FM 31-16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides guidance for all infantry and airborne commanders and, where applicable, staffs of the brigade, battalion, and rifle company when they have the primary mission of conducting counterguerrilla operations. This guidance also applies to mechanized infantry and armor units of comparable level when they have been appropriately tailored to delete the major portion of their mechanized vehicular support. Commanders and staffs must be prepared to conduct counterguerrilla operations on a detached or semi-independent basis.

b. This manual discusses the nature of guerrilla forces and the supporting underground elements and civilian auxiliary of resistance movements; and the organization, training, tactics, and techniques to destroy guerrilla forces in active war (active or nonactive nuclear or nonnuclear) and subliminal war.

c. The tactics prescribed herein are developed for existing combat units which may be tailored to meet the requirements of counterguerrilla warfare. These tactics maximize the use of Army aviation for lift, reconnaissance, and fire support. These tactics generally have universal application for this type of warfare. However, since guerrilla warfare is normally conducted on the most difficult terrain in an area of operations, commanders must modify these tactics to fit the particular terrain in which they are operating. For example, in jungle areas, more emphasis must be placed on the use of foot mobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in the desert, on the use of vehicular mobility.

d. This manual is an adjunct to FM 31–15, Operations against Irregular Forces; FM 7–30, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades; FM 7–20, Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions; and FM 7–11, Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry; and is designed to discuss only those areas which require special emphasis in counterguerrilla operations.

e. Counterguerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation by the opposing commanders. Commanders must be ever alert to change or adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the specific situation at hand. Once the routine operations of a counterguerrilla force become stereotyped, surprise (a major ingredient of success) has been lost.

f. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to the Commandant, United States Army Infantry Combat Developments Agency, Fort Benning, Ga.

2. Terms

a. Civilian Support. The comparatively unorganized body of disaffected civilians which provides continuous support to the more organized elements of the resistance movement.

b. Guerrilla Force. The armed combatant element of a resistance movement organized on a military or paramilitary basis.

c. Resistance Movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power.
CHAPTER 2
THE ENEMY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Section I. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

3. General
   a. A guerrilla force is the armed manifestation of a resistance movement by a portion of the population of the area against the local government or occupying power.
   b. The fundamental cause of a resistance movement is the real, imagined, or incited dissatisfaction of a portion of the population with prevailing political, social, or economic conditions. Normally, this dissatisfaction will crystallize early in the resistance movement into a firm ideological base. This ideological base may be essentially positive in nature with such goals as national independence, economic and social improvements, or the securing of individual rights. However, many times, particularly during the early stages of a resistance movement, this base will be primarily negative with such goals as relief from actual or alleged oppression, elimination of foreign occupation, or elimination of exploitation and corruption.

4. Beginning of Resistance
   a. Resistance movements begin when—
      (1) Sufficient numbers of the population of an area become discontented with existing conditions which cannot be changed by peaceful and legal means, and
      (2) A strongly motivated leadership element rises to lead the discontented population in its cause of changing the existing situation.
   b. The movement focuses its initial attention on the spreading of the attitudes and beliefs of the early members of the movement to greater portions of the population, thereby turning discontent into disaffection and a willingness to participate in resistance activities.
   c. Small groups then begin to live and work within the dissident order and gradually organize into underground elements that conduct covert activities to support the resistance movement.
   d. The factors which inspire a resistance movement may arise internally in an area or country, or they may be created or assisted by “out-of-country” elements which desire to sponsor the movement for their own cause. Often, another country will lend support to a local resistance movement and attempt to control the movement to further its own aims.

5. Organization of a Resistance Movement
   a. As elements of the population begin to group together for covert underground operations, the organization of the resistance movement is born. Thereafter, as the size of the movement grows, the organization develops along clearer and clearer lines. The organization of a resistance force differs from a regular force in that it is developed for a specific purpose, for specific terrain, and to combat a specific enemy. As the purpose, terrain, and enemy differ, the organization will vary.
   b. Depending on the phase of growth the resistance movement has reached, it will vary in size from a few small groups to a large, complex, paramilitary organization of thousands of personnel. Once sufficient strength and civilian support is present, the small underground elements found in the early stages of the resistance movement will normally expand into an irregular force with two organized elements: an overt or guerrilla element, and a supporting covert or underground element. Both these elements depend on civilian and/or sponsoring power support to sustain themselves during operations. This civilian support is often called the “auxiliary.” While one individual may oper-
ate both as a member of a guerrilla band and of a supporting underground cell of the irregular force, these two elements are discussed separately in the paragraphs below.

6. Guerrilla Force (Fig. 1)

a. The overt guerrilla arm of the resistance movement may vary from small groups to large paramilitary units of division or larger size with extensive support organizations. Large organizations normally include elements for combat, intelligence and counterintelligence, population control, and logistic support.

b. Members of large guerrilla units are usually severed from their normal civilian pursuits, while members of small guerrilla bands may alternately be either guerrilla fighters or apparently peaceful civilians. Members of guerrilla units may include—

(1) Civilian volunteers and persons impressed by coercion.

(2) Military leaders and specialists.

(3) Deserters.

(4) In active war, military individuals or small groups which have been cut off, deliberate stay-behind forces, escaped prisoners of war, and downed airmen.

c. In the advanced stages, guerrilla forces may consist of a regular army, regional troops, and the popular forces. The distinctions between these forces are based on differences in training, equipment, and mission.

(1) The regular army is the elite battle force and is normally not employed when there is a chance it may be defeated. The regular army is kept free to engage in a war of movement and to select the time and place for combat. It possesses the best equipment, weapons, and uniforms, has the highest pay, and is used strictly in its primary mission of defeating the conventional force opposing it. The regular army is organized along conventional lines and is well trained and led. It operates in close conjunction with the regional and popular forces. Fillers are usually selected from the best of the regional troops.

(2) The regional troops are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regular forces. In the advanced stages, they are generally organized into battalions and regiments, and constitute the “mature guerrillas” in the true sense. One of the primary duties of the regional force is to protect the regular army while it is training and preparing for future operations. This force launches small attacks, harasses the enemy, keeps the enemy off balance, and ambushes reinforcements. Fillers are obtained from the popular troops.

(3) The popular troops are divided into two groups, a labor force and a home guard. The labor force is mainly responsible for collecting intelligence, making road repairs, building bases, fortifying villages, and acting as porters for the regular army. The members of the home guard receive limited military training and extensive political indoctrination. The home guard furnishes limited security for officials at village level.

7. The Underground (Fig. 2)

a. The underground element of a resistance movement must conduct most of its supporting activities in a covert manner because of the countermeasures used against it. Consequently, members of the underground usually maintain their identity as part of the civilian population. Successful underground organizations are compartmented by cells for security reasons. The cellular organization prevents one member, upon capture, from compromising the entire organization.

b. Covert resistance activities normally conducted by the underground may include espionage, sabotage, dissemination of propaganda and rumors, delaying or misdirecting orders, issuing false or misleading orders or reports of assassination, extortion, blackmail, theft, counterfeiting, and identifying individuals for terrorist attack.

c. The terroristic element of a resistance movement is normally a part of the under-
Figure 1. Type guerrilla force organization.
PROPAGANDA CELLS (1)

PROVINCE CHIEF AND COUNCIL

INTEL CELLS (2)

COUNTY CHIEF AND COUNCIL

INTEL CELLS (2)

DISTRICT, CITY, OR VILLAGE CHIEF AND COUNCIL

INTEL CELLS (2)

PRINCIPAL ESPIONAGE AGENT

PRINCIPAL SABOTAGE AGENT

PRINCIPAL TERRORISM AGENT

ESPIONAGE AGENTS

SABOTAGE AGENTS

TERRORISM AGENTS

PRINCIPAL ESPIONAGE AGENT

ESPIONAGE AGENTS

(1) CLOSELY CONTROLLED PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACK ON THE ENTIRE AREA.
(2) DIRECT REPORTING TO CHIEF AND COUNCIL.

CUTOUTS. THESE ARE SECURITY MEASURES WHICH PERMIT CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION BUT PREVENT PHYSICAL CONTACT.

Figure 2. Type underground organization.

ground organization. While terrorism will not normally be used extensively unless necessary, the maintenance of support for the resistance movement will normally dictate its employment.

d. Terrorism is the prime means of the resistance movement for the intimidation of the civilian population. It is used both to coerce individuals to actively support the movement and to force individuals to cease active resistance to it.

e. Since the methods used by the terroristic element normally do not conform to the professed moral base of the resistance movement, every means is used to indicate that the element
arises from the civilian support for the movement rather than from the organized elements of the force. The terroristic element operates in an intensively covert and divorced fashion. Often, only a few members of the resistance movement will know who constitutes the terroristic element and the nature of its operations.

8. Civilian Support

a. In any civilian population there are certain individuals who are sympathetic to a resistance movement; but who, for various reasons, do not actively participate as members of the guerrilla force or underground. It is on these individuals the movement depends for the majority of its support.

b. It is often erroneously believed that the civil population of an area in which a resistance movement is active can be broken down into two general categories, those friendly to the resistance movement and those friendly to the local government or occupying power. Often, in fact, a great part of the population has no concern about the struggle and is sympathetic to neither combatant. Extreme care must be used in dealing with the civilian population in an effort to cultivate their support.

c. Since this neutral majority of the population is a prime target for counterguerrilla propaganda, the resistance movement will often use terroristic measures to ensure that it does not become aligned with the forces countering the resistance movement.

9. Command

a. Successful guerrilla campaigns have invariably been characterized by intelligent leadership. Guerrilla forces that develop with little or no advance preparation are led by recognized local leaders who may or may not have a military background. When a recognized major guerrilla force leader lacks a military background, an allied sponsoring power may infiltrate qualified personnel to serve as military and technical advisors to the guerrilla commander. By so doing, the military capabilities of the guerrilla force are effectively exploited without destroying the command structure of the established organization.

b. Guerrilla forces organized as the result of extensive advance planning and preparation are normally commanded by personnel with an adequate military background.

10. Discipline

a. Far too often, the term “guerrilla” suggests a body of individuals entirely without discipline. Nothing could be more untrue. While spontaneously formed units may have poor discipline initially, it is not long before they learn that only with the strongest discipline can they succeed.

b. Effective guerrilla forces maintain strict discipline in all essential matters. It will surpass the discipline found in regular forces. It is enforced with quick and severe action, possibly without recourse to formal investigations and trials. Series infractions or neglect of duty are often punished by death. To achieve surprise in operations, and security of the force, the guerrilla force commander has no alternative but to insist on implicit obedience to orders.

11. Morale

a. Morale is of prime importance in guerrilla warfare. It is a factor which must be considered for the members of the guerrilla force, the underground, and their civilian support. Enemy propaganda readily reaches these elements and is a constant threat to morale.

b. The belief in the ideological cause of the resistance and in ultimate victory is the most important morale factor for the guerrilla force.

c. Guerrilla leaders conduct continuous propaganda operations to maintain the morale of the guerrilla force and its underground and civilian support. News of local successes and victories is widely distributed. Outstanding exploits of certain individuals and groups may be publicized and honored. When the situation permits, parades, ceremonies, and social events may be held. Regular periods may be devoted to political indoctrination.

12. Training

a. For guerrilla forces to operate successfully against modern military forces without heavy losses, individuals and units must receive train-
ing and acquire those skills peculiar to guerrilla operations. The command, staff, combat, and service echelons of a guerrilla force strive for the same proficiency as that of regular forces.

b. Guerrilla forces are often capable of attaining great proficiency under the most adverse conditions. Individuals and units receive training in areas under the control of the guerrilla force. Technical training is accomplished by dispatching special instructors to subordinate units.

c. One effective means of training utilized by large, highly organized guerrilla forces is to recruit members and utilize them initially in duties of little importance, and then progressively "graduate" them upward as they become better trained until they become a part of the armed guerrilla effort. For instance, a recruit may advance from a messenger to a member of a sabotage team and then to membership in the guerrilla force.

13. Supply

a. The continued existence of a guerrilla force and the extent to which it may be employed strategically or tactically depend on adequate supplies and equipment. In general, a guerrilla force lives off the land. The availability of food may often limit the size of the force that can be concentrated and the staying power of the force.

b. Food is normally procured from the populace by systematic levy. These levies are supplemented by raids on enemy supply depots and convoys. Other supply requirements including clothing, medical supplies, fuel, and communications equipment are procured locally. Arms, ammunition, demolitions, and other purely military-type materiel come from local caches, battlefield salvage, raids on enemy installations, and/or external sources. Guerrilla forces may operate small factories to produce and repair military-type materiel.

c. As a general rule, the full potential of a guerrilla force in the latter and sophisticated stages of development can be exploited only if adequate supplies are infiltrated in from external sources. The amount of external logistic support may vary from small, irregular shipments of critical supplies to total support.

14. Evacuation and Hospitalization

a. Medical support in guerrilla warfare is often nearly nonexistent. Lack of evacuation facilities, hospitals, medical supplies, and trained personnel may preclude the organization of adequate medical support. A guerrilla force often uses existing civilian facilities to care for its sick and wounded, in which case the patients pose as civilians while undergoing treatment.

b. Historically, some guerrilla forces have been known to develop highly organized and effective medical support units and installations. Their organizations have paralleled those of regular forces and have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas. They have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from the civilian population, and have obtained medical supplies from the local populace, from raids, and from external sources.

c. Guerrilla forces normally do not need the same degree of medical support or the extensive medical support backup required by regular forces. Most guerrilla operations are planned to result in comparatively few casualties. Employing surprise and basing its operations on excellent intelligence, the guerrilla force strikes weakly defended objectives or enemy forces unprepared to offer resistance. However, this advantage is offset to some degree by the increased requirement for medical care for sickness and infections resulting from continuous exposure to the elements and an inadequate diet.

15. Transportation

a. Guerrilla forces will utilize every means of transportation available. They develop a cross-country mobility difficult for a regular force to equal. The extent and kind of transportation used by a guerrilla force is limited by the area the force controls, the means at its disposal, and the topography. Historically, guerrillas have made extensive use of animals for mounts, pack animals, animal-drawn vehicles, and boats.

b. Forces that reach a high degree of development and that control large areas may be expected to use motor and mechanized ground vehicles and aircraft.
16. Communication

a. Communication is as important to guerrilla forces as to regular forces. Unified guerrilla forces establish efficient communication systems to exercise command, control, and coordination and to permit the flow of information. Intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and propaganda also depend upon communications. The nature of guerrilla force organization and operations makes radio the most flexible and effective way to fulfill the complex communications requirements.

b. Modern, portable, long-range radio transmitter-receiver equipment provides excellent communications for guerrilla forces. Other conventional and improvised communication means are used extensively. These include wire, visual means, and messenger service. Depending on the terrain, the existing situation, and the facilities available, the guerrilla force may use both mounted and foot messengers. Land communication nets over enemy-held territory are cleverly organized and operated. Women and children are often used as messengers. Every conceivable ruse will be used to conceal documents on messengers and to pass along information.

17. Legal Status of Guerrilla Forces

a. Under the Geneva Conventions, a guerrilla may, in time of war, have legal status. When he is captured, he is entitled to the same treatment as a regular prisoner of war if he:

1. Is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
2. Wears a fixed and distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
3. Carries arms openly.
4. Conducts operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. The underground element of a resistance movement normally does not have legal status.

c. Groups of individuals who take up arms against an invader have the status of belligerents, but inhabitants of occupied areas who rise against the occupier are not entitled to belligerent status. However, the occupation force has the responsibility of making the occupation actual and effective by preventing organized resistance and suppressing resistance activities. The law of land warfare authorizes the occupier to demand and enforce compliance with his countermeasures (FM 27-10).

d. Historically, legal status has been of little concern to guerrilla forces and has had little effect on their operations.

Section II. GUERRILLA FORCE OPERATIONS

18. Prerequisites for Successful Guerrilla Operations (Fig. 3)

a. Irrespective of whether a guerrilla force is operating in resistance to an established government or against an occupying power, the following are the minimum prerequisites for the successful operation of the force:

1. Civilian support. Guerrilla forces must receive help from the civilians in the area. This help may be voluntary or may be forced through blackmail or terrorism. They furnish food, clothing, and other supplies, hideouts, transportation, and medical support to the guerrilla force. In addition, they act as home guards and provide integral parts of the guerrilla force intelligence and warning nets.

2. Outside assistance. Often, assistance from an outside power will further bolster the support of the guerrilla force. A sponsoring power can assist in the routine supply and training of the guerrilla force and furnish adept leadership, funds, barter items, and complex items of military supply. Outside assistance, whatever its form, will usually give moral and psychological support to the resistance movement.

3. Favorable terrain. Terrain gives advantage to a guerrilla force in direct proportion to the disadvantages it gives to the regular force combating it. Terrain such as jungles, mountain, swamps, etc., which restricts the observation, fire, communications, and mobility of the regular force is ideal for operations of guerrilla forces. Until a guerrilla force has secured
SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

CIVILIAN SUPPORT
OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP
FAVORABLE TERRAIN
UNITY OF EFFORT
DISCIPLINE
USE OF PROPAGANDA
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
WILL TO RESIST

CAUSES
SOCIAL
POLITICAL
AESTHETIC
INTELLECTUAL
ECONOMIC
RELIGIOUS

Figure 3. Prerequisites for successful resistance movements.
control of a large area, it must depend to a great degree on difficult terrain for the security of its base of operations.

(4) **Effective leadership.** See paragraph 9.

(5) **Unity of effort.** The responsibility for the development of strategy for a resistance movement must be extremely centralized; and once developed, must be rigidly adhered to by all elements of the force. The guerrilla force cannot tolerate strong internal rival factions. Within established strategy and policies, subordinate guerrilla commanders develop and execute their individual programs to exploit specialized situations and attack local targets of opportunity.

(6) **Discipline.** See paragraph 10.

(7) **Use of propaganda.** A guerrilla force must use propaganda to maintain confidence in its victory and sympathy in its cause among its civilian support.

(8) **Intelligence effort.** The survival of a guerrilla force depends on information about its enemy. It must continually operate extensive intelligence nets among the civilian population. Likewise, the guerrilla force cannot accomplish its operational missions without timely and accurate intelligence concerning its potential targets.

(9) **The will to resist.** Above all else, the guerrilla force must have a will to resist. From the devotion to the cause of the resistance movement comes the sustaining strength of the force. The cause may be national liberation, personal gain or aggrandizement, a political revolution, or the defense of some individual right. It may be a program of desperation against conditions so bad that all is to be gained and nothing lost by resistance. The single-minded devotion to a movement may cause the members of a guerrilla force to pursue an extremely fanatical course of action during the resistance movement. See paragraph 11 for a discussion of guerrilla force morale.

b. The subversion, destruction, or denial to a guerrilla force of any one or more of these prerequisites will hit at the very core of the organization and make the eventual destruction of the force an easier or perhaps unnecessary task.

19. **Characteristics of Guerrilla Operations**

a. A guerrilla force employs **surprise, mobility, and dispersion of forces** to demoralize the enemy and upset his current and projected operations. It normally seeks to paralyze the enemy force. Only in its latter stages of development, when it has achieved the semblance of a conventional force, will it attempt to destroy the enemy in actual combat. Guerrilla operations follow the same principles and methods of combat as conventional operations; only their application differs.

b. **Surprise** is a major requirement of success in guerrilla operations. To offset the enemy’s superiority of forces and equipment, guerrillas strike where the enemy is weak and where he least expects an attack. Reliable intelligence and sound security enhance the surprise. Operations are conducted extensively in the hours of darkness and during periods of adverse weather conditions.

c. **Mobility** is another necessary requirement for the success of a guerrilla operation. Only when the guerrilla force has developed to the point where it can conduct conventional operations, will it attempt to match or surpass the ground vehicular or aerial mobility of its enemy. Quite conversely, in the earlier stages of development it will gain its mobility differential by operating in terrain which cannot be easily traversed by the mechanical mobility of the enemy. Mobility for the guerrilla force comes from the extensive movement of small forces over a large area under the cloak of secrecy. A guerrilla band may strike and be miles away from the scene of the action before enemy reinforcements arrive.

d. **Dispersion of forces** is a principal characteristic of guerrilla operations. Normally, guerrilla operations are small-scale operations carried out over an extensive area. Guerrilla warfare is a war of detachment rather than mass contact; a war of quick paralyzing blows followed by swift withdrawals. Generally, guerrillas avoid pitched battles and seldom defend objectives. If hard pressed, they may disperse
among the civilian population and then reassemble at a prearranged place.

20. Areas of Operation (Fig. 4)

a. In general, the various areas of operation and the type of guerrilla activity conducted in each depends primarily on the degree of guerrilla force control that exists. During the course of a campaign, this degree of control will fluctuate with the combat action that takes place, the size of the guerrilla force, and the attitude of the civil population.

b. Areas of operations and the operations conducted in them are as follows:

1. Areas effectively controlled by the guerrilla forces. Normally, the headquarters, camps, and bases are located in this area. Resistance is offered to enemy forces attempting to penetrate the area.

2. Areas effectively controlled by the counterguerrilla force. Guerrilla offensive operations in this area are limited to raids, small ambushes, sniping, and mining operations. Other activities are usually restricted to covert operations by the underground.

3. Areas not effectively controlled by either force. This is the principal area of guerrilla force offensive operations. The force attempts to bring more and more of this area under effective control. They do not offer determined resistance to the enemy's entry into this area, but rather conduct harassing operations against him.

c. The guerrilla force normally divides the entire area into smaller areas of responsibility which are assigned to subordinate units. Within these areas, subordinate units carry out assigned tactical missions, exercise population control, and collect food and supplies.

21. Intelligence

a. Guerrilla force intelligence organization and operations are influenced by two major considerations; intelligence essential for the guerrilla force's own operations, and the production of intelligence for any regular force they are allied with.

b. A sound intelligence system is vital to successful guerrilla force planning and operations because its tactics stress striking the enemy where he is weak and where he least expects to be hit. Guerrilla intelligence includes a detailed study of the terrain and of enemy strength, movements, dispositions, armament, and habits. Immediate dissemination of information, especially up-to-date changes, is a necessity. Besides combat intelligence, guerrilla forces are interested in strategic considerations such as the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda policies and measures.

c. Guerrilla activity readily lends itself to supplying valuable information to allied regular forces. During certain phases of an active war campaign, the primary mission assigned to guerrilla forces may be intelligence. Regular forces allied to a resistance movement may be expected to infiltrate personnel and equipment to aid and direct the guerrilla force in the collection and evaluation of information and the production and dissemination of intelligence. Unless supervised by trained personnel, guerrilla forces may lack the ability to correctly evaluate reports and observations, and may often pass on exaggerated information as true.

d. The organization of guerrilla force intelligence staffs and nets normally parallels that of regular forces. To collect information, the guerrilla force uses extensively organized nets of spies, informers, and agents. Civilians living near or working in enemy installations report on industrial operations, equipment, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. Government officials sympathetic to the resistance movement supply valuable information on the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda measures. Agents and observers located at strategic points report on ground, air, and naval movements.

22. Counterintelligence

a. Counterintelligence in guerrilla force operations is as important to security as intelligence is to the actual operations. Through propaganda, orders, and threats, guerrilla forces discourage individuals from collaborating with the enemy. Guerrilla force agents and
Figure 4. Type guerrilla force area of operations.
loyal civilian supporters methodically seek out enemy spies and informers. Counterintelligence agents are used extensively to cover all zones of guerrilla force operations. They are placed in all fields of activity. Traitors to the cause are harshly punished or ruthlessly eliminated.

b. Personnel joining the guerrilla force ranks are screened thoroughly. Normally, they are required to undergo a period of minimal responsibility, during which they are closely observed, before they are accepted as bona fide members of the organization.

23. Security

a. Guerrilla forces gain security through intelligence, counterintelligence, movement of forces, dispersion, organization of the civilian population, and the routine measures normal to any regular force. As the resistance movement expands, the problems of security become more complex. Headquarters, camps, and other installations are located in inaccessible areas. All installations are kept mobile and surrounded by elaborate guard and warning systems. Alternate locations are planned and prepared in advance so any installation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated quickly and become operational in a safer area.

b. Radio stations are moved frequently to avoid detection.

c. Important areas may be protected by a series of organized positions to meet and delay small-scale enemy thrusts.

d. Travel of unauthorized individuals in certain areas is restricted, and information about installations is normally limited to personnel who actually man, or have direct dealings with, them. For example, a platoon leader may not know the exact location of his company headquarters. Seldom will he know the location of his battalion headquarters. The application of this principal throughout the structure of a guerrilla force limits the amount of information that may be extracted from captured personnel.

24. Psychological Operations

a. The existence of a unified guerrilla force depends on the accord that can be brought to the various sympathies and interests of the populace which supports the resistance movement. Morale stimuli and guidance, provided by an outside sponsoring power to a guerrilla force, are fully exploited by the force to strengthen the common bonds of the resistance movement. Also, the enemy's psychological efforts to undermine the guerrilla force are countered.

b. Psychological-warfare-type operations are carried on by rumors, meetings, indoctrination courses, news reports, handbills, and in some cases, by clandestine broadcasting stations. Regardless of the media, guerrilla force propaganda is circulated to foster high morale among friendly troops and civilians, to promote loyal, energetic support from the populace, and to undermine enemy morale.

c. The guerrilla force subjects its enemy to a continuous and insidious propaganda attack. The techniques of half-truths, insinuations, faulty logic, and black propaganda are used extensively. Every effort is made to undermine the counterguerrilla will to resist and subvert the legal government.

25. Population Control

a. To ensure support and loyal cooperation, guerrilla forces attempt to exercise control over the civilian population. Control measures may include—

(1) Propaganda, orders, and threats.

(2) Violent action against uncooperative individuals and communities.

(3) Organization and regimentation of the civilian population.

b. Guerrilla forces use intelligence propaganda to gain and maintain civilian support. They appeal to the people's national pride and patriotic spirit. The most effective psychological warfare methods, however, seldom prevent a dangerous percentage of the populace from collaborating with the enemy. To control civilian activities and to discourage collaboration, the guerrilla force may publish restrictive orders and policies and enforce them by acts of violence. Individuals who fail to comply with these orders and policies are ruthlessly killed or severely punished. Often whole communities
that show antiresistance tendencies may be destroyed.

c. Normally, the guerrilla force makes a few ruthless examples to influence the population of a large area to comply with its desires. The guerrilla force may resort to taking prominent individuals from a community and holding them as hostages. The people are made to understand that no harm will come to the hostages as long as the community remains loyal to the cause and cooperates with the guerrilla force.

d. The organization of the civilians into units under local leadership is one of the most effective methods to extend control over the civilians and to ensure their loyal support. Attempts are made to make every individual, male or female, young or old, to feel he is a part of the resistance movement. A portion of each supporter's time is devoted to some task in support of the guerrilla force. The danger of spies, informers, and collaborators is stressed and everyone is charged with the responsibility of detecting and reporting all suspects. Besides these counterintelligence missions, organized civilians may be used on intelligence missions, civil disturbances, sabotage, security details, and supply work. Civilians who are organized and committed to an active part in the resistance movement in conjunction with guerrilla forces seldom defect to the enemy. At the proper time, the civilians provide the mass of the manpower that can be exploited against the enemy.

26. Civil Disturbances

a. To hamper war production and enemy morale, agents and sympathizers of guerrilla forces may be expected to organize and instigate labor strikes, slowdowns, protest meetings, and riots. Under the cover of this instigated confusion, industrial property, machinery, products, and raw materials may be sabotaged. Power, communications, and transportation facilities are damaged and government officials, industrial leaders, and military leaders are abducted or assassinated.

b. Whole communities that collaborate with the enemy or refuse to support the guerrilla force may be punished. This punishment may include the destruction or looting of local food supplies and stocks or blocking the movement of food supplies from rural areas. Bombs may be exploded in public gatherings, communications centers, or administrative offices. Arson is often used to destroy whole communities, thus warning all the surrounding communities to support the resistance movement. Officials or soldiers of the enemy force may be killed and the corpses may be displayed in pro-enemy communities. The discovery of the bodies exposes the entire community to investigations and punishments.

c. Unjust or misplaced punishment to counter civil disturbance is vigorously exploited by the guerrilla force to gain sympathizers and strengthen their cause.

27. Sabotage

a. Sabotage is used to attack the enemy's war waging potential. When conducted under a well-organized plan and on a large scale, it becomes one of the guerrilla force's most effective weapons. Sabotage may be conducted by the overt guerrilla force, the supporting underground, or by sympathetic civilian supporters. In a short time, it is capable of producing a marked degree of material and moral disintegration. Its scope and application, in relation to both objectives and areas, are almost unlimited. Industry, government, administrative offices, power sources, materials, transportation, public services, agricultural production, and communication agencies are examples of possible objectives.

b. Sabotage readily lends itself to guerrilla operations because it may be accomplished with means available to the guerrilla. It requires neither elaborate equipment nor logistical support from outside sources. Methods and means used by the guerrilla force may vary from the most common to the most unusual. Destruction or removal of cables, machinery, and rails are common forms of sabotage. Arson, varying from the most basic means to the most elaborate devices (such as the use of clock works), is utilized against goods, installations, and raw materials. Explosives in the form of bombs or charges are widely used to destroy buildings, bridges, and road beds.
Figure 5. Type guerrilla ambush.
28. Ambushes (Fig. 5)

a. The ambush is the most common guerrilla form of attack. It is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and executed with surprise, shrewdness, and violent determination. Guerrilla ambushes are directed against rail and motor troop and supply movements and against closed foot columns. Defiles and ravines in mountainous or wooded areas are good sites for ambushes. Road signs may be altered to lure convoys onto suitable side roads. The guerrillas, if possible, employ sufficiently strong forces to enable them to completely smother and destroy the enemy by quick, violent action. Commanding ground, concealment, and camouflage are fully utilized. Attacks are usually made at close range to compensate for poor marksmanship and to gain maximum effect. Automatic fire may be used to cover the entire target in depth. Shotguns and grenades may be used. Roadblocks, demolitions, mines, or recoilless weapons are often used to halt fast-moving columns or trains at the desired place of ambush.

b. Silence and immobility are scrupulously observed in the area of the ambush. Small enemy advance guards are usually permitted to pass through the ambush position and dealt with by a separate element. Fire is opened and the attack is launched by prearranged signal usually given by the element charged with halting the head of the column. The action is usually violent and short-lived. If the enemy is incapable of counteraction and there is no threat of local enemy reinforcements, the guerrilla force quickly salvages usable supplies and equipment, destroys the remainder, and withdraws. The guerrilla will be particularly certain to salvage the ammunition left at the site of the ambush since this is an important source of resupply of this critical item.

c. The guerrilla force uses extensive security measures to cover its movement to the ambush position and to conceal the action and the withdrawal. Secondary ambushes, some distance from the site of the principal ambush, are frequently used to destroy or delay enemy reinforcements.

d. When the guerrillas are not strong enough to destroy the enemy completely, action is terminated by a prearranged signal as the enemy’s counteraction begins to form. A planned withdrawal covered by security detachments is executed. Often, the guerrillas will withdraw by detachments in several directions to frustrate and complicate enemy pursuit. Prearranged details are used to maintain visual contact and to report on enemy pursuing units. Subsequent ambushes will often be conducted to delay or destroy the pursuing enemy force. In favorable terrain and during periods of low visibility, guerrillas may simultaneously ambush enemy columns moving toward each other. After deceiving the enemy and inducing a fire fight, the guerrilla will withdraw, leaving the two enemy forces to fight each other.

29. Raids

a. Guerrilla forces conduct raids to destroy or capture arms, equipment, and supplies, or to kill or capture personnel. The raiders also destroy important installations such as guarded bridges, power plants, and communication centers. Raids may be planned only to harass or demoralize the enemy. The raid, like the ambush, is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and is executed with alacrity and violence.

b. The guerrilla force making a raid is usually organized into three principal elements, with each being assigned a specific mission. One element eliminates the guards. As surprise is indispensable for the success of this operation, ruses may be used to approach and eliminate the sentries before they can sound the alarm. The use of firearms in this task is usually forbidden. Following the elimination of the guards, another element kills or captures personnel and destroys or carries away equipment and supplies.

c. A third element of the guerrilla force covers the operation and the withdrawal.

d. Sometimes, the guerrilla force will use a fourth element in the conduct of raids to infiltrate into the target area prior to the raid and assist the subsequent raid according to prearranged plans.

30. Operations against Lines of Communication

a. Guerrilla forces can operate very effectively against enemy lines of communication.
They deny their use to the enemy and harass, delay, or destroy all movements along the routes. Units are normally assigned sectors of the line of communication to be blocked. Within each sector, the bridges and road beds are destroyed to the degree necessary to prohibit traffic. Often, trees are felled and slides are caused to further block the route. Mines and demolitions are used extensively.

b. Guerrilla tactical units are usually deployed on a broad front along the line of communication. They engage small enemy forces and prevent the route from being repaired or cleared. They ambush enemy supply and troop movements. If superior enemy forces are massed against any sector, the guerrillas withdraw and seek another sector of the line of communication which is less strongly protected. By constantly shifting their forces to the enemy weak points, a line of communication may be so thoroughly disrupted that the enemy is forced to abandon the route or to employ sizeable forces to protect it.

31. Attacks in Force

a. Guerrilla forces which have attained a high level of organization and are adequately armed, equipped, and supported logistically, are capable of attacks in force against isolated enemy garrisons, combat units, and installations. Guerrilla operations of this nature closely parallel regular offensive operations and are guided by the established principles of offensive combat. Guerrilla forces may often be more effective against certain objectives than regular forces of comparable strength. The guerrillas, by exploiting their organization, mobility, intelligence of the enemy, and detailed information of the terrain, can often attack objectives from both without and within. Agents, small units, and loyal civilians may be infiltrated into the objective area prior to the actual attack. Coordinated surprise attacks may then be launched simultaneously against every echelon of the enemy to include his security, command, supply, and communications. These operations may be closely supported by air, land, and sea action of regular allied forces sponsoring the guerrillas.

b. Normally, the guerrilla force tries to isolate the objective from adjacent areas. The roads, railroads, and wire communications leading to the objective area are methodically disrupted. Guerrilla forces establish roadblocks and use sabotage and ambushes to intercept, delay, or destroy all troops and supply movements into the objective area.

c. In active war, attacks in force become more frequent and are conducted on an ever-increasing scale as the combat zone of the sponsoring allied regular force moves nearer the area of operations of the guerrilla force. These attacks are effectively exploited by the guerrillas during the critical periods of enemy operations which require unusually large movements of supplies and troops. During these critical periods, guerrilla forces are particularly capable of great achievements and of providing valuable assistance to the allied regular force.

32. Defensive Combat

a. Defensive combat is an exceptional form of combat for guerrilla forces. Guerrillas normally lack artillery, antitank weapons, and other means to face conventional forces in set battle. As a general rule, they avoid a prolonged position type defense. When committed to defensive combat, they modify the principles of defensive combat to best meet their needs and to offset their deficiencies. The guerrillas select terrain that denies or restricts the enemy’s use of armor and complicates his logistical support. They seek terrain that will give them every possible advantage.

b. In conjunction with their position defense, the guerrilla force conducts raids and ambushes and attacks the enemy’s lines of communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Camouflaged snipers fire on officers, messengers, and other worthwhile targets. Routes of approach are mined. Diversionary actions in adjacent areas are often intensified to distract the enemy. The guerrillas use skillful ruses to lure the attacking enemy into dividing his forces.

c. Guerrilla forces may be expected to engage in defensive combat to prevent enemy penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas, to gain time for their forces to accomplish a specific mission, or to assemble their main force for action.

d. They may resort to defensive action to contain enemy forces in a position favorable for attacking the enemy’s rear or flanks. Guerrilla
forces may be given defensive missions to hold objectives pending arrival of regular forces with which they are allied.

33. Prisoners of War

a. Guerrilla policy on taking prisoners is influenced by many factors. The treatment given guerrilla prisoners taken by the enemy may affect the guerrilla policy. The guerrilla force's ability to secure, feed, and guard prisoners may often be a guiding factor. If the guerrillas control a large area where prisoners may be accommodated or if they can evacuate prisoners to allied regular forces without jeopardizing guerrilla operations, they may take prisoners. The proper treatment and indoctrination of prisoners may have the effect of making an enemy less likely to fight to the death if he knows he will be released after capture. As a rule, the administration of prisoners is in too great a conflict with their methods of operations to be conducted extensively.

b. The guerrilla will habitually exert a definite effort to capture certain well-known and effective leaders of the enemy to use as hostages.

c. The characteristics, religious beliefs, and mental attitudes of the tribes, factions, or groups that make up a guerrilla force have a great bearing on the attitudes and actions of the force. Many groups place little value on human life and may be expected to treat an enemy accordingly.
CHAPTER 3
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

34. Mission

a. The mission of counterguerrilla operations is to subvert, kill, or capture the enemy guerrilla force and prevent the resurgence of the resistance movement. The accomplishment of this mission will usually require the successful accomplishment of the following inherent operations:

1. Police operations.
   (a) Population control.
   (b) Security of troops, installations, communities, and lines of communication.

2. Harassment of the guerrilla force (to locate, harass, and inflict casualties on the enemy).

3. Offensive operations to destroy the guerrilla force.

4. Assistance in a program of civil improvement.

5. Denial of sponsoring power support (if applicable).

b. Since the probable guerrilla force reaction to applied pressure is to move to another area or "lie low" until the vigor of current counteraction has lessened, commanders must be particularly alert to consider the force not yet destroyed merely because opposition has halted.

c. Terrain, as a tactical objective, means little to guerrillas until the size and organization of the force begins to parallel that of a conventional force. Commanders must orient their efforts continually on the destruction of the enemy; not on terrain, which can usually be yielded by the guerrilla force with little or no tactical loss.

35. General Principles

a. Preventing the formation of a resistance movement is much easier than dealing with one after it is formed. Likewise, destroying such a movement is much easier during its early stages than when it has reached more advanced stages of development. However, specifically identifying the resistance elements in the early stages is often extremely difficult.

b. Counterguerrilla operations must include appropriate action against the civilian and underground support of the guerrilla force, without which it cannot operate.

c. All policies toward a guerrilla force and its civilian and underground support must be firm. Government forces must determine which elements of the civilian population are supporting the guerrillas. Since this may be difficult initially, strict controls may be necessary and have sometimes proved effective. Harsh measures against entire populations, however, may influence mass defections and encourage support for guerrilla forces. The civil population must be apprised of the reasons for actions taken against it and must be made to understand that such measures are of a temporary nature and will be discontinued when cooperation is effected.

d. An area confronted with a serious guerrilla menace must be considered a combat area. Units in such areas must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitudes as forward troops in conventional war. A "rear area" psychology makes it easy for guerrilla forces to employ one of their most potent weapons, surprise.

e. Purely defensive measures only allow the guerrilla force to grow and become strong. They are justified only when the strength of the friendly forces available does not permit offensive action. Even limited offensive operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Offensive action should be continuous and aggressive.
f. Points of greatest guerrilla force vulnerability are—
   (1) Support of the civilian population.
   (2) Food and medical supply.
   (3) Command structure.
   (4) Morale.
   (5) Arms and ammunition supply.

g. Secrecy of all tactical movements and surprise in all operations are essential to success against guerrilla forces. Indigenous personnel who are not members of recognized paramilitary organizations should not be utilized by counterguerrilla forces. Exceptions to this must be subject to the strictest security screening.

h. To be successful, any force engaged in counterguerrilla operations must have:
   (1) Greater mobility than the guerrillas.
   (2) Sound intelligence about the terrain, the guerrilla force, and the entire population.
   (3) Effective secure communications.
   (4) Well-trained individual soldiers.
   (5) Aggressive and imaginative leadership.
   (6) Realistic evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of own and allied forces.
   (7) Comprehensive analysis of vulnerable and critical installations throughout the sector plus predetermined priorities for the allocation of available resources.
   (8) Effective measures for locating and employing national resources (manpower and material) to meet critical deficiencies.

36. Continuity

a. Continuous pressure is maintained throughout a campaign against guerrilla forces. If contact with the guerrilla force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to reestablish contact through the use of aerial surveillance, extended patrols, aerial “hunter-killer” teams, and coordinated harassing actions. “Hunter-killer” teams may be deployed to an area by air, but for effective search, particularly in the jungle, they must often be deployed on the ground. This keeps the guerrilla force on the move, disrupts its security and organization, and lowers its morale.

b. Long periods of inactivity permit the guerrilla force to lick its wounds, reorganize, and resume offensive operations.

37. Surprise

a. Surprise is sought in all operations. Against well-organized guerrilla forces it is difficult to achieve and requires that every echelon of command, to include platoon and squad leaders, employ the most ingenious and imaginative methods. Surprise may be gained by continually varying operations and by the use of unorthodox tactics and techniques.

b. Caution is exercised throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of operations to prevent the guerrilla force from learning their nature and scope in advance. Special security restrictions are applied to the movements of commanders, communications, reconnaissance, movement of troops, and concentration of supplies and equipment. Cover plans, ingeniously exposed to guerrilla force intelligence, may be used to deceive the enemy of the true intentions.

c. Extreme care is exercised to keep civilian supporters of the guerrilla force from learning our intentions. When necessary, civilian communities in an area of immediate operations may be surrounded and the inhabitants detained incommunicado until the operation has been executed.

38. Mobility

a. Superior mobility is essential in counterguerrilla operations to achieve surprise and to successfully counter the mobility of the enemy force. The extensive use of airmobile forces, if used with imagination, will ensure the military commander superior mobility. The use of tanks and other track vehicles, in areas suitable for employment, must also be considered in counterguerrilla operations.

b. The terrain in which the guerrilla force chooses to operate may be so difficult that extensive improvisation and use of animal packs and animal-drawn vehicles may be necessary to increase the mobility differential of the friendly force.
c. Often, aggressive leadership, the will to fight, dependable intelligence, and good physical conditioning will make a foot mobile conventional force superior to the guerrilla force at its own type of warfare.

d. In swamps and inundated areas, the extensive use of watercraft for movement may be feasible and necessary. Reaction forces (reserves) may be habitually based on boats to facilitate rapid reaction to located guerrilla forces. The boats used must be faster than those of the enemy, be crew-portable, and carry at least half a rifle squad. The peculiarities of the area may create a requirement for both shallow draft and "skin" type watercraft.

e. In areas where inland waterways are plentiful, river patrols with armored amphibious vehicles and gunboats may be used to improve mobility.

Section II. COMMAND AND STAFF

39. Leadership

a. The morale of forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations presents problems quite different from those encountered in normal combat. Operating against an elusive, violently destructive force that seldom offers a clear target, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again is quite different from operating against the more orthodox forces encountered in normal combat. Visible results can seldom be observed.

b. This problem must be countered by strong and capable leadership, by indoctrination in the importance of the counterguerrilla operations, and by utilizing self-reliant and daring junior leaders.

c. Counterguerrilla operations usually require the use of many small patrols and static security posts, often operating for prolonged periods of time. Being separated from their parent units and surrounded by a possibly hostile and unfriendly population has a deteriorating effect on the morale of the men in these small groups. Once again, strong leadership and thorough indoctrination, plus maintenance of the offensive, assist the commanders in dealing with this problem. This problem is also minimized when troops are kept in the area long enough to become thoroughly familiar with it and when small units are granted a degree of initiative in developing methods of combating the guerrilla force.

d. Commanders of all echelons find themselves operating for prolonged periods of time on independent missions where much of their support, both moral and material, depends on their own ingenuity, skill, knowledge, courage, and tenacity.

e. The scope and nature of a commander's mission may emphasize political, economic, and social considerations to a greater extent than in conventional operations. The methods and techniques of combat that commanders have been trained to apply during conventional operations may have to be modified or even, in some cases, disregarded.

40. Command and Staff Action

a. The general principles of command and staff action are applicable to counterguerrilla operations, but the techniques of their application must conform to the conditions imposed by the various situations arising.

b. The responsibilities of the commanders, unit staffs, and special staffs, and the relationship between these entities and with the subordinate commanders are essentially the same for counterguerrilla operations as for conventional operations (FM 7-series). However, command and staff action in operations against guerrilla forces places a relatively higher emphasis on the—

(1) Detailed planning of small-scale decentralized tactical operations.

(2) Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve (reaction) forces.

(3) Detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort.

(4) Detailed planning and coordination of activities concerning the civilian population.

(5) Incorporation of civilian assistance into operational planning.
(6) Detailed integration of administrative support functions (especially aerial resupply) into all tactical planning.

41. Planning Factors

a. Planning for counterguerrilla operations requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, social) and the military situations.

b. The following specific factors are considered in the commander’s estimate:

(1) Terrain and weather.
   (a) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.
   (b) Existence of possible guerrilla bases.
   (c) Effect of weather and seasons of the year on both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

(2) Inhabitants.
   (a) Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy, morale, strength of will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship. Particular attention is given to the following:
      1. Farmers and other rural dwellers.
      2. Criminals and “tough” elements.
      3. Persons known to adhere to the philosophy of the resistance movement.
      4. Former members of armed forces.
      5. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or tendencies.
   (b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla activities.
   (c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.
   (d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(3) The resources available to the guerrilla force, including—
   (a) The capability of the area to furnish food.
   (b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.
   (c) The availability of water and fuels.
   (d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) Guerrilla force relations with any allied sponsoring power, including—
   (a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.
   (b) Communications with the guerrilla force.
   (c) Capability of enemy to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including—
   (a) Their origin and development.
   (b) Their strength, morale, and status of training.
   (c) The personality of the leaders.
   (d) Relations with the civil population.
   (e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.
   (f) Status of equipment and supplies.
   (g) Effectiveness of communications.
   (h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.
   (i) Known or suspected dispositions.
   (j) Tactics being employed.

(6) The size and composition of friendly forces available for counteroperations, including—
   (a) Own forces and their ability to operate in the terrain.
   (b) Other military units available in the area if needed.
   (c) Civil police, and self-defense units.
   (d) Friendly guerrilla forces.
   (e) Friendly vulnerabilities.
   (f) Effectiveness of measures for employment of national resources (manpower and material) within sector to meet critical deficiencies such as personnel for security of critical installations.

(7) The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla forces.
Section III. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

42. Area Organization

a. A military unit engaged in counterguerrilla operations normally is assigned a specific area of operation. Whenever military considerations permit, this area encompasses a political subdivision of the affected area. Such an assignment is effected to—

(1) Make maximum use of existing civil administrative agencies.
(2) Make maximum use of existing police and paramilitary forces.
(3) Make use of existing intelligence nets.

b. The assignment of a political subdivision ensures maximum assistance from the civil authorities and therefore releases the maximum number of military personnel for purely military tasks.

c. However, it must be realized that political subdivisions will seldom provide optimum military areas of operation and, in most cases, the boundaries of the assigned areas must be dictated by overriding military considerations. The principles governing the selecting of unit boundaries are the same in counterguerrilla operations as for conventional warfare.

d. The brigade is normally assigned a specific area of responsibility. The brigade commander assigns specific areas of responsibility (sectors) to subordinate battalions, and battalion commanders normally do the same (subsectors) to subordinate companies. The company commander does not normally assign specific areas to his platoons, but rather assigns tasks/missions to further the accomplishment of the company mission. Within the assigned sector or subsectors, commanders at all echelons down to and including company level will normally establish one or more combat bases from which to conduct offensive operations, and static security posts as needed to secure troops, installations, and lines of communication. Each brigade, battalion, and company assigned an area of responsibility will normally maintain a reaction force (reserve) of appropriate strength at its base to be used in local reaction to any contact made with the guerrilla force.

e. The size of the area assigned to a unit depends on the mission, the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla force, and the troops available. In an underdeveloped, rugged area under the effective control of the enemy guerrilla force, the assigned areas of responsibility will usually be much smaller than in the more populated areas where the friendly force or neither force exercises effective control. The size of the area assigned to a unit may be too large to be cleared concurrently by the subordinate units. In this case, the commander must establish a priority for the clearance of the sectors or subsectors, and assign areas of responsibility to the subordinate units accordingly.

f. Figure 6 shows a schematic brigade area of operations. Note that one battalion has more area than can be cleared concurrently by its subordinate units. Consequently, one subsector in its area is not occupied initially. This subsector will be placed under surveillance and patrolled under battalion control until it can be assigned to a subordinate unit for clearance.

g. To indicate the flexibility possible in the organization of an area of operations, figure 7 shows another schematic brigade area of operation in which, because of the existing terrain and enemy situation, the companies have been assigned areas which are not contiguous in all cases. The gaps between the companies are kept under surveillance utilizing Army aircraft and forces (such as the reconnaissance platoon/armored cavalry platoon and civilian paramilitary patrol units) under battalion control.

h. In any case, the subsector assigned a company should be no larger than the unit can clear and/or control without large groups of the enemy circumventing its forces and regrouping elsewhere in the subsector.

i. A company normally retains a platoon (±) as a local reaction force. Likewise, a battalion normally retains a reaction force of at least two platoons. The brigade normally retains a very strong reaction force of battalion (±) size to counter and destroy large consolidations of enemy guerrillas in the area. The reaction forces must have the capability of operating as an airmobile force. If the terrain permits, they may be mechanized.

43. Designation of Clearance of an Area (Fig. 8)

a. The standing operating procedures of a unit engaged in counterguerrilla operations should include some prearranged system for the designation of the degree of friendly control
Figure 6. Schematic brigade area of operations.
Figure 7. Another schematic brigade area of operations.
Figure 8. Clearance of an area.
existing in any specific area so information can be easily disseminated to all friendly troops and the civil populace.

b. The following designations based on traffic light colors may be used:

(1) **Red area.** This area is under the part-time or continuous control of the enemy guerrilla force. Here the enemy locates its headquarters and bases and operates with comparative impunity. Normally, the civilians in this area support the resistance movement, either willingly or through coercion. All personnel encountered in this area are suspected members of the guerrilla force, the supporting underground, or the civilian auxiliary. Troops maintain a combat status in these areas. Vehicles must travel in convoy with an armed escort.

(2) **Yellow area.** This is an area in which guerrillas often operate, but which is under neither friendly nor guerrilla force control. Troops must carry individual weapons in these areas and must not move alone. Vehicles must have at least one armed guard riding in the open. Curfew and other population control measures are strongly enforced.

(3) **Green area.** This area is firmly under friendly control in which stringent population control has been lifted. Resistance activities in these areas are generally restricted to covert activities. Troops must not move alone, but need not be armed. Vehicles may move freely without guards.

### 44. Mobile Combat Bases

**a.** Units conducting tactical operations against guerrilla forces establish combat bases from which to operate. However, it is not normal for a battalion or higher unit to be assigned an area small enough for it to operate entirely from one such base; it is far more normal for the battalion to assign specific areas of responsibility to subordinate companies, and require that they establish combat bases in their respective areas. Depending on the size of the company subsector, one or more combat bases may be established. Whenever possible, the entire company operates from one base to facilitate security and control. Normally, the majority of the elements of the company move out from the combat base(s) and operate from small unit patrol bases.

**b.** A combat base is the focal point for all tactical operations against the guerrilla force in the area of the unit concerned. It will include the essential command, control, and administrative elements of the unit, and, quite often, certain support elements of higher units located there to facilitate the support of the host unit.

**c.** The combat base is located to facilitate future tactical operations in the area and to facilitate its own security. Whenever possible, combat bases are established on highly defensible terrain since the majority of the unit will be absent most of the time in combating, conducting surveillance, or reconnoitering for the guerrilla force, and only the local reaction force will remain to secure the base.

**d.** The size of the base will vary with the size of the friendly units occupying it, the defensibility of the terrain, and the probability of guerrilla attack. In any case, the combat base is as small as is practicable to facilitate its security.

**e.** A combat base is organized with encircling positions prepared from which it can be defended against guerrilla attack. Protective obstacles are prepared to support the defensive positions. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive positions and occupied at all times. All possible roads and trails leading into the area are mined. Roads and trails are used by friendly forces only as necessary.

**f.** The provision of troop facilities is a consideration in the organization of a combat base. Whenever possible, temporary overhead shelter is provided. An adequate water supply should be located nearby or, ideally, within the base. Some means of physical recreation such as volleyball or wrestling must be provided. A good base will assist in maintaining high morale in the unit.

**g.** The highest standards of discipline and sanitation must be maintained in the combat base. Normally, a commander will seldom see
his men during operations against guerrilla forces, except for the brief periods they are in the combat base. Most of the time, members of the unit will be away operating from forward patrol bases on patrols, raids, ambushes, outposts, etc., under the control of junior leaders.

h. Combat bases must be completely mobile (preferably transportable by foot or Army aircraft at company level) and must be moved periodically within the area of responsibility to prevent the guerrilla force from receiving detailed information about their location and disposition.

i. When the guerrilla force has reached the state of development where its operations approach those of conventional forces, the use of widely separated bases will normally be tactically unsound.

45. Static Security Posts (Fig. 9)

a. A static security post is any organized security system for the protection of fixed critical military or civil installations, or critical points along lines of communication such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. They will be utilized as necessary to adequately secure the assigned area of operations against guerrilla attack. The size of the post depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the hostile force, the attitude of the civil populace, and the importance of the area being secured. It may vary from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company securing a key communication center or civilian community. Static security posts in remote areas will necessarily be larger than those nearer supporting forces.

b. The organization of a static security post will vary with its size, mission, and distance from reinforcing units. In any case, the outpost is organized for the security of both the installation and the security force. Reliable communications must be established between remote static security posts and the parent unit base, and the parent unit must be prepared to counterattack within its reserves or reaction force to assist the outpost.

c. Static security posts are organized and prepared for all-around defense. Adequate guards and patrols should be used to prevent surprise. Precautions are necessary to prevent guards being surprised and overpowered before they can give an alarm. Concealed approaches to the security posts are mined. Areas from which short-range fire can be placed on the position are cleared and mined. Areas of poor visibility are improved or covered with automatic weapons. The immediate area of the outpost is dug-in and reinforced with earth and sandbags. Personnel are provided auxiliary exits and covered routes from their shelters to the combat positions. Buildings used for shelter should be selected with care. Generally, wooden or other lightweight constructions are avoided. If they must be used, the walls should be reinforced for protection against smallarms fire. If the post consists of more than one position, consideration is given to the use of connecting trenches. Supplies are stored in dispersed and protected caches. Adequate security must be provided for communication installations and equipment. Combat efficiency is maintained by training and periodic alert drills.

d. Indigenous personnel, other than paramilitary personnel, are not allowed to enter the defensive positions, and those living in the immediate vicinity are screened and evacuated, if necessary. Friendly civilians may be helpful in warning of the approach of guerrilla units.

e. All consideration possible is given to troop comfort during the organization and preparation of the security post. At best, morale will suffer among troops who must operate for prolonged periods of time in small groups away from their parent organization.

f. If a static security post is far removed from other battalion units and there is a possibility of isolation of the post by guerrilla action, sufficient sustaining supplies are prestocked within the post. A static security post should never have to depend solely on the local populace for supplies.

g. The defense of an installation should be varied often to counter information the enemy may have received concerning the disposition and routine operations of the security force. This may be accomplished by varying:

(1) Patrol and sentinel routes.
(2) Fixed posts and listening post locations.
(3) Schedule of changing guard.
(4) Password.
(5) Position of automatic weapons.
46. Sequence of Operations

a. Normally, the following sequence will be followed:

(1) The brigade or battalion commander, assigned the mission of combating guerrilla forces within a specified area, must accomplish the following tasks prior to assigning areas of responsibility to subordinate units and fully deploying his forces in depth throughout the area:

(a) Conduct an intelligence effort in sufficient detail to ascertain the degree of enemy control existing through the area, to determine the degree of civilian support existing throughout the population of the area, and to gain a working knowledge of the terrain in the area.

(b) Establish liaison with U.S. governmental agencies, local civil authorities, and local indigenous forces within the area.
(2) These tasks may be accomplished prior to movement of the unit into the area or after such movement while the unit is located in large, secure, and consolidated combat bases in the area.

b. Depending on its mission and the civil and military situation in its assigned area, the unit may be required to conduct any or all of the following operations:

(1) Police operations.
(2) Harassment and offensive operations against the guerrilla force.
(3) Assistance in a program of civil improvement.
(4) Denial of sponsoring power support.

c. Assuming the situation requires that the unit conduct all of the above operations, the following sequence of tasks would normally be performed after the intelligence effort and liaison discussed above has been conducted:

(1) The commander establishes subordinate areas of operation and combat bases, and establishes the necessary static security posts and other security measures, utilizing local civil police and self-defense units to the maximum.

(2) Population control and isolation of the guerrilla force from its civilian support is established. Propaganda programs are continued to create civilian support for the friendly cause and civilian disaffection from the resistance movement. Civic action is conducted to enhance the civilian capability to support the friendly effort.

(3) Harassment of the guerrilla force, primarily by ground patrols, aerial "hunter-killer" teams, and aerial surveillance is initiated against the guerrilla force to locate it and keep it under pressure. When an enemy element is located, an offensive reaction with adequate combat power is initiated without delay to destroy it.

(4) If the unit's area of responsibility is on a border with a sponsoring power, operations are conducted to deny ingress/egress across the border by the enemy guerrilla force and the sponsoring power.

(5) When a sizeable guerrilla force has been located, coordinated offensive operations are conducted to destroy it.

(6) After the destruction of the guerrilla force, efforts are continued to effect a program of civil improvement to remove the initial cause for unrest and resistance in the area.

d. While the above sequence is generally normal, it by no means should indicate that one phase of the sequence must be successfully concluded before the initiation of the next. Conversely, the conduct of these phases should overlap in time with police operations, civic action, and combat operations against the guerrilla force being conducted concurrently.

Section IV. USE OF AIRMObILE FORCES

47. General

a. A guerrilla force attempts to maintain superior mobility by a superior knowledge of the terrain, the use of difficult terrain, the use of surprise hit-and-run tactics, and distribution of forces in depth. The imaginative, extensive, and sustained use of airmobile forces offers the most effective challenge available today to this mobility differential of the enemy guerrilla force. It is imperative that, whenever possible, the concept of counterguerrilla operations be based on the maximum employment of this type of force.

b. The employment of Army transport aircraft to lift combat forces in counterguerrilla operations includes (but is not limited to) the—

(1) Rapid movement of reaction forces (reserves) for offensive or reinforcing action.

(2) Movement of combat and reconnaissance patrols into and out of the assigned patrol area.

(3) Rotation of forces on extended patrols.

(4) Rotation of units at forward patrol bases.

(5) Conduct feints or simulated reinforcements.
(6) Movement of troops into and out of jungle or mountainous areas of operations.

(7) Rapid emplacement of troops during an encirclement or pursuit.

(8) Movement of troops to the scene of a raid.

(9) Movement of artillery and other weapons provide fire support to the force.

c. The control of Army transport aircraft is retained at the highest level of command commensurate with its effective employment to support the tactical operations of the combat units. Due to the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations and the extensive areas assigned to combat units, sufficient aircraft will be under the operational control of the brigade to support the routine operations of the unit. Normally, enough aircraft will be provided for the simultaneous lift of the combat elements of the brigade reaction force.

d. Under unusual circumstances, aircraft may be placed under the operational control of battalions or companies for prolonged periods of time. However, it is far more normal for aircraft to be placed under the operational control of these units for the conduct of specific tasks or for specified short periods of time.

e. The priority for the employment of all Army transport aircraft is to the reaction forces when committed.


48. Factors Affecting Employment

a. General. As with any combat unit, employment of an airmobile force is based on the factors of mission, enemy situation, terrain and weather, and the troops available.

b. Mission. The assigned mission is the primary consideration and determines the organization for combat, combat formations, and scheme of maneuver. Because guerrilla forces usually lack sophisticated weapons, airmobile elements may engage in aggressive offensive action to cause maximum destruction of the enemy once it is located.

c. Enemy Situation. All available information of the enemy location, strength, disposition, and composition should be considered before airmobile elements are committed. The collection of enemy information is continued throughout the conduct of the operation. All means and sources are exploited to collect accurate and timely information so a continuing estimate of the situation can be made.

d. Terrain and Weather. Terrain limits the movement of airmobile troops to a lesser degree than ground elements. However, dense vegetation which is often encountered in areas inhabited by guerrilla forces, restricts air-to-ground observation, reduces the effectiveness of air-to-ground fires, increases the difficulty of navigation and accurate location of enemy positions, and limits the number of landing areas available. Limited road nets dictate greater reliance on air movement for both combat operations and logistical support. The lack of manmade features makes navigation more difficult. Weather is a controlling factor in employment, as high winds, icing conditions, and periods of low visibility may reduce the effectiveness of aircraft. However, air activities must be planned to follow up quickly and to exploit these adverse weather conditions. Weather forecast facilities may not be available in the underdeveloped areas in which operations against guerrilla forces are conducted.

e. Troops Available. The assignment of missions and the planned employment of airmobile troops is dependent on the personnel and equipment available. To ensure sustained operations, consideration must be given to previous and contemplated employment of the unit, status of equipment and troops, and adequacy of logistics to support the mission. Because of limited surface transportation, poor road network, and guerrilla force activities, greater emphasis must be placed on movement of supplies by aerial means.

49. Employment of Army Transport Aircraft

a. General.

(1) When an Army aviation element is assigned a mission, the commander takes immediate steps to establish liaison with the supported unit and assists the supported commander in preparation of the operations plan in accordance with detailed guidance pro-
vided in FM 57–35. The aviation unit commander’s planning is done concurrently with the planning of the ground force commander. Plans of each are detailed and coordinated. As soon as the aviation unit commander is informed of the supported unit commander’s plan of maneuver, he—

(a) Determines the composition of flights.

(b) Designates flight leaders and the units to be supported by each.

(c) Briefs personnel of his unit on the details of the operation, to include location of the loading zone, air routes, and landing zones.

(d) Coordinates plans for refueling.

(e) Coordinates the use of pathfinders, if required.

(f) Prepares plans for debriefing air crew upon completion of the mission.

(2) The ability of aircraft to deliver assault forces quickly and directly on, or immediately adjacent to, objectives results in tactical surprise. An aggressive ground attack in conjunction with an airmobile assault exploits surprise and thereby aids in the destruction of the guerrilla force. In order to facilitate the rapid and orderly conduct of an airmobile operation under maximum security conditions, detailed unit standing operating procedures (SOP’s) are developed. This is especially important in the conduct of airmobile operations against guerrilla forces, where speed of reaction and secrecy are of prime importance.

(3) Because requirements for the limited air transport available to the unit normally exceed the capabilities of the available aviation units, the commander establishes mission priorities that determine the allocation of aviation support to requirements of the force. Priority of available support is normally given to the reaction forces. Elements of the available aviation support normally are placed in support of the transported combat elements for specific task assignments with control of the support aircraft retained at brigade level.

b. Contingency Planning. Detailed plans for airmobile operations against guerrilla forces are prepared to cover all contingencies. As soon as possible after the unit moves into an area of operation, the aviation unit commander determines the location of potential landing zones, drop zones, and assembly areas throughout the area of operations. Whenever possible, a detailed reconnaissance is made of each aforementioned area to determine its suitability for use and the number and type of aircraft it can accommodate. In addition, an investigation is made to determine whether the civilian populace is friendly or hostile. A catalog of these areas, together with all available information, is of significant assistance in planning airmobile assaults to include employment of the reaction force, as well as for the defense of friendly bases. Troops may be unloaded by ropes while the aircraft hover over areas in which landing areas are not available.

c. Air Movement. Normally, elements of aviation support will be in an alert status on landing areas within the combat bases or at a location convenient to the supported force. When practicable, reaction forces and aircraft are in the same general location. Necessary equipment, which is bulky and time consuming to prepare for loading, may be preloaded aboard appropriate aircraft to conserve time.

d. Assault.

(1) The assault phase of the airmobile operation begins with the landing of the lead elements and continues through the destruction of the guerrilla force.

(2) After the initial mission is completed, the airmobile force may engage in a variety of operations. These may include link-up with other forces to encircle the enemy, operations to exploit initial successes, establishing a new combat base, or withdrawal from the area. Additional combat forces and logistical support needed for exploitation are aerial delivered as required. Freedom of maneuver is restricted when the airmobile force is required...
to protect landing areas for the delivery of additional troops, supplies, and equipment, and for the evacuation of casualties. This restriction is less pronounced with helicopters than with airplanes, for the helicopter has greater flexibility in selection of landing areas. Throughout the operation, helicopters continue to deliver troops, supplies, and equipment direct to the using ground units, thus reducing the requirements for stocking supplies or maintaining vulnerable land lines of communications.

50. Employment of Air Cavalry Troop

a. The brigade may receive an attachment of all or part of an air cavalry troop during counterguerrilla operations. Successful employment of elements of the air cavalry troop in operations against guerrilla forces is predicated upon effective use of its unique characteristics and capabilities and an understanding of its limitations. The environment in which counterguerrilla operations are conducted and the nature of the enemy forces require modification of normal tactics and techniques. The combat operations of the troop are devoted primarily to employment as all or part of small aerial “hunter-killer” teams, aerial reconnaissance and security, aerial escort, and aerial fire support for combat operations.

b. The air cavalry troop is a combined arms force with combat elements mounted in organic armed helicopters. The unit combines the characteristics of tactical three-dimensional mobility and highly destructive air firepower. The troop operates largely in the ground environment (nap-of-the-earth) which is the air space extending from the ground to a few feet above, but generally below the level of the surrounding terrain formations. This reduces the exposure time of aircraft to enemy ground and air action. Helicopters armed with antipersonnel, antiam- materiel, area, and point fire weapons are capable of providing destructive and suppressive fires.

c. Elements of the troop may operate as a unit or with tactical groupings of aero-scout, aero-rifle, and aero-weapons elements integrated with other elements. The capabilities and characteristics of these elements are designed to complement each other. The flexibility of the organization permits rapid organization of “hunter-killer” teams specifically tailored to accomplish the assigned mission.

d. During combat operations against guerrilla forces, the assembly area for air cavalry elements is normally located within the brigade combat base. Strict security measures must be employed to prevent guerrilla forces from destroying the combat or service elements of the troop when they are within the base. In this regard, full advantage is taken of the security available from other forces in the base. Exceptionally, elements of the air cavalry troop may be located at battalion and company bases when required by the tactical situation.

e. Minimum air traffic control restrictions are imposed on elements of the air cavalry troop. The use of airspace in the troop area of operations requires coordination with friendly ground elements and agencies using airspace in the area of operations.

51. Aerial Fire Support

a. Capability. Army transport aircraft supporting units engaged in counterguerrilla operations may have limited capabilities for providing supplemental fire support to maneuver elements of the brigade and subordinate units. Aerial weapons consist of detachable automatic weapons and antitank guided missiles or rockets capable of being mounted on the tactical transport or light observation helicopters.

b. Fundamentals of Employment. Employment of the aerial fire support means of Army aircraft is based on the following fundamentals:

(1) Surprise. The effectiveness of aerial fire support in counterguerrilla operations depends on the degree of surprise attained. Armed helicopters attain surprise with their speed, maneuverability, and ability to cross terrain obstacles to strike the enemy at an unexpected time and place from unexpected directions. Every effort is made to avoid establishing patterns which permit guerrilla forces to anticipate planned operations. Surprise is also achieved by well-executed maneuvers at low altitude using available cover and concealment, and by avoid-
ing areas or routes suspected of being inhabited by persons sympathetic to the cause of the guerrilla forces. Once an enemy force is located, it is attacked with all possible speed and violence to destroy the hostile force.

(2) Fire and movement. Airmobile forces with air cavalry elements use the technique of fire and movement to destroy hostile guerrillas and for self-protection. Aerial weapons, as well as those of the supported ground elements, are used to provide suppressive fires to protect the movement of aircraft and reduce their vulnerability to ground fire. The psychological effect of concentrated fire from advancing armed helicopters is such that it may disorganize and delay guerrilla force elements attempting to escape and thus assist the ground pursuit force.

(3) Teamwork. Aerial weapons, when employed, normally are integrated with the ground force. The flexibility in organization of Army aviation elements, when armed, allows rapid organization of teams specifically tailored to accomplish the mission. Teamwork between aerial weapons and ground elements is essential to fully exploit the capabilities of both units while offsetting the limitations of each.

(4) Tactical air support. Close air support missions are requested from Air Force to provide cover for Army aircraft operations and to provide fire support in the objective area, particularly when it is outside the range of artillery. During these operations, the forward air controller is normally airborne in Army aircraft.

52. Control Measures

The dense vegetation, limited road nets, lack of manmade features, and other easily identifiable terrain features characteristic of areas in which guerrilla forces operate, make the use of normal measures for controlling aircraft extremely difficult. When they are available, maximum use is made of easily recognizable terrain features. It may be necessary to resort to artificial marking devices such as pyrotechnics, felled groups of trees, balloons suspended from treetops, or treetops which have been marked by paint or other marking agents sprayed from an aerial vehicle. Use of such marking devices is coordinated with the ground combat force to ensure that guerrilla forces do not use similar marking devices to decoy friendly elements into an ambush. It may be necessary to rely on the use of homing devices used with FM radios or nondirectional beacons.

Section V. USE OF AIRBORNE FORCES

53. General

a. Airborne infantry units with their capability for vertical entry into an area of operations by either parachute or air landing are especially well suited for counterguerrilla operations.

b. Major airborne infantry units may be assigned the primary mission of combating guerrilla forces or airborne infantry battalions or rifle companies may be attached to infantry units conducting counterguerrilla operations. In any case, the only essential difference between airborne forces and other combat forces employed against guerrilla forces is the mode of entry into the area of concern.

c. The primary advantage of airborne forces is their capability to drop on or in the vicinity of any given point.

d. Since airborne forces normally land with a minimum of supplies and equipment, the prior planning for adequate and timely logistical support is essential. More than normal reliance is placed on the use of "on call" follow-up supply.

e. Airborne artillery and mortars to accompany airborne operations are desirable and should be included in planning when feasible. Their use will be dependent upon the size and mission of the force, the area of operations, and the limitations imposed by aircraft availability and lift capabilities.
54. Concept of Employment of Airborne Forces

a. When a major airborne infantry unit is assigned the primary mission of combating guerrilla forces, it will conduct the operations as prescribed in this manual in the same general manner as infantry units.

b. If an airborne infantry battalion or rifle company is attached to an infantry unit assigned a primary counterguerrilla mission, the airborne unit will normally be retained as all or part of the reaction forces (reserves) of the unit to which it is attached and its subordinate elements.

c. When airborne units are organized as all or part of a reaction force, the following considerations apply:

(1) Ground alert of sufficient troop transport aircraft to airlift these forces is maintained 24 hours a day.

(2) Each airborne rifle company is reinforced with fire support and logistical support necessary to accomplish its mission.

(3) One observation aircraft with a pilot and pathfinder observer is maintained on 24-hour alert by the appropriate level of command.

(4) Each airborne unit should maintain in a ready status—

(a) All combat and parachute delivery equipment.

(b) Rations to sustain itself in combat operations for 24 hours.

d. The effective employment of airborne forces in counterguerrilla operations without delay normally dictates that the troops drop on extremely small drop zones (DZ). In cases where no drop zone is available, troops may be dropped in a river, on a beach, or in the jungle with ropes to lower themselves down out of the canopy. Often, the drop zone will be selected and marked after the unit is airborne by the pathfinder observer flying in the observation aircraft mentioned above. The following measures are taken to ensure a drop pattern which will produce deployed, tactical units on landing on a small drop zone:

(1) Aircraft are loaded tactically so Platoons and squads land as units.

(2) Aircraft formations which will provide a narrow pattern and facilitate rapid delivery are employed.

(3) Identification devices for all members of the airborne unit are used. These may be armbands, scarfs, or other distinctive markings on the uniform.

(4) Complete delivery of the personnel load of each aircraft is made during one pass over the DZ.
CHAPTER 4
POLICE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

55. General

a. Police operations are those operations conducted primarily for the purpose of—

(1) Population control.
(2) Security of military troops and installations, key communities, and lines of communication.

b. All units engaged in counterguerrilla operations will normally be required to deal in some degree with the civil population in its assigned area. The unit commander may be given the authority and responsibility of exercising military control over the civil population in his area, or he may be required only to coordinate with a civil administration which has authority for population control. In either case, intensive attention to the problem is essential.

c. The objectives of police operations are to—

(1) Isolate the guerrilla force from its civilian support.
(2) Prevent interference with friendly operations by the civilian population.
(3) Secure military troops, installations, and lines of communication from guerrilla attack.
(4) Secure civilian installations and communities from guerrilla attack.
(5) Solicit the active support of the civil population for the friendly cause.

d. Units may be required to conduct police operations concurrently with the conduct of harassing and offensive action against a guerrilla force, or they may be given the primary mission of conducting police operations.

56. Use of Civilians in Police Operations

a. The effective conduct of police operations normally requires an extensive number of personnel far beyond the capability of the military unit responsible for these operations.

b. It is imperative that the maximum effort be made by counterguerrilla forces to organize, train, and utilize available civilian sympathizers in the area to assist in the administration of population control and conduct of the security of the area.

c. The following types of indigenous units should be organized and trained (if not existent) and employed in police operations as directed by higher headquarters:

(1) **National police and civil guard units.** These are uniformed armed police personnel organized to perform police duties in nonurban areas. They are organized to operate throughout the brigade area of operations under centralized control. They exercise law enforcement and support the elements of the military units by assuming responsibility for internal security in the assigned area.

(2) **Municipal and local police.** These are uniformed civilian police who perform the normal law enforcement missions in large urban areas.

(3) **Civilian self-defense forces.** These are armed, nonuniformed units organized at the town, village, and hamlet level to combat dissident activity, protect the local area, and provide surveillance, guides, and local contacts to support the brigade in the conduct of its mission. The importance of securing outlying rural towns and villages should never be deemphasized. The psychological effect of having self-defense forces in a town, village, or hamlet to protect the town from the
guerrilla forces will assist materially in securing the support of the population for the friendly cause.

(4) Special police. These may be organized and trained for special tasks requiring special skills or aptitudes. These units may include—
(a) Foresters or gamekeepers.
(b) Factory, mine, ranch, or railway guards.
(c) Personnel with special knowledge of remote underdeveloped areas.
(d) River and coast patrols.

(5) Civilian intelligence agencies and personnel. These may include specialists in—
(a) Smuggling.
(b) Black marketing.
(c) Sabotage.
(d) Espionage.

(6) Civilian combat-type units. These are normally specially selected and trained volunteer units which conduct small-scale activities throughout the brigade area. They may wear uniform apparel or civilian attire. They are normally employed for prolonged periods of time in the uninhabited portion of the brigade area to hunt down, harass, and destroy small guerrilla bands located in the area.

d. All these civilian units except the national police or civil guard units and guards for long lines of communication are normally placed under the operational control of the subordinate battalion commanders in whose area they operate. The national police or civil guard units and guards of long lines of communication are normally controlled by the brigade. Their operations are closely coordinated with those of the subordinate battalions.

e. The activities of the military units and these indigenous forces may be more effectively coordinated by the establishment of a pacification committee at brigade and battalion level if agreed on by the United States and host country agreements. This committee is headed by the military commander and composed of military personnel and representatives from the civilian administrative and paramilitary agencies. The organization of a pacification committee at company level is normally not practicable.

f. Figure 10 shows a schematic brigade area of operations in which pacification committees have been organized at brigade and battalion levels and numerous civilian agencies are employed.

g. Often, all the civilian administrative and governing agencies in a military unit’s area of responsibility will be sympathetic to the friendly cause and can assume almost total responsibility for police operations. Conversely, the civilian agencies may at times be sympathetic to the resistance movement, or nonexistent in many cases.

h. Numerous civil affairs units are organized specifically to assist commanders in maintaining civil population control through the use of organized indigenous agencies.

Section II. POPULATION CONTROL

57. General

a. Rigid population control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace which is collaborating with guerrilla forces. The extent of the control and the degree of sternness imposed on the civilian population depend on the situation within the assigned area. Information about public attitudes must be gathered and judged carefully. Control and restrictions are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose guerrilla force coercion should be adequately supported.

The basic objective, to isolate the guerrilla force from the populace, must be kept in mind.

b. Administrative measures imposed to suppress an unfriendly populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with hostile guerrilla forces may include—

(1) Employment of roadblocks (par. 58) and patrols.

(2) Search and seizure operations (par. 59).

(3) Constant surveillance by block control (par. 60).
Figure 10. Schematic brigade area of operations for police operations.
(4) Apprehension of guerrilla force sympa-
thizers (par. 61).
(5) Prevention of illegal political meetings
and rallies.
(6) Registration and documentation of all
civilians.
(7) Inspection of individual identification
documents, permits, and passes.
(8) Restrictions on public and private
transportation and communication
means.
(9) Controlling all movement.
(10) Curfew.
(11) Censorship.
(12) Control of the production, storage,
and distribution of food stuffs and pro-
tection of food-producing areas.
(13) Controlled possession of arms, am-
munition, demolition, drugs, medicine,
and money.
(14) Complete evacuation of areas, if
necessary.

Vigorous enforcement and stern punish-
ment is applied to carry out administrative
measures. Half-heartedness or any other sign
of laxness will breed contempt and defiance.
Violators are apprehended and justly and
rapidly punished. Care is taken to punish the
true offenders. The guerrilla force may initiate
acts of violence in communities which are ear-
nestly cooperating with friendly forces to pro-
voke unjust retaliation against those commu-
nities. Any unjust or misplaced punishment at
the hand of elements of the friendly force is
vigorously exploited by the guerrilla force to
gain sympathizers and strengthen their own
cause. Every means is used to publicize the
nature of offenses for which punishment is
imposed. The populace must be made to realize
that the action is not arbitrary, but necessary to
enforce law and order.

58. Roadblocks (Fig. 11)

a. Roadblocks are employed to control the
movements of civilians and illegal goods, to ap-
prehend members of the guerrilla force, and to
check the adequacy of other controls such as the
use of identification passes. They are estab-
lished as surprise checks and are normally or-
ganized to either halt traffic or pass traffic as
desired.

b. Roadblocks are normally located where
there is sufficient space for the assembly of
people under guard and for the parking of
vehicles for search and investigation. Troops
must be positioned in the vicinity of the road-
block where they can apprehend those attempt-
ing to avoid the check point.

c. Elements of the friendly force must be
trained and rehearsed so as to be capable of
establishing a roadblock in a short period of
time at any hour. Civilian personnel or units
may be used, depending on the situation.

d. The processing of personnel and vehicles at
the roadblock is as rapid and efficient as pos-
sible. The attitude of the personnel conducting
the operation should be impersonal.

e. The search must be thorough. Guerrilla
sympathizers may attempt to smuggle re-
stricted items through the roadblocks in hub-
caps of cars, handlebars of bicycles, false bot-
toms of carts, and through other devious means.
Personnel accomplishing the search should be
well trained. The person accomplishing the
search should be covered by an armed guard
who watches the suspect closely, and by an
automatic weapon position from cover.

59. Search and Seizure Operations

a. Search and seizure operations are con-
ducted to screen a built-up area or large water-
craft, apprehend guerrilla force members, and
uncover and seize illegal arms, communication
means, medicines, and other items of a critical
nature. A search and seizure operation may be
conducted at any time and may be used as a
preventive measure against the possible ac-
cumulation of critical items by the population.
The operation is conducted as a controlled in-
convenience to the population and should suffi-
ciently irritate and frighten the populace so
they will not collect restricted items, harbor
guerrilla force leaders, nor support them in the
future. Conversely, the operation must not be
so severe as to drive the civilians into collabora-
tion with the guerrilla force because of resent-
ment.

b. A built-up area to be searched is divided
into zones and a search party is assigned to
Legend

- **Concealed friendly troops who seize personnel who attempt to turn back on seeing roadblock.**
- **Security forces.**
- **Vehicle and personnel inspection areas.**

![Diagram of a roadblock]

Figure 11. Physical layout of a roadblock.

each zone. A search party should consist of three elements—

1. A search element to conduct the search.
2. A security element to encircle the area, prevent entrance/exit, apprehend, and detain persons, and secure open street areas.
3. A reserve element to assist as needed.

c. Unannounced searches may be conducted. After an area is cordoned, an announcement of the procedures expected of the populace may expedite the search.

d. It is desirable for loyal civilians or other local paramilitary personnel to perform the operation or accompany the search elements during the action.
e. Each head of a household or business is directed to assemble all occupants into one room or area, and then to accompany the search party to prevent any later charges of looting or pilferage. Force is used only if necessary.

f. Buildings which have been cleared are marked with a coded designation to ensure that no building is missed during the operation.

g. If active resistance develops to the search and seizure operation, offensive operations are conducted to eliminate the resistance formed.

60. Block Control

a. Block control is the constant surveillance and reporting of civilian activities within a block or other small populated area by a loyal resident of that block or area who has been appointed and is supervised by an appropriate authority. Block control is one of the most effective and economical means of population control. However, it takes considerable time to establish and, by its nature, operates much better under civil authority than under military control. It is possible for a military unit to establish and control a system of block control if such is necessary due to the lack of an effective civil administration. In any case, the military unit must actively support all established block control systems in its assigned area and exploit them to the maximum.

b. Block control is instituted by dividing each block or area into zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a street within a block. A zone leader is appointed from among the residents for each zone and a separate block leader is appointed for each block. Zone leaders report all movements, to include arrivals and departures, to the block leaders. The block leader reports periodically to the military commander or some civil authority on all movements within his block. Unusual activities are reported immediately.

c. If the loyalty of the zone and block leaders is questionable, informants may be located throughout the area as an effective check on their operations. The informants may be organized in a way similar to that of the block control system itself.

61. Apprehended Guerilla Force Members

a. Counterguerrilla operations can generate large numbers of prisoners which can create serious problems for the military unit and can often cause extreme political, social, and economic difficulties. Whenever possible, these prisoners should be turned over to the next higher headquarters as soon as possible. If the brigade or lower unit must assume any responsibility for the administration of prisoners, the principles discussed below will apply. See paragraph 17 for a discussion of the legal status of guerrilla forces.

b. When guerrilla force members desert or surrender voluntarily and indicate that their attitudes and beliefs have changed, at least in part, the following principles govern their administration:

(1) Confinement is used only for screening and processing, and should be separate from prisoners who exhibit no change in attitude.

(2) Promises made to induce defection or surrender must be met.

(3) Post-release supervision is essential, but should not be stringent.

(4) Relocation may be necessary to prevent reprisal from the guerrilla force.

c. When guerrilla force members are captured, they can be expected to retain their attitude of opposition. The administration of these captured personnel is governed by the following principles:

(1) Confinement is required, possibly for extended periods.

(2) Prisoners charged with specific crimes are brought to justice immediately. Charges of crimes against persons are made, if possible, instead of charges of crimes directly concerned with the resistance movement, which may result in martyrdom and serve as a rallying point for increased guerrilla activity.

(3) Captured members of a guerrilla force will require intensive reeducation and reorientation during confinement.
(4) Families of prisoners may have no means of support and a program of care and reeducation should be initiated to administer adequate support.

d. Special handling is required for captured nationals of a sponsoring power. This handling will normally include the segregation of these personnel from other captured enemy. The interrogation of these prisoners may produce information of strategic value.

Section III. SECURITY MEASURES

62. Troop, Installation, and Community Security

a. In areas threatened by a guerrilla force, security measures must be taken to safeguard the military personnel, military and civilian installations, and key communities. Vigilant security and sound defensive measures will not only minimize our losses, but will tend to discourage guerrilla force operations.

b. Troop security is a command responsibility and function. All elements of the military unit must be thoroughly briefed on known or suspected guerrilla forces. Combat security measures, including extensive patrolling, are employed on the march, during halts, and while in the combat base to minimize losses from guerrilla ambushes and attacks. Troops in rear areas may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance even though guerrillas threaten them with dangers as great as those in the forward areas. Commanders of units which have not experienced or witnessed a guerrilla attack must exercise methodical supervision to maintain security discipline. Since guerrilla operations may be spasmodic, long quiet periods will further tend to reduce security vigilance.

c. Supply discipline must be strictly enforced, and it must be emphasized to troops that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away will be recovered by the guerrillas and used against our forces. Arms and equipment must be salvaged from battle areas and from civilians who have collected them.

d. Command posts and administrative support installations are secured from guerrilla attacks and sabotage. Special attention is given to the security of arms, ammunition, and other equipment of critical value to the enemy force. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for command posts and trains installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Installations are grouped together so they may be guarded as a unit. To further conserve personnel, maximum use is made of physical obstacles and aids such as wire, mines, alarms, illumination, searchlights, and restricted areas. Fields of fire are cleared and field fortifications are constructed for guards and security forces. The guard or security system should be supplemented by a vigorous patrol system.

e. All soldiers, including headquarters personnel, are trained in tactics to be used against guerrilla forces. Specially trained dogs may be used with guards and patrols. Rigid security means are enforced on native labor to include screening, identification, and supervision as a defense against sabotage within installations. All security measures are kept on a "ready" basis, and all personnel keep their weapons available for instant use.

f. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent guerrilla forces from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense.

63. Security of Lines of Communication

a. A Military unit may be required to secure the lines of communication in its assigned area or given the primary mission of securing a major route or network of routes by a higher headquarters. Lines of communication are difficult to secure in guerrilla-infested areas. Limited manpower usually prevents complete security of long lines of communication.

b. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured by establishing defined areas of responsibility from theater command (or corresponding echelon of command) down through subordinate commands such as the field armies, the communication zone commands, the area commands, and down to and including the company. Standing operating procedures are normally published by theater or the corresponding echelon of command.
c. Within the areas threatened by hostile guerrilla forces, security measures are taken to protect designated installations, repair and maintenance crews, and rail traffic. Important installations such as bridges, underpasses, tunnels, water towers, marshalling yards, and roundhouses are secured. The right-of-way and area within 300 meters of the tracks may be declared and posted as a restricted zone. Civilian inhabitants living within this zone are evacuated and unauthorized persons are prohibited from entering. Underbrush and thick forests are cleared from both sides of the roadbed. Static security posts, including blockhouses, may be established along the right-of-way. Frequent ground and aerial patrols are conducted along the routes and to the flanks to discourage trespassing in the restricted zone, to detect mines and sabotage along the roadbed, and to give warning of guerrilla activities. Armored railroad cars may be used to supplement patrolling. Railway inspection, maintenance, and repair crews are provided with armed security detachments to defend them against guerrilla attack.

d. When passing through areas of likely ambush (ravines, defiles, forests, or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush), automatic weapons may keep up continuous fire to the flanks until the danger area is passed. Flame throwers may also be used to an advantage in this role. In addition to preventing a possible ambush, they clear out heavy underbrush and prevent the site from being used in future operations. Such fire is opened only on the command of the convoy commander. For added protection against sabotage and mines, an engine pushing cars loaded with rocks and earth may be run ahead of important trains. Other techniques will be devised to counter successful guerrilla interdiction as opportunities arise. Security detachments guarding the right of way have their own communications system which is tied in to the administrative railway communications system.

e. Highway through hostile guerrilla areas are secured by the applicable methods listed above for the security of railway rights-of-way. Lone vehicles and convoys not capable of providing their own security are grouped together and escorted through danger areas by armed security detachments. All traffic through danger areas is controlled by traffic control stations.

64. Security of a Convoy with a Strong Security Detachment (Fig. 12)

a. Special combined arms teams may be organized and trained to accompany and protect convoys in hostile guerrilla areas. The force is organized with adequate combat power to successfully counter guerrilla raids and ambushes. The size and composition of the detachment will vary with the topography, the capability of the hostile force, and the size and composition of the convoy. In any case, the security detachment should have the following subordinate elements:

(1) A headquarters element to provide the command, communication, and medical facilities.

(2) An armored element (if available) to provide increased firepower and shock action.

(3) A mechanized or motorized infantry element.

(4) A combat engineer element to supplement the combat forces, make minor bridge and road repairs, and detect and remove mines and obstacles.

b. The combined arms team is usually organized into a holding element and an attacking element.

c. Before entering the danger area, the convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed. The commander is briefed on the latest information about the area through which he is to pass. He formulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for action if the guerrilla force attacks the convoy. All elements are briefed to act initially according to prearranged plans, as there will seldom be enough warning for orders to be issued on the road. If the infantry is motorized, the canvas covers on the trucks are removed and tailgates are left down. When practical, personnel are entrucked in such a way they can detruck rapidly into their pre-drilled formations. Arms and ammunition are readied for immediate action, and senior noncommissioned officers are charged with the responsibility of
keeping alert the personnel in their vehicles when passing through danger areas.

d. The formation of a security detachment and its integration into a convoy may and should be varied. Guerrillas may be expected to observe convoy habits and prepare their ambushes to cope with the expected formations. The holding element is distributed to provide close-in defense throughout the convoy. If available, tanks lead the convoy to gain maximum advantage from their mobility and firepower. If no tanks are available, a heavy vehicle with sandbags placed on the floor beneath personnel should lead the convoy.

e. A strong attack element is placed on the rear of the convoy formation where it can have maximum flexibility in moving forward to attack any guerrilla force attempting to ambush the head or center of the convoy.
f. Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance or armed Army aircraft and may have tactical air support on call.

g. An advance-guard formation preceding the convoy is normally ineffective against guerrilla ambushes. The guerrilla force will allow the advance guard to pass the site of the main ambush, and then block the road and deal with the main body and the advance guard separately.

h. When hostile guerrillas are the governing factor, the convoy speed is kept slow (15 to 25 km per hr.) in areas of likely ambushes. When passing through these areas (ravines, defiles, forests, or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush), automatic weapons may be used to keep up continuous fire to the flanks until the danger area is passed. Fire, however, is opened only on the order of the convoy commander.

i. At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles stop, taking care to remain in the tracks on the vehicle in front. No effort is made to clear the road by driving to its side or shoulders, which may be mined. Personnel, other than the driver and assistant driver, dismount as rapidly as possible, not waiting for the vehicle to come to a stop. Drivers turn off ignitions, brake their vehicles to a stop, set the hand brake, and leave the vehicle in gear before detrucking. Assistant drivers are alert to assist in case the driver becomes a casualty.

j. Upon dismounting, personnel take cover and open vigorous fire on the suspected targets. Tanks (if available) open fire and maneuver to the most favorable ground in the immediate vicinity.

k. While the holding element conducts its action to protect the convoy, the commander rapidly surveys the situation and issues orders to the attack element at the rear of the convoy to begin one of its pre-drilled offensive maneuvers against the guerrilla force, preferably an envelopment. The fire of the holding element is coordinated with the attacking element by prearranged communications.

l. After driving off the guerrilla force, security details are posted to cover the reorganization of the convoy. The convoy commander reports by radio and gives a brief account of the engagement either to his commander or to a traffic control station. Captured guerrillas are interrogated about the location of the rendezvous where the guerrilla unit is to reassemble.

m. After an ambush, patrols may be sent to interrogate and, if necessary, apprehend civilians living near or along the routes of approach to the ambush positions.

65. Security of a Convoy with a Weak Security Detachment

a. If the security detachment accompanying a convoy is not strong enough for decisive action against a guerrilla attack or ambush, the following instructions apply:

(1) Part of the available troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and the remainder are placed to follow the convoy by about 3 minutes.

(2) Radio contact is maintained between the two groups if possible.

(3) A fairly fast speed is maintained. Defiles are traversed at the maximum safe speed. Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areas where slow speeds are necessary, are reconniètered by foot troops before passage.

(4) At the first indication of ambush while the convoy is in motion, leading vehicles, if the road appears clear, increase speed to the maximum consistent with safety in an effort to smash through the ambush area.

(5) Drivers or assistant drivers of vehicles disabled by enemy mines or fire seek to direct their vehicles to the sides or off the roads so vehicles in the rear may continue through.

(6) Troops from vehicles stopped in the ambush area dismount and return fire. Troops from vehicles breaking through the ambush dismount and attack back against the flanks of the ambush position. The rear guard of the convoy, upon learning the main body has been ambushed, dismounts and attacks forward against the flanks of the ambush position. Both attacking groups exercise care that they do not fire on each other.

(7) If the guerrilla force allows the main convoy to pass through and then am-
bushes the rear guard, troops from the main body return and relieve the rear guard by an attack against the flanks of the ambush position.

b. Since there will seldom be time for the issuance of orders after the ambush is discovered, the actions of the security detachment are rehearsed by drills prior to the departure of the convoy. If the security element is overrun, individual elements should take action to destroy supplies rather than allow the guerrillas to capture them.

c. The use of reconnaissance Army aircraft for surveillance of routes immediately forward of a convoy will often provide adequate early warning of impending danger to the front. If such warning is received, the security detachment may move forward from its positions within the convoy and engage the located enemy force prior to the arrival of the convoy in the danger area.

66. Counterambush (Fig. 13)

a. Since the ambush is a tactic used extensively by guerrilla forces, any force operating against guerrillas must be extremely adept in conducting counterambush actions. It must be realized that a unit caught in an ambush is at a tremendous disadvantage and must react without the slightest hesitation in order to avoid annihilation. Counterambush techniques are conducted in training as immediate action drills until each member of a unit will respond almost instinctively when first fired upon.

b. There are two general techniques which can be effectively employed in countering ambushes. They are—

(1) The element which receives the initial burst of enemy fire takes cover and immediately returns a maximum volume of fire. As this element attempts to gain fire superiority, the elements which have escaped the initial burst of enemy fire immediately begin pre-drilled maneuvers against the flanks and rear of the enemy ambush without further orders.

(2) The second technique is to have the element which is initially fired upon return the fire and immediately assault the enemy positions. This technique requires extensive training and an unusual alertness of the friendly force. However, this action tends to astound and confuse the enemy and, in most cases, will cause him to panic at the apparently mad and reckless action, thereby aiding the unit in more rapidly achieving success with fewer casualties. Such a course of action will seriously hinder the enemy's withdrawal and may force him to remain in the area until friendly reinforcements arrive.

67. Conventional Defense

a. In the latter stages of development, a guerrilla force may have reached the point in size, organization, training, and equipment where it can employ combat power approximating that of conventional forces. At this time, the force can be expected to turn its attention to the seizure and control of large areas of the country involved. At this point, the operations become conventional in nature and the opposing force will conduct coordinated attacks to seize and control the enemy-held terrain.

b. Defense against such coordinated attacks will be planned and executed by the military force in accordance with the doctrine prescribed in the FM 7-series for conventional operations.
Figure 13. Counterambush by fire and maneuver.
CHAPTER 5
COMBAT OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

68. General
a. Combat operations are those operations conducted against a guerrilla force (or elements of the underground which have incited large-scale organized riots) to seize and hold urban areas. If any portion of the assigned area of a unit is a RED area (under effective control of the guerrillas), priority must be to these operations to harass and destroy the guerrilla force. Figure 14 shows a brigade area of operations in which the majority of the combat power of the brigade has been employed in operations within the RED areas.

b. Normally, the presence of civilians within the area of operations will dictate the continued conduct of police operations concurrently with combat operations against the guerrilla force.

69. Decentralization
Combat actions against guerrilla forces are extremely decentralized until sizeable guerrilla elements have been located. Even then, operations are centralized only to the degree necessary to effect the destruction of the located enemy force. A continuous distribution of force in depth is necessary.

Section II. HARASSMENT OF THE GUERRILLA FORCE

70. General
a. At the start of combat operations against a guerrilla force, the location and strength of the elements of the enemy will seldom be known. If they are known, offensive operations may be initiated against them immediately. Normally, however, an extended program of harassment by the military force is necessary to—

(1) Locate the guerrilla force.
(2) Inflict casualties.
(3) Gain detailed knowledge of the terrain.
(4) Restrict the freedom of action of the guerrillas.
(5) Force the guerrilla force to consolidate or cease operations.
(6) Establish friendly control over areas of operations.

b. While the harassment operations against the enemy may continue for weeks and months, they are nevertheless necessary, unless the location and size of the elements of the enemy guerrilla force are known in enough detail to permit immediate offensive operations.

c. Once the area under the control of the guerrilla force has been definitely determined, harassment operations are restricted to this area. They are conducted primarily by the use of—

(1) Reconnaissance patrols (par. 73) to locate guerrilla units and bases.
(2) Combat patrols (par. 74) and raids (par. 76) against known and suspected enemy bases, installations, patrols, and outposts.
(3) Aerial "hunter-killer" teams (par. 75).
(4) Ambushes (par. 77).
(5) Marking targets.
(6) Mining probable guerrilla routes of communication.
(7) Continuous aerial surveillance.

d. During the conduct of this harassment (fig. 15), the majority of the elements of the rifle companies combating the guerrilla force will operate from forward patrol bases in the company subsectors and maintain continuous pressure on the enemy force.
Figure 14. Schematic brigade area of operations for combat operations.
These harassing operations are conducted day and night. Operations at night are directed primarily at guerrillas moving about on tactical and administrative missions. Operations during the day are directed primarily at guerrillas in their encampments while resting, regrouping, or training.

71. Use of Reaction Forces

a. When a guerrilla element is located during harassing operations, the friendly force making contact with it engages the enemy and destroys it if it has sufficient combat power. If it does not have sufficient combat power, it maintains contact with the encountered enemy and requests assistance from its parent unit. This unit rapidly deploys its reaction force or forces from other sectors or subsectors (preferably by Army aircraft) to engage and destroy the guerrilla force.

b. Often the immediate reaction to hastily discovered guerrilla forces will consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop the enemy force and cut it off from the rear. Once the escape of the guerrilla force has been blocked, it may be destroyed by the pursuing force. The mobility required to conduct such a pursuit is provided by ground and air vehicles and by accelerated foot movement.

c. Throughout operations against guerrilla forces, unit commanders at all levels continually establish priority assumptions as to what action the guerrilla force may take in each situation and prepare plans for decisive reaction to each assumed enemy action. These plans are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Since the guerrilla is most active during the hours of darkness, it must be assumed that most reaction plans will be conducted during the same period. A current list of possible guerrilla targets must be maintained. Common targets may include important road and railroad junctions, defiles, bridges, homes of important persons, key military and police installations, key communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and commercial establishments.

d. Priority of use of Army aircraft must be to the movement of the reaction forces. Depending on the situation, the aircraft may be habitually located with the reaction forces of the battalions and companies. In any case, there should be a minimal delay between a request for assistance from a reaction force and its airmobile or airborne deployment into the required area of operations. It is imperative that commanders realize that all the extensive harassing operations conducted to locate a guerrilla force and all the police operations conducted to secure troops, installations, communities, and lines of communication are for naught if the unit cannot react immediately with sufficient combat power (reaction forces) to destroy contacted elements of the guerrilla force. It is the extensive use of airmobile and airborne forces which will primarily give the unit this capability of immediate reaction.

e. For simplicity, reaction to sizeable consolidated enemy forces which have been located are called OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS and discussed separately in paragraphs 78 through 88.

72. Patrol Bases

a. Patrol bases are temporary bases established throughout the area of responsibility of a company from which platoons and squads of the unit conduct harassing patrols, raids, and ambushes.

b. Patrol bases are carefully sited and should not be occupied for more than 48 hours. They primarily depend on the secrecy of the location for security.

c. When a patrol base is occupied, the personnel are disposed in a perimeter defense for maximum security.

d. The following deceptive measures may be taken to counter enemy intelligence efforts to locate the base:

1. All movements to the base are made at night if possible.

2. Daylight movements to the base are made by infiltration.

3. Local civilians who inadvertently discover the location of the base are detained until the base is moved.

4. Bases are located in difficult areas away from all trails and paths.
(5) Fires should be avoided or used only as necessary.

(6) Noise discipline is scrupulously observed in the vicinity of the base.

(7) Civilian footwear may be carried by personnel and used to replace combat boots in the vicinity of the base to preclude leaving identifying boot prints on the ground.

e. Figure 16 shows a typical platoon patrol base.
f. All small rifle units should have an SOP established for the immediate occupation of a patrol base utilizing the clock system. When this SOP is understood, each individual in a unit can move immediately to his relative position on initial arrival at the base area. He knows his area of responsibility and the men on his right and left. The use of this SOP will eliminate large adjustments of the defensive perimeter of the base.

g. The initial occupation of a patrol base should always be preceded by action to ascertain the area is clear of enemy and civilian personnel. This is accomplished by dispatching a security detachment into the area ahead of the remainder of the unit. Additional security measures may consist of several small patrols dispatched from the patrol base to make reconnaissance of the surrounding area. This reconnaissance would locate all avenues of approach into the patrol base and provide intelligence of the surrounding area.

73. Reconnaissance Patrols

a. The effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations can be measured by the amount and reliability of intelligence the military force collects or otherwise has available to it. Extensive reconnaissance patrols provide an effective information gathering agency available to the commander.

b. A reconnaissance patrol is one dispatched specifically for the purpose of collecting information. Whenever possible, it avoids contact with the enemy and will usually conduct decisive combat only as a means of self-preservation. A reconnaissance patrol is normally small, composed of from two to five members who avoid contact and move by stealth. Some means of avoiding contact with civilians who might compromise the security of the patrol are—

   (1) Movement by night.
   (2) Movement of the patrol in civilian transport.
   (3) Use of indirect circuitous routes.
   (4) Introduction of a patrol into the area of concern by the use of helicopters, boats, parachute, etc.

c. For detailed techniques of patrolling, see FM 21–50 and FM 21–75.

74. Combat Patrols

a. Combat patrols may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced company. They generally seek out and attempt to destroy elements of the guerrilla force. Missions for a combat patrol may be to—

   (1) Attack guerrilla camps or bases.
   (2) Pursue guerrillas after contact has been made.
   (3) Execute an ambush.
   (4) Dominate an area to deny its use to the guerrilla force.
   (5) Search remote areas.
   (6) Screen and clear villages.

b. In patrolling relatively inaccessible areas such as swamps and jungles, aid to and evacuation of casualties should be planned. The preselection of drop and/or landing zones will often be necessary. Often the patrols may be required to prepare these drop and/or landing zones.

c. Combat patrols may be particularly extended in operations against guerrilla forces. They may last for days, especially in underdeveloped areas. It is essential that only the necessary items of clothing and equipment be carried, since any excess carried only constitutes an overload and impedes the mobility of the patrol. Consideration must be given in advance to the items of special equipment the patrol needs to accomplish its mission. Such equipment may often include highly sophisticated items such as infrared devices and radar equipment. In jungle terrain, it is normally preferable to arm a combat patrol with a preponderance of automatic weapons and shotguns to compensate for the limited visibility and short fields of fire. Fragmentation grenades are also used extensively in the jungle.

d. Combat patrols are extensively covered in FM 21–50 and 21–75.

75. Aerial “Hunter-killer” Teams

a. The employment of aerial “hunter-killer” teams mounted in armed helicopters utilizes both the mobility and firepower of these craft to the maximum and will have a decidedly depreciating effect on the morale of the force.

b. “Hunter-killer” teams may be employed in two general ways:
NOTE: OUTPOST MAY UTILIZE SOUND-POWERED TELEPHONES FOR COMMUNICATION.

Figure 16. Type platoon patrol base.
(1) **Aerial search.** Utilizing this technique, the team flies over an assigned area or route in search of elements of the guerrilla force. When the enemy is located, it may be engaged from the air or the members of the team may land and engage the enemy on the ground, utilizing the maximum the aerial fire support of the helicopter(s). The technique has little value over thinly-vegetated areas and should be limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justify their use and then only in conjunction with ground operations.

(2) **Ground search.** Utilizing this technique, the helicopter(s) lands in an assigned area suspected of containing hostile guerrilla elements. The personnel unload, screen the area, and engage located guerrilla elements, using the fire support of the helicopters. The personnel then reload and move to the next assigned area and repeat the same process. Members of these teams should be trained in tracking procedures and may follow guerrillas to their base. If they encounter a superior force, the reaction force is called in.

c. "Hunter-killer" teams in armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for destruction-type raids on known enemy installations, using to the maximum the inherent firepower and mobility of the craft. They can move in, strike the objective, and move out without a great deal of preparation or support from other sources.

76. Raids (Fig. 17)

a. A raid is a surprise attack on an enemy unit or installation, followed by withdrawal of the attacking force after the accomplishment of the mission. Counterguerrilla operations, by their very nature, offer numerous opportunities for the utilization of raid techniques. A raid has little chance for success unless it is based on accurate, up-to-date, and detailed information of the area, unit, or installation to be raided.

b. The success of a raid ultimately depends on surprise. This can best be obtained by attacking when and where the enemy least expects it, due to inclement weather, limited visibility, or the use of terrain considered impassable.

c. The composition of the raiding force may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced battalion. The raiding force is normally organized into an assault element and a security element. Larger raiding forces may have a support element. (For additional information on the composition and organization of a raiding force, see FM 21-75.)

d. The use of airborne and airmobile troops enhances the chances of absolute surprise in a raid. The technique of parachuting troops at night into an objective area with a daylight after-action pickup by helicopters from pre-selected landing zones (LZ's) offers a variety of targets far behind enemy lines or in areas which the enemy considers relatively secure from such attacks. However, the area must be one in which the troops can easily locate themselves once on the ground and measures must be taken to ensure accurate delivery.

77. Ambush

a. An ambush is a surprise attack upon a moving or temporarily halted enemy with the mission of destroying or capturing the enemy force.

b. Ambushes are effective for the destruction or capture of—

(1) Guerrilla leaders.
(2) Guerrilla patrols.
(3) Guerrilla raiding parties (before or after the raid).
(4) Guerrilla forces being driven toward the ambush by other friendly forces.
(5) Targets of opportunity.

c. There are two types of ambushes, deliberate ambushes and ambushes of opportunity. These are discussed in FM 21-75; however, they may require modification in many instances.

(1) **Deliberate ambush.**

(a) When inadequate intelligence exists, an area ambush may be established with several deliberate ambushes located along likely avenues of approach or withdrawal (fig. 18).
Figure 17. Typical raid patrol in vicinity of objective.
(b) When adequate intelligence exists, a deliberate ambush may be established at a specific point on a particular avenue of approach or withdrawal (fig. 19).

(2) Ambush of opportunity.
(a) A patrol may be directed to move an area, select an ambush site, and ambush the first profitable target that appears.
(b) A patrol may, if it sees the enemy first, quickly establish an ambush to surprise and destroy them. This will require prior training to enable immediate execution.

d. The ambush force is composed of an assault element and a security element.
(1) The security element protects the assault element and covers the avenues of approach into the ambush site which may be used by the enemy to reinforce the ambushed forces. This element also covers the withdrawal of the assault element after the ambush is completed and guards the rallying point. It normally does not participate in the attack on the ambushed enemy.
(2) The assault element captures or destroys the enemy. It is composed of the ambush commander; the killing group whose mission is to kill or capture the enemy within predesignated sectors of fire of the established killing zone; the search party from the killing group whose mission it is to search the dead and wounded for documents and pick up weapons, ammunition, and equipment; and the front and rear stop groups who prevent the enemy from escaping through the front or rear of the killing zone. The ambush element commander determines when to open fire. In close terrain, this may be on sight; in open terrain, it may be on a predetermined signal or when the enemy has reached a predesignated point. In any case, the accurate, rapid commencement of fire is essential to success. Sectors of fire into the ambushed enemy are predesignated to ensure that the entire enemy element is covered by fire. Enfilade fire is desirable. The enemy is allowed no avenue of escape once he is trapped. If the ambushed enemy force is a vehicular element, initial fire is delivered against the front or rear vehicle, whichever is at weakest point of the ambush site. If both front and rear are equally strong, fire is delivered against the trail vehicle first.
(3) After the ambush, a hasty search of the ambushed area is made by predetermined individuals for documents, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. If the equipment is too heavy to carry, it should be destroyed. The assault element then moves rapidly to the rallying point, covered and followed by the security element.

e. Factors essential to the successful execution of an ambush are—
(1) A good plan. The plan for a deliberate ambush must provide for every course of action the enemy is capable of adopting and must be rehearsed in detail. Plans must be as well rehearsed as the situation permits. They must take into consideration the length of the target. A single platoon, moving in a column of two's with 5 meters between men, spreads more than 100 meters from front to rear. A convoy of 10 vehicles, with 50 meters interval, covers a road distance of more than 500 meters.
(2) Control. Very close control must be maintained in executing an ambush. This is best achieved through rehearsals and establishment and maintenance of good communications.
(3) Patience. A patrol may be forced to occupy an ambush site well ahead of the arrival of the target. Patience is essential if secrecy is to be maintained.
(4) Camouflage. The key to a successful ambush is surprise. Surprise cannot be achieved if men, weapons, and equipment are not well camouflaged and camouflage discipline enforced.
(5) *Information of the enemy.* However sketchy information of the enemy may be, it must be used to the fullest in plans, preparation, and execution.

*f.* The size and organization of an ambush patrol depend on the purpose of the ambush, the force to be ambushed, and the weapons and equipment with which the ambush will be executed.

*g.* Equipment carried by ambush patrols varies with the assigned mission. For example, more equipment is needed to ambush an enemy vehicular convoy than a foot column. Since the success of ambush patrols depends on surprise...
LEGEND

- SECURITY ELEMENT

Figure 19. Point ambush.
and shock action, sufficient automatic weapons are needed to deliver a heavy volume of fire. This is especially true when ambushing foot elements. In addition to automatic weapons, vehicular targets require antitank weapons, demolitions, antitank and antipersonnel mines, and incendiary grenades. The use of flame throwers or fougasse mines is particularly suited to ambush operations, and provides illumination of the enemy for night operations. Smoke is effective against tanks. Adequate communications are of great importance to ensure a smoothly coordinated ambush. Radios are an excellent means, but the use of field telephones should be considered because of increased reliability and security offered. If available, the entire ambush force may be equipped with infrared devices.

b. An "ideal" ambush site restricts the enemy on all sides, confining him to an area where he can be quickly and completely destroyed. Unfortunately, it is seldom possible to prepare an "ideal" ambush site and completely restrict the enemy. Natural restrictions or obstacles such as cliffs, streams, embankments, or steep grades which force vehicles to slow down are used whenever possible. Artificial restriction such as barbed wire, mines, long bamboo spears placed in the underbrush, and cratered roads are used not only to confine the enemy to the desired area, but also to inflict casualties.

i. The manner in which an ambush is executed depends primarily on whether its purpose is harassment or damage. To a lesser degree, the manner of execution is determined by whether the ambush is deliberate or an ambush of opportunity.

1. When the primary purpose is harassment, the area is sealed off to prevent reinforcement and escape of the enemy. Maximum damage is inflicted with demolitions and automatic weapons fire. A very heavy volume of fire is delivered for a short time and a withdrawal is made quickly and quietly. No assault is made and physical contact is avoided.

2. When the primary purpose is damage, the area is sealed off with security teams. Maximum damage is inflicted with demolitions, antitank weapons, and automatic weapons fire from the support team or element. Fires are lifted or shifted and an assault with heavy fire and great violence is conducted to complete destruction. The assault team provides security on the far side while designated teams kill or capture personnel and destroy vehicles and equipment. On a command or by prearranged signal, all elements withdraw to the objective rallying point and move out quickly.

3. When the primary purpose is to obtain supplies or capture equipment, security teams seal off the area. Demolitions and weapons are used to disable vehicles, but not to destroy them. The assault team must use care to ensure its fire does not damage the supplies or equipment you seek to capture. Designated teams secure the desired items. Other teams then destroy vehicles and equipment if desired.

Section III. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

78. General

a. Once a sizeable guerrilla force has been definitely located, priority of all available combat power is given to offensive operations to eliminate the enemy. Offensive operations normally require a friendly force much larger than the located guerrilla force. The brigade, battalion, and company may conduct offensive operations or participate in the conduct of such operations by larger units. In large-scale offensive operations, the brigade and division reaction forces (reserves) are normally the basic offensive units employed. Offensive operations are extremely difficult to execute and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops must be well briefed and rehearsed.

b. Since the immediate application of combat power is usually necessary to effectively engage and destroy a located guerrilla force before it disperses, emphasis must be placed on the use
of airmobile and airborne forces for the conduct of these operations whenever possible.

c. The encirclement of a guerrilla force usually offers the most effective means to fix it in position and ultimately destroy it. However, if lack of time, inadequate forces, or the terrain prevents or does not favor an encirclement, it may prove successful to conduct surprise attacks against the enemy and follow them up immediately with aggressive pursuit ("screen" the area). The extensive use of armed Army aircraft in this attack makes maximum utilization of their mobility and firepower.

d. The techniques for the conduct of these operations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

e. After a successful attack on a resistance force, the area is always combed for supplies, equipment, and documents.

79. Enticement To Surrender

a. Whenever tactically feasible, the psychological warfare technique of using broadcasts and leaflets should be utilized in an effort to entice a located and fixed guerrilla force to surrender prior to the conduct of offensive operations against it. This technique has proven effective historically and should never be disregarded. A captured guerrilla is as effectively destroyed as a dead one.

b. Commanders are cautioned not to use these techniques when the success of the offensive operations against the enemy depends on surprise. Normally, the guerrilla force should be encircled with all exit routes denied to the enemy before an attempt is made to entice him to surrender.

80. Combat in Urban Areas

a. Since built-up areas are the most unfavorable terrain for an overt combat element of a guerrilla force, it will not normally choose to fight in these areas until it has reached the latter phases of its organizational development and has strength and capability comparable to the conventional force. However, underground elements in cities and towns often incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect street barricades, and resist attempts to enter the area. Nonparticipants caught in the area are usually held as hostages.

b. The objectives of these operations may be solely to conduct resistance, or, more probably, to commit the counterguerrilla force to actions against the civil population which will result in a gain of sympathizers for the guerrilla force and make it appear that it is promoting a popular cause.

c. When an urban area has been seized, it must be reduced as soon as possible to prevent an apparent success or victory by the guerrilla force, to maintain popular support for the friendly cause, and to free troops for use elsewhere.

d. The tactics of reducing a barricaded built-up area (fig. 21) resembles the conventional tactics of normal street and house-to-house fighting.

e. A cordon is established to surround and seal the barricaded area. The cordon is established at the next street or road out from the barricaded area which offers good visibility, fields of fire, and ease of movement. All unauthorized persons are cleared from the intervening area. The cordon controls all entrance/exit of the encircled area.

f. Announcements are made to the insurgents by such means as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets, that the area will be attacked at a given time unless the insurgents lay down their arms, return their hostages safely, and surrender peacefully. Amnesty and protection may be offered to those who surrender prior to the attack.

g. During the period between the time of the announcement and the time of the attack, a show of force in the vicinity of the barricaded area will assist in impressing on the insurgents the hopelessness of defending against the forthcoming attack. This show of force may be accomplished by airlifting or parachuting the attack units into their attack positions as early as possible, by firing indirect fire into uninhabited areas on the fringe of the barricaded area, and by making all overt preparation for the attack as obvious to the insurgents as possible. Tanks and armored personnel carriers
(if available) with their inherent massiveness, are very good show of force weapons.

h. If the insurgents do not surrender, maneuver and fire support elements attack at the prescribed time and clear the area as rapidly as possible with a minimum of killing and destruction of property. The cordon remains in place to maintain security, support the attack by fire where possible, and receive prisoners and rescued hostages from the attacking elements.

i. If the area is large, it is either divided into sectors for control purposes or the attack is controlled by the use of progressive phase lines. As each sector or phase line is cleared, the cordon moves to exclude it. Close surveillance of cleared areas is maintained in case underground
passageways are used as escape routes. Succeeding sectors are attacked and cleared one at a time.

j. Commanders must be alert to the psychological aftereffects of an offensive operation against a barricaded urban area. In any case, innocent civilian adults and children will probably be killed and wounded by the action. The guerrilla force will attempt in every way possible to exploit this fact to the utmost to arouse hatred by the civil population for the counter-guerrilla force. A very effective means available to counter such psychological warfare efforts lies in the effective use of the loudspeaker announcements and leaflets prior to the attack. These announcements and leaflets categorically state to the insurgents and the remainder of the civilian population that in the forthcoming attack, (1) civilians will probably be killed or wounded, and (2) the responsibility for such actions rests entirely on the insurgents, who may surrender and negate the necessity for such action.

k. Chemical and biological munitions are particularly effective for area coverage of built-up areas. Incapacitating agents may be used when temporary effects are desired.

81. Encirclement

a. Of all the possible offensive actions open to a counterguerrilla force, the encirclement offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing a guerrilla force in position and achieving decisive results. By the same token, it is one of the most difficult operations to conduct. The brigade, battalion, and company may conduct an encirclement or participate in an encirclement conducted by a larger unit.

b. The encirclement requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops. However, firepower, aerial reconnaissance, surprise, and the use of strong airmobile reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

c. The prior planning, preparation, and execution of an encirclement are aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the enemy. Normally, maximum security and surprise can be gained by occupying the line of encirclement during the hours of dark-ness. The encirclement should be completed by daylight.

d. The initial encircling movements (fig. 21) are executed with alacrity to maximize surprise. Maximum use of airmobile and airborne troops will contribute speed to the early phases of the encirclement. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions. It is preferable that the entire line of encirclement be occupied simultaneously, if possible. If a simultaneous occupation is not possible, the best escape routes are covered first. This initial occupation of the line of encirclement is the most critical period of the operation. If large guerrilla formations realize during this period that they are encircled, they can be expected to react immediately and violently. The guerrillas will probe for gaps and attack weak points to force a gap. Escape routes may be deliberately established as ambushes. Continuously throughout the encirclement, the guerrillas will attempt to escape from the area either individually or in small parties. Difficult terrain should not be considered a barrier to guerrilla forces, but must also be patrolled. Guerrillas will often select the most difficult terrain, such as a swamp for an escape route, since the possibility of being detected is less.

e. From the outset of the occupation of the initial line of encirclement, the units occupying the encircling positions provide strong combat patrols well to their front so early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received. If strong combat patrols are not utilized, the minimum security required is an outpost line with a multiple of listening posts.

f. Strong mobile reaction forces are positioned behind the line of encirclement ready for immediate movement to any portion of the line threatened by a guerrilla breakout. After the emplacement of the units on the line of encirclement, priority of all airlift support should be to these reaction forces.

g. Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an impending encirclement operation by gaining and maintaining the guerrillas' attention through effective destruction and harassing fires while the encircling units occupy the initial line of encirclement. Such deception plans should be incorporated whenever possible.
Fires should be planned in detail to support the encirclement after it is discovered by the enemy.

h. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

1. Enticement to surrender.
2. Tightening the noose (contraction of the encirclement).
3. Fragmenting the disc.
4. Hammer and anvil.

82. Tightening the Noose (Fig. 22)

a. This technique of culminating an encirclement operation is characterized by a coordinated shortening of the line of encirclement by the convergence of friendly troops into the encircled area. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces.
b. Sometimes against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by this progressive protraction of the line of encirclement. However, against larger enemy forces, it is much more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

c. It is sometimes feasible, after the contraction of the line of encirclement to a "critical mass," to establish counterguerrilla "killing zones" and let the enemy "escape" into them.

83. Fragmenting the Disc (Fig. 23)

a. After the line of encirclement has been contracted until a "critical mass" has been achieved, one effective way to continue the attack and annihilate the enemy is by "fragmenting the disc." By this technique, the guerrilla force is split by offensive action into successively smaller units until the destruction of the fragmented unit has been accomplished.

b. Difficulties in conducting such an operation include:
(1) Closely controlling the use of supporting weapons and movements of troops during small-unit linkups.

(2) Massing sufficient strength to effect the operation.

(3) Possible fanatical reaction by the guerrilla force, resulting in increased casualties.

84. Hammer and Anvil (Fig. 24)

a. This "blacksmith-type operation," long a tactic of conventional warfare, is an effective technique for annihilating the enemy after an encirclement has been contracted to a "critical mass."

b. This technique utilizes two forces, one to hold the enemy in position (the anvil), and one to force the guerrilla force against the anvil element by offensive action and annihilate it with crushing pressure (the hammer element). Either element may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the forces composing the hammer element, while the anvil serves predominantly as a blocking force holding the guerrilla force in place.
c. Emplacement of the hammer element can best be accomplished by airmobile or airborne troops. It is desirable to emplace the hammer force as late in the operation as possible in an effort to gain surprise and thus effect greater confusion among the guerrilla force on discovery of the strong thrust being made against it.

d. Aerial reconnaissance should be continuous during the attack so mobile reserves may be moved as early as possible to potentially threatened areas.

e. This technique is most profitably employed when the blocking (or anvil) element is located on, or immediately in rear of, a natural terrain obstacle. This gives more strength to the blocking position.

85. Pursuit (Sweep) (Fig. 25)

a. When contact is made with a guerrilla force, the probable reaction of the guerrilla force will be to inflict the maximum casualties on the regular force without becoming decisively engaged, and then flee the scene of action. This method of operation dictates that military forces operating against guerrilla forces be particularly adept in the conduct of pursuits.

b. A pursuit is the maintenance of contact with, and the continuation of offensive action against, a fleeing enemy. It may be conducted by any size force. However, often the unit that makes the initial contact with a guerrilla force will require rapid augmentation to maintain pressure against the fleeing force, envelop it, and eventually effect its destruction.

c. A force conducting a pursuit is normally organized into two elements, the direct pressure force, and the encircling force(s). The direct pressure force pursues the enemy and maintains constant offensive pressure on him as he withdraws. The encircling force(s), employing superior mobility (preferably by using airmobile or airborne forces), conducts local envelopments (single or double) to cut him off and destroy him. The brigade and subordinate units may conduct a pursuit or participate in the conduct of a pursuit by a larger force.

d. The superior mobility may be gained by the use of more trafficable terrain, fresh troops, superior knowledge of the area, motorized or mechanized vehicles (if terrain permits), airmobile and airborne troops, and water craft.

e. Reaction forces of all units are prepared to move out on a moment's notice to conduct a pursuit against enemy forces located by patrols in the area or attempting to flee the scene of raids and ambushes. These forces are given the highest priority for use of available transport to ensure their delivery to the scene of action as soon as possible.

86. Rabbit Hunt (Fig. 26)

a. The "rabbit hunt" is a very effective technique for finding and destroying elements of a guerrilla force known or suspected to be in a relatively small area.

b. This technique involves the use of three forces:

(1) The hunting element. This element begins on one boundary of the area to be cleared and advances parallel to the "direction of beat" in a line formation methodically searching the area and, on finding the enemy, either destroys him or pushes him deeper into the area.

(2) The blocking or ambush forces. This force takes up static positions around the entire area to be cleared, less the side occupied by the hunting element. It engages any enemy trying to exit the area under the pressure of the advancing hunting element.

(3) Reserves. Adequate reserves are located behind both the hunting element and the blocking or ambush forces ready for employment if the enemy attempts to make a concerted breakout at any point around the area.

c. Success in this operation is gained only as a result of a scrutinizing search of the area. This requires that the personnel of the hunting element be particularly close together during their advance through the area.

d. Since the secrecy of this operation precludes the extensive preparation of fields of fire, the members of the hunting element and the blocking or ambush forces are armed predominantly with light automatic or semiautomatic
A. ENCIRCLEMENT COMPLETE

B. HAMMER ACTION INITIATED

C. FINAL CRUSHING ACTION

Figure 24. Hammer and anvil.
weapons. The use of expert riflemen with sniper rifles is very effective.

e. It is imperative that the blocking or ambush forces be kept informed of the location of “the hunter line” to ensure that friendly troops do not fire on each other.

f. In difficult terrain, each member of the hunting element may be issued a compass and ordered to advance on a given azimuth. For simplicity, the hunter element should always advance on a straight line throughout the operation.

87. Fire Flush (Fig. 27)

a. An effective variation of the “rabbit hunt” is the “fire flush.”

b. In this technique, the blocking or ambush forces encircle an area approximately 1000 meters square and await the enemy to exit the area as he is subjected to intense saturation-type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical air support. For security, the friendly troops occupy their ambush positions coincidentally with the initiation of the bombardment or as close thereto as is possible.

c. The fire flush is an effective technique to keep the guerrilla on the move in a large area. The larger area is divided into smaller 1000-meter (plus or minus) square areas, some or all of which are periodically surrounded and flushed out with fire (fig. 28).

88. Conventional Attack

a. In the latter stages of development, a guerrilla force may have reached the point in size, organization, training, and equipment where it approximates the combat power of a conventional force. At this time, the force can be expected to attempt the execution of extensive control over large areas. Any attempts to counter this control will probably be met with a conventional-type positional defense.

b. Coordinated attacks on these positional defenses will be planned and executed in accordance with the doctrine prescribed in the FM 7-series for conventional operations.
Figure 26. Rabbit hunt.
Section IV. DENIAL OF SPONSORING POWER SUPPORT

89. General

a. Operations are initiated simultaneously with other counterguerrilla operations to deny guerrilla elements the benefit of “safe havens” across international boundaries and support by an external sponsoring power. These operations require effective measures to secure extensive land border or seacoast areas and to preclude communication and supply operations (to include aerial resupply) between a sponsoring power and the enemy guerrilla forces.

b. The methods of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment whether by air, water, or land must be determined at the earliest possible time. Detailed surveillance of border areas must be conducted continuously to determine the—

(1) Location of ingress/egress routes and crossing sites.
(2) Frequency of crossing.
(3) Volume of traffic.
(4) Type of transportation.
(5) Terrain conditions.
(6) Probable locations of “safe havens” across the border.

c. Military units may be given the primary mission of preventing ingress/egress across a boundary or shoreline, or they may be required to conduct denial activities concurrently with the conduct of combat operations against the guerrilla force.

d. The surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of—

(1) Coordinated ground patrols of the shoreline.
(2) Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline and river delta areas.
(3) Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance of the offshore waters and the shoreline.
(4) Static observation posts along the shoreline in the vicinity of river mouths, good ground lines of communication, and accessible portions of the shoreline.
(5) Effective centralized control and coordination of all these activities.

(6) An effective system of licensing and identifying all friendly military and civilian watercraft using the offshore waters.

e. While certain definite portions of an international land boundary may be placed under effective surveillance and control by the use of static security posts, reaction forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and control of an entire extensive land border is extremely difficult. Since it is not possible to place military forces at all the crossing sites, a priority system for the sites requiring military forces is often established. In the following paragraphs, two operational concepts for the control of extensive land borders are discussed. They are—

(1) Restricted zone.
(2) Friendly population buffer.

90. Restricted Zone

a. Under this concept, an area of predetermined width contiguous to the border is declared a restricted area. Appropriate proclamations are issued to the civilian population so all personnel understand that any individual or group encountered in the area will be considered as an element of the enemy force if it cannot be readily identified as a member of a friendly military or paramilitary unit.

b. So far as practicable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetation and other obstacles to good observation over the area. Defoliates and earth-moving equipment may be used for this purpose. Since the clearance of the zone along the entire boundary is normally not feasible, a priority of areas for such clearance is usually necessary.

c. The restricted zone is controlled by the use of ground and aerial observers, electronic listening posts, and patrols. It is preferable that these activities be conducted by indigenous forces to economize on the available military combat power which can be better utilized in combat operations against the guerrilla force.

91. Friendly Population Buffer

a. Utilizing this concept, the civilian population in the area of operations is redistributed
RESERVE

1000 METER ($) SQUARE TARGET AREA FOR SATURATION FIRES

RESERVE

LEGEND:

BLOCKING OR AMBUSH POSITIONS

Figure 27. Fire flush.
as necessary to assure that all civilian personnel residing in the vicinity of the border are sympathetic to the friendly force. This may entail the—

(1) Screening of all personnel now settled along the border.
(2) Resettlement of those persons of doubtful sympathy along the border.
(3) Supplementary resettlement of the border area with elements of the civilian population with friendly sympathies from the interior of the area of operations.

b. The extensive resettlement of portions of the civilian population is beyond the capability of military units and must be accomplished under the supervision of civilian agencies of the national government or the local friendly government.

c. Extensive resettlement operations must be preceded by detailed economic, social, and political preparation so the socio-economic stability of the area is not endangered by the shifts in population. The conduct of these operations without such preparation can result in the following undesirable effects in the resettlement area.

(1) Political instability.
(2) Extensive unemployment.
(3) Inequities in land distribution.
(4) Inadequate public utilities.
(5) Inadequate housing.
(6) Intermingling of conflicting religious beliefs and social mores.

d. This concept provides—
(1) A good potential informant net along the border.

(2) Friendly local civilians for employment as self-defense units to control the border area.

(3) A lack of potential civilian contacts and "safe houses" for use by the enemy in border crossing activities.
CHAPTER 6
COMBAT UNITS, COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS, AND
ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

Section I. GENERAL

92. Capabilities

In counterguerrilla operations, the infantry and airborne brigade and the subordinate infantry and airborne infantry battalions and rifle companies have the capability to—

a. Conduct offensive operations against the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him.

b. Repel an enemy attack by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

c. Conduct extensive combat and reconnaissance patrolling, to include long-range patrolling when appropriately equipped.

d. Conduct police operations, to include the exercise of population control and the establishment of adequate security measures to secure military troops, military and civilian installations, key communities, and lines of communication, when appropriately augmented.

e. Conduct air landings when provided with sufficient air transport.

f. Conduct airborne operations by parachute with minimum marshalling and planning procedures (airborne units only).

g. Conduct operations in all types of terrain and climatic conditions.

h. Participate in limited amphibious operations.

i. Participate extensively in the implementation of positive programs of civic action.

j. Advise, train, and assist indigenous forces in counterguerrilla operations.

93. Missions

The infantry and airborne brigades and the subordinate infantry and airborne infantry battalions and rifle companies may be assigned any one or combination of the following missions in counterguerrilla operations:

a. Conduct police operations.

b. Conduct harassing activities against an enemy force.

c. Conduct offensive operations against a guerrilla force.

d. Participate in operations as all or part of the reaction force of a higher headquarters.

e. Deny sponsoring power support.

f. Provide active assistance to the implementation of a program of civic action.

94. Organization for Combat

a. The task organization of the unit engaged in counterguerrilla operations depends on the particular requirements of each situation. Normally, the specific terrain and civil and military situations in the area of operations will require a small-scale tailoring of the battalion and subordinate rifle companies prior to counterguerrilla operations. Depending on the particular situation, emphasis during this tailoring is placed on the provision of—

(1) Superior mobility by—

(a) Providing an extensive airmobile capability to the unit. (This may be centralized at higher unit levels.)

(b) Removing from the organization all unnecessary ground vehicles which cannot be utilized to the maximum on the applicable terrain.

(c) Removing all except the essential items from the load of the individual soldier to increase his foot mobility.

(d) Providing non-TOE aids to mobility as required, such as boats, ropes, motorcycles, and bicycles.

(e) Providing indigenous transportation means such as commandeered civilian transport and pack animals.
(f) Employing indigenous bearer units for pack operations.
(2) Superior firepower by providing an extensive airmobile capability to the unit. (This may be centralized at higher unit levels.)
(3) Removal from the organization of those weapons which have marginal value in the area, such as large anti-tank weapons.
(4) Adequate capability for dealing with the civilian population in the area by providing the force with sufficient translators, interpreters, civil affairs personnel, and other supporting units to assist in the performance of police control and civic action.
(5) Adequate capability for tactical self-sufficiency by the attachment of sufficient intelligence, counterintelligence, signal support, and infrared light equipment to make the unit capable of semi-independent or independent operations.

b. Emphasis is given to the substitution of lightweight items of equipment throughout a unit engaged in counterguerrilla operations. In some cases, the procurement and issue of civilian-type items may be feasible because of their lighter weight.

Section II. INFANTRY AND AIRBORNE BRIGADE

95. General
In counterguerrilla operations, the infantry and airborne brigade may be employed as a subordinate element of the division or, with appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, as an independent or semi-independent force. It has the capability to command and control up to five attached maneuver battalions. It also has the capability of commanding and controlling indigenous forces.

96. Task Organization

a. Combat, combat support, and combat service support units are attached or placed in support of the brigade as required by the specific mission assigned. In counterguerrilla operations, the emphasis is normally on the attachment of combat support units.

b. The missions assigned to the brigade may vary from the execution of control over a segment of the civilian population in an area under effective friendly control to the execution of purely combat tasks as the reaction force of the division in an area under effective control of the guerrilla force.

c. In the former case, the brigade is organized with emphasis on the attachment and support of civilian and military personnel and units to assist in the conduct of population control and security operations. In such situations, the brigade will normally receive substantial attachments of military intelligence, psychological warfare, and civil affairs units. Figure 29 shows a type brigade task force organized for counterguerrilla operations at this end of the scale of possible missions.

d. When the brigade is organized primarily for the conduct of offensive combat operations, the emphasis is on the attachment and support of military combat and combat support units which enhance the combat power of the brigade. See figure 30 for a type brigade organized primarily for offensive counterguerrilla operations.

e. Normally, the mission assigned the brigade will be somewhere between these two extremes and will include the concurrent conduct of police and combat operations in its assigned area. In these cases, the organization of the brigade will be appropriately balanced to permit the successful accomplishment of the diversified mission.

f. The brigade may receive the attachment of sufficient combat service support units to make it administratively self-sufficient. See chapter 7 for a discussion of the units normally required by the brigade for this purpose.

Section III. INFANTRY AND AIRBORNE INFANTRY BATTALION

97. General

a. The battalion is the basic tactical element of the infantry and airborne infantry. The personnel, equipment, and training of the battalion
LEGEND:

- NATIONAL POLICE
- LOCAL OR MUNICIPAL POLICE
- SELF-DEFENSE UNITS
- SPECIAL POLICE
- ATTACHED NONDIVISIONAL UNITS
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL

* 4.2 INCH MORTARS OR 75 MM PACK HOW MAY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR 105 HOW

Figure 29. Type brigade task force for police operations.
ATTACHED NONDIVISIONAL UNITS.
SEE CHAPTER 7 FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS.

* 4.2-INCH MORTARS OR 75-MM PACK HOW MAY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR 105 HOW.

Figure 30. Type brigade task force for combat operations.

LEGEND
provide for a versatile force which can effectively combat guerrilla forces with a minimum tailoring to meet the exigencies of the mission, terrain, and enemy situation. The command structure of the battalion is designed to accept an augmentation of forces as necessary. The battalion is capable of fighting with or without vehicles and with a minimum adjustment of equipment and personnel whenever dismounted, mechanized, motorized, amphibious, airmobile, or joint airborne operations are required.

b. The major units of the infantry and airborne infantry battalions and details of the headquarters company are shown in figure 31.

c. In counterguerrilla operations, the infantry and airborne infantry battalion normally are employed as subordinate, attached elements of a brigade. In exceptional cases, they may be employed directly under the control of a higher headquarters, or conduct independent operations with proper augmentation.

d. Due to the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations, the battalion will normally receive the attachment of numerous combat and combat support units to assist in the accomplishment of its mission. Normally, the battalion can expect little immediate combat support from higher headquarters because of—

(1) The size of the area of operation.
(2) The decentralization of combat support by the larger units.

e. The battalion task organization depends on the particular requirements of each situation. Under unusual circumstances, the battalion may have continuous operational control of certain Army aircraft to provide an airmobile capability. Normally, however, Army transport aircraft will be retained under the operational control of higher headquarters to be allocated to specific task assignments as required. A type battalion task force is shown in figure 32.

f. The organic combat units of the infantry and airborne infantry battalions are the—

(1) Three rifle companies.
(2) Reconnaissance platoon.
(3) Antitank platoon.
(4) Mortar and Davy Crockett platoon.

g. The organic combat support units of the infantry and airborne infantry battalion are the—

(1) Communication platoon.
(2) Ground surveillance section.

h. The organization, missions, capabilities, limitations, and methods of employment of these units are discussed in detail in FM 7-20. The following discussion of these units is concerned only with areas which are of particular concern to counterguerrilla operations.

98. Rifle Company

The rifle companies (fig. 33) are the basic maneuver elements of the battalion. They may occasionally be detached from the parent battalion for employment under the control of a higher headquarters.

99. Reconnaissance Platoon

a. If the terrain of the area of operations will not permit the extensive use of vehicles, the employment of the reconnaissance platoon may be modified or it may be employed in its normal role as a foot-mobile force. The latter has the advantage of retaining the unit as a valuable intelligence collection agency. While the equipment of the tank section may be deleted from the platoon, the personnel of this section may be employed as augmentation to the S2 section or to other elements of the battalion. The support squad can be integrated into the mortar section of a rifle company, or its personnel may be used as augmentation for the battalion mortar and Davy Crockett platoon.

b. If the battalion area has any substantial amount of terrain suitable for wheeled or tracked traffic, the entire platoon with its organic ground vehicle means may be employed in its normal reconnaissance and security role.

c. The platoon may also be employed as an "economy of force" unit to conduct police operations in trafficable areas not under effective control of guerrillas, thereby releasing more rifle companies for direct action against the guerrilla force.

d. With its organic mobility, the platoon can disperse over a relatively large area, periodically visit the civilian communities and static security posts in the area, patrol lines of communication, and still mass rapidly to counter a contacted guerrilla element anywhere in the area.
Figure 51. Infantry and airborne infantry battalion.
Figure 32. Type battalion task force.
* FOR MECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY ONLY.

Figure 33. Rifle company.
100. Antitank Platoon

a. When the battalion is conducting operations against a guerrilla force in remote, underdeveloped areas with difficult terrain, the antitank platoon may be deleted from the organization. In such a case, consideration is given to retaining the personnel of the platoon as an augmentation of other elements of the battalion.

b. If the terrain and nature of the operation permit the effective use of the platoon, it will normally be retained under battalion control with priority of employment in support of the battalion reaction force. Only exceptionally will squads of the platoon be attached to the rifle companies. Such an attachment will normally so impede the cross-country mobility of the companies as to outweigh its value as additional combat power.

101. Mortar and Davy Crockett Platoon

a. Due to the nonnuclear environment usually found in counterguerrilla operations, and the extensive area normally assigned the battalion, the mortar and Davy Crockett platoon will usually require extensive reorganization. This reorganization may include the following changes:

1. Deletion of the Davy Crockett section.
2. Addition of more mortar squads.
3. Augmentation of the forward observer and fire direction personnel and equipment to provide the capability for decentralizing the mortar firing positions and operations to dispersed two-squad sections.
4. Substitution of 81-mm mortars for 4.2-inch mortars.

b. Except in large-scale offensive operations utilizing the battalion in coordinated action, the platoon can be best utilized by attaching mortar squads to subordinate maneuver elements.

c. For security, the firing elements will normally occupy positions within the combat bases of the units to which they are attached. If a section is required to occupy firing positions outside the combat bases, rifle elements may be used to secure the positions.

d. The employment of harassing mortar fires against an elusive guerrilla force must be emphasized. These fires are very effective in inflicting losses (or threatening such losses), curtailing movement, disturbing the rest of the guerrilla force, and lowering its morale.

e. Consideration is given to resupplying all mortar squads at their position by aerial resupply methods.

102. Communication Platoon

a. The communication platoon and communication personnel of the headquarters company provide continuous communication means for the battalion headquarters by—

1. Installing, operating, and maintaining all communication facilities within the battalion headquarters.
2. Establishing and maintaining communication to the rifle companies, elements of the headquarters company, and attached and supporting weapons.

b. The extreme dispersion of the elements of the battalion will normally require an extensive substitution of radios and an augmentation of other signal equipment. Substituted and augmentation equipment will normally include—

1. Short-range portable FM radios and medium-range portable or mobile AM radios for ground-to-ground communications.
2. Short-range portable FM radios for ground-to-Army aircraft communications.
3. Short-range portable AM-UHF radios for ground-to-Air Force or Navy aircraft communications.
4. Appropriate radio relay equipment and long-distance antennae.
5. Signal flags, lights, panel sets, and other visual signaling and/or marking devices.

c. It is imperative that the required equipment be planned for, received, and integrated into the organization prior to the commitment of the battalion into counterguerrilla operations.

d. Radio communication is the primary means of communication within the battalion and with civil agencies. The extended distances may require the use of both aerial and ground relay
stations. The increased use of radio creates a greater communications security problem. The guerrilla force must be presumed to have means for acquiring communications intelligence. In order to reduce the value of this source of intelligence to the guerrilla force, the use of continuous wave (CW) and codes for radio transmissions is routine.

e. Wire communication is used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communications to guerrilla action dictates that wire be used only in secure bases and installations. If wire lines must be laid through insecure areas, an unusually large maintenance requirement must be anticipated. In addition, the lack of security of traffic on the lines must be realized by all users of the net.

f. Visual means of communication are effective for ground-to-ground communications between small units and for ground-to-air signaling and marking.

g. Messenger service between combat bases or installations is the most secure means of communication available, but requires an accompanying security guard for each messenger. Pigeons may be effectively used as messengers, especially by individuals or agents.

h. Communication with local civil and police authorities may require the issuance of military communication equipment to these civil agencies or the use of commercial-type sets by the battalion.

i. The friendly communications means are a prime target for the guerrilla force. Ground signal installations must be guarded, unsecured wire lines must be patrolled, and normal communication security precautions must be practiced.

j. The use of public radio stations is a most effective means of mass dissemination of information to the civil populace. Conversely, any such radio station in the hands of the enemy will assist him materially in gaining and/or retaining civilian support in the area.

k. Infrared light equipment may be used as an alternate communication means.

103. Ground Surveillance Section

a. The battalion conducting operations against guerrilla forces often has additional medium-range (AN/TPS–33) and short-range (AN/PPS–4) radar teams attached to assist in the implementation of the battalion surveillance plan.

b. These radars are normally used to extend surveillance forward of static security posts, combat bases, and forward patrol bases.

c. Since a great part of the combat operations against guerrilla forces involves the use of small-unit patrols, particular consideration should be given the use of radar teams at combat and forward patrol bases to assist the patrols by—

(1) Locating enemy activity which may be detrimental to the patrols.

(2) Vectoring patrols toward enemy activity or on a desired route.

(3) Receiving coded signals from friendly patrols.

d. During the conduct of an encirclement, they may be effectively used for surveillance forward of the line of encirclement to give early warning of an attempted breakout by the encircled guerrilla force. It must be realized that the use of radar in densely vegetated areas is extremely limited.

Section IV. ARMOR AND ARMORED CAVALRY UNITS

104. Armor

a. The poor terrain occupied by a guerrilla force normally prevents the use of massed armor. However, if the terrain in the area of operations is trafficable, the brigade and subordinate units may receive the attachment of some tanks for employment as a part of the security or offensive forces. It must be realized that tanks have the following general disadvantages in counterguerrilla operations:

(1) Are easily ambushed by unsupported infantry.

(2) Have limited value in difficult terrain.

(3) Compromise the secrecy of operations.

b. If tanks are used against guerrilla forces, they must be closely supported by infantry. Even though guerrilla forces habitually lack sophisticated antitank weapons in great quantity, they are normally quite skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks. The
development of recoilless weapons and light rockets has certainly increased the guerrilla antitank potential.

c. The tank, with its inherent appearance of massiveness, is an ideal “show of force” weapon and, if used, can be expected to keenly impress the guerrilla force and the civilian population.

d. Terrain permitting, tanks may be effectively utilized in counterguerrilla operations to—

(1) Patrol lines of communication, thereby releasing infantry or airborne infantry units for offensive operations against the guerrilla force.

(2) Provide increased firepower and shock action to convoy security detachments.

(3) Execute offensive operations against consolidated guerrilla forces in trafficable terrain as part of a unit’s reaction force.

(4) Escort of government chiefs in danger areas.

(5) Reconnaissance of extensive areas.

(6) Conduct demonstrations and feints.

e. When tanks are employed in counterguerrilla operations, they must act with speed and aggressiveness. Emphasis is placed on—

(1) Advanced planning.

(2) Rapid movement to contact.

(3) Maximum use of surprise and shock action.

f. For additional guidance on the employment of tank elements organic to the division, see FM 17–1 and FM 17–15.

105. Armored and Air Cavalry

a. Since the conventional mission of these units to provide security for the elements of the division is normally not applicable in counterguerrilla operations, they may be attached to the brigade and battalion for employment in counterguerrilla operations.

b. They are particularly well organized to conduct police operations over large trafficable areas not under the effective control of guerrilla forces. Their organic mobility and communications capability permit their effective employment to—

(1) Secure surface lines of communication.

(2) Installation and community security.

(3) Conduct contact patrols between the self-defense forces guarding villages throughout the area.

(4) Establish roadblocks.

(5) Mass sufficient forces rapidly to react to any contact made with guerrilla forces in its assigned area.

(6) Apprehension of guerrilla force members.

(7) Conduct extensive ground surveillance of large areas uncovered by friendly forces.

(8) Collect and report information of intelligence value.

(9) Provide armed escorts for airmobile operations.

(10) Provide armed aircraft for use as aerial “hunter-killer” teams.

(11) Provide a pathfinder capability (in airborne divisional units).

(12) Provide convoy security.

c. Figure 34 shows the organization of the armored cavalry squadron.

d. An armored cavalry unit has the capability of dispersing in small units over a large area, periodically visiting all key communities, and yet being always ready to assemble a combat force rapidly at any point in its area of responsibility to counter a guerrilla action.

e. The brigade or battalion may be given operational control or attachment of a portion of, or, exceptionally, the entire divisional air cavalry troop. The elements of this unit, organized to utilize both the firepower and the mobility of the armed helicopter, are a valuable adjunct to the available combat power.

f. See paragraphs 47 through 52 for a discussion of the tactical employment of air cavalry units in counterguerrilla operations.

g. For additional guidance on the employment of armor and air cavalry units, see FM 17–36 and FM 17–95.
106. General

a. In counterguerrilla operations, the brigade will normally be supported by an extensive complement of Army aircraft from the following sources:

(1) Aviation battalion, division.
(2) Air cavalry troop, divisional armored cavalry squadron.
(3) Aviation section, division artillery.
(4) Nondivisional aviation units.

b. A type composite aviation battalion which may support the brigade is shown in figure 35.

c. To provide the most effective utilization of these aircraft, they are normally controlled as centrally as the situation will permit. Whenever tactically feasible, the brigade will maintain control over all aircraft except the light observation helicopters habitually required by subordinate commanders for command, control, and reconnaissance. Elements of the aircraft support are normally placed under the operational control of subordinate commanders as required for the accomplishment of specific support tasks. However, when required by the situation, aircraft may be placed under the operational control of (or exceptionally, attached to) battalions or companies for prolonged periods of time. These aircraft may physically operate from landing areas in the brigade combat base(s) or from those of the lower units. In any case, the aircraft will normally return to the brigade base for logistical support.

d. The conduct of aerial surveillance can usually be best coordinated throughout the entire area when directed and controlled by the brigade.

e. The brigade must be prepared to provide adequate aircraft without delay to lift its reaction forces or those of the subordinate units when their commitment against a located enemy force is required. In counterguerrilla operations, the effectiveness of reaction operations are often directly proportional to the speed with which the reaction forces are committed.

f. Within the priority for employment of available Army aircraft to support tactical operations, extensive use is made of these aircraft to provide combat service support to the subordinate elements (pars. 132–141).

107. Tactics and Techniques of Employment

See paragraphs 47 through 52.
NOTE: ONLY TWO ARMORED CAVALRY TROOPS IN THE AIRBORNE DIVISION.

Figure 34. Armored cavalry squadron.
Section VI. FIRE SUPPORT

108. General

a. The coordination of fire support in counter-guerrilla operations is conducted as discussed in the FM 7-series so far as practicable. The nature of the mission, the large size of the as-
signed area, and the nature of the enemy with little or no interest in the seizure or retention of terrain will normally dictate—

(1) A greater decentralization of organic and attached fire support (normally by attachment to subordinate units).
(2) A relative lack of brigade and battalion control and coordination over all fires utilized within their assigned areas.

(3) Greater security of firing positions.

b. Nuclear fires normally cannot be profitably employed in counterguerrilla operations. If they are used, they must be closely coordinated, not only with military operations in the area, but also with the civilian population. However, appropriate chemical and biological weapons may be used effectively.

109. Employment of Fire Support

a. Fire support is employed as follows:

(1) Field artillery can provide effective fire support in counterguerrilla operations if used with imagination and ingenuity. The following capabilities of field artillery should be considered in operational planning:

(a) Can fire in all conditions of weather and terrain.
(b) Can provide effective support day or night.
(c) Can engage a target with accurate fire without warning.
(d) Can maneuver massed fires rapidly within a large area.

(2) Artillery normally has the following limitations in counterguerrilla operations, particularly in underdeveloped areas:

(a) Limited mobility due to difficult terrain.
(b) Limited ground observation due to rugged terrain, heavy vegetation, and the fleeting nature of the enemy.
(c) Limited freedom to fire due to civilian villages, activities, and movements within the area of operations.

(3) Supporting artillery fires can be effectively employed to—

(a) Assist in the defense of static security posts, roadblocks, and patrol actions against guerrilla attack.
(b) Harass guerrillas during periods of reduced patrol activity by friendly elements.
(c) Flush guerrillas out of areas of limited or difficult accessibility into preplanned friendly ambushes.
(d) Deceive the guerrilla force as to the plan of counterguerrilla action. Placing fires in areas other than where an operation is planned will distract the guerrilla from the main effort and enhance the element of surprise.
(e) Provide illumination during hours of darkness. Illumination is particularly valuable during guerrilla night raids on important installations such as bridges, power plants, communication centers, supply points, and villages sympathetic to the counterguerrilla cause.
(f) Block escape routes of a guerrilla force which is being attacked or encircled.
(g) Inflict casualties to encircled guerrillas with massed fires during “tightening the noose” operations. These fires are particularly effective once the contraction reaches the point where a “critical mass” is achieved.

(4) In counterguerrilla operations, the division will normally attach most or all of the division artillery to the subordinate brigades. One 105-mm howitzer battalion is normally attached to each brigade. 4.2-inch mortars may be substituted for howitzers. During operations, the brigade will seldom receive any appreciable ground artillery support beyond this attachment from higher headquarters.

(5) Depending on the situation, divisional artillery and artillery attached to the brigade may be given the tactical mission of supporting the subordinate battalions engaged in counterguerrilla operations by—

(a) Attachment.
(b) Direct support.
(c) Reinforcing.
(d) General support.
(e) General support-reinforcing.

(6) Because of the large size of the area of operations, artillery units are often attached to battalions.
(7) Consideration should be given to the augmentation of artillery units with additional survey personnel to permit accurate target location and survey control during decentralized operations.

(8) The terrain in which guerrilla forces operate will often limit or prevent artillery support of ground units in the conventional manner. However, the demoralizing effect of artillery fire on guerrilla units will often justify its use when there is little possibility of its inflicting substantial damage. Before artillery support is ruled out in any operation, all limitations are carefully analyzed and studied. Flexibility and ingenuity will often make artillery support possible under circumstances which are seemingly the most adverse. Range and trajectory capabilities and the capability of all means of communication and of Army aircraft are exploited. Pioneer work may permit the use of trails and dry stream beds to reach firing positions in difficult terrain. All leaders, to include section leaders, must be skilled in reconnaissance, pioneering, and field expedients. Ground reconnaissance may often be conducted by small civilian parties. Aerial and map reconnaissance must be thorough to compensate for the relative lack of good ground reconnaissance. When possible, firing positions should be occupied just before the time they are to be used.

(9) Once a guerrilla force has been definitely located in an area and offensive operations are planned to destroy the force, artillery is placed so fires may be massed in the area to be cleared, if possible. A combat-tested technique for using artillery in such a situation is shown in figure 36. The positions of attached artillery may be established, utilizing battery, platoon, or section firing positions, depending on the situation. The positions should be established for all-around defense. Infantry personnel may be used to assist in the defense of the firing position.

(10) Counterguerrilla operations place a burden on communications and fire control which may be met only by improvisation. Since radio is the most flexible, mobile, and at times the only possible means of communication in very difficult terrain, it may be necessary to make extensive use of Army aircraft as radio relay stations between the firing units and the forward observers with the ground combat troops and to perform functions normally associated with the fire direction center (FDC). The airborne FDC adjusts fire and monitors, relays, and performs tactical fire direction; that is, exercises the command of units in the selection of targets, the designation of units to fire, and the allocation of ammunition. Technical fire direction is accomplished by stationing a computer (preferably equipped with a graphical firing table fan) at each battery position. The advantage of this system is that it will allow for decentralized operation of the firing unit with retention of centralized control.

(11) Since ground transportation is limited in most operations against guerrilla forces, the greatest possible use is made of Army aircraft to transport supplies, especially ammunition.

b. Tactical air support (close air support and tactical air reconnaissance) and naval gunfire (if applicable) will be requested and controlled as discussed in the FM 7-series. The transitory nature of guerrilla targets and the possibility of long reaction times in the use of these supporting weapons often make a greater dependence on the use of organic and attached weapons mandatory. Fire bombs, with their area-type effects, are normally the most effective munition. The use of organic and attached airborne fire support (armed Army helicopters) must be fully exploited.

c. Chemical and biological munitions are extremely effective in counterguerrilla operations. They may be employed to—

(1) Restrict selected areas to the guerrillas (with persistent agents).
(2) Destroy the enemy force and leave the area trafficable for military units and civilian personnel (with nonpersistent agents).

(3) Incapacitate an enemy force intermingled with friendly civilians with no permanent effects to the civilians (with incapacitating agents).

(4) Remove vegetation restricting observation and fields of fire (with defoliant agents).

(5) Destroy food-producing crops of the guerrilla force (with crop disease agents).

d. Portable flame weapons and flame field expedients are extremely effective in counterguerrilla operations.

110. Fire Support Planning and Coordination

a. The decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations minimizes the requirement for extensive coordination of fire support by the brigade and battalion, except when the unit is conducting coordinated offensive operations against a located enemy force.

b. Except for coordinated offensive operations, the preparation and implementation of a coordinated and integrated fire support plan is normally not practicable. By the same token, the employment of extensive fire control measures (fire coordination lines, no-fire lines, etc.) is normally not necessary in decentralized counterguerrilla operations, since their use may restrict or slow down the operations of subordinate units. However, in the final phases of an encirclement when artillery fires are used to destroy the guerrilla force, a fire coordination line or no-fire line may be used to ensure that converging friendly elements are not fired upon.
Section VII. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

111. General

a. Successful counterguerrilla operations by the brigade and subordinate units require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. A unit which conducts counterguerrilla operations without sound intelligence wastes time, material, and troop effort. In counterguerrilla operations, the commander is even more deeply dependent upon intelligence and counterintelligence than in conventional warfare situations. Several factors are responsible for this. First, guerrilla activity is an advanced stage of a preceding environment which fostered the development of dissidence and insurgency. It is the product of, and continues to exist as a result of, a complex of interrelated military, political, economic, and social factors. A complete awareness and intimate knowledge of the background of the prevailing situation is essential to the conduct of current counterguerrilla operations; therefore, intensive intelligence measures to pinpoint the roots of subversion that support the guerrilla force are requisite. Second, the tactics of guerrilla forces and the clandestine nature of their popular support requires accurate, timely, and continuous information for intelligence analysis as an essential preliminary to the planning or application of effective countermeasures. Third, since guerrilla operations depend for success upon intelligence regarding the activities and forces opposing them, counterintelligence security discipline becomes vitally important in denial of this information to the enemy.

b. The general doctrine, methods, and procedures for collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence are covered in FM 30–5. The standard practices of counterintelligence and clandestine intelligence operations are set forth in FM’s 30–17 and 30–18. All are applicable to counterguerrilla operations in a varying degree, depending on the mission, situation, and environment. There are, however, additional special aspects of intelligence specific to counterguerrilla operations which are further developed here.

c. Counterguerrilla intelligence activities may be generally categorized under four headings as shown below. These categories are not in priority or chronological order; in fact, all four types will normally be conducted with varying emphasis at the same time.

1) Preventive measures which are implemented to create such conditions of security within the social structure of the operational area that guerrilla activity will not further develop.

2) Reactive measures which are designed specifically to counter subversive and guerrilla actions which threaten the security of the command or accomplishment of its mission.

3) Aggressive measures which are designed to strike at the root of the subversive civilian support apparatus and the guerrilla force in order to destroy them entirely.

4) Remedial measures taken in coordination with other components of the command to correct conditions which have led to the development of the guerrilla situation.

d. A basic essential in any type of counterguerrilla intelligence operation is a thorough understanding of the target area and society, in all its aspects, augmented by a complete understanding of the prevailing internal and external forces supporting or subverting that society. Effective counterguerrilla intelligence operations must be based on such knowledge, must be an extension of previous efforts to counter dissidence and subversion, and must exploit any friendly or allied intelligence assets developed prior to the emergence of enemy guerrilla activity. The basic inventory of intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from area and country studies supplemented with situational intelligence collected more recently on the scene. This body of available data forms the basis of the commander’s estimate of the guerrilla situation and the subsequent intelligence collection plan of his intelligence officer.

112. Area Studies and Intelligence Requirements

a. The area study includes a detailed examination of the following factors affecting a country: geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other specific fields constituting potential danger points.
b. Following is a cursory discussion of some principal factors which should be included in an area study. It is in no sense exhaustive in scope; rather, it is intended to illustrate the importance of considering these factors in intelligence support of counterguerrilla operations.

(1) Geography, topography, terrain, climate, flora, and fauna. An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counterguerrilla operations. Mild or tropical climate favors the guerrilla forces who must depend largely on the land, as this type of climate ensures year-round vegetation and foliage for subsistence, cover, and concealment. Rigorous cold climates hamper guerrilla operations, since increased logistical support is required for operations under these conditions. Only when the unit's knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the enemy guerrilla can that unit meet the guerrilla on anything like equal terms. Terrain intelligence is continuously collected, recorded, and disseminated. Up-to-date photo maps are prepared. Terrain models may be constructed and used for briefing subordinate commanders. Particular effort is made to collect information of the following:
(a) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases. Such areas have the following characteristics:
   1. Difficulty of access, such as mountains, jungles, or marshes.
   2. Protection from aerial reconnaissance.
   3. Terrain which favors defense and covered withdrawals.
   4. Location usually one day's journey from small civilian settlements which may provide food and act as outposts.
   5. Adequate water supply.
(b) Roads and trails approaching suspected or possible guerrilla areas.
(c) Principal roads and trails traversing and passing along the circumference of the guerrilla-controlled area.
(d) Principal routes connecting separate guerrilla-controlled areas.
(e) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communications.
(f) Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across rivers; seasons of the year when the rivers are in flood stage.
(g) Areas where drinking water is not available or where foot travel is difficult or impossible.
(h) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near guerrilla-controlled areas.
(i) If guerrillas are known to have or are suspected of having contact with the enemy regular force, location of suitable areas for airdrops or boat or submarine rendezvous; roads and trails leading into enemy-held areas or neutral countries friendly to the guerrillas.
(j) Escape and evasion routes of the guerrillas.

(2) Sociological factors. Population size and distribution, basic racial stock and physical characteristics, ethnic and minority groups, social structure, religion, and culture (all) must be considered in area studies.
(a) Dense populations, such as are usually found in cities and metropolitan areas, are more easily controlled and protected by government forces. Since the population of these areas tend to identify themselves with trade unions, cultural groups, and political parties, they may be subjected to a greater degree of subversion.
(b) People residing in sparsely settled areas such as small villages and farms are more strongly influenced by their immediate environment; that is, such considerations as family relationships and those factors related to obtaining food, clothing and shelter, and are more susceptible to a lesser amount of subversion.
(c) The racial stock and physical characteristics of the population of an
area are important considerations in counterguerrilla operations. A tendency exists among the population of underdeveloped countries to fear and distrust persons who are not of their own race.

(d) Ethnic groups constituting minority factions become a consideration in counterguerrilla operations; because of discrimination or persecution, they may be either a source of discontent or of major assistance.

(e) Social groups may also exercise great influence and control over their members.

(f) In countries where religion exerts a strong influence, control of or gaining the favor of the clergy could be a powerful weapon.

(3) Governmental considerations. An understanding of the formal structure of the government and its operations is important. Its relationship with the population, its relationship within the internal departments of the government such as police, communications, etc., and the relationship each of these departments has with the population.

(4) Political considerations. Area studies must consider the political forces which influence the operation of a society. Political organizations are often classified in accordance with social, economic, or cultural characteristics. They may be identified as liberal, conservative, or radical. Important considerations in politics are the leaders, their motivations, ambitions, and influence.

(5) Economic considerations. Among the economic considerations are the types of economy, agricultural or industrial, living conditions, transportation, communications, food supply, and standard of living of the various segments of the population.

113. Intelligence Planning

a. Once the intelligence staff has completed its study of the area or areas of probable operation, it must begin its planning. This planning will consist of the following:

(1) Formulation of an estimate of the guerrilla situation. In the formulation of the estimate of the guerrilla situation, the operationally significant factors, in addition to those required for all intelligence estimates, may be considered under three general categories.

(a) The first of these comprises the conditions which constitute natural strengths or sources of resistance to the guerrillas. These are such things as healthy national institutions, strong and loyal forces, and sound popular attitudes. These factors will be exploited.

(b) The second category embraces conditions in the target society in which the potential exists either to exploit these as counterguerrilla strengths, or where neglect of them will invite exploitation by the enemy. In this category fall such matters as ambitious officials and popular hunger for social improvement.

(c) The third category includes the factors which have already been seized by the enemy and which are being effectively dominated or exploited by him. These factors are considered for neutralization:

(2) Based on the estimate of the guerrilla situation formed as a result of the consideration of the above factors, the intelligence staff prepares an operational assessment based on the strengths, weaknesses, and exploitable areas of the operational situations.

(3) The operational assessment will determine for the intelligence staff the intelligence gaps which exist. These intelligence gaps are those areas about which the unit or higher, lower, or adjacent echelons cannot supply information.

(4) The next step in the planning is the formulation of the collection plan.

b. Conventional intelligence techniques must be adapted to the situation and tailored to exploit the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the particular area of operation and enemy being encountered. Procedures must be
established which clearly define the responsibility for intelligence and its automatic exploitation.

114. Agencies

a. Information collection agencies organic to the brigade and its normal attachments and support include—

1. The scout section and the aviation platoon of the brigade headquarters and headquarters company.

2. Combat battalions and other combat units. Each combat battalion has an organic reconnaissance platoon and ground surveillance section which are specifically designed for information collection and target acquisition. In addition, the subordinate companies and platoons of the battalions have an information collection capability.

3. Combat support units. Supporting artillery units have excellent target acquisition capabilities with their ground and aerial observers, aircraft, and countermortar and medium-range surveillance radars. All combat support units, which have habitual contact with the civilian population, such as engineer units engaged in civil construction, are good information collection agencies.

4. Administrative support units. These units are normally considered to have extremely limited capabilities for information collection. However, in counterguerrilla operations when these units may be extensively engaged in providing logistical support to the civilian population, they may be valuable collection agencies. All doctors, aidmen, supply specialists, truck drivers, and other administrative personnel whose duties require close contact with the civilian population are trained and employed to collect and report information. These personnel can often give an extremely valid index of the sympathies of the civilian population in a local area.

5. Provisional long-range patrols.

b. Other military agencies may be attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade for primary use as information collection agencies. In addition to the military intelligence units mentioned above, the agencies may include elements of the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA). These elements may support the brigade by providing communications and non-communications intelligence, certain communications countermeasures, and a means of assisting in communications security.

c. Numerous civilian and paramilitary collection agencies are normally available for support within the area of operations of the brigade and its subordinate units. These may include—

1. National, municipal, or special police units.

2. Self-defense units.

3. Civilian administrators.

4. Friendly guerrilla units.

5. Civil affairs units.

115. Sources

The most common sources of information available in counterguerrilla operations are—

a. Agencies of the civilian population.

b. Enemy activity.

c. Captured personnel, documents, and enemy material.

d. Studies and reports.

e. Photographs and maps.

f. Any civilian who can be induced to report on the activities of the civilians in the area.

116. Overt Combat Intelligence

a. Through training and constant emphasis, the personnel of the brigade and subordinate units must acquire a keen awareness of the value of information, regardless of how unimportant any single item may seem. Everything observed is reported and everything reported is processed as possible intelligence. Every member of the unit is trained to constantly think in terms of what to observe and what to report. The reporting of negative information gains importance in counterguerrilla operations.

b. Information collection is a full-time duty of every member of the unit, whether on duty or off, and whether engaged in routine activities, reconnaissance and surveillance patrols, or combat operations against the guerrilla force.
c. The brigade and battalion collection plans are prepared in great detail and must ensure that the orders or requests for information dispatched to collection agencies are in clear, concise, and simple terms. Every man must know what to look for.

d. Continuous surveillance of the area of operations may be accomplished by the coordinated employment of—

(1) Aerial surveillance.

(2) Ground surveillance from observation posts located on dominant terrain or on trails, paths, road junctions, and the edges of forests, jungle areas, and other difficult terrain.

(3) Constant patrolling.

e. Prisoners of war are taken whenever possible. Every opportunity is given the enemy to surrender, except when the success of combat operations depends on surprise. Interrogation of prisoners is conducted at the lowest level when trained interrogators are present. The principle of evacuating prisoners expeditiously to higher headquarters for further exploitation applies to those taken during counterguerrilla operations; however, due to the wider areas of responsibility assigned battalions, higher headquarters may authorize more lengthy retention and interrogations at this level than is normal in other types of operations. Prisoners should be segregated into appropriate groupings, such as—

(1) Guerrilla and underground leaders.

(2) Other volunteer members of guerrilla forces and underground cells.

(3) Impressed members of guerrilla forces and underground cells.

(4) Civilian supporters and sympathizers.

f. Any “new faces” among the civilian population within the area of operations are carefully and thoroughly interrogated as a routine matter. They may be observers, informants, or guerrilla force members.

g. Personality files on guerrilla commanders, guerrillas, members of the underground, and civilian support in the area are maintained. All names and data on persons likely to be connected with the resistance movement are collected. Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organizational data of guerrilla forces. The names and locations of sweethearts, families, relatives, and friends of known members of the guerrilla force are obtained. These persons are valuable as sources of information, as hostages, and as bait for traps that can be laid for guerrillas visiting them. When hostages are taken, consideration must be given to provisions of the Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians. In communities friendly to the guerrilla force, some persons are usually responsible for collecting food and other aid for the guerrillas and for furnishing message centers and safe houses for guerrilla messengers. Every effort is made to discover these persons. It is often preferable not to arrest them immediately, but rather to watch their activities and contacts and seek to apprehend guerrilla couriers.

h. Communications provide the essential link between a guerrilla force and any outside regular force sponsoring or allied with it. Control and coordination within guerrilla commands and with allied regular forces all depend on communications. Guerrilla forces are particularly adept at the use of clandestine means of communications. Radio is normally the essential means of communication in guerrilla organizations. The use of codes by guerrillas is well understood and commonplace. Special consideration is given to intercepting and locating guerrilla force transmitter-receiver stations. Intelligence efforts include the breaking of codes and the operation of special radio stations that attempt to enter the guerrilla force radio net using many call signs and procedures. If cleverly operated, such stations may occasionally obtain valuable information or transmit messages to mislead the guerrilla force. Radio direction finders are used to locate guerrilla force transmitter-receiver stations. Enemy radio frequencies may be jammed to deny the use of radio channels.

i. A special effort is made to collect information that will lead to the capture or destruction of guerrilla commanders. The enemy resistance movement may never recover from such a stunning blow as the loss of its commanders.

117. Other Intelligence

a. The use of covert intelligence techniques are necessary in counterguerrilla operations to complement the overt collection efforts which are relatively ineffective in determining—
(1) The location, strength, and capability of guerrilla forces.

(2) The location, strength, and activities of enemy underground cells.

(3) The strength and activities of civilian supporters of the resistance movement.

b. Since the major source of military information available to a force conducting counterguerrilla operations is the civilian population, every effort is made to develop a reliable informant net utilizing civilian personnel. In many cases, such a net will have already been established by civil authorities or friendly indigenous forces in the area of operations. Since the establishment of an extensive informant net requires a considerable period of time, commanders are encouraged to support and utilize any reliable informant operations already being conducted in their area. It is normally not feasible for units below brigade level to attempt to establish informant nets.

c. Historically, many informant nets have grown into extremely complex and extensive organizations. In many cases, this has been so despite the lack of sophisticated communication equipment available for the transmission of the information gathered. The means and methods for effective transmission of information by civilian sources are limited only by the bounds of imagination. The following are a few of the improvised procedures for communicating information which have been effectively used during various past counterguerrilla operations:

(1) The use of coded activities such as a person walking down a road in a certain direction, hitching or unhitching an animal from a plow, drawing water from a well at a certain time of day, etc., each with a specific prearranged meaning.

(2) The use of stationary coded signals such as a certain arrangement of washed clothes hanging to dry, lights on or off in certain windows, mud dabbed on tree trunks or walls in certain forms, and the laying of plows, barrels, etc., on the ground in an arrangement feasible to aircraft.

(3) The extensive use of old people and children moving between preselected points as couriers. Normally, the points are relatively close together. While such a system requires many couriers to cover a large area, it requires no person to move far from his normal area of activity. For instance, a boy may carry a message to a relative's house; the relative may carry it to the grocer; and he, in turn, may give it to a vender to carry to an adjacent town.

d. The enemy guerrilla force can be expected to use every means available, including terrorism, to compromise the informant net of the friendly force. This requires the implementation of the most stringent counterintelligence measures within the net.

(1) The most effective of these measures is the use of the "cutout." A "cutout" is any technique devised for the transmission of information and orders between persons or groups without the receiving and transmitting person or group ever making physical contact with or learning the identity of the receiver. The most common example of a "cutout" is one person leaving a message in an unattended place to be picked up later by some other unknown person.

(2) "Cutouts" must be used extensively throughout the entire informant net. If a compromise is then made of some portion of the net, only a small part of the apparatus is revealed while the rest of the net remains entirely operational.

(3) When indications are received that an informer is suspected of clandestine operations by the enemy force, he should be immediately removed from the area of operations. If he is allowed to remain, he may be subjected to terroristic measures effective enough to force him to compromise a portion of the net.

e. Attempts may be made to infiltrate special agents into guerrilla forces by a wide variety of methods. Agents disguised as liaison personnel from a sponsoring enemy regular force may be parachuted at night into guerrilla com-
mands. Agents disguised as downed air crews of the enemy regular force also provide an effective penetration method.

118. Flow of Information and Intelligence

Intelligence production in counterguerrilla operations is in accordance with the standard intelligence cycle of collection, production, dissemination, and use.

a. Collection programs in counterguerrilla operations will be more diversified; in that, due to the number of sources and the type of these sources, the number and type of collection agencies involved will be broader. Collection techniques will range from open research to the more sophisticated collection performed by intelligence specialists.

b. Production of counterguerrilla intelligence will involve wider, more diversified, and more frequent coordination with intelligence operational counterparts. The intelligence picture is likely to be more complex than in the conventional military operation.

c. Dissemination is perhaps the most critical aspect of the intelligence staffing process. Systems are vitally needed which ensure immediate and continuing communication to all elements of the counterguerrilla forces having a need for the information.

d. The augmentation necessary to conduct this intelligence program may include—
   (1) Personnel to assist in providing control and operational supervision of subordinate intelligence efforts.
   (2) Interrogators.
   (3) Interpreters and translators.
   (4) Order of battle specialists.
   (5) Intelligence research and analysis personnel.
   (6) Censorship units.
   (7) Photointerpreters.

119. Counterintelligence

a. Effective counterintelligence increases the security of the military unit and increases the probability of attaining surprise in operations against the guerrilla force. In counterguerrilla operations, counterintelligence activities are normally complicated by the presence of large numbers of civilians of unknown reliance. It is very difficult to distinguish friendly and enemy elements of the population.

b. Adequate security measures must be developed and enforced continuously to prevent penetration of the enemy into the intelligence operation and to detect possible enemy agents already within the operation. Since the guerrilla force is usually numerically inferior to that of the force opposing it, it depends heavily on intelligence and counterintelligence for successful operations. Denial of intelligence to the guerrilla force will greatly weaken his ability to retain the initiative and continue his efforts.

c. Counterintelligence operations depend in great part on the information of civilian informants concerning enemy sabotage, subversion, and espionage activities.

d. The brigade and its subordinate elements place emphasis on the following counterintelligence measures:

   (1) Background investigation of civilians in sensitive civil positions.
   (2) Screening of all civilians employed by the unit.
   (3) Surveillance of all known or suspected members of the resistance movement.
   (4) Control of civilian movement.
   (5) Adequate internal security of installations and bases.
   (6) Indoctrination of all personnel on all aspects of security.
   (7) Careful use of security classification procedures and safeguarding of plans, orders, and reports.
   (8) Communication security procedures.

120. Intelligence Support of Tactical Deception

a. In counterguerrilla operations, brigades and lower echelons habitually plan and execute small-scale cover and deception operations to disguise the intentions of units which must frequently move under the observation of large numbers of civilians during combat operations. While the planning of these operations is a primary S3 responsibility, the intelligence analysis for the operations must be developed by the S2.

b. Intelligence support for cover and deception activities may include—

   (1) Intentionally permitting erroneous information to be "leaked out."
   (2) Requesting information from unreliable sources concerning one area, while planning operations in a different area.
   (3) Communication electronic deception.
Section VIII. ENGINEER SUPPORT

121. General

a. In counterguerrilla operations, engineer support is normally provided the brigade by the attachment of one or more engineer companies from the division engineer battalion. Special engineer units and equipment may be attached if required by the particular situation. In any case, the brigade and subordinate units will normally require more engineer support than during conventional operations.

b. The decentralized nature of the operation and the large size of the assigned area normally require the further attachment of engineer elements to subordinate units of the brigade. Engineer elements may be required to—

(1) Clear or improve roads and trails throughout the area.
(2) Assist in the establishment of minefields and protective obstacles around static security posts, combat bases, military and civil installations, and key communities.
(3) Assist in the detection and clearance of enemy minefields and obstacles.
(4) Conduct route reconnaissance and road and bridge classification, and improve existing bridges or build bridges to open lines of communication.
(5) Assist in the light construction of shelters, storage areas, command posts, aid stations, etc.
(6) Assist in the preparation of defensive positions.
(7) Provide engineer parties with patrols, raiding forces, ambush forces, convoy security detachments, search and seizure forces, and static security posts.
(8) Supply potable water and natural construction material on independent and semi-independent-type operations.
(9) Provide engineer construction support for the conduct of civic rehabilitation projects.

122. Support of Police Operations and Civic Action

a. The requirements for logistical support of the civilian population and the rehabilitation of civilian installations may require the employment of engineer construction units in the brigade area.

b. These units may be employed to construct or rehabilitate civilian installations, to include the following:

(1) Roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, and marshalling yards.
(2) Water reservoirs, filtering plants, dams, locks, and pipelines.
(3) Churches, schools, hospitals, shelters, and warehouses.
(4) Resettlement areas.

c. Engineer construction units may be employed under the control of a higher headquarters or attached to the brigade. Seldom will they be attached to battalions or lower echelons.

d. For details of engineer capabilities and tasks, see FM's 5–135 and 5–136.

Section IX. OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT

123. Ground Transportation

a. Depending on the mission, trafficability of the terrain, the size of the area of operations, and the civil and military situations, the brigade and subordinate units may require the habitual support of additional wheeled vehicular mobility from corps and field army transportation units. Additional vehicles may be required for—

(1) Motorizing reaction forces.
(2) Patrols of lines of communication.
(3) Resupply and evacuation.
(4) Support of civic action projects.
(5) Evacuation of civilians during resettlement operations.

b. The terrain found in the area of operations usually does not favor the use of attached armored personnel carriers in operations against an enemy guerrilla force. However, their employment in police operations may be extremely effective if the terrain is trafficable.
Consequently, units may receive an attachment of armored personnel carriers.

c. Armored personnel carriers may be utilized for—

   (1) Mechanization of all or part of the reaction forces, terrain permitting.
   (2) Employment with convoy security detachments.
   (3) Employment on remote static security posts.
   (4) Transport of key civilian government officials.
   (5) Use of patrols of lines of communication.
   (6) River crossing operations or on-river patrols.
   (7) Use as a flamethrower vehicle by adding a flame gun and tanks.

d. Armored personnel carriers with their speed, mobility, and appearance of massiveness are an excellent “show of force.” They may deeply impress the resistance force and the civilian population.

124. Communication Units

a. The brigade receives direct signal support to its headquarters from a forward command communication section of the division signal battalion. This section connects the brigade into the division area communication system and operates a brigade station in the Division Comd/Op Net RATT. This section is located at the brigade CP and may be attached in counterguerrilla operations.

b. In addition, in counterguerrilla operations, the brigade receives general signal support from a forward area signal center platoon, just as in conventional operations. This platoon provides message, message center, messenger, teletypewriter, crypto, telephone switching and patching, radio wire integration, and multichannel radio-relay facilities. The platoon is normally in area support and operates from the vicinity of the brigade trains area.

c. The brigade and its subordinate elements will normally require an extensive substitution of portable amplitude modulated radio sets for certain of the shorter range frequency modulated transmitter-receivers provided organically.

d. Units may require an augmentation of signal support for the purpose of constructing, rehabilitating, and/or maintaining civilian communication facilities.

e. Infrared light equipment may be used as an alternate communication means.

125. Chemical Units

a. Army Chemical Corps units are available to provide the following support for the brigade in counterguerrilla operations:

   (1) Smoke operations.
   (2) Servicing of flamethrowers.
   (3) Decontamination.

b. The initial source of chemical supply and maintenance is provided by elements of the division support command.

126. Army Security Agency Units

a. The ASA will be utilized to provide those types of intelligence security and electronic warfare support as set forth in AR 10-122. To accomplish this task, agency support will be echeloned into three compatible and integrated types as follows:

   (1) Man pack subsystem. To furnish direct support to lower echelon combat troops in contact with the enemy.
   (2) Forward area subsystem. To provide direct support to division and forward elements while utilizing vehicle mobility.
   (3) Rear area subsystems. To incorporate ASA activities in support of all elements to rear of the division.

b. Application of ASA support to elements will be tailored to fit specific missions.

c. ASA unit mobility will be compatible with that of the supported unit.

127. Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs Units

TOE’s 33–500E, 33–600E, and 41–500E show the available psychological warfare and civil affairs units which may be attached during counterguerrilla operations.
128. Use of Dogs

a. Patrol, tracker, and security dogs are a valuable asset in counterguerrilla operations. Their employment should habitually be considered in the planning of all patrol and security operations. The successful employment of these dogs is primarily dependent on the skill of the handler and the knowledge and full understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the dogs by all commanders and staffs.

b. Patrol dogs work from scents in the air and from noises. They are trained to give silent warning of individuals or groups by pointing. While they must always work under the control of handlers, they can normally be employed on a lead or loose. On patrols, the dog will normally lead. If it is working loose, the handler must continually keep it in sight. Since the handler must keep his attention on his dog, he is normally provided an armed escort for protection. The handler should move so that the dog can take maximum advantage of the wind. A dog is normally capable of detecting humans at a distance of 200–300 meters directly up wind.

c. Tracker dogs follow human ground scents in hope of receiving a food reward at the end of a successful mission. They may be employed night or day. A scent remains more concentrated during the night. It is important that the dog be brought to the source of the scent as rapidly as possible and that it is transported to the source so it arrives fresh and untired. Once it has been decided to employ tracker dogs in an area, attention must be directed toward preventing contamination of the area with other extraneous scents. Movement of friendly forces in the area is restricted.

d. Security dogs are employed to augment the normal security of static security posts. They are trained to give early warning of approaching individuals or groups.

e. While these dogs can be worked night and day and in most types of terrain and weather, they do have the following definite limitations which must be recognized by all personnel concerned with their employment:

(1) Heavy rain adversely affects their performance.

(2) Dense vegetation tires them rapidly.

(3) Enemy and friendly forces cannot be differentiated by the dogs.

(4) The performance of the dogs decreases as the number of personnel in its vicinity increases.

(5) Foreign bred dogs normally lack the stamina to resist local diseases in the area of operations.

(6) The proficiency of the dogs can be maintained only through continuous training under the supervision of trained personnel.

129. Use of Civil Forces and Individuals

a. To minimize the requirements for military units, maximum assistance will be sought from indigenous police units, paramilitary units, and local individuals who are sympathetic to the friendly cause. The national policy at the specific time and appropriate directives will dictate to a great degree the way these nationals may be employed.

b. Within national policy, the employment of the units and individuals may include their use as:

(1) Intelligence agents and informers.

(2) Propaganda agents.

(3) Government and key civil administrators.

(4) Civil police, local police, special police, and self-defense forces.

(5) Labor and service forces.

(6) Trackers and guides.

(7) Interpreters and translators.

(8) Counterguerrilla combat units.

c. Use of nationals must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature organization and exploitation of such forces may invite treachery. To avoid dangerous repercussions, the commander must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization and use it to screen those persons available for use. Hostile guerrilla forces may be expected to infiltrate agents into any locally organized units to obtain information and to exploit these units in conjunction with guerrilla operations at the opportune time.
When there is some doubt about the loyalty of the nationals, they may still possibly be used on certain nonsensitive duties to release regular troops for military operations. It may also be possible to use them in other jobs where they do not have a close relationship with the local population.

130. Use of Allied Forces

a. Whenever possible, allied regular troops native to an area are employed against hostile resistance movements within the area. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable.

b. Total responsibility for control over liberated areas is transferred to the local government as soon as possible. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the reestablished power. Close liaison and ample support is provided for the reestablished government and its organized forces until it is entirely self-sufficient. Such support may be administered through advisory and liaison groups or civil affairs units.

131. Support by Other Services

a. Air Force units can assist in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by—

(1) Preventing air delivery of supplies and equipment by a sponsoring power.
(2) Conducting aerial resupply and other logistic functions.
(3) Conducting close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.
(4) Delivering airborne and airlanded forces.

b. Naval forces can assist in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by—

(1) Disrupting guerrilla coastal supply channels.
(2) Providing sea transport.
(3) Conducting shore bombardment, close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.
(4) Preventing seaward escape of guerrilla forces.
(5) Providing seaborne supply and other logistic functions.

c. Marine forces can assist in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by conducting operations in the air and on the ground similar to those performed by the Air Force and Army.
CHAPTER 7
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

132. General

a. Combat service support encompasses the fields of personnel support, logistical support, and the administrative aspects of civil affairs.

b. The combat service support of infantry and airborne infantry brigades and lower units is discussed in detail in the FM 7-series. So far as practical, the procedures discussed in these field manuals will be followed in counterguerrilla operations. However, the extended distances between units, the diversity of the mission, the lack of security of supply installations and the lines of communication, and the requirement to support the population administratively as prescribed by higher headquarters, will normally require modification of these procedures to some degree.

c. At division level, combat service support (except civil affairs) is provided by units of the division support command which is organized on a functional basis as shown in figure 37. Personnel, administrative, and replacement functions are the responsibility of the division adjutant general. Logistical support operations are under the operational control of the division support command commander. Details of division combat service support, and the organization and operation of the Administrative Support Operations Center (ADSOC) are covered in FM 54–2.

d. The brigade is normally a tactical echelon which enters administrative channels only to the extent necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment of its mission. Combat battalions assigned to the brigade are logistically self-sufficient when normal logistical support is available through the division support command. Normally, personnel and administrative functions and services are accomplished for the battalions by the appropriate staff section of the division administration company.

e. Due to the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations and the extensive areas of operations normally assigned to military units, the brigade may be tailored to be administratively self-sufficient. In these cases, it will normally require the attachment of a provisionally organized support battalion to provide logistical support. The support battalion may include the following units:

(1) Headquarters and headquarters detachment (provisionally organized).
(2) Medical company.
(3) Forward support maintenance company.
(4) Administrative company or detachment (provisionally organized).
(5) Supply and transport company (provisionally organized).
(6) Aerial supply platoon.
(7) Air equipment support detachment (if airborne units are attached).

f. When a battalion is subordinate to an administratively self-sufficient brigade task force, it is not administratively dependent on the division as prescribed in FM 7–20; but, instead, receives its combat service support from the parent brigade.

g. The following discussion of combat service support is concerned primarily with areas where increased emphasis must be placed on certain facets of the functions of personnel, logistics, and civil affairs, and where modification of the procedures employed by the combat service support units may be required for the successful conduct of counterguerrilla operations.

133. Personnel

a. The brigade and battalion S1’s exercise unit staff supervision over all personnel activities of their respective units. They coordinate
NOTE ORGANIZATION SHOWN ABOVE IS GENERALLY THE SAME FOR ALL TYPE DIVISIONS. THE AIRBORNE DIVISION SUPPORT COMMANDS INCLUDES AN AIR EQUIPMENT SUPPORT COMPANY.

Figure 37. Infantry division support command.
personnel activities of the unit and recommend changes to plans, policies, and orders to ensure effective use of the available human resources.

b. The major areas of personnel responsibility are—
   (1) Maintenance of unit strength.
   (2) Personnel management.
   (3) Development and maintenance of morale.
   (4) Maintenance of military discipline, law, and order.
   (5) Headquarters management.
   (6) Miscellaneous.

c. These major areas are discussed in detail in the FM 7-series. Generally, the procedures discussed there apply to counterguerrilla operations. However, continuous command emphasis must be given to the following areas:
   (1) Orientation of replacements.
   (2) Development and maintenance of morale.
   (3) Maintenance of discipline, law, and order.
   (4) Handling of prisoners of war.

d. Prior to counterguerrilla operations, replacements must receive an extensive orientation on the nature of the terrain and climate, unusual health hazards, characteristics of the population, their relations with the civil population, and the ideological and political fallacies of the resistance movement.

e. Troops employed in counterguerrilla operations are subjected to morale and psychological pressures far different from those found in normal operations. This is particularly true when the operation is against a revolutionary movement in a situation short of war and results in large degree from—
   (1) The natural reluctance of the soldier to repress women, children, and old men who are active in resistance activities.
   (2) The sympathy of some soldiers for certain stated objectives of the resistance movement.
   (3) Fear of guerrilla force atrocities and an impulse to take vindictive retaliation because of such atrocities.

f. An indoctrination, education, and recreation program must be carried out on a continuing basis to effectively offset these morale and psychological pressures within the unit.

g. The maintenance of discipline, law, and order is extremely important when dealing with large segments of an indigenous population. The conduct of the members of the military unit must impress the civil population with their ability, courtesy, and moral fiber and with the neatness, security, and efficiency of their bases and installations.

h. See paragraph 61 for a discussion of the principles governing the handling of apprehended guerrilla force members.

134. Logistics, General

The brigade and battalion S4's exercise unit staff responsibility over all logistical matters for their respective units, they insure that the logistical support system is feasible and immediately responsive to the requirements of subordinate units.

b. The major areas of logistical responsibility are—
   (1) Supply.
   (2) Maintenance.
   (3) Medical support.
   (4) Transportation.
   (5) Miscellaneous services.

c. The focal point for logistical operations at the brigade is the brigade trains. Activities in the brigade trains are under the staff supervision of the S4. The exact composition of the brigade trains will vary with the tactical situation and the disposition of the combat and combat support units attached to, or in support of, the brigade. Normally, in counterguerrilla operations, the brigade trains will include—
   (1) Elements of the brigade company headquarters.
(2) Brigade staff section personnel not normally located at the command post.

(3) Maintenance and supply section of the aviation platoon.

(4) Division support command elements, or logistic elements of this command attached to the brigade, if it is organized for administrative self-sufficiency.

(5) Service elements of combat, combat support, and administrative support units attached to, or in support of the brigade, as necessary.

d. In counterguerrilla operations, the battalion will normally organize and employ only one trains organization instead of utilizing both the field and combat trains as prescribed in FM 7-20. These trains will normally be located in the vicinity of the battalion headquarters or reaction force for security. Seldom will logistical elements of the infantry or airborne infantry battalion be located in the brigade trains as in conventional operations. The battalion trains will normally include:

(1) Class I distributing point.

(2) Class III distribution point.

(3) Class V distributing point.

(4) Kitchen area.

(5) Maintenance area.

(6) Bath and clothing exchange units.

(7) Motor park.

(8) Medical elements.

(9) Salvage collecting point.

(10) Collecting points for excess equipment and captured enemy material.

(11) A drop zone or aerial resupply point.

(12) Elements of trains of attached units.

(13) A water point.

e. Company trains are the logistical elements, including vehicles, equipment, and personnel which provide logistical support for the company. Company trains are normally located in the combat base(s) of the applicable company.

f. While currently prescribed logistical systems are adequate to support all facets of counterguerrilla operations, the techniques of support employed must be geared to the operational requirements and may vary considerably from those employed for conventional operations.

g. Flexibility and responsiveness of logistical support in counterguerrilla operations are facilitated by—

(1) Preplanning so all units are equipped with the minimum essential supplies and equipment required for current, planned, and possible contingent operations.

(2) Stocking levels of supply at echelons lower than normal in order to expedite supply.

(3) Maximum use of available Army transport aircraft for logistical support, consistent with established priorities for the tactical employment of these aircraft.

135. Supply

a. Units engaged in counterguerrilla operations are provided only those supplies and equipment essential to the accomplishment of the assigned mission and any possible contingencies which may arise. Other supplies are maintained in the brigade and battalion trains and static security posts so as not to reduce the foot and air mobility of the combat elements. No company or smaller unit is encumbered with any supplies or equipment which are not manportable.

b. Sufficient stocks of supplies and equipment are maintained at the brigade and battalion trains and at secure static security posts to ensure the provision of logistical support without interruption.

c. The planning of resupply activities in counterguerrilla operations must be extremely detailed and accomplished well in advance of the actual requirements. Resupply procedures are standardized at all levels of command. It is imperative that the experience factors on which to base this standardization be computed early in the operation.

d. Emphasis is placed on the maximum utilization of aerial resupply within the availability of aircraft and the established priority for their employment to support tactical operations. Preselected rendezvous points for resupply are established for all units. These
points vary according to a prearranged schedule so their use will not indicate the location of a friendly base to the enemy.

e. Once experience factors (to include civilian population requirements) have been determined, a standard basis load to cover the desired period of time (normally 1 day) can be established for each unit, irrespective of its size. These basic loads for battalions, companies, platoons, and squads can be used for the prepackaging, rigging, and prepositioning of supplies in brigade and battalion trains areas ready for immediate air delivery either automatically or on call. Whenever possible, no package is prepared which weighs over 50 pounds. This facilitates the removal of supplies from the resupply rendezvous point.

f. Emphasis is on unit distribution of all supplies to units as far forward as possible. For instance, the issue of supplies to a company should be not only to the company trains in the combat base, but also directly to elements of the company conducting operations from static security posts and forward patrol bases.

g. The procedure for requesting items of supplies and equipment can be simplified by the preparation and use of a catalog supply system. This system—

(1) Utilizes a brevity code in which a single item or several associated items are identified and requested by an abbreviated code word. See FM 31–21.

(2) Comprises both packages of associated individual items and units comprising several packages. This combination permits the user maximum flexibility in choice of supply consistent with the use of the abbreviated coded request and communications transmission security. See FM 31–21. Figure 38 shows a portion of a sample catalog supply list.

h. The counterguerrilla force must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to elements of the civilian populace, especially civilian victims of guerrilla attacks, isolated population centers, and groups relocated or concentrated for security reasons. The provision of these items provides for emergency situations, assists in the implementation of the military program of civic action, and may prevent serious drains on a struggling civilian economy. Stocks of the following supplies should be maintained for issue to the civilian population:

(1) Food (staples such as salt, oil, tea, sugar, potatoes, and rice).

(2) Clothing (may include cloth in bolts, salvaged military clothing, and/or new items of locally procured clothing).

(3) Shelter (salvage tents and/or construction materials).

(4) Medical supplies (medicines, bandages, vaccines, and ambulatory aids).

(5) Fuel (of the type characteristic to the heating systems of the area).

i. Strict control must be exercised over the assembly, storage, and distribution of indigenous supplies destined for civilian consumption, lest they be used to establish a “black market” or eventually find their way into the hands of the guerrilla force. Civil affairs units organized and trained for this purpose will often be available to assist in the exercise of this control.

j. Minimum dependence is placed on the local economy for the provision of supplies and equipment unless encouraged to bolster the economic status of the area. Often, authority may be granted to use supplies such as food as payment for services rendered by the civilian population. Such payments must be made in the name of the friendly force and not as an individual gesture.

k. All friendly troops must understand the difficulties in providing logistical support in counterguerrilla operations and the importance of conserving, maintaining, and securing available supplies and equipment. Troops must realize that supplies lost or abandoned will be recovered by the resistance force and used against them. Maximum use is made of captured enemy supplies for civilian support.

136. Maintenance

a. The difficulties in maintaining a reliable resupply system in counterguerrilla operations
make the continued emphasis on preventive maintenance mandatory. Commanders at all levels must permit adequate time for equipment care and maintenance and the conduct of all required operational checks on available equipment.

b. All commanders are responsible for maintenance activities of organic and attached units.

c. Organizational maintenance (1st and 2d echelon) of all equipment is a unit responsibility. All units in a brigade task force are provided the personnel and equipment necessary to perform organizational maintenance.

d. Field maintenance of all equipment (except signal cryptographic, electrical accounting, and medical) of the brigade and attached units is performed by the maintenance battalion of the division support command. Field maintenance of signal cryptographic equipment is performed by the division signal battalion. Field maintenance of medical equipment is not accomplished in the division.

e. A forward support company of the division maintenance battalion, with appropriate augmentation, operates as part of the division support command elements in each of the brigade trains areas and performs field maintenance to the extent of its capability. This unit is backed up by the main support company.

f. When the brigade is organized for independent and semi-independent operations, a forward support company with appropriate augmentation is normally attached to the brigade.

g. The infantry or airborne infantry battalion conducting counterguerrilla operations will normally require considerable augmentation of its maintenance platoon. The extent of this augmentation will depend on the particular requirements of the situation. In any case, it normally includes a composite 3d echelon maintenance team from the forward maintenance support company supporting the parent brigade. This team habitually functions in the
battalion trains area. It performs 3d echelon and back-up 2d echelon maintenance support for chemical, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal items.

h. On-site maintenance must be performed whenever possible. Emergency repair teams should be air transported to the site of required maintenance whenever the aircraft availability permits.

137. Evacuation and Hospitalization

a. The provision of medical support in counterguerrilla operations must be as flexible and imaginative as the supported combat operations.

b. During counterguerrilla operations, the extended distances between installations and the semi-independence of the operations complicate medical support and will normally require augmentation of organic medical units and modification of the supporting medical service organization and procedures of higher headquarters.

c. Measures the military units may take to overcome the complicating factors are—

(1) Greater reliance on self-aid and buddy aid.

(2) Establishment of small aid stations with a treating and holding capability at static security posts, combat bases, and other echelons lower than normal.

(3) Provision of sufficient Army aircraft to move medical elements rapidly to reinforce existing treatment and holding installations where the patient load has risen unexpectedly.

(4) Maximum use of scheduled and on-call air evacuation.

(5) Provision of small medical elements to support extended patrols, "hunter-killer" teams, and raid and ambush forces.

(6) Assignment of specially trained enlisted medical personnel capable of operating small treatment facilities with minimum supervision.

(7) Use of indigenous litter bearer teams.

(8) Strict enforcement of the highest standards of sanitation and first aid and buddy aid training.

(9) Utilization of indigenous medical resources and capabilities when available and acceptable.

(10) Cross-training of all combat personnel in the practical application of emergency treatment.

(11) Training and utilization of paramedics to support airborne units during airborne parachute operations and to make vertical entry into isolated areas to provide emergency medical support to combat units.

d. The emergency treatment and evacuation procedures to be followed should be prescribed in unit SOP's.

e. Medical support should be provided the civilian sick and wounded in the area of operation when the operational conditions permit.

138. Transportation

a. Certain unusual transportation problems must be considered in providing transportation support to combat units in counterguerrilla operations. These problems arise primarily because of—

(1) The size of the normal area of operations.

(2) The difficult and underdeveloped nature of the area the guerrilla force chooses for tactical operations.

(3) The lack of security of ground lines of communication.

b. Transportation planning for counterguerrilla operations must provide a reliable transportation system responsive to the requirements of both tactical operations and logistical support.

c. Often, the terrain and the existing civil and military situation will require that a military unit release to the next higher headquarters certain of its ground vehicles not necessary for command, control, and transportation support. Conversely, if the terrain is trafficable, military units assigned the primary mission of conducting police operations in a large area will usually require an augmentation of organic ground transportation means. This is
due primarily to the extended distances that may exist between the static security posts, self-defense units in villages, combat bases, and patrol bases used to control the population and conduct the required security missions. This augmentation may come from military or civilian sources, or both.

d. Depending on the situation, the provision of adequate transportation may require such measures as—

1. Commandeering civilian ground and water transportation means such as trucks, bicycles, rafts, sampans, river boats, motorcycles, and horses or mules.

2. Recruiting indigenous bearer units and pack animals for pack operations.

3. Exploiting available waterways.

e. Army aircraft is the most effective means of transportation because of its speed, relative security from ground attack, and lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions. Emphasis is placed on both parachute and air-landed operations.

f. Security of all surface movements is normally necessary. Appropriate measures include—

1. Combat training of drivers.

2. Arming of vehicles.

3. Extensive route reconnaissance.

4. Employment of convoy security detachments.

139. Construction

a. The underdeveloped nature of the area and the difficult terrain in the area of responsibility of a counterguerrilla force often require much more light construction than is normally done by the unit in conventional warfare.

b. This increased construction may include construction of—

1. Defenses of combat bases and static security posts.

2. An adequate ground transportation network.

3. Landing areas, airfields, and helicopter pads.

4. Resettlement areas.

140. Civil Affairs

a. In operations against guerrilla forces, military units may be assigned an area of operations in which control of the civil population is administered by an area support civil affairs unit. In such cases, the commander is relieved of responsibility for civil administration in the area. However, he must coordinate the military operations of his unit very closely with the administration of the civil affairs unit. Further, the members of the military force will have certain technical, managerial, and administrative skills which may be effectively employed in support of the civil affairs operations when requested.

b. Often, however, the military commander will be both the civil administrator and military commander in his assigned area. In this case, the commander obtains maximum assistance in dealing with the civilian population from command civil affairs units located in the area. These units may be attached to the military force or may operate in the area under higher headquarters control.

c. Civil affairs plays a much more dominant role in counterguerrilla operations than is normal in conventional operations. In conventional operations, civil affairs functions are usually exercised only to the extent necessary to conduct the commander's military-political responsibilities and support the combat operations. However, in counterguerrilla operations where the isolation of the organized elements of the resistance movement from its civilian support is necessary, the conduct of civil affairs functions may become a primary mission of the military force. In counterguerrilla operations, all tactical plans are based on an integrated

(5) Civic action projects to support the civilian population.
and coordinated civil and military approach designed to not only destroy the guerrilla force, but also to remove the cause for the resistance movement.

d. Population control is discussed in chapter 4.

141. Other Combat Service Support Matters

a. Water resupply in counterguerrilla operations is dependent primarily on the use of indigenous sources. Several expedients are available to purify this water before it is used for cooking and drinking. Such methods include the use of calcium hypochlorite, individual water purification tablets, and boiling. For details concerning water purification, see FM 21–10.

b. Mass management must normally be provisionally organized in counterguerrilla operations. Normally, elements of the military force which are conducting operations at small static security posts or operating from forward patrol bases must depend predominantly on the use of combat-type rations. The use of imaginative improvisation by the elements of the military force normally operating within combat bases (e.g., company reaction forces) may provide earthen ovens and open grills which can be used to provide hot meals. It is emphasized that the issue of Class I items to these units must usually be modified to provide foodstuffs suitable for preparation by such improvised techniques. The use of TOE field ranges and other cooking equipment by these units is impractical since it substantially reduces the mobility of the base.

c. Captured enemy material is tagged, collected, and evacuated in the same manner as salvage. Captured enemy material is always reported to the next higher headquarters, where it may be a source of enemy information. Captured enemy material which may have originated from a sponsoring power and new and unusual weapons and equipment are evacuated through intelligence channels. Enemy weapons are used only in emergencies. In counterguerrilla operations, the characteristic sounds of friendly and enemy weapons are often a valuable intelligence source used to identify the firing units.

d. Graves registration functions are normally performed at brigade by a collection and evacuation section which establishes a collecting point in the brigade trains area to receive the dead from subordinate units, identify remains, and evacuate the remains to the rear. The infantry and airborne infantry battalion is responsible for evacuation of the dead to the brigade collecting point. The battalion engaged in counterguerrilla operations will normally receive assistance from attached collection and evacuation elements in the evacuation of the dead.

e. The destruction of supplies and equipment (less medical) may be conducted to deny their use to the enemy. In counterguerrilla operations, the authority to destroy supplies and equipment is normally delegated down to and including squad leaders. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, medical material and stores shall not be intentionally destroyed (par. 234, FM 27–10).
CHAPTER 8
TRAINING

142. General

a. Intensive training in counterguerrilla operations is necessary to offset the advantages which the enemy guerrilla force often has in the following areas:
   (1) Discipline.
   (2) Motivation.
   (3) Experience.
   (4) Conservation of supplies.
   (5) Ruthlessness.
   (6) Hardiness.
   (7) Knowledge of the local terrain, language, customs, and other characteristics of the population.

b. Counterguerrilla training at all levels emphasizes the following:
   (1) Physical and mental conditioning and acclimation to the areas of operation.
   (2) Combat tactics and techniques of counterguerrilla operations to include the techniques of raids and ambushes.
   (3) Long-range patrol operations under primitive conditions and utilizing only such supplies as can be transported with the patrol.
   (4) Cross-country movement at night and under adverse weather conditions, to include tracking and land navigation.
   (5) Employment of Army aviation.
   (6) Conduct of police operation.
   (7) Intelligence and counterguerrilla procedures and techniques.
   (8) Employment of psychological warfare units.
   (9) Employment of civil affairs units.
   (10) Civic action.
   (11) Immediate reaction drills.
   (12) Orientation on the nature of the motivations, operations, and objectives of resistance movements. This orientation should consist of counterpropaganda training and orientation on the need to engage in counterguerrilla operations.

c. The preparation of conventional combat units for effective employment in the counterguerrilla operations involves training in four primary areas:
   (1) Combat training of the individual soldier in those skills peculiar to this type of warfare.
   (2) Training of units in counterguerrilla police and combat operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.
   (3) Training of brigade and battalion commanders and staffs and company commanders.
   (4) Special orientation of all personnel, in varying degrees of intensity, in the characteristics of the proposed country or area of employment, followed by inspection in techniques used for analyzing the assigned sector as the basis for counterguerrilla operation plans.

d. See paragraph 47, FM 31–15, for a detailed discussion of the morale and psychological factors involved in training for counterguerrilla operations.

143. Integrated Training

a. Much of the training presented in the normal Army training program is applicable to combat against both a conventional enemy and a guerrilla force with little or no interest in the seizure and retention of terrain. The varying of the enemy situation between these two types of forces not only provides breadth to training, but also permits the extensive integration of counterguerrilla operations into normal training.
b. Some examples of subjects suitable for the integration of counterguerrilla training and possible areas to be integrated follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject area</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad tactical training</td>
<td>Cover organization, missions, and tactics of counterguerrilla patrols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stress need for effective small-unit leadership and aggressiveness after guerrillas have been contacted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard duty</td>
<td>Develop security consciousness against infiltration and guerrilla actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasize the need for alertness against surprise attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence training</td>
<td>Cover the need for continuous and accurate reporting of information of the terrain and enemy to ensure detection of guerrilla units and information on guerrilla activities. Stress the need for rapid transmission of information on guerrilla activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field sanitation and personal hygiene</td>
<td>Stress the need for proper health measures, self-aid, buddy aid, and aerial medical evacuation during counterguerrilla operations. Discuss expedient evacuation methods and additional items to be included in the individual aid kit such as calamine lotion, sodium bicarbonate, and insect repellents. Discuss the composition and code names for prepackaging medical supplies for air dropping as found in FM 31–21.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) In advanced individual training, the following integration may be effected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject area</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling and squad tactical training</td>
<td>Include training in—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Countermeasures against infiltrators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Countermeasures to detect and evade guerrilla ambushes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Tailoring of patrols to fit mission. Stress ability to move silently, avoid detection, and track guerrilla forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew-served weapons training</td>
<td>Stress security of crew-served weapons to prevent destruction or loss to guerrilla or underground elements. Cross-train on alternate weapons which may be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps and compass training</td>
<td>Stress importance of land navigation in counterguerrilla actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cover determination of likely routes of movement by guerrillas and possible locations of friendly and enemy ambush sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications training</td>
<td>Cover the effective employment of communications in counterguerrilla operations to include communication security and the use of all means of communications. Stress that signal communications is a primary guerrilla target. Include training in operation of AM radio sets. If not previously taught, consider a minimum of 3 hours instruction on operation of each new item of radio equipment to be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field fortification training</td>
<td>Stress improvised obstacles to include sharpened stakes, pits, and use of nails on ground. Cover preparation of weapons' positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field fortifications</td>
<td>Demonstrate the use of obstacles to assist in securing combat bases and static security posts in counterguerrilla operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmine warfare</td>
<td>Cover improvised types of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices and techniques used by guerrilla and counterguerrilla forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment and camouflage</td>
<td>Emphasize use of concealment and camouflage to deceive guerrillas as to the location of forces and combat bases. Discuss guerrilla techniques of concealment and camouflage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad, section, and platoon tactical exercises and ranger training.</td>
<td>Incorporate the conduct of raids and ambushes on guerrilla forces. Stress tactics and techniques employed by small units in offensive and defensive operations against infiltrators and guerrillas. Emphasize security, intelligence, communications, and the use of aggressive reaction to contact with guerrilla elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First aid</td>
<td>Integrate medical training such as care of wounds, snake bites, and mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Counterguerrilla training is integrated into the basic and advanced unit and field exercise and maneuver training of all units.

144. Cross-Training

a. Since counterguerrilla operations require the habitual employment of small widely separated tactically self-sufficient combat units, the personnel of these units must be cross-trained in the employment of all types of weapons and communications found in the unit. The loss of a portion of a unit should never cause crew-served weapons or communication equipment to be unused because of a lack of trained personnel.

b. Personnel are cross-trained in the use of nonorganic equipment which may be required by the particular situation. Such nonorganic equipment may include:

(1) Lighter, more mobile equipment such as the 81-mm mortar in lieu of the 4.2-inch mortar.
(2) Shotguns and hand-held automatic weapons.
(3) Boats.
(4) Civilian-type equipment such as foreign weapons, bicycles, civilian vehicles, etc.

c. All personnel are cross-trained in the provision of emergency medical aid since there will seldom be sufficient medical personnel to accompany all the small units conducting ambushes, raids, and patrols in depth throughout the area of operations.

145. Training for Commanders and Staffs

a. Prior to commitment in counterguerrilla operations, commanders and staffs need additional training in those operational areas peculiar to this type of operation to include—

(1) Tactics and techniques peculiar to combating an enemy with little interest in seizing and holding terrain.
(2) Familiarization with changes in organization and equipment necessary for success in counterguerrilla operations.
(3) Command, communication, and logistical problems to include medical treatment and evacuation associated with conducting highly decentralized operations over large areas.
(4) Understanding and support of clandestine intelligence and communications nets and cooperation with other intelligence agencies, both United States and indigenous.
(5) Conduct of police control.
(6) Employment of supporting civil affairs and psychological warfare units.
(7) Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health hazards.
(8) National characteristics (customs, religious, economic, and political).

b. Particular attention is directed to the development of strong, capable small unit leaders. During the decentralized conduct of counterguerrilla operations, the small-unit leader must be able to plan and execute tactical operations with little or no assistance from higher headquarters. He must be able to effectively perform the duties of his senior in the event the senior becomes a casualty. Training should provide for the periodic assumption of the higher command by small unit leaders.

146. Physical Conditioning

a. By nature, the guerrilla is a particularly hardy enemy. Success of his operations depends on his ability to continually move about over extended distances, and to sustain himself for prolonged periods under the most austere and difficult conditions.

b. The counterguerrilla force must be superior to the enemy in physical conditioning. It must be prepared not only to match the foot mobility and endurance of the guerrilla, but to exceed it. This requires an extremely intensive training effort to condition the personnel in the counterguerrilla unit. Emphasis is placed on—

(1) Foot marches, to include speed marches.
(2) Physical training drills.
(3) Combatives, to include hand-to-hand combat and bayonet drill.
(4) Survival training (both land and water).
(5) Confidence tests.
(6) Organized athletics.
c. Training exercises are planned and conducted to tax the physical endurance of the personnel of the unit. This conditions the troops to mentally accept the concept of continuous offensive operations to the limits of available physical stamina.

147. Immediate Action Drills

a. The majority of the counterguerrilla combat operations conducted by small units will be in rapid reaction to newly detected enemy forces. The guerrilla response to detection will normally be to inflict the maximum casualties possible and then flee the scene of action. The counterguerrilla force must be prepared to immediately react against detected enemy forces without taking time for an adequate reconnaissance of the area, development of detailed estimates of the situation, or issuance of detailed orders.

b. This requires that small units be conditioned to react with predrilled movements immediately after contact has been made. The basic battle drills discussed in appendix III, FM 7-15, are excellent guides to training in these movements.

c. Small unit alerts at various times throughout the training program will further condition the personnel to react swiftly to unanticipated situations.

148. Training in Police Operations

a. Police operations require small unit proficiency in the use of numerous techniques not generally associated with conventional combat. This is particularly true of the following measures which must be taken to control the civilian population.

1. Roadblocks.
2. Search and seizure operations.
3. Block control.
5. Registration of civilians.
6. Use of passes and permits.
7. Restrictions on transportation and communication.
8. Control of movement.
10. Censorship.
11. Control of food and critical items.
12. Riot control.
13. Evacuation of areas.

b. Training in these techniques emphasizes the fact that the segment of the population friendly to the counterguerrilla effort are subjected to these control measures the same as the rest of the population. Tactlessness, rudeness, unnecessary delays, etc., in the conduct of this control may alienate these persons with friendly sympathies.

c. So far as possible, these techniques of control are developed in pretrained drills to the point where they can be executed without delay with each individual soldier knowing his exact duties during the operation. This is particularly true for the conduct of roadblocks and search and seizure operations.

d. The American soldier has an ingrained dislike for police-type operations and will display a reluctance to take repressive measures against the women, children, and the infirmed of the civilian population unless he is extremely well indoctrinated on the necessity for these operations.

149. Tailoring of Units

a. Units engaged in counterguerrilla operations are tailored prior to each exercise for optimum results during the training. Unnecessary vehicles should be deleted from the units to minimize vehicular movement during training.

b. A continuous study is made of the weapons, ammunition, equipment, and material required for these operations. Emphasis is placed on determining the minimum essential load the individual and unit may carry and still maintain excellent foot mobility. Unit SOP's are developed concerning the specific amount and type of rations, clothing, equipment, and ammunition to be carried by each individual. An increase in the individual or unit load seriously reduces the ability to move and fight.

150. Use of Army Transport Aircraft

a. Counterguerrilla forces must be trained to accept Army transport aircraft as abnormal means of combat support.

b. All units from battalion down to rifle squads are trained to conduct coordinated air-
mobile operations as proficiently as ground operations. SOP's are developed for the loading and tactical deployment from all available types of Army aircraft. The optimum is for a unit to be able to be supported with any “mix” of available aircraft with no time lost in reorganizing the force for air movement in particular aircraft furnished for the operation.

c. Particular attention must be given in training to the—

(1) Characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of Army aircraft.
(2) Techniques of loading and unloading to include debarking on ropes.
(3) Techniques of stowing and transporting equipment.
(4) Terminal guidance techniques.
(5) Employment of terminal guidance equipment and navigational aids.
(6) Aerial resupply techniques to include the procedures for packaging equipment.

d. Whenever possible, Army transport aircraft will be provided on a one-for-one basis for training exercises.

e. While it is undesirable, in many situations, the availability of aircraft will require simulation of certain craft during exercises. It must be realized that the extensive simulation precludes the development of detailed techniques by small units in the use of this means of mobility and the gaining of familiarity with these vehicles and, thus, adds little to the training program.

151. Large Unit Training Exercises

a. Battalions and brigades must conduct extensive training exercises to gain proficiency in counterguerrilla operations.

b. Unlike conventional operations which may be broken down to tactical increments such as “the attack”, “the defense”, “night withdrawal”, etc., counterguerrilla operations are normally long-term operations with a complicated interplay of combat operations, police operations, and concurrent propaganda and civic action. This requires that—

(1) Only specific, well-defined, and developed situations normal to an overall counterguerrilla operation be played in a short-term exercise.

(2) Individual tactical exercises be varied to cover all possible aspects of counterguerrilla operations.

c. It is impossible to conduct a three- or four-day exercise and expect elements of a large unit to realistically locate, harass, consolidate, and eliminate a guerrilla force in its area during the available time. Such an operation may take weeks or months in actual combat. By the same token, it is impossible in a short-term exercise to conduct extensive civic action or police operations concurrently with combat operations and receive any significant proficiency in the skills involved.

d. Guerrilla representation must be played realistically during the exercises. The Aggressor plan of action must be detailed, comprehensive, and purposeful. The use of an Aggressor force (operating at random throughout the area) making contact with the player unit at will serves no useful purpose and contaminates the intelligence collection effort of the player unit.

e. An adequate representation of the civilian population in the normal counterguerrilla area of operations is necessary in all tactical exercises emphasizing police operations and/or civic action. Realism may be acquired by clandestinely dividing the civilian representation into the following groups prior to the exercise:

(1) Sympathizers with the friendly force (known only to the player unit).
(2) Sympathizers with the enemy force (known only to the Aggressor unit).
(3) Personnel with no polarized sympathies.

f. During unit exercises, inspections and maintenance are conducted as a part of the normal training exercise. Emphasis is placed on maintaining weapons and equipment in combat operational condition at all times.

152. Unit Esprit

The habitual employment of small units in widely separated areas and on detached task assignments which require the maximum endurance of the individual and the unit develops an extremely high esprit within the unit.

153. Army Training Program

See ATP 31—( ), Counterguerrilla Operations (to be published).
## APPENDIX

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   - (C) 105–87 Electronic Warfare (U).
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   - (C) 515–1 Army Cold War Activities.
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   - 7–15 Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Rifle Platoons and Squads.
   - 7–20 Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions.
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12–11  Administration Company, Airborne, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Divisions.
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17–36  Armored Cavalry Platoon and Troop, Air Cavalry Troop and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron.
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J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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NG: Corps Arty, Div, Div Arty, Bde, Regt/Gp/BG, Bn (2); Co/Btry (1); Units org under fol TOE: 17–22 (2); 33–106 (2); 33–107 (3).

USAR: Same as active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit. For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320–50.