INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

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*This manual supersedes FM 30-15, 26 September 1960, including C 1, 1 August 1962, and C 2, 4 April 1966.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section 1. GENERAL

1. Purpose

This manual is a doctrinal guide for intelligence personnel in the general principles of interrogation. Classified aspects of prisoners of war (PW) interrogations in NATO and American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) operations are contained in STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW), and SOLOG Number 69, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW). To facilitate dissemination of this manual and to make it more conveniently accessible to personnel in the field, classified defense information has been excluded; however, the content of this manual is in accord with pertinent STANAG and SOLOG (app A).

2. Scope

a. This manual provides guidance in the techniques, principles, and procedures of intelligence interrogation. It includes discussion of the treatment of subjects of interrogation, the handling and treatment of PW, the exploitation of documents related to interrogations and subjects of interrogation, and the reporting of intelligence information gained through interrogation.

b. The material presented herein is applicable without modification to nuclear and non-nuclear warfare, including chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) operations. (Example 2, app B, is a special question guide applicable to employment of, and protection from, chemical, biological, and radiological agents.)

c. The procedures and techniques discussed are applicable for stability operations. Chapter 4 addresses specifically the application of techniques and procedures in the internal defense environment.

d. The procedures and techniques discussed also are applicable in support of psychological operations (PSYOP) (FM 33–1 and FM 33–5).

e. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Whenever possible, comments should be prepared on DA Form 1598 (Record of Comments on Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Md. 21219.

3. Responsibility of the Intelligence Staff Officer

The G2/S2 has the primary staff responsibility for all intelligence functions of the command. He assists the commander by supervising the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of all information and disseminating intelligence to appropriate higher, lower, and adjacent units. One of the important collection means employed by the intelligence staff officer is the interrogation of PW, deserters, civilians, and other persons of intelligence interest. The intelligence staff officer will provide guidance on the employment of interrogator personnel and will assign collection requirements upon which interrogations are to be based. Guidance or direction is provided by such means as listings of essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR), briefings, and issuance of specific instructions. In this respect, the officer in charge of the interrogation element should be required by the
G2 to make periodic visits to the G2 section to attend briefings and to keep abreast of the tactical situation by studying the G2 situation map and the G3 operations map, viewing recent photographs, and reviewing selected operational, intelligence, and civil affairs reports for items of interest to the interrogation element.

Section II. PRINCIPLES OF INTERROGATION

4. General

Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining an individual in order to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. A good interrogation is one that produces needed information which is timely, comprehensive, and accurate. An interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities — the subject of interrogation and the interrogator. Each encounter between these two differs from every other one to some degree because of the individual characteristics and capabilities of the participants. Furthermore, the circumstances of each encounter — friendly or hostile — and the physical environment are variables. There are, however, certain principles which can be considered to have general applicability, namely, the objective, initiative, accuracy, use of force, and security.

5. Objective

Each interrogation must be conducted for a definite purpose. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he proceeds to obtain the maximum amount of usable information to satisfy the assigned requirement and thus contribute to the successful accomplishment of the unit's mission. The objective may be as specific as to establish the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general as seeking to obtain routine order of battle information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator must use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. To the extent possible, the interrogator should attempt to prevent the subject from becoming aware of the true objective of the interrogation. The interrogator should not concentrate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to take cognizance of valuable information that is given by the subject. For example, in the course of an interrogation the interrogator learns of the presence of a hitherto unknown, highly destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his specific objective, the interrogator must develop this important lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weapon. It becomes obvious then that the objective of an interrogation can be changed as necessary or desirable.

6. Initiative

a. Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to the successful interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The initiative in any interrogation must rest with the interrogator throughout the entire interrogation. The interrogator will have certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation which will enable him to grasp the initiative and assist in maintaining this initiative throughout the interrogation.

(1) The interrogator clearly knows the purpose of the interrogation. The subject does not; he may assume, but he cannot be certain. This gives the interrogator a distinct advantage.

(2) The interrogator has had the opportunity to study the subject by personal observation or study of documents whereas the subject knows nothing about the interrogator.

(3) The interrogator enjoys a position of authority over the subject. The subject knows this, and in some cases, he realizes that his future might well depend upon his association with the interrogator.

(4) Having gained the initial advantage, the interrogator must strive to maintain the initiative by application of appropriate interrogation techniques, through exercise of self-control, by exploiting the subject's weaknesses as they become apparent, and by continually displaying an attitude of confidence and self-assurance.
b. It is possible for an interrogator to lose the initiative during interrogation of a subject. If this should occur, postponement of the interrogation and a reassessment of the situation may be advisable. If the interrogation is resumed, it might be advantageous to introduce a different interrogator. Following are some examples of loss of initiative:

(1) The interrogator becomes angry and completely loses his composure and self-control because of the arrogant actions of the subject. As a result, the interrogator loses sight of his objective and concentrates his efforts on humbling the subject.

(2) During the interrogation the interrogator fails to note significant discrepancies in the subject's story. The interrogator may lose the initiative as the subject gains confidence from his success and resorts to further deception, leading the interrogator away from the objective of the interrogation.

(3) The interrogator becomes overly friendly with the subject and allows him to lead the interrogation. The subject reports only what he believes to be important and neglects several significant items of information which could have been obtained had the interrogator maintained the initiative.

7. Accuracy
The interrogator must make an effort to obtain accurate information within the limitations of the subject of interrogation. He must be certain that he understands the subject correctly by repeating questions at varying intervals. The interrogator, however, is not an analyst and should not reject or subordinate information because it conflicts with previous information. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all information as the truth; he must view all information with skepticism, and, to the extent his capabilities and time permit, he should attempt to confirm or deny information received. The interrogator's primary mission, however, is collection of information, not evaluation. Of great importance is the accurate reporting of information to the using elements. The interrogator must check his notes against the finished report to insure that it contains and identifies appropriately the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the subject.

8. Use of Force
The use of force as an aid to interrogation is prohibited by law and international agreements and is not authorized by the United States Army. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain cooperation of subjects of interrogation. At best, use of force is a poor technique since it may induce the subject to tell what he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. The subject may not possess the information sought, but he will fabricate information to please the interrogator and bring an end to the force being applied. This leads to doubt as to the truth of the information obtained and may cause more harm than good. The use of force is not to be confused with the application of psychological techniques to assist the interrogator in the successful interrogation of difficult subjects.

9. Security
The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses much classified information. He must constantly be aware that his job is to obtain information and not to impart it to the subject. The necessity for safeguarding military information by the interrogator is an ever-present and ever-important requirement. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom he has contact will be those who are attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator must be alert to detect any attempt to elicit information from him.

Section III. THE INTERROGATOR

10. General
The use of properly qualified and thoroughly trained interrogators is a fundamental requirement for the efficient exploitation of personnel.
who are potential sources of intelligence information. These interrogators are found in interrogation units and in intelligence and security units as well (FM 30-9). Interrogators are selected for their personal qualities and special skills and abilities as discussed in paragraphs 11 and 12.

11. Personal Qualities

The obvious personal qualities which an interrogator should possess are an interest in human nature and suitable personality characteristics which will enable him to gain the cooperation of subject to be interrogated. Ideally, these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator; however, in most cases an interrogator can correct some deficiency in these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote much time to study and practice. Some of the personal qualities desirable in an interrogator are—

a. Motivation. An interrogator may be motivated, for example, by interest in human relations, intellectual curiosity, a desire to react positively to the challenge of personality interplay, or an enthusiasm for the collection of information. Whatever the motivation, it is the most significant factor in the success achieved by an interrogator, for without motivation other qualities lose their significance. The stronger the motivation, the more successful the interrogator. The interrogator must guard against tendencies of boredom, cynicism, and becoming overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task and the forces with which he may be faced. Mental attitude of an interrogator is actually a part of motivation. An interrogator must approach each interrogation as a separate entity. He should look forward to starting the interrogation and he must be confident that the subject will cooperate. He must have the will to do a good job. Such an attitude on the part of the interrogator will be felt by the subject and may increase the chances of his cooperating.

b. Alertness. The interrogator must be aware constantly of the shifting attitudes which normally characterize a subject's reaction to interrogation. The interrogator must note the subject's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. Is the subject angry, frightened, light-hearted, talkative, sullen, vague, straightforward, at ease, cooperative, worried, nervous, sincere? If the subject is angry, why is he angry? Is it because he resents being interrogated, or is it because he was captured? There may be other reasons. The interrogator must attempt to determine why the subject is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed, for it is from the subject's mood and actions that the interrogator can best determine how to proceed with the interrogation. The interrogator must watch for any indication of the possession or withholding of additional information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for diminishing resistance, and for contradictions or other tendencies.

c. Patience and Tact. These qualities in an interrogator assist him to create and to maintain a favorable atmosphere between himself and the subject, thereby enhancing the success of the interrogation. The validity of a subject's statements and the motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of tact and patience. The display of impatience will encourage the difficult subject to think that if he remains unresponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will give up. By being tactless, the interrogator loses respect in the eyes of the subject and, as a result, may lose his cooperativeness. An interrogator displaying patience and tact will be able to terminate an interrogation and to reinstitute further interrogation without having aroused apprehensions or resentment.

d. Objectivity. The interrogator must have the ability to maintain a dispassionate mental attitude regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience or which he may simulate during the course of an interrogation. Without this required objectivity, the interrogator may unconsciously distort the information acquired and may be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effectively.

e. Self-Control. An exceptional degree of self-control is required by the interrogator to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative during the interrogation. This quality is especially important when em-
ploying interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emotions or attitudes.

f. Adaptability. An interrogator must be able to adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the subject’s position. By being able to so adapt, the interrogator can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during interrogations. The interrogator must also be able to adapt himself to the operational environment. Interrogators will, in many cases, be required to function effectively under a variety of unfavorable physical conditions.

g. Perseverance. A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an interrogator who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, noncooperation, and other difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a successful conclusion nor seek leads to other valuable information.

h. Appearance and Demeanor. The personal appearance and behavior of the interrogator may influence to a great degree the conduct of the interrogation and the attitude of the subject toward the interrogator. A neat, organized, and professional appearance will favorably influence the subject. A firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude will create a proper environment for the conduct of a successful interrogation. If the interrogator’s personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the subject may prove cooperative and more receptive to questioning.

12. Special Skills and Abilities

The interrogator must possess or acquire through training and experience a number of special skills and knowledge.

a. Writing and Speaking Ability. The interrogator must be able to prepare and to present written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. Since the interrogation is not an end in itself, its full value can be realized only with the timely dissemination of the information obtained in a usable form to the appropriate persons or agencies.

b. Linguistic Skill. Fluency in the English language obviously is necessary, but knowledge of a foreign language(s) is equally necessary since interrogators must often work with non-English speaking people. Language ability should include a knowledge of military terms, foreign idioms, abbreviations, colloquial and slang usages, and local dialects. Although a trained interrogator who lacks a foreign language skill can interrogate successfully through an interpreter, the results obtained by the linguist interrogator will be more timely and economical and probably more accurate and comprehensive.

c. Specialized Knowledge. The nature of the intelligence interrogator’s mission requires that he possess much detailed and varied information. The objective of the interrogator and the locality will dictate specific requirements, but under normal circumstances the specialized knowledge should include as a minimum—

(1) Mission, organization, and operations. The interrogator should have a working knowledge of the organization, methods of operations, and missions of his own establishment as well as that of the subject.

(2) Identification of enemy uniforms and insignia. Through his knowledge of uniforms, insignia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of unit, and military experience of the prisoner of war.

(3) Enemy order of battle. Order of battle is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Order of battle intelligence factors — separate categories by which detailed information is maintained — include composition, disposition, strength, training, combat efficiency, tactics, logistics, and miscellaneous data. Application of order of battle factors during interrogation improves the accuracy of the information obtained and frequently results in new identifications of enemy units. Aids which may be used to identify units are—names of units; names of commanders; home station identification; code designations and numbers; uniforms;
insignia; guidons; documents; military postal system data; and equipment and vehicle markings. (Order of battle intelligence is elaborated upon in FM 30-5.)

(4) **Enemy organization.** The interrogator should be familiar with standard units of an enemy's organization so that he may avoid being misled by false or inaccurate information and will recognize new information when it is developed in an interrogation. Knowledge of the organization, functions, and normal dispositions of enemy units, coupled with access to previously developed information, will aid the interrogator in securing additional information to substantiate previous intelligence and to detect untruths.

(5) **Enemy materiel.** The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, appearance, and employment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include—small arms; infantry support weapons; artillery; army aviation; automotive and communications-electronics equipment; and chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) equipment.

(6) **Data on enemy personalities.** Familiarity with the names, ranks, and background of enemy officers and other key individuals is a valuable aid to the interrogator. Such data can be used as an effective wedge to gain new, or to confirm existing, information.

(7) **Enemy military signs and symbols.** The interrogator will often find it necessary to examine captured enemy documents containing signs and symbols of various kinds. Familiarity with these signs and symbols enables him to obtain maximum information from documents which are useful both as an aid to interrogation and as a source of information.

(8) **Area familiarity.** The interrogator should be completely familiar with the social, political, and economic institutions; geography; history; and culture of the area in which he is operating and of the enemy home country. Since many prisoners of war will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, knowledge of the geography, economics, or politics of the enemy country may be used by the interrogator to induce reluctant prisoners to talk. Once the prisoner has started to talk, the interrogator may then gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion.

(9) **Map reading.** The interrogator should be proficient in all aspects of map reading.

d. **Knowledge of Interrogation Techniques.** Specific interrogation techniques applicable to all forms of interrogation are discussed in chapter 2.

e. **Understanding of Basic Psychology.** An interrogator can best adapt himself to the personality of the subject and control of the subject's reaction if the interrogator has an understanding of basic psychological factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. For example, the timely use or promise of rewards and incentives may mean the difference between success or failure of an interrogation and future exploitation of the subject.

13. **Interrogator Training**

Training of intelligence interrogation consists of instructing the trainee in the general principles and, more importantly, the practical application of interrogation as outlined in this manual. Included are the principles and techniques of interrogation, questioning procedures, use of interpreters, proper handling of interrogation subjects, and procedures for recording and reporting information obtained through interrogations. Additional training should be given to further the special skills and knowledge listed and discussed in paragraph 12. It is important that the interrogator be well-versed in U.S. Forces organization, tactics, techniques, equipment, and related subjects in order for him to judge the relative significance of information a subject may impart to him.
14. General

The types of persons an interrogator encounters will vary greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation, military specialities, and political and religious beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health, their mental abilities may range from well below average to well above average, and their security consciousness may range from the lowest to the highest. Subjects may be prisoners of war, defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents or suspected agents, enemy as well as friendly civilian personnel, and allied or U.S. military escapees or evaders. Because of these variations, the interrogator must make a careful study of every subject to obtain an evaluation of his character and use it as a basis for interrogation.

15. Categories of Subjects

From the standpoint of attitude toward the interrogator or toward the act of interrogation itself, subjects fall into the three broad categories described in a through c below.

a. Cooperative and Friendly. A cooperative and friendly subject offers little resistance to the interrogation, and normally he will speak freely on almost any topic broached, other than one which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To secure the maximum value from this type of subject, the interrogator must take care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those private affairs of the subject which are beyond the scope of the interrogation.

b. Neutral and Nonpartisan. A neutral and nonpartisan subject is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly but seldom volunteering information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in a conflict involving irregular forces or in internal defense operational environments, where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisal should they cooperate with government forces or submit to interrogation or questioning. With the neutral and nonpartisan subject, the interrogator must ask specific questions and in the detail required by the circumstances.

c. Hostile and Antagonistic. A hostile and antagonistic subject offers the most difficult interrogation problem. In many cases, he will refuse to talk at all and offers a real challenge to the interrogator. The exercise of self-control, patience, and tact are particularly important when dealing with him. As a rule, it is considered unprofitable to expend excessive time and effort in interrogating hostile and antagonistic subjects at the lower echelons. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at a higher level. However, the urgency of the situation may dictate that every effort be made at a lower level to extract needed information from this type of subject.

16. Vulnerabilities

Regardless of the category to which a particular subject belongs, he will possess vulnerabilities which, if recognized by the interrogator, can be exploited. These vulnerabilities are manifested in personality traits such as speech mannerisms, facial expressions, physical movements, excessive perspiration, and other overt behavior. These vulnerabilities will vary from subject to subject. From a psychological standpoint, the interrogator must be cognizant of the following behavioral principles which he can use in interrogations. A human being is likely to—

a. Talk especially after harrowing experiences.

b. Show deference when confronted by superior authority.

c. Rationalize acts about which he feels guilty.

d. Lack the ability to apply or to remember lessons he may have been taught regarding security if confronted with a disorganized or a strange situation.

e. Cooperate with those who have control over him.

f. Attach less importance to a topic which he thinks is his exclusive knowledge when someone else demonstrates that he, too, pos-
senses identical or related experiences or knowledge.

g. Appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt.

h. Resent having something or someone he respects belittled, especially by someone he dislikes.

i. Respond to kindness and understanding, particularly in trying circumstances.
CHAPTER 2
THE INTERROGATION PROCESS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

17. General

This chapter considers the basic types of interrogation, the phases of an interrogation, the techniques of approach and questioning, the psychological aspects of interrogation, and the use of interpreters and the polygraph.

18. Basic Types of Interrogation

Interrogation normally takes two general forms—direct interrogation and indirect interrogation. The distinction between the two lies primarily in the subject's awareness of the fact that he is being interrogated.

a. Direct Interrogation. In the direct form of interrogation, the subject is aware of the fact that he is being interrogated, but he may or may not learn the true objective of the interrogation. This method may be likened to a cross-examination of a witness in a court of law in that every ethical and legal advantage is taken by the interrogator. An advantage of the direct form of interrogation is that it is less time consuming, and for this reason, it is the most frequently used method. The direct form of interrogation is used in almost all PW interrogations, from the preliminary screening in combat areas and occupied zones to the detailed and methodical questioning of suspected enemy agents. An example of the direct form of interrogation would be the questioning of a PW about his military history. He may or may not learn that the specific information wanted by the interrogator is the location of the PW's present unit headquarters.

b. Indirect Interrogation. This method is the obtaining or elicitation of information through subterfuge. The task of the interrogator is to extract the maximum amount of usable information from a subject without his realization of the fact that he is under interrogation, or without divulging to the subject the specific objective or its importance. This form of interrogation requires careful planning, extreme discretion, and skillful application; only the skilled and experienced interrogator can employ this method with success. An example of this form of interrogation could be the disguising of the interrogator as a guard in a PW compound; by becoming friendly with PW, the interrogator is able to elicit information through idle conversation. The disadvantage of this method is that it is time consuming; for that reason it is employed mainly at higher echelons with selected subjects who are thought to possess valuable information.

19. Selection of Subjects

Criteria for the selection of persons to be interrogated or interviewed vary with the nature of the information sought, the time limitation, and the number and types of potential subjects available. The selection process is particularly important in PW interrogations. A detailed discussion of PW screening for tactical interrogations is found in chapter 3.

Section II. PHASES OF INTERROGATION

20. Planning and Preparation Phase

Each interrogation requires considerable advance planning and preparation if it is to succeed. Consequently, every interrogator must continually plan and prepare himself by keeping abreast of current events, the local and
world situation, the latest interrogation aids and techniques, and by practice in techniques and languages. Many unsuccessful interrogations result from inadequate planning and preparation. In addition to the above, the interrogator must consider the following factors when preparing for an interrogation:

a. **Familiarity With Objective.** The interrogator must make a thorough study of the objective and use it as a basis of his plans and preparation for a particular interrogation. If the objective is a composite of many general and specific collection requirements, as will often be the case in tactical interrogations, the interrogator must continuously review and keep abreast of changes in these requirements.

b. **Specialized Background Knowledge.** The interrogation may require that the interrogator conduct research to obtain detailed background data on a specific geographic area, political group, weapons systems, or technical field. In the technical field, technical intelligence personnel will be able to assist the interrogator.

c. **Assessment of Subject.** The interrogator must collect, study, and evaluate all information available on the person to be interrogated. This procedure may range from a brief examination of a PW captive tag by an interrogator at the lowest tactical level, to a lengthy analysis of voluminous investigative files compiled by intelligence specialists. In addition to this background data, a visual observation of the subject immediately prior to the interrogation may be of value.

d. **Interrogation aids.** The interrogator may require maps, documents, recording equipment, photographic equipment, and other aids to facilitate the conduct of the interrogation. From among these, he must select those best suited to accomplish the objective, determine their availability, and arrange for their procurement well in advance of the interrogation. Specific items of aid to the interrogator include—

(1) **Prisoner of war tag.** The tag provides information as to date and time, circumstances, and location of capture and unit responsible for making the capture.

(2) **Previous interrogation reports.** Personal history data, summary of information received, and the former interrogator's evaluation of the information and the subject should be contained in reports of previous interrogations.

(3) **Documents found on subject or elsewhere.** Documents are broadly defined as any written, printed or engraved material conveying information or any recorded information, regardless of how it is recorded. With few exceptions, a subject will have identity documents in his possession. From such documents, much about the subject will become known. Other documents in his possession or found in the area often furnish information which may be used to establish rapport with the subject and serve as an initial point of discussion. This is particularly true of PW who may have in their possession letters, diaries, and other personal documents devoid of any military information, but which may furnish information reflecting personal feelings, morale, and family affairs. Documents may also be used to check the truthfulness of the subject, to refresh his memory, and to provide clues upon which further interrogations may be based.

(4) **Maps.** A military map of the area involved is a prerequisite to thorough interrogation. For interrogation purposes, large scale maps are most useful, but they should be of the same size as those used by the intelligence sections to which the interrogators are attached. Maps are useful in—

(a) Orienting interrogation personnel.

(b) Understanding the tactical situation.

(c) Pinpointing specific locations, structures, topographical features, and similar items.

(d) Interrogating subjects who are willing to point out enemy positions, gun emplacements, troop concentrations, and enemy objectives of a tactical or strategic nature. Captured enemy maps may already have
much of this information posted on them.

(5) Imagery, aerial photos, and photomaps show the actual features of the terrain and permit accurate identification of enemy positions. Aerial photos and photomaps may be easier to read for some individuals than maps.

(6) Order of battle data. Interrogators should have access to all recent order of battle data assembled by order of battle sections of divisions, corps, and field armies. A study of such data will assist in the selection of interrogation subjects and in the preparation for the interrogation.

(7) Guards. If the subject has been under guard, the interrogator should question the guards prior to the interrogation. The guards may be able to furnish information concerning the subject such as circumstances of capture, treatment afforded the subject since capture, attitude, and behavior of the subject. A subject's treatment since capture will have a direct bearing on his subsequent interrogation. Interrogators should maintain close liaison with guards to obtain this information.

(8) Civil affairs personnel. Close liaison with civil affairs personnel will often provide interrogators with valuable information concerning civilian personalities, subversive elements, enemy agents, and friendly civilians. Civil affairs personnel have a continuing requirement for information pertaining to these elements and interrogators can often elicit current and pertinent data from the persons that they interrogate.

(9) Informants. The use of informants among the prisoners can be a valuable aid to interrogations. One of the most likely situations in which an informant would be used is in PW cages wherein one prisoner provides data on other prisoners to the interrogator. Due to lack of time, personnel, and facilities, informants normally are not employed at lower echelons. However, in an internal defense situation where the location of the lower echelons is fairly stable, the use of informants may be considered. At any level, the fact that informants are being used should be a matter of strict security for the protection of the individual informants, as well as for maintaining the security of the system.

(10) Monitoring equipment. The use of concealed monitoring devices may prove valuable in obtaining information and developing leads. These devices also are an excellent means of recording an interrogation if the interrogator is unable to take sufficient notes or if he wishes to check his notes for clarity at a later time. The use of this equipment at lower echelons may be restricted by lack of time and suitable facilities. As in the use of informants, steps must be taken to maintain security and the integrity of the system.

(11) Interrogation guides. Interrogation guides are designed to assist the interrogator in formulating his interrogation plan (app B). Interrogation guides normally contain topics for questions rather than actual questions to be asked. Since most guides are intended for use in conducting interrogations at tactical levels, those topics which are of major importance to brigade and division commanders are included in appendix B. Emphasis and priority should be given to topics pertaining to essential elements of information and other intelligence requirements for special operations and other special tactical situations. Since the interrogation guide is intended to serve as a checklist, the use of a guide should assure the interrogator that he has covered all the major topics on which the subject should be knowledgeable, based on his background. It must be emphasized that the interro-
The interrogator should not permit the guide to become a crutch and limit his coverage of topics to only those included in the guide. He must remain constantly alert for leads to other important information which may not be listed in the guide.

e. Obstacles and Limitations. The interrogator must give advance consideration to obstacles and limitations which may have a bearing on the interrogation. These obstacles and limitations may include—legal status of the subject; time and facilities available for the interrogation; the military situation; knowledgeable of the subject; language restrictions; physical condition of the subject; psychological aspects; and other issues which may appear during the course of the interrogation.

f. Logistical Requirements. These include such things as billets, office space, heat, light, messing facilities, detention facilities, and transportation which may be required in support of the interrogation.

g. Interrogation Plan. Consideration of the aforementioned factors will aid the interrogator in formulating a plan of interrogation. The plan may be nothing more than an informal mental note or it may be a detailed and well-documented written plan. In either case, the plan will include at least the interrogation objective, identity of the subject, time and place of interrogation, tentative approach and alternate approaches, techniques of questioning, and means of recording and reporting the information obtained.

The approach phase begins with the initial contact with the subject by the interrogator. Extreme care is required since the success of the interrogation hinges to a large degree on the early development of a willingness on the part of the subject to communicate. The objective of the interrogator during this phase is to establish rapport with the subject and thus gain his cooperation so that he will answer the questions to follow. The interrogator adopts an appropriate attitude, based on his appraisal of the subject, prepares for a change in attitude if necessary, and begins to employ the technique decided upon. The amount of time spent on this phase will depend on such factors as the quantity and value of information the subject possesses, the degree of knowledge of subjects with similar training and the time available. At the businesslike relationship should be

As the subject assumes a cooperative attitude, a more relaxed atmosphere may be advantageous. Approach techniques are discussed in greater detail in paragraphs 25 through 29.

22. Questioning Phase

Although there is no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the questioning phase begins, the questioning phase, in general terms, commences when the interrogator begins to ask questions directly pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. The manner of questioning and the nature of the questions will be based on the mission and the situation. (Questioning techniques are discussed in para 25–29.) The following general guidelines are applicable to the questioning phase:

a. Thoroughness. Questions should be comprehensive enough to insure that the topic of interest is thoroughly explored. Answers should be obtained to establish the who, what, when, where, why, and how.

b. Logical Sequence. Questions should be presented in a logical sequence to be certain that significant topics are not neglected. A series of questions following a chronological sequence of events is frequently employed, but this is by no means the only logical method of asking questions. Adherence to a sequence should not deter the interrogator from exploiting information leads as they are obtained.

c. Subject Response. The interrogator must consider the probable response of the subject to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to antagonize the subject. Experience has shown that in most tactical interrogations the PW is cooperative; in such instances, the interrogator should proceed with direct questions.

23. Termination Phase

The termination phase of an interrogation will depend on various factors. Examples of
these factors are as shown in a through e below.

a. If the subject is wounded, sick, or elderly, the interrogator may be forced to terminate the interrogation or discontinue it until a later time.

b. The amount of information possessed by a subject may be so great that several sessions will be necessary to obtain all the desired information.

c. The attitude of the subject may indicate termination or postponement. He may become bored or refuse to cooperate.

d. All questions may be answered and the requirements satisfied.

e. Whatever the reason for terminating the interrogation, the interrogator should consider that he or someone else may wish to question the subject at a later date. For that reason, the interrogation should be ended on a friendly basis with the subject convinced that he may be interrogated again at a later time. The interrogator should not imply that the subject is of no further value and will not be reinterrogated.

24. Recording and Reporting Phase

a. Recording. To insure accuracy and retention of details, it usually is essential that some form of notes or record be made during the course of, or immediately after, the interrogation. Whether or not the notes are taken during the interrogation will depend upon the circumstances, the cooperativeness of the subject, and the nature of the topic under inquiry. In general, notes should be taken only if it can be done without distracting or silencing the subject. In some cases, it may be desirable to have an assistant remain out of sight and take notes without the knowledge of the subject, or concealed sound recording equipment may be employed. The interrogator usually should refrain from note taking until he has made a favorable start and the subject is communicating freely. At no time should note taking by the interrogator be in such detail that it interfere with the interrogator’s observation of the subject’s reactions to questions. Notes taken during the interrogation should be reviewed as soon as the subject departs, and gaps in the recorded information should be filled in while the details are still clear in the interrogator’s mind. If sound recording equipment is to be used surreptitiously, it should be tested under simulated interrogation conditions. Immediately after the interrogation, the recording should be checked for clarity. The sound recording must be properly identified and secured at the conclusion of the interrogation.

b. Reporting phase. Reports of interrogations may be either oral or written, formal or informal, and the exact type of report rendered will be as directed by SOP or by the agency or individual directing the interrogation. Oral reports usually are rendered when the value of the information to be reported is contingent upon the speed with which it reaches the using agency; they should be followed by written reports to confirm and to provide a record for future reference. Many forms of reports will require the interrogator to include a narrative appraisal or coded evaluation of the subject’s reliability. Evaluation of the information normally is not required, but the interrogator does perform an appraisal service by accurately reporting the information obtained, and by his own observations of the subject, if they are pertinent or significant. Conclusions based on the reported facts should be included insofar as practicable, but must be clearly identified as such. The most important information which the interrogator obtains may be valueless unless it is reported to intelligence agencies in usable form. This means that the interrogation report must be accurate and complete, yet concise. Interrogation reports are discussed in detail in chapter 5.

Section III. TECHNIQUES OF INTERROGATION

25. Approach and Questioning Techniques

Before an interrogator has completed his planning for a specific interrogation, he must select an appropriate approach for the first meeting with the subject. The first words spoken and the initial impression created by the interrogator will have a great bearing on the rest of the interrogation; therefore, the
The interrogator must carefully determine which of the various approach techniques he will employ. The approach technique chosen by the interrogator will depend on the physical and/or mental state of the subject, the mission and objectives of the interrogator, the background knowledge on the subject, and the interrogator himself. The techniques outlined below are not new by any means, nor are all the possible or acceptable techniques discussed. The variety of techniques is limited only by the initiative, experience, imagination, and ingenuity of the interrogator. Some techniques which have proven effective are—

a. Direct Approach Technique. The interrogator makes no effort to conceal the purpose of the interrogation. It is best employed when the interrogator believes the subject will offer little or no resistance. It is also suitable for employment with subjects who have had little or no security training. The advantages to this technique are in its simplicity and the fact that it takes little time. Experience has proven this technique to be very effective with PW, because most PW will cooperate with little persuasion. For this reason, it is frequently used at the lower tactical levels where time is limited.

b. "File and Dossier" Technique. The interrogator prepares a dossier containing all available information obtained from records and documents concerning the subject or his organization. Careful arrangement of the material within the file may give the illusion that it contains more data than is actually there. The file may be "padded" with extra paper if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as "education," "employment," "criminal record," "military service," and others are particularly effective for this purpose. The interrogator confronts the subject with the dossier at the beginning of the interrogation and explains to him that "intelligence" has provided a complete record of every significant happening in the subject's life; therefore, it would be useless to resist interrogation. The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the subject. If the technique is successful, the subject will be impressed with the "voluminous" file, conclude that everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation with the interrogator. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naivete of the subject, the volume of data on the subject, and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the subject.

c. "We Know All" Technique. This technique may be employed in conjunction with the "File and Dossier" technique or by itself. The interrogator must first become thoroughly familiar with all available data concerning the subject. To begin the interrogation, the interrogator asks questions based on this known data. When the subject hesitates, refuses to answer, or provides an incomplete or incorrect reply, the interrogator himself provides the detailed answer. Through the careful use of a limited number of known details, the interrogator may convince the subject that all information is already known; therefore, the subject's answers to the questions are of no consequence. When the subject begins to give accurate and complete information, the interrogator interjects questions designed to gain the needed information. Questions to which answers are already known are asked to test the subject and to maintain the deception that all the information is already known.

d. Futility. In this approach, the interrogator convinces the subject that resistance to questioning is futile. Factual information is presented by the interrogator in a forceful, persuasive, and logical manner. When employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the subject's physical, psychological, and moral weaknesses, as well as weaknesses inherent in his society.

e. "Rapid Fire" Technique. The interrogator asks a series of questions, one after another, not giving the subject time to completely answer any one question. This tends to confuse the subject and put him on the defensive. Since the subject will have little time to think out his answers, he will tend to contradict himself. The interrogator then confronts the subject with these inconsistencies, provoking him into further contradictions, frustrations, and anger. In many instances, the subject will begin to talk freely in self-defense and deny the inconsistencies. This technique is based on the
principle that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks; it is frustrating to be interrupted in mid-sentence with an unrelated question. Confused and frustrated, the subject will likely reveal more than he intended, thus creating openings for further questioning. The interrogator must have the questions to be asked in mind before he starts the approach so that he gives the subject no pause to reorganize his thoughts.

f. Harassment. A subject who is hostile, but lacks willpower and has shown a fondness for physical comfort and convenience, is more likely to be susceptible to harassment. The harassment may take many forms; for example, the subject may be called for interrogation at any time of the day or night, questioned for a few minutes and then released only to be recalled shortly thereafter. This treatment is continued until he realizes that the harassment will continue until he talks, and he finally decides to cooperate with the interrogator. Caution must be exercised to prevent the subject from providing false or inaccurate information simply as a means to gain a respite from the harassment. This harassment should never reach the point of physical torture.

g. Repetition. As a specific form of harassment, repetition is used to wear down the uncooperative subject. In one variation the interrogator listens carefully to the subject's answer to a question and then the interrogator repeats both the question and the answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the subject becomes so thoroughly bored or angry with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly in order to satisfy the interrogator and to bring an end to this disturbing practice. The repetition technique must be used on selected persons as it will not be effective on subjects who have a high degree of self-control. In fact, it may offer such a subject an opportunity to delay the unwary interrogator. The use of more than one interrogator or a tape recorder has proven effective in this technique.

h. "Mutt and Jeff" Technique. This is a technique wherein two interrogators interrogate the subject separately. The two interrogators display completely opposite personalities and approaches toward the subject. For example, the first interrogator is hostile and strict at the beginning of the interrogation. When the subject refuses to cooperate, the interrogator becomes very angry. He may order the subject to stand at attention while being interrogated. He may use harsh and abusive language towards the subject and threaten violence. Just at the point when it appears the interrogator will resort to violence, the second interrogator appears. The second interrogator admonishes the first in front of the prisoner, promises that he will be reported to his superiors, and orders him from the room. He then apologizes to the subject for the actions of the first interrogator. He soothes the subject, perhaps offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and a lack of self-discipline. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the subject have in common a high level of intelligence and self-discipline above and beyond that of the first interrogator. This serves to create a bond between the subject and the second interrogator and the subject is inclined to have a feeling of gratitude and indebtedness towards the second interrogator. The interrogator continues a sympathetic attitude towards the subject to increase his cooperativeness for the questioning which follows. The second interrogator might imply that if the subject refuses to cooperate, the first interrogator might return. This technique will not succeed unless both interrogators are convincing actors.

i. "Pride and Ego" Technique. The strategy of this technique is to trick the subject into revealing desired information by goading or flattering him. It is effective with subjects who have displayed weaknesses or feelings of inferiority. A real or imaginary deficiency noted about the subject, his loyalty to his organization, or any other feature can provide a basis for use of this technique. The interrogator accuses the subject of weakness or implies that he is unable to do a certain thing. The proud or egotistical subject will jump to the defensive. This type of subject is also prone to make excuses and give reasons why he did or did not do a certain thing, often shifting the blame to others. An example is the interrogator opening
the interrogation with the question, “Why did you surrender so easily when you could have escaped by crossing the nearby ford in the river?” The subject is likely to provide a basis for further questions or to reveal significant intelligence information if he attempts to explain his surrender in order to vindicate himself with an answer such as, “No one could cross the ford because it is mined.” This technique may be employed in another manner—by flattering the subject into admitting certain information in order to gain credit. For example, while interrogating a suspected saboteur, the interrogator states, “This sure was a smooth operation. I have seen many previous attempts fail. This was really done with finesse. I bet you planned this; who else but a clever fellow like you could have planned it? When did you first decide to do the job?” This method is especially effective with the rather stupid subject who has always been looked down upon by his superiors. This provides him with the opportunity to show someone that he has “brains.”

j. “Silent” Technique. This technique may be successful when employed against either the nervous or the confident type subject. In this technique the interrogator says nothing to the subject, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a light smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the subject, but force him to break eye contact first. The subject will become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, look away. He may ask questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The subject may blurt out questions such as, “Come on now, what do you want with me?” When the interrogator is ready to break silence, he may do so with some quiet nonchalant question such as, “You planned this operation a long time, didn’t you? Was it your idea?” The interrogator must be patient when employing this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding, but it usually will when given a reasonable chance.

k. “Change of Scene” Technique. The idea in using this approach is to get the subject away from the atmosphere of an interrogation room or setting. If the interrogator confronts the type subject who is very apprehensive or frightened because of the environment of an interrogation, this technique may well prove effective. In some circumstances, the interrogator may be able to invite the subject to a nearby coffee house (it must be a setting which the interrogator can control) for coffee and pleasant conversation. During the conversation in this more relaxed environment, the interrogator steers the conversation to the topic of interest. Through this somewhat indirect method, he will attempt to elicit the desired information. The subject may never realize that he is being “interrogated.” Another example is an interrogator posing as a guard (the subject a prisoner), engaging the subject in conversation, and thus eliciting the desired information. This technique requires skill and patience on the part of the interrogator.

l. “Establish Your Identity” Technique. This technique is especially adaptable to the interrogation of PW. The interrogator insists that the PW has been correctly identified as an infamous individual wanted by higher authority on very serious charges, and that he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this allegation, the subject will make a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the interrogator with information and leads for further development.

m. “Emotional” Technique. This technique is employed to play on the subject’s emotions. Through observation of the subject, the interrogator often can determine the dominant emotions of the subject. These may include fear, greed, revenge, hate, love, and others. To successfully employ the technique, the interrogator places pressure on the subject’s emotional problems by going into detail and creating a sorrowful picture of the subject’s plight. A skilled interrogator can cause the subject to feel despondent and perhaps even bring him to tears. Subsequent questioning is usually simple. One example is the prisoner of war who has a great love for his unit and fellow soldiers. The interrogator may take advantage of this by telling the subject that his providing information may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many of his comrades’ lives, but his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This places a burden on the subject and perhaps will bring
him to seek relief by cooperating. Another example is the prisoner who hates his unit because it withdrew and left him to be captured, or perhaps he feels that he was treated unfairly in his unit. The interrogator may point out that if the subject cooperates and points out the location of the unit, the unit can be destroyed. This gives the subject an opportunity for revenge. The interrogator proceeds with this method much the same way as in the "Mutt and Jeff" technique. The interrogator uses a series of temperamental outbursts by raising his voice, pounding on the table, and generally conducting himself in such a manner as to create a feeling of insecurity and anxiety in the subject. The subject is not permitted to relax nor recover his composure until he has demonstrated complete cooperation. This approach is more likely to be effective with the immature and timid subject. This technique should be employed only by an experienced interrogator.

26. Types of Questions

Once the subject has been induced to talk by application of an appropriate approach and questioning technique, the interrogator must employ effective questions designed to achieve the maximum results. Examples of types of questions are—

a. Prepared Questions. When the topic under inquiry is particularly technical or when the legal aspects of the interrogation require preciseness, it is desirable for the interrogator to have a list of prepared questions to follow during the course of the interrogation. In other cases, where the interrogation will touch on several fields of interest, it may be desirable to prepare an interrogation guide or outline to insure that all topics are explored. In the use of prepared questions or interrogation guides, the interrogator must be careful to avoid restricting the scope and flexibility of the interrogation.

b. Control Questions. To maintain control and to check on the veracity of the subject, the normal questions should be interspersed with control questions—those with known answers. Failure to answer these questions or erroneous answers indicate that the subject may not be knowledgeable or that his answers to the questions are also erroneous.

c. Nonpertinent Questions. Frequently it may be desirable, or even mandatory, that the true objective of the interrogation be concealed from the subject. By carefully intermingling pertinent with nonpertinent questions, the interrogator can conceal the true purpose of the inquiry and lead the subject to believe that some relatively insignificant matter is the basis for the interrogation. The interrogator also can conceal the objective of his interrogation by asking pertinent questions in a casual manner, stressing questions and details which are not important, and dwelling on nonpertinent topics which the subject appears reluctant to discuss. The interrogator may also ask nonpertinent questions to gain further rapport with the subject. The subject may be reluctant to discuss the matter of interest, but quite willing to discuss more pleasant things. The interrogator may relax the subject by first discussing irrelevant topics using nonpertinent questions, then switching back to pertinent questions for desired information. Another use of nonpertinent questions is to break the "train of thought" of the subject. This is of particular importance if it is suspected that the subject is lying. Since a person must concentrate in order to lie effectively, the interrogator can break this concentration by suddenly interjecting a completely unrelated question, then switching back to the pertinent topic.

d. Repeated Questions. As a means of insuring accuracy, particularly when the interrogator suspects that the subject is lying, questions should be repeated after varying intervals. Since a lie is more difficult to remember than the truth, especially when the lie has been composed on the spur of the moment, the interrogator may establish discrepancies by rephrasing and disguising the same questions which the subject has already answered. Repetition also serves to insure accuracy on points of detail, such as place names, dates, component parts of technical equipment, and similar topics.

e. Direct and Leading Questions. The manner in which questions are worded has a direct bearing on the subject's response. A question may be posed in a number of ways, for example—

(1) "Where did you go last night?"
The first example is a simple direct question which requires a narrative reply. Such an answer usually produces the maximum amount of information and provides a greater number of leads which can be followed up by the interrogator. The other three examples are leading questions in that they suggest the answers. The subject merely answers "yes" or "no." Leading questions tend to prompt the subject to give the reply he believes the interrogator wants to hear and to limit the amount of detail in the reply. As a general rule, leading questions do not serve the purpose of interrogation—to obtain complete and accurate information. This does not mean, however, that leading questions should always be avoided by the interrogator. They can be used very effectively as a means of verification, as a means of strategy, or as a means of pinpointing specific details.

f. Compound Questions. Compound questions normally should be avoided because they are easily evaded and sometimes hard to understand. An example of a compound question is: "What type of training did you receive at aggressor basic training center and what type of training did you receive later at aggressor advanced training center?" The subject may answer both, only one, or neither one; the answer received may be ambiguous, incomplete, or both. Definitive answers to compound questions seldom are received.

g. Negative Questions. The interrogator should avoid asking negatively phrased questions because they are confusing and may produce misleading or false information. Suppose for a moment that the interrogator poses a question such as this: "You do not know whether Smith went to the headquarters last night?" The reply is "Yes." Does the subject intend to say, "Yes, I know," or did he mean, "Yes, it is true that I do not know," or did he mean, "Yes, Smith was there?" If the ambiguity is caught at the moment that the answer is received, another question can be asked to clarify the doubt. If the interrogator fails to note the negative question, in all probability he will elicit an answer that the subject never meant to give. In either case, the delay or the resulting loss of an important point detracts from the effectiveness of the interrogation.

h. Brief and Precise Questions. All questions should be brief and to the point. There should be no doubt in the subject's mind as to what the interrogator wants to know. If the subject cannot understand the question, he certainly cannot be expected to answer it. And if he does answer it, the answer may lead the interrogator to arrive at an erroneous conclusion.

i. Simply Worded Questions. All questions should be simple, avoiding big words. This is especially important when using an interpreter; for even with simple words and questions, the complexities of language and normal translation difficulties pose enough of a communication problem.

j. Followup Questions. During the course of the interrogation, the subject may make statements indicating that he has information of intelligence value other than that which is the objective of the current interrogation. He also may mention other persons who may be profitably interrogated. These leads may appear while the subject is telling a story or replying to a question. Leads frequently appear in compound answers to simple and direct questions, as shown in the following example: The interrogator asks, "Where did you go on 22 June?" The subject replies, "I drove home to Centerville to borrow some money from my brother, Joe." The interrogator's question asked only "where," but he learned not only "where" but "why" and "who" was contacted. Thus, several new avenues of questioning have been opened. The interrogator must remain alert to detect and exploit these leads with further questions, but in doing so, he must exercise caution to insure that the subject does not deliberately introduce obviously inviting leads as a means of evading the topic under inquiry at the moment.

27. Psychology in Interrogation

Psychology as used in interrogation involves
an assessment of human behavior. Various subjects will react and behave differently under similar conditions. Reactions and behavior often will give clues to the interrogator as to the best approach to use. If the interrogator has a basic understanding of psychology and expands this understanding with experience, he will achieve success in interrogation. The following is a listing and brief discussion of some basic psychological factors which, if thoroughly understood by the interrogator, may aid him in preparing for and conducting interrogations:

a. Emotion. Emotion is a strong, generalized feeling, a state of mental excitement. In evaluating emotions, the interrogator must recognize the fact that different people react to stresses in different ways. This difference is the direct result of the manner in which the person evaluates the stress situation—especially in relation to his evaluation of his own ability to cope with it. In addition to this difference, the recognition of the two principal effects of emotions is also important. These effects are those which prepare a person for action in an emergency and which also may upset patterns of response. Emotions affect the subject so as to prepare him for action in an emergency by making it possible for him to exert himself over a longer than normal span of time, to exert enormous strength for a brief period of time, and to render him relatively insensitive to other stimuli. The emotions may upset patterns of response and may have definite disadvantages to those engaged in work requiring a great deal of skill or thought. Equally as important as the knowledge of these effects is the ability to recognize the existence of the different types of emotions. A combination of external responses usually will betray the existence of emotions. These include facial expressions, contortions of the mouth, vocal expressions, and other overt manifestations. Internal responses to emotion are more difficult to detect by the interrogator; hence, they are the bases upon which the polygraph operates. These responses include an increase in heartbeat, blood pressure, endocrine flow, temperature, respiration, and perspiration. To be sure, some subjects are better able to conceal their emotions than others.

(1) Fear. Fear is an emotion of relatively short duration which may appear whenever the individual directly, or his possessions or values, may be threatened. The fear may also be of the unknown. When the individual is unable to cope with the threat, fear mounts and operates much like a warning alarm that constantly reminds him of the necessity to act. Once some action is taken, be it physical as in the case of flight, or symbolic in the case of apologizing or even fainting, the intensity of the fear decreases. But while the subject is gripped by fear, he is disorganized and experiences difficulty in thinking clearly and acting rationally. To some, the continued sensation of fear may be so acute and painful as to prompt them to feel that almost any concession should be made in order to gain relief. This is the level that the interrogator can use, for the PW has been thrust into the hands of his enemy in a strange and hostile environment. Care must be exercised by the interrogator, however, as an extremely frightened subject may fabricate information as a means of seeking flight from fear.

(2) Anger. When the individual feels that he can cope with the situation, he is more apt to express anger. Typically of short duration, a matter of seconds, anger is a very intense emotion and normally occurs more frequently during the hour before a meal than during the hour following or during periods of tiredness or sleepiness. It may be the result of deprivation or thwarting of desires for social activity. An angry subject is not in complete control of his faculties and can be goaded into making revealing statements. In exploiting anger, the interrogator must control the tendency to fight anger with anger.

(3) Frustration. Frustration is an emotion which occurs when an individual's needs or drives are not satisfied. The
need may be external or internal, overt or obscure, and the individual may or may not be conscious of it. The frustrated individual may exhibit anger, anxiety, or tension. Usually the individual attempts to avoid frustrations since the accompanying feelings are painful. The interrogator must deal with frustration by studying its reactions, seeking to determine its cause, and finally, selecting an appropriate interrogation technique to exploit it. In some cases, it may be desirable to intensify the subject's frustration to the point that he will unintentionally divulge information. In other cases, it may be to the interrogator's advantage to lessen the frustration by satisfying some of the emotional need of the subject.

b. Defense Mechanisms. When an individual is affected by emotion because of changes in environment, he attempts to adapt to the new environment by use of defense mechanisms. In many cases, the individual is unaware that he is adopting such defense mechanisms. Different subjects will use different defense mechanisms in the same situation. The interrogator should be alert for the appearance of these mechanisms and should know how he may exploit them to enhance the success of the interrogation. Some common defense mechanisms are—

(1) Rationalization. Rationalization is perhaps the most prevalent of all the defense mechanisms. In this mechanism, individuals formulate reasonable and logical reasons why they do or fail to do certain things. This is done unconsciously by the individual. When individuals have committed what is generally accepted as a wrong, they reason with themselves that they had no choice but to commit the act because of environmental factors of other persons. When an individual has accepted this reasoning, his conscience is relieved because he considers what has happened as fate and beyond his control. Going further, many individuals will commit an act which they ordinarily would not do if they can find reasonable or logical means to justify their conduct. Rationalization can be used frequently and successfully by almost every interrogator by convincing the subject that he should cooperate and then telling him why. An example is explaining to a PW that there is no reason for his not talking, because all information he knows has already been disclosed by other members of his unit. Another example is telling the PW that he has fought honorably, but now he is a PW and his country can no longer look after him and he must take care of himself; therefore, under the circumstances, his cooperation would not be unreasonable.

(2) Identification. An individual identifies himself with another person or group, usually one that he admires or respects. An example is the young boy who tries to be like his father. Normally this is not a conscious effort on the part of the individual. This mechanism is quite often assumed by an individual when he is placed within a strange group or situation. The interrogator can take advantage of this mechanism by associating himself with the subject. He may do this by acting like the subject, by stressing their similarities, such as both being soldiers, officers, sergeants, etc.; both having the same problems; both having the same religion; and in other ways. Another example is the subject who respects another person who has also been interrogated. The interrogator would then induce the subject to cooperate because the other person, with whom the subject identifies himself, has cooperated.

(3) Compensation. In compensation, the subject is likely to emphasize a desirable trait or attempt to make up for frustration by overgratification in another area. The interrogator can handle such a subject by flattering him or by completely exposing the compensation for what it is. For ex-
ample, a young PW may put on a brave and aggressive front when in actuality he is just a frightened youth. He may be susceptible to flattery in the form of praise for the actions which he has reputedly taken, but now that he is a PW he should be equally brave and face up to reality. This may be an opening for the subject to tell the interrogator about some of his brave exploits, or what prompted him to take the actions that he did. The point is to get him to talk, to relieve the fear he is concealing, and to divulge information that the interrogator is seeking. Another way of handling such a soldier, if the first approach fails, is to destroy quickly and totally the facade of bravery that he has assumed. Once the scared young lad is exposed in his true light, he will be easier to control and to remold into the shape desired.

(4) Projection. Projection is an escape mechanism in which the individual blames his own mistakes, shortcomings, and misdeeds on others and attributes his own unethical desires, impulses, and thoughts to others. Since a subject with these techniques will blame others for his own mistakes, he may be prompted to inform on other members of his own group. When a PW is first captured, the interrogator may trigger this reaction by blaming the officers or superiors of the subject’s group for his capture. The subject’s statements which place the blame on others must be carefully evaluated for veracity.

(5) Exhibitionism. This is an egocentric method of obtaining attention whereby the person will attempt to overcome feelings of inferiority or inadequacy by boasting about his exploits, being disobedient for the purpose of attracting attention, and manifesting other attention-attracting behavior. Having attention centered upon him by being selected for interrogation will appeal to such an individual. The information obtained, however, must be closely examined to uncover items of exaggeration or total fabrication.

c. Escape Mechanisms. There are other mechanisms wherein the individual mentally escapes from unpleasant situations. Some of the more common escape mechanisms are—

(1) Seclusion. Signs of this escape mechanism are apparent in the subject when he is overly shy, timid, and modest. The subject feels that the less he has to do with others, the less he will become involved. The interrogator frequently can overcome this attitude with a quiet, slow, and tactful approach. The interrogator should appeal to the subject’s logic and reason, while minimizing the importance of the topic being discussed and the personal involvement of the subject.

(2) Phantasy. This escape mechanism is commonly known as daydreaming. Individuals with little to do, such as prisoners, tend to daydream more than other persons; this sometimes presents a problem to the interrogator. He must be careful when interrogating seclusive subjects or subjects who may have been prisoners for some time. After a subject has imagined something for a long period of time, it often becomes fact to him, which creates for the interrogator the problem of separating fact from phantasy.

(3) Negativism. The subject reaches the point where he refuses to cooperate in any manner or does just the opposite to what is asked. Usually, a subject will reach this state after he has been under restraint for a period of time and has worked himself into a high emotional pitch of resentment, hostility, and fear. When confronted with this type of escape mechanism, the interrogator should approach the prisoner by trying to lessen his fears, hostility, and resentment, affording him some type of security. He should try to minimize the interrogator-subject relationship and offer encouragement and reassurance.
(4) Regression. In regression, the subject may retreat to earlier developmental stages in his life—in extreme cases, even to early childhood. The unconscious reason for such regression is to escape responsibility or reality. The subject who is fearful of the consequences of the interrogation, or lacks faith in his own ability to withstand interrogation, may resort to regression to escape reality and the responsibility of facing the interrogator. In many cases, the interrogator can reestablish the subject in his adult role and gain his cooperation by using a reasonable, sympathetic, and friendly approach. In extreme cases, the interrogator may have to use a “parent to child” approach to obtain any information from the subject.

(5) Repression. Repression is not a deliberate mechanism employed by individuals, but an involuntary action which tends to blot events from the memory, or deny past happenings. It affects especially memories of happenings which were violent, repulsive, illegal or shameful. It is an unconscious effort of the individual who has feelings of guilt, shame, or loss of self-esteem. This mechanism was encountered quite frequently after World War II by interrogators among subjects who had participated in or were associated with atrocities. When the interrogator encounters this type of escape mechanism, it may be necessary for him to assist the subject in recalling repressed memories. The “futility” interrogation approach has proven to be successful in many cases of this type. However, it should be considered that in some cases, it may be desirable to avoid topics which the subject has repressed, depending on the type of information the interrogator is seeking.

28. Conduct of the Interrogation

Logically, the subject should be questioned initially on those topics on which he can be expected to have knowledge. If the subject is a PW, his rank, branch of service, duties, and missions will give some indication of his general knowledgeability.

a. Topics. Normally, the first topic for questioning should be concerned with determining the duties performed by the subject. This information will give the interrogator an important clue to the general knowledge the subject is likely to possess and will provide the bridge to the next question.

b. Subject's Mission. Clues obtained from the duties of the subject will help the interrogator to determine the subject’s mission just prior to capture. This information will also aid the interrogator in determining the missions of the subject’s or PW’s agency or unit and those of related units.

c. Immediate Area Information. The subject will be most familiar with the activities, locations, installations, or troop dispositions of his own unit and those within his immediate area. The activities in which he was personally engaged or observed are those upon which he is best qualified to speak.

d. Adjacent Area Information. The subject may be able to provide additional information about adjacent areas which will enable the intelligence officer or other using agency to draw conclusions concerning other sectors of the enemy front.

e. Supporting Information. Everything the subject can contribute to the overall situation should be reported. This includes locations, deployment, and activities of supporting weapons, units, installations, and areas. It also includes the names of all commanders and other persons known to the subject.

f. Travel Information. The subject may well have observed items of intelligence interest while moving in or through other areas. Questions on these points should be asked. If the subject has recently been in rear areas, he may have information concerning reserve units, artillery positions, locations of higher headquarters, supply installations, supply routes, preparations for defense in depth, and related data.

g. Hearsay Information. Rumors and hearsay may provide valuable information, but they
should be labeled as rumor or hearsay when reported.

h. Conclusions. As the final step of the interrogation, the interrogator should obtain any additional conclusions, statements, observations, or evaluations from an especially qualified subject. Officer PW or informed noncommissioned officers and civilian subjects, who may be qualified, should be thoroughly questioned as to their conclusions; their opinions and evaluations may be as important as factual information. When the interrogator receives such information, he must further obtain the facts upon which the subject based his conclusions and/or evaluations.

29. Measures to Insure Accuracy

a. General. While the interrogator attempts to get the maximum amount of usable information as circumstances permit, he must also strive to increase the value of this information by insuring its accuracy. In this respect, the interrogator must distinguish between things the subject has seen, heard, or assumed. In each case, the source of the information should be ascertained. In a like manner, the interrogator should distinguish between information of which the subject has definite knowledge and information of which he is not certain.

b. Use of figures. Great care should be exercised in the use of figures. The average person does not think in terms of large numbers. However, when asked, "What is the strength of your company?", a PW will often provide a quick answer without concern for accuracy. Especially in the case of overcooperative subjects, there is a danger in accepting their estimates at face value. A better approach is to begin with a question as to the number of men in his squad; how it compares in strength with other squads; the number of men in his platoon; and how it compares in strength with other Platoons; and finally, asking him about the strength of his company. This will provide both the interrogator and the PW with a firmer basis for the answer to the ultimate question, the strength of the company. It may also be foolish to ask a PW to provide an answer to a question such as this: "What percentage of your company are specialists?" Although he may give an answer, he may not have any idea what "percentage" means, what the number of specialists is, or what the term "specialist" really means. Statements such as losses were "high," "low," and other similar responses provide little information. Specific numbers should be obtained where possible; such words as "high" or "low" mean different things to different people.

c. Distances. Subjects are inclined to overestimate distances they have traversed. In calculating time and distance, consideration must be given to whether movement was by road or cross-country, the method of movement, and the geographical area involved: The interrogator can secure an accurate figure by asking how long and under what circumstances the march was undertaken—night, day, road conditions, terrain, and other circumstances.

d. Map Tracking.

(1) While the experienced interrogator is an expert map reader, this may not be true of the subject. In some cases, the subject may be unable to adjust himself to the unfamiliar U.S. Army maps. These problems may be overcome by using captured enemy maps which should be familiar to the prisoners. Relief maps are especially effective aids to interrogation because of the ease with which untrained persons can recognize familiar terrain features. In many cases, however, the interrogator will find it useful to resort to a technique known as "map tracking" in order to obtain accurate information. At tactical levels of command, the scope of interrogation is primarily concerned with the accurate location of enemy weapons, troop dispositions, installations, and other points on the map by means of coordinates of at least six digits.

(2) Map tracking is based on the concept that an interrogator, completely oriented on his map in relation to the terrain in question, through a graphic portrayal in words and through association of ideas, can recall to the mind of the subject various features of the terrain over which the latter has recently traveled, without the subject
(3) As a first step in the technique of map tracking, both the subject and the interrogator must become familiar with a location on the terrain which can then become a common point of departure upon which to start the tracking and thereby the interrogation. From the capture tag, which accompanies the subject and is prepared by the capturing unit, or from the results of questioning a guard or escort, the interrogator can normally obtain information on a PW’s time, place, and circumstances of capture, and the unit which captured him. The place of capture, if given in coordinates, will assist the interrogator in pinpointing it on a map and in aiding the subject to recall terrain features of the area. If the subject can remember the place of capture, it can be used as a common point of departure. In the event the interrogator does not have accurate information from the capturing unit as to the place of capture and the subject does not recall where he was captured, another terrain site familiar to both must be located to serve as a starting point. This point usually can be located by questioning the subject as to his place of departure, the route he took, where he had been, or what he had seen while travelling (topography, prominent terrain features).

(4) The next step in map tracking is to limit the geographical area on which the subject will be questioned. This can be done by further questioning—what he had been doing, where he had been, and related questions. The distance the PW travelled from his initial point of departure to his point of capture is designated by interrogators as the “route.” The route limits the scope of interrogation to that portion of the terrain with which the subject is familiar.

(5) The final step in the map tracking process is to question the subject as to things that he may have heard or seen along his route. The technique employed is to begin at the common point of departure and to describe progressively all possible terrain features—roads, manmade objects, natural terrain features, and so forth, gradually leading the subject from departure point to capture point. Continual references to the map should be made by the interrogator as he painstakingly leads the subject from area to area and, in doing so, leaves nothing to chance. Every possibility is exhausted by asking the subject questions as to what he heard; what he saw; what was to his left, right, front, and rear; while making continual progress through the route until the PW has been “tracked” to his point of capture. After the interrogator has “brought” the subject to the point of capture, he can backtrack along the route to pick up additional information about particular points of interest or features that may have been missed. The interrogator can then ask about other trips; i.e., down a road, trails, a body of water, etc.

(6) Map tracking may be carried out in reverse order—from point of capture to point of origin. In some cases, this procedure may be best as it begins with a point on the map which the subject remembers most vividly and from that point continues to the more dimly remembered past. In whatever order the map tracking is carried out, the procedures remain the same.

Section IV. USE OF INTERPRETERS

30. General
Most military operations are conducted on foreign soil; consequently, there are occasions when available interrogators lack the linguistic
"... our Bn Hq was in the woods west of the church in the village of WALDORF."

On the map, locate some feature which is well known to the PW.

"... saw six 120mm How along the south side of the big hill to the left of the highway. I was told an Arty Bn has its Hq in the old warehouse near the highway."

Have the PW describe military activities along a route he has traveled.

"... medical aid station in the UNTERHEIM hospital near the crossroads on the south edge of town. I saw wounded personnel there from both regiments."

Get details from the PW about enemy activity which he has observed along known route.

"... have mined the bridge over the GRAF CANAL on the highway from WALDORF to UNTERHEIM. Two RL in the woods cover the bridge."

Question the PW about military activities within geographic limits known to the PW.

"... the reserve mech regt of the 10th Mech Rifle Div has its CP in the school house near the woods outside of OBERNDORF. I heard our regt would take over..."

Continue the route-description process.

"... an artillery OP in the steeple of the church next to the big cemetery. The 31st Mech Regt of the 10th Mech Div is in the line along the edge of the woods near the river bank north of UNTERHEIM. They had heavy losses on..."

Continue the tracking process until all routes known to the PW have been exploited.

Figure 1. Map tracking.
ability to interrogate effectively the subjects native to the particular area. The use of interpreters must be considered an unsatisfactory substitute for direct communication, but their use may be necessary. The following restrictions limit the use of interpreters:

a. The difficulty of establishing rapport because of the lack of personal contact.

b. The increased time requirements—more than twice that which is required normally.

c. The possibility of misunderstanding—shades of meaning, tonal inflections, and certain idiomatic expressions are almost impossible to convey through an interpreter.

d. The restriction on use of certain techniques of interrogation such as rapid fire questioning.

e. The additional security risk posed because the interpreter will become aware of intelligence requirements and may obtain much classified information during the course of interrogation.

f. The presence of an interpreter may cause an otherwise cooperative subject to remain silent during the interrogation. Since the giving of information to the “enemy” is forbidden, some subjects may be willing to give information only if they can be sure that there will be no retribution from their fellow PW, internees, or others. The presence of a third party at the interrogation may cast doubt upon this assurance.

31. Desired Capabilities

To be effective, an interpreter should possess certain qualities or capabilities. Some of these are:

a. He should be completely fluent in the English language as well as the language of the subject. This fluency is important in both oral and written methods of expression.

b. He should be able to adjust his personality to that of the subject, and to that of the interrogation. (This is particularly important in areas where social caste systems exist—the interpreter may be of a distinct, separate class from that of the subject; therefore, he must make a great adjustment in his attitude towards the subject.)

c. Other qualities desirable in an interpreter are discussed in paragraph 32.

32. Selection of Interpreters

Interpreters should be selected from U.S. military or civilian personnel if at all possible. In most instances, however, it will be necessary to employ foreign nationals for this purpose. In selecting an interpreter, the following factors must be given consideration:

a. Security Clearance. Normally it will be required that the interpreter have a security clearance. This is dictated by the continual attempts of the enemy to penetrate our intelligence organizations and to learn our intelligence requirements.

b. Local Dialect. In addition to the normal desired language capabilities listed in paragraph 31a, the interpreter should have a good understanding of local dialects and slang expressions.

c. Personality. Where possible, the personality of the interpreter should mirror that of the interrogator. This is especially true in cases where special interrogation techniques, such as “Mutt and Jeff,” are employed. As a general rule, the interpreter should be one who is capable of arousing feelings of respect and confidence.

d. Area Knowledge. Undoubtedly the greater the degree of area knowledge, the greater the value of the interpreter to the interrogator. However, if at all possible, the interpreter should not be a person from the immediate geographic area. Many persons hesitate to talk to a person with whom they are acquainted if data of a derogatory nature is to be divulged. On the other hand, the interpreter may be besieged by “friends” asking him to intercede on their behalf.

e. Social Status. This is a consideration in those countries in which social stratification exists. On the whole, a person who qualifies as an interpreter is an educated person and should be able to adapt himself to changing circumstances. To ease the situation where a disparity of classes may exist between the interpreter and the subject, the interrogator should explain to the subject that the conversation is between the two of them and the interpreter is merely an inconvenience imposed by the language barrier. In conjunction with social status, women are often relegated to an inferior role in certain societies. Their presence, therefore, may not be appropriate in cases where a man is being interrogated. It may be inappropriate even in cases where an-
other woman is being interrogated, since she may resent being interrogated in the presence of the other woman.

33. Training of Interpreters

Generally speaking, the establishment of special schools for interpreters is not feasible. Consequently, the interrogator himself will be responsible for properly orienting the interpreter as to the nature of his duties, the standards of conduct expected, the techniques of interrogation to be employed, and any other requirements which the interrogator considers necessary. Special attention should be given to the development of language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreter is expected to be employed. The accuracy of translation should be stressed. Periodic testing and evaluation of the interpreter should be conducted; evaluation should be made without the interpreter's knowledge.

34. Interrogation with an Interpreter

The interrogation procedures to be employed must be adapted to the employment of an interpreter. Some of the adaptations to the normal procedure discussed in a through d below, need only be considered at the initial stage—when the interpreter is first teamed with the interrogator—and need not be reconsidered thereafter if the interpreter and the interrogator constantly work together as a team.

a. Planning and Preparation. To insure maximum results from interpreter employment, the interrogator should take certain steps prior to the interrogation. Among these are the following:

(1) Determine the security clearance, linguistic ability, personality, and general education of the interpreter. In reference to linguistic ability, if a special vocabulary (technical or professional and/or slang terms) or the precise translation of specific terms are necessary for a particular interrogation, the interpreter must be so informed. In some instances it may be necessary for the interrogator to provide a precise English definition of terms to insure a clear understanding by the interpreter. If possible, the interpreter should be given an opportunity to conduct any research necessary prior to the interrogation.

(2) Brief the interpreter thoroughly on the information available regarding the subject and the objectives of the interrogation.

(3) Instruct the interpreter on the physical arrangements for the interrogation and, if possible, permit him to observe the actual place and facilities to be used for the interrogation. The interpreter should know exactly where his physical position will be in relation to the interrogator and the subject. The interpreter should be as close as possible to the two principals but sufficiently out of the way to allow them to face one another. In many cases, the most desirable arrangement is for the interrogator and the subject to face one another at opposite sides of a table with the interpreter located at the end of the table.

(4) Instruct the interpreter on the manner in which the interrogation is to take place. The interpreter should be made to understand that he is the "right hand" of the interrogator and is very important to the interrogation, but that he must guard against any tendency to inject his own questions, ideas, or personality into the interrogation. The interpreter should use direct translations of the statements made by the principals, and avoid such expressions as "He wants to know if you . . ." or "He said to tell you that . . ."

(5) Select the method of interpretation, either alternate or simultaneous, to be used during the interrogation. The choice between them has to be made on the basis of the interrogator's evaluation of the interpreter's ability and personal characteristics, and in conjunction with other factors influencing the interrogation. Each method has certain advantages, disadvantages, and peculiarities which the interrogator must recognize.
(a) Alternate method. In the alternate method, the interrogator speaks entire thoughts, sentences, or even paragraphs, and then pauses to permit the interpretation of all that has been said. This method requires the interpreter to have an exceptionally good memory; it has the disadvantage of making the interpreter's presence more evident, thus tending to break down the desired eye-to-eye contact between the interrogator and subject. It does, however, allow the interpreter to rephrase statements to insure better understanding in the second language. This is significant when the other language has a sentence structure which differs from that of the language employed by the interrogator.

(b) Simultaneous method. In the simultaneous method, the interpreter speaks right along with the interrogator, keeping up with him as closely as possible, usually a phrase or so behind. With this method, the highly skilled interpreter can more closely follow and render the exact mental attitudes, connotations and fine shades of meaning conveyed by either the subject or the interrogator. Simultaneous interpreting enhances rapport between the subject and the interrogator and promotes attentive listening since there will be no long pauses during which the two principals are not involved. Simultaneous interpreting has the disadvantage of greater error, especially where there is a difference in sentence structure between the languages. This method also requires a very high degree of proficiency in both languages.

(c) Practice, under conditions approximating those of the planned interrogation, is desirable.

b. Approach, Questioning, and Termination Phases. At the onset of the interrogation, the interrogator must instruct the subject as to the role of the interpreter. The subject is told to talk directly to the interrogator, and to avoid such phrases as "Tell him that . . ." and "I would like to have you say . . ." The interrogator and subject must use simple, direct language and take care to avoid the use of ambiguous questions or statements. They must also control their rate of speech and, while talking, avoid looking at the interpreter. The interpreter's role is to give an accurate translation and to refrain from engaging the subject in personal conversation during the course of the interrogation. In all of these phases, the interpreter should assume a secondary role.

c. Recording and Reporting Phases. Both the interrogator and the interpreter should take part in preparing the record and the report of the interrogation to eliminate, insofar as possible, all ambiguities and to insure explanation of words which cannot be translated into precise language.

d. Other Considerations.

(1) Procurement. Interpreters usually are obtained in one or two ways—they are assigned or the using element or interrogator may be required to hire them. When it becomes necessary to hire an interpreter, the hiring element should determine—

(a) The prospects for continued availability of the interpreter (e.g., is the interpreter subject to conscription into the armed forces, perhaps that of another country?).

(b) The qualifications of the individual in relation to the desired employment.

(c) The probability of the individual being granted a security clearance.

(2) Evaluation. The interrogator has the responsibility to evaluate constantly the interpreter's capability and reliability. This is true even for interpreters who may have been employed for long periods of time.

(3) Culture and social problems. A problem which will arise, especially when using foreign nationals as interpreters, is the cultural and social difference between the interpreter and the subject. For example, the interpreter
and subject may be from groups of peoples who traditionally hate each other. No matter how proficient or experienced an interpreter he may be, it should be expected that certain animosities and prejudices are going to affect his attitude in his dealings with others. These prejudices may be based on religious, political, ethnic, or other differences. Such attitudes have no place in harmonious coordination and communication, and it is the responsibility of the interrogator to watch for and control such attitudes.

(4) **Rapport with the subject.** Communication between two persons becomes increasingly difficult when a "middle man," the interpreter, is introduced into the situation. The use of an interpreter is time-consuming and impersonal, and impedes the flowing continuity of communication. The interpreter, however, is in direct communication with the recipient, and definitely may influence the tone and ultimate meaning of the communication, as well as the mood or tenor of relationship with the recipient.

(5) **Rapport with the interpreter.** The establishment of rapport with the interpreter is vital. The interpreter must accept the fact of his relative position—he works for the interrogator. It is not his position to make decisions, but to act as a communication media. By the same token, the interrogator must realize that the interpreter is a professional assistant, and he should be treated accordingly.

### Section V. THE POLYGRAPH

#### 35. General

One of the technical aids available to the interrogator is the polygraph. While it is sometimes possible to detect that a person is lying by simple observation of such signs as blood rushing to the face, thumping of the heart, an uncontrollable impulse to swallow, or the inability to "look the interrogator in the eye," not all persons exhibit these reactions outwardly. Some individuals are able to maintain a controlled, calm attitude with no outward sign of emotion. Through the use of a polygraph, certain physiological changes in blood pressure, respiration, and electro-dermal response (changes in skin resistance) can be recorded scientifically. When properly diagnosed by a trained, competent examiner, these findings may give some indication as to whether or not a person is telling the truth. The fear of detection appears to be the principal factor causing the physiological changes to take place in an individual, but other factors such as remorsefulness or consciousness of wrongdoing can act as contributing factors. Since this equipment requires a trained operator and controlled physical facilities, its use will be limited, especially in tactical interrogations. In this regard, some of the factors discussed in the following paragraphs will not be applicable to the normal PW type interrogation. However, interrogators should be aware of the capabilities of the polygraph and its availability for use in special cases. The situation may well arise wherein it is essential that the truthfulness of a particular PW be determined. The polygraph may prove a valuable aid in making this determination.

#### 36. Use of the Polygraph

##### a. Capabilities.

(1) **Establishing knowledgeability.** The polygraph can be used to examine selected potential interrogation subjects to establish the extent of knowledgeability. It permits the interrogator to concentrate his efforts on the most potentially productive subject, particularly in counterintelligence and criminal interrogations.

(2) **Establishing veracity.** Indications of deception recorded by the polygraph will provide valuable means for providing the interrogator with specific points upon which to concentrate his interrogation efforts. Just as valuable is the evidence of a lack of
attempt to deceive on the part of a person furnishing information; this indicates to the interrogator that the subject probably will be truthful concerning any information he may reveal.

b. Limitations.

(1) Emotional tension or extreme nervousness. When the subject has just been extensively interrogated or is at the point of exhaustion at the time of testing, polygraph findings often are inconclusive. It is normal, however, for most subjects to be somewhat apprehensive and nervous during a test with the polygraph. The polygraph operator must distinguish between natural emotional tension or nervousness on the subject's part and attempts at deception.

(2) Physiological abnormalities. Heart and respiratory diseases, excessively high or low blood pressure, the use of drugs, narcotics or barbiturates, and recent serious illness or injury could adversely affect the examination. The interrogator should be alert to detect any such abnormalities in a subject and inform the examiner of them prior to the examination.

(3) Mental abnormalities. Subjects who are feebleminded (idiots, imbeciles, and morons), those suffering from mental disorders (paranoids, schizophrenics, and manic depressives), and those who are emotionally unstable pose a definite limitation to examination. Such subjects may not understand the questions posed, nor distinguish between truth and falsehood.

(4) Unresponsive subjects. Some subjects will fail to respond sufficiently to produce conclusive results. This group would include among others, subjects who have no fear of detection, who are able to control their responses through mental attitude, who have been previously tested, and who are physically exhausted or under shock.

(5) Answers. No narrative answers can be obtained—only "Yes" or "No" answers. Subsequent interrogation, however, may elicit the necessary details, using examination results as a basis for questioning.

(6) Questions. Only a limited number of relevant questions can be asked in any given test. Consequently, test questions must be carefully planned and selected.

(7) Consent of subject. An obvious limitation is the necessity for obtaining the consent and willingness of the subject to undergo a polygraph examination. U.S. citizens have certain rights which must be safeguarded. AR 195–12 governs the use of the polygraph in this connection. This limitation is not applicable to PW; however, the subject's cooperation, or lack of it, has a direct influence on results of any examination.

c. Physical Facilities. The examination should be conducted in a plain room, free from distraction (fig. 2). A two-way mirror may be necessary to provide a means for witnesses to observe from an adjoining room without distracting the subject. Such a precaution is often taken when the subject is a woman, to preclude any later charges of mistreatment or mishandling of the subject on the part of the examiner. The room should also be equipped with listening and recording devices.

d. Responsibilities of the Examiner. Aside from the preparation of the physical facilities and the polygraph, the examiner must determine if the subject is psychologically and physiologically ready for the examination. In addition, the examiner is responsible for the final formulation and phrasing of the questions to be asked during the examination. These questions are based upon information concerning the case and the subject obtained from the investigator prior to the examination.

e. Employment. In order for the examiner to conduct an effective polygraph test, he must be provided with all the available facts and circumstances forming the basis for the test. Such information is essential to the examiner so that, in coordination with the interrogator, he will be able to formulate the questions to be asked during the examination. Polygraph tests
should not be conducted unless the examiner agrees that sufficient facts are available upon which pertinent questions can be based and constructed. It is the responsibility of the interrogator to coordinate with the examiner prior to the examination. The interrogator must brief the examiner on the complete situation concerning the subject, and the interrogator must provide all available information pertaining to the subject’s background—his past life, history, and all personal data. Information of this sort not only enables the examiner to more readily engage the subject in conversation, but more importantly, it gives him data for preparing control (known answer) questions for the test.

f. Special Considerations. The use of a polygraph examination conducted on U.S. citizens is governed by AR 195–12. Interrogation personnel, particularly chiefs of interrogation elements, when a polygraph capability is present or available, must be familiar with this regulation. The current regulation (1 Feb 1966) provides that in criminal and personnel security investigations of personnel of the Department of the Army, or of personnel outside the Department of the Army requiring access to classified defense information, certain authorization must be obtained and certain procedures followed. These procedures are generally not applicable to the PW, captured insurgent, or indigenous civilian. If, however, the subject is charged with or suspected of having committed an offense against U.S. law and is subject to trial either by U.S. court-martial or other U.S. court, a failure to advise the subject of his right against self-incrimination and of his right to counsel as provided by law will prevent the use against him at a subsequent trial of any evidence so obtained. The staff or installation judge advocate should be consulted in doubtful cases.

g. Summary. The interrogator should remember that the polygraph is an investigative aid only, and it should never be used as a substitute for exhaustive interrogation or in-
vestigation. It may be used to guide him into the correct channels of interrogation, to select the proper person to interrogate, or it may be used to aid in determining the truth of a man's statements. The instrument cannot perform miracles—the polygraph only records the physical responses of the human body to psychological stimuli. The interrogator can expect one of only four conclusions from the polygraph examination—

(1) There were indications of attempted deception.
(2) There were no indications of attempted deception.
(3) The examination was inconclusive.
(4) No opinion could be rendered due to incomplete examination; e.g., suspect refused to continue.

37. Applicable STANAGS
The material presented in this chapter agrees with applicable portions of STANAG 2022—Intelligence Reports, STANAG 2033 (SOLOG-69)—Interrogations of Prisoners of War (PW), and STANAG 2084 (SOLOG-94)—Handling and Reporting Enemy Documents.
CHAPTER 3
TACTICAL INTERROGATION OPERATIONS

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

38. General
The basic techniques and procedures of interrogation outlined in chapters 1 and 2 are valid for all interrogations. However, the procedures will be modified in tactical interrogation because of the type of information desired, the types of subjects to be interrogated, and time limitations. Tactical interrogations normally will be limited to obtaining that information about the enemy and terrain which the commander at each echelon requires to fulfill his mission. Subjects possessing strategic and other nontactical information will be recommended for detailed interrogations at higher levels (field army and above). Normally, interrogations conducted at corps level and lower echelons are tactical in nature and limited in scope. Interrogations conducted at field army level and higher may be either tactical or strategic in nature and are carried out in greater detail. The primary sources of information during tactical operations are PW. These captured enemy personnel are first-hand and last-minute observers of enemy operations. They represent one of the few forms of live connection with the enemy and usually possess valuable information. Other sources of information are enemy and friendly civilians, refugees, defectors, captured espionage agents, informers, and allied escapees or evaders. Because these subjects may have lived in or passed through areas occupied and/or controlled by the enemy, they can provide valuable information. One other important source of information, which interrogation personnel will be required to exploit in tactical operations, is captured enemy documents. Documents will be found in the possession of PW and on the battlefield. They provide critical and sometimes detailed information about the enemy which he has recorded in his own words and for his own use.

39. The Geneva Conventions
a. Treatment of PW will be in accordance with the laws of land warfare as derived from customs and treaties to include the Geneva Conventions, 12 Aug 49, para 1, article 3 (see app B, this manual), and AR 633–50. It is important that the interrogator be thoroughly familiar with the Geneva Conventions to include those portions pertaining to the various categories of captured personnel (especially those without PW status), their privileges, and obligations. An interrogator who is able to draw upon his knowledge of the Geneva Conventions has in his possession a valuable interrogation tool.

b. Under the Geneva Conventions a PW, when questioned, must give basic identity data consisting of his full name, rank, date of birth, and service number or equivalent information. Willful refusal to comply with this provision subjects the PW to possible loss of the normal privileges accorded a PW of his rank or status.

c. The interrogator must observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. In general, the Conventions prohibit any form of coercion as a legal method of obtaining information. This restriction need not handicap the interrogator, since force is neither an acceptable nor effective method of obtaining accurate information.

d. Observance of the Geneva Conventions by the interrogator is not only mandatory but advantageous because there is a chance that our own personnel, when captured, will receive better treatment, and enemy personnel will be
more likely to surrender if the word goes out that our treatment of PW is humane and just.

e. Further information concerning the treatment of PW, from capture through evacuation and internment, may be found in FM 19–40. Information on the handling of civilian and allied personnel (escapees and evaders) may be found in FM 30–5.

Section II. TREATMENT, HANDLING, AND EVALUATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

40. Treatment of PW

The success or failure of an interrogation often will be determined by the way a prisoner is handled and treated from the moment of his capture through his final interrogation. The most critical period is from the moment of capture until the first interrogation. This is known as the “conditioning period.” When a prisoner is first captured, he usually is overwhelmed by the shock of battle, his defeat, and subsequent capture. This shock, plus the natural insecurity of not knowing what will happen to him, creates a feeling of distress or psychological inferiority in the prisoner. These feelings within the prisoner provide a tremendous advantage to the interrogator; therefore, the prisoner should remain in this state of mind through his interrogation. Personnel coming into contact with the prisoner must know the proper handling procedures in order to assist in maintaining this state of mind.

41. Handling of PW

The proper conditioning of PW for interrogation can be materially aided by a well-organized and smoothly functioning handling and evacuation system. Careful indoctrination of our own and other friendly troops is essential to assure the proper handling of PW. Troops must be completely oriented in the five-S’s of PW handling: Search, Silence, Segregate, Safeguard, and Secure. This indoctrination may be accomplished during periods of training, using experienced interrogators as instructors. (ASubjScd 19–4 will be of assistance in preparing and conducting such instruction.) Capturing soldiers should disarm, search, segregate, and tag prisoners and evacuate them to the battalion PW collecting point located in the battalion combat trains area where the S–2 interrogates them. They are then evacuated under battalion guard to the forward division PW collecting point located in the brigade trains area. The forward division collecting point is normally operated by the military police platoon supporting the brigade (fig. 3). Additional information on the handling of PW is given in FM 19–40 and FM 61–100.

a. Disarm. Immediately after capture, the prisoner will be disarmed. Where a large group of prisoners is captured, as a temporary expedient they will be instructed—verbally or through the use of sign language—to drop their weapons and to step aside so that their weapons can be collected. Weapons of intelligence value obtained as a result of this disarming should be placed in the custody of the guard to be evacuated along with the PW. Otherwise the weapons should be disposed of in accordance with established SOP. Further information on the handling and evacuation of captured enemy material is contained in FM 30–5 and FM 30–16.

b. Search. After the PW is disarmed of weapons, a search for concealed weapons, items which may serve as weapons, and documents should be conducted. Ideally this search should take place as soon after capture as possible—before the PW has an opportunity to rid himself of anything. During internal defense operations, the search must include a clearing of the immediate area in the vicinity of the point of capture. Those items of equipment which cannot be used as weapons or aid in escaping will be retained by the PW. Equipment in this category includes: helmet, protective mask, uniform, rank insignia, decorations, and other related items. Anything containing recorded information—letters, papers, official documents, maps, and photographs—are removed from the PW. Document tags should be completed and attached or the documents should be otherwise identified with the PW from whom taken. Care must be taken not to deface the documents. These documents should then be placed in the custody of a guard and evacuated along with the PW.

c. Segregation. As soon as practicable after capture, the PW should be segregated. Among PW there will be individuals who, because of
Figure 3. Handling and interrogation of PW at tactical levels.
rank, training, and other reasons, will influence other PW. These individuals will be more security conscious and therefore less amenable to the interrogation, and they will try to influence weaker and subordinate PW to act likewise. Other problems will arise if people of varied background remain together; e.g.,
military and civilian, male and female, officers and privates, etc. In order to prevent the strong-willed PW from influencing the weaker, and to enhance control, the PW should be segregated. The following are suggested groupings or categories for segregation:

1. Officers
It should be kept in mind that the primary purpose of segregation is to prevent communication between individuals and/or groups. Immediately after capture, this segregation may amount merely to having groups of PW stand a few feet apart from each other and face in different directions, whereas at a higher echelon it could mean a physical separation within the PW compound or between separate camps.

d. Tagging. Each PW should be tagged by the capturing unit. The information on each tag can be supplied by the capturing soldier without talking to the PW (fig. 4). The completed tag will then be secured to the PW. The PW must be advised not to destroy or lose the tag, for such loss will cause him only more inconvenience and delay in reaching a PW camp. To the interrogater, the information on the tag will serve as a means of commencing the interrogation. The tag further aids the interrogator in geographically locating the place of capture—should this datum be otherwise unavailable. Particularly important are the date/time group, the exact place or location of capture (grid coordinates, if possible), and how the individual was captured (e.g., unit overrun, ambushed, surrendered).

e. Evacuation. The normal chain for evacuating PW is from the point of capture to the battalion PW collecting point located in the battalion combat trains area. From this point, PW are evacuated under battalion guard to the forward division PW collecting point established in the committed brigade trains area. From division forward collecting points, PW are evacuated to the division central collecting point by military policemen of the division military police company. Field Army military police normally are in charge of moving prisoners from the divisions to the Army cage. For additional information, see FM 19-40. At lower levels (below brigade), interrogators may assist in instructing untrained personnel who will serve as guards. Routine measures to be taken by the guards in handling PW during evacuation are as follows:

1. Prevent escape.
2. Maintain segregation.
3. Enforce silence.
4. Be alert for PW attempting to destroy or discard documents or other items which may have been overlooked in the search.
5. Do not allow PW to have any provisions or comfort items (food, drink, tobacco) except those necessary for sustenance of life.
6. Keep the evacuation moving—speed is essential.
7. Allow no one to talk to the PW except intelligence, medical, or other authorized personnel. Wounded prisoners are evacuated through medical channels. They may be interrogated upon approval of competent military medical personnel.

Section III. PROCESSING OF ENEMY DOCUMENTS

42. Handling, Reporting, and Evacuation of Captured Enemy Documents

a. Captured enemy documents include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession of the enemy and subsequently comes into our possession. This includes our own documents which the enemy may have previously captured. Basically, enemy documents are acquired in two ways—they are found in the possession of PW or on enemy dead, or they are found on the battlefield. Captured enemy documents are generally of two types—official documents of governmental or military origin (such as overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field manuals, and reports), or personal documents of a private or commercial origin (such as letters, diaries, newspapers, books, and identification cards). Some documents, such as military identification and personnel orders, may be of military origin but
they are personal documents nonetheless. Methods and procedures of handling and reporting captured enemy documents is governed by STANAG No. 2084 (SOLOG No. 94), 12 October 1966. Although this STANAG is directed mainly to intelligence staff aspects of captured enemy documents, pertinent guidance provided has been incorporated into this part of the manual. STANAG 2084 is included as an appendix to FM 30-5.

b. Captured enemy documents must be sent without delay to higher headquarters. This will insure that their intelligence value will be determined and exploited in the earliest time. The following procedures have been formulated to aid this timely evacuation and exploitation:

(1) Documents found on PW and those documents found on the battlefield which can be exploited more efficiently when combined with PW interrogation, will be given to the PW escort for delivery with the PW to the next echelon in the channel of evacuation. In exceptional cases, documents may be evacuated through intelligence channels ahead of the PW for advance study by intelligence agencies.

(2) Technical documents found with materiel and which relate to the materiel’s technical design or operation should be evacuated with the materiel. If the operational situation prevents evacuation of the materiel, the documents should be identified with the materiel by means of an attached sheet marked “TECH DOC” listing the precise location, time, and circumstances of capture, and as detailed a description of the materiel as practical. If possible, photographs should be taken of the equipment and evacuated with the document. An object of known size (i.e., a ruler) should be photographed along with the materiel to provide a size reference.

(3) Documents from other sources (enemy dead or found on the battlefield) are evacuated to the nearest intelligence officer (S2/G2) for disposition.

(4) All documents should be identified with the following minimum information:

(a) The capturing unit.
(b) Location of capture (grid coordinates).
(c) When it was captured (date and time).
(d) Circumstances under which it was captured (including when applicable, identification with the PW on which found).

This minimum information should be placed on a tag, envelope, or similar device. The PW capture tag shown in figure 4 may be used on documents as well. It is never written on the document itself. Documents should not be marked, altered, or defaced in any way.

(5) All personnel involved in the evacuation and handling of documents will take care to protect the documents from soiling, weather, and wear.

(6) The echelons for evacuation of documents found on PW are the same as for the PW himself—normally capturing unit to brigade, division, and to field army, bypassing corps. Those documents found on dead enemy or on the battlefield follow these same channels, but include corps.

43. Documents Found on Prisoners of War

a. All documents found on a PW immediately should be taken from him to prevent his destroying or disposing of them. Any document taken from a PW must be identified carefully with the PW from whom taken.

b. The final disposition of a document will depend on the nature of the document itself. Basically, three actions can be taken concerning a document found on a PW.

(1) They can be confiscated. Official documents, except those issued for personal use (such as identity documents) are confiscated. This means that they are taken with no intention of returning them to the person on whom they were found.

(2) They can be impounded. Personal documents are impounded. This means that they are taken with the intention of returning them to the owner at a later time. This same
procedure is followed with other valu-
ables.

(3) They can be returned to the PW im-
mmediately. Identity documents are
frequently taken from the PW by an
interrogator, examined briefly, then
returned to the PW. The Geneva
Conventions prescribes that identity
documents may not be permanently
removed from the PW.

44. Document Processing

A captured document, excluding one found
on a PW, passed from the capturing unit into
intelligence channels, will be processed through
various echelons. Each echelon may extract
certain information from the document; how-
ever, the document should be rapidly processed
and transmitted to the next echelon. The fol-
lowing is a normal chain of events for a cap-
tured enemy document.

a. The capturing unit will forward the doc-
uments to the intelligence officer of its imme-
diate headquarters (e.g., an infantry company
would forward documents to its battalion S2).
The document will then be processed and for-
warded through intelligence channels.

b. Under normal circumstances, the first
level where a document will be exploited to any
degree will be at brigade. Normally, the in-
telligence specialists who can first examine
captured documents are interrogators attached
at brigade level. In addition to interrogating
prisoners of war, these interrogators, within
their capability, will scan the documents and
extract from them such information as may be
of value to the brigade. In any case—whether
interrogators are located at brigade or not—
the documents will be evacuated quickly to di-
vision. If at brigade it is desired to retain
portions or all of the document for future ex-
ploration, a copy of the document or extracts
of desired portions will be made. The original
document will not be altered or retained.

c. At division, the documents will be scanned
for tactical information of immediate value to
the division. Again, if it is desired to retain
portions or all of the document, a copy will be
made or the information will be extracted.
The unaltered original must be evacuated.

d. At division, the documents will be as-
signed a category dependent on the type of
information contained in the document. Cat-
egories assigned documents are not permanent;
they may be changed at any time during the
process of evacuation. Information consid-
ted to be of value at division level may not have
importance at field army or vice versa; it de-
deps on the information sought and other in-
formation already available. This is particu-
larly true of information with a critical time
factor; documents containing useful tactical
information frequently lose their value when
the information becomes outdated. It is quite
common for a document to contain both tactical
and strategic information; the categories
merely determine the priority of exploitation.

(1) Category “A” documents contain in-
formation of immediate tactical or
strategic value. Examples of this
type of document are those which
contain information such as enemy
order of battle, the employment of
new weapons and equipment by the
enemy, and the enemy’s logistic and
morale situation. Information from
this type document will be transmit-
ted to higher, lower, and affected ad-
jacent units by the most expeditious
means available.

(2) Category “B” documents contain
cryptographic items and information
relative to enemy radio systems. This
category includes such items as en-
crypted messages, code books and
sheets, signal operating instructions,
radio manuals, etc. Category “B”
documents require special handling.
They will be handled as SECRET and
will be forwarded through intelli-
gence channels to the nearest United
States Army Security Agency (USASA) unit as expeditiously as possible. They will be tagged in the regular manner to indicate place, time, date, circumstances of capture, and capturing unit.

(3) Category "C" documents contain information of lesser value to intelligence staffs. Examples of these type documents are personal letters that divulge no information, pinup pictures, some commercial or business literature, fiction books, comic magazines, etc. However, some of the most innocuous looking documents may contain fragmentary information which, when evaluated in conjunction with intelligence from other sources, may divulge important tactical or strategic intelligence concerning the enemy.

(4) Category "D" documents contain no information of apparent value to intelligence staffs, but require special handling. Included are documents the value of which cannot be determined. This category includes items such as oil paintings and money. Again it is important not to give authority to untrained personnel to make the decision regarding the value of captured enemy documents.

e. Priority of transmission is determined by the category of the document. "A" documents receive the highest priority, then "B," "C," and lastly "D." Cryptographic documents are transmitted separately. All documents are studied carefully; information falling into the "A" category is extracted for immediate use, and the documents are forwarded in accordance with the priority given them. Documents which do not accompany a specific PW will be forwarded with a "batch slip." The batch slip lists the transmitting headquarters, time, place, and circumstances of capture of the documents and capturing unit, as well as pertinent control data (fig. 5).

f. Division will evacuate documents to corps if the documents are not accompanying a specific PW. If a document is associated with a specific PW, it will be evacuated along with the

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BATCH SLIP

SHIP TO: Hq, VII Corps FROM: 3d Inf Div

BATCH NO: 6 ITEM COUNT: 4 DATE: 5 Jun 6...

TIME & PLACE CAPTURED: 041600 Jun 6... vic RB 214638

CAPTURED BY: Co A, 2d Bn, 15th Inf, 2d Bde, 3d Inf Div.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found lying about in abandoned enemy CP

DATE RECEIVED: 4 Jun 6... BATCHED BY: PFC J. P. JONES
```

Figure 5. Batch slip for transmittal of captured documents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FILE NO.</th>
<th>DATE &amp; TIME RECEIVED</th>
<th>INCOMING BATCH NO.</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT</th>
<th>TIME &amp; PLACE OF CAPTURE</th>
<th>CAPTURING UNIT</th>
<th>RECEIVED FROM</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>052000 Jun 6...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Operations Plan, 17th Aggressor Mech Regt</td>
<td>041600 Jun 6... vic-RB214638</td>
<td>Co A, 2d Bn, 15th Inf, 2d Bde, 3d Inf Div.</td>
<td>3d Inf Div</td>
<td>T-207-D-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6. Captured documents log.*
TRANSLATION REPORT

1. Control data:
   a. Item Nr: 2
   c. Capture (DTG and place): 041600 June 6..., vic RB214638
   d. Capturing unit: Co A, 2d Bn, 15th Inf, 2d Bde, 3d Inf Div.
   e. Received (date): 5 Jun 6... in Batch Nr 6
   f. Type of translation: (Extract).

2. Text of translation:
   (Translation typed in here, continuation sheets used as needed)

Figure 7. Sample—document translation report.
PW to field army. At corps as at division, the documents will be scanned for tactical information of value to corps. After extraction of information of interest, the documents will be evacuated to field army.

g. The lowest level to which document examiners normally are assigned is field army. A document examination section of the interrogation element is found at this echelon. Documents normally are processed at field army as follows:

(1) Upon arrival, documents are logged into the captured documents log which shows the time received, description of the document, time and place of capture, and capturing unit as well as pertinent control data (fig. 6).

(2) Documents are screened to determine further transmission priority based on immediate command requests and directives. Information of immediate tactical value is extracted and reported to the G2 section as expeditiously as possible.

(3) Full or extract translations will be accomplished as directed by the G2. All translations are prepared in triplicate, marked conspicuously with the word “DRAFT,” and a copy is provided the G2 section. The original translation is appended to the document for transmission to higher headquarters and a file copy is kept by the document translator section (fig. 7).

(a) When documents have been processed by the document translators, they are prepared for transmission to the appropriate higher headquarters (normally theater). A separate package is made for all documents captured on the same date, at the same place, and received by the documents translator section at the same time.

(b) Temporary numbers are given each package of documents. Example: T-101-D-14. The T-101 indicates the identity of the translating MI unit. The D-14 indicates the package number of the documents.

(c) A documents inventory showing time and place of capture, capturing unit, forwarding headquarters, and item numbers assigned each document as well as an inventory describing the transmitted documents is prepared in triplicate. One copy is retained by the preparing section and two copies accompany the documents (fig. 8).

h. At theater, there normally will be more elaborate document examination elements. Here may be found combined and possibly national interrogation centers which will include a document examination center. Documents at theater level will be given a final screening to determine categories and disposition of documents. Detailed exploitation and indexing will be performed by the document centers.

(1) Category “A” documents will be translated, retained, and stored within the theater. Pertinent information will be disseminated to requiring agencies and units. The stored documents will be accessible to any authorized agency either in the original or by photographic reproductions.

(2) Category “B” documents which may be received through intelligence channels or otherwise acquired at theater level will be transmitted as expeditiously as possible to the USASA unit specified by the command.

(3) Category “C” documents will be given a careful screening to insure that they contain no information of value. Then they will be retained within the theater, to be distributed in accordance with theater instructions which may include destruction.

(4) Category “D” documents will be screened carefully and disposition made depending on the nature of the document. Documents which contain information of value to military branches (but not intelligence information) will be forwarded to the interested branch. For example, unmarked maps and charts of previous unknown types will be forwarded to
**HEADQUARTERS:** VII Corps

**DOCUMENTS TRANSLATOR SECTION:** 207th MI Det

**PACKAGE NUMBER:** T-207-D-17

**CAPTURED BY:** Co A, 2d Bn, 15th Inf, 2d Bde, 3d Inf Div.

**TIME & PLACE CAPTURED:** 041600 Jun 6... vic-RB214638

### INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS

**ITEM NO.**

1. Overlay to accompany operations plan, 17th Aggressor Mech Regt, notes in Esperanto.


3. Administrative Directive, 6th Aggressor Army, 10 May 6... mimeographed in Esperanto, seven pages.

4. Personal letter and envelope to Captain Emil KROWKOLSKI, Hq 17th Aggressor Mech Regt, from his brother in Uditz, HOSTILONIA; written in Esperanto, dated 24 May 6... three pages.

*Figure 8. Sample—captured documents inventory.*

The nearest engineer unit or topographical section. Documents relating solely to captured equipment will accompany the equipment to the per-
incent technical service. Other documents will be handled as directed by theater procedures or appropriate authority.

45. Documents—Aid to Interrogation

Some documents which provide little information of intelligence value serve as invaluable aids to the interrogator when used in the interrogation of a PW. Especially valuable are those documents which have a continuing standard format or pattern. Although there are many types of documents which may aid the interrogator, the majority fall into two broad groups—identity documents and personal documents.

a. Identity Documents. Identification documents (identity cards or booklets, passports, visas, etc.) are examples of documents with established formats and patterns. Most countries adopt one particular format for an identity document which remains unchanged for many years. Identity cards or booklets will contain the following information:

(1) Basic identity data—name, rank, service number, date of birth, height, weight, color of hair and eyes, and blood type.

(2) Branch of service—the interrogator may use this information to develop questions for the PW to whom the card belongs; i.e., an infantry lieutenant might well be a platoon leader; an artillery lieutenant might be a forward observer.

b. Personal Documents.

(1) Personal documents include such things as letters, diaries, notes of meetings, notes of things to do, etc. Into this category also fall engraved watches or bracelets and fraternal, school, and wedding rings. These items may or may not be of intelligence value, but they provide valuable aids to the interrogator in inducing a PW to reveal information.

(2) Into this category also falls what may be described as “pocket litter”—miscellaneous items that most people carry in their pockets for reasons as diverse as the items themselves. People habitually carry such items as money, knives, matches, keys, receipts, addresses, and sundry cards. Many times the skillful interrogator may uncover leads to valuable intelligence information through these items.

Section IV. SCREENING AND SELECTION OF SUBJECTS

46. General

Interrogation procedures, including screening, are governed by STANAG No. 2033. This text provides guidance which is in accord with this STANAG. Screening and selection of productive subjects for interrogation is a difficult and important interrogation procedure. This is particularly true when there are large numbers of PW available for interrogation and limited time. It is important that interrogators select only the most likely and most knowledgeable subjects, particularly at the lower tactical levels where time is very critical. The principles shown in a through c below, are important in the screening and selection process.

a. The PW realizes that the best way to avoid detailed interrogation is to avoid being selected.

b. The sequence in which PW are interrogated is of significance; information from one subject may be used as a check or pressure point on subsequent subjects.

c. The time available for interrogation will vary at each echelon.

47. The Screening Process

The screening process varies at each level but the basic considerations are time, facilities, and personnel available. In some cases, the complete-screening process may not take place until the PW reaches field army. To the extent that conditions permit, the steps described in a through h below, should be taken.

a. As a preliminary step in the screening process, all PW are assembled on open ground and organized or segregated by interrogation.
personnel into smaller groups. Civilians are segregated from military personnel, officers from enlisted men and NCO. These groups are then subdivided by nationality, grade or rank, organization, branch of service, political affiliations, military or civilian specialty, and so on. Each major group is then further separated according to categories necessary for control and to make the “screening” effort more effective. The major consideration in such screening is, of course, the intelligence requirements of the command.

b. Screening personnel attempt to locate the most highly qualified prisoners for interrogation. Since the initial groups are formed by having the PW voluntarily move to designated groups, those who have intentionally placed themselves into the wrong category are automatically selected for further interrogation and possible referral to counterintelligence specialists.

c. In the first stage of individual screening, each PW reports to an initial screener who questions the PW in as much detail as time and circumstances allow to ascertain his true identity and determine his general intelligence information potential in the light of requirements. The number selected for interrogation normally is larger than actually required, and those not selected are designated for evacuation. Depending upon the screening plan, the screener may record basic information on those selected, together with reasons for the initial selection, or he may complete a simply coded form designed so the PW cannot understand what is written on the form. A written report by the initial screener usually is unnecessary if the preliminary screening and planning arrangements are sufficiently detailed. The selected subjects are then instructed to report to a second screener seated nearby.

d. The second screener prepares a report based on the results of his screening. Further clarification and exploration of the PW’s background is accomplished by the second screener and the PW’s intelligence potential is estimated by relating his specific areas of knowledge to outstanding intelligence requirements. After the screening report is prepared, the PW is referred to the final screener.

e. The final screener makes his selection based on the overall intelligence requirements and priorities assigned, and by weighing such factors as the capability of the interrogation unit and housing capacity against the estimated intelligence potential of the PW. Those selected are retained in a holding compound. The final screening report is then prepared and forwarded to the chief interrogator who prepares the necessary interrogation schedules and assigns selected PW to interrogators for detailed intelligence interrogation.

f. In many instances, the limited number of interrogators and limited time will necessitate simplification of the foregoing process to the extent that a single interrogator may perform the entire screening process. His ultimate task will be that of the final screener above.

g. The screening of refugees, displaced persons, and evacuees generally follows the same pattern used for screening of PW. The initial screening of civilians in these categories normally will be conducted at brigade level in the division area. Further screening will be conducted in assembly areas and assembly centers. Screening should be accomplished in coordination and in conjunction with counterintelligence, civil affairs, and military units in the area.

h. According to their value to intelligence, prisoners of war may be divided into categories. These categories are assigned to prisoners at their initial interrogation or screening. The assigned category is not permanent and may be changed at a higher echelon. The categories discussed here are assigned by letter; however, in some areas, local policy may dictate that other designations be used.

(1) Category A. This category embraces high-level prisoners of war whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators at the highest echelon. Types of prisoners in this category include—

(a) General officers, chiefs of staff sections of divisions or larger units, heads of staff sections at field army and above.

(b) Scientific and technical personnel
with current knowledge of CBR weapons or new types of equipment.

(c) Political officers and psychological warfare personnel.

(d) High civilian officials, war correspondents, etc., who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistic capabilities or political and economic factors.

(e) Persons with detailed knowledge of enemy communications, particularly ciphers and cryptographic equipment.

(f) Persons in intelligence units or staff positions.

(2) Category B. Prisoners of war who have enough information about the enemy on any subject of value to intelligence, in addition to information of immediate tactical value to warrant a second interrogation.

(3) Category C. Prisoners of war who have only information of immediate tactical value and thus do not warrant a second interrogation.

(4) Category D. Prisoners of war who are of no interest to intelligence.

48. Screening at Echelons Below Field Army

The initial selection of PW for interrogation should be conducted by experienced interrogators. This basis for screening will be the current intelligence requirements of the command. At the tactical levels of division and lower, PW are screened to locate those with information that will affect the current tactical situation. Corps may interrogate selected prisoners at division collecting points or at special cages in the vicinity of their own headquarters, in which case they evacuate and hold such prisoners.

49. Screening at Corps

Corps is not in the normal channel of evacuation of PW. Therefore, screening at this level is primarily involved with the preliminary screening of prisoners captured by corps troops. In addition, corps interrogators make selections of PW held at division and field army level for special interrogations to meet corps requirements.

50. Screening at Field Army

a. General. The normal channel of evacuation for all PW leads to field army. Consequently, the prisoner traffic into a field army PW cage will often become heavy. For this reason, the facilities of the cage, the disposition of the interrogation element, and the responsible military police units must be sufficiently flexible to conduct rapid and yet thorough screening of captured personnel on a very large scale. Unlike lower levels of command, the factors of security against enemy ground operations and proximity to the intelligence officer are not the deciding factors in the selection of a site for the army PW cage. Facilities necessary for temporary detention and interrogation normally are available; furthermore, the cage should not be located near the army headquarters.

b. Previous Screening. The more thorough the process of screening accomplished at lower tactical levels, the more rapid and effective will be the screening at the army PW cage. Although all of the PW who arrive at the field army cage may have been screened previously, the interrogation group must rescreen them for the following reasons:

(1) All field army EEI and screening requirements cannot be disseminated to lower level interrogators. Consequently, screening at lower levels cannot be sufficiently selective to identify all types of PW which the field army may require for interrogation.

(2) The needs of field army are broad in scope and concern long range plans rather than the fluid tactical situation of lower units.

(3) Time and personnel required for screening may not be available at lower echelons.

(4) Prisoners of war suitable for interrogation at higher levels must be selected in accordance with the desires of the theater G2.

51. Selection Criteria for Interrogation at Field Army

In order to simplify the process of recognizing likely interrogation prospects at field army,
individual background, position, duty rank, and other factors must be considered.

a. Individual Background. Normally, positions of trust are occupied by intelligence personnel. They are generally in a position to participate in or to observe significant activities which would be of particular interest and importance to our intelligence officers. Such personnel are also frequently assigned to positions which demand specialized or technical training. These factors make them valuable interrogation prospects when captured; on the other hand, in many instances relatively uneducated or unintelligent PW who were in seemingly unimportant positions may have had access to highly sensitive installations and sensitive data. Such personnel should not be disregarded, but should also be subjected to screening as time permits.

b. Position. The position a person has held in his army or government is often an excellent indication of his suitability for interrogation. The position or assignment can frequently be determined from a study of his uniform or of his personal papers. The following list of positions or military occupational specialties may assist the interrogator in determining the relative value of specific persons for intelligence exploitation:

(1) Commanders and staff officers of the combat arms and technical services above battalion level.
(2) All personnel engaged in the supervision and operation of communications and message centers at regimental level or above.
(3) Personnel engaged in the personal service of senior officers (secretaries, drivers, orderlies, and valets).
(4) Personnel engaged in psychological warfare, military intelligence, counterintelligence, censorship, and civil affairs activities.
(5) Personnel engaged in the supervision or dispatch of transportation for men and supplies.
(6) Personnel engaged in nuclear warfare, or chemical, biological, or radiological operations including planning, development, research, or maintenance of equipment.
(7) Cryptographic personnel of all types including maintenance and repair personnel.
(8) Political and technical advisors.
(9) Specialized medical personnel.
(10) Personnel engaged in or previously engaged in the research, development, maintenance, or testing of new weapons, materiel, or tactics.
(11) Personnel with technical knowledge of existing weapons, materiel, and tactics.
(12) Technical repair and maintenance personnel for all types of equipment.
(13) Reconnaissance personnel and "special mission" personnel.
(14) Senior clerks (NCO) of all staff sections above regimental level.

c. Duties. A knowledge of the specific duties of PW will assist interrogators in making rapid and sound decisions as to whether PW should be retained for interrogation.

d. Rank. Military rank normally is an indication of the knowledge or information possessed by an individual concerning his own forces. As a general rule, officers are the best prospects for interrogation, with noncommissioned officers and privates following in that order. Frequently, however, persons of low rank will have access to great amounts of information and will be of more importance than persons of higher rank.

e. Other Factors. Enemy personnel, whose position, duty, or rank make them most likely to possess the kind of information required, are the least likely to be captured, since they are not usually stationed near the front. Except for such special operations as breakthroughs, airborne operations, and long range reconnaissance missions which would yield PW from higher levels of enemy command, most of the persons captured in normal operations are the soldiers from the frontline positions. Although few of these troops possess high level information, certain individuals will have observed and overheard items of military information which may be highly significant. PW who may have opportunities to observe or to hear of important information are—

(1) Personnel who are important by vir-
tue of being related to, or friendly with, influential military or civilian persons of the enemy country.

(2) Company and battalion commanders and members of battalion staffs, to include enlisted specialists.

(3) Liaison officers, drivers, and messengers.

(4) Officers and noncommissioned officers with friends and acquaintances at higher headquarters who gave them important information.

(5) Members of long range reconnaissance missions.

(6) Members of corps or army reconnaissance units, survey, and engineer demolitions and bridging parties operating near frontlines.

52. PW Suitable for Interrogation by USASA

The U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) has an interest in interrogating certain PW, defectors, and refugees who possess any knowledge of the enemy's communications and electronic fields. Such personnel include persons possessing a working knowledge of the enemy's—

a. Communications.

b. Noncommunications electromagnetic equipment.

c. Codes and ciphers.

d. Electronic warfare.

Whenever such personnel are discovered during the screening process, their availability for interrogation should be reported immediately to the nearest USASA support element (available at all echelons of command from brigade on up). In addition to the foregoing notice, captured documents dealing with the enemy's communications and electronic equipment will be handled as secret material and forwarded to the nearest USASA unit. The commander of the USASA unit obtaining information through the resulting interrogations and examination of documents coordinates this information with the signal officer on the staff of the commander in whose area of responsibility the USASA unit is operating.

Section V. FIELD ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

53. Functions

The field army interrogation center is the principal establishment for the thorough exploitation of PW in the field army area. Functions of the center include—

a. Conducting tactical and limited strategic interrogations based on the intelligence requirements and specific guidance of the Army G2 section.

b. Screening to select PW suited for further exploitation at a higher echelon interrogation center.

c. Screening to select PW of interest to counterintelligence personnel.

d. Interrogating PW of interest to Air Force or Navy intelligence based on their requirements.

e. Preparing and disseminating interrogation reports.

54. Organization of the Army Interrogation Center

The interrogation center should be administratively and operationally self-sufficient and should be located either within or adjacent to the PW cage—close enough to facilitate operations. It is supervised by the senior interrogation officer at field army who normally will be a lieutenant colonel, and who will command the interrogation element of the MI unit assigned to field army. In addition, he may act as the chief interrogator at the center, but in some instances the duties of chief interrogator may be assigned to another officer who is more directly concerned with the screening and interrogation of prisoners of war. The officer in charge of the center will operate directly under the assistant chief of staff G2, field army, or his representative. Elements which will normally operate within the interrogation center are—

a. Screening Personnel. These personnel are specially trained qualified interrogators.

b. Interrogation Personnel. These personnel are qualified interrogators normally attached to the field army G2 section. They may include Army counterintelligence and Air Force and Navy interrogators. Additional in-
interrogators may be provided through augmentation from higher headquarters.

c. Microphone and Recording Personnel. These technicians install and operate microphone and recording equipment for the purpose of monitoring interrogations, enclosures, cells, or other locations.

d. Editorial Personnel. The editorial section of the interrogation element of the MI unit at field army normally operates at the Army interrogation center. In collaboration with the interrogators, the editorial section personnel produce various types of finished interrogation reports and also are responsible for reproduction and distribution of the reports.

55. Coordination

a. Guards. Interrogators must work closely with the guards at field army cages during the searching, screening, and segregation of prisoners of war. Informed and cooperative guards and MP personnel are essential to the accomplishment of the interrogation mission. Guards operating at cages are employed in the maintenance of discipline during the screening process, the marching of groups to designated areas in the PW cage, and the guarding of groups during their detention at these cages. Appreciation of proper handling methods by the guards will enhance interrogation by reducing resistance of the prisoner.

b. Cage Commander. Since the successful conduct of interrogations requires adequate space, shelter, light, and other services, the chief of the Army interrogation center must maintain close and harmonious relations with the cage commander.

c. Cage Displacement. As soon as a new site has been designated and movement authorized, the chief of the Army interrogation center or his representative should accompany the cage commander to the forward cage location in order to make arrangements for the required screening and interrogation facilities. In some instances, part of the interrogation section may have to move forward before operations in the rear area cage have been completed. Any additional or exceptional requirements at the new site essential to better operations should be requested by the chief of the interrogation center in coordination with the cage commander, and submitted without delay so that the facilities will be available when required. If additional guards or interrogation personnel are deemed necessary, requests for augmentation should be directed to the theater MI group.

Section VI. TACTICAL INTERROGATIONS

56. Command and Control of Interrogation Elements (Units)

Interrogation elements serve under the staff supervision of the intelligence officer of the echelon to which assigned or attached. The command function is exercised by the commander of the MI unit to which the interrogation is organic, through the chief of the interrogation element. The intelligence officer (G2/S2) insures that the interrogation effort is directed towards fulfillment of the intelligence needs of his unit by providing essential elements of information and other intelligence requirements to the interrogation element. The intelligence officer also sees that the chief of the interrogation element receives frequent briefings to insure up-to-date knowledge of the tactical situation and of future operational plans. The chief of the interrogation element should make frequent visits to the G2/S2 section for these briefings and to study the G2 situation map, the G3 operations map, and imagery of critical areas. He must also take steps to insure receipt of distribution of intelligence reports, order of battle reports, and pertinent studies. Additionally, he must arrange for receipt of an adequate supply of maps and aerial photography.

57. Coordination

Effective coordination between all intelligence agencies and the intelligence officer is imperative for efficient operations. Just as important is the coordination between the interrogation element and other collection and production elements. Coordination with other agencies is effected either directly on an informal basis, as authorized, or through the intelligence officer of the unit concerned.
a. Order of Battle Sections. Normally, interrogators are a primary source of order of battle information. The chief of the interrogation element should make certain that daily personal contact with order of battle sections is accomplished either by himself or by someone appointed to this duty. During these visits, all questions and information pertaining to order of battle factors can be discussed and later disseminated to the various interrogators. Interrogator elements must receive all reports and findings made by order of battle personnel; in turn, all interrogation reports should reach order of battle personnel. It is essential that direct contact be maintained between these two elements, preferably by direct telephone. This is to insure access to important information which may arise between liaison visits.

b. Imagery Interpreter (II) Sections. Interrogators should maintain close contact with imagery interpretation sections. Interrogators may be required to verify identification on airphotos and should report information of interest to the imagery interpreters. Imagery interpreters can aid interrogation personnel by furnishing photographs for use in connection with interrogation and by verifying leads originally obtained through interrogation.

c. Technical Intelligence Specialists. Normally, interrogation elements coordinate with technical intelligence units or teams through the appropriate intelligence officer (G2/S2). The technical intelligence company and its field teams furnish guidance and requirements to the interrogation elements in the form of questionnaires and interrogation guides. These prove to be valuable aids to the interrogator in obtaining specific technical information. Upon discovery of subjects who possess technical information, interrogators notify the nearest technical intelligence representative through appropriate intelligence channels. At times, interrogators may interrogate subjects for technical intelligence personnel to obtain detailed technical information. At tactical levels, this is the exception rather than the rule, but it may nevertheless be necessary when technical information is of immediate tactical value.

d. Counterintelligence Personnel. Coordination between counterintelligence elements and interrogation elements is necessary at all times. This coordination is effected continuously, directly or indirectly, at the discretion of the intelligence officer. Counterintelligence elements are active in the security screening of refugees and civilians in the combat zone. Counterintelligence personnel and interrogators must work together to insure proper interrogation of enemy civilians or personnel speaking the enemy language. Interrogator personnel can further assist the counterintelligence effort by:

1. Furnishing leads on suspected enemy agents.
2. Informing counterintelligence elements concerning enemy personnel dressed in other than enemy uniforms.
3. Furnishing information on suspected enemy intelligence personnel.
4. Referring to counterintelligence elements, or making available to them for interrogation, all prisoners of war and other subjects of counterintelligence interest. Counterintelligence personnel are trained specifically for interrogation on cases of suspected espionage, sabotage, or subversion. Additionally, their knowledge of the counterintelligence situation (to include hostile intelligence activities) tends to insure full exploitation of appropriate subjects.

e. Interpreters. Interpreters assigned to nonintelligence duties (e.g., to commanders or staff officers) come in contact with many friendly civilians who, in casual conversation, may impart information of intelligence interest. These interpreter personnel will also be required from time to time to translate foreign documents. Coordination should be constantly maintained between the interrogation element and these interpreter personnel. This coordination may be on a direct or indirect basis at the direction of the intelligence officer.

58. Tactical Interrogations Below Brigade Level

a. Normally, interrogation personnel are not attached below brigade level; however, in some combat situations it may be desirable to conduct limited tactical interrogations at the
battalion or lower level. For this reason, skilled interrogators from the division MI detachment may be temporarily attached to committed battalions to assist in exploiting PW immediately upon capture for EEI of the capturing unit. Usually such interrogations at the battalion and lower level are brief and are concerned only with information bearing directly on the success of the combat mission of the capturing unit. Some circumstances which would indicate the advisability of such interrogations are when—

1. A unit or landing force is assigned an independent mission in which the S2 is primarily responsible for collecting information necessary to fulfill the unit’s mission. This is particularly true when immediate tactical information is essential to the accomplishment of the unit mission.

2. There is a definite need for a complete or fairly detailed interrogation at a lower level to permit rapid reaction based on the information obtained.

3. It is desirable to have a PW point out enemy defenses and installations from observation points in forward areas, or when it is desirable to use PW as guides to enemy troop locations.

4. A patrol’s mission is to reconnoiter enemy terrain on a basis of information obtained from PW captured during the patrol.

b. Interrogators employed for temporary periods at battalion level usually are placed under the direct operational control of the battalion S2. They are fully oriented on the battalion mission and the immediate information desired from captured PW. In other instances, interrogators may be situated at brigade in an “on-call” status. In this type of employment, interrogators can proceed to any of the subordinate battalions as circumstances warrant. Upon completion of a low level immediate-type interrogation, the interrogators can return to brigade and resume the on-call status.

c. While the advantage of having skilled interrogators at battalion and lower levels to conduct immediate-type interrogations is obvious, it must be realized that situations will exist wherein interrogators will not be available to commanders and S2 officers for PW exploitation. In these circumstances, battalion and company level units will have to rely on assigned noninterrogator personnel who have a language capability and/or some form of interrogator experience to conduct the brief questioning of PW for information essential to the accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

d. Commanders and S2 officers below brigade level who are unable to obtain interrogator support from higher echelons should include provisions in unit and staff SOP for the immediate-type exploitation of PW. Organic personnel should be screened for language capability and/or interrogator experience. Provisional interrogators should be designated and provided limited instruction and training in their additional interrogator duties, if at all possible. In this regard, each of the organic personnel designated as a provisional interrogator should have a working knowledge of the contents of this manual, circumstances permitting, and applicable portions of FM 30-5 (for internal defense assistance operations).

e. Combat personnel engaged in, or supervising, the immediate-type tactical questioning of PW at the time of capture or at the battalion collecting point are responsible to insure that PW are afforded the proper treatment and handling procedures described in paragraph 40 and 41. Guiding principles in the conduct of immediate-type PW questioning are—

1. Use of force. The use of force, even under severe combat conditions, must be prohibited.

2. Psychological pressures. Psychological pressures as distinguished from acts of violence, have been discussed in chapter 2. Such pressures have application in the immediate-type interrogation, although the element of time will likely restrict their usage. PW should be separated from one another as soon as possible after capture, and the weaker-willed PW selected for immediate exploitation.

3. Limited questioning. Questioning of the PW for immediate-type exploitation must be restricted to essential information only and the PW should be evacuated from the immediate
combat area as soon as possible. Non-interrogator personnel must be sure, however, that the who, what, where, when, and how, of their immediate intelligence needs have been satisfied prior to evacuation of the PW.

(4) **Security.** PW selected for immediate-type interrogation at or near the point of capture should be removed from "sight and sound" of other PW and any friendly activity in the area. Further, personnel engaged in questioning PW must be careful not to reveal the mission of their unit or its vital interests directly or indirectly in their questioning procedures.

(5) **Information obtained.** The information obtained during immediate-type interrogations should be passed through intelligence channels for operational use and for future interrogation exploitation purposes. Commanders and S2 officers should insure that regular interrogator personnel working at the division collecting points are made aware of the PW who have been exploited for immediate-type questioning purposes, to include when, where, by whom, and the results.

59. **Employment of Interrogators at Brigade**

a. **General.** The first formal interrogation normally takes place at brigade level. Interrogation teams will be attached temporarily to brigades in contact with the enemy when determined appropriate by the division G2. These teams come from the interrogation section of the parent division. Interrogation personnel are permanently attached to separate brigades. Interrogation at brigade level are strictly tactical in nature and deal only with information of immediate value to the brigade. All other information which the subject might possess is developed at higher levels. At brigade, the scope of the interrogation changes from hour to hour as the tactical situation develops; therefore, the interrogations must be geared to cope with any tactical possibility at a moment's notice.

b. **Location of Interrogators.** Interrogation personnel at brigade should be located adjacent to the division forward PW collecting point in the brigade trains area. The collecting point should be out of sight and sound of other activity in the trains area and as near as practical to the normal routes of evacuation. The distance between the collecting point and the command post is an important consideration. Whenever possible, the collecting point and interrogation site should be within walking distance of the command post or at least within a few minutes driving distance.

c. **Desirable Facilities.** Prisoners of war need not be kept within the confines of a building or other shelter at brigade level since they seldom remain at a forward collecting point for more than a few hours before being evacuated. The use of open fields, courtyards, gardens, jungle clearings, or other similar sites, provided they are hidden from enemy observation, will suffice for processing and guarding PW at brigade level. These areas can be inclosed with barbed wire, if necessary, for more efficient handling of PW. Space should be available to allow interrogation personnel to work without being observed by prisoners who have not yet been interrogated. If possible, interrogations should be conducted in rooms of an adjoining building, or in nearby tents which offer a degree of privacy. Guards should escort PW to and from the interrogation rooms or areas in such a way that they cannot be seen by others who have not yet been interrogated.

60. **Employment of Interrogators at Division**

a. **General.** The principal tactical interrogation of PW takes place at division level. While the interrogation procedure is similar to that employed at brigade level, the scope of the interrogation is much broader. Previous interrogation reports received from brigades are reviewed and information is expanded by further interrogations for available tactical information to include all order of battle factors. In this respect, the interrogators at division level prepare and disseminate individual interrogation reports.

b. **Location of Interrogators.** The division central PW collecting point is operated by division military police under the supervision of the division provost marshal. The interrogation section should be located in the vicinity of the division central PW collecting point, nor-
mally along the main supply route (MSR). The distance between the interrogation facility and the G2 section is not as critical at division as at brigade level. Personal liaison between the interrogation section and the intelligence sections, although extremely important, may not be required as frequently as at brigade. Normally at division, the G2 directs the collection efforts of the interrogation section in conjunction with the military intelligence detachment commander, who serves as one of his principal assistants.

c. Desirable Facilities. Since the division interrogation section normally handles and interrogates more captured personnel than at brigade and interrogations are conducted in greater detail, the division interrogation facilities will be larger. Whenever practicable, interrogations should be conducted in improvised interrogation rooms in buildings adjacent to the division collecting point. If possible, several separate rooms should be available to permit the conduct of multiple interrogations.

d. Scope of Interrogations. The broadened scope of interrogation includes such items as unit movement, rear area installations, troop morale, and health. Tactical interrogations, with emphasis on order of battle and other requirements of the G2 collection orders, are conducted on selected PW, to include air and naval personnel who were engaged in ground fighting roles. After extraction of tactical information, such PW will be evacuated to the field army cage or detained for further interrogation by Air Force and Navy interrogators. It may be advantageous, in some instances, to conduct interrogations at the medical company of the infantry division. Wounded prisoners being evacuated through medical channels are frequently valuable sources of information, and the fact that the PW is wounded and is in an "enemy" hospital puts him in a state of mind conducive to interrogation. The requirement for permission of competent U.S. Army medical personnel to interrogate wounded prisoners must be borne in mind.

61. Employment of Interrogators at Corps

a. General. Corps is not in the normal channel of evacuation of PW. However, corps does maintain adequate holding facilities for those PW selected at division or at field army for interrogation on matters of corps interest of those PW captured by corps troops. In addition, corps interrogation personnel interrogate selected prisoners at division collecting points and the field army cage without physical transfer to corps, whenever possible.

b. Intelligence Requirements. The scope of the corps interrogation effort normally does not include requirements for strategic intelligence. The emphasis is, therefore, on tactical intelligence appropriate to the fulfillment of the mission assigned to corps, which normally requires more detailed and long range tactical information.

c. Personnel Interrogated. Interrogations at corps are normally limited to the following types of PW:

1. Those captured directly by corps troops.
2. PW apprehended by corps military police or counterintelligence elements and recommended by them for tactical interrogation.
3. PW specially selected at field army for evacuation to corps for detailed tactical interrogation.
4. Personnel selected by division interrogators for interrogation at corps based on PW's general knowledge.

d. Desirable Facilities. Corps military police have the mission of handling and guarding prisoners of war at the corps PW cage. The corps cage normally is not as large at the one found at the division collection point. However, at corps level, particular emphasis should be placed on providing facilities adequate for the interrogation of prisoners of higher position or rank. Since interrogations normally will last longer, a greater degree of comfort than is customary at division level should be provided, if possible. In other respects, the type of interrogation facilities and equipment parallel those found at division.

e. Screening for Further Interrogation. Corps interrogation personnel may screen persons interrogated at division and field army for further interrogation at the corps cage. After extraction of detailed tactical information at corps, prisoners are evacuated for detailed tactical and strategic exploitation at higher levels. Normally, corps interrogators will base their
selections upon specific instructions and EEI
from higher headquarters and the corps mis-
mission. Continuous coordination is required be-
tween corps, field army, and division interro-
gators to insure a smoothly functioning opera-
tion.

62. Employment of Interrogators at Field
Army

The scope of interrogations at field army is
widened by the broad intelligence requirements
of the army commander, as well as by the
special information requirements of the numer-
ous technical service staff agencies, other in-
telligence agencies, and other services. All such
special needs for information are coordinated
by the field army G2 section. Army interro-
gators must be aware of these overall intelligence
requirements in order to exploit captured per-
sonnel to the highest degree possible for the
broad range of specialized information re-
quired. Because of these special requirements,
interrogation at field army level should be con-
ducted by interrogators who specialize in given
fields; for example, armor, engineer, medical,
etc. Through this specialization, it will become
possible for thorough and detailed information
to be extracted from the PW. In achieving
these results, the officer in charge of interro-
gation may assign specific interrogators as screen-
ers and others to specialized areas; however, he
must coordinate the overall effort to prevent
duplication or gaps in the information obtained.

63. Interrogations in Other Operations

a. General. The functions and basic opera-
tional techniques employed by the interrogation
element attached to the infantry division are
applicable to interrogation elements supporting
armored, amphibious, and airborne operations
in any terrain or climate. Differences arise pri-
marily in the planning stages and in the ob-
jectives of interrogation. These differences
normally result from the inherent characteristics
of each of the types of units and the terrain
and climate involved. For example, the interro-
gator who is to engage in airborne and amphib-
ious operations will be dependent upon intelli-
genue support from higher agencies during the
planning stage. This is necessitated by the fact
that the unit does not and probably will not
have actual contact with the enemy until a
specific operation is commenced. Once H-Hour
arrives, the interrogator will be faced with a
rapidly developing and changing tactical situa-
tion. At this time, adequacy of the preparations
made during the planning stage will affect crit-
ically the degree of success to be achieved by
the interrogators. Consequently, the interro-
gator must make a concerted effort to learn every-
thing possible about the objective area—the
terrain, the enemy, and the weather—and re-
late these factors to the mission of the unit
supported. Only by taking these steps will
the interrogator be able to assure himself of
success and of being prepared to commence interroga-
tions as soon as possible after contact
with the enemy is established. The objectives
of the interrogations will be dependent upon
the mission assigned and the type of unit sup-
ported.

b. Amphibious Operations.

(1) General. Interrogators attached to
units designated for amphibious op-
erations should become familiar with
the nature of this type operation. The
assault landing team is the basic sub-
ordinate task organization of the as-
sault echelon of a landing force.
Regardless of whether a battalion
landing team or a brigade landing
team is the basic element, it will op-
erate independently during the first
stages of the landing and be organized
to land, overrun beach defenses, and
secure terrain objectives.

(2) Planning and preparation. The initial
intelligence necessary for the launch-
ing of an amphibious operation will
be disseminated by the landing force
commander. He also will provide in-
telligence units with amphibious land-
ing force intelligence support require-
ments to be met by appropriate
collection agencies. One of these
agencies is the interrogation element.
This element should participate in all
aspects of the planning phase affecting
the landing force to which attached.
Interrogators should conduct special-
ized training and the chief interroga-
tor should coordinate with the landing
force intelligence officer on all mat-
ters concerning functioning of inter-
 AGO 7969
rogators after the landing has been made. The interrogators will receive as much background information about the enemy as possible to serve as a basis for efficient interrogation of captured enemy personnel. Interrogators should study carefully all maps, charts, and photographs of the terrain and defenses of the landing areas, as well as all intelligence reports on the enemy armed forces in that area. Available information on enemy reserves, as well as on civilians residing in the area, should also be studied. Interrogators should engage in other phases of training, including rehearsals, designed to insure the smooth execution of embarkation, movement, and debarkation operations.

(3) Employment of the interrogator. The interrogation element attached to the amphibious landing force will come under direct operational control of the landing force intelligence officer and will be employed by his direction. Because of the nature of the operation, it is conceivable that the interrogators may be split into small teams and embark on separate ships. Once embarked, communication silence will place an effective barrier between these teams until radio silence is lifted. When the assault is commenced, organizational artillery, air support, and naval gunfire will depend primarily on shore units for accurate target information. As a result, interrogators may be required to concentrate their efforts on target acquisition. In a land operation, the commander can undertake probing operations to “feel out” the enemy; normally this is not possible in establishing a beachhead; therefore, the importance of information to be obtained from captured enemy personnel is highly magnified. Rapid processing and dissemination of information obtained is essential.

(4) Debarkation. Usually, the interrogators will accompany the intelligence officer and the intelligence section. This insures that the interrogators will be able to report directly to the intelligence officer on information obtained from captured enemy personnel.

(5) Employment on the beaches. Interrogators should conduct initial interrogations near the landing beach close to the landing force command post in order to communicate information without delay. If the situation warrants, interrogators may be sent forward to operate with assaulting companies. All interrogations are directed toward obtaining information covered in current EEI and on specific items of interest as the situation progresses. PW are turned over to the landing force shore party for custody and eventual evacuation. Further specific instructions concerning interrogations and the handling of PW normally are outlined in the intelligence annex of the landing force operation order. The interrogation of civilians for information of intelligence value is also an important aspect of the interrogation mission.

(6) Consolidation. When the headquarters of the next higher echelon above the landing force has landed and established its command post, some of the interrogators may be returned to the level of command from which they were originally detached. Collecting points and interrogation facilities are then established and operated as in ordinary ground operations.

(7) Evacuation of PW. Initially, the shore party or helicopter support teams operate PW collecting points in the vicinity of the landing beaches. PW are evacuated from these points to designated ships by landing craft, helicopter, or amphibious vehicles. Retention in the objective area is begun and increased as facilities, supplies, and personnel permit, consistent with reasonable safety of PW from enemy action.

c. Airborne Operations.

(1) General. The functions and basic
methods of operation of interrogation personnel with airborne operations are similar to those in the conventional infantry division. However, the method of employment of interrogators is somewhat different. Certain specific peculiarities in operations, as well as in training, must be thoroughly understood by interrogators who are to operate with airborne units. The most significant difference between airborne operations and normal ground operations is that the former are usually carried out behind enemy lines.

(2) Planning and preparation. The conduct of effective interrogations for airborne operations requires detailed preparation by interrogators. As soon as the objective area and the missions of the respective units within an airborne force are designated, the interrogator personnel who are to take part in the operation must receive detailed information on most aspects of the operation. Interrogators must be provided with the EEI and the proposed H-Hour. They should also obtain maps, photographs, and other data required for interrogations. They should obtain all information on enemy units which are outside the objective area but which are capable of being employed to counterattack our forces. Sufficient time should be spent by interrogators, in coordination with other intelligence specialists, particularly order of battle personnel, to provide as realistic and complete a picture of the enemy situation as possible. Enemy units identified in the objective area, as well as significant terrain features, must be studied in detail to provide a background for more comprehensive interrogations when the first PW are captured. Prior to the actual airborne assault, interrogation personnel must be familiarized with respective proposed command posts of the division and its subordinate units.

(3) Flexibility. Interrogation personnel involved in airborne operations must be aggressive in anticipating the numerous problems which will affect the interrogation mission. For example, is should be considered that during the assault phase, no basic transportation will be available to the interrogation personnel. Flexibility is to be emphasized in both planning and executing airborne operations.

(4) Employment of the interrogator. Interrogator personnel designated to support airborne units will come under the direct operational control of the intelligence officer of that unit and will be deployed by his direction. Interrogator personnel should move to the objective area with the unit they are designated to support. The echelon of command to which interrogator personnel will be attached will depend on the operation. Normally, one interrogation team will be attached to each airborne battalion for the assault phase. It is conceivable that teams could be split into smaller teams should the supported unit be employed as two elements. This may become necessary to insure the continuous collection of information during the critical early stages when the situation changes rapidly.

(5) Consolidation. After the headquarters of the next higher echelon along the assault units have been airdropped or after the assault units have established physical connection with higher headquarters, some of the interrogators may be returned to the level of command from which they were originally detached. Collecting points and interrogation facilities then are established and operated as in ordinary operations.

(6) Evacuation of PW. Evacuating and guarding prisoners of war is initially a capturing unit (normally battalion) responsibility. In brigade-size operations, battalions will evacuate the prisoners to brigade collecting points as the situation permits. Normally, most
PW are rapidly evacuated by air from brigade collecting points to the departure area because they require food and guards, both of which are in short supply at brigade. PW collecting points should be located in the proximity of airlanding facilities to facilitate air evacuation.

d. Armored and Mechanized Infantry Operations.

(1) General. Armored units normally operate on extensive fronts, with deep zones of action and dispersed formations. Because of the mobility and wide range of action of armored units, interrogation is not normally as detailed as in other divisions. Interrogators must remain mobile, operate with minimum facilities, and be alert for sudden changes in the tactical situation.

(2) Planning and preparation. The planning and preparation necessary for interrogators supporting armored units is the same as for those supporting regular infantry units with a few exceptions. Since radio is the normal means of communication, it is desirable that some members of an interrogation team be familiar with voice radio procedure and know how to operate radio equipment common to armored units.

(3) Employment of the interrogator. Interrogator personnel designated to support armored units will come under the direct operational control of the intelligence officer of the supported unit. Interrogators at all levels of armored units must be able to operate during continuing fluid situations, and must remain extremely mobile at all times. Because of this continuous mobility, liaison with the intelligence officer will not be as frequent as in other units. Interrogators must be able to operate with maximum efficiency on the basis of radio communications, messages, and written reports. As in other type units, the interrogation personnel remain under the control of the division G2 until operations begin.

At that time, the division G2 will attach interrogation personnel to the active subordinate units. After a given operation is completed, the interrogation personnel will revert to division control, pending a future mission. Normally, interrogations within armored units will be limited to interrogation of PW on such matters as location and deployment of antitank weapons and defenses, enemy roadblocks, and presence of enemy armor. In fast moving offensive operations, interrogators are best employed with forward elements of the units.

(4) Facilities and evacuation.

(a) Facilities for interrogation at battalion and brigade in fast moving armored operations are kept to a bare minimum as PW are questioned briefly at the point of capture and evacuated to division PW forward collecting points or turned over to division military police personnel for evacuation. Interrogators with battalions and brigades in armored operations should have vehicles equipped with radios which will enable them to communicate with the respective intelligence officers and other intelligence agencies.

(b) The central division collecting point normally is established some distance behind the brigades. Elements of division military police operate the collecting point; normally it should be located on the MSR in the vicinity of the division trains area under divisional control. The division interrogation section is adjacent to the collecting point. Army military police units evacuate PW from the division collecting point or the PW are turned over to follow and support forces.

e. Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear (Radiological) (CBR) Operations. The timely collection of information and the dissemination of CBR intelligence are essential in the planning of chemical, biological, and radiological defen-
sive measures. On the basis of available intelligence, the commander makes his estimate of the imminence of the threat of enemy employment of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear (radiological) agents. FM 101-40 contains guidance to assist the commander in determining items and quantities of protective equipment to be included in chemical-biological-radiological defense planning.

(1) General. Example 2, appendix II contains a sample CBR question guide which is not intended to be all-inclusive, but is intended to serve as a guide.

(2) Planning and preparation. Enemy CBR activities are the source of most information of combat intelligence value. For example, the sudden issue of CBR protective equipment to enemy troops may indicate the planned initiation by enemy forces of chemical, biological, or radiological operations. Evidence that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities (for example, the lack of CBR protective measures) might imply that the enemy is not contemplating CBR operations.

64. Applicable STANAGS

The material presented in this chapter agrees with applicable portions of STANAG 2022—Intelligence Reports, STANAG 2033 (SOLOG-69)—Interrogations of Prisoners of War (PW), and STANAG 2084 (SOLOG-94)—Handling and Reporting Enemy Documents.
CHAPTER 4
INTERROGATION SUPPORT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

65. Introduction

The principles and techniques of interrogation discussed elsewhere in this manual apply with equal validity to interrogations conducted in internal defense assistance operations. Specific applications of the general principles and techniques must be varied to meet local peculiarities. However, because of these peculiarities of internal defense assistance operations, this chapter has been added to provide additional guidelines for the conduct of interrogations in support of such operations. Intelligence interrogations will play a significant role in ascertaining the development of an insurgency in the latent or incipient stage, the intentions, capabilities, and limitations of the insurgents, their underground organizations, their support systems and external sanctuary, and any outside support. In addition to the traditional military concepts of strategic and tactical intelligence during limited and general warfare concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather, internal defense assistance operations have added a new dimension—the population. The major aim of both the threatened government and the insurgents is to influence favorably the significant segments of the population and thereby control the entire population.

66. The Subject

The categories and vulnerabilities of the subject are discussed in paragraphs 14 through 16. It must be recognized, however, that the status of insurgents in an internal defense assistance operation differs from that of recognized belligerents; also, the field of interrogation will encompass the great variety of subjects common to internal defense assistance operations.

a. Legal Status of Insurgents. From a comparative point of view, interrogations of prisoners of war in time of war are conducted in support of military operations and are governed by the guidelines and specific limitations on military interrogations of PW provided by the Geneva Conventions (FM 27-10). Conversely, insurgent subversive underground elements seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency environment do not hold legal status as belligerents (DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive activities principally are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host government police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions, but will be subject to the internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of U.S. Forces, however, will be governed by existing agreements with the host country and by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of insurgents, specifically by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. (See appendix D and paragraph 37 of this manual.)

b. Population. Internal defense assistance operations place the population in the position of a prime target; therefore, the population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The population that the interrogator will have to deal with may be composed of elements which are friendly, hostile, or completely indifferent. In dealing with these population elements, as well as with the insurgents, the desires of the host country must be taken into consideration, for there is a need to gain the support of the population in order to deprive the insurgents
of their primary sources of support. Such a need places a burden upon the interrogator to learn more about the people— their customs and taboos (by ethnic groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear of foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philosophy or outlook on life, and other facets of their political, economic, and social institutions.

67. Limitations to U.S. Assistance

U.S. military or civilian participation in intelligence interrogations during internal defense assistance operations in a support, advisory, or operational role generally is limited to that permitted by the host government concerned. This places certain restrictions on U.S. military and civilian personnel engaged in such operations with the internal security forces of the host country. The degree of participation, therefore, will be determined by combined U.S./host country policies. Normally, the interrogator will be asked to advise, assist, and train host country personnel who are members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other security agencies (FM 31-22 and FM 31-73). The interrogator also may provide intelligence interrogation support to committed U.S. or allied forces during internal defense assistance operations which will require effective, close coordination of the joint effort with host country agencies. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by conducting a joint interrogation effort with interrogators of the host country. Further advantages of such a measure are the language capability and the intimate knowledge of the area—personalities, customs, ethnic differences, and geography—possessed by the host country's interrogation personnel.

68. Intelligence Requirements

a. General. Interrogators employed in internal defense assistance operations will be guided by the requirements levied by the agencies which they support. These may be agencies of the host country, U.S. agencies and units, allied agencies, or a combination of two or more of these. EEI in many cases will be quite similar to those in normal military operations. Interrogators should, if practicable, prepare interrogation guides based on general and recurring requirements. An example of such a guide containing many topics which will apply to internal defense assistance operations is provided in appendix B.

b. Specific EEI. In conjunction with interrogation guides, the following additional topics should be explored, as applicable, by the interrogator:

1. CBR operations.
   (a) Defensive material and instructions for defense against riot control agents.
   (b) Modifications in tunnels and caves for defense against riot control agents.
   (c) Instructions for defense against defoliation agents.
   (d) Instructions for defense against anticrop agents.
   (e) Capability and plans for offensive use of CBR weapons.

2. Psychological operations (PSYOP). The interrogator will be required to support PSYOP while operating in internal defense assistance operations. As one of the key collectors of PSYOP information, the interrogator must know the PSYOP essential elements of information (EEI) concerning military, social, political, and economic situations in the host country. Particular attention should be given to the collection of information pertaining to the effectiveness of existing PSYOP programs. Such information can be developed during interrogations of insurgents, civilians, refugees, and other persons who have been in areas where PSYOP programs are active.

3. Sociological data. The interrogator must make a specific effort to elicit information pertaining to the internal organization of the insurgent movement to facilitate its detection and destruction. In addition to data on enemy armed forces personnel, information about persons of influence in the government or insurgents; persons who are known insurgents, sympathizers, or collaborators; procedures followed by these persons; organiza-
tional structures and bases of operations must be determined and fur-
nished to CA personnel as well as to police agencies and the military.
Chapter 5

Interrogation Reports

Section 1. Types of Reports

69. General

An interrogation report is an oral or written statement of the information gained through interrogation. The purpose of the report is to disseminate information to interested persons or agencies and to record the information for future reference. The reporting of information through interrogation reports is the responsibility of the interrogator. The most critical information which the interrogator may obtain is of no value unless it is reported to the appropriate person or agency in a timely manner and in usable form. Oral reports of information are used when it is essential that the information be reported as soon as possible. The means used for oral dissemination are telephone, radio, and personal liaison. All information disseminated orally should be followed by written reports. Written reports are more complete and usually are written in a particular format. Example formats for written reports may be found in appendix C. A suggested format for use in support of psychological operations is contained in FM 33-5. These formats may vary depending on the policies of the command or the agency requesting the information.

70. Types of Reports

The type of report rendered will depend on the echelon of command receiving the report and the extensiveness of the interrogation conducted.


(1) A spot interrogation report is an oral or written statement containing information which is of immediate importance to the intelligence officer of the unit concerned. Such a report is rendered by the interrogation element to the intelligence officer whenever information of immediate tactical use is obtained.

(2) Should an interrogator develop important information during the course of an interrogation, he must determine immediately all essential aspects and insure that the information is reported to the intelligence officer at once, before the interrogation is continued. This may require that the interrogator temporarily terminate the interrogation to avoid alerting the subject as to the importance of the information obtained. For example, should an interrogator learn that the enemy plans to launch a counterattack within a few hours, he immediately should determine the unit or units to participate, the objective of the attack, and where and when it will be launched. This information should be reported to the intelligence officer at once. Further details of the attack, such as the role of artillery and phases of the attack, may then be developed by continued questioning. Additional items of information obtained, whose intelligence value is dependent upon immediate transmission and use, also should be immediately disseminated to the intelligence officer by means of spot reports.

(3) The interrogation element should retain a written record of the spot report for future reference. The information rendered by spot reports
is recapitulated in the next periodic interrogation report.

b. Tactical Interrogation Report. The tactical interrogation report serves as a written summary of the initial interrogation conducted by interrogation personnel. Its purpose is to—

1. Eliminate duplication of effort in subsequent interrogations of the subject.
2. Serve as a means of disseminating information to the intelligence officer of the immediate command, to other appropriate commands, and to interrogators who will conduct further interrogations of the subject.
3. Serve as an initial assessment of the subject's intelligence value.

The report normally is prepared in four copies. Copies are sent to the unit intelligence officer and to the intelligence officer of next higher command. One copy is retained in the interrogation element and one copy is evacuated with the subject. The report consists of two sections. The first section contains personal and biographical information pertaining to the subject. It also includes an assessment of his intelligence potential. The second section contains a summary of information of intelligence value obtained from the subject and recommendations for future disposition.

c. Individual Interrogation Report. An individual interrogation report contains information obtained from the detailed tactical interrogation of one specific prisoner. Like the tactical report, it must include an assessment of the prisoner's intelligence potential and a recommendation for his future disposition. In addition, the individual interrogation report concerns tactical matters with special emphasis on order of battle and any other intelligence requirements of the particular echelon of command. The individual report is generally much broader in scope than the tactical report. The heading of the individual interrogation report is very important. The reporting unit and the map used in the preparation of the report must be clearly identified. When complete data is not available on a particular topic, this fact should be so indicated.

d. Consolidated Interrogation Report. Consolidated interrogation reports contain information obtained from a number of prisoners. The report may be based on any of the following:

1. A specific period of time.
2. A particular subject or topic.
3. Information obtained during a particular (special) operation.

This type of report often simplifies the task of the intelligence officer who must evaluate the information. There is no particular format prescribed for this report; however, the format used for the individual interrogation report may be used as a guide. When reporting on a specific operation, a "from and to" time factor should be added to the heading. If an evaluation of the subjects interrogated is made, it should be stated as such in an appropriate paragraph of the report.

e. Special Interrogation Report. The special report should be prepared in those cases where a PW or a group of PW provide considerable information of sufficient importance to warrant special distribution. This type of report is also commonly used to disseminate the results of higher level interrogations exploring a topic in considerable detail. Occasionally, interrogators at tactical levels of command use this report. For example, an interrogator operating at division level may conduct a thorough interrogation of a selected subject who knows the complete organization and equipment of an enemy engineer battalion facing the division. The interrogator may write one special report on this topic, leaving other items of tactical information to be incorporated in another report. In rare instances, intelligence officers may require interrogators to submit special interrogation reports on each prisoner.

f. Periodic Interrogation Report. A periodic interrogation report is one which contains a compilation of all the information obtained by interrogation during a given period of time. This type of report is useful to the intelligence officer at tactical levels of command. No special format is prescribed for this type of report. The format is primarily dictated by the type and amount of information to be reported during a given period of time. In order to facilitate the compilation of information contained in interrogation reports from several units, the intelligence officer may prescribe some de-
degree of standardization for periodic interrogation reports. The periodic interrogation report is usually incorporated into the Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) or is attached thereto as an annex.

g. The Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report (DD Form 1396). The DD Form 1396 is a report form widely used for the distribution of information obtained from various collection of intelligence information, to include interrogators. This report is used throughout the world by the various military and national intelligence agencies for the reporting of tactical, strategic, and other information. Its use by intelligence agencies is universal and unlimited. The report form consists of four major sections—

1. The heading, which provides the administrative control data.
2. The summary, which provides a concise statement of the content of the report.
3. The text, which conveys in detail the information obtained.
4. The comments paragraph in which the individual preparing the report may express his personal opinions about the subject or the information.

h. Other Reports. Other report formats may be originated and used in a particular or special operation. An example of this is the interrogation report used in internal defense assistance operations. The types and formats of reports used should be standard for host country and assisting forces and preferably bilingual. These reports normally would be restricted for use within the particular area of operation. For guidance in formulating such reports, the types and formats shown in appendix C should be considered. In any case, the report used should answer the basic interrogatives, be readily understandable, and provide complete information appropriate to the type operation.

Section II. REPORT PREPARATIONS

71. General Principles

Every interrogation report should adhere to the following principles, regardless of the type of report being prepared:

a. Accuracy. The information entered into the report should be exactly as obtained from the subject.

b. Brevity. The report should be brief and to the point. All information should be reported; however, flowery language or extraneous and unnecessary words should be avoided.

c. Clarity. Clarity takes precedence over brevity. To insure clarity—

1. Use simple sentences.
2. Use simple, understandable language.
3. Avoid abbreviations and terms not commonly known.
4. Use correct grammar and punctuation.
5. Avoid vague, meaningless, and ambiguous expressions.
6. Use topic sentences at the beginning of each paragraph.
7. Be specific, do not generalize.

d. Coherence. Ideas should be expressed in a logical pattern. Related items should be placed in an orderly sequence.

e. Completeness. The report should answer questions anticipated from the reader of the report. Obviously, not every subject will be able to answer every question completely; however, there should be a clear indication as to which questions were asked, regardless of the subject's response.

f. Timeliness. Tactical information, in particular, is highly perishable. Because of this, the foregoing principles have to be weighed against the requirement for disseminating the information as expeditiously as possible to the appropriate using agencies. An interrogation report should be as perfect as possible, but if it reaches the recipient too late to be acted upon, it is of no value. Therefore, timeliness takes precedence over other principles.

72. Preparing the Report

Preparation of interrogation reports involves consideration of various editorial details which, if followed, will provide standardized, understandable reports.
Paragraphing. Paragraphs should be organized in accordance with the provisions of AR 340-15.

Capital Letters. The names of countries and the surnames (last name) of persons should be written in capital letters; i.e., Munich, GERMANY; SMITH, John A. (In instances where surnames are hard to distinguish, e.g., Vietnamese names, capitals should be used for the complete name.) Unless otherwise directed by local policies, place names (other than countries), points on the compass, and similar items should not be written completely in capital letters.

Abbreviations. Unnecessary use of abbreviations in ordinary text saves little or no time for the writer and causes the reader to expend needless time in attempting to follow the thoughts expressed.

(1) Examples of common abbreviations used in writing are: etc., i.e., e.g., et al. There is no objection to the appropriate use of such commonly known abbreviations.

(2) Authorized military abbreviations and military symbols are those contained in AR 320-50 and FM 21-30. They should be used sparingly and only when they serve a useful purpose; e.g., in tabulation, or when a term (or type of term) occurs very frequently. Periods should be omitted after the abbreviations.

(3) Explained abbreviations are those which are not universally understood but which are useful to shorten cumbersome expressions which occur frequently in the report; e.g., “A.S.S.R. (Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic)” is subsequently referred to simply as ASSR.

d. Date and Time Groups. Dates and times should be expressed as required by FM 21-30; e.g., the date and time group for occurrence on the 4th of February, 1966, at 1600 hours should be written as 041600 Feb 66. Local time is used unless otherwise specified.

e. Quotation Marks. Quotation marks should be used sparingly. As a general rule, they should be reserved for a direct quotation in the original language or in an exact translation when the exact quotation may affect interpretation. Occasionally quotation marks are used to indicate a strange term when first used.

f. Dates and Places. Dates, as well as places, are of particular importance for the proper collation of information. Without specific dates, information is bound to be misleading. It is important to remember that there are usually several dates for each activity—the day the subject first encountered the action or knew that it commenced, the day the subject last saw or knew of the activity reported, the period of time during which the source saw the activity continuing without change, and the date or dates when there was a change in the activity.

(1) Precision. A date worth recording is worth recording as accurately as the source knows it. “On the seventh of the month” or “late last year” should not be written. Six months later it would not be known to what month or year the source was referring. It is just as simple to write “7 March 1960.” The use of “7/3/60” may cause confusion and should not be used. If the subject does not know the exact day, he should know the month or at least the season of the year. Depending on the subject’s accuracy, the date might then be shown as “October 1960,” “late summer 1960,” or “early 1960.”

(2) Period of observation or duration of information. It is important that it be known how long a certain activity has been going on without major change. If only the source’s last dates of observation is recorded, the value of his information is reduced. It is then difficult to cross-reference his data with other information. For example, if a source says, “the 39th Mechanized Regiment was in Minsk on 10 October 1960,” it is of importance to know for how long a period prior to 10 October 1960 it had been in Minsk, and when it first arrived there. The explanatory phrase, “When source left Minsk,” should also be included. Any temporary departures of the 39th Mechanized Minsk Regiment or its elements during its period of long-term stay in
Minsk should be determined and recorded. Similarly, with a factory or a road, or practically any information where the source has observed an activity over a period of time, the duration of that activity and the dates of change should be noted.

g. Names and Coordinates. Faulty spelling or translation of proper names has often led to confusion and erroneous identification. If the English alphabet is not used in the language, a standard system of transliteration should be employed.

(1) Geographical place names. The spelling used should be that used by the country itself, except that conventional English forms may be used for names of countries, provinces, well-known geographical features, and national capitals. Diacritical marks should be added, at least on the first occurrence. Place names should be written with the initial letters in capitals, accompanied by coordinates.

(2) Repeat place names. Geographical place names should be repeated exactly and as frequently as necessary throughout the report. Reference should not be made to "the source's hometown" or "the same locality." The town name in its exact form should be repeated each time.

(3) Changes in names. Many place names have been changed in recent years, especially in Communist countries. Whenever the interrogator learns of, or suspects such a change, he should include a full account of it in his report. If the change has been previously reported and accepted as fact, he should still place the old name in parenthesis as long as most standard maps still show it. Example: "Karl-Marx-Stadt (formerly Chemnitz)"

(4) Unrecognized names. If a place name is given by the PW and cannot be found on any available map or gazetteer, the interrogator should endeavor to get the source to pinpoint it by reference to other known places. This report should then read somewhat as follows: "Beloselskovo (not shown in available reference materials but said by PW to be approximately five kilometers northwest of Minsk)."

(5) Personal names. The Christian or given name or names should be written with normal capitalization. The family name is to be written entirely in upper case letters. For the sake of uniformity, all names should be written in the normal sequence as used in the language in question. (In instances where surnames are hard to distinguish; e.g., Vietnamese names, capital letters should be used for all names.) If only one name is shown, it is assumed to be the family name. "FNU" and "LNU" are standard abbreviations to indicate unknown names. "FNU" means "first name unknown" and "LNU" means "last name unknown." They are used as needed as "(FNU) IVANOVICH" or "Ivan (LNU)." At the beginning of the report, names should be written in the language of the prisoner, (If the English alphabet is not used by the enemy nation) followed by a transliteration which may be used thereafter in the report.

(6) Names of organizations. Special care must be taken with names of organizations, tactical units, agencies, bureaus, programs, and the like. It is essential that the users be provided with the exact name in the original language in order to avoid confusion in various translations by different individuals. Hence, unless it is the name of a widely known organization with a well established English translation, the full version of the name in the original language should be given in parentheses after its first mention.

(7) Coordinates. At tactical-level interrogations, it is often necessary to determine locations and be able to report these locations. Normally, the maps at that level will be of a large scale, either 1:50,000 or 1:25,000. Superimposed and keyed to the map projection will be a system of straight
lines representing a rectangular coordinate system, either the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system covering the area between 80°N and 80°S latitude, or the Universal Polar Stereographic (UPS) grid system covering the remaining areas at the north and south poles. In order to report locations using the grid coordinate system, the standard military practice of reading right and up is used. A reference consists of the easting or “right” reading and a northing or “up” reading. Usually, the numerical part of a point reference taken from a 100-meter grid is expressed in a 6-digit number; for example, 916091. To satisfy special needs, a numerical reference can be given to the nearest 10 meters and the nearest meter; for example 91620914 locates a point to the nearest 10 meters. When the grid interval on a particular map is 100,000 meters, the normal grid reference will consist of a 4-digit number, locating a position to the nearest 1,000 meters; for example, 9209, with the 9 and 0 representing estimated tenths between grid lines. The first time a place name appears in interrogation reports, its location should be firmly established by this grid coordinate system unless it is well known. These are often referred to by giving the place name and the grid reference under the military grid system. National and provincial capitals usually require no coordinates; however, all other towns and villages should be given a grid reference to distinguish between similar names given to lakes, passes, hills, and provinces.

h. Units of Measure. Normally, the metric system of measuring is to be used in recording sizes or weights. It is preferable to report the measure as given by the source (i.e., normally metric except in some oriental countries) rather than to attempt conversion. For the metric system, units of measure may be abbreviated as follows: 10mm, 20mm, 30mm, 10km, 10g, 20kg.

i. Gun Calibers. It is normal practice to quote foreign gun calibers in millimeters. For example, a small arms weapon is the “7.62mm SKS,” and a field piece is the “85mm gun” or the “122mm howitzer.” When the number of weapons is also given, it should be written as “12x 85mm guns.”

j. Unit Numerical Designations. Armies are to be referred to in Arabic numbers as 1st, 5th, etc; corps are designated in Roman numerals as II, V, etc; and divisions and all smaller units are recorded as 1st, 5th, etc. The unit designation should be repeated in full in each reference. “The above-mentioned unit,” “in source’s battalion,” or “the preceding regiment,” should be avoided. Neither should “3d Regiment” or “4th Division” be recorded when available information makes “3d Infantry Regiment” or “4th Armored Division” more exact.

k. Military and Paramilitary. “Military” applies to the army, navy, and air force. The use of “military” only for a foreign army should be avoided; it may be confusing. The term “paramilitary” refers to militarized and frequently uniformed organizations other than the army, navy, and air force. They are professedly nonmilitary, but formed as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization. These include frontier guards, labor troops, security troops, peoples’ police units, and the like.

73. Other Considerations

In reporting the results of an interrogation, the interrogator must insure that the report is an accurate and complete, yet concise, description of the information obtained. The interrogator will improve his reports if he observes the following points:

a. Manner of Acquiring Information. It should be clearly indicated in the report whether the subject saw, heard, read, or implied the information given to the interrogator together with the conditions under which he obtained the information or made the deduction. This can be accomplished by the interrogator’s insistence on exact dates, specific answers, examples or anecdotes to illustrate each general statement, and sketches to help identify equipment, locations or movements.
Much of the background material thus developed in the course of interrogation may not require verbatim reproduction in the report. Nevertheless, the grounds should be determined for each significant statement or expression of opinion, and the exact degree of the subject’s familiarity with each set of facts should be made clear. Following are some examples:

1. “While a supply sergeant at the Supply Depot in Hadong (Jul-Dec 66), subject handled supply request forms. He stated that by this means he knew of the arrival and storage of the following material: ____________”

2. “From Apr 66 until Nov 66, subject was Company Commander, B Company, 21st Regiment, 35th Mechanized Division. Unless otherwise indicated, all information was directly observed during this assignment.”

3. “While a sergeant in 1964–65, subject served as a draftsman in the directorate of operations of the general staff in Krakow. He remembers having drawn an overlay of what appeared to be a strategic plan, dated simply 1963. He believes that the circled objects were: __________. Units to be employed were: __________.”

4. “It was rumored in Lvov __________.”

5. “The subject was told by a driver of a vehicle in the convoy that __________.”

b. Accuracy of Detail. The interrogator should strive to record detailed and accurate information rather than a mass of information. For example, when a subject declares, “The 10th Rifle Regiment was at Pilsen from January through April 1966,” the following should be determined:

1. Was this the entire 10th Rifle Regiment?
2. Is Pilsen the traditional garrison area of the 10th Rifle Regiment?
3. Did some or all of the 10th Rifle Regiment leave Pilsen during the period January–April 1966?

C. Negative Information. The interrogator usually will be familiar with the available intelligence regarding a given area or location and will have access to reference materials to refresh his mind. If the subject shows himself to be well-informed on the activities, tactical units, etc., in an area but fails to mention something previously accepted as existing there, he should be specifically interrogated on this point. This must be done, however, without divulging classified information or intelligence. For example, he should not be asked, “What about the 11th Rifle Regiment, which is supposed to be in Pilsen?” Rather the question should be, “What other unit was in Pilsen?” The report should then read: “Subject could identify only the 10th Rifle Regiment in Pilsen and knew nothing of any other unit there.” Or perhaps: “Subject was positive that the 10th Rifle Regiment was the only unit in Pilsen; he thought, based on hearsay, that another unit may have previously been there, but if so, it must have left before he arrived in November 1965.”

d. New Information. Occasionally, completely new information, or information which is a radical departure from previously acquired data, is obtained. In this case, the report should show how certain the subject was that his information was correct. For example, a report might read: “An aggressor unit, estimated at 500 men, in army uniforms, shoulder board colors __________, with rifles, mortars, and submachine guns, arrived in Pilsen in early February, 1966 from the direction of Prague and remained in the barracks on the northeast edge of Pilsen until the time of the subject’s departure on 20 May 1966.” Here an explanatory statement might be added: “Subject was certain of this because he lived opposite the barracks and he saw that men and officers wore shoulder boards and caps different from those subject saw while serving in the army in 1954.”

e. Doubtful Information. Forced estimates are undesirable, but they are better than reporting “a big building,” or “an old bridge.” The subject certainly can be persuaded to state the size or age more precisely than “big” or “old” if only by comparing the structure in question with others of known size or age. Or he may be able to give upper and lower limits, as “at least 100 and not more than 200 meters long.” In any case, the report should clearly reflect the degree of doubt in the interrogator’s mind.
f. Vague Comparisons. When a report reads, “The initial training for antiaircraft troops is exactly the same as that for infantry,” the interrogator is using time which could be better spent in describing precisely some of the required features of antiaircraft training. Normally, generalized comparisons are misleading and inaccurate. As an obvious example, the statement, “The police uniform is the same as the army uniform,” overlooks numerous distinctions.

74. Evaluation

The system of evaluation and the evaluation scale given and explained in FM 30–5 will be applied as appropriate in the reports of interrogation. The interrogator primarily is concerned with the reliability of the source who is the subject of interrogation. Previous experience with a particular enemy, or with certain enemy units, may indicate that prisoners of war from such nations or certain units are generally reliable or, conversely, generally unreliable. The application of certain questioning techniques may assist in determining the probable veracity of the subject. Consideration of the conditions at the time a subject allegedly obtained his information, particularly whether such information could have been obtained under those conditions, is a good test of the apparent reliability of source. The interrogator must be objective and unbiased in his estimate of the subject’s reliability, and he must insure that his report includes any indications or conditions arising during an interrogation which may have a bearing on the reliability and credibility of a subject.

75. Applicable STANAGS

The material presented in this chapter agrees with applicable portions of STANAG 2022—Intelligence Reports and STANAG 2033 (SOLOG–69)—Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW).
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

FM 3-10 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents
FM 3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
FM 7-30 Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades
FM 17-1 Armor Operations
FM 17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units
FM 19-1 Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades
FM 19-2 Military Police Support in the Field Army
FM 19-30 Physical Security
FM 19-40 Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
FM 19-60 Confinement of Military Prisoners
FM 21-6 Techniques of Military Instruction
FM 21-26 Map Reading
FM 21-30 Military Symbols
FM 21-40 Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense
FM 21-41 Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare
FM 22-100 Military Leadership
FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare
FM 30-5 Combat Intelligence
FM 30-9 Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army
FM 30-10 Terrain Intelligence
FM 30-16 Technical Intelligence
FM 30-102 Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces
FM 30-103 Aggressor Order of Battle
FM 31-12 Army Forces in Amphibious Operations
FM 31-13 Battle Group Landing Team (Amphibious)
FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces
FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations
FM 31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces
FM 31-78 Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency
FM 33-1 Psychological Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine
FM 33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures
FM 41-5 Joint Manual of Civil Affairs
FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations
FM 57-100 The Airborne Division
FM 61-100 The Division
FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, Operations
(C) FM 100-20 Field Service Regulations, Stability Operations (U)
FM 101-5 Staff Officers Field Manual—Staff Organization and Procedures
FM 101-40 Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense
| AR 105–31 | Message Preparation          |
| AR 195–12 | Department of the Army Polygraph Activities |
| AR 320–5 | Dictionary of United States Army Terms |
| AR 320–50 | Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes |
| AR 340–15 | Correspondence |
| AR 380–5 | Safeguarding Defense Information |
| AR 600–20 | Army Command Policy and Procedure |
| AR 633–50 | Prisoners of War; Administration, Employment, and Compensation |
| ASubjScd 19–4 | Prisoner of War Operations |
| DA Pam 27–1 | Treaties Governing Land Warfare |
| DA Pam 27–161–1 | International Law, Volume I |
| DA Pam 108–1 | Index of Army Films, Transparencies, GTA Charts, and Recordings |
| DA Pam 310-Series | Military Publications Indexes (as applicable) |
| (S)DIAM 58–11 | Defense Intelligence Collection Operation Manual (U) |
| TC 3–16 | Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, and Herbicides in Counterguerrilla Operations |
| TOE 30–25 | Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army |
| TOE 30–27 | Military Intelligence Company, Interrogation |
| TOE 30–600 | Military Intelligence Organization |
| STANAG 2002 | Intelligence Reports |
| STANAG 2033 | Interrogations of Prisoners of War |
| STANAG 2084 | Handling and Reporting Enemy Documents |
| SOLOG 69 | Interrogations of Prisoners of War (IPW) |
APPENDIX B
INTERROGATION GUIDES

Example 1
(QUESTION GUIDE FOR SUPPORT OF TACTICAL INTERROGATIONS)

1. RIFLEMEN. Some of the specific topics on which a captured enemy rifleman may be questioned are—
   a. Identification of subject’s squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division.
   b. Organization, strength, weapons, and disposition of squad, platoon, and company.
   c. Location and strength of men and weapons at strong points, outposts, and observation posts in the subject’s immediate area.
   d. Mission of the subject immediately before capture, as well as mission of subject’s squad, platoon, and company.
   e. Location and description of defensive installations, such as missile sites, antitank ditches and emplacements, minefields, roadblocks, and barbed wire entanglements in subject’s area before capture. Description of weapons with which these locations are covered.
   f. Names and personality information of small unit commanders known to the prisoner.
   g. Possible identifications of support mortar, artillery, and armored units.
   h. Status of food, ammunition, and other supplies.
   i. Morale of troops.
   j. Casualties.
   k. Defensive and protective items of CBR equipment, status of CBR training, and defensive instructions; offensive capability for CBR operations.
   l. Status of immunizations; new shots, booster shots more frequently than normal.
   m. Stress on care and maintenance of CBR protective equipment.
   n. Issuance of new or different CBR protective equipment.
   o. Morale of civilians.
   p. Relocation or movement of civilians.
   q. Civilian supply.
   r. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

2. MESSENGERS. Messengers are frequently chosen on the basis of above average intelligence and the ability to observe well and to remember oral messages and instructions. Messengers who have an opportunity to travel about within the immediate combat zone, generally will have a good picture of the current situation, and are excellent prospects for tactical interrogation. The following topics should be included when questioning a messenger prisoner of war:
   a. The nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable period of time, as well as the names of persons who originated such messages and the names of persons to whom messages were directed. Description of duty positions of such personalities.
   b. Information as to the extent to which messengers are used in the applicable enemy unit; routes of messengers.
   c. Location of message centers and communication lines.
   d. Condition of roads, bridges, and alternate routes.
e. Location of command posts and the names of commanders and staff officers.
f. Location of artillery, mortars, and armor seen during messenger's movement through the combat area.
g. Location of minefields and other defensive installations.
h. Location of supply and ammunition dumps.
i. Description of terrain features behind the enemy's frontlines.
j. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, installations, and units.
k. Morale of civilians.
l. Relocation or movement of civilians.
m. Civilian supply.
n. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

3. SQUAD AND PLATOON LEADERS AND COMPANY COMMANDERS. Squad and platoon leaders, as well as company commanders, generally will possess information on a broader level than that discussed up to this point. In addition to the information possessed by the rifleman, they may be able to furnish information on the following subjects:

a. Plans and mission of their respective units.
b. Organization of their units as well as of their regiment and battalion.
c. Disposition of companies, regiments, and reserves of each.
d. Identifications and general organization of supporting units, such as artillery, armor, and engineer units.
e. Location, strength, and mission of heavy weapons units.
f. Offensive and defensive tactics of small units.
g. Quality and morale of subordinate troops.
h. Doctrine for employment of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
i. Doctrine for defense against chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
j. Status of CBR defense SOP; recent stress on their importance.
k. Recent stress on CBR training.

l. Issuance of CBR detection equipment and detector paints or paper.
m. Morale of civilians.
n. Relocation or movement of civilians.
o. Civilian supply.
p. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

4. RADIO AND TELEPHONE OPERATORS. Radio and telephone operators, like messengers, are frequently familiar with the plans and instructions of their commanders. In general, they can be expected to know the current military situation even more thoroughly because of the greater volume of information which they normally transmit. Topics to be covered when questioning communication personnel are—

a. Nature and exact contents of messages sent and received during a given tactical situation.
b. Code names or numbers of specific enemy units, such as those appearing in enemy telephone directories, and in other SOI items such as unit identification panel codes.
c. Major enemy units to our front and code names of such.
d. Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs and call words, and their operating frequencies.
e. Names and code names of commanders and their staff officers.
f. Types, numbers, and basic characteristics of radios and telephone equipment used at company, regiment, and division level.
g. Identification and locations of units occupying frontline positions.
h. Location of artillery and mortar positions.
i. Information on enemy codes and ciphers.

5. DRIVERS. Questions directed by the tactical interrogator to captured drivers should concern the aspects of the enemy situation which the prisoner would know because of his driving assignments. In dealing with PW drivers of command and staff vehicles, supply vehicles, and vehicles drawing weapons, the following topics should be examined:

a. Identification and location of command
posts of higher, lower, and supporting units.

b. Names and personal character traits of commanders and staff officers.

c. Plans, instructions, and orders over-heard in conversations between commanders and staff officers.

d. Attitudes of commanders and staff officers toward each other, toward civilians, units under their command, and toward the general military situation.

e. Routes of communication and their condition.

f. Tactical doctrines of commanders.

g. Command and staff organization.

h. Supply routes and road conditions.

i. Location of supply points and types of military and civilian supplies.

j. Sufficiency or lack of both civilian and military supplies.

k. Types, numbers, and conditions of supply-carrying vehicles—military and civilian.

l. Location of artillery and mortar positions.

m. Troop movements and troop assembly areas.

n. Location of truck parks and motor pools.

o. Location of AT and ADA positions.

p. Organization of AT and ADA units, weapons, and strength.

q. Names of commanders of AT and ADA units.

r. Mission of AT and ADA units.

s. Types and status of ammunition.

t. Voluntary or forced evacuation or movement of civilians.

u. Morale and health of civilians.

6. PATROL LEADERS AND PATROL MEMBERS. The degree of patrol activity on the part of the enemy is often a good indication of enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrol leaders and members of enemy patrols upon their capture include—

a. Specific missions of the patrol.

b. Exact routes used and time of departure and return of patrol.

c. Location of enemy FEBA, GOP, COP, and outposts.

d. Location of platoon, company, regiment, or division headquarters.

e. Routes of approach and enemy positions.

f. Enemy strongpoints and fields of fire.

g. Machinegun and mortar positions of the enemy.

h. Observation posts and listening posts.

i. Condition of bridges and location of fords.

j. Description of key terrain features.

k. Location and description of defensive positions such as AT weapons, roadblocks, mines, barbed wire entanglements, gaps in wire and safe lines, trip flares, boobytraps, tank traps, and ambushes.

l. Other reconnaissance objectives, agencies, and patrols.

m. Organization and equipment of tactical reconnaissance agencies in regiments and division.

n. Passwords and countersigns of patrols and line units.

o. Patrol communication system; range of radios.

p. Names of commanders, staff officers, and particularly of intelligence officers of PW unit.

q. Coordination of patrol activities with other units such as rifle companies, mortar units, and artillery units.

r. Morale of civilians.

s. Relocation or movement of civilians.

t. Civilian supply.

u. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

7. MEMBERS OF MACHINEGUN AND MORTAR UNITS. Members of machinegun and mortar units can be expected to know, on the basis of their experience or observation, the following:

a. Location of their own, as well as other machinegun and mortar positions and projected alternate positions.

b. Organization, strength, casualties, and weapons of the prisoner's unit.

c. Targets for machineguns and mortars.

d. Names of small unit leaders.
e. Disposition of small rifle units, squads, and platoons.

f. Supply of ammunition to include type of ammunition in the basic load or on hand—Example: CB ammunition.

g. Location of forward ammunition points.

h. Characteristics of weapons used.

i. Food and other supplies.

j. Morale.

k. Effect of our own firepower upon their positions.

l. Availability of nuclear capability.

8. LIAISON OFFICERS. The liaison officer is the commander's agent for accomplishing coordination among the headquarters of lower, adjacent, and higher units. The liaison officer also may be called upon to effect coordination between infantry units and supporting or supported armor and artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units. Topics to be covered when questioning a captured liaison officer are as follows:

a. Location of lower, adjacent, higher, and supporting unit command posts, as well as of supply and communications installations.

b. Location of observation posts and outposts.

c. Assembly areas for troops and supplies.

d. Contents of field orders, such as composition of attacking forces; location and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans for attack, defense, or withdrawal; and plans for communication and coordination among units.

e. Disposition of regiments, battalions, and companies of a division.

f. Identification and disposition of reserves.

g. Status of supplies of all types.

h. Civilian social and economic conditions.

i. Evacuation or movement of civilians.

9. ARMORED TROOPS.

a. Unit identifications.

b. Designation and strength of supporting or supported infantry units.

c. Types and characteristics of tanks employed.

d. Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of such tanks.

e. Means of communication between tanks and between tanks and infantry.

f. Missions and objectives.

g. Routes of approach.

h. Armored units in reserve.

i. Location of tank parks and assembly areas.

j. Location of impassable terrain features.

k. Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank coordination.

l. Location of tank repair depots and POL dumps (to include resupply and refueling techniques).

m. Effect of weather on tank operations.

n. Armored reconnaissance missions.

o. Morale of civilians.

p. Relocation or movement of civilians.

q. Civilian supply.

r. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

s. Status of ammunition and POL resupply.

10. ARTILLERYMEN.

a. Forward Observers. Topics for interrogation of forward observers include—

(1) Location, organization, number of guns of the battery or battalion whose fire the subject was observing and directing.

(2) Location of frontlines, outposts, and observation posts.

(3) Location of alternate observation posts.

(4) Location and probable time of occupation of present or alternate gun positions.

(5) Deployment of artillery.

(6) Characteristics of guns, caliber and range.

(7) Targets for the various types of fire during different phases of combat.

(8) Nature of the infantry-artillery communications net.

(9) Type and location of artillery fire requested by infantry units.

(10) Identification of corps or other supporting artillery units.

(11) Plan of attack, defense, or withdrawal of enemy units.
(12) Methods of coordinating artillery fire with infantry maneuver.

(13) Mission and objectives of subject's unit, as well as of supported units.


(15) Methods of observing and directing artillery fire, including information such as types of aircraft employed in this function.

(16) Methods of counterbattery fire; methods of protecting enemy positions from counterbattery fire.

(17) Use and location of dummy artillery positions.

(18) Types of artillery ammunition used for various targets. New types of ammunition. Conservation of fires and reasons for conservation.

(19) Location of artillery and infantry unit command posts.

(20) Trafficability of routes appropriate for movement of heavy artillery.

(21) Names of commanders, staff officers, and their attitudes toward each other and toward infantry commanders.

(22) Effect of our own artillery upon the enemy units.

(23) Location and numbering of defensive concentrations.

(24) Location of ammunition supply points.

(25) Radio channels used for fire control nets.

(26) Identification and location of supporting battalions.

(27) Availability of nuclear fire support.

(28) Morale of civilians.

(29) Relocation or movement of civilians.

(30) Civilian supply.

(31) Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

b. Artillery Firing Battery Personnel. Interrogation of a subject from a firing battery should cover the following topics:

(1) Measures of defense against our own artillery fire.

(2) Counterbattery protection for artillery installations.

(3) Effect of our counterbattery fire.

(4) Location of battery ammunition points.

(5) Disposition of local security weapons.

(6) Direction and elevation of fire.

(7) Instructions concerning the use of ammunition.

(8) Names of battery and other commanders.

(9) Detailed description of artillery weapons used.

(10) Information on food supplies and morale of military and civilians.

(11) Measures for defense against chemical, biological, and nuclear attack.

(12) Types and amount of ammunition, to include chemical and nuclear ammunition, in the basic load or on hand.

(13) Location of CB ammunitions.

(14) Location of targets marked for CB fires.

c. Air Defense Artillerymen. Interrogations of a subject from an air defense unit should cover the following:

(1) Location and number of air defense weapons.

(2) Detailed description and characteristics of air defense guns and missiles used.

(3) Shape, size, and location of ground radars.

(4) Organization of air defense units.

(5) Types of areas defended.

(6) Nuclear capability.

(7) Methods of attack against our aircraft, by type of aircraft.

(8) Avenues of approach and altitudes most and least advantageous to enemy air defense.

(9) Methods of identifying unknown aircraft.

11. MEDICAL CORPSMEN. Although medical personnel are entitled to special protective measures under the provisions of international agreements, they can be, and are, interrogated without infringement of any existing laws or rules of warfare. Topics to be covered when interrogating enemy medical corps personnel include—

a. Number of casualties over a given period of time or during a given phase of combat operations.

b. Weapons accounting for most casualties.
c. Key personnel who have become casualties.

d. Conditions of health and sanitation in enemy units.

e. Ratio of dead to wounded.

f. Commander's tactics in relation to the number of casualties.

g. Adequacy and efficiency of casualty evacuation.

h. Weapons most feared by the enemy.

i. Location and staffing of aid stations and hospitals.

j. Organization of division, regiment, and battalion medical units.

k. Status and types of medical supplies.

l. Use and characteristics of newly developed medicines or drugs.

m. Data on our own wounded, sick, or dead in the hands of the enemy.

n. Skill of enemy medical personnel.

o. Information on mass sickness or epidemics in the enemy forces.

p. Types of treatment and medication for chemical, biological, and radiological casualties.

q. Supply and availability of materials used in the treatment of CBR casualties.

r. Special training or treatment of CBR casualties.

s. New or recent immunizations.

t. Morale of civilians.

u. Relocation or movement of civilians.

v. Civilian supply.

w. Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

13. RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS. Topics for interrogation of captured reconnaissance troops include—

a. Identification, organization, composition, strength, and weapons of the unit.

b. The reconnaissance plan, march order, time schedule, and specific missions of all elements, means of coordination and communication between elements, and the unit headquarters and higher headquarters.

c. Routes of approach used by the unit.

d. Nature of orders received from higher headquarters.

e. Identification, composition, organization, strength, and disposition of the main body of troops and reinforcements. Routes to be used.
f. General quality of troops of the reconnaissance unit and of the main body.

g. Radio communication equipment and frequencies used.

14. LOCAL CIVILIANS. Civilians who have recently left enemy-held areas normally have important information and often give this information readily. This information is usually of particular importance to the civil affairs personnel of the unit. The following topics should be included when questioning local civilians:

a. Location of enemy frontlines and major defensive positions.

b. Location of artillery positions.

c. Location and nature of minefields in enemy rear area.

d. Description of key terrain.

e. Condition of roads, bridges, and major buildings.

f. Enemy policy and attitude toward local civilians.

g. Human and material resources of the area.

h. Morale of local civilians.

i. Data on important civilian personalities remaining in enemy area.

j. Health and medical status of local populace.

k. Effect of our own operations on civilian populace.

l. Instructions to prepare for defensive measures against CBR attack.

m. Recent immunizations.

Example 2

(QUESTION GUIDE FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (RADIOLOGICAL) (CBR) WARFARE)

1. What items of CBR protective equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Is there any differentiation in issue of items for particular areas? If so, what items for what areas?

2. Are there any new or recent immunizations indicated by prisoners during interrogations?

3. What immunizations have enemy troop units received, as indicated in captured immunization records?

4. Are enemy troops equipped with protective masks? Is the individual required to carry the mask on his person? Are there any sectors where the mask is not required equipment for the individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask?

5. Is protective clothing issued to enemy troops? If so, what type of clothing or articles? If special clothing is issued, is it for any particular area?

6. Have enemy troop units constructed CBR protective shelters? If so, what type?

7. Are enemy fortifications, individual and collective, provided with overhead cover?

8. Are enemy troops issued any protective footwear or other means to provide protection against penetration by liquid agents?

9. Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles provided with specially installed protective equipment to protect the crew in case of chemical attack?

10. Are enemy troops issued protective items such as atropine, antidotes, protective ointment, and so forth, for first aid?

11. Are there any areas for which additional or unusual CBR safety precautions have been established?

12. What is the size and composition of enemy CBR specialist troop units? What is their disposition?

13. Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions relative to consumption of food and water or handling of livestock in areas that may be overrun by enemy forces?

14. What training, if any, have enemy troops received in the use of incapacitating type agents and their dissemination?
15. What items of chemical detection equipment have been issued to enemy troops? Are the items operated constantly, irregularly, or not at all? Is there any differentiation made regarding their use in certain areas?

16. What type of radiac instruments are issued to enemy troop units and what is their range or limit? How are they distributed?

17. How many hours of training with radiac instruments have enemy monitoring and survey personnel received?

18. How many hours of CBR training have enemy troops received? How many hours training are devoted individually to chemical, biological, and radiological operations? Have enemy troops received any special or accelerated training as opposed to what is considered routine?

19. Do enemy units have decontamination materials on hand? If so, what type and in what quantity?

20. Have prisoners observed decontamination stations or installations established in enemy areas? If so, what is their location and composition?

21. Are enemy troop units issued biological sampling kits or devices? If so, what is their type and/or composition?

22. Have prisoners had occasion to observe any cylinders or containers which might contain bulk chemical agents?

23. Have prisoners observed any tactical aircraft equipped with accessory tanks which indicate a spray capability?

24. Are prisoners aware of location of dumps of chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and/or bulk chemical agents?

25. Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket units have chemical ammunition on hand?

26. At what radiological exposure or dose are troops required to relocate?

27. Are there any problem areas or shortcomings in CBR materiel?

28. The following EEI are applicable for internal defense operations in appropriate theaters of operations, such as Southeast Asia (Vietnam):

   a. What types of tunnels and caves and/or modifications are used in defense against riot control agents and explosive gases?

   b. What defensive material and instructions are issued for defense against riot control agents?

   c. What defensive measures are taken against defoliation and anticrop agents?
APPENDIX C

SAMPLE PW INTERROGATION REPORTS

1. Appendix C provides examples of the following IPW reports:
   a. Spot Report
   b. Tactical Interrogation Report
   c. Individual Interrogation Report
   d. Format for Consolidated Interrogation Report
   e. Insurgent Forces Interrogation Report

2. Applicable STANAGS:
   The material presented in this appendix agrees with applicable portions of STANAG 2022, Intelligence Reports, and STANAG 2033 (SOLOG–69), Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW).

SAMPLE SPOT REPORT

(SUGGEST FORMAT)

(CLASSIFICATION)

SPOT REPORT

Report No. 1

TO: S2, 1st Bde, 20th Inf Div

1. WHAT: Attack

2. WHO: Aggressor 5th Mech Regt, 85th Mech Div

3. WHERE: (NA288044), Wertheim, Scale 1:50,000

4. WHEN: 151600 May 6


6. REPORTED BY: Two PW from 2d Co, 1st Bn, 5th Mech Regt.

7. RELIABILITY: C–2

8. REMARKS: Captured from 2d Co, 1st Bn, 5th Mech Regt at 120600 July 6. PW stated unit was issued extra ammo and rations.

/s/ Sp6 Jones—Interrogator
1st Intg Team

(CLASSIFICATION)
FORMAT FOR CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT
(CLASSIFICATION)

_________________________ INTG Team

Unit _______________________

Location ____________________

Date/Time—FROM ____________

TO _________________________

Consolidated Interrogation Report No ____________
Maps __________________________________________

PART I:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Circumstances of Capture</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART II:

2. ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, and DISPOSITION.

3. MISSION.

4. OTHER ENEMY FORCES.

5. SUPPLY, LOSSES, and REPLACEMENTS.

6. PERSONALITIES. (Name, Rank, Organization, Duties and Characteristics)

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

8. REMARKS: List here individual assessments of PW and recommendations for further interrogation, if applicable.

/s/ Signature of Interrogator

_________________________ INTG Team

(CLASSIFICATION)
SAMPLE TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT
(CLASSIFICATION)

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Report No. 3 Cy No 4 Date/Time 160900 June 66
INTG Unit 3d MI Det, 20th Inf Div Janz, J.P.
Attached to Interrogator
Maps Used FRANCE: 1:50,000; Sheet XXXIV-13-Metz
Language Used Polish

PART 1: INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF PW

RANK SGT SCHLUGA, Josef 856943
Full Name Service Number
DOB 10 Dec 41 BIRTHPLACE Warsaw, POLAND NATIONALITY Polish
LANGUAGES Polish-Fluent; German-Poor
Proficiency
UNIT 2d Plt, 1st Co, 2d Bn, 189th Mech Regt, 72d Mech Div
CAPTURE 160500 Jun 6 Fort Champagne KV990472
Date/Time Place (Including Coordinates)
Ambushed by friendly patrol
Circumstances
CAREER (Pre-Military) Student 1948—56 Carpenter 1956—59
MILITARY CAREER Conscripted Sep 59—Regt’l NCO School 62—Sqd Ldr 63
ASSESSMENT Fairly bright Good Good C-3
Intelligence Experience Cooperation Reliability
SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE None
DOCUMENTS Soldier’s Paybook None
Carried at Time of Capture Money/Valuables
EQUIPMENT Submachine gun
(Of Intelligence Interest) Personal Equipment Wpns

PART II: INFORMATION OBTAINED

1st Co is right flank unit of 189th Mech Regt. 1st Co on line KVO-33498–KVO36488. When captured source was leading reconnaissance patrol. Source believes his unit will remain on the defensive for the next few days because none of the usual preparations preceding an attack have been made recently.

PART III: REMARKS

PW appeared to be sincere in his answers. He is not recommended for further interrogation.
SAMPLE INDIVIDUAL INTERROGATION REPORT

(CLASSIFICATION)

INTG Team
Unit 3d Bde, US 20 Inf Div
Location Bruville, FRANCE (KU7646)
Date/Time 020800 Jun

Individual Interrogation Report No. 2
Maps: FRANCE: 1:50,000, AMS Series M761
Sheet #XXXIII—12—Metz Sheet #XXXIII—13—Chambley
#XXXIV—12—Brigue #XXXIV—13—Ukance

Part I:

1. RANK: Senior Private NAME: KURTZ, Franz SERIAL NO: 16584
UNIT: Hq, 2d Provisional Battalion, Fortress Francois De Guise

ASSESSMENT: (Intelligence, Experience, Reliability)
PW is not too intelligent and has limited education (8 grades). Raised on a farm, he has been trained and utilized as a truckdriver in Aggressor Army. Can give limited tactical information on Prov Fortress units around Metz and about routes of communications. Probably reliable.

CATEGORY (A, B, C, D)

DOCUMENTS: (of intelligence interest)
None

EQUIPMENT: (of intelligence interest)
None

2. ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, AND DISPOSITION:
   a. Organization: 2d Prov Bn, Fortress De Guise is organized into 3 Co's. No standard TOE. Luber Co has 3 platoons, each platoon has 3 squads of 8 men each.

   b. Strength: Personnel:

       Fortress De Guise Prov Bn has 300 men.
       Luber Co has 72 men. Wpns Luber Co has 3xUS HMG w/10 boxes of ammo and 3xUS 81mm mortars, ea w/100 rounds.

   c. Disposition: Luber Co was deployed on a line from coord KV693721 southwest to coord KV690716, on the right flank of the 2d Prov Fortress Bn line. There were 2 other Co of the 2d Prov Bn on line to the left of Luber Co.
3. MISSION:
   a. PW: To defend his position against attack.
   b. Luber Co, 2d Prov Bn: To defend against attack on Bn line.

4. OTHER ENEMY FORCES:
   No information.

5. SUPPLY, LOSSES, AND REPLACEMENTS:
   a. Supply: Supply routes run back through Metz (VR3431) to East along the Montoy Flanville Road (TR329994). Supplies of food and ammo built up to a high level over the past 4 days. Supplies sufficient to enable enemy to hold fort.
   b. Losses: No knowledge.
   c. Replacements: No knowledge.

6. PERSONALITIES: (Name, Rank, Organization, Duties and Characteristics)
   LUBER, fnu CPT Luber Co, 2d Prov Bn, Co—very military (Prussian) in manner.
   SUAREZ, fnu Comdt 2d Prov Bn, Co—chain smokes cigarettes.

7. MISCELLANEOUS:
   a. Morale: Not good. Luber Co men now have a defeatist attitude.
   b. Tactics: 2d Prov Bn will defend, using existing forts and prepared defense positions.
   c. Obstacles: No knowledge.
   d. Other Information: PW knows there is a large QM depot “somewhere in the north,” approx 200 km distant.

8. REMARKS:
   PW not recommended for further interrogation.
SAMPLE INSURGENT FORCES INTERROGATION REPORT

(CLASSIFICATION)

INTERROGATOR: JONES, J. P.
INTERROGATION ELEMENT: (name-place-coordinates) 93d INTG Team Thanh Hoa Village (CR018429)
DATE/TIME 170930 Jun 6
MAPS USED: INDOCHINA, 1:50,000, Binh Dinh, Sheet 68521V

INSURGENT FORCES INTERROGATION REPORT

Source Control No 1

1. PERSONAL DATA:

Name NGUYEN VAN THIEU Cover and/or Party Name None
Date & Place of Birth February 1936, Duong Thien Village, Binh Dinh District
Residence (Hamlet, Village, Town, District, Province) Same as above
Education None ( ) Elementary (X) Junior High School ( )
High School ( ) Other ( ) (Specify) 4 years
Ethnic Origin/Tribe Vietnamese Social Class Farmer
Profession Farmer Political Affiliation None
Parents: Father DANH VAN THAN Living (X) Dead ( )
Address Duong Thien Village
Mother LAM THI NGUYEN Living, ( ) Dead (X)
Binh Dinh District
Relatives Working for the Enemy None
(Name-address)
Relatives Working for the Allies Cousin—THUONG VAN THUONG
(name-address) forces—address unknown
Popular
Marital Status/Address of Spouse Single

Children None
Source Classification: Captive (X) Returnee ( ) Suspect ( ) Criminal ( )
Important Captive/Returnee ( ) Other

Position/Rank-Assignment Sgt/Supply Sgt/Binh Dinh Dist Co., Binh Dinh Prov
Captured/Rallied (Date) 170900 Jun (Place-Coordinates) Dai Loi Village
(BR999444)
Binh Dinh District, Binh Dinh Province
Capturing Unit/Rallied To Patrol, 2d Co, 3d Bn, 93d ARVN Regt
Circumstances of Capture/Rallying Captured after his companion fired on Patrol—companion was shot and killed—captive was captured.
Documents Seized w/Source None/Currency—470 piastres
Equipment/Weapons Seized w/Source 9mm home-made pistol—15 kilo
dried shrimp, 10 bottles fish sauce.
2. SCREENING FOR INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL IN OTHER AREAS:
Source has information falling into the area of:

- Strategic Information ( )
- Technical Information (X)
- Counterintelligence ( )
- Cryptographic ( )
- Civic Action ( )
- Political ( )
- Others (Specify) ( )

Area(s) of knowledgeability (describe briefly): Source has information on VC supply procedures and a COSVN QM School in War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province.

3. REMARKS, SOURCE EVALUATION & RECOMMENDATIONS:
(The interrogator should give his evaluation as to source's intelligence, reliability, cooperation, and include any additional information which will help in the evaluation of this report.)
The interrogator feels that the source is a fairly intelligent individual. It is believed that he was truthful to the best of his knowledge. It is recommended that he be evacuated to division for more detailed interrogation, particularly on QM subjects.

4. PRIORITY INFORMATION:
(Planned operations, including sabotage and terrorism, in the very near future; activation of new units; arrival of units in area of operations; new military/political doctrine and programs; EEI of local commanders; etc.)
The Binh Dinh District Co was recently expanded to three platoons by recruiting personnel from the Village Guerrilla units. The mission of the Binh Dinh District Co is to harass ARVN, PF, and FR in the district—to collect rice for main force units and to bring the company up to full strength.

5. INFORMATION:
(Organization, strength, disposition, mission, other forces, supply, losses, replacements, personalities, morale, tactics, obstacles, food/ammo/weapons, depots, bases, communications lines, agents, political action and organization, infiltration, sabotage, terrorism, miscellaneous, etc.) (Present information in the general order indicated above—USE ADDITIONAL BLANK SHEETS FOR CONTINUATION)

a. Organization:
(1) The Binh Dinh District Co (C-7) was organized as follows:
Co Hq—1st, 2d, and 3d Plt, each consisting of three squads, which were further subdivided into cells of three men each (when available). The Co Hq consisted of headquarters personnel and a four-man Recon/Intelligence Section.
(2) The Binh Dinh District Co (C-7) was subordinate to the Binh Dinh District Military Affairs Committee, which in turn was subordinate to the Binh Dinh District (Party) Committee.

b. Strength:
The Binh Dinh District Co has a total strength of 80 men. The 1st Plat consists of 27 men, armed with 1x45cal pistol; 15xUS M-1 rifles; 7xK-50 SMG; 1x60mm mortar, and 1xBAR. The 2d Plat consists of 27 men, armed with 10xK-50 SMG; 12xMAT-34 rifles; 2xBAR; 1x60mm mortar. The 3d Plat consists of 19 men,
armed with 10xMAT-34 rifles; 5x home-made shotguns; and 2xUS M-1 rifles. The company headquarters is composed of two officers and one sgt (Source), and a four-man Recon/Intel Section. No other information known.

c. Disposition:
   (1) CP Binh Dinh District Co & Binh Dinh District Military Affairs Committee at CR026379.
   (2) Alternate for above vic 600-700m W of Thanh Ha Village, vic CR098477.
   (3) 2d & 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Binh Dinh District Co, vic CR098477.
   (4) 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, Binh Dinh District Co, vic CR056473.
   (5) 1st Plat, Binh Dinh District Co deployed around Co CP.
   (6) 3d Plat, Binh Dinh District Co located vic BR997480.
   (7) OP, 3d Plt, Binh Dinh District Co located vic CR007473.
   (8) OP, 1st Plt, Binh Dinh District Co located vic CR026469.
   (9) District hospital and aid station located vic CR056479 (consists of two large huts).
   (10) Binh Dinh District (Party) Committee, located vic CR088478.
   (11) Binh Dinh District Co Depot located vic CR022483.
   (12) Binh Dinh District Co emergency Rice Depot located approx 1000m SW of 2d Plat.

d. Mission: The mission of the Binh Dinh District Co was:
   (1) Harass ARVN, PF, and RF forces.
   (2) Collect rice for main force units.
   (3) Train personnel in order to bring company up to strength.

e. Supply: The company had adequate supplies. Stored in the depot located at CR022483 were 3000 kilo of rice, 8000 rounds of small arms ammo, 55 rounds of 60mm mortar ammo, and equipment assigned to the Recon/Intel Section. Located in an emergency rice depot, mentioned in para 5c(11) were 750 kilo of rice. Captured during the attack against the police post were 18 carbines.

f. Personalities:
   (1) ANH NGUYEN, Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, Binh Dinh District Co.
   (2) NGUYEN VAN SUU (Ethnic South Vietnamese), Plat Ldr, 2d Plat, Binh Dinh District Co.
   (3) HAI THANH VAN, Binh Dinh District CO & Chief, Binh Dinh District Military Affairs Committee (North Vietnamese).
   (4) LAM VAN DUONG, Polit Off & Paymaster, Binh Dinh District Co.
   (5) NAM THI, Chief, Recon/Intel Section.

 g. Morale: The morale was good in the Binh Dinh District Co, especially after the successful attack against the police post.

h. Agents: Source stated that the Binh Dinh District Co had advance informers in the following villages:
   Dai Loi (BR0044), Chanh Dai (CR0543), and Phuong Phi (CR1042)

i. Miscellaneous:
   (1) The letter box number of the Binh Dinh District Co was 422a, and code designation of the company was C-7.
   (2) Source referred to the 1st Plt, Binh Dinh District Co as B1.
APPENDIX D

ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons.

(a) violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

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Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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