FOREWORD

This manual furnishes guidance in applying the principles of combat intelligence for commanders, intelligence officers, and other personnel concerned with the intelligence effort in units below division level.

The attention of personnel using this manual is especially invited to the fact that realistic and vigorous command support must be provided to intelligence activities in order to obtain the information required to accomplish the unit's mission. To be effective, this support must be based on a thorough appreciation of the potentialities for the collection of information and the production of intelligence inherent in the units for which this manual has been prepared.
FM 30-7
HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 25 August 1959

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
BATTLE GROUP, COMBAT COMMAND AND
SMALLER UNITS

FM 30-7, 23 September 1958, is changed as follows:

45. Principal Sources for Lower Echelons

   g. (Superseded) Captured Documents. Captured documents are recorded information which has been in the hands of the enemy. Documents may include maps, sketches, photographs, orders, manuals, unit records, personal diaries, paybooks, newspapers, tape recordings, engravings or any other matter that may contain information relative to the enemy, weather, and terrain. Documents of friendly origin known to have been in enemy hands are also considered enemy documents. Captured documents constitute one of the prime sources of information regarding the enemy’s plans, tactics, morale, and order of battle to include organization, identity, strength and personalities. Documents may be found wherever the enemy has been—scattered on the ground, in former enemy installations, in foxholes, in abandoned vehicles, on the dead, and on prisoners of war. All troops must be trained to understand their responsibility for turning in documents promptly and to appreciate their intelligence value (par. 109e).

108. Handling of Prisoners of War
(Superseded)

   a. General. Correct handling of captured personnel enhances the probability of securing information from them. Interrogation takes precedence over rapid evacuation, except in forward areas, where prompt removal is prescribed by the Geneva Conventions.

   b. Disarm and Search. The first action by capturing troops is to disarm the prisoner and search him for concealed weapons and documents. If circumstances do not permit a thorough search, the prisoner should be disarmed and the search conducted as soon as possible. All documents must be identified with the prisoner from whom they were taken, and they must be evacuated with the prisoner.
to insure their availability to the interrogator when the prisoner is interrogated.

c. Tag. As soon as possible prisoners should be tagged to show the date-time of capture, circumstances of capture, place of capture and capturing unit. If no tags are available, a memorandum containing this information should be prepared to accompany the prisoner when he is evacuated.

d. Segregate. The capturing unit segregates POW to insure that security conscious individuals do not warn or influence others to remain silent. The groupings for segregation are officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, deserters, civilians, females, and political indoctrination personnel. Female POW, where possible, are evacuated separately. Due regard is shown for their sex.

e. Evacuation. Capturing troops are responsible for escorting POW to the nearest collecting point or POW cage as quickly as possible. They may question POW only for information of local tactical value.

f. Basic Rules. Guards must be instructed in the proper procedures for handling prisoners. There are seven basic rules to be followed—

1. Maintain segregation at all times.
2. Prevent prisoners from destroying or discarding documents and insignia left on them.
3. Prevent others from giving food, drink, or tobacco to prisoners.
4. Enforce silence at all times.
5. Deliver prisoners to collecting point as rapidly as possible.
6. Prevent prisoners from escaping.
7. Prevent anyone except interrogation of prisoner of war (IPW) personnel or other intelligence personnel from questioning a prisoner.

g. Preliminary Interrogation. The preliminary interrogation (the first formal interrogation conducted by IPW personnel) is intended to develop information of immediate tactical value to the unit commander. It is also intended to screen prisoners of war for their value as subjects for interrogation at higher echelons. The lowest level at which preliminary interrogation will normally take place is battle group or equivalent.

h. Intelligence Value. According to their value to Intelligence, prisoners of war may be divided into four broad categories:

1. Category A. High level prisoners of war, whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators and at the highest level. Types of prisoners in this category include—
(a) General officers; chiefs of staff of divisions or larger units; heads of staff sections at field army and above.

(b) Scientific and technical personnel with current knowledge of CBR weapons or new types of equipment.

(c) Political officers and psychological warfare personnel.

(d) Officials, war correspondents, contractors, etc., who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistic capabilities or political and economic factors.

(e) Persons with detailed knowledge of enemy communications, particularly ciphers and cryptographic equipment.

(f) Persons in intelligence units or staff positions.

(2) Category B. Prisoners of war who have enough information about the enemy on any subject of value to Intelligence, in addition to information of tactical value, which will warrant a second interrogation.

(3) Category C. Prisoners of war who have only information of immediate tactical value and do not therefore warrant a second interrogation.

(4) Category D. Prisoners of war who are of no interest to Intelligence.

i. Tactical Interrogation Report. The results of preliminary interrogations are reported in the Tactical Interrogation Report (fig. 15.1). This report includes personal and biographical particulars on the POW, an assessment of intelligence value of the POW, documents and equipment of intelligence value carried at time of capture, and particulars of the information gained from the POW. Copies of the report are sent directly to the intelligence officer of the next higher echelon; evacuated with the source; retained by the IPW unit; filed by the unit intelligence officer.

j. Enemy Wounded and Dead.

(1) Enemy wounded must be treated humanely and evacuated. At any time during evacuation, wounded POW may be examined for information if in the opinion of medical authorities such examination will not endanger life. The fact that a POW is wounded and being treated by the enemy has a psychological effect on the POW which makes him quite willing to talk.

(2) Enemy dead will be searched for documents, insignia, and other items as directed by the commander (on recommendation of the intelligence officer). The dead are later searched by recovery and disposition personnel. Documents found are tagged with date-time, location, and circumstances of finding as well as the name, rank, and unit of the enemy dead on whom found (if known), and forwarded through intelligence channels.
k. Enemy Agents. When hostile intelligence agents are detected in prisoner of war channels, they are segregated from other prisoners, isolated from each other, and complete information, including location of the POW or enemy agent, is relayed to the security (CIC) element of the supporting military intelligence unit.

l. Medical Personnel and Chaplains. These persons are not considered as prisoners of war while they are detained to care for POW (FM 27-10). However, they are evacuated with POW and there is no provision in the Geneva Conventions prohibiting their interrogation.

m. Enemy Civilians. These persons are segregated from other captured persons. They may be interrogated by qualified personnel from security (CIC) units; Civil Affairs units; IPW sections; or other intelligence units.

109. Handling of Captured Documents and Materiel
(Superseded)

a. Captured documents and materiel must be evacuated without delay to higher headquarters. This insures that their intelligence value will be determined and exploited at the earliest practicable time. Documents and equipment, the value of which can be exploited more efficiently when combined with prisoners of war interrogation, will be evacuated with the POW whenever possible. The S2 is responsible for the timely evacuation of documents and materiel obtained from the enemy. See FM 30-16.

b. Immediately upon seizure, guards are placed on enemy headquarters, command posts, communications installations, document or map repositories, and the like, to prevent destruction or loss of any documents. Battle group (or battalion) intelligence sections tag documents coming into their possession and forward them to the next higher echelon. Information on tags includes the capturing unit, place, date-time, and circumstances of capture. No markings or notation may be placed directly on any captured document.

c. Documents relating to technical design or operation found near, in, or in direct connection with, enemy materiel will be evacuated, if practicable, together with the materiel. However, if the operational situation and/or size of materiel makes timely evacuation impossible, the documents alone should be evacuated through intelligence channels together with supporting information as to location, description, type of materiel, sketch or photograph, nameplate data, etc.

d. All captured documents or devices dealing with codes, ciphers, and cryptomaterial of any kind will be treated as SECRET matter and evacuated by the most expeditious means to the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) through intelligence channels.
Much information of intelligence value may be lost or received too late because of the lack of intelligence training of individuals who are likely to collect and retain enemy documents and materiel as war trophies and souvenirs. Captured enemy property is the property of the United States (UCMJ, art. 103) and the S2 must ensure that all personnel are aware of the value of enemy documents and materiel as a source of intelligence information. The individual

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

REPORT NR 3 CY NR 4 DATE/TIME 160900 Jun 59

SOURCE - SHLUGA LAST NAME

CATEGORY - A B C D

IPW UNIT 3d Ml Det 2d BG, 15th Inf. Jenz, J.P. Attached to Interrogator

MAPS USED BELGIUM 1:50,000, LIMERLE

LANGUAGE USED Polish

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF POW

RANK Sergeant SHLUGA JOSEF 856943
Full Name Service Number

DOB 10 Dec 38 BIRTHPLACE Warsaw, Poland NATIONALITY Polish

LANGUAGES Polish-fluent, German-poor UNIT 2d Plat, 1st Co, 2d Bn, 5th Rifle

Proficiency Regt., 1st Agg Rifle Div

CAPTURE 160500 Jun 59 RETZFELD LA068609 Ambushed by friendly patrol

Date/Time Place (Including Coordinates) Circumstances

CAREER (Pre-Military) Student 1945-53: Carpenter 53-56.

MILITARY CAREER Conscripted Sept 56, Regimental NCO School 58, Squad Leader 59

ASSESSMENT Fairly bright N/A Good Unknown

Intelligence Experience Cooperation Reliability

SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE None

DOCUMENTS Soldiers paybook None

Carried at time of capture Money/Valuables

EQUIPMENT Source carried a new type of Dosimeter N/A

(Of intelligence interest) Personal Equipment Weapons

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

1st Co is right flank unit of 5th Rifle Regt. When captured source was leading patrol to contact

3d Rifle Regiment somewhere to the west of place of capture. Source believes his unit will

remain on the defensive for the next few days since none of the usual preparations preceding an

attack has been made recently.

Figure 15.1 (Added) Tactical interrogation report.
must be impressed, through training, with the importance of enemy
documents and materiel and the necessity for putting all such items
into intelligence channels with a minimum loss of time.

[AG 353 (9 Jul 59)]

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

L. L. LEMNITZER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
R. V. LEE,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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- US ARADCOM (5)
- US ARADCOM Rgn (5)
- OS Maj Comd (5)
- Log Comd (2)
- MDW (2)
- Armies (15) except First US Army (17)
  - Corps (10)
  - Div (10)
  - Brig (5)
  - Engr Gp (5)
  - FA Gp (5)
  - Inf Regt/Bg (5)
  - Armor Regt (5)
  - Engr Bn (2)
  - FA Bn (2)
  - Inf Bn (2)
  - Armor Bn (2)
  - Engr Co (1)
  - FA Btry (1)
  - Inf Co (1)
  - Armor Co (1)
  - USATC (10)
  - USMA (50)

USAR:

NG: State AG (3) ; units—same as Active Army except allowance is one
half the requirements for each unit.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.
# Field Manual

**Headquarters, Department of the Army**

**No. 30-7**

**Washington 25, D.C., 23 September 1958**

**Combat Intelligence Battle Group, Combat Command, and Smaller Units**

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

The purpose of this manual is to furnish guidance to commanders, staff officers, and other personnel concerned with the production and utilization of combat intelligence in units below division level.

2. Scope

a. This manual describes the organization of agencies which produce intelligence at units below division level, the influence of combat intelligence on operations, the techniques and procedures employed in collecting and processing information, and related intelligence functions and responsibilities.

b. The intelligence doctrine presented in this manual is based upon the premise that intelligence is produced for the commander, his staff, and for higher, lower, and adjacent units; and further, that intelligence and operations are interdependent and mutually supporting.

c. Details of procedures and techniques related to combat intelligence are omitted from this text when they are contained in other intelligence and basic branch manuals. For example, intelligence planning, applicable at all levels, is covered in Chapter 12, FM 30-5. Cross-references are made where necessary.

d. To standardize presentation and to avoid repetitions, the infantry and airborne battle group has been used throughout the manual, unless otherwise specified, as the basic echelon for illustrating the application of the principles and procedures discussed. Other echelons below division levels such as the combat command and battalion of the armored division, can readily adapt these principles and procedures to fit their organization and the mission assigned to them. Intelligence principles and techniques used by company and platoon commanders are also discussed separately.

e. The material presented herein is applicable without modification to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

3. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Commander

The commander is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence activities of his command. He is responsible for insuring that his command, within the limits of its capabilities,
collects all pertinent information of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain, and disseminates this information to all other units that require it. He is also responsible for the formulation and implementation of adequate counterintelligence measures designed to insure the security of his command, to deny to the enemy information concerning the strength, disposition, materiel, capabilities or intentions of the command, and to deceive the enemy.

4. Meaning of Intelligence Officer

The intelligence officer is a staff officer in a unit or organization who assists the commander in collecting, evaluating, interpreting information, and disseminating resultant intelligence of military value pertaining to the enemy, terrain, and weather, and in denying similar intelligence to the enemy. In an organization having a general staff, he is usually designated as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence. The term intelligence officer as used in this manual is the S2 of lower units provided with a staff.

5. Definition of Combat Intelligence

a. SR 320-5-1 defines combat intelligence as "intelligence for use in a combat area, whether based upon information collected locally or provided by higher headquarters." In elaboration of this definition, and to show its application within lower echelon combat units, the following supplemental definition is provided: "Combat intelligence consists of conclusions made and accepted as a result of collating, evaluating, and interpreting available information which indicates the effects of the weather, terrain, and enemy on a unit's mission." Combat intelligence results from interpretation of intelligence data, which is defined as that body of knowledge concerning the weather, terrain, and enemy situation which provides the basis for formulating conclusions.

b. Combat intelligence has two objectives.

(1) To reduce to a minimum uncertainties regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain, so that the commander will be able to make sound decisions and properly direct his units in the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) To assist the commander in applying counterintelligence and security measures to conceal from the enemy the unit's intentions and activities and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities.

6. Commander's Approach to Intelligence

a. The commander is responsible for executing the mission assigned to his unit. In units larger than company size, the commander has a staff to assist him in both the planning and execution
of these missions. The commander relies on his intelligence officer, the S2, to carry out intelligence activities and furnish the intelligence the commander needs to accomplish his mission. The S2 should have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities, limitations, and intelligence requirements of his unit.

b. The degree to which each of the three unknowns, the weather, terrain, and enemy will affect the accomplishment of a mission is variable. The commander must use the knowledge of all three elements concurrently in every situation. As a general rule, the uncertainties concerning the enemy situation are the most critical and the most difficult to resolve.

c. Weather information is provided by the next higher echelon in the form of climatological information, weather forecasts, reports of current weather, and weather summaries. The S2 must advise the commander as to the effect of weather on operational plans. The S2 is responsible for initiating requirements for weather data, interpreting weather information, and disseminating weather information and intelligence to the commander, staff, and subordinate units.

d. Upon receipt of a mission, the commander will automatically make a preliminary terrain analysis. In this terrain analysis, the commander will concentrate primarily on possible routes of approach, available cover and concealment, and other aspects of the terrain over which he will operate. The S2, upon receipt of the mission by the staff, will make as complete an analysis of the terrain as time permits. He will concentrate on the terrain as it affects the enemy capabilities as well as its effects on the friendly mission. He will furnish the commander, and other staff members, all available data regarding the terrain (air photos, special reports), and will call their attention to the probable effects of the weather on the terrain. The S2 will assist the other staff members, primarily the S3 and S4, in making their terrain analysis in accordance with the requirements of their function.

e. The commander demands the maximum effort from his S2 in the production of intelligence on enemy capabilities and for determination of the effects which those capabilities will have on his own mission as well as on the operations plans prepared for the mission. This is the area in which the S2 will normally provide the greatest assistance to the commander.

7. The S2's Approach to Intelligence

a. The S2's primary function is to advise and assist his commander. He must concentrate his efforts within the framework of the mission of the command and the operation plan devised by the commander to accomplish his mission. The S2 is governed by
the intelligence requirements of his commander. He must devote his time and effort to answering specific questions posed by the commander on subjects such as the strength, disposition, and identity of enemy units, the locations of enemy weapons, minefields, and defensive installations. In anticipation of specific guidance, the S2 must prepare the intelligence required by the unit's mission. Concurrently, the S2 will be determining the enemy capabilities and probable courses of action.

b. The broad enemy capabilities, as developed in FM 30-5, are of lesser significance at lower combat echelons. Enemy capabilities at division and higher levels are stated in terms too general for application to the missions of battle groups. When a commander receives a mission, all effort is directed toward the fulfillment of that mission, regardless of existing enemy capabilities. It must be presumed that enemy capabilities were considered by the higher echelon commander at the time the mission was assigned. Therefore, the lower echelon commander's primary problem is to ascertain ways and means to counter the enemy's capabilities, and to complete the assigned mission successfully. To accomplish this, specific questions must be posed and answered.

c. The general approach of the S2 in his function as a staff officer is to provide his commander and the other staff members with timely, pertinent, intelligence data, and with conclusions as to the effects of the weather, the terrain, and the enemy's capabilities on the mission of the command. The S2 must recognize that the staff member with whom he must coordinate most closely is the S3. At this level, the S2 and S3 must have a relationship best described by the term "dual function." That is, it is imperative that both the S2 and the S3 possess a firm, clear, and realistic understanding of the functions of the other, and must be cognizant of the fact that each must be prepared for short periods to assume the functions of the other concurrently with his own. With this positive approach, the S2's contribution will be dynamic, constructive, and indispensable.

8. The S3's Approach to Intelligence

a. The S3 incorporates the efforts of all staff members into the commander's overall plan and prepares the appropriate orders which direct the execution of that plan. In order to prepare a properly integrated operations plan, the S3 must understand and support the commander's intelligence requirements, his concept of operations, and must accept the conclusions concerning the effects of the weather, terrain, and enemy capabilities. The S3 must work most closely with the S2 and accept the necessity for a "dual function" capability by both himself and the S2, to insure
the proper, coordinated, integrated effort at this level. Considering personnel limitations, dual capabilities are a necessity to serve the command properly and to accomplish the assigned mission.

b. The S3 has the staff responsibility for all training. It is axiomatic that close coordination with all other staff members is required for maximum effectiveness of the training program. In order to provide adequate intelligence training so vital to the command, it is essential that the S3 and S2 coordinate closely in all aspects of this matter.

9. Combat Intelligence in the Field Army

a. Combat intelligence within the field army is dependent upon the coordinated employment of all agencies which collect, process, and disseminate information and intelligence regarding the enemy, the terrain, and the weather.

b. Collectively, the echelons below the division level comprise a significant portion of the agencies within a field army which are concerned with combat intelligence. Within the overall combat intelligence effort, the echelons below division are considered to be primary collecting agencies by higher echelons. Therefore, the intelligence personnel of lower echelons have a dual role of producing intelligence for use at their own level, and of collecting and reporting information to support the intelligence production of the higher echelon. In order to fulfill their responsibilities, the collecting personnel must receive proper guidance from higher headquarters in the form of clearly stated requirements. These requirements should specify in detail the nature of the desired information. Furthermore, they must be based upon a realistic appraisal of the ability of lower echelons to obtain the desired information. It must be clearly understood that the S2's primary intelligence responsibility is to his commander and to the command to which he is assigned. His responsibility to the higher echelon is concurrent with, but never supplants his primary responsibility.

c. Current military intelligence organization (MIO) provides for the attachment of military intelligence detachments to division and corps, and the assignment of a military intelligence battalion to a field army. These military intelligence detachments are assigned to the military intelligence battalion. There are no intelligence specialists organic to the intelligence sections of division or higher echelons. The MIO is flexible and has the capability of providing augmentations of intelligence specialists to any echelon of command when the situation requires it. The capabilities of MIO units are explained in current 30-series TOE's and FM 30-9.
The military intelligence detachment, division, is shown schematically in figure 1.

1. Of these personnel, shown in figure 1, we may expect to find the following intelligence specialists operating at battle group or combat command level for specific operations:
   a. Interrogation prisoner of war personnel.
   b. Security personnel.
   c. Interpreter/translator personnel.

2. The battle group or combat command S2 may, from time to time, expect to find operating in his area field operations intelligence personnel, who are organic to the field army's military intelligence battalion, as well as personnel of the Army Security Agency (ASA) which is not part of MIO.

3. It is important that all commanders and S2's have a thorough knowledge of the intelligence specialists available to them within the division and of the capabilities and limitations of the latter in order that the specialized assistance which these specialists can render may be exploited. A firm working knowledge of these fields of specialization will provide a better understanding of the needs that exist in each field, which, in turn, will facilitate the flow of intelligence information in its most usable form.
CHAPTER 2
WEATHER AND TERRAIN

Section I. GENERAL

10. Effects of Weather and Terrain

a. The military commander must consider the effects of weather and terrain on his mission when he plans for and executes an operation; as a result, he strives for a thorough and accurate knowledge of these factors. This knowledge, considered together with the enemy capabilities, is required to assure the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

b. Weather varies with time, and terrain varies from one area to another. As a military unit moves from one area to another, these factors must be constantly reappraised. Weather and terrain conditions will affect various types of military units in different ways and will be of varying significance according to the type of mission to be accomplished by a particular unit.

c. This chapter discusses the military aspects of weather and terrain. A basic knowledge of weather and terrain and an understanding of their effects upon military weapons, personnel, and operations are considered a minimum requisite for all intelligence officers.

11. Relationship of Weather and Terrain

a. An analysis of the effect of all of the conditions of weather and terrain upon our own forces and the enemy constitutes the basis for estimates made by the commander and his staff. The answer sought is the best utilization of the weather and terrain by our own forces in order to increase our chances for success, and to assist in the deduction of the most likely capability of the enemy.

b. Definitions.

(1) Terrain is any area of ground considered as to its extent of natural features in relation to its use for a particular operation.

(2) Weather is the condition and behavior of the atmosphere at a given place and at a specified time, as determined by observation of the meteorological elements; i.e., air temperature, barometric pressure, humidity, clouds, wind and precipitation.
c. Changes in weather tend to alter the surface condition of terrain. Identical weather conditions, on the other hand, may have a decidedly different effect on various types of terrain. As an example, a heavy rain may cause a clay road to become impassable, while it may cause a sandy road to become more firm.

d. The relief of the terrain, on the other hand, has a direct effect on weather conditions. For example, moist air moving up the slopes of a mountain, hill, or ridge often results in fog, mist, or low lying clouds over the elevated terrain, while the nearby valleys are clear. Moisture at high elevations results in snow, while the same amount of moisture may fall as rain at lower elevations. Terrain also influences other aspects of the weather, such as wind velocity, dust content in the air, etc.

Section II. MILITARY ASPECTS OF WEATHER

12. General

Weather forecasts and other types of weather information originate at corps or higher headquarters and are disseminated through intelligence channels. The S2 at battle group or combat command level is responsible for coordinating the requirements of his command for weather information and for interpreting all weather information received from higher headquarters. The S2 also coordinates local observations, and disseminates all weather reports to subordinate elements of the command.

13. Types of Weather Forecasts

a. There are three types of weather forecasts normally available.
   (1) Short period (covers periods 0 to 2 days).
   (2) Long period (covers periods from 3 to 5 days).
   (3) Extended period (covers periods longer than 5 days).

b. Weather information is normally received from higher headquarters on a routine basis at regularly established intervals. When weather information is required, but has not been made available, the S2 should request such information from the intelligence section of the next higher echelon. When regularly distributed forecasts are inadequate to satisfy particular requirements, special weather forecasts may be requested.

c. In addition to analyzing weather information at his own command level, the S2 is charged with the responsibility for speedy dissemination of extracts of the weather forecast and the effects of weather to subordinate echelons.

d. While the effects of weather conditions will normally have been considered at the higher echelon prior to the assignment of a mission to a subordinate unit, this does not preclude an analysis
at the lower echelon of the possible effects of weather on the operation. The local commander may well require a more detailed interpretation of the weather information than has been provided by higher headquarters.

14. Effects of Weather

a. General. Weather affects tactical operations either advantageously or disadvantageously. The commander who receives timely and adequate weather information can make provision for the exploitation of the weather factor and is thus enabled to gain an advantage over the enemy. Proper assessment of the weather factor entails a knowledge of how the various weather elements may affect operations.

b. Visibility. Fog, haze, smoke, and precipitation cause poor visibility and provide varying degrees of concealment from ground and air observation, as well as some attenuation of thermal radiation of nuclear weapons. Such weather conditions normally favor the attacker by affording him some degree of protection while obscuring the enemy's fields of fire. Disrupting actions, feints, ruses, and other deceptive measures are especially facilitated by poor visibility. On the other hand, in attacks where air support and/or observed artillery and nuclear fires are of major importance, poor visibility will tend to be detrimental. Good visibility normally favors the defender by permitting him to observe the approach of the enemy and to fire with maximum effectiveness. Other features being relatively equal, good visibility tends to favor the combatant with superiority in air, artillery and nuclear weapons. Visibility is also an important consideration in troop and supply movements.

c. Cloudiness. Density and/or height of clouds affect air support, enemy air activity, air photography, air reconnaissance, air observation, nuclear weapons effects, and under some circumstances, ground observation. Dense clouds (i.e., cumulonimbus) may cause premature detonation of certain types of proximity fuses, and depending upon the height of burst, enhance or attenuate thermal radiation of nuclear weapons. Cloudiness also affects other weather elements such as temperature. Extensive night cloudiness retards loss of heat from the earth's surface due to radiational cooling, thereby inducing higher night time temperatures which may have great importance during periods of excessive cold. Conversely, daytime cloudiness reduces the amount of solar insolation on the earth's surface. Certain types of clouds are beneficial to artificial battlefield illumination but any considerable night cloudiness reduces the amount of illumination available by moonlight. To a
lesser degree, illumination during daylight periods is similarly reduced by cloudiness.

d. Precipitation. Precipitation is one of the most significant of weather elements, because of its effects on soil trafficability, with the subsequent effect on the mobility of vehicles and personnel. Precipitation in sufficient quantities produces excessive runoff, thereby swelling or flooding streams and rendering fording operations difficult or impossible. Precipitation affects wire and radio communications, smoking operations, listening posts, sound ranging equipment, certain surveillance devices, certain reconnaissance devices and chemical and biological agents. In most instances, the effects are adverse, but light rain may sometimes be favorable for smoke screening, and rains may improve visibility by washing excessive impurities from the air. In utilization of nuclear weapons, precipitation may cause fallout in greater quantities than anticipated, as it is washed down through the nuclear induced cloud. Prolonged or excessive precipitation may produce acute physical discomfort and lowered body resistance, and in general may adversely affect the efficiency of troops in the field. In addition to these adverse effects on personnel, precipitation causes many types of equipment and supplies to rust, swell, mildew, and rot.

e. Temperature. Low temperature increases the likelihood of cold injury and affects the functioning of firing mechanisms of weapons, various types of vehicle engines, and cameras. “Warm up” times of engines are increased. Subfreezing temperatures may affect trafficability and fordability by freezing the soil and the surface of streams, lakes, and other bodies of water. High temperatures create the danger of personnel suffering from heat exhaustion and affect the operation of various types of engines. Rising temperatures cause thawing of the ground, melting of snow cover, and melting of ice on rivers, lakes and streams, thereby again affecting trafficability and fordability.

f. Wind. Wind velocity materially affects the degree of cold in which an individual can survive. (As an example, with no wind, properly clothed personnel can be fairly comfortable at temperatures below 0° F., but a 5 mph wind at 20° F. or a 20 mph wind at 25° F. can cause exposed flesh to freeze). Wind can indirectly affect air or ground observation by picking up and blowing sand or dust. Wind, through its drying effect on wet soils, may at times be a factor in trafficability. Excessively high winds complicate such operations as airborne, amphibious and stream crossings as well as various types of construction. Wind will be a factor in the fallout pattern and conflagrations following use of nuclear, incendiary or other types of fires. Wind also affects the accuracy of artillery fire, especially of longer range heavy caliber weapons.
Wind will be a factor to consider in the use of smoke and chemical or biological agents, since wind may either enhance or hinder the effect of such agents. Wind may also have an adverse effect upon the efficient operation of listening posts and sound ranging equipment.

g. Light Data. Light data pertaining to sunrise and sunset, moonrise and moonset, phase of the moon, and twilight periods, are not weather information. However, this information is necessary, and it is customary to consider the factors of weather and illumination together. The amount of available natural illumination at night has a significant effect on night operations. This illumination depends on the moon phase, time of moonrise and moonset, cloudiness, and visibility. Before sunrise and after sunset, there is a period during which sufficient illumination is available for normal daylight operations. This period, known as "Nautical Twilight" begins in the morning, when the sun is 12° below the horizon. This is known as "Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight" (BMNT) and it is normally possible at this time to distinguish a human figure at a range of 400 to 500 yards. The end of the evening period of nautical twilight, known as "End of Evening Nautical Twilight" (EENT), occurs when the sun reaches a point 12° below the horizon. After this time, human figures at a range of 400 to 500 yards become indistinguishable under normal conditions. Early morning attacks are normally planned for BMNT and night alerts start at EENT, except under weather conditions which materially reduce the amount of illumination during the twilight period. Under such conditions, an earlier time must be designated for the beginning of night alert.

Section III. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN

15. General

a. Terrain influences the application of the principles of war, such as the ability to mass and maneuver. Properly exploited, terrain may allow a numerically inferior force to achieve relative superiority. A mechanized, well-equipped, and heavily armed force drawn into marshy or rugged terrain may well be defeated by a smaller, lightly equipped force, because the relative strength has passed to the smaller force. The smaller force has the greater ability to mass, maneuver, and surprise. Constant study of the terrain must be made in light of the mission and the enemy situation. The small unit leader must often weigh the advantages of defending the bottom of a hill to gain maximum grazing fire against the advantages of defending the top of the hill and forcing the enemy into a slower and more fatiguing approach in his attack.
b. Normally, the smaller the unit, the greater the interest in details of terrain. The higher headquarters may think in terms of mountain ranges, a lower headquarters in terms of hill complexes, while a small unit is concerned with the small ridges and draws on a single hill.

c. Terrain is normally evaluated in terms of the following factors to determine its effect on military operations:
   1. Observation and fields of fire.
   2. Concealment and cover.
   3. Obstacles.
   5. Avenues of approach.

16. Terrain Features

a. The earth's surface consists of terrain features including topography, hydrography, vegetation, surface materials, and cultural features. An understanding of these terms and their application to terrain analysis at lower echelons assists the S2 in his preparation of terrain studies.

b. Topography is the configuration or shape of the land surface. Drainage refers to the areas of surface depression which serve as water runoffs or collection points such as marshes, swamps, streams, rivers, ponds, and lakes. A knowledge of the general shape of land forms is gained through a study of detailed relief features. Drainage forms a network system which interlocks with the ridge and hill network. Steepness of slopes, height and size of hill masses, depth, length, and width of drainage features, and size of valleys and draws are major features for the topographic study of a given area.

c. Relief and drainage irregularities in the ground influence the employment of tactics by the degree of observation afforded opposing forces, ease or difficulty of movement, and the degree of protection afforded against enemy fire. Flat ground provides equal observation for opposing forces within an area. In rolling or mountainous terrain, the higher ground normally provides better observation. Advances made parallel to a series of ridges or parallel to a stream are physically easier than movement made perpendicular to them. Steepness of slope may limit movement. Flat ground offers little protection against enemy fire, while rolling ground offers some protection, particularly against flat trajectory weapons.

d. Vegetation may be classified as cultivated and natural. Cultivated vegetation includes all crops and orchards tended by man, while natural plant life includes all types of grasses, bushes, and trees growing without man's assistance. Density, height, and type
of growth, and diameter of tree trunks are significant features in the study of vegetation.

e. Vegetation restricts observation or offers concealment. Movement may be made extremely difficult by the density and size of vegetation. Vegetation will afford varying degrees of protection, depending upon the type of vegetation, the type of weapon encountered, and the technique of its employment. In the employment of nuclear weapons, some attenuation of thermal radiation may be expected from vegetation. On the other hand, artillery fragmentation from tree bursts is effective against troops who have no overhead cover. The blast from a nuclear explosion may result in tree portions having a missile and/or obstacle effect, if the weapon is detonated over a wooded area.

f. Surface materials determine the trafficability of an area. Related to this matter of trafficability are the slope of the ground, the type of vegetation, weather as it affects the condition of the ground (i.e., wet, dry, frozen, etc.), and surface roughness (boulders, hummocks, serrated ground surface, etc.). In general, all soils except very loose sand afford good trafficability when dry; however, soils are seldom completely dry. Water may change soil from a hard, baked clay to slippery, impassable mud. It is important to be able to determine trafficability of soils when they are saturated.

g. Cultural features encompass all the works of man, such as towns, airfields, roads, railroads, inland waterways, and bridges. For military purposes, man-made features are considered an integral part of terrain. Cities and towns are important, because they are centers of population, industry, transportation, communications, and supply. Thus, they are frequently the objectives of attacking forces. Tactically, they may be centers of resistance as well as physical obstacles to movement. Roads, railroads, and bridges are vulnerable links in communication networks. In terms of their location and use, roads are classified as main and secondary routes, main lateral routes, feeder routes, and minor roads and trails. In terms of their construction and condition, roads may be classified as improved (all weather) or unimproved roads in good or poor condition. Other significant characteristics of roads are width in terms of lanes of traffic; percent of slope of critical grades; presence and location of tunnels and bridges; culverts, cuts, fills, and ditches; thickness of pavement at base width and stability of shoulders, and provisions for drainage. The military value of bridges is affected by their capacity to sustain weight, width in terms of lanes of traffic, and clearances.
17. Effect of Terrain on Nuclear Weapons

The nature and characteristics of terrain will exert considerable influence on the effects achieved by nuclear weapons. The texture of the soil will affect the reflectivity achieved in blast, and, dependent upon its composition, will increase or decrease the effect of thermal and residual radiation. The configuration, or topography, will limit or add to the effects. As an example, in rough or broken terrain, there will be some degree of shielding from all effects, by the passive intervention of the terrain. In gently rolling or flat terrain, we may expect all effects to be maximized. The limitations imposed by terrain may be turned to an advantage. As an example, to detonate a nuclear weapon above an enemy force passing through a gorge, ravine or steeply sided valley, would concentrate the effects within a relatively narrow area. The S2, in recommending targets and target areas must keep in mind the effects terrain and vegetation will have upon the use of nuclear weapons.

18. Routes of Communication

a. Routes of communication include roads, railways, navigable waters, and airplane landing facilities. Avenues of approach are not to be confused with routes of communication. Many times, routes of communication coincide with desirable avenues of approach. In such cases, movement will be greatly facilitated.

b. Even the smallest military forces have logistic and control problems which are dependent on routes of communication. Routes of communication also influence such other factors as maneuver, the ability to sustain an operation, and the timing of operations.

c. If roads are inadequate, recommendations for supplementing the existing roads are in order. If the enemy does not have the use of adequate roads, the S2 must determine the effect of this condition upon possible future hostile actions, as well as its effect on the friendly mission.

19. Observation and Fields of Fire

a. Recognition and proper use of the terrain characteristics of an area which permit observation are essential to effectively fire upon the enemy, control the maneuver of troops, and prevent surprise. The best observation is generally to be found on the higher terrain features in an area. Observation is limited or denied by such factors as fog, smoke, precipitation, heat refraction, darkness, vegetation, cultural features, and relief features. These factors must be considered in determining the extent of observation available to the enemy or to our forces. During periods of limited visibility, supplemental means of observation or increased security measures may be required.
b. A field of fire is an area that a weapon or group of weapons can effectively cover with fire from a given position. As with cover, it is necessary to evaluate fields of fire in relation to the types of weapons utilized. Mortars and artillery howitzers are indirect fire weapons and can deliver fire into all areas within range; their effectiveness is influenced primarily by cover available in the target area. Small arms and other direct fire weapons require line of sight fire for maximum effectiveness; their fields of fire are affected by objects between the weapon and the target. Since each weapon has different characteristics, each has its own particular functions within a selected sector of a field of fire. Often a compromise must be reached in choice of fields of fire so that maximum collective effectiveness of all supporting weapons can be realized, even though each of the participating weapons cannot be utilized at maximum effectiveness. This is an aspect of fire planning with which all commanders must be concerned.

20. Cover and Concealment

a. COVER is protection from enemy fire; CONCEALMENT is protection from enemy observation. The smaller the unit, the greater the regard will be for the details of terrain from the point of view of cover and concealment.

b. Cover is generally provided by relief and drainage features, cultural features, and artificial means. Owing to the numerous types of weapons used in combat, it is necessary to consider cover in relation to the types of fire encountered. Cover from small arms will not necessarily afford protection from mortar fire. Cover from mortar fire will not always provide protection from artillery fire. All weapons employed on the battlefield must be considered when evaluating the quality and type of cover necessary for protection. One must take into account the type of weapons, and the proportion of each type weapon as compared with others known to be within the area of operations. Cover from aerial bombardment and nuclear weapons must also be considered.

c. Most terrain features that offer cover also afford concealment, if properly employed. However, concealment does not always provide cover; therefore, a distinction is made between the two. Tall grass, shrubs, woods, or such weather conditions as fog, haze, and falling snow provide concealment, but little cover. Ditches, railroad embankments, draws, or craters may furnish both cover and concealment. Concealment from ground observation does not necessarily provide concealment from air observation or from the newer types of electronic detection devices.
21. Obstacles

Obstacles are natural or artificial obstructions that impede or halt movement of military forces. They are studied with regard to their effect on the three methods of movement normally available to ground troops, foot, wheeled vehicle, and tracked vehicle. Common natural obstacles of military importance include mountains, rivers, streams, lakes, marshes, gullies, loose soil, steep inclines, and heavily wooded terrain. Cities, canals, and other works of man are not specifically constructed as obstacles to military movement. Artificial obstacles are works of construction or destruction executed for the purpose of stopping or impeding military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abattis, roadblocks, deliberately flooded areas, deliberately induced fallout areas of radiological concentration, or other chemically or biologically contaminated areas. Obstacles parallel to the axis of advance generally favor the attacker by protecting his flanks, but induce canalization and limit lateral movement. In the attack, the enemy may adopt a plan of fire and maneuver to exploit advantages afforded by obstacles and avoid those which are disadvantageous. Likewise, he may take advantage of obstacles by including them in his defense plan.

22. Critical Terrain Features

A critical terrain feature is any locality or area the seizure, retention, or control of which affords a marked tactical advantage to either combatant. Determination of critical terrain features is based primarily upon the mission of the unit. Critical terrain at any echelon will be that which should be seized from or denied to an enemy in order to gain an advantage over the enemy; it is also terrain that should be held, retained or controlled in the defense to deny its advantages to the enemy. Critical terrain features frequently control avenues of approach. At lower echelons, the most common critical terrain is high ground. However, critical terrain may also include such areas as those containing transportation and communication facilities, areas which are key sectors of the enemy defense complex, or areas which must be under control of our forces prior to the implementation of a tactical or strategic plan. Designation of critical terrain will vary depending upon the level of the command. Availability of army aviation may reduce the reliance on high ground for observation purposes. Terrain features which may be considered critical to a company may not be so considered by a battle group or division.
23. Evaluation of Cover, Concealment, Observation, and Fields of Fire

a. When evaluating the available cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire from either an enemy or friendly point of view, the S2 and company commander must appreciate the interrelationship of these four factors.

b. A defending force in its choice of defensible terrain must consider these four critical characteristics. Given sufficient time, a defender can be expected to improve the conditions of all four of these factors. In a stable position, a defender can supplement natural concealment by camouflage, and he can supplement natural cover by field fortifications. Furthermore, he can improve observation and fields of fire by clearing away vegetation or other obstructions. Thus, it may be to the advantage of an attacking force to maintain the momentum of the attack and deny the enemy the advantage of improving his positions.

c. An attacking force relies, for the most part, on natural cover and concealment, and must use such observation points and fields of fire as are readily available. The defending force attempts to deny these four factors to the enemy in every way possible, and at the same time, utilizes them to the maximum advantage as part of its own defensive plan.

24. Avenues of Approach

a. An avenue of approach is a terrain feature, or combination of terrain features, which offers a maneuvering force a suitable route of movement to an objective. The desirable terrain characteristics of an avenue of approach are—

   (1) Ease of movement toward the objective.
   (2) Cover and concealment from the defender's fire and observation.
   (3) Favorable observation and fields of fire for the attacker.
   (4) Adequate room for maneuver and dispersal by the using unit.

b. Ease of movement covers the following factors:

   (1) Directness of approach to the objective.
   (2) Control over troops during the movement forward.
   (3) Opportunity for deployment and massing of forces.
   (4) Extent of mobility offered by the terrain to meet the requirements of the maneuvering force.
   (5) Communications networks.
   (6) Soil trafficability.
   (7) The direction of terrain compartments with respect to the direction of movement.
c. Cover and concealment may have to be sacrificed to some degree in the choice of an avenue of approach by the maneuvering force. Too great a regard for cover tends to impede the advance, while too great a concern with concealment, may be a hindrance to control of troops and directness of movement. It may, therefore, be necessary to compromise between the advantages and disadvantages of available cover and concealment on the one hand, and ease of movement on the other.

d. The security elements of the maneuvering force, in particular, must maintain favorable observation and fields of fire, which may be reduced, if the maneuvering force were to take full advantage of cover and concealment.

Section IV. TACTICAL STUDIES OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

25. Staff Responsibility

a. Tactical studies of the weather and terrain may be presented orally or in written form. At the battle group or combat command level, these studies will usually be oral. As a general format, paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate provides for virtually all of the information contained in a tactical study, without the necessity for a separate document or format for oral presentation, except for special operations, such as amphibious landings or airborne operations. The S2 is charged with the primary staff responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and insuring timely completion of such a study.

b. Specifically, the S2 points out the influence of weather and terrain on possible enemy courses of action, dispositions, tactics, peculiarities, and weaknesses. In addition, the S2 must anticipate the commander’s requirements in order to collect and report additional terrain and weather information effectively.

c. There is no physical dividing line between the designated FRIENDLY and ENEMY terrain. The forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is irregular and largely imaginary, and may be, at most, a series of pencil lines on a map or photograph. The interest in terrain is not confined to the S2 section, but is of utmost importance to the commander and all staff members and others who advise him. Staff coordination is the key to the successful completion of weather and terrain studies and estimates.

26. Sources of Weather and Terrain Information

a. Weather. Weather forecasts available from higher headquarters have already been discussed as the major source of
weather information at levels below the division. The following are additional sources which may be exploited by the S2:

(1) Subordinate units (for information on the current weather at any specified point or area).
(2) Climatological studies.
(3) Special weather information published by higher headquarters or civilian agencies, including—
   (a) Chemical data.
   (b) Ballistic data.
   (c) Surf and swell forecasts.
   (d) Time, tide, and light data.
   (e) Stream level and soil trafficability data.

b. Terrain. Personal ground reconnaissance, supplemented by aerial observation, maps and airphotos, provides the basic information utilized by the S2 in his preparation of terrain studies. Other supplementary sources or agencies which may be utilized are—

(1) Patrols.
(2) Enemy prisoners of war, friendly natives, and other civilians.
(3) Higher and adjacent headquarters, particularly engineer units.
(4) Hydrographic charts.
(5) Detailed reconnaissance and trafficability reports.

27. Formal Studies of Weather and Terrain

a. Detailed knowledge of weather and terrain, together with the analysis thereof, is important to commanders and staff members at all levels of command. The need for extensive, detailed, written terrain and weather studies decreases from higher to lower echelons and is practically nonexistent at the battle group/combat command level. Formal, detailed, written studies will usually be promulgated only for special operations, such as amphibious or airborne operations. The time element will usually preclude the utilization of such a formal, elaborate study. The lack of need for such written studies at levels below division can be attributed to the fact that the commanders and staff members actually LIVE on the terrain over which they operate.

b. Air photos are valuable aids to the tactical study of terrain. Under certain circumstances, particularly when time does not permit the development of detailed, elaborate studies, airphotos may well take the place of a terrain study.
22. Graphic Aids to Terrain Study

a. General. Maps and air photos have already been mentioned as major supplemental sources of terrain information. However, difficulty may be encountered in quickly identifying on a map all terrain characteristics necessary for a tactical study, because of the mass of detail shown. For this reason, routine procedures for analyzing terrain have been developed. For the most part, these procedures (techniques) deal with the methods of marking maps, air photos, or overlays in order to emphasize terrain characteristics. Any method or combination of methods that enables one to "see" the terrain most easily and clearly may be adopted.

b. Ridge and Streamlining. This method consists of emphasizing streams by drawing over them with heavy blue lines and emphasizing ridges with brown or red lines. Ridges are marked by drawing heavy lines along the topographic crests. Either ridgelining or streamlining may be used alone, if desired, but the combination of the two is usually more effective. This method tends to emphasize the compartmentation of an area, but does not show relative elevations or slope. Ridge and streamlining are easily employed on air photos. Additional information on this subject is found in FM 30-5.

c. Layer Tinting. Layer tinting consists of coloring or shading successive elevations of the ground. By applying a series of colors ranging from yellow through orange and brown to red to show successive elevations (from the lowest to the highest) between appropriate contours of a map, a realistic, three-dimensional effect is created. It is not necessary to color the entire map; uncolored portions may represent the lowest areas, thus making it possible with four colors to distinguish five levels of elevation. Care should be taken to color lightly, using colored pencils or transparent ink; coloring heavily or using opaque crayons or ink may result in obliterating other terrain details. Use only enough colors to interpret the area. Too many colors may lead to confusion. By layer tinting the configuration of all the high ground, the low ground can be made to stand out clearly. A map or overlay of this type is one of the most effective ways to describe the relief of an area.

d. Hill Topping. Hill topping is a method of accentuating the high ground in an area by selecting a critical elevation, and then coloring or shading all areas higher than that elevation. By this technique, only the size and location of the higher ground within an area are emphasized.

e. Marking of Communications Routes. Routes of communication may be emphasized by marking land routes in black and by indicating water routes in blue. Water routes should be marked heavily enough to distinguish them from streamlining on the same
map. Varying thicknesses of black, or a scheme of dotted black lines or dashes may be employed to distinguish different types of roads and paths.

f. Trafficability Map. Trafficability may be indicated on a map or overlay by a system of crosshatching in black. Similarly, different types of soil or various kinds of vegetation may be shown by a crosshatching scheme in colors, in conjunction with an appropriate legend.

29. Formats for Tactical Studies of Weather and Terrain

a. FM 30–5 prescribes the format for a formal, written, tactical study of the weather and terrain. This format specifies four major headings arranged in a logical sequence, designed respectively to explain the purpose of the study, to describe the terrain in general terms, to discuss the military aspects of the area, and to state the conclusions concerning the effect of the weather and terrain upon military operations. Appropriate subheadings allow for detailed treatment of all subject matter pertinent to such a study.

b. If the extent of the area and the purpose of the report are too broad, this type of weather and terrain study may become lengthy and cumbersome. While a voluminous study with annexes and appendices to provide all possible detail may be most desirable at higher echelons, they are too lengthy for effective usage by units below division level. In practice, at battle group and company level, commanders and staffs seldom have sufficient time to study lengthy weather and terrain studies prior to formulating estimates and plans. As a result, the S2 must develop brief, concise, and graphic weather and terrain studies which provide the commander and other staff members with basic data and conclusions necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. Paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate provides for all weather and terrain information necessary at this level, except for special operations.
CHAPTER 3
COMMANDER'S INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Section I. GENERAL

30. Purpose

In his capacity as a staff officer, the S2 directs his efforts toward the support of the planned or anticipated mission. This chapter is designed to provide the S2 with guidance in the proper approach for determining and understanding the intelligence requirements of the commander under varying situations.

31. General

a. The commander’s intelligence requirements are those facts which he needs to know concerning the weather, terrain, and enemy, in order to facilitate the execution of his assigned mission. These requirements never coincide exactly for any two assigned missions, because of the changing nature of tactical situations and the varying types of missions which a military unit may receive. Requirements must be announced to the command for each different mission.

b. The intelligence requirements for a defensive operation differ from those of an offensive operation; however, the difference may be only in degree of interest or in emphasis. For example, knowledge of enemy dispositions is a requirement in either a defensive or offensive operation. However, in the defense, the commander is concerned with enemy dispositions as an indication of the strength, direction, and location of a possible attack. On the other hand, detailed knowledge of enemy disposition is of critical importance when the mission is to attack, because our forces must move into enemy-held terrain. The commander cannot effectively plan or properly execute his mission without this vital intelligence information.

c. Some intelligence requirements may be levied only in certain types of operations. As an example, the commander needs certain intelligence data for a river crossing which would not be required for an operation involving the capture of a city.

d. Since the commander’s intelligence requirements vary according to his mission, the S2 must provide the commander with intelligence data applicable to each specific mission. The detailed knowledge and thorough understanding demanded of an S2, in order to satisfy these requirements, are discussed in this chapter.
Section II. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE ATTACK

32. General

a. The commander determines his intelligence requirements in any tactical situation. As previously stated, these requirements never coincide exactly for any two missions, but vary as a result of both the friendly and enemy situation, as well as the mission itself. However, certain types of intelligence data are required regardless of the nature of the mission or situation.

b. The S2 should anticipate the commander’s future intelligence requirements. When it becomes apparent that a mission may develop or be assigned, the S2 should begin to develop plans to support it. The process of anticipating the commander’s needs serves to direct the S2’s planning activity and permits him to begin his collection effort at the earliest possible date. As additional requirements develop, they can be incorporated into the collection plan. However, with this approach the S2 will often have on hand the exact answers to the commander’s questions at the time they are asked.

c. In subsequent paragraphs, possible intelligence requirements for both offensive and defensive missions are listed and explained. The S2 should use these lists as guides and adapt them to the situation in which he is operating. He is expected to modify these listed requirements by adding such items as he deems appropriate, and by adding items as directed by his commander.
33. Preparation for Attack

a. General. Most of the commander’s initial intelligence requirements must be satisfied during the planning phase. This needed intelligence data must be made available at the earliest possible moment to allow the commander and his S3 to utilize the data in formulating plans and preparing the operation order.

b. Specific Requirements. Following is a list of information requirements for the planning phase. A rigid priority cannot be assigned to any item in this list since the specific value of each item will vary according to the situation.

(1) Location, type, and strength of enemy units in line.
(2) Location, type, and strength of enemy reserves.
(3) Location, type, nature, and extent of enemy defensive installations.
(4) Location, number, and types of enemy automatic weapons.
(5) Location, number, and types of enemy supporting weapons.
(6) Location of enemy outposts.
(7) Location of obstacles (natural or artificial).
(8) Location of avenues of approach.
(9) Location of enemy observation posts.
(10) Location of enemy command posts.
(11) Location of enemy boundaries.
(12) Weather forecast.
(13) Critical terrain, both friendly and enemy.
(14) Cover and concealment in the projected area of operations.
(15) Observation and fields of fire in projected areas of operation.

c. Location, Type, and Strength of Enemy Units in Line. The locations of the enemy units in contact should be established to the lowest unit practicable, commensurate with time and availability of information. The type of enemy unit defending the area in question will, in many ways, be indicative of the manner in which the area will be defended. The strength of the enemy unit in contact will serve to inform the commander of the extent of enemy resistance, and will aid in determining the force necessary to overcome the resistance.

d. Location, Type, and Strength of Enemy Reserves. The commander will be concerned with those enemy reserves which have the capability of reinforcing in time to affect the accomplishment of his mission. For this reason, it is essential to locate, identify as to type, and determine the strength of enemy reserves in the area.
of operation. It is the S2's responsibility to determine the movement capabilities of these enemy reserves, and to keep the commander informed as to these capabilities.

e. Location, Nature, and Extent of Enemy Defensive Installations. The location of defensive installations will tend to confirm and amplify the indications revealed by the disposition of enemy units in contact. An analysis of the nature of the defensive installations located in the enemy-held area may reveal further details concerning the enemy plan of defense. The extent (magnitude or complexity) of the enemy's defensive installations will be valuable intelligence in determining the choice of area for the main attack, the choice of the route to the objective, and the choice of areas for secondary attacks, and in addition, will aid in the planning for destruction of specific obstacles or defensive installations necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

f. Location, Number, and Type of Enemy Automatic Weapons. Prior knowledge of the location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons positions is of obvious advantage to the attacker. The density of automatic weapons in portions of the enemy's defensive area, together with the observation and fields of fire available, will influence the commander's choice of area for his main attack, together with the planned supporting fires to overcome this factor. The volume of fire power anticipated will also aid the commander in determining attachments of supporting elements to subordinate units to overcome enemy resistance.

g. Location, Number, and Types of Enemy Supporting Weapons. The weapons included in this category include mortars, direct fire artillery, tank guns employed in a fire support role, antitank guns, or other weapons within the range of weapons controlled by the battle group or combat command commander. The amount of mortar and other fire support within the enemy defensive area must be considered in assessing his overall defensive strength. Knowledge of this aspect of enemy strength, and the location of these weapons, enables the commander to plan for reducing the effectiveness of these fires by the employment of his own fires, the choice of routes for his attacking force, the timing of the attack (day or night), or through the use of other countermeasures (such as smoke screens).

h. Location of Enemy Outposts. An enemy may use outposts to prevent close ground observation of his main battle position, indicate a false location as his main battle position or to mislead the opposing force as to the direction of his main defense position. The commander can apply the principle of surprise in his operations when he knows the location of the enemy's outposts by denying them observation, by cutting them off from the main body,
reducing them through fire or bypassing them. When a commander possesses this knowledge, he has a wider choice of action upon which to base his decision regarding the attack.

i. Location of Obstacles. The presence and location of natural or artificial obstacles are usually determined by means of map, aerial, or ground reconnaissance, or a combination of the three. Knowledge of the location and type of obstacles is important to the commander from an operational point of view. The intelligence officer analyzes the relationship between obstacles and the enemy's dispositions to determine the degree to which these factors will influence the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The commander applies this intelligence to his plan, particularly in the choice of routes to the objective and in the timing of the operation.

j. Location of Avenues of Approach. In general, avenues of approach are divided into two classifications: those available to our own forces and those available to the enemy. In planning an attack, the commander is concerned with the choice of direction of attack. This choice is influenced by the location of his objective, the terrain (including obstacles and trafficability), the enemy (disposition and strength), and the extent to which the friendly commander can exert his force (personnel and fire) against the enemy in a local area. In planning the attack, the avenues of approach available will influence the choice of direction, when considered with these factors.

k. Location of Enemy Observation Posts. Prior knowledge of the location of enemy observation posts enables the commander to plan for their destruction, to plan the time of his attack to best advantage, and to plan for the use of screening agents to deny observation to the enemy. By these means, the effectiveness of enemy supporting fires is minimized, and the shifting of enemy troops or fires to counter the friendly attack will be hindered.

l. Location of Enemy Command Posts. Locating and neutralizing enemy command posts aid in the reduction or elimination of command control over enemy subordinate units. This may be effected through harassment, destruction, isolation, or a combination of these means. The commander may physically isolate enemy command elements from their units by tactical maneuver and/or by cutting wire communications. A time schedule to insure maintenance of momentum may be prepared prior to the attack in order to isolate the enemy rear area and destroy command posts and other installations.

m. Location of Enemy Boundaries. When the commander plans an attack, it is a function of the intelligence officer to analyze the significance of enemy boundaries. If the enemy has recently moved...
into an area, recently shifted boundaries, or recently replaced units, he may be vulnerable along boundary lines. Enemy boundaries reveal much concerning the enemy defense, and thus may have a bearing on the time of our attack, routes of advance, and the general employment of subordinate units.

n. Weather Forecasts. For method of procuring weather forecasts, and for a description of the influences of weather, see chapter 3.

o. Critical Terrain. In the attack, critical terrain features are selected in order to emphasize to the commander those areas and localities, the seizure or control of, which must be considered in the development of the operations plan. The selection is based primarily upon the mission of the command. Those specific terrain features are selected, which, when held or controlled by our forces, will have an especially favorable effect on the accomplishment of the mission of the command. Upon his initial study of an area, the S2 may select certain features which appear to be critical regardless of the commander's scheme of maneuver; other selected features may become critical only if particular dispositions or schemes of maneuver are adopted.

p. Cover and Concealment. In the planning for the attack, consideration will be given to those routes to the objective which offer cover from the enemy's fire and concealment from his observation. These factors must be viewed from the standpoint of the enemy's dispositions and his ability to counter the apparent advantage of cover and concealment along routes available. It is the S2's responsibility to point these factors to the commander for consideration in the overall planning for the operations.

34. The Attack

a. General. The fulfillment of all the requirements discussed under the planning phase would be the ideal situation; such complete development will be rare in actual practice. However, since the accomplishment of the mission is the end toward which all efforts of the planning phase are directed, the importance of the earliest possible development of intelligence cannot be overemphasized. The intelligence developed during the planning phase provides a basis for understanding the significance of enemy activities during the attack.

b. Importance of Intelligence During Attack. The commander requires intelligence during the conduct of the attack in order to influence the action which is in progress or which develops during the course of the attack. Once his force is committed to a course of action, the commander has limited but highly important means
for influencing and controlling the action. These means, the use of which is influenced by intelligence, are—

(1) Movement of his reserve force.
(2) Commitment of his reserve force.
(3) Employment of his supporting weapons.
(4) Modification of his operation plan.
(5) Requests for additional support from higher headquarters.
(6) His location and the location of his staff.

The commander cannot apply on a sound basis any of the means listed above, if he lacks knowledge about the enemy’s defense tactics. Failure to provide intelligence to the commander during the attack may well result in the passing of initiative from the friendly to the enemy force. The commander then may find himself forced to counter enemy actions after they occur. He is then not forcing the enemy, the enemy is forcing him. The procurement of the required intelligence data regarding the enemy is hampered in varying degrees by factors over which the intelligence officer has no control. Significant among these factors are inclement weather, darkness, time limitations, space involved, and enemy counterintelligence measures. Working within these potential limitations, the intelligence officer must develop the enemy situation to the greatest possible extent. From all of the above, we see that intelligence is important in the attack, because knowledge about the enemy’s defense tactics allows the friendly commander to take aggressive action, enables him to maintain the initiative and exploit his success, and to exploit enemy vulnerabilities to the greatest extent.

c. Specific Intelligence Requirements. Those activities which indicate the manner in which the enemy is conducting his defense, comprise the minimum intelligence requirements during the attack. Typical enemy activities which provide this indication are—

(1) Movement of enemy units.
(2) Displacement of enemy weapons.
(3) Resistance of enemy units in contact.
(4) Enemy resupply activities.
(5) Enemy expenditure of ammunition.

d. Movement of Enemy Units. The movement of any enemy unit is accomplished for a definite purpose. Defensively, units are moved for deception, to reinforce, to readjust strength, for replacement, for counterattack, for blocking, and for withdrawal. The direction of movement, the location of the vacated area, and the newly occupied area all provide important considerations for re-evaluating enemy dispositions and strengths. They also provide indications of the enemy’s defensive plan.
e. Displacement of Enemy Weapons. The displacement of enemy weapons will provide indications as to the enemy's plan of action. Weapons displacing to the rear, or disposed in depth, or located centrally, will usually indicate a planned or deliberate defense as will the storage of ammunition on position.

f. Resistance of Enemy Units in Contact. The enemy may defend by fire alone and then withdraw, avoiding close combat; or he may defend with both fire and close combat. His willingness or lack of willingness to engage in close combat will indicate the employment of either a mobile or position defense. If enemy troops remain in position and fight even after being flanked by friendly units, their resistance may indicate that they have been ordered to hold at all costs; that they realize breaking off contact would cause excessive casualties; or that a counterattack, either by troop action or by fire, is imminent. In the event of an enemy withdrawal, it is important to determine the routes he uses, the areas to which he withdraws, the manner of execution of withdrawal, and the support given the withdrawal. If the enemy withdrawal becomes disorganized, control is lost, and an organized effort by the attacker can exploit the situation. Indications of the degree of disorganization are given by the answers to these questions.

(1) Is the enemy evacuating his casualties?
(2) Is the enemy leaving weapons in position?
(3) Is the enemy destroying defensive positions prior to withdrawing?

g. Enemy Resupply Activities. Normally, a large portion of the enemy activity within or to the rear of the battle position results from the necessity of resupplying the defending force. The area having priority for resupply is that which the enemy plans to defend most strongly. The type of supplies which are brought forward may reveal possible shortages as well as the type of defensive action which the enemy is adopting.

h. Enemy Expenditure of Ammunition. The enemy's expenditure of ammunition establishes patterns of fire which may reveal his fire plan. It may further indicate the degree to which the enemy is determined to resist. The volume of fire directed against certain areas may, when compared with the total volume, indicate the sectors within his position which the enemy has the greatest interest in defending.

i. S2's Approach in the Attack.

(1) The S2's primary contribution during the attack is to provide the commander with intelligence data which enables him to understand the conduct of the enemy defense. The intelligence officer should study and develop each of the intelligence requirements enumerated in para-
graph 34b, keeping the commander advised on the status of this development, and analyzing continuously the effects of enemy activities in relation to the overall defense, and the effects of these activities on the mission of the command.

(2) The S2 seeks answers to the following questions concerning the movement of enemy units:

(a) What is the purpose of this move?
(b) Does this move jeopardize or facilitate the execution of the commander’s plan?
(c) If the enemy reinforces one area, does he leave the adjacent areas vulnerable?
(d) Is the enemy massing or extending his forces?
(e) How does the move fit into the pattern of previous enemy movements?
(f) Does this move indicate a counterattack; if so, where, in what strength and at what time may it occur?
(g) Does this move indicate that the enemy will block our axis of advance; if so, at what point?
(h) Does this move indicate that the enemy has deduced the area of our main attack?

(3) The S2 seeks answers to the following questions concerning the displacement of enemy weapons:

(a) What is the reason or purpose for this displacement?
(b) Does this displacement threaten or facilitate the execution of the commander’s plan?
(c) Does this displacement significantly change the ratio of enemy strength in one area as compared with another?
(d) Does this displacement fit into a larger pattern of weapon displacement?
(e) What is the relationship of this displacement to the recent movement of other enemy units?
(f) Is the displacement by echelon or in mass?

(4) The S2 seeks answers to the following questions concerning the resistance of enemy units in line:

(a) In which areas is enemy resistance strongest?
(b) Why is the enemy defending tenaciously in these areas?
(c) In which area is enemy resistance weakest?
(d) Is the enemy conducting a position or mobile type defense?
(e) Is the enemy defending by fire, by close combat, or by both?
(f) How much resistance is the enemy exerting in the area of our main attack?
(g) How much resistance is the enemy exerting in areas of our secondary attacks?

(h) Is the enemy withdrawing; if so, from which area and to which area?

(i) Is the enemy resisting as he withdraws, or is he attempting to break contact?

(j) If the enemy is withdrawing, is the withdrawal orderly and supported?

(k) Is the enemy withdrawing into prepared defenses?

(l) Is the enemy occupying a new line, or is he forming islands of resistance?

(m) Are there gaps in enemy minefields which would permit an attacking force to move through?

The S2 seeks answers to the following questions concerning enemy resupply activities:

(a) Which area is the enemy resupplying?

(b) What is the priority for resupplying these areas?

(c) Is there a time pattern in the resupply activity?

(d) What types of supplies are being brought forward?

(e) Does resupply indicate the type of defense the enemy is employing?

(f) How does resupply fit into other patterns of activity as an indication of the enemy's defensive line?

The S2 seeks answers to the following questions concerning enemy expenditure of ammunition:

(a) Which areas are receiving the heaviest enemy fires? From what type of weapons?

(b) Why are fires concentrated in those areas?

(c) Has the enemy determined the areas where our forces have the greatest density of personnel and weapons?

(d) Has the enemy ascertained the area of our main attack?

(e) Has the enemy adequate observation of the areas where his firing is heaviest?

(f) Does the enemy ammunition expenditure indicate the imminence of a withdrawal?

(g) Is the enemy blocking the approaches to an area by fire to compensate for a scarcity of troops in that area?

(h) Has the enemy adequate ammunition stocks and the ability to resupply?

(i) Does the volume of enemy fire in localized areas confirm or modify other patterns of enemy activity?
Section III. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE DEFENSE

35. General

a. When the mission is defense, the major threat to the accomplishment of the mission is an enemy attack. Although the enemy could defend or withdraw, these courses of action will pose a threat to the accomplishment of the mission only when the specific mission is destruction of the enemy force.

b. In the defense, the battle group commander is still concerned with the effects of the weather, the terrain, and the enemy on his plan of operation. However, in the defense, emphasis in the application of intelligence data changes and certain new intelligence requirements appear.

c. The following discussion is designed to provide the S2 with an understanding of the commander's intelligence requirements in a defense situation, and to explain the application of this knowledge in respect to its influence on the commander's plan.

36. Enemy Preparation for Attack

a. General. Certain preliminary actions are necessary prior to an attack. Among these actions are planning, buildup of supplies, execution of reconnaissance, and to some extent, the shifting or massing of forces. The commander in the defense attempts to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy's plan of operations by use of countermeasures. Among these countermeasures are the reduction of the number of troops available to the enemy, delay of his supply buildup, deceiving the enemy as to the true location and strength of defensive areas, and the establishment of strong, effective counterreconnaissance screens. The troops available to the enemy may be reduced by destruction or by utilizing deceptive measures to force their premature commitment. The supply buildup may be hampered by destruction of stockpiles or interdiction of supply routes. Deception as to the true location and strength may be accomplished by shifting units to alternate positions; changing locations, size, and missions of outposts and security forces; organizing new defensive positions; shifting of reserve and support units; concealment of movements; use of camouflage; heavy patrolling; and other counterintelligence measures.

b. Specific Intelligence Requirements. Although priorities will vary as situations change, the following items are of basic importance in the defense during the period prior to the enemy's attack:

(1) Location and strength of opposing enemy units.
(2) Location of potential enemy assembly areas.
(3) Location of enemy supporting weapons.
(4) Location of natural and artificial obstacles.
(5) Location of avenues of approach.
(6) Location of enemy boundaries.
(7) Number and routes of enemy reconnaissance and/or combat patrols.
(8) Weather forecast.
(9) Fields of fire.

c. Location and Strength of Opposing Enemy Units. From a knowledge of the location of enemy units opposing the friendly forces, and those units able to influence the impending action, the strength which the enemy maintains in various portions of the area of operations can be determined. Changes in this strength are significant, since they indicate progress in the enemy's attack preparations. Identification of areas weakened by shifting of troops will enable the commander to exert pressure on these areas, forcing the enemy to redeploy to meet the new threat.

d. Location of Potential Enemy Assembly Areas. The location of enemy assembly areas is influenced by the terrain and by the distance from the line of contact. The primary terrain considerations are those of cover and concealment, and routes into and out of the area. The distance between assembly areas and the line of contact tends to change as the attack plan progresses. Early in the planning phase the assembly areas are usually farther to the rear, and may move successively nearer the line of contact as the time of attack nears. If such a pattern of movement is detected, it will assist in determining the enemy's time schedule, and will further indicate the area selected for the attack. Determination of assembly areas is of prime importance in target acquisition for the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

e. Location of Enemy Supporting Weapons. The commander may desire to destroy as many of the enemy's supporting weapons as possible prior to the attack, or he may locate them in order to bring destruction or neutralization fire on them at the time of the enemy attack. The locations of the enemy's supporting weapons provide indications as to the attack plan of the enemy force. The presence or movement of specific types of supporting weapons within the enemy area must be analyzed to determine their potential employment and the consequent threat to the friendly mission; to determine whether such weapons provide indications as to the enemy time schedule and the location of the area of his main attack or answers to other intelligence requirements of the commander.

f. Location of Natural and Artificial Obstacles. The commander employs natural and artificial obstacles to strengthen his defensive position. Natural obstacles within the enemy area should be considered with reference to the limitations which they impose on
enemy mobility and consequently on his choice of avenues of approach.

g. Location of Avenues of Approach. The avenue of approach of most concern to the defending commander is the route most advantageous to the enemy in his main attack. Possible avenues must be determined and studied with reference to the disposition of the enemy and to terrain difficulties of each route. Movements of enemy personnel in reconnaissance activities may indicate enemy consideration of avenues of approach. Consideration must also be given to avenues of approach for the use of friendly forces in the counterattack.

h. Location of Enemy Boundaries. The location of enemy boundaries is of significance due to its influence on the enemy plan of attack. Knowledge of boundaries provides indications as to the size of the force which may participate in the attack and, possibly, the depth of echelons. Consideration of boundaries, along with the locations of enemy units, both in contact and in rear areas, provides an overall picture of the enemy situation.

i. Number and Routes of Enemy Reconnaissance and/or Combat Patrols. To execute his attack most advantageously, the enemy must collect information on the location of our security elements, our line units, our fire support weapons, and our reserves. During his preparation for the attack, the enemy usually will stress reconnaissance. The enemy will usually attempt to locate and exploit gaps in our defense line. The enemy may execute raids on our positions or installations, possibly even in our rear areas through successful infiltration. Destruction missions may be expected prior to the beginning of the enemy main attack. The enemy may also utilize patrol activity as a counterintelligence device. Extensive patrolling may be designed to cover or misrepresent other enemy activity, as a show of strength to cover weakness, or as measures to force our forward outposts and listening posts back. In any case, an analysis of the missions, routes, numbers, and objectives of enemy patrols will often reveal the enemy’s real purpose. Knowledge of the purpose of enemy patrol activity enables the commander to apply timely and effective countermeasures.

j. Weather Forecast. Depending upon factors such as mobility of personnel, weapons, supplies, the element of surprise, reduction of visibility, and other effects of inclement weather, it is often advantageous for an enemy force to initiate an attack during periods of bad weather. If the enemy does not initiate an attack, he may well use periods of inclement weather for greater patrolling activity.
k. Fields of Fire. An accurate determination of the fields of fire available throughout a sector with special emphasis on avenues of approach is important in defensive operations.

37. Enemy Attack

a. General. The degree to which the aggressive commander can take the initiative away from the enemy will greatly influence the success of the defense. The commander attempts to force the enemy to counter moves initiated by the friendly force. The commander attempts to influence the development of the engagement along lines unfavorable to the enemy, and takes active measures to destroy the enemy and reduce the effectiveness of his actions by exploiting inherent enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Any military force has inherent problems of timing and control which necessitate the establishment and use of certain procedures in operations. An enemy force, therefore, becomes vulnerable when measures taken by the friendly force significantly increase the enemy's problems of control and disrupt his time schedule.

b. Specific Intelligence Requirements. The commander has two primary intelligence requirements for his execution of the defense during an enemy attack. These requirements are—

1. Determination of the area of the enemy main attack.
2. Determination of enemy tactics.

c. Determination of Area of Enemy Main Attack. This requirement is satisfied by surveillance of the movement of enemy units and displacement of weapons from their original locations to points of contact. In addition, the routes of movement, the type and size of units involved, the displacement of weapons, and the movement of reserve units are the significant considerations. The commander must know the area of the main attack before he can decide where to direct the counterattack, and where to employ the available supporting fires. The commander's decision regarding the timing of the counterattack involves several considerations which the S2 must understand. Our tactical doctrine states that the commander counterattacks only when he has a reasonable expectation of doing so successfully. Otherwise, the reserve is used for blocking purposes. Unless the commander is certain of the area of the enemy main attack, which in turn requires a knowledge of all enemy dispositions along the unit front, he cannot evaluate his chances for success in a counterattack.

d. Determination of Enemy Tactics. This requirement may also be satisfied by surveillance of the movement of enemy units and the disposition of his weapons. Enemy formations, the depth of echelons, and the type and size of units are significant considerations for early determination of enemy tactics. The conduct of the
enemy attack must be ascertained early in the engagement in order to allow the friendly commander to make an appropriate decision in regard to the employment of his subordinate units (to include the time and place of counterattack) and for the utilization of available supporting fires.
CHAPTER 4
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE DATA

Section I. GENERAL

38. Purpose

This chapter provides the intelligence officer with guidance for collecting information and intelligence data under varying conditions.

39. General

a. The scope of the collection of information at battle group level is greatly reduced as compared to that of higher echelons (see FM 30-5). However, the collection effort at lower echelons is a major problem for the intelligence officer and requires an organized and purposeful approach.

b. The S2 must use the time and means available to him with maximum effectiveness in order that his collection effort will satisfy the greatest possible number of current and anticipated requirements, including those originated by other echelons, units or agencies.

Figure 3. Determination of appropriate collecting agencies.
c. Since the intelligence officer will, in some situations, be unable to satisfy all requirements placed upon him, he must establish a system organized on a priority basis; that is, he must work toward the satisfaction of his requirements in the order of their importance. His decision as to the relative importance of any particular requirement results from his analysis of the requirement as it pertains to the current situation, and after considering any priority that may have been directed by higher headquarters.

d. The following discussion is designed to guide the intelligence officer in his collection effort by explaining the problems which must be solved, the means available for solving them, and outlining the technical procedures employed.

Section II. COLLECTION AGENCIES

40. General

A collection agency is any person or unit that acquires information by research, observation, or interrogation (or other exploitation) of a source. At all echelons of field command from the battle group (combat command) and above, the intelligence officer is aided in the performance of his duties by specialized collection agencies. The quality and quantity of the information collected depends largely on the S2's understanding of the capabilities and limitations of individual collecting agencies, and his ability to properly direct and employ the collecting agencies available to him. For types of collecting agencies, see FM 30-5.

41. Organic Collection Agencies Under S2 Control

Each battle group and combat command has an intelligence section under the direct control of the unit intelligence officer. This intelligence section, organic to the headquarters company of the major unit, is supervised by the S2. The personnel are trained in the collection, processing, and dissemination of information and intelligence. They are also trained to supervise reconnaissance and observation activities. Utilization of these personnel is discussed in subsequent chapters of this manual. The S2 of battle group and combat command supervises the employment of the organic reconnaissance element.

42. Organic Collection Agencies Not Under S2 Control

Individual soldiers in the units of the command afford the lower echelon intelligence officer his most direct and basic means of collecting information. Although the primary mission of these soldiers and units is to close with and destroy the enemy, they retain responsibility for obtaining and reporting information. The
amount of information and the form in which it is reported are determined by the unit’s organization, mission, communications, equipment, and training. These individual soldiers report much pertinent information on their own initiative. Proper intelligence training of the individual soldier is paramount to the effectiveness of his contribution as a collection agency.

43. Nonorganic Collection Agencies

a. The lower echelon intelligence officer may have collection agencies under his direct control, although such agencies are not organic to the command in which he serves. Such agencies are organic to the military intelligence organization, and may be attached to lower echelons. See FM 30-9, MI Battalion, Field Army.

b. A field artillery unit, with its air and ground observers, radar equipment, and extensive communication system to higher, lower, and adjacent units is a prolific collection agency. Representatives of this collection agency are the forward observers and liaison teams.

c. The services of many other collecting agencies not organic to lower echelons are available to the intelligence officer. For a listing and a description of these agencies, see FM 30-5 and FM 30-9.

Section III. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

44. General

Sources of information are the person, thing, or action from which information of the enemy, weather, or terrain is derived. Although sources of information are numerous and varied in type, only a few are available to and exploited by intelligence personnel at the lower echelons. For greater detail on sources, see FM 30-5.

45. Principal Sources for Lower Echelons

a. Enemy Activity. Any individual or unit within proximity or in close contact with the enemy has the continuous opportunity to detect and report hostile activities. Such activities include, but are not limited to—

(1) Movement of troops and presence of armor.

(2) Displacement of weapons.

(3) Movement of supplies and materiel.

(4) Construction of installations and obstacles.

(5) Deception and camouflage activity.

(6) Amounts of artillery, mortar, and/or nuclear fires.
b. Lack of Enemy Activity. Lack of enemy activities in specified areas may be an equally important factor in determining the enemy situation. This information, although negative in nature, must be exploited at lower echelons.

c. Weather and Terrain. Current weather and terrain conditions, as observed locally, are also sources of information in that they are the origin for certain information from which intelligence is produced. This is not to be confused with official weather forecasts, terrain studies, or maps which in themselves are sources of weather and terrain information. At lower echelons, where local weather and terrain play an important role in tactical operations the intelligence officer must be constantly alert to the significance of changes.

d. Prisoners of War. Interrogation of prisoners of war at the lower echelons is designed to procure tactical information of immediate value, particularly about the enemy and the terrain. This is a lucrative source, and should be exploited to the fullest extent. Interrogation prisoner of war specialists are available at the division military intelligence detachment, and may well be employed operationally at the battle group/combat command or even at company level.

e. Civilians.

(1) Local civilians. Civilians residing in or near the areas of operations are normally familiar with local terrain and may possess information pertaining to local enemy forces.
They may be good sources, if properly questioned to elicit the information they possess.

(2) Line crossers. All persons entering friendly areas from enemy held or neutral areas are considered to be good sources of information. This includes one-time line crossers such as refugees and defecting officials and the habitual line crossers such as partisans, enemy espionage agents, and saboteurs, blackmarket operators, etc. Battle group and lower echelons will interrogate or interview line crossers only for tactical information of immediate use to the command. Persons falling in this category will be evacuated to higher headquarters for further exploitation in compliance with established policies and directives.

f. Escapers and Evaders. Personnel of our own or friendly forces, who have returned to our control after escaping from capture, or who have evaded capture while in enemy held territory, may be debriefed by battle group and lower echelons only for tactical information of immediate concern to the command. Under no circumstances will such personnel be questioned concerning means and routes of escaping or evading. Personnel falling in this category will be processed in accordance with established policies and directives.

g. Captured Documents. See FM 30-15.


i. Photographs. Information of the enemy and terrain derived from air photos, other than those which are normally disseminated, may be secured from higher echelons by special request. In addition, requests for photographic prints of enemy areas which can be used by battle group and company may be forwarded through intelligence channels to the next higher echelon.

j. Enemy Materiel. Enemy materiel, captured or observed, is an excellent source of information for lower echelons. From this source is derived information, which is usable at the collecting echelon and at higher headquarters for such purposes as identifying and locating enemy units and weapons, determining enemy status of supply, and effectiveness of weapons and equipment. For more detail, see FM 30-16.

Section IV. DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

46. General

Collection agencies require guidance to insure that information collected will satisfy current requirements with respect to the situation and mission. Much information and intelligence data are reported to an intelligence section, whether or not such data
has been requested from the reporting agency. This follows the
precept that all information is reported. Information which comes
from the company level is raw and requires processing (ch. 5).
Planning for the collection of needed information is one of the most
important, difficult, and exacting tasks of the S2. The result of the
planning for collection of information is the collection plan.

47. Essential Elements of Information

a. The essential elements of information (EEI) in any operation
are the specific information of the enemy, the weather, and the
terrain which the commander needs in order to accomplish his
mission. In effect, the essential elements of information are the
commander's current, high priority intelligence requirements and
are the basis of the collection plan. Direction of the collection effort
comprises five successive steps.

(1) Determination of the essential elements of information
(EEI).

(2) Analysis of the EEI to determine indications which point
toward answers to the EEI.

(3) Translation of indications into orders and requests for in-
formation pertaining to specific activities, localities, char-
acteristics, or conditions.

(4) Selection of collection agencies to be employed, and
issuance of the necessary orders and requests for infor-
mation.

(5) Followup.

b. Indications are any evidence of enemy activity, either positive
or negative, or any characteristic of the area of operations, which
points toward the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particu-
lar capability, or which may influence the commander's selection
of a course of action. For greater detail concerning essential ele-
ments of information and indications, see FM 30-5.

c. Enemy capabilities must be considered in arriving at essential
elements of information. Enemy capabilities will provide the
impetus for the essential elements of information. Enemy capa-
bilities are defined as those courses of action which the enemy is
physically capable of adopting, and which, if adopted, will effect
the accomplishment of our mission. Commanders must be certain
that they base their actions, dispositions, and plans upon estimates
of enemy capabilities, rather than upon estimates of enemy inten-
tions. An estimate of the enemy capabilities is based upon knowl-
dge of enemy strength, dispositions, activities, organization,
equipment and tactics. Enemy capabilities generally fall into
these categories.
(1) Attack.
(2) Defend.
(3) Reinforce.
(4) Withdraw.

The statement of enemy capabilities must provide the answers to—
(1) What.
(2) Where.
(3) When.
(4) In what strength.

In dealing with the enemy's capabilities to attack, defend, reinforce (or employ guerillas, CBR warfare, special weapons, etc.), the four elements are invariably expressed. See appendix III for rules for calculating enemy movement capabilities.

d. From the foregoing, it is easily deduced that by analyzing the essential elements of information (the commander's stated priority intelligence requirements), the S2 arrives at indications which, in turn, form the basis for specific orders and requests to collecting agencies. For greater detail, see FM 30-5.

48. Collection Plan

a. At battle group or combat command level, because of time limitations and operational handicaps, the collection plan must take the simplest form possible. Since the requirements constantly change as the situation and mission change, the form for the collection plan must be extremely flexible. Greater flexibility and mobility in future operations, together with the need for increased speed in the flow of information may well preclude a formal, written collection plan. In this even, the S2's collection plan may be a few hasty notes in a notebook. The important factor is that the collection plan must be patterned to the commander's needs at any given time, and must be an aid in the control of his direction of the collection effort. The format presented in FM 30-5 illustrates the considerations for a type of collection plan which may be used at all echelons of command.

b. The collection plan developed by the S2 permits him to portray graphically all of his intelligence requirements and the agencies he has available to furnish information to him. It will serve as a reminder as to what agencies have been assigned certain tasks, and whether all available agencies have been designated to obtain adequate coverage. It helps him to assign collection missions within the capabilities of the agencies and may act as a check list to insure that information is submitted in time to be of use. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the collection plan must not be so cumbersome that it hinders, rather than aids, in the collection of information, particularly in developing indications of
enemy concentrations which will offer lucrative targets for the employment of nuclear weapons.

c. Any variation of the collection plan depicted in FM 30-5 should be kept a simple device. It will provide the S2 with an organized approach to the procurement of the categories of information or intelligence data which he needs for operation. These categories include, but are not necessarily limited to—

1. Information needed to satisfy the requirements for the specific mission at hand.
2. Information needed to satisfy the requests from higher and lower echelons.
3. Information needed by the intelligence officer for analysis in the production of intelligence.
4. Information needed to satisfy the requirements for target acquisition for the employment of nuclear weapons.

d. The suggested approach to formulating a collection plan consists of first analyzing the commander's essential elements of information to determine indications; then listing the requirements thus derived for the assigned or anticipated mission; listing the requests from other echelons; adding such requirements as are desired personally by the intelligence officer; and then those requirements posed by target acquisition needs. These requirements should summarize the total areas of inspection to which the intelligence officer must of necessity commit himself. Opposite the listing of requirements use a simplified listing of all available collection agencies. Most of the agencies that will be shown are organic agencies. Those not organic may be included under an entry HIGHER HQ.

e. The use of the entry HIGHER HQ relieves the intelligence officer of the responsibility and burden of deciding which collecting agency of the higher headquarters may be best equipped to obtain specific items of information or intelligence data for him. The S2 or company commander sends his requirements to the next higher echelon in the form of requests for information, and decisions on procurement are made at each succeeding echelon. Ordinarily most requests made at the battle group/combat command level need go no higher than division level since that echelon is equipped with intelligence specialist support, as well as other agencies.

f. The battle group/combat command relies to a great degree upon subordinate units for the procurement of needed data. This is correct and proper. In many cases, the battle group/combat command may have the ability to acquire information by organic means, but it may be more easily procured, and in fact, in many cases, may already have been procured, by collection agencies of higher headquarters. Therefore, to economize on time, effort, and
lives, the higher echelon intelligence sections should be requested to furnish all information and intelligence data usable at the battle group/combat command level.

**g.** The lower echelon intelligence officer must realize that many of the reports received from higher headquarters by normal distribution are not prepared specifically for use at the lower level, but are prepared for use by the issuing headquarters and other higher headquarters. As such, they are prepared to meet the requirements of the issuing or higher headquarters, and will lack the detail and scope which is needed for use at battle group/combat command levels. However, when specific requests are sent to higher headquarters, the intelligence officer will usually receive information which is immediately usable at his echelon, and which has not been summarized or condensed for the use of a higher echelon. As an example, a request to division for location of enemy units will be answered in terms of enemy companies and platoons rather than in terms of battalions, which is the lowest enemy unit with which division is normally concerned.

**h.** The intelligence officer may enter his own section as one of the agencies to which requirements may be given. Although this may appear to deviate slightly from the logical purpose of the collection plan, it portrays the flexibility possible under the plan. The requirements placed under an S2 section entry will usually be those which may require greater analysis by intelligence personnel, or would require analysis not suitable for assignment as a part of a requirement.

**i.** Listing patrols as an agency assists the intelligence officer in the determination of appropriate missions which should be assigned to patrols whose personnel are supplied by the line companies. It must be remembered that all patrols from the battle group as a whole will be integrated into the overall battle group patrol plan, which is coordinated with higher headquarters when possible, in order to prevent duplication of effort or possible interference with plans of higher headquarters. This is true even of those patrols sent out by company request. The patrol tasks might be accomplished by a lesser number of patrols, since some of the information required would be obtained concurrently with a patrol’s execution of its overall mission. See FM 21–75.

**j.** Most requirements lend themselves to subdivision. When time allows, or necessity demands, requirements may be advantageously divided, in order to specify the respective geographic areas to which the requirements may apply, or to show specific types of weapons about which information is most desired. As an example, a requirement, such as Enemy Activity, might well have such subdivisions as—
(1) Digging.
(2) Mine warfare activity.
(3) Patrol activity.
(4) Construction.
(5) Movement of troops.
(6) Concentrations forming a nuclear target.
(7) Indications of enemy's nuclear capability.

\textit{k}. In the implementation of the collection plan, it is of utmost importance to use an active agency which has the greater capability for collecting the information desired. No agency should be overlooked, and the plan must be kept flexible to allow for the addition or deletion of agencies as they become appropriate or available, and to allow for their replacement when no longer available.

\textbf{COLLECTION PLAN}

\textbf{What Does My Commander Need to Know?}

\textbf{INDICATIONS}

What indications will I look for to answer my commander's questions? Where will I look?

\textbf{TIME}

When do I need the information for it to be of value?

\textbf{AGENCIES}

Who can get the information for me?

\textbf{SOURCES}

Of the available sources, which are most reliable? Can they be exploited in time?

\textbf{ORDERS}

\textbf{REQUESTS}

\textit{Figure 5. Formulating the collection plan.}

\textbf{49. Modification of the Collection Plan}

\textit{a}. The collection plan is designed basically for planning a battle group/combat command attack. As the time for the attack approaches, new and specific requirements may be inserted into the plan in order that early collection of needed information may be initiated. When the intelligence officer realizes that a new requirement has developed, he will add that requirement to the list. Also, other echelons will send timely requests for information, many of which are not directly related to the intelligence officer's own unit requirements, and thus will necessarily be added as separate entries.
b. If desirable, the intelligence officer may carry over his collection plan for the planning phase into the attack phase. If not desirable or feasible, a new collection plan for the attack phase will be initiated.

c. In the event there is sufficient time and/or requirement for long range planning, see the suggested format in appendix II.

50. Supervision of the Collection Effort

a. After sending orders and requests for information to the appropriate agencies, the intelligence officer must follow through by active supervision of the collection effort. This is particularly true of the collection agencies organic or attached to the battle group/combat command. This supervision is best accomplished by personal staff visits by the S2, and by means of visits and liaison by other members of the intelligence section.

b. An appropriate example of this supervision responsibility is provided by the S2 function of briefing and debriefing patrols. Briefing is given prior to the departure with regard to details of the enemy situation. In addition to pointing out known locations of enemy troops and weapons, it is normally beneficial to brief a patrol on such matters as enemy uniforms, insignia, and descriptions and characteristics of enemy weapons and equipment which the patrol is likely to contact or observe. Such guidance improves the recognition capability of the individual patrol members. Debriefing is accomplished at the earliest possible time after the return of the patrol. Debriefing should not only include all phases
of the patrol's mission, but should be so conducted as to assure receipt of completeness of detail from all members of the patrol. Debriefing can be best held with all members present, as the details of each member will stimulate the memory of all. This briefing and debriefing responsibility is vitally important, with the results directly proportionate to the effort expended.
CHAPTER 5
PROCESSING OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE DATA

Section I. GENERAL

51. Purpose

This chapter outlines the scope of the processing of information and intelligence data which is accomplished at battle group/combat command and explains the techniques which are used to accomplish this task.

52. General

a. Processing is the means by which information and intelligence data are transformed into intelligence. Processing includes recording, evaluation, and interpretation. Processing at the lower echelon is accomplished generally in accordance with the procedures described in FM 30-5. However, since the scope of operations at the lower echelon is proportionately smaller, and the personnel and time available for the task are proportionately limited, the application of the processing steps is simplified. The steps of processing at battle group/combat command level consists of—

   (1) Recording (sec. II).
   (2) Evaluation (sec. III).
   (3) Interpretation (sec. IV).
   (4) Formulation of conclusions (sec. V).

b. The information and intelligence data which receive detailed processing at battle group/combat command are those items which are of immediate tactical value. These are essentially items which pertain to the requirements listed in the battle group/combat command collection plan (see ch. 4).

c. All information received from subordinate units and higher headquarters must be screened to determine those which are of importance to the unit. Pertinent items are then interpreted in the light of related information and appropriate conclusions are drawn in regard to their significance within the current situation.

Section II. RECORDING

53. Purpose of Recording

a. Recording is accomplished for the following general purposes:
(1) To provide a permanent record of events which occur within the area of interest to the battle group/combat command.

(2) To facilitate dissemination (preparation of periodic reports or summaries).

(3) To organize material for further processing.

(4) To relieve processing personnel from memorizing data.

(5) To assist in assessing the effectiveness of operations in "after action" reports and staff studies, etc.

b. All items received by intelligence personnel are recorded in one or more places. The primary recording devices used at the battle group/combat command consist of a journal file, a situation map, and a worksheet.

54. Journal File

a. Maintenance of a journal at battle group/combat command level is required. The purpose of the journal is to provide a permanent record of events and activities concerning the unit. The form in which the journal is to be submitted periodically to higher headquarters, and conformance to other directives such as time and manner of opening and closing the journal, are prescribed by higher headquarters by means of unit standing operating procedures (SOP). These directives are based on current Army Regulations. The commander may prescribe the maintenance of one journal for the unit or maintenance of separate journals by each staff section. It is felt desirable, in view of the trend toward a dual function capability on the part of the S2-S3, to maintain a combined journal for the S2-S3 section. In this event, separate worksheets and message files should be maintained. It must be remembered that no matter what type of journal is kept, the recording of a message will in no instance take precedence over the action necessitated by the message itself.

b. The journal consists of entries of all messages received or sent out, descriptions of both friendly and enemy activities, and occurrences of significance to the unit's operations.

c. Regardless of whether the journal is maintained on the unit, staff section, or combined S2/S3 section basis, the S2 section will maintain a separate intelligence journal file to provide a working file for the S2 section's use and to support the unit journal. The journal file consists of written messages and other intelligence documents either initiated or received by the S2 section and the written records of oral messages received or sent out. Incoming messages received by oral communication are recorded by the duty officer or his representative. The message, as entered, should show—
(1) An accurate statement of the message itself.
(2) A notation as to the sender of the message.
(3) The time of receipt and method of transmission of the message.
(4) Action taken as a result of the message.

In connection with (4) above, it is important that the "action taken" be filled in only after the action is taken, so as to reflect what has been done, not the intention of the individual making the entry.

d. When written messages are received, the time of receipt and the action taken are recorded.

e. Messages are received in written form or are recorded in written form upon receipt of verbal messages. The message forms upon which the messages are written should be processed in chronological order of receipt (if the subject matter in the body of the message allows this expenditure of time) after which they are placed in the proper message file (S2 and S3 maintain separate files for rapidity and ease of referral). The file itself may be a spindle, a piece of masking tape, or any other means of securing the messages for future use. If a single journal is maintained by the S2 (dependent upon the commander's desires), the messages can be assigned journal numbers and formally recorded in his journal in appropriate form.

55. Situation Map

a. General. Maintenance of the situation map at battle group/combat command level is usually a joint S2/S3 action. The friendly situation is basically the responsibility of the S3, the enemy situation the basic responsibility of the S2. In combined operations, personnel from either section may plot friendly or enemy entries on the situation map and perform other processing functions. The situation map provides a basis for comparison of the enemy situation in relation to the friendly situation. From the S2's standpoint, pertinent information of the enemy is recorded graphically on the situation map for reference and study. Whenever possible, both the situation map and the S2 worksheet will be maintained. However, in a fast moving situation when the volume of messages is such that both cannot be maintained effectively, priority should be given to keeping the situation map current.

b. Intelligence Content of the Situation Map. At battle group/combat command level, the situation map includes the following types of entries (with date/time of last sighting):

(1) Enemy unit identifications (down to the lowest level practicable).

(2) Enemy unit dispositions (down to the lowest determinable level).
(3) Enemy boundaries (down to the lowest determinable echelon).

(4) The location of enemy weapons, to include—
   (a) Machine gun positions.
   (b) Supporting mortars (all calibers).
   (c) Antitank gun positions.
   (d) Direct-fire artillery positions.
   (e) Armored vehicles.

(5) Enemy minefields.

(6) Enemy roadblocks.

(7) Enemy entrenchments.

(8) Other enemy obstacles or defensive installations.

(9) Enemy activities.

(10) Enemy logistic and command facilities.

(11) Terrain data.

c. Intelligence Uses for the Situation Map.

(1) The primary intelligence uses of the situation map are to—
   (a) Show the enemy disposition and situation.
   (b) Provide a basis for comparison in order to determine the significance of newly received data pertaining to the enemy forces.
   (c) Provide a background and basis for briefings and other required intelligence reports.
   (d) Provide the basis for overlays which graphically show the enemy situation.

(2) In addition to these primary uses, the intelligence officer may add other items to the situation map to assist in the efficient accomplishment of his duties. Since the command post and its staff sections must be extremely mobile at this echelon, all equipment carried must be used for as many purposes as possible. It is convenient to record additional helpful and needed information on the situation map, so as to reduce the bulk of material needed for operation, as well as actually placing such information where it can be used most conveniently, i.e., on the situation map. Items which lend themselves readily to inclusion on the map or in its margins include—
   (a) Computations of enemy personnel and weapons strengths.
   (b) Organization charts of appropriate enemy units.
   (c) Summarizations of weather and terrain data.
   (d) A listing of priority intelligence requirements.
   (e) Notations pertaining to current patrol plans.
   (f) Closing time computations.
   (g) A listing of friendly attachments.
d. Maintenance of the Situation Map.

(1) For general instruction and guidance in techniques of maintaining situation maps, refer to FM 30-5 and FM 30-19.

(2) With the guidance contained in FM 30-5 and FM 30-19, only minor adaptations need to be made for maintenance of the battle group situation map. These adaptations stem from the reduced scope of operations at battle group level, as well as the necessity to show much more detail on the map than do higher echelons.

(3) To assist the intelligence officer in maintaining his map with the many and varied types of entries, the following suggestions are offered:

(a) Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of conventional or improvised military symbols, a number or letter may be plotted in the area where the activity was observed, where a contact with the enemy was made, where a weapon or vehicle was sighted, etc. The corresponding letter or number can then be entered in a space to the side of the map, and a notation as to the meaning of the entry placed there. See figure 7.

(b) A line can be drawn from the descriptive passage or statement entered in the margin to the spot where the activity, sighting, contact, or observation occurred, thus obviating the need for a letter or number. See figure 7.

(c) Care must be taken not to overcrowd the map with details. Rather than attempting to crowd all entries on the basic transparency covering the map, several overlay sheets may be fastened to the top and sides of a map board and unrolled as needed. The content of each overlay should consist of related entries; i.e., one of the overlays should contain only plottings of enemy entrenchments; another may indicate boundaries and unit dispositions. Additional overlays may be added as needed.

(d) The intelligence officer may use blank paper with large grid squares drawn on it to reproduce schematically any portion of the map which is overly crowded with entries, or in which he desires to show the entries and their interrelationships more clearly. With this technique, the specific locations of weapons, units, fortifications, activity, etc., in a given area can be shown much more clearly than they can be shown on a stand-
ard operations map. This will be a supplementary method since the relationship of entries to terrain will not be shown.

Note:

X  •• Use of lines from point to margin.

Y  •• Graphic portrayal by military symbol.

Z  •• Use of letters and numbers to point margin written data.

Figure 7. Entries on situation map.

56. The Worksheet

a. Purpose. The purpose of the worksheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information received by the intelligence section, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. The worksheet is an aid in the preparation of estimates, summaries, and reports. It is a convenient memorandum for the intelligence officer and is usually not considered a permanent document.
b. **Form.** No specific form is prescribed for the worksheet. For convenience, the worksheet may consist of pages of a looseleaf notebook that are indexed along the side to facilitate the preparation of the intelligence summary (ISUM) and other intelligence documents. All items (messages) bearing upon the same subject are entered on the same page of the worksheet. Some messages may relate to more than one subject, and therefore, require double entries which are cross-referenced.

c. The following is an explanation of the form shown in Figure 8:

1. *Enemy operations* are reduced to four subindices: infantry, artillery, armor, and air. The intelligence officer should enter appropriate enemy activity in accordance with the proper index. These indices serve two purposes; first, to facilitate interpretation by listing information of a similar nature for comparison, and secondly, arrange information for handy reference in the preparation of the Intelligence Summary (ISUM).

2. *Enemy losses* are divided into two subindices: personnel and materiel. These indices should assist the intelligence officer in determining enemy combat effectiveness and in the preparation of the ISUM.

3. *Obstacles.*

4. *Unit identifications.*

5. *Enemy movements.*


7. *Friendly rear areas* index is reduced to three specific subindices which characterize the three types of enemy activity which may be exerted against friendly forces in both a nuclear and nonnuclear conflict.

8. *Other intelligence factors* provide a space for miscellaneous items of information not readily categorized into one of the foregoing classifications.

9. *Significant intelligence* indices are for the recording of notes concerning the significant items of intelligence currently produced. Entries here will normally be entered in other indices previously. These indices may also include the current evaluation of enemy capabilities, if they are not being recorded on a separate "enemy capability worksheet."

d. This format for an intelligence worksheet is suggested as being an appropriate form for use at the battle group/combat command echelon. It is designed to meet the needs of the intelligence section at this level, where the intelligence summaries and the oral briefing are the primary means of disseminating intelli-
The classification will be stamped on top and bottom of each page.

A loose-leaf notebook with tabbed separators may be used.

Number of page headings varies with information in ISUM.

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**Figure 8. Example of worksheet for S2 use.**

The actual composition of the worksheet, and the form which it takes, will be based upon the needs of the individual intelligence officer and the requirements posed by his commanding officer and higher headquarters.

**57. Coordinates Register**

- **General.** The coordinates register is a recording device designed to provide the lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and worksheets maintained at higher echelons. Intelligence data must be organized by some means into related groupings or into systematized forms, in order that interpretation of them can be accomplished.
readily and without time loss. Also, recording devices must be designed to operate efficiently in periods of stress rather than in periods of lull or in static situations. This means that the lower echelon intelligence officer must not be encumbered with forms and formats which become unworkable when his unit is operating in close combat with the enemy and when the situation is fluid. When action is heavy, displacement of command posts is common, and the intelligence officer must be prepared to operate under all types of limitations and adverse conditions. The coordinates register, properly used, provides the S2 with a means of organizing material for study, and is sufficiently compact and small that it can be carried in his jacket wherever he goes.

b. Form of Coordinates Register.

(1) The register should consist of a looseleaf notebook. Each page of the notebook pertains to a single grid square on the operational map, the grid squares consisting of those which fall within the geographical area of operation or of interest to the echelon maintaining the register. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly area, and areas of concern on both flanks.

(2) The pages of the coordinates register are of two types. One type of page is designed for written entries which describe enemy activity, locations, weapons, etc. These are entered by date-time group, followed by the appropriate coordinates, followed by the entry itself. The S2 may add his personal comments or notations to any entry, if desired. Figure 9 illustrates the composition of this type of page for the coordinates register.

(3) The second type of page of the register is designed to represent a single grid square schematically. Entries are plotted on the square in a manner comparable to that used in plotting the operational situation map. This type of page of the register shows graphically any data applicable to a single grid square which the S2 desires to plot. An enlarged grid square is drawn on the page and entries are made as shown in Figure 10.

c. Uses of Coordinates Register. Some of the more important uses which the S2 may make of his coordinates register are—

(1) Interpretation. Examples of this use are developing patterns of enemy activity and following the progress of construction, laying of minefields, etc.

(2) Planning.

(a) Operational planning. Data in the register may be used to advantage in determination of routes of movement, areas of main and secondary attacks, etc.
GRID SQUARE 2815

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>COORD</th>
<th>STATEMENT</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>092235</td>
<td>28381539</td>
<td>MG Fired on Recon Ptl from A Co</td>
<td>Have next Ptl check this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>092318</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Veh noise - Tk? - Heard direct N. of A Co OP #2 28321507</td>
<td>Ask Air OP's to look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>100500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special OB report on Wpns &amp; Fortifications Trenches &amp; Bunkers</td>
<td>Div OB wants more dope on wpns strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28021523 to 28141527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28141527 to 28221529</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28611545 to 28781551</td>
<td>Platoon on line - has 2 MG's</td>
<td>Same MG's as Yesterday? Check this!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28811551 to 29001559</td>
<td>Extensive trenches and firing Psns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>102335</td>
<td>28391530 to 28691541</td>
<td>B Co Ptl Rpts wire and AP Mines Very Heavy</td>
<td>New since 081800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>110600</td>
<td>28431588</td>
<td>Res Unit (Co?) in Gen'l Area</td>
<td>(From Div PIR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>110630</td>
<td>28381557</td>
<td>Med Tank spotted by L Plane</td>
<td>How many more???</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>111320</td>
<td>28731584 and 28151564</td>
<td>Active mortars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>120010</td>
<td>28611564</td>
<td>Flash from small Cal. Arty not over 75</td>
<td>At? AA? Gun? RR or Bazooka? Ask higher H.Q.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9. First type of page for the coordinates register.*

(b) *Patrol planning.* Data in the register provide guidance as to appropriate missions which should be assigned to patrols, and are available for briefing patrol personnel as to what is known of areas through which they may pass.

(c) *Fire plan.* Contents of the register may be used to assist in formulating the friendly fire plan in either defensive or offensive situations.
(3) **Reference.** Since missions are assigned by area, commanders generally think in terms of areas. The coordinates register, being organized on an area (grid squares) basis, readily lends itself to reference for satisfying many of the commander's questions in regard to areas of interest to him. Important in this respect is the ease with which data can be found in and extracted from the register. Also, this use of the register allows the S2 to answer the questions of higher headquarters more effectively, because they too are interested in specific areas.

d. **Maintenance of Coordinates Register.**

(1) The coordinates register should be reorganized periodically. This reorganization may result from movement to a new area or for the purpose of removing entries no longer applicable because of time lapse. It is recom-
mended that blank sheets be prepared for grid squares in which future operation of the friendly unit is anticipated.

(2) The register should be maintained on bond paper, whenever possible. The transparency of such paper is sufficient to allow the use of a grid scale underneath the schematic page, allowing more accurate and rapid plotting of or reference to the entries.

(3) The scale of the schematic page may be made a matter of standing operating procedure by higher headquarters for the purpose of standardization throughout subordinate units. Such standardization would assist dissemination of intelligence down to the lower echelons, e.g., order of battle special reports or photo interpretation studies could be sent to companies in the scale more readily usable at that echelon.

(4) The friendly situation should not normally be plotted in the coordinates register. The portability of the register increases the possibility of compromise, so the friendly situation is omitted for security reasons. The friendly situation plotted on the unit situation map is normally shown in sufficient detail in a scale of 1:25,000 to allow the use of the friendly situation when interpreting an item of intelligence data. If the S2 is operating away from the command post, he must keep the friendly situation in his head.

Section III. EVALUATION

58. General

a. Evaluation is the appraisal of an item of information in order to determine its pertinence, the reliability of the source or agency, and the accuracy of the information.

b. Evaluation of information at the lower echelon is a simple step as compared to the procedures employed at higher echelons. This is in large part due to the fact that information received from higher headquarters has been processed, evaluated and interpreted, and also to the fact, that the information collected by organic agencies at lower echelons is generally acquired by direct observation or actual contact with the enemy.

59. Procedure for Evaluation

a. In considering an item of reported information, the S2 first determines whether or not it applies to the current situation at his unit level. If so, the item should pertain to one of the requirements listed in his collection plan. If it does not apply and the collection
plan is complete, the item is reviewed for source reliability and is disseminated to higher headquarters and/or adjacent units as appropriate.

b. The reliability of source and agency and the accuracy of information are interdependent at the battle group/combat command level. The majority of reported information will describe objects, activities, or events which were actually seen or head by the reporting agency. Although human error exists in reports which contain such items as estimates of size of enemy forces, location of troops and weapons, and the number of rounds of enemy fire in an area, etc.; proper training will assure that such reports are as accurate and reliable as the reporting agency can make them. For greater detail on this subject, see FM 30–5.

60. Acceptance of Information

When the S2 determines that an item of information is pertinent and accepts that information as being sufficiently accurate and reliable for inclusion in the current estimate of the enemy situation and for basing friendly plans and actions on it, that information has become intelligence data.

Section IV. INTERPRETATION

61. Purpose

Up to this point, the intelligence officer is concerned with assembling, cataloging, and evaluating information. He is now faced with the problem of analyzing the evaluated information to determine its significance with respect to information or intelligence already at hand. This process of critical analysis is known as interpretation. Interpretation is, therefore, the mental consideration given to an item of intelligence data or groups of intelligence data by the intelligence officer.

62. General

a. The process of interpretation, although much narrower in scope at the lower echelon than at higher echelons, is one of the more important and demanding tasks of the intelligence officer. Mental considerations involving analysis, comparison, integration, deduction, and other types of logical reasoning are the means whereby the intelligence officer produces combat intelligence. Combat intelligence is the result of the final step of processing, i.e., the formulation of conclusions is so close that separation is difficult, either in application or for instructional purposes.

b. To interpret evaluated information, it must first be determined whether the information conforms or does not conform to
existing information, and second, whether it affects the existing
estimate of the situation. Pertinent considerations are—

(1) What does this information mean in connection with what
is already known?
(2) Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add significance to infor-
mation previously received?
(3) Does it tend to confirm or refute the existing estimate of
the enemy situation?

c. Correct information leads to accurate conclusions concerning
the enemy's capabilities and his probable courses of action.

63. Procedure for Interpretation

a. After recording an item of intelligence data on the situation
map and/or in the worksheet, the intelligence officer studies the
item with respect to related knowledge in order to determine its
significance. All such items, by virtue of being pertinent, have
some degree of significance. Naturally, some items have more
significance than others. For example, a report to the effect that
an enemy unit is moving within the enemy defensive sector may
be of more significance than a report which indicates the position
of an enemy automatic weapon.

b. The determination of significance results from comparing and
analyzing a newly acquired item in light of such considerations
as—

(1) Where it occurred on the terrain.
(2) When it occurred in the chronological sequence of events.
(3) How it fits or fails to fit into known patterns of enemy activity.
(4) How it substantiates or fails to substantiate known indications of enemy operations.
(5) To what extent it may be an enemy deception measure.
(6) To what extent it indicates a change in enemy capabilities.

c. The situation map and worksheet are the devices which provide the greatest amount of related knowledge for use in interpretation. The situation map outlines the current friendly and enemy situation; the worksheet contains descriptions of past activities and development and generally provides more detail concerning the current enemy situation. Therefore, the intelligence officer, by adding his knowledge of the friendly mission and operational plans to his considerations, normally has ample basis for developing his interpretations accurately, and for executing the final processing step, the formulation of conclusions.

d. As each new item of information is processed, the interpretation placed upon it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate. New capabilities are determined, old ones discarded; conclusions already drawn such as the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's capabilities are altered or further supported. The estimate is continuously revised and kept up to date in the light of new intelligence.

Section V. FORMULATION OF CONCLUSIONS

64. General

a. Any conclusion made and accepted as a result of evaluation and interpretation, and which reflects the effects of the weather, the terrain, or the enemy situation on the friendly unit's mission, is combat intelligence. This must be differentiated from intelligence data which is comprised of that body of accepted knowledge concerning the weather, the terrain, and the enemy situation which provides the basis for formulating conclusions, i.e., for producing combat intelligence. Thus, the acquisition of intelligence data precedes the production of combat intelligence. Also, as newly acquired intelligence data is incorporated into the estimate of the enemy situation, the conclusions previously made must be reconsidered to determine the extent to which new data support, refute, alter, or change the degree of emphasis on, or add new concepts to, combat intelligence which is being used for plans and operations by the friendly unit.

b. The commander's intelligence requirements, or essential elements of information, describe in general terms the intelligence data needed for the production of combat intelligence, as well as
knowledge which is essential to the commander for the most effective employment of his unit.

c. The formulation of conclusions is a continuing process. As each successive conclusion is formulated, the need for additional information and intelligence data invariably becomes evident. This assists the intelligence officer in determining specific requests for information and his priority of effort in his continuing search for information as outlined in his collection plan.

65. Procedure for Formulating Conclusions

a. Conclusions previously made are reference points for evaluating the pertinence and accuracy of collected information, for establishing direction in the interpretation step, and for arriving at new conclusions which bear on the current situation and mission. However, the intelligence officer must realize that in using this procedure, he must constantly be aware of the possibility of rapid changes in the enemy situation. Particularly at lower echelons, enemy situations may change rapidly; consequently conclusions based on enemy activity have a short time interval of validity. Thus, when processing any item of intelligence information which results in a radical departure from, or contradiction to, currently accepted combat intelligence, a drastic reconsideration of previous conclusions is necessary. Requests for substantiation and for additional information should be issued immediately. The commander and S3 should be notified at once of the possibility of change and ordinarily should be briefed on the circumstances and the implications of such a change.

b. The formulation of a conclusion is the logical product of the interpretation step. A conclusion, to be useful to either the commander or S3 must be definite, even though it is based on limited knowledge. A conclusion may be drawn from each item of evaluated data. The type of conclusion drawn, and whether or not it requires immediate dissemination, depends upon its relative significance with respect to previous conclusions and its impact upon the mission. For instance, a relatively significant conclusion based upon accurate and detailed data, such as that described in paragraph 67, might be a statement of the enemy’s probable course of action and be immediately disseminated to the commander, S3, and other interested personnel. Conclusions of a somewhat different type might be drawn from such items of information as weather reports, newly reported terrain data, or relatively minor reports concerning enemy strength, location, and activity. Conclusions drawn from this variety of intelligence data usually take the form of changes, additions, or confirmations of pertinent elements of the current intelligence estimate. Such conclusions are not nor-
intelligence estimate current. Thus, collectively and cumulatively, mally disseminated singly as conclusions, but are used to keep the such conclusions may cause a change in the current estimate which would warrant dissemination. The handling of conclusions, as described, should not be confused with the handling of items of information requiring immediate dissemination.

c. A specific conclusion may be qualified as a result of insufficient intelligence information, or because there are alternate conclusions which could be drawn through a different interpretation of that data. This means that the intelligence officer is faced with the problem of making conclusions based on partial development of the enemy situation and capabilities and of choosing the most probable of several possible interpretations. However, a specific conclusion is none the less demanded. A vague or generalized conclusion made to eliminate the qualifications is more worthless and may be more dangerous to the commander than no conclusion at all. Just as the commander and S3 are exposed to the possibility of operational errors, the S2 also is exposed to the same possibility of error by committing himself to a definite stand as to the influences of intelligence on the friendly operations plan. The commander is as aware of the possibility of error in intelligence, as he is of error in his operations plan. He takes the necessary steps to protect his unit against unexpected developments, i.e., providing for security of his flanks and rear, regardless of the degree of soundness which he feels is present in his plans and orders. He also prepares alternate plans of operations, so as to cope with this problem more effectively. Thus, the intelligence officer need not feel that he should not commit himself, because of the possibility of his conclusions being erroneous, either in part or completely. The S2 commits himself positively. Pertinent conclusions, after their formulation, are disseminated to appropriate using personnel by the most expeditious means.

Section VI. EXAMPLE OF PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

66. Purpose

This section is designed to illustrate the production of combat intelligence by tracing an item of information through the steps of processing as described in the preceding sections of this chapter.

67. Processing An Item of Information

a. Situation. A reconnaissance patrol was dispatched during the hours of darkness to reconnoiter the area of the reserve company of the opposing enemy battalion. The patrol reported the
following information to the S2 during the debriefing: “When we reached our objective, the enemy was moving out. We observed their departure and then followed them. They stopped here (indicates on map), stacked their gear, and began digging positions.”

b. Recording the Item. The S2 records this report for inclusion in the journal file and for dissemination to higher headquarters. He then records the new location on the situation map and in his worksheet.

c. Evaluating the Item. The S2 automatically realizes that the item is pertinent, because it pertains to one of his intelligence requirements, i.e., the location of enemy reserves. He considers the reliability of his source or reporting agency to the extent necessary to determine whether or not the patrol reached its objective and could have observed the activity reported. If these conditions exist, he accepts the report as being accurate. When he accepts and decides to interpret the report, it is treated as intelligence data.

d. Interpretation of the Item.

1. In studying the item as recorded on the situation map and in the worksheet, the S2 notes that the reserve company has moved from one flank of the enemy battalion sector to the other flank. He begins his task of determining the change in capabilities resulting from his shift.

2. He studies the terrain in the vicinity of the new location and compares this analysis with a study of the terrain in the vacated area. He compares the heights in the two areas, the avenues of approach, fields of fire, the observation afforded, and the distances and routes from the respective positions to the areas of the front within the enemy battalion sector.

3. He studies the new area in the light of present locations and recent shifts in locations of supporting weapons. He studies the new location in relation to the locations of enemy units in line, i.e., the ability to support the line units by fire, the routes of movement to the positions of the units in line, etc. He determines whether this move fits into the pattern of recent enemy activity.

4. He considers the extent to which the weather may have influenced the enemy commander’s choice of location of his reserve company. For example, if there has been a recent freeze, is there a new avenue of approach into our position over frozen crust which formerly had been an impassable, boggy piece of terrain; or, if there has recently been a low ceiling from morning fog, mist, or clouds, is observation better from the new position than it was from the old?
(5) The S2 also considers the possibility that the reason for the move may have resulted from recent, observed, friendly activity. For example, could the recent movement of the friendly reserve have caused the enemy to move his reserve in a countering position? Has friendly harassing or interdictory fire been sufficiently heavy to force this move? Has friendly patrol activity been a factor in the move? Has friendly activity indicated the friendly operation plan?

(6) The S2 must also consider the possibility that the shift of the enemy reserve may be a deception measure. His consideration here includes the timing of the move in relation to the friendly operation plan, past tendencies on the part of the enemy to employ ruses, demonstrations, and deceptions, as well as the logical probability of this move being one of deception in the light of all other factors which can be brought to bear on the problems as previously stated.

e. Formulation of the Conclusion. After interpreting the intelligence data, the S2 must formulate a conclusion. An illustration of an appropriate conclusion resulting from interpretation of intelligence data follows: "The reason the enemy shifted his reserve was to strengthen his defense capability. This new indication, together with those previously arrived at, removes another qualification from the defense capability. At this time, with these facts available, the enemy is definitely committed to a position defense in this area."
68. Definition

Dissemination is defined as the timely transmission of information and intelligence in appropriate form to the units or agency which can use them.

69. General

a. One object in disseminating intelligence is to insure that the intelligence staffs at different echelons of command receive the same information of the enemy and the area of operations. Commanders of the various echelons of command will then have the same general intelligence picture and will not be at variance with each other in planning their operations.

b. In the dissemination of intelligence, there are two general problems—dissemination to lower and adjacent units, and dissemination to higher units and within the producing headquarters. Of these two problems, dissemination to lower and adjacent units is the more difficult and critical. This is because—

(1) The requirement of timeliness is generally more critical due to the rapidity of change of the intelligence picture at the lower echelons.

(2) A greater amount of detail is required. This requirement for detail complicates that of timeliness.

(3) All pertinent intelligence produced at higher headquarters by specialized means at their disposal must be disseminated to lower echelons.

(4) Intelligence for higher echelons is limited to relatively few recipients, while the number of recipients at lower echelons is much larger.

(5) Dissemination to lower echelons (company) is often complicated by such factors as tactical fluidity, dispersion, and communications difficulties.

c. In accomplishing his staff responsibilities for dissemination, the intelligence officer has three governing considerations. Each item of information of intelligence value must be considered to determine—

(1) To whom it should be disseminated.

(2) The detail in which it should be disseminated.

(3) When it should be disseminated.
d. There are, in general, five categories of units or agencies to which information or intelligence data may be disseminated. These are—

1. Individuals or agencies within the local headquarters.
2. Subordinate echelons or agencies.
3. Higher echelons or agencies.
4. Adjacent echelons or agencies.
5. Supporting and supported units.

e. In order to disseminate to the appropriate using agencies, the S2 must understand their requirements, and thus be able to determine the pertinency and applicability of items of information and intelligence data as they apply to the needs of others. In a majority of instances, the appropriateness of dissemination is readily apparent because of the nature of the items to be disseminated, and the known missions of possible using agencies. If the S2 is in doubt as to whether specific items are usable by other agencies, he should disseminate them. Over-dissemination is preferable to under dissemination.

f. The adequacy of intelligence dissemination may be judged in order of priority, by the following criteria:

1. Information and intelligence must be placed in the hands of the ultimate user in time to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture has changed. If the information is disseminated without processing, it must be clearly stated that such information is unevaluated. The source should be given if security permits.
2. Only essential intelligence that can be used by the unit or individual concerned should be disseminated.
3. The importance and priority of the intelligence furnished will be carefully considered.
4. The disseminated matter should be in such form that the recipients may readily locate details of interest to them.

g. The amount of detail which should be included for dissemination purposes stems from a knowledge of the needs and interests of the using agency. In general, data disseminated to lower echelons involve more detail than those disseminated to higher echelons. However, a major exception to this principle exists when specific requests for information have been received from higher echelons. Such requests are part of the higher echelon's collection plan, and the satisfaction of this requirement may require collecting and reporting in great detail.

h. Information and intelligence data must be disseminated, so as to allow the using agency maximum time for including them in
its estimate of the situation. This requires an evaluation by the S2 as to the relative importance of specific items. Some items require a higher priority for dissemination, because of their urgent or critical nature, (requiring immediate countermeasures by the using agency) or because of their tendency to become outmoded rapidly (requiring immediate action by the using agency, if the data are to be of any value, as for example target acquisition information for employment of nuclear weapons).

i. At the lower echelons, most dissemination is accomplished by means of oral, rather than written reports, because of the extreme necessity for timeliness. Written reports require much more time for preparation and dissemination than do oral reports (telephone or radio) and their use results in loss of time which lower echelons cannot afford. This principle of speedy dissemination to the lower echelon (battle group to company, combat command to battalion, battalion to company) should not be allowed to become habit-forming to the point where all information or intelligence is always disseminated by the fastest means. Evaluation of the item in each case will establish the priority.

70. Methods of Dissemination

Dissemination may be accomplished by a variety of means or methods. In each case, the urgency of need of the user will establish the appropriate means or method. Among the means or methods are—

a. Messages.
   (1) Messenger (written).
   (2) Telephone.
   (3) Radio.
   (4) Teletype.
   (5) Liaison officer (oral or written).

b. Conferences.
   (1) Formal.
   (2) Informal.

c. Briefings.
   (1) Formal.
   (2) Informal.

d. Intelligence Documents.
   (1) Intelligence Summary (ISUM).
   (2) Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) (Corps or Higher Hq).
   (3) Intelligence Annex.
   (4) Intelligence Estimate.
   (5) Maps, overlays.
   (6) Unit Operations Order.
Any or all of the above may be used in varying situations. Evaluation by the S2 as to the urgency of the material to be disseminated will in each case clearly dictate the method and means used to insure the *timely* receipt by the user, allowing sufficient time in every case for the user to take appropriate action or make operational changes to meet the changed situation.

**Section II. DISSEMINATION BY LOCAL HEADQUARTERS**

**71. Dissemination Within Local Headquarters**

The *principal* recipients of information, intelligence data, and combat intelligence within the local headquarters are the commander and the S3. Also, such other personnel as the executive officer, S1, S4, and S2 of the supporting artillery unit must be informed, when information or intelligence of interest or use to them becomes available.

**72. Dissemination to Lower Echelons**

The S2 must disseminate appropriate data to subordinate elements of the command. This includes the results of the local intelligence production effort as well as applicable portions of reports sent down by higher echelons. The desire and need for knowledge at company level is constant and demanding. The S2's efforts to satisfy the needs of the lower echelon result in a more vigorous, better supervised, and more effectively directed collection effort on the part of the collection agencies.

**73. Dissemination to Higher Echelons**

The lower echelons are considered to be collecting agencies by each succeeding higher echelon. This means that information must be disseminated from the lower echelon up. The information reported to higher headquarters consists of answers to requests received from them, as well as items which the lower echelon considers to be of possible interest or use at higher headquarters. Normally, information is reported through channels, i.e., from a lower echelon to the next higher echelon. As an example, company to battle group to division (or company to battalion to combat command to division). However, when a battle group, as an example, has received specific requests for information from corps, it may be directed that reports be made directly to corps as expeditiously as possible. Information copies of such reports should then be sent by battle group to its next higher headquarters, division.

**74. Dissemination to Adjacent Echelons**

Certain items of information procured by one collecting agency may be of interest to or usable by one or more adjacent headquar-
ters. Of particular importance in this respect, are items which originate from enemy activity near the flanks of the area of responsibility of the collecting agency's command, and activity which the collecting agency observes within the area of responsibility of a flank unit. The urgency of the information dictates the means and speed of such dissemination. Liaison visits between adjacent headquarters on the part of liaison officers and/or S2 action personnel are an important means of such dissemination. It should be noted that dissemination is more difficult when the parent unit of an adjacent headquarters is not the same as that of the reporting agency.

75. Briefings

a. Briefing of personnel on the intelligence situation or portions of the situation is a frequently employed method of dissemination. Briefings may be formal or informal, and may be presented to an individual, to a selected group, or to a large audience, such as the entire command.

b. A briefing is frequently employed to summarize intelligence activities which have occurred during a specified period of time. Personnel who have been absent from the command post for extended periods of time must be brought up to date on the current situation.

c. Visitors from outside the headquarters who are concerned with intelligence are normally briefed on the situation. In such briefings, the scope and degree of detail presented must be geared to the needs and interests of those being briefed.

d. The intelligence officer may well present special briefings to orient appropriate personnel in preparation for a mission. For example, the area of interest for a patrol is relatively small, yet within that area the patrol leader is concerned with many details regarding the terrain and the enemy situation. Also, prior to a special operation, the intelligence officer may present a series of briefings, in each of which he presents a portion of the enemy situation, i.e., one briefing on the enemy dispositions, another on the extent and nature of fortifications, and another on obstacles, minefields or on any specialized aspect of the situation. Whenever possible and wherever practicable, patrols given an intelligence mission should be both briefed and debriefed by the S2 or his authorized representative.

e. In view of the many types of briefings required, and because briefings must fit the needs and desires of the commander, there is no fixed formal content of a briefing at lower echelons. However, local operating procedures may include a format for routine briefings in accordance with the desires of the commander.
the paragraphs of the intelligence estimate as developed in FM
30–5 are acceptable as a general outline for an intelligence briefing.

76. Spot Reports

Spot reports are used to transmit information or intelligence
data which is of sufficient importance to warrant immediate dis-
semination. They are used when any delay in dissemination could
be detrimental to the welfare of the friendly forces. Spot reports
are transmitted immediately and by the most expeditious means
of communication.

77. Flash Reports

Flash reports are used to transmit information or intelligence
data of high priority which must reach the user without any delay.
Flash reports are usually concerned with an enemy activity (such
as air, armor, CBR, or nuclear attack) which poses an immediate
threat to the command or a portion of it. Flash reports receive
the highest priority of all transmission means because of their
urgency and usually will be disseminated without evaluation or
interpretation as unconfirmed information, subject to later con-
firmation.

78. Liaison

a. Formal exchange of information between intelligence staffs
of higher, lower, or adjacent echelons by mechanical means can
never be completely effective. The S2 must visit other headquar-
ters and appropriate collecting agencies as often as practicable and
possible.

b. Many liaison missions are performed by members of the S2
section, in order to expedite both the collection and dissemination
of information. Intelligence needs dictate that the S2 must plan
for the employment of his personnel on liaison duties, and that
they be trained and practiced in performing liaison missions to
both higher and lower headquarters. In this connection, it must
be remembered that due to the dual function capability of S2–S3
personnel, liaison officers assigned or attached to the S3 section
will also perform S2 liaison missions as a matter of course.

c. During the planning phase of an operation, frequent liaison
is necessary between the company commander and the next higher
headquarters to provide for an exchange of information and re-
quirements. During the execution phase, radio contact provides
the normal means of transmittal between the two headquarters.
Since the company commander's first concern is for operational
matters, operational data tend to dominate the information sent
back by company.
d. The collection plan will usually call for some of the requirements to be met by higher headquarters. The nature of the information desired and the methods of transmitting it may require either the use of message center or a liaison trip. It is not always practicable for the S2 to make such visits personally (because of requirements posed by the commander), so others of the section must be trained to perform this task and to understand the various agencies that can or should be contacted during such a visit.

79. Shelling Reports

a. Units receiving enemy shells in their areas have the responsibility of making immediate shelling reports (Shelreps). Crater analysis will probably be the basis for most Shelreps from frontline units. After the information has been disseminated to artillery units, these reports are processed by the S2 section to determine hostile firing positions. There is a need for rapid dissemination in order that counterfire may be employed before the enemy can take evasive action.

b. The effectiveness of counterfire based on shelling reports is dependent upon these reports being accurately prepared and submitted in large numbers, so that hostile weapons located by the intersection method can be plotted on the map.

c. In making a shelling report, five facts should be reported immediately. They are—

1. Designation of unit making the report.
3. Estimated caliber of the weapon.
4. Location of the observer.
5. Azimuth to the hostile weapon.

d. Use of DA Form 1691-R (Artillery Counterfire Information) or the form suggested in FM 6-20, allows the information to be reported by column designation to reduce transmission time and to insure completeness (fig. 13).

e. Emphasis should be placed on the accuracy of shelreps and on submission by the most expeditious means. Counterfire, with subsequent destruction or silencing of hostile weapons, is the result of speedy, accurate shelreps. It is a responsibility of the S2 to emphasize the requirement for such instant response within his unit and, by close supervision of the training program insure the steady flow of information.

80. Sandtables, Mockups, and Rehearsals

a. A sandtable may be used advantageously to present the intelligence situation in three dimensions. This aid is of assistance in the conduct of intelligence briefings. It may also be used jointly by the commander or S3 to show the plan of action and friendly
dispositions. When time is limited, the sandtable may be only a sketch made on the ground as the briefing progresses. In planning special operations, or when time is not at a premium, more elaborate models made to scale and representing details of the situation, such as are employed in planning for an airborne operation, can be constructed.

b. Mockups of enemy defensive obstacles, weapons, etc., are good methods of accurately disseminating data. Mockups have the advantage of being to scale, giving a true picture of the item being presented and leaving nothing to imagination. The details and extent of the mockups are governed by the time available for preparation, and the opportunity of bringing the audience to the mock-up area.
c. A rehearsal of an operation is advantageous, as it provides a means of acquainting each participant with his duties, the sequence of actions, and his relationship to other participants. It allows the commander to make minor adjustments in details of coordination and timing. An area should be selected which duplicates the area of the actual operation to provide maximum realism. Some operations, such as counterattack, may be practiced on the
actual terrain. During such practice sessions the intelligence aspects of weather, terrain, and the enemy should be played as they exist, are expected to exist, or as they have been assumed.

81. Overlays

a. An overlay is often the simplest and most easily understandable means of disseminating intelligence or information to appropriate using agencies. It provides a means for graphically showing the interrelationship of various types of intelligence items and thus supplements other means of dissemination, such as a chronological listing of events or a listing by topic.

b. An overlay provides a relatively rapid means of reproduction in graphic form. Its most frequent use at the lower echelon is for reporting to another headquarters the situation as represented by the local situation map or worksheet.

c. An S2/S3 overlay may be prepared to accompany either an oral or written operations order. In some cases, the order may be written on the overlay itself. In any event, the items or entries shown graphically on an overlay need not be repeated in a written order, thus making the order brief and easy to understand. An overlay attached as an annex to a written order reduces the amount of written material by providing a graphic reference.

82. Other Methods of Dissemination

The intelligence officer prepares the intelligence portions which may be required in special or routine orders or reports. These include operational situation reports, operation plans and orders, and other orders and reports. The format and content of all such orders and reports are prescribed by higher headquarters and are based on current directives, regulations, and field manuals.

Section III. DISSEMINATION FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

83. General

The lower echelon intelligence section receives routine and special intelligence reports from higher echelons. The lower echelon S2 utilizes these reports to gain maximum assistance for his own intelligence effort. For maximum utilization of these reports, he must understand the purpose for which they are prepared and the limitations of their scope as applied to his own level of operations.

84. Periodic Intelligence Report

a. The periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) is prepared by corps and higher headquarters. It is not normally prepared
at division or lower units. It is one of the principal means by which higher echelons disseminate intelligence to other headquarters, higher, lower, or adjacent. The PERINTREP is disseminated to the headquarters of the next two higher and subordinate echelons, as well as to adjacent units. It sums up the general situation in a readable form and provides a convenient means of disseminating information and intelligence. It is a summary of weather and terrain factors and the enemy situation, to include operations and capabilities.

b. The intelligence contained in the PERINTREP may, and probably will, have been previously disseminated as spot reports or in other summaries covering shorter intervals. Nevertheless, this report remains unique in its completeness and scope. It often has annexes which contain order of battle reports, translations of captured documents, interrogation of prisoner of war reports, air photo interpretation reports, and counterintelligence reports.

c. The form and content of the periodic intelligence report are illustrated in FM 30-5.

85. Intelligence Summary

a. The intelligence summary (ISUM) is a compilation of important items of intelligence information to include negative information. It is transmitted by the quickest means. It contains a brief estimate of the enemy situation with deductions, and it should assist lower units in assessing the situation. In tactical units, intelligence summaries are used as brief, consolidated reports of intelligence compiled during a prescribed period. The contents of the intelligence summaries may, or may not, have been previously disseminated.

b. No specific form for an intelligence summary is prescribed. Its form varies according to purpose and content. It is a telegraphic condensation of important items of intelligence value that have resulted from information received and disseminated over a certain period. The summary does not take the place of regular and spot reports, but provides a means by which the unit intelligence officer can periodically review the information received and consolidate all items into a resume for the period.

c. The intelligence summary will include as a minimum---
   (1) Identification of the issuing unit.
   (2) Time and date of issue.
   (3) Summary of recent information received and intelligence produced during the period.
   (4) Brief estimate of the enemy situation with deductions.

d. In addition to the above, the ISUM will also include as many of the following as are applicable:
(1) Summary of enemy operations for the period, to include
enemy air activity.
(2) Estimated enemy personnel and equipment losses.
(3) Location of new enemy minefields and road blocks.
(4) Enemy administrative activities indicating offensive
action.
(5) New enemy identifications.
(6) Enemy movements during the period.
(7) Estimated number of enemy vehicles sighted during the
period.
(8) The capture of enemy materiel during the period.
(9) Weather data and condition of the ground.

e. The period covered by the intelligence summary (ISUM) and
the time of dissemination are prescribed by the next higher head-
quarters. Summaries are usually disseminated to lower units, the
next higher headquarters, unit staff and commander, and to adja-
cent units. The time specified is usually for a period covering four
or six hours. Time of submission is geared to the time the higher
unit is required to submit its summary, to allow for inclusion of
pertinent items in the higher unit summary. Again, the summary
does not take the place of regular and spot reports, but supplements
and consolidates these reports.

f. For an example of an ISUM, see FM 30-5.

86. Tactical Studies of Weather and Terrain

a. Tactical studies of weather and terrain are prepared by
higher echelons for their own use and are not disseminated to
lower echelons on a routine basis. However, when a lower echelon
is unable to accomplish physical reconnaissance of a proposed area
of operations, such studies are of great importance and may be
disseminated to the lower echelons.

b. For format, details, and an example of a tactical study of
weather and terrain, see FM 30-5.

87. Intelligence Annex

The intelligence annex is a means used by higher echelons for
disseminating intelligence and for issuing intelligence instructions
to a command for current or impending operations. It will con-
firm orders and requests for information that have been made
previously in fragmentary form, unless the orders or requests are
obsolete by the time the annex is issued. This annex is a part of
the operations order. It amplifies or supplants the information
contained in paragraph 1α of the operations order. Higher eche-
lons use paragraph 3 of the annex, "Reconnaissance and Observa-
tion Missions," as the formal means of implementing their collec-
88. Special Order of Battle Reports

Special reports on any topic concerning the enemy forces or enemy activities within any desired area may be procured by the lower echelon S2 section upon submission of a request to its parent division G2 section. These reports contain descriptions of all currently available information on the topic requested and have the further advantage of being prepared specially for the use of the requesting echelon. For more detail on special order of battle reports, see FM 30-19.
CHAPTER 7
FUNCTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Section I. GENERAL

89. Purpose
This chapter is designed to guide the lower echelon intelligence officer in the performance of his duties and the discharge of his responsibilities for organizing his section, operation in the command post, reconnaissance, and other functions.

90. General
a. The more readily apparent functions of the intelligence officer have been discussed and illustrated in preceding chapters. Those functions consist generally of the intelligence officer's approach to his task of producing and disseminating information, intelligence data, and combat intelligence. The primary mission of the intelligence officer is to provide intelligence support for his commander.

b. There are many other functions for which the S2 is responsible at lower echelons of command. Some of these additional functions directly or indirectly support the intelligence production effort; others are administrative in nature.

Section II. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

91. Employment of Personnel
a. Personnel organic to the intelligence section must be organized and assigned appropriate duties to assist the S2 in accomplishing all the functions for which he is responsible. The organization of the section and the assignment of duties must be designed for prolonged operation during periods of stress, even though this may result in some inactivity during lulls in action.

b. The intelligence section must operate on a 24-hour basis. This requires the assignment of personnel into shifts. The S2 must determine the abilities of his personnel in order that he may assign his people individually to the types of tasks for which they are best suited. He should have a qualified and balanced operational section for all shifts.

c. Certain personnel of the section may be assigned liaison duties with higher and lower echelons. This liaison effort must be closely guided and supervised. In this connection, it should again be noted that liaison officers assigned to the unit should be used for intelligence as well as other matters.
d. The foregoing again emphasizes the necessity for “dual function” capability on the part of both S2 and S3 personnel, in order to assure continuous operations of both functions over extended periods of time. It is essential that personnel of both the S2 and S3 sections be prepared to assume the duties and functions of the other, in case of necessity, or to assist the other in meeting a heavy workload.

e. Nonorganic intelligence personnel, such as interrogation of prisoner of war personnel, security personnel, or interpreter translators may be attached to the battle group/combat command for specific operations. The S2 is responsible for insuring that these personnel are properly employed to meet the local (unit) intelligence requirements, as well as those needed by higher headquarters. The S2 will also make provision for their quartering, assignment of area and work space, messing, security, and supply. For further details, see chapter 2 and FM 30-9, MI Battalion, Field Army.

92. Duties at the Command Post

a. The command post, which is the communications and control center for the unit, provides a base of operations for the intelligence staff. The S2 section maintains its records at the command post, and it is from this focal point that intelligence activities of the command are coordinated and controlled by the S2.

b. Many of the operational duties of the command post are shared by personnel of the S2 and S3 sections to economize in the use of personnel. This requires that members of each section understand the routine functions of personnel in the other section. These combined personnel must be organized to function continuously and efficiently despite the frequent displacement of the command post (necessitating an echelonnement of personnel) and the minimum facilities available for field operation.

93. Duties in Regard to Observation Posts

a. Observation posts are established by all units from company through division. The number and location of observation posts will be dependent upon the terrain, the area of responsibility of the unit, and the field of vision in the area of operations. An observation post (OP) is a fixed location from which all activities that occur within a particular sector of enemy-held terrain may be observed. Observation posts are usually established well forward and on terrain offering the best view of the area of interest. The need for concealment from enemy observation and communication with friendly units, especially for the headquarters, are two limiting factors or considerations in selecting the location of OP’s.
6. Precautions are taken to insure secrecy of the location of the observation post. Personnel going to or departing from the OP will move so as to deny enemy observation, and two separate routes for entrance to and exit from the OP will be maintained. When natural concealment is inadequate, the observation post is camouflaged. Alternate sites for OP's are selected well in advance and as much preparatory work as possible will be completed.

c. Considering the limitations existent in an area of operations, it is obvious that several OP's will have to be established in the forward areas. These OP's will be established by company, battle group, and supporting artillery observers. In order to eliminate overlap, as well as to insure complete coverage of the unit zone, it becomes necessary for the S2 to coordinate the locations, areas of observation, and zones of responsibility of the various OP's. This is done by selecting OP sites with the best observation of the area. As a rule, each OP is assigned to two or more units (see FM 21-75).

d. When the command group moves to an observation post, communications and the minimum records required for operation must also be taken and maintained so that these elements of control will not be neglected simply to gain better observation. The intelligence records that the S2 normally takes on such a move include his worksheet or Coordinate Register and a copy of the S2 and S3 situation map for use by the commander.

94. Duties in Regard to Reconnaissance

a. The staff responsibility for the planning and assignment of reconnaissance missions is a combined S2/S3 responsibility. The planning of the collection effort is the responsibility and prerogative of the S2, while the orders directing the dispatch of the patrols are issued by the S3 in the name of the commander.

b. Reconnaissance is a directed effort in the field to gather information of the enemy or the area of operations, and is undertaken by an appropriate element of the unit concerned. Reconnaissance, then, is one means utilized by the S2 to accomplish the mission of securing information of two of the unknown elements, the enemy and the terrain.

c. The S2 must prepare suitable missions for his reconnaissance elements, if he is to obtain the desired information. Missions will usually depend on the collection plan developed as a result of the commander's EEI, and will be assigned to the reconnaissance elements in the form of orders or requests. Reconnaissance elements consist of all personnel whose activities encompass observation or the manning of patrols or those units charged with the execution of reconnaissance missions. Of these, the reconnaissance elements of infantry, armor, artillery and engineer units perform battle and close reconnaissance.
d. The S2 is responsible for air reconnaissance and either he or the assistant S2 functions as the S2 Air for the command. Divisions are provided with army support for the conduct of air reconnaissance. Visual, photographic, or electronic means may be employed to maintain surveillance of the battlefield or to collect information on terrain or enemy activity at a specific location. The S2 Air has these responsibilities.

1. Prepare air reconnaissance plans for attached, organic, or supporting air units.
2. Receive, screen, consolidate, and establish priorities for air reconnaissance requests.
3. Prepare specific directives and/or requests for reconnaissance.
4. Forward planned air reconnaissance requests to the next higher echelon and immediate requests to the coordinating agency of a supporting service.
5. Forward planned and immediate requests to organic air reconnaissance agencies.
6. Coordinate requests for air photo reproduction within the unit.
7. Supervise operations of photointerpreters (organic or attached).
8. Supervise airphoto procurement and distribution within the command.
9. Supervise the procurement and distribution of maps and map supplements.
10. Disseminate information obtained from air reconnaissance and airphotos.
11. Maintain air reconnaissance maps and essential records.

95. Duties in Regard to Counterreconnaissance

a. Counterreconnaissance is an active effort to neutralize enemy reconnaissance. It seeks to protect a force from enemy observation and other hostile reconnaissance measures. It is executed by establishing a defensive or an offensive screen, or a combination of both.

b. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance are closely related. All units have both reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance responsibilities. In effect, the two complement one another, and cannot readily or easily be separated. Good reconnaissance in itself will insure a certain amount of security by the very nature of its activity. Conversely, activities of a counterreconnaissance force inevitably will provide a certain amount of reconnaissance information.
c. In most cases the agencies executing reconnaissance missions will be employed simultaneously in varying degrees in counter-reconnaissance; however, it must be specifically understood that an agency should be given only one primary mission, performing other functions as secondary missions. The order to the force must state explicitly which mission has precedence and priority. In forces of sufficient size, a portion of the force may be assigned separate missions.

d. The responsibilities of the S2 for counterreconnaissance are the same as for reconnaissance.

96. Duties for Combat Deception

The S2 has a staff responsibility for activities pertaining to deception operations of the unit. This responsibility is carried out in coordination with the S3. For further details, see FM 31-40, Combat Deception (U).

97. Duties in Regard to Radiological Survey and Monitoring Operations

a. Both ground and aerial radiological survey and monitoring are conducted in the combat zone to furnish the commander with information as to the extent and the degree of radioactive contamination. This information will be integrated into the tactical plans of the unit or forwarded to the next higher echelon with appropriate recommendations.

b. Battle groups/combat commands have the following organizational and supervisory functions in regard to radiological survey and monitoring:

(1) Training radiological survey and monitoring teams within the command.
(2) Assigning areas of responsibility for survey and monitoring operations.
(3) Insuring the overall functioning of radiological survey and monitoring operations conducted by subordinate elements of the command.
(4) Consolidating and interpreting radiological survey and monitoring data and transmitting pertinent information to subordinate adjacent, and higher headquarters.
(5) Alerting subordinate units when fallout warning is received and directing subordinate units to carry out survey and monitoring operations when informed that radiological contamination exists in a subordinate or adjacent unit area.
(6) Conducting ground and/or aerial survey and monitoring of any part of the area beyond the capabilities of the responsible subordinate units.

c. The S2 performs the following functions in radiological survey and monitoring:

(1) Coordinates radiological survey and monitoring operations.

(2) Maintains the radiological survey and monitoring situation map.

(3) Interprets radiological survey and monitoring data and provides fallout information to the commander and staff.

(4) Disseminates radiological fallout information according to regularly established procedures for handling all intelligence.

98. Duties in a Fire Support Coordination Role

a. The S2 provides his commander with information concerning the location of enemy close support weapons. He does this through the counterfire operations sergeant, who collects and processes counterfire information and disseminates it to the unit fire support coordinator for counterfire purposes and to the S2 for information. The counterfire operation sergeant's functions include—

(1) Process shelling reports (shelreps).

(2) Provide counterfire information for planning and operations.

b. Shelling reports are normally forwarded to the command post, where they are immediately made available to the counterfire operations sergeant or his representative for recording, analysis and dissemination. The counterfire operations sergeant usually operates in battle group/combat command fire direction center or in close proximity to the unit fire support coordinator.

c. The counterfire operations sergeant, in coordination with the fire support coordinator and the S2, provides the commander with the counterfire information needed for planning and operations.

d. The counterfire operations sergeant also maintains a situation map and provides the S2 with the location and description of targets as described in fire requests and the action taken on those requests. This information amplifies the picture the commander and the S3 obtain from operational reports from the rifle companies. A comparison can be made of the information gained by these two means, in order to provide the commander with a more accurate understanding of the operation. This increases the commander's ability to control his supporting fires as well as providing him with a firmer basis for his decisions.
FIRE MISSION
FROM BASE POINT
AZIMUTH 2500
RIGHT 800
ADD 100
ENEMY PLATOON APPROX 30 MEN
WILL ADJUST

MONITOR FIRE REQUESTS AND RECORD * --

1. TARGET DESCRIPTION

2. TARGET LOCATION

*Figure 14. Information plotted from fire requests.*
99. General

a. Definition. A patrol is defined as a detachment sent out by a larger unit for the purpose of gathering information, securing prisoners of war, or carrying out some harassing, destruction, mopping up, or security mission.

b. The following terms classify the types of patrols according to assigned missions:
   (1) Combat.
   (2) Reconnaissance.
   (3) Ambush.
   (4) Raiding.
   (5) Screening (counterreconnaissance).
   (6) Security.

100. Operational Aspects of Patrols

a. All patrols are operational in nature. Each patrol requires an operation plan and an operation order, regardless of its mission. A reconnaissance patrol, for example, is distinguished from a combat patrol by differences in mission, but remains an operational detachment whose operation must be planned, supported, and controlled within command channels. Reconnaissance patrols support the intelligence effort primarily by collecting information. Combat patrols, on the other hand, exploit combat intelligence derived from the current tactical situation.
b. Patrols normally operate within territory held by the enemy or within territory where contact with the enemy is possible or expected. As a result, patrols will have intelligence requirements and will possess information collecting capabilities regardless of the type of missions which may be assigned.

c. Patrol planning requires coordination between the S2 and S3. Operational considerations which require decisions and mutual assistance of the S2 and S3 include—

(1) Designation of the unit which is to supply the personnel.
(2) Determination of the size of the patrol.
(3) Weapons and equipment to be used by the patrol.
(4) Communications means and methods of reporting.
(5) Route to be followed by the patrol.
(6) Timing of the patrol.
(7) Fires available to support the patrol.
(8) Designation of the agency which is to exercise command control and responsibility over the patrol.
(9) Coordination with the agency from whose area the patrol is to depart and/or to whose area it will return.

d. The intelligence officer completes the planning for patrols that are assigned reconnaissance missions. He will usually prepare a daily patrol plan which will include the missions and routes for all of the unit's patrols for that day. The intelligence officer must first coordinate his patrol plan with the S3 and will then present his plan to the commander for approval. After approval of his plan, further coordination with the S3 is necessary to determine the units which are to provide personnel for the patrols. The S2 gives adjacent, higher, lower, and supporting artillery units the patrol routes or areas, time of departure, and time of return. This is usually done in the form of an overlay and is absolutely necessary in order to insure coordination of all patrols and fires in the area. Frequently, this coordination will reveal duplication of effort and will result in the deletion of one or more patrols from the patrol plan. In any event, the S2 has the responsibility for the preparation and coordination of this consolidation for all subordinate elements within his unit.

101. Intelligence Aspects of Patrols

a. It is the responsibility of the intelligence officer to inform the S3 when reconnaissance patrols are required. It is the S2's responsibility to insure, through coordination with the S3, that patrols of all types are thoroughly briefed before departure. This should be accomplished whenever possible under his direct supervision. The S2 must take an active interest in this briefing. This briefing should contain, as a minimum, these items.
(1) Mission of the patrol.
(2) Location of the enemy.
(3) Locations of friendly forces.
(4) Locations of minefields and obstacles.
(5) Terrain features.
(6) Weather and light data.
(7) Time of departure.
(8) Countersigns.
(9) Communications means.
(10) Planned or on call fires.
(11) Intermediate objectives.
(12) Rehearsals.
(13) Time of return.

All of the foregoing, with additions as time and situation permit, should be gone over thoroughly with the patrol well in advance of the actual patrol. These points constitute the minimum necessary to insure the patrol an adequate opportunity to successfully complete its mission.

b. Debriefing is just as important as the briefing. There is, of course, a direct relationship between the degree of detailed briefing given the patrol prior to its departure and the degree of detailed information which a patrol will report during the debriefing. Intelligence debriefings of patrols are conducted in order to acquire and record information of intelligence value which the patrol members have collectively or individually gathered as a result of performing their mission. Patrols should be debriefed immediately upon their return. The entire patrol should be gathered in a safe place, and cigarettes, hot or cold drinks, or other aids to relaxation should be provided. Patrol members should be encouraged to speak freely and to agree or disagree with the spokesman, usually the leader, adding details omitted or overlooked. Debriefings must be informal, and relaxation and freedom of expression must be the keynote. The S2 should, if possible, attend, or preferably, conduct the debriefing. Informational items thus obtained are then disseminated to echelons and units concerned.

c. The requirements for briefing and debriefing described in a and b above, are as valid for combat patrols as for reconnaissance patrols. Ordinarily, members of combat patrols gather as much incidental information of intelligence value as do members of reconnaissance patrols. Careful and detailed preparation is necessary in order to obtain maximum results from patrols.

d. For greater detail on patrolling, see FM 21-75.
Section IV. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

102. General

Counterintelligence consists of measures designed to conceal from the enemy our activities and probable courses of action, and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities, to include prevention of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and to detect possible sedition or treason. The S2 has staff responsibility for those counterintelligence measures which are applied at echelons below division level. These measures are differentiated from those which may be accomplished by personnel of the security units from higher echelons of the MIO working within or through the geographical areas assigned to tactical units.

103. Types of Counterintelligence Measures

a. Counterintelligence measures are accomplished for three general purposes—denial, detection, and deception. Frequently the measures applied to accomplish one of these purposes contribute to the accomplishment of one or both of the other two purposes. For example, patrol activity may be used to simultaneously deny, detect, and deceive. Camouflage is used both to deny and to deceive, but would be used only indirectly for detection purposes.

b. Denial measures are applied to prevent the enemy from obtaining information. Such measures include signal communications security, document security, censorship, counterreconnaissance, and the physical security of installations.

c. Detection measures are used to expose and neutralize the enemy intelligence effort. Lower tactical echelons accomplish their responsibility for detection by means of collecting and reporting information concerning enemy activities, by establishing check points to control the movement of personnel and vehicles within or through their areas, and by evacuation of possible enemy agent personnel for interrogation at higher echelons.

d. Deception measures are employed to mislead the enemy as to the true status or purpose of friendly activity, personnel and weapons, strength, disposition, and logistical buildup. Such measures include feints, ruses, demonstrations, and leaking of false information to the enemy. Most deception measures are initiated, directed, and controlled by higher headquarters. Plans for use of deception measures which are initiated by lower tactical echelons must be submitted to higher headquarters for coordination and approval prior to their execution. As with other operational planning, the S3 has staff responsibility for implementation. The S2 must provide recommendations and the necessary intelligence support and coordination.
104. Counterintelligence Functions of the S2

a. A basic counterintelligence function of the S2 consists of implementing and supervising counterintelligence measures directed by higher headquarters. At lower echelons the emphasis is on denial measures. These measures are directed and controlled by higher headquarters through the use of standing operating procedures (SOP), standing signal instructions (SSI), signal operating instructions (SOI), administrative orders (Admin O), and operations orders (Opn O). The application of these measures requires close coordination with other command and staff personnel and particularly with the S3 and the communications officer.

b. The S2 functions as a staff advisor for the application of counterintelligence measures in an operational situation. Operational activities, such as the establishment of outposts, listening posts, and ambushes, which are mainly S3 functions, also have counterintelligence implications, since they are designed not only to protect the unit, but also to counter the enemy's collection effort. Therefore, the location of such positions or activities should be decided in the light of counterintelligence value as well as operational aspects. This, then, requires close coordination and joint planning by the S2 and S3.

c. A division security section, a part of the military intelligence detachment, operating as a centralized unit at division headquarters, or decentralized to battle group, combat command, or lower units, has direct support responsibilities for counterintelligence to the division and lower echelon intelligence officer. It is the responsibility of the senior security personnel to make appropriate recommendations in the field of counterintelligence.

d. The S2 assists in planning and supervising counterintelligence training conducted within lower echelons. Troops must be trained in unit and individual security measures, to include the counterintelligence aspects of evasion and escape, and conduct in the event of capture.

Section V. ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

105. General

The S2 is charged with accomplishment or supervision of certain functions which are more administrative in nature than they are operational. Many of these functions vary in degree or extent from unit to unit because of local standing operating procedures or because of the commander's personal desires and methods.
106. Administrative Records and Reports

The S2 may be called upon to assist in the preparation of any of the records and reports which are maintained at the local headquarters. Most often these reports deal with summaries of activities, such as after-action reports. Some are specifically within the province of the S2; for example, the processing and submission of security clearances for personnel within the command. Personnel not properly cleared must not be employed in sensitive work. Procedures governing applications for clearance of personnel are contained in the division intelligence instructions.

107. Requisitions of Maps and Photos

The S2 is responsible for the requisition of different types of maps and photos in sufficient quantity to meet the requirements of the command. The procedure for such requisition is contained in the unit standing operating procedures. These requirements must be anticipated early and appropriate requests submitted because of the time required for receipt and distribution of maps and photos.

108. Handling of Prisoners of War

a. The success of an interrogation of a prisoner of war is frequently in direct relationship to the handling of the prisoner prior to interrogation. Interrogation takes precedence over rapid evacuation, except in forward areas, where prompt removal of prisoners of war is prescribed by the Geneva Conventions.

b. The first action is to disarm the prisoner and search him for concealed weapons and documents. If the circumstances do not permit a thorough search, the prisoner should be disarmed and the search conducted as soon as possible. All documents must be identified with the prisoner from whom they were taken, and they must be evacuated with the prisoner to ensure their availability to the interrogator when the prisoner is interrogated.

c. Prisoners may be questioned by the capturing unit under the supervision of qualified personnel for information of immediate tactical value.

d. Guards must be instructed in the proper procedures for handling prisoners. There are seven basic rules to be followed.

(1) Maintain segregation at all times.
(2) Prevent prisoners from destroying documents left on them.
(3) Prevent others from giving prisoners food, drink, or tobacco.
(4) Enforce silence at all times.
(5) Deliver prisoners to collecting point as rapidly as possible.

(6) Prevent prisoners from escaping.

(7) Prevent anyone except interrogation of prisoner of war personnel or other intelligence personnel from questioning a prisoner.

e. Segregation is a measure designed to insure that security conscious prisoners do not warn or influence others to remain silent. The groupings for segregation are officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, deserters, civilians, females, and political indoctrination personnel. For additional information on this subject refer to FM 30–15 and FM 19–40.

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*Figure 16. Staff coordination in intelligence matters.*
109. Handling of Captured Documents and Materiel

Captured documents and materiel must be evacuated immediately to higher headquarters. This insures that their intelligence value will be determined and exploited at the earliest practicable time. The S2 is responsible for the timely evacuation of materiel obtained from the enemy. He must further insure that the personnel of the command are indoctrinated with the necessity of delivering such objects to intelligence personnel rather than retaining them for their souvenir value. See FM 30–15 and FM 30–16 for more detailed information.

110. Unit Censorship

When Unit Censorship has been established, the S2 supervises this function and is responsible for the training of those personnel who perform unit censorship duties within the unit. He is further responsible for the orientation and training of all members of the command in the purpose, importance, and mechanics of this security measure.

111. Miscellaneous

The S2, because of the requirements in the normal operation of his staff section, may often be temporarily absent from the command post. During these periods of absence, the S2 must, through competent training, insure that his section functions properly and efficiently.
CHAPTER 8
COMPANY INTELLIGENCE

Section 1. GENERAL

112. Purpose
This chapter provides the company commander with guidance in determining his intelligence requirements and in the formulation of means and methods in the collection of information and the dissemination of information and intelligence.

113. General

a. The scope of intelligence activities at the company level is very much reduced from that found at higher echelons. However, an urgent need does exist for the collection of information and the application of intelligence to the tactical plan or mission of the company.

b. The company commander must make the greatest possible use of the time and means available to him in order that the collection of information and the proper use of the resulting intelligence will fulfill the maximum number of his intelligence requirements. The company commander has a realistic and urgent responsibility to supply needed information to the S2 of the next higher echelon. It is largely through the efforts of the individual companies, that the S2 is able to produce the intelligence necessary for the commander and the subordinate elements of the command. There is a very direct relationship between the amount of information furnished the S2 and the amount of intelligence received from the S2.

c. The company commander, like the S2, is often unable to satisfy all of his requirements for information. This means that he must establish a working priority for his requirements. The priority is usually easily established after a consideration of the mission of the company and the enemy situation as it is currently known.

Section II. COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

114. General
The type and amount of intelligence required will vary with each situation, the knowledge previously acquired, and the terrain in the area of immediate operations. It is a maxim that the commander will never have all of the information of the enemy that is desirable. It is also established, that for the different missions assigned
to the company, the requirements as to type and detail for intelligence will change. In every case, however, the company commander will rely upon the S2 at the next higher echelon to furnish him with much of the intelligence necessary to arrive at a sound plan for the accomplishment of his assigned mission.

115. Requirements for the Attack

a. The company commander requires timely and accurate intelligence concerning the enemy's defense capability in order to implement an attack order successfully. The details of the company's intelligence requirements will vary with the situation. In general, the commander will always require intelligence of the enemy, weather, and terrain which will enable him to influence the outcome of the action through the proper decisions relative to—

(1) Positioning of the reserve.
(2) Employment of weapons.
   (a) Location.
   (b) Type of fire.
   (c) Weighting of fire support.
(3) Location of the company commander.
(4) Commitment of the reserve.
(5) Requests for support from higher headquarters.
   (a) Fire support.
   (b) Troop support.

b. The commander's actions and decisions in regard to the above listed means available to him often prove the decisive factors in the outcome of the operation. By basing these important means of influencing the course of events on current, reliable, and detailed intelligence, the commander greatly increases the likelihood that these actions and decisions will be correct and timely, thereby enabling him to keep the enemy off balance and to seize his objective with maximum speed and minimum casualties.

c. In summary, intelligence is important to the company commander in the attack, because knowledge as to the manner in which the enemy is conducting his defense allows the commander to take a positive approach in influencing the action, enables him to maintain the initiative, exploit his own successes, exploit enemy weaknesses, and to apply the force available at the most advantageous moment.

116. Requirements for the Defense

a. When the company is faced with a defensive mission, the threat to the accomplishment of this mission is, of course, an enemy attack. For details on this subject, see chapter 3.
b. As in the attack, intelligence requirements needed for the conduct of a successful defense will vary. However, we may generally expect the following items to be given priority during the period prior to the actual enemy attack:

1. Locations of avenues of approach into the friendly position.
2. Locations of obstacles, both natural and artificial.
3. Locations and strengths of opposing enemy forces, to include the reserve.
4. Locations of enemy automatic weapons.
5. Locations of likely enemy assembly areas.

e. The items listed above are self-explanatory. Early knowledge of these items will allow the commander to plan and conduct his defense in such a manner as to counter the enemy moves either as they occur or in advance. Again, this allows the commander to take a positive approach in influencing the action, enables him to maintain the initiative, and to fully exploit his own capabilities and the enemy's weaknesses. For more detail, see chapter 3.

117. Intelligence Requirements for Other Actions

a. Withdrawal. A withdrawal, whether conducted during daylight or at night, poses very definite intelligence requirements. One of the most important means of fulfilling these requirements is by reconnaissance. The company commander will find it necessary to select routes to assigned or designated assembly areas. These routes must be carefully selected so that they will provide security from enemy fire and observation. To this end, terrain and weather will be carefully and fully considered during the route selection. Security for this action must begin with the inception of planning and continue until the movement is complete. This security will include both the physical security for the force and security measures designed to deny the enemy intelligence agencies knowledge of the withdrawal before, during, and frequently after the action is completed.

b. Company as a Security Force. The company commander will frequently find that his unit has been designated either as a security force for the next echelon or as part of a larger security force for the division. Security forces are used to provide security, deception, and flexibility, and to add depth to the defense of the larger unit. Security forces should have greater mobility than the enemy; this mobility is achieved by deception, use of darkness, and retention of initiative in movement. All of this poses a need for timely, detailed, and accurate information of the enemy and his capabilities, in order that initiative may be retained. At the same time, the company commander must be constantly aware of his respon-
sibility of rapidly passing back to the echelon controlling the security force all items of intelligence information. Intelligence requirements for this type of action will also be focused on terrain, reconnaissance, and the effects of weather as forecast.

c. Company as a Reserve Force.

(1) The company commander will find that his requirements for intelligence will pose a very definite problem, when his unit is designated as the reserve, or as part of the reserve of the next higher echelon. It is axiomatic that being placed in reserve, necessitates planning for employment in a minimum of one role and usually in several roles. The company commander's intelligence requirements will increase proportionately with the number of roles in which his unit may possibly be employed. He must make several reconnaissances to ascertain the best utilization of the terrain for each of the roles in which his unit may be employed. Weather information and its effect on terrain and the probable missions must be carefully weighed and studied. The enemy's capabilities in each case must be rapidly determined. Since the company is in reserve, the opportunity of acquiring information by organic means is limited or nonexistent, so requests must be made to the S2 of the next higher echelon for the intelligence necessary to plan for various methods of employment.

(2) In reserve, the company commander will frequently be charged with an area security responsibility by the next higher echelon. This security mission will pose problems commensurate with the employment of the higher unit. As a general rule, considering the increased dispersion necessitated by the enemy's capability to employ nuclear weapons, the security mission will require the utilization of most, if not all, of the company's personnel. Area security against guerillas, partisans, infiltrators, bypassed enemy combat units, and enemy agents will call for diversified measures. This security mission will necessitate the employment of the counterintelligence measures mentioned in chapter 7.

d. Other Actions. The company commander will be concerned with the local security of his unit regardless of the role or mission. Basically, each commander is responsible for the security of his own unit, without regard to the security measures that may be ordered by the next higher echelon. Insuring the security of a company while it is in movement, presents many problems to its commander. Certainly all possible security measures that do not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission will be imple-
merited. In complying with the need for increased dispersion necessary to avoid providing a lucrative target for nuclear weapons, the security problem for the unit increases proportionately. The security measures employed must be developed for each situation on an individual basis.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE MEANS AVAILABLE

118. General

The company commander and his headquarters must accomplish the tasks and duties characterizing the S2 or G2 at higher echelons. There are not, however, any personnel whose principal duty is intelligence. With the urgent and pressing need for intelligence at this level, the company commander must organize his unit to provide for the receipt of information and dissemination of intelligence. This section is devoted to this problem.

119. Organic Collecting Agencies

All subordinate elements of the company must be trained and prepared to function as collecting agencies for intelligence information. Available to the commander are his tactical elements (platoons), his organic supporting weapons observers, reconnaissance elements, personnel manning the company observation post, and finally, every individual of the company who can observe any enemy activity or its effects. In reality, then, every individual is a potential agent for the collection of information. The chief problem in transmitting the information available to the commander, and through him to the S2, is one of training to insure that all items of information are passed on to the commander.

120. Attached or Supporting Collection Agencies

That each individual of the company is a collecting agency, applies also to those personnel of units attached to or supporting the efforts of the company. The chief problem confronting the commander here is one of insuring that the information collected by these personnel is reported to the commander for his consideration. Chief among these personnel, who supply information, are forward observers of supporting artillery and personnel manning observation posts in the company's area of responsibility. Also included will be other personnel of supporting arms and reconnaissance elements from the next higher echelon either attached or operating in the company area.

121. The Company Commander's Intelligence Role

It has often been incorrectly stated that the company does not produce intelligence. This statement is usually made in connection
with a consideration of the S2's role in the production of intelligence for his commander, staff, and subordinate elements. The company commander can and does analyze, evaluate, and produce intelligence for the use of his company and its subordinate elements. True, this processing is largely mental and instinctive, but does encompass the elements associated with the production of intelligence. For this intelligence to be valid, accurate, and timely, it is essential that the commander have at hand for his consideration as much information bearing on the subject as is available. This requirement necessitates the personnel and means of communication for receiving this information from the collecting agencies described above. It also necessitates some form for recording the information in the absence of the commander. The recording must be simple and easily accomplished. Once the commander has established his "intelligence section" and insured the transmission of items of information from his agencies, his role then parallels that of the S2, i.e., analyzing items in the light of his mission and the known enemy capabilities. This processing, as has been stated, is mental, and will result in intelligence for use at his company level and by his subordinate elements. One additional responsibility remains for the commander—that of insuring the uninterrupted flow of these items of information by the most expeditious means to the next higher echelon S2. The commander does not attempt to evaluate this information prior to dispatching it, but leaves this evaluation function to the S2.

122. Personnel Available

There are no organic intelligence personnel within the company to aid in the production of intelligence at this level. It is necessary, therefore, for the commander to utilize personnel with other primary duties for intelligence duties. An inspection of personnel assigned to the company headquarters will usually result in the selection of several who will be available to function in this capacity at least on a part-time basis. The actual personnel utilized will necessarily be decided by each company commander on an individual basis, according to his situation and his method of employment of his personnel. For one suggested solution, see figure 17. The main point to insure is that trained personnel are available and functioning in this capacity within the company on an around-the-clock basis.

123. Dissemination

Equally as important as the receipt of information and intelligence is its timely dissemination to personnel and units concerned with the use of these items. This need alone would necessitate a type structure as shown in figure 17. For information or intelli-
gence to be of use, it must be expeditiously put in the hands of the user. Not only does the commander have responsibility for reporting (disseminating) information to the S2, but quite as important, he must also keep his organic, subordinate, attached, and supporting elements informed. This responsibility can and must be fulfilled by the commander.

![Diagram showing flow of information and intelligence](image)

Figure 17. Suggested personnel use for intelligence purposes, and flow of information and intelligence to and from company.
Section IV. INTELLIGENCE AT LOWER LEVELS

124. General

At the level of units below company, intelligence, while reduced in scope, nonetheless is equally important and will pose many of the same requirements that are discussed at the company level. It must be considered that a large portion of intelligence used here must be produced at company and higher level and then disseminated to the platoon and squad. This is necessitated by the comparatively small area of operations and the limited number of personnel involved.

125. Platoon Intelligence Requirements

As a major subordinate element of the company, the platoon comprises the main tactical echelon of the company. Cognizance must be taken of the different types of platoons within the company, and the varying needs of each, based upon the particular mission, assignment, and capabilities of each. Basically, the platoon as a tactical entity needs the same type of information as that needed by the company, although reduced in scope and area coverage, to fit the mission or assignment in each case. Platoon leaders will themselves develop some intelligence at their level for use by the platoon and the squads. Care must be taken, however, to insure the broadest coverage possible at company and higher level, in order that items of information developed at the platoon level are viewed in the proper perspective. Distortion and incompleteness are sure to result if this broad coverage is not made available to the platoon leader. Dissemination, then, must be made from company to platoon and from platoon to the squads. Platoon leaders must also observe carefully the responsibility for transmitting to the company items of information developed within the platoon. This responsibility is as important as any responsibility vested at this level. The production of intelligence cannot be complete without the participation of all of the elements of the command. For details, see preceding paragraphs.

126. Squad Intelligence

The squad, as the smallest tactical entity of the company, possesses intelligence needs commensurate with the mission assigned to the squad. Because of the size of the unit and the relative limitation of area of knowledge, the great majority of the squad's intelligence must be furnished by the higher echelons. Some items of intelligence may be developed by the squad; however, these items will be limited and are subject to distortion unless compared to the intelligence developed at company and higher echelons.
Intelligence must be furnished to the squad in sufficient detail, timeliness, and accuracy, particularly when the squad is operating in part, or as a whole, on a patrol mission, which will frequently be the case. It is the squad leader’s responsibility to insure the receipt of this intelligence and to disseminate to each of the members of his squad. Equally important is the squad leader’s responsibility for training the members of his squad in intelligence matters, and more important, in the immediate and accurate reporting of all items of information. All items of information must be reported to the next higher echelon, at once, in detail, and accurately. Any performance of duty less than this will endanger the entire command. For details, see FM 21–75.

**Section V. COMPANY PATROLS**

127. **General**

In previous discussion of patrols, we have considered the matter from the viewpoint of the S2, who plans, coordinates, and supervises all reconnaissance patrols of the unit. This coordination refers to those patrols which operate outside the company area of responsibility, and refers more specifically to reconnaissance patrols. It must be assumed that the company will continue to furnish the greater part of personnel for patrolling, whether instituted by the S2 or by the company itself. This, in itself, gives the company commander certain responsibilities for these patrols. At the same time, the patrol will provide the company commander with much information, even though the patrol is dispatched by the S2.

128. **S2 Directed Patrols**

These patrols have been discussed in chapter 7. However, it should be noted here that the company commander has certain responsibilities for patrol personnel from his unit, in addition to the responsibilities borne by the S2. In actual operations, it will not always be possible for the S2 to individually brief and debrief each patrol, desirable though this may be. In his absence, the responsibility for this function falls quite naturally on the company commander. The company commander will check, rehearse, and give additional briefings to patrols from his company, regardless of the initiating authority. The company commander or his representative will be present at debriefings and will secure reports of the patrol to add to his store of information. These normal functions are in no way abrogated by the ordering of patrols by higher headquarters.
129. Company Directed Patrols

In addition to those patrols directed by the S2, the company commander will dispatch patrols to obtain needed information, to provide contact with adjacent units, and as a screening or counter-reconnaissance force. These patrols will, for purposes of coordination, be reported to the S2. The S2 will include in his daily patrol plan those patrols whose missions must be coordinated with higher and adjacent units. This will usually apply to those patrols leaving the company area (usually reconnaissance patrols). Company directed patrols for the most part will consist of those patrols that the commander feels necessary for the maintenance of contact between elements of the company, and between the company and adjacent units; those patrols considered necessary to provide warning and security to the company from enemy activity; and those patrols utilized for reconnaissance of importance to elements of the company, rather than of the company itself. From the foregoing, it can be understood that many patrols will be instituted by the company for a variety of reasons and purposes. Constant, aggressive, and thorough patrolling is the strongest deterrent to the enemy intelligence effort. The more effort and personnel the enemy must expend to counter the friendly patrol plan, the less he will have available to utilize in his intelligence effort. As in all other tactics, patrolling is profitable to the party with initiative and is a source of constant trouble and harassment to the party who has lost the initiative. Patrolling is an excellent and effective means of obtaining information, providing security and harassing the enemy, provided that meticulous care and attention to detail are followed in its employment. See FM 21–75, and chapter 7, this manual.
CHAPTER 9
INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

Section 1. GENERAL

130. Purpose

This chapter is designed to guide the S2 in ways and means of emphasizing and supplementing the intelligence training which is given tactical units or individuals in accordance with the schedules of the Army Training Program (ATP). This is accomplished by four general methods or procedures which are—

a. Use of prescribed intelligence training principles.

b. Emphasizing the intelligence factors which are inherent to subjects contained in the Army Training Program.

c. Integration of intelligence play and training into the maximum number of subjects contained in the Army Training Program.

d. Instruction in intelligence subjects during the time available for concurrent training.

131. General

a. The goal of intelligence training conducted by the lower echelons of command is twofold.

(1) Training of personnel whose primary duties are in intelligence. These are the personnel organic to the S2 sections and those organic to reconnaissance or counterfire units at this level.

(2) Training of personnel whose primary duties are in fields other than intelligence. This category includes all personnel in tactical units who have a responsibility to support the intelligence effort under combat conditions.

b. The specialist training of intelligence personnel is accomplished by means of specialized courses taught at service schools and by on-the-job training conducted under the supervision of the intelligence officers in the lower echelons. In the training of enlisted personnel, the emphasis is on operational techniques, i.e., the mechanical functions of recording and disseminating, of maintaining journals, situation maps, and work sheets; of carrying out the physical operation of the S2 and S3 section within the command post. However, when being taught these techniques, enlisted personnel must be taught why things are done the way they are; they must be taught the operating principles which govern the techniques in order that they can adapt themselves to changing
conditions and circumstances. The S2 should conduct unit intelligence schools in order to accomplish the training of his section personnel.

c. The general intelligence training of the personnel in tactical units is prescribed by the Army Training Programs. This intelligence training by itself is not adequate in bringing a training unit up to the standards demanded for satisfactory accomplishment of its obligation to the intelligence effort under combat conditions, and must be supplemented by integrated and concurrent training in intelligence subjects. See appendix IV for suggested methods.

132. Scope
Intelligence specialists training at all echelons of command will include appropriate instruction in the collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information of the enemy and the terrain; in the dissemination and use of combat intelligence; in assisting the commander to direct the intelligence effort; and in counterintelligence. However, training in intelligence must not be restricted to personnel assigned to the intelligence sections of various headquarters. Appropriate instruction in this subject must be given to all officers and enlisted men, because all military personnel have combat intelligence responsibilities (ch. 8). Personnel assigned to intelligence duties are given additional and more thorough instruction appropriate to their assignment.

133. Responsibility
a. The Commander. Intelligence is produced for the commander, and he must understand the principles and procedures in the production of intelligence. Training in this field is his responsibility.

b. The Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer is responsible for the planning and supervision of intelligence training of his own section and, in coordination with the operations officer, for all such training within the command. Close coordination in this function is of prime importance. For greater detail, see FM 30–5.

134. Personnel to be Trained
Personnel to receive training in the characteristics of combat intelligence at battle group or lower echelons fall into the following four categories:

a. Intelligence section personnel.

b. Reconnaissance units, Army aviators, air observers, and special information service personnel.

c. Military intelligence specialists.

d. All other troops.
For greater detail, see FM 30–5.
Section II. PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

135. General

The principles of military instruction and the principles of learning which are discussed in FM 21-5 and FM 21-6 provide basic guidance for successfully presenting the training program. This section discusses principles of intelligence training which elaborate upon or supplement the basic principles cited above. The intelligence officer increases the effectiveness of intelligence training by applying the following principles, utilizing imagination, initiative, and originality:

a. Creating an enemy.
b. Defining the objective.
c. Teaching from mistakes.
d. Controlling repetition.
e. Instilling realism.

136. Creating an Enemy

a. The maximum number of subjects in the Army Training Program must be taught in conjunction with a tactical situation. This situation includes an enemy as well as friendly troops. Most military instruction presupposes that the purpose of the subjects taught lies in their eventual use against an enemy in combat. The use of Aggressor as a training medium is helpful. See FM 30-101, FM 30-102, FM 30-103, and FM 30-104.

b. The enemy situation which is used as the background for military subjects must be appropriate to the echelon to which the training is directed. This means that the training of lower tactical echelons must have a setting which includes the dispositions and missions of comparable echelons of an enemy force. The training of the individual soldier must be presented in a setting in which individual enemy soldiers are the ever-present opponent, regardless of whether the enemy soldiers are actually played or are merely assumed. Squad, platoon, company, and battle group problems must be presented with realistic missions against appropriate enemy units. It is in such training that awareness of intelligence factors must be initiated and developed.

137. Defining an Objective

a. The approach to developing intelligence awareness in the tactical troops of each command must be systematically organized. This means that the objective for which the training is accomplished must be clearly defined by those who are supervising the training program.

b. The intelligence officer must determine the status to which intelligence training should progress during each phase of the
Army Training Program. He must also continually evaluate the training to determine the degree of accomplishment of the objective toward which he is working. Such considerations govern the types of intelligence subjects which need to be stressed during each phase of training.

138. Teaching From Mistakes

a. The training value of mistakes made by individuals and units must be exploited. When an error is committed, it is often the result of a lack of understanding on the part of one or more individuals. When this is the case, an opportunity for constructive training has developed. When a mistake is explained, the individual who critiques the incident relates what was done in the training problem, and then states what should have been done. In many cases, this explanation can be followed by a discussion of what the enemy would have done to the individual or unit if the mistake had been made in combat. When possible, this should be done without embarrassment to the individual who made the mistake.

b. Troop leaders and training officers should take advantage of mistakes made during training and exploit the instructional opportunities they afford. Good training includes placing individuals and/or units in situations (practical exercises, CPX's) in which they will make mistakes unless they understand the principles under which they are operating. Mistakes made and corrected in training will help prevent similar mistakes being made in combat.

139. Controlling Repetition

a. Repetition is an aid to learning. When properly utilized, repetition provides a significant means for increasing the effectiveness of intelligence training. It is particularly important that the individual soldier learn to respond spontaneously to his obligation of collecting and reporting information of intelligence value.

b. Repetition must be controlled to be effective. Repeating subjects or problems simply to expend time or occupy the troops changes repetition from a training medium to monotony and harassment and tends to defeat the training purpose.

c. The S2 must vary the intelligence play which he integrates into the training program. He must insure that different enemy situations are developed in new training problems, and vary the sequence of enemy activities which develop in the intelligence play. This requires the soldier to apply the principles he has learned under changing sets of circumstances. Principles are repeated constantly; the situations in which the principles are applied must change frequently.
d. "Canned" problems which are run over and over by the same unit are not as desirable as problems presenting varying situations. Successive exposure of units and personnel to such "canned" problems promotes boredom and defeats the training objective. There are instances, however, in which "canned" problems are very valuable. This is particularly true when a set-piece problem is used for many different units and has been carefully designed to teach several techniques and methods.

e. Problems can be run repeatedly over the same terrain, but the missions assigned must be changed and the enemy situation varied. This requires a new approach by the participants in their reconnaissance, plans, preparations, troop leading procedure, and procurement and use of intelligence.

40. Instilling Realism

a. Training must approximate the conditions of combat as closely as possible. Realism makes training more interesting, resulting in increased receptiveness and retention on the part of the men. The basis for realism in intelligence training lies in providing an appropriate friendly and enemy situation in which the training can be conducted. The use of enemy materiel is a valuable aid for creating an enemy situation and thereby instilling realism in training. Such use further serves to train personnel in the recognition of enemy materiel.

b. Neither the friendly nor enemy situation should be allowed to remain static. There must be development, progress, and incidents to explain the passage of time and to justify the activities of participating personnel. The intelligence which is injected to instill realism in the training must be logical and consistent. The training must react to the enemy situation, or realism cannot be achieved. Since they must react to the enemy in combat, they must be taught to react to the enemy in training. Actual Aggressor should be used whenever and wherever possible, even in small numbers, to add realism to the training.

Section III. INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

161. General

a. Many of the subjects taught in the Army Training Program have inherent intelligence factors. Others lend themselves to integration of intelligence into the subject matter itself, or to the integration of intelligence subjects during concurrent training time. In order to emphasize and integrate intelligence effectively, the S2 must survey each subject of the training schedule to determine which intelligence factors should be emphasized and integrated into it. After these decisions are reached, the S2, in coordin-
nation with the S3, supervises the inclusion of the intelligence training into lesson plans.

b. In many cases, a subject can be placed in an intelligence setting by showing the enemy’s use of the same subject matter being taught to the personnel. This is a teaching technique which should be emphasized in the subjects for which it is appropriate. The enemy’s use of tactics would be an appropriate topic for inclusion in our own subjects on tactics; the enemy’s use of map reading would not be an appropriate topic for inclusion in our subjects on map reading. Common sense must be used in applying this technique to the training program. For appropriate reference material, see DA Pam’s of the 30-series, and appendix I, this manual.

c. Emphasizing the inherent intelligence aspects in subjects is accomplished by pointing out areas of the subject matter which are of intelligence value; by placing requirements on the soldier to separate and report that which is of intelligence value; and by insuring that the intelligence aspects of all subjects taught are pointed out in critiques.

d. Another means of integrating intelligence into the training program is to include intelligence material at logical points in the presentation of appropriate subjects. When soldiers follow a compass course, they need not find merely a numbered stake or marked tree as they go from point to point. They may instead find symbols representing enemy military units or installations; they may find such items of intelligence value as enemy documents, weapons, and simulated dead soldiers in uniform. Enemy activities may be simulated throughout the training area. These devices give training in collecting and reporting information, and give soldiers an awareness of intelligence requirements.

e. Another means of integrating intelligence into the training program is to give instruction in intelligence subjects during training time. Certain subjects, such as those involving range firing, provide concurrent training time, part of which may well be utilized for teaching or reviewing intelligence subjects.

f. A third means of integrating intelligence into the training time is provided by the time allocated to critiques of certain subjects. Critique periods provide an especially favorable time for stressing teaching and learning points. The soldier has a personal interest in what has occurred, because he has been participating. This is an opportune time for explaining the intelligence implications and the principles of intelligence value which are applicable to the situation and applicable to what the men have accomplished.

g. Paragraphs 142 and 143 discuss certain subjects which are taught in the Basic Combat Training Phase of the Army Training
Program, and illustrate means of emphasizing and integrating intelligence training into those subjects.

142. Basic Combat Training Program

a. General. The fact that the Basic Combat Training Program is used to train all male military personnel who have had no prior military service, makes it the logical time to initiate the development of intelligence awareness. During these first weeks in the Army, the soldier more readily assimilates instruction. Most of the instruction he receives at this time has a direct or related association with intelligence or is adaptable to the integration of intelligence training.

b. Camouflage and Concealment.

(1) Soldiers are taught what camouflage and concealment are, why they are used, and how they are used. They are taught that these are counterintelligence measures. They are taught that camouflage discipline is an intelligence responsibility. The soldier should also be told that when he employs camouflage and concealment he not only hides himself, his position, and his weapon from enemy observation, but he is contributing to the counterintelligence effort by helping to hide his entire unit from the eyes of the enemy. Thus, the intelligence factors in this subject are primarily those which deal with counterintelligence.

(2) Intelligence training may be integrated into this subject by switching the subject to an enemy setting. All enemy activity, including his counterintelligence activities, are of intelligence value to our forces. Therefore, teaching the soldier why we use camouflage and concealment is counterintelligence training; teaching him how the enemy uses them is intelligence training. To accomplish this integration requires that the S2 direct the instructor's attention to appropriate references.

c. Hasty Fortifications.

(1) The purpose of this subject is to teach the soldier the various types of positions which are prepared to provide cover for personnel and weapons. The instruction on hasty fortifications includes a tactical walk through a defensive position prepared for a unit of at least platoon size. The intelligence factors in this instruction center around the explanations of why each position has been prepared in a certain way. For example, a machine gun is placed in a position to cover a particularly important sector by fire. The decision to so place that machine gun was based on intelligence of the terrain and a considera-
tion of possible enemy forces which could be employed against the defensive sector.

(2) The amount of overhead cover on a position is the result of considerations of enemy weapons which might be used against the position. To realize the maximum from this instruction, the soldier must observe the positions from the enemy's viewpoint.

(3) Intelligence may be integrated into this subject by pointing out means of observing and reporting information from this type of defensive position; the use of camouflage and concealment; how movement from position to position is best accomplished; the enemy tactics which are designed to reduce hasty fortifications; countermeasures against these tactics, etc.

d. Weapons Training.

(1) Throughout the instruction the soldier receives on individual or crew-served weapons, the best means of emphasizing and integrating intelligence training is to teach these subjects in conjunction with a tactical situation. The reason such training is conducted is understood by the soldier only in view of its eventual application against an enemy in combat. This is true whether the training involves individual combat skills or involves team cooperation for its effectiveness. When weapons are fired, they should be fired at a simulated enemy. Training in such an atmosphere causes the constant development of intelligence awareness among the troops.

(2) Many of the subjects taught during weapons training have time available for concurrent training because of limited numbers of firing points, the use of firing orders, etc. Intelligence training which can be integrated during this time includes range estimation, location, and description of targets, use of a compass, and the mil formula. All such integrated training should stress the characteristics of the weapon being fired in regard to the types of enemy targets against which it is most effective; should emphasize the necessity for accurate observation and reporting of targets taken under fire and of other enemy activity observed while manning the weapon; and should discuss the use of the weapon being fired to counter possible enemy tactics which might be employed against friendly units. Concurrent training should be related as closely as possible to the scope of the primary subject being taught.

e. **Character Guidance.** Time used for miscellaneous subjects such as character guidance should include measures for maintaining the intelligence awareness of the soldier. Those attributes of character which are desirable for the individual and collective moral standards of our Army, i.e., loyalty, perseverance, and leadership, can be used to direct the soldier's attention to his intelligence responsibilities. The security of his country and military establishment is the moral responsibility of every member of the Armed Forces. Violations of security must be reported. The security discipline exercised by each individual is directly connected to the standards of character which each individual maintains.

### 143. Plan for Integration of Intelligence Training

**a.** To insure an organized intelligence training program, the S2 should prepare a planning table to cover a period of days or weeks during the current training cycle. This chart serves as a reference with which to guide the supervision of the intelligence training which the S2 desires to emphasize or integrate into the overall training program.

**b.** When a subject is assigned to an instructor, the S2 refers to his chart to determine those aspects of intelligence training which should be included in that particular subject. He briefs the instructor and suggests ways and means for accomplishing the desired goal. Based on this orientation, the instructor prepares his lesson plan to include appropriate intelligence training.

**c.** The instructor himself must be allowed to prepare his lesson plan and present it in order that instructors also may receive valuable intelligence training. Under this system, leaders, commanders, and staff personnel receive constructive training through the preparation, supervision, and critiquing of all subjects of the program. If this approach is not used, the instruction tends to become stereotyped, solutions become known beforehand, and the training therefore becomes mechanical.

**d.** For additional guidance in establishing such a training program, refer to DA Pam 21–81.
## APPENDIX I
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### APPENDIX II

**SAMPLE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING TIMETABLE FOR BATTLE GROUP S2**

*Note.* Planning timetable illustrates how the S2 may plan for the utilization of prolonged periods of preparation for an operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rehearse BG &amp; Atchmts</td>
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(Note: The table columns represent days with specific actions scheduled for each day, starting from 18 days before the operation day D-Day.)
APPENDIX III
RULES FOR CALCULATING ENEMY MOVEMENT CAPABILITIES

TIME LENGTHS AND RATES OF MARCH

Time lengths (minutes)

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<td>Men on foot*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Night</td>
<td>Day</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inf Div</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf Regt</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inf Bn</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tk Bn</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arty Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armd Div</td>
<td>266</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armd CC</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures are for column of twos.

The following are rules for calculating Aggressor capabilities:

1. Starting time and place are time and place unit was last reported.
2. Select logical point unit must reach to start a particular capability.
3. March distance is distance from 1 to 2 above.
4. Arrival time is starting time plus march time plus closing time. This total time is rounded off to the nearest 5 minutes. In case of a piece-meal action, compute the arrival time of the nearest enemy unit that can initiate the action; closing time is not computed.
5. Compute foot marching time for reinforcements for all distances; compute motor marching time for distances greater than 5 miles only. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor marching time.
6. Consider a foot march of over 20 miles as a forced march.
7. Consider motor march of over 200 miles as a forced march for motorized rifle units and over 140 miles as a forced march for tank and mechanized units. This cannot be continued indefinitely, but must be adjusted to actual conditions.
8. At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is in the process of closing at BMNT, continue to close the column at the night rate of march.
9. At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is in the process of closing at EENT, continue to close the column at the day rate of march.

10. To move an enemy rifle battalion, move and close entire unit.

11. To move and close an enemy rifle regiment or combat team, move and close two rifle battalions (except when part of a division movement). See 12 below.

12. To move an enemy rifle division, move and close two entire rifle regiments.

13. In determining the when of an enemy capability, consider that a rifle unit of regimental size or larger is ready for coordinated action when two-thirds of the combat elements of the unit have closed.

14. In determining enemy time and space factors for a marching column (foot or motor), the head of a column is the point from which measurements are made.

FM 101-10 presents time lengths and rates of march for units organized like U. S. units. In actual operations, it will be necessary for the intelligence officer to make his own tables of march rates and time lengths based on experience with the particular enemy concerned. For calculations involving Aggressor, see FM 30-102.
## APPENDIX IV
SAMPLE METHOD OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE WITH OTHER TRAINING

### INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO OTHER SUBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal subject</th>
<th>What to Integrate</th>
<th>How to Integrate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHARACTER GUIDANCE AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT.</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Stress the moral obligation of all military personnel to report violations of security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.</td>
<td>The intelligence chain</td>
<td>Show intelligence structure from the individual soldier to DA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND GENEVA CONVENTION.</td>
<td>Handling of POW's.</td>
<td>Correct treatment of enemy POW's means more information during interrogations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP INFORMATION.</td>
<td>Orientation in foreign armies.</td>
<td>Use foreign armies as a topic, if possible. Otherwise integrate as much information as is possible considering the primary topic scheduled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggressor, the maneuver enemy.</td>
<td>Good concealment and camouflage denies the enemy information about our dispositions, both troops and supplies. Discussion of sound and light discipline should be included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEALMENT AND CAMOUFLAGE.</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Clean bivouac areas means less information for the enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrolling.</td>
<td>Troops on patrol or evading capture must often treat injuries without professional aid or medical supplies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| FIELD SANITATION. | Counterintelligence | Use challenge and password in the field as well as garrison. Maintain bivouac security guard against infiltration and guerilla activities. Practice camou.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal subject</th>
<th>What to Integrate</th>
<th>How to Integrate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CBR ATTACK.</strong></td>
<td>Reporting..........................</td>
<td>flage and concealment. Use Aggressor to add realism in demonstrations and practical exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necessity for speed in reporting.</td>
<td>Report CBR equipment whenever observed. Each person detecting use of CBR must report: (a) location; (b) time of attack; and (c) method of release (if known).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSPECTIONS</td>
<td>Patrolling.................................................</td>
<td>Troops, especially NCO's, must know the difference between a formal field inspection and the inspection of a patrol. During garrison inspection, question individuals about the meaning of combat intelligence, observation, counterintelligence, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVASION AND ESCAPE.</td>
<td>Collecting and reporting information. Camouflage and concealment. Scouting and patrolling. Observation. Map and compass-reading. Survival.</td>
<td>Remember and report information of intelligence value; practice camouflage and concealment techniques during escape and evasion training. Apply the principles of scouting and patrolling as insurance for successful evasion. Weather may be used as a cover for evaders and escapers but may complicate the escape effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY ECONOMY, AND COST CONSCIOUSNESS.</td>
<td>Counterintelligence.... Security.</td>
<td>Do not leave equipment where the enemy can pick it up. Discarded equipment is as important a source of information to the enemy as any other data. Littered bivouac areas mean more information for the enemy. Practice security measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ELEMENTARY.</td>
<td>Patrolling.................................................</td>
<td>A patrol acts as the eyes and ears of the commander. Messages used to report information must be clear, concise, and timely. Be security conscious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal subject</td>
<td>What to integrate</td>
<td>How to integrate</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTIGUERILLA AND ANTI-INfiltration TRAINING</td>
<td>Counterintelligence.........................................</td>
<td>Guards and sentries should practice camouflage and concealment at all times; discover the enemy before being discovered; get the drop on the enemy and attempt to capture him for interrogation. Report guerrilla activities. Other troops must be alerted and anti-guerrilla operation conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Collection of information..................................</td>
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<td>Handling of POW's...........................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collecting and reporting..................................</td>
<td>Good camouflage and concealment prevent detection from both air and ground. Practice light discipline. Use Aggressor to test camouflage effectiveness and discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterintelligence.......................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observation..................................................</td>
<td>Select a position that affords good observation, camouflage it well, and practice light and sound discipline. Observation must be continuous. Practice camouflage and concealment. Use cover at all times. The chances of avoiding capture are enhanced by following the simple rules taught in scouting and patrolling and use of cover and concealment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterintelligence.......................................</td>
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<td>Security.....................................................</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Observation..................................................</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security.....................................................</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Map and compass reading...................................</td>
<td>Practice light and sound discipline. Use compass and the stars to determine direction. Use night observation and listening techniques to collect information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Collecting and reporting..................................</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evasion and escape........................................</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting information......................................</td>
<td>Learn how to use coordinates in reporting information. The air photo is valuable both for obtaining and verifying information. Use map and air photo to select patrol routes that afford maximum cover and concealment. All patrol members must be versed in map and air photo reading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrolling..................................................</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS.</td>
<td>Collecting and reporting information.  Patrolling.</td>
<td>Importance of reporting and marking enemy mines and booby traps. Patrols must be proficient in detecting and skirting or passing through enemy mine fields. Knowledge of the patterns used by both friendly and enemy forces is very important as well as methods by which mines and booby traps may be disarmed.</td>
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<td>Nonorganic to battle group</td>
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<td>41</td>
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By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
HERBERT M. JONES,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:
Active Army:
DCSPER (5)
ACSI (5)
DCSOPS (5)
DCSLOG (5)
Technical Stf, DA (1)
Technical Stf Bd (2)
USCONARC (25)
US ARADCOM (Incl ea Rgn
    Comd) (5)
OS Maj Comd (5)
Log Comd (2)
MDW (2)
Armies (15)
Corps (10)
Div (10)
Brig (5)
Engr Gp (5)
FA Gp (5)
Inf Regt/bg (5)
Armor Regt (5)
Engr Bn (2)
FA Bn (2)
Inf Bn (2)
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Engr Co (1)
FA Btry (1)
Inf Co (1)

Armor Co (1)
Pt & Camp (2)
USATC (10)
USMA (50)
Svc College (10) except
USAGCSC (100)
Br Svc Sch (10) except
USAARMS (1300)
USAAAMS (2000)
USA Ord Sch (100)
Fin Sch (100)
USAIS (2073)
USA QM Sch (250)
US ARADCOM (250)
USAINTS (250)
USA Security Agcy Sch (55)
USA CmlC Tng Comd (100)
USA Trans Tng Comd (500)
PMST (2)
Army Terminal (5)
Trans Terminal Comd (5)
OS Sup Agcy (3)
Mil Dist (3)
USA Corps (Res) (3)
Sectors, USA Corps (Res) (3)
Units org under fol TOE:
44-35 (2)
NG: State AG (6); units—same as Active Army except allowance is one half the requirement for each unit.

VRAR: Same as Active Army except allowance is one half the requirement for each unit.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320–50.