SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE
Special Forces Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine

FM 31-21, 14 February 1969, is changed as follows:

1. A star indicates new or changed material.

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<th>Insert pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1-1 and 1-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-3 through 4-8</td>
<td>4-3 through 4-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-3 and 5-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-3 through 7-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-1 and 11-2</td>
<td>11-1 and 11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1 and A-2</td>
<td>A-1 through A-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary-1 through Glossary-4</td>
<td>Glossary-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Index-1 and Index-2</td>
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3. File this change sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W. C. Westmoreland,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

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Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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# SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS—U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

## PART ONE. INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER 1. GENERAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1—1, 1—3</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces</td>
<td>1—4, 1—5</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Special Forces Mission and Capabilities</td>
<td>1—6, 1—7</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PART TWO. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

### CHAPTER 3. FUNDAMENTALS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General</td>
<td>3—1—3—6</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Indigenous Resistance Forces</td>
<td>3—7—3—9</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Guerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>3—10, 3—11</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Evasion and Escape</td>
<td>3—12—3—15</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Subversion</td>
<td>3—16—3—19</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 4. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Organizational Concepts</td>
<td>4—1, 4—2</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The External Organization</td>
<td>4—3—4—9</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Internal Organization</td>
<td>4—10—4—13</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Communications</td>
<td>4—14, 4—15</td>
<td>4-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 5. EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>5—1, 5—2</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Employment with Indigenous Resistance Forces</td>
<td>5—3—5—5</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Unilateral Employment</td>
<td>5—6—5—8</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Air Support</td>
<td>5—9—5—11</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Naval Support</td>
<td>5—12—5—16</td>
<td>5-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Special Forces Communications in Unconventional Warfare</td>
<td>5—17—5—20</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 6. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Infiltration</td>
<td>6—1—6—4</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Exfiltration</td>
<td>6—5, 6—6</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 7. ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. The Area Command</td>
<td>7—1—7—5</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Special Forces-Resistance Relations</td>
<td>7—6, 7—7</td>
<td>7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Psychological Operations in the UWOA</td>
<td>7—8—7—11</td>
<td>7-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Communications in the UWOA</td>
<td>7—12, 7—13</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Logistical Support for the UWOA</td>
<td>7—14—7—19</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This manual supersedes FM 31—21, 3 June 1965.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-10</td>
<td>Section VI. Administration in the UWOA 7-20, 7-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10</td>
<td>VII. Establishment of a Training Program 7-22—7-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>CHA P T E R 8. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>Section I. General 8-1, 8-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>II. Intelligence Production Within the UWOA 8-3—8-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>III. Counterintelligence Within the UWOA 8-6, 8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-2</td>
<td>IV. Security Within the UWOA 8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1</td>
<td>CHA P T E R 9. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF GUERRILLA FORCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>Section I. Introduction 9-1—9-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-5</td>
<td>III. Demobilization 9-11, 9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>P A R T THREE. OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>CHA P T E R 10. EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>Section I. Introduction 10-1—10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>II. Employment 10-6—10-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>III. Logistical Support 10-10—10-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>IV. Selection and Training of Personnel 10-15—10-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>CHA P T E R 11. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>Section I. Introduction 11-1, 11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>II. Missions 11-3, 11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>III. Organization 11-5, 11-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-2</td>
<td>IV. Command, Control, and Communications 11-7—11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-3</td>
<td>V. Operations 11-9—11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-3</td>
<td>VI. Logistical Support 11-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>APPENDIX A. REFERENCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glossary-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of US Army Special Forces.

b. FM 31–21, Special Forces Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine, and FM 31–21A, its classified supplement, describe the mission, capabilities, organization, methods of employment, and support of the US Army Special Forces group. They explain the relationships of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB) the Special Forces group and its support battalion, operational battalions, companies and detachments and other US elements and indigenous forces operationally engaged with Special Forces. The material contained herein is applicable to operations in general war, to include considerations for the employment of, and protection from, nuclear munitions and chemical, biological, and radiological agents; limited war; and cold war, to include stability operations.

c. FM 31–21 should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance and procedures for the conduct of unconventional and conventional warfare operations (app A). Techniques for Special Forces operations are contained in FM 31–20 and FM 31–20A. For additional information and guidance on the training and employment of units, detachments, and individuals in stability operations, see FM 31–22 and FM 31–23.

d. FM 31–21A, the classified supplement to this field manual, is keyed to the appropriate paragraph or subparagraph of this text, which is annotated as in e below.

e. See FM 31–21A.

1-2. Explanation of Terms

Terms used in this manual are in accordance with AR 310–25. Additional explanations of terms pertaining to special forces operations are contained in the glossary.

1-3. Changes

Users of this publication are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the publication. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command, Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations (Prov), Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.

Section II. THE ROLE OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

1-4. General

The role of US Army Special Forces is to contribute within their capability to the accomplishment of whatever missions and responsibilities are assigned to the US Army. Within the framework of that contribution, the US Army Special
Forces group is a multipurpose force which, by organization, flexible command arrangements, tailored logistical and fiscal procedures, and highly trained personnel, can address a variety of missions. As the repository of expertise within the Army for unconventional warfare (UW), Special Forces must be constantly prepared to assume missions of this nature during any intensity of conflict. Since the option for unconventional warfare is selective, Special Forces are able to employ these highly trained assets on other appropriate and varied missions which contribute to the accomplishment of the overall mission of the Army.

★1-5. The U.S. Army Special Forces Group

Special Forces groups are the major TOE units within the US Army Special Forces and provide command, control, administration, and support for assigned and attached units. The Special Forces group can assume strategic or tactical missions and provide flexible responses. It can undertake a variety of tasks and missions, in many modes and configurations, under circumstances and in environments not customarily envisioned for regular forces, and, most importantly, in all levels of conflict. US Army Special Forces participation in operations may be either in a primary role, or in a supporting role in conjunction with other forces or agencies. Deployment for operations may involve only selected individuals or detachments with specific capabilities, or it may require one or more Special Forces groups.

Section III. SPECIAL FORCES MISSION AND CAPABILITIES

1-6. Mission

a. The mission of the US Army Special Forces is to—

   (1) Plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations.

   (2) Plan, conduct, and support stability operations.

   (3) Plan and conduct direct action missions which are peculiar to Special Forces due to their organization, training, equipment, and psychological preparation.

b. Mission priorities are established in accordance with the planned employment.

1-7. Capabilities

Special Forces possess specific capabilities to—

a. Plan and conduct military operations which include but are not restricted to the following (fig 1-1):

   (1) Develop, organize, equip, train, and direct non-US forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

    (2) Participate in and/or support evasion and escape operations.

    (3) Conduct other unconventional warfare missions, either unilaterally or in conjunction with resistance forces.

    (4) Train, advise and assist non-US military or paramilitary forces, to include operational, logistical, and fiscal support.

b. Plan and conduct deep penetration missions to include—

   (1) Attack of critical strategic targets.

   (2) Collection of intelligence.

   (3) Conduct other unconventional warfare missions, either in conjunction with other forces or agencies.

   (4) Train, advise and assist non-US military or paramilitary forces, to include operational, logistical, and fiscal support.

    (5) Provide planning assistance and training to US or allied forces or agencies in Special Forces operational techniques.
### OPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General War</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration of an area and conduct of guerrilla warfare with indigenous forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay-behind element to work with, and provide limited support and direction to, isolated friendly military and paramilitary forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting the development, organization, equipping, and training of indigenous forces designed to operate in insurgent controlled areas (mobile guerrilla force).</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assisting in evasion and escape.</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Economy of force missions.</td>
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<td>Conduct direct unilateral operations against specific objectives.</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Supporting theater sabotage and other acts of subversion.</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Supporting US/host government stability operations with advisory detachments.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing mobile training teams.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting, advising, and directing the operations of indigenous Special Forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Preparing for a later UW or war limiting capability within the area(s) concerned.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing Special Forces staff advice and planning assistance to other US military and civilian organizations.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide combat intelligence support to US military and civilian organizations and for host countries.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of special weapons.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction of selected personnel from enemy controlled areas.</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air, sea, and mountain rescue.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of US space program.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster assistance.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide training cadre for US forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1-1. Type operations U.S. Army Special Forces.*
CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL EMPLOYMENT OF
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

2-1. General

a. US Army Special Forces units are organized under tables of organization and equipment (TOE) which provide personnel and equipment for the conduct of unconventional warfare. Sustained unconventional warfare operations require augmentation by combat support and combat service support units (para 4–7e). Employment in other roles may also necessitate augmentation (para 10–4) or modification TOE (MTOE) as discussed in AR 310–31 to meet unusual requirements.

b. For the conduct of direct action missions, elements of the Special Forces group are organized as indicated in the remarks column of the component TOE. This separate and distinct organization may be required based on the operational and contingency missions assigned.

c. US Army Special Forces consist of personnel trained in basic and specialized military skills, and organized into multipurpose units. These units provide a training, advisory, or operational capability in the functions of command, staff, operations, intelligence, weapons and tactics, communications, medical support, field engineering, logistics, and demolitions associated with UW, stability operations, and direct action missions.

2-2. Tailoring

The organization of Special Forces units and operational detachments is sufficiently flexible to permit further tailoring for a specific mission. Tailoring is accomplished by substitution or augmentation from resources available to the Special Forces group and theater assets.

Section II. UNITS

2-3. The U.S. Army Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The Airborne Special Forces group is organized under TOE 31–101. Under this TOE, the group consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, three Special Forces battalions, and one support battalion (fig 2–1).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General. The Special Forces group through its headquarters and support elements is deployed to establish an SFOB (fig 4–2) from which to deploy, command, control, and support its operational elements (para 4–7). It may provide Special Forces operational elements or personnel to joint forces or other commands in support of unconventional warfare, stability operations, or direct action missions. Special Forces groups are not normally employed as tactical maneuver units.

(2) Unconventional warfare operations. The Special Forces group is normally employed to conduct guerrilla warfare and related activities within a theater of operations under the direction of the unified commander. It may also be tasked to conduct such operations for a specified or a joint task force commander. The Special Forces group provides the appropriate commands a capability to conduct operations deep within enemy or enemy-held territory (chap 5).

(3) Stability operations. The Special Forces group may be assigned to unified and specified commands for the support of stability operations. The group may operate as a separate organization or as a major element of a Special Action Force (SAF) (chap 10).

★ (4) Direct action mission. Special Forces elements may be required to operate within hostile or denied areas without the support of indigenous forces. Direct action missions may be
required to provide the commander of the unified command with strategic intelligence or with the capability of applying US military force within denied areas. These missions may include a variety of tasks, which range from the recovery of friendly personnel from remote or hostile areas to the attack of strategic targets (chap 11).

★2–4. Headquarters and Headquarters Company

The headquarters and headquarters company (fig 2–2) is organized to provide the Airborne Special Forces group with command and control for training and employment of organic and attached units. The headquarters company provides personnel and equipment to operate and support the group headquarters.

★2–5. Group Headquarters and Staff

The group headquarters section consists of the group commander, the deputy commander, the executive officer and other unit staff officers, the special staff officers, and the sergeant major (fig 2–3). The headquarters is organized for sustained operations.

a. Group Commander.

(1) The group commander exercises command over the units assigned or attached to his group. The assigned or attached battalion commanders are his principal subordinates and his contact with them is direct.

(2) The group commander has overall responsibility for the command and control of his group in training and combat. The flexible or-
ganizational characteristics of the group demand that the commander have complete knowledge and understanding of unconventional warfare, stability operations, and direct action missions. He must make timely decisions and be capable of operating with mission-type orders which require exercise of initiative and professional judgment in execution. He has responsibility for the command, control, and planning in support of contingency missions of unified or specified commands. He may be required to command the Army component of a joint unconventional warfare force, or the US Army unconventional warfare operations in support of the theater command. In turn, he provides his subordinates with guidance for their operations and allows them freedom of action in implementing his orders. He must be alert to exploit the opportunities for decisive results which arise in the diversified activities of UW, stability operations, and direct action missions.

b. Deputy Commander.
   (1) The deputy commander performs those tasks and functions assigned by the commander. FM 101–5 contains examples of duties that may be assigned to the deputy commander.
   (2) The deputy commander must keep himself informed of operations so that he can assume command during the absence of the commander. He may assume command of the separate operational base (SOB), or advanced control base (ACB) when the mission or the distance between the operational areas of subordinate units and the SFOB requires a separate control headquarters.

c. Executive Officer. The group executive officer performs the functions and responsibilities

\[\text{Figure 2-2. Headquarters and headquarters company Airborne Special Forces group.}\]
NOTES: (1) Exercises operational control of medical platoon, TOE 31-126
(2) Exercises staff supervision of signal company, TOE 11-247

Figure 2–3. Special Forces group staff.

similar to those of a chief of staff. FM 101–5 contains examples of duties of the executive officer and chief of staff. He is responsible to the group commander for the coordination and supervision of the group staff within the authority delegated to him by the group commander. The executive officer is normally located at the group headquarters.

d. **S1 (Adjutant).** The duties of the group S1 correspond to those prescribed for the G1 in FM 101–5. He has unit staff responsibility for personnel activities and other administrative matters not assigned to other staff officers. He may, when the need arises, perform those functions related to his field of interest that normally are performed by special staff officers in the personnel and administrative field found at higher staff levels (but who are not included in the group staff) such as the Inspector General, Provost Marshal, Information Officer, and Special Services Officer. The S1 has staff responsibility for the movement, internal arrangement, organization, and operation of the headquarters and the allocation of space within the group headquarters. His principal assistant for this function is the headquarters commandant. The S1 also exercises staff supervision over those activities of the special staff that fall within his field of interest.

e. **S2 (Intelligence Officer).** The duties of the group S2 are similar to those prescribed for the G2 in FM 101–5. He has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to strategic intelligence, combat intelligence and counterintelligence. He
is responsible for the planning, collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence required in unconventional warfare, stability operations, and direct action missions. He advises the commander in the deployment of intelligence personnel required to support the organic battalions when they are conducting independent operations. He recommends signal security policy and considers the intelligence aspects of electronic warfare. The S2 also exercises staff supervision over those activities of the special staff that fall within his field of interest.

f. S3 (Operations and Training Officer).

(1) The S3 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, and combat operations of the group. His duties correspond generally to those prescribed for the G3 in FM 101-5. He supervises the operations center of the Special Forces operational base, and has staff responsibility for the overall security of the command. He exercises staff supervision over the electronic countermeasures (ECM) resources and coordinates electronic warfare support of operations. He advises the commander in the employment of area specialist personnel (fig 2-5) required to support the battalions. He exercises staff supervision over those activities of the special staff that fall within his field of interest.

(2) The assistant S3 serves as the S3 air operations officer. He is responsible to the commander for all aviation support requirements for the group. He receives, processes and coordinates all operational and logistical air support requirements based upon priorities and guidance established by the group commander.

g. S4 (Logistics Officer). The S4 is primarily a planner and an advisor to the group commander. He recommends the general location of the support center (fig 2-17), and has staff responsibility for the operations, security, and displacement of the center. The S4 maintains staff responsibility for consolidating all logistical planning and support requirements within the group. He coordinates with the support battalion commander, who is responsible for logistic support operations. He is responsible for area damage control planning (to include CBR aspects) and its integration into the theater army plan. Other duties of the S4 correspond with those of the G4 as discussed in FM 101-5.

h. S5 (Civil-Military Operations Officer). The duties of the S5 are similar to those prescribed for the G5 in FM 101-5. He has staff responsibility in all matters pertaining to the relationship of the group with the civilian population, government, economy, and institutions within the assigned area of operations. He coordinates the activities in which PSYOP techniques are used to support the achievement of command objectives. Section III, chapter 7 contains additional details pertaining to PSYOP.

i. Chaplain. The group chaplain is the senior chaplain assigned to the group headquarters and headquarters company. He coordinates activities and provides assistance and supervision necessary to insure adequate religious coverage of all organic and attached units.

j. Surgeon. The group surgeon is responsible for coordination of all medical activities. He advises the commander on all matters affecting the mental and physical health of the command. He exercises operational control of the medical platoon organic to the group (TOE 31-126) and of assigned and attached medical units and elements. The surgeon coordinates with the entire staff on medical matters in their respective areas of responsibility.

k. Communication-Electronics (C–E) Officer. The group C–E officer is the principal advisor to the group commander and staff for all communications-electronics matters. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the communications personnel in the group headquarters and headquarters company. He exercises staff supervision of the signal company, TOE 11-247, and of assigned and attached signal units and elements. The C–E officer plans and recommends employment of communications within the group area of operations. He supervises the implementation of electronic warfare plans and annexes.

l. Comptroller. The comptroller is the principal advisor to the group commander and staff in all matters pertaining to the receipt, handling, safeguarding, and disbursement of US and indigenous funds. The functions of the comptroller include responsibility for exercising technical control over all finance policies, plans, and services of the group. He coordinates the finance services for the group with other US, allied, and friendly elements within the theater or area of operations.

m. Engineer. The engineer is the principal advisor to the group commander and staff for all
engineer matters. His duties correspond generally to those prescribed for the staff engineer in FM 101-5. He exercises staff supervision of attached engineer units. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the SF engineer personnel organic to the group. He plans and supervises engineer operations pertaining to construction, maintenance, rehabilitation, and repair of facilities.

n. Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). The SJA is the principal advisor to the group commander and staff in all legal matters. The SJA provides advice on matters of US, local, and international law both customary and conventional.

★2-6. Area Specialist Team (AST)

There are three AST assigned to the Special Forces group. Each AST is organized to support a battalion and/or the organic units of a battalion during independent operations. The AST consists of an area specialist officer, an area specialist sergeant, and an intelligence analyst. The AST assists in predeployment planning, and coordinates activities of their respective battalions and/or units with the group staff within the operations center SFOB (fig 4-2). The AST is also trained to conduct civil-military operations for the deployed battalion.

★2-7. Company Headquarters

The company headquarters is composed of the personnel and equipment required for limited administration, billeting, and routine supply functions for the group headquarters and headquarters company. The company headquarters includes the company commander (who is also headquarters commandant), company executive officer, first sergeant, armorer, and company clerk. Administrative services and personnel activities, messing, supply, medical, maintenance, and aviation support are all provided by the headquarters and service company, support battalion (para 2-17).

★2-8. Special Forces Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The Special Forces battalion is organized under TOE 31-105. It consists of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and three Special Forces companies (fig 2-4).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General. The Special Forces battalion is a readily deployable unit normally oriented towards specific regions of the world. It is not normally employed as a tactical maneuver unit. This unit can perform unconventional warfare, stability operations, and direct action missions.
It normally operates under the command and control of the group headquarters. It also can be deployed to conduct independent operations, but requires appropriate augmentation from resources available to the Special Forces group. The Special Forces battalion headquarters may be deployed for command and control purposes whenever two or more of its organic companies are deployed in an operational area.

(2) Unconventional warfare operations. A Special Forces battalion headquarters is employed to command, control, and support the assigned Special Forces companies and their detachments until their deployment into operational areas. The battalion headquarters may also be employed independently to perform operations within the UWOA. To perform this mission, it requires necessary augmentation from the support battalion (fig 2–5). Other missions which may be assigned to the Special Forces battalion include: the establishment of a separate operational base (SOB) or an advanced control base (ACB) (para 4–8).

(3) Stability operations. Employment in stability operations requires great flexibility in both size and composition of each unit deployed. Size may range from a small mobile training team (MTT) to the augmented operational battalion. Skills and equipment are tailored to assure mission accomplishment. The unit is capable of advising, assisting, and training host government military and paramilitary organizations in border surveillance, target acquisition, and other missions similar to direct action missions. The Special Forces battalion, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, medical, military police, signal, engineer, and Army Security Agency elements, constitutes a source of highly specialized skills. It is responsive to the needs of the US Country Team to assist in the support of development of a host country's military, paramilitary, and irregular forces.

(4) Direct action mission. The battalion may operate either within the framework of the Special Forces group or, independently, be responsive to the commander of a unified or specified command. The battalion headquarters provides the command and control element for the assigned Special Forces units.

--- Represents attachments from support battalion.

*Figure 2–5. Type battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment organization for independent operations.*
2-9. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

The headquarters and headquarters detachment, Special Forces battalion, is organized under TOE 31-106. It consists of the battalion headquarters and the detachment headquarters (fig 2-6). The headquarters and headquarters detachment is organized to command and control assigned and attached companies and to perform an operational function. Its organization provides limited support to the assigned or attached companies. The personnel organization is indicated at figure 2-7. The headquarters is organized for sustained operations.

2-10. Battalion Headquarters and Staff

The battalion headquarters section consists of the battalion commander, the executive officer and other unit staff officers, the special staff officers and the sergeant major (fig 2-8).

a. Battalion Commander.

(1) The battalion commander exercises command over the elements assigned and attached to his battalion. The assigned company commanders are his principal subordinates, and his contact with them is direct. The battalion commander, and one of the principal commanders of the group, operates directly under the group commander and has access to him at all times.

(2) The battalion commander has overall responsibility for the command and control of his battalion in training.

b. Executive Officer. The battalion executive officer is second in command and principal assistant to the battalion commander. His primary function is direction and coordination of the unit staff. He transmits the commander's decision to staff sections and, in the name of the commander, to subordinate units when applicable. The executive officer keeps abreast of the situation and future plans and, during the commander's absence, represents him and directs action in accordance with established policy. He is prepared to assume command at any time.

(a) During the conduct of UW operations, the battalion commander is responsible for training and mission preparation of assigned companies. Upon deployment of these units into an unconventional warfare area, operational control of deployed units normally reverts to the SFOB.

(b) During stability operations, the commander is responsible for command and control of the battalion when deployed as a unit. Elements of the battalion may be individually deployed to assist the host country. In such cases, operational control of deployed elements will pass to the US military element to which they are attached.

(c) For the conduct of direct action missions, the battalion commander has overall responsibility for command and control of his battalion. Upon attachment of assigned elements to the US military command, operational control passes to the receiving command.

Figure 2-6. Headquarters and headquarters detachment Special Forces battalion airborne Special Forces group.

2-8
Figure 2-7. Headquarters and headquarters detachment Special Forces battalion.

NOTES: (1) Not required in Direct Action Mission.
(2) One (1) Additional space authorized when organized for Direct Action Mission.
c. **S1 (Adjutant).** The duties of the battalion S1 correspond to those prescribed for the group S1 (para 2-5). The S1 has unit staff responsibility for personnel activities and other administrative matters not assigned to other staff officers. He may, when the need arises, perform those functions related to his field of interest that normally are performed by special staff officers in the administrative and personnel field found at higher level staff. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S1 also trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces in all matters relating to personnel and administrative functions.

d. **S2 (Intelligence Officer).** The duties of the battalion S2 correspond to those prescribed for the group S2 (para 2-5). The battalion S2 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence. He recommends signal security policy and considers the intelligence aspects of electronic warfare. He exercises staff supervision over the activities of the special staff that fall within his field of interest. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S2 also trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces in all matters relating to intelligence, counterintelligence, and other activities within his field of interest.

e. **S3 (Operations and Training Officer).** The duties of the battalion S3 correspond to those prescribed for the group S3 (para 2-5). The battalion S3 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, and combat operations of the battalion. He exercises staff supervision over special staff matters that fall within his field of interest. He has staff responsibility for the overall security of the command. He exercises staff supervision over the electronic countermeasures (ECM) resources and coordinates electronic warfare support of operations. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S3 also trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces in all activities within his field of interest. The S3 normally exercises staff supervision over
the battalion C-E officer, and the AST when attached. During stability operations, the AST performs those functions pertaining to civil-military operations (CMO).

f. S4 (Logistics Officer). The duties of the S4 correspond to those prescribed for the group S4 (para 2–5). The battalion S4 has staff responsibility for logistics and those activities of special staff officers that fall within his area of interest. He is primarily a planner and advisor to the battalion commander. His functions relate to logistical support for the unconventional warfare area and for logistical support required in the performance of stability operations and direct action missions. He selects the general location of the battalion support center and has staff responsibility for the operation, security, and displacement of the center as required to support operations. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S4 trains, advises, and assists non-US military or para-military forces in all activities within his field of interest. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the supply personnel in the battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment and supply personnel assigned to organic companies.

g. Communication-Electronic (C-E) Staff Officer. The duties of the C-E Officer correspond to those prescribed for the group C-E Officer (para 2–5). He is the principal advisor to the battalion commander and staff in all communications-electronics matters. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the communications personnel in the companies. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations he trains, advises, and assists non-US military or para-military forces in all matters within his field of interest. The C-E officer develops plans and recommends employment of all communications for the battalion. When operating from a separate operational base, he assists in the preparation of electronic warfare plans and annexes and implements signal security plans and policies. Normally, he is under the staff supervision of the S3.

h. Engineer Officer. The duties of the battalion engineer correspond with those prescribed for the group engineer (para 2–5). He is the principal advisor to the battalion commander and staff in all engineer matters. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the engineer personnel in the battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment and assigned Special Forces companies. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations the staff engineer trains, advises, and assists non-US military or para-military forces in all matters within his field of interest.

2–11. Headquarters Section

The headquarters section is staffed and equipped to both organize and operate the battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment. For the conduct of unit training, the section is normally formed into functional elements in order to plan and conduct the operational training, and communications functions of the battalion. Routine, administrative and logistical support for internal operations is normally provided by forward support elements of the Special Forces support battalion (para 2–20–2–21).

2–12. Special Forces Company, Airborne, Special Forces Battalion

a. Organization. The Special Forces company is organized under TOE 31–107. It consists of a company headquarters and five Special Forces operational detachments (fig 2–9). This TOE provides for two distinct “type” organizations; the company headquarters as organized for the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations; and the company headquarters as organized for direct action missions (fig 2–10). Organizational variations for the accomplishment of the full range of missions assigned to Special Forces groups are accommodated by modification tables or organization and equipment to meet the mission requirements of each Special Forces unit.

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General. The Special Forces company provides operational detachments for the conduct of unconventional warfare, stability operations, and direct action missions. It provides command and control and limited support to the operational detachments. It may also be deployed independently in an operational or training role. It is not normally employed as a tactical maneuver unit.

(a) Unconventional warfare. The company headquarters provides command and control and limited support and planning to assigned operational detachments until their deployment into operational areas. The Special Forces Operational Base will normally assume command of these detachments once they are selected for a specific mission. The company headquarters may
be deployed in the UWOA to command and control assigned operational elements (providing the UWOA is sufficiently secured to accept a command and control headquarters), or to conduct unconventional warfare operations.

(b) Stability operations. The Special Forces company, with its capability to provide command, control, staff planning, and supervision, is normally the smallest command and control Special Forces element committed to the support of stability operations. When the company is committed in this manner, it is augmented, as appropriate, by elements of the Special Forces support battalion. The company normally retains command of its subordinate elements, and comes under the operational control of the appropriate US headquarters within the host country. Whenever the company is committed to stability operations as part of the Special Forces battalion, normal command and staff relationships exist (chap 10).

(c) Direct action. The Special Forces company may be assigned to support, conduct, or control direct action missions. The company may be deployed independently or under the direction and operational control of the battalion or group headquarters. It may also be deployed as directed by a unified or specified command.

★2-13. Company Headquarters
The company headquarters is organized to command and control assigned operational, detachments and to perform an operational function. Its organization provides administrative and planning support to the operational detachments. It provides the capability to train and advise indigenous and paramilitary units up to and including a brigade size force in operational and staff planning procedures.

★2-14. Headquarters and Staff
The headquarters consists of the company commander, the executive officer and other unit staff officers, and the sergeant major (fig 2-11).

a. Company Commander.

(1) The company commander exercises command over the operational detachments assigned to his company. The operational detachment commanders and his principal subordinates, and his contact with them is direct. The company commander, as one of the principal commanders of the battalion, operates directly under the battalion commander and has direct access to him at all times.

(2) The company commander exercises overall command and control of his company in
NOTES:  
(1) Three (3) additional spaces authorized for direct action missions.
(2) Not required for direct action missions.

*Figure 2-10. Special Forces company headquarters.*
NOTE: (1) When organized for direct action missions, three (3) additional personnel are authorized for the performance of liaison functions.

Figure 2-11. Company headquarters and staff.

training until such time as the assigned operational detachments are selected for deployment into their assigned UWOAs. At this time, control normally reverts to the SFOB.

b. Executive Officer. The company executive officer is the principal assistant and advisor to the company commander. He exercises supervision over the operations of the company staff and represents or acts for the company commander as required.

c. S1 (Adjutant). The duties of the company S1 correspond to those prescribed for the battalion S1 (para 2-10). The adjutant has unit staff responsibility for personnel activities and other administrative matters not assigned to other staff officers. He may, when the need arises, perform those functions related to his field of interest that are normally performed by special staff officers in the administrative and personnel field found at higher level staff. For the conduct of UW or stability operations, the adjutant also trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces up to and including a brigade size force in all activities within his field of interest.

d. S2 (Intelligence Officer). The duties of the company S2 correspond to those prescribed for the battalion S2 (para 2-10). The company S2 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence. He recommends signal security policy and considers the intelligence aspects of electronic warfare. He exercises staff supervision over the activities that fall within his field of interest. For the conduct of UW or stability operations, the S2 also trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces up to and including a brigade size force in all matters relating to intelligence, counterintelligence, and related activities within his field of interest.

e. S3 (Operations and Training Officer). The duties of the company S3 correspond to those prescribed for the battalion S3 (para 2-10). The company S3 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to the organization, training, and combat operations of the company. He exercises staff supervision over special staff matters that fall within his field of interest. He has staff responsibility for the overall security of the command. He exercises staff supervision over the electronic countermeasures (ECM) resources and coordinates electronic warfare support of operations. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S3 also trains, ad-
vises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces up to and including a brigade size force in all activities within his field of interest.

f. S4 (Logistics Officer). The duties of the company S4 correspond to those prescribed for the battalion S4 (para 2-10). The company S4 has staff responsibility for logistics and those activities that fall within his area of interest. His functions relate to logistical support within the unconventional warfare area and for logistical support required in the performance of stability operations and direct action missions. He selects the general location of the company support center, and has staff responsibility for the operation, security, and displacement of the center as required to support operations. For the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations, the S4 trains, advises, and assists non-US military or paramilitary forces up to and including a brigade size force in all activities within his field of interest.

★2-15. Operational Detachment, Special Forces Company

a. Organization. The operational detachment is organized under TOE 31-107. It may be organized to perform UW and stability operations or it may be further organized to conduct direct action missions.

(1) UW/stability operations. For the conduct of UW or stability operations, the detachment consists of the detachment commander, the executive officer, the detachment sergeant, two intelligence specialists, two engineer sergeants, two medical specialists, two weapons specialists, two radio operators, and a supply sergeant (fig 2-12). Its organization provides the basic military skills to organize, equip, train, and direct or advise non-US military or paramilitary forces up to and including a battalion size force for sustained operations.

(a) Operational detachment commander. The detachment commander has overall responsi-
bility for the command and control of his detachment in training and combat. He is one of the principal subordinate commanders to the company commander and has access to him at all times.

(b) Executive officer. The detachment executive officer is second in command and the principal assistant to the commander. He is prepared to assume command at any time.

(2) Direct action missions.

(a) For the conduct of direct action missions, the operational detachment consists of 14 men. The operational skills vary from those of the operational detachment organized for UW and stability operations. The direct action operational detachment is organized to provide a fourteen man direct action force, or, two six-man teams each capable of conducting independent operations with a two-man liaison team, or it may be further tailored for mission requirements. It consists of a detachment commander, two enlisted team leaders, two assistant team leaders, two medical specialists, two engineer sergeants, four radio operators, and a radio operator supervisor (fig 2-15). The senior team leader is normally the second in command.

(b) Detachment commander. During the conduct of direct action missions, the detachment commander may accompany the elements of the detachment, or he may serve as liaison officer as directed, and as required to insure close coordination between Special Forces and the supported headquarters. He supervises the planning, preparation and coordination for the deployment of the detachment or elements of the detachment. He details the teams for assigned missions and insures their availability and operational readiness.

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General. The Special Forces operational detachment is the basic operational element of the Special Forces Group. It is employed in an

Figure 2-15. Operational detachment—direct action mission.
operative role to serve as a nucleus for the organization, training, and development of indigenous guerrilla or paramilitary forces for the conduct of unconventional warfare or stability operations. The operational detachment may also be employed unilaterally as a force for the accomplishment of direct action missions. This element of the Special Forces group is capable of conducting sustained operations with limited outside support while operating directly under the supervision of the SFOB.

(2) Unconventional warfare and stability operations. Chapters 5 and 10 contain doctrinal guidelines regarding the employment of the Special Forces operational detachment in unconventional warfare and stability operations.

(3) Direct action missions.

(a) The Special Forces operational detachment may be deployed to conduct selected independent operations in support of unified or specified command objectives. Examples of strategic type missions include—

1. Reconnoitering critical strategic targets.
2. Locating and reporting activity/movement of major enemy forces.
3. Conducting target damage assessment.
4. Emplacing ST ANO devices, special weapons and other items of equipment.
5. Conducting raids against critical strategic targets.

7. Conducting other operations of a sensitive nature that Special Forces units are best suited to perform by nature of their training, organization, and equipment.

(b) Additional details pertinent to the employment of Special Forces in the conduct of direct action missions are contained in section V, chapter 11 of this manual.

2-16. Special Forces Support Battalion, Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The Special Forces support battalion is organized under TOE 31-125. It consists of a headquarters and service company, and a signal company (fig. 2-14).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General.

(a) The support battalion is employed to provide combat support and combat service support to the Special Forces group and its battalions. This is accomplished by providing direct support from an established location, or by employing forward support elements to deployed Special Forces units. The support battalion provides administrative and logistical support to the SFOB through the support center (fig. 4-3). For additional details of the support center refer to paragraph 4-7f.

(b) For extensive unconventional warfare operations and for stability operations, augmentation may be provided from appropriate cellular...
teams of the 500/600-series TOE, or by the establish-ment of a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) under the provisions of AR 310-31.

2-17. Headquarters and Service Company

The headquarters and service company (fig 2-15) is organized to provide command, control and administrative and technical supervision for the Special Forces support battalion. It provides administrative, logistical, medical, maintenance, mess, limited aviation and transportation support for the Special Forces group. Normally, this unit will provide support to the group headquarters elements from the support center (para 4-7), with forward support elements deployed to support the organic battalions.

2-18. Support Battalion Headquarters Staff

The support battalion headquarters section consists of the battalion commander, an executive officer and the unit staff officers, special staff officers, and the sergeant major (fig 2-16). The commander and staff are charged with the responsibility for the conduct of combat support and combat service support for the Special Forces group. The headquarters is organized for sustained operations.

a. Battalion Commander.

(1) The battalion commander exercises command over the units assigned and/or attached to his battalion. The headquarters and service company commander, the signal company commander, the medical platoon leader, the administrative services platoon leader, the supply and maintenance platoon leader, and the aviation platoon leader are his principal subordinates and his contact with them is direct.

(2) The battalion commander, as one of the principal commanders of the group, operates directly under the Special Forces group commander and has access to him at all times. He has overall responsibility for the conduct of the combat support and combat service support operations. The flexible organizational characteristics of the Special Forces group demand that the battalion commander have complete knowledge and understanding of combat support and combat service support operations for unconventional warfare, stability operations, and direct action missions. In this regard the Special Forces support battalion commander fulfills a similar role in relation to the Special Forces group as the support battalion commander of a separate brigade. He is the logistics operator for the Special Forces group. He must make timely decisions and be capable of operating with mission-type orders which require exercise of initiative and professional judgment in execution. In turn, he provides his subordinates with guidance for their support operations and allows them freedom of action in implementing his orders.

b. Executive Officer. The executive officer is second in command and the principal assistant to the battalion commander. His primary function is direction and coordination of the unit staff. He transmits the commander's decision to staff sections and in the name of the commander to subordinate units when applicable. The executive officer keeps abreast of the situation and future plans and, during the commander's absence, represents him and directs action in accordance with established policy. He is prepared to assume command at any time.

c. S1 (Adjutant). The duties of the support battalion S1 correspond to those prescribed for the group S1 (para 2-5). The S1 has unit staff responsibility for personnel activities and other administrative matters within the support battalion not assigned to other staff officers. The S1 has staff responsibility for the movement, internal arrangement, organization, and operation of the headquarters and the allocation of space within the support battalion headquarters. When the need arises, the S1 may perform those functions related to his field of interest that normally are performed by special staff officers in the personnel and administrative field found at higher staff levels. Normally, he does not enter the personnel and administrative channels between the group headquarters and attached units in the support battalion except for policy matters.

d. S2/S3 (Intelligence and Operations Officer). The battalion S2/S3 has staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to operations, intelligence and counterintelligence. He exercises staff supervision over the activities of the special staff that fall within his field of interest. He is responsible directly to the battalion commander for all operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence which may affect the support battalion. He also coordinates with the Special Forces group S4 on all logistical operational matters. He supervises the support activities provided by the battalion for operational units during the conduct of UW, stability operations, and direct action missions.
Figure 2-15. Headquarters and service company, Special Forces Support battalion.
e. S4 (Logistics Officer). The battalion S4 has staff responsibilities for logistics and those activities of special staff officers that fall within his area of interest. He is primarily a planner and advisor to the support battalion commander on matters relating to the logistical support of the elements organic to the support battalion. He provides staff coordination on all internal logistical matters.

f. Signal Company Commander. The signal company commander is the principal advisor to the support battalion commander and staff in all communication matters. In his capacity as signal company commander, he is under the staff supervision of the group C-E officer, and is responsible for providing signal communications for the Special Forces group and its deployed units and operational detachments. He coordinates and exercises technical supervision over training and activities of the communications personnel in the signal company. He is also responsible for establishing and maintaining the signal center facilities within the SFOB and for furnishing personnel and equipment augmentation for separate operational bases and control bases.

g. Administrative Services Platoon Leader. The platoon leader acts as the support battalion commander’s principal staff assistant for the accomplishment of the administrative and personnel functions in support of the group. He will normally retain the personnel section under his direct control and attach the forward support.
teams to the supported battalions as the situation dictates. He also coordinates directly with the group S1 on all matters pertaining to personnel activities and administrative policies.

h. Group Supply and Maintenance Platoon Leader. The platoon leader serves as the principal assistant to the battalion commander for those functions involving supply, maintenance, food service, and rigger/aerial delivery support for the Special Forces group. In this capacity he is responsible directly to the support battalion commander and serves as the principal coordinator with the Special Forces group S4 on all supply and maintenance matters.

i. Aviation Platoon Leader. The aviation platoon leader is the advisor to the support battalion commander on all aviation matters pertaining to the support of Special Forces group operations. Additionally, he coordinates and exercises technical supervision over the training and activities of the aviation personnel assigned or attached to his platoon.

j. Medical Platoon Leader. The platoon leader is directly under the command of the support battalion commander, but is under operational control of the group surgeon. He provides medical support to the Special Forces group headquarters and to the deployed units.

2-19. Medical Platoon

The medical platoon is composed of the personnel and equipment required to provide medical support for the Special Forces group.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The medical platoon headquarters is staffed to command, control, and provide planning and supervision of dispensary and preventive medicine operations. It is also responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of supplies. The headquarters normally operates from the support center.

b. Medical Team. The medical team provides dispensary services to the Special Forces group and is normally employed at the support center. The team is staffed for continuous operations and can also be fragmented to provide limited dispensary services for one operational base in addition to the SFOB.

c. Preventive Medicine Team. This team provides preventive medicine support to the Special Forces group and may operate from the support center or may provide mobile support.

d. Medical Operations Teams. These three teams provide limited dispensary support to the Special Forces battalions. The teams may operate from a support center, may be committed to support an operational element for independent operations, or may provide mobile support. The teams may be deployed with the supported battalions or may revert to platoon control when the supported battalion is deployed.

2-20. Administrative Services Platoon

The administrative services platoon provides personnel services and administrative support to the Special Forces group. Normally, this support will be provided to the group from the support center. The support for the Special Forces battalions is normally provided by the attachment of forward support teams to each battalion.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters provides command, control, and supervision of the group personnel services and administrative support. It contains the personnel and equipment required for the conduct of routine administrative support for the group.

b. Personnel Section. This section performs the personnel services activities for the Special Forces group to include forms management, records, disposition control, and publication control. The section normally provides support from the support center.

c. Forward Support Teams. These three teams perform the normal supply and administrative services to support the Special Forces battalions. Normally, the teams are attached to the battalions and may be deployed with the supported battalion. They may also operate from the area of the support center and under control of the platoon headquarters.

2-21. Group Supply and Maintenance Platoon

This platoon provides supply, maintenance, food service, and rigger/aerial delivery support to the Special Forces group.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters commands, controls, and supervises the supply and maintenance operations of the group. The platoon is commanded by the group supply and maintenance officer and normally provides support from the support center.

b. Food Service Section Headquarters. The section headquarters is composed of the personnel
required to control and supervise the mess support for the Special Forces group. The section headquarters normally operates from the support center.

c. Subsistence Team. This team contains the personnel and equipment required for the procurement, receipt, storage, and issue of rations and supplies. The team is capable of providing support for consolidated messing and/or unit messing as required. The team normally operates from the support center.

d. Forward Support Teams. These three teams provide unit mess support to the Special Forces battalions, or may be utilized to provide consolidated messing support. The team(s) may be deployed with the supported battalion(s) or may revert to section control.

e. Base Support Teams. These two base support teams provide mess support to the Special Forces group headquarters elements and the Special Forces support battalion. Support is normally provided through consolidated mess facilities.

f. Rigger/Aerial Delivery Section Headquarters. This section provides control and supervision of the group’s rigger/aerial delivery functions. It normally operates from the support center.

g. Base Operations Team. This team provides rigger/aerial delivery support to the SFOB. The team normally is employed at the support center.

h. Forward Support Teams. These three teams provide rigger/aerial delivery support to the Special Forces battalions. The teams are normally attached to and deployed forward with the battalions.

i. Supply Section. The supply section plans the procurement and monitors the receipt, temporary storage, issue, and/or distribution of supplies and equipment. It maintains all records relating to these actions. Support is normally provided from the support center.

j. Maintenance Section. This section provides limited direct support maintenance for wheeled vehicles, engineer equipment, and marine items organic to the Special Forces group. Support is normally provided from the support center.

2-22. Aviation Platoon
The aviation platoon provides limited fixed wing and rotary wing US Army aviation support for the Special Forces group. Its organization limits the support to command, control, liaison, and reconnaissance activities. Support of combat operations requires augmentation by appropriate US Army aviation units, or Special Operations Force units of the US Air Force Tactical Air Command.

a. Aviation Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters is composed of the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, crew chiefs, a flight operations specialist, and a radio operator. The headquarters controls and supervises the group aviation activities and provides for single shift flight operations activities. The headquarters normally operates from the support center but can be deployed forward.

b. Flight Section. This section contains the fixed wing and rotary wing pilots. The section is staffed for single shift operators.

c. Aviation Maintenance Section. This section provides organizational maintenance and limited direct support maintenance of aircraft for the platoon. The section may operate from the support center or may support from forward locations.

2-23. Signal Company, Special Forces Support Battalion

a. Organization. The signal company is organized under TOE 11-247. It consists of a company headquarters, a base operations platoon, two base radio platoons and a forward communications platoon (fig 2-17).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) Figure 2-18 depicts the Special Forces signal company employed to provide communication facilities for a Special Forces group on a 24-hour basis.

(2) The capabilities of the signal company include the following:

(a) Terminal communications facilities for long range radio (CW) communications with deployed operational detachments.

(b) Secure radio teletype (RATT) communications between the SFOB and a maximum of four advanced control bases (ACB) or three separate operational bases (SOB).

(c) Terminal facilities for telephone and secure teletypewriter circuits from higher and adjacent headquarters.

(d) Terminal facilities for voice radio nets from higher and adjacent headquarters.
(e) Local and internal telephone service within the SFOB.

(f) Pictorial support (black and white) for the SFOB, to include developing and printing.

(g) Cryptographic support, to include direct support maintenance for cryptographic equipment of the signal company.

(h) Limited general support maintenance for those items of signal equipment peculiar to the Special Forces group and for such other items which are within the capability of the equipment and personnel authorizations.

(3) The Special Forces signal company may be employed to provide communication support to any one of the following configurations of a deployed Special Forces group:

(a) One Special Forces operational base and four advanced control bases.

(b) One Special Forces operational base, one separate operational base, and three advanced control bases.

(c) One Special Forces operational base and three separate operational bases.

(4) Chapter 4, section IV and chapter 5, section VI discuss Special Forces communications in more detail.

**2-24. Company Headquarters**

This element consists of the company commander, first sergeant, and enlisted personnel to provide command, control, and administrative and logistical support for the signal company. The headquarters is organized for sustained operations. The company commander has overall responsibility for the command and control of elements assigned or attached to his company. The assigned or attached communication platoon leaders are his principal subordinates and his contact with them is direct.

**2-25. Base Operations Platoon**

The base operations platoon consists of a platoon headquarters and various sections to provide base communications operational functions.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters provides command, control, and supervision of base communications operational functions. It consists of the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.

b. Communications Center Section. This section provides communication center and cryptographic services for the Special Forces group headquarters and also provides cryptographic maintenance for the group.
Figure 2-18. Type SFOB communication systems.
c. Electronic Maintenance Section. This section performs organizational and direct support maintenance of signal equipment of the Special Forces group, and performs general support maintenance of signal equipment peculiar to the Special Forces group.

d. Radio Section. This section provides terminal service for RTT circuits from higher and adjacent headquarters (LAW FM 24-1) and operates the net control station for the group command net (SSB-voice).

e. Teletype Section. This section terminates all teletype circuits for the Special Forces group headquarters.

f. Wire Section. This section installs and maintains all internal wire lines of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB) and provides telephone and teletypewriter switching for the Special Forces group.

g. Photo Section. This section provides photographic support for the Special Forces group.

**2-26. Base Radio Platoon**

There are two radio platoons assigned to the Signal Company. Each of these platoons consists of a platoon headquarters and various sections to provide base radio operational functions.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters provides command, control, and supervision of base radio functions. It consists of the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant.

b. Control Sections. These sections provide telephone and teletypewriter switching and termination, and provide communications center services for the base radio platoon and its supported headquarters.

c. Receiver Sections. These sections receive, record, and copy burst radio communications from operational detachments.

d. Transmitter Sections. These sections operate and maintain the transmitters of the base radio platoons.

**2-27. Forward Communications Platoon**

The forward communications platoon consists of a platoon headquarters and four forward communications sections. It provides personnel and equipment augmentation to provide communications for up to four advanced control bases, or it may be consolidated to provide communications for one SOB.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The platoon headquarters consists of the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. It provides command and control for the forward communications sections.

b. Forward Communications Section. These sections consist of the personnel and equipment augmentation to provide communications for the establishment of four ACB or for one additional SOB.
PART TWO
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
CHAPTER 3
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Section I. GENERAL

3-1. Unconventional Warfare

a. General.

(1) Commanders designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are responsible for the conduct of unconventional warfare. Such designated commanders include commanders of unified and specified commands and joint task force commanders.

(2) As part of this responsibility, such commanders designate specific areas for the conduct of unconventional warfare operations.

(3) As required, the commander has the authority to establish a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) Headquarters to plan for and to conduct unconventional warfare operations within his area of responsibility.

(4) Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of a covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and avoids formal military confrontation.

b. Concept. UW is conducted to exploit military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy. It is implemented by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral operations of U.S. UW forces. Its conduct involves the application of guerrilla warfare and selected aspects of subversion, political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological operations in support of national objectives.

3-2. Unconventional Warfare Operations

Unconventional warfare operations may be covert, clandestine, or overt in nature. Covert operations are conducted in such a manner as to conceal the identity of the sponsor, while clandestine operations place emphasis on concealment of the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor. Overt operations do not try to conceal either the operation or the identity of the sponsor. In an established theater of operations in which significant ground operations by a conventional U.S. military force will be undertaken, UW is conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional U.S. forces will not be deployed, UW may be conducted as an economy of force measure, and to reduce or dissipate the enemy potential.


U.S. forces have an effective UW capability consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces as they are assigned for these operations. Resources of the military services include—
3—1. U.S. Army Special Forces, a force developed and trained to fulfill requirements for the Army to participate in unconventional warfare.

b. Elements of the U.S. Navy, including Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), and Sea Air Land Teams (SEAL Teams), plus selected reconnaissance elements of the U.S. Marine Corps, which have among their capabilities the conduct of UW on hostile shores, restricted waterways, or river areas in conjunction with naval operations or in coordination with other UW forces.

c. Elements of the U.S. Air Force, including Special Air Warfare units, which participate in unconventional warfare, principally by providing airlift and other air support to UW forces.

3—4. Responsibilities for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare

a. Responsibility for developmental action in each of the categories of unconventional warfare has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that department or agency having primary concern. The U.S. Army is responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities within its capabilities.

b. Within geographical areas designated as unconventional warfare operational areas (UWOA), U.S. Army Special Forces are assigned single or multiple missions, but must be prepared to assume responsibility for all aspects of unconventional warfare.

3—5. Training Requirements for Unconventional Warfare

To fulfill the responsibilities outlined above, U.S. Army Special Forces are trained in all aspects of unconventional warfare. The level of training is such that Special Forces personnel are capable of direct participation in these activities as well as providing training, advice, or support to other forces or agencies.

3—6. Legal Status of Participants in Unconventional Warfare

a. In limited or general war, members of regular military units sent to enemy or enemy-occupied areas to conduct unconventional warfare are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war, provided they wear the uniform of the country they represent (FM 27–10).

b. In territory occupied by the enemy, personnel indigenous to that country who operate against the enemy are entitled to prisoner of war status providing that they—

(1) Are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) Wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) Carry arms openly.

(4) Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

c. Indigenous personnel not meeting the above criteria are subject to punishment under the laws of the occupying power.

d. In the domestic territory of the enemy, local nationals who cooperate with members of foreign military units are not entitled to prisoner of war status when captured by their own government.

e. See FM 27–10 for detailed explanation of the laws of land warfare.

Section II. INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE FORCES

3—7. The Resistance Movement

a. A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the established government or an occupying power.

b. A resistance movement generally is composed of a hardcore resistance leadership, clandestine element (underground), overt militant element (guerrilla force), and a supporting civilian population (auxiliary). The full development and eventual success of the resistance depends on the ability to mold these component elements into an efficient and effective organization.

c. Support of resistance by an external source may be covert, or may remain predominantly clandestine.
3-8. Types of Resistance

There are two broad types of resistance:

a. Clandestine Resistance (Auxiliary and Underground). This type of resistance is conducted by people who outwardly follow their normal way of life. Organized clandestine activities can include political action, psychological operations, espionage, sabotage, assassination, traffic in contraband, and the gathering of intelligence. This type of resistance may be either passive or active in nature:

(1) The passive form is limited to those activities short of physical violence and destruction such as work slow downs, general strikes and civil disobedience programs.

(2) Active resistance implies direct, physical action that may be accompanied by violence and destruction such as sabotage and assassination; however, leaflet distribution and illicit radio broadcasts are also active type programs.

b. Overt Resistance (Guerrilla Force). This type of resistance is conducted openly by individuals and groups organized and trained along military lines. This militant arm of the resistance movement normally is referred to as the guerrilla force. It makes no secret of its existence or objectives. The guerrilla force is compartmented from other components of the resistance movement to prevent compromise of the entire resistance organization.

3-9. Basic Factors Influencing Resistance Forces

a. Attitude. The attitudes of the people toward the regime in power and the actual or potential enemy of the regime are considered in developing and employing resistance forces. The historical experience of a race or nation influences the development of an inclination towards resistance activity.

b. Motivation. The motivation of individuals to support the resistance effort is derived from many sources, including ideology, culture, environment, respect for the resistance leaders, economy, personal ambition, personal security, hate, ego, and fear.

c. Topography. Topography plays an important part in the conduct of resistance operations. Mountains, swamps, large forests, and jungles provide relatively secure guerrilla bases and sanctuaries while urban areas provide a lucrative environment for subversive operations by the underground.

d. Manpower. The availability of manpower to support the resistance movement is an influencing factor. Sufficient personnel to actively participate in the resistance increases the effectiveness of the movement.

Section III. GUERRILLA WARFARE

3-10. Definition of Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. The term guerrilla warfare is used to denote the primary overt military activities of a resistance movement.

3-11. Characteristics of Guerrilla Warfare

a. General. Guerrilla warfare is characterized by offensive actions with emphasis on swift, brief, violent action, and elusiveness, mobility, and surprise. In addition, there are other important considerations such as local population support, external support, and the political, legal, and tactical situation.

b. Support Factors.

(1) Population support. The existence, growth, and success of guerrilla movements depend, to a degree, on the moral and material support they receive from the local population.

(2) External support. Guerrilla operations are more effective when outside sponsorship is present. During a wartime situation, this support is political, psychological, and logistical, as well as tactical. A sponsoring power decides to support guerrilla forces when it feels that the guerrillas can make a contribution toward the achievement of the sponsor’s national objectives.
c. Political Situation. Guerrilla warfare is influenced by both military and political considerations. Guerrilla leaders in conflict with a common enemy, yet politically opposed to each other, may dissipate their efforts by fighting among themselves. The long-range political goals of a strong and effective guerrilla leader may be in opposition to U.S. national objectives or to those of a U.S. sponsored government in exile. In some instances, the true political character of a supported resistance movement is not apparent at the time support and sponsorship are extended. These factors make it necessary for a potential sponsoring power to evaluate thoroughly the long-range as well as the short-range effects of any support rendered.

d. Tactical Situation.

(1) Primary considerations. Guerrilla units normally cannot achieve the degree of combat power expected of regular units. Guerrilla units, by taking maximum advantage of their capability for surprise and elusiveness, while at the same time acknowledging and allowing for their limitations, can survive and conduct successful operations.

(2) Offensive tactics. Successful guerrilla operations depend on detailed, timely intelligence and a well conceived and rehearsed tactical plan. The guerrilla force normally is best employed in interdicting fixed lines of communication and in the attack of critical enemy installations. Except in those instances in which the tactical advantages are clearly with the guerrilla force, no effort is made to close with and destroy an enemy. Conversely, the enemy must provide security for his critical installations and seek to contact and destroy the guerrilla force. These essentially contradictory courses of action create a fluid operational environment that benefits guerrilla operations.

(3) Defensive tactics. Protective surveillance is the guerrilla's best assurance against being surprised by the enemy. One way this is achieved is by organizing civilian support to augment the local security elements of the guerrilla force. The guerrilla is always prepared for a rapid withdrawal to alternate areas. Guerrilla force security and the ability to control an area are achieved more easily in difficult terrain which restricts ground and air observation and ground movement by the opposing force. Terrain restrictions limit the opponent's capability to mount coordinated operations quickly against the guerrillas and, as a result, frequently permit guerrilla units to avoid static defensive combat.

Section IV. EVASION AND ESCAPE

3–12. General

Evasion and escape (E&E) activities are designed to return to friendly control those military personnel and other selected individuals who become isolated in hostile areas or who escape from captivity. For a detailed discussion of the subject, see FM 21–77, 21–77A, and 31–20A.

3–13. Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape Activities

a. The U.S. Air Force has the responsibility for developing tactics, techniques, and equipment concerning the joint aspects of evasion and escape.

b. Army responsibilities include providing appropriate support and assistance as required, and developing a capability to conduct E&E activities within assigned unconventional warfare operational areas.

3–14. Training Requirements for E & E

To provide the capability to support or conduct E&E activities, U.S. Army Special Forces require training in evasion methods and techniques (FM 21–77A and 31–20A).

3–15.

See FM 31–21A.
Section V. SUBVERSION

3–16. General

a. Subversion consists of those actions designed to reduce the military, moral, political, economic, or psychological strength of any enemy. These activities may be violent or non-violent in character. A resistance organization attempts to undermine or overthrow a government or an occupying power by the systematic application of subversion.

b. U.S. Army Special Forces are capable of conducting or supporting subversive operations to further UW objectives and the mission of the force or command. Special Forces operational personnel, therefore, must be trained in the conduct and support of subversive operations.

3–17.
See FM 31–21A.

3–18.
See FM 31–21A.

3–19.
See FM 31–21A.
CHAPTER 4
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES

Section I. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

4-1. General

a. U.S. Army Special Forces elements provided to a command for operations may expect to function under many varied command and control arrangements. The exact organizational structure is determined by the mission, resources available for both conduct and support of operations, and prerogatives of the commander.

b. Type organizations have been developed to fulfill the particular command, control, and support requirements of unconventional warfare. These organizations fit into two general categories, discussed in succeeding sections of this chapter, according to whether the organization is to function within or outside of areas controlled by the enemy.

4-2. Factors Influencing Organization

In designing an organizational structure for unconventional warfare, the following factors are considered:


b. Duration and scope of operations.

c. Administrative and logistical support required to conduct operations.

d. Security requirements for dispersal of facilities and compartmentation of activities.

e. Restrictions imposed on communications by distance, terrain, or security.

f. Desirable span of control.

Section II. THE EXTERNAL ORGANIZATION

4-3. General

The external organization includes those command, control, and support elements located outside areas under enemy control.

4-4. The Theater Unconventional Warfare Command

a. Operational control of U.S. UW forces is exercised by the commander of the unified command through a theater unconventional warfare command organization. The structure and title may vary according to the duration and magnitude of operations and the components or agencies involved.

b. UW operations of significant size and duration require the establishment of a joint command and control organization at theater level. It consists of a joint headquarters and elements from two or more services and agencies. The joint headquarters is allocated its own combat service support elements and a composite signal support element capable of communicating with all components of the UW force. The joint UW command staff includes appropriate representation from the services and agencies providing UW forces to the command or providing support to those forces. The joint force commander exercises operational control of assigned UW forces through the appropriate component commander of the joint force, i.e., operational control of deployed Special Forces UW forces by the joint force commander is done through the commander of the Army component. The sensitive nature of many UW operations requires command...
and staff procedures based on the principles of compartmentation and strict observance of dissemination of information on a need-to-know basis. An example of one possible organizational structure for a joint UW command is depicted in figure 4-1. Guidance on the exercise of command by joint force commanders, as well as doctrine for unified operations and training, is contained in JCS Pub 2.

c. In the absence of a permanent UW command organization, or as a subordinate element thereof, a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) may be formed to satisfy specific UW requirements. It is organized in a manner similar to the joint UW command discussed above; however, it is a
semipermanent command arrangement. The JUWTF organization directs joint UW training exercises when no permanent UW command exists.

d. The theater UW headquarters prepares operational plans and directs the conduct of unconventional warfare in designated areas. These headquarters determine UW requirements, procure intelligence, prepare plans, allocate resources, monitor the stockpiling of materiel for potential operations, and supervise the training of designated operational and support elements to attain and maintain the precise state of readiness required by their mission.

e. The principal functions of the theater UW headquarters or JUWTF are—

(1) To direct UW operations within its area of responsibility.

(2) To recommend geographical areas to be designated unconventional warfare operational areas as required.

(3) To determine missions, designate areas, and assign tasks to subordinate elements for planning and execution.

(4) To procure and maintain intelligence in support of UW.

(5) To develop operational, administrative, and logistical plans and requirements for the support of UW.

(6) To coordinate with other theater agencies in planning for all types of operations.

(7) To develop communications procedures and requirements to support UW plans.

(8) To plan and conduct joint or combined training of land, sea, and air units designated to participate in, or to support UW.

(9) To coordinate with allied military authorities for the preparation and execution of UW plans, as required.

(10) To maintain liaison with other UW agencies or units.

(11) To recommend and periodically revise strengths of indigenous forces to be supported, based on current intelligence.

(12) To maintain liaison at staff and operational levels with appropriate intelligence agencies; to coordinate requirements, collection, and communications with other activities in denied areas; and to plan intelligence operations in support of conventional forces when directed by the theater commander.

(13) To coordinate psychological operations (PSYOP) requirements in support of UW (FM 33-1 and 33-5).

(14) To maintain liaison with theater civil affairs units concerning civil affairs (CA) aspects of UW (FM 41-10).

4—5. Army Component of the Theater UW Command

The Army component of a joint UW command is normally a Special Forces group with its attachments and necessary augmentation. A separate Army component headquarters may be established for command, control, and support of all Army units in the force or command when more than one Special Forces group is represented or if significant numbers of other Army elements are allocated to the UW force.

4—6. Special Forces Group

The Special Forces group functions as the Army component of a joint UW force, or as the command, control, and support organization for Army operations when a UW command is not organized. The Special Forces group normally will administratively arrange its resources to establish a SFOB for large commitments or for long duration missions.

4—7. The Special Forces Operational Base

a. The SFOB provides command, control, and support for deployed US Army Special Forces within a theater of operations or a designated portion thereof. It is established by grouping the resources of a Special Forces group headquarters and its headquarters and signal companies into functional elements which provide operational control, and administrative and logistical support for assigned and attached units (fig. 4–2).

b. The SFOB may be physically located at one installation or dispersed among a number of smaller sites. Because of the sensitive nature of operations conducted at the SFOB, special consideration is given to the principles of
Figure 4-2. Special Forces operational base.
dispersion and security. Preparation for operations, as well as control and support is compartmented on a need-to-know basis to prevent or minimize compromise. The SFOB should not be located with other facilities such as airfields, port facilities, or other major headquarters. Deployment of detachments and resupply of a UWOA is simplified by locating the SFOB within a reasonable distance of the delivery agencies employed. The site selected should provide maximum security from ground and air attack and should be included within the rear area defense system.

c. The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational detachments for deployment into the UWOA. After deployment, the mission of the SFOB is to provide command, control, administration, and support for these deployed detachments in furtherance of the assigned theater mission.

d. Among the functions that may be performed at the SFOB are—
   (1) Command and control of operations, to include—
      (a) Guerrilla warfare.
      (b) Evasion and escape.
      (c) Subversion.
   (2) Communications support of organic and attached units.
   (3) Intelligence support.
   (4) Air support, as appropriate.
   (5) Logistical support.
   (6) Preparation and deployment of detachments.
      (a) Training.
      (b) Briefing and staging.
      (c) Infiltration.
   (7) Civil affairs support.
   (8) PSYOP support.
   (9) Liaison and coordination with higher and adjacent commands.
   (10) Administration.
   (11) Coordination of exfiltration operations.

e. The Special Forces group has sufficient personnel to establish an SFOB, to deploy detachments, and to provide limited logistical support. It requires augmentation to conduct support activities on a sustained basis. Theater support services are attached as required. Physical security, counterintelligence, and base defense requirements are also met by attachment of appropriate units or by tasking designated rear area defense and security units with the requirements.

f. The support center is established and organized to provide administrative support to the SFOB and its deployed units (fig. 4–3). The headquarters and service company and elements of the signal company that are not engaged in signal center operations, or deployed forward to support the organic battalions, will normally be located within the support center complex. The support battalion commander exercises command and control of all support center activities. The support battalion headquarters staff coordinates with the Special Forces group staff and computes requirements for the deployed units which it supports. The support center normally maintains a minimum stock level of supplies and equipment. Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM) provides the storage facilities and issuance of military supplies and equipment. TASCOM also provides additional administrative support and augmentation to the center. The support center also manages assigned stocks, coordinates movements, develops and manages the maintenance plan, requisitions and coordinates support requirements, and maintains central control of personnel management and records. Headquarters of the support center accomplishes control, evaluation, and management through the functional grouping of the assigned support elements. To facilitate adequate support, the support center should be located in the vicinity of a good road net and an airfield.

g. The isolation area is a maximum security facility established to isolate selected Special Forces units or personnel that have been committed for operations (fig. 4–4). In the isolation area, representatives of the group staff, and special staff conduct briefings pertaining to the operational procedures and other special activities that apply to the assigned mission. Special briefings are also provided to each committed member of the unit pertaining to their particular occupational specialties (i.e., the C–E officer briefs the radio operators on all pertinent signal matters, the Engineer officer briefs the Engineer sergeants on demolition procedures and other engineer matters). The committed units are provided ample time during this period of isolation to continue area studies and to plan their operations. At the conclusion and prior to deployment, the units provide “brief-backs” to the SFOB Commander and/or selected personnel to insure a thorough understanding of the mission requirements and opera-
Figure 4-8. Type Special Forces support center.
RECREATION AREA

- Op Det Billets (1)
- Study Room
- Briefing and Debrief
- Storage
- Co HQ (1)

Exercise Area

- Op Det Billets (1)
- Study Room
- Op Det Billets (1)

Storage Area

- Admin Processing
- Admin Processing (1)
- Area Specialist Team
- Plans Rep

Switchboard and Guards

Messing Facility

NOTE: (1) Individual latrine in each billet/living area.

★Figure 4-4. Type company size isolation area.
tional procedures. Security is paramount throughout the isolation period. Units committed to separate missions, and separate operational areas, are compartmentalized in order to preclude compromising their mission. The isolation area should include compartmented briefing areas, adequate billeting, messing, latrine facilities, limited dispensary services, available staff administrative support, and a recreation and exercise area. The S3 supervises the activities of the area and schedules the briefings. Personnel to operate the isolation area may be designated from SF battalion and company headquarters and the support battalion as required. In addition to briefing the unit(s) on their area of operations, the area specialist team also serves as coordinator between the isolated unit(s) and the SFOB staff.

4—8. The Advanced Control Base, Separate, and Alternate SFOB

a. The Advanced Control Base (ACB). The advanced control base, under the command of the main SFOB, is established as an immediate control headquarters when distances involved preclude satisfactory control and support of deployed operational detachments. It is used to extend the span of control or communications capability of the main SFOB.

b. The Separate Operational Base (SOB). The separate operational base is established when there is an operational requirement for an additional SFOB. Such a requirement may be justified when the mission or the distance between the operational areas and the main SFOB requires a separate control headquarters between the operational detachments and the theater UW command.

c. The Alternate Operational Base (AOB). The alternate operational bases are locations for which planning for future use has been accomplished. These locations will be utilized only if the existing operational base becomes untenable or if mission accomplishment can be facilitated by displacement.

★4—9. Separate Deployment of a Special Forces Battalion

a. Separate deployment of a Special Forces battalion to establish and operate an SFOB may be required when distances between deployed operational detachments and the main SFOB are too great for normal control and support by the main SFOB. A separate SFOB may also be established and operated by a Special Forces battalion for specific missions to be conducted under the direction of an organization other than the parent group. Such employment of the Special Forces battalion requires suitable augmentation.

b. The Special Forces battalion may employ companies as subordinate control elements in order to extend its span of control or communications capability.

Section III. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

4—10. General

The internal organization includes command, control, and support elements located within areas under enemy control. The organization usually integrates Special Forces and indigenous resistance elements. It may provide for US advice and assistance, for direct US control of indigenous forces, or for unilateral operations by Special Forces (para 5–6).

4—11. The UW Area Command

a. Normally the area command is a combined command structure within an unconventional warfare operational area which integrates the Special Forces operational detachments(s) and the resistance organization. It is established by the Special Forces element as soon as possible after infiltration. There is no rigid pattern for the organization of an area command; it is tailored to fit the mission and situation. The size and composition depends on the strength and capability of the resistance forces, the type and scope of operations to be undertaken, and the degree of United States influence. The area command is compartmented to reduce the possibility of compromise. A UWOA may be subdivided into subordinate sector commands.

b. The purpose of the UW area command and subordinate sector commands is to control, coordinate, support, and assist all resistance activities within the UWOA. For a detailed discussion, see chapter 7, Organization and Development of the UWOA.
4-12. Use of Detachments for Internal Command and Control

a. Normally all operations are directed by the SFOB. Battalion and company headquarters possess a command and staff capability which may be employed to develop the command structure of the internal organization as the resistance effort grows, or for unilateral control battalion and company headquarters in place, may be tasked to assume operational control of designated detachments. Additional detachments or augmentations to detachments in place may be infiltrated for that specific purpose.

b. Under certain circumstances, initial infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected provisional team composed of individuals possessing specialized skills. The mission of the pilot team is to make an assessment of an area and to establish contact and rapport with indigenous leaders. The pilot team determines whether development of the area is feasible, and notifies the SFOB. Upon evaluation by the SFOB, Special Forces operational elements may be infiltrated into the area. The infiltrated pilot team may remain with the operational element or be exfiltrated.

4-13. Internal Support Bases

An internal support base is a facility or complex within hostile territory which provides logistic or other support to UW forces operating in or near the base area. It can be a small, carefully hidden, and dispersed facility in a remote area, or, when the enemy lacks the desire or capability to interfere, it can become larger and much more elaborate. The base complex eventually could include airstrips, seaports, or beach facilities, storage areas, medical facilities, and a pool of locally acquired or introduced vehicles. UW activated bases and aircraft are discussed in paragraph 5-10. Internal support bases have particular application in more remote parts of a theater of operations where no linkup with conventional ground forces is intended.

Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS

4-14. General

Control and support of UW operations requires a secure and reliable long-range communications capability between the external control headquarters and deployed US UW elements. Equipment, training, and communications procedures are applicable to covert, clandestine, or overt operations. The capability provides for communication at both short and long-ranges to accommodate theater-wide employment. Continuous wave (CW) radio is the primary means of communication between the external control headquarters and deployed Special Forces operational detachments.

4-15. Procedures

a. Detachment to External Headquarters. Communications procedures employed in UW must be formulated with the physical security of the detachment remaining a primary consideration. This security factor requires that the detachment radio transmitter be on the air for an absolute minimum of time at infrequent and irregular intervals; that it be relocated immediately after each contact if possible, and that every reasonable effort be made to preclude its being identified as a Special Forces station. To satisfy this criteria, it is imperative that the detachment communications equipment be reliable, lightweight, capable of rapid installation and removal, and possess a CW “burst” transmit and receive capability.

b. SFOB to Subordinate Control Headquarters (Control/Operational Bases). Communications will normally consist of sole-user telephone and secure teletype circuits provided by the theater army communication system and terminated by the Special Forces signal company. The alternate means will be a long-range radio-teletype system installed and operated by the Special Forces signal company. A type UW communications net is diagrammed in figure 4-5.

c. Exceptions. Exceptions to the above occur when linkup with approaching friendly ground forces is imminent (para 9-7), during stability operations (para 10-4 and 10-10) and during additional military operations (para 11-8). These situations require communications equipment and procedures appropriate to the mission.
Figure 4-5. Type UW communications net.
CHAPTER 5
EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. General
Special Forces groups conduct language and area training according to their geographic orientation. In addition, operational detachments receive training in special techniques and tactics required for the conduct of operations in their planned operational environments.

5-2. Selection of Operational Detachments for Deployment
Based on the mission and any other guidance received, the group or SFOB commander determines the type and composition of operational detachments to be deployed in response to specific requirements.

Section II. EMPLOYMENT WITH INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE FORCES

5-3. Phases in the Development of a Sponsored Resistance Movement
a. General.
(1) The importance of security and intelligence procedures are emphasized throughout the development of resistance operations.
(2) The development of a U.S.-sponsored resistance movement can embrace seven phases. These phases do not necessarily occur in the sequence indicated, and several phases may occur simultaneously.
b. Phase I, Psychological Preparation. Pre-infiltration PSYOP, when time and security permit, are conducted by PSYOP activities to prepare the population of an area to receive U.S. UW forces.
c. Phase II, Initial Contact.
(1) Before Special Forces detachments are introduced, it is desirable that assets be developed in the operational area. Initial contact provides for the development of assets for the subsequent reception of, and assistance to, the infiltrated operational detachment.
(2) It is advantageous to have an asset exfiltrated from the operational area to the SFOB to brief the operational detachments and to accompany them during infiltration. The lack of an asset does not preclude the infiltration of the Special Forces detachment.
d. Phase III, Infiltration. The entry of the Special Forces detachment, with accompanying supplies, into an enemy-controlled area (para 6-1), and the establishment of communications with the SFOB are accomplished during this phase.
e. Phase IV, Organization. Area assessment is initiated. Organization and development of the area begins immediately (para 7-3).
f. Phase V, Buildup. The guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground are expanded. The organizational structures are compartmented for greater security and to improve the operational potential. All activities increase in scope and intensity to provide the capability to support theater objectives (para 7-1).
g. Phase VI, Combat Employment. Resistance forces are committed to accomplish unconventional warfare objectives of the commander of the unified command. This phase continues until linkup occurs with conventional ground forces (para 9-7) or until hostilities cease.
h. Phase VII, Demobilization. Once the need for resistance forces has been eliminated, disposition of these forces will depend on direction from higher headquarters. Political, economic, social, ethnic, and military factors must be considered before appropriate action can be taken.

5-4. Command Relationships

a. General. Distances and topography, enemy counterguerrilla activities, and the relationship between the guerrilla leader and the detachment commander may preclude an immediate response to operational orders. As a result of these limitations, subordinate commanders normally are given mission-type orders that may be time-phased to support the stated objectives and they are permitted to operate freely within the scope of assigned tasks.

b. Operations.

(1) Deployed Special Forces operational detachments are responsive to the SFOB, either directly or through intermediate control headquarters (para 4-8a). However, in a large theater of operations, when there is an operational requirement for additional SFOBs, these deployed SFOBs are under the direct control of the theater UW command (para 4-8b and fig. 4-3).

(2) During the early stages of development of the UWOAs, the command relationship is as discussed in (1) above. However, as the unconventional warfare operational area is developed, Special Forces detachments may be placed under the operational control of a designated control detachment as discussed in paragraph 4-12. The number of the subordinated detachments is determined by the SFOB commander.

5-5. Operational Control of Guerrilla Forces

a. Operational control of U.S.-sponsored guerrilla forces is exercised by the commander of the unified command through the theater UW command. Response to theater UW command orders depends to a degree upon the relationship between the deployed Special Forces element and the resistance force.

b. When unconventional warfare operational areas fall within the area of influence of advancing major tactical commands, operational control of affected guerrilla forces usually is transferred to the tactical command concerned. In conjunction with this transfer, Special Forces personnel are attached to the tactical command headquarters to provide liaison and to assist in the employment of the guerrilla force.

c. The major tactical commander, such as a field army commander, may assign operational control of the guerrilla force to his subordinate commands. Generally, such delegation of control is not made below division level.

d. Chapter 9 presents a more detailed discussion of utilization of guerrilla forces by tactical commands.

e. Operational control of the underground is discussed in FM 31-21A.

Section III. UNILATERAL EMPLOYMENT

5-6. General

a. The preceding paragraphs outline the employment of Special Forces within the framework of an indigenous resistance movement. Such employment is most appropriate in an established theater where UW operations are of sufficient duration to permit the development and exploitation of a resistance potential. All UW tasks cannot be accomplished in this manner. Unilateral employment of Special Forces elements on special operations or other tasks directed by the commander of the unified command is within the capability of Special Forces (para 1-7).

b. Unilateral employment, sometimes referred to as direct action, is proper under the following conditions:

(1) When Special Forces skills are required by the mission.

(2) When the state of development of a resistance movement or the absence of a significant resistance potential in a critical area precludes the use of resistance forces.

(3) When the urgency of a requirement,
as well as security or policy considerations, necessitates execution by US personnel.

5—7. Contingency Operations

Contingency operations may involve unilateral action by Special Forces, particularly during the early stages of commitment, because of the urgency of requirements and a lack of indigenous assets. In other situations, Special Forces may be the only component of a contingency force capable of executing some of the tasks derived from the force commander’s mission.

5—8. Special Tasks

See FM 31–21A.

Section IV. AIR SUPPORT

5—9. General

a. Air operations in support of UW activities differ from those in support of conventional tactical operations. Aircrews with special training are required for the accurate and undetected delivery of personnel and equipment to the UWOA, or for the extraction of personnel or objects from these areas.

b. Air support of Special Forces engaged in UW operations may be provided from Army, Navy, or Air Force resources depending on the availability and the capability of aircraft and aircrews for specific missions or categories of support. Army aviation elements organic to the Special Forces group and Special Air Warfare aircrews of the US Air Force, which are trained in clandestine air support techniques, provide support within their capabilities. Some aircraft employed by these elements are specially configured or equipped for UW support. When support requirements exceed the numbers or capabilities of Special Forces or Special Air Warfare aircraft, other air support elements are employed. Army and Air Force air support of UW is discussed in succeeding paragraphs. Support by naval aviation is discussed in paragraphs 5–12 through 5–16.

c. See FM 31–21A.

5—10. Army Aviation

a. General.

★(1) Organic aviation. Army aviation organic to the Special Forces group is limited to support Special Forces requirements, because of its specialized training, immediate availability, common security and operational procedures, common communications, habitual use, and the command relationship. It is the principal source of administrative aviation support to the SFOB, and provides operational support as appropriate. Organic aviation normally operates from a site in the vicinity of the SFOB; however, aircraft operational teams tailored to fit the mission may be deployed to secure areas near the UWOA to improve range capabilities. When requirements are within the capabilities of Army aircraft, but exceed the capability of organic aviation, additional aviation may be attached or given a supporting or reinforcing mission. Command relationships and the duration of the assignment are specified at the time such assignment is made (FM 1–100).

(2) Attached aviation. When the gaining Special Forces unit is assigned operational control or attached aviation, and when the attachment is of sufficient duration, attached aircrews may be profitably trained and employed on operational missions. If time and the specified command relationship preclude operational employment, attached aviation is employed on administrative support missions.

(3) Supporting and reinforcing aviation. Aviation units placed in direct or general support, or assigned a reinforcing mission, normally are employed on administrative support rather than operational missions.

b. Operational Missions.

(1) The following operational missions are appropriate for Army aviation elements in support of UW:

(a) Surveillance and reconnaissance (visual, photographic, and electronic).

(b) Direct fire support.

(c) Airborne radio retransmission between the SFOB and deployed detachments.

(d) Infiltration.

(e) Exfiltration.

(f) Resupply.

(g) PSYOP loudspeaker and leaflet missions.

(h) Message pickup and delivery.

(i) Airmobile operations.

(j) Deception operations.
(2) Army aviation support of UW is discussed in FM 1-105.

c. UWOA Based Aircraft. When the tactical situation permits, aircraft of any service can be infiltrated into the UWOA to perform air operations missions. This employment is appropriate only when the following conditions exist:

(1) The UWOA is large and well-secured by the guerrilla force, and landing areas are available or may be constructed.

(2) The UWOA is in a remote area and generally denied to enemy ground operations by the local topography.

(3) Enemy air defenses or air defense systems are ineffective or nonexistent.

(4) Enemy nuclear capability is nonexistent or so reduced as to make nuclear attack in the UWOA unlikely.

(5) It is tactically feasible to infiltrate aviation elements using either their own flight capability, or by Air Force or Navy transportation.

(6) See also paragraph 4-13 on internal support bases.

5-11. Air Force Support

a. General. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) is the primary US Air Force activity with UW interests and responsibilities, although other commands and activities may be directly or indirectly involved in UW support. Within TAC, Special Air Warfare wings are equipped for UW air support and trained in UW air tactics and techniques.

b. Special Air Warfare Squadrons. Special Air Warfare squadrons provide the nucleus for Air Force UW support. They are assigned within continental United States (CONUS) as subordinate elements of TAC. In overseas areas, they may be assigned to the appropriate major command as part of area tactical air forces. The organization, equipment, and strength of a Special Air Warfare squadron is flexible and may be developed or modified to satisfy mission or area requirements.

c. Command Relationships. When a Joint UW command organization (para 4-4) exists, Special Air Warfare and other Air Force units allocated to the joint UW force comprise the Air Force component of that force. Operational control of Air Force elements is exercised by the commander of the joint force through the Air Force component commander. In the absence of a joint UW command or force, command and control of Air Force UW resources are as specified by the major air commander concerned, or by higher authority. AFM 2-5 outlines Air Force doctrine on command and control of Special Air Warfare forces. Joint doctrine on command and control, including the criteria for allocation, and attachment, with or without operational control, is contained in JCS Pub 2, and in FM 100-27.

d. Operational Missions. The following operational missions are appropriate for Air Force elements in support of UW:

(1) Surveillance and reconnaissance (visual, photographic, and electronic).

(2) Infiltration.

(3) Resupply.

(4) Exfiltration.

(5) Airborne radio retransmission.

(6) Interdiction.

(7) Close air support.

(8) PSYOP loudspeaker and leaflet missions.

(9) Airlift support.

(10) Deception operations.

(11) Message pickup and delivery.
Section V. NAVAL SUPPORT

5–12. General
Coastal areas have always been vulnerable to naval operations. Improved carrier-based aircraft and advanced weapon systems have greatly extended the Navy's capability to influence operations inland. This fact, along with other advances in technology, has increased the ability of the Navy to support Special Forces UW operations. Support by subsurface, surface, and aviation elements of the Navy, as well as support by specialized naval units, are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

5–13. Subsurface Craft
a. The submarine provides a dependable means for accurate and undetected delivery or removal of personnel and equipment. This method of transportation is effective providing the distance from short (once the forces have landed) to the operational area is not prohibitive. Water of sufficient depth for submerged operations relatively close to the selected beach area is important. This reduces the distance between the dropoff point and the shore, which is usually covered at night in inflatable boats or by swimmers using self-contained underwater breathing apparatus. Human fatigue, errors in navigation, and the cumulative effects of tide, current, and wind decrease as the distance to be traveled decreases.

b. See FM 31–21A.

5–14. Surface Forces
Naval elements can support a specific UW mission by conducting landing feints, gunfire attacks, or air strikes. Certain naval units may be assigned UW support as a primary mission. Surface forces of the Navy are capable of providing the following types of support to Special Forces:

a. Infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply.

b. Communications support.

c. Logistic support.

d. SFOB afloat.

5–15. Naval Aviation
a. General. Naval aircraft are not designed for troop carrier operations, therefore their capability for air delivery of troops and equipment is limited. Certain types of naval aircraft, as well as those of the fleet capable of launching and recovering aircraft, can provide advantages under otherwise restrictive operational conditions.

b. Ship-Based Aircraft. The mobility of the fleet can extend the range of both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft into many areas of the world denied to land-based air support. Aircraft carriers normally include among their complement at least one cargo aircraft capable of being configured for airdrop or air ground pickup of personnel or equipment. Other carrier-based naval aircraft can provide a similar, but reduced, capability for infiltration or resupply; however, their primary value is in the functions of reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack. Rotary wing aircraft operations are not restricted to aircraft carriers since most larger naval ships have landing decks which will accommodate one or more helicopters. Both fixed and rotary wing Army aircraft organic to the Special Forces group, as well as certain types of Air Force aircraft, are capable of carrier-based operations. Carrier-based operations by Army aircraft are discussed in FM 1–105.

c. Land-Based Aircraft. Naval patrol and cargo aircraft based ashore can provide a means for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of a UW mission within range. Some patrol aircraft may be configured for airdrop or air ground pickup, and some models are capable of operating from water.

5–16. Specialized Navy and Marine Corps Units
Sea Air Land Teams of the Navy, and to a lesser degree, Navy underwater demolition teams and Fleet Marine Force reconnaissance units, have capabilities which may be employed in the conduct or support of UW. Personnel of SEAL units are SCUBA qualified and normally are also parachutists. They are trained in clandestine operations and are capable of performing reconnaissance, demoli-
tions, and other tasks at sea or on hostile shores and inland waterways in conjunction with naval operations or in coordination with other UW forces. Naval units allocated to a joint UW command or force (para 4–4), comprise the Navy component of that force. Operational control of these naval elements is exercised by the commander of the joint force through the Navy component commander. Navy doctrine on employment of SEAL Teams is contained in (S) NWIP 29–1, SEAL Teams in Naval Special Warfare (U).

Section VI. SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

5–17. Signal Section, Special Forces Group
The signal section, consisting of the group signal officer and his assistants, coordinates signal requirements, prepares the signal operating instructions, the standing signal instructions, and signal annexes for UW operational plans and orders.

5–18. Signal Company, Special Forces Group
The signal company establishes the signal center of the SFOB. Contact with subordinate or alternate SFOBs and with deployed operational detachments is established and maintained at the signal center. Communications systems and radio circuits from the theater UW command and other components of the command terminate at the signal center.

5–19. Operational Detachments
The Special Forces operational detachments supervise and assist the establishment of guerilla force communications. Communications between deployed Special Forces elements and the SFOB are unilateral. Communications in the UWOWA are discussed in paragraphs 7–9 and 7–10.

5–20. Communications Security
a. Appropriate security measures are taken to protect communications systems against physical compromise, interception, traffic analysis, direction finding, imitative deception, and cryptoanalysis.

b. Communications which include information of a sensitive nature, and which require limited handling, are encrypted with appropriate internal handling instructions.

c. U.S. Army cryptoequipment and procedures are not made available to indigenous forces without prior approval of competent authority. Low-level code and cypher systems can be devised which provide secure communications within these forces.

d. The sensitive nature of UW operations demands strict control over all communications traffic. Length and number of transmissions are limited during periodic radio contacts.

e. For detailed information concerning the safeguarding and proper handling of cryptographic material and classified COMSEC equipment, see AR 380–40, AR 380–41, appropriate ACP listed in JANAP 201, and DA Pam 310–9.
CHAPTER 6
INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

Section I. INFILTRATION

6-1. General
   a. Infiltration is the clandestine entrance of selected personnel, documents, or equipment into a hostile area. Procedures used are designed to avoid contact or detection by the enemy.
   b. Special Forces employ three general methods of infiltration—air, water, and land, as well as combinations of these.
   c. Air, water, or land infiltration may be met by a preplanned friendly reception party, or it may be "blind" when no reception party is employed.
   d. Stay-behind operations, see FM 31-20.
   e. See FM 31-21A.

6-2. Air Infiltration
   a. General. Air is usually the most practical and rapid means of infiltration. Personnel and supplies can be transported to, and airdropped or landed within any geographical area of the world.
   b. Advantages of Air Infiltration.
      (1) Generally unaffected by terrain.
      (2) Speed of delivery.
      (3) Direct delivery into operational area.
      (4) Relatively short exposure to enemy countermeasures.
      (5) Ability to deliver supplies in excess of each individual’s load.
   c. Disadvantages of Air Infiltration.
      (1) Precise navigation may be difficult.
      (2) Requirement for aircrew to be trained in specialized techniques.
      (3) Vulnerability to enemy air defense and detection measures.
      (4) Affected by weather conditions.
      (5) Possible injury to personnel and damage or loss of equipment when airdropped.

6-3. Water Infiltration
   a. General. Infiltration by water includes the use of surface or undersea craft. The most secure means is by undersea craft, while the use of surface craft is considered to be the most efficient.
   b. Advantages of Water Infiltration.
      (1) Long-range delivery capability.
      (2) Relatively unaffected by weather up to the point of debarkation from parent craft.
      (3) Exfiltration operations may be possible in conjunction with infiltration.
      (4) Operational briefings can be continued en route.
      (5) With surface craft, large quantities of supplies can be transported.
   c. Disadvantages of Water Infiltration.
      (1) Time-consuming transshipment and offshore unloading normally are required.
      (2) Movement of supplies from landing site to final destination is subject to limitations of land infiltration.
      (3) Additional packaging is required to protect equipment from water damage.
      (4) Additional training and equipment may be required.
      (5) Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing operations.
      (6) Limited cargo capacity of current undersea craft.

6-4. Land Infiltration
   a. General. Under most circumstances, land infiltration is the least desirable means and is usually limited to short distances. Land infiltration is best accomplished under conditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain.

(6) Necessity to "sterilize" (remove all evidence of use) the DZ/LZ.
Land infiltration is most feasible when the enemy's lines are overextended, the combat zone fluid, or portions of the country's borders are inadequately secured. Personnel participating in land infiltration must be well trained in survival, evasion techniques, and land navigation.

b. Advantages of Land Infiltration.
(1) Requires minimum logistical support.
(2) Provides an opportunity for area familiarization.
(3) Provides flexibility of movement and timing consistent with the local situation.
(4) Requires little interservice coordination.

c. Disadvantages of Land Infiltration.
(1) More time required.
(2) Increased vulnerability to enemy detection and interdiction.
(3) Limited capability for transporting supplies and equipment.

Section II. EXFILTRATION

6–5. General
Exfiltration is the extraction or evacuation of personnel, documents, or equipment from an operational area and may be accomplished by air, water, or land. Methods and procedures used are designed to avoid detection and interception by the enemy. In selecting exfiltration sites, the danger of compromising other activities, if the exfiltration is observed, must be considered.

6–6. Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages and disadvantages of the methods of exfiltration are generally the same as those listed for infiltration by the same means.
CHAPTER 7
ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UWOA

Section I. THE AREA COMMAND

7-1. General
The organization of an unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA) involves early compartmentation of the command structure and the subsequent buildup of resistance forces. Buildup is the expansion of the original nucleus into an operational unit capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. Special Forces detachments infiltrate the UWOA either before or after this organization has taken place.

7-2. The Area Command

a. General. As discussed in chapter 4, the area command normally is a combined organization designed to integrate the Special Forces detachment and the resistance organization in a UWOA. Details of organization vary according to the situation, mission, size of the resistance organization, and the relationship between the resistance force and the Special Forces detachment. See FM 31-21A.

b. Composition. The area command usually is composed of two basic subdivisions—

(1) Command group. The command group may consist of the Special Forces detachment, the resistance leader and his staff, and, as appropriate, representatives from the auxiliary, underground, and guerrilla force in the area. Either a formal staff is organized or the command group meets periodically or "on call." See FM 31-21A.

(2) Resistance forces. The resistance force may include three components: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground.

c. The Command Group. The purpose of the command group is to provide centralized control and coordination of all resistance activities in the UWOA.

d. Resistance Forces.

(1) General. A resistance movement contains two broad categories of membership, those whose principal function is to conduct operations against the enemy and those who support the operational elements. Operations against the enemy may be overt, by guerrilla who openly bear arms, or clandestine activity conducted by the underground. The auxiliary is the internal support element of the resistance organization. It functions chiefly as support for the guerrilla force since security often requires that the underground support its own activities.

(2) The guerrilla force. The overt element of a resistance movement which takes direct action against enemy forces and facilities is the guerrilla force. It is organized into units and subunits along military lines and is composed of full-time guerrillas, although it may rely on temporary assistance from part-time guerrillas who live within its area of operations.

(3) The auxiliary.

(a) General. The function of the auxiliary is to organize both active and passive civilian supporters of the resistance movement so that they are responsive to the needs of the area command. Their organization and operations are clandestine in nature and members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance movement.

(b) Membership. The auxiliary includes that portion of the population who are not full-time guerrillas or members of the underground, but who are sympathetic to the resistance movement and are willing to assist. Their effort is organized and directed by the area command.
(c) Organization. The auxiliary command structure normally conforms to existing political subdivisions; however, the territorial organization of the auxiliary should be compatible with that of the local guerrilla force.

(d) Role of the auxiliary. Auxiliary units normally are assigned direct support missions for a specific guerrilla unit in their area and general support missions for the area command. Activities in support of the guerrilla unit include security and warning, logistics, medical support, recruiting, and providing a reserve of part-time guerrillas for diversionary operations or temporary reinforcement of the supported guerrilla unit. Such functions as intelligence and counterintelligence, psychological operations, and evasion and escape operations are coordinated at the area command level. One of the most important functions of the auxiliary is to exercise control or influence over the movement and activity of the population.

(4) The underground.

(a) General. The underground is that element of a resistance organization which conducts operations in areas denied to the guerrilla force either by enemy security measures or by opposition of a segment of the population. Urban areas, for example, are particularly susceptible to attack by the underground. The underground is a clandestine, highly compartmented organization whose members do not openly express sympathy with the resistance and who make every effort to conceal their participation. Its activities must be an integrated part of the total resistance effort and are coordinated at an appropriate level in the resistance organization. An underground organization is largely self-contained and performs many of its own support functions; however, requirements beyond its capability may be procured through other resistance channels or from a sponsoring power. Successful underground operations are dependent upon a superior security system and careful selection of its membership.

(b) Role of the underground. See FM 31–21A.

(c) Mission of the underground. See FM 31–21A.

(d) Organization of the underground. See FM 31–21A.

(e) Control of the underground. See FM 31–21A.

7–3. Special Forces Initial Objective in the UWOA

The initial major objective for the Special Forces operational detachment is to develop resistance elements into an effective combat force. To facilitate this development within the UWOA, several tasks must be accomplished:

a. Conduct of the area assessment.
b. Establishment of an effective working relationship among the various resistance elements and the Special Forces operational detachment.
c. Establishment of the security, intelligence collection, and communications systems.
d. Organization of civilian support.
e. Organization of a logistical system.
f. Provision for administrative services.
g. Establishment of a training program.
h. Planning and execution of tactical operations commensurate with the state of training of the guerrilla unit.
i. Expansion of guerrilla forces to permit their support of the unified commander's unconventional warfare objectives.

7–4. Command Relationships of U.S. Agencies in the UWOA

In addition to Special Forces operational detachment(s), there may be other U.S. military or nonmilitary units operating within the UWOA. Normally, the presence of other activities in an area is known in advance by the commanders concerned. Command relationships are specified and area authority established prior to infiltration and necessary liaison, coordination, and cooperation are effected.

7–5. Geographical Areas of Responsibility

a. Unconventional Warfare Operational Area. Normally, plans are initiated for the organization of the UWOA far in advance of anticipated deployment of a Special Forces operational detachment. These plans are based
on the designation by the unified force commander of specific geographical areas within enemy territory as unconventional warfare operational areas.

b. Unconventional Warfare Operational Sector. Based on the development of the UWOA and the requirements for additional special forces operational detachments, it may be advisable to subdivide the UWOA. These subdivisions are called sectors. The sector remains subordinate to the UWOA. An operational detachment becomes responsible for each sector. Sectors are further divided into subsectors when appropriate.

Section II. SPECIAL FORCES-RESISTANCE RELATIONS

7-6. General

a. Immediately upon completion of the infiltration, the Special Forces detachment commander initiates action to organize the guerrilla effort to achieve guerrilla warfare objectives.

b. The detachment commander impresses upon the resistance leaders that all personnel involved have a common goal against a common enemy and that it is to their mutual benefit for the guerrillas to accept sponsorship and operational guidance for the United States.

c. Once the guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages of close cooperation, the Special Forces detachment commander develops a command structure in conjunction with resistance leaders (para 7-12).

d. In some situations, the nucleus of resistance elements may be recruited from exiled or liberated personnel currently located in friendly-held territory. These personnel and units may be infiltrated as indicated in chapter 6.

7-7. Considerations

a. Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among the various guerrilla units are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces efforts to unify them. Opposition may stem from many causes such as personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences. It is essential that the detachment commander and his subordinates have a knowledge and appreciation of these attitudes and of the personalities concerned. He must know how extensive the Phase I preparation was, to include promises made and commitments to be honored. Without specific guidance from competent US authority, it is beyond the scope of the detachment commander to make political commitments in the name of the US Government. Guidance in political matters will normally emanate from the unified commander through the JUWTF and the SFOB. At some point prior to the linkup with conventional US forces, political responsibilities may be assumed by Army Civil Affairs, and a Civil Affairs liaison officer may be assigned to Special Forces units within the GWOA.

b. Perhaps the most delicate part of a detachment commander's responsibility is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy key positions. If leaders and staff members of the resistance organization do not appear qualified to fill positions held, the detachment commander should endeavor to increase their effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel normally will increase the influence of the detachment commander. If all efforts in this direction fail and the future effectiveness of the resistance force is in doubt, the detachment commander should discreetly attempt to influence the selection of new leaders. It is mandatory, however, that the Special Forces commander exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive area, lest he jeopardize his mission or even the survival of his detachment.

c. The detachment commander and several of his subordinates should have at least a working knowledge of the local language. If, however, interpreters must be used, such personnel must be selected and utilized with caution. A detachment commander will have considerable difficulty gaining the confidence of the guerrillas who either dislike or distrust the interpreter(s).

d. All members of the Special Forces detachment must display a high degree of professional competence in unconventional warfare operations.

e. The judicious control of supplies may persuade the guerrillas to form a united force and support US objectives.

f. A medical facility to provide limited treatment for noncombatant personnel should be established by the Special Forces detachment.
g. The Special Forces detachment commander and his subordinate must have a thorough knowledge of, and a rigid respect for, local courtesies, traditions, and taboos.

h. All members of the detachment must abide by the provisions of the Code of Conduct and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to display loyalty to their own nation's future.

Section III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

7–8. General

a. Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among the various guerrilla units are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces efforts to unify them. A planned psychological operations program can be of assistance in achieving cohesive efforts among Special Forces and guerrilla units.

b. Unconventional warfare involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional, partisanship. Resistance organizations tend to attract personnel who accept violence as a means of achieving change.

c. The ideological and political factors associated with resistance activity create a fertile field for propaganda. Ideally, certain members of resistance movements are active propagandists. Hence, there is paralleling the guerrilla military effort a propaganda effort conducted by all resistance elements seeking to gain support for their movement. Civilians may be induced to harass the enemy by participating in work slowdowns, strikes, absenteeism, minor acts of sabotage, arson, etc. The relative isolation and clandestine atmosphere associated with resistance activities creates a continuing need for propaganda to support the effort.

d. Special Forces units, by their presence in a particular country, have a psychological impact on selected military or paramilitary elements and on informed elements of the population. Two factors which contribute to a favorable psychological impact are—tangible evidence of United States' interest and support through the presence of Special Forces personnel in daily face-to-face meetings and an evident appreciation by these US representatives of the objectives and problems of the indigenous guerrilla force. This impact can be increased if psychological operations techniques are used at various stages in the organization and development of the guerrilla force. This task requires the detachment commander to have a thorough knowledge of psychological operations fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the peculiar operational environment in which he is immersed. This is particularly true in the initial phases of forming guerrilla units when the Special Forces operational detachment commander is seeking to win and weave together the assistance of supporting resistance elements (FM 33–1). PSYOP methods and techniques are discussed in detail in FM 33–1 and FM 33–5.

☆e. Attached US PSYOP specialists will augment Special Forces units operating in a UW environment as required by a specific situation or mission.

7–9. Target Groups

a. General. In a UW environment there are four major target groups:

Group 1—Enemy Military Forces.
Group 2—The Populace.
Group 3—Guerrillas.
Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground.

b. Group 1—Enemy Military Forces. This group consists of enemy military personnel. These military forces may be of the same nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying foreign power. Psychological warfare programs are directed against this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the morality of their cause. Guerrilla activities to include interdiction operations, particularly at night, induce in the enemy soldier a basic feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This feeling of inadequacy and fear permits easy access to the mind with the several tools of psychological operations, and may make the enemy soldier vulnerable to persuasion urging surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion. These procedures may include pointing up appropriate inadequacies in their supplies and equipment and the constant danger of death. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, psycho-
logical warfare serves to lower his morale and reduce his effectiveness, particularly in conjunction with the powerful pressures generated by continuous combat action. The enemy soldier's feeling of isolation and his receptivity to US-sponsored propaganda can be further increased through leaflets and broadcast messages which stress the popular support of the arms of the guerrillas. The propaganda appeals must attract attention, address a cogent problem, be meaningful, and show the way to a practical solution. For example, when tactically justified, the enemy soldier should be told why and how he should defect and given assurances concerning his safety and welcome. When enemy soldiers are captured by or defect to the guerrillas, promises of safety and good treatment must be kept. Proof of good treatment could be passed on to enemy units by photographing the soldier, having him sign leaflets, or possibly having him make loudspeaker broadcasts to his former comrades. Resistance clandestine elements may also inform enemy units, by rumor and surreptitious contact, of the well-being of defected or captured personnel. The defection of an enemy soldier is important news to his former comrades and may provide those remaining behind to consider similar action. Such operations have a great psychological impact on the enemy and on the guerrillas as well. The enemy is made to feel that his own comrades are wavering and do not support their goals, while the guerrillas begin to realize the enemy is weakening, and their own chances for success are increasing. The psychological warfare objective against this target group is to cause the combat efficiency of the enemy military forces to diminish materially. Under exceptional circumstances, certain of these personnel may ultimately be included in Group 4, Resistance Forces.

c. Group 2—The Populace.

(1) Enemy supporters include those civilians in an operational area who willingly collaborate with the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad psychological objectives, however, are the same as for those directed against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the collaborators, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against collaborators may result in reprisals and consequent loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations objectives; however, punitive action is often initiated and effected against collaborators by the guerrillas and other elements of the resistance. Such action is difficult to prevent, but must not be encouraged or sanctioned by US Army representatives in the guerrilla warfare area. Psychological operations programs against this group are designed to curtail their support of the enemy forces and elicit their support of the resistance forces.

(2) Guerrilla supporters include that part of the civilian population which is sympathetic toward the goals of the resistance force but who are not active members of some element of the resistance force. Psychological operations programs aimed and directed at this target audience stress appeals for the population to support the guerrillas in achieving common objectives. Successful guerrilla movements require that some portion of the population be favorably inclined toward these movements. In the initial stage of hostilities, the population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy force as well as those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological operations program must stress that the guerrillas share the political and social goals of the population, that these goals will be successful, and that the United States in supporting the guerrilla force supports these political and social goals. Special Forces personnel in the operational area have access to exploitable information on the immediate situation and on the attitudes and behavior of the local population. It may be directed that the Special Forces commander provide such information to higher headquarters in order that specific predetermined and coordinated psychological programs can be carried out in support of the UW effort. This support may be limited to the dissemination of leaflet or radio propaganda to the population or may be expanded to supply the guerrillas with the themes and materials to conduct PSYOP. The SFOB commander may provide the Special Forces operational detachment with additional advice as well as capabilities upon which to base a detailed and integrated psy-
psychological program. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this group is to impress upon them that they, the guerrillas, and the United States, have a common goal, and the success of this goal directly depends upon this group's support. This is the group that will serve as the primary recruiting source for personnel for Groups 3 and 4.

d. Group 3—Guerrillas. Psychological operations programs aimed at this target group stress that the presence of Special Forces personnel provides the guerrilla force with tangible evidence that the United States supports the general objectives of the guerrilla movement. Since the guerrilla bears the brunt of enemy attention and counteractions, any acceptable activities that enhance his prestige or raise his morale should be used. Other programs must stress the reliance of guerrillas on, and their rapport with, the population for support.

e. Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground. The efforts of this group should receive suitable recognition and be urged to continue their activities of aiding the guerrilla force; however, caution must be exercised to avoid compromising these individuals by unwittingly revealing them as members of the resistance force. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this target group is to impress upon all personnel that the ultimate success of the resistance movement depends upon their unwavering support.

7—10. Psychological Operations Activities

★a. General. These include operations by which the Special Forces commander seeks to achieve psychological effects on the four target groups previously discussed. The board spectrum of combat will have psychological as well as conventional military objectives. Examples are operations which tend to unify and increase the morale of the guerrilla fighters, or those which manifest guerrilla support of the people. As a byproduct, such operations tend to reinforce civilian beliefs in the strength of the guerrilla force and their political and military objectives. From the practical side, these operations should produce sources of food and information required for the survival of the guerrilla force. Evidence that the strength of the guerrilla force is growing tends to lower enemy morale and increase requirements for countermeasures. Within the limitation of resources available, operations initiated primarily for their psychological effects may include—

(1) Supporting the civilian population by sharing medical services and supplies.
(2) Providing sanctuary, as required, to civilians supporting the guerrilla cause.
(3) Encouraging portions of the civilian population to pursue traditional ways of life in the face of enemy opposition.
(4) Providing manpower and skills to the local population to repair or build needed structures, harvest crops, maintain schools and churches, and organize social activity groups.
(5) As feasible, the Special Forces detachment personnel may reinforce operations by direct contact with local civilians to provide additional evidence that the guerrillas are supported by the United States and that all are working in the interest of the population.

★b. Face-to-Face Communication. Face-to-face communication is the most effective PSYOP media and, therefore, should receive primary emphasis in PSYOP conducted within the UWOA. This medium ranges from confrontation of two individuals in informal conversation to planned persuasive communication among many individuals. The personal touch inherent in face-to-face communication plays an important role in conveying the PSYOP message. All members of the Special Forces detachment should be aware of the importance of face-to-face communication in conducting PSYOP.

★c. Printed Media. Printed leaflets, posters or bulletins can be produced by the area command on simple reproduction machines or produced with a variety of field expedient means. The techniques of leaflet writing for unconventional operations are essentially the same as for conventional programs. Utilizing knowledgeable members of the resistance force, psychological themes can be adapted to local conditions in order to produce timely, creditable, and consistent messages. Locally prepared programs can be augmented by requesting air deliveries of printed media and special PSYOP equipment. These materials can be airdropped to target audiences or issued through auxiliary unit channels.

★d. Rumor. Rumor can be an effective propaganda device, but requires extreme skill and care in its use. Accordingly, members of the resistance force initiate or participate in rumor campaigns for short range tactical objectives only. The SF command will furnish appropriate guidance. To insure consonance with theater objectives, ru-
mors of a long-range and/or strategic impact should not be disseminated without authority of the SFOB.

7-11. Development of Psychological Operations Campaign

a. While specific aspects of any particular campaign will vary in accordance with the situation, the steps for planning a psychological operations campaign are applicable to any situation. Organic or attached PSYOP specialists provide PSYOP staff guidance and plans to the commander and supervise implementation, based upon the commander's guidance.

b. A psychological operations campaign consists of two fundamental phases: the selection of the psychological objectives and the accomplishment of these objectives. In the first phase of the campaign, the condition and attitudes within the area of operations are analyzed in terms of potential target groups; their susceptibility and effectiveness. From this analysis, meaningful psychological objectives are developed which, if achieved, will result in the accomplishment of the assigned, psychological operations mission. The second phase of the campaign involves the creation of meaningful themes which will be employed by appropriate media, stressed as the situation demands, scheduled in accordance with the concept of the campaign, and disseminated accordingly. These themes must be directed at the achievement of the psychological objectives.

Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

7-12. General

Communications used in unconventional warfare require continuous evaluation and adjustment to meet changing operational and security requirements. Within the UWOA, non-electronic means are used wherever practical. Until the area is relatively secure, radio and other electronic means should be used sparingly to avoid enemy detection. Direction communication between all elements of the area command usually is neither desirable nor possible due to the necessity for compartmentation of one activity from another, the physical distances between elements, and the primitive communications means employed.

7-13. Area Command Systems of Communication

a. Internal Communications.

(1) General. Direct communications between all elements of the area command usually are neither desirable nor possible due to the necessity for compartmentation of one activity from another, the physical distances between elements, and the communications means employed. The area command establishes communications with subordinate resistance components. Although operations by all components of the resistance force must be mutually supporting and coordinated, the guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground all organize, operate and communicate differently because their activities and operational environments are different.

(2) Guerrilla force. Communications with and between guerrilla units normally will be by messenger or by visual and audible signals. Operational tasks are assigned and coordinated at periodic meetings or by liaison visits. While voice radio could assist coordination of tactical operations, its use advertises the presence and location of guerrilla units and detracts from the guerrillas' surprise and elusiveness.

(3) Auxiliary. The auxiliary is a compartment organization which employs clandestine communications techniques. Its environment usually permits greater freedom of movement than is possible by the underground. The auxiliary establishes courier routes or systems for its own communications and provides courier service to the area command and its guerrilla units.

(4) Underground. The underground is a highly compartmented organization which relies on clandestine communication techniques. Contact with other resistance elements is extremely limited for security reasons and may not always be possible at the area command level (FM 31-21 A).

b. External Communications.

(1) Control and support. Deployed Special Forces detachments provide communications between the UWOA and the SFOB (para 4-14 and 4-15). These external communications are unilateral even when an area command is established. Normally, all detachments communicate directly with the SFOB and not with each other.
Electronic communications between deployed detachments in the same or nearby UWOA's is either prohibited or severely restricted for security reasons. Lateral contact between detachments, using any means, normally is prohibited to compartment one operation from another.

(2) \textit{Link-up communications}. When the UWOA becomes a part of the area of influence of the friendly ground unit commander, communications must be established between that unit and the deployed detachment to facilitate coordination of tactical operations. This communication system will normally be voice radio.

c. \textit{Factors Affecting Radio Communications}. Radio communications within an area command are affected by the operational situation and requirements, the physical geography of the area, enemy capabilities in detection and intercept techniques, and the communication equipment and operators available. It must be assumed that the enemy intercepts every electronic signal originating within the UWOA.

\textbf{Section V. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA}

\textbf{7–14. General}

Logistical support for resistance forces is derived from two primary sources: the sponsor (external supply) and the UWOA (internal supply). Logistical planning by the area command is based upon support available from
both of these sources.

a. Internal support includes locally available transportation, care of the sick and wounded, and other personal services. It may also include food, clothing, and shelter, when they are available in the UWOA. Plans consider the possibility of rationing or requisitioning of food and clothing by the enemy and the effects of further demands for these items on the population. Successful guerrilla operations provide a source of arms and military equipment; however, it may be necessary for a sponsoring power to augment these sources.

b. Major items from an external source are weapons, ammunition, demolitions, medical supplies, and communications equipment. As indicated above, it may be necessary to supply rations and clothing. Appropriate logistics directives provide guidance on types and amounts of rations, arms, and equipment suitable for guerrilla warfare operations (FM 101-10-3).

7-15. Internal Logistical Support to the Resistance Elements

a. The area command supervises the allocation of logistical support provided by internal sources.

b. Each guerrilla unit is assigned a part of the UWOA from which to receive logistical support. Usually, guerrilla units receive direct logistical support from the auxiliary units within their assigned sector. In addition to the support from local auxiliaries, the guerrilla unit depends upon operations against the enemy to satisfy a portion of its logistical requirements.

c. One of the functions of auxiliary units is logistical support to guerrilla units. Since the auxiliaries must also support themselves, their support of guerrilla forces from local resources may be sporadic and undependable.

d. The logistical role of the underground is largely one of supporting its own members. The area command may support the underground with special equipment received from the sponsor.

e. The Special Forces commander may be issued operational funds in the form of negotiable currency or gold with which to purchase critical items or services within the UWOA. General guidance on fiscal administration is contained in AR 37-103, 37-103-1, and AR 381-141.

7-16. External Supply

a. Supply of the area command from external sources varies from small, initial deliveries to total logistical support.

b. If possible, sponsor-provided supplies are delivered directly to the lowest level guerrilla unit having Special Forces representation.

c. The situation may be such that direct delivery to the guerrilla unit is neither desirable nor possible. In such cases, supplies are delivered to a location from which further supervised distribution is made by Special Forces personnel. Although this method requires more time and effort, it permits continued control over sponsor-provided supplies. This may be the preferred method when the guerrilla unit does not include Special Forces representation on a full-time basis.

7-17. Storage

The protected storage or caching of supplies and equipment plays an important role in the area command logistical plan. The uncertainties of the weather and enemy action may prevent regularly scheduled delivery of supplies by the sponsoring power. The area command, therefore, should be prepared to operate for varying periods of time without external re-supply. Guerrilla units cannot maintain excess stocks of supplies or equipment without limiting their mobility and combat effectiveness. To minimize the risk of discovery by the enemy, supplies in excess of current requirements are cached in a number of isolated locations. Only the commander and key personnel should know the location of caches.

7-18. Transportation Services

The transportation requirements of the area command normally are met by resources from within the area. In most instances it is impractical for the sponsor to provide the types of transportation required for operational use.
7-19. Medical Service in the UWOA
The primary purpose of medical service in support of the unconventional warfare effort is to conserve the fighting strength of all participating resistance and Special Forces personnel. As soon after infiltration as practicable, the Special Forces operational detachment commander insures that a medical service facility is established. The auxiliary plays an important role in medical service support.

Section VI. ADMINISTRATION IN THE UWOA

7-20. General
A program for administration and management within the area command is established. Security requirements determine the type and number of records to be maintained, and may preclude keeping any records whatsoever. If facilities and equipment exist for miniaturizing records, such records are cached for recovery or disposition at a later date. Extreme precautions are exercised to prevent any records from falling into the hands of the enemy.

7-21. Value of Records
Accurate records maintained by the area command in a UW environment have value during the post hostilities period. Aside from historical purposes, such records assist in the settling of disputes or claims.

Section VII. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRAINING PROGRAM

7-22. General
a. An important part of the Special Forces detachments mission usually is to develop selected guerrilla cadre into competent instructors of guerrilla units.

b. Based upon a preinfiltration estimate of the training situation, a training plan and, if possible, the program of instruction is prepared by the detachment prior to infiltration.

c. The combat effectiveness of a guerrilla force depends, to a large degree, on its state of training and motivation. As soon as practicable after infiltration, the detachment commander refines the estimate, plan, and program of instruction prepared before infiltration and initiates a training program. The provisions of FM 21-5 are applicable to the training of guerrilla units.

7-23. Characteristics of Guerrilla Training
Training is normally decentralized. To expedite the training program and to provide effective instruction to dispersed units, centralized training courses are designed and presented to selected guerrilla personnel who in turn act as instructor cadres to dispersed units.

7-24. Training Operations
As a training vehicle, the guerrillas should be given an opportunity to participate in limited combat engagements. Such engagements are productive only if within the capability of the guerrilla unit concerned. A combat defeat in the early stages of training has a demoralizing effect on the guerrilla force. Operations are carefully planned and rehearsed and the guerrillas completely prepared in order to assure a high probability of success in initial operations. Every operation should be followed by a critique.
CHAPTER 8
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

Section I. GENERAL

8-1. General
Intelligence, counterintelligence, and security are of extreme significance to both the survival and the effectiveness of Special Forces personnel operating in hostile areas. For Special Forces intelligence techniques, see FM 31-21 and FM 31-20A. See also FM 30-5, FM 30-17, FM 30-17A, FM 30-18, and Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 58-11 (DICOM).

8-2.
See FM 31-21A.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE UWOA

8-3. Guerrilla Force Information Gathering
A guerrilla force normally employs conventional, unsophisticated information gathering techniques such as patrols, and area and target reconnaissance and surveillance. Information gathered in this manner is supplemented by information provided by the auxiliary and underground components of the resistance. The deployed detachments may be required to obtain information within the UWOA or adjoining areas to support theater conventional operations. The area command is frequently in a position to provide intelligence information which is otherwise unavailable to forces operating outside the UWOA. In the assignment of intelligence tasks, the impact on the detachment's primary missions and security and communications limitations are considered.

8-4. Intelligence Information Collection and Production Agencies
a. In addition to the Special Forces personnel, the area command has three primary agencies available for collecting and producing intelligence information, the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. Intelligence information from theater collection and production agencies may be procured from the theater UW command through the SFOB.

b. Special Forces operational detachments may be augmented by intelligence specialists when requirements exceed the capability or degree of skill possessed by the detachments.

8-5. Intelligence Requirements
The area command intelligence section normally has the following requirements for intelligence:

a. To support internal operations.
b. To support higher headquarters.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE UWOA

8-6. General
a. Normally, the enemy will have developed a hard core infrastructure organized to assist in controlling the civilian population, and to assist in identifying, neutralizing, and destroying resistance forces.

b. The establishment of a sound counterintelligence system within the area command
is of utmost importance to neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy infrastructure and his intelligence gathering systems, and to prevent penetration by enemy agents and informants. As the resistance movement gains momentum and new members are recruited, the resistance organization becomes more vulnerable to penetration. Continuous application of effective countermeasures is necessary to the survival of the organization and its members. The area command applies basic counterintelligence principles to its own activities and insures their application by subordinate resistance elements.

8–7. Responsibility
Counterintelligence is a command responsibility under the staff supervision of the intelligence section of the area command.

Section IV. SECURITY WITHIN THE UWOA

8–8. General
a. Security is the keynote to survival and success in UW operations. The area command, in the field of security, seeks the following three objectives:

(1) Prevent the enemy from identifying the organizational structures, missions, and locations of resistance forces.

(2) Prevent the enemy from neutralizing or destroying resistance forces.

(3) Develop an area command organization which minimizes vulnerability to enemy action.

b. A combination of active and passive measures are utilized to increase overall security. These measures include—

(1) Compartmentation of activities.

(2) Dispersion and tactical security.

(3) Communications security.

(4) Mobility of units and installations.

(5) Camouflage, cover, and deception measures.

(6) Counterintelligence measures.

(7) Comprehensive warning systems and as many supplementary systems as possible.

(8) Counterpropaganda measures.
CHAPTER 9
COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF GUERRILLA FORCES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

9-1. General
   a. The combat employment of guerrilla forces begins as soon as training, organization, preparation, and available support permit, and continues through the entire span of guerrilla warfare development.
   b. Guerrilla forces have a much greater chance for success and can support conventional military operations more effectively when their activities are coordinated with the operations of other forces. Unconventional warfare, including guerrilla warfare, is a supporting operation. The guerrilla effort is coordinated with theater operations through the Special Forces operational detachments and the SFOB.
   c. Guerrilla forces normally conduct interdiction operations and attack critical enemy installations in support of theater objectives. Certain situations may dictate that guerrilla forces establish a measure of area control in order to facilitate operations. Guerrilla force capability to seize and hold terrain against a determined enemy is limited. The degrees of control may be classified as follows:
      (1) Area superiority. This is temporary control of an area attained through application of the principles of surprise, mass, and maneuver. Area superiority is maintained only for the period of time required to accomplish missions.
      (2) Area supremacy. This is complete control of a specific area. It is attainable when the enemy is incapable of effective interference with guerrilla operations. Area supremacy normally is not achieved through unconventional warfare efforts alone.
      (3) Contested areas. These are areas subject to permanent control by neither the guerrillas nor the enemy, but which contain targets profitable for attack by the guerrillas. Most guerrilla operations take place in contested areas.

9-2. Characteristics of Guerrilla Combat Operations
   a. Planning. Careful detailed planning is a prerequisite for guerrilla combat operations. In addition to primary targets, alternate targets may be designated to allow subordinate units a degree of flexibility in taking advantage of sudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed to an operation, the area command has minimal capability to divert subordinate units to other missions. Plans must be thorough, yet sufficiently flexible to allow subordinate commanders to adopt alternate courses of action when contingencies arise, or when valuable targets of opportunity are encountered.
   b. Intelligence. As in conventional warfare, the basis for sound decisions is accurate and timely intelligence. The intelligence principles set forth in FM 30–5 are pertinent to guerrilla warfare. See FM 31–20 and FM 31–20A for intelligence techniques applicable to guerrilla operations.
   c. Decentralized Execution. Guerrilla warfare operations feature centralized planning and decentralized execution. Actions of all resistance elements are directed and coordinated by the area commander. Within the guidance furnished by the area commander, subordinate units are allowed the widest possible latitude in the conduct of operations.
   d. Surprise. Guerrilla combat operations stress surprise. Attacks are executed at unexpected times and places. Set patterns of ac-
tion are avoided. Maximum advantage is gained by attacking enemy weaknesses. Surprise may also be enhanced by the conduct of concurrent diversionary activities. Violent and rapid execution of operations assist in achieving surprise.

e. Short Duration Actions. Combat operations of guerrilla forces are usually marked by actions of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal of the attacking force. Prolonged combat action from fixed positions is avoided.

f. Multiple Attacks. Multiple attacks by small units over a wide area may be launched against related targets or portions of a target system. This tends to deceive the enemy as to the location of guerrilla bases, causes him to overestimate guerrilla strength, and forces him to disperse his security forces. Initial attacks may be timed to draw security forces away from critical or more heavily defended targets, or into an ambush.

g. Terrain. The guerrilla forces must have an intimate knowledge of the operational area and take maximum advantage of difficult terrain for movement. The more difficult the terrain, the less chance there is of an unannounced encounter with conventional military forces, especially motorized or mechanized elements.

h. Weather. Guerrilla forces exploit adverse weather conditions since they hamper enemy surveillance, detection, and location processes, and increase the time required for reaction forces to effectively engage the guerrillas if they are located.

9-3. Target Selection Factors

a. The general mission assigned designates the target system to be attacked, with the final selection of target components usually made by the detachment commander. Specific targets may be designated by the theater UW command and SFOB when such targets are of strategic significance. The following important factors largely influence target selection:

   (1) Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or damage will exercise a significant influence upon the enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Such targets as bridges, tunnels, ravines, and mountain passes are critical to lines of communications. Engines, tires, and POL stores are critical to transportation. Each target is considered in relationship to other elements of the target system.

   (2) Accessibility. Accessibility is measured by the ability of the attacker to infiltrate the target area. In studying a target for accessibility, consideration is given to security measures taken in the target area, location of the target, and approach and withdrawal routes.

   (3) Vulnerability. Vulnerability is a target's susceptibility to attack by means available to UW forces. Vulnerability is influenced by the nature of the target, i.e., type, size, disposition, and composition.

   (4) Recuperability. Recuperability is the enemy's ability to restore a damaged facility to normal operating capacity. It is affected by the enemy capability to repair and replace damaged parts of the target.

b. Many of the above are variables. Accordingly, target selections and priorities are continually reviewed and re-evaluated.

c. Operation plans include primary and alternate targets. This enables guerrilla forces assigned the task to adjust plans to meet unforeseen situations precluding attack of the primary target.

d. Target selection always considers possible political-economic-sociological impact. Guerrilla forces seek to destroy the core of enemy power. At the same time, they conserve the energy, unity, and fighting spirit of the friendly civilian population.

Section II. OPERATIONS

9-4. Operational Missions

Operational missions for guerrilla forces include the following:

a. Missions in Support of the Unified Command. These missions are strategic in nature. Special Forces detachments influence the action of guerrilla forces toward the accomplishment of these missions. Operational command
of unconventional warfare forces is retained by the unified force commander and exercised through the theater UW command and the SFOB.

b. Missions to Assist Ground Combat Forces. These missions are conducted to assist advancing tactical commands. As delegated by theater, operational control of guerrilla forces may be exercised by tactical commanders through a Special Forces liaison element. This element is attached to the headquarters gaining operational control from the unified force commander. These missions may result in a linkup between the guerrilla elements and the ground force. See paragraph 9–7.

c. Missions Conducted After Linkup. Rear area security and related missions may be assigned guerrilla forces after linkup with friendly forces. Operational control of the guerrilla force normally is exercised by tactical commanders. Special Forces detachments may continue to assist the guerrilla force in the execution of missions after linkup.

9–5. Missions in Support of the Unified Command

a. General. These missions, strategic in nature, may be tactical in execution. Such missions have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy and usually consist of interdiction of lines of communication and destruction of strategic targets. Subsidiary operations may involve support of psychological operations, special intelligence tasks, subversion operations, and evasion and escape operations. Actions by guerrilla forces against the enemy to obtain logistical items are subsidiary to their strategic missions.

b. Type Missions.

(1) Interdiction. Interdiction operations are designed to interrupt the enemy’s communications, deny him use of certain areas, and destroy industrial facilities, military installations, and equipment. Interdiction ranges from destruction of a vehicle by an individual to attacks by guerrilla forces against strategic industrial sites. Interdiction can make a significant contribution to the destruction of enemy combat power and will to fight. Guerrilla operations which cause the enemy to commit forces to rear area defense missions, and subsequent actions to insure these forces remain committed to this role, are considered in this category.

(2) Psychological operations. Guerrilla operations are conducted in a manner that creates a favorable impact on the indigenous population since adverse psychological effects of guerrilla operations may outweigh the tactical results. The ability of guerrilla forces to influence the population and elicit civilian support is dependent largely upon the psychological impact of the resistance movement upon the populace. The fact that guerrilla forces are operating in enemy territory is in itself of psychological benefit to the people and should be fully exploited by the Special Forces detachment.

(3) Strategic target destruction missions. Special category targets of a strategic nature, not included in the interdiction program, may be assigned to UW forces for destruction. Examples of these target systems are air defense installations, propaganda outlets, radio-jamming stations, and research and developmental facilities (FM 31–21A).

(4) Evasion and escape. Evasion and escape mechanisms are developed to assist in the recovery of friendly personnel. Although guerrilla units assist evasion and escape activities, such operations are conducted by the auxiliary and underground.

(5) See FM 31–21A.

(6) See FM 31–21A.

9–6. Missions To Assist Ground Combat Forces

a. General. As the major ground forces area of influence (area in which the commander, by means available to him is capable of directly affecting operations) nears the UW operational area, guerrilla operations are expanded to assist their advance. Guerrilla forces can complement all forms of conventional force offensive and defensive operations in varying degrees. General missions which guerrilla forces can accomplish are—

(1) Conduct reconnaissance and maintain surveillance of critical routes, areas, and installations.
(2) Provide current intelligence.
(3) Support friendly cover and deception operations.
(4) Divert enemy units from an objective area by accelerated guerrilla activity in other areas.
(5) Interdict or block approaches to an objective area.
(6) Occupy key terrain features and hold them for a limited time.
(7) Seize key installations to prevent destruction by the enemy, e.g., bridges, tunnels, dams, and power facilities.
(8) Attack enemy forces and facilities.
(9) Provide guides to friendly units.
(10) Assist in containing by-passed enemy units.
(11) Assist in recovery of prisoners and stragglers.
(12) Assist in control of civilians.

9-7. Linkup Operations

a. General.
(1) Many offensive operations in which guerrilla forces assist tactical commands involve a linkup between elements of the two forces.
(2) Not all guerrilla forces in an UWOA are involved in linkup with tactical units. Some missions preclude physical juncture. For example, during raids or area interdiction operations by airborne forces or when conducting operations as part of a cover and deception plan for an amphibious force, it is often undesirable to linkup all guerrilla units with the attacking units.
(3) For linkup control measures, see FM 61-100.

b. Command Relationship.
(1) Operational control of guerrilla forces normally is assumed by a major headquarters of the advancing ground force prior to linkup. The gaining headquarters receives a Special Forces liaison element to assist in coordination. Such control then continues throughout the operation.
(2) When guerrilla units are attached to a conventional force, responsibility for combat service support of these units normally passes from the SFOB to the conventional force.

(3) The theater commander, in coordination with United States and allied officials, determines the disposition or further utilization of the UW forces following linkup.
(4) In the event that control of guerrilla forces is retained by the United States after linkup, it may be practicable to use these forces for missions under the control of the theater army support command (TASCOM), theater army civil affairs command (TACAC), or control may be retained by the local tactical commander. For continuity, Special Forces detachments may remain with guerrilla units until relationships have been established with the appropriate U.S. command.

9-8. Missions Conducted After Linkup With Friendly Forces

a. Reconnaissance and Security Missions. Because of their familiarity with the terrain and people in their operational areas, guerrilla forces possess a unique capability in a reconnaissance and security role. Their lack of vehicular mobility and voice communications equipment limits their employment with mobile forces. When employed by mobile units, the tactical commander provides transportation and communications equipment for attached guerrilla units.

b. Rear Area Security.
(1) Guerrilla forces may be assigned rear area security missions with various tactical commands or within the theater army support command area. When assigning guerrilla forces a rear area security role, the commander should employ the forces in areas where they have previously operated. When provided with appropriate transportation, guerrilla units may be employed as a mobile security force reserve.
(2) Guerrilla forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counterguerrilla operations in rear areas. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques and of the language, terrain, and population are important capabilities which can be exploited by conventional commanders engaged in counterguerrilla operations. Guerrilla forces also provide a source of intelligence information concerning dissident elements opposing friendly forces.
c. Civil Affairs Assistance. Because of their knowledge of the area and previous experience, guerrilla forces, or selected civilian support elements, may be assigned to assist civil affairs units. They may be attached to divisional, corps, or to army civil affairs units. Guerrilla forces used in this role must be supervised to prevent their disruption of the tenuous controls which exist in the area. Care is exercised to prevent guerrilla units and leaders whose postwar goals may not be in agreement with those of the United States from assuming positions of authority under U.S. sponsorship.

d. Conventional Combat Operations. Properly trained and equipped guerrilla units can be employed as conventional combat units. Such units require additional combat and logistical support units, e.g., armor, artillery, and transportation. A period of retraining and re-equipping following completion of linkup may be required prior to commitment to combat. When so employed, the guerrilla units should be commanded by their own leaders. Usually the Special Forces operational detachment remains with the guerrilla unit to assist in the transition.

9-9. Guerrilla Force Defensive Measures

a. UW forces normally do not engage in extensive defensive operations. For this reason, an adequate security and warning system is vital (see chap 8).

b. Guerrilla units with their relatively light weapons and equipment are normally inferior in firepower to organized enemy forces of like size. Guerrilla units, therefore, do not undertake defensive operations unless forced to do so or unless required to support operations by theater conventional forces. When the enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves by movement and dispersion, withdrawals, creating diversions, or combinations of all of these actions.

9-10. Urban Operations

a. Resistance activities in urban areas may be conducted by any element of the resistance forces. The development of many resistance or revolutionary movements have had their roots in urban areas, where the seat of the target government's or occupying power's economic, political, and military power was centralized.

b. The strategy, tactics, and procedures employed in urban unconventional warfare operations are different from those employed in more rural areas. As part of the clandestine apparatus established in urban settings, the militant faction of the underground, sometimes referred to as the urban guerrilla, establishes shock forces in urban areas that are heavily populated. These forces may carry out street disorders, organize and move agitators into universities and industrial establishments, kidnap local officials, and carry out terrorist acts in the form of bombings and assassination of key political and military leaders.

c. Current trends indicate that there will be increased opportunities to conduct guerrilla type warfare in urban areas. The urban guerrilla may be a part-time guerrilla who carries out acts of subversion and generally carries on a part-time guerrilla war in an urban environment.

d. See FM 31-21A.

Section III. DEMOBILIZATION

9-11. General

a. When linkup operations between friendly conventional troops and the area command are completed, the ability of resistance forces to support military operations effectively usually gradually diminishes. Resistance forces retained beyond their period of usefulness may become a liability and a potential source of trouble.

b. Consideration is given to the demobilization of resistance forces in sectors occupied by friendly forces. The decision regarding the transfer of resistance forces to the national government concerned is made at an appropriate level and the political, economic, and social implications of such a transfer are paramount considerations.

c. In the event that no recognized national
government exists, the decision to disband the forces, in part or in their entirety, likewise requires careful consideration. Disbanding of resistance forces when composed of elements foreign to the area may be extremely dangerous.

d. Civil affairs units normally assist U.S. authorities in the demobilization. Special Forces units may be required to support demobilization processes. Coordination between Special Forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate military and political authorities insures a disposition of resistance forces in harmony with the long-range political objectives of the United States in the area.

9-12. Demobilization Courses of Action
Demobilization operations by U.S. forces may taken any one or a combination of the following courses:

a. The resistance force, with all arms and equipment, may be released to the recognized government.

b. The resistance force, less U.S. supplies, arms, and equipment may be released to the recognized government.

c. The resistance force may be demobilized and relocated by the United States.
PART THREE
OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 10
EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

10-1. General

a. Stability operations are that type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved. See FM 100-20.

b. This chapter provides guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of Special Forces in stability operations. It describes Special Forces capabilities and limitations, explains command and control relationships with military assistance advisory groups (MAAG), missions, military groups, subordinate unified commands, and other elements of a U.S. country team; outlines employment and logistical support; and discusses considerations in the selection and training of Special Forces for stability operations. Additional information and guidance is available in FM 31-16, FM 31-22, FM 31-23, and FM 31-73.

c. Unconventional warfare doctrine is not entirely applicable to overt stability operations. Stability operations are conducted in a less restrictive operational environment than is common to UW. Efforts are directed toward preventing or defeating an insurgent movement by providing security for the population so that nation building activities can be carried out, and by supporting those activities. This is accomplished by conducting tactical operations, intelligence, populace and resources control, civil affairs, and psychological operations, and by providing advisory assistance. Many UW tactics and techniques, such as those employed to gain the support of the local population, to establish intelligence nets, and to conduct tactical operations, such as raids and ambushes, may be adapted to stability operations. These tactics and techniques may be applied in training and advising host country forces and agencies engaged in operations to promote the nation's internal defense and internal development plans and programs.

10-2. Concept of Employment

a. The organization, training, and capabilities of Special Forces lend themselves to early application in programs of assistance to a nation engaged in combating insurgency. Special Forces detachments are immediately available, possess many of the requisite basic skills, and in many instances are oriented toward the area concerned. Initial employment might include tasks not distinctly related to Special Forces operations. Missions assigned Special Forces should exploit their specialized training.

b. The Special Forces group, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, medical, military police, signal, engineer, and Army Security Agency elements, constitutes a source of highly specialized skills responsive to the assistance needs of a host country's armed, paramilitary,
and irregular forces, as well as to governmental agencies and officials. The use of Special Forces in these roles, particularly in remote or insurgent-dominated areas, provides a valuable and economical adjunct to the capabilities of MAAGs, missions, military assistance commands (MAC), and military groups.

10–3. Capabilities

a. General. Special Forces units are capable of reinforcing MAAGs, missions, military groups, and subordinate unified commands with individuals, mobile training teams (MTT), or operational detachments to provide planning, training, and operational advice and assistance to forces and agencies engaged in internal defense and internal development activities.

b. Specific Capabilities. Special Forces units, augmented as required, possess the following specific capabilities:

(1) See FM 31–21A.

(2) To provide planning, training, and operational advice and assistance, including the management or supervision of fiscal and logistic support, as appropriate, to:

(a) Host country Special Forces-type units operating in areas dominated or controlled by insurgents.

(b) Host country armed, paramilitary, or irregular forces engaged in remote area operations (para 10–7).

(c) Selected forces assigned to specialized missions, such as raids or long-range patrol operations.

(d) Host country province and district-level leaders and to paramilitary or irregular forces under their direction.

10–4. Limitations

Special Forces tables of organization and equipment are designed to satisfy the requirements of unconventional warfare. Prolonged employment in stability operations may require additional equipment and personnel. When a Special Forces group is committed to stability operations missions personnel and equipment limitations may be resolved by modifying the TOE under the provisions of AR 310–31 (para 2–3). Tailoring of detachments for specific missions, or providing additional specialist training when time permits, assist in improving their capability.

10–5. Command and Control

Special Forces may expect to function under a variety of organizational alternatives. The presence or absence of a U.S. military organization, such as a military mission, MAAG, or MAC, and its size and capability to support deployed Special Forces detachments are determining factors. It may be necessary to organize a functional Special Forces operational base to direct and support deployed detachments.

10–6. Advisory Assistance—General

a. Advisory Assistance to Host Country Regular Forces. Special Forces detachments are well suited to fulfill critical or unprogrammed needs of MAAGs, missions, or MACs because of their capabilities and immediate availability. When employed to advise or train host country regular forces, other than Special Forces-type units, they should be replaced as soon as regular advisory detachments become available since Special Forces are more profitably employed in conjunction with paramilitary or irregular forces.

b. Advisory Assistance to Host Country Paramilitary or Irregular Forces. Organizing,
equipping, training, and directing paramilitary or irregular forces in stability operations has many similarities with the activities in the development and combat employment of a guerrilla force for which Special Forces detachments are trained. This type mission is appropriate employment for Special Forces since it makes good use of their skills and duplicates many aspects of the UW mission.

c. Advisory Assistance to Lower Echelon Host Country Government Officials. Special Forces detachments have the basic capability to provide advisory and training assistance in functional fields that are of military or civil concern to province and district level governments. An important advantage gained by this employment is that it provides training and operational assistance to paramilitary or irregular forces maintained and directed by the province or district government.

10-7. Missions

a. **FM 31–21A.**

b. **Remote Area Operations.** Remote area operations may be conducted by U.S. Army Special Forces in conjunction with host country military, paramilitary, or irregular units. They may be undertaken in contested areas, including those under insurgent control, which are populated by ethnic, religious, or tribal minorities or other isolated population groups. They may also be undertaken in areas devoid of population, but within which insurgent forces have established training bases, mission support sites, rest areas, arms factories, food-producing means, or major infiltration routes. The purpose of operations in populated areas is to provide security to the people so that local government can establish control over them and provide for their needs thereby creating local islands of resistance to the insurgents, and to expand and consolidate them into larger areas capable of defending themselves and denying support to the insurgents. The purpose of operations in areas devoid of population is the interdiction of insurgent movement and the destruction of his support facilities. The remote area campaign is discussed in FM 31–23. Tactics and techniques for Special Forces are presented in FM 31–20.

c. **Border Operations.** Border surveillance or control usually are functions of civilian police organizations or civil-controlled paramilitary forces. When requirements exceed the capabilities of established border forces and to preclude dissipation of regular forces for this duty, paramilitary or irregular units supervised by Special Forces elements may be directed to assume responsibility for border or seacoast operations in remote areas, or to reinforce existing border forces which are inadequate for the mission. Border operations may be undertaken to achieve one or more of the following purposes:

1. To separate the insurgents from external support.
2. To separate the insurgents from an external sanctuary.
3. To separate the insurgents from support of the local population.
4. To destroy insurgent forces and facilities existing in areas adjacent to the border.
5. To locate and establish surveillance on insurgent infiltration routes.
6. See FM 31–21A.

d. **Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes.** Operations against interior infiltration routes are conducted to deny or limit insurgent movement. Detection of enemy movement or the location of infiltration routes, stream crossing sites, and support facilities is followed by attack, ambush, or destruction, as appropriate.

e. **Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas.** Operations against insurgent base areas are designed to separate the insurgent force from its support and to destroy insurgent facilities and forces. They may also be conducted to harass the insurgent by interrupting training, interfering with rest and re-equipment, and disrupting his combat service support activities. Frequently, this type operation is conducted in conjunction with combat operations by regular forces.

f. **Urban Operations.**

1. Events in recent years have shown that urban areas often assume important roles in the course of insurgent resistance or revolutionary movements. The city-based insurgent hard core leadership and infrastructure factions may be responsible for the overall
direction and political action of the insurgent movement, for gathering intelligence, controlling the population, and for the expansion and support of the guerrilla forces. The insurgents employ the strategy and tactics of subversion covertly to separate the existing government from its base of power by capturing the institutional supports upon which it rests, by alienating mass support from the government, and by overtaxing security forces with problems of unrest generated among the diverse ethnic and minority groups in the urban area. The tactics of sniper attacks, bombings, terrorism against individuals, organized riots and demonstrations, and sabotage all lend themselves to use by the urban insurgents.

(2) Based on the foregoing, the employment of U.S. Army Special Forces in support of friendly governments under insurgent unconventional attack must focus considerable attention on the urban aspects of subversion and insurgency. In this context, one of the primary requirements of Special Forces elements in urban areas will be to assist the local government in neutralizing the insurgent political leadership and infrastructure. Good intelligence is the key to identifying and locating hard core insurgent leaders. Apprehending or destroying the hard core leadership is the first step in the fragmentation of the insurgent infrastructure, elimination of centralized direction and control, creating disunity, and the eventual destruction of the insurgent underground apparatus.

10-8. Intelligence and Security

a. Intelligence. Timely, accurate intelligence is vital to effective action against an insurgent movement. The importance of the insurgent infrastructure organization must be recognized and dealt with. Stress should be placed on gaining sufficient intelligence on the infrastructure organization to allow friendly forces to neutralize or destroy its effectiveness in support of the resistance movement. For further discussion, see FM 31-20 and FM 31-23.

b. Security. Stability operations require thorough application of all security methods. Many of the principles and techniques employed in UW apply particularly when small paramilitary or irregular units are operating in populated areas dominated or contested by the insurgents (see chap 8 and FM 31-20).

10-9. Communications

a. General. The CW radio equipment organic to the Special Forces group and the communications procedures employed by Special Forces are designed for security and dependability rather than speed and ease of communications. Stability operations are conducted in a less restrictive environment which both permits and requires the capability for continuous two-way communications in a much greater volume than would be safe in clandestine operations. Stability operations are more effective when communications permit immediate reporting of, and reaction to, enemy sightings and emergencies. Support of paramilitary or irregular forces by an internal logistic system produces a heavy volume of administrative traffic. Efficient coordination of aerial reconnaissance, airmobile, and combat support missions necessitates an air ground communications capability. Command and control of subordinate elements, and coordination with adjacent or supporting forces must be accommodated. The vulnerability of land-line facilities to insurgent attack imposes a heavy reliance on radio, particularly in remote areas. Existing CW communications may be employed by Special Forces, but they should be supplemented by appropriate voice radio equipment to satisfy the requirements and conditions stated above.

b. Communications Security. Overt operations against what might be regarded as an unsophisticated and poorly equipped insurgent force are not an excuse to ignore the principles of communications security. While some of the procedures and techniques common to clandestine operations may not be required, the basic principles of communication security still apply. Introduction of voice radio equipment for use by Special Forces and by paramilitary or irregular units requires training on voice radio procedure and communications security.
Section III. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

10–10. General
Logistical support for Special Forces elements deployed for stability operations is provided by the Army supply system or from funds allocated the Special Forces commander for local purchase and contract, or from a combination of both. The existence and capability of Army support activities in the area, and the mission and its probable duration are determining factors.

10–11. Operational or Imprest Funds
An allocation of funds is usually required to support deployment for critical or unprogrammed requirements and for temporary requirements, such as MTTs, in areas where the Army supply system cannot provide full support. These funds are used for local purchase, local hire, and contractual services in support of the Special Forces elements. In some instances, funds are required for the support of indigenous paramilitary or irregular units organized by Special Forces detachments. Guidance on the administration of Army funds is contained in AR 37–103 and AR 37–103–1. See also AR 381–141.

10–12. Army Logistical Support
Once assigned or attached to a command for employment, primary responsibility for logistical support of the Special Forces element is transferred to the U.S. Army overseas component of the appropriate unified command. Logistical support requirements are coordinated between the Army component commander and the Chief, MAAG, in the host country as directed by the commander of the unified command. Normally, administrative and logistical support elements of the MAAG support assigned or attached Special Forces elements. When required by the scope of operations, the Chief of the MAAG may be directed to establish a separate administrative and logistical support element to administer to the needs of the operational detachments. In such instances an SFOB may be established to provide this support.

Logistical support of the military forces of the host country may be provided through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and administered by the MAAG or other appropriate U.S. military assistance agency in the country.

10–14. Logistical Support of Paramilitary or Irregular Forces
Support of paramilitary or irregular forces may not be a MAP function. Units in this category requiring support outside of MAP, may be supported by special operational and imprest funds. Every effort must be made to obtain support through the indigenous government. Details of this support arrangements are contained in AR 580–5.

Section IV. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

10–15. Selection of Personnel
Detachments may be designated for employment in a specific geographical area in advance of commitment to allow predeployment training for the area and for the mission, if known. Whenever possible, they are tailored to meet specific requirements. Detachment integrity is desirable; however, it is subordinate to the requirement of selecting personnel qualified to accomplish the mission. Substitutions or additions should be made as early as possible to allow the detachment to train together and to permit evaluation by the detachment commander.

10–16. Cross-Training
Cross-training of Special Forces personnel in other skills organic to the detachment adds to their capability. Expansion of the medical, combat engineering, weapons, and operations and intelligence specialties has obvious value in stability operations. Cross-training in communications adds flexibility and provides a capability to rotate small advisory teams on
field operations and still retain the full range of skills.

10-17. Specialist Training
Maximum advantage should be taken of courses of instruction in specialties such as intelligence/counterintelligence, medicine, psychological operations, engineering, police operations, and civil affairs. The knowledge and skills acquired increase Special Forces capability for stability operations.

10-18. Language and Area Training
General language and area training is a part of the training process for Special Forces personnel and is conducted according to the geographical orientation of the Special Forces groups and their subordinate elements. Missions assigned outside the geographical area of orientation of a particular unit usually require additional language training and additional study of the area of operations.

10-19. The Predeployment Training Program
Predeployment training is conducted to insure a high level of understanding and ability in subjects which assist detachments in accomplishing their mission. It includes refresher training in appropriate military subjects as well as training in subjects directly related to the area and mission.
CHAPTER 11
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

11–1. General
US Army Special Forces assets may be employed in a variety of additional overt or covert-military operations other than those already discussed. These operations are of the direct action type and capitalize on the capabilities of Special Forces for special operations which are inherent to their broader unconventional warfare mission. Special Forces personnel are highly trained in tactics, operations and intelligence, communications, weapons, demolitions, and medical subjects. Additionally, their capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate specific desired areas by land, sea, or air and, while in these areas to survive and operate for extended periods of time with minimum external direction and support facilitates their use in more highly specialized operations.

11–2. Purpose
This chapter provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of Special Forces in direct action special operations.

Section II. MISSIONS

11–3. Types of Missions
The types of additional military operations that US Army Special Forces are capable of conducting are diversified. Examples of missions that may be assigned Special Forces in order to accomplish additional military operations are—

a. Unilateral deep penetration to—
   (1) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
   (2) Attack critical strategic targets.

b. Recovery of friendly personnel in remote or hostile areas.

c. Training of US and/or allied personnel in Special Forces operational tactics and techniques.

11–4. Limitations
The examples cited in paragraph 11–3 are not the only additional missions that Special Forces are capable of performing. The types of military operations that Special Forces can conduct are limited primarily by the availability of personnel and material resources.

Section III. ORGANIZATION

11–5. Tailoring
Often it will be necessary for the Special Forces commander to tailor his organization to give it the capability to accomplish additional missions assigned. Special Forces detachments contain a wide variety of military skills and experiences. The personnel in Special Forces are mature, flexible individuals who normally adapt readily to changing situations and organizations.

11–6. Factors Influencing Organization

a. The Special Forces commander, as in all operations, must consider the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and troops available (METT) during the planning stage of tailoring his force. These four factors should be considered constantly. A detailed discussion of these factors is contained in FM 17–1.

b. A prime consideration of the commander...
in tailoring his force is that Special Forces detachments may lack many items of equipment that are required for special operations. Selected weapons, voice radio equipment, and other items may have to be procured from other than Special Forces resources.

c. Combat support may have to be provided by other friendly units to Special Forces elements conducting additional military operations. Special Forces elements that are under the operational control of another unit will normally be provided combat support by that unit.

Section IV. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

11-7. Command and Control
Special Forces elements conducting additional military operations will operate under their normal command and control system. Operational requirements may require that Special Forces elements be placed under the operational control of conventional units. Normally operational control of these elements will be retained at higher levels but, exceptionally, may be as low as division level for specific missions. Units assuming operational control of Special Forces elements may have to provide combat service support due to limitations of Special Forces TOE.

11-8. Communications
a. The majority of additional military operations assigned to US Army Special Forces require special communications considerations. The security and high dependability required in unconventional warfare operations may be required by some direct action tasks, while other tasks will emphasize the need for speed and simplicity.

b. Appropriate radio equipment should be employed to satisfy the requirements and conditions stated in a above. Organic CW communications equipment may be employed to supplement other methods of communication.

Section V. OPERATIONS

11-9. General
Operations may be conducted in either an overt or a covert nature depending on the situation. All operations should employ the techniques utilized in covert operations to increase the chance for surprise of the opposing force and to enhance the chance for survival of the friendly force. The greatest contributions of Special Forces in these operations are realized when the operations closely parallel the training already perfected by Special Forces. Special Forces soldiers are true foot soldiers, trained and conditioned to navigate, during extended periods, the most rugged and diversified terrain with little or no outside support. They are psychologically prepared to work in small groups behind enemy lines and to expect little or no air or artillery support.

11-10. Conduct of Deep Penetration Operations
a. Special Forces have the capability to perform strategic reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations within and outside the area of responsibility of the field army. These tasks may be executed for specific missions in the area of operations of a conventional unit, thereby necessitating close coordination and, in some cases exercise of operational control over the Special Forces element by the commander of the conventional unit (para 11-7).
(1) Special Forces personnel may perform these tasks using U.S. personnel only or may employ units which include indigenous personnel.

(2) These forces have an offensive capability as well as the normal reconnaissance capability. Each patrol member has the ability, training, and background experience to call for, and adjust, air, naval, or artillery fires on observed targets.

b. Another important aspect of deep penetration operations is the attack of critical strategic targets in remote or hostile areas. Raids against this type target may be conducted by Special Forces individuals or elements when other raid forces are not available or are not capable of conducting the mission.

(1) Special Forces elements may be composed completely of U.S. personnel, or may include indigenous personnel native to the area of operations.

(2) The knowledge of tactics, operations and intelligence, communications, weapons, demolitions, and medical subjects found within the Special Forces operational detachments provide expertise for sound operational planning and execution of raid operations in remote or hostile areas.

c. Further information on raids may be found in FM 31-20, FM 7-11, FM 7-20, FM 21-50, FM 21-75, FM 57-10, and FM 61-100.

11-11. Recovery of Friendly Personnel in Remote or Hostile Areas

a. Recovery of friendly personnel in remote or hostile territory may involve Special Forces personnel employing raid techniques to liberate selected personnel being detained by the enemy. This situation is similar to the raid as discussed above.

b. Other recovery operations may involve the location, identification, and extraction of friendly personnel not being detained by the enemy. Examples of personnel in this category are—

(1) Downed aircrews.
(2) Civilian or military personnel who have expressed a desire to defect to the friendly side.

b. Additional information on personnel recovery operations may be found in FM 21-77, FM 21-77A, FM 31-20A, and FM 31-21A.

11-12. Training of U.S. and/or Allied Personnel in Special Forces Tactics and Techniques

a. Special Forces elements may provide training to other U.S. and/or allied personnel in Special Forces tactics and techniques. This training may be presented by a single instructor on a particular subject, or may be conducted in much the same manner as a mobile training team presenting training to allied units.

b. A wide variety of training may be presented by Special Forces elements. Among the types of training that may be presented are lectures, demonstrations, and practical exercises on such subjects as:

(1) Individual and crew-served weapons, both U.S. and foreign made.
(2) Communications procedures, to include cryptography, and equipment.
(3) Advanced field medical procedures and techniques.
(4) Demolitions for destruction, construction, offense and defense.
(5) Detailed area study information.
(6) Patrolling and small unit tactics.
(7) Survival, evasion, and escape.

Section VI. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

11-13. General
The logistical support required by Special Forces in the performance of additional military operations will vary greatly depending on the specific mission and situation. Support required may be provided by the Army supply system or from funds allocated the Special Forces commander for local purchase and contract, or from a combination of both (para 10-10 through 10-14).
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-1. Joint Publications
JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JCS Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
(C) JANAP 201 Status of Noncryptographic JANAPs and ACPs (U).

A-2. Defense Intelligence Agency Publications
(S) DIAM 58-11 (DICOM) (U).

AR 37-103 Finance and Accounting for Installations; Disbursing Operations.
AR 37-103-1 Finance and Accounting for Installations; Imprest Funds.
AR 310-31 Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment (The TOE System).
★AR 310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
★AR 310-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
AR 380-5 Safeguarding Defense Information.
(C) AR 380-40 Department of the Army Policy for Safeguarding COMSEC Information (U).
AR 380-41 Control of COMSEC Material.
(C) AR 381-141 Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control, and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U).
(S) AR 580-5 Project PARASOL; Support of Paramilitary Forces in Special Operations (U).
(C) DA Pam 310-9 Index of COMSEC Publications (U).
FM 1-100 Army Aviation Utilization.
FM 1-105 Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures.
FM 3-10 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
FM 3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
FM 3-50 Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations.
FM 5-26 Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).
FM 6-20-1 Field Artillery Tactics.
FM 6-20-2 Field Artillery Techniques.
★FM 7-10 The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads.
★FM 7-20 The Infantry Battalions.
FM 17-1 Armor Operations.
FM 20-32 Landmine Warfare.
FM 20-33 Combat Flame Operations.
FM 21-5 Military Training Management.
FM 21-6 Techniques of Military Instruction.
<p>| FM 21-30 | Military Symbols. |
| FM 21-40 | Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense. |
| FM 21-41 | Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare. |
| FM 21-50 | Ranger Training and Ranger Operations. |
| FM 21-75 | Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling. |
| FM 21-76 | Survival, Evasion, and Escape. |
| (S) FM 21-77A | Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U). |
| FM 21-150 | Combatives. |
| FM 24-18 | Field Radio Techniques. |
| FM 24-20 | Field Wire and Field Cable Techniques. |
| FM 27-10 | The Law of Land Warfare. |
| FM 30-5 | Combat Intelligence. |
| FM 30-17 | Counterintelligence Operations. |
| (C) FM 30-17A | Counterintelligence Special Operations (U). |
| (S) FM 30-18 | Intelligence Collections Operations, Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U). |
| FM 31-10 | Denial Operations and Barriers. |
| FM 31-16 | Counter-guerrilla Operations. |
| ★FM 31-18 | Long-Range Reconnaissance Ranger Company. |
| FM 31-20 | Special Forces Operational Techniques. |
| (C) FM 31-20A | Special Forces Operational Techniques (U). |
| ★(S) FM 31-21A | Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine (U). |
| FM 31-22 | U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. |
| ★FM 31-35 | Jungle Operations. |
| (C) FM 31-40 | Tactical Cover and Deception (U). |
| FM 31-72 | Mountain Operations. |
| ★(C) FM 32-5 | Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U). |
| ★(S) FM 32-10 | USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U). |
| ★(C) FM 32-20 | Electronic Warfare (U). |
| FM 33-5 | Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures. |
| FM 41-10 | Civil Affairs Operations. |
| FM 57-35 | Airmobile Operations. |
| FM 61-100 | The Division. |
| FM 100-5 | Operations of Army Forces in the Field. |
| (C) FM 100-20 | Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (U). |
| FM 101-5 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. |
| FM 101-10-1 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—Unclassified Data. |
| (S) FM 101-10-3 | Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Classified Data (U). |
| FM 101-40 | Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense. |
| TOE 10-500 | Quartermaster Service Organization. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOE Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOE 11-247</td>
<td>Signal Company Special Forces Support Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE 31-105</td>
<td>Airborne Special Forces Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE 31-106</td>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE 31-107</td>
<td>Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This glossary is provided to furnish the user readily available explanation of terms applicable to Special Forces operations, which are used in this manual, and not contained in JCS Pub 1 and AR 310-25.

**Area Command**—The organizational structure established within an unconventional warfare operational area to command and control resistance forces, usually integrating the Special Forces operational detachment and the resistance force.

**Direct Action Mission**—Overt or clandestine operations in hostile or denied areas which are conducted by US UW forces, rather than by US conventional forces or through US direction of indigenous forces.

**Guerrilla Base**—A temporary site where guerrilla installations, headquarters, and some guerrilla units are located. A guerrilla base is considered to be transitory, and must be capable of rapid displacement of personnel within the base.

**Guerrilla Force**—A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel, organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held or hostile territory.

**Linkup**—The physical juncture between elements of the guerrilla force and conventional tactical commands.

**Special Action Force (SAF)**—The SAF is a specially-trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited, and general war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Support:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force support</td>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>5-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army aviation</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation platoon</td>
<td>2-22a, b, c</td>
<td>2-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>5-15</td>
<td>5-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary and underground</td>
<td>3-8a, 7-2d(3), 7-2d(4)</td>
<td>3-3, 7-1, 7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the UWOA</td>
<td>7-12, 7-13</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational detachments</td>
<td>5-19</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>5-17</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>4-15</td>
<td>4-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>5-20</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courses of action</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of sponsoring power</td>
<td>5-3h</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Action Missions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>2-8b(4)</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>2-12b(1)(c)</td>
<td>2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>2-3b(4)</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational detachments</td>
<td>2-15b(3), 5-6b, 11-1, 11-11, 11-1, 11-3</td>
<td>2-17, 5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>2-15a(2)(a), 11-5</td>
<td>2-16, 11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evasion and Escape:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training requirements</td>
<td>3-14</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exfiltration methods</td>
<td>6-5</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
<td>7-15</td>
<td>7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability operations</td>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Combat Operations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command relationships with conventional forces</td>
<td>9-7b</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive measures</td>
<td>9-9b</td>
<td>9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkup operations</td>
<td>9-7</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>9-4</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command relationships</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational control of guerilla forces</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt resistance (guerilla force)</td>
<td>3-8b, 7-2d(2)</td>
<td>3-3, 7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence information collection and production agencies</td>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence requirements</td>
<td>8-5, 10-8</td>
<td>8-1, 10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation area</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>4-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical support:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical requirements</td>
<td>7-14, 10-10, 11-3, 7-8, 10-5, 11-1</td>
<td>7-14, 10-10, 11-3, 7-8, 10-5, 11-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Support to the resistance element
- Paragraphs: 7-15, 7-16
- Page: 7-9

## Medical service
- Paragraph: 7-19
- Page: 7-10

## Storage
- Paragraph: 7-17
- Page: 7-9

## Transportation services
- Paragraph: 7-18
- Page: 7-9

## Naval Support
- Paragraphs: 5-12, 5-16
- Page: 5-5

## Psychological Operations
- Paragraphs: 7-8, 7-11, 7-4, 7-7
- Page: 7-4, 7-7

## Resistance:
- Forces
  - Paragraphs: 3-7, 7-2d, 3-2, 7-1
  - Page: 3-2, 7-1

- Influencing factors
  - Paragraph: 3-9
  - Page: 3-3

- Phases in development of a sponsored resistance movement
  - Paragraph: 5-3
  - Page: 5-1

## Security:
- Communications
  - Paragraph: 5-20
  - Page: 5-6

- Security within stability operations
  - Paragraph: 10-8
  - Page: 10-4

- Security within the UWQA
  - Paragraph: 8-8
  - Page: 8-2

## Special Forces Groups:

- Concept of employment
  - Paragraph: 2-3b
  - Page: 2-1

- Organization
  - Paragraph: 2-3a
  - Page: 2-1

- Battalion:
  - Concept of employment
    - Paragraph: 2-8b
    - Page: 2-6
  - Organization
    - Paragraph: 2-8a
    - Page: 2-6
  - Separate Deployment
    - Paragraph: 4-9
    - Page: 4-8

- Company:
  - Concept of employment
    - Paragraph: 2-12b
    - Page: 2-11
  - Organization
    - Paragraph: 2-12a
    - Page: 2-11

- Operational Detachment:
  - Concept of employment
    - Paragraph: 2-15b
    - Page: 2-16
  - Organization
    - Paragraph: 2-15a
    - Page: 2-15

- Support Battalion:
  - Concept of employment
    - Paragraph: 2-16b
    - Page: 2-17
  - Headquarters and Service Company
    - Paragraph: 2-17
    - Page: 2-18
  - Administrative Service platoon
    - Paragraph: 2-20
    - Page: 2-21
  - Medical platoon
    - Paragraph: 2-19
    - Page: 2-21

- Signal Company:
  - Concept of employment
    - Paragraph: 2-23b
    - Page: 2-22
  - Forward communications platoon
    - Paragraph: 2-27
    - Page: 2-25
  - Organization
    - Paragraph: 2-23a
    - Page: 2-22
  - Base operations platoon
    - Paragraph: 2-25
    - Page: 2-23
  - Base radio platoon
    - Paragraph: 2-26
    - Page: 2-25
  - Signal Section
    - Paragraph: 5-17
    - Page: 5-6
  - Staff
    - Paragraph: 2-18
    - Page: 2-18

## Special Forces Operational Base

- Float
  - Paragraph: 5-4b
  - Page: 5-2

- Advanced control base, separate and alternative Special Forces
  - Paragraph: 4-8
  - Page: 4-8

## Stability Operations:

- Advisory assistance
  - Paragraph: 10-6
  - Page: 10-2

- Army logistical support
  - Paragraph: 10-12
  - Page: 10-5

- Capabilities
  - Paragraph: 10-3
  - Page: 10-2

- Command and control
  - Paragraph: 10-5
  - Page: 10-2

- Communications
  - Paragraph: 10-9
  - Page: 10-4

- Concept of employment
  - Paragraphs: 2-3b, 2-8b, 2-12b, 10-12
  - Page: 2-1, 2-6, 2-11, 10-5

- Cross training
  - Paragraph: 10-16
  - Page: 10-5

- Intelligence and security
  - Paragraph: 10-8
  - Page: 10-4

- Language and area training
  - Paragraph: 10-18
  - Page: 10-6

- Limitations
  - Paragraph: 10-4
  - Page: 10-2

- Logistical support:
  - Of host country military forces
    - Paragraph: 10-13
    - Page: 10-5
  - Of paramilitary or irregular forces
    - Paragraph: 10-14
    - Page: 10-5

- Missions
  - Paragraph: 10-7
  - Page: 10-3

- Predeployment training program
  - Paragraph: 10-19
  - Page: 10-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection of personnel</th>
<th>10-15</th>
<th>10-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialist training</td>
<td>10-17</td>
<td>10-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply system</td>
<td>10-10</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversion</td>
<td>3-16</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Center</td>
<td>4-7/</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Unconventional Warfare Command</td>
<td>4-4, 4-5</td>
<td>4-1, 4-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Training:**

- Characteristics of guerrilla training | 7-23 | 7-10
- Cross-training | 10-16 | 10-5
- Unconventional warfare | 3-5 |

**Unconventional Warfare Fundamentals:**

- Concept | 3-1b  | 3-1
- Forces | 3-3 |
- General | 3-16, 4-1 | 3-1, 4-1
- Legal status of participants | 3-6  | 3-2
- Operations | 3-2  | 3-1
- Responsibilities | 3-4  | 3-2
- Theater unconventional warfare command | 4-4 |

**Unconventional Warfare Operational Area:**

- Administration:
  - General | 7-20  | 7-10
  - Records | 7-21  | 7-10

- Area Command:
  - Area command | 4-11, 7-2 | 4-8, 7-1
  - Command relationships of U.S. agencies | 4-12, 7-4 | 4-9, 7-2
  - Geographical areas of responsibility | 7-5  | 7-2
  - Special Forces objectives | 7-3  | 7-2
  - Support bases | 4-13  | 4-9

- Special Forces detachment resistance force relations:
  - Concept | 7-6  | 7-3
  - Considerations | 7-7  | 7-3
- Underground | 3-8a, 7-2d(4) | 3-3, 7-2
- Urban Operations | 9-10, 10-7/ | 9-5, 10-3

**US Army Special Forces:**

- Capabilities | 1-7  | 1-2
- Concept of employment | 1-5  | 1-2
- Contingency operations | 5-7  | 5-3
- Mission | 1-6  | 1-2
- Role | 1-4  | 1-1
- Tailoring | 2-2  | 2-1
- Unilateral operations | 5-6  | 5-2

Index—3
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS—U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

PART ONE. INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Section I. Introduction ................. 1-1—1-3  1-1
   II. The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces  1-4,1-5  1-1
   III. Special Forces Mission and Capabilities  1-6,1-7  1-2

CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL
EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL FORCES
Section I. General ...................... 2-1,2-2  2-1
   II. Units .............................. 2-3—2-7  2-1

PART TWO. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

CHAPTER 3. FUNDAMENTALS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Section I. General ...................... 3-1—3-6  3-1
   II. Indigenous Resistance Forces ......... 3-7—3-9  3-2
   III. Guerrilla Warfare ................ 3-10,3-11  3-3
   IV. Evasion and Escape ............... 3-12—3-16  3-4
   V. Subversion ........................ 3-16—3-19  3-5

CHAPTER 4. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
FORCES
Section I. Organizational Concepts ...... 4-1,4-2  4-1
   II. The External Organization ........... 4-3—4-9  4-1
   III. The Internal Organization ......... 4-10—4-13  4-6
   IV. Communications .................... 4-14,4-15  4-6

CHAPTER 5. EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL FORCES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
Section I. Introduction .................. 5-1,5-2  5-1
   II. Employment with Indigenous
       Resistance Forces ......... 5-3—5-5  5-1
   III. Unilateral Employment ......... 5-6—5-8  5-2
   IV. Air Support ....................... 5-9—5-11  5-3
   V. Naval Support ...................... 5-12—5-16  5-5
   VI. Special Forces Communications in Unconventional Warfare 5-17—5-20  5-6

CHAPTER 6. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION
Section I. Infiltration ................. 6-1—6-4  6-1
   II. Exfiltration ....................... 6-5,6-6  6-2

CHAPTER 7. ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE UWOA
Section I. The Area Command ............ 7-1—7-5  7-1
   II. Special Forces-Resistance Relations 7-6,7-7  7-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section/Chapter/Part</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Psychological Operations in the UWOA</td>
<td>7-8—7-11</td>
<td>7-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Communications in the UWOA</td>
<td>7-12, 7-13</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Logistical Support for the UWOA</td>
<td>7-14—7-19</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Administration in the UWOA</td>
<td>7-20, 7-21</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Establishment of a Training Program</td>
<td>7-22—7-24</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 8. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>8-1, 8-2</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Intelligence Production Within the UWOA</td>
<td>8-3—8-5</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Within the UWOA</td>
<td>8-6, 8-7</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Security Within the UWOA</td>
<td>8-8</td>
<td>8-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 9. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF GUERRILLA FORCES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>9-1—9-3</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>9-4—9-10</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>9-11, 9-12</td>
<td>9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART THREE. OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 10. EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>10-1—10-5</td>
<td>10-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>10-6—10-9</td>
<td>10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Logistical Support</td>
<td>10-10—10-14</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Selection and Training of Personnel</td>
<td>10-15—10-19</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 11. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>11-1, 11-2</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>11-3, 11-4</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>11-5, 11-6</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
<td>11-7, 11-8</td>
<td>11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>11-9—11-12</td>
<td>11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Logistical Support</td>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX A. REFERENCES</td>
<td></td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glossary-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td></td>
<td>Index-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose and Scope
a. This manual provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of U.S. Army Special Forces.

b. FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine, and FM 31-21A, its classified supplement, describe the mission, capabilities, organization, methods of employment, and support of the U.S. Army Special Forces group. They explain the relationships of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB), the Special Forces group and its operational detachments C, B, and A, and other U.S. elements and indigenous forces operationally engaged with Special Forces. The material contained herein is applicable to operations in general war, to include considerations for the employment of, and protection from, nuclear munitions and chemical, biological, and radiological agents; limited war; and cold war, to include stability operations.

c. FM 31-21 should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance and procedures for the conduct of unconventional and conventional warfare operations (app A). Techniques for Special Forces operations are contained in FM 31-20 and FM 31-20A. For additional information and guidance on the training and employment of units, detachments, and individuals in stability operations, see FM 31-22 and FM 31-23.

d. FM 31-21A, the classified supplement to this field manual, is keyed to the appropriate paragraph or subparagraph of this text, which is annotated as in e below.

e. See FM 31-21A.

1-2. Explanation of Terms
Terms used in this manual are in accordance with AR 320-5. Additional explanations of terms pertaining to special forces operations are contained in the glossary.

1-3. Changes
Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Institute of Strategic and Stability Operations (Prov), Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.

Section II. THE ROLE OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

1-4. General
The role of U.S. Army Special Forces is to contribute within their capability to the accomplishment of whatever missions and responsibilities are assigned to the U.S. Army. Within the framework of that contribution, the U.S. Army Special Forces group is a multipurpose force which, by organization, flexible command
arrangements, tailored logistical and fiscal procedures, and highly trained personnel, can address a variety of missions. As the repository of expertise within the Army for unconventional warfare (UW), Special Forces must be constantly prepared to assume missions of this nature during any intensity of conflict. Since the option for unconventional warfare is selective, Special Forces are able to employ these highly trained assets on other appropriate and varied missions which contribute to the accomplishment of the overall mission of the Army.

1–5. The U.S. Army Special Forces Group
Special Forces groups are the major TOE units within the U.S. Army Special Forces and provide command, control, administration, and support for assigned operational detachments. The Special Forces group can assume strategic or tactical missions and provide flexible responses. It can undertake a variety of tasks and missions, in many modes and configurations, under circumstances and in environments not customarily envisioned for regular forces, and, most importantly, in all levels of conflict. U.S. Army Special Forces participation in operations may be either in a primary role, or in a supporting role in conjunction with other forces or agencies. Deployment for operations may involve only selected individuals or detachments with specific capabilities, or it may require one or more Special Forces groups.

Section III. SPECIAL FORCES MISSION AND CAPABILITIES

1–6. Mission
a. The mission of the U.S. Army Special Forces is to—
   (1) Plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations.
   (2) Plan, conduct, and support stability operations.
   (3) Plan and conduct direct action missions which are peculiar to Special Forces due to their organization, training, equipment, and psychological preparation.

b. Mission priorities are established in accordance with the planned employment.

1–7. Capabilities
Special Forces possess specific capabilities to—
a. Plan and conduct military operations which include but are not restricted to the following (fig. 1–1):
   (1) Develop, organize, equip, train, and direct non-U.S. forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

   (2) Participate in and/or support evasion and escape operations.
   (3) Conduct other unconventional warfare missions, either unilaterally or in conjunction with resistance forces.
   (4) Train, advise and assist non-U.S. military or paramilitary forces, to include operational, logistical, and fiscal support.

b. Plan and conduct deep penetration missions to include—
   (1) Attack of critical strategic targets.
   (2) Collection of intelligence.
   (3) Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified areas by air, land, or sea.
   (4) Survive and operate in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with minimum of external direction and support.
   (5) Recover friendly personnel from remote or hostile areas.
   (6) Provide planning assistance and training to U.S. or allied forces or agencies in Special Forces operational techniques.
CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL EMPLOYMENT
OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

2-1. General

a. U.S. Army Special Forces units are organized under tables of organization and equipment (TOE) which provide personnel and equipment for the conduct of unconventional warfare. Sustained unconventional warfare operations require augmentation by combat support and logistical support units (para 4-7e). Employment in other roles may also necessitate augmentation (para 10-4) or modification of TOE (MTOE) as discussed in AR 310-31 to meet unusual requirements.

b. U.S. Army Special Forces consist of personnel trained in basic and specialized military skills and organized into small multipurpose detachments. These detachments provide a training, advisory, or operational capability in the functions of command, staff, operations, intelligence, weapons and tactics, communications, medical support, field engineering, and demolitions associated with UW and stability operations.

2-2. Tailoring

The organization of Special Forces detachments and units is sufficiently flexible to permit tailoring for a specific mission. Tailoring is accomplished by substitution or augmentation from resources available to the Special Forces group and theater assets.

Section II. UNITS

2-3. The U.S. Army Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The Airborne Special Forces group is organized under TOE 31-105. Under this TOE, the group consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, four Special Forces operational companies, a signal company, and an aviation company (fig. 2-1).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) Unconventional warfare operations. The Special Forces group is normally employed to conduct guerrilla warfare and related activities within a theater of operations under the direction of the unified commander. It may also be tasked to conduct such operations for a specified or a joint task force commander. The Special Forces group provides the appropriate commands a capability to conduct operations deep within enemy or enemy-held territory (chap 5).

(2) Stability operations. The Special Forces group is a readily available force to unified and specified commands for the support of stability operations. The group may operate as a separate organization or as a major element of a Special Action Force (SAF) (chap 10).

2-4. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The headquarters and headquarters company, Special Forces group is organized under TOE 31-106. It consists of the group headquarters; company headquarters; rigger and aerial delivery platoon, medical platoon; and the S1, S2, S3, S4, psychological...
b. Concept of Employment. The headquarters and headquarters company is employed to provide the Special Forces group with necessary command, control, and support. The company personnel may be organized as shown in figure 2-2, or they may be organized into a SFOB as discussed in paragraph 4-7.

2-5. Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The Special Forces company (fig. 2-3) is organized under TOE 31-107. It consists of an administrative detachment (fig. 2-4), an operational detachment C (fig. 2-5), 3 operational detachments B (fig. 2-6), and 12 operational detachments A (fig. 2-7).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) General.

(a) Unconventional warfare operations. A method of employment of the Special Forces company is for the operational detachment C to command, control and support the assigned operational detachments B and A until their deployment into the assigned operational areas. The company may also be employed independently with necessary augmentation with a mission to operate a Special Forces operational base (para 4-8) and to command, control, and support operations of the assigned or attached Special Forces operational detachments.

(b) Stability operations. Employment in the stability operations role requires great flexibility in both size and composition of each detachment deployed. Size may range the full spectrum from a small military training team (MTT) to the TOE operational company. Skills and equipment must be tailored/augmented on a mission basis to assure satisfying the need which prompted the deployment.

(2) Administrative detachment. Provides administrative, mess, and supply support to the Special Forces company. It is capable of being deployed with the operational detachment C or it may revert to group control when the operational detachments are deployed, depend-
Figure 2-2. Headquarters and headquarters company airborne Special Forces group.
ing on where it can best support the company mission.

(3) Operational detachment C. Provides command and staff personnel, and is ideally suited for commitments where a requirement exists for training or advising command and staff elements and staff responsibilities. This detachment also has a unit training capability.

(4) Operational detachment B. Has the capability for command and staff responsibilities, but to a slightly lesser extent than the C detachment. The B detachment has a unit training capability and, as such, is suited for commitment to those areas where training and command and control are of equal importance.

(5) Operational detachment A. Has limited supervisory capability and should be deployed primarily in an operational and training role. After deployment and if required it may be subdivided into two similar teams each of which possess all of the basic skills of the full detachment.

(6) Provisional or composite operational detachment. May be formed from elements or combinations of elements of operational detachments A, B, or C to accommodate a particular task or mission, or because of an unusual requirement in a specific area.

(7) Pilot team. Under certain circumstances, initial infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected provisional team composed of individuals possessing needed specialized skills. The mission of the pilot team is to assess the area and to establish contact and rapport with indigenous leaders. The pilot team determines whether the area is feasible for development. Subsequent to the evaluation of the area assessment by the SFOB, Special Forces elements may be infiltrated into the area. The pilot team may remain with the infiltrated operational element or be exfiltrated.

2-6. Signal Company, Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The signal company is organized under TOE 11–247. It consists of a company headquarters, a base operations platoon, two base radio Platoons, and a forward communications platoon (fig. 2–8).

b. Concept of Employment.

(1) The Special Forces Signal Company is normally employed to provide communication facilities for a Special Forces operational base (SFOB) on a 24-hour basis to include the following:

(a) SFOB terminal for long-range CW
Figure 2-4. Administrative detachment.
Figure 2-5. Operational detachment C.
Figure 2-6. Operational detachment B.
Figure 2-7. Operational detachment A.

radio communications system to deployed detachments.

(b) Secure radio teletype system between SFOB and maximum of four control or operational bases.

(c) Terminal for telephone and secure land-line teletype circuits from higher and adjacent headquarters.

(d) Stations in voice radio nets of higher and adjacent headquarters.

(e) Local telephone service within the SFOB.

(f) Photo support (black and white) for the SFOB, and developing and printing of film exposed by deployed detachments.

(g) Cryptographic support to include direct support maintenance for cryptographic equipment of the signal company.

(h) Limited general support maintenance for those items of signal equipment peculiar to the Special Forces group and for such other items as are within the capability of the equipment and personnel authorizations.

(2) Personnel and equipment of the Special Forces signal company may be employed to support advanced control or separate operational bases. See figure 4-3.

2-7. Aviation Company, Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The aviation company is organized under TOE 1-307.

b. Concept of Employment. The aviation company provides aviation support to the Special Forces group within the capabilities of its fixed and rotary winged aircraft. The assets of the aviation company are proficient in the conduct of air operations to support Special Forces elements.
Figure 2-8. Signal company, airborne Special Forces group.
semipermanent command arrangement. The JUWTF organization directs joint UW training exercises when no permanent UW command exists.

d. The theater UW headquarters prepares operational plans and directs the conduct of unconventional warfare in designated areas. These headquarters determine UW requirements, procure intelligence, prepare plans, allocate resources, monitor the stockpiling of materiel for potential operations, and supervise the training of designated operational and support elements to attain and maintain the precise state of readiness required by their mission.

e. The principal functions of the theater UW headquarters or JUWTF are—

(1) To direct UW operations within its area of responsibility.

(2) To recommend geographical areas to be designated unconventional warfare operational areas as required.

(3) To determine missions, designate areas, and assign tasks to subordinate elements for planning and execution.

(4) To procure and maintain intelligence in support of UW.

(5) To develop operational, administrative, and logistical plans and requirements for the support of UW.

(6) To coordinate with other theater agencies in planning for all types of operations.

(7) To develop communications procedures and requirements to support UW plans.

(8) To plan and conduct joint or combined training of land, sea, and air units designated to participate in, or to support UW.

(9) To coordinate with allied military authorities for the preparation and execution of UW plans, as required.

(10) To maintain liaison with other UW agencies or units.

(11) To recommend and periodically revise strengths of indigenous forces to be supported, based on current intelligence.

(12) To maintain liaison at staff and operational levels with appropriate intelligence agencies; to coordinate requirements, collection, and communications with other activities in denied areas; and to plan intelligence operations in support of conventional forces when directed by the theater commander.

(13) To coordinate psychological operations (PSYOP) requirements in support of UW (FM 33-1 and 33-5).

(14) To maintain liaison with theater civil affairs units concerning civil affairs (CA) aspects of UW (FM 41-10).

4-5. Army Component of the Theater UW Command

The Army component of a joint UW command is normally a Special Forces group with its attachments and necessary augmentation. A separate Army component headquarters may be established for command, control, and support of all Army units in the force or command when more than one Special Forces group is represented, or if significant numbers of other Army elements are allocated to the UW force.

4-6. Special Forces Group

The Special Forces group functions as the Army component of a joint UW force, or as the command, control, and support organization for Army operations when a UW command is not organized. The Special Forces group normally will administratively arrange its resources to establish a SFOB for large commitments or for long duration missions.

4-7. The Special Forces Operational Base

a. The SFOB provides command, control, and support for deployed U.S. Army Special Forces within a theater of operations or a designated portion thereof. It is established by grouping the resources of a Special Forces group headquarters and its headquarters and signal companies into functional elements which provide operational control, and administrative and logistical support for assigned and attached units (fig. 4-2).

b. The SFOB may be physically located at one installation or dispersed among a number of smaller sites. Because of the sensitive nature of operations conducted at the SFOB, special consideration is given to the principles of
Figure U-2. Special Forces operational base.
dispersion and security. Preparation for operations, as well as control and support is compartmented on a need-to-know basis to prevent or minimize compromise. The SFOB should not be located with other facilities such as airfields, port facilities, or other major headquarters. Deployment of detachments and resupply of a UWOA is simplified by locating the SFOB within a reasonable distance of the delivery agencies employed. The site selected should provide maximum security from ground and air attack and should be included within the rear area defense system.

c. The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational detachments for deployment into the UWOA. After deployment, the mission of the SFOB is to provide command, control, administration, and support for these deployed detachments in furtherance of the assigned theater mission.

d. Among the functions that may be performed at the SFOB are—

(1) Command and control of operations, to include—
   (a) Guerrilla warfare.
   (b) Evasion and escape.
   (c) Subversion.

(2) Communications support of organic and attached units.

(3) Intelligence support.

(4) Air support, as appropriate.

(5) Logistical support.

(6) Preparation and deployment of detachments.
   (a) Training.
   (b) Briefing and staging.
   (c) Infiltration.

(7) Civil affairs support.

(8) PSYOP support.

(9) Liaison and coordination with higher and adjacent commands.

(10) Administration.

(11) Coordination of exfiltration operations.

e. The Special Forces group has sufficient personnel to establish an SFOB, to deploy detachments, and to provide limited logistical support. It requires augmentation to conduct support activities on a sustained basis. Theater support services are attached as required. Physical security, counterintelligence, and base defense requirements are also met by attachment of appropriate units or by tasking designated rear area defense and security units with the requirements.

4-8. The Advanced Control Base, Separate, and Alternate SFOB

a. The Advanced Control Base (ACB). The advanced control base, under the command of the main SFOB, is established as an immediate control headquarters when distances involved preclude satisfactory control and support of deployed operational detachments. It is used to extend the span of control or communications capability of the main SFOB.

b. The Separate Operational Base (SOB). The separate operational base is established when there is an operational requirement for an additional SFOB. Such a requirement may be justified when the mission or the distance between the operational areas and the main SFOB requires a separate control headquarters between the operational detachments and the theater UW command.

c. The Alternate Operational Base (AOB). The alternate operational bases are locations for which planning for future use has been accomplished. These locations will be utilized only if the existing operational base becomes untenable or if mission accomplishment can be facilitated by displacement.

4-9. Separate Deployment of a Special Forces Company

a. Separate deployment of a Special Forces company to establish and operate an SFOB may be required when distances between deployed operational detachments and the main SFOB are too great for normal control and support by the main SFOB. A separate SFOB may also be established and operated by a Special Forces company for specific missions to be conducted under the direction of an organization other than the parent group. Such employment of the Special Forces company requires suitable augmentation.

b. The Special Forces company may employ operational detachments B as subordinate control elements in order to extend its span of control or communications capability.
Section III. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

4-10. General
The internal organization includes command, control, and support elements located within areas under enemy control. The organization usually integrates Special Forces and indigenous resistance elements. It may provide for U.S. advice and assistance, for direct U.S. control of indigenous forces, or for unilateral operations by Special Forces (para 5-6).

4-11. The UW Area Command
a. Normally the area command is a combined command structure within an unconventional warfare operational area which integrates the Special Forces operational detachment(s) and the resistance organization. It is established by the Special Forces element as soon as possible after infiltration. There is no rigid pattern for the organization of an area command; it is tailored to fit the mission and situation. The size and composition depends on the strength and capability of the resistance forces, the type and scope of operations to be undertaken, and the degree of United States influence. The area command is compartmented to reduce the possibility of compromise. A UWOA may be subdivided into subordinate sector commands.

b. The purpose of the UW area command and subordinate sector commands is to control, coordinate, support, and assist all resistance activities within the UWOA. For a detailed discussion, see chapter 7, Organization and Development of the UWOA.

4-12. Use of Operational Detachments for Internal Command and Control
 Normally, all operations are directed by the SFOB. Operational detachments C and B possess a command and staff capability which may be employed to develop the command structure of the internal organization as the resistance effort grows, or for unilateral control. Detachments in place, to include detachments A, may be tasked to assume operational control of designated detachments. Additional detachments or augmentations to detachments in place may be infiltrated for that specific purpose.

4-13. Internal Support Bases
An internal support base is a facility or complex within hostile territory which provides logistic or other support to UW forces operating in or near the base area. It can be a small, carefully hidden, and dispersed facility in a remote area, or, when the enemy lacks the desire or capability to interfere, it can become larger and much more elaborate. The base complex eventually could include airstrips, seaports, or beach facilities, storage areas, medical facilities, and a pool of locally acquired or introduced vehicles. UWOA based aircraft are discussed in paragraph 5-10. Internal support bases have particular application in more remote parts of a theater of operations where no linkup with conventional ground forces is intended.

Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS

4-14. General
Control and support of UW operations requires a secure and reliable long-range communications capability between the external control headquarters and deployed Special Forces operational detachments.

4-15. Procedures
a. Detachment to External Headquarters. Communications procedures employed in UW must be formulated with the physical security of the detachment remaining a primary consideration. This security factor requires that the detachment radio transmitter be on the
Figure 4-3. Type UW communications net.
air for an absolute minimum of time at infrequent and irregular intervals; that it be relocated immediately after each contact if possible, and that every reasonable effort be made to preclude its being identified as a Special Forces station. To satisfy this criteria, it is imperative that the detachment communications equipment be reliable, lightweight, capable of rapid installation and removal, and possess a CW “burst" transmit and receive capability.

b. SFOB to Subordinate Control Headquarters (Control/Operational Bases). Communications will normally consist of sole-user telephone and secure teletype circuits provided by the theater army communication system and terminated by the Special Forces signal company. The alternate means will be a long-range radio-teletype system installed and operated by the Special Forces signal company. A type UW communications net is diagrammed in figure 4–3.

c. Exceptions. Exceptions to the above occur when linkup with approaching friendly ground forces is imminent (para 9–7), during stability operations (para 10–4 and 10–10) and during additional military operations (para 11–8). These situations require communications equipment and procedures appropriate to the mission.
as well as security or policy considerations, necessitates execution by U.S. personnel.

**5-7. Contingency Operations**

Contingency operations may involve unilateral action by Special Forces, particularly during the early stages of commitment, because of the urgency of requirements and a lack of indigenous assets. In other situations, Special Forces may be the only component of a contingency force capable of executing some of the tasks derived from the force commander's mission.

**5-8. Special Tasks**

See FM 31-21A.

### Section IV. AIR SUPPORT

**5-9. General**

*a. Air operations in support of UW activities differ from those in support of conventional tactical operations. Aircrews with special training are required for the accurate and undetected delivery of personnel and equipment to the UW OA, or for the extraction of personnel or objects from these areas.*

*b. Air support of Special Forces engaged in UW operations may be provided from Army, Navy, or Air Force resources depending on the availability and the capability of aircraft and aircrews for specific missions or categories of support. Army aviation elements organic to the Special Forces group and Special Air Warfare aircrews of the U.S. Air Force, which are trained in clandestine air support techniques, provide support within their capabilities. Some aircraft employed by these elements are specially configured or equipped for UW support. When support requirements exceed the numbers or capabilities of Special Forces or Special Air Warfare aircraft, other air support elements are employed. Army and Air Force air support of UW is discussed in succeeding paragraphs. Support by naval aviation is discussed in paragraphs 5-12 through 5-16.*

*c. See FM 31-21A.*

**5-10. Army Aviation**

*a. General.*

**1) Organic aviation.** Army aviation organic to the Special Forces group is responsive to Special Forces support requirements, because of its specialized training, immediate availability, common security and operational procedures, common communications, habitual use, and the command relationship. It is the principal source of administrative aviation support to the SFOB, and provides operational support as appropriate. Organic aviation normally operates from a site in the vicinity of the SFOB; however, aircraft operational teams tailored to fit the mission may be deployed to secure areas near the UW OA to improve range capabilities. When requirements are within the capabilities of Army aircraft, but exceed the capability of organic aviation, additional aviation may be attached or given a supporting or reinforcing mission. Command relationships and the duration of the assignment are specified at the time such assignment is made (FM 1-100).

**2) Attached aviation.** When the gaining Special Forces unit is assigned operational control of attached aviation, and when the attachment is of sufficient duration, attached aircrews may be profitably trained and employed on operational missions. If time and the specified command relationship preclude operational employment, attached aviation is employed on administrative support missions.

**3) Supporting and reinforcing aviation.** Aviation units placed in direct or general support, or assigned a reinforcing mission, normally are employed on administrative support rather than operational missions.

*b. Operational Missions.*

**1) The following operational missions are appropriate for Army aviation elements in support of UW:**

**a) Surveillance and reconnaissance (visual, photographic, and electronic).**

**b) Direct fire support.**

**c) Airborne radio retransmission between the SFOB and deployed detachments.**
(d) Infiltration.
(e) Exfiltration.
(f) Resupply.
(g) PSYOP loudspeaker and leaflet missions.
(h) Message pickup and delivery.
(i) Airmobile operations.
(j) Deception operations.

(2) Army aviation support of UW is discussed in FM 1-105.

c. UWOA Based Aircraft. When the tactical situation permits, aircraft of any service can be infiltrated into the UWOA to perform air operations missions. This employment is appropriate only when the following conditions exist:

(1) The UWOA is large and well-secured by the guerrilla force, and landing areas are available or may be constructed.

(2) The UWOA is in a remote area and generally denied to enemy ground operations by the local topography.

(3) Enemy air defenses or air defense systems are ineffective or nonexistent.

(4) Enemy nuclear capability is nonexistent or so reduced as to make nuclear attack in the UWOA unlikely.

(5) It is tactically feasible to infiltrate aviation elements using either their own flight capability, or by Air Force or Navy transportation.

(6) See also paragraph 4-13 on internal support bases.

5-11. Air Force Support

a. General. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) is the primary U.S. Air Force activity with UW interests and responsibilities, although other commands and activities may be directly or indirectly involved in UW support. Within TAC, Special Air Warfare wings are equipped for UW air support and trained in UW air tactics and techniques.

b. Special Air Warfare Squadrons. Special Air Warfare squadrons provide the nucleus for Air Force UW support. They are assigned within continental United States (CONUS) as subordinate elements of TAC. In overseas areas, they may be assigned to the appropriate major command as part of area tactical air forces. The organization, equipment, and strength of a Special Air Warfare squadron is flexible and may be developed or modified to satisfy mission or area requirements.

c. Command Relationships. When a Joint-UW command organization (para 4-4) exists, Special Air Warfare and other Air Force units allocated to the joint UW force comprise the Air Force component of that force. Operational control of Air Force elements is exercised by the commander of the joint force through the Air Force component commander. In the absence of a joint UW command or force, command and control of Air Force UW resources are as specified by the major air commander concerned, or by higher authority. AFM 2-5 outlines Air Force doctrine on command and control of Special Air Warfare forces. Joint doctrine on command and control, including the criteria for allocation, and attachment, with or without operational control, is contained in JCS Pub 2, and in FM 100-27.

d. Operational Missions. The following operational missions are appropriate for Air Force elements in support of UW:

(1) Surveillance and reconnaissance (visual, photographic, and electronic).

(2) Infiltration.

(3) Resupply.

(4) Exfiltration.

(5) Airborne radio retransmission.

(6) Interdiction.

(7) Close air support.

(8) PSYOP loudspeaker and leaflet missions.

(9) Airlift support.

(10) Deception operations.

(11) Message pickup and delivery.
on the designation by the unified force commander of specific geographical areas within enemy territory as unconventional warfare operational areas.

b. Unconventional Warfare Operational Sector. Based on the development of the UWOA and the requirements for additional Special Forces operational detachments, it may be advisable to subdivide the UWOA. These subdivisions are called sectors. The sector remains subordinate to the UWOA. An operational detachment becomes responsible for each sector. Sectors are further divided into subsectors when appropriate.

Section II. SPECIAL FORCES-RESISTANCE RELATIONS

7-6. General

a. Immediately upon completion of the infiltration, the Special Forces detachment commander initiates action to organize the guerrilla effort to achieve guerrilla warfare objectives.

b. The detachment commander impresses upon the resistance leaders that all personnel involved have a common goal against a common enemy and that it is to their mutual benefit for the guerrillas to accept sponsorship and operational guidance for the United States.

c. Once the guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages of close cooperation, the Special Forces detachment commander develops a command structure in conjunction with resistance leaders (para 7-12).

d. In some situations, the nucleus of resistance elements may be recruited from exiled or liberated personnel currently located in friendly-held territory. These personnel and units may be infiltrated as indicated in chapter 6.

7-7. Considerations

a. Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among the various guerrilla units are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces efforts to unify them. Opposition may stem from many causes such as personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences. It is essential that the detachment commander and his subordinates have a knowledge and appreciation of these attitudes and of the personalities concerned. He must know how extensive the Phase I preparation was, to include promises made and commitments to be honored. Without specific guidance from competent U.S. authority, it is beyond the scope of the detachment commander to make political commitments in the name of the U.S. Government. Guidance in political matters will normally emanate from the unified commander through the JUWTF and the SFOB. At some point prior to the linkup with conventional U.S. forces, political responsibilities may be assumed by Army Civil Affairs, and a Civil Affairs liaison officer may be assigned to Special Forces units within the GWOA.

b. Perhaps the most delicate part of a detachment commander's responsibility is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy key positions. If leaders and staff members of the resistance organization do not appear qualified to fill positions held, the detachment commander should endeavor to increase their effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel normally will increase the influence of the detachment commander. If all efforts in this direction fail and the future effectiveness of the resistance force is in doubt, the detachment commander should discreetly attempt to influence the selection of new leaders. It is mandatory, however, that the Special Forces commander exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive area, lest he jeopardize his mission or even the survival of his detachment.

c. The detachment commander and several of his subordinates should have at least a working knowledge of the local language. If, however, interpreters must be used, such personnel must be selected and utilized with caution. A detachment commander will have considerable difficulty gaining the confidence of the guer-
rillas who either dislike or distrust the interpreter(s).

d. All members of the Special Forces detachment must display a high degree of professional competence in unconventional warfare operations.

e. The judicious control of supplies may persuade the guerrillas to form a united force and support U.S. objectives.

f. A medical facility to provide limited treatment for noncombatant personnel should be established by the Special Forces detachment.

g. The Special Forces detachment commander and his subordinates must have a thorough knowledge of, and a rigid respect for, local courtesies, traditions, and taboos.

h. All members of the detachment must abide by the provisions of the Code of Conduct and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to display loyalty to their own nation's future.

Section III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

7–8. General

a. Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among the various guerrilla units are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist Special Forces efforts to unify them. A planned psychological operations program can be of assistance in achieving cohesive efforts among Special Forces and guerrilla units.

b. Unconventional warfare involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional, partisanship. Resistance organizations tend to attract personnel who accept violence as a means of achieving change.

c. The ideological and political factors associated with resistance activity create a fertile field for propaganda. Ideally, certain members of resistance movements are active propagandists. Hence, there is paralleling the guerrilla military effort a propaganda effort conducted by all resistance elements seeking to gain support for their movement. Civilians may be induced to harass the enemy by participating in work slowdowns, strikes, absenteeism, minor acts of sabotage, arson, etc. The relative isolation and clandestine atmosphere associated with resistance activities creates a continuing need for propaganda to support the effort.

d. Special Forces units, by their presence in a particular country, have a psychological impact on selected military or paramilitary elements and on informed elements of the population. Two factors which contribute to a favorable psychological impact are—tangible evidence of United States' interest and support through the presence of Special Forces personnel in daily face-to-face meetings and an evident appreciation by these U.S. representatives of the objectives and problems of the indigenous guerrilla force. This impact can be increased if psychological operations techniques are used at various stages in the organization and development of the guerrilla force. This task requires the detachment commander to have a thorough knowledge of psychological operations fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the peculiar operational environment in which he is immersed. This is particularly true in the initial phases of forming guerrilla units when the Special Forces operational detachment commander is seeking to win and weave together the assistance of supporting resistance elements (FM 33-1). PSYOP methods and techniques are discussed in detail in FM 33-1 and FM 33-5.

7–9. Target Groups

a. General. In a UW environment there are four major target groups:

Group 1—Enemy Military Forces.
Group 2—The Populace.
Group 3—Guerrillas.
Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground.

b. Group 1—Enemy Military Forces. This group consists of enemy military personnel. These military forces may be of the same nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying foreign power. Psychological warfare programs are directed against this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the morality of their cause. Guerrilla activities to include interdiction operations, particularly at night, induce in the enemy soldier a basic feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This feeling of inadequacy and fear permits easy access to the mind with the several tools of psychological operations, and may make the enemy soldier vulnerable to persuasion urging surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion. These procedures may include pointing up appropriate inadequacies in their supplies and equipment, and the constant danger of death. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, psychological warfare serves to lower his morale and reduce his effectiveness, particularly in conjunction with the powerful pressures generated by continuous combat action. The enemy soldier's feeling of isolation and his receptivity to U.S.-sponsored propaganda can be further increased through leaflets and broadcast messages which stress the popular support of the arms of the guerrillas. The propaganda appeal must attract attention, address a cogent problem, be meaningful, and show the way to a practical solution. For example, when tactically justified, the enemy soldier should be told why and how he should defect and given assurances concerning his safety and welcome. When enemy soldiers are captured by or defect to the guerrillas, promises of safety and good treatment must be kept. Proof of good treatment could be passed on to enemy units by photographing the soldier, having him sign leaflets, or possibly having him make loudspeaker broadcasts to his former comrades. Resistance clandestine elements may also inform enemy units, by rumor and surreptitious contact, of the well-being of defected or captured personnel. The defection of an enemy soldier is important news to his former comrades and may provide those remaining behind to consider similar action. Such operations have a great psychological impact on the enemy and on the guerrillas as well. The enemy is made to feel that his own comrades are wavering and do not support their goals, while the guerrillas begin to realize the enemy is weakening, and their own chances for success are increasing. The psychological warfare objective against this target group is to cause the combat efficiency of the enemy military forces to diminish materially. Under exceptional circumstances, certain of these personnel may ultimately be included in Group 4, Resistance Forces.

c. Group 2—The Populace.

(1) Enemy supporters include those civilians in an operational area who willingly collaborate with the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad psychological objectives, however, are the same as for those directed against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the collaborators, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against collaborators may result in reprisals and consequent loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations objectives; however, punitive action is often initiated and effected against collaborators by the guerrillas and other elements of the resistance. Such action is difficult to prevent, but must not be encouraged or sanctioned by U.S. Army representatives in the guerrilla warfare area. Psychological operations programs against this group are designed to curtail their support of the enemy forces and elicit their support of the resistance forces.

(2) Guerrilla supporters include that part of the civilian population which is sympathetic toward the goals of the resistance force but
who are not active members of some element of the resistance force. Psychological operations programs aimed and directed at this target audience stress appeals for the population to support the guerrillas in achieving common objectives. Successful guerrilla movements require that some portion of the population be favorably inclined toward these movements. In the initial stage of hostilities, the population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy force as well as those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological operations program must stress that the guerrillas share the political and social goals of the population, that these goals will be successful, and that the United States in supporting the guerrilla force supports these political and social goals. Special Forces personnel in the operational area have access to exploitable information on the immediate situation and on the attitudes and behavior of the local population. It may be directed that the Special Forces commander provide such information to higher headquarters in order that specific predetermined and coordinated psychological programs can be carried out in support of the UW effort. This support may be limited to the dissemination of leaflet or radio propaganda to the population or may be expanded to supply the guerrillas with the themes and materials to conduct PSYOP. The SFOB commander may provide the Special Forces operational detachment with additional advice as well as capabilities upon which to base a detailed and integrated psychological program. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this group is to impress upon them that they, the guerrillas, and the United States, have a common goal, and the success of this goal directly depends upon this group's support. This is the group that will serve as the primary recruiting source for personnel for Groups 3 and 4.

d. Group 3—Guerrillas. Psychological operations programs aimed at this target group stress that the presence of Special Forces personnel provides the guerrilla force with tangible evidence that the United States supports the general objectives of the guerrilla movement. Since the guerrilla bears the brunt of enemy attention and counteractions, any acceptable activities that enhance his prestige or raise his morale should be used. Other programs must stress the reliance of guerrillas on, and their rapport with, the population for support.

e. Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground. The efforts of this group should receive suitable recognition and be urged to continue their activities of aiding the guerrilla force; however, caution must be exercised to avoid compromising these individuals by unwittingly revealing them as members of the resistance force. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this target group is to impress upon all personnel that the ultimate success of the resistance movement depends upon their unwavering support.

7-10. Psychological Operations Activities

a. General. These include operations by which the Special Forces commander seeks to achieve psychological effects on the four target groups previously discussed. The broad spectrum of combat actions initiated by the Special Forces commander will have psychological as well as conventional military objectives. Examples are operations which tend to unify and increase the morale of the guerrilla fighters, or those which manifest guerrilla support of the people. As a byproduct, such operations tend to reinforce civilian beliefs in the strength of the guerrilla force and their political and military objectives. From the practical side, these operations should produce sources of food and information required for the survival of the guerrilla force. Evidence that the strength of the guerrilla force is growing tends to lower enemy morale and increase requirements for countermeasures. Within the limitation of resources available, operations initiated primarily for their psychological effects may include—
(1) Supporting the civilian population by sharing medical services and supplies.

(2) Providing sanctuary, as required, to civilians supporting the guerrilla cause.

(3) Encouraging portions of the civilian population to pursue traditional ways of life in the face of enemy opposition.

(4) Providing manpower and skills to the local population to repair or build needed structures, harvest crops, maintain schools and churches, and organize social activity groups.

(5) As feasible, the Special Forces detachment personnel may reinforce operations by direct contact with local civilians to provide additional evidence that the guerrillas are supported by the United States and that all are working in the interest of the population.

b. Printed Media. Printed leaflets, posters, or bulletins can be produced by the area command on simple reproduction machines or produced with a variety of field expedient means. The techniques of leaflet writing for unconventional operations are essentially the same as for conventional programs. Utilizing knowledgeable members of the resistance force, the Special Forces commander can adapt psychological themes to local conditions in order to produce timely, credible, and consistent messages. The Special Forces commander can augment the locally prepared program by requesting air deliveries of small newspapers, reinforcing leaflets, and bulletins. These materials can be air dropped to target audiences or issued through auxiliary unit channels. Because of the variable delays in conducting such operations, printed materials of this type usually emphasize the appealing aspects of psychological programs undertaken at higher levels. As an example, war aims are expressed as national aims and policies and disseminated through the media of official-looking leaflets. In this connection, the official text of joint communiques by the U.S. commander and recognized resistance leaders should be official and formal in appearance when issued to the target audience.

c. Rumor. Rumor can be an effective propaganda device but requires extreme skill and care in its use. Accordingly, the Special Forces commander initiates or participates in rumor campaigns for short-range tactical objectives only. To insure consonance with theater objectives, rumors of a long-range and/or strategic impact should not be disseminated without authority of the SFOB.

7-11. Development of the Psychological Operations Campaign

a. While the specific aspects of any particular campaign will vary in accordance with the situation, the steps for planning a psychological operations campaign are applicable to any situation.

b. A psychological operations campaign consists of two fundamental phases: the selection of the psychological objectives and the accomplishment of these objectives. In the first phase of the campaign the condition and attitudes within the area of operations are analyzed in terms of potential target groups; their susceptibility and effectiveness. From this analysis, meaningful psychological objectives are developed which, if achieved, will result in the accomplishment of the assigned, psychological operations mission. The second phase of the campaign involves the creation of meaningful themes which will be employed by appropriate media, stressed as the situation demands, scheduled in accordance with the concept of the campaign, and disseminated accordingly. These themes must be directed at the achievement of the psychological objectives.

Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

7-12. General

Communications used in unconventional warfare require continuous evaluation and adjustment to meet changing operational and security requirements. Within the UWOA, non-electronic means are used wherever practical. Until the area is relatively secure, radio and other electronic means should be used spar-
ingly to avoid enemy detection. Direction communication between all elements of the area command usually is neither desirable nor possible due to the necessity for compartmentation of one activity from another, the physical distances between elements, and the primitive communications means employed.

7–13. Area Command Systems of Communication

a. Internal Communications.

(1) General. Direct communications between all elements of the area command usually are neither desirable nor possible due to the necessity for compartmentation of one activity from another, the physical distances between elements, and the communications means employed. The area command establishes communications with subordinate resistance components. Although operations by all components of the resistance force must be mutually supporting and coordinated, the guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground all organize, operate and communicate differently because their activities and operational environments are different.

(2) Guerrilla force. Communications with and between guerrilla units normally will be by messenger or by visual and audible signals. Operational tasks are assigned and coordinated at periodic meetings or by liaison visits. While voice radio could assist coordination of tactical operations, its use advertises the presence and location of guerrilla units and detracts from the guerrillas’ surprise and elusiveness.

(3) Auxiliary. The auxiliary is a compartmented organization which employs clandestine communications techniques. Its environment usually permits greater freedom of movement than is possible by the underground. The auxiliary establishes courier routes or systems for its own communications and provides courier service to the area command and its guerrilla units.

(4) Underground. The underground is a highly compartmented organization which relies on clandestine communication techniques. Contact with other resistance elements is extremely limited for security reasons and may not always be possible at the area command level (FM 31–21A).

b. External Communications.

(1) Control and support. Deployed Special Forces detachments provide communications between the UWOA and the SFOB (para 4–14 and 4–15). These external communications are unilateral even when an area command is established. Normally, all detachments communicate directly with the SFOB and not with each other. Electronic communications between deployed detachments in the same or nearby UWOA’s is either prohibited or severely restricted for security reasons. Lateral contact between detachments, using any means, normally is prohibited to compartment one operation from another.

(2) Link-up communications. When the UWOA becomes a part of the area of influence of the friendly ground unit commander, communications must be established between that unit and the deployed detachment to facilitate coordination of tactical operations. This communication system will normally be voice radio.

c. Factors Affecting Radio Communications. Radio communications within an area command are affected by the operational situation and requirements, the physical geography of the area, enemy capabilities in detection and intercept techniques, and the communication equipment and operators available. It must be assumed that the enemy intercepts every electronic signal originating within the UWOA.

Section V. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

7–14. General

Logistical support for resistance forces is derived from two primary sources: the sponsor (external supply) and the UWOA (internal supply). Logistical planning by the area command is based upon support available from
CHAPTER 11

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

11–1. General
U.S. Army Special Forces assets may be employed in a variety of additional overt or covert military operations other than those already discussed. These operations are of the direct action type and capitalize on the capabilities of Special Forces for special operations which are inherent to their broader unconventional warfare mission. Special Forces personnel are highly trained in tactics, operations and intelligence, communications, weapons, demolitions, and medical subjects. Additionally, their capability to infiltrate and exfiltrate specific desired areas by land, sea, or air and, while in these areas to survive and operate for extended periods of time with minimum external direction and support facilitates their use in more highly specialized operations.

11–2. Purpose
This chapter provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and employment of Special Forces in direct action special operations.

Section II. MISSIONS

11–3. Types of Missions
The types of additional military operations that U.S. Army Special Forces are capable of conducting are diversified. Examples of missions that may be assigned Special Forces in order to accomplish additional military operations are—

a. Unilateral deep penetration to—
   (1) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
   (2) Attack critical strategic targets.

b. Recovery of friendly personnel in remote or hostile areas.

c. Training of U.S. and/or allied personnel in Special Forces operational tactics and techniques.

11–4. Limitations
The examples cited in paragraph 11–3 are not the only additional missions that Special Forces are capable of performing. The types of military operations that Special Forces can conduct are limited primarily by the availability of personnel and material resources.

Section III. ORGANIZATION

11–5. Tailoring
Often it will be necessary for the Special Forces commander to tailor his organization to give it the capability to accomplish additional missions assigned. Special Forces detachments contain a wide variety of military skills and experiences. The personnel in Special Forces are mature, flexible individuals who normally adapt readily to changing situations and organizations.

11–6. Factors Influencing Organization

a. The Special Forces commander, as in all operations, must consider the mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, and troops available (METT) during the planning stage of tailoring his force. These four factors should be considered constantly. A detailed discussion of these factors is contained in FM 17-1.

b. A prime consideration of the commander in tailoring his force is that Special Forces detachments may lack many items of equipment that are required for special operations. Selected weapons, voice radio equipment, and other items may have to be procured from other than Special Forces resources.

c. Combat support may have to be provided by other friendly units to Special Forces elements conducting additional military operations. Special Forces elements that are under the operational control of another unit will normally be provided combat support by that unit.

Section IV. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

11-7. Command and Control
Special Forces elements conducting additional military operations will operate under their normal command and control system. Operational requirements may require that Special Forces elements be placed under the operational control of conventional units. Normally operational control of these elements will be retained at higher levels but, exceptionally, may be as low as division level for specific missions. Units assuming operational control of Special Forces elements may have to provide combat service support due to limitations of Special Forces TOE.

11-8. Communications

a. The majority of additional military operations assigned to U.S. Army Special Forces require special communications considerations. The security and high dependability required in unconventional warfare operations may be required by some direct action tasks, while other tasks will emphasize the need for speed and simplicity.

b. Appropriate radio equipment should be employed to satisfy the requirements and conditions stated in a above. Organic CW communications equipment may be employed to supplement other methods of communication.

c. The commander must keep in mind that Special Forces detachments do not generally have sufficient voice radio equipment to conduct direct action operations effectively. Necessary arrangements should be made to procure this communications equipment when needed.

Section V. OPERATIONS

11-9. General
Operations may be conducted in either an overt or a covert nature depending on the situation. All operations should employ the techniques utilized in covert operations to increase the chance for surprise of the opposing force and to enhance the chance for survival of the friendly force. The greatest contributions of Special Forces in these operations are realized when the operations closely parallel the training already perfected by Special Forces. Special Forces soldiers are true foot soldiers, trained and conditioned to navigate, during extended periods, the most rugged and diversified terrain with little or no outside support. They are psychologically prepared to work in small groups behind enemy lines and to expect little or no air or artillery support.

11-10. Conduct of Deep Penetration Operations

a. Special Forces have the capability to perform strategic reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations within and outside the area of responsibility of the field army. These tasks may be executed for specific missions in the area of operations of a conventional unit, thereby necessitating close coordination and, in some cases exercise of operational control over the Special Forces element by the commander of the conventional unit (para 11-7).
APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A-1. Joint Publications

JCS Pub 1  Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JCS Pub 2  Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
(C) JANAP 201  Status of Noncryptographic JANAPs and ACPs (U).

A-2. Defense Intelligence Agency Publications

(S) DIAM 58–11  (DICOM) (U).


AR 37–103  Finance and Accounting for Installations; Disbursing Operations.
AR 37–103–1  Finance and Accounting for Installations; Imprest Funds.
AR 320–5  Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
AR 320–50  Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
AR 380–5  Safeguarding Defense Information.
(C) AR 380–40  Department of the Army Policy for Safeguarding COMSEC Information (U).
AR 380–41  Control of COMSEC Material.
(C) AR 381–141  Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control, and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U).
(S) AR 580–5  Project PARASOL; Support of Paramilitary Forces in Special Operations (U).
(C) DA Pam 310–9  Index of COMSEC Publications (U).
FM 1–100  Army Aviation Utilization.
FM 1–105  Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures.
FM 3–10  Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
FM 3–50  Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations.
FM 5–26  Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).
FM 6–20–1  Field Artillery Tactics.
FM 6–20–2  Field Artillery Techniques.
FM 7–11  Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized.
FM 7–15  Rifle Platoon and Squads—Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized.
FM 7–20  Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions.
FM 17–1  Armor Operations.
FM 20–32  Landmine Warfare.
FM 20–33  Combat Flame Operations.
FM 21–5  Military Training Management.
FM 21-6 Techniques of Military Instruction.
FM 21-30 Military Symbols.
FM 21-40 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense.
FM 21-41 Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare.
FM 21-50 Ranger Training and Ranger Operations.
FM 21-75 Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
FM 21-76 Survival, Evasion, and Escape.
(S) FM 21-77A Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U).
FM 21-150 Combatives.
FM 24-18 Field Radio Techniques.
FM 24-20 Field Wire and Field Cable Techniques.
FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare.
FM 30-5 Combat Intelligence.
FM 30-17 Counterintelligence Operations.
(C) FM 30-17A Counterintelligence Special Operations (U).
(S) FM 30-18 Intelligence Collections Operations, Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U).
FM 31-10 Denial Operations and Barriers.
FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations.
FM 31-18 Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company.
FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques.
(C) FM 31-20A Special Forces Operational Techniques (U).
(S) FM 31-21A Special Forces Operations (U).
FM 31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces.
FM 31-30 Jungle Training and Operations.
(C) FM 31-40 Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
FM 31-72 Mountain Operations.
FM 33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations.
FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.
FM 61-100 The Division.
FM 100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
(C) FM 100-20 Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (U).
FM 101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure.
FM 101-10-1 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—Unclassified Data.
(S) FM 101-10-8 Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Classified Data (U).
FM 101-40 Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense.
TC 3-16 Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, and Herbicides in Counterguerrilla Operations.
TOE 10-500 Quartermaster Service Organization.
TOE 11-247 Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-105 Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-106 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-107 Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
This glossary is provided to furnish the user readily available explanations of terms applicable to Special Forces operations which are used in this manual. Although some terms are contained in JCS Pub 1* and AR 320-5**, they are reproduced here for the benefit of those who do not have ready access to those publications. Other terms related to stability operations have been approved for publication in AR 320-5***. Terms listed without asterisk are not found elsewhere but are in common usage in Special Forces units.

*Agent—One who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

Area Assessment—The prescribed collection of specific information by the Special Forces element commander which commences immediately after infiltration and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence of the area acquired from area studies and other sources prior to infiltration.

Area Command—The organizational structure established within an unconventional warfare operational area to command and control resistance forces, usually integrating the Special Forces operational detachment and the resistance force.

Area Study—The prescribed collection of specific information pertaining to a given area developed from sources available prior to infiltration.

Assets—Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations in place or which can be placed in position to accomplish specific tasks. These assets may be covert or overt depending upon the nature of their activity. They must be responsive to U.S. control and committable in support of U.S. objectives.

Auxiliary—That element of the resistance force, normally located in rural areas, established to provide organized civilian support of the resistance movement.

*Black Propaganda—Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. (See also Propaganda.)

*Clandestine Operations—Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

*Cold War—A state of international tension, where in political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

Compartmentation—The division of an organization or activity into functional segments or cells to restrict communication between them and
prevent knowledge of the identity or activities of other segments except on a need-to-know basis.

*Compromise—The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets, or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person.

*Cover—Protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with clandestine activities.

*Covert Operations—Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operations.

*Evasion and Escape—The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

*Exfiltration—The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control.

*General War—Armed conflict between the major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

*Grey Propaganda—Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source. (See also Propaganda.)

*Guerrilla—A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla Base—A temporary site where guerrilla installations, headquarters, and some guerrilla units are located. A guerrilla base is considered to be transitory, and must be capable of rapid displacement of personnel within the base.

Guerrilla Force—A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel, organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held or hostile territory.

*Guerrilla Warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

*Infiltration—The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals at extended or irregular intervals; when used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided.

*Insurgency—A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

*Interdiction—Preventing or hindering, by any means, enemy use of an area or route.

*Internal Defense—The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

*Irregular Forces—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

*Limited War—Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents,
involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more
nations.

**Linkup**—The physical juncture between elements of the guerrilla force
and conventional tactical commands.

*Paramilitary Forces*—Forces or groups which are distinct from the
regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organiza-
tion, equipment, training, or mission.

**Pilot Team**—A small provisional team, composed of selected Special Forces
personnel, that infiltrates into enemy or enemy-controlled territory to
evaluate and report on specific areas and situations.

**Propaganda**—Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals in
support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emo-
tions, attitudes or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit
the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (See also Black Propaganda,
Grey Propaganda, White Propaganda.)

***Psychological Operations***—These operations include psychological war-
fare, and in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and
ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or
friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes or behavior to support
the achievement of national objectives.

**Resistance Force**—That portion of the civil population of a country who
are engaged in the resistance movement, i.e., guerrillas, auxiliaries, and
members of the underground.

**Resistance Movement**—The resistance movement is an organized effort by
some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally
established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil
order and stability. Initially, such resistance may consist of subversive
political activities and other actions designed to agitate and propagan-
dize the population to distrust and lose confidence in the legally es-
tablished government or occupying power. If not suppressed, such
resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.

**Safe Area**—A relatively secure location in enemy or enemy-controlled
territory where a limited number of Special Forces/guerrilla personnel
may receive temporary refuge.

**Special Action Force (SAF)**—The SAF is a specially-trained, area-
oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the com-
mander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited, and gen-
eral war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and capa-
bilities according to theater requirements.

**Special Forces**—See: United States Army Special Forces.

**Special Forces Operational Base**—A provisional organization which is
established within a friendly area by elements of a Special Forces
group to provide command, administration, training, logistical support,
and intelligence for committed Special Forces detachments.

**Stability Operations**—Stability operations are that type of internal de-
fense and internal development operations and assistance provided by
the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order
within which responsible government can function effectively and
without which progress cannot be achieved.

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See footnotes at end of glossary.

Glossary-3
Subversion—Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

Unconventional Warfare—Includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion, and escape, and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

*Denotes definition appearing in JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 January 1966.


***Denotes definition approved for publication in AR 329-5. (DA approved by unclassified message CAGO-L 143, HQ, USACDCCAG, 14 February 1967.)
## INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph Page</th>
<th>Paragraph Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Support:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army aviation</td>
<td>5-10, 5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force support</td>
<td>5-11, 5-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval aviation</td>
<td>5-15, 5-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary and underground</td>
<td>3-8a, 3-3, 7-2d(3), 7-1, 7-2d(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the UWOA</td>
<td>7-12, 7-7, 7-13, 7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational detachments</td>
<td>5-19, 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>5-17, 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>4-15, 4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>5-20, 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal company</td>
<td>5-18, 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>2-6, 2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal section</td>
<td>5-17, 5-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional Operations:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>11-7, 11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>11-8, 11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical support</td>
<td>11-13, 11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>11-3, 11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>11-9, 11-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>11-5, 11-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demobilization:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courses of action</td>
<td>9-12, 9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of sponsoring power</td>
<td>5-3A, 5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment of Special Forces in Stability Operations:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advisory assistance</td>
<td>10-6, 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army logistical support</td>
<td>10-12, 10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>10-8, 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>10-5, 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>10-9, 10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of employment</td>
<td>10-2, 10-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-training</td>
<td>10-16, 10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and security</td>
<td>10-8, 10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language and area training</td>
<td>10-18, 10-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>10-4, 10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of host country military forces</td>
<td>10-13, 10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of paramilitary or irregular forces</td>
<td>10-14, 10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>10-7, 10-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predeployment training program</td>
<td>10-19, 10-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Selection of personnel                           | 10-15, 10-5   |
| Specialist training                              | 10-17, 10-7   |
| Supply system                                     | 10-10, 10-5   |
| Evasion and Escape:                              |                |
| Responsibilities                                  | 3-13, 3-4     |
| Training requirements                             | 3-14, 3-4     |
| Exfiltration methods                              | 6-5, 6-2      |

| Funds:                                             |                |
| Unconventional warfare                            | 7-15, 7-9      |
| Stability operations                              | 10-11, 10-5    |
| Guerrilla Combat Operations:                      |                |
| Characteristics                                   | 9-2, 9-1       |
| Command relationships with conventional forces     | 9-7b, 9-4      |
| Defensive measures                                | 9-9b, 9-5      |
| Linkup operations                                 | 9-7, 9-7       |
| Missions                                          | 9-4, 9-2       |
| Guerrilla Warfare                                 |                |
| Characteristics                                   | 3-11, 3-3      |
| Command relationships                             | 5-4, 5-2       |
| Definition                                        | 3-10, 3-3      |
| Operational control of guerrilla forces           | 5-5, 5-2       |
| Overt resistance (guerrilla force)                | 3-8b, 3-8, 7-2d(2) |

| Infiltration:                                      |                |
| Air                                               | 6-2, 6-1       |
| Land                                              | 6-4, 6-1       |
| Water                                             | 6-3, 6-1       |
| Intelligence:                                     |                |
| Intelligence information collection and production agencies | 8-4, 8-1 |
| Intelligence requirements                         | 8-5, 8-1, 10-8, 10-4 |

| Logistical Support:                               |                |
| Logistical requirements                           | 7-14, 7-8, 10-10, 10-5, 11-13 11-3 |
| Log support to the resistance element             | 7-15, 7-16 7-9 |
| Medical service                                   | 7-19, 7-10     |
| Storage                                           | 7-17, 7-9      |
| Transportation services                           | 7-18, 7-9      |
| Naval Support                                     | 5-12, 5-5      |
| Psychological Operations                          | 7-8, 7-4       |

**Index-1**
Resistance:
- Forces: 3-7, 7-2d
- Influencing factors: 3-9
- Phases in development of a sponsored resistance movement: 5-3

Security:
- Communications: 5-20
- Security within stability operations: 10-8
- Security within the UWOA: 8-8

Separate Deployment of a Special Forces Company: 4-9

Special Forces Operational Base:
- Special Forces operational base afloat: 5-4d
- The Special Forces operational base: 4-7
- The advanced control base, separate and alternate Special Forces operational base: 4-8

Special Employment:
- Contingency operations: 5-7
- Unilateral operations: 5-6

Special Forces Groups:
- Army Airborne:
  - Concept of employment: 2-3b
  - Organization: 2-3a
- Aviation Company:
  - Concept of employment: 2-7b
  - Organization: 2-7a
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company:
  - Concept of employment: 2-4b
  - Organization: 2-4a
- Signal Company:
  - Concept of employment: 2-6b
  - Organization: 2-6a
- Special Forces Company:
  - Concept of employment: 2-5b
  - Organization: 2-5a

Stability Operations: 10-1, 10-19

Subversion: 3-16

Theatre Unconventional Warfare:
- Command: 4-4, 4-1, 4-5

Training:
- Characteristics of guerrilla training: 7-28
- Cross-training: 10-16
- Language and area training: 10-18
- Requirements for unconventional warfare: 3-5
- Specialist training: 10-17

The predeployment training program: 10-19

Unconventional Warfare:
- Concept: 3-1b
- Forces: 3-3
- General: 3-1a
- Legal status of participants: 3-6
- Operations: 3-2
- Organization:
  - Concept: 4-1
  - External:
    - Separate deployment of Special Forces company: 4-9
    - Special Forces operational base: 4-7
    - Advanced control base, separate, and alternate Special Forces operational base: 4-8
    - Influencing factors: 4-4
- Internal:
  - Area command: 4-11, 4-6
  - Operational Detachments: 4-12
  - Support bases: 4-13
  - Responsibilities: 3-4
  - Training requirements: 3-5

Unconventional Warfare Operational Area:
- Administration:
  - General: 7-20
  - Records: 7-21
  - Area Command:
    - Area command: 4-11, 4-6
    - 7-2
  - Command relationships of U.S. agencies: 7-4
  - Geographical areas of responsibility: 7-5
  - Special Forces objectives: 7-3
  - Special Forces detachment resistance force relations:
    - Concept: 7-6
    - Considerations: 7-7
  - Underground: 3-8a, 3-3
  - 7-2d(4)
  - Urban Operations: 9-10, 9-5
    - 10-7f

U.S. Army Special Forces:
- Capabilities: 1-7
- Concept of employment: 1-5
- Mission: 1-6
- Role: 1-4
- Tailoring: 2-2