# SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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*This manual supersedes FM 31–21, 29 September 1961, including C 1, 4 September 1963.*
Part One

Introduction

Chapter 1

General

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides doctrinal guidance to commanders and staffs responsible for the training and operational employment of U.S. Army special forces in unconventional warfare (UW) and in counterinsurgency (CI) operations. It describes the organization, mission, and methods of employment of the U.S. Army airborne special forces group. It explains the interrelationships of the special forces operational base, the airborne special forces group and its C, B, and A detachments, and other U.S. elements operationally engaged in the guerrilla warfare operational area (GWOA). It furnishes guidelines to the operational detachment commander in his relationships with resistance leaders and other resistance personnel. This manual is applicable in nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

b. This manual should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques, and procedures on the conduct of unconventional warfare operations (see app). For operational techniques pertaining to special forces
operations, see FM 31-20. For detailed information and guidance for the training and operational employment of units, teams, and individuals designated as U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces, see FM 31-22 and FM 31-22A.

c. The classified supplement to this manual is keyed to the appropriate paragraph or subparagraph. In each case, the appropriate paragraph in this manual is so annotated, d and e, below. See FM 31-21A.

d. See FM 31-21A.

e. See FM 31-21A.

2. Definitions

A compilation of definitions pertaining to unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations is found in the glossary.

3. Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, N. C. 28307.

Section II. FUNDAMENTALS

4. Definition of Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and es-
cape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

5. Responsibilities for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare

a. Responsibility for developmental action in each of the interrelated fields of unconventional warfare has been delegated to that department or agency of the U.S. Government having primary concern. Guerrilla warfare is the responsibility of the U.S. Army.

b. Within certain designated geographic areas (guerrilla warfare operational areas), U.S. Army special forces must be prepared to assume responsibility for all three interrelated fields of unconventional warfare.

c. Guerrilla operations are customarily supported and accompanied by both overt and clandestine political and economic activities of individuals and groups integrated or acting in concert with established guerrilla forces. These types of activities are interlocking.

6. Counterinsurgency

Broad unconventional warfare doctrine does not apply to counterinsurgency situations; however, selected tactics and techniques are applicable. Certain special forces detachments are highly trained in counterinsurgency and have the capability of providing such training, operational advice, and assistance to selected indigenous forces. See chapter 11.
CHAPTER 2
RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

7. Historical Background

a. Numerous historical examples reveal that guerrilla activities started with a small band of determined men striking at the support and communication facilities of a more powerful enemy. Under strong leadership, these resistance groups grew larger and became better organized and better trained. In rare instances, they became strong enough to organize an army capable of seizing and holding ground.

b. Resistance generally begins with the desire of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an occupying power or an unpopular regime in their own country. The feeling of opposition toward, and hatred of, conditions as they conflict with the individual's values, interests, aspirations, and way of life spreads from the individual to his family, to his close friends, and to his neighbors. As a result, an entire community may be obsessed with hatred for the established authority. Initially, this hatred will manifest itself by sporadic, spontaneous acts. As the discontent grows, "natural leaders," e.g., former military personnel, clergymen, local office holders and neighborhood spokesmen, emerge to guide this discontent into channels of organized resistance that will promote its growth. Resistance
movements may start as group movements; e.g., oppressed or radical political parties, or cultural, religious, and social minority groups.

8. The Resistance Movement

a. A resistance movement is defined as an organized effort by some portion of a civil population of a country to resist the established government or an occupying power. Initially, such resistance may consist of insurgent political activities and other actions designed to agitate and propagandize the population to distrust and lose confidence in the established government or occupying power. This is the most vulnerable stage of insurgency where it may most easily be crushed. If not suppressed, such resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.

b. A resistance movement is composed of the hardcore resistance leadership, the overt militant element (guerrilla force), the clandestine element (underground), and the supporting civilian population (auxiliary). The full development and eventual success of the resistance is dependent on the capability for molding these component elements into an efficient and effective organization (para 46d).

c. Support of resistance by an external source in cold war situations is usually covert. In limited or general war, while resistance operations remain predominantly clandestine, the external source of support for the resistance is usually acknowledged.

9. Types of Resistance

Resistance is characterized as being of two broad categories—
a. **Clandestine Resistance (Auxiliary and Underground).** This type of resistance is conducted by people who outwardly follow their normal mode of existence. Organized and controlled group and individual activities normally include political action, propaganda, espionage, sabotage, traffic in contraband, and the gathering of intelligence. This type of resistance may be either passive or active in nature.

(1) The passive form is limited to those activities short of physical violence and destruction.

(2) Active resistance implies direct, physical action accompanied by violence and destruction.

b. **Overt Resistance (Guerrilla Force.)** This type of resistance is conducted openly by individuals and groups organized and trained along military lines. This militant arm of the resistance movement normally is referred to as the guerrilla force. They make no secret of their existence or their objectives. However, the specific relationship of the guerrilla force to other components of the resistance movement is compartmented to prevent compromise of the entire resistance movement.

10. **Basic Factors Influencing Guerrilla Warfare**

a. **National Character.** This is a composite of the personal characteristics of individuals and of the groups they form. The attitudes of the people toward the regime in power and toward the actual or potential enemy of that regime must be considered in developing and employing guerrilla forces.

b. **Motivation.** The motivations of these people to support the guerrilla effort will be influenced by
many factors; for example: ideological, cultural, environmental, respect for the resistance leaders, economic, personal ambition, hate, personal security, ego, and fear.

c. Topography. Topography plays a vital part in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Mountains, swamps, large forests, and jungles can provide relatively secure guerrilla areas and sanctuaries. In areas lacking favorable terrain, resistance movements tend to take on a clandestine character.

11. Definition of Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. The term “guerrilla warfare” is used to denote the primary overt military activities of a resistance movement.

12. Characteristics of Guerrilla Warfare

a. General. Guerrilla warfare is characterized by offensive actions with emphasis on mobility, elusiveness, and surprise. In addition to these traits, there are other important characteristics, such as civilian support, external support, political aspects, legal aspects, and tactical aspects.

b. Support Factors.

(1) Civilian Support. The success of guerrilla movements depends upon continuous moral and material support from the local civilian population. Necessary support of the population may be difficult to achieve, since the local community usually is under intense pressure from counterguerrilla factions.
Such punitive measures as reprisals, terrorism, deportation, restriction of movement, and seizure of goods and property are frequently conducted against supporters of a resistance movement. However, if the local populace has a strong will to resist, enemy reprisals may often cause an increase in support of resistance activities (para 46d(3) and (4)).

(2) External Support. Guerrilla operations are more effective when outside sponsorship is present. During a wartime situation this support is political, psychological, and logistical, as well as tactical. A sponsoring power decides to support guerrilla forces when it feels that the guerrillas can make a significant contribution toward the achievement of national objectives.

c. Political Aspects. Guerrilla warfare is recognized as being both military and political in nature. Guerrilla leaders in conflict with a common enemy yet politically opposed to each other may dissipate their efforts by fighting each other. This factor makes it necessary for a potential sponsoring power to thoroughly evaluate the short-range as well as the long-range ramifications of any support rendered.

d. Legal Status of Participants in Unconventional Warfare.

(1) In limited or general war, members of regular military units sent to enemy or enemy-occupied areas to conduct unconventional warfare are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war provided they wear the
uniform of the country they represent. (See para 63 and 74, FM 27–10.)

(2) In territory occupied by the enemy, personnel indigenous to that country who operate against the enemy are not entitled to prisoner of war status unless such indigenous personnel:

(a) Are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(b) Wear a fixed distinctive sign recogniz-able at a distance.

(c) Carry arms openly.

(d) Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

(e) Indigenous personnel not meeting the above criteria are subject to punishment under penal legislation promulgated by the occupying power.

(3) In the domestic territory of the enemy, local nationals who cooperate with members of foreign military units are not entitled to prisoner of war status when captured by their own government.

(4) See FM 27–10 for detailed explanation of the laws of land warfare.

e. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Primary considerations. Guerrilla units ordinarily cannot achieve the degree of combat power in the manner of conventional units. However, by taking maximum advantage of their inherent capabilities, i.e., mobility and elusiveness, while at the same time acknowledging and allowing for their limitations, guerrilla units can survive and attain eventual success.
(2) Offensive tactics. The basis for a successful guerrilla operation is predicated on detailed intelligence and a well thought out and rehearsed tactical plan, employing the principle of surprise. Normally, the guerrilla force is interested primarily in interdicting lines of communication and the destruction of critical enemy installations. Except in those instances wherein the tactical advantages are clearly with the guerrilla force, no effort is made to close with and destroy an enemy. Conversely, the enemy must provide security for his critical installations and seek to contact and destroy the guerrilla force. These essentially contradictory courses of action create a fluid operational environment that benefits guerrilla operations.

(3) Defensive tactics. Protective surveillance is the guerrilla's best assurance against being surprised by the enemy. This is achieved by organizing civilian support to augment the local security of the guerrilla force. At all times he must be prepared for a hasty withdrawal to alternate areas. Guerrilla force security and ability to control the area is more easily achieved in difficult terrain which restricts enemy observation and movement. Terrain restrictions limit the enemy capability to mount coordinated operations quickly against the guerrillas and permit guerrilla units to avoid static defensive combat.
PART TWO
ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

CHAPTER 3
JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE (JUWTF)

13. General
a. Commanders designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are responsible for the conduct of unconventional warfare. Such designated commanders include commanders of unified and specified commands and joint task force commanders.
b. As a part of this responsibility, such commanders designate specific areas (guerrilla warfare operational areas) for the conduct of guerrilla warfare and related unconventional warfare activities.
c. As required, the commander has the authority to establish a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) Headquarters to plan for and to conduct wartime unconventional warfare operations within his area of responsibility.

14. Concept of Organization
a. Joint unconventional warfare task forces are activated by the JCS and may be organized prior to the initiation of hostilities. The typical JUWTF
consists of a joint headquarters and two or more services and appropriate civilian agencies. There are innumerable advantages to be gained by the JUWTF being established prior to actual operational commitment. Such advantages include determining UW requirements, preparing plans, and monitoring the stockpiling of materiel for potential operations.

b. The Airborne Special Forces Group, the principal Army element of the JUWTF, establishes a special forces operational base (SFOB) to command and support operational detachments prior to and after commitment in a guerrilla warfare operational area.

c. The JUWTF headquarters and its major subordinate control headquarters are located in areas under friendly control.

15. Functions of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force

a. The JUWTF commander and his staff make operational plans for and direct the conduct of unconventional warfare. The principal functions of the JUWTF are—

1. Recommend geographical areas to be designated guerrilla warfare operational areas.
2. Procure and maintain intelligence materials in support of unconventional warfare.
3. Develop operational, administrative, and logistical plans and requirements for the support of unconventional warfare.
4. Coordinate with other theater agencies in planning for all types of operations.
Develop communication procedures and requirements to support unconventional warfare plans.

Plan and conduct joint training of land, sea, and air units designated to participate in or support unconventional warfare.

As directed, coordinate with allied military authorities for the preparation and execution of unconventional warfare plans.

Maintain liaison with other unconventional warfare agencies or units.

Recommend strengths of indigenous forces to be supported for unconventional warfare operations.

Maintain liaison at staff and operational level with appropriate intelligence agencies; coordinate requirements, collection and communications with other activities in denied areas; plan intelligence operations in support of conventional forces when directed by the theater commander.

Maintain liaison with theater civil affairs units with respect to civil affairs (CA) aspects of unconventional warfare.

The staff operations of a JUWTF are basically the same as for other U.S. military staffs.

Operational Control of Guerrilla Forces

Operational control of U.S.-sponsored guerrilla forces is exercised by the unified command commander through the JUWTF.

When guerrilla warfare operational areas fall within the zones of responsibility of advancing major tactical commands, operational control of
affected guerrilla forces usually is transferred from the JUWTF to the tactical command concerned. In conjunction with this transfer, special forces personnel are attached to the tactical command to provide liaison and to advise and assist in the employment of the guerrilla force.

c. The major tactical commander, such as a field army commander, may assign operational control of the guerrilla force to his subordinate commands. Generally, such delegation of control is not made below division level.

d. Chapter 9 presents a more detailed discussion of utilization of guerrilla forces by tactical commands.
CHAPTER 4
THE AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

Section I. GENERAL

17. General

U.S. Army special forces are trained to conduct guerrilla warfare and related unconventional warfare activities. Special forces is a strategic force employed under the direction of the unified command and provides the unified command a capability to conduct unconventional warfare operations deep within enemy or enemy-held territory.

18. Mission and Concept

a. Mission. The missions of special forces are to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare and to advise, train, and assist host country forces in counterinsurgency operations (see ch 11 on counterinsurgency operations).

b. Concept. Within guerrilla warfare operational areas, special forces are responsible for the conduct of all aspects of U.S. Army-sponsored unconventional warfare activities.

Section II. UNITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

19. The Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The airborne special forces group, as organized under TOE 31–105E, consists of
a headquarters and headquarters company, four special forces companies, a signal company, and an aviation company. The group structure may be modified to conform to area requirements (fig. 1 and current Table of Organization and Equipment).

b. Mission.

(1) To plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations in areas not under friendly control.

(2) Through the operational detachments, to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

c. Capabilities.

(1) Establishes a special forces operational base.

(2) Establishes and operates concurrently up to four subordinate control bases or separate operational bases.

(3) Infiltrates detachments by air, sea, land, or stay-behind tactics into areas not under friendly control in order to conduct unconventional warfare operations.

(4) Commands and controls deployed special forces elements.

(5) Coordinates supply of deployed special forces elements.

20. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. Figure 2 and current Table of Organization and Equipment.

b. Mission.

(1) To establish a special forces operational base.
Figure 1. Airborne Special Forces Group.
Figure 2. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
(2) To provide for command of special forces and selected augmentation elements, when assigned.

(3) To advise and coordinate the employment of the special forces group and selected augmentation elements, when assigned, with joint headquarters and joint unconventional warfare task force headquarters during limited or general war.

(4) To advise and coordinate the employment of the special forces group and selected augmentation elements, when assigned, with the staffs of theater army and major subordinate headquarters of all services within the theater.

(5) To conduct detailed unconventional warfare planning in support of theater UW plans. The scope of this planning will include widely scattered geographical areas, diverse terrain, variable military, ethnic, political and social factors, communications, and logistical elements.

(6) To provide personnel, training, intelligence, and logistical support for assigned special forces and attached elements.

(7) To coordinate supply of deployed special forces detachments.

c. *Capabilities.*

(1) Provides command, staff, liaison personnel, and equipment to establish and operate a special forces operational base (SFOB).

(2) Provides staff and support elements to the operational detachments C of the airborne
special forces companies, in order to establish and operate up to four subordinate control bases or separate operational bases when required.

(3) Provides command, staff, control, and planning for special forces and selected augmentation elements prior to and after employment.

(4) Plans and coordinates logistical support of special forces operational elements on a continuing basis beginning with the infiltration phase (para 34).

(5) Provides unit level medical and dental service.

21. Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group
(fig. 3)

a. Organization. The special forces company consists of an administrative detachment, 1 operational detachment C (fig. 4), 3 operational detachments B (fig. 5), and 12 operational detachments A (fig. 6).

b. Mission.

(1) To plan and conduct unconventional warfare operations in areas not under friendly control.

(2) To organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

(3) To perform such other unconventional warfare missions as may be directed, or as may be inherent, in or essential to the primary mission of conducting guerrilla warfare.
Figure 3. Special Forces Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
Figure 4. Operational Detachment C.
Figure 5. Operational Detachment B.
Figure 6. Operational Detachment A.
c. Capabilities.

(1) Infiltrates by air, sea, land, or stay-behind methods into areas not under friendly control in order to conduct unconventional warfare operations.

(2) As directed, provides liaison personnel to the appropriate supporting and supported forces.

(3) Operational detachment C provides for command of uncommitted operational detachments B and A. When committed, this detachment may conduct guerrilla warfare operations or may control two or more operational detachments within a GWOA. When augmented by appropriate personnel and equipment from the headquarters and headquarters company and the signal company, it establishes and operates a subordinate control base or separate operational base as required. In garrison, the operational detachment C commander serves as the commander of the special forces company.

(4) Operational detachment B conducts guerrilla warfare operations as required and provides for the command of subordinate operational detachments.

(5) Operational detachment A conducts guerrilla warfare operations as required.

(6) Administrative detachment performs the normal administrative functions of a company headquarters. The detachment commander executes the directives and orders of the commander of the special forces com-
pany ((3) above). The detachment reverts to group control if all operational detachments are deployed.

22. Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. Figure 7 and current Table and of Organization and Equipment.

b. Mission.

(1) To provide signal communications for the special forces group headquarters.
(2) To establish and maintain communications for special forces operational base(s) (SFOB).
(3) To furnish augmentation to the operational detachments C by providing the necessary communications facilities for four subordinate control bases or separate operational bases.
(4) To terminate landline and radio circuits from adjacent and higher headquarters.
(5) To perform direct support maintenance on cryptoequipment and direct and limited general support maintenance on all other signal equipment organic to the special forces group.

c. Capabilities.

(1) Provides communications for a special forces operational base on a 24-hour basis, including message center, cryptofacilities, teletypewriter and radio communications.
(2) As required, provides personnel and equipment to the special forces group headquarters to operate a main SFOB, and furnishes personnel and equipment to augment
Figure 7. Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
the operational detachments C to establish and operate concurrently four subordinate control bases (less landline teletypewriter).

(3) As required, furnishes personnel and equipment augmentation to the operational detachment C to provide communications including landline teletypewriter, message center, and cryptofacilities for up to four separate operational bases.

(4) Provides direct support maintenance of crytoequipment for the special forces groups; and performs organizational, direct support, and limited general support maintenance of all other signal equipment organic to the special forces group.

(5) Provides command, control, and planning for special forces communications prior to, and after deployment of, the operational detachments.

(6) When augmented, this unit provides the necessary personnel and equipment to the operational detachment C to establish and operate an additional main SFOB.

23. Aviation Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. Figure 8 and current Table of Organization and Equipment.

b. Mission. To provide aviation support for the airborne special forces group in unconventional warfare operations in limited or general war.

c. Capabilities.

(1) Within the capabilities of the aircraft:

(a) Provides air delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment in unconventional warfare operations.
Figure 8. Aviation Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
(b) Provides for exfiltration of selected personnel from the GWOA.

d) Provides spot aerial photography.

c) Provides limited aerial fire support.

e) Provides other aviation support such as battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, liaison, limited logistical support, administrative support, aeromedical evacuation, and participates in PSYOP.

(2) Provides qualified personnel to man the air operations section of the operation center.

(3) Performs direct support aircraft maintenance.
CHAPTER 5

THE SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE
(SFOB)

Section I. GENERAL

24. Description

a. The SFOB is the functional regrouping of the special forces group into operational elements and administrative elements for the purpose of providing direction and support for special forces UW operations within a U.S. theater of operations. The SFOB is located in territory under friendly control and is established prior to the commencement of hostilities.

b. The SFOB may be physically located at one installation or dispersed among a number of small sites. Because of the sensitive nature of operations conducted at the SFOB, special consideration must be given to the principles of dispersion and security. The SFOB should not be collocated with other facilities such as airfields, port facilities, or other major headquarters. The site selected should provide maximum security from ground and air attack and should be included within the rear area defense system.

25. Mission and Functions

a. Mission. The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational detachments for deployment into guerrilla warfare areas. After deployment, to
provide direction, administration, and support for these deployed detachments in furtherance of the theater mission.

b. Functions. The functions performed at the SFOB are—

(1) Assistance in planning and direction of operations.
   (a) Guerrilla warfare.
   (b) Evasion and escape.
   (c) Subversion.

(2) Communications support.

(3) Intelligence support.

(4) Air support as appropriate.

(5) Logistical support.

(6) Preparation of detachments for deployment.
   (a) Training.
   (b) Briefing and staging.
   (c) Infiltration.

(7) Civil Affairs support.

(8) PSYOP support.

(9) Liaison and coordination with higher and adjacent commands.

(10) Training as required.

(11) Administration.

(12) Coordinate exfiltration operations.

26. Organization

(fig. 9)

The SFOB is organized along functional lines into the operational elements and the administrative elements.
Figure 9. Special Forces Operational Base.
Section II. THE OPERATIONS CENTER AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER

27. Operations Center

a. General. The operations center is a functional grouping of personnel concerned with the coordination, supervision, and direction of UW operations in designated GWOA.

b. Functions.

(1) Based on approved UW plans and guidance from the SFOB commander, conducts detailed planning for guerrilla warfare operational areas including preparation of the operations plans for each operational detachment.

(2) Conducts briefings and supervises readiness preparations of alerted detachments.

(3) Coordinates with other components of the JUWTF as directed.

(4) Exercises staff supervision over activities in guerrilla warfare operational area(s).

(5) Makes recommendations to the SFOB commander concerning employment of guerrilla forces.

(6) Exercises staff supervision over the isolation area and the signal center.

c. Composition and Responsibilities (fig. 10).

(1) Director.

(a) In the group level SFOB, the deputy commander of the group, assisted by the S3, serves as the director of the operations center.

(b) At the operational detachment C level SFOB, the director of the operations cen-
ter will be designated by the C detachment commander.

(2) S2 operations. The S2 operations consist of the S2, intelligence sergeant, intelligence editors, analysts, and order of battle specialists. They assemble and evaluate intelligence information received from the operational areas; evaluate, prepare and
disseminate intelligence reports, and conduct intelligence briefings and debriefings. Additional military intelligence specialists may be attached to assist in briefing detachments as required.

(3) **S3 operations.**

(a) **Plans section.** The plans section, consisting of the assistant S2, the assistant S3, the assistant S4, and enlisted augmentation, conducts planning for future operations. The area specialist team (AST) coordinates the implementation of approved plans.

(b) **Air operations section.** The air operations section, consisting of the group aviation officer, assistant group aviation officer, enlisted personnel, and attached U.S. Air Force liaison personnel, coordinates aviation requirements from the area specialist teams and advises the S3 on operational aviation matters.

(c) **Area specialist team (AST).** The AST, consisting of an area specialist officer and an area specialist NCO, assists in precommitment planning, coordinates activities of their respective detachments in the isolation area, and is responsible for following through on all messages to and from committed detachments. During preinfiltration briefings, a close rapport is established between the alerted detachments and their respective AST. The AST keeps the commander and staff informed of the operational situation.
(d) *Isolation area.* The isolation area is a maximum security site accessible only to authorized personnel. The operations of the area are supervised by the S3, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander is responsible for administrative functioning and security. The organization and functioning of the isolation area is discussed in paragraph 28.

(e) *Liaison section.* Although not an integral part of the operations center, the liaison officers from the various services, other governmental agencies, and allied countries are located near the operations center to provide an opportunity to exchange matters of common interest pertaining to unconventional warfare operations.

(f) *Special forces liaison detachment.* This detachment is a provisional unit organized, when required, to provide liaison and assistance to the tactical commander who assumes operational control and/or administrative and logistical support of a U.S.-sponsored guerrilla force. This normally occurs during offensive operations when the advancing tactical commander's area of influence encompasses the GWOA. The size of the detachment may vary from a minimum of one liaison officer to a modified operational detachment C or B. The composition of the liaison detachment is influenced by many
factors such as the type headquarters having operational control, the size command structure, and disposition of guerrilla forces concerned, and the necessity of providing adequate communications. Functions of the detachment are as follows:

1. Prepares plans for the operational employment of the guerrilla forces in consonance with the tactical commander's mission.

2. Based upon approved plans, recommends operational missions for the guerrilla forces.

3. Exchanges information and intelligence.

4. Provides staff assistance in the supervision of guerrilla force activities.

5. Advises on PSYOP implications in the GWOA.

6. Provides a communications link between the ground commander and the special forces detachment commander. The liaison detachment may arrange for direct communications to the operational area. Additional radio equipment will be provided by the SFOB. Additional equipment and personnel may be provided by field army signal sources. During the transition period, the SFOB may act as the radio intermediary between the tactical command and the operational area. In this situation, transmissions between the tactical command headquarters and the
guerrilla forces are relayed through the SFOB; the advantage being utilization of established communications facilities with no need for additional communication equipment and personnel. A disadvantage of this system is the time lapse between initiation and receipt of messages.

7. Maintains liaison with subordinate tactical headquarters as directed.

8. Maintains liaison with the SFOB.

(4) Signal section. The signal section coordinates signal requirements with area specialist teams for each of the alerted detachments, and is responsible for all operational signal matters. It prepares the signal operating instructions and signal annex for guerrilla warfare operational plans. The signal center, which provides communications support for the operations center, is discussed in paragraph 29.

(5) Civil affairs section. This section provides planning, training, and advice on all aspects of civic action and civil affairs.

(6) Psychological operations section. This section provides planning, training, and advice on all aspects of psychological operations.

28. Isolation Area

a. General. In the isolation area, the detachments are provided with housing, messing, briefings, special training and limited dispensary and morale services, such as chaplain counseling and religious and legal services. Detachments are briefed on their
operational missions, and conduct their final preparations prior to infiltration. For security reasons, detachments are further isolated from each other, and there is also the opportunity for detachment study and for the packaging of accompanying supplies.

b. Functioning. The operations center schedules briefings and arranges for the staging of detachments to the departure installation. Briefing personnel are the area specialist officers, staff officers, and other selected personnel including appropriate liaison officers. When required, specialists from other headquarters, services, and allied governments will participate.

c. Other Activities.

(1) Detachments prepare their plans based upon the approved operations order(s) for the guerrilla warfare area. Detachments package their own equipment; parachute rigging support is provided as required. Detachments are afforded maximum time to study the information received at briefings. Much of the information is classified, hence, it must be committed to memory.

(2) After a detachment has prepared its implementing plans, it briefs the director of the operations center and his principal staff officers and AST on these plans. Because detachment operational plans are not normally reduced to writing, this briefing is conducted to insure the director and staff that complete coverage of pertinent details has been accomplished, and that the detachment understands its mission.
(3) A small dispensary facility is established in the isolation area to care for personnel who become sick or injured. Evacuation of seriously ill or injured personnel from the isolation area will be coordinated with S2 operations to insure that necessary arrangements are made to preclude any breach of security.

(4) The AST supervises staging of the detachment from the isolation area to the departure area.

(5) Delivery agency requirements pertaining to preflight or embarkation briefings are coordinated in advance. When necessary, arrangements are made for secure housing at the departure area.

29. Signal Center

a. General. The signal center established by the group signal company operates under the supervision of the SFOB signal officer. It is located in the vicinity of the operations center and provides the communications support for the operations center and other elements of the SFOB. For a detailed discussion of communication operations, see paragraphs 38 and 67 through 69.

b. Organization and Functions (fig. 11).

(1) Base operations platoon. Provides command supervision of the sections within the platoon, installation and maintenance of the internal communications system of the SFOB, and terminates circuits from higher and adjacent headquarters.
Figure 11. Signal Center.
Type Communications Net, JUWTF/SFOB/GWOA

Figure 11—Continued.
(a) **Communication center section.** Provides communications for the administrative and operations centers within the SFOB. It includes the personnel and equipment for providing cryptofacilities within the SFOB signal center.

(b) **Radio section.** Provides voice, continuous-wave (CW), and radio teletype-writer (RATT) communications with higher and adjacent headquarters for the SFOB. In addition, this section augments and provides backup to landline teletypewriter facilities.

(c) **Teletypewriter section.** Provides facilities for terminating teletypewriter circuits from higher and/or adjacent headquarters on a 24-hour basis including on-line cryptocommunications.

(d) **Wire section.** Operates the switchboard and provides for the installation and maintenance of the internal wire system for the SFOB.

(e) **Photo section.** Provides personnel and equipment for pictorial support of the SFOB.

(f) **Electronic maintenance section.** Provides direct support and limited general support maintenance for all of the signal equipment organic to the airborne special forces group used within the SFOB.

(2) **Two base radio platoons.** The base radio platoons provide long-range radio com-
communications from the SFOB to deployed special forces operational detachments. They normally operate separate transmitter and receiver sites in the vicinity of the SFOB. One base radio platoon may be deployed independently with an operational detachment C to provide communications for a separate SFOB.

(a) *Two control sections.* Provide and operate a communication center in direct support of deployed special forces elements. These sections may be located at the SFOB or at some distance from it.

(b) *Two receiver sections.* Provide and operate the receiver facility for the base radio station. These sections, utilizing remote keying facilities, transmit all traffic to the deployed special forces elements. These sections also have the capability of receiving high speed CW (300 wpm) as well as slow speed transmissions from deployed special forces elements.

(c) *Two radio transmitter sections.* Provide and operate the transmitter facility for the base radio station. Facilities are also available to communicate with the SFOB.

(3) *Mobile radio platoon.* Provides personnel and equipment for the operation and maintenance of mobile radio communication support to the operational detachment C. This section provides radio facilities for special forces liaison officers and for internal control of the SFOB. This platoon, consist-
ing of four identical teams, supports, on an austere basis, the communications requirements of four separate operational bases or subordinate control bases.

c. **Capabilities.**

(1) Operates telephone service within the SFOB.

(2) Terminates landline communications from other headquarters, including teletypewriter, on-line cryptocommunications, and telephone.

(3) Operates base receiver and transmitter sites.

(4) Provides radio teletypewriter backup.

(5) Operates the communications center.

### 30. Administrative Center

**a. General.** The administrative center is a functional grouping of personnel who plan, coordinate, and provide administrative support for the SFOB and deployed operational detachments.

**b. Functions.**

(1) Plans and controls administrative activities of the SFOB.

(2) Prepares the S1 and S4 portions of the briefing given to the operational detachments in the isolation area.

(3) Prepares plans to insure that the deployed operational detachments receive necessary administrative support.

(4) Exercises staff supervision over the headquarters commandant, the logistical support section, and the training section.

**c. Composition and Responsibilities (fig. 12).**

(1) **Director.**
Figure 12. Type Administrative Center—Functional Grouping.
(a) In the group level SFOB, the executive officer of the group, assisted by the S4, serves as the director of the administrative center.

(b) At the detachment C level SFOB, the director of the administrative center will be designated by the C detachment commander. The director is assisted by the detachment S4.

(2) **Personnel and administration.**

(a) *Personnel section.* This section, operating under the supervision of the S1, consists of the personnel officer, personnel sergeant, and enlisted augmentation. Prior to infiltration, the section insures that each member of the alerted detachment is given a complete personnel processing, to include routine personal matters, emergency data cards, and allotment and disposition of pay. Necessary wills and powers of attorney will be handled by a judge advocate. The S1 portion of briefing detachments may include discussions of the following matters:

1. **Strengths.** Status of personnel will be reported only when a change takes place; i.e., wounded, missing, captured, or killed.

2. **Replacements.** Individual or unit replacements may be provided.

3. **Prisoners of war.** The handling of prisoners of war is governed by the fact that the United States is firmly committed by treaty and existing directives
to humane treatment and care of PW (see para 85, FM 27-10).

4. **Burials and graves registration.** Reporting and marking graves within guerrilla warfare operational areas will be as directed.

5. **Morale and personal services.** Recommendations for awards will be forwarded by the detachment commanders to the SFOB for preparation and processing. Commensurate with the operational situation, a system for periodic delivery and pickup of personal mail will be established. Comfort items for both detachment and guerrilla personnel are provided automatically as a part of operational resupply. These items are specially packaged to preserve security and may be furnished from U.S. stocks or procured from indigenous sources.

6. **Personnel procedures.** Commanders of committed detachments are given a clear statement of their promotion, demotion, and disciplinary authority.

7. **Fiscal.** Policy governing pay or recognition for indigenous troops will be as directed. When required, confidential funds, which are accountable, and barter items, such as medicine, gold, or other scarce items, may be issued or delivered on order. Credit systems for services rendered may be established.

(b) **Plans section.** The plans section, consist-
ing of the assistant S1 and enlisted personnel, conducts planning for future operations.

(c) Distribution center. The S1 establishes and supervises a distribution center which arranges for the orderly handling of correspondence into, within, and from the SFOB. This center controls all messages except those originating from committed detachments or the operations center which are controlled by the signal center.

(3) Training section.

(a) The training section, consisting of the assistant S3 for training, the assistant S2 for training, and enlisted personnel, prepares and supervises training. The assistant S3 for training exercises staff supervision over the training section. There are generally two training programs that must be conducted for the special forces operational detachments in the SFOB:

1. Training for uncommitted operational detachments.
2. Training for alerted operational detachments.

(b) Training programs. For the two training programs enumerated in (a) above, the training section is responsible as follows:

1. For uncommitted operational detachments. Plans for and supervises the training required to maintain the basic military skills and physical fitness of
the detachment(s). This training should incorporate any unusual techniques that may be applicable to projected operations.

2. For alerted operational detachments. Plans for and supervises the training as may be directed by the SFOB commander. Detachment training is conducted in the isolation area under the supervision of the training section of the administrative center. This training is limited to what is essential for the pending operation that for security or other reasons cannot be conducted elsewhere. New items of equipment or weapons may be issued that may require familiarization training. Instructions may have to be given in unusual techniques relating to the planned infiltration. If detachments are isolated for relatively long periods, training programs are expanded in order to maintain basic skills and physical fitness.

(4) Logistical support.

(a) General. The logistical support section, which operates under the supervision of the S4, consists of supply, service, support and maintenance elements of the special forces group. This section may include attached or supporting logistical units from other headquarters, as well as liaison elements from the JUWTF and other services (fig. 13).
Figure 13. Type Functional Grouping for Logistical Support.
(b) Planning. The assistant S4 serves in the operations center and functions as the logistical planner of the S4 section.

(c) Logistical operations. The logistical support section coordinates logistical support for all sections of the SFOB and the guerrilla warfare operational areas. Functions include—

1. Requirements. A continuing review of supply requirements and submission of these requirements to the appropriate supply agency.

2. Storage. The SFOB must be capable of providing short-term storage for detachment supplies. This storage is only temporary until supplies are packaged and shipped to the delivery agency. Large stocks of supplies for indigenous forces are stored at theater depots not at the SFOB.

3. Preparation of supplies. Normally, supplies are packaged in 50 pound manportable loads for air delivery to enable the guerrilla force to quickly transport them from the DZ/LZ. Packaging is accomplished by the parachute rigging platoon of the airborne special forces group. Theater army quartermaster aerial supply units (TOE 10–500) are provided to supplement the organic rigging capability of the group. Civilian labor may also be employed to assist during packaging and rigging operations.
4. Coordination. Liaison personnel from other organizations attached to the logistical support section coordinate logistical matter for the SFOB.

5. Shipment of supplies to the delivery agencies (fig. 14). This is a coordination responsibility of the SFOB. If packaging can be accomplished at the depot, the flow of supplies is directly to the departure installation. If a packaging facility is located at the departure point, supplies may be delivered direct from depot to the departure installation for packaging. Special items may be shipped from depots to the SFOB for packaging and then to departure installations.

(5) Uncommitted special forces units. Operational detachments will conduct predeployment training and, in exceptional cases, may support SFOB activities.

(6) Non-special-forces attached units. Theater support services, primarily those of the TOE 500-series, will be attached as required.

(7) Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The headquarters and headquarters company, augmented by technical service and security units from theater sources, handles housekeeping activities at the SFOB. The company commander normally is headquarters commandant.
Figure 14. SFOB Supply System.
CHAPTER 6

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

31. General

U.S. Army special forces detachments consist of personnel cross-trained in basic and specialized military skills and organized into small multipurpose detachments. These detachments are tailored to provide training to guerrilla forces in functions of command, staff, operations, intelligence, weapons and tactics, communications, medical, and demolitions.

32. Selection of Special Forces Operational Detachment(s)

a. General. The type and composition of special forces detachments to be deployed is made by the SFOB commander based upon his mission and guidance and his analysis of the operational requirements to fulfill the assigned mission.

b. Considerations. The type and composition of special forces operational detachments to be deployed will be determined by the following:

(1) Specific objectives directed by the JUWTF.
(2) Rank (actual or assumed) of the resistance leaders.
(3) State of organization of the guerrilla area.
(4) Strength and state of training of the resistance force.
(5) Extent of available assets in the operational area.
(6) Characteristics of operational area.
(7) Existence of other U.S. unconventional warfare elements in the operational area.
(8) Extent of enemy control over operational area.
(9) Prevalent enemy activity.
(10) Civilian attitude to resistance movement.
(11) Known or potential targets.
(12) Resistance force potential in the operational area.
(13) Proximity to missile or air strike targets.
(14) Extent of early anticipated build up of GWOA.
(15) PSYOP requirements within operational area.

33. Types and Capabilities of Special Forces Elements

a. Operational Detachment C. The operational detachment C provides senior command and staff personnel, and is ideally suited to serve as the initial deployed operational element where a requirement exists for training guerrilla command and staff elements. This detachment also has a training capability. However, if the detachment mission includes training as well as command responsibilities, the C detachment may require augmentation of at least part of an A detachment to assist in the training mission.

b. Operational Detachment B. The operational detachment B likewise has the capability for command and staff responsibilities, however, to a slightly lesser extent than the C detachment. The B de-
tachment has a training capability and, as such, is suited for commitment to those areas where training as well as command and control are of equal importance.

c. **Operational Detachment A.** Operational detachment A has a limited supervisory capability and should be deployed primarily in an operational and training role.

d. **Subdivided A Detachment.** The operational detachment A may be subdivided into two similar teams. Two reasons for such a subdivision are—if the operational area is well organized and the special forces role is primarily one of logistical support; if guerrilla units are operating semi-independently in small bands.

e. **Pilot Team.** Under certain circumstances, initial infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected provisional team composed of individuals possessing needed specialized skills. The mission of the pilot team is to assess the area and the establishment of contact and rapport with indigenous leaders. The pilot team determines whether the area is feasible for development. Subsequent to the evaluation of the area assessment by the SFOB, special forces elements may be infiltrated into the area. The pilot team may remain with the infiltrated operational element or be exfiltrated as directed.

f. **Provisional Operational Detachment.** Based upon an evaluation of a detailed area study that points up distinct strengths and weaknesses, a provisional or composite operational detachment may be formed from elements or combinations of elements of operational detachments A, B, or C. Because of the probability of having to decimate several organic
operational detachments to form this type of unit, planners and commanders should only consider this solution after carefully weighing all ramifications.

34. Phases In Development of Guerrilla Warfare

a. General.

(1) Throughout the development of guerrilla warfare, the importance of security and intelligence procedures must be emphasized.

(2) The cycle of a U.S.-sponsored resistance movement consists of seven phases of development. These phases do not necessarily occur in the sequence indicated and several phases may occur simultaneously.

b. Phase I, Psychological Preparation. Psychological operations are initiated well in advance to prepare the local populace to receive U.S. personnel. This requires a well-coordinated psychological operations effort executed at the JUWTF level.

c. Phase II, Initial Contact.

(1) Before special forces detachments can be introduced into a guerrilla warfare operational area, assets must be developed in the area. Initial contact provides for the development of assets and their subsequent reception of, and assistance to, the infiltrated operational detachment.

(2) It is advantageous to have an asset exfiltrated from the operational area to the SFOB to assist in briefing the operational detachments and to accompany the detachment during infiltration. The lack of an asset does not necessarily preclude the infiltration of the special forces detachment.
d. Phase III, Infiltration. The entry of the special forces operational detachment, with accompanying supplies, into the enemy or enemy-controlled area, to include establishing communications with the SFOB (for further discussion, see ch. 7).

e. Phase IV, Organization. Area assessment is initiated. Organization and development of the guerrilla warfare operational area begins immediately after infiltration (for further discussion, see ch. 8).

f. Phase V, Build Up. The guerrilla force is expanded. The organizational structure, including various clandestine support activities, is compartmented to enhance security and improve operational potential. All activities increase in scope and intensity to include the capability of the guerrilla force to support theater objectives (for further discussion, see ch. 8).

g. Phase VI, Combat Employment. The guerrilla force is committed in consonance with unconventional warfare objectives of the unified commander. This phase continues until linkup occurs between conventional and guerrilla forces, or hostilities cease (for further discussion, see ch. 9).

h. Phase VII, Demobilization. Once the ultimate objectives for the activation and organization of the guerrilla force have been achieved, demobilization of the guerrilla force should be accomplished (for further discussion, see ch. 10).

35. Command Relationships

a. General. The commander of the SFOB normally cannot expect immediate response to command directives by deployed detachments as is the practice
in conventional operations. Distances and topography, enemy counterguerrilla activities, and the relationship between the guerrilla leader and the detachment commander may preclude an immediate response to operational orders. As a result of these limitations, subordinate UW force commanders normally are given mission-type orders and permitted to operate freely within the scope of assigned tasks.

b. Operations. Deployed special forces operational detachments are responsive to the SFOB either by direct control exercised by the SFOB or through subordinate control by operational detachments B or C. Normally, the special forces operational detachment is controlled by, and reports directly to, the SFOB during the early stages of development of the GWOA. As the operational area is developed, the detachments B and C may find themselves progressively involved in directing subordinate detachments. The number of subordinate detachments which may be controlled by the B or C detachments is determined by the commander of the SFOB and is based on the following factors:

1. Operational justification for establishing an intermediate control headquarters.
2. Capability of the control detachment to communicate and influence its subordinate detachments.
3. Political boundaries and relationships among indigenous populations within the operational area.
4. Compatible with future theater operational plans.
36. Army Aviation Operations

a. General. The principal source of Army aviation support of the SFOB is from the aviation company organic to the airborne special forces group. This aviation company normally will be established in the vicinity of the SFOB. However, aircraft operational teams may be deployed to secured areas nearer to the GWOA in order to improve range capabilities. Many air missions may be within the range capabilities of organic special forces aircraft.

b. Type Operations. Following are type operational missions that may be conducted by the special forces aviation company:

1. Battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance (both visual and photographic).
2. Fire support operations.
3. Airborne radio retransmission between the SFOB and the deployed special forces operational detachment(s).
4. Infiltration.
5. Exfiltration, to include aero medical evacuation.
6. Resupply.
7. PSYOP loudspeaker and leaflet missions.

37. Aircraft Based Within a GWOA

When the tactical situation will permit, aircraft of the special forces aviation company may be infiltrated into the GWOA to perform air operations missions. The problems of fuel, maintenance, and security, however, will be overwhelming. Consideration should be given to the use of organic aviation within the GWOA only when the following conditions exist:
a. The GWOA is large and well secured by the guerrilla force, and landing areas are available or may be constructed.

b. The GWOA is in a remote area in an underdeveloped part of the world, is generally denied to enemy operations by the local topography, but is accessible to U.S. Army aviation.

c. Enemy air defenses or air defense systems are ineffective or nonexistent.

d. It is tactically feasible to infiltrate organic special forces aviation using either its own flight capability, or by Air Force transportation.

38. Communications Operations

a. Signal Center. The signal center establishes and maintains contact with the JUWTF, other JUWTF components, and with deployed operational detachments. In those situations where the SFOB command cannot establish contact with the deployed special forces operational elements due to equipment limitations, it will be necessary to deploy radio relay/retransmission teams to provide reliable communications.

b. Operational Detachment. The special forces operational detachments supervise and assist the establishment of guerrilla warfare communications. The operational detachment may be required to establish communications with the UW air support and to operate electronic devices relating to air support of UW operations.

c. Communications Plans. Detachment communications plans will be prepared prior to infiltration. In addition to establishing frequencies, call signs, cryptography, authenticators, danger signals and
reporting signals, and consistent with security considerations, these plans should include—

(1) Provision for air-ground communications with supporting aircraft, to include homing beacons.

(2) Plans for contact with friendly forces which may be operating in the area.

d. Communications Security.

(1) Communications which include information of a sensitive nature and which require limited handling will be encrypted with appropriate internal handling instructions.

(2) U.S. Army cryptoequipment and procedures will not be made available to indigenous forces without specific prior approval of the SFOB.

(3) Due to the sensitive nature of UW communications traffic, equipment operators must possess the necessary security clearances. Security demands strict control over all communications traffic. Periodic radio contact must be limited in length and number of transmissions.
CHAPTER 7

INFILTRATION

39. General

a. Special forces development of a guerrilla organization begins with infiltration. Infiltration is the entrance of selected personnel into an enemy area.

b. There are four methods of infiltration for special forces—air, water, land, and stay-behind, or any combination thereof.

40. Influencing Factors on Selections of Infiltration Means

a. Missions. A prime consideration in determining the method of infiltration is the operational mission of the alerted detachment. The mission of the detachment may require rapid deployment into the operational area, thereby dictating the most expeditious method of infiltration.

b. Enemy Situation. Enemy capabilities and security measures affect the means selected for infiltration; for example, a heavily guarded border may preclude land infiltration. Similarly, a strongly defended and patrolled coastline may eliminate water as a possible means. Also, the capability of the enemy air defense systems will reduce air delivery potential.

c. Weather. Certain adverse weather conditions may seriously affect air and water infiltration; how-
ever, these same conditions may favor land infiltration.

d. Topography. Land formations must be considered in deciding on the method of infiltration to be used. Land infiltration will have a better chance for success if the chosen routes pass through mountainous, swampy, or heavily forested areas. On the other hand, the presence of mountains could force aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, thus causing a greater exposure to enemy detection and air defense systems.

e. Hydrography. Hydrographic factors, i.e., tides, depth of offshore water, beach gradients, currents, and the location of reefs and sandbars, influence the selection of water as a method of infiltration.

f. Personnel. The numbers and types of personnel to be infiltrated may be a limiting factor. Although the training given the operational detachment personnel is usually sufficient to prepare them for infiltration, other individuals who are to accompany the operational detachments may require special training on a short-term basis prior to infiltration.

g. Accompanying Supplies. The type and quantity of supplies which must be infiltrated with the operational detachment may dictate the method of infiltration.

h. Distance. The distance to the objective area must be considered in selection of infiltration means.

i. Equipment Available. The operational capabilities of air and watercraft available for infiltration and the amount and types of special equipment, i.e., waterproof kits, air delivery containers, etc., are major factors to be considered. Available types
of air- or watercraft will determine the number of personnel and the amount of equipment that can be deployed in a single sortie.

41. Air Infiltration

a. General. Air is usually the most practical and rapid means of infiltration. Personnel and supplies can be transported to, and air dropped, or landed within any area in the world. The Air Force has the primary responsibility for providing air delivery of UW forces, equipment, and supplies to objective areas. In most cases, standard troop carrier aircraft will be used. Some situations may dictate a limited requirement for aircraft capable of parachute delivery of personnel and equipment from high altitudes using high altitude low opening (HALO) techniques. In addition, assault-type aircraft as well as amphibious and utility types used by the several Services will be available in varying numbers. Some of these aircraft have the capability of using relatively short, unprepared airstrips. Under certain circumstances, longer range tactical aircraft may be used. The Army can provide both rotary and fixed wing aircraft within the capabilities of the aircraft concerned.

b. Advantages of Air Infiltration.

1. Generally unaffected by topography.
2. Speed of delivery.
3. Direct delivery into operational area.
4. Relatively short exposure to enemy countermeasures.
5. Ability to perform multiple missions.
6. Ability to deliver supplies in excess of individual loads.
c. Disadvantages of Air Infiltration.
   (1) Precise navigation may be difficult.
   (2) Vulnerability to enemy air defense and detection measures.
   (3) Affected by weather conditions.
   (4) Possible injury to personnel and damage of equipment when air dropped.
   (5) Requirement for a suitable drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ).
   (6) Necessity to sterilize the DZ/LZ.

d. Desirable Capabilities of Aircraft. Special forces operational detachments are trained to conduct operations involving use of a wide variety of aircraft. The following characteristics and capabilities are representative of the type of aircraft support required for UW operations:
   (1) Paradrop a minimum of 24 persons with necessary impedimenta.
   (2) Operate at varying altitudes during darkness or adverse weather conditions.
   (3) Possess the required navigational aids to allow the aircrew to locate and make an accurate pass over the DZ.
   (4) Sufficient combat radius to reach the operational area and return to a friendly base.
   (5) Land and take off from unprepared short airstrips.
   (6) Under certain circumstances, land and take off from water.
   (7) Possess the capabilities of parachute delivery of personnel and equipment by HALO techniques.
42. **Water Infiltration**

   a. **General.** Infiltration by water includes the use of surface and undersea craft; the most secure means is by undersea craft, while the use of surface craft is considered to be the most efficient.

   b. **Advantages of Water Infiltration.**

   (1) Long-range delivery capability.

   (2) Relatively unaffected by weather up to the point of debarkation from parent craft.

   (3) Evacuation operations may be possible in conjunction with infiltration operations.

   (4) Operational briefings can be continued en route.

   (5) Concentration and control of personnel and supplies is facilitated.

   (6) With surface craft, large quantities of supplies can be transported.

   c. **Disadvantages of Water Infiltration.**

   (1) Time consuming transshipment and offshore unloading normally are required.

   (2) Movement of supplies from landing site to final destination is subject to limitations of land infiltration.

   (3) Additional packaging required to protect equipment from water damage.

   (4) Additional training and equipment may be required.

   (5) Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing operations.

   (6) Limited cargo capacity of current undersea craft.
43. Land Infiltration

a. General. Under most circumstances, land infiltration is the least desirable means and is usually limited to short distances. Land infiltration is best accomplished under conditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain. Land infiltration is most feasible when the enemy’s lines are overextended, the combat zone fluid, or portions of his country’s borders are inadequately secured. Personnel participating in land infiltration must be well-trained in survival, evasive techniques, and land navigation.

b. Advantages of Land Infiltration.

(1) Requires minimum logistical support.
(2) Provides an opportunity for area familiarization.
(3) Provides flexibility of movement and timing consistent with the local situation.
(4) Requires little interservice coordination.

c. Disadvantages of Land Infiltration.

(1) More time required to accomplish.
(2) Increased vulnerability to enemy detection and interdiction.
(3) Limited capability for transporting supplies and equipment.

44. Stay-Behind Infiltration

a. General.

(1) Stay-behind infiltration involves the positioning of special forces operational detachments within their proposed operational areas prior to enemy advances through or occupation of the general area. Stay-behind operations should be considered when the enemy has the capability of occupying
friendly areas and the attitude of the civil populace indicates it will support such an operation. Stay-behind infiltration is the easiest to accomplish.

(2) See FM 31-21A.

b. Advantages of Stay-Behind Infiltration.
   (1) Operation may be preplanned and rehearsed prior to hostilities.
   (2) Less infiltration support required.
   (3) Personnel are familiar with operational area.
   (4) A high degree of security is possible.
   (5) Civilian contacts are normally already established.
   (6) Caches of supplies and equipment can be established.
   (7) Current intelligence is available.

c. Disadvantages of Stay-Behind Infiltration.
   (1) Proximity to enemy combat troops during occupation of the operational areas.
   (2) Freedom of movement and communications are initially greatly restricted.
   (3) Informers may compromise detachment members as a result of prehostility contacts.
CHAPTER 8

ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA COMMAND

Section I. ORGANIZATION CONCEPTS

45. General

The organization of a guerrilla warfare operational area (GWOA) involves the early organization of a compartmented command structure for the area and the subsequent build up of resistance forces. Buildup is the expansion of the original nucleus into an operational unit capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. Special forces detachments may infiltrate the operational area either before or after this organization has taken place.

46. The Area Command

a. General. The area command is a type organizational structure, within a guerrilla warfare operational area, integrating the special forces operational detachment(s) and the resistance forces. It should be established as soon as possible after the infiltration of the operational detachment. There can be no rigid pattern for the organization of an area command. It must be tailored to fit the mission and situation. The size is dependent upon the guerrilla force to be supported. When a GWOA is subdivided, the subdivisions are called sector commands. See FM 31–21A.
b. Composition. The area command basically is composed of two subdivisions—

(1) Command group. The command group consists of the special forces detachment, the overall resistance leader and his staff, and as appropriate, representatives from civilian support elements (auxiliary and underground) in the area. A formal staff organization may ensue or the command group may come together periodically or "on call." See FM 31-21A.

(2) Resistance forces. The components of a resistance force normally are the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground.

c. The Command Group.

(1) The purpose of the command group is to provide a centralized means to control and coordinate all resistance activities in a given guerrilla warfare operational area. The background, efficiency, and organizational structure of the indigenous elements of this group dictates to a large extent the number of deployed special forces detachments required for the conduct of operations.

(2) Because of the vulnerabilities of enemy countermeasures in guerrilla warfare, command and control measures applicable to a conventional military organization are impractical within an area command. Accordingly, specific guidance to subordinate units is contained in operations orders to cover extended periods of time. Maximum use is made of standing operating procedures (SOP), to include long-term guidance on
such matters as psychological operations, security, intelligence, guerrilla/civilian relations, target complexes, logistical support, evasion and escape, and emergency procedures.

(3) The operating establishment within the guerrilla warfare operational area is the guerrilla base, a temporary site where installations, headquarters, and units are located. Within the guerrilla base may be found such elements as command posts, training and bivouac areas, and communications and medical facilities. A guerrilla base is a temporary installation and must be able to be displaced rapidly and on short notice.

d. Resistance Forces.

(1) General. Each guerrilla warfare operational area may not have all three elements of a resistance force, the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. To survive and expand, the guerrilla force must have more than passive civilian support. The support of the local populace must be organized expeditiously to obtain the logistical and security support essential for successful guerrilla operations.

(2) Guerrilla forces. The guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel, organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held or hostile territory. The guerrilla force is the element of the resistance force with which the special
forces operational detachment is primarily concerned.

(a) The number of guerrillas which may effectively be trained and employed by a special forces operational detachment will vary in accordance with the geographical locations, the ethnic groups encountered, their general level of illiteracy, and whether they have been exposed to previous military training. In some areas it may require a complete special forces detachment to train and direct a force of 200 guerrillas, while in other areas, where the guerrilla force has a well-organized command and staff structure, the special forces detachment may direct, advise, train, and support large guerrilla formations. The capability of special forces operational detachments to train and direct indigenous guerrilla forces depends on—

1. The experience and effectiveness of the members of the special forces detachment.

2. Recruitment potential available in the operational area.

3. The existing organizational structure of the guerrilla force.

4. The status of training of the guerrilla force.

5. The extent of cooperation among resistance forces.

6. Previous military or paramilitary experience of the indigenous elements.
7. The relationship between the guerrilla force and the special forces detachment.

(b) In some situations the special forces operational detachments may be augmented with personnel possessing special military or civilian skills. Other situations may require only two or three of the specialty skills in a special forces operational detachment. When the guerrilla force is well trained and organized, and its objectives are in consonance with U.S. objectives, it may only be necessary for the SFOB to provide a special forces command, liaison, and the communications element. Where the guerrilla force is composed of tribal elements with low levels of education and outmoded weapons, it may be necessary to augment the special forces operational detachment with additional special forces personnel. Special situations may require the use of other military skills available in the Army or other services and, in some instances, certain civilian skills.

(3) The auxiliary.

(a) General. The auxiliary is that element of the resistance force established to provide organized civilian support to the resistance movement. Auxiliaries may be organized in groups or operate as individuals. Organization and control of the auxiliary is necessary to insure that both active and passive civilian support is re-
sponsive to the area command. The auxiliary is constituted from persons who are members of other resistance elements (guerrillas or underground) but who knowingly and willingly support the movement. Unlike guerrilla units, the auxiliaries are a clandestine organization which do not openly express their sympathies or openly engage in resistance operations. The auxiliary includes the occasional, as well as the consistent supporter. Individuals or groups who furnish support either unwittingly or through coercion are not considered auxiliaries.

(b) Personnel. Auxiliary units usually are composed of personnel living in rural areas. When necessary for operations, however, urban personnel may also perform as auxiliaries. In contrast to guerrilla units, it is not expected, nor is it desirable, that the auxiliaries move from place to place to conduct operations. The normal activities of the auxiliaries should be such that they can also support the guerrilla effort without arousing the interest of the enemy. Examples of such personnel are foresters, fishermen, farmers, transportation personnel, and other persons able to travel freely through enemy occupied or controlled areas. Ordinarily, such persons as factory workers, office clerks, former government officials, and business executives will be under close
surveillance by the occupying power, and their utilization as auxiliaries must be carefully considered. With careful screening, this latter group might better serve the resistance movement as members of the underground (4) below).

(c) **Organization.** The auxiliary command structure normally will parallel existing political structures of the country. This method of organization insures that each political subdivision is the responsibility of an auxiliary unit. The territorial organization of the auxiliary should be compatible with that of the local guerrilla force. Organization of the auxiliary units can commence at any political or territorial level or at several levels simultaneously, and is either centralized (fig. 15) or decentralized (fig. 16). The basic organization at each level usually takes the form of a command committee (fig. 17). Such committees control and coordinate auxiliary activities within their areas of responsibility. In this respect, the command committee resembles the command group and the staff of a conventional military unit. Members of the command committee are assigned specific duties. At the lowest level one individual may perform two or three of these duties. These subordinate elements are compartmentalized to enhance internal security.

(d) **Role of the auxiliaries.** Normally, auxiliary units within their respective areas
Figure 15. Type Centralized Auxiliary Organization.

are assigned direct support missions for guerrilla units. Examples of these support missions are—security and warning, intelligence, PSYOP and related intelligence, counterintelligence, logistics, recruiting, medical support, evasion and escape net operations, reception for personnel and equipment, and combat operations. During the planning and execution of these functions, there must be a close coordination between the auxiliaries and the guerrillas.
(4) The underground.
   (a) General.
   1. The underground is that element of a resistance force established to operate in areas under direct control of enemy forces. The underground is constituted by persons who are not members of other resistance elements (guerrillas or auxiliary), but who knowingly and will-
Figure 11. Type Command Committee.

NOTE: THIS REPRESENTS A HIGHLY ORGANIZED UNIT SEPARATED INTO FUNCTIONAL SUB-UNITs
ingly support the common cause. The underground is a clandestine, highly compartmented organization whose members do not openly express their sympathies or engage in resistance operations. In some respects the underground resembles the auxiliary. The underground conducts operations in much the same manner as the auxiliary and performs many of the same functions. However, the underground is not as dependent for its success upon control or influence over the local population as is the auxiliary. Security conditions are paramount for successful underground operations.

2. FM 31–21A.
   (b) *Mission of the underground.* FM 31–21A.
   (c) *Role of the underground.* FM 31–21A.
   (d) *Organization of the underground.* FM 31–21A.
   (e) *Personnel.* In contrast to the auxiliary who usually live in rural areas, the underground generally is composed of personnel living in urban areas. Because of the highly clandestine nature of activities conducted by the underground, its members must be carefully selected.

47. *Special Forces Objectives in the GWOA*

The major objective for the special forces operational detachment is to develop the resistance elements into an effective military force. To facilitate
this development within the GWOA, the following tasks must be accomplished:

a. Conduct of the area assessment.

b. Establishment of an effective working relationship among the various resistance elements and the special forces operational detachment.

c. Establishment of the security, intelligence collection, and communications systems.

d. Organization of civilian support.

e. Organization of a logistical system.

f. Provision for administrative services.

g. Establishment of a training program.

h. Planning and execution of tactical operations commensurate with the state of training of the guerrilla unit.

i. Expansion of guerrilla forces to permit their support of the unified commander's unconventional warfare objectives.

48. Command Relationships of U.S. Agencies in the GWOA

In addition to special forces operational detachment(s), there may be other U.S. military or non-military units operating within the GWOA. Normally, the presence of two or more activities in a given area will be known in advance by the commanders concerned. Command relationships will have been specified, area authority established, and necessary liaison, coordination, and cooperation effected.

49. Geographical Areas of Responsibility

a. Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (GWOA). Normally, plans are initiated for the organization of
the GWOA far in advance of anticipated deployment of a special forces operational detachment. These plans are based on the designation by the unified commander of specific geographical areas within enemy territory as guerrilla warfare operational areas. The shape and size of the GWOA will be influenced by many factors—political boundaries, natural terrain features, location of enemy installations, possible targets, indigenous population density, anticipated resistance potential, and existing attitudes of the population.

b. Guerrilla Warfare Operational Sector. Based on the development of the GWOA and the requirements for additional special forces operational detachments, it may be advisable to subdivide the GWOA. These subdivisions are called sectors. The sector has the same characteristics as the GWOA and remains subordinate to it. An operational detachment becomes responsible for each sector.

Section II. SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENT—RESISTANCE FORCE RELATIONS

50. General

a. Immediately upon completion of the infiltration, the special forces detachment commander initiates action to organize the guerrilla effort to achieve the unified commander’s guerrilla warfare objectives.

b. The detachment commander must impress upon the resistance leader(s) that all involved have a common goal against a common enemy; and as such, it is to the mutual benefit of each for the guerrillas to accept sponsorship and operational guidance from the United States.
c. Once the guerrillas have been convinced of the advantages of close cooperation, the special forces detachment commander develops a command structure in cooperation with the resistance leader(s) (para. 46).

d. In some situations, the nucleus of guerrilla elements may be recruited from exiled or liberated personnel currently located in friendly-held territory. These personnel and units may be infiltrated as indicated in chapter 7.

51. Considerations

a. Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among the various guerrilla units are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist special forces efforts to unify them. Opposition may stem from many causes such as personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences. It is essential that the detachment commander and his subordinates have a knowledge and appreciation of these attitudes and of the personalities concerned. He must know how extensive the Phase I preparation was, to include promises made and commitments to be honored. Without specific guidance from competent U.S. authority, it is beyond the scope of the detachment commander to make political commitments in the name of the U.S. Government. Guidance in political matters will normally emanate from the unified commander through the JUWTF and the SFOB. At some point prior to the linkup with conventional U.S. forces, political responsibilities may be assumed by Army Civil Affairs, and a Civil
Affairs liaison officer may be assigned to special forces units within the GWOA.

b. Perhaps the most delicate part of a detachment commander’s responsibility is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy key positions. If leaders and staff members of the resistance organization do not appear qualified to fill positions held, the detachment commander should endeavor to increase their effectiveness. Increasing the effectiveness of these personnel normally will increase the influence of the detachment commander. If all efforts in this direction fail and the future effectiveness of the resistance force is in doubt, the detachment commander should discreetly attempt to influence the selection of new leaders. It is mandatory, however, that the special forces commander exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive area, lest he jeopardize his mission or even the survival of his detachment.

c. The detachment commander and several of his subordinates should have at least a working knowledge of the local language. If, however, interpreters must be used, such personnel must be selected and utilized with caution. A detachment commander will have considerable difficulty gaining the confidence of the guerrillas who either dislike or distrust the interpreter(s). Being the only individual to know what both sides are saying, the interpreter is in a very powerful position.

52. Techniques Available To Gain Confidence of Guerrilla Force

a. All members of the special forces detachment must display a high degree of professional competence in unconventional warfare operations.
b. Time spent developing a cooperative relationship with the guerrillas will later pay large dividends for the special forces personnel.

c. The judicious control of supplies may persuade the guerrillas to form a united force and support U.S. objectives.

d. A medical facility to provide limited treatment for noncombatant personnel should be established by the special forces detachment.

e. The special forces detachment commander and his subordinates must have a thorough knowledge of, and a rigid respect for, local courtesies, traditions, and taboos.

f. All members of the detachment must abide by the provisions of the Code of Conduct and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to display loyalty to their own nation's future.

Section III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

53. General

a. This section pertains to psychological operations during the following phases in development of guerrilla warfare (para 34): Phase II (Initial Contact), Phase III (Infiltration), Phase IV (Organization), Phase V (Build Up), and Phase VI (Combat Employment). For psychological operations during Phase VII (Demobilization), see paragraph 100d.

b. Unconventional warfare involves ideological, religious, political, economic, and social factors which promote intense, emotional partisanship. Resistance organizations tend to attract personnel who accept violence as a means of achieving change.
c. The ideological and political factors associated with resistance activity create a fertile field for propaganda. Ideally, certain members of resistance movements are active propagandists. Hence, there is paralleling the guerrilla military effort a propaganda effort conducted by all resistance elements seeking to gain support for their movement. Civilians may be induced to harass the enemy by participating in work slowdowns, strikes, absenteeism, minor acts of sabotage, arson, etc. The relative isolation and clandestine atmosphere associated with resistance activities creates a continuing need for propaganda to support the effort.

d. Special forces units, by their presence in a particular country, have a psychological impact on selected military or paramilitary elements and on informed elements of the population. Two factors which contribute to a favorable psychological impact are—tangible evidence of United States’ interest and support through the presence of special forces personnel in daily face-to-face meetings and an evident appreciation by these U.S. representatives of the objectives and problems of the indigenous guerrilla force. This impact can be increased if psychological operations techniques are used at various stages in the organization and development of the guerrilla force. This task requires the detachment commander to have a thorough knowledge of psychological operations fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the peculiar operational environment in which he is immersed. This is particularly true in the initial phases of forming guerrilla units when the special forces operational detachment commander is seeking to win and weave together the as-
sistance of supporting resistance elements (see FM 33–1).

54. Concept and Organization

Planned psychological operations support the conduct of unconventional warfare operations by reinforcing, weakening, or sustaining those attitudes in the population in a manner which causes them to act in a manner beneficial to their own and to United States' objectives. These programs generally fall into two categories—

a. National Programs. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) has the broad mission of generally defining American principles and aims and interpreting America and its people to other peoples. These national programs provide a basis upon which military psychological operations planners can develop programs for the acceptance of American military personnel by indigenous groups.

b. Service Oversea Component Commands. Army psychological operations units are available to operational oversea commands to assist in bringing broad U.S. policies and goals to the particular areas in which unconventional warfare operations are being conducted. Planning for special forces operations includes preparing plans for psychological operations support of unconventional warfare operations.

55. Target Groups

a. General. In a UW environment there are four major target groups—

(1) Group 1—Enemy Military Forces.
(2) Group 2—The Populace.
(3) Group 3—Guerrillas.
(4) Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground.
b. Group 1—Enemy Military Forces. This group consists of enemy military personnel. These military forces may be of the same nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying foreign power. Psychological warfare programs are directed against this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the morality of their cause. Guerrilla activities to include interdiction operations, particularly at night, induce in the enemy soldier a basic feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This feeling of inadequacy and fear permits easy access to the mind with the several tools of psychological operations, and may make the enemy soldier vulnerable to persuasion urging surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion. These procedures may include pointing up appropriate inadequacies in their supplies and equipment, and the constant danger of death. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, psychological warfare serves to lower his morale and reduce his effectiveness, particularly in conjunction with the powerful pressures generated by continuous combat action. The enemy soldier's feeling of isolation and his receptivity to U.S.-sponsored propaganda can be further increased through leaflets and broadcast messages which stress the popular support of the aims of the guerrillas. The propaganda appeal must attract attention, address a cogent problem, be meaningful, and show the way to a practical solution. For example, when tactically justified, the enemy soldier should be told why and how he should defect and given assurances concerning his safety and welcome. When enemy soldiers are captured by or defect to the guerrillas,
promises of safety and good treatment must be kept. Proof of good treatment could be passed on to enemy units by photographing the soldier, having him sign leaflets, or possibly having him make loudspeaker broadcasts to his former comrades. Resistance clandestine elements may also inform enemy units, by rumor and surreptitious contact, of the well-being of defected or captured personnel. The defection of an enemy soldier is important news to his former comrades and may provide those remaining behind to consider similar action. Such operations have a great psychological impact on the enemy and on the guerrillas as well. The enemy is made to feel that his own comrades are wavering and do not support their goals, while the guerrillas begin to realize the enemy is weakening, and their own chances for success are increasing. The psychological warfare objective against this target group is to cause the combat efficiency of the enemy military forces to diminish materially. Under exceptional circumstances, certain of these personnel may ultimately be included in Group 4, Resistance Forces.

c. Group 2—The Populace.

(1) Enemy supporters include those civilians in an operational area who willingly collaborate with the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad psychological objectives, however, are the same as
for those directed against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the collaborators, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against collaborators may result in reprisals and consequent loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations objectives; however, punitive action is often initiated and effected against collaborators by the guerrillas and other elements of the resistance. Such action is difficult to prevent, but must not be encouraged or sanctioned by U.S. Army representatives in the guerrilla warfare area. Psychological operations programs against this group are designed to curtail their support of the enemy forces and elicit their support of the resistance forces.

(2) Guerrilla supporters include that part of the civilian population which is sympathetic toward the goals of the resistance force but who are not active members of some element of the resistance force. Psychological operations programs aimed and directed at this target audience stress appeals for the population to support the guerrillas in achieving common objectives. Successful guerrilla movements require that some portion of the population be favorably inclined toward these movements. In the initial
stage of hostilities, the population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy force as well as those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological operations program must stress that the guerrillas share the political and social goals of the population, that these goals will be successful, and that the United States in supporting the guerrilla force supports these political and social goals. Special forces personnel in the operational area have access to exploitable information on the immediate situation and on the attitudes and behavior of the local population. It may be directed that the special forces commander provide such information to higher headquarters in order that specific predetermined and coordinated psychological programs can be carried out in support of the UW effort. This support may be limited to the dissemination of leaflet or radio propaganda to the population or may be expanded to supply the guerrillas with the themes and materials to conduct PSYOP. The SFOB commander may provide the special forces operational detachment with additional advice as well as capabilities upon which to base a detailed and integrated psychological
program. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this group is to impress upon them that they, the guerrillas, and the United States, have a common goal, and the success of this goal directly depends upon this group’s support. This is the group that will serve as the primary recruiting source for personnel for Groups 3 and 4.

d. Group 3—Guerrillas. Psychological operations programs aimed at this target group stress that the presence of special forces personnel provides the guerrilla force with tangible evidence that the United States supports the general objectives of the guerrilla movement. Since the guerrilla bears the brunt of enemy attention and counteractions, any acceptable activities that enhance his prestige or raise his morale should be used. Other programs must stress the reliance of guerrillas on, and their rapport with, the population for support.

e. Group 4—Auxiliaries and Underground. The efforts of this group should receive suitable recognition and be urged to continue their activities of aiding the guerrilla force; however, caution must be exercised to avoid compromising these individuals by unwittingly revealing them as members of the resistance force. The primary objective of psychological operations aimed at this target group is to impress upon all personnel that the ultimate success of the resistance movement depends upon their unwavering support.
Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare Areas

a. General. These include operations by which the special forces commander seeks to achieve psychological effects on the four target groups previously discussed. The broad spectrum of combat actions initiated by the special forces commander will have psychological as well as conventional military objectives. Examples are operations which tend to unify and increase the morale of the guerrilla fighters, or those which manifest guerrilla support of the people. As a byproduct, such operations tend to reinforce civilian beliefs in the strength of the guerrilla force and their political and military objectives. From the practical side, these operations should produce sources of food and information required for the survival of the guerrilla force. Evidence that the strength of the guerrilla force is growing tends to lower enemy morale and increase requirements for countermeasures. Within the limitation of resources available, operations initiated primarily for their psychological effects may include—

(1) Supporting the civilian population by sharing medical services and supplies.

(2) Providing sanctuary, as required, to civilians supporting the guerrilla cause.

(3) Encouraging portions of the civilian population to pursue traditional ways of life in the face of enemy opposition.

(4) Providing manpower and skills to the local population to repair or build needed structures, harvest crops, maintain schools and churches, and organize social activity groups.
(5) As feasible, the special forces detachment personnel may reinforce operations by direct contact with local civilians to provide additional evidence that the guerrillas are supported by the United States and that all are working in the interest of the population.

b. Printed Media. Printed leaflets, posters, or bulletins can be produced by the area command on simple reproduction machines or produced with a variety of field expedient means. The techniques of leaflet writing for unconventional operations are essentially the same as for conventional programs. Utilizing knowledgeable members of the resistance force, the special forces commander can adapt psychological themes to local conditions in order to produce timely, credible, and consistent messages. The special forces commander can augment the locally prepared program by requesting air deliveries of small newspapers, reinforcing leaflets, and bulletins. These materials can be air dropped to target audiences or issued through auxiliary unit channels. Because of the variable delays in conducting such operations, printed materials of this type usually emphasize the appealing aspects of psychological programs undertaken at higher levels. As an example, war aims are expressed as national aims and policies and disseminated through the media of official-looking leaflets. In this connection, the official text of joint communiques by the U.S. commander and recognized resistance leaders should be official and formal in appearance when issued to the target audience.
c. Rumor. Rumor can be an effective propaganda device but requires extreme skill and care in its use. Accordingly, the special forces commander initiates or participates in rumor campaigns for short-range tactical objectives only. To insure consonance with theater objectives, rumors of a long-range and/or strategic impact should not be disseminated without authority of the SFOB.

Section IV. SECURITY WITHIN THE GWQA

57. General

a. Security is the keynote to success in UW operations. Security of the area command is based upon three principles—

(1) Preventing the enemy from identifying the organizational structure, pattern of operations, and locations of resistance forces.
(2) Preventing the enemy from neutralizing or destroying these forces.
(3) Organizing the area command so that vulnerability to enemy action is minimized.

b. The underground and the auxiliary provide for their own security by establishing a cellular and compartmented structure.

c. Security within the GWQA is achieved by a combination of active and passive means to include—

(1) Compartmentation of activities.
(2) Dispersion and tactical security.
(3) Communications security.
(4) Mobility of units and installations.
(5) Camouflage, cover, and deception measures.
(6) Counterintelligence measures.
(7) Supplementary warning systems.
(8) Counterpropaganda measures.
58. Security System

a. General. Guerrilla units normally employ an inner zone and outer zone in establishing a security system. Although this is the recommended system, there are disadvantages which exist, principally in areas where security responsibility devolves on two or more resistance elements. In such instances, specific delineations of security responsibilities must be made and coordination procedures established.

b. Inner Security Zone (a, fig. 18). This zone is the responsibility of the guerrilla force, and its security system depends upon standard military practice; i.e.—

(1) Patrols.
(2) Outguards and outposts.
(3) A guardpost system.
(4) Detection and warning devices.
(5) Camouflage and deception techniques.

c. Outer Security Zone (b, fig. 18). Within this zone, the auxiliary and the underground are normally responsible for furnishing guerrilla forces timely information of enemy activity. Such supplementary warning systems should not be fully relied upon by the guerrilla force. The auxiliary and underground elements may be required to harass and delay the enemy, thus allowing the guerrilla force to disperse.

59. Principles of GWOA Security


(1) Guerrilla forces must avoid concentrating on the march, in camps, or in bivouacs. Even though the tactical and logistical situations may favor concentrating the guer-
a. Inner zone security

Figure 18. Security system.
b. Outer zone security

*Figure 18—Continued.*
rilla force, security requirements dictate that the guerrilla force organize into smaller units and tactically disperse. A large force may be concentrated to conduct a specific operation, but upon completion of the operation it quickly reverts to the original organizational and dispersion pattern.

(2) The principle of dispersion should be applied to command as well as tactical and support elements.

(3) In the event of large-scale enemy operations against the guerrilla force, the area commander may be forced to divide units into even smaller elements to achieve greater dispersion or to facilitate escape. This extreme dispersion will reduce the effectiveness of command and control, lower the morale of the guerrilla force, and hinder the ability of the auxiliaries to render support. Accordingly, excessively dispersed units must be reassembled as quickly as possible. Operational plans must provide for such contingencies to include post-operation assembly areas (rallying points).

b. Mobility of Units and Installations.

(1) Guerrilla installations and forces must maintain a high degree of mobility. Emergency evacuation plans for guerrilla installations and forces should include measures to eliminate all traces of guerrilla activity prior to departure from an area.

(2) Mobility may be facilitated by preparing equipment to be moved in one-man loads and by caching less mobile equipment.
c. Camouflage and Cover Operations. Another principle of security is the use of cover and camouflage and the execution of deception operations. These operations are planned to conceal the nature and extent of guerrilla operations and to provide the enemy with misleading or false information. Such operations are an integral part of all resistance activities.

60. March Security

a. Tactical security on the march is based upon knowledge of the enemy's location and strength. The intelligence section of the area commands provides this vital information for security of movement and operations.

b. Units are briefed on the local enemy situation, primary and alternate routes, dispersal and reassembly areas along the way, and security measures to be observed en route. Areas through which the guerrilla force plans to pass may require assistance from the auxiliary to provide security for the guerrilla force.

c. The guerrilla forces employ standard march security techniques such as advance, rear, and flank guards. Preselected bivouacs are reconnoitered by patrols prior to the arrival of guerrilla units. As feasible, contact is established with local auxiliary units in order to obtain the latest information on enemy forces in the area.

61. Counterintelligence Within the GWOA

a. Safeguarding Plans and Records. At all levels of the UW command, information concerning present or planned guerrilla operations is disseminated
only on a need-to-know basis. Specific safeguards appropriate to guerrilla warfare areas are indicated below.

(1) The amount of administrative and operational records are kept to a minimum and cached in locations known only to the essential personnel who need to know.

(2) References to names and places may be coded with the key to the code disseminated on a need-to-know basis.

(3) Unnecessary records are destroyed.

(4) The guerrilla must rely on his memory to a far greater extent than the regular soldier due to stringent security requirements.


(1) Strict physical security measures are enforced. These include, but are not necessarily limited to—

(a) Camouflage discipline.

(b) Isolation of units from each other.

(c) Proper selection and rigid supervision of courier routes between headquarters and units.

(d) Controlled entry and exit from campsites and installations.

(e) Movement control between guerrilla bases.

(f) Isolation of guerrilla units from the civilian population. Necessary contact with civilians is accomplished through designated individuals and groups.

(2) Requirements for security are continually impressed upon guerrilla personnel. Commanders at all levels constantly strive to improve security measures. Particular atten-
tion is devoted to those units and elements that have recently been inactive or are located in relatively safe areas.

c. Counterintelligence Measures.

(1) Security measures used by guerrillas to safeguard information, installations, and communications are supplemented by an active counterintelligence program designed to neutralize the enemy's intelligence system and to prevent enemy penetration of the guerrilla force.

(2) Counterintelligence is a command responsibility under the staff supervision of the intelligence section of the area command. Personnel, specially trained in counterintelligence, carefully screen all members of the resistance force as a protective measure against enemy penetration.

(3) Counterintelligence efforts include constant checks on the civilian population of the area to uncover enemy agents. One of the most potent dangers to the guerrilla is that segment of the population which does not support the guerrilla force. Such groups, willingly or by coercion, act as informants and obtain intelligence of guerrilla activities and organization for the enemy. Thorough indoctrination of all personnel as to release of information and how to resist interrogation is mandatory.

(4) Counterintelligence measures also include determining enemy counterguerrilla methods and operations and identifying enemy intelligence personnel and informants.
Such information may be obtained from defectors or through penetration of enemy intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.

62. Security Role of the Auxiliary and the Underground

The auxiliary and the underground supplement the security measures of the guerrilla force by uncovering enemy activity and by identifying potential dangers to the guerrilla force. In addition, they establish warning systems designed to provide timely information of the approach of enemy units. They maintain surveillance over collaborators and attempt to elicit information from enemy personnel, local officials, and the police. The auxiliary usually operates in the outer security zone.

63. Movement of Guerrilla Units

Premature or unnecessary movement of guerrilla units may expose guerrillas to greater risks than those which would result from remaining concealed. Unnecessary moves disrupt guerrilla operations and tend to reduce security by exposing guerrillas to the enemy and its informants. The decision to move should be made on actual rather than potential threats of enemy counterguerrilla operations.

Section V. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION WITHIN THE GWOA

64. General

The establishment of a GWOA provides the unified commander with a valuable information source. Prior to assigning specific intelligence tasks to the special forces operational detachment, commanders
at the SFOB and JUWTF should carefully weigh the impact of such tasks on the primary mission. The area command frequently is able to obtain information which otherwise is unavailable. Intelligence information may also be generated as a by-product of other operations conducted.

65. Agencies for Intelligence Information

a. The area command has available three primary agencies for intelligence information—the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. The SFOB may also be able to furnish intelligence information to the GWOA.

b. For specialized intelligence collection missions, the special forces operational detachment may be augmented by intelligence specialists.

c. The GWOA may be directed to have an intercept, direction finding, or jamming capability. In such instances, the operational detachment will require augmentation of necessary personnel and equipment.

66. Intelligence Requirements

The area command normally has the following intelligence requirements:

a. Intelligence To Support Internal Operations. The intelligence system of the area command is primarily oriented to support its own requirements. Intelligence produced is for the use of the guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground elements.

b. Intelligence Information to Support Higher Headquarters. Intelligence information acquired which may be of value to higher headquarters includes—
(1) Order of battle data.
(2) Information to support psychological operations.
(3) Targets of opportunity.
(4) Poststrike assessments.
(5) Information on political, sociological, and economic matters.
(6) Intelligence information to support specific air, ground, and naval operations.
(7) Technical intelligence information.
(8) Identification, location, and affiliation of all known or suspected supporters and sympathizers to the government in power.

Section VI. COMMUNICATIONS IN THE GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

67. General

The establishment of a tactical communications system to support unconventional warfare operations in a GWOA is a challenging task and will require continuous evaluation and adjustment to meet operational and security requirements. Within an area command, nonelectronic techniques are used wherever practical. Until the area is relatively secure, radio and other electronic means should be used sparingly to avoid enemy detection. The establishment of direct communications between all elements of the area command may not be desirable or possible due to requirements for compartmentation of activities.

68. Area Command Communications System

a. General. Normally, a guerrilla force will communicate with its respective sector or area command and not directly with the SFOB.
b. Possible GWOA—SFOB Systems of Communication. Communications between the special forces detachment and the SFOB can be organized in any one of several ways. These include—

(1) All special forces operational detachments communicate directly with the SFOB and have no established lateral link with each other. The SFOB relays required information between operational detachments.

(2) An operational detachment B is present in the GWOA—subordinate operational detachments A may communicate directly with the SFOB on administrative and supply matters but with the B detachment on operational matters. Emergency communications on all matters may be conducted between all operational detachments and the SFOB.

(3) An operational detachment B is present in the GWOA—subordinate operational detachments A normally communicate with the B detachment on all matters. Emergency communications, however, may be conducted between all operational detachments and the SFOB.

(4) In a well-established sophisticated GWOA—the operational detachment C, only, routinely communicates directly with the SFOB. The chain of command structure from C to B to A detachments is respected. However, emergency communications may be conducted between all detachments and the C detachment and between all detachments and the SFOB.
c. Factors Affecting Radio Communications. Radio communications within an area command are affected by the operational situation and requirements, the physical geography of the area, enemy capabilities in detection and intercept techniques, and the communication equipment and operators available. The enemy's capability to intercept and exploit either electronic or nonelectronic communications must always be assumed.

69. Communications Security

a. General.

(1) Communications security measures are employed to protect communications systems against physical compromise, interception, traffic analysis, direction finding, imitative deception, and cryptanalysis.

(2) The three components of communications security are—

(a) Physical security.

(b) Transmission security.

(c) Cryptosecurity.


(1) Physical security is that protection resulting from all measures taken to safeguard classified communications equipment and material from access by unauthorized persons. Physical compromise can occur by theft, capture, salvage, defection, loss, and viewing.

(2) Adequate physical security of sensitive communication equipment and materiel in an operational area requires close command supervision.

(1) Transmission security is that protection resulting from all measures taken to protect transmissions from interception, traffic analysis, direction finding, and imitative deception.

(2) Interception is the process of gaining possession of a message without the knowledge and consent of the correspondents. Interception is more typically applied to radio communications than to any other means. The only positive countermeasure against interception is complete radio silence. Other than complete radio silence, the best countermeasures against interception are—

(a) Minimum time on the air.
(b) Infrequent and irregular transmission times.
(c) Continual change of frequencies.

(3) Traffic analysis is the analysis of the external characteristics of signal communications and related materials for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the organization and operation of a communication system, to include unit identification, troop locations, dispositions, and strengths. Countermeasures employed against traffic analysis are—

(a) Frequent change of call signs.
(b) Compliance with standard radio operation procedures (see FM 31-20).
(c) Seeking to eliminate individual operator characteristics.
(d) Random and constant change of frequencies.
(e) Frequent movement of radio sets.
(f) Immediate evacuation of area from which transmission was made.
(g) Maximum use of blind transmissions.
(h) Use of duplex method of communication (transmitting on one frequency and receiving on another).

(4) Direction finding is determining the location of a radio transmitter by utilizing two or more direction finding stations monitoring the transmitter’s radio waves. All of the countermeasures against interception also apply against direction finding plus the following:
(a) Immediate movement of transmitter following completion of transmission.
(b) Attempt to have radio wave propagation skip zone cover known location of enemy direction finding stations.

(5) Imitative deception is the method employed by the enemy to imitate friendly radio stations in a net for the purpose of deception. Countermeasures against imitative deception include communication checks and authentication systems.

d. Cryptosecurity.
(1) Cryptosecurity is that protection resulting from all measures taken to provide technically sound cryptosystems and the proper use of these systems.
(2) In developing cryptosystems a thorough estimate must be made as to the enemy's
ability to cryptanalyze codes and ciphers. Any cryptosystem devised must be capable of resisting enemy cryptanalysis at least for the period of time that the plain text message would have tactical value.

Section VII. LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA

70. General

a. The logistical support for guerrilla forces is derived from two primary sources: the sponsor and operational area. Logistical planning by the area command is based upon support available from both of these sources.

b. The less time spent by the guerrilla in sustaining himself on the resources of an already rationed population, the more time he can devote to operational tasks. Local support includes transportation, care of the sick and wounded, and other personal services. In isolated cases, a limited amount of food, clothing, and shelter may be provided by internal support. Successful guerrilla operations may provide a source of arms and equipment; however, the best source for these items is the sponsoring power. Major items from an external source are weapons, ammunition, demolitions, and communications equipment. Appropriate logistics directives provide guidance on the types and amounts of sustenance, arms, and equipment suitable for guerrilla warfare operations (FM 101-10-3).

71. Logistical Requirements

Logistical requirements in a typical GWOA include—
a. Sustenance, clothing, and survival items.
b. Light weapons, ammunition, demolitions, and communications equipment.
c. Transportation.
d. Medical supplies and equipment.
e. Essential repair and maintenance services for clothing and equipment.
f. Certain critical PSYOP materials such as inks and papers.
g. Money, identity papers, and specialized equipment.

72. Logistical Support to the Resistance Elements

a. Area Command. The area command supervises logistical support of resistance elements from internal sources.

b. The Guerrilla Force. Each guerrilla unit is assigned a part of the operational area from which it receives direct logistical support by the auxiliary units within their assigned sector. In addition to the support from local auxiliaries, the guerrilla unit depends upon operations against the enemy to satisfy a portion of its logistical requirements.

c. The Auxiliary. One of the primary functions of the auxiliary is to provide logistical support to guerrilla units. Since the auxiliaries must also support themselves, their support of guerrilla forces may be sporadic and undependable.

d. The Underground.

(1) The logistical role of the underground is largely one of supporting its own members. In fact, the area command will often support the underground with special equipment received from the sponsor.
(2) In some situations, the underground may be able to provide selected critical items of supply, such as local drugs and medicines, indigenous or enemy radios, raw materials for explosives, and documents (curfew passes, travel permits, ration cards).

73. Supply Systems

a. External Supply.

(1) Supply to the area command from external sources varies from small initial deliveries to total logistical support.

(2) If possible, sponsor-provided supplies should be delivered directly to the lowest guerrilla echelon having special forces representation.

(3) The situation may be such that direct delivery to the guerrilla unit is neither desirable nor possible. In such cases, supplies are delivered to a location from which further supervised distribution is made by the special forces personnel. Although this method requires more time and effort, it permits continued control over sponsor-provided supplies. This may be the preferred method when the guerrilla unit does not include special forces representation on a full-time basis.

b. Internal Supply. This system includes all methods used by the area command to obtain supplies and equipment from within the operational area. The needs of their civilian supporters must be kept in mind.
(1) **Offensive operations and battlefield recovery.** During offensive operations, the guerrilla force may be able to satisfy some of its logistical requirements and at the same time accomplish the objective of denying these supplies to the enemy. Items of enemy equipment obtained during operations, that are not needed or cannot be evacuated, should be destroyed or made inoperable.

(2) **Barter.** It may be desirable for the area command to engage in barter with the civilian population. In some cases, it will be mutually beneficial to exchange critical items, such as medical supplies, for food, clothing, or services.

(3) **Purchases.** Special forces commanders may be issued funds in the form of negotiable currency or gold with which they may purchase critical items or services within the operational area.

(4) **Levy.** This system for providing support to guerrillas usually is not desirable. Under circumstances its use may be necessary to the survival of the guerrilla force. In establishing a levy system, the commander must consider the factors which advise against the use of a levy; for example—

(a) Chronic food shortages due to enemy rationing or confiscation of supplies.

(b) Certain adverse psychological effects which may alienate the population.

(5) **Seizure.** Seizure of items tends to alienate the civilian population because of the forced nature of the transaction. Therefore, sei-
zure should be used only in emergencies. In all cases, seizure should be reported to higher authority, either before or after the act.

\[\text{c. Storage.}\]

(1) The protected storage or caching of supplies and equipment plays an important role in the area command logistical plan. The uncertainties of the weather and enemy action may prevent regularly scheduled delivery of supplies by the sponsoring power. The area command, therefore, must be prepared to operate for varying periods without external resupply. Guerrilla units cannot maintain excess stocks of supplies or equipment without limiting their mobility and combat effectiveness. To minimize risk of discovery, supplies in excess of current requirements are cached in a number of isolated locations. Items are carefully packaged so that damage from exposure is minimized. Specialized packaging of supplies may be accomplished by the sponsor.

(2) Caches may be located anywhere, to include caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries, and lakes. It is necessary only that the caches be dispersed throughout the operational area to permit accessibility for the guerrilla force.

(3) Generally there are two types of caches—those containing items used on a day-to-day basis and those containing items to be used in the future. Each unit caches excess supplies and equipment and draws upon these as needed. Only the unit commander and
key personnel know the location of caches. In the same fashion, commanders establish caches containing supplies which represent a reserve for emergency use throughout the area.

74. Transportation Services

a. The transportation requirements of the area command normally are met from resources from within the area. In most instances it is impractical for the sponsor to provide the types of transportation required for operational use. However, technological advances in the transportation field may alter this concept.

b. Movement of personnel and supplies by foot typifies the initial stage of guerrilla development. Foot mobility, however, may be supplemented by locally procured motor vehicles or animals. The auxiliary, essentially a rural element, is the most logical source of local transportation for guerrilla units; however, this transportation normally is furnished on a mission basis. In some instances, the guerrillas may acquire their own transportation and be able to organize supply trains.

75. Medical Support in the GWOA

a. General.

(1) The primary purpose of medical service in support of the GWOA is to conserve the fighting strength of all participating personnel. As soon after infiltration is practicable, the special forces operational detachment commander should insure that a medical service facility is established.
(2) Upon establishment of the area command, the presence of organic medical service with the guerrilla forces can be a definite recruiting incentive. PSYOP should exploit any military civic action gains derived from the medical program.

(3) During combat the guerrillas are more likely to take the personal risks frequently necessary to achieve an objective, knowing that if they are wounded they will be given proper medical treatment.

b. Characteristics. There are certain aspects of medical service in a GWOA that must be emphasized. These include—

(1) Preventive medicine. The maintenance of health of any military command is always important. In unconventional warfare, the health of the guerrilla assumes an even greater significance. Early in the development of the area command, a rigorous program of preventive medicine, to include personal hygiene and field sanitation, must be initiated. This may require emphasis from the command group. The maintenance of a balanced diet may be a problem and have a direct effect on the health and stamina of guerrilla personnel.

(2) Evacuation means. For planning purposes, the detachment commander must assume there will be no evacuation from the GWOA until such time as the situation permits. For that reason he must rely on his own resources and on support of the auxiliaries and the underground (d and e below).
(3) **Medical supplies.** Medical supplies are critical in guerrilla operations; therefore, strict supply economy must be practiced. Limited supplies can be obtained from local sources, but the most probable source of medical supplies will continue to be the sponsor.

(4) **Training program.** Early in the development of the area command, a training program must be initiated to provide indigenous medical specialists to accompany the guerrilla units. There should be a minimum of one qualified medical specialist for each 50 guerrilla personnel.

c. Organization for Medical Service. Efforts should be made to recruit professional medical personnel to establish and operate guerrilla hospitals. All members of the guerrilla force should be trained in basic self-aid. Dead or wounded guerrillas should be evacuated from the engagement site as soon as possible for security as well as humane purposes. Selected U.S. medical teams may be infiltrated into the GWOA, including special forces medical personnel from the medical detachment, Airborne Special Forces Group.

d. Role of the Auxiliary.

(1) The auxiliaries by establishing and operating supporting medical facilities can make a major contribution to the medical support of the guerrilla force. Organizing the auxiliaries in this manner is the responsibility of the medical component of the command committee (para 46d(3)).
(2) Auxiliary medical personnel can provide assistance during combat operations by establishing casualty collecting points, thus permitting remaining members of the guerrilla force to continue to withdraw. Casualties at these collecting points can later be evacuated to the guerrilla base or to civilian medical facilities.

e. Role of the Underground. The underground has a limited medical support capability. In the event resistance personnel need medical treatment beyond the capability of the guerrilla base hospital, the underground may be called upon for support.

Section VIII. ADMINISTRATION IN THE GWOA

76. General

a. A program for administration and management within the area command must be established.

b. Security requirements will determine the number and type of records to be maintained. If facilities and equipment exist for miniaturizing records, such records can be cached for recovery or disposition at a later date.

c. Accurate records maintained by the area command in a UW environment will have tremendous value at the end of hostilities. Aside from historical purposes, such records may be used to assist in the settling of disputes or claims that frequently arise.

77. Organization for Administration

An administrative section is established within the command group of the area command to maintain essential records. As the area develops, it may become feasible to decentralize administration to
subordinate echelons. However, in such cases, duplicate information should be forwarded to the administrative section of the area command for miniaturization and disposition.

78. Records

(See para 61a for applicable security considerations)

a. Operations Journal. Because of its ultimate historical importance, an operations journal should be maintained. Reports of combat engagements should include the designation and commander of the guerrilla force, the type of actions and approximate length of the guerrilla force, guerrilla casualties and, if possible, the specific designation of the enemy unit and an estimate of enemy casualties. To assist in post-operations investigations, eyewitness accounts of atrocities should be clearly documented. These data should be made available to PSYOP personnel.

b. Command Structure. This record should reflect the designation of the various units within the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, the underground, and the names and designation of key personnel.

c. Personnel Roster. The personnel roster should list members of the various organizations within the area command and to be of value must be kept current. The type information desirable includes; individual’s full name, home village or city, date joined the resistance force, whether or not an oath of enlistment was taken, date discharged, promotions, demotions, acts of bravery, awards and decorations, rank or position attained in the resistance force, and any disciplinary action taken against the individual.
d. Oath of Enlistment. It is desirable that an oath of enlistment be administered by the local indigenous leader to each new member of the resistance force. This may, after hostilities, provide a basis for recognition by the local government for the jurisdictional authority exercised by guerrilla unit commanders over individual guerrillas.

e. Casualty Records. This information includes records of personnel killed, wounded, missing in action, or separated from the guerrilla force for illness or other causes.

f. Graves Registration Information. This information, as a minimum, should include name, date and cause of death, and location of the remains.

g. Medical Records. These records should include data as to type of prevalent diseases, preventive medicine actions taken, types of wounds, and general information on the organization of the medical structure for the area command.

h. Payrolls. Appropriate records must be maintained to support any commitment made to members of the resistance force for services rendered.

i. Claims. The area command should maintain records to assist in settling claims after hostilities.

Section IX. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRAINING PROGRAM

79. General

a. The provisions of FM 21–5, are applicable to the training of guerrilla units.

b. Preparation of the training plan and, if possible, the program of instruction, should be prepared prior to infiltration.
c. As soon as practicable, the special forces operational detachment commander must initiate action to establish a training program.

d. The combat effectiveness of a guerrilla force is directly proportional to its state of training and motivation. Guerrilla personnel must receive training in the tactics, techniques, and skills of guerrilla warfare.

e. The training area selected must be sufficiently secure to permit concentration on the training program; however, provision must be made for adequate security and warning systems.

f. The primary training mission of special forces operational detachment personnel is to develop a selected guerrilla cadre into competent trainers of guerrilla personnel and units.

80. Characteristics of Guerrilla Training

These are factors which must be considered in developing a training program:

a. Training of units is normally decentralized. To expedite the training program and to provide effective instruction to dispersed units, centralized training courses are designed and presented to selected guerrilla personnel who in turn act as instructor cadres to dispersed units.

b. Wide range of educational and capabilities levels of resistance personnel.

c. Divergences of motivation for joining resistance force.

d. Variance in the extent of previous military experience.

e. Possible language barriers requiring training through interpreters.
f. Probability of limited training materials available.

g. Use of combat engagements as a training device.

81. The Training Plan

a. General.

(1) The training plan is an outline of the commander’s decision how he can best accomplish the training mission. It results from his evaluation of the overall training situation, the state of training of the guerrilla force, the personnel available, the weather and climate, and the training objective. The mission is the most important element in any training situation.

(2) The development of a training plan consists of—

(a) The analysis of the mission.

(b) An analysis of the local training situation.

(c) Determination of system and organization for training.

(3) Following the training estimate, the training plan is developed. Training is then programed into time frames which will facilitate accomplishment of the training objectives.

b. Analysis of the Mission.

(1) Based upon his operational directives, the detachment commander determines precisely what the guerrilla force is to accomplish.

(2) In the event the guerrilla force has been assigned multiple missions, priorities of training must be established.

(3) If intermediate objectives are derived from
the mission, the detachment commander must insure that all requirements can be met within the time specified and with the facilities and personnel available.

(4) The mission and any operational objectives derived therefrom must be specifically delineated for the guidance of all concerned. The shorter the training time, the greater the care that must be taken in defining the training mission or objectives.

c. Analysis of the Local Training Situation. The detachment commander must evaluate all aspects of the local training situation to determine shortcomings in the overall training program. This analysis may reveal obstacles of training that cannot be resolved or which dictate the selection of another organization or program for training. Personnel recruited for the guerrilla force may have had little or no previous military training. The detachment commander must evaluate the capabilities of resistance personnel and their state of training by personal observation, inspections, and the results of limited operational missions. Principal factors to be considered in this analysis are—

(1) Essential training to be conducted. In consonance with the above, the detachment commander may have to establish priorities of subject material to be covered. Lesson plans brought with the detachment during infiltration may have to be modified.

(2) Personnel. The detachment commander may have to provide special training for resistance leaders in the technical and tactical aspects of conducting guerrilla warfare.
(3) **Time.** Training time available is one of the most critical factors to be considered. The operational detachment commander will initially estimate the training time required to accomplish the training mission. If training progress permits him to reduce this time, it may result in a favorable effect on the morale of the guerrilla force. The detachment commander must realize that training time will be lost by individuals as well as by groups and provide for make up training as an integral part of the training program.

(4) **Training facilities.** The detachment commander must determine requirements for ranges, rehearsal areas, improvised classrooms, and other training facilities that must be established. Physical security is a prerequisite for all training areas. It may be advisable that range and rehearsal areas be located away from the guerrilla base to preclude enemy detection.

(5) **Training aids.** Consistent with the situation, maximum training aids and equipment will accompany the operational detachment at the time of infiltration. Initially, equipment available for training may be limited, however, improvised training aids and mockups may be used during the early training phase.

d. **System and Organization for Training.** The requirement for physical security within the GWOA generally dictates that guerrilla forces be dispersed
over a wide area. Consequently, the system and organization for training normally is decentralized.

82. Training Operations

a. General. As a training vehicle, the guerrillas should be given an opportunity to participate in limited combat engagements. Such engagements may be productive if within the capability of the guerrilla force concerned. A combat defeat in the early stages of training would have a demoralizing effect on the guerrilla force. Operations must be planned so that a high assurance of success is probable. Every operation should be followed by a critique.

b. Type Training Operations That May Be Considered.

(1) Reconnaissance patrols.

(2) Ambushes, raids, and limited demolition missions.

(3) Surveillance over future possible guerrilla force objectives.
Chapter 9

Combat Employment

Section I. Introduction

83. General

a. The combat employment of guerrilla forces begins as soon as conditions permit and continues through the entire span of guerrilla warfare development.

b. Resistance forces have a much greater chance for success and can more effectively support conventional military operations when their activities are coordinated with the operations of other forces. The area command effort is coordinated with theater plans of operations.

c. Guerrilla forces normally conduct interdiction missions in support of designated objectives. However, certain situations may dictate that guerrilla forces establish a measure of area control in order to facilitate operations. Planners must recognize that the guerrilla force capability to seize and hold terrain against a determined enemy is limited. Area control may be categorized as follows:

(1) Area superiority. This is temporary control of a specific area attained through maximum use of the principles of surprise, mass, and maneuver. Area superiority is maintained against prohibitive interference by
the enemy only for the period of time required to accomplish missions.

(2) Area supremacy. This is complete control of a specific area that is attained whenever the enemy is incapable of effective interference with guerrilla operations. Area supremacy is seldom achieved through unconventional warfare efforts alone.

84. Characteristics of Guerrilla Combat Operations

a. Planning. Careful and detailed planning is a prerequisite for guerrilla combat operations. In addition to primary targets, alternate targets may be designated to allow subordinate units a degree of flexibility in taking advantage of sudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed to an operation, the area command has minimal capability to divert subordinate units to other missions. Thus, plans must be thorough but flexible enough to allow subordinate force commanders to adopt alternate, predetermined courses of action when contingencies arise.

b. Intelligence. As in conventional warfare, the basis for sound decisions is accurate and timely intelligence. The intelligence principles set forth in FM 30-5 are pertinent to guerrilla warfare; however, different techniques for the collection of information may be appropriate. Prior to initiating an operation, a detailed collection effort of the objective area is accomplished. Surveillance of an objective area is maintained until the time of attack.

c. Decentralized Execution. Guerrilla warfare operations feature centralized planning and decentralized execution. Actions of all resistance elements
are directed and coordinated by the area command. Within the guidance furnished by the area commander, subordinate units are allowed the widest possible latitude in the conduct of operations.

d. Surprise. Guerrilla combat operations stress surprise. Attacks are executed at unexpected times and places and set patterns of action are avoided. Maximum advantage is gained by attacking enemy weaknesses. Surprise may also be enhanced by the conduct of concurrent diversionary activities. Violent and rapid execution of operations assist in achieving surprise.

e. Short Duration Action. Combat operations of guerrilla forces are usually marked by actions of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal of the attacking force. Prolonged combat action from fixed positions is avoided.

f. Multiple Attacks. Multiple attacks over a wide area may be employed by small units tailored to the individual mission. This is not piecemeal commitment of units against single targets, but a number of attacks directed against several targets or portions of the target system. Such action tends to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of guerrilla bases, causes him to overestimate guerrilla strength, and forces him to disperse his security forces.

g. Terrain. The guerrilla forces must have an intimate knowledge of the operational area. The more difficult the terrain, the more freedom may be given the guerrilla leader to plan and conduct operations.

h. Weather. Guerrilla forces exploit adverse weather conditions.
Section II. OPERATIONS

85. Offensive Operations

a. Interdiction. Interdiction is defined as the prevention or hindrance by any means, of enemy use of an area or route, and is the cumulative effect of raids, ambushes, sniping, and the use of mines and booby-traps. Interdiction is the most common operation used by guerrilla forces to accomplish the operational objectives.

b. Planning.

(1) The mission of the guerrilla force includes the results desired by the commander of the unified command and prescribes priorities of attack against target systems. The guerrilla force commander plans for and conducts operations designed to accomplish his assigned mission.

(2) Normally, operations are directed against targets on a broad scale utilizing all available UW forces which have the capability to attack the target. Guerrilla units conduct overt attacks against the enemy, his supply and production facilities, and his lines of communications. Attacks are timed so as to achieve maximum results from surprise and confusion and often to coincide with operations of other theater forces. Closely coordinated with these guerrilla operations, the underground and the auxiliary may organize a widespread program of sabotage, strikes, and disaffection.

(3) The enemy reaction to large-scale UW operations is usually violent, immediate, and
may result in reprisals against the civilian population. Losses among civilian support elements (auxiliaries and the underground) and a concentration of operations against the guerrilla forces may result. A reduction in the number of guerrilla operations may be ordered to relieve pressure being exerted by the enemy. The JUWTF may direct that guerrilla operations in contiguous areas be intensified to help dissipate enemy retaliation efforts.

c. Types of Interdiction Operations.

(1) Raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a surprise attack against the enemy to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installation. Such attacks are characterized by secure movement to the objective area; brief, violent execution; rapid disengagement from action; and a planned, deceptive withdrawal.

(2) Ambush. An ambush is a surprise attack used against moving or temporarily halted targets such as railroad trains, truck convoys, individual vehicles, and dismounted troops.

(3) Use of mines and boobytraps. The use of standard or improvised mines and boobytraps affords the area commander a means of interdicting enemy routes of communication and key areas with little expenditure of manpower. The planned use of these items as an interdiction technique also has a demoralizing effect on enemy forces. Mines
and boobytraps can be effectively utilized in defensive operations.

(4) **Sniping.** Sniping tends to impede enemy operations and demoralize personnel. A few snipers can cause casualties among enemy personnel, deny or hinder use of certain routes, and require employment of a disproportionate number of troops to neutralize the snipers. For this reason, snipers can be very effective in defensive operations. Snipers may operate to cover a mined area, as part of a raiding or ambush force, or as a separate operation. Snipers operate best in small teams, alternating between the duties of observer and sniper.

86. **Target System**

The following target systems are ideally suited for interdiction operations:

a. **Railroad Systems.** Railroads present one of the most profitable and accessible target systems for attack by guerrilla forces. In general, open stretches of track, trestles, switches, repair facilities, tunnels, and slide areas provide unlimited opportunities for attack. On electrified railroads, power substations, plants, and lines offer critical targets. Type of railway targets vary with the geographical area.

b. **Highway Systems.** Points for interdiction are selected in areas where the enemy cannot easily re-establish movement by making a short detour. Bridges, underpasses, and tunnels are vulnerable points on road networks. Sections of road which may be destroyed by flooding from adjacent rivers, canals, or lakes are also vulnerable. In addition, a
road may be interdicted by causing rock or landslides. Live and dummy mines may be used to interrupt road traffic. Ambushes are conducted when suitable terrain is available. Long-range fires from positions away from roads can disrupt enemy traffic.

c. Waterway Systems. The most critical parts of waterway systems are ports, dams and locks which are usually well guarded. The destruction of these installations can effectively disrupt traffic for long periods. Waterway control equipment such as signal lights, beacons, and channel markers can be attacked effectively. Sinking vessels in restricted channels, dropping bridges into the waterway, creating slides, and destroying levees are all effective in blocking waterway traffic.

d. Airway Systems. Air terminals, communication systems, radar and navigation systems, maintenance facilities, and key personnel are targets for attack. Further, such vital support items as fuel, lubricants, spare parts, and maintenance tools can be destroyed.

e. Communication Systems. Widely dispersed communication systems, which include radio, telegraphy, telephone, and other communications facilities, are vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Destruction of enemy communication facilities, such as cutting telephone wires and cables, damaging telephone terminals and exchanges, destroying radio antennas and transmission lines, and destroying, where possible, the radio stations themselves will seldom result in the enemy's complete loss of communications. Alternate and emergency means of communication usually is still available. Destruction of any part of the enemy's communication system, however, will
harass the enemy and will create an overload on the remaining communication facilities. Critical communication facilities will likely be well protected and difficult to attack; however, interconnecting facilities, such as wire and transmission lines, will be easier to damage or destroy.

f. Power Systems. Powerlines are vulnerable to attack in the same manner as wire communication lines. Large transmission towers often require demolitions for destruction. Critical points in any power system are the transformer substations. Heavily guarded power-producing plants and steam-generating plants are difficult to attack, but a successful effort will disrupt the power supply for extended periods of time. Power transfer equipment should be destroyed in this type of attack.

g. Water Supply Systems. The disruption of waterlines supplying industry can often be profitably accomplished. Raids against reservoir facilities, pipelines, and purification plants are feasible, however, the possible adverse effects upon the civilian population must be considered.

87. Target Selection Factors

a. The general mission assigned designates the target system to be attacked, with the final selection of target components usually made by the detachment commander. Specific targets may be designated by the JUWTF and SFOB when such targets are of strategic significance. The following important factors largely influence target selection:

(1) Criticality. A target is critical when its destruction or damage will exercise a significant influence upon the enemy's ability
to conduct or support operations. Such targets as bridges, tunnels, ravines, and mountain passes are critical to lines of communications; engines, tires, and POL stores are critical to transportation. Each target is considered in relationship to other elements of the target system.

(2) *Vulnerability*. Vulnerability is a target's susceptibility to attack by means available to UW forces. Vulnerability is influenced by the nature of the target; i.e., type, size, disposition, and composition.

(3) *Accessibility*. Accessibility is measured by the ability of the attacker to infiltrate the target area. In studying a target for accessibility, consideration is given to security controls around the target area, location of the target, and approach and withdrawal routes.

(4) *Recuperability*. Recuperability is the enemy's ability to restore a damaged facility to normal operating capacity. It is affected by the enemy capability to repair and replace damaged parts of the target.

b. Many of the above factors are variables. Accordingly, each target selection is constantly reevaluated. The criticality factor for a target changes with the situation. A railroad bridge is less critical when the enemy has few locomotives. Its safeguarding may be critical when friendly conventional force plans include its use. The vulnerability of a target shifts with the means available to attack it, such as explosives, incendiaries, and special devices. A powerplant, command post, or supply depot is less
accessible after the enemy has positioned additional security personnel. Recuperation is more likely if reserve stocks are plentiful.

c. Operations plans should include primary and alternate targets. This enables the commander to adjust his plans to meet unforeseen situations that may preclude attack of the primary target.

d. Target selection must always take into account the potential political-economic-sociological impact. The guerrilla must seek to destroy the core of the enemy power but at the same time he must conserve the energy, the unity, and the fighting spirit of the civilian population.

88. Tactical Control Measures

a. General. The area commander utilizes appropriate control measures as an aid in directing and coordinating guerrilla warfare operations. Common control measures are—

(1) Targets. Targets or objectives are designated for attack by subordinate units. These targets are usually lines of communications, military installations and units, and industrial facilities. Normally, targets or objectives for guerrilla forces are not physically held for any length of time nor are they cleared of determined enemy resistance.

(2) Zones of action. Zones of action are used to designate area of responsibility for offensive operations of subordinate units. Within the zone of action the subordinate commander exercises considerable freedom in the conduct of operations. Movement of other guerrilla units through an adjacent
zone of action is coordinated by the area command. The auxiliary units within a zone of action provide support to the guerrilla unit responsible for the area. Boundaries of zones of action are changed as required.

(3) *Routes of movement.* Guerrilla force commanders may prescribe routes of movement for their unit or subordinate units in order to control movement to targets. Guerrilla units approach the objective area either by single or multiple routes.

(4) *Mission support site (MSS).* The mission support site is a preselected area used as a temporary storage site or stopover point and normally is located in areas not controlled by the guerrilla force. A MSS is utilized by guerrilla units to increase their operational range and enable them to remain away from guerrilla bases for longer periods of time. Mission support sites are utilized prior to and/or after an operation. They are occupied for short periods of time; seldom longer than a day. As in an assembly area, the using unit prepares for further operations and may be provided with supplies and intelligence by the auxiliary. The MSS should be reconnoitered and outposted prior to occupation by the main guerrilla force.

b. *Other Control Measures.* Additional control measures may be employed by smaller guerrilla units such as rallying points, direction of attack, assault
positions, and lines of departure. These control measures are employed in a manner similar to their use by conventional military units.

89. Operational Missions

Operational missions for the guerrilla forces may be summarized as follows:

a. Missions in Support of Unified Command Plans. These missions are strategic in nature. Special forces detachment influence the action of guerrilla forces toward the attainment of these missions. Operational command of these unconventional warfare forces is retained by the unified commander and exercised through the JUWTF and the SFOB.

b. Linkup Operations. These missions are conducted to assist advancing tactical commands. Operational control of guerrilla forces is exercised by the tactical commander through a special forces liaison detachment.

c. Missions Conducted After Linkup. Rear area security and related missions may be assigned guerrilla forces after linkup with friendly forces. Operational control of the guerrilla force normally is exercised by tactical commanders. Special forces detachments may continue to be used to assist the guerrilla force in the execution of these missions.

90. Command Relationships During Special Operations

a. Airborne Operations. Operational control of guerrilla forces within the objective area should be exercised by the airborne force commander. Control of guerrilla forces in the operational area whose effect upon the airborne operation is indirect should remain with the unified commander. Specific com-
mand and control procedures will have been developed jointly by the JUWTF and airborne commanders.

b. Amphibious Operations. Guerrilla forces operating within the objective area should be under the operational control of the amphibious task force commander. As the amphibious assault progresses, operational control of guerrilla forces should be transferred to the landing force commander when the latter assumes responsibility for operations ashore. However, operational control of guerrilla forces supporting amphibious operations is seldom passed below division level.

c. Linkup Operations.

(1) Prior to linkup, operational control of guerrilla forces normally is assumed by the major force. When this occurs, such control continues throughout the operation.

(2) When guerrilla units are attached to a conventional force, responsibility for administrative and logistical support of these units normally passes from the SFOB to the conventional force.

(3) The unified commander in coordination with United States and allied officials will determine the disposition and utilization of the UW forces following linkup.

(4) In the event control of guerrilla forces is retained by the United States after linkup, it may be practicable to utilize these forces for missions under the control of the theater army support command (TASCOM), theater army civil affairs command (TACAC), or control may be retained by the tactical
commander. For continuity, special forces detachments may be required to remain with guerrilla units until coordination relationships have been established between guerrilla forces and the appropriate U.S. command.

(5) Upon completion of the mission or when directed by the unified commander, guerrilla forces are released for further employment or demobilization (see ch 10).

91. Missions in Support of the Unified Command

a. General. These missions, strategic in nature, may be tactical in execution. Such missions have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy and usually consist of interdiction of lines of communications and destruction of strategic targets. Subsidiary operations may involve support of psychological operations, special intelligence tasks, subversion operations, and evasion and escape operations. Actions by guerrilla forces against the enemy to obtain logistical items are subsidiary to their strategic missions.

b. Type Missions.

(1) Interdiction. Major emphasis is placed upon interdiction, which is the basic guerrilla warfare operational mission. Interdiction operations are designed to interrupt the enemy’s communications, deny him use of certain areas, and destroy industrial facilities, military installations, and equipment. Interdiction ranges from destruction of a vehicle by an individual to attacks by guerrilla forces against strategic industrial
sites. When properly coordinated with other activities, interdiction can make a significant contribution to the destruction of enemy combat power and will to fight. Guerrilla actions which cause the enemy to allocate forces to rear area defensive missions, and subsequent guerrilla operations to insure these forces remain committed in this role, are considered in this category.

(2) Psychological operations. All guerrilla operations are conducted in a manner calculated to create a favorable impact on the indigenous population. The adverse psychological effect of guerrilla operations may outweigh the tactical results. The ability of guerrilla forces to influence the population and elicit civilian support is largely dependent upon the psychological impact of the resistance movement upon the populace. The fact that guerrilla forces are operating in enemy territory is in itself of psychological benefit to the people and should be exploited fully by the special forces detachment. Psychological operations personnel may be attached to the special forces detachment to assist in these operations. (See para 50-52 and FM 33-1.)

(3) Special intelligence tasks. Special forces detachments, although not primarily intelligence collection agencies, may be required to support or to accomplish information-gathering tasks. Such operations usually are accomplished by either the auxiliary or un-
derground under the supervision of the area command.

(4) **Strategic target destruction missions.** Special category targets of a strategic nature, not included in the interdiction program, may be assigned to the UW forces for destruction. Examples of these target systems are—air defense installations, propaganda outlets, radio jamming stations, and research and developmental facilities.

(5) *FM 31–21A.*

(6) **Evasion and escape.** Evasion and escape mechanisms are developed to assist in the recovery of friendly personnel. Although guerrilla units assist evasion and escape activities, such operations are conducted by the auxiliary and underground. As required, special forces operational detachment commanders will support and supervise the conduct of such operations (*FM 31–21A*).

(7) *FM 31–21A.*

(8) *FM 31–21A.*

92. **Missions to Assist Ground Forces Engaged in Combat**

a. **General.** As the ground commander’s area of influence nears the guerrilla warfare operational area, guerrilla force operations are conducted to produce immediate effects on the enemy. Specific missions that guerrilla forces can undertake to assist the combat operations of conventional forces are—

(1) Occupation of key terrain to facilitate airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations,
to include portions of lightly defended airhead or beachhead lines, drop and landing zones, or reconnaissance and security positions.

(2) Employment as a reconnaissance and security force.

(3) Seizure of key installations to prevent destruction by the enemy, e.g., bridges, defiles, tunnels, dams, and power facilities.

(4) Support of friendly cover and deception operations.

(5) Diversionary attacks and accelerated guerrilla activities prior to and during major operations, in order to force the enemy to allocate a portion of his combat power to a counterguerrilla effort.

(6) Blocking and harassing operations which isolate selected portions of the battle area, airborne objective area, or beachhead.

(7) Destruction of command and communications networks.

b. Operations in Support of a Penetration. Due to the normal high density of enemy combat troops in the immediate battle area, guerrilla forces can only provide limited assistance to friendly forces. Guerrilla forces can best support the attack by isolating, or assisting in the seizure of designed objectives. Guerrilla forces can hinder or prevent movement of enemy reserve forces, interrupt his supply of combat elements, as well as attack his command and communications facilities, fire support means, and airfields. Location of critical installations and units which the guerrilla forces cannot effectively interdict are reported to the ground commander.
As friendly forces near the designated objective(s), guerrilla units direct their operations toward isolating the objective(s) from enemy reserves. Guerrilla forces may be able to assist in seizing and holding the objective(s) or key approaches to it for a limited time pending the arrival on the objective(s) of major elements of the conventional force.

c. Guerrilla Operations During an Envelopment.

(1) Guerrilla units assist the enveloping force in much the same way as in a penetration (b above). Guerrillas can conduct diversionary attacks to assist tactical plans of other forces. Guerrillas hinder movement of reserves, disrupt supply, attack command and communications installations, and disrupt fire support facilities. They may assist in the mopup of bypassed enemy units. They may seize and hold critical terrain such as bridges, defiles and tunnels, to prevent enemy destruction. They may perform screening missions to the front and flanks or be a security element to fill gaps between dispersed units of the enveloping force.

(2) If used in a reconnaissance or security role, guerrilla units operate in assigned sectors. Guerrilla forces rarely possess the transportation or communications equipment that will permit them to accompany mobile conventional forces.

d. Guerrilla Operations During Exploitation.

Subsequent to successful penetration or envelopment by friendly forces, guerrilla operations increase in intensity. As the enemy attempts to reconstitute his defense or withdraw to new positions, he is
attacked at every opportunity by the guerrilla forces. The enemy may be required to commit rear area security forces to restore defensive positions, thus enabling guerrilla forces to increase attacks against enemy rear areas. Guerrilla forces assist in containing bypassed enemy units, recovering stragglers and prisoners, seizing control of areas not occupied by friendly forces, attacking enemy units and installations, and adding to the enemy demoralization by exploitation and pursuit. During the exploiting phase, guerrilla forces may be employed as discussed in paragraphs 93 through 96.

93. Support of Airborne Operations

a. General. Guerrilla forces may support airborne forces during the assault phase and subsequent operations. They may also be employed in conjunction with airborne raids and heliborne operations.

b. Guerrilla Force Assistance to an Airborne Assault.

(1) Guerrilla forces can provide intelligence of the objective area to the airborne force commander. Guerrilla units may be given the mission of securing drop and landing zones, seizing objectives within the airhead line, occupying reconnaissance and security positions, delaying or harassing enemy movements toward the objective area. Concurrent with the landing of the assault echelon, guerrillas can furnish current intelligence data, provide guides, conduct reconnaissance and security missions, interdict approaches into the objective area, control lightly defended areas between separate airheads and
dispersed units, attack enemy reserve units and installations, and conduct diversionary attacks. In addition, guerrilla forces may assist in controlling the civilian populace within the objective area.

(2) Precise timing of the airborne assault with supporting guerrilla operations is essential. If committed prematurely, guerrilla forces may nullify the surprise effect of the operation, and, in turn, suffer defeat in detail. If committed late, the desired support effects from the guerrilla force employment may never materialize.

(3) Subsequent to the air assault phase, guerrilla forces continue to exert pressure on the enemy in the vicinity of the objective area. Guerrillas continue to provide current intelligence information. The guerrillas conduct harassing attacks against enemy units, thus requiring the enemy to fight two forces simultaneously. During the exploitation phase, guerrilla forces may be employed to assist in controlling areas between dispersed friendly units and in reconnaissance security roles and as guides. During retrograde movements, the guerrillas can assist the covering force by diversionary operations conducted in the rear of enemy forces.

(4) Guerrilla forces can assist an airborne raiding force by providing information and guides, performing reconnaissance and security missions, and diverting enemy forces during the withdrawal of the raiding force.
94. Support of Amphibious Operations

a. General. Guerrillas may support ground forces engaged in amphibious operations in one or more of the following ways: conduct operations to hinder or deny the enemy approach to the beachhead, temporarily seize and hold all or a portion of a lightly defended beachhead, conduct diversionary operations to deceive the enemy as to the location of the actual beachhead, temporarily seize helicopter landing areas, and assist airborne and heliborne operations which may be conducted in conjunction with or complementary to the amphibious assault.

b. Guerrilla Assistance to an Amphibious Assault.
(1) Guerrilla forces can interdict approaches into the area, attack reserves, destroy command posts and communications facilities as well as logistical installations and airfields which can support the enemy. One of the most important guerrilla targets is the enemy artillery fire support capability; therefore, all efforts should be made to neutralize those weapons within range of the beachhead.

(2) If the selected beachhead is lightly defended or unoccupied, guerrilla units may seize and hold portions of the beachhead. Guerrilla forces should seize their objectives just prior to the initial assault. Landing force planning must provide for early relief of guerrilla units. Plans for naval gunfire support to guerrilla forces must include provisions for the conduct and adjustment of fires. Naval gunfire liaison personnel, shore fire-control parties, and tactical air
control parties should be provided as required. Planning for such operations is conducted jointly by the JUWTF and amphibious task force commanders.

(3) Guerrillas may be employed in a tactical cover and deception role to assist amphibious assaults. Guerrilla forces intensify operations in selected areas to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main landings. Air defense radar and coastal detection stations are targets for guerrilla attack to reduce the enemy's early warning capability. A sudden increase in, or a shifting of resistance activities to other areas adds further harassment to enemy operations. The employment of the guerrilla forces is integrated into the overall amphibious operation plan.

(4) Timing of the use of guerrilla forces in support of an amphibious operation is extremely important. Premature commitment alerts the enemy and may lead to the defeat of the guerrilla force. Late employment may not produce the desired effect.

95. Linkup Operations

a. General.

(1) Many offensive operations in which guerrilla forces assist tactical commands involve a juncture between elements of the two forces.

(2) Not all guerrilla forces in an operational area are involved in linkup with tactical units. Some guerrilla units may be as-
signed missions assisting tactical commands
where the requirements of the operation pre-
clude physical juncture. For example, dur-
ing raids or area interdiction operations by
airborne forces or when conducting opera-
tions as part of a cover and deception plan
for an amphibious force, it is often unde-
sirable to linkup all guerrilla units with the
attacking units.

(3) Prior to linkup, responsibility for the guer-
rilla force normally should pass from the
JUWTF to the ground force commander
when the GWOA falls within the tactical
command’s area of influence.

b. Planning Considerations.

(1) Liaison.

(a) Linkup planning provides for an ex-
change of liaison personnel between the
linkup force and the SFOB. The guer-
rilla warfare area command should be rep-
resented by a liaison party exfiltrated from
the GWOA. This party, consisting of
special forces personnel and indigenous
representatives, can provide timely infor-
mation to the tactical commander, to in-
clude the latest friendly and enemy situ-
ation, recommended linkup coordination
measures, and missions for guerrilla units.

(b) The tactical commander will send a liai-
sion party to the area command. This
liaison party normally consists of repre-
sentatives from the tactical commander,
the special forces liaison detachment, tac-
tical air control parties, forward observer teams, and communications personnel and equipment. The liaison party should be completely aware of the scope and purpose of the linkup plan.

(2) Coordination of schemes of maneuver. Standard control measures are established to assist linkup. See FM 61–100 for details of these control measures. Guerrilla units usually are dispersed over a large area, consequently linkup may take place at several widely separated points.

(3) Fire coordination measures. Fire coordination measures, such as no-fire lines and fire support coordination lines (FSCL), are established by the headquarters directing the operation. Because of the dispersion existing among guerrilla units and the fact that civilian support organizations are a part of the UW force, additional restrictions on supporting fires may be necessary. In particular, the planned employment of nuclear and CB weapons by the tactical commander within guerrilla warfare operational areas must be thoroughly coordinated.

(4) Communication coordination. Radio communications equipment with the guerrilla forces normally is limited. The tactical commander will provide the guerrilla force equipment with a voice capability which can link the guerrilla force to his headquarters. This equipment could be brought into the area by the liaison party. Visual recognition signals are selected to assist in linkup.
If necessary, pyrotechnics and other markings not available to the guerrilla force should be provided by the linkup force.

(5) Contact points. Specific locations are established for the two forces to effect contact. Usually these points are well-defined terrain features.

(6) Employment following linkup. The unified commander will prescribe the conditions and duration of utilization of the guerrilla forces after linkup. Within the scope of this guidance the tactical commander may employ uncovered guerrilla forces. For a discussion of employment after linkup, see paragraph 96.

96. Missions Conducted After Linkup With Friendly Forces

a. Reconnaissance and Security Missions.

(1) Because of their familiarity with the terrain and people in their operational areas, guerrilla forces possess a unique capability in a reconnaissance and security role. However, their lack of vehicular mobility and voice communications equipment are limitations on their employment with mobile forces. When employed with mobile units, the tactical commander may provide the necessary transportation and communications equipment for selected guerrilla units.

(2) The normal method of employment in reconnaissance and security missions is to assign guerrilla units an area of responsibility.
Within this area, guerrilla forces patrol difficult terrain and gaps between tactical units, establish roadblocks and observation posts, screen flanks, provide guides to conventional units, and seek out enemy agents and stragglers.

b. Rear Area Security.

(1) Guerrilla forces may be assigned rear area security missions with various tactical commands or within the theater army logistical command area. In assigning guerrilla forces a rear area security role, they should be employed within areas they have previously operated in.

(2) Guerrillas may be used as security forces at logistical and administrative installations, supply depots, airfields, pipelines, rail yards, ports, and tactical unit trains areas. Guerrilla units can patrol difficult terrain which contains bypassed enemy units or stragglers; police towns and cities; guard lines of communications such as railroads, highways, telecommunications systems, and canals. When provided with appropriate transportation, guerrilla units may be employed as a mobile security force reserve.

(3) Guerrilla forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counterguerrilla operations in rear areas. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the language, terrain, and population are important capabilities which can be exploited by conventional commanders engaged in counterguerrilla
operations. Guerrilla forces may provide a source of intelligence information concerning dissident elements opposing friendly forces.

c. Civil Affairs Assistance. Because of their knowledge of the language, familiarity with the local population, and previous experiences, guerrilla forces, or selected civilian support elements, may be assigned to assist civil affairs units. They may be attached to divisional, corps, or army civil affairs units, or placed under another appropriate area command. Guerrilla forces can perform refugee collection and control duties, civil police duties, assist in the psychological operations campaign in rear areas, help establish civil government, apprehend collaborators and spies, recruit labor, furnish or locate technicians to operate public utilities, guard key installations and public buildings, assist in the review and censorship of material for dissemination through public media facilities and, in general, assist in restoring normalcy to the area.

d. Conventional Combat Operations. Properly trained and equipped guerrilla units can be employed as conventional combat units. Such units will require additional combat and logistical support units, e.g., armor, artillery, and transportation. A period of retraining and reequipping may be required prior to commitment to combat. When so employed, the guerrilla units should be commanded by their own leaders. Usually the special forces operational detachment remains with the guerrilla unit to assist in this transition to a status of a “conventional” unit.
97. Guerrilla Force Defensive Measures

a. General.

(1) UW forces normally do not engage in extensive defensive operations. For this reason an adequate security and warning system is vital (see also para 57-66).

(2) Guerrilla units with their relatively light weapons and equipment are normally inferior in firepower to organized enemy forces of like size. Guerrilla units should not, therefore, undertake defensive operations unless forced to do so or unless required to support special operations conducted by other theater forces. When the enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves by movement and dispersion, by withdrawals, or by creating diversions.

b. Preparation Against Enemy Offensives. Adequate intelligence measures should provide advance warning of impending large-scale counterguerrilla operations. Guerrilla commanders must be cognizant of the following activities or conditions which might indicate impending enemy offensives in their operational areas:

(1) Advent of suitable weather for extensive field operations.

(2) Arrival of new enemy commanders and key staff officers, especially those with previous experience in counterguerrilla operations.

(3) Any change in the conventional battle situation which releases additional troops for counterguerrilla operations, e.g., enemy victories over allied conventional forces, a lull
in active operations, or a reduction in the size of the battle area.

(4) Increase in the size of local garrisons or the arrival of new units in the area, especially if these are combat troops or troops with special counterguerrilla capabilities such as radio direction finding units, CBR units, rotary-winged aircraft, mountain, airborne, or reconnaissance troops.

(5) Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial reconnaissance.

(6) Increased enemy intelligence effort against the area command.

(7) New measures employed by the enemy to pacify or control the civilian population.

(8) Increased PSYOP effort directed against the guerrilla force.

c. Common Counterguerrilla Tactical Operations. (See FM 31-16 for detailed discussion.)

(1) Encirclement. An encircling maneuver is the greatest threat to guerrilla forces because its limits the guerrilla's flexibility of action so vital to survival. If the enemy succeeds in encircling the guerrilla force, he will most likely employ tactics as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

(2) Tightening the noose (fig. 19). The culmination of an encirclement operation is characterized by a coordinated shortening of the line of encirclement by the convergence of enemy troops into the encircled areas. As the line is progressively shortened, more counterguerrilla units are removed from the
line and added to the reserve forces. After the contraction of the line of encirclement to a "critical mass," the counterguerrilla force may establish "killing zones" and permit the guerrillas to "escape" into them.

(3) **Fragmenting the disc** (fig. 20). After the line of encirclement has been contracted until a "critical mass" has been achieved, an effective way to continue the attack and annihilate the guerrilla is by "fragmenting the disc." In this operation, the guerrilla force is split by offensive action into successively smaller units until the destruction of the fragmented unit has been accomplished.

(4) **Hammer and anvil** (fig. 21). This operation normally involves two forces, one to block and hold the guerrilla force in position (the anvil) and one to drive the guerrilla force against the anvil element by offensive action (the hammer element). Either element may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of the destruction will usually be accomplished by the forces composing the hammer element, while the anvil serves predominantly as a blocking force. This operation is most profitably employed when the blocking (or anvil) element is located on, or immediately in rear of, a natural terrain obstacle, thus giving more strength to the blocking position.

(5) **Pursuit (sweep)** (fig. 22). A pursuit is the maintenance of contact with, and the continuation of offensive action against, a fleeing guerrilla force. A counterguerrilla
NOTE: PHASE LINE RED IS THE LINE OF CONTRACTED ENCIRCLEMENT.

Figure 19. Tightening the noose (contraction of encirclement).
force conducting a pursuit is normally organized into two elements, the direct pressure force and the encircling force(s). The direct pressure force pursues the guerrilla and maintains constant offensive pressure on them as they withdraw. The encircling force(s), employing superior mobility
A. ENCIRCLEMENT COMPLETE

B. HAMMER ACTION INITIATED

C. FINAL CRUSHING ACTION

Figure 21. Hammer and anvil.
(preferably by using airmobile or airborne forces), conducts local envelopment (single or double) to cut them off and effect destruction.

(6) *Rabbit hunt* (fig. 23). This operation involves the use of three counterguerrilla forces—

(a) *The hunting element.* This element begins on one boundary of the area to be

![Diagram of pursuit (sweep)](image)

*Figure 22. Pursuit (sweep).*
cleared and advances parallel to the "direction of beat" in a line formation methodically searching the area and, on finding the guerrillas, either destroys them or pushes them deeper into the area.

(b) The blocking or ambush forces. This force takes up static positions around the entire area to be cleared, except for the side occupied by the hunting element. The force then engages any guerrillas trying to exit the area under the pressure of the advancing hunting element.

(c) Reserves. Adequate reserves are located behind both the hunting element and the blocking or ambush forces ready for employment if the guerrillas attempt to make a concerted breakout at any point around the area.

(7) Fire flush (fig. 24). In this operation the blocking or ambush forces encircle an area approximately 1,000 meters square and await the guerrillas to exit the area as they are subjected to intense saturation-type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical air support.

d. Defensive Measures That the Guerrillas May Employ.

(1) Have auxiliaries and underground increase counterintelligence activities.

(2) Initiate diversionary activities in other areas.

(3) Intensify operations against lines of communication.
Figure 23. Rabbit hunt.
(4) Prepare to implement guerrilla base evacuation plan.
(5) Institute delay and harassing tactics.
(6) Exploit guerrillas' inherent advantages of fluidity and intimate knowledge of terrain.
(7) Prepare to initiate "breakout" operations (see e below).
(8) Withdraw to more favorable terrain.
(9) Increase frequency of ambush operations.
(10) Prepare for the enemy's use of chemical and biological weapons.
(11) Establish caches in potential withdrawal areas.
(12) Improve passive air defense measures.
(13) Plan for employment of concentrated fires of automatic and semiautomatic weapons against helicopters and low-performance aircraft.
(14) Plan counteractions against enemy heliborne and airborne operations.
(15) Take adequate communications security measures (para 69).
(16) As a last resort, implement dispersal plan which must include instructions covering interim conduct and ultimate reassembly.

e. Guerrilla Breakout Operations (fig. 25).
(1) Organization for breakout operations. A type guerrilla organization for breakout operations includes—
   (a) Guerrilla scouts.
   (b) Breakout force, consisting of two strong guerrilla elements.
   (c) Main body.
   (d) Two flank guard elements (right and left).
   (e) Rear guard.
(2) Operational concept. The guerrilla scouts locate a weak point in the enemy lines along an axis of movement that will benefit the
Figure 25. Guerrilla breakout from encirclement.
guerrillas following the breakout (e.g., jungles, swamps, mountains, etc.). The remaining elements ((1)(b) through (e), above) are positioned as shown in figure 25. The breakout force attacks to create and maintain a suitable gap in the enemy lines. The main body and flank guards then proceed through the gap thus formed. The two breakout force elements close on each other and proceed through the gap, followed by the rear guard element. The breakout is timed to occur during periods of poor visibility, free from enemy observation and accurate fire. During the attempt, guerrilla units not included in the enemy circle make attacks against the enemy's rear to lure forces away from the main breakout attempt and help to create gaps. After a successful breakout, the guerrilla force should reassemble in predesignated areas. Wherever possible, the tempo of its operations are increased at this time, thus raising the morale of the guerrilla force.
CHAPTER 10
DEMOBILIZATION

98. General

a. When linkup operations between friendly conventional troops and the area command are completed, the ability of guerrilla forces to effectively support military operations gradually diminishes. Guerrilla units retained beyond their period of usefulness may become a liability and a potential source of trouble.

b. Consideration must be given to the demobilization of guerrilla units in sectors occupied by friendly forces. The decision regarding the transfer of guerrilla forces and associated organizations to the national government concerned must be resolved at the theater level.

c. In the event that no recognized national government exists, the decision to disband the forces, in part or in their entirety, likewise requires careful consideration. Disbanding of guerrilla forces when composed of elements foreign to the area may be extremely dangerous.

d. Problems of international relationships, attitudes of the civil population toward these forces, and the political, economic, and social implications of such a transfer are paramount considerations.

e. Civil affairs (CA) units normally will assist U.S. authorities in demobilization actions of a guer-
rilla force. Special forces units may be required to support such demobilization procedures. Measures to achieve adequate coordination between special forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate military and political authorities are instituted to insure a disposition of guerrilla force in harmony with the long-range political objectives of the United States in the area.

f. Demobilization procedures usually have little effect upon the auxiliaries and the underground. Where possible, the area command furnishes names of known active underground and auxiliary personnel to the new government. It can be anticipated that these personnel will receive less in the way of actual benefits than the guerrillas; however, they should receive some public recognition for their services.

99. Role of Sponsoring Power

a. When deemed appropriate a unified command may coordinate the release of the guerrilla forces to the provisional government recognized by the United States.

b. Although the final responsibility for demobilization of guerrilla forces rests with the provisional government, the United States may initially assume responsibility for reestablishing and maintaining public order.

100. Planning

a: Initiation of Plans. Long-range planning for the eventual disposition of the guerrilla force commences at theater level as soon as these forces have been organized. Planning is continuous and is revised concurrently with operations to reflect the exist-
ing political, psychological, and military situation. Appropriate instructions are included in theater civil affairs plans.

b. Civil Affairs (CA) Role. CA teams may be provided to assist in demobilization procedures, particularly when no suitable provisional government exists to assume control. To maintain adequate liaison, CA personnel normally are attached to special forces detachments well in advance to release guerrillas to CA authority.

c. Special Forces Role. The special forces operational detachments may be required to assist CA during the transition and demobilization period. The JUWTF and SFOB should be able to provide CA commanders with the following:

(1) Lists of guerrillas, their supporters and other key inhabitants, together with any knowledge as to their political attitudes, their leadership or administrative potential, and other information that might be helpful in operations subsequent to the UW phase (para 76c).

(2) Area studies and intelligence not already available to CA elements.

d. Psychological Operations Role. Psychological operations are used to assist in the demobilization of a guerrilla force. Operations consist of programs explaining to guerrilla personnel steps to be taken in the demobilization process and to condition them for the change. In addition, rehabilitation programs, sponsored by the United States or the national government concerned, are explained to the guerrillas with emphasis on the importance of the guerrilla's role in the future plan for their
country. Psychological operations aid in the orderly transition of the guerrilla force to more normal pursuits and prepare the civilian population for the return of guerrilla elements.

101. Area Demobilization: Courses of Action

Demobilization operations by U.S. forces may take any one or a combination of the following courses:

a. The guerrilla force, with all arms and equipment, may be released to the recognized government.

b. The guerrilla force, less U.S. supplies, arms and equipment, may be released to the recognized government.

c. The guerrilla force may be demobilized and relocated by the United States.

102. Demobilization Operations

Demobilization of the guerrilla force will be directed by higher authority and can be expected to include—

a. Assembly of the Guerrilla Force.

(1) The guerrilla force may be gathered by units into assembly areas. All records and equipment should be brought with the units. Medical facilities are located within the assembly areas. Reorientation programs facilitating demobilization should be conducted.

(2) The guerrilla force may represent a powerful political element in the liberated area. As such, support from its members for various causes can be sought by factions both within and outside the guerrilla forces. In the interest of orderly demobilization, po-
political activity by or among the guerrillas must be closely supervised and movement of the guerrilla controlled.

b. Completion of Administrative Records. All elements of the guerrilla force should complete the administrative records of their units. Certificates should be prepared to cover records that have been lost or destroyed. Complete payrolls are necessary and should be reconciled with authorized unit strength figures. Arms and equipment must be inventoried and accountability established.

c. Settlement of Pay, Allowances, and Benefits. Members of the force must be paid all money due. Authorized benefits must be paid to legal survivors of guerrilla personnel who died or were killed in action.

d. Settlement and Claims.

(1) Claims against the recognized local government. All claims should be settled fairly and promptly. Administrative delay in the settlement of claims arising from the activities of resistance forces is a partial source of ill will and may result in injustice.

(2) Claims against the United States. These claims likewise should be settled fairly and promptly. The procedures for settling such claims will be as prescribed in pertinent Army regulations and theater directives.

e. Awards and Decorations. Prompt action must be taken on recommendations for decorations and awards for deserving guerrillas and other resistance personnel. The awards should be presented at appropriate ceremonies as soon after operations as possible, and attended, when practical, by the guer-
rilla troops, the civilian population, high-ranking officers of the conventional forces, and officials of the provisional government and supported by appropriate PSYOP.

f. Collection of Arms and Equipment.

(1) To preclude future criticism of the United States, there must be a clear understanding with the provisional government as to the disposition and responsibility of arms and equipment in the hands of the guerrillas.

(2) If arms and equipment are to be collected, they must be turned in by the guerrillas prior to the settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits. Care must be taken that weapons are not hidden for later unlawful use. Public announcements must be made that weapons will be turned in and that, after a specified date, unlicensed possession of weapons or military equipment will be unlawful.

(3) In the event that the guerrilla force, with arms and equipment, is to be turned over to a recognized national government, collection of arms and equipment can be omitted. Inventories of arms and equipment in hands of the guerrillas, however, should be conducted jointly by representatives of the local national government and U.S. forces.

g. Care of Sick and Wounded. Every effort must be taken to insure that wounded and sick guerrilla personnel are given necessary care. Guerrilla hospitals should be kept in operation until the responsibility for all patients is assumed by other appropriate military or civilian medical facilities.
h. Discharge. In the event that an individual who had been sworn in as a member of a guerrilla force is to be given a complete release from service, he or she must be given a formal discharge and a testimonial of services. The discharge provisions applicable to U.S. military personnel can be used as a guide. Appropriately modified Department of Army forms may be used.

i. Rehabilitation and Employment of Discharged Guerrillas. Suitable measures should be taken to assist discharged guerrillas in assuming their places in civilian life. Some may be given employment by the conventional forces or by the newly constituted government. Individuals or entire units may be incorporated into the police or armed forces of the new government. Where feasible, U.S. forces may assist in rebuilding damaged houses or farms belonging to guerrillas. Rehabilitation operations normally should not involve the U.S. forces when a provisional government exists that is capable of rendering aid.

j. Prevention of Formation of Bandit or Other Dissident Groups. The greatest danger in any demobilization program is the possibility that former guerrillas will resort to dissidence, factional quarrels, or even to banditry. Opportunists may take advantage of the prevalent unstable conditions to organize quasi-military or political groups which will conflict with the provisional government or U.S. authorities. It is vital, therefore, that demobilization procedures be executed expeditiously and with foresight. Procedures that are instituted must be an outgrowth of deliberations on a high level by military and political authorities. In the implementation of directives, maximum coordination between
special forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate elements is necessary. To preclude troublesome situations from arising, tight control measures should be instituted; persons suspected of favoring action hostile to the newly established authority must be kept under surveillance. Every effort must be made to foster the local populace’s acceptance of peaceful means as the desirable procedures to bring about a restoration of the governmental structure in order to facilitate the readjustment in society which accompany a cessation of wartime pursuits. Psychological operations can be of considerable assistance in these activities.
103. General

a. Counterinsurgency operations consist of those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by, or in conjunction with, a government to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency (see FM 100–20).

b. Certain special forces units are highly trained in both unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency and have the capability of providing planning, training, advice, and operational assistance to selected indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations. The utilization of special forces personnel in this mission is a valuable adjunct to the counterinsurgency capabilities of MAAG's, Missions, and unified commands. When adequately augmented by professional skills not found in the special forces group, special forces can provide specialized advisory assistance in the solution of internal defense prob-
lems through a combination of advisory, psychological, and military civic action measures. The special forces group, operating with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, signal, military police, medical, and engineer units can be formed into a special action force (SAF) which is a specially trained, tailored, and an immediately available U.S. Army counterinsurgency force (see FM 31-22).

c. Broad unconventional warfare doctrine does not apply to counterinsurgency situations. In unconventional warfare operations, the U.S.-sponsored guerrillas operate deep within enemy or enemy-dominated territory and are the insurgent elements. Their efforts are directed towards the delay and harassment of the enemy military force and are facilitated by inducing the local civilians to support the guerrilla effort. In counterinsurgency operations, U.S.-supported forces are operating in a less restrictive operational environment with their efforts directed toward prevention or countering the insurgent movement by winning the support of the population, thus denying the insurgents this support and by combat action against the insurgent forces. However, selected UW tactics and techniques such as establishing intelligence nets and methods used to gain the support of the local population and combat techniques such as raids and ambushes may apply to counterinsurgency. These tactics and techniques may be used in advising indigenous military and paramilitary forces engaged in remote area operations to promote defense and internal security, border control and surveillance tasks.

d. This chapter provides guidance and procedures for employing special forces in support of counter-
insurgency. FM 31–22 together with its classified supplement FM 31–22A, provide information and guidance for the training and operational employment of the SAF. This chapter also explains the relationship of U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces to MAAG’s, Missions, and subordinate unified commands and other elements of a U.S. country team engaged in supporting counterinsurgency efforts of a friendly nation receiving U.S. economic and military aid.

104. Missions of Special Forces in Counterinsurgency

a. General. The mission of special forces is to reinforce MAAG’s, Missions, and subordinate unified commands with individuals, mobile training teams, and operational detachments capable of training, advising, and providing operational assistance for host country military forces and civilian agencies engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

b. Primary Missions. The counterinsurgency trained special forces group may be effectively employed in the following missions:

(1) See FM 31–21A.

(2) To train, advise, and provide operational assistance to host country special-forces-type units operating against insurgent elements within areas of the host country dominated by the insurgent.

(3) To act as advisors to indigenous special forces, provincial authorities, and tribal leaders in the recruitment, organization, equipping training, and operational employment of host country tribal elements or ethnic minority groups.
c. Contingency Missions. In addition to the three missions enunciated in b above, there are other missions that U.S. Army special forces may be called upon to perform. Such missions are when there is only a token MAAG-type force within the host country or where there is no MAAG. These basic contingency missions are—

1. To function as advisors to host country military and paramilitary forces at division level and below.

2. To provide advisory assistance to selected host country forces for specialized missions, such as raids or long-range patrol operations.

d. Military Civic Action. U.S. Army special forces may at times advise or engage in military civic action activities in support of the missions stated above (see para 106).

105. Organization and Control

Operational control of the U.S. special forces detachments normally will be assigned to the MAAG, Mission, or subordinate unified command. Three different situations for control and coordination of special forces assets in-country are given below.

a. Limited MAAG or Mission. When only limited MAAG or military missions exist in a country, special forces groups may provide detachments to act as advisors or mobile training teams at division, regiment/brigade, battalion, and company level indigenous military and paramilitary forces. In this situation the special forces detachments or elements thereof are performing a conventional type of advisory duty. Special forces training teams operating with indigenous conventional military and paramili-
tary units should be replaced, as soon as possible, by MAAG personnel. The chain of command and operational control normally flows from the Chief, MAAG or Mission, through the Chief, Army Section, down through the special forces advisory teams located at and below division level (fig. 26).

b. Fully Established MAAG or Subordinate Unified Command. A MAAG or a subordinate unified command may be fully established with regular MAAG advisory teams assigned or attached down to and including the battalion level for both the indigenous military and paramilitary forces. In this instance, and at those levels, there may be no requirement for special forces support to conventional units; however, a requirement may exist to provide special forces advisory elements for host country special forces, ranger, long-range patrols, and for tribal and minority groups. In this case, special forces operational detachments B or C may be assigned or attached to the subordinate unified command or MAAG headquarters to provide the necessary command, control, and logistical support. Special forces detachments may be further assigned or attached as a subordinate element of the MAAG headquarters or to subordinate MAAG field elements (fig. 27).

c. No MAAG or Mission. In rare instances, the U.S. special forces elements may be the only U.S. military organization in country. Under these circumstances there may be a requirement to establish a special forces operational base (SFOB). An operational detachment C or B, augmented as required, will establish the SFOB and would command assigned advisory elements in country. The SFOB would provide operational, logistical, and adminis-
Trainig of Specialized Group for Remote Area Ops

Special Forces (SAF) (AS REQUIRED)
Special Forces (BF) (AS OR C AS APPROPRIATE)

Military Mission or Limited MAAG

SAF HQ

SFOS

HOST COUNTRY TNG AND SCHOOL COMMAND

Legend:
- - - - ADVISORY
- - - - CONTROL

Figure 26. Special forces employment in support of military mission or limited MAAG.
Figure 27. Organization and control of special forces detachments in CI operations.
trative support to these elements until such time as a senior headquarters is established in-country. The SFOB would then operate under the immediate control of this senior headquarters.

Section II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

106. Primary Missions

a. FM 31–21A.


(1) General.

(a) One of the counterinsurgency missions of U.S. special forces is to provide planning, training, advice, and operational assistance to host country special-forces-type units engaged in operations in insurgent dominated areas within the host country. These operations can only be conducted when favorable conditions exist in the objective area. A lack of complete control by the insurgent group and a segment of the population willing to support the host country forces are examples of favorable conditions. Host country special forces will normally operate with friendly indigenous personnel recruited, where possible, from the area of anticipated employment. Selected members of the civilian population must also be recruited and organized to support operations within the insurgent-controlled areas.

(b) Operations, primarily consisting of raids and ambushes, will be conducted so as to
interdict and harass insurgent guerrilla units, training areas, and logistical installations, and to deny insurgent forces access to local supply sources.

(2) Preparation.

(a) The initial action taken will be an area study of the proposed operational area. All available intelligence agencies and sources should be utilized. Efforts should be expended to recruit and infiltrate agents into the proposed area and to locate or exfiltrate assets indigenous to the proposed area. Any assets recruited should exercise some degree of control over a number of the population or have the trade, occupation, or talent that enhances an operation of this type.

(b) A detailed and comprehensive psychological operations campaign, tailored towards the population in the proposed operational area, must be conducted by higher authority. The themes of this campaign must stress the advantages of popular support of the national forces and the disadvantages to following and supporting the insurgents. The campaign should include, but not be limited to, leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and psychological consolidation operations and must continue throughout all phases of the operation (see FM 33-1).

(3) Elements of force.

(a) The size and makeup of forces for employment in insurgent dominated areas
will depend mainly on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, the degree of control exercised by the insurgents, and the area potential for recruiting and developing an adequate local force.

(b) When the insurgent group exercises strict control and influence over the population, it may be feasible to infiltrate only a small team of host country special forces together with supporting assets. The mission of this team would generally be limited to area assessment, intelligence, and establishing contact and rapport with friendly indigenous elements of the operational areas (see pilot team concept, par 33).

(c) When the area assessments and intelligence evaluations reveal that the proposed area offers opportunities for success, an increased number of personnel may be committed or recruited from the local population. This may include, in addition to host country special forces with U.S. special forces as advisors, indigenous personnel recruited, organized, and trained prior to infiltration for this type of operation. The majority of personnel infiltrated should be indigenous to the proposed operational area. When the situation dictates, a small infiltration unit may be able to recruit personnel and operating elements from within the local populace.
(d) The number of U.S. special forces personnel infiltrated will depend mainly on the state of training of the host country special forces units. If the special forces mission is primarily one of logistical support, then a small team, such as a reduced A detachment, may be all that is necessary. As the magnitude of the operation increases, particularly as regards support, the role of U.S. special forces will also increase.

(4) Methods of infiltration. All factors influencing the selection of a method of infiltration must be considered (ch 7). It must be realized, however, that those factors such as long-range infiltration normally associated with limited or general war may not be applicable for CI. For example, infiltration by means of helicopter or small fixed-wing aircraft will be more feasible than the use of heavy military aircraft. Land infiltration may be the most desirable method due to the relatively shorter distances involved.

(5) Organizational phase.

(a) This phase encompasses all aspects necessary to the proper organization of the infiltrated base and for accommodating the resistance potential of the area (ch 8).

(b) The organization developed must provide for the conduct of civic action projects, psychological operations, and tactical operations. Organization of auxiliary and underground elements must be considered.

(6) Operations.
(a) Operations will normally consist of patrolling, ambushes, and raids against insurgent base areas, training camps, and logistical points.

(b) The infiltrated force may have certain advantages that are denied unconventional warfare forces in limited or general war. Some of these are—

1. Artillery support from guns positioned outside the insurgent area of control when range permits.

2. Immediately available close air support.

3. The capability for rapid reinforcement within the insurgent's area of control by host country military units.

4. Immediate evacuation of the force if necessary.

(c) As the operational area develops, larger scale operations may be conducted to further deny the area to the insurgents. Coordinated operations with host country military units should be employed during this phase to assist host country army units applying pressure on the periphery of the insurgent's area of control.

(d) Evasion and escape techniques should be applied as required.

(7) Consolidation operations.

(a) If the objective of gaining control of the area from the insurgents has been attained and linkup is effected, operations are expanded until the area has been returned to government control.
(b) As regular government forces assume responsibility for the area, the paramilitary components of the infiltrated forces should be demobilized or integrated into the conventional military forces of that particular area.

(c) Host country special forces and/or U.S. special forces must render all assistance possible toward an orderly transfer of control.

(d) Psychological operations are an essential and integral part of the consolidation operation.


(1) General. Normally, host country governmental and military control in remote areas is weak or nonexistent. U.S. special forces may be assigned the mission of providing planning, training, advisory, and operational assistance in recruiting and organizing selected ethnic minority or tribal elements in such areas. The principal mission assigned to these forces is to control the population by providing security from insurgent exploitation and render assistance through military civic action.

(2) Organization and employment.

(a) The size and organization of paramilitary forces will vary considerably from country to country. Within each country, however, standard organizations should be developed and instituted on a countrywide basis to insure the proper planning of
logistical support, training programs, and the allocation of personnel resources.

(b) Types of paramilitary organizations that may be recruited for remote area operations are—

1. Personnel operating alone or in small groups. These personnel, clothed in native dress, are utilized mainly for surveillance and intelligence purposes. Personnel may or may not be armed.

2. Volunteers organized into squads or platoons and armed and trained to defend their home villages. Personnel are trained in the use of small arms, defensive and security measures, and in civic action activities. These units normally are not used in interdiction or offensive-type actions.

3. A unit similar to a U.S. infantry rifle company, less its vehicles and heavier weapons, may be organized to provide a limited offensive, interdiction, and reinforcement capability within its own local area. Typical missions are—

   (a) Security of training and operational activities and reinforcement of organized hamlets and villages.

   (b) Interdiction of insurgent routes of movement and areas of activity employing raids and ambushes, combat and reconnaissance patrols, and on selected occasions limited conventional combat operations in conjunction with regular military forces.
(c) Psychological operations, such as loudspeaker broadcasts, distribution of leaflets, and face-to-face persuasion.
(d) Military civic action programs.
(e) Equipment augmentation, such as voice radio sets and binoculars, may be used in border denial operations (para 107b).

(3) General considerations.

(a) Characteristics of training.
1. The scope of instruction is limited to essential requirements.
2. Emphasis is on practical work.
3. Night operations are stressed.
4. Intelligence and counterintelligence.
5. Training is continuous.

(b) Recruiting of personnel.
1. Personnel recruited must be screened by host country intelligence agencies. An investigation, although simple, together with close observation, is necessary to determine the loyalty of all personnel.
2. The loyalty of the indigenous paramilitary forces must be directed towards the local government, not to the United States or U.S. special forces.
3. Standard compensation for services should be provided through host country personnel even though the United States provides the funds.

(c) Coordination requirements.
1. With MAAG or subordinate unified command advisors at all appropriate levels
to preclude duplication of effort and to insure coordination of tactical operations.

2. With other U.S. agencies in-country such as AID or USIS.

3. With host country military and civilian leaders at all appropriate levels (province, district, etc.) to insure proper support and integration of effort, and a clear understanding of responsibilities.

107. Included Tasks

Tasks outlined in a and b below may be included in missions assigned to special forces employed in counterinsurgency operations.


(1) Special forces are capable of providing limited civic action assistance to indigenous forces. For example, medical specialists of the operational detachments can furnish dispensary services and provide training to indigenous health and sanitation personnel. Such actions have a favorable psychological impact on the people, especially in the remote areas where health and sanitation measures may be virtually nonexistent. Additional military civic action support may be provided by augmentation elements of the special action force (SAF). The SAF is composed of personnel who possess necessary civic action skills such as civil affairs, engineers, military intelligence, and psychological operations. (See FM 31-22 for organization and mission of the SAF.)
Examples of some of the types of civic action programs which may be initiated and supported by augmentation elements to special forces detachments are—

(a) Medical assistance.
(b) Aid to education.
(c) Improvement in health and sanitation.
(d) Agricultural assistance.
(e) Improvement of transportation routes.
(f) Recreational programs for children.
(g) Information programs.
(h) Construction.

The close contact between special forces personnel and the indigenous military and civilian populace will also result in important benefits. By their presence in an area—by living, eating, and working with the local population and military units—special forces personnel establish relationships which will result in increased mutual cooperation, understanding, and success of mission.

b. Border Denial.

(1) General.

(a) In a majority of cases where a subversive insurgency has been successful against an established government, support to the insurgent from sources outside the country has been a key factor in the success of the insurgency. Denial of this external support to the insurgents is an important factor in the success of a counterinsurgency program. In addition to the infiltration of personnel and logistical support, ex-
ternal support also includes the use of adjacent countries as sanctuaries by the insurgent forces.

(b) Indigenous forces advised by U.S. special forces may be given the mission of conducting various border control operations concurrently with the conduct of military operations against the insurgent force.

(c) Border denial measures are those measures which a host country can use to physically separate the insurgent force from external support provided from an adjacent country. For the purpose of understanding, any measure taken to prevent or hinder the infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equipment into the host country will be discussed under the one general term—border denial (see FM 31–10 and FM 31–16).

(2) Operational concepts.

(a) There are two basic concepts of border denial. One concept requires that the border be physically sealed off with barriers and fences, and guarded continuously. The other concept requires an extensive network of observation posts and watchers augmented by intensive patrolling activity to detect, ambush, and destroy small groups of infiltrators. Reserve forces must be provided to engage larger groups of infiltrators. Normally, the latter concept is most applicable to indigenous units, advised by special forces. Remoteness of the area often involves op-
erating in rugged terrain where the erection, security, and support of physical barriers is infeasible.

(b) Two concepts employed along vulnerable border areas exploited by the insurgents are:

1. *Restricted zone along the border.* Under this concept an area of predetermined width along the border is declared a restricted area. All civilian personnel are removed and resettled outside the zone. U.S. special forces may assist the agency of the host country responsible for the resettlement program. Clearing the border zone of all civilian personnel denies local support to insurgent infiltrations and assists in detection and identification of unauthorized activity. Augmentation personnel from the SAF, such as civil affairs and engineer skills, may be necessary. Once the area has been cleared, it is controlled by the use of ground and aerial observers, listening posts, extensive patrolling, and electronic devices.

2. *Friendly population buffer zone.* Under this concept the majority of the civilian personnel residing in the vicinity of the border are sympathetic to the friendly forces. Screening of the population by host country agencies is necessary and those of doubtful sympathy should be located outside the buffer zone. This concept creates a strong
potential for establishing an informant net along the border and provides an excellent source for recruiting personnel who are familiar with the operational area. Special forces, augmented by intelligence specialists from the SAF, may assist host country agencies in the screening operation.

(c) Operations will consist of intensive small unit patrolling of assigned areas of responsibility near the border, but away from fixed outposts or strong points. Sites for observation and listening posts should be hidden, frequently changed, and placed along likely routes of insurgent infiltration (trails, water or foot paths, animal paths, water holes, and potential sites for insurgent way stations or camps).

(d) Highly trained, immediate action reserve forces must be maintained to cope with all but the larger border infiltrations. Plans using regular military units as reinforcements must be developed to assist border forces in countering major infiltration attempts. If required, selected areas should be cleared to provide landing sites for the delivery of helicopter transported reinforcements.

(e) The gathering of intelligence from all available sources and agencies will be a primary factor in the effectiveness of border denial operations (see FM 31-21A).

(f) The success of the border denial operations depends to a major degree upon the
reliability of voice communications equipment. All patrols, listening posts, and observation posts should be able to communicate with one another, their base, their reserve forces, and with supporting aircraft.

(g) Aircraft, if available, should be employed in surveillance and combat support missions to assist in the movement and resupply of border denial organizations and reserve forces. See paragraphs 108 and 109 for employment of aviation support.

(3) Border denial forces.

(a) Indigenous military and police units, when possessing inherent mobility and communications systems, are best suited to conduct border denial operations in open or built-up areas which normally have an extensive road and trail network. Paramilitary forces, however, may be organized and trained to augment these forces.

(b) Indigenous personnel, native to the particular border area, are best suited to conduct border denial operations in difficult terrain such as mountains, rugged hills, forests and jungle regions. The individual’s knowledge of the terrain and his inherent ability to operate effectively in the remote environment are the predominant factors. Special forces advisory elements are particularly suited for employment with these forces.

(c) See FM 31-21A.
Section III. SPECIAL FORCES AVIATION

108. Aviation Company, Airborne Special Forces

a. Mission. To support counterinsurgency and psychological operations.

b. Organization. See figure 8.

c. Capabilities. At full strength the special forces aviation company has the following capabilities:

(1) Provide limited aerial fire support, to include escort of air serials, in counterguerrilla operations.

(2) Provide administrative and tactical air movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment in parachute or air-landed operations.

(3) Provide advice, training, and operational assistance to indigenous forces in the conduct of airmobile operations.

(4) Provide aviation support for command and control activities.

(5) Provide aviation support for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

(6) Provide aviation support for the evacuation of casualties.

(7) Provide support to military civic action programs.

(8) Support psychological operations.

(9) Organize direct support aircraft maintenance including the repair and maintenance of avionics and navigation equipment. General and depot maintenance support elements, military or civilian, must be provided when the unit is deployed to a host country where aircraft maintenance facilities are inadequate.
109. Employment

a. General. This aviation company will be employed to support special warfare operations in counterinsurgency. While it is organic to an airborne special forces group, it may be attached or placed in direct support of elements of a special action force.

b. Method of Operation.

(1) General. The aviation company, or elements thereof, will be deployed into a foreign country at the invitation of that country as an element of U.S. support. Specific missions will be directed through established command channels (para 105). The unit may be deployed within one or more locations within the country.

(2) Company headquarters. The company headquarters plans for and controls operations of subordinate elements of the company; effects liaison with other U.S. elements in the host country and with indigenous forces as required; acts as the control and planning headquarters for miscellaneous aviation augmentation teams; and directs the special training required by elements of the company. The company headquarters provides administrative personnel, less medical and personnel administration, required to support an organization, operating under conditions of little or no external support.

(3) Flight operations section. This section directs flight operations for the commander; makes available command and control aircraft, with additional radios, for close super-
vision and coordination operations requiring an airmobile operations command post; and establishes lighting and a navigational aid for the primary air facility.

(4) Communications section. This section furnishes the equipment and operators necessary to establish communications between the company headquarters and higher and lower units, at distances of up to 150 miles; personnel to repair the communications and electronic navigation equipment on aircraft of the organization; and a photographic laboratory with necessary personnel to support a limited capability for aerial photography.

(5) Command and control platoon headquarters (fixed wing). The section headquarters team controls the fixed-wing teams of the company. However, to obtain maximum flexibility in tailoring elements for specific missions, the team commander is trained to control and employ all aircraft elements of the company, together with essential support elements, for extended periods of time and in areas distant from the company headquarters.

(6) Fixed-wing utility team. Equipped with the U-10 aircraft, this team can operate from areas normally not accessible to other fixed-wing aircraft in the Army inventory. The U-10 provides the company with an aircraft which can serve in a wide variety of roles, to include utility transport, observation, courier, evacuation of casualties, radio relay and psychological operations.
This aircraft can further be equipped with pontoons or skis when required.

(7) Fixed-wing transport team. This team, equipped with cargo aircraft, furnishes logistic support to deployed elements of the company, special forces group, and other elements of a special action force. The excellent cargo carrying capability, together with the short takeoff and landing characteristics of the aircraft, make it ideal for furnishing airlift support between refined air facilities used by Air Force-type aircraft and the smaller strips which normally can be used only by Army-type aircraft.

(8) Command and control platoon headquarters (rotary wing). This action headquarters has the same capabilities as the fixed-wing command and control section headquarters. Normally, when the rotary-wing reconnaissance and strike and transport teams are employed in airmobile operations, the team commander, together with the indigenous ground force commander, will be located together in a command control helicopter from the flight operations section.

(9) Rotary-wing reconnaissance and strike team. This team provides additional aerial reconnaissance and surveillance means in support of indigenous forces. Its fire support capability, rockets and machineguns, is employed to support ground troops, to attack targets of opportunity, and to escort the transport helicopters.
(10) **Rotary-wing transport teams.** These teams transport personnel, supplies, materiel, and equipment for elements of the special action force; provide the type of airlift most frequently lacking in developing countries; and provide the mobility essential to successful counterguerrilla operations (see FM 57-35).

(11) **Maintenance and service platoon.** This platoon provides direct support field maintenance, motor maintenance support, and POL and ammunition handling and storage. Elements of the platoon are normally attached to other elements of the company which may be operating for extended periods of time at great distances from the main base of the company.

c. **Limitations.** Several limiting factors imposed by certain types of terrain must be considered in planning aviation support.

(1) **Jungle operations.**

(a) Ground reconnaissance will be limited because of jungle vegetation.

(b) Navigation will be difficult due to a lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and a limited number of well-defined reference points.

(c) Lack of suitable landing areas.

(d) Aircraft will require a considerable increase in maintenance due to moisture, corrosion of component parts, and electrical systems.

(e) High-temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.
(2) Mountain operations.

(a) Navigation is difficult due to the inadequacies of line of sight electronic navigation facilities and the loss of a visible horizon when flying in valleys at night.

(b) Lack of suitable landing areas.

(c) Atmospheric conditions and altitude requirements restrict the load-carrying capacity of aircraft.

(d) Air turbulence conditions.

(e) Early morning fog and cloud cover often prevalent in these areas restrict visibility.

(3) Desert operations.

(a) Navigation is difficult due to lack of prominent landmarks and terrain features.

(b) Maintenance, landing, and takeoff problems are magnified due to blowing sand.

(c) High-temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(4) Inundated and swampy areas.

(a) Limited landing areas for fixed-wing aircraft.

(b) Difficulties in selecting landing areas for rotary-wing aircraft.

(c) Maintenance requirements increase due to moisture and corrosion.

(5) Northern operations.

(a) Weather conditions of fog, snow, or clouds frequently render flight impossible.

(b) Navigation is difficult due to lack of prominent landmarks and terrain features.

(c) Maintenance requirements increase due to low temperatures. Special precautions
and equipment are necessary to insure efficient operation of the aircraft.

Section IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

110. Training of U.S. Special Forces

a. Training of special forces personnel for counter-insurgency missions involves developing skills and techniques which must in turn be taught to indigenous personnel with a cultural background vastly different from that of the U.S. soldier. The major training objective must be accomplishment of the following tasks:

(1) Military tasks.
   (a) Methods of instruction.
   (b) Physical endurance.
   (c) Leadership.
   (d) Communications.
   (e) Intelligence.
   (f) Language training.
   (g) Improvisation of training aids.
   (h) Medical training.
   (i) Small unit tactics.
   (j) Organization and development of a village defense system.
   (k) Use of air support and artillery.
   (l) Psychological operations.

(2) Military civic action tasks. Civic action activities primarily at the village level.

b. Once designated to support a specific counter-insurgency requirement, the detachment commences an intensive area study, language training, and pre-deployment training programs. Selected detach-
ments may attend language schools as a group to expedite the language training program.

c. Cross-training programs must be established to develop those skills and subjects established by mission requirements and experiences. For example, detachment personnel may require cross-training in equipment operations such as motor vehicle maintenance and bulldozer operations.

d. For a further discussion of training, see FM 31-15, FM 31-16, FM 31-22, and ATP 33-300.

111. Selection and Assignment of Operational Detachments

a. Detachments are selected and designated for employment in a geographical area in advance of commitment and wherever possible are tailored to meet each specific requirement. Detachment integrity, although desirable, is subordinate to the requirement of selecting qualified personnel to accomplish the mission. Where possible, personnel with identical language skills are assigned to the detachment. Detachment compatibility is also important in accomplishment of the mission.

b. Rotation should be accomplished by detachment rather than on an individual basis. Sufficient overlap of the detachments is necessary.

c. Operational detachments requiring special skills may be augmented with appropriate specialist personnel or selected individuals may be trained within the detachment (psychological operations or intelligence specialists).

d. Special forces personnel may be attached, as required, to other type specialist teams such as psy-
chological operations, engineer, or medical to perform specific missions.

112. Logistical Support

a. Special forces detachments have been provided with limited equipment in Tables of Organization and Equipment. Special forces elements will require additional equipment when operating in a counter-insurgency operation. Such equipment may include voice radio sets, additional weapons, or vehicles.

b. Once assigned or attached to a MAAG for employment, primary responsibility for logistical support of the special forces element is transferred to the U.S. Army oversea component of the appropriate unified command. Coordination of logistical support requirements is effected between the Army component commander and the Chief, MAAG, in the host country as directed by the commander of the unified command. Normally, the administrative and logistical support elements of the MAAG will be adequate to support the assigned or attached special forces elements. When required by the scope of operations, the Chief of the MAAG may be directed to establish a separate administrative and logistical support element to administer to the needs of the operational detachments. In such instances, a special forces operational base may be established to provide this support.

c. Logistical support of the indigenous military forces of the host country is provided through the Military Assistance program and administered by the MAAG or other appropriate U.S. military assistance agency in the country.

d. Operational or imprest fund allocations should
be provided and immediately available for the purpose of providing pay and allowances for indigenous paramilitary forces, contracting for labor and construction, and purchasing food and supplies for environmental improvement programs.

113. Communications

a. When employed in support of counterinsurgency operations, special forces elements may be directed to establish and operate an internal communications system to link operational detachments with MAAG or equivalent control organizations. This communications system may parallel, but will be separate from, indigenous communications systems.

b. For a further discussion of communications systems, see FM 31-20.

114. Intelligence

For a detailed discussion of intelligence operations, see FM 30-5, FM 31-15, FM 31-20, and FM 31-22A.
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This glossary is provided to enable the user to have readily available terms unique to unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. Although some terms are contained in JCS Pub 1* and AR 320-5** they are reproduced here for the benefit of personnel not having ready access to those publications. Other terms are not found elsewhere, but are in common usage in special forces units. Where differences exist between U.S. Army terms and JCS definitions, the JCS definition is included.

*Agent—One who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

*Area assessment—The prescribed collection of specific information by the special forces operational detachment commander which commences immediately after infiltration and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence of the area acquired from area studies and other sources prior to infiltration.

*Area command—The formal organizational structure within the guerrilla warfare operational area integrating the special forces operational detachment and the resistance force.

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*Denotes definition appearing in JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, dated December 1964.

**Denotes definition appearing in AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, February 1963, with change 1.
Area study—The prescribed collection of specific information pertaining to a given UW area developed from sources available prior to infiltration.

Assets—Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations in place or which can be placed in position to accomplish specific tasks. These assets may be covert or overt depending upon the nature of their activity. They must be responsive to U.S. control and committable in support of U.S. objectives.

Auxiliary—that element of the resistance force, normally located in rural areas, established to provide an organized civilian support of the resistance movement.

*Clandestine operations—Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

*Cold war—A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

*Counterguerrilla warfare—Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

*Counterinsurgency—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

See footnotes on page 212.
**Cover**—The assumed identity and/or purpose through which an undercover agent disguises his true identity and/or mission.

*Covert operations*—Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity or sponsor rather than on concealment of the operations.

*Evasion and escape*—The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (One of the three interrelated fields of unconventional warfare.)

Exfiltration—The removal or recovery of personnel from enemy or enemy-controlled areas to areas under friendly control.

*General war*—Armed conflict between the major powers of the Communist and free worlds in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

*Guerrilla*—A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla base—A temporary site where guerrilla installations, headquarters, and some guerrilla units are located. A guerrilla base is considered to be transitory, and must be capable of rapid displacement by personnel within the base.

Guerrilla force—A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel, organized along mili-

See footnotes on page 212.
tary lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy or enemy-held territory.

*Guerrilla warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (One of the three interrelated fields of unconventional warfare.)

Guerrilla warfare operational area—A geographical area within enemy or enemy-held territory designated by the unified commander for the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare and related unconventional warfare activities in support of theater objectives.

Infiltration—The clandestine entrance of selected personnel into enemy or enemy-controlled territory making maximum use of deception to avoid enemy detection.

*Insurgency—A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist-inspired, supported, or exploited.

*Interdiction—Preventing or hindering, by any means, enemy use of an area or route.

*Internal defense—The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

*Internal security—The state of law and order prevailing within a nation.

*Irregular forces—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces.

See footnotes on page 212.
Joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF) headquarters—A headquarters composed of assigned or attached personnel of two or more services, constituted and designated by the commander of a unified command to organize, plan for, conduct, and support unconventional warfare operations.

Joint unconventional warfare task force—The joint headquarters and subordinate units consisting of forces designated from the component services commensurate with the assigned mission and operational requirements.

*Limited war—Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.

Linkup—The physical juncture between elements of the guerrilla force and conventional tactical commands.

*Military civic action—The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

Mission support site (MSS)—A relatively secure site, utilized by an unconventional warfare force as a temporary storage site or stopover point during the conduct of UW operations.

See footnotes on page 212.
Overt operations—Operations which are planned and executed without attempt at concealment and with evident intent.

*Paramilitary forces—Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

*Paramilitary operation—An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force.

Pilot team—A small provisional team, composed of selected special forces personnel of specialized skills, that infiltrates into enemy or enemy-controlled area to evaluate and report on specific areas and situations.

*Propaganda—Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

*Psychological operations—This term includes psychological warfare, and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

*Psychological warfare—The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

See footnotes on page 212.
Resistance force—That portion of the civil population of a country which is engaged in the resistance movement, i.e., guerrillas, auxiliaries, and members of the underground.

Resistance movement—The resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power. Initially, such resistance may consist of subversive political activities and other actions designed to agitate and propagandize the population to distrust and lose confidence in the legally established government or occupying power. If not suppressed, such resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.

Safe area—A relatively secure location in enemy or enemy-controlled territory where a limited number of special forces and guerrilla personnel may receive temporary refuge.

Separate operational base—An operational detachment C, augmented by appropriate personnel and equipment from the HQ and HQ company, Signal Company, and Aviation Company, organized to control one or more subordinate detachments. The separate operational base, under the command of the JUWTF, is established when there is an operational requirement for an additional SFOB. Such a requirement may be justified when the distance between the operational areas and the main SFOB requires an additional control headquarters between the operational detachments and the JUWTF.
**Special action force (SAF)**—The SAF is a specially trained, area oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited and general war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements.

**Special forces**—See U.S. Army special forces.

**Special forces operational base**—A provisional organization which is established within a friendly area by elements of a special forces group to provide command, administration, training, logistical support, and intelligence for committed special forces detachments.

**Sponsoring power**—Any nation which actively provides external support to a resistance effort.

**Subordinate control base**—An operational detachment C, augmented by appropriate personnel and equipment from the HQ and HQ Company, Signal Company, and Aviation Company, organized to control one or more operational detachments. The subordinate control base, under the command of the SFOB, is established as an intermediate control headquarters based on factors such as the capability of the subordinate control base to better communicate with and influence operational detachments or on compatibility with future theater operational plans.

*Subversion*—Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime. (One of the three interrelated fields of unconventional warfare.)

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See footnotes on page 212.
*Unconventional warfare—Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

**Unconventional warfare area (UWA)**—A geographic area within enemy or enemy-controlled territory designated by the commander of a unified command for the future conduct of unconventional warfare operations.

**Unconventional warfare forces**—U.S. forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.

**Underground**—That element of the resistance force established to conduct operations in areas which normally are denied to the auxiliary and guerrillas.

**U.S. Army special forces**—Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialized military skills, organized into small, multiple-purpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and to conduct unconventional warfare operations.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.
Distribution:

Active Army:

DCSPER (2)  Div (10)
DCSOPS (2)  Bde (5)
ACSI (2)    Regt/Gp (5)
DCSLOG (2)  Bn (5)
CRD (1)     Co/Btry (2)
CORC (2)    Br Svc Sch (5)
ACSFOR (2)  except
COA (1)     USAAVNS (20)
CINFO (1)   USAES (25)
TIG (1)     USACHS (25)
TPMG (1)    USAINTS (25)
CofEngrs (3) USASCs (40)
CofCh (1)   MFSS (25)
TJAG (1)    USAMPS (10)
OPO (1)     TJAGSA (12)
TSG (1)     USAJFKCENSP-WAR (20)
USACDC Agcy (2) USACDCSWCAG (10)
    except
USACDCMSA (5) Units organized un-
USACDCSWA (25)    der following
USCONARC (10) TOE's:
USAMC (15)  1–307 (20)
USACDC (10)  11–247 (20)
ARADCOM (10)  31–105 (20)
ARADCOM Rgn (10)  31–106 (20)
OS Maj Comd (5)  31–107 (20)
Armies (25)  Corps (15)

NG: Units—Div (2) ; Div Arty (2) ; Bde (2) ; Regt/Gp (2) ; Bn (2) ; Co/Btry (1) ; TOE 31–105 (5) ; 31–106 (5) ; 31–107 (5).

USAR: Units—same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320–50.