban areas require added emphasis because of the large civilian population. Military participation in populace and resources control programs and military support of civil defense are major activities. Planning and preparation to assist civilians if insurgents launch an armed attack are essential. This assistance may include:

(a) Rescue, evacuation, and hospitalization.

(b) Recovery and disposition of the dead.

(c) Handling of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.

(d) Emergency provision of prepared food and facilities for food preparation.

(e) Issue of food, water, essential supplies, and materials.

(f) Restoration of utilities.

(g) Emergency clearance of debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail systems, and shelters.

(h) Damage assessment.

(d) US Assistance. US Army advisors and other US personnel will be present in urban areas—a few in the smaller urban areas, more in the major cities. Planning for internal defense and internal development activities must include measures to safeguard US personnel. Those whose duties do not include advising and assisting host country forces must prepare for self-defense and installation security duties in emergencies. US personnel and resources are considered in planning and coordinating operations for defense of urban areas.

h. Defensive operations normally are conducted as coordinated military and civilian programs. Defensive operations are employed to—

(1) Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action.

(2) Deny the insurgent entry into an area.

(3) Destroy or trap the insurgent force.

(4) Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.

(5) Economize on forces in one area so that decisive force can be applied elsewhere.

i. Retrograde Operations. Retrograde operations are conducted to preserve the integrity of a force and for one or more of the following reasons—

(1) To harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and inflict punishment on the enemy.

(2) To draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.

(3) To permit the use of the force elsewhere.

(4) To avoid combat under undesirable conditions.

(5) To gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.

(6) To disengage from combat.

(7) To relocate forces in relation to other friendly forces.

(8) To shorten lines of communication.

j. Bases of operation are localities from which operations are projected and supported. They may be permanent or semipermanent installations containing essential command, control, communications, combat support, and combat service support elements. FM 31-16 and FM 31-31 contain details of base establishment and defense.

k. Combat support and combat service support units are integral to all tactical operations. These units provide the operational assistance, combat service support or administration support to the tactical forces. They are organic to, attached to, or are placed in support of the tactical forces. Sound combat support and combat service support planning is required for all tactical operations. Appendix C contains a précis on each of the combat support and combat service support branches.
HIGHLIGHTS

The ROLES of stability operations include:
- civil affairs
- psychological operations
- intelligence
- populace and resources control
- tactical operations

US Military stability operations emphasizes:
- TRAINING host country military
- ADVISING host country military
- ASSISTING host country military

US ADVICE and ASSISTANCE is provided through:
- DOD
- USAID
- USIA

Within DOD, the principal agency charged with providing ADVICE and ASSISTANCE is the:
- MAAG
- Mission
- Military Assistance Command

The civil-military operations (CMO) officer is the PRINCIPLE STAFF OFFICER for CIVIL AFFAIRS and PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. CIVIL AFFAIRS includes any activity of command concerned with relationships between the:
- MILITARY FORCES
- CIVIL AUTHORITIES
- PEOPLE IN THE AREA

Figure 8-2. Highlights.
CIVIL AFFAIRS liaison should be established between all
- US military forces
- host country military forces
- government agencies

The US and host country PSYOP efforts
- are MUTUALLY SUPPORTING
- promote the attainment of POPULATION SUPPORT for the
  host government

TARGET GROUPS for PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
- insurgents
- civilian population
- host country and allied forces
- neutral elements
- external hostile powers.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL programs are
- designed to complement
- designed to support
  the other IDAD programs.

TACTICAL operations
- DESTROY insurgent tactical forces
- ESTABLISH a secure environment for IDAD programs.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS should be
- UNIFIED and CENTRALIZED
- INITIATED early
- CONTINUOUS

Figure 8-2.—Continued.
CHAPTER 9
US ARMY FORCES

Section 1. US FORCES

9-1. General
This section provides guidance on the employment of US forces participating in stability operations. Additional background information and guidance may be found in—


c. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces.


9-2. Legal Aspects

a. General. Commanders, senior advisors, and their subordinates should be familiar with the legal basis for their presence in a foreign country for the purpose of assisting its government and armed forces. At the very least, the basic rules of international law and domestic law that authorize these operations and the major restrictions imposed upon them by law should be understood. Three bodies of law are relevant to the conduct of stability operations: international law, consisting of customs, international agreements, and general principles recognized by civilized nations; United States Law; and the law of the host country. Collectively, these laws regulate the status and activities of the armed forces engaged in such operations.

b. International Law. The rules of international law applicable to US, allied, and host country forces can be found in the writings of experts, international agreements, and judicial decisions. International agreements, are the most important source. These prescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the US Armed Forces stationed abroad and of the governments of the host and allied countries and their respective armed forces. They also regulate, to some extent, the relationship between the opposing parties in internal conflicts. In this realm, the international agreements that regulate the status or activities of US forces offer the best guidance. These agreements are of three general types: MAAG agreements, mission agreements, and status of force agreements. The US Army is committed to conduct internal security operations in accordance with the applicable provisions of international law of war, including those of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and others set forth in FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, and DA Pam 27–1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare.

c. United States Law. United States law— as expressed in statutes, executive orders, Department of Defense directives and instructions, Army regulations, directives and regulations issued by the unified command and by the Army component command—is applicable to US forces in the host country. Areas such as military justice, the control of public funds, the procurement of supplies, and the disposition of property continue to be regulated by US domestic law. Copies of publications containing applicable US laws are on file at the headquarters of the military assistance organization in the host country.

d. Host Country Law. The law of the host country establishes the rules under which stability operations are to be conducted. This body of law emanates from the various levels of government and from the agencies functioning at each echelon. The foreign laws governing the employment of labor, currency, foreign exchange transactions, the separation of powers, local purchases, judicial procedures, control of the populace and resources,
and emergency legislation in general are of major importance and must be understood by all members of advisory groups. Detailed guidance in this area normally is obtainable through the local US consul, a legal advisor or local attorney employed by the US Diplomatic Mission, or a judge advocate if one is assigned.

e. Claims Administrations. Activities of US Army personnel serving in allied countries will occasionally result in personal injuries, deaths, and property losses to other individuals and entities. Also, US Armed Forces personnel may be injured and their property or that of the US Government may be damaged under such circumstances. Claims against the United States are settled under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act of 1964, and Non-Scope of Employment Claims Act, or under the Military Claims Act, which are implemented by AR 27-20. Claims in favor of the United States are settled under the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 and AR 27-37, or the Medical Care Receiving Act and AR 27-38.

9-3. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

a. The US Army provides personnel, units, and administrative and logistical support to MAAG as directed by the Department of Defense and the unified command. The term MAAG applies only to the military assistance advisory group; however, the functions ascribed to the MAAG may be performed by a joint US military group (JUSMG), a joint US military advisory group (JUSMAG), a military assistance command, or a military attaché. The MAAG is the military agency present to advise the host country and to administer the Security Assistance Program for the US Department of Defense.

b. The commander of the unified command provides guidance governing the organization and operation of the MAAG in a document referred to as "terms of reference." The "terms of reference" are developed by the Unified Commander, approved by JCS and DOD and covers missions, command relationships, organization, responsibilities and functions of the MAAG.

c. The overall mission of the MAAG is to administer US military security assistance planning in the host country, and to support military security assistance requirements of the country team. MAAG organizations vary according to existing host country requirements, but will consist primarily of one or a combination of these listed below—

(1) Logistical MAAG. Logistical MAAG missions are—

(a) Programming MAP equipment, supplies, services, and training.

(b) Advising and monitoring the use, maintenance, and operation of equipment and supplies.

(2) Training MAAG. Training MAAG missions are—

(a) Advising and assisting in the development of training programs.

(b) Advising and assisting host country field units.

(c) Instructing host country staff personnel in organization, operations, and training.

(d) Administering the Military Assistance Training Program.

(3) Military assistance commands. When US military security assistance includes sizeable US combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, a military assistance command may be established. This command will normally assume the functions of the MAAG.

d. The MAAG is a joint service group normally under the military command of the commander of a unified command. The Chief, MAAG, normally is the senior military representative on the US country team and represents the Secretary of Defense. He is responsible for providing advice and assistance on the military aspects of the US internal defense and internal development effort and insuring that they are coordinated with other US departmental representatives in the host country.

e. A MAAG is divided into Army, Navy, and Air Force sections, each of which is responsible for the accomplishment of its service portion of MAAG activities. In a large MAAG, there may be joint, general, and special staffs. If the MAAG has an operational or training mission, it will have advisors who advise host country counterparts on operational and training matters. A type of MAAG organization is depicted in figure 9-1.

(1) Command. The Chief, MAAG, supervises the military assistance aspects of the Security Assistance Program in the host country and advises and assists host country armed forces in tactical, technical, organizational, administrative, logistical, and training matters. He also exercises operational command over all US armed services personnel of the MAAG.
Figure 9-1. Type of MAAG organization.
(2) Advisory chain. The MAAG advisory chain should parallel the organization of host country forces to facilitate the advisory effort. It is not a part of the host country chain of command.

(3) Personnel status. The status of MAAG personnel varies according to the provisions of applicable mutual defense assistance agreements and status of forces agreements.

f. The Chief, MAAG, is guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance and Sales Manual, applicable DOD directives and instructions, and such other directives as may be issued periodically by appropriate authority.

(1) Tactical operations. Complex military problems can arise in nations in which an insurgency is developing, and the MAAG must be prepared to provide solutions. For example, it may be necessary to reorient the military effort from external defense to internal defense against insurgency. Insurgency requires the development of extensive counterintelligence and security systems. When MAAG does not have personnel qualified to assist the host country in these fields, it must be augmented by the necessary specialists.

(2) Support operations. US combat service support and combat support units may be introduced to assist host country military forces in coping with an insurgency. MAAG normally will assume operational control over these US forces.

(3) Advisory operations. Advising is construed to mean counseling, training, assisting, and influencing one's counterpart in performing his duties more effectively. Although advisors are not primarily instructors in the formal sense of the word, they must realize that teaching is one aspect of their duties. Advising does not include command or the authority to issue orders to host country personnel. See FM 31–73 for duties and responsibilities of unit advisors.

Section II. US ARMY FORCES

9–4. Tiers of Forces

In addition to the members of the MAAG in a host country, the US Army has three tiers of forces upon which the commanders of unified commands or the chiefs of MAAGs can draw to support stability operations. In most cases, the US elements described below will be employed to advise and train host country forces; although elements can also provide combat support and assistance to these forces.

a. The first tier consists of a US Army Special Action Force (SAF) organized by the Army to support commanders of unified commands. This force may be strategically located and can provide skilled readily available mobile training teams to assist a MAAG in its training requirements. Paragraph 9–6 contains more information on Special Action Forces.

b. The second tier is drawn from overseas and US based general purpose TOE units that are designated as brigade size backup forces. These may include forces consisting of infantry, armor, armored cavalry, artillery, engineer, psychological operations, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, and essential support units, designated as backup forces for the SAF. Area oriented, partially language qualified, and fully trained in stability operations, these backup forces provide mobile training teams and operational units of sizes and capabilities consistent with mission requirements. Generally, their elements are committed when requested by the MAAG and the capabilities of the SAF have been exceeded by the requirements of the country concerned. Paragraph 9–8 provides more information on backup forces.

c. The third tier consists of CONUS-based general purpose forces. In consonance with contingency planning, area oriented brigade-sized backup forces that are trained for stability operations are designated for employment in specific areas where needed to assist in preventing or defeating insurgency. The third tier satisfies requirements that exceed those of the first and second tiers.

9–5. Mobile Training Teams (MTT)

Mobile training teams are provided to fill training requirements beyond the capability of the in-country military assistance organization. These teams can be used when the circumstances require immediate training for which assistance has not been programmed, or for which assistance could not be feasibly provided through US service school training of host country instructors. AR
The mission of MTTs is to provide the host country an immediate operational capability and a capability for self-training in a particular skill. MTTs are used when an immediate training requirement exists. Host country instructors assist in training units and prepare to assume full responsibility for the type of training being conducted. MTTs are programmed on a short-term basis and are not replaced by similar teams upon their departure.

c. The MTT will be tailored to provide it with the specific capabilities required for its mission. Under most circumstances, the MTT will operate directly under the operational control of a MAAG. A specific command and control element can be included in the MTT when required by the mission.

d. The MTT mission is a normal function of a Special Action Force when it is assigned to a unified command. When the requirements for a specific MTT are beyond the SAF’s capabilities, an MTT would be constituted from general purpose forces within the unified command.

9–6. Special Action Forces

The Special Action Force (SAF) is a composite organization of units organized under a Special Forces group headquarters. Each SAF is structured to meet the requirements of the command to which it is assigned. The organizational structure is based on the concept of employing mobile training teams and small detachments to fulfill specific mission requests in a specified time period. The flexibility of organization and the wide range of skills available in the SAF provide the Army with forces to temporarily expand the capability of a MAAG whose mission is the provision of military assistance for stability operations. Personnel requiring detailed information about the SAF elements should consult the appropriate TOE.

a. The SAF is a specially trained, area oriented, partially language qualified, ready force which would be available to the commander of a unified command for the support of stability operations. The force normally consists of a Special Forces group as the nucleus and is usually augmented with civil affairs, psychological operations, engineer, medical, intelligence, military police and Army Security Agency units. Elements of the SAF can provide, on a small scale, many of the capabilities of the Army as a whole for advice and assistance in stability operations (fig. 9–2).

b. The mission of the SAF is to assist MAAG’s by providing training, operational advice, and assistance to host country forces engaged in stability operations.

c. As early as possible, the SAF commander should be asked to assist in preparing for the employment of the SAF or elements of the force. Visits to the host country by SAF representatives before deployment will be beneficial and should be requested whenever possible. The MAAG requesting the unified command to employ elements of the SAF must consider the anticipated mission, organization, concept of operation, control, and logistical support, including personal services available in the host country, to adequately prepare the force and insure its success upon arrival.

Figure 9–2. Type of special action force (SAF).
in-country. In most cases, the resources available to the MAAG will be adequate to support small missions such as MTT requirements for medical, dental, legal, postal, finance, exchange, commissary, and other services normally available through US military or civilian agencies. Transportation and maintenance requirements must be considered. Host country transportation resources may be available and adequate. The use of in-country resources is preferable to establishing additional US support activities for short term operations.

d. Within the SAF, the organization of the Special Forces group provides a command and control system that facilitates administration, logistical support, and operational control of deployed elements. In addition to the group headquarters staff, the SF battalions and companies have unit staffs that can be deployed to serve as command and control elements. When augmented, these unit staffs can provide limited administrative and logistical support for deployed operational detachments.

9-7. Elements of the SAF

The commander and the staff of the Special Forces group functions as the commander and the staff of the SAF. The Special Forces group staff includes an S5 civil-military operations (CMO) officer, who has staff responsibility for civil affairs and psychological operations. Special staff elements include a surgeon, staff judge advocate, communication-electronics officer, engineer, comptroller, and a chaplain. Military police and other organizations also provide special staff officers when assigned or attached to the SAF.

a. Airborne Special Forces Group.

(1) The airborne Special Forces group is organized under TOE 31-101. Major elements are a headquarters and headquarters company, three Special Forces battalions, and one support battalion. The Special Forces battalions consist of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and three Special Forces companies, each company composed of a company headquarters, and five operational detachments. The support battalion has a headquarters and service company and a signal company. The headquarters and service company consists of headquarters sections, an aviation platoon, medical platoon, administrative service platoon, and a logistics and maintenance platoon. The signal company has a company headquarters, a

b. Civil Affairs Company. The civil affairs company of the SAF provides professional and technical assistance and advice to US and indigenous officials, agencies and military forces to strengthen the host country's social, economic, and political posture.

(1) The civil affairs company has appropriate headquarters and staff elements and functional teams drawn from TOE 41-500. The teams are selected to meet the requirements of the area of operations. A civil affairs company can be organized with a company headquarters, one to ten platoon headquarters, and the required number of language and functional teams to operate in the four broad functional categories of government,
Figure 9–3. Airborne special forces group.
economics, public facilities, and special functions. The following skills are represented in this type of company: economics, agriculture, public health and sanitation, public welfare, public education, labor, public works and utilities, public communications, public transportation, and civil information. The company can also include personnel with veterinary, public administration, and specialized medical skills.

(2) The civil affairs company can—
(a) Provide mobile training teams, individuals, or functional teams to support the activities of other SAF elements or MAAGs.
(b) Provide assistance in preparing area studies and surveys.
(c) Analyze conditions to determine the basic causes of insurgency and recommend action to reduce or eliminate these causes.

(3) The civil affairs company supports the missions of the SAF. Its platoons, functional teams, and individuals can be attached to other elements of the SAF, MAAGs, or other US headquarters to support indigenous military forces in stability operations programs. See FM 41-10 for doctrine for civil affairs operations.

c. Psychological Operations Company. The psychological operations company provides training, advice, and operational assistance to other SAF elements and indigenous military forces to strengthen the host country's psychological operations programs. It can also assist a MAAG or US civil agency in the host country.

(1) A company includes functional teams drawn from TOE 33–500 and consists of elements for command and control, operations, liaison, and a number of control and operational teams suitable for mobile training team employment. Specific organizations and numbers of teams are determined by the requirement of the area of operations. Mobile training teams and operational teams are tailored to meet the specific SAF mission requirements.

(2) The psychological operations company can provide mobile training teams, individuals or operational teams to support the PSYOPS activities of other SAF elements or MAAGs. It also provides advice, assistance, and support to indigenous forces engaged in psychological operations programs.

(3) The psychological operations company supports SAF missions. Its platoons, operational teams, and individuals can be attached to SAF elements, MAAGs, or other US headquarters. Support to indigenous military forces engaged in stability operations may include training programs, assistance in producing leaflets, operating printing plants and radio stations, and assistance to mobile sound and film teams. See FM 33–1 for doctrine.

d. Medical Detachment. The medical detachment of the SAF is a composite unit which provides mobile medical advisory support teams to advise, train and assist indigenous military forces of a host country with medical programs. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of military civic action projects. The detachment provides unit-level medical support for US personnel deployed with other elements of the SAF.

(1) The detachment may contain appropriate functional teams drawn from TOE 8–600 and 8–620. One type of detachment has three medical control teams (team AL) consisting of one Medical Corps officer each; and up to 27 medical advisory support teams (team OL) with a chief medical NCO, a medical operations and training NCO, a preventive medicine NCO, and an X-ray specialist. The senior officer of the medical control teams commands the provisional detachment when the SAF is deployed as an entity or in garrison before deployment.

(2) The detachment can—
(a) Provide mobile medical advisory teams to advise, train and assist indigenous military, paramilitary forces and local civilians in medical treatment and preventive medicine procedures in stability operations.
(b) Establish health service clinics to provide limited medical treatment to indigenous civilians as part of the coordinated civil affairs program and train civilian or paramilitary personnel to maintain and staff these clinics.
(c) Provide unit level medical support to other deployed elements of the SAF.

(3) The medical detachment, with its flexible organization, supports the missions of the SAF. Its command and control teams, medical advisory support teams, or individuals, can be attached to SAF and MAAG elements, or to other US headquarters. Support to indigenous military forces, paramilitary forces, or civilian medical programs consists of training, advice, assistance, and sup-

9–8
port of military civic action projects. See FM 8–10 for medical support doctrine.

e. Engineer Detachment. The engineer detachment provides staff planning, technical advice and assistance, coordination, and administrative support for engineer aspects of SAF missions. It provides advice, assistance and operational support to indigenous forces and other SAF elements.

(1) The detachment consists of engineer civic action teams drawn from TOE 5–600. Team KA, Engineer Civic Action Headquarters; Teams KB, Engineer Civic Action Control; and Teams KC, Engineer Civic Action Advisory, are assigned on the basis of area of operations requirements. Mobile training teams, and command, control, and support elements are tailored to meet the specific requirements of SAF missions.

(2) The engineer detachment can—

(a) Provide engineer staff personnel for the SAF and for deployed command and control elements of the SAF.

(b) Provide advice and assistance to indigenous forces engaged in military civic action programs.

(c) Provide advice and assistance to indigenous military engineer units.

(d) Provide technical advice and assistance on construction, maintenance, and operation of public works and utilities.

(3) The engineer detachment supports the missions of the SAF. Its headquarters, control, and advisory teams, or individual personnel are attached to SAF or MAAG elements, or to other US headquarters. Elements of the detachment can be deployed to provide advice and assistance to indigenous military engineer units or to other indigenous forces engaged in military civic action projects. Advice and assistance also can be provided to civilian agencies engaged in internal development programs. FM 5–1 contains doctrine for engineer organizations.

f. Military Police Detachment. The military police detachment provides planning, coordination, advisory assistance, and operational support for military police aspects of SAF missions. It also assists a MAAG in coordinating activities with US civilian agency public safety advisors or host country police.

(1) The military police detachment consists of teams drawn from TOE 19–500. A detachment could consist of a detachment headquarters team and one or more of each of the following types of functional advisory teams—riot control, area control, police public relations, physical security, and general investigation/police subjects. Mobile training teams and operational teams are tailored to meet the specific requirements of SAF missions.

(2) The military police detachment can—

(a) Provide staff planning, advice, and assistance to the SAF and to deployed elements of the SAF.

(b) Provide training, advice, and assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary police units.

(c) Provide coordination and liaison for police intelligence and operations.

(8) The military police detachment supports the missions of the SAF. Its teams or individual personnel are attached to SAF, or MAAG elements, or to other US headquarters. Elements of the detachment can be deployed to provide staff planning, coordination, training, advice, and assistance to indigenous military police units or other indigenous forces engaged in police type operations. Military police provide advice and assistance to host country forces with emphasis on police intelligence and populace and resources control operations. FM 19–50 contains doctrine for military police in stability operations.

g. Military Intelligence Detachment. The military intelligence detachment provides planning, coordination, advisory assistance, and operational support for intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of SAF missions. It also supports the psychological operations and civil affairs aspects of SAF missions. The detachment can assist a MAAG in coordinating activities with host country intelligence agencies.

(1) The military intelligence detachment consists of a headquarters and teams drawn from TOE 30–600. In addition to its headquarters, a detachment could include order of battle, collection, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and interrogation teams. Mobile training teams and operational teams are tailored to meet the specific requirements of the SAF missions and the operational requirements.

(2) The military intelligence detachment can—

(a) Provide staff planning, advice, and as-
9-8. Brigade-Size Backup Forces

In stability operations, the infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and airborne brigades can be employed as operational elements in conjunction with the SAF. With appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, they can be employed as an independent or semi-independent force or in an advisory and training role. When designated as a backup force, these brigades should become area oriented and partially language qualified. A type brigade organization for combat is shown in figure 9-4. Within each brigade organization there should be specially trained units which can provide MTTs as a provisional SAF backup force. The organizational structure of mobile training teams in this provisional backup force, when augmented, closely parallels that of the SAF.

9-9. Command and Control Elements

a. General. Brigade-size backup forces can be committed to an operational area when the capabilities of the SAF or MAAG have been exceeded. Under certain circumstances, the entire provisional brigade backup force can be committed and operated as a SAF task force. In most cases, however, the brigade will provide units and mobile training teams for attachment to the MAAG or to the SAF elements operating within a host country.

b. Communications. Communications support for the brigade backup force employed in an advisory and training role can be provided by either a signal support company (TOE 11-117) or by a combination of cellular teams from TOE 11-500.

9-10. Backup Force Training Elements

a. Infantry Mobile Training Teams.

(1) The infantry MTT can provide training, advice, and assistance in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons for host country small units up through battalion level.
LEGEND

- - - - ATTACHED UNITS

- - - - - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS ARE ATTACHED, AS REQUIRED.
and assistance emphasizes counterguerrilla tactical operations. The team may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment if appropriate. The team can provide limited advice and assistance on military civic actions.

(2) The combat support company can organize weapons training teams similar to rifle company teams. The composition of the teams will depend on the type of weapons available in the host country.

b. Field Artillery Mobile Training Teams. The field artillery MTTs are constituted from the 105mm direct support field artillery battalion. These teams can provide training, advice, and operational assistance in the tactics and techniques of employment of light artillery, and limited advice on military civic action. They are under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment when training indigenous forces.

c. Armored Cavalry Mobile Training Teams. The armored cavalry MTT provides training, advice, and operational assistance to indigenous troop-size units in the tactics and techniques of the employment of tanks and scout vehicles against guerrillas. Training and advice emphasize employment in both offensive and security roles. The team provides limited advice on military civic action projects.

d. Aviation Component. The brigade's aviation component provides the backup force with necessary airlift to support its activities when deployed as an entity. The organization should include sufficient specialized personnel and equipment to sustain an organizational aircraft maintenance capability. The primary mission of the aviation component is to provide administrative and logistical support to the widely dispersed mobile training teams. On a limited basis, personnel, aircraft, and equipment are employed to train indigenous units and to support psychological operations and military civic action projects.

e. Engineer Component. The engineer company, division engineer battalion, provides the capabilities required to support a SAF or provisional brigade backup force. It can provide training and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The company also can provide combat support to indigenous military and paramilitary forces and to indigenous forces engaged in stability operations. It can also support military civic action programs involving a construction effort. When supporting the country's civic action program, its efforts will be closely coordinated with the USAID mission.

f. Military Police Component. A military police element from the MP company will be tailored to meet the requirements of the provisional backup force. With some special training, personnel of this element can be organized into MTTs to train and advise indigenous military, paramilitary police, and police organizations in riot control, area control, police public relations including civic action, police intelligence, physical security, general investigation.

g. Medical Component. A medical element from the division medical battalion will be tailored to meet the requirements of the provisional backup force. With some special training, this element can be organized into MTTs to provide training and advice to indigenous military forces and assist with military civic action programs.

h. Signal Component. The brigade's communications resources (organic signal platoon plus TOE 11-117 or TOE 11-500 augmentation) can provide, on a limited basis, training advice, operational assistance, and operational support to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. Additional signal advisory support can be provided by cellular teams from TOE 11-500 (teams UA through UF).

9-11. Augmentation Units

Overseas unified commands and USCONARC provide military intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operations elements as required. The CG, USASA, provides additional resources to augment the capabilities of the provisional brigade-size backup force. Skills required in these units are not available in the infantry or airborne division. Such units should have capabilities corresponding to like units in the SAF.
HIGHLIGHTS

Department of Defense provides military assistance guidance in the Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM).

Three bodies of LAWS are relevant to the conduct of stability operations

- International Law
- United States Law
- Law of the Host Country

The MAAG is a JOINT SERVICE GROUP normally under the operational command of a unified commander who represents the Secretary of Defense.

The US Army has THREE TIERS OF FORCES from which the commander of a unified command can request additional support.

- The Special Action Force (SAF)
- Overseas general purpose TOE units (backup forces)
- CONUS based forces

MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS fill training requirements BEYOND the CAPABILITY of the MAAG.

The SAF is

- specially trained
- area oriented
- partially language qualified
- available to a unified command for the support of stability operations.

BACK-UP FORCES are

- area oriented
- designed to back up a particular SAF

Selected CONUS based forces are

- area oriented
- partially language qualified to provide backup for the SAF and/or MAAG.

*Figure 9-5. Highlights.*